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HISTORY 



OF ISE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 



• 
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK 



OF 



THUCYDIDES. 



BY WILLIAM SMITH, A. M. 

EBCTOR or TBS BOLT TRimTY IN CHBSTBRf AMD CHAPLAIN TO THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF DERBY. 



A NSW EDITION. COKRECTED AND BEVISED. 






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THE LIFEAND WR^IT X'N G » 

OF 

DR SMIT-H, 

BY THE REV. THOMAS CRANE OP CHteSlTelfl. 



William Smixh, son of the Rev. Richard Smith, Rector of the church of all Saints, 
and Minister of St Andrews, in the city of Worcester, was born in the parish of St 
Peter's Church in that city, on the 30th day of May, in^he^ye'^r 1711. He was educated 
in grammar-learning at the College-School in his native cfty, where he made great 
proficiency in his studies. In January 1725-8, it pleased GcJd to deprive Him <rf his 
father. On the 27th day of November, 1728, he was matriculated at-Wfew^ Colftge ill 
Oxford ; where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, in June, 1732 ; and tVat of 
Master, in July, 1737. 

Soon after he had taken his bachelor -s degree, his merit caused him to be recom- 
mended to the Right Hon. James Earl of Derby, that great patron of arts and sciences : 
and he was retained three years in his lordship's house, lA the office of Reader to hid 
lordship. His connections withmy lord of D^by intl*6d JcMdhim to the honour of "being 
known to several other persons of fbrtune and quality ; Whfcii Vas of singular service to 
kirn in his progress through life. 

A gentleman by birth, blessed with an excellent capacity and education, and having 
ready and easy intercourse with the great and good, it is no wonder that he was adorned 
with manners most polite, with literary accomplishments most splendid and solid, and 
with morals becoming a faithful servant of the holy Jesus. Well qualified for the work 
of the ministry, he took deacon's orders at Grosvenor Chapel in Westminster, on 
Sunday the first of June, 1735, from Benjamin, Bishop* oif "XV'in Chester. On the 10th 
of September following, he was presented by his patron, JSimes fearl of Derby, to the 
Rectory of Trinity Church in Chester. On the 14th of the same month he took priest's 
orders in the Cathedral Church of Chester, from SamUel, the bishop of that See : was 
instituted the same day, and inducted the next.' 

Mr Smith's first publication was* " Dioriysiuslionginus on the sublime ; translated 
from the Greek, with Notes and Observations, and some Account of the Life, Writings 
and Character of the Author t '^ in one volume 8vo. ; inscribed to the Right Hon. the 

*Tho fourth is the best edition of Longinue. The Dean corrected two copies of the third 
edition; the one for the printer to follow, the other for himself to keep; the Dean's copy I 
possess. I showed the Dean Mr Toup's criticism of his translation. The Dean, knowing Toup 
to be in the wrong, thought him not worth answering : be said, **I followed Pearce, and Pearce 
is the best. I shall take no notice of Toup." The frontispiece to Longinus describes the power 
of eloquence : it was delineated, not by a professed limner, but by Dr Wall of Worcester, an 
eminent physician. 



iv LIFE OF DR SMITH. 

Earl of Macclesfield. The anonymous author of « the History of the Works of the 
Learned," for May, 1739, says of this work :— *« The Translation of Longinus is, accord- 
ing to the most impartial judgment I can frame of it, after a comparison with others, 
the most elegant version that has been made of that author into the English tongue. 
The Preliminary Discourse excels that of the celebrated Boileau, which he has prefixed 
to his edition." Father Philips in " A Letter to a Student at a foreign University," 
published 1756, recommending, among other books, Longinus on the sublime, says : — 
** A late English translation of the Greek critic, with notes and observations by Mr 
Smith, is a credit to the author, and reflects lustre on Longinus himself As conver- 
sant as you are in the original language, you cannot but be highly pleased with this 
performance." . In the " Weekly Miscellany," by Richard Hooker, of the Temple, Esq. 
No. 363, dated Saturday, December 8, 1739, we read : — Mr Smith, Rector of Trinity in 
Chester, "justly deserves the notice and thanks of the public for his version of Lon- 
ginus on the sublime. Though the learned will not be satisfied without tasting the 
beauties of the original, which cannot be translated in all their perfection, yet they 
may reap benefit and pleasure from the judicious sentiments and ingenuity of the 
Translator, in his account of his author, and from the notes which help to illustrate the 
text, and discover the excellency of the rules. To the unlearned also it may be of use, 
and give pleasure. It will enable him to read with more satisfaction, when he can 
read with more judgment, and distinguish the perfections and faults of a writer. He 
will be the better able to bear his part in a rational conversation, and appear with cred- 
it, when his observations are just and natural. Such compositions, while they form 
the understanding to a true taste, kindle an inclination to literature, and excite an 
emulation in mankind to distinguish themselves by such excellencies as distinguish 
men from brutes. Athens and Rome were even the glory of the whole world, when 
they were the universities of the whole world ; and those were reckoned the most ac- 
complished gentlemen, who were the greatest scholars, the deepest philosophers, the 
most eloquent orators, and the best moralists. England — would I could go on with- 
out reproaching my country." Mr Hooker sent a copy of his Miscellany to Mr Smith 
with the following letter : 

« Rev. Sir, 

" Though I have not the happiness of being known to you, yet as I perceive, 
by your public writings, that you are a gentleman of learning and parts, I take the 
liberty of desiring your assistance in the public design * committed to my care. 
Though it is the common concern of every one who wishes well to religion and the 
Church of England, yet I find the observation strictly verified, that what is every body's 
business is nobody's business ; and whilst it is generally presumed that I have a great 
deal of help, I have in fact little or none, though I stand much in need of it. I hope 
you will excuse the notice I have taken of you in my paper. In hopes of your cor- 
respondence, I am, Sir, with respect, your very humble servant, R. HOOKER." 

On a state fast, the 4th of February, 1740, our Author preached in Trinity Church on 
Prov. xiv. 34. " Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." 
This sermon was printed at the request of his parishioners, and inscribed to them. The 
Right Hon. Edward Earl of Derby had succeeded that nobleman who presented Mr 
Smith to Trinity Church : but Mr Smith still Continued to be esteemed at Enowsley 

* Mr Smith did not comply with this request respecting the Weekly Miscellany. 



LIFE OF DR SMITH. v 

notwithstanding Enoweley had changed its master. He, who had been long considered 
as the Earl of Derby's Chaplain, was constituted in form, by letters patent, the 2d day 
of August, 1743. On the 31st of July, 1746, our Author preached an Assize-Sermon at 
Lancaster, on St John viii. 32. << Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
you free." This Sermon is inscribed to the High Sheriflf and grand Jury, being " pub- 
lished at their command." 

In the year 1748, the Grammar-school of Brentwood, in the parish of South Weald, 
in the county of Essex, being vacant, was suffered by Lord and Lady Strange to 
lapse to the Bishop of London, who, at their recommendation, appointed Mr Smith 
schoolmaster there for life, by letters patent bearing date 15th day of February, and by 
license dated the 17th of the same month. He held this school only one year, as he 
did in no wise relish the laborious life of a schoolmaster. On the 8th of June, 1753, 
he was licensed as one of the ministers of St George's Church in Liverpool, on the 
nomination of the corporation there. 

In the year 1753, Mr Smith published in two volumes 4to. dedicated to his Royal 
Highness the Prince of Wales, ** The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated 
from the Greek of Thucydides." The Translator has added three Preliminary Discour- 
ses : on the Life of Thucydides ; on his Qualifications as an historian ; and a Survey of 
his History. In these discourses, as well as in the life of Longinus, he has abundantly 
proved his own excellence in original composition. This work has been several times 
reprinted in 8vo. and was highly recommended by the reviewers and others on its first 
publication, and since that period. 

In January, 1758, the Deanry of Chester became vacant by the decease of the Rev. 
Thomas Brooke, LL. D. There were many candidates for this dignity : But Mr Smith 
was so w^ell supported by several of his illustrious friends, especially by his noble patron 
the Earl of Derby, whose interest was powerful at Court, and who prevailed on the 
Right Hon. Earl Granville, then Lord President of the Council, and on his Grace the 
Duke of Newcastle, to unite with him in recommending Mr Smith; that his Majesty 
King George the Second presented him to the Deanry. He now took the degree of Dr 
in Divinity. On the 28th of July, Dr Smith received institution, and was installed the 
same day by thatlearned and accomplished preacher, the Rev. Mr Mapletoft, Vice-dean, 
On the 30th day of April, 1766 the Dean was instituted to the Rectory of Handly near 
Chester, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter. 

Dr Smith had, since he left the University, if we except short excursions, chiefly re- 
sided first with my Lord of Derby, afterwards at the Rectory of Trinity in Chester, 
then one year in Essex, and of late at St George's in Liverpool, from whence he went 
occasionally to Chester Cathedral. But about the beginning of the year 1767, he re- 
solved to resign St George's Church, and wrote a letter to that effect to the body cor- 
porate ; which letter produced the following resolution : — 

" At a council held this fourth day of February, 1767. 

" On Mr Dean Smith's Letter this day to the Council, intimating his desire of resign- 
ing his Chaplainship of St George's Church into the hands of the common council; 
therefore it is ordered, that this council do immediately after such his resignation make 
him a compliment of one hundred and fifty guineas, for his eminent and good servi- 
ces in the said Church." 

In July the same year, he came to the Deanry-house in Chester, with intent to pass 

the rest of his days there. The favourable reception of his Thucydides induced the 

a2 



vi LIFE OF DR SMITH. 

Dean, in this healthy and pleasant retreat, to finish his transUtion of ^< Xenophon's His- 
tory of the Affairs of Greece ;" which ha published in one volume 4to. in the year 
1770 : this translation appeared without any dedication. To form a judgment of its 
merit we may only quote the words of the title page, that it is << by the Translator 
of Thucydides." 

When the Dean retired within the precincts of his Cathedral, he had resigned St 
George's, and held with the Deanry the parish churches of Handley and Trinity only . 
till the Rectory of West Kirkby, in the Hundred of Wirrall in Cheshire, became vacant 
by the decease of that excellent magistrate and persuasive preacher, the Rev. Mr 
Mainwaring, Prebendary of Chester. The Dean was instituted to this Rectory oc 
the 4th of October, 1780. This is a valuable living in the patronage of the Dean and 
Chapter. At this time the Dean resigned the Rectory of Trinity. 

Dr Smith was now Dean of Chester, Rector of Handley, and West Kirkby ; but his 
best parochial preferment happened late in life; he was advanced into his seventieth year^ 
and began to feel the inlirmities ever attendant on age and a delicate constitution. He 
had hitherto been a constant and powerful preacher : he began now to preach less fre- 
quently, as every exertion fatigued him exceedingly. But when he could no longer 
preach from the pulpit, he preached from the press, by publishing in 8vo. *<Nine 
Discourses on the Beatitudes," in the year 1782.^ 

From this time, the Dean's friends saw, with infinite concern, his health gradually 
declining. In the year 1786, he was exceedingly indisposed. In November, he was 
confined to his room ; in December, to his bed. 

About eight, on Friday morning, the 12th of January, 1787, the Dean meekly re- 
signed his spirit into the hands of a merciful Redeemer. On the Friday following, 
the funeral procession passed the nearest way to the Cathedral : the Bishop and five 
Prebendaries were pall-bearers« The body repose th on the south side of the holy table. 
The Dean's name appears over his grave. 

In the broad aisle, at the great pillar on your right hand, as you retire from the choir, 
an elegant and costly monument' is erected to his memory by Mrs Smith, who was a 
Miss Heber, of Essex. He only once married. 

The Dean never was a stipendiary curate. The moment he was ordained a priest, 
he became a rector ; and enjoyed ever after an income which far exceeded his expenses. 
An enemy to ostentatious legacies, he bequeathed the chief of his fortune, which was 
very considerable, to his widow and his nephew, for he had no children. He gave (Hie 
hundred pounds to the Chester Infirmary, and one hundred pounds to the fund for 
widows of clergymen in the archdeaconry of Chester; these he esteemed useful charities. 

The Dean was tall and genteel : his voice was strong, clear *and melodious. He spoke 
Latin fiuently, and was eomplete master not only of the Greek, but Hebrew language. 
His mind was so replete with knowledge, that he was a living library. His manner of 
address was graceful, engaging, delightful. His sermons were pleasing, informing, 
convincing. His memory, even in age, was wonderfully retentive ; and his conversa- 
tion was polite, alSable, and in the highest degree improving. 

1 The good and learned Doctor Lowth, late Bishop of London, highly commends these Ser- 
mons, in a letter to the Dean, dated at Fulham, July 8th, 1782. Bishop Lowth and Dean 
Smith were contemporaries at Oxford : where an intimate friendship commenced between them, 
which continued till that year in which these two luminariea of the church of Christ were 
^snatched — so Heaven decreed!'— away .'» 

9 See the next page. 



SACKED TO THE MEMORY OF 

WILLIAM SMITH, D. D. 

fXEAN OP THIS CATHEClEAL, AND 

Afidtcte o* "WEST jcaacBt and handlet in this covntt, 

tVHb DIED THE XII*. OP JANTAnY M,DCC,LXXXVn, 
IN THE L3CXVItlL YEAR OF HIS AGE. 

AS A 8GH0LAB, BIS EBPTTATION IS PERPSTVATBD 

fit tftS VALVABtE PVBLICATIONS, 

PAETICVLARLT HIS COERECT AND ELEGANT 

TRANSLATIONS OF LONGINVS, THVCtDIDES, AND XENOFHON. 

AS A PREACHER, HE WAS ADMIRED AND 

ESTEEMED B7 HIS RESPECTIVE AVDITORIES. 

AND AS A MANy HIS MEMORT REMAINS INSCRIBED 

ON THE HEARTS OF HIS FRIENDS. 

THIS MONVMENT WAS ERECTED 
BY HIS AFFECTIONATE WIDOW. 

9 



TO 



HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS 

THE PRINCE OF WALES. 

Sib, 

The History of Thucydides hath been studiously read and admired by the greatest 
princes, and may therefore presume to lay some claim to the protection of your Royal 
Highness. Great Britain, of all the states now existing in the world, most nearly 
resembleth what Athens was at the time when the war, which is the subject of it, 
broke out in Greece. A love of liberty, which hath erroneously been supposed to 
thrive and flourish best in a democratical government, was then warm and active in 
every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raised to a great height of maritime 
power, and was become a very formidable state : but faction disjointed a noble plan, and 
at length brought on the loss of her sovereignty at sea. The Athenians soon ceased to 
be great, when they deviated from those salutary maxims, which their worthiest patri- 
ots and most consummate statesmen had recommended to their constant observance. 

The maritime power of Great Britain is more substantially founded, and hath ever 
been more steadily supported, than was that of Athens. The most complete and most 
lasting form of government that man can invent, happily subsists in this realm under 
your Royal Grandfather. The British constitution hath long been, and may it long 
continue to be, the envy of other nations ! For the future support of it, the public 
hopes and expectations are fixed upon your Royal Highness. Long may his Majesty 
your Royal Grandfather live to secure the freedom and happiness of his people, that 
your Royal Highness may become equal, in every respect, to the same great and glo- 
rious charge ! 

I have a heart duly sensible of the great honour conferred upon me, by being thus 
permitted to profess myself, 

Your ROTAL HiGHNESS'S 

most devoted and 

most humble Servant, 

WILLIAM SMITH. 
LoNDOK, 1753. 



PREFACE. 



It was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a pubiie 
call, that the following Translation of Thucydides was first undertaken. To explain 
the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. 
The performance, upon the whole, must justify the undertaking. In what manner it is 
done and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration. 

It will be also needless to tell the English reader, how many versions have been 
made of Thucydides into Latin. Their design was to bring the author more under 
the observation of what is generally styled the learned world ; as the translations of 
him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance 
as an historian capable of innocently amusing most ranks of men, but of usefully in- 
structing the persons, who from duty and from passion would guard the rights or se- 
cure the welfare of public communities. The grand business of history is to make 
men wiser in themselves and better members of society. For this purpose it recals 
past ages to their view ; and thus opens a more extensive scope to reflection than any 
personal experience can offer. To be well versed in a similarity of cases prepares 
men better for counsel or action on present contingencies. The statesman, the pa- 
triot, the friend to liberty and reason, will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his 
own measures, when he can see the tendency and consequence of such as were fol- 
lowed on parallel occasions, and adjust the degrees in which they were either preju- 
dicial or serviceable to public good. 

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leisure, to make themselves profi- 
cients in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honestly, perhaps 
beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek historians, as they 
take a precedency in time, lay further a strong claim to precedency in merit. Thucy- 
dides is the most instructive of these ; and, since the restoration of letters in the wes- 
tern world, each nation, that hath piqued itself at all about humanity or politeness, as 
his manner was soon found to be excellent, have given thanks to those who have en- 
deavoured to investigate his matter and lay it open to public view. 

It is to the honour of the French, that they took the lead. The first translation of 
Thucydides into French, published at Paris in 1527, was that of Claude de Seyssel, 
bishop of Marseilles. However performed , it went within the space of little more than 
thirty years, through four impressions. It is said to have been done at the command of 
Francis I. king of France ; and, to have been carried about with him in his wars, and 
diligently studied by the emperor Charles V. The Germans had also a translation of 
him soon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 ifrancis di Soldo Strozzi published an 
Italian translation dedicated to Cosmo di Medicis. The first English translation made 
its appearance in London in 1550 ; but, in fact, was only the translation of a translation, 
since it was intitled a version from the French of Claude de Seyssel. In 1564 he was 
published in Spanish. A second translation by Louis Jonsaud d'Usez was 



X PREFACE. 

published at Geneva in 1600. The second into English, by the famous Mr Hobbes of 
Malmsbury, was first published in the year 1628, about which it will be necessary im- 
mediately to enlarge. A third French translation, by the Sieur d'Ablancourt, was pub- 
lished at Paris in 1662, and hath since gone through fou? editions. There is also a 
Danish translation, which closeth the list given of them in the Bibliotheca Grseca of 
Fabricius. 

Mr Hobbes declares in his Preface, that « the virtues of this author so took his affec- 
tion, that they begot in him a desire to communicate him further." He considered 
also that << he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own 
tongues, notwithstanding that he be not very much beholding for it to his interpreters." 
He says afterwards^ that, by the first translation of Nicholls from the French of Seyssel, 
<' he became at length traduced rather than translated into our language ;*' alluding 
perhaps to the Italian sarcasm on translators, Traduttore ircuUtore, He then resolved 
himself <' to take him immediately from the Greek — ^knowing, that when with diligence 
and leisure I should have done it, though some errors might remain, yet they would 
be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless (says he) I can discover none, 
and hope they be not many." 

Hobbes, however sorry and mischievous a philosopher, was undoubtedly a very learn- 
ed man. He hath shown it beyond dispute in his translation of Thucydides. He is an 
excellent help, for any one who consults him, to find out the meaning and adjust the 
sense. £ut, though his translation hath now passed through three editions, and hath 
profitably been read by many, yet (I speak not from my own private judgment) 
he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleasure. He is faithful, but 
most servilely so, to the letter of his author. Even in the orations, he merely acts 
the interpreter, and hata quite forgot the orator. He translates literally through- 
out, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the 
construction is very often intricate and confused, the thoughts pregnant with sense 
are not suficiently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators trans- 
fused with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too scrupulous an attachment to the 
letter of the original hath made the copy quite fiat and heavy, the spirit is evap- 
orated, the lofty and majestic air hath entirely disappeared. Too many low and 
vulgar expressions are used, which Thucydides ever studiously avoided. Such fre- 
quently occur in the midst of some grand circumstance, which they throw into a kind 
of burlesque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The English language hath gbne 
through a great variation, hath been highly polished, since Mr Hobbes wrote. Hence, 
though his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatness, preci- 
sion, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the last century have 
habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that, Mr Hobbes either exe- 
cuted in great haste, or performed his revisals in a very cursory and negligent manner. 
I am inclined to think so from the very many passages, necessary and emphatical pe- 
riods, nay sometimes in the very speeches, which to my great surprise I have found 
omitted in his translation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the 
greatest attention sometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omissions in Mr 
Hobbes are too numerous and important, to be excused in any tolerable consistence 
with repeated care and curcumspection. 

Monsieur Bayle hath ascribed the translation of Thucydides by Mr Hobbes to a mo« 
tive of which he hath not left the least hint himself in his preface : — ** in order to show 



PREFACE. Hi 

tin Bagiisfa, in itte historjr of th^ Athenians, the disorders and confusions of a demoera- 
tical government." Mr Hobbed eoukl not possibly , so long before they happened , fore- 
see the strange revolutions that Were soon to take place in the government of his eoun- 
trf. The very actors in them could tiot possibly discern the consequence of their owh 
embroilments. Some violent encroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and 
property of Englishmen, and a spirit of discontent began tospread throughout the nation. 
But it cannot be supposed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, 
or for several years after. The History of Thucydides abundantly shows , how danger- 
ous and destructive is faction in a state ; that severe or wanton power may make men 
deiSperate ; and that liberty abused may make them insolent and mutinous. It detects and 
expoeeth venal orators and false patriots ; but it exhibits men, who are studious and elo- 
quent in behalf of public welfare, and active in support of liberty and honest power, in 
full beauty and proportion. And his lessons lie not so apposite and ready for the appli- 
cation of any state now existing in the world, as for that of Great Britain. 

The reader may by this time have caught a glimpse of several reasons, for which the 
present translation of Thucydides was finished and is now made public. No care hath 
been omitted to make it as correct as possible. It hath been attentively reviewed : the 
narraiifve part, more thAn olice ; the ora^orial part, with repeated endeavours to reach 
the spirit and energy of the original. In the former, the author hath been followed step 
by step : bold deviaticKis here might imperceptibly have misrepresented or distorted the 
facts, and quite baai^ed ihe peculiar style and manner of the author. In the latter, it 
hath been often judged necessary to dilate the expression, in order fully to include the 
primary idea $ though> where it seemed possible the studied conciseness of the author 
hath been imitated, pro'rkled the thought could be clearly expressed, and the senten* 
tiduS inaxiffl adequately conveyed . The turns and figures of expression have been e v- 
eiy wh^re diligently noted, and an endeavour constantly made at imitation. This was 
judged a point of duty ; or a point at least, where, though something may be permitted 
to a translator's discretion or to the genius of modern language, yet he must not indulge 
hiflOMsetf in too wide a soope, lest, wlien what ought to be a copy is exhii^ted, the prime 
dietiikUkmB of the original be lost, and tittle or no resemblance foe left behind. 

It is very just and true what Mr Hobbes hath observed, that " this author so earrieth 
with him his own tight throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before 
him, and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow. ' ' And he , who applies to 
any commentator but Thucydides himself for an explanation of his own meaning, must 
exoeedingly often get quite wide of iJie sense* The writers of SchoUa and the notes of 
vorbal critics put us frequency on a wrong scent, and more frequently leave us utterly 
in the dark. But, if we will be patient at a dead lift, something wili so6n occur in the 
author himself to help us out, the obscurity witi vanish, and light beam in upon us. 
Though sometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, since in many cases it is 
vain to apjdy to the aids of Grammar to develop the construction, yet the context at 
length will fl^w whether we have succeeded, or help us to ascertain the sense. This, 
howoTer, demaiMifi repealted and attentive revisals. The present translator hath not been 
fiugai of histime or labour in these pcrnits. And whether he hath generally succeeded in 
ascertaining the thought and property expressing it in another language, must be left to 
the decisiOB^ not of mon of no learning, nor of mere learning, but to that class of judges 
who are well acquainted with the state of Athens at the time of the history, and are really 
Attic both in taste and judgment. This class, it may be thought, will be small : it is larger 



zii PREFACE. 

however, and higher seated in this our community, than the generality have either 
opportunity enough to discover or good-nature enough to own. 

The complaints so often made by the most able translators are indeed alarming. Their 
performances (they say) may very much disgrace, but can never commend them. The 
praise of all that is clear, and bright, and pleasing, and instructive, is reflected back up- 
on the original author : but every appearance of a different nature is laid with severity 
of censure at the door of the translator. If it be so, we know the terms beforehand on 
which, either able or unable, we engage, and must patiently acquiesce in the issue. Bu t 
candour is always expected, nay, ever will be had, from persons of good sense and sound 
judgment. Few but such may be pleased with Thucydides either in his old native 
Greek, or in a modem English garb ; and, if such confer the honour of their applause, 
the clamour of some will not terrify , nor the silence of others mortify at all. The book- 
seller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others 
from the sale. And it must be owned, that every original writer, as well as every copy- 
ist, is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation. 

The present translation of Thucydides is accompanied with a few notes, and three 
preliminary Discourses. Concerning these something must be added. 

The notes are only designed for the English reader, to give him light into that anti- 
quity, with which he may be little acquainted : and therefore the first time that any 
thing relating to the constitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their 
fleets and land armies, occurs, I have endeavoured in a note to give him a competent 
perception of it. I have done the same, in regard to the characters of the chief person- 
ages in the history, which seemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath 
given them. The persons were well known when he wrote : but a modem reader may 
not be displeased to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted, with the 
characters of the principal agents in these busy and important scenes. In notes of ver- 
bal criticism or mere learning, I have been veiy sparing, judging they would never 
be read with patience. 

Of the preliminary discourses the two first were due, by the rules of decorum observ- 
ed by editors and translators, to the author. In the last, I have thrown into one contin- 
ued discourse what might have been broke into pieces, and interspersed occasionally 
by way of notes. The method observed appeared most eligible, as it will give the 
reader a clear prospect of the whole history ; preparing him for or inciting him to a close 
and attentive perusal of it ; or enabling him, after he hath perused it, to recollect the 
most instructive passages and most material occurrences. By this means, also, a 
more lively and succinct account could be given of the speakers and the speeches, 
than could have been done by way of set and formal arguments. 

I think the English reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucy- 
dides with pleasure and profit ; especially if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian 
history, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, since Mr Stanyan's History 
of Greece and the Universal History are in so many hands. I dismiss the work with 
some hope, but more terror, about its success. That hope is encouraged and sup- 
ported by the list of my Subscribers. There are names that do me honour indeed ; 
and which, whether the work may suit the generality or not, will preserve me from 
ever repenting, that I have bestowed so much time on translating Thucydides. 



THREE DISCOURSES. 



I. ON THE LIFE OF THUOYDIDES. 
II. ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTOEL/IN. 
m. A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 



B 



DISCOURSE I. 

ON 

THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES. 



It is a natural piece of curiosity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one 
commended, to inquire af^er the author. We acquiesce not in his bare name ; we 
immediately seek farther information. The stranger shows an inclination to form some 
acquaintance with him ; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length 
grow inquisitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars. 

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He who 
endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at least to have something to say 
about him, and something rather tending perhaps to give favourable impressions. All 
his editors and translators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them : 
but it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and slovenly manner. His 
life wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morsel, hath been prefixed to all the 
G-reek editions. That by Suidas is an unsatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A third 
in Greek, by an anonymous author, is also but a very slight and shapeless sketch, and 
seems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed, but very superficially read his 
history. Some incidental escapes from his own pen are the marks, which should be 
always kept in view by him who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. 
Writers of a better age and class will contribute now and then a little assistance. And 
the laborious care of a late author,^ in adjusting the chronology and clearing away 
rubbish, will enable one now to give at least a coherent, though by no means an ac- 
curate, account of him. 

Thucydides, an Athenian, by borough a Halymusian, was born in the year before 
Christ four hundred and seventy-one ; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after 
Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius ; and about three years before Socrates, as the 
birth of the latter is settled by Laertius. He was descended of a very splendid and 
noble family, though perhaps not so honourable as many others, since it was not purely 
Attic. Its splendour can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of 
Miltiades. Miltiades the elder, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, 
a people in Thrace ; and left vast possessions in that country to his descendants : and 
Miltiades the younger had married Hegesipyle the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king.f 
Yet foreign blood, though royal, was always thought to debase the Athenian. The 
firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary aversion to every circumstance of royalty ; 

* Vite Thucydidis Synopsis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell. 

t HeTodottis in Erato. 

15 



xvi ON THE LIFE 

and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexions with Barbarians, the scornful 
title they gave to all the rest of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphi- 
crates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the'son of an Athenian shoemaker and a 
Thracian princess. Yet, bemg afrked to which of his parents he thought himself most 
obliged, he replied haughtily — *^ To my mother. She did all she could to make me an 
Athenian ; my father would have made me a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades 
whom wars had obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in 
the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine 
set upon him by the people of Athens. His son Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. 
The family for a time had been in poverty and distress, but emerged again in Cimon. 
Cimon the same day gained a victory both by land and sea over the Persians at 
Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put 
it in a train of much greater advancement. In civil affairs he clashed with Pericles, 
who was leader of the popular party: Cimon always sided with the noble or the few; 
as were the party-distinctions in vogue at Athens. 

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are strong and convincing. Plutarch 
directly asserts it in the life of Cimon. His father, in grateful at least if not honour- 
able remembrance of the Thracian king, whose daughter Miltiades had married, bore 
the name of Olorus. His mother also was another Hegesipyle. He inherited rich 
possessions 'u\ Thrace; particularly some mines of gold. A monument of him was to be 
seen for many ages after, in the Coele at Athens, amongst the Cimonian, or those 
belonging to the family of Cimon; and stood next, according to Plutarch, to that of 
Elpinice, Cimon 's own sister. His father's name in the inscription on this monument, 
at least some latter grammarians have averred it, was Olorus. Thucydides himself, in 
the fourth book of his history, calls it Orolus. Can we want stronger authority? 
Whether any stress ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the mistake, though a 
very minute one, might proceed, are points too obscure and trifling to take up any 
attention. 

Such was the family of which Thucydides was descended. His pedigree might be 
fetched from the gods ; since that of Miltiades is traced down from JEojcvlb. But, Uke 
my author, I should choose to keep as clear of the fabulous as possible. Cicero says 
of him, " Though he had never written a history, his name would still have been 
extant, he was so honourable and noble."* I quote this, merely as a testimony to the 
splendour of his birth, since it may be questioned whether the historian, in the pre- 
sent instance, hath not entirely preserved his memory, and been solely instrumental 
in ennobling and perpetuating the man. 

His education no doubt was such as might be expected from the splendour of his 
birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens, the 
politest city that then existed, or ever yet existed in the world. It is impossible 
however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any 
class whatever, seems merely of a presumptuous though probable kind. It is said 
Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, because the name of Anaxagoras was 
great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and 
of Socrates, is named also by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he 
adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that << it was whispered about that Thucydides 
was atheistical, because he was so fond of the theory of Anaxagoras, who was generally 

* In the Orator* 



OP THUCYDIDES. xvii 

reputed and stytod an atheist." The solution of an eclipse from natural causes ac- 
counting for appearances from the laws of motion, and investigating the course of na- 
ture, were sufficient proofs of atheism amongst a people so superstitious as the Athe- 
nians. Thucydides, possibly, might be well acquainted with the philosophy of Anax- 
agoras, without having personally attended his lectures. However that be, his own 
history abundantly shows that he was no atheist ; it may be added, and no polytheist. 
By his manner of speaking of the oracles and predictions tossed about in his own time, 
it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather insinuates them to be mere for- 
geries. " And yet," says Mr Hobbes,* " he confirms an assertion of his own touch- 
ing the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction. "The passage occurs in the 
fifth book of this history. But whoever considers it, will find it only an argumentum ad 
hominemy to stop the mouths of such as believed in oracles, from contesting his own 
computation of the whole time the Feloponnesian war lasted. I can only say, that he 
was undoubtedly a serious man, and of a large fund of solid sense, which deriving 
originally from the bounty of nature, he had most certainly improved by a regular and 
sound education. 

For a reason of much less weight, Antipho is assigned for his master in rhetoric — 
because he speaks handsomely of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due 
acknowledgement to the merit of Antipho as a speaker; but it cannot be inferred from 
hence, that he had ever any connection with him. Others have made Antipho a scholar 
of TlracydideSyf with full as little reason. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by 
profession. It is pity to waste so much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides 
had a liberal education, though the particular progress of it cannot now be traced. 

But, to show the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognostic what sort 
of person he would prove, the following story is recorded by several authors, and dated 
by Mr Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age. — ^His father carried him to the CHympic 
games. He there heard Herodotus read his history to the great crowd of Grecians as- 
sembled at that solemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and, at length, burst out 
into tears. " Tears childish indeed," it hath been remarked: but however such as few 
children would have shed, and highly expressive of his inward spirit. The active as- 
piring mind of Themistocles was not stronger shown, when the trophy of Miltiades 
' would not let him be at rest; nor the genius of the lad at Westminster-school, when he 
could not sleep for the colours in Westminster-hall. Herodotus is said to have observed 
it, and to have complimented Oloruson his having a son, that had so violent a bent to 
letters. A similar passage in any person's life would always be called to mind, when 
he was the subject of conversation. 

In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exercise 
in the study of arms, and to begin to share in the defence of his country. Every 
citizen of Athens was also a soldier. They served at first within the walls, or on 
great emergencies marched, though to no great distance from home. As years and 
skill advanced, they were called upon to join in more distant and foreign expeditions. 
We are quite in the dark about the particular services in which he might thus be em- 
ployed. We are sure at least he much improved in the theory of arms. He quali- 
fied himself for the great trust of heading the forces of the state; and, in the sequel, we 
shall see him invested with a command. 
The anonymous author of his life relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, 

* Of the Life and History of Thucydides. t Plutarch's Lives of the ten Orators. 
3 b2 



xviii ON THE LIFE 

whom the Athenians sent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus 
were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is said to have been associated in it. 
If Thucydides went the voyage (and the strange inconsistencies of him who relates it 
render his whole account suspicious,) he must have been about twenty-seven years of 
age. One thing is pretty certain; his stay at Thuria could have been of no very long con- 
tinuance. This is not to be inferred from the ostracism, which the same writer says 
he soon after suffered; a mistake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him 
with Thucydides the son of Milesias, who was of the same family, and being a leader 
in the oligarchical party at Athens, had the ostracism thrown upon him by the interest and 
popularity of Pericles. But the quarrel between the Corcyreans and Corinthians about 
Epidamnus broke out soon after this. The enemies of Alliens were now scheming the 
demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory transactions, 
marks all the defensive measures of the Athenians, as a person who was privy to eve- 
ry one of them. And there should be very strong and very positive proofs of the con- 
trary, before any reader of his history doubts of his having been all the time at Athens. 

His own Introduction, of itself in a great measure establishes the fact. He perceived 
the storm was gathering; he knew the jealousies of the states which composed the La« 
cedemonian league; he also knew the real strength of Athens, and heard all the pre- 
ventive measures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper pos- 
ture of defence. He himself seems to have been alert for the contention, and ready 
both with lance and pen, not only to bear his share in the events, but also to perpetuate 
the memory of them. His own words (ix»-t«-«$ and r$xft»ife/tivoe) seem to denote the 
great earnestness and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter which was now 
going to be opened. He longed to become an historian; he saw a fine subject for history 
fast approaching; he immediately set about noting all occurrences, began at once to 
collect materials; and was resolved to writetheHistory of thePeloponnesian War before 
it was actually on foot. 

Can we doubt then of his residence during this portion of time at Athens? He was ar- 
rived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigour and ripeness of his years and 
understanding, according to his chronologist, Mr Dodwell, was just forty years old. We 
learn from himself,"^ that he knew personally the whole series of things; he was ever 
present at the transactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his 
exile at those of the Peloponnesians; and consequently, before his exile, at those of the 
Athenians. He speaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witness of his conduct; as 
one who heard him harangue in the assembly of the people, convincing that a war there 
would necessarily be, and for that reason they ought not to weaken themselves by ill- 
judged concessions, but gallantly to exert that naval power which had made Athens 
envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He must 
regularly have taken his post upon the walls, and seen the Peloponnesians, in the first 
year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waste. He must have marched under 
Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, since the whole force of the state was 
obliged to take the field on this occasion. He must have assisted at the public funeral 
solemnized in the winter for the first victims of this war, and heard Pericles speak in 
honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own 
laws and constitution. The plague broke out immediately after this; we are absolutely 
certain he was then in Athens. He himself assures us of it. He was an eye-witness 

*Book the fifth. 



OF THUCYDIDES. xix 

to all that horrid scene. He had the plague himself; and hath given a circumstantial 
detail of it. 

The war proceeds with vigour, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides 
must have borne his share in the service; the particulars he hath not recorded. No 
man was ever less guilty of egotism; he never mentions himself but wheu it is absolute- 
ly necessary. His next six years were certainly employed in fighting and in writing; the 
latter was his passion, and the former his duty. In the forty-seventh year of his age, he 
was joined in the command of an Athenian squadron and land-force on the coasts of 
Thrace. He might be assigned to this particular station, on account of his possessions 
and interest in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was best 
qualified to serve his country in this department. The Lacedemonian commander in 
Thrace dreaded his opposition. Let us wait a little for the event: it is the most im- 
portant passage in the life of Thucydides. 

It was entirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was asserted above to 
be a descendant from Miltiades, and in the mode of consanguinity to have inherited his 
fine estate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is forever jumbling and con- 
founding facts, hath also made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold- 
mines for her fortune. Mr Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and solves all the 
difficulty in a very plausible manner. " In Thrace," says he, " lay also the possessionsof 
Thucydides and his wealthy mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. 
And although those riches might come to him by a wife, (as is also by some afirmed,) 
which he married in Scapte-syle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it ap- 
peareth that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there 
unknown." I cannot believe that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely 
Attic. He seems to have been high-spirited in this respect, and proud of his country. 
Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princess; and nothing, but the vast estate 
brought into the family by this match, could have made his descendants easy with such 
a blemish in their pedigree: for a blemish undoubtedly it must have been thought at 
Athens. Letusseehow Thucydides himself drops his sentiment of such another match. 
The passage I have in view occurs in the sixth book. He is speaking of Hippias, the 
son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens. " To jSBantidas the son of Hippoclus tyrant of 
Lampsacus — to a Lampsacene, though he himself was an Athenian — he married his 
daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let such a sarcasm fall from his 
own serious pen, could ever condescend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be ever 
so great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine 
for himself. — This digression was caused by the express mention Thucydides hath made 
of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the lists against the most gallant and 
active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedemonian league. 

It was Brasidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponnesian troops in 
Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Thessaly and Macedonia. By 
his fine deportment and his persuasive addressjoined to uncommon vigilance and activ- 
ity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get possession 
by surprise of the important city of Amphipolis: he had very nearly succeeded. Eucles 
commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the isle of Thasus, 
about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. A messenger was despatched to him, to hasten 
him up for the defence of that city. He put to sea immediately with a small squadron 
of seven ships. Brasidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Am- 
phipolitans, and gained admission for his troops. Thucydides stood up the Strymon in 



XX ON THE LIFE 

the evening, but too late*, since Brasidas had got fast possession of Amphipolis. The 
city of Eion is situated also upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles 
and a half irom Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. ^'Brasi- 
das (in his own words)^ had designed that very night to seize Eion also. And, unless 
this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost." 
Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed 
boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was re- 
pulsed in both : upon which, he gave up the scheme, and returned back. 

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occasion, 
and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens made a differ- 
ent determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greatest influence there, and is 
generally supposed to have exasperated them against the man who had not wrought 
impossibilities in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury 
rose so high against him, that they stripped Thucydides of his command, and passed 
the sentence of banishment upon him. It is himself who tells us,' ^* It was his lot to 
suffer a twenty years' exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis." 

We have thus lost Thucydides the commander to secure more fast Thucydides the 
historian. Though sadly treated, he scorned to be angry with his country. His com- 
plexion was not at all choleric or resentful; there appears not the least sign of any gall 
in his constitution. Discharged of all duties and free from all public avocations, he was 
lefl without any attachments but to simple truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for 
commemorating exploits, in which he could have no share. He was now eight and 
forty years old, and entirely at leisure to attend to the grand poiat of his ambition, that 
of writing the history of the present war; a calm spectator of facts, and dispassionate 
observer of the events he was determined to record. 

To judge of him from his history (and we have no other help to form our opinion 
about him), he was so nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no passion. No 
murmur or complaint hath escaped him upon account of his severe undeserved treat- 
ment from his country. Great souls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a sim- 
ilar cast. 

Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
Which, like the toad, agly and venomous, 
Bears yet a precious jewel in his head. 

Shakspeare has thus expressed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, must have 
thought. *< Exile , according to Plutarch,' was a blessing which the muses bestowed up- 
on their favourites. By this means they enabled them to complete their most beauti- 
ful and noble compositions." He then quotes our author for the first proof of his obser- 
vation — ** Thucydides the Athenian compiled his history of the Feloponnesian war at 
Scaptesyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his residence. It lay convenient for taking 
care of his private affairs and overlooking his mines: they lay not within the dominions 
of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the state. Hence he made ex- 
cursions at proper seasons to observe transactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now 
more conversant in person on the Feloponnesian side. Some private correspondences he 
might still carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchase all proper materi- 
als, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment till the very end 
of the war; and it is certain he collected materials for carrying down his history to 

1 Book the fourth. 2 Book the fifth. 3 Of Banishment. 



OF THUCYDIDES. xxi 

that period of time '< when (in his own words^ ) the Lacedemonians and their allies put 
an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long Wall and the Piraeus." 
fiut whoever reads it, will be mclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate 
and elaborate manner in which it now appears, till the war was finished. He might 
keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, 
as he saw better reason or gained more light. His complete well-connected history, 
though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution. 

His exile lasted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the ^ar, in the 
year before Christ four hundred twenty-three. Consequently, he was restored the year 
before Christ four hundred and three, being at that time sixty-eight years old. In that 
very year an amnesty was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the 
demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. 

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleased, to return and pass the remamder of his 
days at Athens. Whether he did so or not, is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years 
after, and died in the year before Christ three hundred ninety-one, being then about 
fourscore years old. He was constantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to 
this History; — with what accuracy, what severity, what toil, the rea4er may judge, 
sincehe will find that after all he left it imperfect. The first seven books are indeed fully 
and exactly finished. The eighth, though moulded into due form, hath plainly not had 
a final revisaJ, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is said to have fallen into 
Xenophon's possession, who at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from 
Athens: and Xenophon is also said to have made it public. This carries a great air of 
probability -virith it, since Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in so 
lofty and m^estic, but in a sweeter and more popular style. There is a chasm indeed 
between tho time the History of Thucydides breaks off, and the Grecian History of 
Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to 
offer one, I believe, entirely new, but which, for that reason, I shall readily give up to 
the first person of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation? It is this — That Thu- 
cydides left somewhat ihore behind him than now appears. How it came to be suppres- 
sed or lost, 1 will not pretend to guess. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledg- 
ed continuator resumed the subject at the very spot where his predecessor had left off. 
Nearly two years are however wanting, in which several important incidents took 
place. It is pity; but we have no redress. General historians are by other means 
enabled to supply the deficiency; but the loss of any thing from so masterly a hand is 
still to be regretted. 

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was most probably Scaptesyle 
in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a spot where he had passed 
so many years in studious and calm retirement. The hurry and bustle and engagements 
of Athens could not have been much to the relish of so grave, and now so old a man. 
His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, since most writers 
^^e, it had the mark upon it which showed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, < Here 
lieth,' were not in the inscription.^ I have nothing to add about his family. It is said 
he left a son; but the very name of that son is merely conjectural. I have collected 
'eyery thing that carries any consistency with it about the Man; I shall proceed with 
^ore pleasure to view him in a clearer and more steady light, and mark the charac- 
ter in which it was his ambition to be distinguished, that of an Historian. 

4 Book the fifth. 6 MareeUinus. 



DISCOURSE II. 

ON HIS 

QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN.' 



It is now to be considered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice 
and arduous task of writing history. — No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by 
outward circumstances; and very few so enabled to perform it well by the inward abili- 
ties of genius and understanding. 

Lucian, in his celebrated treatise " How a History ought to be written," is generally 
supposed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every person of judgment, 
who loves a sincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were possible, to have the 
writer of them abstracted from all kind of connection with persons or things that are 
the subject-matter,' to be of no country, no party; clear of all passions; indepen- 
dent in every light; entirely unconcerned who is pleased or displeased with what he 
writes; the servant only of reason and truth. 

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we shall find his qualifications in all these respects 
very nearly, if not quite, complete. 

No connection with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards, any one person in the 
world, can be fixed upon him. Never man so entirely detached, or proceeded so far (if 
I may use the expression) in annihilating himself. He had afather indeed, whose name 
was Olorus; he was an Athenian born; — but, who are his relations? who were his asso- 
ciates? what, rival or competitor doth he sneer) what friend doth he commend? or, 
what enemy doth he reproach? — Brasidas was the immediate occasion of his disgrace 
and exile. Yet, how doth he describe him? He makes the most candid acknowledg- 
ments of his personal merit, and doth justice to all his shining and superior abilities. 
Cleonis generally supposed to have irritated the people against him, and to have got him 
most severely punished, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth 
he show the least grudge or resentment against this Cleon? He represents him indeed 
in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of course an 
arrant coward. And how do all other writers? how doth Aristophanes painrthis worth- 
less man, this false bellowing patriot? I would never call Aristophanes for an evidence 
to character, but in cases where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the 
same foundation of truth though not with the same superstructure of bitterness and 
abuse. He should not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may 

be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himself as op- 

xxii 



HIS QUALIFICATIONS. xsdu 

pofied to any man but Brasidas; and never so much as drops an insinuation that ke 
was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general consent, he hath gained immortal honour 
by giving fair and true representations of men, whom he never felt to be such, but 
whom succeeding writers have assured us to have actually been his enemies.— As to 
things; though in the first seven years of the war he must m some measure have had 
employment, yet he was soon disentangled from all business whatever, in a manner 
which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath stated the fact; and then with the great- 
est calmness and unconcern, he hath left the decision to posterity. 

He was henceforth of no country at all. Cut o£f from the republic of Athens, he 
never sought after or desired a naturalization in any other state of Greece. He was 
now only to choose out and fix a proper spot of observation, from whence, like a 
person securely posted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the storm that was 
raging or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, distinguish 
every turn, and with a philosophical tranquility enjoy it all. In short, he now was, 
and continued all the rest of the Peloponnesian war, a citizen of the world at large, 
as much as any man ever actually was. 

But before this separation from the community, whilst yet he continued at Athens, 
where liberty opened the field to all passionate chases after power, where consequently 
competitions were ever fermenting, and party was always alive and active, — can we find 
him BJBSociated with any particular set of men? can we find him dabbling in political in- 
tiiguel a leader of, or led by, any party? or, can we assuredly find out his principles? or 
even guess at his real thoughts about the form of government under which he had liv- 
ed? His biographers indeed, though ever parading his candour and impartiality, are of- 
ten tracing out signs and marks of party-zeal and personal prejudices from the very 
characters in his history. Marcellinus says, << he described Cleon as a madman because 
he hated him;" forgetful what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent testimonies to the 
truth of the character. The anonymous writer says, « he opposed Pericles at Athens, 
got the better of him, and became the first man in the republic." A ridiculous story! 
void of all manner of support. According to this writer's way of arguing in other places, 
whosays, << he cajoled the Lacedemonians, and inveighed against the tyrannic all-grasp- 
ing temper of the Athenians, in his history, because he had no opportunity to rail at 
them in any other shape ," — he should have left a far different character of Pericles be- 
hind him, than he had actually left. But these are strange compilers of patch- work, 
and deserve no regard. Fronvwhat the former hath said about him, a reader might be 
tempted to judge him of the oligarchical, from what the latter hath said of him, of the 
democratical principle. Mr Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real 
principles, and avers him a tight and sound royalist. He is sure, that he least of all 
liked the democracy: as sure, he was not at all fond of an oligarchy. He founds this 
assurance on a passage in the eighth book — " They decreed the supreme power to be 
vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrol- 
led for the heavy armour, and that no one should receive a salary." — Thncydides just 
after pronounceth this,inhisown opinion,^' a good modelling of their government, a fine 
temper between the few and the many, and which enabled Athens from the low estate 
into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect her head." If this passage proves any 
thingof the author's principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty strong degree republi- 
can. Mr Hobbes however sets out from hence to prove him a royalist. * ' For," says he, 
<* he commendeth the government of Athens more, both when Pisistratus reigned 
(saving that it was an usurped power,) and when in the beginning of this war it 



zziv HIS QUALIFICATIONS. 

was democr&iical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles.'^ He praiseth, it is 
true, the administration at both these periods; and he also pndseth the good effects re- 
sulting firom an administration lodged in the hands of five thousand men. Under Peri- 
cles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had 
taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet Pericles was all the time 
a strong republican, and owned his masters. Plutarch says, he never harangued them 
without praying beforehand, that '< not a word might slip out of his mouth, that was 
not pertinent to the business in hand;" and that be never put onhis armour to lead them 
out into the field, without saying to himself— <* Remember, Pericles, you are going to 
command free men and Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of 
Thucydides can thus be discovered. It appears only, that he was always candid to a 
good administration, and might possibly think of government, as Mr Pope has wrote: 

For modes of government let fools contest, 
That which is best administer'd is best. 

That studied obscurity in which he hath veiled himself, will not let us discover, 
whether on instant and critical occasions he ever suffered himself to be actuated by any 
of the darker passions, or too fondly indulged those of a brighter cast. But it cannot be 
found from what he writes, that he hath praised any man from fondness, or ev6n from 
gratitude, degraded any one though envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill- 
nature. The same will hold in regard to states or whole communities. Doth he ever 
censure the Athenians in the wrong placel or commend the Lacedemonians but in the 
right? Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work and the conclu- 
sions of the years, could any one guess to what state he had ever belonged, whether he 
was a Lacedemonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity 
of the Attic dialect in which he writes? In that dialect he was cradled; he could not pos- 
sibly swerve from it; without it he could neither write nor speak. Could he have 
thought that this might yield suspicion of an impassioned or prejudiced spirit, he might 
perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Boric or Ionic idiom. 

Independent, further, he certainly must have been, since he had no great man to 
cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of 
Persia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of 
France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on t^e sunny side of a hill in Swit- 
zerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not so much influence at 
Scaptesyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lausanne. The states of 
Greece had garrisons on the coasts, but were not masters of Thrace. Thrace was full of 
little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongst 
them to insure his personal safety and guard his retirement. He could disoblige those 
about whom he wrote, without fear of their resentment, and could praise without be- 
ing in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a stricter independence. 

His unconcern about the opinions of a present generation, is strong and clear. It 
looks as if he thought they would scarce give. him a reading, so little care had he taken 
to soothe 01 to amuse them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a 
year. He hated contention, and scorned short-lived temporary applause. He threw 
himself on posterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the present he 
had made them. The judgment of succeeding ages hath approved the compliment he 
thus made to their understandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able 
statesmen, sound politicians, politicians that do not rend asunder politics from good 



AS AN HISTORIAN. ov 

order and general happiness, he will meet with candid and gratefnl acknowledg- 
ments of his merit. 

Other historians have sooner pleased, have more diffusively entertained. They have 
aimed more directly at the passions, have more artificially and successfully struck at 
the imagination. Truth in its severity, and reason in its robust and manly state, are 
all the Muses and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obedience. Can we won- 
der, that he hath not been more generally read and admiredl or, could we wonder, 
if he had not been so muchi A great work planned under such circumstances and 
with such qualifications as I have been describing, cool serious judgment will always 
commend as a noble design, even though executed it may prove too cheerless to the 
more lively passions, its relish not sufficiently quick for the popular taste, or piquant 
enough to keep the appetite sharp and eager. 

But to proceed. Thucydides hath been censured in regard to the choice of his subject. 
It hath occasioned the solidity of his judgment and excellence of his taste to be called in 
question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus hath exerted himself much on his account; hath 
tried him by laws which have poetry rather than history for their object; and censures 
him for not delighting, when his profession was only to instruct. Mr Hobbes has gal- 
lantly defended his author, and shown all the arguments of Dionysius to be imperti- 
nent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I shall not repeat, it willsuffice to refer 
the curious reader to what Mr Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath cele* 
brated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the historic strokes of that and 
of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting everything he touched. That splendid part 
of the Grecian history, in which his countrymen resisted and triumphed over the very 
formidable arms of the Persian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. 
Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legen- 
dary and romantic writer! He had, he could have, no subject equal to his ambition and 
his abilities, but the war which broke out in his own days, which he foresaw would prove 
extensive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorously exerted 
to pull down the power of Athens, to demolish that naval strength which gave her the 
sovereignty of the sea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly 
therefore with my reason as an examiner of things, and warmly with my passion as an 
Englishman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the soundest and 
best system of English politics, so long before the constitution had existence; and hath 
left us fine lessons, such as his factious countrymen would not observe, how to support 
the dominion of the sea on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare entirely 
depends. In this light itis a most instructive and interesting history, and we mayfe« 
licitate ourselves on the choice of Thucydides. I must not anticipate; Thucydides 
would have his readers pick out their own instructions. I can only add, that Thucy- 
dides is a favourite historian with the statesmen and patriots of Great Britain: this fits him 
also to be an historian for the people* Other nati()ns have admired him, and I hope will 
continue to admire him, gratis: we are bound to thank him, and never to lose sight of that 
grand political scheme, formed by a Themistocles, and warmly and successfully pur- 
sued by an Aristides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the swerving from which at Athens drew 
after it the loss of the sovereignty at sea, then sunk her into a petty state, and made her 
end at last in a mere academy, though most excellent in its kind. 

From such considerations it will also follow, that the history of Thucydides is more 

useful than that of Livy ; at least, that we have more reason to applaud the choice of the 

former. I design no comparison between these two historians. The performance of 
4 C 



xxvi ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 

the Jesuit Rapin on that point is in general reading. Liv7's history is certainly more 
august, more splendid, more amazing: I only insist that it is not more useful. And, 
though Livy be happier in his subject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who 
seized the only fine subject that could offer itself to him: in regard to him, it was 
either this or none at all. The parallel should be only drawn in regard to execution, 
where much hath been said on both sides, and the superiority still remains undecided. 
This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and understanding, which capacita- 
ted my author to execute his work. His genius was certainly of the highest order: it 
was truly sublime. Here the critics unanimously applaud. In the arrangement of his 
matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftiness of his sense 
he copied Pindar. He is ever stately and majestic; his stateliness perhaps too formal, 
his majesty too severe. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary person. He 
thinks faster than he can utter: his sentences are full-stored with meaning; and his ve- 
ry words are sentences. Hence comes his obscurity. Where pure thought is the object, 
he connects too fast, nor is enough dilated for common apprehension. But this is not 
the case with the narrative part of his history, which is pithy, nervous, and succinct, 
yet plain, striking, and manly. He never flourishes, never plays upon words, never 
sinks into puerilities, never swells into bombast. It is a relation from the mouth of a ve- 
ry great man, whose chief characteristic is gravity. Others talk more ingenuously; 
others utter themselves with a more cheerful air; yet every one must attend to Thucy- 
dides, must hearken with serious and fixed attention, lest they lose a word, a weighty 
and important word, by which the whole story would be spoiled. It is in his Orations, 
that he is most remarkably obscure. He might not be so in so high a degree to the ap- 
prehensions of mankind, when his history was first made public. The world was then 
used to hear continual harangues: no business of a public nature could be carried on 
without them. In his time, the speakers aimed entirely at strength and brevity. If 
they were not exceeding quick, the apprehensions of the Athenians would outstrip, 
or at least affect to outstrip, their utterance. They must think much, and yet leave 
much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in 
the following history* calls them<< Spectators of speeches." They affected to discern at 
the first glance; and without waiting for formal deduction and solemn inference, to be 
masters of the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffusive eloquence 
was the improvement of the next generation. But the most forcible orator that even 
Athens ever boasted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from 
Thucydides. ItwasDemosthenes, who copied him in the close energy of his sen- 
tences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demosthenes is said to have transcrib- 
ed him eight times over with his own hand: so diligently did he persevere to form an in- 
timate acquaintance with him, and habituate himself to his quick manner of conception, 
and to his close and rapid delivery. Cicero says however ,f that << no rhetorician of 
Greece drew any thing from Thucydides. He hath indeed been praised by all; I own 
it; but, as a man who was an explainerof facts with prudence,severity , and gravity: not 
as a speaker at the bar, but an historical relator of wars. And therefore he was never 
numbered amongst the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: he could not, nei- 
ther in his own words << would he if he could." His talents were different; he was 
quite in all respects accomplished; he was eloquence itself. But Demosthenes — and 
can there be higher praisel — Demosthenes certainly loved and studied Thucydides; 

* Cleon's speech in book the third. f In the Orator. 



AS AN HISTORIAN. zxvii 

jbr whose perfection I am not arguing; I would only establish his character of lofli- 
aess and sublimity^ Longinus* proposeth him as the model of true grandeur and 
exaltation in writing history. 

And now, I have mentioned this princely and most judicious critic, let us call Thu- 
cydides to take a trial at his bar, and see whether he hath all the genuine constitu- 
ents of the true sublime. For elevation of thought, for his power in alarming and 
interesting the passions, for his bold and frequent use of figures, his character will 
soon be established. Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus bears testimony here, who lov- 
ed him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the most pa- 
thetic, and a writer of the greatest energy and variety that ever was. The scenes in his 
history are strong, most expressive paintings. He makes the past to be present; he 
makes hearing sight. In the very words of Plutarchf — ^* Eiis readers are thrown into 
the same astonishment and hurry of passion, as the eye-witnesses to every scene 
must have felt. Demosthenes drawing up his men on the craggy shore of Pylus— firasi* 
das calling out on his pilot to run the vessel ashore, getting himself on the stairs, then 
wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the Spartans fighting a land battle 
from the water, the Athenians a naval battle from the shore; — and again, in the Sicilian 
war, the land armies of both parties on the beach, whilst a naval engagement is yet un- 
der decision on the water, sympathising in all the contest, adjusting themselves to all 
the various turns of battle, by new attitudes, quick contortions of the body; — ^All these 
things are set before the readers in actual representation, in all the disposition, all the 
expression and perspicuity, of picture." Though the whole course of the history, a 
battle either at land or sea is an object clear and distinct. The writer is never confound- 
ed himself, nor throws confusion on his reader. That reader sees the whole, from the 
psan of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he discerns the whole train of fight, and 
beholds exactly the loss or gain of the victory. He further assists at the assemblies of 
the people, and all important consultations. He learns the state of affairs from the 
managers themselves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the assembly, 
pries into all the politics, and preconceives the resolution. Where the politics are 
bad, he will own no other could be expected from those who recommend them. Where 
they are sound and good, nor wilfully severed from duty to their country, and in 
moral consistence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, 
and think he hath been himself discovering the fine maxims which the author hath 
been teaching, who never appears in person, never puffs his own integrity and discern- 
ment, and without digressing into comments or setting up for a politician, is found 
upon reflection the best of the kind that ever wrote. 

To quote passages for the truth of his sublime thought or his pathetic address, would 
be to transcribe the greater part of the following history. They will be observed in the 
orations of these two different casts, and the incidents of the work. His figures are 
thickset; the figures that regard both the sentiment and the diction. His metaphors 
are strong and uncommon; his hyperboles far but not overstretched, the tone is still 
preserved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midst of some grand circumstance. 
The figures in which he most delights, are the Interrogation; the Change of number and 
time; the Hyperbaton, or transposing and inverting the order of things which seem 
naturally united and inseparable; and above all, the Antithesis. This last he hath 
fondly used, almost to satiety. Term is not only opposed to term, but thought to 

* On the Sublime. Section 14. t De gloria Atheniensium. 



xxviii ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 

thought, sentence to sentence, and sometimes whole orations to one another even 
where the latter speaker cannot possibly be supposed to have heard the former. A 
constant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. 
I am sensible there should have been more variety to make the whole quite beauti- 
ful and graceful. 

As the fourth constituent of sublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and 
graceful expression, our author's claim cannot be so well established. Noble un- 
doubtedly he is, but as for the graceful — the reader may wish he had been more careful 
in this particular, and I* am sure his translator wishes it from his heart. For fear of being 
vulgar, he is too set and solemn; and from the passion to be always great, he hath lost the 
air of ease and genteelness, Dionysius of Halicarnassus says he studiously affected 
hard and obsolete words. But yet the same writer sets him up as the standard of Attic 
purity; nay, hath frequently strengthened his own style by using the hard and obsolete 
words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this respect 
fallen half-way short: and more so, in the fifth constituent of sublimity, composition or 
structure of his periods. He hath no harmony , hath given little or no proof of having 
a good ear. He is rough, austere; his periods are sometimes a mile long, in which he la- 
bours himself both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his imperfections, and beg 
the reader would weigh them and set them in the balance with his excellencies: he may- 
judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly, affects surprisingly; 
his expression is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor cheer- 
ful. But, though his pieces are not so completely finished as to stand every test, 
yet they are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar style, and for greatness of 
design and strength of expression are beyond every other hand. 

I think no fair comparison can be made of him, except with the historians who are 
his countrymen, who like himself are original in their own way, and the first in their 
manner. These are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucy- 
dides was junior a Uttle to the former, and senior to the latter. In stateliness, gran- 
. deur, and majesty, he far surpasseh them both. The manner of Herodotus is grace- 
ful and manly; his address is engaging; he loves to tell a story; and, however fabulous 
or trifling that story, he will be heard with pleasure. The course of his history is 
clear and smooth, and yields a most cheerful prospect: that of Thucydides is deep, 
rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly 
perceive the bottom of the one: but it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the other. 
Herodotus, like a master on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harshness 
sink down into the lowest and mellowest notes. Thucydides sounds the trumpet; 
his blasts are sonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial strain.* Xenophon 
never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful simplicity; he is sweeter than 
honey; he charms every ear; the Muses themselves could not sing sweeter than he 
hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in some particular points. Each 
hath his particular excellence: that of Herodotus is gracefulness; that of Thucydides, 
grandeur; and that of Xenophon, sweetness itself. If generals, and admirals, and 
statesmen, were to award the first rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucy- 
dides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in gen* 
eral who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing. 

As to the Roman historians, who saw what these mighty originals had done before 

* Canii guodammodo belHeum, Cicero in the Orator. 



AS AN HISTORIAN. zxiz 

them, I cannot judge it fair to form decisive parallels. Time had enabled them to 
judge maturely about defects and excellencies of their Greek predecessors. Yet 
every Roman historian shows plainly he is a Roman himself; he stood not so aloof from 
his subject as Thucydides. The loss of a Feloponnesian writer is never regretted in 
regard to the latter: the loss of Carthaginian and historians of other nations is highly 
regretted in regard to the former. National partiality will admit no comparison here, 
though excellence of composition may admit a great deal. Sallust is the only one 
who seems to have had our Author ever in his eye, and to have been his professed 
imitator. Sallust frequently translates his political maxims, copies him exactly in 
the conciseness and laboured energy of his phrase; and Sallust, for that reason, is 
like him very often obscure. It is entirely in his manner, that he draws up his ora- 
tions, contrasts his speakers, and fights his battles. Sallust hath many, hath deserv- 
edly many admirers: and I hope, if I am so fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more 
general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will bestow regard upon the other, 
and pay due honour to his historic progenitor. 

I shall wind up this essay on Thucydides as an historian with a passage from the 
Critic on the Sublime,'" only desiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance^ 
as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and prose— 

" I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are by no means pure 
and correct, since whatever is neat and accurate throughout, must be exceedingly lia- 
ble to flatness. In the Sublime, as in great affluence of fortune, some minuter articles 
will unavoidably escape observation. But it is almost impossible for a low and grovel- 
ling genius to be guilty of error, since he never endangers himself by soaring on high, or 
aiming at eminence, but still goes on in the same uniform secure track, whilst its 
very height and grandeur exposes the Sublime to sudden falls. Nor am I ignorant in- 
deed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in passing our judgment 
upon the works of an author, we always muster his imperfections, so that the remem- 
brance of his faults sticks indelibly fast in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies 
is quickly worn out. For my part, I have taken notice of no inconsiderable number 
of faults in Homer, and some other of the greatest authors, and cannot by any means 
be blind or partial to them; however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, so much 
as accidental slips incurred though inadvertence: such as, when the mind is intent 
upon things of a higher nature, will creep insensibly into compositions. And for 
this reason 1 gave it as my real opinion, that the great and noble flights, though they 
cannot every where boast an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry oflf the prize 
by the sole merit of their own intrinsic grandeur." 

* Longinos, Section 33. 
02 



% 



DISCOURSE III. 



SURVEY OF THE HISTORY 



In the preceding discourse we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of 
our author for writing history, and settled his character. Let us now take a view of 
the work itself; first casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the 
whole; and then surveying it more distinctly in its parts. 

The disposition of the whole is most elaborately exact. Order is scrupulously 
observed; and every incident so faithfully arranged in its proper time, that some have 
doubted whether annals were not a more proper title for it than history. If we should 
call it annals, it must be owned at the same time that annals were never composed with 
80 much majesty and spirit; and never was history more accurately distinguished by the 
punctuality of dates so nicely interwoven. Thucydides states every occurrence in 
just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to make frequent transitions, 
and to drop aparticular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be 
most fixed upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a disappointment 
here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it 
regularly resumed in due place and time; and they at once may satisfy their own cu- 
riosity, without disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing that work which he 
was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They will afterwards for- 
give, perhaps applaud him, for his great-care to prevent confusion, and to give a neat 
and precise conception of all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, -when he is 
necessitated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such transitions; and, 
when we have been amused with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of his- 
tory, but is really a coincidence of events not to pass unheeded; when we have been 
so long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excursion at all; yet 
we are glad to see him re-connect, and land us on a spot, where we are already well 
acquainted. He shows a steady and inviolable attachment to chronology, a necessary 
attendant upon history But the chronology of Thucydides is like a herald, that ex- 
actly marshals a long stately procession, adjusts the rank, clears the way, and preserves 
every step distinct and unincumbered. 

No writer had done this before him. No settled era was yet in use, not even the 
famous one of the Olympiad. The several states of Greece computed time by a method 
of their own. It was not easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The 
Athenians reckoned by their annual archons; the Lacedemonians by their ephori; the 
Argi ves by the years of the priestess of Juno. The seasons of the year, when the two 
former entered on their ofiices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time; 

XXX 



A SURVEY OP THE HISTORY. xxri 

the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, sinee it depended on the death 
or removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to avoid confusion, left all these artificial 
jarring rules, and adhered to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into 
halves, into a summer and winter. His summer includes the spring, and reaches 
from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in his 
winter. He always records eclipses, as strange events, and proper concomitants for 
the horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine, that he supposed 
such appearances might some time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and as- 
tronomy be made the faithful guide of chronology. 

Book I. — The First Book of Thucydides is mtroductory to the rest. It is a compre- 
hensive elaborate work of itself. It clears away rubbish, opens a view from the 
earliest ages, strikes out light from obscurity, and truth from fable; that the reader may 
enter upon the Feloponnesian war with a perfect insight into the state of Greece, and the 
schemes, interest, and strength, of the contending parties. The author unfolds his 
design in writing, magnifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of 
mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and furnishes us with the 
knowledge of everything proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention 
with judgment and discernment, when the point contended for is no less than the 
sovereignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow. 

He begins at the source, and traces the original of the G-reek communities from 
certain and indisputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural 
barrenness of the soil, which tempted no invasions; and from the shelter its inhabitants 
gave to all who would settle amongst them, and share their polity. — He shows the 
invention of shipping to have been exceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea 
with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling them 
suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry oflf and secure their booty. No considerable 
commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such 
annoyance. And when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could be 
opened for traffic, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was merely the instrument of 
ready conveyance from place to place: it was not yet become an engine of attack and 
defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with success to 
obtain a naval strength,'*' by which he cleared the isles of the pirates, who hati settled 
upon them toset out readier from thence on their plundering excursions. — The grand 
fleet that carried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of transports. 
Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this cele- 
brated era,t the Corinthians were the first people of Greece, who became in reality a 
maritime power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and opportunity 
for commerce; and commerce must have strength to guard and support it. They first 
improved a vessel of burden into a ship of war,| and set power afloat as well as wealth. 
Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their example, and, though 
originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at sea. They fought on their 
own darling element for superiority. || This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was 
not decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; 
till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the 
ascendant over them both, and to assert the empire of the sea for itself. 

• TeaiB before Christ 1006. f Before Christ 904. 

X Before Christ 697. || Before Christ 657. 



xzxii SURVEY OP 

The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occasioned 
their most recent embroilment,* and a hot war, in which the Corcyreans applied for 
the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the first pretext 
for the Peloponnesian war, and therefore our author opens the affair at large. Athens 
held the balance of power in her hands: how she came to be possessed of it, will 
Boon give room for as pertinent a digression as Thucydides could have wished* 
Ambassadors from both parties are soon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; 
the other, to traverse their negotiation. The people of Athens, in whom the supreme 
power was vested, admitted them both to audience, and orations of course must 
follow. Our grave historian is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to 
mount the stage, who are very well worth hearing. 

The Corcyreans, who take the lead, recognize " the necessity of alliances, which, 
though sometimes entanglements, are generally security and defence. Wronged as 
they now are, they sue for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, 
the Athenians would show honour and virtue, and at the same time promote their own 
private interest. Th^ accession of the naval strength of Corcyra to their own was very 
well worth the gaining; in the end, it might preserve their state .—They open the nature 
of colonies, show the original contract between them and the mother-country? obedi- 
ence and protection are reciprocal, and imply one another.— They prove that Athens 
may grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engagements; by doing it, may 
secure herself in time against the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians; since the 
naval strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter in a future war, wilt 
be weak and ineffectual against the combined fleets of Corcyra and Athens.'' 

The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the Corcyreans. They 
describe them as ** a very designing iniquitous set of men, and a colony in the high- 
est degree undutiful to its mother-state. They endeavour to prove it unjust, and 
ungrateful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal 
behaviour. They maintain, that true honour points out another conduct; and schemes 
of interest should never supersede the laws of equity and good faith. What may 
happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions is strictly right. 
They entreat at last, though with a menacing air; and close with warmly adjuring 
the Athenians to stand neutral in the quarrel." 

The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. 
The war is renewed; and the Athenians send the Corcyreans a petty aid, which they 
afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are 
baffled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and never will forgive them. 

Another affair soon happens to embroil them more, and to make the second pretext 
for a general war. Potidsea, a town in the isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian 
colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays, 
and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast to Thrace and Macedonia, would 
enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of a rupture. They order it therefore 
to be dismantled. The Potideeans refuse obedience, and revolt. A war ensues. The 
Athenians attempt to reduce PotidsBa; and the Corinthians to support the revolt. It 
is at length besieged by the former. The siege runs out into a great length of time, 
and at last becomes one of the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war. 

The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of resentments, and leave no 

* Before Christ 438. 



THE HISTORY. «xni 

etone unturned to stir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themselves in 
the Feloponnesian league, of which the Lacedemonians were the head. The Corin- 
thians never set up for a leading state. They were ever content with the secondary 
rank, though the first in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. 
Commerce had long since made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, 
though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet they never piqued them- 
selves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had 
rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of 
the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, that of Sarone, was now entirely in the jurisdiction 
of the Athenians, who had also begun to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of 
Crissa. They were consequently bent on the demolition of this all-grasping rival, but 
were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all the confederates to re- 
pair to Lacedemon, all full of complaint and remonstrance against the Athenians. The 
Corinthians reserve themselves for the finishing charge; and our author repeats (or 
makes for them) their most inveigling and alarming speech on this occasion. 

** They address the Lacedemonians with an artful mixture of commendation and 
reproach; of commendation, for their strict adherence to good faith; of reproach, for 
their indolence and sloth. They had suffered the state of Athens to grow too migh- 
ty for her neighbours. Though the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, they had 
now for a length of time taken no notice of the encroachments of the Athenians; 
but, through wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow too big, 
and able now to enslave them all.-^They do all they can to irritate and provoke them. 
They draw an admirable parallel between them and the Athenians; invidious and 
reproachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they want to exasper^ 
ate. — Then, they warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedemonians; 
they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to 
abandon their league, unless they exert themselves in defence of their friends; they 
endeavour to prove the necessity of active and vigorous measures; and end with a 
very artful stroke of insinuating and persuasive address." 

An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedemon, being informed of these loud 
and bitter outcries against their masters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, 
they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedemonians, as their judges or su« 
periors — ^Athenians scorn such self-debasement; but to vindicate their state from mis- 
representations, to clear her reputation, and justify her power. 

" With this view, they run over the great services they had done to Greece, in the 
time of the Persian invasions: they had ever been the most strenuous, most disinterest- 
ed, and most gallant, champions for liberty. They pompously detail their battles of 
Marathon and Salamis: their evacuating Athens on the last occasion: and when they 
bad no polity of their own subsisting, fighting ardently and successfully for the other 
communities of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned; and must they forego it, 
because it was enviedl They had honourably gained, and justly used it; much more 
justly, than the Lacedemonians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are 
calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common to mankind,, who ever 
hate and abuse their superiors, and ever repine at subjection though to the most gentle 
masters. — Lacedemonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command, and 
though most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage it with any measure of dexteri- 
ty and address. They should reflect again and again, before they ventured upon war: it 
might last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than ihey seemed willing to ap^ 

5 



MXJdr BURVEt OF 

preh«nd. They had better submit their complaints to fair arbitration: if not, the 
Athenians invoke the gode to witness their readiness to defend themselTes, whenev- 
er and however their enemies shall attack them.'' 

All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedemonians go to counsel amongst them 
^Ives. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the speech of the Atheni- 
ans, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus one of their 
kings, rose up to temper their fUry. And the speech of his Spartan majesty on this 
occasion carries all the marks of a good king, an able statesman, and a thorough patriot: 
it does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure 
but at the head of an army: then he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no 
selfish considerations; they are lost in his regard for the public welfare. 

He tells them, " he is not fbnd-of war himself; raw unexperienced youth alone is li- 
able to such weakness. The war now under consideration is a most important point. It 
may run out into a great length of time. It is against Athenians— a remote people^a na- 
val power — ^abounding in wealth — excellently provided in all respects. He demands. 
In every single article, whether they can presume to become a match for such antago- 
Bistsl They ishould remember the high spirit, the habits of activity and perseverance so 
natural to these Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the first loss, nor frightened at 
big words or haughty threats. Insults indeed must not be brooked; but adequate pre- 
parations should be made to avenge them, and time be gained to make such prepara- 
tions. It would be most prudent to begin a negotiation, to spin it out into length. If 
affairs can be amicably adjusted, it would deserve their choice; — ^if not, when they are 
competently enabled , it will be soon enough to act offensively. He dreads not war him- 
«elf, yet war cannot be carried on without money. Ample funds must be provided, a 
work of time and deliberation. Circumspection is no real reproach; precipitation draws 
positive mischiefs after it. Lacedemonians are used to be calm and considerate; they 
should not now be cajoled or exasperated out of their judgment. The Athenians are a 
wise and dextrous people. The Lacedemonians should keep that in remembrance, and 
support their own character of calmness of spirit and true manly resolution: they should 
begin with caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they can; if not, 
when duly prepared and adequately provided, they might trust the decision to arms.** 

The kings of Sparta were ever jostled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing 
Ephori. Sthenelaidas, one of that college, answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, 
properly Laconic speech. " He is severe upon the Athenians, sneers Archidamus, 
^nd avers that Lacedemonians should not deliberate upon, but instantly tak^ the 
field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the question — whether the peace was 
broken?^-divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the English style, that 
the Ays had it. 

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the resolution. Yet, 
it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried some weight, and actual war was to 
be deferred, till all the parties in the Lacedemonian league had ripened thehr mea- 
sures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigour. 

Here the author again makes his appearance, and assures us the true motive of the 
determination for a war at Sparta, was a jealousy of the Athenian power, now very 
great, and a dread of its more extensive growth; the latter of which they were deter- 
mined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less distasteful and terrific bounds. 

Then follows a most pertinent digression, in which Thucydides points out the steps 
by which the Athenians had so highly exalted their state. In a close and succinct man- 



THE HISTORY. ivxv 

jDerheruzus over the history of Athens for fifty years, from the inT&siou of Zerxes to 
the breaking out of the Feloponnesiau war. He arranges all the incidents in due 
place and time, Herodotus hath related the splendid passages of the Grecian history 
during that invasion; hath exhibited Themistocles in all the lustre of his command at the 
battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and, 
through the address of Themistocles obliged all parties to fight, for Uberty against 
Xerxes, On this day they earned a greater title than that of citizens of Athens; they 
were afterwards acknowledged the sovereigns of the sea. The Lacedemonians be« 
came mortified at it; but the Athenians had gloriously deserved it. Themistocles was 
the very life and soul of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difilculties he formed 
a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. 
Thucydides describes his address and foresight. He soon sets the city beyond the 
reach of envy and jealousy. And though soon afler he lost his country, through the mal- 
ice of his personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, 
yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his plan of naval power; and the 
steps of its progress and advancement are mutually traced out by our historian. 

Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The Long Walls were built; 
the Pineus, aspacious harbour, opened and fortified , a magazine for traffic , and an arsen- 
al for war, Aristides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through 
his honest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their 
common liberty against future invasions; and the leaders at sea were made collectors 
and treasurers of this naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, atfirst, of lodging 
this fund; but it was soon after removed to Athens ;-^a shrewd political step, yet capa- 
ble however of an ample, if not full, justification. The war is briskly carried on against 
the Persian monarch; the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on 
the coast are regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his part nobly; he earns two 
victories the same day, by eea and land, on the coast of Ionia, from the Persians. 
He completed a negotiation with the petty maritime states, confederate with Athens, 
who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money instead of ships 
and personal attendance* By this means the shipping of those states soon mould* 
ered away, and their money was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and 
strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the opposition, which the 
Corinthians and Boeotians gave them at home^ whose rancour to them was never to 
be appeased, in the course of no large number of years they had established a very 
extensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of the ^gean sea 
were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was entirely in their own jurisdiction: 
and, by being masters of Naupactus, they considerably awed the bay of Crissa. 
Their squadrons cruised round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their 
interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the 
naval strength of Gorcyra> rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colony 
fiiee to extend their traffic and influence both in ^aly and Sicily. 

These points are opened step by step in this digression by Thucydides, till jealou- 
sy in the Lacedemonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesi- 
an states and their alliee agdnst them, and ended in the determination for war. The 
Corinthians had now earried their point, and hoped soon to gratify all their resentments. 
Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Bparta, when all the rest of the states 
had declared their minds, they warmly encourage th^n to enter at once upon an 
offensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech. 



xiz?i SURVEY OF 

** They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedemonians. - They animate 
the land states of Peloponnesus to join effectually with those on the coasts. A firm 
and lasting peace can only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens 
must needs be reduced.— They open a plan — ^for establishing funds — for weakening 
the marine of Athens, and consequently for improving and strengthening the marine 
of her enemies — for effectuating the revolts of her dependents — and raising fortifi- 
cations in Attica itself Independence can never be earned at too great a price; it 
costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves. A single state should never be 
suffered to play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity, their lib- 
erty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay, the very gods themselves, summon 
them to action. They close with a very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding 
as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens." 

No w war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready , with 
the utmost despatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time the Athenians are to be 
amused with embassies and negotiations, merely to gain time and save appearances. 
Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an 
opportunity of introducing some notable passages relating toCymon,Pausanias, and 
Themistocles. He then shifts the scene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the most 
commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consummate statesmen, and at this 
time prime minister of the republic — introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the 
people, to give themaninsightinto the schemes of their enemies,and apian for theirown 
conduct; to encourage them to a brave and steady resistance, in strict adherence to 
such methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely secure but aggrandise their state. 

The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous, so emphatically and 
concisely just, that if the reader be not immediately struck into an adequate conception 
of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He 
says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolishes all the assertions of 
the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta, as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps 
Thueydides here hath not sufficiently concealed his art in writing, fiut the speech is 
entirely in character, completely suited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. 
Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an Englishman both in heart and judgment. 
England hath adhered and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot. 
— «* Of vast consequence indeed," says this enlightened statesman, " is the dominion 
of the sea. But consider it with attention. For, were we seated on an island," as the 
force of his argument evidently implies, << we could never be subdued. And now you 
ought to think, that our present situation is as nearly as possible the same, and so to evac- 
uate your houses and lands in Attica, and to confine your defence to the sea. If this can 
need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his Polity of the Athenians. — ^^ In one point,'* 
says he, << the Athenians are deficient. For if, beside their being sovereigns of the sea, 
they were seated on an island, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleas- 
ure, and yet they could not be ravaged themselves so long as they held the mastery at 
sea; their lands could never be laid waste, no enemy could post themselves upon them. 
But now, the occupiers of labds and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilst 
the people in general, conscious they have nothing to be burnt and nothing to be 
plundered , live exempt from fear nor fly before an invader. The expedient used on such 
occasions is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the isles, and trusting 
to their superiority at sea, slight all the devastations an enemy can make in Attica.'* 
England is complete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Pericles 



THE HISTORY. xxxvii 

and Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power of Great Britain! I will not 
pretend to anticipate the reader's pleasure by descending into more particularities. 
It may suffice to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the ad- 
vice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by command; they had already offered 
to refer all disputes to ^ fair judicial decision: so far only, but no farther, compliance 
must be expected from Athens." — Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war 
will very soon commence. 

Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of Thucydides. It 
is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath over- 
done it '< out of a desire of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the 
portal have been thought too stately, if the whole fabric had been completely finished? 
To form a right judgment here, we should examine the design and not the execution: 
the latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the Park, the Banqueting-house 
at Whitehall is too big for what stands near it. But halh it that appearance in the 
original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erected? 
Something of this nature may justly be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach 
us not to judge too hastily of a whole, when we cannot survey all the parts, because 
they never were finished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify my author, 
but I by no means pretend to decide the point. 

Book II, — The second book opens with the first act of hostility. The Thebans 
march by night, and enter by surprise the city of Platasa. This city and petty state, 
though just within Boeotia, was not comprised in the union, of which all the other 
cities of BcBOtia were constituents, with Thebes at their head; but had ever been 
firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was 
under the protection of, and in fast alliance with Athens. This surprise of Plattea 
our author describes in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out or slaughtered, 
and a place is secured for the Athenians. 

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides 
sounds the charge in all the disposition and spirit of Homer. He catalogues the al- 
lies on both sides. He awakens our expectation; and fast engages our attention. All 
mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavours 
are made to disclose futurity. Heaven itself is interested in the dispute. The earth tot- 
ters, and nature seems to labour with the great event. This is his solemn and sublime 
manner of setting out. Thus he magnifies a war between two, asRapinstyles them petty 
states; and thus artfully he supports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble 
method. 

Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic size of the Roman 
empire,if they cast their eyes on the state of Athens even at the present juncture, are 
apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the highest meridian 
of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disadvantageous and incon- 
gruous parallels? His subject was certainly the greatest that to his day had occurred 
in the world: and ought Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because 
he was not born in the same age with Livy? As much amusement at least accompanies 
and as much instruction flows from reading carefully the history of Athens, as from 
that of Rome. Wonder may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in 
detestation of a people who became enormously great by the miseries and destruction 
of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men; they were not tol- 
erably humanized till they had conquered Greece, Greece reconquered them, and 

D 



xxxvrn SURVEY OF 

established a better, more lasting triumph over mind, than the others over body. 

Grsecia capta ferum victorem cepit. — Hor, 

Who then best deserves the applause of the heart; the citizens of Athens, or the citizens 
of Rome? I atn not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and considerate spirit will 
decide the question. Or, let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more 
sedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty state, which could 
be magnified and ennobled only by artifice. The first army, that invaded her territo- 
ries in this war, consisted (according to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an 
object big enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value of mon- 
ey is adjusted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were possessed, at the breaking 
out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of 
them were at one time in commission, in the fourth year of the war; consequently, 
at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must have been fifty 
thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a petty state, 
nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one should set 
down to Thucydides with such low prepossessions against his subject. 

The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assembled, and ready to march 
into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general 
he harangues his troops, " encourages them with a sight of their own numbers, but 
guards them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The strict obser- 
vation of discipline is always necessary to armies, be they ever so large. No enemy 
ought ever to be despised, much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in 
high commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their characters. He 
ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe rules, conform to discipline, and 
bravely to execute orders; and, Spartan -like, concludes with an encomium on the 
beauty and strength of strict military obedience." 

He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The 
Athenians are as determined as ever to make no submissions. The messenger is con- 
ducted out of their territories, and parts from his escort with a pathetic prediction of 
the miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon after is invaded. 
The mischief done by the invaders is described; and the sense at Athens of their suffer- 
ings and distresses represented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into 
the form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how they began to 
be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theseus, one of their earliest 
kings. Other historians expatiate on the method, by which, from being under a regal, 
they had varied gradually into a purely republican form. I shall only mention an ob- 
servation,* that, contrary to most other nations, they had abolished the regal govern- 
ment, not from distaste but reverence to kings. . Codrus, the last of their kings, had de- 
voted himself for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved no mortal 
should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They declared Jupiter king of Athens, 
about the same time that the Jews rebelled against theocracy, and would have a man 
to reign over them. Archons for life succeeded; whose term was afterwards abridged 
to ten years; then, to a single year. All general histories point out the variations, 
till they came to the popular form which now prevailed. 

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians 
take the field to retaliate upon them. Their squadron had been all the time at sea, 
cruising upon and infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are 

* TourreiPs Preface Historique. 



THE HISTORY. zzm 

called to Athens to see the public funeral of those who were killed in the first campaign. 
Here, the first time it occurs, our author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes 
the funeral oration. 

I shall make no reflections on this celebrated performance. Should -the reader not 
think it deserving of its high reputation, I fear the translator will be sadly to blame. 
It is hard to give such noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their 
due exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to display their abil- 
ities on the same occasion. Plato hath entered the lists with a high spirit of emula- 
tion, and with a high degree of success: and a great master * this way hath lately 
made him English. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the unlearn- 
ed but judicious reader is empowered to make, the latter must be entreated to observe, 
that the eloquence of Plato was beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accom- 
plished in all that is beautiful and sweet, than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an ad- 
judged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the door of his translator. 

After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it must have been to all who 
heard it, and must have determined every Athenian to suffer any thing with intrepidity 
and patience in the causeof his country, a very mournful scene immediately succeeds, 
which lays them under such a heavy load of affliction and distress, as no arguments, no 
philosophy, can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader must be 
ready to feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of mo- 
rality and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated distresses, Pericles is the only su pport 
of the community; and, like the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for be- 
ing their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the right. At last he 
convenes them, and addresses them with such an air of ingenuity, such spirit, and con 
Bcious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cause, as only two orators that I know of hav* 
ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are Demosthenes and St Paul. All 
the world of letters and good taste are well acquainted with the oration of the former 
against .£schines about the crown; and every class of readers is surely well versed in the 
Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. I can but hint these resemblances, since 
now I must attend on Pericles, who sooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their 
discontent and malice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic 
distress soon effaceth any other impressions; their passions are again inflamed by in- 
wardly corroding anguish; and Pericles after all must be fined, and turned out of his 
employments. Yet people are not always mad ; good -sense and conviction return u pon 
them; and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept the sole administration. 
He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then 
lost her ablest, honestest statesman. He was able to have sat at the helm of govern- 
ment, to have steered the republic safe through every storm, and to have insured her 
not bare security but open triumph. His successors were very alert at catching hold 
of that helm; but none of them could hold it long; and the vessel, through their mu- 
tual quarrels, must needs run aground or founder at last. 

But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of the Peloponnesians to 
Invest Plataea, and the solemn parley held at their approach. Archidamus is at the 
head of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since 
theallianceofBoeotiain this war is of mighty consequence, and to be purchased at any 
rate. Archidamus indeed siruggles hard lor the Plataeans; he would fain spare them, 
could he persuade tham lo a neulcalUy. But the Platesans have too much honour and 

• Mr Wegt. 



zl SURVEY OF 

gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally 
struck at. They remonstrate in vain from the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, 
the glory and sanction of the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, 
and strenuously plied, though without success. Oar author always shines in exact 
description; no method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned 
into a blockade; and a sufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the 
main army marcheth off. 

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An 
Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupactus in the bay of Crissa, awed all the motions 
of the Corinthians and allies on their own coasts; and it was determined, to clear away this 
annoyance. Accordingly they launch out against it with more than double the number 
of vessels. The Athenians, at one exertion of skill, drive them all on a heap, defeat 
them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedemonians, excellent land men, bat 
very awkward seamen, think this an unaccountable event. They send down their 
most active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again 
at sea. Much artifice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the admi- 
rals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Fhormio at length is snared; 
the enemy blunders; then Fhormio extricates himself, and gives them a second de- 
feat. The reader sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel. 

Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise the Pirseus by night, 
and to finish the war in a moment. The project is described, and the probability of 
success established. But the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. 
Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into great consternation; but the project total- 
ly miscarries, and the Firseus is better secured for the future. 

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Ferdiccas king of Macedonia. A 
vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches over a great length of country, strikes 
a general panic, effectuates no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away.. 
Such bulky unwieldy armies make an awkward figure, compared with the regular- 
ity, exact discipline, and personal bravery, of the diminutive armies of Greece. 

Thucydides gives us once more a sight of Fhormio and his gallant squadron; and 
thencloseth the book, and the history of the third year of the war. " Never history," 
says Rapin, << comprised so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few 
words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too closely 
crowded with one another^ so that the coherence seems somewhat intricate and con- 
fused, and the multiplying of objects tends only to dissipate the attention of the reader." 
An historian however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they subsist in 
fact. He is not so much to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter perti- 
nently, accurately, and with due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted him. 
self of his duty. The poet or writer of fiction must pick out and heighten his incidents* 
with a view to fill up properly, and give to every distinct object its needful splendour: 
he is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain applause. The his- 
torian is not to pick, but to make the best use of his materials. He may give them 
indeed all possible lustre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader 
may be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly blamed. 

Book III. The Third Book is no less full of matter than the preceding. The inci- 
dents crowd fast upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The 
revolt of Lesbos is the first occurrence of importance. The people <^ that isle had 
been long in the Athenian league: but the members of this league were dependents 



THE HISTORY. x» 

rather than confederates. Thucydides always employs the same Grenk wcnrd (c«i»/mix«») 
for the members of either league: the idea it gives is that of companions in war 
But there is great difference between such as accompany, because they choose !t; and 
such ajs accompany, because they are summoned and cannot help it. The former was 
in general the case of those who sided with Sparta; the latter, of those who sided 
with Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any state, which thinks 
it ought, and is able to be quite independent. This was the case with the Lesbians, 
a people considerable in many respects, but especially fcr their naval strength. It 
is w^ell worth the while of the Lacedemonians to gain such confederates^ it must be 
a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such dependents. The fact was, all the cities- 
of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are 
at once with a powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylene- 
ans had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedemonians. They had 
an audience from them and the rest of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games 
were ended. The speech they make on this occasion is very artful, very insinua* 
ting, and nicely adapted to carry their point. 

'* They open the nature of a revolt, and the cases in which it merits protection and 
succour from others. They have been ill used by the Athenians; have been made 
their tools in enslaving their compatriots of Greece; have been long caressed indeed, but 
are well assured what their own fate would soon have been. Every state hath a 
natural right to take preventive measures against the loss of their liberty, and to stand 
on their defence. They had revolted sooner, would the Lacedemonians have conn 
tenanced the measure: they had declared it on the first invitation of the Boeotians^ 
It was a noble revolt; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave the rest 
of Greece; it had associated them in the cause of honour and liberty. It had been made 
indeed with too much precipitation; but this should make others more zealous and 
active in their protection, who would reap a great accession of strength by it; an ac 
cession of maritime strength; whilst the Athenians would be weakened in point of 
shipping, and in point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others, and 
assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would reflect abundant honour 
on the Lacedemonians to succour the distressed, to save men whose preservation 
would give them glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to liberty,, 
which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them to be.'' 

Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to insure their success. But the lat* 
ter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedemonians, who resolve on 
sending them a succour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige 
them to raise the siege of Mitylene. 

The blockade of Platssa by the Peloponnesians still continuing, our author relates 
the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Flatssans, in ma- 
king their escape over all the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantiaT 
and a most clear and intelligible relation. 

Mitylene is now forced to surrender at discretion. The principal agents in the revolt 

are sent prisoners to Athens, where the people vote that ** not they only but all the Mi* 

tyleneans in general be put to death; and an order is immediately despatched to their 

commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence. This bloody decree was 

carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he who worked up the people of Athens 

to such a pitch of inhumanity; which, however, instantly subsided r They are stmcfc 
6 n2 



xlii SURVEY OF 

with horror at their own resolution, and will have it again debated. We shall hear 
the two speakers on each side of the question, Cleon and Diodotus. 

<< Gleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man who hath a bad heart. He hath 
abjured humanity to show himself a most zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged 
to have been, and so appears in his invectives against his own masters andhisowntoolSy 
the people, for their foolish commiseration, for their being the eternaldupes of orators, of 
subtle and venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country; and hates her 
enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on the 
Mityleneans; none but their pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted 
can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all foolish pity, all 
womanish forbearance; to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on 
the horrors of their punishment: and give this proof to their dependents, that death 
shall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, that their arms may be henceforth employ- 
ed in opposing their public enemies, and not in chastising their own subjects." 

Diodotus replies in a speech that shows him a real patriot, and who thought good 
manners, a calm considerate temper, and a regard to humanity, to be very consistent 
with the true patriot spirit. " He there defends the re-committing of their former re- 
solution, since repeated consultations cannot be prejudicial to the public welfare. It is 
a base and odious method, to lavish the charge of ignorance and venality on men who 
differ in sentiment; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and sincerest friends. 
Strict justice, in the present instance, may be with Cleon; but the future and lasting 
welfare of their country is the object now apt to be kept in view. The punishment of 
death hath never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men desperate is 
very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping off their own limbs, and ruining 
their own revenue. Men should be retained in their duty by mild discretionary precau- 
tions; severe and sanguinary proceedings never answer the purpose. And what cruelty, 
to doom a whole people to destruction! to involve the innocent with the guilty! to mur- 
der even such as had been their friends and benefactors! He advises them not to give 
too large a scope to mercy, but to punish the guilty, and the guilty alone. This will 
sufficiently intimidate others; will secure their interest in Lesbos better for the future; 
and convince the world how soundly Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns." 

Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in fits of choler, but habitually 
humane, repeal the bloody sentence; and despatch a vessel with all haste to stop exe- 
cution, which arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre. 

The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedemonian character with that of the 
Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and obvious 
to pass unobserved. — ^Flatsea, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine tosurrender. 
They surrender however to the Lacedemonians, on condition of being brought to a ju- 
dicial trial, and only if found guilty of unjust behaviour, to be put to death. Some dele- 
gates arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition, since thewhole pro- 
cess is confined to a single question — ^«* Whether they had done any positive service to 
the Lacedemonians and allies" — that is, to their declared and determined enemies — << in 
the present warl" The question plainly manifested a deliberate resolution to put them all 
to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying 
speech before men who were styled indeed judges, but in fact were butchers. It was 
a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with all that natural elo- 
quence which flows from an inward and keen sensibility. If men were not deaf to per- 



THE HISTORY. xliii 

suasion, it must have persuaded. The cause was most alarming, and a more pathet- 
ic plea hath never been exhibited. 

<* They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they had surrendered to the Lace- 
demonians, whereas now they were prejudged and precondemned to gratify their unre- 
lenting foes the The bans. The insidious question left them no plea at all. They 
could not answer it, and must not be silent. Since life is at stake, something must 
be said even by men who despair of persuading. Their quarrel with the Thebans 
had been just and honourable; quarrel with the Lacedemonians they never had any. 
Nay, merely at the desire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendship, that 
unpardonable crime for which they were now doomed to destruction. They expati- 
ate with truth and energy on the great services they had done to the liberty of Greece. 
All Grreece was bound in honour, in gratitude, in deference to positive and solemn 
oaths, to preserve the Flataeans. Ought every tie to be rent asunder, generosity to be 
quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aside, to serve a private turn? Ought Flatae- 
ans to be thus basely reduced, as they really had been, either to be starved or to be butch- 
ered3 The Lacedemonians should entreat the Thebans for them, should beg them to save 
the lives of friends and benefactors; at least, should replace them within their walls, 
and leave them to the fate of war. They apply to their generosity, to their human- 
ity; to strive to give them some emotions of pity; they represent the liableness of 
mankind to calamity; how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how sinful it 
is to be resolutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth to interpose in their 
behalf; they run over every pathetic and persuasive topic; till they can add no more, 
and yet dare not end; and again entreat the Lacedemonians to save those worthy 
patriots to whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence." 

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedemonians had a higher sense of honour 
and gratitude than they really had, demand also to be heard. 

In the speech they made on this occasion, ** they first accuse the Flataeans of slander 
and invective. They endeavour to palliate the reproach on themselves for deserting the 
cause of liberty and joining the arms of Fersia. The Flataeans had been active ever 
since to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked scheme, which with all their power the 
Thebans had ever opposed. By such iniquitous conduct the Flataeans had extinguish- 
ed their former glory, and effaced all their former merits. Nobody was bound to re- 
dress or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had been always 
bad; always bent on violence and mischief; always addicted to tyranny in Greece, 
provided Athenians were the tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an anti-pathet- 
ic into their own representations. They paint the death of their countrymen slain 
at the surprise of Plataea in a mournful light, as put to death contrary to every law, 
and murdered in the very act of stretching out their hands and pleading a promise 
of life. The lives therefore of such butchers are forfeited to justice; and they insist 
the forfeit shall be taken: the Lacedemonians are bound in honour to take it. They 
beg them therefore to be deaf to vain complaints and entreaties, to revenge the injur- 
ed, and to punish the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what they 
have said; to defy eloquence, and heed only simple unsophisticated truth; by which 
alone men, who preside in judgment, can satisfy their conscience and their duty." 
An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the Lacedemonians, and 
they purchase it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Flataeans, by all man- 
kind abandoned, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hun- 
dred; their wives are sold for slaves; their city is rooted up from its foundation. 



xUv SURVEY OF 

Tbucydides soon after describeB the sedition of Corcyra» the horrors of which are 
scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints all the dreadful consequences of faction 
in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous and innate love of liberty, 
when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery to reasonable creatures ! 
Our author^ contrary to his custom, runs out here into many grave and judicious re- 
flections, in the interest of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend 
to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws embroilments and 
confusions into all communities. In governments strictly republican, the ambitious are 
eager to obtain more than an equal share. In an oligarchical form, the few in power 
want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share ; and the cry of liberty is shouted 
loudest by those who want most to overthrow it. But yet; was the matter ever mended, 
or the miseries of mankind prevented, by setting up a single tyrant? Communities 
have suffered more, for the caprice, for the support of the nominal glory of such a 
head, than they have done by a number of popular seditions. The reader will cer- 
tainly all along reflect on the fine model of government established in his own coun- 
try; and own that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power 
of the one and of the few and of the many may be tempered into an apt and lasting 
consistence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but un- 
hurt by intestine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself. 

After this tragical business of Corcyra, Tbucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. 
The seeds of war are sowing in that island, which will afterwards grow into a mighty 
harvest.— He relates other incidents, till he comes to a remarkable scene of war in 
^tolia, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated. — He de- 
scribes the purification of the isle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art 
to make it a cheerful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath 
been engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and is soon going to be 
engaged in more.-— The battles of Olpe and Idomene are sufficiently stored with 
slaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this history have 
been often thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They made no havoc ; they do 
not knock one another on the head fast enough to preserve attention. But these old 
Greeks were men, and not brutes. And it is pity, that the history of men should be 
so much a history of the destruction of the human species. 

Book rV.-*In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, principals in 
the war, are matched directly against one another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave 
commander, had seized and fortified Fylus in the territories of the latter, had placed 
such a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound 
the very vitals of that state. The Laced sBmonians slight it at first, as if their bare 
appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land armies and their squadrons 
are unable to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an experienced 
and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues his small body of Athenians, 
when he draws them up on the beach of the sea, to beat off the ships of the enemy. 
Tbucydides shines on these occasions ; in him the addresses are always made, and 
pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present; they interest and animate^ but 
never run into declamation and common-place. — The turns of war at Pylus are 
«udden and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by sea ; nay, what is 
more, land battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off the 
shore. The eye will distinctly view these strange occurrences; they are painted 
strong ; the groupes are not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are 



THE HISTORY. xir 

eminently distinguished. The body of Sp^ans intercepted in the isle of Sphacteria, 
who must either starve, or, what to Lacedeamonians is full as bad, must surrender 
their persons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial comniu . 
nity. Things had long since gone against them ; but now, their hereditary honour 
and military glory, on which, and which alone, they piqued themselves, are in dan- 
ger of being miserably tarnished. Their proud spirits condescend to beg a truce, thai 
they may send an embassy to Athens to solicit an accommodation. 

It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedie- 
monians lengthening their monosyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to 
hear in what manner they solicit, when admitted to audience. They declare them- 
selves sent, ** in behalf of their countrymen, to propose an expedient very much for 
the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themselves from difficulties that 
now bore hard upon them. Athens never had so fine an opportunity of raising her 
credit, securing her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the highest pitch. They 
should not be puffed up, but reflect on the strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who 
could expect, the Lacediemonians should ever be sunk so low, as to sue for peace 1 
Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly become, sometime or other, the lot of 
Athens. The latter should be moderate now, should accept of offered friendship, 
should cheerfully receive submission, made only to prevent desperation in great and 
gallant souls, and open a field for mutual benevolence. The rival states may now 
be reconciled ; and only now, before things are brought to extremities, and disgrace 
hath rendered one party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may confer on 
Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace, and reap all the honour and advantage 
of it, since all the credit of it will be their own. Lacediemonians may be obliged, 
but will not be compelled. At length they propose their expedient, not explicitly, 
but with a shrewd insinuation; that would the Athenians strike up a bargain with 
them, they might jointly lord it over Greece for the future, beyond control.'' 

Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess how readily he would have laid 
hold on this opportunity to end a burthensome and distressful war, which on the side 
of Athens had at first been necessitated and (nerely defensive. But success had elevated 
Athens quite too high ; and no real friend to the state had at present so much influence 
as Cleon, that loud and boisterous demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are 
insisted upon as the Lacedaemonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires ; 
and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important scene of contention at Pyhis. 

The author here interposeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then 
returns to Fylus. The Spartans in the isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The 
people of Athens murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that after 
all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with lies, and exasperates them 
by slanders. In short, though quite undesigning it, he bullies himself into the com* 
mand ; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Fylus. The author 
describes the event with so much state and dignity, that he raises it into another Ther- 
mopylae. There three hundred Spartans stopped for along time the whole numerous 
army of Xerxes, and perished in the service. About the same number of them strug- 
gle here as long as they can against the troops of Athens ; but, to the disappointment 
of all Greece, they at last surrender prisoners of war, and are carried, nay, are carried 
by Cleon, in triumph to Athens. The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by 
the Athenians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We 
are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragical sedition at Corcyra, quite of a 
piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror transcending, the preceding. 



rivi SURVEY OF 

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with success. The conquest 
of the isle of Cythera by Nicias is another sad blow to the Lacedaemonians. They are 
quite dispirited ; and dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now 
more so because successful enemies* 

Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a squadron 
on that coast, on pretence of aiding the Egesteans, but in fact to excite a war and 
embroil the states of that island. Syracuse, the leading state, perceived all their 
schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a suspension of arms 
amongst all the parties at war ; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congress 
at Gela, for the amicable adjustment of all their quarrels, and a perfect re-union 
against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuse, opens the 
true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The warrior must now give place to the 
politician, who shows himself a master in the business. 

" He is here,*' he tells them, " as representative of the greatest of the Sicilian states. 
As such, he cannot speak from pusillanimity or a sense of fear, though he declares 
himself averse to war. It is difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check 
ambition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn ; a prudence, which 
points out the proper season for every pursuit. It was separate interest, that first 
kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but separate interest should always be hushed, 
when the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy amongst them, 
to inflame their mutual resentments, to note their indiscretions, and turn them to their 
own advantage ; that, when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may 
seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of these Athenians is conquest ; 
they regard no ties of consanguinity ; they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. 
He blames them not ; he can never blame men, who are desirous of command ; but 
he must blame such as are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians 
have no strength in Sicily, but in the divisions of its states. Let those states but once 
re-unite, and Athenians must get them gone; and may depart with a face of success, 
as if they had united whom they really wanted to disunite, and had effectually re- 
settled peace, when their latent design was war." — He touches every topic in a suc- 
cinct but masterly manner. He hath recourse often to figures ; renders his addresses 
emphatical, by making his own community speak from his mouth. He applies the first 
person and the singular number with great energy and weight. He useth those figures 
in the same manner as Saint Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans. He presseth 
harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a manner best fitted to persuade. The 
whole speech, in a word, is a very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory. 

The consequence is, a peace is settled in Sicily to general satisfaction ; and the 
Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their squadrons, to be 
punished there for what they could not possibly prevent. 

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take 
their turn in being checked and vanquished. Their attempt on Megara is related at 
large ; and this piece of narration is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met 
with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours 
to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this struggle for Megara, the 
fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at last 
secures the city, and quite disconcerts the main project of the Athenians. — The latter 
also had another great scheme in agitation for a total revolution in Boeotia. Arms and 
intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens 



THE HISTORY. xlvit 

takes the field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous 
battle of Delium ensues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas 
the Theban is an excellent speaker on this occasion. The BcBotians are not repre- 
sented in this history, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character from 
the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins also to harangue his 
troops, but is cut short by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely described, 
and the dispute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful 
blow, which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments, in refusing 
the accommodation lately offered from Sparta. 

In other quarters also the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. 
Brasidas, that active and accomplished Spartan, had now completed a march, at the 
head of a small army, through Thessaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His 
bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Ferdiccas king of Mace* 
donia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers ; and whenever 
he harangues,, he e£fectually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians, is strong, 
pertinent, laconic. He saya^all that can be said in favour of his countrymen, in re- 
commendation of the cause of liberty. There is that air of sincerity and good faith 
in it, which were constantly approved and verified by his personal deportment. The 
towns revolt to him as fast as he has opportunities to address them. The reader will 
follow him with pleasure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he 
wears his laurels deservedly, and with peculiar grace. 

Book Y. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage to stop the rapid 
conquests of Brasidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown 
so conceited that he wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He 
accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine body of land forces. 
He retakes a town or two ; is confident he shall soon recover the important city of 
Amphipolis ; and though contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the 
enemy. Brasidas having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws open the 
gates, sallies out of Amphipolis and routs him in an instant. Cleon falls a victim to 
his own cowardice, and Brasidas also drops a victim to his own valour. The latter 
lives long enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires, admired 
by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the allies of his country. 

Their riddance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in this defeat, and the 
Lacedaemonians had dearly purchased the victory with the loss of their hero. As the 
principal states were now pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce 
is concluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the management chiefiy of 
Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up treaties. 
They are curious morsels of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how 
solemn, how concise, and yet how guarded, they are. The peace turns out to be 
merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at all, set their invention to 
work in order to embroil Greece afresh, and to rekindle a general war. Several wars 
break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedaemonians are concerned as auxiliaries. 
And another state in G-reece, which hitherto had been neutral and saving its strength 
entire, endeavours now to seize the primary of Greece for itself. We shall be made 
privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one 
battle at Mantinea. This state was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus, which had 
been in long alliance with, but in no dependence at all upon, Athens, and had been 
a long time also at peace with Sparta, by means of truces of thirty years. Young 



xlviii SURVEY OF 

AUibiades doth ail he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta 
and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinea. Thucydides introduceth 
the battle with all the spirit and precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled. 
AJid animated by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar circumstances 
of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all their glory. Trained up for a 
camp and the day of battle, we shall view them in their dicipline and actual exertion 
of their personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader 
will judge whether Thucydides did not love good soldiers, and take a pleasure in 
doing them justice. It was the greatest battle, which for many years had been 
fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occasion, wiped off all the imputations that 
had lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been always success- 
ful: and the aspiring state of Argos is compelled to acquiesce in her usual rank, and 
BtJW leave the contention of supremacy to the leading states of Athens and Sparta. 

This book affords but one incident more, of consequence enough to be particularly 
4istingui6hed; and that is the conquest of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell 
out in the sixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and encamped 
.on that i^and, they summon the Melians to a conference, of which Thucydides hath 
drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the 
critics, whether they should praise or condemn it. But is there any thing more unna- 
tural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding a conference? It is my business 
only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as 
they are avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing 
could tempt him to make palliating representations, or to suppress the truth. 

<<The Athenians, on this occasion, avow without a blush that principle on which 
conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet have been ashamed to own : they 
are ever hunting for colourings and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a 
little of the air of equity: but here, without the least shame or remorse, the Athenians 
assert their right to enslave another community, because it suits their own interest, and 
because they have power to do it. This is the principle from which they argue; and, 
how scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from it. They represent the politics 
of their own state, of the Lacedemonian state, nay of all mankind, as encroaching, 
oppressive, rapacious, and totally estranged from humanity, good faith, and the least 
tincture of morality. The whole conference yields perhaps a just representation of 
human nature in the gross; but then, the representation is distasteful to a mind that is 
cool and disengaged. Such a mind must interest itself on the side of the Melians and be 
sorry that the Athenians have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, 
that the Melians, with the regard they show to honour and justice, should not have 
had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally in defence of their liberties 
and rights. In ^ort, through the whole course of this history, the Athenians never 
made so scandalous a figure as on this occasion." 

Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. 
The scene is going to shift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have so bravely 
resisted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for those enemies what they 
could not do themselves. No patriot, no statesman, no orator, is able to dissuade them 
from lavishing their strength on the projects of sanguine ambition and foreign con- 
quests. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leisure to note their indiscretions, 
and improve them all to their own advantage, till the great name of Athens is quite 



THE HISTORY. xlix 

eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of the sea, which she had maintained for 
seventy years with great lastre and reputation. 

The Sicilian war, which some critics* are inclined to think hath no connection with 
the subject of Thucydides and to be mere digression, whatever it may appear at first, 
the reader will at length bo satisfied, was an essential part of the Feloponnesian war, 
and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the principal subject, it must 
however be acknowledged, that it is the history of a war nobly related, well connected, 
very closely followed, and fall of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and interest 
the passions. Thucydides in the course of it, which takes up the two following 
books, w^ill display the excellencies of the poet and the painter as well as of the histori- 
an. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is presumed that, with- 
out a negative, he. will be allowed the master of history. 

He begins with describing the theatre, on which two mighty Slate9 are going to 
enter the lists. — The geography and antiquities of Sicily could not in their nature be 
very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the concisest manner. — The 
soaring enterprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the aggran- 
dizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence 
and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means 
of executing in so imperial a manner as the monarch of Macedonia and captain-gen- 
eral of Grreece. He was able soon to convince the younger and more numerous part of 
the Athenian community, that the enterprise was most inviting, and carried with it 
such a probability of success as overbalanced all expense and hazard. It was long 
the subject of general conversation ; it gradually inflamed the public ardour ; and at 
length engrossed all their hopes and wishes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is 
formally proposed and decreed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is 
convened on waya and means. On this occasion a grand debate ensued, the managers 
of which are Nicias and Alcibiades. 

Nicias declares himself "totally averse to the expedition ; but doth it with that diffi- 
dence, which was a principal foible in his character. The honour conferred upon him- 
self in his nomination to the command, shall not suppress his real sentiments. He is 
neither fond, nor prodigal, of his life t but he loves his country, and would advise 
them to give up the expedition. — ^He next runs over the political topics, and shows 
it to be in every light an undesirable and ill-judged project. And then, without 
naming him, strikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any respect for so im- 
portant a command ; he reflects with some severity on his life and behaviour ; and 
though owning himself afraid he shall be out-voted, yet he would fain have the ques- 
tion put again, whether the expedition shall proceed." 

Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked 
by the personalities that Nicias had thrown out against him. He had been a constant 
opposer of the latter, who was beloved at Athens ipr his amiable qualities. For, though 
Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people; yet he had influence enough often- 
times to check and restrain the aspiring busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this 
^casion strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades ; and, delivered 
with that life and grace, and pretty lisp, for which he was remarkable, must have en- 
gaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of 
their judgment. 
^'Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication of himself. He 

*See Raphi^i ComparMon of Thucydides and Livy. 
7 E 



1 SURVEY OF 

maintains his right to the command. He hints at the splendour of his birth, his pub 
lie spirit, the generosity of his heart. He recites, with a haughty and exulting air, his 
victories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his capacity for polit- 
ical intrigue already and successfully exerted. He then justifies the wisdom of the de- 
cree for the Sicilian expedition. He shows all the political topics in a different light 
from Nicias. He insinuates the adrice of the latter to proceed from indolence and a 
desire to sow dissensions amongst them. He exhorts to union, and to the observa- 
tion of order. So Athens rose; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted. The 
fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and the experience of the old, should ever 
duly accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community; practice enables it to go 
through every conflict, and to triumph over all opposition.'' 

Such an address could not but effect, such arguments could not but be persuasive 
with the people of Athens ; the expeditions must go forwards. But Nicias makes a 
second effort, if possible to divert them from it. 

He begins with <<a prayer for its success; and a desire, that the preparations may be 
adequate to the ends proposed. He states the nature, the power and strength, of the 
people they are going to invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of 
necessary articles for those who invade them. He hopes to frighten and deter his 
audience by the vast expense, which he shows must necessarily be incurred on this 
occasion. The Athenians must provide every thing themselves, and trust nothing 
to the care and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and the safety of all who are 
to be employed in this expedition, demand all manner of previous foresight and care." 

This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. Instead of discourag- 
ing, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly a de- 
cree was soon passed, investing himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiades and 
Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the service. 

All hands now were soon at work. The quotas from the dependents were deman- 
ded; the fleet was equipped and manned; the levies went on briskly, since all men came 
into the service with alacrity ; and every thing was soon ready for the expedition. 

At this juncture, some drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw 
Athens into consternation. They were soon construed by his enemies into a plot to 
bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly 
accused ofbeing a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an immediate trial, 
which he was sure would end in his justification. The plot, which in fact was a plot 
against Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him ; and therefore, by a strange 
preposterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take 
his trial at his return. 

Our author next describes the departure of the grand armament in all its solemnity, 
and with all the medley of hopes and fears shown by the whole people of Athens on 
this occasion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the spectators. The prime 
flower of their strength, nay, Athens itself, is now sailing out of the Piraeus, never 
again to return. They make the best of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for 
a time, that we may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures of 
Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most powerful state in that is- 
land, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior, yet second at this time to no other 
state in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditions, had 
often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a democratic constitution. 

Advice had been received there of the intended invasion. The people are convened 



THE HISTORY. li 

about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermen- 
ting, justly exemplified. Some are incredulous ; others magisterially pronounce it all a 
^Isehood. At length Hermocrates riseth.up, and gives them his own sense of the affair. 

He assures them, <<his country is eminently endangered, and neither incredulity 
nor ridicule shall awe him into silence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians 
are already at sea, fully bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans ought to be- 
lieve it, and to prepare for their defence. Feair will unite all Sicily against the invaders. 
Athens will only reap disgrace, but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion. Large 
armaments are seldom successful ; they moulder away for want of supplies or are 
ruined for want of conduct. They should therefore prepare for gallant resistance, 
by getting every thing in readiness at home, and strengthening themselves by foreign 
alliances. They should do more; they should at once put out to sea, and dispute their 
very passage with the enemy. A defeat, or eyen delay thus given them might oblige 
them to give up the project. He supports his advice by many strong and judicious 
arguments ; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and ac- 
tive, by no means to despise the enemy except in action, but vigorously and with all 
their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their enemies are undoubtedly at sea 
and only not arrived on their coasts." 

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by Hermocrates. That 
community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, since this worthy patriot was 
regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering dem- 
agogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shows that he regarded 
Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himself into em- 
ployment. He seems more alarmed for the lucrative posts of the state than for the 
welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good sense, but in a very imperti- 
nent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who study popularity more than 
duty, and sacrifice all their. talents to ambition or private lucre. 

He affirn^s, that ^* none but cowards and traitors wish the Athenians might not in- 
vade them, and so infallibly meet their destruction: but the whole account is a glaring 
falsehood, the glory of a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience whether it carries 
the least probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians esteem themselves 
happy they are not invaded by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing 
but their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is all a fiction; a 
scheme to dishearten the friends of the people*, and seize the government of the state. 
Some men have ever been, and ever will be, dabbling in such vile machinations. 
But let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain already, and ought 
to be punished like open treason. He then exhorts the people or the many to sup- 
port their friends, and entirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes; and in- 
veighs severely against the few, or the party whom he supposeth to be bent on the 
overthrow of the democracy at Syracuse." 

This speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and party animosity, that, 
had the debate proceeded, dissentions might have run very high at a season when 
unanimity was so needful in all the members of that community. A general of great 
eminence and weight thinks it high time to interpose; who, in a short speech repri- 
mands Athenagoras, recalls the general attention to their own preservation from the 
imminent danger, and adjourns the assembly. 

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra. The historian takes 
& review of the whole, and gives a short account of its numbers and strength. They 



Ill SURVEY OP 

arrive on the eo»it of Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields 
them a diseouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find they had been grossly deluded 
by their Sicilian friends, who instigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, 
which the Egestians had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The com- 
manders at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at last come to no sound re- 
solution. They hover about the coast of Sicily, and parade in sight of Syracuse. Al- 
eibiades endeavours to persuade the Cataneans to join with and receive them, but a 
mere accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibi- 
ades came here to an end. One of the state- vessels arrives, and summons him to Ath- 
ens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That'cityy 
ever since the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confUsion and horror. A 
plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there must be, to set up a tyrant, that 
most odious sound to Attic ears. Recollection of the most dismal things they had heard 
about the tyranny of the Pisistratids increased their fears, and drove them into furious 
and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to settle some facts relating to 
that set of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly the affair of Harmodius and Aris-* 
togiton, one of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed 
from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to rest the point up- 
on his authority, great as it is; though no man ever traced out facts, or made his in- 
quiries, with more sedateness and impartiality. 

But to return to Alcibiades; he was obliged to quit the command, and he seemed 
quietly to submit to the orders of the state. But, determined not to face his country- 
man in their present mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him 
the slip, and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a most violent 
and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of 
Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing except the parade of hid 
own personal importance, and the gratification of private caprice. 

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help 
of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without opposition, and seize a strong post for their 
encampment. The Syracusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides 
form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited and forcible, ha- 
rangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactness, perspicuity, and ardour, 
of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not so decisively, as to think proper 
to continue in their post, since they re-embark, and sail back to Catana. 

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend in negotiations for 
Ihe acquisition of allies. That at Gamarina, where ambassadors from both the warring 
parties are at the same time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. — Hermo- 
«rates, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address. *' It is masterly, like all that Her- 
mocrates performs. It is designed to convince the Camarineans, how insidious and 
how vile the schemes of the Athenians had ever been, and still continue to be. He 
arraigns all their politics and their conduct since the Persian invasion; and gives that 
artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others from entering into any con- 
nexion or alliance with them. His strokes are severe and cutting. He makes use of 
the figures, which give force and energy to discoulrse. No person better understood 
the common welfare of Sicily; and no person could better explain it. He unfolds the 
political scheme at present in agitation; declares the consequence in case the Atheni- 
ans prevail, to alarm the concern of the Camarineans for their country, and further to 
alarm their fears for themselves. He even threatens them with a severe revenge, in 



THE HISTORY. liii 

case the Syraeusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaderB." In short, if 
the Camarineans had been good Sicilians, his arguments must have prevailed. 

Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this occasion, makes a 
bold and spirited defence for his country. << He at once briskly attacks Hermocrates 
for the bitter imputations he had cast upon Athens. He asserts her fair reputation, 
and justifies her series of politics ever since the invasion of Xerxes. Liberty had been 
the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athenians had guarded, had 
established it in Greece ; and were come to support and secure it in Sicily. He 
throws back the charge of enslaving-projects on the Syracusans, who now are eager 
to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best defence, by raising distaste towards the 
Athenians. He spares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely to effect. He proves 
a notable advocate for his Athens, pompously celebrates her passion and her care for 
liberty, and most ingeniously strives to conceal her present ambition under a veil 
of naost generous and disinterested principles." 

The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one another's arguments, 
and the Camarineans declare a neutrality. 

The embassies firom Syracuse succeed much better in Peloponnesus. The Corinthians 
are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouse up 
and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was bom to be of every party, and to be the 
best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is the exiled Alcibiades who 
pleads most effectually in their behalf at a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on 
this occasion is a masterpiece. " He insinuates himself into the favour and confidence 
of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is making his own personal justi- 
fication, he praiseth and magnifieth himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, 
discloseth all her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs towards them 
the attack of her foes ; and, full as he is of resentment against, and skilful to annoy 
her, she totters whilst he speaks.'' Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by 
the debasement of this mighty and imperial republic. Her glory, hath reached its 
summit : it immediately will begin to sink, and her laurels will fade away apace. 

In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians stand away from 
Catana, and land by night at Syracuse. They instantly march, and seize Epipolse, a 
strong post that commanded the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to 
beat them from it. The siege now commenceth in form. It is clearly represented in the 
whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. 
In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of course lefl singly in the whole 
command. He carries on the siege with vigour and success for a short space of time ; 
but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian aids, are now only not arrived. 

Book VII. " If you would read truly great things," said a Spartan to Au gustus CsBsar, 
" read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this cursory 
survey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no historian ever executed so 
closely, so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically, as Thucydides. << No fleet but that 
of the Athenians," it is the observation of Cicero,* << was ever able to enter the harbour 
of Syracuse. The fleet was only able to achieve it by the mighty force and number 
of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of Athens defeated, lessened, 
depressed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the glory of Athens, are judged to 
have Buffered a total wreck." Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermo- 
crates and Gvlippus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose phlegm and natural 

* Orat. quinta in Verrem. 
£2 



liv SURVEY OF 

diffidence are . no match against such vigilance and activity. The b<5sieging party 
soon becomes as it were the besieged. The letter of Nicias to the people of Athens, 
represents all the difficulties to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever wrote 
so precisely and perspicuously about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, 
no dictionary of arts, or an adept in war, to explain the terms ; and can judge, as 
could the meanest citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. 
Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his country- 
men for the great foible in their behaviour, justifies his own conduct, and begs to be 
recalled. In short, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epistle. 

The Athenians are too high-spirited to recall their troops, and have too good an 
opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the command. Though Attica was now invaded 
by the Peloponnesians, and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for 
their lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the 
command of Dtoosthenes. They empty Athens of the residue of her strength, so 
highly wanted for domestic support. The Syracusans, when advised of this rein- 
forcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. 
They had had a career of success against Nicias, had just beat him both by land and 
sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of Syracuse. The sight caused a 
strange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehensions in the contending 
parties. The Syracusans again become the besieged ; and Demosthenes is intent to 
put an end to the seige, if possible, by vigorous and daring measures. 

His attempt to retake Epipolse is, in our author's description of it, as fine a night- 
piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil could express it stronger. The moon 
shines just bright enough, to show us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to give 
a glimpse of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one another* 
The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid tumult. What a medley of 
singing their paeans, of conflict, of flight, of pursuit ! friends and countrymen routing 
one another, till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in the fall ! 
The hope of the Athenians is blasted : Syracuse erects her trophies fast. 

Demosthenes is now convinced the most prudent step they could take is to raise 
the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The very moment they are going to embark 
their troops, the moon is eclipsed. Who but must pity the weakness of Nicias at so 
dangerous a crisis 1 who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable a man should 
stop an army from a principle of superstition, and detain them for so long a time on 
a spot of ground, where nothing but ruin and destruction could befal them? Men 
so dispirited can make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now 
successful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive engagement is 
fast approaching. 

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than historic spirit, emulates 
his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now war- 
ring against and in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere muster- 
roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint many useful and moral reflec- 
tions in the mind. His little incidental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as 
Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the people. 

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians must 
fight their way out ; or, burn all their ships, and march off by land. It is determined to 
attempt the former ; and the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. 
A more striking, more astonishing battle-piece was never exhibited ; and a masterly 



THE HISTORY. W 

pencil, though none but a masterly one, might exactly delineate it from this descriptioa 
The present temper of the combatants on both sides is strong! ymarked in the harangues 
before the engagement. Nicias then said all, and the Athenians in action did their best ; 
but all was unavailing. I shall say no more about it, since the reader hath nothing to do 
but turn his eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its process, till the 
Syracusans sail in triumph to their city, and raise the most glorious of all their trophies. 

The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the siege, the mournful 
decampment, the good heart of Nicias sympathising in all their distress, and endea- 
vouring to cheer a little their desponding minds, their laborious marches whilst the 
enemy is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the surrender of 
the column under Demosthenes, the carnage in the river Asinarus of the troops 
under Nicias, his surrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the 
captivated residue of once so flourishing and gallant an army — these are the several 
incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the highest commen- 
dation to the historian, when he hath read them through : he will have no leisure 
till then to think of Thucydides. 

Book VIII. The catastrophe hath now taken place in this history, and the reader is 
assured how all will end. The wings of this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, 
never to reach their full growth again : yet, like an dagle in the same situation, she 
will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulse 
her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart. Intestine faction will assist her enemies 
to finish her ruin, as a state imperial and commercial A regular deduction of such 
incidents as these is the subject of the eighth and last book of Thucydides. As a 
writer, he now performs in a more faint and less engaging manner, compared with 
what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketches his pieces : but 
the drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand. We will give them 
a cursory view : the reader will give them a more exact and deliberate perusal. 

He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe the people of Athens, 
dispirited and distressed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and 
emotions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous ; they are an- 
gry ; they are convinced ; and then, they despond ; they pluck up their spirits again, 
and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their own preservation. They now cas^ 
their thoughts towards every resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and 
resolution. All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party ; all 
are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their own dependents are 
meditating revolts, and some make them at once without premeditation. The Lace- 
daemonians, amidst the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the 
revolting states they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is busy at Sparta, 
advising proper measures, and guiding their counsels. Even the Persian monarch, 
by his lieutenants, enters into league against them ; and some of their finest islands 
are immediately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians. 

The various turns of th& war at Chios, and on the coast of Ionia, are distinctly but 
concisely related; till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his busy and intriguing 
genius. Suspected at length, and hated by the Lacedaemonians, he became again their 
enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return to Athens, and saving 
his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now 
lying at Samoa, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary 
measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alcibiadds himself ; but it is 



hi SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 

opposed and disconcerted by Phrynichus ; by Fhrynichus, who soon after turns out a 
violent enemy to the democracy^ whilst Alcibiades is active and zealous in its support. 

None but our author's pen could have so clearly unfolded that series of caballing, that 
fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading 
members of the Athenian stale amongst themselves, which brought on seditions amongst 
the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The demo- 
cracy is at length overturned ; and an oligarchy, consisting of four (lundred persons, 
erected in its stead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was first laid, declare 
against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican ; and 
Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a sincere love and regard for his country. 
Parties newly formed are broke again into divisions ; and Athens was indebted to 
nothing but the indolence of the Lacedaemonians, that she did not fall immediately 
into their hands, through the violence of her own intestine seditions. But the new 
administration proved of short continuance ; the democracy, though on a model 
somewhat varied, is again established ; and Athens thus obtains a respite. 

Full of matter as this part of the history is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear 
and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple unadorned narration, and never re- 
ceived the finishing hand. There are scattered occasionally throughout it some i^ort 
accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at important 
junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for 
regular and full orations. The reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what 
accidents can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into full pro- 
portion; particularly that of the deputation from the army at Samos to Athens, in 
which " the people are persuaded to part with their darling democracy ;" of Thrasy- 
bulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the democracy, in which 
<* he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of Athens from liberty and her 
choicest patriots, who might now form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her 
empire, though they had lost the city ; that of Alcibiades further, when on his recal- 
ment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where << he deplores the 
malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability yet to serve his country, and again shines 
in the character of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous patriot." 

Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distinguished in honour of the 
Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedasmonians are strongly contrasted 
through the whole course of this history, and highly to the credit of the former. Their 
spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mutiny and faction. The Lace- 
daemonians are indolent in success, and show neither alacrity nor address in promoting 
that cause of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this destructive war. 
They seem at last more intent on pocketing the royal subsidies, than doing their duty, 
as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. 
The last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where they receive a 
signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they judged as well nigh completed. 
When Athens is totally to be vanquished, as her doom is fast approaching, she must aid 
her own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies, and trampling under 
foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accomplish, what without 
them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human must decay. The best 
constituted state in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they 
eould not be conquered, and at length be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers. 
May Gbeat Bbitain prove an exception to this affecting but juit observation ! 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



BOOK I. 



Ivtrodaetioii, eontaininf the AnthorHi reasoiM for writing this Hiitory, npon a review of the affairs of Greece 
from the earlieit timee.— The trae reason of the Peloponnesian war was a Jealousy of the Athenian power. 
Those pretended were, I. The affair of Epidamnus, which if opened at large ; II. The revolt of Potidcat the 
circumstances of which are exactly related. Consultations held at Sparta by the members of the Lacede- 
monian league, where at length war is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacedaemonians act 
from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A digression showing how that power arose, which gives the 
avihor opportunity to relate the history of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of 
this war. Embassies accusing and recriminating are sent to and fro, in the account of which are inter wore tlie 
■buies of Cylon, Pauaanias, and Themistorles. The Lacedemonians send a final demand to Athens ; and the 
Athenians, at the persuasion of Pericles, return a resolute answer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and 
an open rupture ensueth. 



Thvctdibbs an Athenian hath compiled the 
histoiy of the war between the Peloponnesians 
ttd the Athenians, as managed by each of the 
'contending parties. He began to write upon 
its first breaking ont, from an expectation that 
it wonld prove important, and the most deserv- 
ing regard of any that had ever happened. He 
grounded Mb conjecture on the earnestness of 
both the flourishing parties to make all neces- 
sary preparations for it; and he saw that all 
the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or 
the other, some joining immediately, and others 
intending soon to do it; for this was the great- 
est commotion that ever happened amongst the 
Grecians, since in it some Barbarians, and it 
may be said the greatest part of mankind, were 
concerned. The actions of an earlier date, 
and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, 
through length of time, be adequately known ; 
yet, from all the lights which a search into the 
remotest times hath afforded me, I cannot think 
they were of any great importance, either in re- 
gaid to the ware themselves, or any other con- 
nderations. 
8 



It is certain, that the region now known by 
the name of Greece was not formerly possessed 
by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject ta 
frequent transmigrations, * as constantly erery 
distinct people easily yielded up their seats ta 
the violence of a larger supervening number. 
For, as to eoiomeroe there was none, and mu- 
tual fear prevented intercourse both by sea and 
land, as then the only view of culture was to 
earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous 
wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was 
not their employment, it being uncertain hqw 
soon an invader might come and dislodge them 
from their unfortified habitations, and as they 
thought they might every where find their daily 
necessary support, they hesitated but little 
about shifting their seats : and for this reason 
they never flourished in the greatness of their 
cities or any other circumstance of power. 
But the richest tracts of country ever were more 
particularly liable to this frequent change of in- 
habitants, such as that which is now called Thes- 
saly, and Boeotia, and Pelopoimesus mostly ex- 
cept Arcadia, and in general eveiy the most 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



fertile part of Greece. For the natural wealth them all in this general style, but hath appro- 



of their soil increasing the power of some 
amongst them, that power raised civil dissen- 
tions, which ended in their ruin, and at the 
same time exposed them more to foreign at- 
tacks. It was only the barrenness of the soil 
that preserved Attica through the longest 
space of time, quiet and undisturbed, in one 
uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and 
not the least convincing, proof of this is, that 
other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuat- 
ing condition of the inhabitants, could by no 
means in their growth keep pace with Attica. 
The most powerful of those who were driven 
from the other parts of Greece by war or sedi- 
tion, betook themselves to the Athenians for 
secure refuge, and as they obtained the privi- 
leges of citizens,^ have constantly, from re- 
motest time, continued to enlarge that city 
with fresh accessions of inhabitants, insomuch 
that at last, Attica being insufficient to support 
the number, they then sent over colonies into 
Ionia. 

There is another, and to me a most convinc- 
ing proof of the weakness of the ancients. 
Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear 
that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one 
common undertaking ; nor had the' whole coun- 
try that one general appellation; not indeed 
did the same subsist at all before the time of 
Hellen, the son of Deucalion ; the several na- 
tions taking their distinguishing names from 
their own selves, and Pelasgicum being that of 
the greatest tract, ^ut when Hellen and his 
sons had acquired power in Fthiotis, and led 
out their dependents by way of aid to other 
cities, conversation made the use of this name 
become much more frequent among t^e several 
people, though it was long before it so prevail- 
ed as to become the general appellation of 
them all. For this Homer is my principal 
authority, who, though bom a long time after 
the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned 

1 They were admitted to the same privileges with free- 
horn native Athenians., Bat this was practised only in 
the infancy and early growth of that state. It was 
afterwards an honour very seldom and with difficulty 
granted. Those who came from other places to settle 
at Athens are distingnished from ttoxitmi citizens, by 
the name ofiuiroixei sojourners, who had taken up their 
residence and cohabited with them. They performed 
several duties as subjects to the state which gave them 
protection, but never became Athenians, or citizens of 
Athens, in the emphatical sense of those terms. The 
English reader will please to remember this, as thedis* 
tinction often occurs in the sequel of our history. 



priated it to those who came with Achilles 
from Fthiotis, and were the first that bore this 
name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems 
Danaans, and, Argives, and Achsans are dieir 
distinguishing titles. Nor hath he farther once 
mentioned the Barbarians, for this plain rea- 
son in my opinion, because Grecians were not 
yet distinguished by this one comprehensive 
name in contradistinction to that other. These 
Grecians therefore whatever, whether 'so apart 
in their different cities, or united by mutual 
converse, or at length comprehended in one ge- 
neral name, for want of strength and correspon- 
dence, never acted together in joint confede- 
racy before the war of Troy; nor was it till 
the use of the sea had opened free communi- 
cation amongst them that they engaged to- 
gether in that expedition. 

For Minos is the earliest person whom we 
know from tradition to have been master of a 
navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the sea 
which is called the Ghrecian. To him "were 
the isles of the Cyclades subject; nay, most 
of them he planted himself with colonies, hav- 
ing expelled the Carians, and substituted his 
own sons in the different commands. And 
then of course he exerted his utmost power to 
clear that sea of pirates, for the more secure 
conveyance of his own tributes. 

The Grecians formerly, as well as those 
Barbarians who, thougjh seated on the conti- 
nent, lived upon the coast, and all the islanders, 
when once they had learned the method of pass- 
ing to and fro in their vessels, soon took up 
the business of piracy under the command of 
persons of the greatest ability amongst them, 
for the sake of enriching such adventurers and 
subsisting their poor. They landed, and plun- 
dered by surprise unfortified places and scat- 
tered villages, and from hence they principally 
gained a subsistence. This was by no means 
at that time an employment of reproach, but 
rather an instrument of glory. Some people 
of the continent are even to this day a proof 
of this, wfaf> still attribute honour to such ex- 
ploits if genteelly performed :* so also are the 
ancient poets, in whom those that sail along 
the coasts are every where equally accosted 

a " With due respect, with humanity," as the scho- 
liast explains it. For then they never made booty of, 
or carried away by stealth, the labouring cattle ; they 
never made their attacks by night, nor committed aoy 
murder. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



with diis qnestaon, Whether they are pirates ; 
as if neither they to whom the question was 
pat would disown their employment, nor they 
"who are desirous to be informed would reproach 
them with it. The people of the continent 
also exercised robberies upon one another: 
and to this very day many people of Greece 
are supported by the same practices: for in- 
stance, the Ozolian Locrians, and j£tolians, 
and Acamanians, and their neighbours on the 
continent; and the custom of wearing their 
"weftpons, introduced by this old life of rapine, 
is still retained amongst them. 

The custom of wearing weapons once pre- 
'vailed' all over Greece, as their houses had no 
manner of defence, as travelling was full of 
hazard, and their whole lives were- passed in 
armour, like Barbarians. A proof of this is 
the continuance still in some parts of ^Greece 
of those manners, which were once with uni- 
formity general to alL The Athenians were 
the first who discontinued the custom of wearing 
their swords, and who passed from the disso- 
lute life into more polite and elegant manners. 
And it is not a long time since those amongst 
the rich, who were advanced in years and stu- 
died their ease, left offwearing the linen garments 
and fastening the hair of their head behind with 
grasshoppers of gold f though the aged amongst 
^e^ lonians have constantly persevered in the use 
of those ornaments as marks of their affinity. 
That modest uniformity of dress, which is still 
\ in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacede- 
monians ; amongst whom in other points also 
there was the greatest equality of dress and 
diet observed, both in the highest and meanest 
ranks. They also were the first who performed 
their exercises naked, stripping themselves in 
public and anointing with oil before they en- 
tered the lists; though, before, the custom 
had prevailed at the Olympic games for the 
champions to wear scarfs about their loins: 
and it is only a few years since these were 
quite disused.^ But even yet, amongst some 
Barbarians, more especially those of Asia, 
where the matches of boxing and wrestling are 
in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs 



• To imlinate their being the original poesesBora and 
pure natives of the soil, as much as the very grasshop- 
pers, which they supposed to be a natural and sponta- 
neous production of the earth. They regarded them- 
selves as cotemporary with the insects. 

* See Mr West's IHssertation on the Olympic Games, 
p. 50. 



round theb loins. Many other arguments 
might with ease be alleged to prove that an- 
cient Greece had forms and modes of living 
quite similar to those of the present Barbarian 
world. 

As for cities, so many as are of a later foun- 
dation, are better placed for the increase of 
wealth, since the improvement of naval skill ; 
all these have been built on the sea-shore, and 
walled about, and are situated upon necks of 
land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of 
traffic and greater security from the insults of 
neighboring people. But those of an earlier 
date, having been more subject to piratical de- 
predations, are situated at a grefht distance from 
the sea, not only on islands, but also upon the 
main. For even those who lived upon the 
coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to 
make excursions up into the country for the 
sake of plunder: and such inland settlements 
are discernible to this very day. 

But the people of the islands, that is, the 
Carians and the Phoenicians, were by much the 
most expert at these piratical adventures : for 
by them the greatest part of the isles was in- 
habited. This is proved from the expiation 
solemnized at Delos in the course of this war ; 
on which occasion all the sepulchres of the dead 
in that island being broken open, more than 
half of the number appeared to be Carians, 
known to be such from the weapons found in 
their graves aivi a particularity of interment 
still used amongst them.^ It was not till 
after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a 
communication was opened at sea. For by him 
the mischievous banditti were ejected from the 
islands, and many colonies of his own planted 
there in their stead. And from this period it 
was that the maritime people, grown more in- 
tent on the acquisition of wealth, became more 
fond of settled habitations : and such of them 
as then surpassed in wealth, strengthened their 
settlements by walling them about. And this 
their passion for gain continuing to increase, 
the poorer hired out their services to those who 
had affluence ; and the great, who had all need- 



> The Carianst first invented the boss of shields and 
the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small 
shield and a crest were always buried with tbero. By 
this means were the Carians known. The Phcbnicians 
were distinguished by the manner of their interment : 
for, whereas other nations laid the faces of their dead 
towards the east, the Phcenicians reversed the posture, 
and laid them to the west. SehoHatt 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



fill supplies at hand, reduced less powerful 
cities into their own subjection. And their 
power by. these methods gradually adyancing, 
they were enabled in process of time to under- 
take the Trojan expedition. 

It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage 
of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing 
so much to the attendance of the suitors of 
Helen in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn 
to Tyndarus, as to his own superior power. It 
is related by those who received from their an- 
cestors the most certain memorials of the Pelo- 
ponnesiai^ affairs, that Pelops, arriving there 
from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon 
gained so great an influence over those needy 
people, that, though a foreigner, he had the 
honor to have the country called^ter his own 
name ; and that the power thus gained by him 
was. successively enlarged by his posterity. 
Eurystheus, indeed, whose mother was the sister 
of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the 
Heraclidffi ; and Eurystheus, when he departed 
on that expedition, left the government of My- 
cenffi and his kingdom, because of his affinity, 
in the care of Atreus, who then resided with 
him, having fled from his father upon the mur- 
der of Chrysippus. When therefore the return 
of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the 
Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclids were 
well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great 
abilities and deep in the aflections of the people, 
he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycens and 
all the territories which had belonged to Eu- 
rystheus ; and from hence the family of Felops 
quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To 
these enlargements of power Agamemnon suc- 
ceeding, and being also superior to the rest of 
his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled 
in my opinion to form that expedition more from 
awe than favour. It is plain that he equipped 
out the largest number of ships himself, besides 
those he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my 
witness here, if his testimony have any force ; 
who hath farther, at the deliveiy of the sceptre, 
slyled him, 

** Of many isles, and of an Argos, king.** 

And a king who lived upon the continent could 
not possibly be lord of islands, except such as 
were fidjacent, the number of which must needs 
be small, unless he had a competent strength 
at sea : but from this armament we have good 
light afforded to guess at the preceding. 

What though Mycenas was a small city, or 



though any place at that time lemaikable ap* 
pear at present inconsiderable to ns 1 yet, no 
one ought on these motives prematurely to im- 
agine that armament to have been less consider- 
able than it is described by the poets and re- 
ported by tradition. Supposing the city of 
Lacedemon to be now in a ruinated condition, 
nothing left but the temples and the pavements 
of the mass, I fancy, in process of time, pos- 
terity could not easily be induced to believe 
that their power had ever been proportioned 
to their glory. Of the five divisions of Pelo- 
ponnesus* they are actually possessed of two^ 
having the command of the whole, and of many 
confederate states without : yet, as the city is 
neither closely built, as the temples and public 
edifices are by no means sumptuous, and the 
houses detached from one another, after the 
old mode of Greece, it would suffer disparage^, 
ment from such a view. If we farther sup- 
pose the Athenians in the same reverse of for- 
tune, from the view the city then would aflford, 
it might be guessed that once it had double the 
strength which it really hath. We ought not 
therefore to be incredulous, nor so much to 
regard the appearance of cities as their power ; 
and of course, to conclude the armament 
against Troy to have been greater than ever 
was known before, but inferior to those of ova 
age. And whatever credit be given to the 
poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt 
as a poet hath set it off with all possible en- 
largement, yet even according to his account it 
appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to^ 
consist of twelve hundred ships ; those of the 
Boeotians carrying each one hundred and twen- 
ty men, those of Philoctetes fifty; pointings 
out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest 
rates; for of the rate of other ships he hath 
not made the least mention in his catalogue 
though he hath expressly informed us that 
every person of the crews belonging to the 
ships of Philoctetes were both mariners and 
soldiers, since he hath made all who plied at 
the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not pro- 
bable that any ships carried supernumeraries, 
excepting kings or persons in command, espe- 
cially as their point was a mere transportation 
with all the necessary habiliments of war, as 
their ships were not decked, but built entirely 



1 These were Laconia, Arcadia, Aigotiea, Measeitia, 
and Eiis. The Lacedemonians wore possessed of La- 
conia and Messenia.— -ScAoItMC. 



-/ 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



5 



in the fashion of the old piratical cruisers. If 
therefore a mean be taken between the largest 
and smallest rates, the number of the whole 
will torn out of small account for quotas sent 
in general from the whole of Greece.* The 
reason of this was not so much 'a scarci^ of 
mea as want of money. They adjusted the 
number of men to the slender store of provi- 
sions they already had, and the probability of 
procuring a competent subsistence in the course 
of the war. On their first landing they got 
the better in fight; the proof is, that they could 
not otherwise have fortified their camp with a 
walL Neither doth it appear that they e;xerted 
all their strength at once, numbers being de- 
tached for supplies of provisions, to till the 
Ghersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus 
divided as they were, the Trojans were better 
able to make a ten years* resistance, being 
equal in force to those who were at any time 
left to cany on the siege. For had the stores 
of provision at the first landing been ample 
enough for the whole number of men they 
brought, and had they been able to prosecute 
the war free from the avocations of foraging 
and tillage, their superiority in the^ field must 
have given them an easy and expeditious cop^ 
quest. But in fact they did not ply the work 
with all their number, but only with a part 
constantly reserved for the purpose : had they 
formed the siege with their whole force, in 
less time and with less difficulty they must 
have taken Troy. Through want of money 
it was that expeditions prior to this, and even 
this the most celebrated of all that ever hap- 
pened, are plainly found to have been less in 
reality than they aOre in fame or current esti- 
mation at present through poetical assistance. 

Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan 
expedition put an end to the unsettled and 
fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tran- 
quility so necessary to advancement The re- 
turn of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long 
an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Se- 
ditions were excited in almost every city ; and 
those who were forced to withdraw, built cities 
for themselves in other places. The present 



< Tlmcjrdides makta it of small account, fn regard to 
the war wbich is his lubject. But the number of men 
employed in the expedition against Troy was 102,000. 
For the mean between 130 and 50 is 85, and 85 X ^^ 
1,900 ss 103,600. 



BcBotians, for instance, being driven out of 
Ame by the Thessalians, sixty years after the 
taking of Troy, planted themselves in the coun- 
try now called Boeotia, though before that time 
Cadmeis: but a body of them had already 
seated themselves there, of whom were those 
who went in the expedition against Troy : and 
eighty years after it, the Dorians with the 
HeraclidsB took possession of Peloponnesus. 
It was not without much ado and length of 
time, that Greece, quiet and settled at borne, 
had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then 
the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the 
islands; the Peloponnesians the greatest part 
of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonies in 
the different tracts of Greece. But all these 
transactions are of a later date than the Tro- 
jan war. 

But when once the state of Greece was 
grown more robust, and an increase of wealth 
became their study more than ever before, as the 
public revenues grew apace, in many places 
tyrannies started up : for before this, kingdoms 
were hereditary and with limited authority. 
Now Greece throughout was employed in 
building navies, and became addicted to naval 
afiairs with unusual application. The Corin- 
thians are said to have been the first, who, by 
varying the make of their ships, brought them 
to that model which is now in use, and Co- 
rinth to be the first place of Ghreece where tri- 
remes^ were built. It is a known fact, that 
Aminocles, a ship.carpenter from Corinth, 
built four ships for the Samians; now, from 
the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the con- 
clusion of the war which is now my subject, 
there passed at most but three hundred years. 
The oldest sea-fight we know any thing of 
was that of the Corinthians against the Cor- 
cyreans: but the distance between that and 
the same period is not more than two hundred 
and sixty. For the city of the Corinthians, 
being seated on the isthmus, hath ever been a 
place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both 
within and without Peloponnesus, more ao- 



a The triremes were the ships of war, of the galley 
kind, and take their name from the three hanks of oars 
with which they were furnished. They were also 
masted and carried sails ; but they generally lowered 
the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on 
their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, 
or to run down upon the enemy with more force and 
steadiness. See Potter*s Archieologia, vol. ii. c. 14. 



6 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



eustomed to land than sea, could have no 
traffic with one another without passing through 
their territory. They were also remarkable 
for wealth, as clearly approveth from the an- 
cient poets, who have given that city the epi- 
thet of rich. And. when once navigation was 
practised in Greece, they lost no time in their 
own equipments; they cleared the sea of pi- 
rates; and, opening their town as a public 
mart, bo^ by land and sea, made Corinth 
powerful by the increase of its revenue. The 
lonians had no naval force till a long time after 
this, in the reign of Cyrus first king of the 
Persians, and his son Cambyses ; and, waging 
war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters 
of the sea which lieth upon their own coasts. 
Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos, in 
the reign of Cambyses, having a powerful navy, 
subdued many of the islands, and among the rest 
Rhenea, which as soon as conquered he con- 
secrated to Delian Apollo. The Fhoceans 
also, when planting their colony at Marseilles, 
had a successful engagement at sea against the 
Carthaginians. 

These were the most remarkable equip- 
ments of a naval force; and these, though 
beyond contest many generations later than 
the war of Troy, had a very small number of 
triremes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of 
fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. 
And it was but a little while before the Me- 
dian war and the death of Darius, who suc- 
ceeded Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, 
that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyreans 
became masters of any considerable number of 
triremes. For these last were the only in- 
stances of a naval strength in Greece, before 
the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve par- 
ticular mention. The vessels of the ^ginets, 
of the Athenians, and some others, were few 
in number, and most of them but of fifty oars. 
It was not till later times, when the Athenians 
had war with the ^ginetce and also expected 
the approach of Xerxes, that at the persuasion 
of Themistocles they built those ships with 
which they fought successfully against the Bar- 
barians; and even these were not yet com- 
pletely decked over. 

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, 
both of an earlier and later date. And the 
states to which they belonged gained by them 
considerable strength, through an increase of 
their revenue and the enlargement of their do- 
minions. Embarkations grown more frequent, 



especially to those who were pent up in a nar- 
row soil, occasioned the reduction of the isle^; 
but for a land war, and, in consequence of that, 
an accession of power, none such was at that 
time known. All conflicts of that sort which 
ever happened, were disputes of boundaries 
between contiguous states. The Grecians had 
not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, 
nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. 
There were no dependent cities, which ftir- 
nished quotas at the will of others who gave 
them law ; nor did those who were upon equa- 
lity concur in any joint undertaking; each 
petty state took up arms occasionally fn its own 
defence against the encroachments of its neigh- 
bours. At most, the greatest division of Greece 
that ever happened was in the old rupture be- 
tween the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when 
leagues were formed in favour of both. 

By these means was the growth of many 
states prevented, and that of the lonians by a 
different cause — ^the^eat and surprising growth 
of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had 
completed the conquest of Croesus, and all the 
country which lieth between the river Halys 
and the sea, invaded them and enslaved their 
towns upon the continent; and Darius after- 
wards, victorious by the strength of a Phoeni- 
cian fleet, did the same by the islands. 

As for those tyrants who had any where 
usurped the government of Grecian cities, — 
thejr whole application being confined to their 
own private concerns, to the guard of their 
persons, or aggrandizement of their familie^-*- 
they resided in their own cities so far as was 
consistent with their own security. Nothing 
worthy of remembrance was achieved by them, 
unless we take into account the frequent broils 
between them and their neighbours. Not but 
that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their 
power to a great height. But Greece, in 
general, was thus withheld for a long course of 
time from performing any remarkable exploit, 
by the strength of her united, or the adventu- 
rous efforts of her separate states. 

But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all 
the ^rrants of other parts of Greece, generally, 
and of old, subject to these violent encroach- 
ments, notwithstanding their number and the 
fresh vigour of the last, were all (except those 
of Sicily) demolished by the Lacedemonians. 
— For Lacedemon, ever since it came into the 
hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it 
still continueth, though harassed with seditions 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



tbe longest of any place we know, yet hath 
ever been happy in a well regulated govern- 
ment, and hath always heen exempt from ty- 
rants; for, reckoning to the conclusion of this 
present war, it is somewhat more than four 
hundred years that the Lacedemonians have 
enjoyed the same polity. On this hasis was 
their power at home founded, and this enabled 
them to exert it in reg^ating other states. — 
But, aller that the tyrants were by them extir- 
pated from Greece, not many years intervened 
before the battle of Marathon was fought by 
the Medes against the Mhenians ; and in the 
tenth year after that, the Barbarian (Xerxes) 
a^ain, with a vast armament, invaded Greece 
in order to enslave it. Htmging then on the 
Teiy hi^mk of ruin, the Lacedemonians, on ac- 
count of their pre-eminent power, took the 
command of all the Greeks combined together 
in tbeir own defence; whilst the Athenians, 
<Hi the approach of the Medes, having already 
determined to abandon their city, and laid in 
their necessary stores, went on board their 
ships, and made head against him by sea. 
Having thus by their common efforts repulsed 
the Barbarian, the Grecians, not only those 
who revolted from the king, but those also 
who bad combined together against him, were 
soon after divided among themselves, siding 
either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedemo- 
nian lea^e ; for the mastery appeared plainly 
to be in their hands, since these were the most 
powerftd by land and those by sea. The agree- 
ment between the Athenians and Lacedemo- 
uians was but of short continuance ; variance 
ensued; and they entered the lists of w^ 
one against another, each with the additional 
strengih of their own respective allies : and 
hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they 
went over in parties to these as their principals. 
Insomuch that from the invasion of the Medes 
quite down to the breaking out of this war, 
one wbile striking up truces, another while at 
open war, either with one another or the con- 
federates revolting from either league, they had 
provided themselves vntYi all military stores, 
and much improved their skill by constant 
practice exercised in dangers. 

As for the Lacedemon^ns, they gave law to 
their confederates without the heavy imposition 
of tributes. Their study was only to keep 
ihem well afiected to themselves, by introduc- 
ing the oligarchy among them. But the Athe- 
Bi&Qs lorded it over theirs, having got in course 



of time the ships of all those who might op' 
pose them, into their own hands, excepting th« 
Chians and the Lesbians, and imposed on them 
a certain payment of tribute. And their own 
particular preparations for the present war 
were more ample than former times had known, 
even during the greatest vigoiu: of their state 
and the most perfect harmony between them 
and their allies. 

Such are the discoveries I have made con- 
cerning the ancient state of Greece ; which, 
though drawn from a regular series of proofii, 
will not easily be credited ; for it is the cus- 
tom of mankind, nay, even where their own 
country is concerned, to acquiesce with ready 
creduHty in the traditions of former ages, with- 
out subjecting them to the test of sedate ex- 
amination. Thus, for instance, it is yet a 
received opinion amongst the bulk of the 
Athenian people, that Hipparchus was the ty- 
rant, and therefore slain by Harmodius and 
Aristogiton,; and they have not yet discovered, 
that Hippias then governed by virtue of his 
being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, 
and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his 
brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, on the 
very day appointed, and just at the crisis, 
suspecting that information had been given to 
Hippias by some who were privy to the design, 
taade no attempt upon him, as put already on 
his guard. Yet willing, before they were ap- 
prehended, to show their resolution and con- 
tempt of danger, they accidentally found Hip- 
parchus at the Leocorium superintending the 
Panathenaioal procession,* and immediately 
slew him. There are many other things of a 
more recent date, and of memory not yet in- 
validated by time, about which the other Gre- 
cians are very wrong in their notions ; such as, 
that the Lacedemonian kings had each of them 
a double and not a single vote in public xjues- 
tions ; and that amongst them the Fittanate 
was a military band, which never yet existed. 
So easy a task to numbers is the search of 



* This procession was made at the great Panathenea, 
which festival was celebrated once in five years in com- 
memoration of the nnion of all the people of Attica by 
' Theseus. The lesser Panathenea was celebrated every 
third year, some say every year, and was lengthened out 
by public games. These were also used at the great 
Panathenea, in which the greatest splendour and mag- 
nificence were employed, and the procession added, 
here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the cu- 
rious reader may see a particular account In Potter's Ar- 
chnologia, vol. i. p. 431. 



8 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



traih ; so eager are they to catch at whateTer 
lieth next at hand ! 

But, fiom ihe teetimoniea alleged in luppoit 
of what I have thitherto adTanced, any one 
may depend on my account of things, with- 
out danger of false opinions. Let him with- 
hold his credit from the songs of poets, whose 
profession it is to give all possible enlarge- 
ments to their subjects; let him do so 
farther, by the writers of prose,' who study 
more that artful composition which captivateth 
the ear than the plain and simple recital of 
truth, where proper attestations are never to 
be found, and many things through length of 
time have incredibly sallied out into mere 
fable ; and then he will be convinced upon the 
plainest proofs, that the state of ancient Greece 
was very nearly the same as I have described it. 
And this present war, when considered in all 
its operations, notwithstanding the propensity 
of mankind to imagine that war in which .they 
are personally engaged, to be the greatest that 
ever happened, and so soon as it is over to re- 
place their admiration upon others more an- 
cient, will easily be owned to have been the 
most important of all. 

As to the speeches of particular persons either 
at the commencement or at the prosecution of 
the war, whether such as I heard myself or 
such as were repeated to me by others, I will 
not pretend to recite them in all their exacts 
ness. It hath been my method to consider 
principally what might be pertinently said upon 
every occasion to the points in debate, and 
to keep as near as possible to what would 
pass for genuine by universal consent And as 
for the actions performed in the course of this 
war, I have not presumed to describe them 
from casual narratives or my own conjectures, 
but either from certainty, where I myself was 
a spectator, or from the most exact informa- 
tions I have been able to collect from others. 
.This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, 
because even such as were present at those 
actions disagreed in their accounts about them, 
according as affection to either side or memory 
prevailed. 

My relation, because quite clear oC fable, 
may prove less delightful to the ears. But it 
will afford sufficient scope to those who love a 



t Thucydides ii bere supposed to glance at Herodotns; 
and again a little after he jusUy thinks, that jkfMn and 
f9hU ought to have no place in history. 



sincere account of past transactions, of such as 
in the ordinaiy vicissitudes of human afiain 
may fully occur, at least be resembled again. 
I give it to the public as an everlasting posses- 
sion, and not as a contentious instrument of 
temporary applause. 

Of former transactions the greatest was that 
against the Modes, which however, by two en- 
gagements on sea and as many at land, was 
brought to a speedy conclusion. But the con- 
tinuance of this war ran yut into a much great* 
er length ; and Greece in the course of it was 
plunged into such calamities as were never 
known before in an equal space. Never had 
so many cities been made desolate by victories, 
some by Barbarians and some by the violence 
of intestine feuds; to say nothing of those 
where captivity made room for new possessors ; 
never so many instances of banishment ; never 
so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or 
seditions. Such calamities, fiirther, as were 
known only by report, but had rarely been felt 
in fjBtet, now gained credit from experience; 
earthquakes, for instance, which affected the 
largest part of the habitable globe, and shook it 
with the utmost violence : eclipses of the sun, 
which happened more fluently than former 
times had remembered : great droughts in some 
places, the consequence o^ which was famine ; 
and, what made not the least ravage, but did \\s 
share of destruction, the noisome pestilence. 
For all these things ensued in the sequel of this 
war, which was carried on between the Athe- 
nians and Peloponnesians, after breaking the 
thirty years' truce concluded between them 
upon the reduction of Eubcea. 

The reasons for which this truce was broke, 
and their course of variance, I have in the first 
place thought proper to write, that none may 
be at a loss about the origin of so momentous 
a war among the Grecians. The growth of 
the Athenian power I conceive to have been 
the truest occasion of it, though never openly 
avowed; the jealousy stmdc by it into the 
Lacedaemonians made the contest necessaiy. 
But the pretences, publicly alleged on either 
side for breaking the truce and declaring open 
war, shall now be related. 

Bpidamnus is a q|ty on the right hand as 
you sail into the Ionian gulf: adjoining to it 
live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Xllyria. 
The Corcyreans settled a Colony here, the lead- 
er of which was Phalius the son of Heratocli' 
des, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



9 



Herenles, in^ted to the office out of the mo- 
ther-city, according to the custom of ancient 
times : and beside this, some Corinthians and 
others of Doric descent joined themselves to 
this colony. In process of time, the city of 
th^ Epidamnians became great and populous. 
Yet, having been afterwards harassed with se- 
ditions of many years' continuance, they were 
brought very low (according to report) by 
war waged against them by the neighbour- 
ing Barbarians, and were deprived of the 
greatest share of their power. But the most 
recent event at £pidamnus before the present 
war was, that the people there had driven the 
noUes out of the dty. These sheltering them- 
selv^ amongst the Barbarians, began depreda- 
tions on those who remained behind, both by 
land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, 
su£Eering vastly from these depredations, des- 
patched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother- 
city, beseeching th^n, << Not to behold their de- 
struction with eyes unconcerned, but to recon- 
cile their exiles to them, and to deliver them 
£rom this Barbarian war." The tunbassadors, 
sitting down submissively in the temple of Ju- 
no, offered these supplications. But the Corcy- 
reans refusing to receive them, sent them home 
again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus 
convinced that no redress could be had from 
Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their 
present perplexities, sent to Delphos to inquire 
of ihe god, « Whether they should surrender 
their city to the Corinthians as their founders, 
and should seek security from their protectionl'' 
He answered, that *< they should surrender and 
take them for their leaders.*' The Epidam- 
nians, in pursuance of this oracle, arriving at 
Corinth, make there a tender of the colony, re- 
presenting that " the leader of it had been at 
Corinth," and communicating the oracle ; and 
farther entreated them « not to look on with 
eyes of unconcern till their destruction was 
completed, but to undertake their redress." 
The Corinthians granted them their protection 
from a regard to justice, imagining themselves 
to be no less interested in their colony than the 
Cercjrreans. But they were also actuated by 
a hatred of the Corcyreans, from whom, though 
a colony of their own, they had received some 
contemptuous treatment : for they neither paid 
them the usual honour on their' public solem- 
nities, nor began with a Corinthian in the 
distribution of the sacrifices, which is always 
done by other colonies. This their contempt 
9 



was founded as well on the suffieieney of their 
own' wealth, in which at that time they equal- 
led the richest of the Greeks, as on the supe- 
riority of their military force. Their insolence 
became greater in time with the enlargement 
of their navy, and they assumed glory to thekn- 
selves in a naval character as succeeding the 
Phsacians in the possession of Corcyra. This 
was their chief incentive to furnish themselves 
with a naval strength, and in it they were by no 
means inconsiderable : for they were masters of 
a hundred and twenty triremes, when they be- 
gan this war. Upon all these reasons the re^ 
sentments of the Corinthians rising high against 
them, they undertook with pleasure the relief 
of Epidanmus ; encouraging all who were so 
disposed, to go and settle there, and sending 
thither a garrison of Ambraciots and Leuca- 
nians and their own people. These marched 
by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the 
Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyre^e, 
lest they should have hindered their passage 
had they attempted it by sea. 

As soon as the Corcyreans heard thai the 
new inhabitants and garrison were got to Epii> 
damnus, and that the colony was delivered in^' 
to the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot 
with indignation : and putting out immediately 
with twenty-five ships which were soon foll6w- 
ed by another equipment, they command them 
« at their peril to receive their exiles ; — for those 
who had been driven out of Epidamnus had al^ 
ready been at Corcyra, where, pointing to the 
sepulchres, and claiming the rights of consan** 
guinity, they had entreated them to undertake 
their restoration : — " and to send away the gar- 
rison and new inhabitants which they had receiv- 
ed from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite 
deaf to these haughty commands. And upon 
this the Corcyreans, with a squadron of forty 
ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they 
pretended to restore, and an aid of Illyrians, 
began hostilities. Having blocked up the city, 
they made proclams^on, ** that all Epidamnians 
who were willing and the strangers might de- 
part without molestation, or otherwise they 
should be treated as enemies." But this ha- 



ving Ho effect, the Corcyreans beset the place, 
which is situated upon an isthmus, on all sides^ 
in regular siege. 

The Corinthians, upon ihe arrival of messen- 
gers from Epidamnus vrith an account of the 
siege, draw their forces together. They also 
gave public notice, " that a new colony was 
1-2 



10 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



going to Epi3aim»is, into which all that would 
enter should have equal and like privileges with 
their predeceBsors ; that, if any one was un- 
willing to set out immediately, and yet chose to 
have the benefit of the colony, he might depo- 
sit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused 
his personal attendance." The number of 
those who entered for immediate trane^rta- 
tion, and of those who deposited their money, 
was large. They sent farther to the Megare- 
ans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge 
their convoy, that their passage might not be 
obstructed by the Con^eans, from whom they 
received a supply of eight, and four more fr^m 
Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request 
was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. 
A single ship joined them from Hermione ; two 
from Trcezene ; ten from the Leucadians ; and 
eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans 
and Phliasians they requested money ; of the 
iileans, empty ships and money. And the num- 
ber of ships fitted out by themselves amounted 
to thirty and three thousand heavy-armed. 

When the Corcyreans were informed of 
these preparations, they went to Corinth, pur- 
posely accompanied by ambassadors from La- 
cedemon and Sicyon. There they charged the 
Corinthians « to fetch away their garrison and 
new settlement firom Epidamnus, as having no 
manner of pretensions there : that, if they had 
any thing to allege to the contrary, they were 
willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponne- 
sus before such states as both sides diould ap- 
prove; and to whicheiter party the colony 
should be adjudged, by them it should be held.*' 
They also intimated « their readiness to refer 
the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos; 
-^war, in their own inclinations, they were 
quite against : but if it must be so, on their 
aiides, (they said) mere necessity would pre- 
scribe the measure ; and if thus compelled to 
do it, they should for assistance haver recourse 
to friends not eligible indeed, -but better able 
to serve them than such as they already had." 
The Corinthians answered, that « if they would 
wi&draw their fleet and their Barbarians from 
before Epidamnus, they would theb treat of an 
accommodation : but, till this was done, their 
honour would not suffer them to submit to a 
reference, whilst their friends were undergoing 
the miseries of a siege." The Corcyreans re- 
plied, that " if they would recall their people 
from Epidamnus, themselves also would do 
the like; but were ready further to agree, that 



both parties should remain in their present sit- 
uation, under a su/^nsion of snaa, till the af> 
fair could be judicially determined." 

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every 
proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned 
their ships and their allies were come up, des- 
patching a herald befoidband to declare war 
against the Corcyrieans^ and th^ weighing an- 
chor vrith a force of -seventy-five ships and two 
thousand heavy-armed, they stretched away for 
Epidamnus to make head against the Corcy- 
reans. The conmianders of this fleet we^e 
Aristeus the son of Pellicas, CalUcrates the 
son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timan- 
thes; those of the land forces were Aicho- 
timus the son of Eurytimus, and-Isarchidasthe 
son of Isarchus. 

When they were come up as &r as Actium 
in the district of Anactorium, where standeth 
the temple of Apollo, in the month of the 
gulf of Ajibracia, they were met by a herald 
despatched expressly in a row-boat by the Coiv 
cyreans, forbidding them « at their peril to pro*- 
ceed." < But at the same time the Corcyreans 
were busied at home in manning their own 
ships, repairing such as were old to mi^e them 
fit for service, and equipping the rest with the 
utmost expedition. When the herald brought 
back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and 
their squadron was now completed to eighty 
ships (for they had had forty einployed in the 
siege of Epidalnnus), they sailed in quest of 
the enemy, and drawing up against them came 
to an engagement The victory fell beyond 
dispute to the side of the Corcyreans, and fif- 
teen ships of the Corinthians were utteriy d^ 
stroyed. 

Their good fortune was such that on the v^ 
ry same day Epidamnus was suifendered to the 
besiegers upon a capitulation, by which «a]l 
the strangers in the plane were to be sold for 
slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained pri»> 
oners at discretion." 

After the engagement at sea, the Corcyreans 
having erected a trophy^ upon Leucinma apro 

t This was constantly done by the Grecians upon a vic- 
tory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both sidei, 
both sides erected tropbies, of which several instances 
occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land 
were decked out with the arms they had taken ; those 
for a victory at sea, with arms also and the shatters of 
the enemy's ships. " To demolish a trophy was looked 
on as unlawful, and a kind of sacrilege, because they 
Were all consecrated to some deity ; nor was it less a 
crime to pay divine adoration bef<H-e them, or to repair 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



11 



N 



montoiy of Corcjra, put to dealb all the pri- 
soners tbej had taken, except the Gorinlluans 
whom they kept in chains. And after this, as 
the OonvM^SBB and allies having been Tanquish- 
ed in figbt* were forced to retire within their 
•vm harboiirs, they were quite masters of all 
&e adjacent sea ; and, sailing first to Lencas, 
a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its terri- 
tory waste ; and then burned Cyllene, a dcfek 
of the Eleans, because they had supplied the 
Corinthians with ships and money. In this 
manner they continued masters of the sea a 
long time after their naval victory, and in their 
cruises very much annoyed the allies of the 
Corinthians. It was not until the beginning 
of the summer, that a check was given them 
by a fleet and land army, who were commis- 
sioned, in order to relieve their harassed allies, 
to station themselves at Actium and round the 
Chimerium of Thesprotis. There they lay, 
to cover Leucus and other places which were 
in friendship with them from the ravage of the 
enemy. "Hie Gorcyreans, upon this, with a 
naval and land force stationed themselves over> 
against them at Leucimna. But, neither party 
venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet 
in their opposite stations the whole summer ; 
and, on the approach of winter, both sides 
withdrew to their respective homes. 

During the remainder of the year, after the 
engagement at sea, and all the following, the 
Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in 
this their war against the Corcyreans, were 
building new ships, and sparing neither labour 
nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, 
and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the 
other parts of Greece to hire marines into their 
service. The Corc3rreans, hearing of these 
great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and 
with reason ; for at that time they were in no 
alliance with any of the Grecians, nor compre- 
hended either in the Athenian or Lacedsmo- 
nian league. And hence, they thought it quite 
expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the 
Atheiuans, and endeavoiv to obtain some suc- 
cour from them. The Corinthians gaining in- 



tbem when decayed, as may be likewise observed of the 
Eoman trioinphal arches; this being tbe means to re- 
vive the memory of forgotten qaarrels, and engage pos- 
terity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors ; for 
the sSBie reason, those Grecians, who first introduced 
liaB cQStam of efeeting pillais for trophies, incurred a ae* 
vere censure from the ages they lived in*"-'PotUr*s 
Ankm^logiOt vol. U. e. 19. 



tolligence of their design, despatched an embas^ 
sy at the same time fo Athens, instructed by 
any means to prevent the junction of the Athe- 
nians to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, 
which might hinder them from bringing this 
war to a successful issue. The Athenians be- 
ing met in general assembly,' both embassies 
rose up to plead their own cause; and the 
Corcyrean spoke as follows : 

«It is quite proper, Athenians, that those 
who address themselves to a neighbouring 
power imploring their succour, which is now 
our case, without being able to plead the merit 
of prior good services or an old alliance in their 



• The f xKXitrtti or assembly of the people. In this the 
sovereignty was vested ; and it is proper the English 
reader should grow acquainted with this particular form 
in the Athenian democracy. * 

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, 
which presided by rotation. The year was divided into 
ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. 
The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by 
their authority and in their name : these were called 
Prytanes. These being too large a number for business 
they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions 
presiding for a week ; and these were called Proedri, 
One of the Proedri presided or was in the chair for a 
day, and was styled Epistates. For that day, and he 
never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time In his 
life, he was Invested with the highest trust in the go- 
vernment. He kept the public seal and the keys of the 
citadel and treasury. In the assembly of the people he 
ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, 
put the question, and declared the majority. 

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, ordi- 
nary and extraordinary. Of the first kind, four were 
regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, a;td 
at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states 
had public audience. The latter were occasionally con- 
vened by the presidents in courses or by the general of 
the state. Some days beforehand, notice was publicly 
given by the senate or council of five hundred upon 
what subjects they were to deliberate ; but this could 
not be observed upon sudden emergencies. 

They met early in the morning, generally, in the 
Pnyx, at the summons of the public crier. At the se- 
cond summons they were obliged to attend at their peril. 
For then the proper ofiicers ran along the forum with a 
rope stretched across and rubbed over with vermilion, 
and all upon whom-a mark was found were fined; but 
those who attended early and regularly, received half 
a drachma each for attendance. The number which 
attended generally amounted to five or six thousand. 

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young 
pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way 
of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud 
by the crier for the prosperity of the commonwealth of 
Athens ; which ended, a curse was next pronounced 
on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of 
his country. Then the presidents of the week opened 
the points upon which they were convened, and the 
assembly proceeded to business. 



12 



PELOPONNKSIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



own behalf, should previouflly convince them, 
chiefly, that a compliance with such requests 
mus^ turn to their advantage ; at least, that it 
will cause no manner of inconvenience ; and 
then, that the favor will be returned with ef- 
fectual gratitude. If they are unable to give 
satisfactory conviction in any of these particu- 
lars, they can have no reason to be angry if 
their suit- be rejected. The Corcyreans, confi- 
dent that they can clear up these points beyond 
(he reach of scruple, have sent us hither to re- 
quest your alliance. 

*< The method, indeed, which hitherto we 
have fondly observed, hath proved in fact ab- 
surd towards you in this our exigency, and pre- 
judicial to our own affairs in our 'present situa- 
tion. In preceding times, we never chose to 
grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come 
to sue' for alliance from others, being through our 
own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our 
war against the Corinthians : and that which be- 
fore appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to 
keep clear of danger by shunning the entangle- 
ments of a foreign alliance, we now find by the 
event to have been both impolitic and weak. 

« Once already we have engaged the Corin- 
thians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our 
own strength. But ^ince, with a greater force 
collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of 
Greece, they are again preparing to attack us ; 
since we perceive ourselves unable to resist 
them merely vnth our own domestic strength ; 
since further with our subjection the danger 
will spread abroad ; we are necessitated to ap- 
ply to you aud everywhere else for succour ; 
and though now emboldened to act in opposi- 
tion to our former inactive maxims, yet we 
deserve your pardon, as they were not the re- 
sult of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments : 
and could we but obtain redress from you, this 
incidental necessity of ours will turn out high- 
ly to your honour upon several accounts. 

" In the first place, you will favour those vtrith 
your assistance who have felt but never com- 
mitted injustice. In the next place, by protect- 
ing those whose lives and liberties are at stake, 
you will confer so vast an obligation that the 
memory of it can never be abolished. We are 
now masters of the greatest naval force except 
your own. Consider therefore how fair an 
occasion, very seldom to be met vnth, of the 
greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest 
vexation to your enemies, now lieth before 
you ; when that very power, the accession of 



which you would readily have purchased wi<& 
ample sums of money and a weight of obliga- 
tion, Cometh here to invite your acceptance 
and make a tender of itself without any danger 
or expense to you ; nay, what is more, enabling 
you to gain the praise of the world, the grate- 
ful acknowledgments of those you defend, and 
an increase of power to yourselves. Few peo- 
ple, in preceding ages, have ever had at any 
one time so many fine opportunities within 
their reach. And few there are, who, suing 
for alliance, do it not rather from a view of re- 
ceiving than conferring security and reputation 
by their suit 

«If there be any one amongst you, who 
imagineth that war will never happen in which 
we may do you service, in such imagination he 
is quite mistaken. He doth not penetrate the 
designs of the Lacedemonians, who, alarmed 
at your power, are intent on war ; nor those of' 
the Corinthians, who, powerful of themselves, 
and your enemies, have begun with us to open 
the way for attacking you ; that, united by com- 
mon resentments, we might not stand up in our 
mutual defence against their violence ; nor they 
be disappointed at least in one of their views, 
either effectually to humble us, or securely to 
establish their own power. It is your interest 
to prevent them, by accepting that alUance 
which we ofifer, and rather to anticipate their 
designs than counterplot them when ripening 
into act 

*< If farther, they tax with a breach of justice 
your presuming to interfere with their colonies ; 
let them learn, that every colony, whilst used 
in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard- 
to its mother-state, but, when treated with inju- 
ry and violence, is become an alien. They are 
not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals, 
of those who remain behind. Their violence 
and injustice require no proofe. For, invited 
by us to submit the business of Epidanmus to 
a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute 
their claims at war than at equity. And let 
such behaviour towards us their relations put 
you timely on your guard, that you may not 
be over-reached by their collusions, nor hesitate 
one moment to grant our petitions. For he 
who findeth the least room to repent of having 
gratified his enemies, is most fikely to persevere 
in uninterrupted security. 

« You will not break your treaty with the 
Lacedemonians by our admission, who are 
allied to neither of you. By that treaty it is 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



13 



expKMly stipulated, that « If any of the states 
of Greece be not at present in alliance with 
either of the contracting parties, permission is 
given them to go into either league, at their 
own discretion.'*— And terrible indeed it is, if 
they must be at liberty to man their fleets out 
of places in their alliance, nay, more than that, 
out of Greece at large, and to small amount, 
even out of your dependents : and we must be 
debarred not only your most inviting alliance, 
but every possible expedient of succour: then 
after all, they must raise a cry of injustice, if 
we offer our requests to you and have Ihcm 
Spranted. But much greater reasons of com- 
plaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail 
upon you. For then you will throw at a dis- 
tance those who are beset with dangers, and 
never were your enemies ; you will not only not 
restrain the encroachments of enemies and in- 
vaders, but vnll behold them through your ne- 
gligence assuming strength out of your domin- 
ions, which you ought never to endure. You 
ought either t6 hinder them from seducing 
your subjects into their pay, or said an imme- 
diate succour to us, in what manner you may 
be persuaded is the most expedient; but the 
course you ought principally to take is, to 
form with us a defensive alliance, and to act 
immediately. 

« The advantage of such a measure, as we 
premised at first, we are clearly proving. But 
that which carrieth the greatest weight is this, 
that our enemies are enemies also to you (a 
point too clear to require proof), and enemies 
by no means despicable, but able to make re- 
volters feel their vengeance. The bad conse- 
quences of rejecting a land cannot be equal to 
those of rejecting a naval alliance, especially to 
you, who should exert your utmost efforts to let 
none be masters oia. fleet beside yourselves ; or, 
if that be not feasible, to make the most power- 
ful in that respect your fast alUes. And who- 
soever, allowing the plain advantage of these 
our arguments, may yet dread a rupture if their 
infloence prevail,-— let such a one know, that 
the event he feareth, accompanied by strength, 
will strike greater dread into all your enemies, 
but that the zeal of him who would have us 
now rejected, aince it is founded on a weak 
presumption of their strength, must the sooner 
encourage those enemies to attack you. The 
present consultation is not confined to Gorcyra, 
but very nearly ooncemeth Athens also : — 
let him therefore be assured, that he doth not 



provide the best for the welfare of Athens^ 
when, directly foreseeing a war fast approach- 
ing and only not on foot, he hedtateth the 
least about gaining a people provided with all 
the necessary means of being a most serviceable 
friend or a most prejudicial foe ; — a people op- 
poi^unely situated in the course to Italy and 
Sicily, so capable to hinder the accession of 
any naval force from thence to the Pelopon- 
nesians, and to secure a passage from hence to 
any of those coasts, not to mention the com- 
modiousness of it in many other respects. 

« To reduce the whole to one i^ort point, 
wherein all and every individual of you is con- 
cerned, learn from hence that we .are not to be 
abandoned : there* are but three naval powers 
amongst the Grecians of any consideration, 
your own, our own, and that of the Corinthi- 
ans. If you indolently suffer 'two of these to 
be incorporated, by leaving us a prey to the 
Corinthians, you must for the future make 
head against the Corcyreans and Peloponnesi- 
ans both : but, if you grant your alliance to us, 
the contest will lie against them alone, and 
your own naval strength be considerably aug^ 
mented." 

In this manner the Corcyreans spoke : and 
when they had concluded, the Corinthians to<di 
their turn as foUoweth : — 

« Since these Corcyreans have not confined 
their discourse merely to solicit the favour of 
your alliance, but have enlarged it with invec- 
tives against our injustice in making war upon 
them, we also liennder a necessity to make some 
previous observations on both of those p<Hnts, 
before we proceed to other matters. By thie 
means you will perceive your own great secu- 
rity in complying with our demands, and what 
weighty reasons you have to reject their im- 
portunate solicitations. ^ 

«They allege it as a maxim of prudence 
that they have been hitherto averse to any fo- 
r^gn alliance : but their motives in this were 
founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. 
They would have no ally to be a witness of 
the wrongs ihey do ; they declined the society 
of such as might put them to the blush. Their 
very island farther, which is finely situated for 
such arbitrary tempers, suffereth them alone to 
judge those outrages they themselves commit : 
exempting them firom fair and equitable trials, 
because they seldom go abroad to visit their 
neighbours, as their harbours are the constant 
and necessary resort of others. Here then 



14 



PKLOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



lieth the modesty of their unasaociating max- 
im : it was designed to preyent their having 
any partners in violence, that they might have 
it all to themselves ; that, when they were su- 
perior, they might oppress witiiont control, 
when there was none to watch them they 
might engross the spoil, and might enjoy their 
rapine without danger of a hlush. Had they 
been those virtuous souls they proclaim them- 
selves, then, clear of every bad imputation from 
their neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to 
manifest their integrity to the world by doing 
and by submitting to justice. 

" But such neither we nor any other people 
have in fact experienced them. For, though 
planted by us, they have ever disowned their 
allegiance to us, and now wage open war 
a)gainst us, pleading that they were not sent 
atbroad to be maltreated and oppressed. We 
also aver in our own behalf, that neither did 
we send them to receive their injurious re- 
quitals, but to retain them in lawful depen- 
dence, and to be honoured and reverenced b^^ 
them. Such dutiful returns the rest of our 
colonies punctually make us, and by such no 
other people are so well respected as ourselves. 
From the great satisfaction therefore we give 
to all the rest, it plainly appeareth, that we 
afford no reasonable disgust to these alone, 
and that without some glaring injury, we should 
have had no inclination to declare war against 
them. But, though we had actually trans- 
gressed, it would have been quite decent on 
their part to have shown condescension when 
we were angry ; and then it would have been 
base in us to have pressed too far on such 
moderation. To their pride and the insolence 
<)f wealth their many transgressions against us 
are justly to be ascribed. Hence it was, that 
they laid no claim to Epidamnus, which be- 
longeth to us, whilst harassed with intestine 
feuds ; but when we came to its redress, then 
by force they seize and detain it. And now 
they pretend that previous to that they were 
willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration. 
— Such pleas are not to be regarded, when of- 
fered by men who are already masters in pos- 
session, and on that security make appeal to 
justice : they are only of weight, when facts 
and words are equitably to be judged, before 
the point hath been decided by arms. And it 
was not before they had besieged that city, but 
when they thought that we were intent on sav- 
ing it, that they had recourse to the specious 



pretence of a fSur arbitration. And here they 
are at present, by no means content with the 
wrongs they have there committed, presuming 
to ask conjunction from you, net in league but 
in violence, and on the merit of being rebels 
against us to beg your protection. Then was 
the proper time for sQch an address to you, 
when their affairs securely flourished ; not now 
when we have been outraged by them, and they 
are beset with dangers ; not when you, who 
have shared no benefit from their former power, 
are to relieve their distress, and by no means 
their accomplices in crimes are to come in for 
an equality of censure from us. A prior con- 
j unction of force justly entitleth to a share of 
what may be the event : but those who had no 
participation in the guilt ought to be exempted 
from the consequences of it. — ^And thus we 
have clearly shown, that we have addressed 
ourselves before you with all the requisites of 
a rightfid cause, and that their proceedings are 
violent and rapacious. 

« It is now incumbent upon us to convinee 
you, that you cannot with justice receive them 
into alliance. For, granting it to^be expressly 
stipulated in the treaty that any of the stotea 
not particularly mentioned may go into either 
league at their own discretivn, yet the intent 
of the stipulation reacheth not to those who 
join one party to the prejudice of another, but 
to such as having withdrawn from neither side 
are in need of protection — to such as bring not 
war instead of peace to those who receive 
them, — ^if they know their interest. And yet 
the latter must be your portion, if our argu- 
menta lose their influence: for you will not 
only become auxiliaries to them, but enemies 
also to us who are your allies by treaty. Of 
necessity, if you join with them, our vengeance 
must be levelled at them vrithout separating 
you. Right above all things it would be for 
you to keep yourselves at a distance from us 
both ; — ^if tiiat will not please, to reverse your 
proceedings, and join with us in opposition to 
them. For, to the Corinthians you are bound 
by firm and lasting treaties, with the Corey- 
reans you have never yet transacted even for a 
truce, and by no means to establish a new law 
for receiving revolters iFirom the other league. 
We ourselves did not, upon the Samian revolt, 
give our suffrage against you, when the rest of 
the Peloponnesians were divided upon the 
question — ^whether they ought to be supported : 
but we openly maintained, that eveiy state had 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



15 



a right to proceed ageinit its own dependents. 
For if 70U leceiTc and undertake the defence 
of those who have hehaTed amiss, the event 
will show that the gpreater number will come 
OYer to our aide, and that jou establish a law 
prejudicial to yourselves much more than to us. 

** The points of justice we have thus sufficient- 
ly cleared up to you, according to the general 
laws of Greece. We have only to add a word 
of advice and the claim of a favour, such a one 
as we now. affirm upon ai principle of gratitude 
ought not to be denied us, who are neither 
your enemies so far as to hurt you, nor ever 
were your friends so fisur as to burden you. 
When formerly before the invasion of the 
Medes, you were in want of long ships in your 
war against the ^gineta, you were supplied by 
the Corinthians with twenty. The service 
which we then did you, and that other more re- 
cent about the 8amians, when we prevented 
their receiving any support from the Pelopon- 
nesians, enabled youin their turns to vanquish 
the ^ginets and to chastise the Samians. And 
these services were done you at a season when 
the human attention, fixed entirely on war, re- 
gardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory. 
Whoever forwardeth this, men esteem their 
friend, though he was before their foe ; and him 
who checketh it, their foe, though perhaps he 
may be their real friend. For even domestic 
^Sian are sorrily conducted at a time when the 
nund is inflamed by contention. 

*< Recollect these things. Let the young man 
kam the truth of them from his elders, and ao- 
hnowledge^hat we ought to be properly requit- 
ed. Let him not entertain thb thought, ^t 
what we say is agreeable to equity, but that in 
case of a war interest indineth another way : 
for interest is most surely to be found there 
where the least injustice is committed. The 
contingency of that war, from the dread of 
which the Corcyreans encourage you to act un- 
justly, lieth yet in obscurity, and ought not to 
inflame you into open and immediate hostilities 
i'gunst the Corinthians. It would be prudent, 
farther, to lessen that jealousy we have already 
conceived from the proceedings at Megara. 
''or a later obligation, by the favour of time, 
though of less weight in itself, is able to cancel 
& charge of greater moment. Neither suffer 
yourselves to be aUured with the promise of Si 
powerful conjunction of naval force : for never 
to act unjustly against equals is a firmer se- 
citrity of power than to be elevated upon pr&> 



sent plauaibiUties, and enlazge it througih a 
series of dangers. Our present circumstances 
resemble those concerning which we explicitly 
declared at Lacedemon, that every state had a 
right to proceed against its own dependents: 
and now we beg that liberty from you; and 
that you, who have reaped the benefit of such 
a suffrage from us, would not prejudice us by 
yours. Render us for it the just requital; 
remembering that this is the critical season, in 
which he who aideth is the best of Mends, and 
he that opposeth the greatest foe. And, as 
for these Gorc3rreans, take them not into your 
alliance in despite of us, nor abet them in the 
injuries they have done us. By acting in this 
manner you will discharge the obligations in- 
cumbent upon you, ^d will take those mea- 
sures which are most for your own advantage." 

This is the substance of what was said by the 
Corinthians. 

The Athenians having heard both parties, 
^ met twice in full assembly on this occasion. 
At the first meeting they jthought there was 
validity in the arguments of the Corinthians; 
but, at the second, they came to a different re- 
solution — not indeed to form such an alliance 
with the Corcyreans as to have the same ene- 
mies and the same firiends (for then, if the 
Corcyreans should summon them to join in an 

i Here the English reader should be informed, in 
what manner business went on when difficulties, diver- 
sities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued. 

When it appeared that the point proposed would not 
pass unanimously , the crier, at the command of the pre* 
sident in the chair, proclaimed aloud, ** What citizen 
above fifty years of age hath a mind to speak?'* When 
such had been heard, the crier made a second proclama- 
tion,that "any Athenian whatever had liberty to speak." 
The debate being ended, the president in the chair bade 
the crier put the, question. It was decided by holding 
up of hands. The chairman distinguished the numbers 
in the affirmative and negative, and declared the major- 
ity. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in 
form : and the Archon*s name who gave title to the 
year, the day of the month, and the name of the presid- 
ing tribe, were prefixed. 

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy ob- 
servation. The sentiments of age and experience were 
first to be heard, and then the spirit and resolution of 
the younger were called in to assist at the public con- 
sultation. Nay, they carried it farther ; no person con- 
victed of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or pub- 
lic misdemeanour, was suffered to speak in this as- 
sembly. From them they expected no sound instruc- 
tion, no disinterested advice. If any such offered to 
speak, the presidents of the assembly immediately en- 
joined them silence: or, if they were refractory, order- 
ed their officers to pull them down and turn them out 
of the assembly. 



16 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



expedition against Gorinih, their treaty with 
the Peloponnetdans would be broke;) but on 
alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal 
succour of one another, if either Corcyra 
or Athens, or any of their respective allies 
should be assaulted. A war with |he Pelo- 
ponnesians seemed to them unavoidable ; and 
they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which 
-had so great a naval force, for a prey to the 
Corinthians ; but, to break them to the utmost 
of their power against one another, that upon 
occasion they might be the better able to war 
with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their 
hands, though joined by other states of Greece 
which had power at sea. At the same time 
that island appeared to them most conveniently 
situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily. 
Upon these motives the Athenians received 
the Corcyreans into their alliance: and, not 
long after the departure of the Corinthians, 
sent ten ships to their aid under the command 
t>f Lacedemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus 
the son of Strbmbichus, and Proteas the son 
of Epicles. Their orders were, " by no means 
to engage the Corinthians, unless they stood 
against and endeavoured to make a descent at 
Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if 
they did so, to resist them with all their efforts.'' 
These orders were given with a view of not 
infringing the treaty: and this their aid of 
shipping arriveth at Corcyra. 

The Corinthians, when they had completed 
their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a 
fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, 
ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Me- 
gareans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven 
to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and 
the other ninety were their own. The quotas 
from the allied cities had each of them their 
respective commanders; but the Corinthian 
squadron was commanded by Xenoclides the 
son of. Euthyeles, with four colleagues. So 
soon as they were all assembled at that part of 
the continent which looks towards Corcyra, 
they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the 
Chimerium in Thesprotis. A harbour open- 
eth itself here, and above it is the city of 
Ephyre, at a distance from the sea, in Eleatis, 
a district of Thesprotb : near it is the outlet 
into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into 
which the river Acheron, having run through 
Thesprotis, is at last received ; from which also 
it dcriveth its name. The river Thyamis also 
mnneth here, dividing Thesprotis from Ce»< 



I trine, and between these two riven ariseth the 
cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians there- 
fore arrive at this part of the continent, and ^ 
their station there. But the Corcyreans so 
soon as ever advised of their sailing, having 
manned a hundred and ten ships under the 
command of Miciades, ^simides, and Eury- 
batus, took their station at one of those isles 
which are called the Sybota, accompanied by 
the ten Athenian ships. Their land-force was 
left at the promontoiy of Leucimna, with an 
aid oi a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians* 
The Corinthians had also ready upon the con- 
tinent a numerous aid of barbarians: for the 
people on that coast ever continued their 
friends. When every thing was in order among 
the Corinthians, taking in provisions for three 
days, they weigh by night from Chinxerium 
with a design to fight ; and having sailed tloag 
till break of day, they discover the ships of the 
Corcyreans already out at sea, and advancing 
against them. When thus they had got a view 
of each other, both sides form into the order 
of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyreans 
were the Athenian ships ; the rest of the fleet 
was all their own, ranged into three squadrons^ 
each of which was respectively under Ihe orders 
of the three commanders : in this manner was 
the order of the Corcyreans formed. In the 
right of the Corinthians were the ships of the 
Megareans and Ambraciots ; in the centre the 
other allies in their several arrangements ; the 
Corinthians formed the left wing themselves, 
as their ships were the best sailers, to oppose 
the Athenians and the right of the Corcyreana 
When^ the signal flags were hoisted on both 



1 To give the English readier, once for alF, a proper 
Ii(;bt into their method of beginning an engagement, I 
■ball quote the foUowing paragraph from archbishop 
Potter's Archeologia, vol. ii. c. 31. 

" Before they joined battle, both parties invoked tbe 
gods to their assistance by prayers and sacrffices ; and 
the admirals, going from ship to ship in some of tbe 
lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a set oration to 
behave themselves lilce men ; then all things heing in 
readiness, the signal wrs given by ha~nging ont of tbe 
admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read in Plntarch, 
or a red garment or banner, which was termed »tp»'9 
trntttiti. Daring the elevation of this tbe fight continued^ 
and by its depression or inclination towards the right or 
left, the rest of the ships were directed in what manner 
to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To thiii 
was added the sound of tnimpeto, which was began in 
the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole na- 
vy ; it was likewise vsual for the soldiers before tbe figM 
to sing a paean or hymn to Mars, and after the figlkt 
anotlier to Apollo.'* 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



17 



wades, they ran togedier and began ibob engage- 
ment; both sidefl having atowed their decks 
with bodies oi heavy-aimed, with many further 
that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. 
Their preparations still retained something' of 
the awkward mamier of antiquity. The engage- 
ment was sharply carried on, yet without exer- 
tions of skill, and very much resembling a 
battle upon land. When they had laid one 
another close, they were not easily separated 
again, because of the number and hurry of tiie 
-vessels. The greatest hope of victory was 
placed in the heavy-armled fighting on the decks, 
wrho fixed to their post engaged hand to hand, 
wrhilst their ships continued without any mo- 
tion. They had no opportunity to make their 
charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of 
strength and courage without any dexterity. 
The tumult ;nras great on all sides, and the 
whole action Alll of disorder: in which the 
Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean where- 
ever they were pressed too hard, and did what 
they could to intimidate the enemy ; but their 
commanders refrained from any direct attack, 
remembering with awe the orders of the Athe- 
nians. The right wing of the Corinthians suf- 
fered the most ; for the Corcyreans with twenty 
ships, having put them to flight, chased them 
when dicqpersed to the continent, and continu- 
ing the pursuit to th^r very camp, landed imme- 
diately, where they set fire to their abandoned 
tents and carried off all the baggage : in this 
part therefore the Corinthians and their allies 
were vanijnished, and the Corcyreans were 
plainly superior. But in the left, where the 
Corinthians personally engaged, they easily 
prevailed, as twMity ships of the Corcyreans, 
and those too from a nxunber at first inferior, 
were gone off in the pursuit. But the Athe- 
nians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, 
now came up to their su|^rt more openly than 
before, having hitherto refrained from any direct 
attack. And when the chase was clearly be- 
gun, and the Corinthians followed their success, 
then every one amongst them applied himself 
to action. There was no longer any time for 
discretion: Corinthians and Athenians were 
forced by absolute necessity to engage one an- 
other. 

The chase being thus begun, the Corinthians 
towed not after them the hulks of the vessels 
they had sunk, but tumed all their attention 
to the men who were floating about, and cruiz- 
ed at large more to slaughter than take afive. 
10 



And, having not yet discovered the defeat of their 
rightj they slaughtered through igncNnmce their 
own friends. For the number of ships beinglarge 
on either side, and covering a wide extefit of sea, 
after the first confusion of the engagement they 
were not able easily to distinguish which were 
the victors or which the vanquished : since Grre- 
ctans against Grecians had nev^ at any time be- 
fore engaged at sea with so large a number of 
vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued 
tiie Corcyreans to land, they returned to look 
after their shattered vessels and their own 
dead. And most of these they took up and 
parried to Sybota, where also lay the land-force 
of their barbarian auxiliaries : this Sybota is a 
desert haven in Thesprotis. Having performed 
this duty, they gathered togel!ber again into a 
body and went in quest of the Corcyreans, who 
with those damaged vessels that yet could 
swim, and with all that had no damage to- 
gether vrith the Athenians, came out to meet 
them, feaiikig lest they might attempt to land 
upon their shore. It was now late in the day, 
and they had sung their pean as going ta at- 
tack, when op a sudden tile Corinthittis^ 
slackened their course, having descried a rein- 
forcement of twenty sail coming up from 
Athens. This seccmd squadron the Athe-^ 
nians had sent away to support the former teny 
fearing (what really happened) lest the Corey* 
teans might be vanquished, and their own ten 
ships be too few for their support. The Co- 
rinthians, therefore, having got a view of thern^ 
and suspecting tiiey came from Athens, and 
in a larger number than they yet discovered, 
began gradually to fall away. They were not 
yet descried by the Corcyreans (for the course 
kept them more out of their ken), who were 
surprised to see the Corinthians thus slacken 
their course, till some, who had gained a view, 
informed them that such ships are coming up» 
and then they also fell back themselves : for 
now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians 
being tumed about had dissolved their order. 
In this manner they were separated from one 
another : and the naval engagement ended with 
the night 

The Corcyreans having recovered tiietr sta> 



1 Tbe original is irffivmv nefevevreftbey Itnocked the 
hintf dedc, • pbnise elegantiy applied bf Thueydides 
to thoM tbat retreat figbting, and still facing their ene- 
mies. It was done by running tbeir ships backwarda 
upon their bind decks in order to tack about. See Pot- 
ter's Arehsotogla, vol. il. c. S0« 
G 



w 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



{ion at Leucynma, those twenty ships from 
Athens, under the command of Glauco the 
son of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leo- 
goras, having passed through floadng carcases 
and wredLs, came up to the station, not long 
aft^ they hod been descried. Yet the Cor- 
cyreans (for now it was night) were in great 
consternation lest they should be enemies: 
but they were soon known, and then came to 
an anchor. 

Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, 
•oeompanied by such of the Corcyreans as were 
fit for sea, weighed away and made over for 
the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians 
lay, designing to try whether or no they would 
engage again. The Corinthians, putting their 
ihips from olT die shore and drawing up into 
ocder ia the deeper water, remained there with- 
out advancing. They had no deaigikor in- 
clination to begin another engagement, as they 
were sensible of the junction of the fresh 
Athenian ships, and of the namerous difficul- 
ties with which they were beset, about the 
custody of the prisoners whom they had on 
board, and ihe want of necessary mat^als to 
repair their ships upon thia desert coast. Their 
thoughts were more employed upon their re- 
turn home, and the method to accomplish it, 
ftom the apprehension lest the Athenians, 
judging the league to be broke as &ey had come 
to blows, might obstruct their passage* For 
this reason they determined beforehand to des- 
patch a boat witli proper persons, though with- 
out the solemn protection of a herald, and so 
to sound their intentions. The message to be 
delivered wae this : 

** You are guilty of injustice, ye men of 
Athena, in beginning war and violating treaties : 
fi»r you hinder us from taking due vengeance 
upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms 
against us. If you are certainly determined to 
hinder our course, either against Corcyra or 
any other plaee whither we are willing to go, 
and so violate treaties, take us first who are 
here in your power, and treat us as enemies." 

The persons sent thus delivered- their mes* 
sage : and the whole company of the Corcyre- 
ans who heard' it, shouted out immediately to 
" apprehend and put them to death.'* But the 
Athenians returned this answer. 

« We neither begin waz^ ye men of Pelo- 
ponnesus, nor violate treaties. We are come 
hither auxiliaries to these Corcyreans our al- 
lies. If therefore you are desirous to sail to 



any other phce, we hinder you not But, if 
youvgo against Corcyra or any other place be- 
longing to it, we shall endeav<» to oppose you, 
to the utmost o£.our power.** 

Upon receiving this answer from the Athe- 
nians, the Corinthians prepared for their return 
home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the 
continent. But the Corcyreans were employed 
in picking up the wrecks and bodKs of the 
dead, driving towards them by favour of the 
tide and the wind, which blowing fresh the 
night before had scattered them all about ; and, 
as if they too had the victoiy, erected *an op- 
posite trophy at Sybota in the island. The 
reasons upon which each ode thus claimed the 
victory, were these. The Corinthians erected 
a trophy, because they had the better of the 
engagement till n^^ht, and so were enabled to 
pick up most of the shatters and the dead ; 
they had, farther, taken a number of prisoners, 
not less than a thousand, and had disabled about 
seventy ships of the enemy. — ^Tfae Cqrcyreans 
did the same : because they also had disabled 
about thirty ; and, upon the coming up of the 
Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and 
dead bodies driving towards them ; and becauae 
the Corinthians tacking about had retired from 
them the night before, so soon as they descried 
the Athenian ships ; and when they came to 
offisr tiiem battle at Sybota, durst not come out 
against them. In this manner did both sides 
account themselves victorious. 

The Corinthians, in their passage home- 
wards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which 
lieth in ^e mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. 
It belonged in common to the Corcyreans and 
themselves. They put it entirely into the 
hands of tiie Corinthian inhabitants, and then 
retired to liieir own home. Eight hundred of 
their Corcyrean prisoners who were slaves, 
they sold at public sale. Two hundred and 
fifty they reserved in safe custody, and treated 
them with extraordinary good usage, that after 
their ransom they might serve them in their 
design of gaining Corcyra : for the majority of 
them were persons of the greatest authorify in 
that state. Thuff, dierefore, is Corcyra pre* 
served in the war of the Corinthians ; and the 
ships of the Athenians after such service left 
them. But this was the first ground of war 
to the Corinthians against the Athenians, be» 
cause they had assisted the Corcyreana in a 
naval engagement against themselves, who 
were in. treaty with them. 



FELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



19 



Immediately titer Ihis tnaactioiiy other 
misundenitandings also happened between the 
Athenians and Pelopopneaians, tending to a 
war. For all the schemes of > the Corinthi- 
ans aiming at revenge, the Athenians, jealous 
of their enmity, sent an order to the inhabi- 
tants of Potidsa situated upon the isthmus 
of Pallene, (and, though a Corinthian colony, 
yet allied with and tributaiy to them,) ** to 
demolish that part of their waU which faceth 
the Fallene, to give them hostages, to send 
away the epidenUurgi, and not to receive those 
magistrates for the future, who were annually 
sent them from Corinth." They were appre- 
hensive of a revolt at the instigation of Perdic- 
cas and the Corinthians, and their seducing 
into the same defection the other dependents 
of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athe- 
nians thought proper to take with the people 
of Potidsa, immediately after the sea-fight of 
Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifestly 
at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son 
of Alexander king of the Macedonians was 
now become their enemy, who before had been 
their ally and friend. His enmity was occa- 
sioned by an alliance the Athenians had form- 
ed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who 
were jointly in op3>oaition against him. Alarm- 
ed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedemon 
to stir up against them a Peloponnesiaa war, 
and to draw over the Corinthians into his in- 
terest, in order to bring about the revolt of 
Potidsa. He had also been tampering wilh 
the Chalddeans of Thrace and the Bottisans 
to persuade them to revolt at the same time ; 
concluding, that if he could bring about a junc- 
tion of the adjacent people, he might venture a 
war against them with greater probability of 
success. The Athenians perceived his scheme, 
and'^were desirous to prevent the revest of the 
dties. They had begun an expedition against 
his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a 
thousand heavy-armed, under the command of 
Archestratus the son of Lycomedes associated 
with ten others in this service. They gave 
particular orders to the commanders to take 
hostages from the Potidsans and to demoUsh 
their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over 
the neighbouring cities that they might not 
revolt The Potidseans had already sent am- 
bassadoiB to the Athenians, to dissuade them 
if possible from the execution of any new 
designs against them : and had at the same 
time despatched an embassy to Lacedemon 



along with the Oortnthians, inateoctsd to pro- 
cure a pvomise of redress if there ribould be oc- 
casion. But, when their long negotiation at 
Athens p;-oved quite ineffectual, and the fleet 
was gone out to sea both against Macedonia 
and themselves ; when, hither, the regency at 
Lacedemon had given a promise to make an 
irmption into Attica, if the Atiienians should 
attempt any thing against Potidsa ; upon this 
encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt 
in conjunction with the Chalddeans and Bot- 
tiaans, all combined by an oath of mutual de- 
fence and support Perdiccas, fiirther, prevail- 
eth with the Chalddeans to abandon and de- 
molish all their towns upon the sea-coast, and 
then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that 
town by a junction of all their strength. And 
to these people, thus abandoning their own 
homes, he made a cession of that part of Myg- 
donia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for 
their subsistence during the war with the 
Athenians. Having thus demolished their own 
cities, they went to another place of residence, 
and were employed in preparations for the war. 

The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving 
on the coasts of Thrace, find Potidsa and the 
other cities already revolted. The comman- 
ders, judging it impossible with their present 
strength to act against Perdicdas and the re- 
volted cities both, turn their course towards 
Macedonia, pursuing the first dedgn of the ex- 
pedition. Landing there they joined in the 
war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, 
who with an army had made an irruption firom 
the inland country. 

In the mean time, Potidsa being now in 
revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedo- 
nian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the 
security of that place, and making the danger 
their own, despatched thither some volunteen 
of their own people and other Peloponnesians 
taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred 
heavy-ami^^ and four hundred tight-armed. 
The command of this body of men was given 
to Aristeus the son of Adamantus ; since, out 
of Iheir own private affection to him who had 

1 The beavy-armed wore a complete suit sf ermoar* 
and engaged with broad sbields and long spears. Tbey 
were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and 
had the highest rank of military hononr. The light- 
armed wer« desigiied for dEirmisbes and fighting at a 
distance : their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. 
The targeteers mentioned often in this history, we;-e a 
middle sort of soldiery, armed with targets or narrow 
shields and spears, neither large nor heavy. 



90 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book^i. 



ever been a steady friend to Potidea, mo^ of 
the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken 
the service ; and the time of their arrivsd in 
Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of 
Potidsa. 

An express soon arrived at Athens wi& the 
news of the revolt of the cities, and when after- 
wards they heard tjf the airival of that body 
under Aristeus, they send away two thousand 
of their heavy armed, and forty ships under the 
command of Callias the son of Calliades, and 
four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, 
arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the 
former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, 
having a little before got possession of Ther- 
me. They sat down with them for a time to 
carry on the siege of Pydne ; but afterwards, 
making with Perdiccas a composition and alli- 
ance the best they could in their present exi- 
gency, since Potidfea and the arrival of Aris- 
teus were very urgent points, they evacuate 
Macedonia. They marched next to Bercea; 
and turning from thente, after having first 
made an unsuccessful attempt upon the place, 
l^ey marched by land towards Potidaea. Their 
army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed 
of their own, vdthout including a large body of 
auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse, 
who had served with Philip and Pausanias; 
seventy ships at the same time sailed along the 
coast. And thus, by moderate marches, they 
came up in three days to Gigonus, and there 
encamped. 

The Potidseans, with the body of Pelopon- 
nesians commanded by Aristeus, excepting the 
Athenians, had formed a camp near Oiynthusj 
witkin the isthmus, and had a market kept for 
them wi&eut ihe city. The command of the 
infantry had been given to Aristeus by the 
voice of the confederates, and that of the 
cavalry to Perdiccas; for now again he had 
abruptly broken witii the Athenians and joined 
the Potidseans, deputing lolaus to command in 
his slbsence. It was the design of Aristeus, 
by eneamping the body under his own com- 
mand within the isthmus, to observe the 
motions of the Athenians if 'th^ advanced, 
whilst without the isthmus, liie Chalcideans 
and allies, and two hundred borse belonging to 
Perdiccas, should continue at Olynthus, who, 
Tihen the Athenians came forwards against 
them, were to throw themselves in their rear, 
. and &UB shut up the enemy between the two 
bodies. But Callias, the general of the Athe- 



nians, in conceit with his colleagues, detaches 
the Macedonian horse, and a few of their allies, 
to Olynthus, to prevent emy sally from thence ; 
and then, breaking up their camp^ they marched 
directly for Potidsa. But, when they were 
advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their 
enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also 
formed ; and in a little time they came to an 
action. The wing under Aristeus, Corin- 
thians and the very flower of their strength, 
who engaged with him, -soon compelled their 
enemies to turn their backs, and pursued exe- 
cution to a great distance ; but the rest of the 
army, composed of Potidsans and Pelopon- 
nesians, were defeated by the Athenians, and 
chased to the very walls of Potidaea. Aristeus, 
returning from his pursuit, perceived the rout 
of the rest of the army, and knew not whither, 
with the least hazard, to retreat, whether to 
Olynthus or PotidsBa. But, at last, he deter- 
mined to embody together those he had about 
him, and, as Potidsa lay at the smallest dis- 
tance, to throw himself into it with all possible 
speed. This, with difficulty, he effected, by- 
plunging into the water near the abutments of 
the pier, amidst a shower of missive weapons, 
with the loss, indeed, of some of his men, but 
the safety of the larger number. 

Those who should have come to succour the 
Potideans from Olynthus, which is at no 
greater distance than sixty stadia,* and situ- 
ated in view, at the beginning of the battle, 
when the colours were elevated,* advanced, 
indeed, a little way, as designing to do it, and 
the Macedonian horse drew up against them 
as designing to stop them. But, as the vic- 
tory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and 
the colours were dropped, they retired again 
within tiie walls, and the Macedonians marched 
away to the Athenians : so that the cavalry of 
neither side had any share in the action. After 
the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and 
granted a suspension of arms to the Potidsans 
for fetching off their dead. There were killed 
of the Potidsans and allies very near three 

1 Aboat six miles. 

a The elevation of tbe colours or ensigns, was the 
signal of joining battle, and they were kept up during 
the whole continuance of it : the depression of them, 
was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. 
The depression of the colours in this instance, was a 
proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. 
The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to 
MinerVa, the tutelary goddess of Athens. See Potter's 
ArchieoIogiaGreca, vol. ii. c.9. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



21 



himdredy and of the Atheniani one bundled 
and fiffy, with Callias their general. 

The Athenians without loss of time, throw 
log up a work against the wall which faceth the 
isthnms, hlockaded the place on that side, but 
the wall towards the Pallene they left as they 
found it. For they thought their number was 
by no means sufficient to keep the guard 
within the isthmus, and to pass over to the 
Pallene' side, and block it up also there. They 
were apprehensive, that thus divided, the Poti- 
dieans and their alties might fall upon them. 
And the Athenians at home, hearing there was 
no work on the Pallene side, sent thither a 
thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of 
their own people, under the command of Phor- 
mio the son of Asophius, who arriving upon 
the Palleney and having landed his men at 
Aphytis, marched forward to Potidsa, advan- 
cing slowly and laying waste the country as he 
moved along. And, as nobody ventured out to 
give him opposition, he also threw up a work 
against that side of the wall which faceth the 
Pallene, By these methods was Potidsa close- 
ly blocked up on either side, and also by the 
ships which lay before it at sea. 

The blockade being thus perfected, AristeuS) 
destitute of any means of saving the place, un- 
less some relief should arrive fiK)m Pelopon- 
nesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed 
it as his advice, that « all excepting five hun- 
dred men should lay hold of the first favourable 
wind to quit the place, that the provisions 
ought for a longer time support the rest;'* 
declaring his own readiness to be one of 
those who staid behind.'' Though he could 
not prevail with them, yet willing in this 
plunge to do what could be done, and to 
manage affairs abroad in the best manner he 
was able, he made his escape by sea undis- 
covered by the Athenian guard. Continuing 
now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what 
military efibrts he could, and Jdlled many of 
the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade 
he fonned before that city ; and endeavoured 
to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up 
a timely relief. Phormio, also, after com- 
pleting the works round Potidaa, with his 
sixteen hundred men ravaged Ghalc&dica and 
Bottiea ; and some fortresses he took by storm. 

These were the reciprocal causes of dissen- 
tion between the Athenians and Pelopon- 
nesians. The Corinthians were enraged at 
the blockade of Potidsa, a colony of their 



own, in which were shut up both Corintfaianf 
and other Peloponnesians. The Athemam 
resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians^ 
in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with 
and tributary to them, and siding openly, by a 
voluntary expedition, with the warring rebels 
of Potidsa. Yet a war, open and avowed, 
had not yet broke out between them ; hoetilitiea 
were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was 
merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians. 

But when once the blockade of Potidsa 
was formed, the Corinthians could hold no 
longer. In it their own people were shut up^ 
and they were at the same time in anxiety 
about the place. They smnmoned their alliee 
to repair immediately to Lacedemon, and 
thither they went themselves, with loud ac- 
cusations against the Athenians, «that they 
had violated the treaty, and injured Pelopon- 
nesus." The iSSginets, indeed, fronft a dread 
of the Athenians, did not openly despatch' their 
embassy ; but underhand they had a great shore 
in fomenting the war, asserting, that « they 
were restrained in the privilege of governing 
themselves, which had been allowed them by 
the treaty." 

. The Lacedemonians, summoning to appear 
before them, not barely their allies^ but who- 
ever had any manner of charge to prefer against 
the Athenians, assembled in grand council, as 
usual, and commanded them to speak ; others 
who were present laid open their respective 
complaints, but the Megareans preferred the 
largest accusations, in particular, that, «they 
had been prohibited the use of all the harbours 
in' the Athenian dominions, and the market of 
Athens, contrary to the treaty." The Corin- 
thians were the last who stood forth. Having 
first allowed sufficient time to others to exaspe- 
rate the Lacedemonians, they preferred their 
own charge as foUoweth :*-. 

" That faith, ye Lacedemonians, which ever 
both in public conduct and in private life, you 
so punctually observe, rendereth what others, 
what we ourselves, may have to say, more 
difficult to be believed. By it you have gained 
indeed the reputation of probity, but contract 
a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote 
occurrences. For, though we have frequently 
suggested to you, Y^hat wrongs we were appre- 
hensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet 
have you not deigned tp make inquiry into the 
grounds of those suggestions, but rather have 
suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish 
g2 



S2 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



views and piivate resentments. And it is not 
to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we 
alieady feel their weight, that yon convene 
these confederates together ; before whom, we 
eught to be indulged in a larger share of dis* 
course, as we have by much the largest share 
of complaints to utter; wronged as we have 
been by the Athenians, and by you neglected. 

« If indeed by treachery, lurking and unob- 
served, they had violated the peace of Greece, 
tliose who had not discerned it might justly 
have demanded ex^fdicit proofs. But now, 
what need can there be of multiplying words, 
when some you already see enslaved ; against 
others, and those not the meanest of your allies, 
the same fate intended; and the aggressors 
fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war 
fibould be declared ? With other views, they 
had not clandestinely laid hands on Corcyra 
and forcibly detail^ it from us, nor had they 
dared to block up Fotidsea; of which places, 
this lifter lieth the most convenient for ex- 
tending our power in Thrace, the former could 
supply Peloponnesus with the greatest navy. 
But to your account these events are to be 
charged, who after the invasion of the Medes 
first suffered the strength of Athens to be in- 
creased, and afterwards their long walls to be 
erected. Ever since you have connived at 
liberty overthrovm, not only in whatever com- 
munities they have proceeded to enslave, but 
now where even your own confederates are 
concerned. For not to the men who rivet on 
the chains of slavery, but to such as, though 
able, yet neglect to prevent it, ought the sad 
event with truth to be imputed; especially 
when assuming superior virtue they boast them- 
selves the deliverers of Greece. 

« With much ado we are now met together 
in council, but not even now upon the plain 
and obvious points. We ought not to be any 
longer debating whether we have been injured, 
but by what measures we should avenge our- 
selves. The aggressors, having long since 
planned out their proceedings, are not about to 
make, but are actually making attacks upon 
those, who are yet come to no resolution. Nor 
are we unexperienced by what steps, what 
gradual advances, the Athenians break in upon 
their neighbours. Imagining themselves to be 
still undiscovered, they show themselves the 
less audacious because you are insensible. But 
when once they know you alarmed and on your 
guard, they vnll press more resolutely forwards. 



For you, Lacedsmonians, are the only peopie 
of Greece, who sit indolently at ease, protecting 
not with present but with pr(\mised succour : 
you alone pull down, not the commencing but 
the redoubled strength o^your foes. You have 
indeed enjoyed the reputation of being steady, 
but are indebted for it more to report than 
fact We ourselves know, that the Persian 
had advanced from the ends of the earth quite 
into Peloponnesus, before you exerted your 
dignity in resistance. Now also you take no 
notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was 
but seated near you ; and, instead of invading 
them, choose rather to lie upon your defence 
against their invasions ; and, to expose your- 
selves more to the hazards of war, against a 
grown augmented power. And all this while 
you know, that the Barbarian was guilty of 
many errors in his conduct: and the very 
Athenians firequentiy, in their contests with 
us, have been defeated more through their own 
blunders than the vigour of your resistance; 
for their confidence in you hatii caused the 
destruction of some, who upon that very confi- 
dence were taken unprepared. 

** Let no one in this assembly imagine, that 
we speak more from malice than just grounds 
■ of complaint. Complaint is just lovrards 
friends who have failed in their duty ; accusa- 
tion is against enemies guilty of injustice. And 
surely, if any people «ver had, we have good 
reason to think we have ample cause to throw 
blame upon our neighbours; especially, when 
such great embroilmente have arose, of which 
you seem to have no maimer of feeling, nor 
ever once to have reflected, in regard to tiie 
Athenians, with what sort of people, how fiff, 
and how in every point unlike yourselves, you 
must soon contend. They are a people fond 
of innovations, quick not only to contrive, but 
to, put their schemes into effectual execution : 
your method is, to preserve what you already 
have, to know notKing further, and when in 
action to leave something needful ever unfin- 
ished. They again are daring beyond their 
strengtii, adventurous beyond the bounds of 
judgment, and in extremities ftiU of hope: 
your method is, in action to drop below your 
power, never resolutely to follow the dictates 
of your judgment, and in the pressure of a 
calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever 
active as they are, they stand against you who 
are habitually indolent : ever roaming abroad, 
against you who think it misery to lose sight 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



sa 



of jottx hxxmes. Thoir view in aliifiixig place is 
to enlaige their possessions : you imagine, that 
in foreign attempts you may lose your present 
domestic enjoyments. They, when once they 
h&v9 gained superiority over enemies, push 
forward as far as they can go ; and if defeated, 
are diq»irited the least of all men. More than 
this, they are as lavish of their lives in the 
public service, as if those lives were not their 
own, whilst their resolution is ever in their 
power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of 
their country. Whenever in their schemes 
they meet with disappointments, they reckon 
they have lost a share of their property : when 
those schemes are successful, the acquisition 
seemeth small in comparison with what they 
have farther in design : if they are baffled in 
executing a. project, invigorated by reviving 
hope, they catch at fresh expedients to repair 
the damage. They are the only people who 
instantaneously project, and hope, and acquire ; 
so expeditious are they in executing whatever 
they determine. Thus, through toils and 
dangers they labour forwards so long as life 
continueth, never at leisure to enjoy what they 
already have, through a constant eagerness to 
acquire more. They have no othe( notion of 
a festival, than of a day whereon some needful 
point should be accomplished; and inactive 
rest is more a torment to them than laborious 
employments In short, if any one,, abridging 
their characters, should say, they are formed 
by nature never to be at quiet themselves, nor 
to sufTer others to be so, he describeth them 
justly. 

« When such a state haih taken the lists of 
opposition against you, do ye dally, O Lacede- 
moniansl do you imagine that those people 
will not continue longest in the enjoyment of 
peace, who timely prepare to vindicate them- 
selves, and manifest a settled resolution to do 
themselves right whenever they are wronged? 
You, indeed, are so &r observers of equity, as 
never to molest others, and stand on your 
guard merely to repel damage from yourselves ; 
— ^points you would not without difficulty se- 
cure, though this neighbouring state were 
governed by the same principles as you are; 
but now, as we have already shown you, your 
customs, compared with them, are quite obso- 
lete; whereas, those whidh progressiveiy im- 
prove, must, like all the works of art, be ever 
the best. Were, indeed, the continuance of 
peace ensured, unvarying maAuers would cer- 



tainly be preferable; but such people as an 
liable to frequent vicissitudes of foreign con- 
test, have need of great address to vary and 
refine their conduct For this icause, the man- 
ners of the Athenians, improved by a long 
tract of experience, are formed in respect of 
yours upon a model entirely new. Here, there- 
fore, be the period fixed to that slow-moving 
policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to 
the relief of others, to that of the Potidnana, 
as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica 
without loss of time, that you may not leave 
your friends and your relations in the mercy of 
their most inveterate foes, and constrain us, 
through your sloth, to seek redress from a new 
alliance. Such a step, if taken by us, could 
neither scandalize the gods who take cognizance 
of solemn oaths, nor men who own their obli- 
gation ; for treaties are not violated by those 
who, left destitute by some, have recourse to 
others, but by such as, being sworn to give it, 
withhold their assistance in the time of need. 
Yet, if you are willing and ready to perform 
your parts, with you we firmly abide. In 
changing then, we should be guilty of imfnety ; 
and we never shall find others so nicely suited 
to the disposition of our own hearts. Upon 
these- points form proper resolutions ; and exert, 
yourselves, that the honour of Peloponnesus be 
not impaired under your guidance, who have 
received from your ancestors this great preem- 
inence." 

To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it 
happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian 
embas^ was at Lacedemon, negotiating some 
other points ; who, so soon as they were ad- 
vertised of what had been said, judged it 
proper to demand an audience of the Lacedo- 
monians. It was not their design to make the 
least reply to the accusations preferred against 
them by the complainant states, but in general 
to convince them, that «they ought not to 
form any sudden resolutions, but to consider 
matters with sedate deUberation." They were 
further desirous «to represent before them, 
the extensive power of their own state, to 
excite in the minds of the elder a recollection 
of those points they already knew, and to give 
the younger information in those of which 
they were ignorant 'y\ concluding, that << such a 
representation mig^t turn their attention more 
to pacific measures than military operations," 
Addr^psing themselves, therefore, to the Lace- 
demonians, they expressed their desire to speak 



S4 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



in the present assembly, if leaTc could be ob- 
tained. An order of admittance being imme- 
diately sent them, they approached, and deliv- 
ered themselves as foUoweth : 

« It was not the design of this our embassy 
to enter into disputations with your confe- 
derates, but to negotiate the points for which 
our state hath employed us. Yet, having been 
advertised of the great outcry raised against us, 
hither we have repaired : not to throw in our 
plea against the accusations of the complainant 
states ; for you are not the judges before whom 
either we or they are bound to plead : but, to 
prevent your forming rash and prejudicial re- 
solutions, upon concerns of high importance, 
through the instigation of these your confede- 
ratea« Our view is, farther, to convince you, 
notwithstanding the long comprehensive charge 
exhibited against us, that we possess with cre- 
dit what we have hitherto obtained, and that 
the state of Athens is deserving of honour and 
regard. 

« And what need is there here to go back 
to remote antiquity, where hearsay tradition 
must establish those facts to which the eyes of 
the audience are utter strangers? This we 
•hall wave ; and call forth first to your review 
the Persian invasions, and those incidents of 
which you are conscious, without regarding 
that chagrin which the remembrance of them 
will constantly excite in you. Our achieve- 
ments there were attended with the utmost 
danger : the consequence was public benefit, of 
which you received a substantial share: and 
though the glory of that acquisition may not 
be all our, own, yet of a beneficial share we 
ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly 
be averred ; not with a view of soothing you, 
but doing justice to ourselves, and giving you 
to know against what a state, if your resolu- 
tions now are not discreetly taken, you are 
going to engage. For we aver, that we alone 
adventured to engage the barbarian in that most 
dangerous field of Marathon. And when, upon 
the second invasion, we were not able to make 
head by land, we threw ourselves on shipboard 
with all our people, to fight in conjunction 
with you by sea, at Salamis ; which prevented 
his sailing along the coasts of Peloponnesus, 
and destroying one by one your cities, unable 
to succour one another against that formidable 
fleet The truth of this, the barbarian himself 
hath undeniably proved : for, thus defeated at 
■ea> and unable to gather together again so 



large a force, he hastily retired with the greatest 
part of his army. In this «o wonderfvd an 
events where beyond dispute the preservation 
of Greece was achieved at sea, the three most 
advantageous instruments were contributed by 
us — ^the largest number of shippings— a person 
of the greatest abilities to command — and the 
most intrepid courage. For the number of 
ships, amounting in all to four hundred, very 
nearly two-thirds were our own. Themistocles 
was the commander, to whom principally it 
was owing that the battle was fought in the 
straits, which was undeniably the means of 
that great deliverance : and you yourselves paid 
him extraordinary honour on that very account,' 
more than ever to any stranger who hath ap> 
peared amongst you. We ourselves showed 
further, on this occasion, the most daring 
courage; since, thoi^h none before marched 
up to our succour, and every state already en- 
slaved had opened the road against us, we 
bravely determined to abandon even Athens, 
to destroy our ovm effects, nor, like the gene- 
rality of those who were yet undemolished, to 
desert the common cause, or dispersing our- 
selves to become useless to our allies, but — ^to 
embark at once, to face the • urgent danger, 
without the least resentment against you for 



t Herodotus relates, that after the p'eat victory at 
Salamis, "■ the Grecians sailed to the Isthmus, to bestow 
the prize upon him who had deserved best of Greece, 
by his behaviour in the war. But upon their arrival, 
when the commanders gave in their billets on the altar 
of Neptune, in which they bad wrote the name of him 
who had behaved best, and of him who was second, 
each of them had given the preference to his own self, 
but most of them agreed in awarding the second place 
to Themistocles. Thus, while each competitor was 
only honoured with his own single voice fbr the first 
place, Themistocles was clearly adjudged to deserve 
the second. Envy prevented the Grecians frem procee- 
ding to a just declaration, and they broke up and de- 
parted, leaving the point undecided. Themistocles, 
however, was celebrated and honoured as the man 
who in prudence far surpassed all the Grecians tben 
alive. Thus denied the honour due to him, for having 
undoubtedly excelled them all in the affair of Salamii, 
he immediately repaired to Lacedemon, desirous to have 
justice done him there. The Lacedemonians received 
him nobly, and honoured him abundantly. They gave, 
indeed, to Euribiades the crown of olive,as first in valour; 
but for wisdom and dexterity they bestowed a second 
crown of olive on Themistocles. They presented bim 
farther with the first chariot in Sparta. And after bo 
much applause, be was eondneted, in faisretarn,tothe 
frontier of Tegea, by three hundred picked Spartans, 
who composed the royal guard. He was the oniy per- 
son ever known to have received such a compliment 
ttcm the Spartans.'* Herodotus in Urania. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



25 



four preceding' backwardnefls of aid. 80 that 
we aver the sendee we then did you, to be no 
len than what vre afterwards received. For 
to our aid| indeed, at last you came, from 
cities yet inhabited, from cities you ever de- 
signed should stiU be inhabited, when once 
you were alarmed for your own safety much 
more than for ours. So long as we were 
safe, your presence was in vain expected: but 
we, launching forth from a city no longer our 
own, and hazarding our all for a place we al- 
most despaired of recovering, effected our own 
preservation, and with it in a great measure 
yonis. Had we, overcome with fear, gone 
over early to the Mede, as others did, to save 
our lands ; had we afterwards not dared, as 
men undone beyond recovery, to throw our- 
selves on board ; you had never been obliged 
to fight at sea, as not having sufficient strength 
to do it ; but the invader without a struggle 
would have leisurely determined the &Ae of 
Greece. 

« Do we then deserve, Lacedemonians, that 
violence of envy with which the Grecians he- 
boid us, for the courage we manifested then, 
for our judicious resolution, and the superior 
power we now enjoy 1 That power, superior 
is.it is, was by no means the effect of violent 
encroachments. You would not abide with 
PB to glean away the relics of the Barbarian 
war. To us the associated states were obliged 
to have recourse, and entreat us to' lead them 
to its completion. Thus, by the necessary 
exigence of afiEairs, obliged to be in action, we 
l*ve advanced our power to what it now is : 
St firrt, firom a principle of fear ; then from 
the principle of honour ; and at length, from 
^^ of interest. When envied by many, when 
obliged to reduce to their obedience some who 
fcad revolted, when you, no longer well dis- 
V^*^ towards us, were actuated by jealousy 
ind malice ; we thought it not consistent vntii 
onr security to endanger our welfare by giving 
vp our power, since every revolt from us was 
tt accession of strength to you. No part of 
»»iltiiid wiU fix any reproach on menwhotiy 
^^ expedient to ward off extremities of dan- 
ger* Nay, it is your own method also, Lace- 
^monians, to manage the states of Pelopon- 
^^""^ M suits your own interest best, and to 
pVMcribe them law. And, had you abided 
^th us, and persevered in that invidious su- 
pwionty as we have done, we are weU con- 
^^'^^ that you would soon have grown no less 
11 



odious to your allies ; and so obliged either to 
have ruled with rigour, or to have risked the 
loss of your all. It foUowetb, therefore, that we 
have done nothing to raii^e surprise, nothing 
to disappoint the human expectation, in a&> 
cepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in 
firmly maintaining it thus accepted, upon those 
most prevailing principles of honour, and fear, 
and interest. 

« The maxim by which we have acted was 
not first broached by us, since it hath been ever 
allowed, that inferiors should be controlled by 
their superiors. To be the latter we thought 
ourselves deserving : you thought so till now, 
when private interests engaging your attention, 
you begin to cry out for justice, which no people 
ever yet so studiously practised, as, when able 
to cany a point by strength, tp check their in- 
clination and let it drop. And worthy, fiirther, 
are they of applause, who pursuing the dictates 
of human nature, in gaining rule over others, 
observe justice more steadily than their scope 
of power requireth from them. And so far 
we have reason to conclude, that were our 
power lodged in other hands, plain evidence 
would soon decide vrith what peculiar moden^ 
tion we use it : though, so hard indeed is our 
lot, that calumny and not applause hath been 
the consequence of such our lenity. In suits 
of contract against our dependents we are often 
worsted; and though ever submitting to fair 
and impartial trials in our own courts, we are 
charged vrith litigiousness. Not one of them 
reflecteth, that those who are absolute in other 
places, and treat not their dependents with that 
moderation which we observe, are for that very 
reason exempted from reproach: for, where 
lawless violence is practised there can be no 
room for appeals to justice. But our depen- 
dents, accustomed to contest with us upon 
equal footing, if they suffer never so little 
damage where they fancy equity to be along 
with them, either by a judicial sentence or 
the decision of reigning power, express no 
gratitude for the greater share of poverty 
they yet enjoy, but resent vrith higher cha» 
grin the loss of such a pittance, than if at 
first we had set law aside, and seized their all 
vrith open violence; even in this case, they 
could not presume to deny, that inferiors ought 
to submit to their superiors. But mankind, 
it seemeth, resent the acts of injustice more 
deeply than the acts of violence : those, coming 
from an equal, are looked upon as rapioaa: 



26 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



these, coming firom a superior, are complied with 
18 Necessities. The far more grievous oppres- 
sion of the Mede they hore with patience, but 
our government they look upon as severe ; it 
may be so ; for to subjects tlie present is always 
grievous. If you therefore by our overthrow 
should gain the ascendant over them, you 
would soon perceive that good disposition 
towards you, which a dread of us hath occasion- 
ed, to be vanishing away ; especially should 
you exert* your superiority according to the 
specimens you gave during your short com- 
mand against the Mede. For the institutions 
established here amongst yourselves have no 
affinity with those of other places: and more 
than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when 
delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth 
how to apply his own, or make use of those of 
the rest of Greece. 

« Form your resolutions therefore with great 
deliberation, as on points of no small import- 
ince. Hearken not so far to the opinions and 
calumnies of foreign states as to embroil your 
own domestic tranquility. Reflect in time on 
the great uncertainty of war, before you engage 
in it. Protracted into long continuance, it is 
generally used to end in calamities, from which 
we are now at an equal distance ; and to the 
lot of which of us they will fall, lieih yet to be 
determined by the hazardous event. Men 
who run eagerly to arms are first of all intent 
on doing some exploits, which ought in point 
of time to be second to something more impor- 
tant ; and when smarting with distress, they 
have recourse to reason. But since we are by 
no means guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor 
as yet perceive it in you, we exhort you, 
whilst healing measures are in the election of 
us both, not to break the treaty, not to violate 
your oaths, but to submit the points in contest 
to fair arbitration, according to the articles sub- 
aisting between us. If not, we here invoke 
the gods, who take cognizance of oaths, to 
bear us witness, that we shall endeavour to 
revenge ourselves upon the autiiors of a war, 
by whatever methods youxseives shall set us an 
example." 

These things were said by the Athenian 
embassy. And when the Lacedemonians had 
thus heard the accusations of their allies against 
die Athenians, and what the Athenians had 
urged in their turn, ordering all parties to with- 
draw^ they proceeded to serious consultation 
amongst themselves. The majority agreed in 



the opinion, that ** the Athenians were already 
guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be 
immediately declared.*' But Archidamus their 
king, esteemed a man of good understanding 
and temper, standing forth, expressed his own 
sentiments thus : 

« I have learned myself by the experience of 
many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lace- 
demonians, as great proficients in years as I 
am, that no one should be fond of an enterprise 
because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, 
judging it thence both advisable and safe. 
The war, which is at present the subject of 
your consultation, you will find, if examined 
discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. 
Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers 
upon ourselves, we have ever a competent force 
in readiness, and by exj^editious steps can ad* 
vance against any of them. But against a 
people whose territories are far remote, who 
are further most expert in naval skill, who with 
all the expedients of war are most excellently 
provided, with wealth both private and public, 
vrith shipping, vrith horses, with arms, and 
with men, far beyond what any other state 
in Greece can singly pretend to ; who, more 
than this, have nuilierous dependent states 
upon whom they levy tribute — where is the 
necessity sanguinely tp wish for war against 
siiph a people 1 and wherein is our dependence, 
if thus unprepared we should declare it against 
them ? Is it on our naval force 1 But in that 
we are inferior : and if to this we shall apply 
our care, and advance ourselves to an equality 
with them, why this will be a work of time. 
Or, is it on our wealth 1 In this we are yet 
much more deficient ; and neither have it in any 
public fund, nor can readily raise it from pri- 
vate parses. But the confidence of some may 
perhaps be buoyed up with our superiority in 
arms and numbers, so that we may easily march 
into their territory and lay it waste : yet other 
territories, and of large extent, are subject to 
their power, and by sea they will import all 
necessary supplies. If, further, we tempt dieir 
dq[>endents to a revolt, we shaU want a n^val 
strength to support them in it, as the majority 
of them are seated upon islands. What there- 
fore will be the event of this our war % Far 
if we are unable either to overpower them at 
sea, or divert those revenues by which their 
navy is mipported, we shall only by acting pre- 
judice ourselves. And in such a situation 
to be foiced to give it up will be a blemish 



PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 



87 



pn our honour ; eapeciolly if we shall be thought 

to have been the authors of the breach. 

For let us not be puffed up with idle hope 
that this war must soon be over, if we can lay 
tlieir territory waste ; I have reason on better 
grounds to apprehend, that we shall leave it 
behind as a legacy to our children. It is by no 
means consistent with the spirit of Athenians 
either to be slaves to their soil, or, like unprac- 
tised so diers, to shudder at a war. Nor again, 
on the other hand, am I so void of sensibility 
as to advise you to give up your confederates 
to their outrage, or wilfully to connive at their 
encroachments ; but only not yet to have re- 
course to arms, to send ambassadors to prefer 
our complaints, without betraying too great an 
eagerness for war, or any tokens of pusilla- 
Dimity. By pausing thus, we may get our own 
afiairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength 
through an accessioil of allies, either Grecian 
or Barbarian, wheresoever we can procure sup- 
plies of ships or money. And the least room 
there cannot be for censure, when a people in 
the state we are in at present, exposed to all 
the guiles of the Athenians, endeavour to save 
themselves not merely by Grecian but even by 
Barbarian aid. And at the same time let us 
omit no resource within the reach of our own 
ability. 

" If, indeed, upon our sending an embassy, 
they will hearken to reason, that will be the 
happiest for us all. If not ; after two or three 
years' delay, tben better provided, we may, if 
it be thought expedient, take the field against 
them. But in good time, perhaps, when they 
lee our preparations and the intent of them 
clearly explaimed by our own declarations, they 
Qoay make each requisite concession, before 
their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst 
yet they may save thehr property from utter 
devastation. Regard their territory, I beseech 
you, in no other light than as a hostage for 
their good behaviour, and the more firmly such 
the better may be its culture. Of this we 
ought to be sparing as long as possible, that 
we^ drive them not into desperate fury, and 
render more unpracticable their defeat. For 
iff thus unprovided as we are, and worked up 
tb anger by the instigations of our confeder- 
ates, we at once begin this ravage, reflect 
whether we shall not taint its reputation, and 
the more embroil Peloponnesus; since accu- 
aatiens as well of states as private persons it is 
possible to clear away ; but in a war, begun by 



general concurrence for tlie sake of « single 
party, which it is impossible to see how far it 
will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and 
preserve our honour. 

« Let no one think it a mark of pusillani- 
mity, that many as we are we do not rush imm^ 
diately upon one single state. That state has 
as large a number of dependants who contri- 
bute to its support: and a war is not so much 
of arms as of money, by which arms are ren- 
dered of service; and the more so, when a 
landed power is contending against a naval. 
Be it therefore our earliest endeavour to pro- 
vide amply for this, nor let us prematurely be 
too much fermented by the harangues of oar 
allies. Let us, to whose account the event, 
whatever it be, will be principally charged— 
let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavour in 
some degree to foresee it ; and be not in the 
least ashamed of that slow and dilatory temper 
for which the Corinthians so highly reproach 
you. For through too great precipitancy you 
will come more slowly to an end, because you 
set out without proper preparations. The 
state of which we are the constituents, hath 
ever been free and most celebrated by fame : 
and that reproach can at most be nothing but 
the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this 
we are distinguished, as the only people who 
never grow insolent with success, and who 
never are abject in adversity. And when again 
they invite us to hazardous attempts by utter- 
ing our praise, the delight of hearing must not 
raise our spirits above our judgment. If any, 
farther, endeavour to exasperate us by a flow 
of invective, we are not by that to be provoked 
the sooner to compliance. From tempers 
evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the 
field of battle, and cool in the liours of debate : 
the former, because a sense of duty hath the 
greatest influence over a sedate disposition, 
and magnanimity the keenest sense of shame : 
and good we are at debate, as* our education 
is not polite enough to teach us a contempt 
of laws, and by its severity giveth us so much 
good sense as never to disregard them. We 
are not a people so impertinently wise, as to 
invalidate \ji^ preparations of our enemies bv a 
plausible harangue, and then absurdly proceed 
to a contest ; but we reckon the thoughts of 
our neighbours to be of a similar cast with 
our own, and that hazardous contingencies 
are not to be determined by a speech. We 
always presume that the projects of pur ene- 



38 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



BUM are jndiciously jdanned, and then seri- 
ously prepare to defeat them. For we ought 
not to found our success upon the hope that 
they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but 
that we have omitted no proper step for our own 
security. We ought not to imagine, there is so 
mighty difference between man and ^lan ; but 
that he is the most accomplished who hath been 
regularly trained through a course of needful 
industry and toil. 

** Such is the discipline which our fathers 
have handed down to us ; and by adhering to 
it, we have reaped considerable advantages. 
Let us not forego it now, nor in a small por- 
tion of only one day precipitately determine a 
point wherein so many lives, so vast an expense,^ 
so many states, and so much honour, are at 
stake. But let us more leisurely proceed, which 
our power will warrant us in doing more easily 
than others. Despatoh ambassadors to the 
Athenians concerning Potidiea ; despatoh them 
concerning the complaints our allies exhibit 
against them ; and the sooner, as they have 
declared a readiness to submit to fair decisions. 
/ Against men who offer this we ought not to 
march before they are convicted of injustice. 
But, during this interval, get every thing in 
readiness for war. Your resolutions thus will 
be most wisely formed, and strike into your en- 
emies the greatest dread." 

Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaidas, 
at that time one of the ephori, standing forth 
the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as 
fblloweth : 

« The many words of the Athenians, for my 
part, I do not understand. They have been ex- 
ceeding large in the praise of themselves ; but 
as to the charge against them, that they injure 
our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no 
reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good 
against the Modes, but are now bad towards 
us, they deserve to be doubly punished; be- 
cause, ceasing to be good, they are grown very 
bad. We continue the same persons both then 
and now ; and shall not, if we are wise, pass 
over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait 
any longer to revenge them, since they are past 
waiting for their sufferings. But—other peo- 
ple, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and 
ships, and horses — ^we too have gallant allies, 
whom we ought not to betray to the Athenians, 
nor refer them to law and pleadings, since it 
was not by pleadings they were injured : but 
we ought, with all expedition and with all our 



strength, to seek revenge. Hoiw we ought to 
deliberate when we have been wronged, let no 
man pretend to inform me : it would have bet- 
ter become those who designed to commit snch 
wrongs, to have deliberated a long time ago. 
Vote then the war, Lacediem<mians, with a 
spirit becoming Sparta. And neither suffer the 
Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us be- 
tray our own confederates ;- but, with the gods 
on our side, march out against these authors of 
injustice." 

Having spoke thus, by virtue of his office as 
presiding in the college of ephori,' he put the 
question in the Lacedaemonian council. But, 
OS they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said, 
" he could not amidst the shout distingruish the 
majority;" and, being demrous that each of 
them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might 
show they were more inclined to war, he pro- 
ceeded thus — « To whomsoever of p>u, Lace- 
diemonians, the treaty appeareth broke, and the 
Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up 
and go thidier," pointing out to them a certain 
place : « but whoever is of a contrary opinion^ 
let him go yonder." They rose up and were 
divided ; but a great majority was on that aide 
which voted the treaty broke. 

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they 
told them, ** They had come to a resolution that 
the Athenians were guilty of injustice ; but 
they were desirous to put it again to the vote in 
a general assembly of all their confederates, 
that by taking their measures in concert, they 
might briskly ply the war, if determined by com- 
mon consent" 

Matters being brought to this point, they 
departed to their respective homes, and the 
Athenian ambassadors, having ended their ne- 
gotiations, staid not long behind. This decree of 
the Lacedssmonian council that ** the trea:^ was 
broke," was passed in the fourteenth year of 
the treaty concluded for thirty years after the 
conquest of Eubcea. But the Lacedemonians 
voted this treaty broke and a war necessary 
not so much out of regard to the arguments 

i The college of Ephori (or inspectora) at Sparta con- 
sisted of five. They were annually elected fay the peo- 
ple from their own body, and were designed tobe etaacka 
upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of 
their institution, and in fact quite lorded it over the 
kings. In a word, the whole administration was lodg- 
ed in their hands, and the kings were never sovereigns 
but in the field at the head of their troops. One of the 
Ephori had the honour to give its style to the year, in 
the same manner as the first archon did at Athens. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



29 



uged by their allies, as from their own jea- 
lousy of the gvowing power of the Athenians. 
They dreaded the advancement of that power, 
ts they saw the greatest part of Greece was al- 
ready in subjection to them. 

Now the method by which die/ Athenians 
had advanced their power to this invidious 
height was this.' 

After that the Medes, defeated by the Gre- 
cians both at land and sea, had evacuated Eu- 
rope, and such of them, as escaped by sea, were 
utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of 
the Lacedemonians, who commanded the Gre- 
cians at Mycale, returned home, drawing away 
with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. 
But the Athenians, with the confederates of 
Ionia, and the Hellespont, who are now revolt- 
ed from the King, continuing in those parts, 
laid siege to Sestus then held by the Medes ; 
uui pressing it during the winter season, the 
Barbaxians at leng^ abandoned the place. Af- 
ter this they separated, sailing away from the 
Hellespont, every people to their own respec- 
tiw countries. 

But the Athenian community, when the 
Barbarians had evacuated their territory, im- 
mediately brought back again from their places 
of refuge their wives and children and all their 
remaining effects, and vigorously appUed them- 
wWes to rebuild the city of AAens and the 
walls : for but a small part of these had been 
left standing ; and their houses, most of them, 
">d been demolished, and but a few preserved 
^y way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The 
Lacedsmonians, informed of their design, came 
m embassy to prevent it; partly, to gn'^tify 
themselves, as they would behold with pleasure 
*^eiy city in Greece unwalled like Sparta; 
"Bt more to gratify their confederates, inviting 
u^em to such a step from the jealousy of the 
naval power of the Athenians, now greater 
^^^^ at any time before, and of the courage 
^ey had so bravely exerted in the war against 
™e Medes. They required them to desist 

The aeries of history on which Thncydides now 
cnten, thoagh not strictly within the compan of his 
nltjeet, yet most needful to give it light, and to show 
"^ present events are connected with, and how far 
tliey resQlted Arom, preceding, is excellent in its kind. 
He Mates important facts in the clearest and and most 
orderly manner; he opens before us the source of the 
Athenian power; and by a neat and concise enumer- 
^^ of notable events, conducts it to that height, which 
^^cited the Jealousy of other states, and was the true 
l»liiical cause of the succeeding war. 



from building their walls, and rather to Join 
witii them in levelling every fortification -wha^* 
ever without Peloponnesus. Their true mean" 
ing and their inward jealousy they endeavoured 
to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence 
that « then the Barbarian, should he again in« 
vade them, would find no stronghold from 
whence to assault them, as in the last instance 
he had done from Thebes;" alleging farther, 
that « Peloponnesus was a place of secure re- 
treat and certain resource for all.'' To these 
representations of the Lacedemonians, the 
Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, 
made this reply, that ** they would send 
unbassadors to them to debate tiiis affair;" 
and so without further explanation dismissed 
them. Themistocles next advised, that «he 
himself might be despatched forthwith te 
Lacedsemon, and by no means hastily to send 
away the others who were to be joined in the 
commission with him, but to detain them till 
the walls were carried up to a height necessary 
at least for a defence ; that the work should 
he expedited by the joint labour of all the in- 
habitants without exception of themselves, 
their wives, and their children, sparing neither 
public nor private edifice from whence any pro- 
per materials could be had, but demolishing 
all." Having thus advised them, and suggested 
farther what conduct he designed to observe, 
he sets out for Lacedsemon. Upon his arrival 
there, he demanded no public audience, he pro- 
tracted matters and studi^ed evasions. When- 
ever any person in the public administration 
demanded the reason why he asked not an audi- 
ence, his answer was, that "he waited for 
the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained 
by urgent business: he expected that they 
would speedily be with him, and was surprised 
they are not yet come.*' As they had a good 
opinion of Themistocles, they easily acquiesced 
in such an answer. But other persons after- 
wards arriving and making clear affirmation that . 
" the wall is carrying on, and already built up to 
a considerable height," they had it no longer in 
their power to be incredulous. Themistocles, 
knovnng this, exhorts them, « not rashly to be 
biased by rumours, but rather to send away 
some trusty persons of their own body, who 
from a view might report the truth." With 
this proposal they comply ; and Themistocles 
sendeth secret instructions to the Athenians 
how to behave to these delegates: — «to de- 
tain them, though with as littie appearance 
H 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



•f design as possible, and by no means to 
dismiss them before they received again tbeir 
own ambassadors : for bis colleagues were by 
this arrived, Abronycbus the son of Ly sides, 
and Aristides the son of Lysimacbus, wbo 
brougbt him an assurance that the wall was 
sufficiently completed. His fear was, that the 
Lacedaemonians, when they had discovered the 
truth, would put them under arrest. The 
Athenians therefore detained the delegates ac* 
cording to instruction. And Themistocles, 
going to an audience of the Lacedaemonians, 
there openly declared, ** that Athens was now 
to far walled, as to be strong enough for the 
defence of its inhabitants : for the future, when 
the Lacedemonians or confederates sent am- 
bassadors thither, they must address themselves 
to them as to a people who perfectly knew 
their own interest and the interest of Greece ; 
since, when they judged it most advisable to 
abandon their city and go on ship-board, they 
asserted their native courage without Laceds- 
monian support ; and, in all subsequent mea- 
sures taken in conjunction, had shown them- 
selves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the 
field : at present therefore they judge it most 
expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, 
and thus to render it a place of greater security 
for their own members and for all their allies : 
it would not be possible, with strength inferior 
to that of a rival power, equally to preserve and 
evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece." 
—From hence he inferred, that " either all 
eities of the states which formed the Lacede- 
monian league should be dismantled, or it be 
allowed that the things now done at Athens 
were just and proper." The Lacedemonians, 
upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance 
of resentment against the Athenians: — they 
had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, 
but to advise them to desist upon motives of 
general good: at that time also, they had a 

• great regard for the Athenians, because of the 
public spirit they had shown against the Mede : 
— but however, thus baffled as they were in 
Aeir political views, they were inwardly pro- 
voked ; and the ambassadors on each side re- 
turned home without farther embroilments. 

By this conduct the Athenians in a small 
space of time walled their city around : and 
the very face of the structure showeth plainly 
to this day that it was built in haste. The 
foundations are laid with stones of every kind, 

^ in some places not hewn so as properly to fit, 



but piled on' at random. Many pil!ars also 
from sepulchral monuments and carved stones 
were blended promiscuously in the work. For 
the circuit of it was every where enlarged be- 
yond the compass of the city, and for this reason 
collecting the materials from every place "with- 
out distinction, they lost no time. 

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish 
the Pirsus ; for it was begun before this, dur- 
ing that year in which he himself was chief 
magistrate at Athens.^ He judged the place 
to be very commodious, as formed by nature 
into three harbours ; and that the Athenians, 
grown more than ever intent on their marine, 
might render it highly conducive to an en- 
largement of their power. For he was the 
first person who durst tell them, that they 
ought to grasp at the sovereignty of the sea, 
and immediately began to put the plan into 
execution. And by his direction it was, that 
they built the wall round the Firsus of that 
thickness which is visible to this day. For 
two carts carrying the stone passed along it by 
one another: wfthin was neither mortar nor 
mud ; but the entire structure was one pile of 
large stones, hewn square to close their angles 
exactly, and grappled firmly together on the 
outside with iron and lead : though in height it 
was not carried up above half so far as he intend- 
ed. He contrived it to be, both in height and 
breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile 
assaults ; and he designed, that a few, and those 
the least able of the people, might be sufficient 
to man it, whilst the rest should be employed 
on board the fleet. His intention was chiefly 
confined to a navy ; plainly discerning, in my 
opinion, that the forces of the king had a much 
easier way to annoy them by sea than by land. 
He thence judged the Pireus to be a place of 
much greater importance than the upper ci^. 
And this piece of advice he frequently gave 
the Athenians, that " if ever they were pressed 
hard by land, they should retire down thither, 
and with their naval force make head against 
all opponents." In this manner, the Athe- 

*■ The number of the Archons or Rulers was nine. 
They were annually elected by lot, and were required to 
be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproach* 
able both in moral and political character, dutiful to 
their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first 
of the nine gave its style to the year, and was there- 
fore called Eponymua or the Namer: the second was 
gtyled King; the third Polemarch; the other six in com- 
mon Thosmothete. All the civil and religious affairs 
of the state belonged to their apartment. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



31 



niiiis, without losing timOi after the retreat 
of the Medes, fortified their city, and pre- 
pared all the necessaiy means for their own se- 
curitj. 

Pausanias the son of Chembrotus was sent 
out from Lacedsmon, as commander-in-chief 
of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from 
Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenian and 
a number of other allies. They bent their 
course against Cyprus, and reduced most of 
the towns there. From thence they proceeded 
to Byzantium, garrisoned by the Medcs, and 
blockaded and carried the place under his di- 
rections. 

But, having now grown quite turbulent in 
command, the other Grecians, especially the 
lonians and all who had lately recovered their 
liberty from the royal yoke, were highly cha- 
grined. They addressed themselves to the 
Athenians, requesting them " from the tie of 
consanguinity to undertake their protection, 
and not to leave them thus largely exposed to 
the violence of Pausanias." This request 
was favourably heard by the Athenians, who 
expressed their willingne^ to put a stop to their 
grievances, and to re-settle the general order, 
to the best of their power. — But during this, 
the Lacedsmonians recalled Pausanias, that 
he might answer what was laid to his charge. 
Many of the Grecians had carried to them ac- 
cusations against him for an unjust abuse of 
oM power, since in his behaviour he resembled 
inore a. tyrant than a general. And it so fell 
out, that he was recalled just at the time when 
the confederates, out of hatred to him, had 
'^uiged themselves under the Athenian orders, 
excepting those troops which were of Pelopon- 
nesus. Upon his return to Lacedsmon, he 
Was convicted upon trial of misdemeanours to- 
'^Mds particulars, but of the heaviest part of 
the charge he is acquitted ; for the principal 
accusation against him was an attachment to 
the Medish interest ; and it might be judged 
^ clear to stand in need of proof. Him 
therefore they no longer intrust with the public 
Command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis with 
*ome colleagues to command what little force 
01 their own remained. To these the confede- 
fites would no longer yield the supreme com- 
^"^^^ ; which so soon as they perceived, they 
"Btoined home. And here the LaoediBmoniaiui 
'««i«ted from commissioning any others to 
^® upon them that post ; fearing, lest those 

^to should be sent might by their behaviour 



still more prejudice the Lacedsmonian intereal, 
a case they had reason to dread from die be- 
haviour of Pausanias. They were now grown 
desirous to rid themselves of the Medish 
war: they acknowledged the Athenians had 
good pretensions to enjoy the command, and 
at that time were well affected towards them. 

The Athenians having in this manner ob- 
tained the supreme command, by the voluntary 
tender of the whole confederacy in consequence 
of their aversion to Pausanias : they fixed by 
their own authority the quotas whether of ships 
or money which each state was to furnish 
against the Barbarian. The colour pretei^ded 
was ** to revenge the calamities they had 
hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the 
dominions of the king." This gave its first 
rise to the Athenian office of General Receiv- 
ers of Greece,^ whose business it was to col- 
lect this tribute : for the contribution of this 
money was called by that title. The first tri- 
bute levied in consequence of this amounted 
to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was 
appointed to be their treasury ; and the sittings 
were held in the temple there. 

Their command was thus at first over firee 
and independent confederates, who sat with 
them at council, and had a vote in public revo- 
lutions. The enlargement of their author- 
ity was the result of wars, and their own 
political management during the interval be- 
tween the invasion of the Modes and the 
present war, when the contests were against 
the Barbarian, or their own allies endeavour^ 
ing at a change, or those of the Peloponne- 
sians who interfered on every occasion on pur- 
pose to molest them. Of these I have sul^ 
joined a particular detail, and have ventured a 
digression from my subject, because this piece 
of history hath been omitted by all preceding 
writers. They have either confined their ao 
counts to the afiairs of Greece prior in time, 

i This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aris- 
tides, to the general satisfaction of all parties concern- 
ed. Greece conferred upon him this most important 
trust, he was called to this delicate commission by the 
united voice of his country; " Poor (says Plutarch) when 
be set about it, but poorer when he bad finished it.** 
The Athenian state was now furnished with a large 
annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy 
the fore^n enemies of Greece, but even those Greeks 
who should at any time presume to oppose the mea- 
sures of Athens. They soon found out that their own 
city was a more convenient place for keeping this 
treasure than the isle of Delos, and accordingly took 
care to remove it thither. 



82 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



or to the invasions of the Medes. Hellanicns 
is the only one of them, who hath touched it 
in his Attic histoiy ; though his memorials are 
short; and not accurately distinguished hy pro- 
per dates. But this, at the same time, will 
most clearly show the method in which the 
Adienian empire was erected. 

In the first place, under the command of 
Cimon son of Miltiades,^ they laid siege to 
Eion a town upon the Strymon possessed by 
the Medes, which they carried, and sold 'all 
found within it for slaves. — They afterwards 
did the same by Scyros an island in the Egean 
8ea, inhabited by the DolOpes, and placed in 
it a colony of their own people. — They had, 
farther, a war with the Carysthians singly, in 
which the rest of the Eubceans were uncon- 
cerned, who at length submitted to them upon 
terms. — After this they made war upon the 
Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them 
by a siege. This was the first confederate 
state, which was enslaved to gn^tify their as- 
piring ambition ; though afterwards all the rest, 
as opportunity occurred, had the same fate. 

The occasions of such revolts were various ; 
though the principal were deficiencies in their 
quotas of tribute and shipping, and refusal 
of common service. For the Athenians ex- 
erted their authority with exactness and rigour, 
and laid heavy loads upon men, who had 
neither been accustomed nor were willing to 
bear oppression. Their method of command 
was soon perverted; they no longer cared to 
make it agreeable, and in general service dis- 
allowed an equality, as it was now more than 
ever in their power to force revolters to sub- 
mission. But these points the confederates had 
highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, 
through a reluctancy of mingling in frequent ex- 
peditions, a majority of 'them, to redeem their 
personal attendance, were rated at certain sums 
of money, equivalent to the expense of the ships 
they ought to have furnished. The sums paid 

> Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, 
open, and ingenious, upright in hig political conduct 
like AriBtides, and though an able politician, yetnotso 
miflchievously refined as to discard honesty and sincer- 
ity from public measures. His father Miltiades, after 
performing most signal services to his country, was 
heavily fined, thrown into prison, because unable to 
pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards 
paid the fine, is now going also to perform great servi- 
ess to the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, 
and again employed in'^foreign commands, dying at last 
in the service of his country, highly regretted not on- 
ly at Athens, but throughout Greece. 



on these occasions to the Adieniaas, were em- 
ployed by them to increase thor own naval 
force ; and the tributaries thus drained, when- 
ever they presumed to revolt, had parted vnth 
the needful expedients of war, and were with- 
out resource. 

After these things it happened, that the 
Athenians and their confederates fought against 
the Medes, both by land and sea, at the ri'vo' 
Eurymedon in*Pamphylia. Cimon, the son 
of Miltiades commanded ; and the Athenians 
were victorious the very same day in both 
elements. They took and destroyed the ships 
of the Phoenicians, in the whole about two 
hundred. 

Later in time than this, happened a revok 
of the Thasians, arising from disputes about 
places of trade on the opposite coasts of Thrace, 
and the mines which they possessed there. 
The Athenians with a sufiScient force sailed 
against Thasus; and, after gaining a victory 
by sea, landed upon the bland. — About the 
same time, they had sent a colony, consisting 
of about ten thousand of their own and con- 
federate people, towards the Strymon, who 
were to settle in a place called the Nine-ways, 
but now Amphipolis. They became masters 
of the Nine-ways, by dispossessing the Edo- 
nians. But advancing fiirther into the mid- 
land parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at 
Drabescus of Edonia, by the united force of 
the Thracians, who were all enemies to this 
new settlement now forming at the Nine-ways. 
— But the Thasians, defeated in a battle and 
besieged, implored the succour of the Laceds- 
monians, and exhorted them to make a diver- 
sion in their favour by breaking into Attica. 
This they promised unknown to the Athenians^ 
and were intent on the performance, but were 
prevented by the shock of an earthquake. The 
Helots,^ farther, had seized this opportunity, 



a Helots was the name given in general to the slaves 
of tlie Lacedsmonians. The first of the kind were the 
inhabitants of Helos in Messenia, who were conquered 
and enslaved by the Lacedsmonians; and all their slaves 
in succeeding times had the same denomination. The 
tillage of the ground, the exercise of trades, all manual 
labour, and every kind of drudgery, was thrown upon 
them. They were always treated by their Spartan 
masters with great severity, and often with the utmost 
barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for reasons of 
state, they were wantonly put to death or inhumanly 
butchered. There is a remarkable instance of the latter, 
in the fourth book of this history. According to Plu- 
tarch, it was a common saying in Greece, ** Tliat a 



ELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



33 



in conoert with the nug^iboiiiiiig ThnriaCe and 
Etheans, to levolt and Miaw Ithome. Most of 
the Helots were descendants of the ancient 
Messenians, then reduced to slayeiy, and on 
tlus account all of them in general were called 
MesBemans. This war against die revolters 
in Ithome, gave foil employ to the Lacedsme- 
nians. And the Thasians, after holding out 
three years' blockade, were fqroed to surrender 
upon terms to the Athenians : — They were « to 
level their walls, to give up their shipping, to 
pay the whole azieai of their tribute, to advance 
it punctually for the future, and to quit.all pre- 
tensions to the continent and the mines/' 

The Lacedsmonians, as their war against 
the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of 
time, demanded the assistance of their allies, 
and amongst others of the Athenians. No 
small number of these were sent to their aid, 
nnder the command of Cimon. The demand 
of assiBtance from them, was principally owing 
to the reputation they then were in for their 
Riperior skill in the methods of approaching and 
attacking walls. The long continuance of the 
aiege convinced them of the necessity of such 
methods, though they would fain have taken 
it by storm. The first open enmity between 
the Lacedsmonians and Athenians broke out 
from this expedition. For the Lacedsmonians, 
when the place could not be canied by storm, 
Sowing jealous of the daring and innovating 
temper of the Athenians, and regarding them 
as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be 
tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and so 
vaiae them firesh embarrassments, gave a dis- 
mission to them alone of their allies. They 
strove, indeed, to conceal their suspicions, by 
alleging, « they have no longer any need of 
their assistance." The Athenians were con* 
^ced, that their dismission was not owing to 
this more plausible colour, but to some latent 
jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved ; 
wd thinking they had merited better usage 



'^^cnian at Sparta was the freeat, and a slave the great* 
M slave io the world."— Thus miserably oppreaaed, 
no wonder they adzed an opportunity of revolt. The 
^u^liquake here mentioned was ao violent, that (ac- 
cording to Plutarch) it demoliahed all the hooaea in 
Bpaita, except five. The Helota roae at once effectually 
^ dauKrtteh those Spartans too, who were not buried in 
theraitta..xBnt Archidamna had ahready, by way of 
prerantion, aounded an alarm, and got them together in 
A body. The Helota thus prevented, marched off, and 
sstted Ithome, where they made a long and obstinate 
■sstatance. 
12 



from the hands oi the Lacedsmonians, were 
scarcely withdrawn, than in open disregard to 
the league subsisting between them against 
the Mode, they clapped up an alliance with 
their old enemies, the Argives; and in the 
same oaths and in the same alliance, the Thee- 
salians were also comprehended with them 
both. 

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of 
the siege, unable to hold out any longer, sur- 
rendered to the Lacedsmonians on the follow- 
ing conditions — that « a term of security be 
allowed them to quit Peloponnesus, into which 
they shall never return again ; that if any one 
of them be ever found there, he should be 
made the slave of whoever apprehended him." 
The Pythian oracle had already warned the 
Lacedsmonians « to let go the suppUonts of Ju- 
t»iter Ithometes." The men therefore, with their 
wives and children, went out of Ithome, and 
gained a reception from the Athenians, who 
acted now in enmity to the Lacedsmonians 
and assigned them Naupactus for their resi- 
dence, which they had lately taken from the 
Locrians of Ozoli. 

The Megareans also deserted the Lacedsmo- 
nians, and went over to the Athenian allianco, 
because the Corinthians had warred upon them 
in pursuance of a dispute about settling their 
frontier. Megara and Pegs were put into 
the hands of the Athenians, who built up for 
the Megareans the long walls that reach down 
from Megara to Niasa, and took their guard 
upon themselves. This was by no means the 
least occasion of that violent enmity now be- 
ginning to arise between the Corinthians and 
Athenians. 

Inarus the son of Psanunetichus, a Libyan, 
and king of the Libyans, bordering upon Egypt, 
taking his route from Marsa, a city beyondf 
the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of 
Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. 
He himself was constituted their leader^ and 
he brought over the Athenians to associate in 
the enterprise. They happened at that time 
to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, 
with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own 
and their allies: but relinquishing Cyprus, 
they went upon this new design. Being arriv- 
ed on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they 
were masters of that river, and two thirds of 
the city of Memphis, and were making their 
attack upon the remaining part, which is called 
the white wall. It was defended by the Per- 
h2 



34 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



■UoiB and Medes who had resorted thither for 
lefnge, and by thoee Egyptians who had stood 
out in the general defection. 

The Athenians, further, having made a de- 
scent at Halie, a battle ensued against the Co- 
rinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victoiy 
was on the Corinthian side. — ^And afterwards 
the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphelea 

•with a fleet of PeloponnesianB, and completely 
gained the -victory.— A war also breaking out 
after this between the ^ginets and Athenians, 
a great battle was fought at sea by these two 
contending parties near ^gina. Boih. sides 
were Joined by their respective confederates; 
but the victoiy remained with the Athenians ; 
who having taken seventy of their ships, landed 
upon their territory, and laid siege to the city. 
under the command of Leocrates the son of 
Stroebus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous 
to relieve the JBginete, transported over to 
JSgina, three hundred heavy-armed, who be- 

' fore were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and 
Epidaurians. In the next place they secured 
the promontory of Geranea. The Corinthians 
now with their aUies made an incursion into 
the district of Megara, judging it impossible 
for the Athenians to march to the relief of the 
Megareans, as they had so large a force already 
abroad in ^gina and in Egypt ; or, if they 
were intent on giving them relief, they must 
of necessity raise their siege from ^gina. 
The Athenians however recalled not 'their 
army from jSSgina, but marched away all the 
old and young that were left in Athens to the 
aid of Megara, under the command of Myro- 
nides : and having fought a drawn battle against 
the Corinthians, both sides retired, and both 
•ides looked upon themselves as not worsted 
in the action. The Athenians, however, upon 
the d^arture of the Corinthians, as being at 
least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The 
Corinthians at thdr return heard nothing but 
reproaches from the seniors in Corinth; so, 
after bestowing an interval of about twelve 
days to recruit, they came back again ; and, to 

. lay their claim also to the victory, set about 
erecting a trophy of opposition. Upon diis, 
the Athenians sallying vrith a shout out of 
Megara, put those who were busy in erecting 
tM's trophy to the sword, and routed all who 
endeavoured to oppose them. The vanquished 
Corinthians were forced to fly ; and no small 
part of their number, being closely pursued 



and driven £rom any certain route, were chased 
into the ground of a private person, whick 
happened to be encompassed with a ditch so 
deep as to be quite impassable, and there was 
no getting out The Athenians, perceiving 
this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front 
them, and then forming their light-armed in a 
circle round them, stoned eveiy man of them 
to death. This was a calamitous event to the 
Corinthians ; but the bulk of their force got 
home safe again from this unhappy expedition. 

About this time also, the Athenians began to 
build the long walls reaching down to the sea, 
both towards the Phalerus, and towards the 
Piraus. 

The Phocians were now embroiled witii the 
Dorians, from whom the Lacedsmoniane are 
descended. Having made some attempts on 
BcBon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken 
one of those places, the Lacedemonians march- 
ed out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hun- 
dred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten 
thousand of their allies, commanded by Ni» 
comedos the son of Cleombrotos in the right 
of Pleistionax son of Pausanias thor king, who 
vras yet a minor ; and having forced the Ph<^ 
clans to surrender upon terms the town they 
had taken, vrere preparing for 'their return. ^ 
Now, in case they attempted it by passing over 
the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians 
having got round with a squadron were ready 
to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to 
attempt it by way of Geranea, as Megara and 
Pegs were in the hands of the Athenians ; for 
the pass of Geranea is ever difficult, and now 
was constantly guarded by the Athenians ; and 
should they venture this route, they perceived 
that the Athenians were there also ready to 
intercept them. They determined at last to 
halt for a time in Bceotia, and watch for an: 
opportunity to march away unmolested. Some 
citizens of Athens were now clandestinely 
practising vrith them, to obtain their concur- 
rence in putting a stop to the democrairjr and the 
building of the long walls. But the whole 
body of the Athenian people rushed out into 
the field against them, vrith a thousand Argtves 
and the respective quotas of their allies, in the 
whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They 
judged them quite at a loss about the means of 
a retreat ; and the design also to overthrow thehr 
popular government began to be suspected. 
Some Thessalian horsemen came also up to 



PELOPONNESUN WAR. 



35 



jma the Atbcnums, in pursuance of treaty, who 
ifterwude in the heat of action rerolted to the 
Laeedsmonians, 

They fought at Tanagra of Bootia, and the 
Tietoiy feated with the Lacedemonians and 
allies: but the slaughter was great on both 
tides. The Lacedanuonians afterwards took 
their route Uxrough tiie district of Megara; 
and having cut down the woods, returned to 
their own home through Geranea and the Isth- 
mus. 

On the siztynaecond day after the battle of 
Tanagra, the Athenians had taken the field 
against the Boeotians, under the command of 
Myronides.* They engaged them, and gained 
a complete victory at Oenophyta f in conse- 
qaence of wfaidi, they seized all the territories 
of BcBotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls 
of Tanagra. 'They took from the Locrians of 
OpoB one hundred of their richest persons for 
hostages; and had now completed their own 
long wdls at Athens. 

Soon after, the ^ginets surrendered to the 

Athenians upon terms. They « demolished 

their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and 

nbmitted to pay an annual tribute for the fa- 
tnre." 

The Athenians, fiirther, in a cruize infested 
the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command 
of Tohnidas, the son of Tolmaus. They 
l><nnt a dock of the Lacedemonians, took 
Chalds, a city belonging to the Corinthians, 
and landing their men, engaged with and de- 
feated the Sicyonians. 

IMng all this interval, ihe army of Athe- 
i^iuui and alliee continued in Egypt, amidst 
▼urious incidents and events of war^^— At first, 

■ RtttftKh in his Apotbegm relates, that whea My- 
v^nUes WIS putting himself at the bead of the Atbe- 
DiaDionthis occasion, his officers told him "they were 
not all come oat yet into the field:*^ he replied briskly, 
"AH are come oat that will fight/* and marched off. 

* Tfaii hatUe is represented by some as raK>re glorious 
^ the Athenians tjban even those of Marathon or Pla- 
^*« Is the latter they fought, accompanied by their 
>Vies, against Barbarians; but here with their own sin- 
gle force, they defeated a far more numerons body of 
tbe choicest and best-disciplined troops in Greece, 
riate hath marked it in his Funeral Oration, and told 
I" those who fell In this battle were the first who were 
aonoured with a public interment in the Ceramicns, 

l^sie brave men, (says he, as translcteil by Mr West) 
||a*|ag fought against Grecians for the liberties of 
^''ociaBs, and delivered those whose cause they had 
vMertaken to defend, were the first after the Persian 
^' vpoB whom tlie commonwealth conferred the hon- 
^ of being buried in this public cemetery." 



the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt 
Upon this, the king^ despatoheth to Laceds- 
mon Megabazus, a Persian noble, furnished 
with great sums of money, in order to prevail 
upon the Laoedsmonians to make an incursion 
into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall 
their troops from £gypt: when Megabaaua 
could not prevail, and some money had been 
spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back 
what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. 
He then sendeth Megabazus| the son of Zopy- 
rus, a Persian noble, against them with a nu- 
merous army, who marching by land, fought 
with and defeated the Egyptians and their al- 
lies ; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis ; 
and at last shut them up in the isle of Proso- 
pis. Here he kept them blocked up for a 
year and six months ; till having drained the 
channel by turning the water into a different 
course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered 
the island almost continent. He then marched 
his troops across, and took the place by a land 
assault And thus a war, which had employed 
the Grecians for six continued years, ended in 
their destruction. Few only of the numbers 
sent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got 
safe away to Gyrene ; the far greater part were 
entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced 
to the obedience of the king : Amyrteus alone 
held out, who reigned in the fenny parts. The 
large extent of the fens prevented his reduc- 
tion ; and besides, the Egyptians of the fens 
are the most remarkable of all for military 
valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the au- 
thor of all these commotions in Egypt, was 
betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. 
Besides this, fifty triremes from Athens and 
the rest of the alliance, arriving upon the coast 
of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up 
to Medasium, a mouth of the Nile, quite igno- 
rant of their fate. These, some forces assaults 
ed from the land, whilst a squadron of Phoeni- 
cians attacked them by sea. Many of the vesHek 
were by this means destroyed, but «M>me few 
had the good fortune to get away. And thus 
the great expedition of the Athenians and al- 
lies into Egjrpt was brought to a conclusion. 

But farther, Orestes, son of Echecratidas 
king of the Thessalians, being driven from 
Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to under- 
take his restoration. The Athenians, in con- 
junction with the Bceotians and Phocians now 

* Alexander liOngimanus. 



36 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 



[book I. 



their allies, marched up to Phanalus of Thes- 
saly. They became masters of the adjacent 
country, so far as they could be whilst keeping 
in a body ; for the Thessalian cavalry prevented 
any detachments. They took not that city, 
neither carried any one point intended by the 
expedition, but were obliged to withdraw, and 
carry Orestes back again with them, totally -un- 
successful. 

Not long after this, a thousand Athenians 
going on board their ships which lay at Pegs, 
for Pegs was now in their possession, steered 
away against Sicyon, under the command of 
Pericles* the son of Xantippus. They made 
a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the 
Sicyonians who endearoured to make head 
against them. From thence they strengthened 
themselves by taking in some Achsans; and 
stretching across the gulf, landed in a district 
of Acamania, and laid siege to Oenias ; yet, 
unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and with- 
drew to their own homes. 

Three years after this, a peace to continue 
for five years was dapped up between the Pe- 
loponnesians and A&enians. Upon this, the 
Athenians, now at leisure from any war in 
Chreece, engaged in an expedition against Cy- 
prus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their 
own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty 
of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at 
the request of Amyrtsus king of the fenny 
part ; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. 
Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent fa- 
mine, they were compelled to quit the blockade 



*■ Here the name ol* Pericles first occurs, and a hint 
should be given to those who are not well acquainted 
with him, to mark a person that was a true patriot, a 
consummate statesman, a good general, and a most sub- 
lime spealcer. He was born of one of the most illustri- 
ous families in Athens. He was educated in the best 
manner, and learned his philosophy or the knowledge 
-of nature firom Anaxagoras, whose doctrines agreed so 
Mttle with the superstitious practices and tempers of 
the Athenians, that the master and all his disciples were 
charged with atheism, for which many of them were 
prosecuted, and the divine Socrates most Injuriously put 
to death. He engaged early In public affairs, gained the 
ascendant over all his competitors,. became at length, 
and continued to his death, master of the affections and 
liberties too of the Athenian people, and though master, 
yet guardian and increaser of tbe latter. In short, accor- 
ding to writers of the best authority and the gravest his- 
torians, he was one of the most aMe and most disinteres- 
ted ministers that Athens ever had, Athens the most de- 
mocratical state that ever existed, so fertile in every thing 
great and glorious, and so overrun at the same time with 
faction, licentiousness, and wild tumukuary caprice. 



of Citium ; and being crane up to the b^gbt 
of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time 
an united force of Phcenicians, and Cyprians, 
and Cilicians botii hy land and sea. They 
gained the victory in both engagements ; and 
being rejoined by the detachment they had eent 
to Egypt, tkey returned home. 

After this, the Lacedsmonians engaged in 
that which is known by the name of the holy 
war ; and having recovered the temple at Del- 
phi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no 
sooner were they withdrawn, than the Atheni- 
ans marched out in their turn, retook it, and 
delivered it into the hands of the Phocians. 

At no great interval of time from hence, the 
Athenians took the £eld against the Bceotian 
exiles, who had seized Orchomenus and Clue- 
roniea, and some other cities of Bceotia. Their 
force, sent out upon this service, consisted of 
a thousand heavy-armed of their own with pro- 
portional quotas from their allies, and was 
commanded by Tolmidas the son of Tolmteus. 
Having taken and enslaved Charonsa, they 
placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. 
But upon their march, they are attacked at 
Coronea by a body of men, consisting of llie 
BcBotian exiles sallying out of Orchomenus, 
joined by Locrians, and the exiles from Euboea 
and others of their partizans. After a battle, 
the victory remained with the latter, who made 
great slaughter of the Athenians, and todc 
many prisoners. Upon this, the Athenians 
evacuated Bceotia, and, to get the prisoners re- 
leased, consented to a peace. The Boeotian 
exiles, and all others in the same circumstances, 
were by this resettled in their old habitations, 
and recovered their former liberty and rights. 

It was not a great while after these last og* 
currences that Eubcea revolted from the Athe- 
nians. And Pericles was no sooner landed 
upon that island with an Athenian' army to 
chastise them, than news was brought him that 
" Megara also had revolted ; that the Pelopon- 
nesians were going to make an incursion into 
Attica ; that the Athenian garrison had been 
put to the sword by the Magareons,' excepting 



9 This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost sur- 
rounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued closely 
with her, and under her protection, gave rise to that 
decree which excluded the Megareans from the ports 
and markets of Athens. Others add, that they Slew an 
Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with 
them on this account. Could such outrages bo pocketed 
hy Athenians? could Pericles dissuade tbe people of 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



37 



UuMe who had thrown thenuelvefl into Niaea ; 
and that th^ Megareana had effected this revolt 
by a junction of Corinthians, and Sicyonians, 
and Epidaurians." Upon, hearing this, Peri- 
cles re-embarked with the utmost expedition, 
and brought back his army from Eubcea. And 
soon after, the Peloponnesians, marching into 
Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the 
country waste, under the command of Pleis- 
tionax,' the son of Pausaniaisp king of Sparta : 
and then, without extending the rarage any 
fiurther, they withdrew to their own homes. 
Now,, again the Athenians transported a mili- 
tary force into Eubcea, under the command of 
Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. 
The tranquility of the rest of the island was 
re-established upon certain conditions ; but they 
wholly ejected all the inhabitante of Hestina, 
and re-peopled it with a colony of their own. 
— And not long after their return from Euboea, 
they concluded a peace for thirty years, with 
the Lacedemonians and their allies, in pur- 
suance of which they restored them Nisna and 
Chalcia, and Pegs and Trszene; all which 
places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, 
were in the hands of the Athenians. 
In the sixth year of this peace^ a war broke 



Athens from showing resentment? Tbey decreed far- 
ther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, 
that the generals of the state should swear at their elec- 
tion, to make an incursion twice a year into the Megaris. 
We shall soon see that the Peloponnesians made it a 
pretext for the ensaing war, and that Pericles Justified 
the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a 
war rather than rejteal it. This is the true history of 
the point, though comedy, and raillery, and libelling, 
strangely vary the account. 

• As Pleistionax on this occasion evacuated Attica on 
a sudden, be was banished from Sparta, as having been 
bribed by the Athenians, to quit their territory. Dio- 
dorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of 
Cleandridas hisgiiardian, who attended him in the field 
on account of his youth; and that Pericles, afterwards 
passing his accounts at Athens, changed " ten talents 
properly laid out for the service of the state,'* which 
passed without farther explanation or exception. 

« Pericles here performed a great and signal service 
to his country. The motives to this war are, according 
to our historian, sufficiently strong, upon the scheme 
now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty 
of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets, and writers of 
memoirs and private history, give another account of 
the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of 
the Universal History, inclined to think as well founded 
as what is given by Thucydides, that ** Pericles engaged 
the republic in this war, merely to gratify the resent- 
ment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against 
the Samians." As this Aspasia bad all the honour of 
Perides*8 merit imputed to herself, and he hath suffered 



out between the Samians and Milesians about 
Priene* The Milesians, having the worst in 
the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to 
whom they bitterly exclaimed against the 
Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of 
Samoa joined with them in this outcry, whose 
s<^eme it was to work a change in the govern- 
ment. The Athenians, therefore, putting to 
sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon 
Samoa, where they set up a democracy ; and 
exacted from them fifty boys and as many 
grown men for hostages, whom they deposited 
at Lemnos. They had farther, at their de* 
parture, lefl a garrison behind to secure that 
island. But a body of Samians, who would 
not submit to the new form of government, 
and therefore had refuged themselves upon the 
continent, having gained the correspondence of 
the most powerful persons abiding inSamos^ 
and the alliance of Pissuthnes, son of Hys- 
taspes, at that time governor at Sardis, and 
collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, 
passed over by night into Samoa. They first 
exerted their efforts against the popular party, 
and got a majority of them into their power : 
in the next place, they conveyed away the 
hostages from Lemnos by stealth ; they openly 
declared a revolt ; and delivered up the Athe- 
nian garrison, with their officers whom 'they 
had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then imme- 
diately prepared to renew their war against 
Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with 
them in the revolt. 



a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will ac- 
cept a short account of this famous lady. She is allow- 
ed on all hands to have been a woman of the greatest 
beauty, and the first genius; but averred by some to have 
been a libertine, a prostitute, a bawd, nay, every thing 
scandalous and vile. Pericles was dotingly fond of her, 
and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love, to 
marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined max- 
ims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even 
composed the speeches on which so great a share of his 
reputation was founded. The best men in Athens ftre- 
quented her house, and brought their wives to receive 
lessons from her of economy and right deportment. 
Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives 
her the honour of that fuAeral oration which he delivers 
in the Menexenus of Plato. There must have been 
some ground even for complimenting h^r in this extra- 
ordinary manner. And after every abatement, what 
must we think of a lady who was in such high esteem 
with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who 
taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and con- 
duct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles 
for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiast? See 
Bayle's Dictionary under Pericles, and Universal His- 
tory, vol. vi. p. 415, note. 



38 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



N4> sooner were the Athenians informed of 
this, than they put out against Samos, with 
sixty sail, though sixteen of them were de- 
tached for other services. Some of the latter 
were stationed upon the coadt of Caria, to 
ohserre the motions of a Phoenician fleet, and 
the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos, to 
give there a summons of aid. The remaining 
forty-four, commanded by Pericles* and nine 
colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragia 
with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy 
sail, twenty of which had land soldiers on 
board, and the whole was now on the return 
from Miletus ; and here the Athenians gained 
a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arriv- 
ed from Athens to^ reinforce them, and twenty 
five from the Ohians and Lesbians. WiUi 
this accession of force they landed upon the 
island, overdrew the Samians in battle, invest- 
ed their city with a triple wall, and at the same 
time blocked it up by sea. 

But Pericles, drawing olT sixty of the ships 
from this service, steered away virith all pos- 
sible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, 
upon receiving advice that «a Phoenician 
fleet is coming up against them." Stesagoras 
also and others had before been sent from 
Samoa with five ships to meet that fleet In 
this Interval, the Samians launched out in a 
sudden sally, fell upon the unfortified' station 



*■ The Atheniaas in the assembly of the people chose 
ten generals every year, according to the number of 
their tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present in- 
stance, all sent out in the same employ. They rolled, 
and each in his turn was general of the day. Thucy- 
dides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom 
we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest 
weight and influence amongst them, in fact a general in 
chief. Philip of Macedon was used to Joke upon this 
multiplicity of generals. ** For my part (said he) I have 
never had the good fortune to find more than one general 
in all my life; and yet the Athenians find ten fresh ones 
every year.** I4ot but that these generals were often re- 
elected, and continued years in commission. Pericles, 
tis plain, did so; and in latter times Pbocioii is said to 
have been elected five and forty times. Their power 
'was great not only in the field, but at Athens. Every 
point that had relation to war came under their de* 
partmenf. Pericles in a foreign employ was always 
first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens 
was the first or rather absolute minister of state. 

« When the Grecians continued long on a station, 6r 
were apprehensive of being attacked by an enemy, they 
fortified their naval station and camp towards the land 
with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a 
palisade. At other times a number of their ships lay 
out more to sea, by way of guard or watch to the res{, 
which were generally dragged ashore, whilst the soldiers 
Iny round them in their tents. Sometimes they were 
only moored to the shore, or rode at anchor, that they 



of the Athenians, sunk the Teasels moored at a 
distance by way of guard, and engaginff those 
who put out against them, victoriously execut- 
ed their purpose, were masters of their own 
seas for fourteen days' continuance, and made 
whatever importations or exportations they 
pleased : but, as Pericles then returned, tfaey 
were again blocked up by sea.' He after- 
wards received fresh supplies from Athens, 
forty ships under Thucydides, and Agnon, and 
Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemua and 
Anticles, besides thirty others from Chios and 
Lesbos. And though after this the Samians 
ventured a short engagement at sea, yet they 
now found all frurther resistance impracticable, 
so that in the ninth month of the siege they 
surrendered on the following terms— ^< To de- 
molish their wall ; to give hostages ; to de- 
liver up their shipping: and to reimburse 
by stated payments the ejLpenses of the 
war. *'* — The Byzantines also came in, apcm 
the engagement of being held only to such 
obedience as had fiNrmerly been required of 
them. ' 

Not many years intervened between this 
period of time, and the rise of those differences 
above recited concerning GcMrcyra and Potidea, 
and all occurrences whatever, on which the pre- 
tences of this Feloponnesian war were ground- 
ed. All these transactions in general, whether 
of Grecians against Grecians, or against the 
Barbarian, fell out in the compass of fifty 
years, between the retreat of Xerxes and die 
commencement of this present war; during 
which period the Athenians had established 

might be ready upon an alarm. See Potter's Jtrekmo- 
logia. Vol. II. c. 20. 

■ The manner of doing this, ** was to environ the 
walls and harbour with ships, ranged in order ftrom one 
side of the shore to the other, and so cloaely Joined to- 
gether by chains and bridges, on which anned men 
were placed, that without breakhsg their order there 
could be no passage from the town to the sea.**— 1^- 
ter's jSrekmehfia. 

* Samoa thus reduced, which in maritime power vied 
with Athens herself, and had well nigh defeated her 
grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles was re- 
ceived upon his return with all the bonoara a grateftil 
people could give him, and was pitched upon to make 
the funeral oration for those slain in the war. He pe^ 
ibrmed his part with high applause. The ladies in par- 
ticular were loud in their acclamations, and were eager- 
ly employed in caressing and crowning him with gar- 
lands. But for a smart piece of raillery Arosa one of 
them, on this occasion, and fais smarter repartee, the rea- 
der may eonsolt the Universal History, vol. vi. p. 499, 
the note. In the latter part of that note, the authors 
seem willing both to deny and to aUow Pericles the merit 
of having served his country in the reduction of 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



39 



their dominimi on a solid basis, and had rose to 
a high exaltation of power. The Lacedemo- 
nians were sensible of it, yet never opposed 
them, except by some transient efforts ; and 
for the most part of the time were quite easy 
and indiflerent about it. That people had never 
been known in a hurry to run to arms ; their 
wars were indispensably necessary ; and some- 
times they were entangled in domestic broils. 
Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern 
till the Athenian power was manifestly estab- 
lished, and encroachments were made upon 
their own alliance. Then indeed they deter- 
mined to be no longer patient ; they resolved 
npon a war, in which their utmost force should 
be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, 
demolished. 

On these motives was formed the public re- 
•ointion of the Lacedemonians — ^that «the 
tnaty was violated, and the Athenians were 
guilty of injustice.'' They had also sent to 
Delphi, to inquire of the god, "Whether 
their war would be successful V* He is repor- 
ted to have returned this answer, that « if they 
Waned with all their might, they should at last 
be triumphant, and he himself would fight on 
their side, invoked or uninvoked." 

They had now again summoned their con- 
federates to attend, and designed to put it to a 
general ballot, « Whether the war should be 
undertaken 1" The ambassadors from the se- 
veral constituents of their alliance arrived, and 
uaembled in one general council. Others 
made what declarations they pleased, the majo- 
rity inveighing against the Athenians, and in- 
sisting upon war ; but the Corinthians (who 
had beforehand requested every state apart to 
Mot for war), alarmed for Potidea, lest for 
want of some speedy relief it might be utterly 
destroyed, being present also at this council, 
"tood forth the last of all, and spoke to this 
effect: 

** We can no longer, ye confederates, have 
*^y room to complain of the Lacedemonians, 
smce then own resolution is already engaged 
ler war, and they have summoned us hither 
to give onr concurrence. For it is the duty of 
' governor and leading state, as in private con- 
**n^ they observe the equitable conduct, so 
e^et to keep their view intent upon the general 
^elfere, suitably to that superior degree of hon- 
*^ur and regard, which in many points they pre- 
receive. 
Por our parts, so many of us as have 



quitted Athenian friendship for this better aa> 
sociation, we require no farther trials to 
awaken our apprehensions. But those amongst 
us, who are seated up in the inland parts, at a 
distance from the coast, should now be con- 
vinced, that unless they combine in the defence 
of such as are in lower situations, they will 
soon be obstructed' in carrying out the fruits of 
the lands, and again in fetching in those neces- 
sary supplies which the sea bestoweth upon an 
inland country. ~ Let them by no means judge 
erroneously of what we urge, as not in the 
least affecting them ; but looking upon it as a 
certainty, that if they abandon the guard of the 
maritime situations, the danger will soon ad- 
vance quite upon them, and they of course no 
less than we are concerned in the issue of our 
present determinations. For this reason they 
ought, without the least hesitation, to make 
the timely exchange of peace for war. 

"It is indeed the duty of the prudent, so 
long as they are not injured, to be fond of 
peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when 
injured, to throw up peace, and to have re- 
course to arms : and, when in these successfrd, 
to lay them down again in peacefril composition; 
thus never to be elevated above measure by 
military success, nor delighted vnth the sweets 
of peace to suffer insults. For he who, appre- 
hensive of losing this delight, sits indolently at 
ease, will soon be deprived of the enjoyment 
of that delight which interesteth his fears ; and 
he whose passions are inflamed by military suc- 
cess, elevated too high by a treacherous con- 
fidence, hears no longer the dictates of his 
judgment. Many are the schemes which, 
though unadvisedly planned, through the more 
unreasonable conduct of an enemy turn out 
successful ; but yet more numerous are those 
which, though seemingly founded on mature 
counsel, draw after them a disgraceful and op- 
posite event. This proceeds from that great 
inequality of spirit, with which an exploit is 
projected, and with which it is put into actual 
execution. For in council we resolve, surround- 
ed with security; in execution we faint, through 
the prevalence of fear. 

" We now, having been grossly injured, and 
in abundant instances aggrieved, are taking up 
arms ; and, when we have avenged ourselves on 
the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay them 
down again. Success, upon many considera- 
tions, we may promise ourselves ; in the first 
place, as we are superior in numbers and mili 



40 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I- 



tary skill ; in the next, as we all advance with 
uniformity to accomplish our designs. A na- 
yal force, equat to that in which their strength 
consists, we shall he enahled to equip, from 
competent stores we separately possess, and 
the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia.* 
If we take up those upon interest for im- 
mediate service, we are. able, by enlarging their 
pay, to draw away all the foreigners who 
man their fleets. The Athenian power is not 
supported by a natural but a purchased strength. 
And our own is less liable to be injured hy the 
same method, as we are strong in our persons 
more than in our wealth. Should we gain the 
victory but in one single engagement at sea, 
in all probability we have done their business ; 
or, in case they continue the struggle, we shall 
then have a longer space to improve our naval 
practice : and when once we have gained an 
equality of skill, our natural courage will soon 
secure us the triumph. For that valiant spirit 
which we enjoy by nature, it is impossible for 
them to acquire by rules : but that superiority 
with which at present their skill invites them, 
we may easily learn to overmatch by practice. 
"Those sums of money by which these 
points are chiefly to be compassed, we will re- 
spectively contribute. For would it not in real- 
ity be a grievous case, when their dependents are 
never backward to send in those sums which 
rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want 
to be revenged on our foes, and at the same 
time to secure our own preservation — if we 
should refuse to submit to expenses, and 
should store up our wealth to be plimdered by 
them, to purchase oppressions and miseries for 
ourselves 1 

" We have other expedients within our reach 
to support this war, — a revolt of their depend- 
ents ; and, in consequence of that, a diminution 
of their revenue, the essence of their strength ; 
erecting forts ^ithin their territory ; and many 
others not yet to be foreseen. For war by no 
means yields to the direction of a pre-deter- 
mined plan ; but of itself, in every present exi- 
gence, confines and methodizeth its own course. 
In war, who moves along with a temper in 
proper command, hath got the firmest support ; 

1 In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Ju- 
piter at Olympia. The wealth reposited in these places 
must have been very large, considering the great vene- 
ration universally paid these deities, and the numerous 
and valuable offerings sent annually to these famous 
temples. 



but he who hath lost his temper is, for that 
reason, more liable to miscarry. 

** Let us remember, that if any one single 
state amongst us had a contest with its foes 
about a frontier, there would be need of perse^ 
verance. But now, the Athenians are a matcli 
for us all united, and quite too strong for any 
of us separately to resist: so that unless we 
support one another with our collective forc^ 
unless every nation And every state unanimous- 
ly combine to give a check to their ambition, 
they will oppress us, apart and disunited, with- 
out a struggle. Such a triumph, how grating- 
so(;ver the bare mention of it may be to any 
of your ears, yet, be it known, can end in 
nothing else but plain and open slavery. To 
hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so 
many states may be enslaved by one, is disgrace 
to Peloponnesus. In such a plunge we should 
either be thought justly to have deserved it, or 
through cowardice to sufler it, the degenerate 
oflfspring of those ancestors who were the de- 
liverers of Greece. And yet we have not 
spirit enough remaining to defend our own 
liberty. We suffer one single state to erect 
itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory 
of pulling down monarchs in particular socie^ 
ties. We know not by what methods to ex- 
tricate ourselves from these three, the greatest 
of calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or sloth. 
For exempt from these in fact you are not, by 
taking up the plea of contempt of your enemies, 
for which such numbers have suflered. The 
many misfortunes arising from this have chang- 
ed the sense of the word, and caused it to stand 
for arrant folly. 

" But on the past what necessity^ is there to 
enlarge ? or to blame any farther than may be 
necessary for the present 1 To prevent worse 
events for the future we ought by immediate 
efibrts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for 
redress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is 
hereditary to Peloponnesians. This custom 
is not to be dropped, though now in wealth 
and power you have made some petty advance- 
ments : for it never can become you to let go 
in affluence what was gained in want. It be- 
comes you rather, upon many accounts, with 
manly confidence, to declare for war. The 
oracle of a god prescribeth it; — that god 
himself hath promised his assistance; — and 
the rest of Greece is ready to join you in the 
contest, some from a principle of fear, and 
some from a principle of interest Neither on 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



41 



^oxL will the fint breach of the peace be charged. 
17]ie god who adviseth war plainly judgeth that 
to be already broke : you will onfy act to re- 
dress its violation. For the breach is not to be 
clisu-ged on those who arm to revenge it ; but 
on those who were the fest aggressors. 

«< Since then war, considered in every light, 
appears honourable in regard to you, ye Lace- 
daemonians ; since we, with united voices, en?- 
courage you to it, as most strongly lequisite 
for our general and separate interests, — defer 
no longer to succour the Potideans, Dorians 
l>y descent, and besieged by lonians, (the re- 
-verse was formerly the case,) and to fetch 
CLS>^ii ^6 liberty of others. The business will 
adnait of no longer delay, when some already 
reel the blow ; and others, if it once be known 
that we met here together, and durst not un- 
dertake our own defence, will in a very little 
time be sensible of the same. Reflect within 
yourselves, confederates, that afiairs are come 
to extremities, that we have suggested the most 
advisable measures, and give your ballot for war. 
Be not terrified at its immediate dangers ; but 
animate yourselves with the hope of a long last- 
ing peace to be procured by it. For a peace 
produced by war is ever the most firm; but 
from tranquility and ease to be averse to war, 
can by no means abate or dissipate our danger. 
With this certain conclusion, that a state in 
Greece is started up into a tyrant, and aims 
indifferently at the Uberty of us all, her arbi- 
trary plan being partly executed and partly in 
agitation, let us rush against and at once pull 
her down. Then shall we pass the remainder 
of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall 
immediately recover liberty for those Grecians 
who are already enslaved.'' 

In this manner the Corinthians spoke : and 
the Lacedsmonians, when they had heard them 
all deliver their several opinions, gave out the. 
ballots to all the confederates that were pre- 
sent, in regular order, both to the greater and 
lesser states : and the greatest part of them 
balloted for war. But, though thus decreed, 
it was impossible for them, as they were quite 
unprepared, immediately to undertake it It 
was agreed, therefore, that « eveiy state should 
get in readiness t^eir several contingents, and 
no time to be lost" However in less than a 
year, eveiy thing needful was amply provided : 
and, before its expiration, an irruption was 
made into Attica, and the war openly on foot 
But even this interval was employed in send- 
13 



ing embassies to Athens, charged with accu- 
sations, that reasons strong as possible for mak- 
ing war might appear on their side, if those 
should meet with disregard. 
. By the first ambassadors therefore whom the 
Lacedemonians sent, they required the Athe- 
nians « To drive away the pollution of the god- 
dess." And the pollution was this : 

There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had 
been victor at the Olympic games, a person of 
noble descent, and of great consequence in 
his own person. He married a daughter of 
Theagenes, a Megarean, who in those days 
was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking 
advice at Delphi about a scheme he had pro- 
jected, was directed by ihe god «To seize 
the citadel of Athens upon the greatest festival 
of Jupiter." In pursuance of this, being sup- 
plied by a party of men by Theagenes, and 
having obtained the concivrence of his own 
friends, upon the day of the *Peloponnesian 
Olympics, he seized the citadel as instrumental 
to his tyranny. He imagined that to be the 
greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a par- 
ticular relation to himself, who had been an 
Olympic victor. But whether the g^ieatest 
festival meant was to be h^ld in Attica^ oi any 
other place, he had never considered, nor had' 
the oracle declared. There is a festival of 
Jove observed by the Athenians, which is 
called the greatest festival of Jupiter the pro>> 
pitious. This is celebrated without the city, 
in full concourse of ^ people, where many 
sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, butt 
of artificial images of creatures peculiar to ^^ 
country. Concluding, however, that he* had- 
the true sense of the oracle, he put his enter- 
prise in execution. The Athenians, taking \hB 
alarm, ran out of the countzy in one general 
confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and' 
investing the citadel, quite blocked them up. 
But in process of time, being wearied out with 
the tediousness of the blockade, many of them' 
departed, leaving the care of it to &e ni^e 
archons, with a full power of « acting^ in what- 
ever manner they should judge most expe- 
dient :" for at ^ that time most parts of the 
public administration were in the management 
of the archons. The party with Cylon, thus 
closely invested, were reduced very low through 
scarcity of bread and water. Cylon, therefore, 
and his brother privately escape. But the 
rest, reduced to extremities, and some 6f them 
had already perished by famine, sit themselves 
I 



42 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



down SUB suppliants by the altar in the citadel. 
The Athenian guard, having ordered them to 
arise, as they saw them just ready to expire in 
the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, 
led them out and slew them. But some of th^ 
number, who had seated themselves at the 
veneri^le goddesses, at the very altars, they 
murdered^n^ the act of removal: And for this 
action, not only the persons concerned in it, 
but their descendants also, were called the sa- 
crilegious and accursed of the goddess. The 
Athenians, indeed, banished those sacrilegious 
persons out of the city ; Cleomenes, the Lace- 
dsmonian, drove them out again, when he was 
at Athens, on account of a sedition ; nay, on 
this occasion they not only . drove away the 
living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, 
and cast them out; yet, in process of time, 
ihey returned again, and some of their posterity 
are still in Athens.^ 

This was the pollution which the Lacedie- 
monians required them to drive away ; with a 
face, indeed, of piety, as vindicating the honour 
of the gods ; but knowing, at the same time, 
that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was tainted 
with it by the side of his mother ; and thence 
concluding, that if 4Le could be removed, the 
Athenians would more easily be brought to an 
accommodation with them. They could not 
carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his 
banishment, but to raise against him the public 
odium, as if the war was partly owing to the 
misfortune they suiTered in him. For, carrying 
with him the greatest sway of any Athenian 
then alive, and presiding entirely in the ad- 
ministration, he was most steady in opposition 
to theLacedsmonians, dissuading the Athenians 
from any concession, and exciting them to war. 

The Athenians, in return, required the La- 
cediemonians "to drive away the pollution 
contracted at Tienanis;" for the Lacedsemo- 
nians, some time ago, having caused their sup- 
plicant Helots to rise out of Neptune^s temple 
at Tsnarus, and led them aside, and slew them. 
And to this action they themselves impute the 

> When these sappllants were ordered to come out, 
they tied a string round the altar in the citadel, And 
keciping bold of it, were come as far as the altars of 
the venerable goddesses. Just there the strings happen- 
ed to break, upon which the archons rushed in to seize 
them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her pro- 
tection. Some of the number sat instantly down for 
fresh protection at the altars of the venerable goddess- 
es; it was an unavailing resource, and they were imme- 
diately slain upon the spot. Plutarch in Solon. 



great earthquake which happened afterwards at 
Sparta. 

They further required them « to drive away 
the pollution of the Chalciscan Pallas," the 
nature of which was this ; 

When Pausanias, the Lacedemonian, upon 
his being first recalled by the Spartans from his 
command in the Hellespont, and brought to his 
trial before them, was acquitted of the charge 
of mal-administration, but was no longer in- 
trusted with the pubUc commisision ; fitting out 
a Hermionian trireme on his own private ac- 
count, he arriveth in Hellespont, without any 
authority from the Lacedemonians. He gave 
out that he did it for the service of the Gre- 
cian war ; but his intention was to carry on his 
negotiations with the king, which, aspiring to 
the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before* 
He had formerly conferred an obligation upon 
the king, fron^ which the whole of his project 
took its date. When, after the return from 
Cyprus, during his first appearance there, he 
took Byzantium, which was possessed by the 
Modes, and in it some favourites and relations 
of the king were made his prisoners, he releas- 
eth them all, to ingratiate himself with the king, 
without the privity of the other confederates, 
giving it out in pubUc that they had made their 
escape. He transacted this affair by means of 
Gongylus, the Eretrian, to whose keeping he 
had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. 
He also despatched Gongylus to him with a 
letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards 
discovered, were these : 

« Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous to 
oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of 
war. And by it I express my inclination, if 
you approve, to take your daughter in marriage^ 
and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into . 
your subjection. I think I have power suffi- 
^cient to effectuate these points, could my sdbeme 
be communicated with you, If therefore any 
of these proposals receive your approbation, 
send down to the coast some trusty person, 
through whom for the future we may hold a 
correspondence." 

Thus much was contained in the letter ; and, 
on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, 
and sends away Artabazus the son of Phama- 
cus, down to the coast, with an order to take 
upon him the government of Dascylis, having 
' first dismissed Megabetes who was the gover- 
nor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausa- 
nias at Byzantium, with an injunction to for- 



PELQPONNESIAN WAR. 



irard it wiUi all possible expedition, and to let 
him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias 
should charge him with any affairs, he should 
execute them with all possible diligence and 
fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all 
the other injunctions with exactness, and 
forwarded the letter, which brought this an- 
swer : 

"Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias. — 
The kindness done me in those persons whom 
from Byzantium you deUvered safe on the 
other side the sea, shall be placed to your ac- 
count in our family, eternally recorded : and 
with the other contents of your letter I am de- 
lighted. Let neither night nor day relax your 
earnest endeavours to effectuate those points 
you promise me : nor stop at any expense of 
gold or silver, or greatness of miUtary force, if 
such aid be any where requisite. But confer 
boldly with Artabazus, a txusty person, whom 
I have sent to you, about mine and your own 
concerns, that they may be accomplished in 
the most honourable and most advantageous 
manner for us boih.'* 

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, 
who before had been in high credit with the 
Grecians, through the lustre of his command 
at Platsa, was elevated much more than ever, 
and could no longer adjust his demeanour by 
the modes and customs of his native country. 
He immediately dressed himself up in Per- 
sian attire, and, quitting Byzantium, travelled 
through Thrace, attended with Persian and 
Egyptian guards, and refined his table into 
Persian elegance. His ambition he was un- 
able any longer to conceal, but by short sketches 
manifested too soon, what greater schemes he 
had formed in his mind for future accomplish- 
meijit. He then showed himself difficult of 
access, and let his anger loose so violentiy and 
so indiscriminately upon all men, that no one 
could approach him. And this was not the 
least motive to the confederacy for going over 
to the Athenians. But the Lacedemonians, 
informed of this, recalled him the first time 
upon the account of such behaviour ; and, when 
he was returned again in the Hermionian ves- 
sel without their permission, he plainly ap- 
peared to have re-assumed a^n his former 
practices. And when forced to remove from 
Byzantium by the opposition raised against 
him by the Athenians, he went not back to 
Sparta ; but withdrawing to Colons of Troas, 
information was given that " he was negotiating 



with the Barbarians, and had fixed his residence 
there for very bad designs." Upon this they 
could no longer be patient, but the ephori 
despatched him a herald and the Scytale,^ with 
an order « Not to stay behind the herald ; if 
he did, war was proclaimed against him by the 
Spartans." And he, desirous to clear himself 
as much as possible from suspicion, and confi- 
dent that with money he could baffle any accu- 
sation, returned the second time to Sparta. 
The first treatment he met with there was, to 
be thrown into prison by order of the ephori : 
for the ephori have so large an authority, even 
over a king. But afterwards, by some private 
management, he procured his enlargement, and 
offers to submit to a trial against any who were 
willing to accuse him. The Spartans indeed 
had no positive evidence against him, not even 
his private enemies, nor the general community 
— none, to support them in proceeding capitally 
against a person of the royal descent, and at 
that time invested with the regal dignity : for, 
being uncle to Pleistarchus the son of Leoni- 
das, their king, though yet in minority, he was 
regent guardian. But, by his disregard of the 
laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian man- 
ners, he afforded them strong reasons to sus- 
pect, that he would never conform to the equal- 
ity then in vogue. They called to remem- 
brance those other passages of his behaviour, 
in which he had at any time deviated from the 
institutions of his country ; and that further 
upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians 
offered as the choicest part of the Persiaa 
spoils, he had formerly presumed, by his own- 
authority, to place this inscription : 

1 Tlie Scytale ia a famous instrument peculiar to the 
Lacedaemonians, and used by them for the close conveyr 
ance of orders to their ministers abroad. It was a iong 
black stick, and the contrivance was this— -" When the 
magistrates gave commission to any general or admiral, 
they took two round pieces of wood exactly equal to one 
another; one of these they kept, and the other whs de- 
livered to the commander; to whom when they had any 
thing of moment to communicate, they cut a long nar- 
now scroll of parchment, and rolling it about their own 
staff, one fold close upon another, they «rrote their bual- 
ness upon it; then taking it off, despatched it away to 
the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the 
folds exactly fell in one with another, as.at the writing* 
and the characters, which, before it was wrapped up, 
were confusedly disjoined and unintelligible, appeared 
very plain." Potter's Jlrehaologia^ vol. ii. c. 13. 

If it be asked (says the Scholiast; how Pausanias 
came tp have the Scytale with him now. as he was 
abroad without the public commission? the answer is, 
He had kept it ever since his former employments. 



44 



PELOPONNESIAN WAk. 



[book I. 



For Penia'B hoatt o*erthrown, and GrBcia freed, 
To Pbobbus THIS Paiuaniae haUi decreed. 
Who led the Grecians in the glorious deed. 

These verses indeed the Lacedsmonians im- 
m^ately de&ced from the tripod, and placed in 
their stead the names of the several states 
which had joined in ike overthrow of the Bar- 
harian, and in making this oblation. This 
therefore was. now recollected to the pirejndice 
of Pausanias ; and, in his present situation, it 
was interpreted, from the circumstances of his 
late behaviour, as an argument that he had been 
equally guilty long before. They had more- 
over got an information that he was tampering 
with the Helots, which in fact was true : for 

, he premised them their liberty and the privilege 
of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his 
command and co-operate with him in the whole 
of his project. But even this would not pre- 
vail : they disdained to place so much confi- 
dence in the informations given by Helots, as 
to run into irregularities to punish him. They 
adhered to the custom ever observed amongst 
then^ never to be hasty in forming a sentence 
never to be recalled against a citizen of Sparta, 
without unquestionable evidence. At length, 
they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is 
said, by means of an ArgyUian, an old minion 
of his, and the person most in his confidence, 
who was to convey to Artabazus the last letter 
he wrote to the king. This man, alarmed by 
the recollection that no person sent on these 
errands before him had ever returned again, hav- 
ing abready counterfeited the seal, to the end 
that if he was deceived in his suspidons, or 
Pausanias should demand them again to make 
:any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks 
open the letters. He found by them, that he 
WIS going on the errand his fears foreboded, 
And that his own murder was expressly enjoin- 

/ ed. He carried upon this the packet to the 
ephori, who were now more than ever con- 
vinced, but still were desirous to hear them- 
^Ives from the mouth of Pausanias, an ac^ 
knowledgment of the truth. They therefore 
contrived, that this person should go to sanc- 
tuary at Tienarus as a suppliant, and refuge in 
a cell built double by a partition. In the 
inner part of this cell he hid some of the 
ephori: and, Pausanias coming to him and 
demanding the reason of his supplication, they 
heard distinctly all that passed. The man 
complained bitterly to him about the clause in 



the letters relating to himself, and expos- 
tulated with him about every particala]>— 
" why he, who had been so trusty to him dur- 
ing the whole course of his negotiations with 
the king, should now be so highly honoured, 
as to be murdered upon an equal rank with 
the meanest of his tools T' Pausanias con- 
fessed the truth of all that he alleged ; begged 
him, «not to be exasperated with what at 
present appeared ;" assured him, ** he should 
not be hurt if he would leave his sanctuary ;" 
and earnestly entreated him, «with all pos- 
sible speed to go the journey, and not to ob- 
struct the schemes that were then in agitation.*' 
The ephori, having exactly heard him, with- 
drew : and now, beyond a scruple convinced, 
they determined to apprehend him in the city. 
But it is reported, that at the instant fixed for 
his arrest, as he was walking along, and beheld 
the countenance of one of the ephori, ap- 
proaching towards him, he immediately^ di»- 
covered his business : and another of them out 
of kindness intimating the matter by a nod, he 
took to his heels, and fled s(Way faster than 
they could pursue him. The Ghalcitscan hap- 
pened to be near, and into a little house within 
the verge of that temple he betook himself, 
and sat quietly down to avoid the inclemency 
of the outward air. They, who had lost the 
start, came too late in the pursuit. But after- 
wards, they stripped the house of its roof and 
doors ; and, watching their opportunity when 
he was within, they encompassed him round 
about,^ immured him within, and placing a 
constant guard around, kept him beset that he 
might perish with hunger. When he was 
ready to expire, and they found in how bad 
a state he lay within the house, they led him 
out of the verge, yet breathing a little ; and, 
being thus brought out, he immediately died. 
They next intended to cast his body into the 
Gsada, where they are used to throw their 
malefiictors; but afterwards changed their 
minds, and put him into the ground, some- 
where thereabouts. But the god at Delphi 
warned the LacedsBmonians, afterwards by an 
oracle, " to remove his body to the place where 
he died :" — And now it lies in the area, before 
the temple, as the inscription on the pillars 
showeth : — " and, as in what they had done 

' ■ ^ ' ■ " ■ 

1 Aldtliea, the mother of Pansanias, is said to have 
brought the first stone on this occasion: such was the 
spirit of the ladies at Lacedemon. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



45 



they h*d violated the lawsof Banctuary, to re- 
atore two bodies to the Chaldscan for that one." 
To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate 
there two statues of brass, as atonements for 
Pauaamas. 

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the 
god himself had judged this a pollution, required 
of the Lacedsmonians, by way of retaliation, to 
clear themselves of it.) 

The Lacedemonians, at that time sent am- 
bassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles 
also of carrying on the same treasonable cor- 
respondence with the Mede, as Pausanias, 
which they had discovered from the papers, 
which had been evidence against Pausanias, 
and demanded that "he should be equally 
punished for it." The Athenians complied 
with this demand. But, as he then happened 
to be under the ostracism,^ and residing chiefly 
at Argos, though he frequently visited other 
parts of Peloponnesus, they send a party along 
with the Lacedemonians, who readily joined 
in his pursuit^ with orders to seize him, where- 
ever they could find him. Themistocles, ad- 
vised in time, flieth out of Peloponnesus into 
Gorcyra, to wliich people he had done a signal 
kindness.' The Gorcyreana expressing their 

1 The ostracism was a compliment of an extraordinary 
kind paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. 
When a person bad done them great services, and they 
grew apprehensive they might possibly show him too 
maeh gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, 
tbey banished him for ten years. On some particular 
day each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote 
Apon an ottraeum (a shell, or piece of tile), who he de- 
nred sboald be sent into retirement. Six thousand of 
these voted carried the point; and he, who had thus a 
legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens with- 
in ten days. The roost disinterested patriot, and most 
•Qceeesfal commander, received, for the most part, this 
pablic acknowledgement of their services. At length, 
a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honour- 
ably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians 
thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by 
treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Ci- 
non, and therefore abolished this strange injurious 
privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to tri* 
noiph over its best friend, public spirit. Other republics 
in Greece had something of the same nature amongst 
tbes). Autbora vary much about the circumstances 
of the ostracism; I have mentioned those points only 
which are universally agreed. 

* At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corey reans 
l>ad refused to join in the common cause of Greece. 
The Grecians, therefore, had afterwards a design to fall 
Qpon an^ destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, 
•ad saved them by remonstrating, that by such pro- 
csadinga Greece would be plunged into greater calam- 
ities, than it would have suffered under the despotic 
power of Xerxes. 



fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expow 
them to the resentment both of Lacedsmonians 
and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them 
to the opposite continent Now, pursued by 
those who were appointed to do it, and who 
had by inquiiy discovered his route, he ia com- 
pelled, by mere distress, to turn in to Admetus 
king of the Molossians,' who was by no means 
his friend. It happened that Admetus was 
not at home ; and Themistocles, the suppliant^ 
addressing himself to the wife, is by her di- 
rected to take their child in his hand, and sit 
himself down upon the hearth. Admetus re- 
turning soon after, he tells him who he was^ 
and conjures him — « though he h%d formerly 
opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the 
people of Athens, not to take revenge upon 
an exile ; to make him suffer now, would be 
taking those advantages over a man in distress, 
which he ought to disdain ; the point of honour 
consisted in equals revenging themselves upon 
equal terms ; he had, it is true, stood in op- 
position to him, but merely in a point of 
interest, and not where life was at stake ; but 
if he now gave him up" (telling him by whom^ 
and why, he was persecuted) « he deprives him 
of the only resource he had left to preserve his 
Ufe." Admetus, having heard him, bids him 
rise, together with the child whom he held as 
he .sat down ; for 4his was the most pathetic 
form of supplication. And when, not long 
after, the Lacedoemonians and Athenians ar- 
rived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he 
refuseth to give him up, and sends him under 
a guard, as he had declared his intention to go 
to the king, to the other sea, by a journey over 
land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to 
Alexander. He here met with a trading 
vessel bound to Ionia; and going on board, 
is driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, 
which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his 
danger, he discovereth himself to the master, 
for not one person on board suspected who he 
was, and telleth him the occasion of his flight ; 
and unless he will undertake his preservation, 
threatens " to inform against him, as one who 
had been bribed to further his escape :-r-pre- 
served he still might be, provided no person 
was suffered, during the voyage, to stir out of 
the vessel ; — if he would comply, the favour 



* Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at 
Athens, but was rejected by the influence of The- 
mistocles. 
l2 



46 



PELOPONNESJAN WAR. 



[book I. 



should be acknowledged with efiectuetl grati- 
tade." — ^The master of the yessel promiseth 
his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a 
night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards 
landeth him at Ephesus. ThemiBtocles, to 
recompense his care, made him a handsome 
present in money, for there he received those 
sums which he had ordered secretly to be con- 
veyed thither from his friends at Athens, and 
f^om Argos; and, travelling upwards from 
thence, in company with a Persian of the 
maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be de* 
livered to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, 
who had lately mounted the throne, the pur- 
port of which was this : 

« I ThemistOcles am coming to you, who of 
all the Grecians have done the greatest mis- 
chiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged 
by necessity to resist the invasion of your 
&ther. Yet the good services I did him were 
much more numerous, when my own preserva- 
^on was secured, and his retreat became full 
of hazards. My former generosity calls for a 
requital;" (here he inserted the message he 
had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from 
Salamis; and that, out of regard to him, he 
had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, 
which was mere fiction ;) " and now, able to 
perform great services for you, I am near at 
hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians 
for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's 
respite, that I may notify to you in person, 
those points which are the subject of my 
journey hither." 

The king, it is said, was surprised at the 
spirit of the man,^ and ordered him to act as he 
desired. The time of respite he had thus ob- 
tained, he spent in making all possible progress 

. 1 The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles hath 
been the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on 
the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a 
price on his head. And yet he was so high in his esteem, 
that the night after first giving him audience, he cried 
aloud thrice in his sleep, '* I have got Themistocles the 
Athenian." He afterwards acknowledged himself two 
hundred talents (near 40,000/. sterling) in his debt; " for 
so much I promised the man that brought you to me.*' 
Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine un- 
derstanding. He was desired by the king to speak his 
mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: he an- 
swered by his interpreter, that *' discourse, like a Per- 
sian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never 
appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, 
but were not to be apprehended, when wrapped up in 
the piece.** ' By this ingenious plea, he obtained a 
year's respite to learn the Persian language, that he 
might be enabled to deliver explicitly his owti senti- 



in the Persian language, and in leaning th0 
manners of the country. When the year was 
elapsed, appearing at court, he became a 
favourite with the king, a greater than any 
Greek had ever been before, as well on ac- 
count of the former lustre of his life, as the 
hope he suggested to him of enslaving Greece; 
but above all by the specimens he gave of his 
fine understanding; for in Themistocles, the 
strength of nature was most vigorously shown ; 
and by it he was so highly distinguished above 
the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the great- 
est admiration. By the mere force of his 
natural genius, without any improvement from 
study, either in his youth or more advanced 
age, he could give the best advice upon suddm 
emei^ncies with the least hesitation, and was 
happy in his conjectures about the events of 
the future. Whatever he undertook, he was 
able to accomplish ; and wherein he was quite 
unexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment 
that he never was mistaken. In a matter of 
ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acute- 
ness the better and the worse side of the 
question. Upon the whole, by the force of 
natural genius, he was most quick at all ex- 
pedients, and^ at the same time excellent, be- 
yond competition, at declaring instantly the 
most advisable measures of acting upon every 
occurrence. — But, being seized with a fit of 
sickness, his life is at an end. Some, indeed, 
report, that he put an end to his own life by 
taking poison, when he judged it impossible to 
perform what he h^d promised the king. His 
monument, however, is at Magnesia in Asia, 
in the forum. Of this province he was gover- 
nor through the bounty of the king, who 
assigned him Magnesia, (which yielded him 
^fifty talents yearly,) for his bread, Lampsa- 
cus, for his wine, (which place was in the 
greatest repute for wine,) and Myus for his 

- 

mcnts to the king, in his own words and method. He 
became afterwards so great a favourite, that the most 
engaging promise, in future times, that the Persian 
monarch could make to a Greek, whom he had a mind 
to inveigle into his service, was, " that he should live 
with him as Themistocles did with Artaxerxes.** And 
yet no attachment to his royal friend, ever made him an 
enemy to his country; nor did his disinterested patriot- 
ism, of which never man had more, ever render him 
ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he 
lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, 
and was used to say humorously to his children, " W« 
had been undone, my children, if we bad not been 
undone.** 
« 9687/. J0«. sterling. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



47 



meat. His bones are said to have been con- 
veyed home bj his relations, in punuance' of 
his own desire, and to have been interred in 
Attica without the privity of the Athenians. 
For it was against law to bury him there, as 
he had been outlawed for treason.^ 

Such an end nad the lives of Pausanias the 
Lacedemonian, and Themistocles the Athe- 
nian, who in their own age made the greatest 
figure of any Grecians. 

The Lacediemonians, by their first embassy, 
had enjoined, what was as amply, in turn, re. 
quired of them, to do as hath been above 
ledted, concerning the expulsion of the sacri- 
legious. But, coming a second time to the 
Athenians, they commanded them <<to quit 
the blockade of Potidiea;" and «to permit 
^gina to govern itself at its own discretion ;" 
and, above all other points, insist upon this, 
declaring most expressly, that in this case war 
should not be made— ^< If they would revoke 
their deraree concerning the Megareans, in 
which they had been prohibited from entering 
any harbour whatever in the dominion of 
Athens, and from the Attic markets. 

But the Athenians listened to none of these 
demands, nor would revoke the decree, but 
reproached the Megareans for tilling land that 
was sacred, land not marked out for culture, 
and for giving shelter to runaway slaves. 

At last, the final ambassadors arrived from 
Laoedsmon, namely, Ramphias, and Melesip- 
pus, and Agesander, who, waving all other 



> Some antbors have related, that his conntrymen 
afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in thePire- 
UB. Plutarch, however, disbelieves the fact, and thinlu 
H merely a presttiDfition, formed on the foUowbig ver* 
ees of Plato the comic poet: 

Tb Owe, Tbemiftodai, a tomb b doe, * 
Ilaoad in the most oonipicaoiii point of view ; 
ISerebuilt tma enrj port, with Jot acelain, 
Shoald riMmt thf howNur, and oontai thy Cunc; 
Each fleet returned, or Mttlnf oat, aboold join 
In mnSag all the naval gLnry thine ; 
It ikonU fommand, high laiMd, ytm wateiy plain, 
.And point that fight whidi gave ni all the main. 

I cannot end this note aboat Themistocles, without 
begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram 
in the Anthologia, which appears to have been written 
with a spirit worthy of this illostrious Athenian: 

Be Greeee the mmmnent ; and aowa the hdght 
With all the tnphiei of the naval fight. 
Let Fanin'i Man and Xerzai •well the beM } 
8vch forma alone Themialoelei can gnoe. 
Next, like a colomn of majettie aia, 
Hie ndi ineeribed, let Silamia ariae. 
SwaQ erery part, and give the hero room, 
Vor aolhiac OBaU diodd icaadallsa the 



points which they had formerly required, said 
thus :— ^< The Lacedemonians are desirous of 
peace, and peace there may be, if you will per- 
mit the Grecians to govern themselves at their, 
own discretion." 

The Athenifms summoned an assembly, 
where every one was invited to deliver his 
opinion. They determined, after dehberate 
consultation on all the points in contest, to 
return one definitive answer. Several others 
spoke on this occasion, and were divided in 
their sentiments ; some insisting on the neces« 
sity of a war ; others, that peace should not be 
obstructed by that decree, which ought to be 
repealed. At length Pericles, the son of 
Xantippus, standing forth, who was at that 
time the leading man at Athens, and a persoR 
of the greatest abilities both for action and de« 
bate, advised them thus: 

« I firmly persevere, Athenians, in the seme 
opinion that I have ever avowed— to make no 
concessions to the Lacedemonians — ^though at 
the same time sensible, that men never exe- 
cute a war' with that warmth of spirit through 
which they are at first impelled to undertake 
it, but sink in their ardour as difificulties in- 
crease. I perceive it, however, incumbent 
upon me, to persist in the same uniform ad- 
vice ; and I require those amongst you who 
are influenced by it, as they concur in the mea- 
sures, either to unite their efforts for redress, 
if any sinister event should follow; or else, 
upon a series of success, to make no parade of 
their own discernment It is usually enough 
for accidents, unforeseen, to bafile the best coi^ 
certed schemes ; since human intenti(ms are 
by nature fallible. And hence it comes to pass, 
that whatever falls out contrary to our expec- 
tations, we are accustomed to throw all the 
blame upon fortune. 

«The treacherous designs of the Lacede- 
monians, formerly, against us, were visible to 
all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear 
than ever. For, notwithstanding that express 
stipulation, that, upon controversies between 
us, we should recip;rocally do, and submit to 
justice, each party remaining in their present 
possessions ; yet, they have never demanded 
justice, nor accept the offer of it from us. 
Their allegations against us they are deter- ^ 
mined to support by arms, and not by evidence ; 
and here they come no~ longer to remonstrate, 
but actually to give us law. They command 
us to quit the blockade of Fotidsa, to permit 



48 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



to govern itself by its own model, and 
to repeal the decree against the Megai^eans ; 
nay, tiiis their last and peremptory embassy, 
•uthoritatiyely enjoins us to restore the Gre- 
cians to their former independence. But, let 
not one of you imagine, that we excite a war 
for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal 
that decree ag^ainst the Megareans. The stress 
they lay upon it, that, if it be repealed, a 
war shall not ensue, is nothing but a colour ; 
Bor think there will be any ground for self- 
accusation, though for so trifling a concern you 
have recourse to arms; since that concern, 
trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof 
and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for 
instance, you condescend to this demand, you 
will immediately be enjoined some other con- 
descension of greater consequence, as if this 
your compliance was owing to the prevalence 
of your fear. But, if at once you strenuously 
refuse to hearken to them, you will convince 
them in a manner clearly to be understood, 
that thpy must treat with you for the future as 
with men who are their equals. 

"Prom the present crisis I exhort you 
thereflSre to form a resolution, either timely 
to make your submission before you begin to 
sufler ; or, if we shall determine for war (which 
to me seemeth most expedient), without re- 
garding the pretext of it, be it important or be 
it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, 
nor to render the tenure of what we now pos- 
sess precarious and uncertain. For not only 
the greatest, but the most inconsiderable de- 
mand, if authoritatively enjoined by equals 
upon their neighbours, before justice hath de- 
cided the point, hath the very same tendency 
to make them slaves. But, from the posture 
in which the affairs of both parties are at pre- 
sent, that we may risk a war with a prospect 
of success as fine and as inviting as our rivals 
can — suffer me distinctly to set the reasons 
before you, and be convinced of their weight. 
"The Peloponnesians are a people, who 
subsist by their bodily labour, without wealth 
either in the purses of individuals, or in any 
public fund. Again, in wars of long continu- 
ance, or wars by sea, they are quite unprac- 
tised ; since the hostilities in which they have 
been embroiled with one another have been 
short and transient, in consequence of their 
poverty. 8uch people can neither com]^eteIy 
man out a fleet, nor frequently march land- 
armies abroad, abandoning the care of their 



domestic concerns, even whilst from thsst 
they must answer a large expense, and, man 
than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. 
Funds of money are a much surer support of 
war, than contributions exacted'by force. And 
men who subsist by the labour of their hands, 
are more ready to advance a advice with their 
bodies than with their money ; since the former, 
though exposed, they strongly presume will 
survive the danger, but the latter they appre- 
hend must be too speedily exhausted, especially 
if the war run out into a greater length than 
they expect, which will probably be the case. 
In a single battle, it is true, the Pelo^nnA- 
sians and their confederates are able to make 
head against united Greece; but they are not 
able to support a war of continuance against an 
enemy, in all respecto provided better than 
themselves ; since by one g^eral council they 
are not guided, but execuie their momentary 
schemes in sudden and hasty efforts : since 
farther, having all of them an equality of msS- 
frage, and being of different descents, each of 
them is intent on the advancement of a separate 
interest. In such circumstances no grand de- 
sign can ever be accomplished. Borne of them 
are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance en a 
foe; others are chiefly intent on preaerviBg 
their substance from unnecessary waste. It 
is long before they can meet together to con- 
sult ; and then, with, great precipitancy, they 
form their public determinations, as the largest 
part of their time is devoted to domestic ooH' 
cems. Each thinks it impossible, that the 
public welfare can be prejudiced by his own 
particular negligence, but that others are intent 
on watohing for himself to share the benefit ; 
and, whilst this error universally pre^aileth 
amongst all the several members, the general 
welfare insensibly drops to ruin. But the 
greatest obstruction to them will be a scarcity 
of money, which as they can but slowly raise, 
their steps must needs be dilatory; and the 
urgent occasions of war can never tarry. 

" As for any forts they can erect within onr 
territory, or their application to a navy, it is 
beneath us to form any apprehensions from 
thence. To effectuate the former, would be 
diflSlcult /or a people of equal strength, in a 
season of tranquility : much more so must it 
be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when 
we are empowered to put Uie same expedients 
in execution against them. And, if they should 
fix a garrisoB in Attica, they might by excur- 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



49 



oMiii or deaeitioiifl from \u annoy some part of 
onr territoiy ; but, whatever works they can 
raise will be insufficient to block us up, to 
prerent our descents upon their coasts, and 
making reprisals upon them by our fleets, 
wherein we are superior. For we are better 
qualified for land-service by the experiense we 
have gained in that of the sea, than they for 
service at sea by the experience at land. To 
learn the naval skill they will find to be by 
no means an easy task* For even you, who 
have been in constant exercise ever since 
the Persian invasion, have not yet attained 
to a mastery in the science. How then shall 
men, brought up to tillage and strangers to 
&e sea, whose practice farther will be ever 
interrupted by us, through the continual annoy- 
ance wh^ch our larger number of shipping 
will give them, effect any point of eclat 1 
Against small squadrons they might indeed 
be sometimes adventurous, emboldening their 
want of skill by multiplying their numbers : 
but, when awed by superior force, they vrill 
of necessity desist; and so, by practice in- 
terrapted, tiie growth of their skill will be 
checked, and in consequence of it their fears 
be incieased. The naval, like other sciences, 
is the effect of art. It cannot be learned by 
accident, nor usefully exercised at starts; or 
rather, there is nothing which so much requir- 
eth an uninterrupted application. 

** If, farther, they should secrete the funds 
laid up at Olympia and Delphi, and endeavour, 
by an increase of pay, to seduce fit>m our ser- 
vice the foreigners who are on board our fleets ; 
—in case we were not their equals in strength, 
and they themselves and such foreigners could 
entirely apply themselves to the work — ^this 
then might be terrible indeed. But nought 
would it avail them now, whilst — ^what is our 
Peculiar advantage— we have commanders Athe- 
nian bom and seamen to man our fleets, in 
larger number and of greater skill than all 
the rest of Greece together. Besides, in so 
^gerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners 
Would think of bartering an exile from his own 
settlement, and a desertion to that side where 
*oe prospect of victory is not near so inviting, 
K>r an enlargement of his pay of few days' con- 
^iiance. 

'^'Hie state of the Peloponnesians I judge 
**^ be such, or very nearly such, as I have des- 
cnbed it; whereas, our own is exempt from 
U 



thote defects which I have pointed out in them, 
and enjoys other great advantages far beyond 
their competition. Grant, that they may in- 
vade our t^ritories by land : we too shall make 
descents upon theirs. And-i-whether is the 
greatest damage, only some part of Peloponne- 
sus, or all Attica put to fire and sword — will 
admit of no comparison. In the former case, 
they will have no other land to repair the 
damage, but what they mUst earn by dint oi 
arms : whilst we have large tracts already in 
our power, both in the islands and on the main. 
— Of vast consequence- indeed is the dominion 
of the sea. But — consider it with attention. 
For, were we seated upon an island, which of 
us would be subdued with greater difficulty 1 
— ^And now, you ought to think, that our pre- 
sent situation is as nearly as possible the same; 
and so, to evacuate your lands and houses here, 
to confine your defence to the sea, and to 
Athens itself; and not, exasperated against 
the Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to 
hazard a battle against superior numbers. 
Should we be thus victorious, we must fight it 
over again with another body not inferior ; and 
should we be vanquished, at that instant we 
lose all our depend^its, the very essence of 
our strength. For the moment we cease to be 
able to awe them by our forces, they vrill be 
no longer obedient to our commands. We 
ought not to wail and lament for the loss of 
our houses or our lands, but for the lives of 
our people: because lands and houses can 
never acquire men, but are by men acquired. 

« Durst I presume on a power to persuade, 
I would exhort you to march out yourselves, 
with your own hands to execute the waste, 
and let the Peloponnesians see that for things 
of such value you will never think of compli- 
ance. I have many other inducements to hope 
for victory, if, intending this war alone, you 
vrill forbear the ambition of enlarging your do- 
minions, and not plunge into voluntary super- 
fluous hazards. For, in truth, I am more 
afraid of our own indiscretions than the schemes * 
of the enemy. But the explanation of what at 
present I only hint at, shall be reserved till 
due occasions, offer in the course of action. 
Let us now dismiss the ambassadors with the 
following answer : 

« That we will open our market and har- 
bours to the Megareans, provided the Lacede- 
monians, in their prohibition of foreigners, ex- . 



50 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



oept us and out confederates : for neither was 
that act in us, nor will this act in them be con- 
trary to treaty. 

« That we will suffer the states to govern 
themselves at their own discretion, if they 
were possessed of that right when the treaty 
was made, and so soon as ever they relax the 
necessity they lay upon the states in their own 
league of governing themselves by that model 
which suits best the Lacedtemoniai^ interest, 
and allow them the choice of their own polity. 

« That, farther, we are willing to submit to 
a judicial determination according to treaty. 

« That a war shall not begin, but will retali- 
ate upon those that do. 

<< Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and 
becomes the dignity of the Athenian state. 
But you ought to be informed, that a war un- 
avoidably there will be ; that the greater ala- 
crity we show for it, the more shall we damp 
the spirits of «ur enemies in their attacks ; and, 
that the greatest dangers are ever the source 
of the greatest honours to communities as well 
as individuals. It was thus that our fathers 
withstood the Medes, and rushing to arms with 
resources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning 
all their substance, by resolution more than 
fortune,, by courage more than real strength, 
beat back the Barbarian, and advanced this state 
to its present summit of grandeur. From them 
we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort 
within our ability avenge it on our foes, and 
deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and 
unimpaired.*' 

In this manner Pericles spoke; and the 
Athenians, judging that what he had advised 
was most for their interest, decreed in confor- 
mity to his exhortation. They returned a par- 
ticular answer to the Lacedsemonians, according 
to his directions, nay in the very words of his 
motion; and in fine concluded — that "they 
would do nothing upon command, but were 
ready to submit the points in contest to a judi- 
cial determination, according to treaty, upon a 
fair and equal footing." Upon this, the am- 
bassadors departed; and here all negotiations 
came to a conclusion. 

Such were the pretexts and dissensions On 
both sides previous to the war, and which took 
their first rise from the business of Epidamnus 
and Corcyra. These however never inter- 
rupted their commercial dealings nor mutual 
intercourse, which still were carried on without 
the intervention of heralds, but not without 



suspicions. For such incidents manifesdy 
tended to a rupture, and must infallibly end in 
war.^ 



1 As the Athenians were a free people, they made use 
of their liberty on all occasions to asperse, calumniate, 
and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were 
at this time exhibited on the stage by name; and Ari»- 
tophanes, whose plays were acted during the Felopon- 
nesian war, hath ridiculecVthe cotemporary statesmen 
and commanders with the utmost petulancy and viru- 
lence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to 
restrain this licentiousness of their comic poets; but it 
may not be amiss in the course of the notes to quote oc- 
casionally some passages from him, to show my coun- 
trymen how much writing libels differs from writing 
history; and that where liberty is abused, no public 
merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the 
malice of faction or the petulance of buffoons. 

Our historian hath laid open the true and pretended 
causes of the Peloponnesian war. Let us now see, bow 
affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. ■ His 
comedy of The Acbarnians was exhibited by Aristo- 
phanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after 
the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is 
the ground-work of it: one Dicaeopolis of the borough 
of AcharnsB is the droll of the play, and amply ridi- 
cules it to a set of his neigbours. 

"Do not be angry," says he,*^if though a beggar I 
presume to talk to Athenians about affairs of state, and 
for once play tragedian. It the province of tragedy 
to give a just representation of things; and I am going 
to speak in a just manner of very sad things indeed. 
Cleon will not be able to catch me this bout, for tradu- 
cing my countrymen in the hearing of strangers. We 
are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of Bac- 
chus. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, 
nor the confederates from other states: we are here snug 
by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those 
odd creatures the sojourners, I look upon as the chaff of 
Athens. And now to speak sincerely, I hate the Lace- 
demonit^s from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily 
wish that Neptune, the god adored at Tenarus, would 
give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their 
houses upon their heads. They have made sad work 
with me, all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the 
rogues. But, my dear friends and countrymen here pre- 
sent, why do we blame the Lacedeemonians for this? 
And mind, Sirs, I cast no aspersion on our own state; 
I aim at nobody employed in the afl[Airs of the admini- 
stration, but at a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, in- 
famous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing infcvma- 
tions against a Megarean pair of paniers. If they once 
set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking-pig, a 
sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once 
they belonged to Megareans, and were sold that very 
day. These things, however, though the general prac- 
tice, are of small signification. A parcel of jolly fellows, 
deep in their cups, had stole away from Megara that 
jade Simstha. The Megareans, exasperated at the loss 
of their wench, made reprisals by carrying off a brace 
of strumpets that belonged to Aspasla. And thus this 
cursed war, which plagues all Greece, took its rise from 
three strumpets. Ay, on account of three whores, 
Olympian Pericles began to storm, he lightened, he 
thundered, roused all Greece to arms; be made new 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



51 



laws as fast as so many baUads, that the poor dogs of 
Megara most be foand neither in the fields, nor the 
insrkets, nor by sea, nor by land. Upon this, being j ust 
ready to starve, away they go to LanedDemon, to get 
tbe decree reversed which had been made on account 
of three whores. It would not do, embassy after em-> 
bassy had no avail, and then immediately rose all this 
clattering of shields." 

Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and 
in another comedy of Aristophanes we find another 
let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice 
with Phidias in secreting some of the gold issued from 
the public treasury for the statue of Minerva in the cit- 
adel, the workmanship of that celebrated artist. In 
his comedy called The Peace, Mercury says—" Ye wise 
husbandmen, attend to my words, if you have a mind 
to know how things came into this sad confusion. Phi- 
dias was the first cause of it by cheating the public. 
Then Pericles helped it forward, for fear he should 
share the fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your 
tempers; he was afraid of falling under your censure; 
so, to prevent his own personal danger, he set the 
whole community in a flame, by lighting up first that 
little spark of the decree against Megara. He then 
blew up that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of 
which bath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, 
from Grecians on both sides." 

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. 
The fine taste of the patron and fine execution of tbe 
artist have been universally acknowledged. An accu- 
sation however was preferred against Phidias by one 



of his workmen, that he had secreted some gold. By 
the advice of Pericles he had laid it on so artfuUy, that 
it might be taken off without prejudicing the statue. 
The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to 
answer weight. It seems however that Phidias was 
banished; because, as the enemies of Pericles attacked 
him at the same time, for impiety, in the persons of his 
beloved Aspaaia and his preceptor in philosophy Anaz- 
agoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artist, 
he had only influence enough to save the former, by 
pleading earnestly for her, and softening his plea with 
abundant tears. 

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a 
thvd story of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this 
— Alcibiades, then a youth, saw him in a very pensive 
and melancholy mood, and demanded the reason of it. 
Pericles told him, " great sums of public money had 
passed through his hands, and he knew not how to 
make up his accounts." " Contrive then," replied Al- 
cibiades, " to give no account at all." And in pursu- 
ance of this advice he is said to have involved the state 
in the Peloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more 
to be depended upon than a whole host of writers of 
scandal, memoirs, private history, and satire? If we 
listen to the latter, there never was and never will be 
any truth in history; there never was, nor is there this 
moment, any true worth or merit in the world. A 
buffoon can degrade a hero, a spiteful satirist cloud 
every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts 
of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and 
slander. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK II. 



YiiLR I. Hofdlitiea begin. Tbe Thebans by nigbt sarpriae Piattea, but are afterwarda repulsed and slaughtered. 
Tbe Peloponnesians invade Attica : tbe Athenians in their turn cruise and make descents on the coast of 
Peloponnesus. A public funeral solemnized at Athens, for those who fell in the first campaign, and the ora- 
tion spoke on that occasion by Pericles. — ^11. Early the next year Attica again invaded. The plague breaks 
out in Atlicns. Its aymptoma, progress, and mortality described. The Atbeniana being greatly dejected, 
marmur against Paricles ; his justification. The Ambraciots war against the Amphilochians. The surrender 
ofPotidsa.—in. li the beginning of the third year tbe Peloponnesians appear before Platsa; a parley 
without effect : the siege is begun and carried on with great industry and art. The Peloponnesians beaten 
at lea by Phormio in the gulf of Crissa ; and when reinforced beaten by him a second time before Naupactus. 
A ^ojeet to seisEe tiie Pineua ^te disconcerted. War between Tbracians and Macedonians. Motions in 
Acanmnia, with an account of thfit country. 



* trt 



Hbics instantiy oommenceth the war between 
Ae Pdopoimesianfl and Athenians,' and the 
coitfederates on both sides — dnring which they 
bad no kind of interconrse with one another 
without the herald ; and now once engaged, 
<*nied it on wiHiout intermission. The -pwcii- 
«^ meidents of it are orderly related by the 
*anmer and the Winter. 

The thirty-yean peace, which was made af- 
ter &e conquest of Euboea, had now lasted 
^wttteen: but in the fifteenth year, when Chry- 
08 had been forty-eight years priestess at Ar- 
8M) when ^nesias was Ephorus at Sparta, 
ind Pythodorus ten months Archon at Athens, 
'^ the sixth month after the battle at Potidea, 
"■^d in <he very beginning of the spring — a 
w^y of Thebftns, somewhat above three hun- 
*wd, under the command of Pythangelus the 
"^ of Phylidiu3, and Diemporus the son of 
vBetoridas, two of the rulers of Boeotia, about 
^ fint deep, got into Platsa' of Bceotia with 

» Before Christ 431. 

* Plataea was a city and petty state in BoBotia, oa'the 
cocoes of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been 
n Armly attaehed ta the liberties of Greece, that it 
^nw ipon tbem Ihe Jastiog raacoor of the Thebans, 
who bad joined the Persians when tliey invaded Greece, 
tnd persoaded them to burn down Platea. The Plat8< 



their arms, which place was then in alliance 
with the Athenians, They were induced to 
this attempt, and had the gates opened to them, 
by Nauclides and associates, citizens of Platsa, 
who had formed a design for the sake of ag- 
grandizing themselves, to destroy all their fel- 
low-citizens averse to their schemes, and fo 
gain the city for tbe Thebans. But the sSfSr 
was managed by Eurymachus, the son of Le- 
ontiades, -a person of the greatest authority 
among the Thebans. For the Thebans, fore- 
seeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while 
peace was actually subsisting and the war not 
yet declared, a strong desire to get possession 
of Platsa, which had been at eternal enmity 
with them. No regular watch was as yet kept 
in it, which was a means of facilitating their 
entrance. When they had gained admission, 
they drew themselves up in order of battle on 
the public forum, contrary to the scheme pro- 
posed by the conspirators, of marching imme- 

ans engaged with the Athenians on the side of Greece, 
in the famous battle fought within their own territory. 
The Athenians, to show their gratitude, gave them a 
place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Piecile in 
honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athens, 
and ever after concluded their religious solemnities 
with a prayer for tho prosperity of the Plateans. 
K 53 



54 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



diately to the houses of their enemies, and pnt^ 
ting them to the sword. Their own design 
was, publicly to offer some fair proposals, and 
gain the city by an amicable composition. 
With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, 
that — "All who were willing to enter into 
league, according to the ancient custom of all 
Boeotians,^ should come and join their arms 
with them." By this method they thought 
the city would easily be brought to an accom- 
modation. 

The Flatieans, when they found that the The- 
bans were already got in and had surprised the 
town, being in great consternation, and thinking 
the enemy more numerous than they really were, 
for the night prevented a view of them,came soon 
to a composition ; and accepting what terms they 
offered, made no resistance ; especially as they 
found that violence was offered to no man. 
Yet, by means of the parley, they had disco- 
vered that the Thebans were few in number ; 
and judged, should they venture an attack, 
they might easily overpower them : — for the 
bulk of the Plateaus had not the least inclina- 
tion to revolt from the Athenians. It was at 
length concluded, that this point should be at- 
tempted, after having conferred together, by 
digging through the partition walls of one an- 
other's houses, to avoid the suspicion which 
going through the streets might have occasion- 
ed. ' Then along the streets they arranged car- 
riages without the oxen, to serve them instead 
of a rampart, and made a proper disposition 
for every thing necessary for immediate exe- 
cution. When they had got every thing ready 
in the best manner they were able, watching 
till night began to vanish and the first dawn ap- 
pear, they marched from their houses towards 
ihe Thebans, that they might fall upon them 
before the full light should embolden their re- 
sistance, and give them equal advantages in the 
fight, and that they might be more intimidated 
by being charged in the dark, and sensible of 

disadvantage from their ignorance of the city. 

» 

A Boeotia was one large republic formed by the anion 
of several little states. The sovereignty (as Thacydides 
informs us, book the fifth) was lodged in four councils, 
composed of deputies sent from every city in the union. 
These were the states general, and sat at Thebes, the 
principal city of Boeotia. The executive and military 
were lodged In eleven persons, chosen annually, and 
styled Rulers of Boeotia, in whose election each city had 
a share. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium, Pa- 
gondas was in this chief command, in right of Thebes. 
Platca had no share in this union, but was closely allied 
with and under the protection of Athens. 



The attack was immediately begun, and both 
sides soon came to action. The Thebans, 
when they found themselves thus circumvented, 
threw themselves into an oval, and wherever 
assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or 
thri<;e they beat them back with success ; and 
when the assaults were again with a loud noise 
repeated, when the very women and menial 
servants were shouting and screaming from the 
houses all around, and throwing stones and 
tiles amongst them, incommoded further by the 
tain which had fallen plentiful that night, they 
were seized with fear, and abandoning their 
defence, fled in confusion about the city. The 
greatest part of them running in the dark and 
the dirt, knew not any of the passages by 
which they could get out, (for this bSsIt hap- 
pened upon the change of the moon,) and were 
pursued by men who, knowing them all, preven- 
ted their escape, so that many of them perished. 
The gates by which they entered, and which 
only had been opened, one of the Platsans had 
barred fast by thrusting the point of a spear 
into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they 
could not possibly get out there. Thus pursu- 
ed about the city, some of them got upon the 
walls, and threw themselves over, but most of 
these were killed by the fall: some of them 
found a gate unguarded, And a woman supply- 
ing them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in 
pieces unperceived, though few only escaped 
by this means, for they were soon discovered* 
Others were separately slain in the different 
quarters of the city. But the greatest part, 
and chiefly those who had kept in a body, threw 
themselves into a great house contiguous to the 
walls, the doors of which happened to be open, 
imagining the doors of this house to be the ci- 
ty gates and a certain passage to a place of 
safety. When the Platsans saw them thus 
shut up, they consulted together, whether they 
should fire the house and bum them all in their 
inclosure, or reserve them for some oth^ pun- 
ishment. But at last these, and all the other 
Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered a- 
bout the city, agreed to give up their aims, and 
surrender themselves to the Platieans prisoners 
at discretion. Such was. the issue of this at- 
tempt on Platsea. 

The other Thebans, who ought during night 
to have come up with all their strength, to rein- 
force the first body in case they miscarried, and 
were still upon the march, when the news of 
this defeat met them, advanced with all possi- 



YEAM I.] 



PELOPOiNNESIAN WAR. 



55 



ble expedition. Pktsea is distant from Thebes i 
about ^seveiitj stadia, and the rain which fell 
that night had retarded their march; for the 
liver Afiopus was so much swelled by it that 
it was not easily fordable. It was owing to 
the march in such a rain and the difficulty of 
passing this river, that they came not up till 
their men were either slain or made prisoners. 
When the Thebans were convinced of that 
event, they cast their attention towards the 
Flatieans who were still without ; for the peo- 
ple of 'Platsa were scattered about the adjacent 
country with their implements of husbandry, 
because annoyance in time of peace was quite 
unexpected. They were desirous to catch 
some of these as exchange for their own people 
within the city, if any were yet living and 
prisoners there. On this they were fully bent ; 
but in the midst of their project the Platseans, 
who suspected the probability of some such de- 
fflgn, and were anxious for their people yet 
without, despatched a herald to the Thebans 
representing to them « the injustice of the at- 
tempt already made ; since, treaties subsisting, 
they had endeavoured to surprise the city;" 
and then warned them «to desist from any 
violence to those without. If not, they posi- 
tively declaared they would put all the prisoners 
yet alive to the sword ; whereas, in case they re- 
tired peaceably out of their territory, they would 
deliver tiiem up unhurt." This account the 
Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. 
The Platsans disown the promise of an im- 
mediate discharge of the prisoners, which was 
reserved for terms to' be agreed on in a subse- 
quent treaty, and flatly deny that they swore. 
The Thebans however retired out of their terri- 
tory, without committing any violence. But 
the Platsans, when they had with expedition 
fetched into the city all their effects of value 
that were out in the fields, immediately put all 
their prisoners to the sword. The number of 
those that were taken was one hundred and 
eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with 
whom the traitors had concerted the surprise. 
And this done, they despatched ^a messenger to 
Athens : and restored to the Thebans their dead 
under truce. And then they regulated the af- 
fiurs of the city in the manner most suitable to 
their present situation. 

The news of the surprisal of Plataea had 
soon reached the Athenians, who immediately 



> About seven English miles. 



apprehended all the Boeotians then in Attica, 
and despatched a herald to Platsa with orders 
«to proceed no farther against the Theban 
prisoners, till they should send their determi- 
nation about them ;" for they were not yet in- 
formed of their having been actually put to 
death. The first messenger had been sent 
away immediately upon the irruption of the 
Thebans — the second so soon as they were 
defeated and made prisoners — as to what hap- 
pened afterwards, they were utterly in the 
dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been 
done, the Athenians despatched away their he- 
rald, who upon his arrival found them all de- 
stroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians marchv 
ing a body of troops to Platsea, carried thither 
all necessary provisions, left a garrison in the 
place, and brought away all the hands that 
would be useless in a siege, With the women 
and children. 

After this business of Platsea, and so mani- 
fest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all 
necessary preparations for immediate war. The 
Lacedsemonians also and their confederates took 
the same measures. Nay, both sides were in- 
tent on despatching' embassies to the king,' and 
to several other Barbarian powers, wherever 
they had hope of forming some effectual inter- 
est for themselves, and spared no pains to win 
those states over to their alliance, which had 
hitherto been independent. In the Lacedae- 
monian league, besides the ships already fur- 
nished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the 
confederates there were ordered to prepare a 
new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the 
several states, that the whole number of their 
shipping might be mounted to five hundred. — 
They were farther to get a certain sum of money 

« By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were 
going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian 
monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each 
partly could cringe to the common enemy, in order to 
obtain subsidies from him to enable them to distress each 
other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in 
his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of 
Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Achar- 
nians, hath described these embassies and the Persian 
monarch too, with excessive buffoonery, but quite too 
low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon the 
Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of 
their employ as much as possible, for the lucre of the sa- 
lary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned 
at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or pub- 
lic rapine-— this exorbitant salary of 15*d. a day to an 
ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great 
king of Persia? 
I ' Artaxerxes Longimanus. 



56 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



in readiness; but in Other respects to remain qui- 
et, and till their preparations could be completed, 
nerer to admit more than one Athenian vessel 
at a time within their ports. — The Athenians 
made a careful survey of the strength of their 
own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to 
the places round about Peloponnesus, to Cor- 
Cjrra, to Ccphallene, to the Acamanians, and 
to Zacynthus ; plainly seeing, that if these were 
in their interest, they might securely attack 
Peloponnesus on all sides. — The minds of 
both parties were not a little elated, but were 
eager after and big with war. For it is natu- 
ral to man in the commencement of every im- 
portant enterprise, to be more than usually 
alert. The young men, who were at this time 
numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at 
Athens, wereibr want of experience quite fond 
of the rupture. And all the rest of Greece 
stood attentively at gaze on this contention 
between the two principal states. Many ora- 
cles were tossed about, the soothsayers sung 
abundance of predictions, amongst those who 
were upon the point to break, and even in the 
cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had 
been lately shook with an earthquake, which it 
had never been before in the memory of the 
Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that 
this was a prognostic of something extraordi- 
nary to happen : and all other accidents of an 
uncommon nature whatever "were sure to be 
wrested to the same meaning. 

The generality of Greece was indeed at this 
time much the best affected to the Lacedaemo- 
nians, who gave out the specious pretence, that 
"they were" going to recover the liberty of 
Greece." Every one made it both his private 
passion and his public care, to give them all 
possible succour both in word and act ; and 
every one thought that the business certainly 
flagged in those places where he himself was 
not present to invigorate proceedings. So ge- 
neral an invasion was there at this time formed 
against the Athenians, when some were passion- 
ately desirous to throw off their yoke, and 
others apprehensive of falling under their sub- 
jection. — With such preparations and such dis- 
positions did they run into the war. 

The states in league with either party, upon 
the breaking out of the war, were these. — ^In 
confederacy with the Lacedsemonians, were all 
Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the 
Argives and Achsans, for these had treaties 
subsisting with both parties. But of the 



Achsans the Pelicans singly were tiie first 
who went over, though they were afterwards 
joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus 
were the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Pho- 
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anaotorians. 
Of these they were supplied with shipping by 
the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pel- 
lenians, Cleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians ; with 
horse by the Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians; 
and the other states furnished them with foot 
This was the confederacy of the Lacediemoni- 
ans. — With the Athenians vr€te the Chians, 
Lesbians, Plateaus, the Messenians of Nau- 
^actus, most of the Acamanians, the Corcyre- 
ans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to 
them in so many nations : namely, the maritime 
people of Caria, the Dorians* that border upon 
the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on 
the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to 
the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and 
all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of 
these, they were supplied with shipping by the 
Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; the rest evp* 
plied them with foot and with money. This 
was the alliance on both sides, uid the alnlity 
for the war. 

The Lacediemonians, immediately after the 
attempt on Plattea, sent circular orders to the 
states both within and without Peloponnesus, 
to draw their quotas of aid together, and get 
every thing in readiness for a foreign expedi- 
tion, as intending to invade Attica. When all 
was ready, they assembled on the day appoint- 
ed, with two^hirds of the force of every state, 
at the Isthmus. When the whole army was 
thu? drawn together, Archidamus king of the 
Lacediemonians, who commanded in the expe- 
dition, convened the commanders from all the 
auxiliary states, with all those that were in au- 
thority, and most fitting to be present, and ad- 
dressed them as follows : 

" Peloponnesians and allies, many are the 
expeditions in which our fathers have been 
engaged both within and witiiout Peloponnesus. 
Even some of us, who are more advanced in 
years, are by no means unexperienced in the 
business of war. Yet, never before did we take 
the field with a force so great as the present 
But,numerous and formidable in arms &b we may 

t These were the Dorians, who were seated in the 
islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnldua, aecording to the 
scholiast. 

9 Plutarch informs us that the namber amounted to 
sixty thousand men. 



I] 



peloponNesian war. 



57 



now appear, we are however marching agamst a 
most powerful state. Thus it is incumbent up<»i 
OS to show ourselves not inferior in valour to our 
lathers, nor to sink below the expectations of 
the world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed 
attentively on our motions. — Their good will 
to us, their hatred of the Athenians, make 
them wish for our success in all our undertak- 
ings. It is therefore our business, . without 
placing too great confidence in superior num- 
bers, or trusting to the presumption that our 
enemies dare not come out to fight us — ^for no 
reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or 
break the regularity of our march — ^but, the 
commander of every confederate body and every 
private soldier ought to keep within himself the 
constant expectation of being engaged in action. 
Uncertain are the turns of war ; great events 
start up from a small beginning, and assaults 
are given from indignation. Nay> frequently 
an inferior number engaging with caution hath 
proved too hard for a more numerous body, 
whom contempt of their enemy exposeth to at- 
tacks for which tiiey are not prepared. Upon 
hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers 
to be resolutely bold, and to keep ready for action 
with proper circimispection. Thus will they be 
always ready to attack vnth spirit, and be most 
fixmly secured against a surprise. 

** We are not marching against a people who 
are unable to defend themselves, but excellentiy 
well qualified for it in every respect ; so that 
we may certainly depend upon their advancing 
against us to give us battle ; — ^nor yet perhaps 
in motion, so long as no enemy appears ; but 
most assuredly so when once tiiey see us in 
l^tnext territory, wasting and destroying their 
substance. ^ All men must kindle into wrath, 
when uncommon injuries are unexpectedly 
done tiiem, when manifest outrage glares be- 
fore them. Reflection then may indeed have 
lost its power, but resentment most strongly 
impels them to resistance. Something like 
this may more reasonably be looked for from 
Athenians than from other people. They es- 
teem themselves wcnrthy to command others, 
and their spirit is more turned to make than to 
suffer depredations. Against so formidable a 
people are we now to march ; and by the event, 
whatever it be, shall we acquire tiie greatest 
gloiy or disgrace, for our ancestors and our- 
selves. — ^Let it therefore be the business of 
every man to follow his commander, observant 
in every point of discipline and the rules of 
16 



war, and obeying with expedition tiie orders you 
receive. The finest spectacle and the strongest 
defence is the uniform observation of discipline 
by a numerous army." 

When Archidamus had finished his oration 
and dismissed the assembly, the first thing he 
did was sending to Athens Mebsippus a Spar- 
tan, the son of Diacritus, to try whether the 
Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, 
since they found an army upon the march 
against them. But they would not allqw him 
to come into the city, nor grant him a public 
audience. For the advice of Pericles had be- 
fore this gaiiied the general assent, that « no 
herald or embassy should be received from the 
LacedfBmonians so long as they were in the 
field against them." They send him back 
therefore unheard, and ordered him « to quit 
their territories that very day ; that fartiier, the 
LacedfBmonians should retire within their own 
frontier ; and then, if they had 'any thing to 
transact with them, should send their ambassa- 
dors for the purpose." They even commission 
some persons to guard Melesippus back, that 
he might have no conference with any person 
whatever. When he was brought to the borders, 
and received his dismission, he parted from 
them with these words, « This day is the be- 
ginning of great woes to the Grecians." Upon 
his return to the camp, Archidamus was con- 
vinced that the Athenians were inflexible as 
ever, so that he immediately dislodged and ad- 
vanced with his army into their territories.— 
The Boeotians sent their quota of foot and 
their horse to join the Pelopoimesians in this . 
expedition, but with the rest of their forces they 
marched towards Platsa, and laid the country 
waste. 

Whilst tiie Peloponnesians were yet assemr 
bling at the Isthmus, or yet on the march, be- 
fore they had entered Attica, Pericles the son 
of Xantippus, who with nine others had been 
appoint^ to command the Athenian forces^ 
when he saw an irruption from the Peloponne- 
sians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion 
tiiat Archidamus, whom the hospitable^ inter- 



1 The tie of hospitality was sacred and inviolable 
amongat the ancients. It was a necessary exertion of 
humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging- 
houses, and was frequently improved into friendship 
and endearment. This between Pericles and Archi- 
damus was merely of a private nature, between the 
royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the repub- 
lic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public 
host of the Spartan state, and entertained their ambat- 

k2 



58 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



conne had made his fiiend, from a principle of 
good-natm'e willing to oblige him, would leave 
his lands untoached, or, might be ordered to do 
so by the policy of the Lacedemonians, as they 
had already demanded an excommunication on 
his account ; by which means he must certainly 
Incur the public jealousy. He declared there- 
fore to the Athenians, in a geno^I assembly of 
the people — that « tliough Archidamus was his 
friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the 
state ; and that if ^e enemy spared his lands 
and houses in Ihe general ravage, he made a 
free donation of them to the public ; so that 
for any accident of that nature he ought not to 
fall under their censure." He then exhorted 
all who were present, as he had done before — 
« to prepare vigorously for war, and -to with- 
draw all their effects icom out of the country, 
•*— by no means to march out against the enf my, 
but keep within the walls and mind the defence 
of the city ; — ^to fit out their navy, in which 
their strength principally consisted, and keep a 
tight rein over all their dependents. By the 
large tributes levied upon &ese, he said, their 
|>ower was chiefly to be supported, since suc- 
cess in war was a constant result from' prudent 
measures and plentifiil supplies. — ^ He exhorted 
di6m by no means to let their spirits droop, 
since, besides their certain revenue, six hun- 
dred talents were annually paid them by their 
tributary states, and they had still in the citadel 
six thousand talents of silver coined." Their 
primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred 
talents, out of which had been taken what de- 
frayed the expense of refitting the gates of the 
citadel, of other public works, and the exigen- 



sadors and public ministera. The itate of Atlnni had 
likewise in all places a public host who lodged their 
ministen. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank 
disinterested tie; when once they had eat salt together, 
or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as 
Under mutual obligations, which small point sought not 
to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable cus- 
tom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon 
as infamous execrable persons. 

1 The account here given showeth Athens at this time 
to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English 
money it stands thus — ^The tribute paid them annually 
amounted to L 116,350 sterling. The Aind yet remain- 
ing in the citadel was L 1,102,500 sterling. They had 
expended lately on their public works 3,700 talents, 
which is equal to Z716,875flterlhig. The weight of the 
fold on the statue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, 
computing the talent only at 651b. Troy, to avoid frac- 
tions, and the gold at £ 4 sterling an ounce, amounts in 
value to LlSti^SOO sterling. 



cies of Potidea^-.« That, besides this, thej 
had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and 
private repositories, many valuable vases des* 
tined for Religious uses and theii^ public solem- 
nities, and the Persian spoils, the whole value 
of which would not amoimt to less than five 
hundred talents." — He mentioned further, « the 
great wealth that was stored up in other tem- 
ples, which they had a right to use; and if this 
right should be denied them, they might have 
recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess 
herself." He declared «that her image had 
about it to the weight of forty talents of gold 
without alloy, all which might be taken off 
from the statue. — That, for the preservation of 
their country it might lawfully be employed ;" 
but added, « that it ought afterwards to be am- 
ply replaced." In this manner did he render 
them confident that their sums of money would 
suflioe. — He told them further, that «they had 
thirteen thousand men that wore heavy annour, 
exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and 
the fflxteen thousand on the guard of the city ;" 
— ^for so large a number, draughted from the 
youngest and oldest dtizens and sojoumen^ 
who wore the heavy armour, was employed 
in this service upon the first invasion of their 
enemies. For the length of the Phalerian 
wall to the place where it joined the circle of 
Ihe city was 'thirty-five stadia, and that part of 
the circular wall which was guarded was ^orty* 
three in length; but that which lay between 
the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. 
The long walls ^continued dowix to the Pireiis 
are ^forty stadia, but the outermost of them 
only was guarded. The whole compass of the 
Pineus, including Munichia, is ^sixty stadia, 
but then only one half of this had a guard.*— 
He then assured them, that « they had, imdnd- 
ing the archers, that were mounted, twelve 
hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, 
and three hundred triremes fit for sea." — 8o 
great in general, and no less in any one article, 
were the military provisions of the Athenians, 
when the Peloponnesians had formed the de- 
sign of invading them, and both sides began the 
war. — These, and such like arguments, was 



ft About 3i English miles. * Above 4 miles. 

* About 4 English miles. « About 6 Englisli aiQes. 

• The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 178 
stadia, or above 2S Attic miles. But, according to Dr 
Arbuthnot, the Atflc mile consisted of but 805 paces, 
whereas the English is 1056. Hence, the compass of 
Athens appears to have been about 17 English nttea. 



nABi.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



» 



Pericles contmnally employing, to convince 
them that they were well able to carry on a 
focceaiful war. 

The Athenians heard him with attention, 
tnd followed his advice. They withdrew from 
the countzy their children, their wives, all the 
furniture of their houses there, pulling down 
with their own hands the timber of which they 
were built Their flocks and their labouring- 
cattle they sent over into Euboea and the adja- 
cent islands. But this removal was a very grie- 
vous business to them, since it had been the 
ancient custom of many of the Athenians to 
reside at large in the country. 

This method of living had been more habit- 
ual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, 
from their first commencement as a people. 
From the time of Cecrops and their first series 
of kings down to Thesus, Attica had been in- 
habited in several distinct towns, each of which 
had its own archons ^ and its own prytaneum ; 
and, unless in times of danger, had seldom re- 
coune to the regal authority, since justice was 
administered in every separate borough, and 
each had a council of its own. Sometimes 
they even warred against one another ; for in- 
stance, the Eleusmiahs, when they sided with 
Eufflolpus against Erectheus. But when the 
regal power devolved upon Theseus, a man of 
an extensive understanding, and who knew how 
to goTem, in several respects he improved the 
whole territory ; and besides, dissolving all the 
councils and magistracies of tiie petty boroughs,' 
he removed tliem to the metropolis, as it is at 
present, and constituting one grand senate 
and piytaneum, made it the point of union in 
whidi all concentred. Their private properties 
he left to them entire, but made them rest 
contented with Athens alone for their city: 
which when all its subjects were now jointly 
contributing to its support, was quickly enlarg- 
ed, and delivered so by Theseus to the suc- 
ceeding kings. In memory of this, from the 
(lajs of Theseus quite down to the present 
time, the Athenians have held an anniversa- 
ly solemnity to the goddess, which they call 
fiynoBcia or Cohabitation. Before this, that 
which is now the citadel, and that part which 
lies on the south side of the citadel, was all the 

• That is— Magistrates of its own, and a common hall, 
io which those magistrates performed the duties of their 
office in administering justice, and offering sacrifices, 
u4 where they had their diet at the public expense. 

* The number of the boroughs in Attica was one hun- 
dred seventy four. 



city. The templet bnili either within the oitik- 
del or without sufficiently show it. For in the 
south part of the city, particularly, stand the 
temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian 
Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Linms, 
in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian 
feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of 
the month Anthesterion :^ which custom is 
still retained to this day by the lonians of Attic 
descent. All the other ancient temples are 
seated in the same quarter. Near It also is 
the fountain now called the Enneakrounos or 
Nine-pipe, from the manner in which it waa 
embellished by the tyrants ;* but formerly, when 
all the springs were open, called Callirrhoe ; 
and which, as near at hand, they perferred on 
the most solemn occasions. And that ancient 
custom is to this day preserved, by making use 

a The English reader may perhaps call this a hard 
word, but I hope will not be frightened. The names of 
other Attic months will occur in the sequel, which I 
shall leave as I find them, because no exact correspon- 
dence hath been found out between the Attic months, 
which were lunar, and those now in use. Monsieur 
Toureil, the celebrated French translator of Demos* 
thenes, hath made it a very serious point. ** I have long 
doubted (saya he) whether fn my translation I shouM 
give the months their old Greek names, or such asthsf 
have in our language. The reason that made me balance 
is the impossibility of computing the months so that they 
shall answer exactly to our French. — My first determi- 
nation was to date in our own manner: I chose to be 
less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of my 
readers by words to which they are not accustomed. 
For what French ears would not be appalled at the 
words, Thergolion, Boedromlon, Elaphebolian?** Ax. 
He then gives reasons for retaining Greek ones, and 
adds, '* I declare then once for all, that I am far from 
pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar con- 
ceived in a language barbarous to numbers of people* 
who, shocked at the sound, woald perhaps impute to 
me a taste which, thtink God, I have not. I protest that 
to my ear, no less than to theirs, the French name of 
the word ^^onld be more pleasing and would sound bet- 
ter. But neither false delicacy nor vicious complaisance 
hath been able to prevail with me to expose myself to 
reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, 
and using words appropriated to Koman and solar 
months, which have no correspondence with the lunar 
or Attic." He says a deal on the suljeci so little affec- 
ting his countrymen, that since his death, they have 
again thrown all the Greek terms into the margin, and 
placed in the text the incongruous modem ones for the 
sake of familiar sounds. If the English reader be as 
delicate, he may read April or May at his option. The 
ablest chronologers are unable to exchange them into 
currency with 'any tolerable exactness. A great deM 
of learning might be also displayed about the days of the 
month and the Grecian method of counting them: but 
as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning 
may be excused in a point where no light is wanting. 

4 TbePisiBtratidc. 



00 



PELOPONNRSIAN WAR. 



[book 



of the same water in connubial and many other 
relig:ious rites. And further, it is owing to 
such their ancient residence in the citadel, that 
it is eminently called by the Athenians to this 
▼ery day, The City. 

In the manner above-mentioned, were the 
Athenians for a long series of time scattered 
about the country, in towns and communities 
at their own discretion. And as not only the 
more ancient, but even the latter Athenians 
quite down to the present war, had still retained 
the custom of ilwelling about the country with 
their families, the general removals into the 
city, after they were formed into one body, 
were attended with no small embarrassment ; 
and particulariy now, when they had bee|;i re- 
fitting their houses, and resettling themselves 
after the Persian invasion. It gave them a very 
sensible grief and concern to think, that they 
must forsake their habitations and temples, 
which, from long antiquity, it had been their 
forefathers' and their own religious care to 
frequent ; that they must quite alter their scene 
of life, and each abandon as it were his native 
home. When they were come into the city, 
some few had houses ready for their reception, 
or sheltered themselves with their friends and 
relations. The greater part were forced to 
aettle in the less frequented quarters of the 
eity, in all the buildings sacred to the gods and 
heroes, except those in the citadel, the Eleusi- 
nian, and any other from whence they were 
excluded by religious awe. There was indeed 
a spot of ground below the citadel, called the 
Pelasgic, which to turn into a dWelling-place, 
had not only been thought profaneness, but was 
expressly forbid by the close of a line in a Py- 
thian oracle, which said, 

" Best is Pelasgic empty," 

Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained 
ihem to convert it to such a use. To me, I 
own, that oracle seems to have carried a differ- 
ent meaning from what they gave it. For the 
calamities of Athens did not flow from the 
profane habitation of this place, but from the 
war which laid them under the necessity of 
employing it in such a manner. The oracle 
makes no mention of the war, but only hints 
that its being some time inhabited would be 
attended with public misfortune. Many of 
ihem, further, were forced to lodge themselves 
within the turrets of the walls, or wherever 
they could find a vacant comer. The city was 



not able to receive so large a conflux of people. 
But afterwards, the long walls, and a great part 
of the Pirsus, were portioned out to then for 
little dwellings. At the same time they were 
busied in the military preparations, gathering 
together the confederate forces, and fitting out 
a fleet of one hundred ships to infest Pel6pon- 
nesus. In afiairs of such great importance 
were the Athenians engaged. 

The Peloponnesian army, advancing for- 
wards, came up first to Oenoe, through which 
they designed to break into Attica. Encamp- 
ing before it, they made ready their engines, 
and all other necessaries for battering the walls. 
For Oenoe, being ' a frontier-town between 
Attica and Bcebtia, was walled about, since the 
Athenians were used, upon the breaking out 
of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy 
made great preparations for assaulting it, and 
by this and other means spent no little time 
before it. 

This del^y was the occasion of drawing very 
heavy censures on Archidamus. He had be- 
fore this been thought too dilatory in gathering 
together the confederate army, and too much 
attached to the Athenians, because he never 
declared warmly for the war. But after the 
army was drawn together, his long stay at the 
Isthmus, and the slow marches he had made 
from thence, exposed him to calumny, which 
was still heightened by the length of the siege 
of Oenoe : for, in this interval of delay, the 
Athenians had without molestation withdrawn 
all their effects from the countty, though it 
was the general opinion, that, had the Pelopo- 
ponnesians advanced with expedition, they 
might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not 
for these dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. 
Under such a weight of resentment did Archi- 
damus still lie with his army before Oenoe. 
His remissness was said to be owing to his pie- 
sumption, that the Athenians, if their territory 
was spared, would make some conbessions, 
and that they dreaded nothing more than to see 
it destroyed. But after this assault on Oenoe, 
and the successive miscarriage of all the me- 
thods employed to take it, the Athenians still 
resolutely refraining from the least show of 
submission, they broke up the siege and march- 
ed into Attica, in the height of summer, when 
the harvest was ripe, about eighty days after 
the Thebans had miscarried in the surprise of 
Platsa. They were still commanded byAi^ 
chidamus son of Zeoxidamus, king of the La- 



I] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



61 



cedamonians, and having fonned their camp 
began their devastationa. They first of all 
ravaged Eiensia and the plain of Thriaaia. 
Near Rheiti they encountered and put to flight 
a party of Athenian horae. Then they advan- 
ced farther into the country through Cecropia, 
leaving mount iGgaleon on their right, till they 
came to Achams, the gieatest of all those 
which are called the boroughs of Athens. 
They sat down before it, and having fortified 
their camp, continued a long time there, laying 
all th^ adjacent country waste. 

The design of Archidamus in stopping thus 
before Achame, keeping there his army ready 
for battle, and not marching down there this 
first campaign into the plains, is said to be this. 
— He presumed that the Athenians, who 
fionriahed at that time in a numerous youth, 
and who never before had been so well pre- 
pared for war, would probably march out 
against him, and would not sit quiet whilst 
their lands were ravaged before their eyes. 
Bat when he had advanced to Eleusis and the 
plain of Thriasia without any resistance, he 
had a mind to try whether laying siege to 
AchanuB would provoke them to come out 
This place seemed further to him a convenient 
spot for a long encampment. Besides, he 
could not persuade himself, that the Achami- 
ans, so considerable a body amongst the citi- 
zens of Athens (for three thousand of them 
now wore the heavy armour), could see viith 
patience their own properties ruined by hos- 
tile devastation, without inciting all their fel- 
low-citizens to rush out to battle. And if the 
Athenians would not come out against them 
this campaign, he might another campaign with 
greater security extend his devastation even to 
the very walls of Athens. He thought it not 
likely that the Achamians, when all their lands 
had been ruined in this manner, would cheer- 
fully run into hazards to prevent tiie losses of 
others, and that hence* much dissention might 

< Aristophanes wrote bis comedy of TheAcharnians 
upon this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public con- 
duct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it 
was not brought upon the stage till the sixth year of the 
war, it amply shows us, how the Achamians resented 
their being thus exposed to the ravage of the enemy; 
and how the wits, that lived upon the public passions, 
helped still more to exasperate them, and misrepresent- 
ed the measures of the ablest politicians, and who per- 
fectly well understood and aimed at the general welfare 
of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and mischie- 
voos. No care to redress, and no commiseration for the 
Achamians as Dicieopolis hints, who was one of that 



be kindled up amongst thelh. Of these imagi« 
nary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst he 
lay before Achamie. 

The Athenians, so long as the enemy remain- 
ed about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasii^ 
conceived some hopes that they would advance 
no farther. They put one another in mind, 
that Pleistoanax son of Pansanias king of the 
Lacediemonians, ^when fourteen years before 
this war he invaded Attica with an army of 
Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis 
and Thrias, and then retreated without pene- 
trating any farther — that upon this account he 
had been banished Sparta, because it looked as 
if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable 
retreat But when they saw the enemy ad- 
vanced to Achams, which was distant but 
sixty' stadia firom Athens, they thought their 
incursions were no longer to be endured. It 
appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy 
grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged 
within their sight; — a scene like this the 
younger sort never had beheld, nor the elder 
but once — in the Persian war. The bulk of 
the people, but especially the younger part, 
were for sallying out and fighting, and not to 
stand tamely looking upon the insult Num- 
bers of them assembled together in a tumul- 
tuous manner, which was the rise of great 
confusion, some loudly demanding to march 
out against the enemy, and others, restraio- 
ing them firom it The soothsayers gave out 
all manner of predictions, which every hearer 
interpreted by the key of his own passions. 
The Achamians, regarding themselves as no 
contemptible part of the Athenian body, be- 
cause their lands had been wasted, in a most 
earnest manner, insisted upon a sally. The 
whole city was in a ferment, and all their re- 
sentments centred on Pericles. They quite 

borough — " And what? it will be said, Can this possibly 
be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, 
if you can. Suppose only, that a Lacediemonian had 
stood across in his skiff to Seriphus, and after killing 
a favourite lap-dog got off again safe: — Would ye now 
in this case sit still ? Quite the contrary. You would 
immediately be putting out to sea with three hundred 
sail of ships; Athens would roar with the 'tumult of 
soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay 
delivering, and our gold flying about. What a bustle 
would there be in the long porticol what distributing 
of provisions, skins; thongs, casks tvM of olives, onions 
in nets, &c. &c. &c. I All the decks would be crowded 
with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music sounding, 
boatswains bawling; nothing but hurry and confusion. 
Such, I am well assured, would then be the case.' 
• About six English miles. 



62 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



^BOOK n. 



forgot the prudent conduct he had fonnerly 
planned out for them. — They reproached him 
as a general that durst not head them against 
their enemies, and regarded him as author of all 
the miseries which their city endured. 

Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined 
by the present state of their affairs, and in con- 
sequence of this, intent upon unadvisable mea- 
sures, hut assured within himself of the pru- 
dence of his own conduct in thus restraining 
them from action, called no general assembly 
of the people, nor held any public consultation, 
lest passion which was more alive than judg- 
ment, should throw them into indiscretions. 
He kept strict guard in the city, and endeav- 
oured as much as possible to preserve the pub- 
lic quiet Yet he was always sending out small 
parties of horse, to prevent any damage that 
might be done near the city, by adventurous 
stragglers from the army. By this means, there 
happened once at Phrygii a skirmish between 
one troop of the Athenian horse accompanied 
by some Thessalians, and the horsemen of Bce- 
otia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians 
a^ntained their ground, till some heavy-armed 
foot reinforced the Bceotiali horse. Then they 
were forced to turn about, and some few both 
Thessalians and Athenians, were slain. How- 
ever, they fetched off their bodies the same day 
without the enemy's leave, and the next day 
the Peloponnesians erected a trophy. — The aid 
Bent now by the Thessalians was in consequence 
of an ancient alliance between them and the 
Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of La- 
risseans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, 
Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Phersans. Those from 
Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and 
Aristonous, each heading those of this own fac- 
tion; those from Pharsalus by Menon; and 
tUose from the rest of the cities had their res- 
pective commanders. 

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians 
made no show of coming out against them, 
broke up from AchamsB, and laid waste some 
other of the Athenian boroughs, which lay be- 
tween the mountains Pamethus and Brilissus. 

During the time of these incursions, the 
Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had 
already equipped, and which had on board a 
thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hun- 
dred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponne- 
sus. The commanders in the expedition were 
Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of £p- 
\cles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. Under 



their orders, the fleet so furnished out, weighed 
anchor and sailed away. 

The Peloponnesians, continuing in Attica 
till provisions began to fail them, retired not by 
the same route they came in, but marched away 
through Boeotia. And passing by Oropus, they 
wasted the tract of ground called Pindee, which 
was occupied by the Oropians, who were sub- 
ject to Athens. On their return into Pelopon- 
nesus, the army was dispersed into th^ seve- 
ral cities. 

After their departure, the Athenians settled 
the proper stations for their guards both by land 
and sea, in the same disposition as they were 
to continue to the end of the war. They also 
made a decree, that « a thousand talents should 
be taken from the fund of the treasure in the 
citadel, and laid up by itself; that this sum 
should not be touched, but the expense of the 
war be defrayed from the remainder — ^and, that 
if any one moved or voted for coBverting this 
money to any other use than the necessary de- 
fence of the city, in case the enemy attacked it 
by sea, he should suffer the penalty of death." 
Besides this, they selected constantly every year 
an hundred of their best triremes, with the due 
number of able commanders. These also they 
made it capital to use upon any other occasion, 
than that extremity for which the reserve of 
money was destined. 

The Athenians on board the fleet of one 
hundred sail on the coasts <^ Peloponnesus, 
being joined by the Corcyreans in fifty ships 
and by some other of their confederates in 
those parts, hovered for a time and infested 
the coast, and at length made a descent and as- 
saulted Methone, a town of Laconia, whose 
walls were but weak and poorly manned. It 
happened that Brasidas' the son of Tellis a 
Spartan had then the command of a garrison 

*■ Here the name of Brasidas first orcurs, and I must 
beg the reader to note him as one who is to make no or- 
dinary figure in the sequel. Trained up through the 
regular and severe discipline of Sparta, be was brave, 
vigilant and active. He wos second to none of hit 
countrymen, in those good qualities which did honoor 
to the Spartans; and was free from all tbe blemisbet 
which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw 
upon them, such as haughtiness of carriage, ferocity of 
temper, and an arrogance which studied no defefencfl 
or condescension to others. He serves his country 
much by his valour an4 military conduct, and more by 
his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a 
word, the distinguishing excellencies both of the Spar- 
tan and Athenian charaeten seem to have been united 
in this Brasidast^ 



TSiLB I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



68 



somewhere near Methone. He was sensible 
of the danger he was in, and set forwards with 
one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The 
Athenian army was then scattered about the 
country, and their attention directed only to 
the walls ; by which means, making a quick 
march through the midst of their quarters, he 
threw himself into Methone, and, with the 
loss of but a few who were intercepted in the 
passage, effectually secured the town. For 
this bold exploit, he was the first man of all 
who signalized themselves in this war, that re- 
ceived the public commendation at Sparta. 
Upon this the Athenians re-embarked and 
sailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town 
of £liB, they ravaged the country for two days 
toother. A body of picked men of the lower 
llUs, with some other Eleans, that were got 
t<^ther from the adjacent country, endeavour- 
ed to stop their devastations, but coming to a 
sidnnish, were defeated by them. But a storm 
ansing, and their ships being exposed to dan- 
ger on the open coast, they went immediately 
onboard, and'Sailing round the cape of Icthys, 
got into the harbour of Pheia. The Messe- 
luans in the meantime, and some others who had 
iu>tbeen able to gain their ships, had marched 
over-land and got possession of the place. 
Soon after the ships, being now come about, 
(rtood into the harbour, took them on board, 
uid quitting the place put out again to sea. 
By this time a great army of Eleans was drawn 
together to succour it, but the Athenians were 
«riled away to other parts of the coast, where 
t^ey carried on their depredations. 

About the same time, the Athenians had 
sent a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast 
about Locris, and at the same time to guard 
Eubcea. This fleet was commanded by Clea- 
ponipus the son of Clinias, who making several 
(descents, plundered many maritime places, and 
took Thronium. He carried from thence 
some hostages, and at Alope defeated a body 
of Locrians, who were marching to its relief. 

^e same summer, the Athenians transport- 
^ from MginA ail the inhabitants, not only 
"»o men but the children and the women, re- 
P«»dung them as the principal authors of the 
present war. And judging they might securely 
^^ ^e possession of ^gina, which lay so 
^^^^ to Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with 
* ^lony of their own— with ihis view, not 
wng after, they fixed tufoe of their own people 
"^Poaaesnon of it The Lacedemomaiis n>- 



ceived the ^ginets on their expulsion, and 
assigned them Thyrsa for their place of reii* 
dence, and the country about it for their sub- 
sistence, not only on accouiit of their own en* 
mity to the Athenians, but the particular obli- 
gations they, lay under to the ^Eginetae, for the 
succour they had given them in the time 
of the earthquake and the insurrection of 
the Helots. The district of Thynea lies be- 
tween Argia and Laconia, declining quite down 
to the sea. Here some of them fixed their 
residence, but the rest were dispersed into 
other parts of Greece. 

The same summer, on the first day of the 
lunar month, at which time alone it can possi* 
bly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the 
afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the 
crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, 
but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its 
lustre. 

The same summer also, the Athenians, who 
had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nym- 
phodorus, the son of Pythes of Abd^ra, whose 
sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a 
great influence over him, made him their public 
friend and invited him to Athens. They 
hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the son of 
Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This 
Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who 
made the kingdom of Odryss the largest in all 
Thrace ; for the greater part of the Thracians 
are free, and governed by their own laws. 
But this Teres was not in the least related to 
Tereus, who married from Athens Procne the 
daughter of Pandion, nor did they belong both 
to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in 
Daulia, a city of that province which is now 
called Phocis, and which in his time was in- 
habited by Thracians. Here it was that the 
women executed the tragical business of Itys : 
and many poets who make mention of the 
nightingale, do it by the name of the Daulian 
bird. And it is more probable that Pandion 
matched his daughter to a person at {his lesser 
distance from him, from the view of mutual 
advantage, than to one seated at Odryss, which 
is many days' journey further off. But Teres, 
whose name is not the same with Tereus, was 
the first king of Odryss, and compassed the 
regal power of violence. This man's son Sital- 
ces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, 
hoping he might gain over to their side the citi^ 
of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriv- 
ing at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces, 



64 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



and jmde his son Sadocus an Athenian. He 
also undertook to bring the war now in Thrace 
to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to 
the Athenians a body of Thracian^ horsemen 
and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas 
to the Athenians by procuring for him the re- 
stitution of Therme ; immediately after which, 
Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio 
in the expedition against the Chalcideans. 
Thus was Sitalces the son of Teres a Thracian 
king, and ^Perdiccas the son of Alexander 
a Macedonian king; brought into the Athenian 
league. 

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred 
■ail, still continuing their cruize on the coast 
of Peloponnesus, took Solium a fort belonging 
to the Corinthians, and delivered the place 
with the district of land belonging to it to the 
Palirensians, exclusively of other Acamanians. 
They took also by storm Astocus, of which 
Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly 
away, and added the town to their own associ- 
ation. Sailing from hepce to the island Ceph- 
allene, they reduced it without a battle. ^ Ceph- 
allene lies towards Acamania and Leucas, and 
hath four cities; the Pallensians, Cranians, 
Samsans, PronsBans. Not long after this the 
fleet sailed back to Athens. 

In the autumn of this summer, the Atheni- 
ans, with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, 
made an incursiod into the territories of Meg&ra, 
under the command of Pericles the son of 
Xantippus. — Those also who had been cruiz- 
ing about Peloponnesus in the fleet of one 
hundred sail (for they were now at JBgina,) 
finding upon their return that all their fellow 
citizens were marched in the general expedition 
against Megara, followed them with the fleet 
and came up to them. By this means, 
the army of the Athenians became the larg- 
est they had ever at any time got together, the 
city being now in its most flourishing state, and 
as yet uninfected with the plague^: for there 



i Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of 
Greece, and both king and people were resided as Bar- 
barians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was 
obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to assist 
at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himself, 
whose successor Alexander the Great, not many years 
after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Asia, was 
at this time balancing between the Lacedemonians and 
Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour 
to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals wUl 
be sometimes seen in this history to use the monarch of 
Macedonia very cavalierly. 



were of Athenian citi^ns only no less than ten 
thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the three 
thousand who were n#7 at Potidea: the sojourn- 
ers of Athens who marched out along with them, 
were not fewer than three thousand heavy-arm- 
ed: they had besides a very large number of light- 
armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part 
of the country, and then returned to Athena 
Every succeeding year of the war the Atheni- 
ans constantly repeated these incursions into 
the territory of Megara, sometimes with their 
cavalry, and sometimes with all their united 
force, till at last they made themselves masters 
of Nisaea. 

In the close also of the summer, Atalant^ 
an island lying near the Locrians of Opus, till 
now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned 
by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of 
Opus, and other parts of Locris, firom annoy- 
ing Euboea. — These were the transactions of 
the summer, after the departure of the Pelo- 
ponnesians out of Attica. 

The winter following, Evarchus the Acar- 
nanian, who had a great desire to recover As- 
tacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to cany 
him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a 
force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and en- 
tdeavour to re-estabUsh him. He himself also 
hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. 
This armament was commanded by Eupby- 
madas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenns son of 
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis; 
who sailing thither executed their business. 
They had a mind to endeavour the reductioii 
of some others of the maritime towns of Aca^ 
nania, but miscarrying in every attempt they 
made, they returned home. But in their pas- 
sage touching at Cephallene, and debarking 
upon the lands of the Cranians, they were 
treacherously inveigled into a conference, where 
the Cranians, falling suddenly upon them, killed 
some of their men. It was not without difl&qulty 
that they drew the others safely off, and gained 
their own ports. , 

But the same winter the Athenians in con- 
formity to the established custom of their coun- 
try, solemnized a public funeral for those whs 
had been first killed in this war, in the manner 
as follows: 

The bones of the slain are brought to a 
tabernacle erected for the purpose three days 
before, and all are at liberty to deck out ths 
remains of their friends^ at their own discretion. 
But when the grand procession is made, the 



TEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



65 



cypresB coffins are di&wn on carriages, one for 
every tribe, in each of which are separately 
contained the bones of all who belonged to 
that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along 
empty for those that are lost, whose bodies 
could not be found among the slain. AH 
who are willing, both citizens and strangers, 
attend the solemnity ; and the women who 
were related to the deceased, stand near the 
sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They de- 
posit the remains in the public sepulchre, which 
stands in the finest suburb of the city ; — for it 
hath been the constant custom here to bury all 
who fell in war, except those at Marathon, 
whose extraordinary valour they judged proper 
to honour with a sepulchre on the field of bat- 
tle. As soon as they are interred, some one 
selected for the office by the public voice, and 
ever a person in great esteem for his under- 
standing, and of high dignity amongst them, 
pronounces over them the decent panegyric — 
and this done, they depart. Through all the 
war, as the occasions recurred, this method was 
constantly observed. But over these, the first 
victims of it, Pericles the son of Xantippus 
was appointed ta speak. So, when the proper 
time was come, walkingiirom the sepulchre, and 
mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, 
from whence he might be heard more distinctly 
by the company, he thus began : 

« Many of those who have spoken before me 
on these occasions, have commended the 
author of that law which we are now obeying, 
for having instituted an oration to the honour 
of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for 
their country. For my part, I think it suffi- 
cient, for men who have approved their virtue 
in action, by action to be honoured for it — by 
such as you see the public gratitude now per- 
forming about this funeral ; and that the vir- 
tues of many ought not to be endangered by 
the management of any one person, when their 
credit must precariously depend on his oration, 
which may be good and may be bad. Difficult 
indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subject, 
where even probable truth will hardly gain as- 
sent. The hearer, enlightened by a long ac- 
quaintance, and warm in his affection, may 
quickly pronounce every thing unfavourably 
expressed, in respect to what he wishes and 
what he knows, — ^whilst the stranger pro- 
nounceth all exaggerated, through envy of those 
deeds which he is conscious are above his own 
achievement. For the praises bestowed upon 
16 



others, are then only to be endured, when men 
imagine they can do those feats they hear to have 
been done : they envy what they cannot equal, 
and immediately pronounce it false. Yet, as 
this solemnity hath received its sanction from 
the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also 
to obey the law, and to endeavour to procure, 
as far as I am able, the good will and approba- 
tion of all my audience. 

« I shall therefore begin first with our fore- 
fathers, since both justice and decency require 
we should on this occasion bestow on them 
an honourable remembrance. In this our 
country .they kept themselves always firmly 
settled, and through their valour handed it 
down free to every sincet- succeeding generation. 
Worthy indeed of praise are they, and yet more 
worthy are our immediate fathers ; since, en- 
larging their own inheritance into the extensive 
empire which we now possess, they bequeathed 
that their work of toil to us their sons. Yet 
even these successes, we ourselves here pre- 
sent, we who are yet in the strength and vigour 
of our days, have nobly improved, and have 
made such provisions for this our Athens, that 
now it is all-sufficient in itself to answer every 
exigence of ^ar and of peace. I mean not 
here to recite those martial exploits by which 
these ends were accomplished, or the resolute 
defences we ourselves and our fathers have 
made against the formidable invasions of Bar- 
barians and Greeks — your own knowledge of 
these will excuse the long detail. But by 
what methods we have risen to this height of 
gloiy-and power, by what polity and by what 
conduct we are thus aggrandized, I shall first 
endeavour to show ; and then proceed to the 
praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, 
can be no impertinent topics on this occasion ; 
the discussion of them must be beneficial to 
this numerous company of Athenians and of 
strangers. 

"We are happy in a form of government 
which cannot envy the laws of our neighbours ; 
— ^for it hath served as a model to others, but 
is original at Athens. And this our form, as 
committed not to the few, but to the whole 
body of the people, is called a democracy. How 
different soever in a pri^te capacity, we all en- 
joy the same general equality our laws are fit- 
ted to preserve ; and superior honours just as 
we excel. The public administration is not 
confined to a particular family, but is attainable 
only by merit. Poverty is not a bindranc^y 
L 



66 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



since whoever is able to serve his country, 
meets with no obstacle to preferment from his 
first obscurity. The offices of the state we go 
through without obstructions from one another ; 
and live together in the mutual endearments of 
private life without suspicions ; not angry with 
a neighbour for following the bent of his own 
humour, nor putting on that countenance of 
discontent, which pains though it cannot pun- 
ish — BO that in private life we converse with- 
out diffidence or damage, whilst we dare not 
on any account offisnd against the public, 
through the reverence we bear to the magis- 
trates and the laws, chiefly to those enacted for 
redress of the injured, and to those unwritten, a 
breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our laws 
have further provided for the mind most fre- 
quent intermissionis of core by the appointment 
of public recreations and sacrifices^ throughout 
the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar 
p(»np, the daily delight of which is a charm that 
puts melancholy to flight The grandeur of 
this our Athens causeth the produce of the 
whole earth to be imported here, by which we 
reap a fiuniliar enjoyment, not more of the de- 
licacies of our own growth, than of those of 
other nations. 

. « In the affairs of war we excel those of our 
enemies, who adhere to methods opposite to 
our own. For we lay open Athens to general 
resort, nor ever drive any stranger from us 
whom either improvement or curiosity hath 
brought amongst us, lest any enemy should 
hurt us by seeing what is never concealed. 
We place not so great a confidence in the pre- 
paratives and artifices of war, as in the native 
warmth of our souls impelling us to action. In 
point of education, the youth of some people 
are inured by a course of laborious exercise, 
to support toil and exerdsp like men ; but we, 
notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of 
life, face all the dangers of war as intre- 
pidly as they. This may be proved by facts, 
since the Lacedemonians never invade our ter^ 
ritories barely with their own, but with the 
united strength of all their confederates. * But; 
when we invade the dominions of our neigh- 
bours, for the most part we conquer with- 
out difficulty in an enemy's country those who 



t BesldM the Tast number of festivals, which were 
celebrated at Athens with pompoui processions, costly 
sacrifices, and sometimes public games, the presidents 
in course offered up sacrifices every morning constant- 
ly for the public welfare. 



fight in defence of their <mn habilations. The 
strength of our whole force no enemy yet. batii 
ever experienced, because it is divided by our 
naval expeditions, or engaged in the different 
quarters of our service by land. But if any 
where they engage and defeat a small party of 
our forces, they boastingly give it out a total 
defeat; and if they are beat, they were cer- 
tainly overpowered by our united strength. 
What though from a state of inactivity rather 
than laborious exercise, or with a natural rather 
than an acquired vdiour, we leam to encounter 
danger? — this good at least we receive from it, 
that we never droop under the apprehension of 
possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the 
danger, are found no less courageous than those 
who are continually inured to it. In these res- 
pects our whole community deserves justly to 
be admired, and in many we have yet to 
mention. 

« In our manner of living we show an ele- 
gance tempered with frugality, and we cultivate 
philosophy without enervating the mind. We 
display our wealth in the season of beneficence, 
ai^d not in the vanity of discourse. A- confes- 
sion of poverty is disgrace to no man, no effort 
to avoid it is disgrace indeed. There is visibly 
in the same persons an attention to their own 
private concerns and those of the public ; and- 
in others engaged in the labours of life, diere 
is a competent skill in the affairs of government 
For we are the only people who think him that 
does not meddle in state-affiurs — not indolent, 
but good for nothing. And yet we pass the 
soundest judgments, and are quick at catching 
the right apprehensions of things, not think- 
ing that words are prejudicial to actions, but 
rather the not being duly prepared by previous 
debate, bef(He we are obliged to proceed to ex- 
ecution. Herein consists our distinguishing 
excellence, that in the hour of action we show 
the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand 
the expediency of our measures. The courage 
of others is the result of ignorance; de]ibe^ 
ation makes them cowards. And those un- 
doubtedly must be owned to have the greatest 
souls, who, most acutely sensible of the mise- 
ries of war and the sweets of peace, are not 
hence in the least deterred from fiioing danger. 

« In acts of beneficence, furtho:, we differ 
firom the many. We preserve friends not by 
receiving but by conferring obligations.- For 
he who does a kindness hath the advantage 
over him who by the lawof gratitude becomes 



ncuri.} 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



e? 



t debtor io his bene&ctor. The person obtig- ! 
ed is compelled to ttei the more insipid part, ! 
oonscioufl that a return of kindness is merely a i 
payment and not an obligation. And we alone 
are splendidly beneficent to others, net so much 
from interested motives, as for the credit of 
pure liberality. I sl^dl sum np what yet re- 
mains by only adding — ^that our Athens in 
general is the school of Greece ; and, that ev- 
ery single Athenian amongst us is excellently 
formed, by his personal qualification, for all the 
various scenes of active life, acting with a most 
gracefol demeanor, and a most ready habit of 



*<That I have not on thiis occasion made 
use of a pomp of words, but the truth of facts, 
that height to which by such a conduct this 
state bath risen, is an undeniable proof. For 
we are now the only people of the world 
who are found by experience to be greater 
than in report — the only people who, repelling 
the attacks of an invading enemy, exempts their 
defeat from the blush of indignation, and to 
theur tributaries yields no discontent, as if 
subject, to men unworthy to command* That 
we deserve our power, we need no evidence to 
nanifest. We have great and signal proofs of 
this, which entitle us to the admiration of the 
present and future ages. We want no Homer 
to be the herald of our praise ; no poet to deck 
off t history with the charms of verse, where 
the opinion of exploits must sufier by a strict 
rehition. Every sea has .been opened by our 
fl^tB, and every land hath been penetrated by 
our armies, which have every where left be- 
hind them eternal monuments of our enmity 
uid our fidendship. 

^'In the just defence of such a state these 
victims of their own valour, scorning the ruin 
threatened to it, have valiantly fought and 
Wely died. And every one of thoee who 
'fornfe is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice 
life in such a cause. And for this reason have 
I enlarged so much on national points, to give 
^ clearest proof that in the present war 
ve have more at stake than men whose pnbKe 
^vantages are not so valuable, and to illustrate 
py actual evidence, hoyr great a commendation 
M due to them who are now my subject, and 
^ greatest part of which they have already ro- 
*ttved. For the encomiums with which I have 
wlehrated the state, have been earned for it by 
^ bravery of these, and of men like these. 
^ such compliments might be thought too 



high and exaggerated, if passed on aay Cr^eciests 
but them alone. The fatal period to which 
these gallant souls are now reduced, is the sur- 
est evidence of their merit — an evidence begun 
in their lives and completed in their deaths. 
For it is a debt of justice to pay superior ho- 
nours to men, who have devoted their hves in 
fighting for their country, though inferior to 
others in every virtue but that of valour. 
Their last service effaceth all former demerits, 
•^it extends to the public; their private d^ 
meanors reached only to a few. Yet not one 
of these was at all induced to shrink from dan- 
ger, through fondness of those delights which 
the peaceful affluent Hfe bestows, — ^not one vras 
the less lavish of his life^ through that flattering 
hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length 
might be exchanged for affluence. One pas- 
sion there was in their minds much stronger 
than these, — the desire of '^vengeance on their 
enemies. Regarding this as the most honour- 
able prize of dangers, fhey boldly rushed to- 
wards the mark, to glut revenge, and then to 
satisfy those secondary passions. The uncertain 
event, they had already secured in hope ; what 
their eyes showed plainly must be done, they 
trusted their own valour to accomplish, think- 
ing it more glorious to defend themselves and 
die in the attempt, than to yield and live. 
From the reproach of cowardice indeed they 
fled, but presented their bodies to the shock of 
battle ; when, insensible of fear, but triimiph- 
ing in hope, in the doubtful charge they in- 
stantly dropped — and thus discharged the duty 
which brave men owe to their country. 

« As for you, who now survive them — it is 
your business to pray for a better fate — ^but, 
to think it your duty alsa to preserve the same 
spirit and warmth of courage against your 
enemies ; not judging of the expediency of 
this from a mere harangue — where any man 
indulging a flow of words may tell you, what 
you yourselves know as well as he, how 
many advantages there are in fighting valiantly 
against your enemies — ^but rather, making the 
daily-increasing grandeur of this community 
the object of your thoughts, and growing 
quite enamoured of it. And when it really 
appears great to your apprehensions, think 
again, that «this grandeur Was acquired by 
brave and valiant men; by men who knew 
their duty, and in the moments of action were 
sensible of shame ; who, whenever their at- 
tempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonour 



6d 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



their country should stand in need of any thing 
their valour could do for it, and so made it 
the most glorious present. Bestowihg thus 
their lives on the public, they have every one 
received a praise that will never decay, a se- 
pulchre that will always be most illustrious — 
not that in which their bones lie mouldering, 
hut that in which their frame is preserved, to 
bo on every occasion, when honour is the em- 
ploy of either word or act, eternally remem- 
bered. This whole earth is the sepulchre of 
illustrious men : nor is it the inscription on the 
columns in their native soil alone that show 
their merit, but the memorial of them, better 
than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, re- 
posited more durably in universal remembrance 
than on their own tomb. From this very mo- 
ment, emulating these noble patterns, placing 
your happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, 
be prepared to encounter all the dangers of 
war. For, to be lavish of life is not so noble 
in those whom misfortunes have reduced to 
misery and despair, as in men who hazard the 
loss of a comfortable subsistence, and the en- 
joyment of all the blessings this world affords, 
by an unsuccessful enterprise. Adversity, 
after a series of ease and affluence, sinks deeper 
into the heart of a man of spirit, than the stroke 
of death insensibly received in the vigour of life 
and public hope. 

« For this reason, the parents of those who 
are now gone, whoever of them may be attend- 
ing here, I do not bewail, — I shall rather com- 
fort. It is well known to what unhappy acci- 
dents they were liable from the moment of 
their birth; and, that happiness belongs to 
men who have reached the most glorious period 
of life, as these now have who are to you the 
source of sorrow, — ^these, whose life hath re- 
ceived its ample measure, happy in its continu- 
ance, and equally happy in its conclusion. I 
know it in truth a difficult task, to fix comfort 
in those breasts, which will have frequent re- 
membrances in se^ng the happiness of others, 
of what they once themselves enjoyed. And 
sorrow flows not from the absence of those 
good things we have never yet experienced, but 
from the loss of those to which we have been 
accustomed. They who are not yet by age 
exempted from issue, should be comforted in 
the hope of having more. The children yet 
to be bom will be a private benefit to some, in 
causing them to forget such as no longer are, 
and will be a double benefit to their country 



in preventing its desolation, and providing: for 
its security. For those persons cannot in 
common justice be regarded as members of 
equal value to the public, who have no children 
to expose to danger for its safety. — But you, 
whose age is already far advanced, compute 
the greater share of happiness your longer time 
hath afforded for so much gain, persuaded in 
yourselves, the remainder will be but short, 
and enlighten that space by the glory gained by 
these. It is greatness of soul alone that never 
grows old : nor is it wealth that delights in 
the latter stage of life, as some g^ve out, so . 
much as honour. 

" To you, the sons and brothers of the de- 
ceased, whatever number of you are here, a 
field of hardy contention is opened. For him 
who no longer is, every one is ready to com- 
mend, so that to whatever height you push 
your deserts, you will scarce ever be thought 
to equal, but to be somewhat inferior to these. 
Envy will exert itself against a competitor, 
whilst life remains : but when death stops the 
competition, afifection will applaud without 
restraint. 

" If after this it be expected from me to say 
any thing to you who are now reduced to a 
state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall 
express it all in one short admonition ; — It is 
your greatest glory not to be deficient in the 
virtue peculiar to your sex, and to g^ve the men 
as little handle as possible to talk of your be- 
haviour, whether well or ill. 

<< I have now discharged the province allotted 
me by the laws, and said what I thought most 
pertinent to this assembly. Our departed 
friends have by facts been already honoured. 
Their children from this day till they arrive at 
manhood shall be educated at the public ex- 
pense of the state^ which hath appointed so 
beneficial a meed for these and all future re- 
lics of the public contests. For wherever the 
greatest rewards are proposed for virtue, there 
the best of patriots are ever to be found. — 
Now, let every one respectively indulge the 
decent grief for his departed friends, and then 
retire." 

Such was the manner of the public funeral 
solemnized this winter, and with the end of 
which, the first year of this war was also ended. 

1 The law was, that they should be instructed at the 
public expense, and when come to age presented with, 
a complete suit of armour, and honoured with a seat in 
all public places. 



n.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



69 



TSAB II. 

In the very beginning of summer, the Pelo- 
ponnesians and allies, with two-thirds of their 
forces, made an incursion as before into Attica, 
under the command "of Archidamus son of 
Zeuxidamus, king of the LacedoDmonians, and 
having formed their camp, ravaged the country. 

They had not been many days in Attica, be- 
fore a 'sickness began first to appear amongst 
the Athenians, such as was reported to have 
raged before this in other parts, -as about Lem- 
nos and other places. Yet a plague so great 
as this, and so dreadful a calamity, in human 



man art was totally unavailing. Whatever sup^ 
plications were oflered in the temples, whatever 
recourse to oracles and religious rites, all were 
insignificant ; at last, expedients of this nature 
they totally relinquished, overpowered by cala- 
mity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that 
part of Ethiopia which borders upon Egypt; 
it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and 
into great part of the king's dominions, and from 
thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the 
Athenians. The contagion showed itself first 
in tlie Piraeus, which occasioned a report that 
the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be 



, , , . , „ , mi^ 1 .1 thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no 

mempry could not be paralelled. The physi- 1 r ^ • .t. a /v ^^^ ^ • 

;:-^ ,, ,.. ,. /.ii' lountams there. After this it spread into the 

upper city, and then the mortality very much 



cians at first could administer no relief, through 
utter ignorance ; nay, they died the faster, the 
closer their attendance on the sick, and all hu- 



* The historian in the funeral oration hath piven us a 
very exalted idea of the Athenian state, and tlie distin- 
guishing excellencies of that humane and polite people. 
The plague, which now broke out, enables him to con- 



increased. Let every one, physician or not, 
freely declare his own sentiments about it ; let 
him assign any credible account of its rise, or 
the causes strong enough in his opinion to in- 
troduce so terrible a scene — I shall only relate 
what it actually was ; and as, from an informa- 



trart his pieces, and give his history a most agreeable : tion in all its symptoms, none may be quite at 
variety It is now going to be exceeding so'eran, seri- ^ ^^^ ^^^^^ jt if ^^^^ ^^ ^j^^^l^ v ^. 



ous, and pathetic. It is as an historian and not as a 
physician that he gives us the relation of it: a relation, 
which in general hath been esteemed an elaborate and 
complete performance. He professeth to give an accu- 
rate detail of it. The accuracy hath generally been 
allowed, but it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucre- 
tius however hath tran^erred all the circumstances 
mentioned by Thucydidea into his own poem, 1. 6. en- 
larging still more minutely upon them; and yet, this is 
the greatest ornament, and certainly the least exception- 
able part of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, 
affected to write with the precision of a philosopher; 
and Thacydides, the historian, always composed with 
the spirit of a poet. Hippocrates hath left some cases 
of the plague, which he bath recited as a physician; hut 
none of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath 
mentioned nothing of his practising there, much less of 
his practising with success. He says, on the contrary 
that*' all human art was totally unavailing;" and his 
follower Lucretius, that, " Mussabat tacito medicina 
timore.** The letters of Hippocrates, which mention 
this affair, are certainly spurious: the facts they would 
establish are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath 
proved to conviction in Jiia Histoirede la mcdecine^ 1. 3. 
They make the plague to have broken out first in Eu- 
rope, and to have spread from thence into the domin- 
ions of the king of Persia. This is quite contrary to the 
account of Thucydides; and to the experience of every 



I shall give an exact detail of them ; having 
been sick of it myself, and seen many others af- 
flicted with it. 

This very year, as is universally allowed, had 
been more than any other remarkably free from 
common disorders; or, whatever diseases had 
seized the body, they ended at length in this. 
J^jit-^^^ who enjoyed the most perfect health 
were suddenly, without any apparent cause, 
seized at first with head-aches extremely vio- 
lent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in 
the eyes. Within — the throat and tongue be- 
gan instantly to be red as blood ; the 'breath 
was drawn with difficulty and had a noisome 
smell. The symptoms that succeeded these 
were sneezing and hoarseness; and not long 
after, the malady descended to the breast, with 
a violent cough : but when once settled in the 
stomach, it excited vomitings, in which was • 
thrown up all that matter physicians call dis- 
charges of bile, attended with excessive torture. 
A great part of the infected were subject to 



age. All plagues and infectious distempers have had I such violent hiccups without any discliarge, as 

their rise in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr I v rl* ^i. x_ i • i. 

«« J u .u . J i.<» n ♦ 1 *i I • ./.... I brought upon them a strong convulsion, to 

Mead hath proved it? But whether his account of this I ® ^ *» ' 

plague at Athens be duly succinct, not too minute, se- | ^^^ t»ut of a short, to others of a very long 
rioas, affecting; and, whether Thucydides hath well , continuance. The body, to the outward touch, 
managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize like j ^as neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, 
a man of virtue and good sense, every reader will judge u,- Ji-v r -i i j n . ■♦! i;**?^ 

for himself. The translator hath chiefly endeavoured I ^^* '^^^'«^' ^'''"^^ ^^^^'^ ^" °^"' "^'^ ^^"^^ 
to preserve that solemn air, which he thought the prime ' Pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorch- 
distinction of the original. ' ed with such excessive heat, that it could not 

l2 



TO 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



bear the lightest covering or the finest linen 
upon it, but must be left quite naked. They 
longed for nothing so much as to be plunging 
into cold water ; and many of those who were 
not properly attended, threw themselves into 
wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguish- 
ed; and whether they drank much or little, 
their torment still continued the same. The 
restlessness of their bodies, and an utter inabil- 
ity of composing themselves by sleep, never 
abated for a moment. And the body, so long 
as the distemper continued in its height, had 
no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a 
mirade, so^that most of them perished within 
nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched 
ihcir vitals, though their strength was not ex- 
hausted \ or, if they continued longer, the dis- 
temper fell into the belly, causing violent ul- 
cerations in the bowels, accompanied with lui 
incessant flux, by which many, reduced to an 
excessive weakness, were carried off. Tor the 
malady beginning in the head, and settling first 
there, sunk afterwards gradually down the 
whole body. And whoever got safe through 
all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremi- 
ties of their bodies still retained the marks of 
its violence. For it shot down into their privy- 
members, into their fingers and toes, by losing 
which they escaped with life. Some there 
were who lost their eyes ; and some who, being 
quite recovered, had at once totally lost all me- 
mory, and quite forgot not only their most in- 
timate friends, but even their own selves. For 
as this distemper was in general virulent be- 
yond expression, and its every part more grie- 
vous than had yet fallen to the lot of human 
nature, so, in one particular instance, it appear- 
ed to be none of the natural infirmities of man, 
since the birds and beasts that prey on human 
flesh either never approached the dead bodies, 
of which many lay about uninterred ; or cer- 
tainly perished if they ever tasted. One 'proof 

^ 1 This passage ie translated close to the letter of the 
original. It was intended by the author to show the ex- 
cessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the 
dead bodies was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous 
animals ; — " Either they never tasted ; or, if they tast- 
ed, died." One proof of this is presumptive, arising 
from the disappearance of all birds of prey. The second 
was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Eve- 
ry body could see that dogs, those familiar animals who 
live with and accompany men abroad, either never tast- 
ed ; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they 
certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates 
the eirewMtanee itself, but hath enlarged in the proof t^ 
and intimates /hat the distemper raged amongst those 



of this is the total disappearance then of such 
birds, for not one was to be seen, either in any 
other place, or about any one of the carcases. 
But the dogs, because of their familiari^ w ith 
man, afibrded a more notorious proof of this 
event 

The nature of this pestilential disorder was 
in general — ^for I have purposely omitted its 
many varied appearances, or the circumstances 
particular to some of the infected in contradic- 
tion to others — such as hath been described. 
None of the common maladies incident to hu- 
man nature prevailed at that time ; or what- 
ever disorder any where appeared, it ended in 
this. Some died merely for want of care ; and 
some, with all the care that could possibly be 
taken ; nor was any one medicine discovered, 
from whence could be promised any certain re- 
lief, since that which gave ease to one was pre- 
judicial to another. Whatever difference there 
was in bodies, in point of strength or in point 
of weakness, it availed nothing; all were 
equally swept away before it, in spite of regu- 
lar diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the most 
affecting circumstances of this calamity were 
— that dejection of mind, which constantly 
attended the first attack; for the mind sink- 
ing at once into despair, they the sooner gave 
themselves up without a struggle — and that 
mutual tenderness, in taking care of one 
another, which communicated the infection, 
and made them drop like sheep.' This lat- 
ter case caused the mortality to be so great 
For if fear withheld them from going near one 

animals, even without eating the flesh of the dead, and 
was general to every living species. 

Muliaque humi com inhmnata jacerant corpora rapn 
Corpnribus, tamen alitaam geout atque feramia. 
Ant proeal abriliebat, ut acrem eziret odorem, 
Ant, abi futlarat, langnrbat morto prapinqw. 
Nee tamen omnioo temere illit coliboi ulla 
Comparebat avia, nee noctibu' aaeela fertram 
Ezibaol sylvit : laoguebaot plenqne morbo, 
£t rooriebantnr : cum primis fida cannm via 
Strata viia animam pooebat in omnibM aegram ; 
Extorqaebat enim vitam via morbMa membrii. 

A This passage is thus translated upon the authority 
of Dr. Mead, in his treatise on the Plague^ which con- 
vinced me that the comma should he omitted in the ori- 
ginal after irf^eu, and -^cfecarfiM; be govemed of sro. 
Lucretius has given it a different turn, as if the resem- 
blance to sheep was not in their dying fast, but to the 
forlorn and solitary manner in which those creatures 
die ; and he hath put before it what follows a little af- 
ter in Tbucydides. 



Nam qnieunqoe looa fngitabtnt viaare ad 
Vital nhniom cnpidi, mortiiqae timeDtea, 
Peribant panlo poat turpi anrte malaqm 
Daaa r to a , opia expcrtea, inouria BHtelaH^ 
Lanigeru tacqoam pecodea, at buoara aada. 



¥£iJl II.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



71 



another, Uiey died for want of- help, bo that 
many hou^ became quite desolate for want of 
needful attendance ; and if they ventured, they 
gone. This was most frequently the 



were 



case of the kind and compassionate. Such per- 
sons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for 
themselves, entirely to abandon their friends, 
when their menial servants, no longer able to 
endure the groans and lamentations of the 
dying, had been compelled to fly from such a 
weight of calamity. But those especially, who 
had safely gone through it, took pity on the dy- 
ing and the sick, because they knew by expe- 
rience what it really was, and were now secure 



more easily induced openly to do what for de- 
cency they did only covertly before. They 
saw the strange mutabiUty of outward condi-" 
tion, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth- 
pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessi- 
tous ; so that they thought it prudent to catch 
hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of 
pleasure ; persuaded that their bodies and their 
wealth might be their own merely for the day. 
Not any one continued resqiuteenough to form 
any honest or generous design, when so uncer- 
tain whether he should live to effect it Wha^ 
ever he knew could improve '^e pleasure ox 
satisfaction of the present moment, that he de- 



ini themselves ; for it never seized any one a Ltermined to be honour and interest Rever- 
second time so as to be mortaL Such were jpnce of the gods or the laws of society laid no 
looked upon as quite happy by others, and restraints upon them ; either judging that piety 



were themselves at first overjoyed in their late 
escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter 
no distemper would prove fatal to them. Be- 
side this reigning calamity, the general removal 
from the country into the city was a heavy 
grievance, more particularly to those who had 
been necessitated to come thither. For as 
they had no houses, but dwelled all the summer 
season in booths, where there wos scarce room 
to brei^e, the pestilence dmtroyed. with the 
utmost disorder, so that they lay together in 
heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead 
upon the dying. Some were tumbling one 
over another in the public streets, or lay expir- 
ing round about every fountain, whither they 
had crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. 
The temples, in which they had erected tents 
for their reception, were fiill of the bodies of 
those who had expired there. For in a cala- 
mity so outrageously violent, and universal ^e- < 
spair, things sacred and holy had quite lost 
their distinction. Nay, aU regulations observed 
before in matters of sepulture were quite con- 
founded, since every one buried wherever he 
could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres 
were already filled by the numbers which had 
perished in their own families, were shamefully 
compelled to seize those of others. They sur- 
prised on a sudden the piles which others had 
built for their own friends, and burned their 
dead upon them ; and some, whilst one body 
was burning on a pile, tossed another body 
they had dra^^ied thither upon it, and went 
tfadur way. 

Thus did the pestilenee give their first rise 
to thooe iniquitous acts which prevailed more 
mad more in Athens. For every one was jbow 



and impiety were things quite indifferent, since 
they saw that all men perished alike; or, 
throwing away evexy apprehension of being 
called to account for their enormities, since 
justice might be prevented by death ; or rather, 
as the heaviest of judgments to which man 
could be doomed, was already hanging over their 
heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, 
before it feu. 

With such a weig^ht of calamity were the 
Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. 
Their city was one scene of death, and the ad- 
jacent country of ruin and devastation. In 
this their affliction they called to mind, as was 
likely they should, the following prediction, 
which persons of the greatest age infonned 
them had been formerly made : 

Two heavy judgments will at once befall, 

A Doric war without, a plague within your wall. 

There had indeed been a dispute before, 
whether their ancestors in this prediction read 
xotftoe a plague, or Kifios a famine. Yet in their 
present circumstances all with probability a- 
greed that Koiftag a plague, was the right : for 
they adapted the interpretation to what they 
now suffered. — But in my sentiments, should 
they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, tad 
a famine happen at the same time, they will have 
recourse with equal probability to the other 
interpretation. It was further remembered 
by those who knew of the oracle given to the 
Lacedemonians, that when they inquired of the 
god, « whether they should engage in this 
war,'' his answer was, that — ^ if they carried it 
on with all their strength, they should be victo- 
rious, and he himself would fight on their side ;** 
— and therefore they conclude^ that what now 



72 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 11. 



befell Was the completion of the oracle. The 
pestilence broke out immediately upon the 
irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never ex- 
tended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance 
which ought to be related. It raged the most, 
and for the longest time, in Athens, but after- 
wards spread into the other towns, especially 
the most populous. And this is an exact ac- 
count of the plague. 

The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged 
the inland parts, extended their devastations to 
those which are called The Coast, as far as 
Mount Laurium,^ where the Athenians had sil- 
ver-mines. And here they first ravaged the 
part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and 
afterwards that which lies towards Eubcea and 
Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the 
command, persisted in the same opinion as be- 
fore in the former incursion, that " the Athe- 
nians ought not to march out against them." 
Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, 
before they had advanced as far as the coast, 
he had equipped a fleet of a hundred ships to 
invade Peloponnesus: and when every thing' 
was ready, he put to sea.^ On board these 
ships he had embarked four thousand heavy- 
armed Athenians ; and in vessels for transport- 
ing horse, now first fitted up for this service 
out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The 
Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedi- 
tion with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet 
^ent to sea from Athens, they left the Pelo- 
ponnesians on the coast of Attica. When they 

1 The Mlver-mines at Laurium originally belonged to 
private persons, but were united to the public domain 
by Tbemistocles. A great number of slaves were em- 
ployed in working thpm, and the produce paid amply 
for all the labour bestowed upon them. Whether the 
state was much enriched by them, is a question ; the 
undertakers and proprietors of the slaves who wrought 
them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by 
Xenophon in his treatise of revenue. 

a Plutarch relates in the life of Pericles, that on this 
occasion, when all was ready, "when the forces were 
shipped, and Pericles himself had Just gotten on board 
bis trireme, the sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, 
that all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. 
Pericles, seeing his own pilot quite terrified and con- 
founded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrappipg him 
up in it, asked, Whether he saw any thing dreadful or 
any thing that portended danger? The pilot answering 
in the negative. What difference then (he went on) 
between this affair and that, unless that what hath 
darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak? Pericles had 
easily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras bow to ac- 
count for eclipses. But whether Plutarch bath placed 
this incident in right time, is a question : for Thucydi- 
des, who is exact in these things, mentions no eclipse 
of the sun this summer. 



were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Pelo- 
ponnesus, they ravaged great part of the conn- 
try about it, and making an assault on the city^ 
itself, had some hopes of taking it, but did not 
succeed. Leaving Epidaurus. they ravaged the 
country about Troexene, Halias, and Hermione ; 
all these places are situated on the sea-coast 
of Peloponnesus. But sailing hence, they 
came before Prasice, a fort of Lacohia, situated 
upon the sea, around which they laid the coun- 
try waste ; and having taken the fort by assault, 
demolished it. After these performances they 
returned home, and found the Peloponnesians 
no longer in Attica, but retired within their 
own dominions. 

The whole space of time that the Pelopon- 
nesians were upon the lands of the Athenians, 
and the Athenians employed in their sea ^ex- 
pedition, the plague T^as making havoc both in 
the troops of the Athenians, and within the 
city. This occasioned a report that the Pelo- 
ponnesians, for- fear of the infection, as having 
been informed by deserters that it raged in the 
city, and been witnesses themselves of their 
frequent interments, retired out of their terri- 
tory with some precipitation. Yet they per- 
severed in this incursion longer than they had 
ever done before, and had made the whole 
country one continued devastation; for the 
time of their continuance in Attica was about 
forty days. 

The same summer, Agnon the son of Ni- 
cias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinins, joined 
in the command with Pericles, setting them- 
selves at the head of the force which he had 
employed before, carried them without loss of 
time against the Chalcideans of Thrace. But 
when they were come up to Potideea, which 
was stfll besieged, they played their engines of 
battery against, and left no method unattempted 
to take it. But the success in this attempt did 
not answer expectation, nor indeed was the 
event in any respect the least proportioned to 
their great preparations ; for the plague follow- 
ed them even hither, and making grievous 
havoc among the Athenians, destroyed tiie 
army; so that even those soldiers that had 
been there before, and had from the beginning 
of the siege been in perfect health, caught the 
infection from the troops brought thither by 
Agnon. — Phormio, and the body of sixteen 
hundred men under his command, had be- 
fore this quitted Chalcidice, so that Agnon 
sailed back with the ships to Athens, of his 



TSAJin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



73 



four thousand men the plague having swept 
awaj one ^onaand and fifty in about forty days : 
but the soldiera who were there before were left 
to cairy on the siege of Potidiea. 

After the second incursion of the Pelopon- 
Desians, the Athenians whose lands were now 
a second time laid waste, who felt the double 
affliction, of pestilence and war, had entirely 
changed their sentiments of things. The blame 
was universally thrown on Pericles, as if at his 
instigation they had engaged in this war, and 
by him had been plunged in all these calamities. 
They desired with impatience to make up the 
breach with the Lacedemonians ; but though 
they despatched an embassy for this purpose, 
no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously 
distressed, and no method of resource occurring 
to their minds, their resentments fell still hea- 
vier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dispi- 
rited with their present misfortunes, and intent 
on such projects as he had reason to expect 
they would, called a general assembly of the 
people, which, by continuing in the command 
of the army, he was authorized to do. He had 
a mind to encourage them, to soothe the hot re- 
sentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring 
them into a more calm and confident temper. 
He presented himself before them, snd spoke as 
follows :— 

« I fully expected, I freely own it, to become 
the object of your resentments. I am not ig- 
norant of the causes of it ; and for this purpose 
have convened this assembly, to expostulate 
with, nay, even to reprimand you, if without 
any reason you make me the mark of your dis- 
pleasure, or cowardly sink under the weight of 
your misfortunes: for it is my firm opinion, 
that by the full health and vigour of a state the 
happiness of its constituents is better decured, 
than when each separate member is thriving 
whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situ- 
ation of any private person prosperous and fine 
as his heart can wish — if his country be mined, 
he himself must necessarily be involved in that 
ruin. But he that is unfortunate in a flourish- 
ing community, may soon catch hold of expe- 
dients of redress. When -therefore your coun- 
try is able to support the misfortunes of its 
eveiy member, and yet each of those members 
must needs be enveloped in the ruin of his 
country, why will you not join and unite your 
efforts to prevent that ruin— and not (as you 
are now g^ing to do, because confounded with 
your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the 
17 



public safety,' and cast the most unjust censures 
upon me who advised this war, upon your own- 
selves also who approved this advice ? What 
— I am the man that must singly stand the 
storm of your anger ! — I am indeed the man 
who I am confident is not inferior to any one 
amongst you in knowing what ought to be 
known, and in speaking what ought to be spoke, 
who sincerely loves his country, and is superior 
to all the sordid views of interest.. For he 
who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate 
his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if 
he could not think at all. He that enjoys both 
these faculties in perfection, and yet is an ene- 
my to his country, wiH in like manner never 
say any thing for his country's good : or, though 
he love his country, and be not proof against 
corruption, he may prostitute every thing to 
his own avarice. If therefore you judged my 
qualifications in all these respects to be in some 
moderate degree superior to those of other 
men, and were thus drawn into a war by my 
advice, there can certainly be no reason why I 
should be accused of having done you wrong. 
Those indeed who are already in the fast pos- 
session of all the ends attainable by war, must 
make a foolish choice if they run to arms : but, 
if once under a necessity, either through tame 
submission to be enslaved by a neighbour power, 
or by a brave resistance to get the mastery over 
them — ^he who flies danger in such a case, is 
much more worthy of reproach than he who 
meets it with bold defiance. 

" I indeed am the man I was, and of the 
mind I was. It is you whose resolutions have 
wavered ; — ^you who, whilst unhurt, through 
my persuasion resolved on war, and repent so 
soon as you feel its strokes — ^who measure the 
soundness of my advice by the weakness of 
your own ju'dgments, and therefore condemn 
it, because the present disasters have so entirely 
engaged the whole of your attention, that you 
have none left to perceive the high importance 
of it to the public. Cruel indeed is that 
reverse of fortune which hath so suddenly 
afilicted you, dejecting your minds and dis- 
piriting your former resolutions! Accidents 
sudden and unforeseen, and so opposite to that 
event you might reasonably have expected, en- 
slave the mind ; — ^which hath been your case 
in all the late contingencies, and more parti- 
cularly so in this grievous pestilence. Yet 
men who are the constituents of such a mighty 
state, and whose manners have been by educa- 



74 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



tion formed for its support, ought never to want 
that inward fortitude which can stem the great- 
est of afflictions, nor by self-desertion utterly 
to efface their native dignity. The world will 
always have equal reason to condemn the person 
who sinks from a height of glory by his own 
pusillanimity, and to hate the person who im- 
pudently pretends to what he never can deserve. 
It mudt be therefore your duty to suppress this 
too keen a sensibility of your own private losses, 
and with united fortitude to act in the defence 
of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely 
undergo the toils of this war ; and if the toil in- 
creaseth, let our resolution increase with it. And 
let these, added to all those other proofs of my 
integrity I have exhibited on other occasions, 
suffice to convince you that your present censures 
and suspicions of me are rash and groundless. 
« I shall now lay before you a point, which, 
so far as I can judge, you have as yet never 
properly considered, nor have I in any former 
discourse insisted upon — < the means within 
your reach of rising to supreme dominion. 
Nor should I meddle even now with a^ point, 
pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see 
you beyond measure fear&il and dejected. You 
think you are only masters of your own depen- 
dents ; but I loudly aver that you are greater 
masters now both at land and sea, those ne- 
cessary spheres for carrying on the services of 
,life, than any other power ; and may be greater 
yet, if so inclined. There is not now a king, 
there is not any nation in the universal world, 
able to withstand that navy, which at this junc- 
ture you can launch out to sea. Why is not 
this extensive power regarded in balancing the 
loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable 
damages which you think you have suffered 1 
— It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond 
under such petty losses, as to despise from the 
thought, that they are merely the trappings and 

i Ferieles here is about to convince the Athenians, 
that they may rise to supreme dominion in consequence 
of thefr naval superiorify. Tt was his ambition to ex- 
ecute the grand extensive plan which was formed ori- 
ginally by Themistocles. And the words, in which he 
introdttceth this topic, are so full of energy, that they 
bear hard upon a translator. He calls it a point— 
Ko/(3rw^f o*T«poiv (%ovTi T((w yrfOTjrufTiv, My first attempts 
at them were very faint and imperfect. I was soon 
convinced of it by the greatest C^enius of the age, who 
did me the honour to read over this speech in manu- 
script, and who as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, 
could not endure that any of his words should be depre- 
ciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which 
the original words include. Mr Hobbes hath entirely 
dropped them in his translation. 



embellishments of wealth ; to fix the firm r^ 
membrance within us, that liberty, in defence 
of which we are ready to hazard our all, 'will 
easily give us those trifles again ; and tli&t by 
tamely submitting to our enemies, the posses- 
sion of all we have will be taken from us. We 
ought not in either of these respects to degen- 
erate from our fathers. By toil, and toil alone, 
they gained these valuable acquisitions, de- 
fended themselves in the possession, and be- 
queathed the precious inheritance to us. And 
to lose the advantages we have possessed, 'will 
be muo^ more disgracefill than to have miscar- 
ried in their pursuit. But we ought to en- 
counter our enemies not with valour only, but 
with confidence of success. Valour starts up 
even ill a coward, if he once prevails through 
lucky ignorance ; but such a confidence must 
be in every mind, which is seriously convinced 
of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay, 
even when the match is equal, the certainty of 
what must be done arising from an inward 
bravery, adds the greater security to courage. 
Confidence then is not built on hope which 
acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate de- 
terminatiqn of what it is able to perform, an 
assurance of which is more g^uarded against 
disappointments. 

« It is further your duty to support the pub- 
lic character (as in it to a man you pride your- 
selves) with which its extensive rule invests 
our community, and either not to fly from toils 
or never to aim at glory. Think not you have 
only one point at stake, the alternative of 
slavery instead of fireedom ; but think also of 
the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of 
vengeance for all the oflences you have given 
in the practice of it To resign it, is not in 
your power, — and of this let him be assured, 
who refines through fear, and hopes to earn 
indenmity by exerting it no longer. In your 
hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. 
To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay 
it down is exceeding dangerous. And if such 
dastardly souls could persuade others, they 
would soon bring this state to utter ruin, or 
indeed any other, where they were members, 
and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs. 
For the undisturbed and quiet life will be of 
short continuance without the interposition of 
a vigilant activity. Slavery is never to be en- 
dured by a state that once hath governed — such 
a situation can be tolerable only to that which 
hath ever been dependent. 



TEAK n.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



75 



« Sufier not younelTes therefore to be se- 
duced by men of such mean and grovelling 
tempers, nor level your resentments at me — 
nnce, though I advised the war, it was not be- 
ipm without your approbation — ^if the enemy 
hath invaded you in such a manner as you 
could not but^xpect from your own resolutions 
never to be dependent What though beyond 
our apprehensions we have suffered the sad 
^sitation of pestilencel — Such misfortunes no 
human foresight will be able to prevent — though 
I know that even this hath in some measure 
served to sharpen your aversion to me. But 
if this be just, I claim as my lawful right the 
glozy of all those happy contingencies, which 
may ever befall you beyond your expectation. 
The evils ii^cted by heaven must be borne 
with patient resignation ; and the evils by ene- 
mies with manly fortitude. Such rational be- 
haviour hsth hitherto been habitual in Athens ; 
let it now be reversed by you ; — by you, who 
know to what a pitch of excellence the state 
hath rose in the esteem of the world, by not 
yielding to adversity ; but, by braving all the 
hoiToiB of war, and pouring forth its blood in 
the glorious cause, hath reached the highest 



The memory of this, time itself will never be 
able to efface, even though we may suffer it tp 
^roop and perish in our hands — ^ what is hu- 
nuui must decline — Our memory I say, who, 
^oug^ Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all 
other Grecians, stood the shock of most formi- 
^le wars, resisted them all when combined 
against us, conquered them all when separately 
^i^gaged, and maintained ourselves in possession 
of the most flourishing and most powerful state 
in the world. These things let the indolent 
>i^ sluggish soul condemn, but these let the 
active and industrious strive to emulate, for 
^liese they who cannot attain will envy. 

''To be censured and maligned for a time, 
^ath been the fate of all those whose merit 
oath raised them above the common level ; — 
but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying 
^ superiority, despiseth the envy. An aver- 
sion Bo conceived will never last. His merit 
won breaks forth m all its splendour, and his 
Kw>ry is afterwards handed down to posterity, 
^^et to be forgot You, who have so clear a 
Prospect before you, both of what will be some 
^ glorious, and of what at present is not 
J^pacefiil, recollect your own worth and secure 
^^ Sink not s« low as to petition terms 



from the Lacedemonians ; nor let them ima- 
gine that you feel the weight of your present 
misfortunes. The man whose resolution never 
sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposi- 
tion to repel calamity, such — ^whether in a 
public or private capacity — must be acknow- 
ledged to be the worthiest man." 

By arguments like these did Pericles en^ 
deavour to mollify the resentments of the 
Athenians against himself, and to divert their 
minds from their public calamities. In regard 
to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with 
all that he had urged ; they desisted from soli- 
citing an accommodation with the Lacediemoni- 
ans ;' and were more hearty than ever for con- 
tinuing the war. Yet, in their own private 
concerns, they were grievously dejected under 
their present misfortunes. The poor citizens 
who had but little, could not bear with patiei^ce 
the loss of that little. The rich and the great 
regretted the loss of their estates, vdth their 
country-seats and splendid furniture; — ^but 
worst of all, that instead of peace they had the 
sad alternative of war. However, neither poor 
nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles, 
till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine.^ 



summit of power, and ever since retained it^ , And yet, no long time after — so unsteady are 



the humours of the pepple — they elected him 
general again, and intrusted him with the ad- 
ministration of affiiirs. The keen sense they 
had at first of their own private losses soon 
grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not 
but allow him the most capable person to pro- 
vide for all the urgent necessities of the pub- 
lic. For the supreme authority he enjoyed in 
times of peace he had exercised with great mo- 
deration; he was vigilant and active for the 
good of the community, which never made so 
great a figure as under his administration ; and 
after the war broke out it is plain he best knew 
the reach of its ability to carry it on. He 
lived two years and six months from its com- 
mencement : and after his death,' his judicious 



1 Plutarch (in the life of Pericles) says, Authors are 
not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time 
laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, 
others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who in- 
cited the people to fine him, is also said by some to have 
been Cleon, with whose genius and character the rea- 
der will soon become acquainted. 

a As the historian is here going to take his leave of 
Pericles, he adjoins a true representation of his patriot- 
ic spirit, his great abilities, his judicious foresight, and 
successful administration. And here, the reader may be 
informed of some points, which Thucydides either 



76 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



foranght in regard to thu war was more and 
more acknowledged. For he had assured them 
they could not fail of success, proYided they 
would not meddle hy land, but apply themseWes 
solely to their navy, without being solicitous 
to enlarge their territories in this war, or ex- 
posing Athens itself to danger. But they had 
recourse to schemes quit opposite to these, nay 
even to some that had no comiection at all with 
this war, wherein private ambition or private 
interest pushed them to such management as 
was highly prejudicial to themselves and their 

thought needlen when he wrote, or toreiga to his sub- 
ject.— Fericleii had two sons by his former wife. The 
eldest of them proved a great vexation to his father, 
who was unable to support him in his expensive way of 
living. Pericles had no large estate, and he was not 
richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all 
out in adorning his Athens, ai)d was rewarded for it by 
giving so many magnificent and lasting proofk of his 
fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building. For the 
city of Rome received not so much decoration from her 
foundation till the time of the Caesars, as Athens did 
firom Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at 
home, as that of his son Xantippus was luxury. This 
son however was taken off by the plague,'as was after- 
wards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates^ and 
^relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was tie 
heaviest Uow; he felt it deeply: and ^1 Athens did all 
that lay in their power to comfort him, sinceVcontrary 
to a law of Pericles' own making, they enroUeX his son 
Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Atheniailof the 
full blood. At length he was seised himself oy the 
plague; and, aitef languishing a long time, in a manner 
different to most others, died of it. In his last moments 
he showed to a friend who was visiting him a charm 
which the women had hung about his neck, as if he 
was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. 
When several ot them were sitting round his bed, and, 
thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the 
great exploits of his life, the shining incidents of his 
administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he 
had erected, he interrupted them with these words, " I 
wonder you lay stress upon such actions, in which for- 
tune claims a share along with me, and which many 
others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass 
over the highest glory and most valuable part of my 
character, that ho citizen of Athens ever put on mourn- 
ing through me.** The wonderful man, though engaged 
for forty years in business, and constantly attacked by 
every furious, seditious, and turbulent Athenian, had 
never amidst all his power given way to the spirit of 
revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely observes, he in 
some measure deserved the lofty title of Olympian., too 
arrogant in any other light for man to wear; since 
gentleness of manners and the habits of mercy and for- 
giveness raise men to the nearest resemblance of the 
gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted 
any man so much, and with so much reason. — If the 
reader be willing to hear any more of Aspasia, the 
same writer tells us that after the death of Pericles, 
she married one Lysicles, a low and obscure man, and 
a dealer in cattle, whom however she improved into an 
Athenlaa of the first class. 



allies. Wherever these politic schemes suc- 
ceeded, private persons carried off all the 1m>> 
nour and advantage;— whenever they miscanied, 
the hardships of the war fell more severely on 
the state. The reason was this — ^Peridea, a- 
man of acknowledged worth and ability, and 
whose integrity was undoubtedly jiroof against 
corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle 
management, and was not so much directed by^ 
them as their principal director. He had not 
worked himself into power by indirect methods, 
and therefore was not obliged to soothe and 
honour their caprices, but could contradict and 
disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. 
Whenever he saw them bent on projects inju- 
rious or unreasonable, he terrified them so by 
the force of his eloquence, that h^ made them 
tremble and desist ; and when they were dis- 
quieted by groundless apprehensions, he ani- 
mated them afiresh into brave resolution. The 
state under him, though styled a democracy, 
was in fact a monarchy. His sucoesaors more 
oti a level with one another, and yet every one 
affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the^ 
people, and so to neglect the concerns of die 
public. This was the souioe of many grievous 
errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a 
great community and possessed of large do^ 
minion ; — but in particular of the expedition to 
Sicily ; the ill conduct of which did not appear 
so flagrantly in relation to those against whimi 
it was undertaken, as to the authors and 
movers of it, who knew not how to make the 
proper provision for those who were employed 
in it For, engaged in their own private con- 
tests for power with the people, ihey had not 
sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at 
home were embroiled in mutual altercations. 
Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriage in Sicily, 
in which they lost their army with the greater 
part of their fleet, and the sedition which in- 
stantly broke out in Athens, they bravely re- 
sisted for three years together, not only their 
first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also 
in conjunction with them, the greater part of 
their dependents revolted from them, and at 
length Cyrus the king's son, who, fisivooring 
the Peloponnesians, supplied them with money 
for the service of their fleet ; — ^nor would at 
last be conquered, till by their own intestine 
feuds they were utterly disabled from resisting 
longer. So much better than any other person 
was Pericles acquainted with their strength, 
when he marked out such a conduct to them as 



YBARn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



77 



woald in&ilibly haye enabled the Athenian 
state to have continued the war longer than the 
Peloponnesians could possibly have done. 

The Lacediemonians, in junction with their 
allies, the .same summer fitted out a fleet of 
one hundred ships agatnst^^he island Zacynthus 
which lies over against Elis. They are a co- 
lony of the Achsans of Peloponnesus, and 
were then in league with the Athenians. On 
board this fleet were a thousand heavy-armed 
Lacedsmonians : and Onemus the Spartan 
commanded in the expedition. Making a de- 
scent upon the island, they ravaged great part 
of the country, — ^but finding the entire reduc- 
tion of it impracticable, they re-embarked and 
returned home. 

In the close of the same summer, Aristeus 
the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protode- 
mus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors 
from the Lacediemonians, and Polis the Argive, 
without any public character, triavelling into 
Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them 
with men and money for carryihg on the war, on 
their journey stop first in Thrace and address 
themselves to Sitalces the son of Teris. They 
had a mind to try if they could prevail upon 
him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to 
the relief of Poti^sa, now besieged by the 
Athenians, to desist for the future from giving 
the latter any assistance, and to pbtain from 
him a safe-conduct through his territory for 
the continuance of their journey beyond the 
Hellespont to Phamaces son of Phamabazus, 
who would afterwards conduct them in safety 
to the royal court. Le&rchus the son of Galli- 
machus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, 
happening at that time to be with .Sitalces, on 
an embassy from Athens, persuade the son of « 
Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of 
Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, 
that they ^ght not go forward to the king, to 
the prejudice of that community of which he 
was a member. He, hearkening to their advice, 
arrests them just as they were going on ship- 
board to cross the Hellespont, after they had 
travelled through Thrace to the spot marked 
for their embarkation. He executed this by 
means of some trusty persons despatched pur- 
posely afier them along v^th Learchus and 
Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver 
them up to the latter : they, so soon as they 
had got them in their power, carried them to 
Athens. Upon their arrival tHere, the Atheni- 
nians standing in great fear of Aristeus, lest | 



upon escape he might do them further mischief^ 
since before this he had been the auflnorof all 
the projects to their prejudice both at Potidea 
and in Thrace, put them to death on the very 
day of their arrival, unjudged and suing in vain 
to be heard, and cast them^into pits. This 
cruel usage of them they justified from the ex- 
ample of the Lacediemonians, who had in the 
same manner put to death and cast into pits 
the Athenian merchants and those of their 
allies, whom they had seized in the trading 
vessels upon the coasts of Peloponnesus. For, 
in the beginning of the war, the Lacedsmonians 
had put to death as enemies all those whom 
they could take at sea — not those only who 
belonged to the states in alliance with the 
Athenians, but even such as were of the yet 
neutral communities. 

About the same time in the end of summer, 
the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of 
the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take 
up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and 
made excursions over all its dependent terri- 
tory. Their enmity Against the Argives took 
its original from hence. — ^This Argos was first 
built, and this province of Amphilochia first 
planted, by Amphilochus the son of Amphi- 
araus, immediately after the Trojan war, who 
on his return home, being dissatisfied with the 
state of affairs in that other Argos, founded 
this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it 
the same name with the place of his nativity. 
It soon became the largest city of Amphiloohia, 
and the inhabitants were most powerful of any 
thereabouts. Yet many generations after, 
being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon 
the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia 
to unite with them. This community of resi- 
dence brought them to their present use of one 
common language, the Greek ; but the rest of 
the Amphilochians are still Barbarians. Yet 
in process of time, the Ambraciots drive the 
Argives from amongst them, and keep posses- 
sion of the city for themselves. Upon this 
event the Amphilochians , threw themselves 
under the protection of the Acamanians, and 
both together implored the succour of the 
Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their as- 
sistance under the command of Phormio. 
Upon Phormio's arrival they take Argos by 
storm, made all the Ambraciots slaves, and 
then both the Amphilochians and Acamanians 
settle themselves together in the city. To 
these incidents was first owing the league 
M 



78 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it. 



oflbnsive and defenaiTe between the Athenians 
and Acamanians. The chief cause of the 
inyeteracy which the AmbraciotB hoie to the 
Argives, was their having made them in this 
manner slaves ; and which afterwards impelled 
them in the confusion of this war, to form this 
invasion with the junction of the Chaonians and 
some other neighbouring Barbarians. Advanc- 
ing up to Argos, they were entire masters of 
the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to 
take the town by assault ; upon which they 
again returned home, and dispersed to their re- 
spective nations. — Such were the transactions 
of the summer. 

On the first approach of winter, the Atheni- 
ans sent out twenty ships to cruize on the 
coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of 
Phormio ; who, fixing his station before Nau- 
pactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing 
durst pass in or out from Corinth and the 
gulf of Crissa. — Six other ships they send to 
Caria and Lycia, under the command of Mele- 
sander, to levy contributions there, and to stop 
the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, 
harbouring in those parts, from molesting the 
course of their trading vessels from Phacelis, 
' Phoenicia, and the adjacent continent. Mele- 
Sander, with the Athenian and confederate 
force he had on board his ships, landed in 
Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in 
which he lost part of his army and his own life. 

The same winter the Potidsans, as they 
were no longer able to hold out the siege ; and 
as besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians 
into Attica had not induced the Athenians to 
raise it; their provisions being quite spent; 
and amongst other calamities to which their 
extremities had reduced them, having been 
forced to feed upon one another ; they held a 
parley about their surrender with the Athenian 
officers, who commanded in the siege,* Xeno- 

*■ In this siege of Potidaea, two persons served ainon;;$t 
the beavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was 
tbe glory of human nature; and the other the glory and 
bane of his country: I mean the divine Socrates, and at 
this time young Alcihiades. Plutarch (in the life of AI- 
cihiades) says, they lay in the same tent, and fought 
always side by side. Once, in a sharp skirmish, both of 
them distinguished themselves above all their fellowsol- 
diers. Alcihiades at length was wounded, and dropped; 
Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved both 
him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore 
had the Justest right to the public reward, as the per- 
son who had behaved beat in this action. But when the 
generals, on account of Alcihiades* quality, showed a 
great desire to confer honour upon him, Socrates, will- 
ing also to increase his ardour for gallant actions, turned 



phon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the 
son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus the son 
of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hard- 
ships their troops suJSered by long lying abroad 
in the winter season, and thkt the carrying on 
of the siege had already cost Athens two thou- 
sand talents,' granted them a composition. 
The terms agreed on were these — *«That 
they should quit the place with their wives, 
their children, and auxiliaries, every man with 
one suit of clothing, but the women with two ; 
and with a certain sum of money to defray the 
expense of their departure." — By virtue of 
this composition they went away to Chalcis, 
where every one shifted for himself. But the 
Athenians called their generals to account for 
their conduct, because they had signed this 
composition without thdr privity (for they 
th^TJght it in their power to have made them 
surrender at discretion,) and afterwards sent to 
Potidea some of their people whom they set- 
.thmn a colony there. — These things were done 
thuf winter, and so ^dedltlie second year of 
this war, the Mstoiry of- which hath been com- 
pile by Thucydides. 

Eabxt the next summer, the Peloponnesi- 
ans and their allies, omitting the incursion as 
before into Attica, marched their forces against 
Platsa. Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus king 
of the Lacedsmonians, commanded, who hav- 
ing encamped his army, was preparing to ravage 
the adjacent country. He vrab interrupted by 
an embassy from the Platsans, who addressed 
themselves to him in the following manner. — 

" The war, O Archidamus and Lacedsmoni- 
ans, you are now levying on Platsa, is a fla- 
grant breach of common justice, a blemish on 
your honour and that of your fathers. Pau- 
sanias the Lacedemonian, son of Oleombrotus, 
when — aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully 
exposed themselves with him to the dangers of 
that battle which was fought on our land — ^he 
had delivered Greece from Persian slavery, at 

witness in his favour, and procuted him the wreath and 
the public present of a complete suit of armour. So- 
crates coveted no recompense for brave exploits but tbe 
consciousness of having performed then, and youi^ 
Alcihiades was to be nursed up to virtue. He was 
capable of every degree either of virtue or vice; and 
Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the 
former, and gave his eager and enterprising soul tbe 
Just direction. 

s X387, 500 sterling, 

* .Before Christ, 499. 



ITEAKin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



79 



a public sacrifice to Jupiter the deliverer, 
solemnized by him on that occasion in the 
public forum of Flatsea, called all the confede- 
rates together, and there conferred these 
privileges on the Platsans — < That they should 
have free possession of the city and territory 
belonging to it, to be governed at their own 
discretion ; — that no one should ever unjustly 
make war upon them, or endeavour to enslave 
them; and in case of such attempts, all the 
confederates then present should avenge it to 
the utmost of their power.* — Such grateful re- 
turns did your. fathers make us in recompense 
of our valour and the zeal we excited in the 
conunon dangers. Yet their generosity you 
are now reversing — ^you, with the Thebans our 
inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. 
But by the gods, who were then witnesses to 
the oath they swore, by all the tutelary deities 
both of your own and of our conuuunify, we 
adjure you to do no damage to Platsan ground, 
nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and 
leave us in that state of independence which 
Pausanias justly established for us.'' — To these 
words of the Platseans, Archidamus made this 
reply : 

" What you have urged, ye men of Platsa, is 
just and reasonable, if it be found agreeable to 
your actions. Let the declarations of Pau- 
sanias be observed ; be free and independent 
yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their 
own freedom to others, to those who, after 
participation of the same common dangers, 
made that oath in your flavour, and yet are now 
enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue them 
and others from that slavery have our prepara- 
tions been made, this war hath been undertaken. 
You who know what liberty is, and are such 
advocates for it, do you abide firmly by your 
oaths; at least, as we heretofore advised you, 
keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly 
your own ; side with neither party ; receive 
both in the way of friendship, in the way of 
enmity,' neither. To a conduct like this we 
never shall object" 

When the Platsan ambassadors had heard 
^ia reply of Archidamus, they returned into the 
aty, and communicating what had passed to the 
^y of the citizens, they carried back in an- 
swer to hini — «<That they could not possibly 
comply with his proposals, without the consent 
of the Athenians, because their wives and 
children were in their power — ^that they were 
apprehensive a compliance might endanger 



their whole community, since in such a case 
either the Athenians might not confirm the 
neutrality, or the Thebans, who were compre- 
hended in the same neutral oath to the two 
principal powers, might again attempt to seize 
their city.'' — Archidamus to remove their ap- 
prehensions spoke as follows : " Deliver up your 
city and your houses to us Lacedaemonians ; 
let us know the bounds of your territory and 
the exact number of your trees, and make as 
true a calculation as you possibly can of all that 
belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside 
wherever you please, so long as the war conti- 
nues ; at the end of it we will restore every thing 
again. In the mean time, we will make the 
best use of every thing intrusted to us, and pay 
you an annual equivalent for your subsistence." 
Upon hearing this, they again returned into the 
city, and the whole body of the people assisting 
at a general consultation, they returned for an- 
swer — "That they desired only to communi- 
cate the proposals to the Athenians, and then 
with their approbation would accept them. In 
the meantime they begged a suspension of 
arms, and to have their lands spared from de- 
predation." He g^ranted them a truce for the 
time requisite to receive an answer, and forbore 
ravaging the country. ^ 

The ambassadors of Platsea, having been at 
Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, re- 
turn again with this answer to their city : « The 
Athenians say that in no preceding time, ever 
since we entered into confederacy with them, 
did they ever suffer us in any respect to be in- 
jured ; that neither will they neglect us now, 
but send us a powerful aid. And you they 
solemnly abjure by the oaths which your fathers 
have sworn, to admit no change or innovation 
in the league subsisting between you and 
them." — When the ambassadors had thus de- 
livered the answer of the Athenians, after 
some consultation, the Platseans resolved, ** ne- 
ver to desert them, to bear any devastation of 
their lands, nay, if such be the case, to behold 
it with patience, and to sufifer any extremities to 
which their enemies might reduce them ; — ^that, 
further, no person should stir out of the city, 
but an answer be given from the walls — That 
it was impossible for them to accept the terms 
proposed by the Lacedemonians." 

This was no sooner heard than Archidamus 

the king made this solenm appeal to all their 

tutelary heroes and gods. — '<Ye gods and 

I heroes," said he, « who protect this region of 



80 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



Plataa, bear witness to us, that it was not till 
after a violation of oaths already sworn, that 
. we have marched into this country, where our 
fathers through the blessings you sent down 
upon their prayers overcame the Medes, and 
which you then made that fortunate field 
whereon the arms of Greece were crowned 
with victory — and that whatever we shall here 
undertake, our every step shall be agreeable to 
justice. We have offered many honourable 
conditions to them, which are all rejected. 
Grant therefore our supplications, that the 
first transgressors of justice may receive their 
punishment, and that those who fight with 
equity may obtain revenge.'' After this solemn 
address to the gods, he roused up his army into 
action. 

He first of all formed an inclosure round 
about them with the trees they had felled, so 
that no one could get out of the city. In the 
next place, they raised a mount of earth before 
the place, hoping that it could not long hold 
out a siege against the efforts of so largf an 
army. Having felled a quantity of timber on 
mount Ciihsron, with it they framed the mount 
on either side, that thus cased it might perform 
the service of a wall, and that the earth might 
be kept from mouldering away too fast Upon 
it they heaped a quantity of matter, both stones 
and earth, and whatever else would cement to- 
gether and increase the bulk. This work em- 
ployed them for seventy days and nights with- 
out intermission, all being alternately employed 
in it, so that one part of the army was carrying 
it on, while the other took the necessary re- 
freshments of food and sleep. Those Lace- 
dsmonians who had the command over the 
hired troops of the other states, had the care 
of the work, and obliged them all to assist in 
carrying it on. The Platteans, seeing this 
mount raised to a great height, built a counter- 
work of wood, close to that part of the city- 
wall against which this mount of earth was 
thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it 
with bricks, which they got for this use by 
pulling down the adjacent houses. The wooden 
case was designed to keep it firm together, and 
prevent the whole pile from being weakened 
by its height. They farther covered it over 
with sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to de- 
fend the workmen firom missive weapons, and 
to preserve the wood from being fired by the 
enemy. This work within was raised to a 
great height, and the mount was raised with 



equal expedition without Upon &1S, tlie 
Flatsana had recourse to another device. 
They broke a hole through the wall, close to 
which the mount was raised, and drew the 
earth away from under it into the city. But 
this being discovered by the PeloponnesiaiuB, 
they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds 
and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm 
consistence could not be dug away like earth. 
By this they were excluded, and so desisted 
for a while from their former practice. Yet 
digging a subterraneous passage from out of 
the city, which they so luckily continued that 
it undermined the mount, they again withdrew 
the earth from under it This practice long 
escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who 
still heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather 
less, as the earth was drawn away from the 
bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. 
However, still apprehensive, that* as they were 
few in number, they should not be able long to 
hold out against such numerous besiegers, they 
had recourse to another project. They desisted 
ftom. carrying on the great pile which was to 
counterwork the mount, and beginning at each 
end of it where the wall was low, they run 
another wall in the form of a crescent along 
the inside of the city, that if the great wall 
should be taken this might afterwards hold out, 
might lay the enemy under the, necessity of 
throwing up a fr^sh moimt against it, and that 
thus the further they advanced the difficulties 
of the siege might be doubled, and be earned 
on with increase of danger. 

When their mount was completed, the Pelo- 
ponnesians played away their battering-engines 
against the wall ; and one of them worked so 
dexterously firom the mount against the great 
pile within, that they shook it very much, and 
threw the Platfeans into consternation. Others 
they applied in different parts against the wall, 
the force of which was broken by the Platsans, 
who threw ropes around them ; they also tied 
large beams together, with long chains of iron 
at both ends of the beams, by which they 
hung downwards from two other transverse 
beams inclined and extended beyond the viraB ; 
— ^these they drew along obliquely, and against 
whatever part they saw the engine of battery 
to be aimed, they let go the beams with a foil 
swing of the chains, and so dropped them down 
directiy upon it, which by the weight of the 
stroke broke off the beak of the battering ma- 
chii^e. Upon this the PeloponnesiaoB, finding 



lEARm.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



81 



til their engines ucielesfl, and their mount 
effeetaally counterworked by the fortification 
within, concluded it a business of no little 
hazard to take the place amidst so many ob- 
stacles, and prepared to draw a drcumTallation 
about it 

But at first they were willing to try whether it 
were not possible to set the town on fire, and 
bom it down, as it was not large, by help of a 
brisk gale of wind ; for they cast their thoughts 
towards every expedient of taking it without 
a ku-ge expense and a tedious blockade. Pro- 
eiuing for this purpose a quantity of faggots, 
they tossed them from their own mount into 
the Yoid space between the wall and the inner 
fortification. As many hands were employed 
in this business, they had soon filled it up, and 
then proceeded to toss more of them into the 
other parts of the city lying beyond, tis &r as 
they could by the advantage which the emi- 
nence gave them. Upon these they threw 
fiery balls made of sulphur and pitch, which 
caught the faggots, and soon kindled such a 
flame as before this time no one had ever seen 
kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed 
sometimes happened, that wood growing upon 
mountains hath been so heated by the attrition 
of the winds, that without any other cause it 
hath broken out into fire and flame. But this 
ivas exceeding fierce; and the Platsans, who 
had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly 
delivered from perishing by its fury; for it 
cleared the city to a great distance round about, 
K) that no Platiean durst approach it : and if 
^ wind had happened to have blown along 
vith it, as the enemy hoped, they must all un- 
avoidably have perished. It is now reported, 
^t a heavy rain falling on a sudden, attended 
^th claps of thunder, extinguished the flames. 
*nd put an end to this imminent danger. 

The Peloponnesians, upon the failure of this 
project, marched away part of their army ; but, 
continuing the remainder there, raised a wall 
of circumvallation quite round the city, the 
troops of every confederate state executing a 
determinate part of the work. Both inside 
iu^ outside of this wall was a ditch, and by 
first digging these they had got materials for 
Inick. This work being completed about the 
"*"»g of Arcturus,^ they left some of their 
^'^ men to guard half of the wall, the other 
half being left to the care of the Boeotians ; 



18 



*■ B^inning of September. 



then marched away with the main army, and 
dismissed the auxiliary forces ]to their respective 
cities. — The Platsans had already sent away 
to Athens their wives, their children, their old 
people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. 
There were only left in the town during this 
siege, four hundred Platsans, eighty Athenians, 
and one hundred and ten women to prepare their 
food. This was the whole number of th^m 
when the siege was first formed ; nor was 
there any other person within the wall, either 
slave or free. — And in this maimer was the 
city of Platsa besieged in form. 

The same summer, and about the time that 
the army appeared before Platsa, the Atheni- 
ans, with a body of their own people, consist- 
ing of two thousand heavy-armed, and two hun- 
dred horsemen, invaded the Chalcideans of 
Thrace and the Bottisans. The com was in 
the ear, when this army was led against them, 
under the command of Xenophon the son of 
Euripides and two colleagues. Coming up to 
Spartolus, a town in Bottisa, they destroyed 
the com, and hoped to get possession of the 
place by the management of a faction they had 
within. But a contrary party, having sent in 
good time to Olynthus, had procured from 
thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force 
for their protection. These even made a sally 
out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to 
a battle under the walls of the town* The 
heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their 
auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and 
retire into Spartolus. The horse and ligh^ 
armed Chalcideans get the better of the horse 
and light-armed Athenians ; but they had with 
them a small number of targeteers from the 
province caUed Crusis. On the first joining 
of battle other targeteers came to their assist- 
ance from Olynthus. The light-armed of 
Spartolus seeing this -reinforcement just come 
up, and reflecting that they had received no 
loss before, with re-animated courage again 
charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the 
Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement 
The Athenians retire to the two companies 
which they had left to guard the baggage. 
Here they drew up again, and whenever ibej 
thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; 
when they retreated from the charge, the enemy 
pressed upon and infested them with missive 
weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where 
they thought they could break them, and falling 
in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to 
m2 



82 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it. 



flight and pursued them to a great distance. 
The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidiea ; and 
afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetoh off their 
dead, return with their shattered army to Ath- 
ens. In this action they lost four hundred and 
thirty men, and all their commanders. The 
Ghalddeans and Bottisans erected a trophy, 
and having taken proper care of their dead, 
separated to their own cities. 

Not long after this, in the same summer, the 
Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the 
total reduction of Acamania, and to compass a 
general defection there from the Athenians, 
prevailed upon Vhe Lacedemonians to supply 
them with shipping from their confederate ci- 
ties, and to send a thousand heavy-armed into 
Acamania. They told them, that— ^< if they 
would J oin them with a land and a naval force 
at the same time, it would be impossible for 
the Acamanians to succour one another by 
•ea ; that hence they might easily g^et all Acar- 
naitia into their power, from whence they might 
become masters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, 
and a stop would then be made to the Atheni- 
an cruises on the coasts of Peloponnesus; 
nay, that there ^as even a hope of reducing 
Naupactus." — This scheme was pleasing to the 
Lacedemonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet 
their admiral) to sail thither with a few ships, 
having on board the heavy-sfrmed : and circula- 
ted orders to their confederates to fit out their 
ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. 
The Corinthians were those who showed most 
zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own ; 
and the shipping of Corinth, Stcyon, and the 
adjacent places, was prepared with all possi- 
ble expedition ; but that of Leucas, Anactori- 
um, and Ambracia, was already at Leucas, and 
waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thou- 
sand heavy-armed performed their voyage un- 
discovered by Phormio, who commanded the 
Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round 
Naupactus, and immediately landed his men 
for the destined service. Besides the thousand 
Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was 
now Joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, 
Anactorians,^of the Grecians;— of the Barba- 
rians, by a thousand Chaonians not subject to 
a regal government, but commanded by Pho- 
tius and Nicanor,,men of those families which 
had a right to command by annual election. 
With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, 
who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian 
of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the 



MeloBsians and Antitaniaas. The Paraveans 
were headed by their own king Ordoeus, 'vAm 
had also the command of a thousand Oresti&ns, 
subjects of Antiochus, which served with his 
troops by the permission ^of Antiochus. Pev- 
diccas Sent also a thousand Macedonians, of 
which the Athenians were ignorant, but these 
were not yet come up. 

With these forces Cneiius began his march, 
without waiting the arrival of the ships from 
Corinth, and passing through Aigia they d^ 
stroyed Limnea, a village unfortified They 
march next for Stratus, the capital ci^ of Acap- 
nania, judging that if they first took this, aH 
other places would readily submit. Tlie Acaf- 
naiiians, finding a large army broke in amoiigst 
them by land, and more, enemies coming -fo at- 
tack them by sea, gave up all view of succour- 
ing one another, and stood separately on their 
own defence* They sent information to Phor- 
mio, and requested him to come up to their re- 
lief. He sent them word, « he could not possibly 
leave Naupactus without a guard, whfen a fleet 
.was ready to Sail from Corinth." The Pelo- 
ponnesians and their allies, dividing themselves 
into three bodies, advanced towards the city of 
the Stratians, with a design to appear before it, 
and if it did not surrender at once, to storm it 
without loss of time. The Chaonians and the 
rest of the Barbarians marched in the middle ; 
to the right 'Were the Leucadians, Anacto- 
rians, and their auxiliaries; to the left Cne- 
mus with his Peloponnesians and Ambraciots ; 
each body at so great a distance from the rest, 
that sometimes they were out of one another's 
sight. The Grecians, in their march, kept 
firm within ranks, and guarded all their mo- 
tions, till they came up to the spot fit for their 
encampment. But the Chaonians, confident 
of their own bravery, 'and valuing themselves 
as the most martial people in that part of the 
world, could not bear the delay of encamping, 
but with the rest of the Barbarians rushing ea- 
gerly forwards, thought to take the town at a 
shoiit, and carry all the honour. The Strati- 
ans finding them thus advanced, thought tfaa^ 
could they master them thus detached, the 
Grecians would become more averse to attack 
them. With this view, they place ambuscades 
in the approaches of the city ; and when the 
enemy was near, rush up at once fit>m the 
places of ambush, and out of the city ; chaiig- 
ing them on all sides. The Chaonians are 
thrown into consternation, and many of them 



TS^'01.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



83 



tie iliiiii. The rest of the Barharians, 
viiea they ' saw them give v/t^y, durst aot 
kedp .their ground, but fled immediately. 
Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any-thing 
of this engagement, so hastily had those ad- 
vanced, and were supposed to have done it 
only to encamp with greater expedition. But 
when the Barbarians came running back to 
them in disorderly ^out, they received them 
intowihelter, and all closing firm together stood 
quiet the rest of the day. The Stratians dui^st 
not directly assault them, because the other 
Acamsoiians were not yet come up to their 
assistance, but were ccmtinually slinging at 
them from a distance, thus harassing them 
abundantly, but unable, without better wea- 
pons, to make them dislodge : the Acamanians 
only could have attacked them with effectual 
vigour. 

By the fiivour of a dark night, Cnemus with- 
drew his army by a quick march to the river 
Anapus, which is eighty stadia^ distant from 
Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to 
ibtch o£r the dead. And the CEniads coming 
up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went 
to take refuge amongst them, before the Acar- 
oanians could draw their succours together, and 
from thence the forces which composedhis army 
marched to their own homes. But the Stratians 
eieeted a trophy on account of their victory 
over the Barbaarisns. 

The fleet of Corinth and the other con- 
federate states, that was to sail from the gulf 
of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and 
pievent the Acamanians on the coast from 
succouring those within the land, never arrives : 
for about the time of the action at Stratus, 
they had been compelled to fight the Athenian 
squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Nau- 
ptctus under the command of Phormio. Phor- 
mio had watched their coming out of the gulf, 
intending to stttack them so soon as ever they 
got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies 
sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to 
fight by sea, as to forward the land-expedition 
on Acamania. They never imagined that the 
Athenians with their twenty ships durst pre- 
"^une to attack them who had forty-seven. 
Yet when they saw them steering the same 
^urse on the opposite shore, they kept first 
slong their own coast, and afterwards from 
<^atre of Achaia stretched over to the opposite 

1 About eight miles. 



side in order to make for Acamania. But 
now again they descried them standing diiecAy 
against them from Chalcis and the river Eve- 
nus, and found they had observed their anchor- 
ing the night before. Thus are they compelled to 
come to an engagement in the midst of the open 
sea.^ The ships of every state were under the 
command of those who had been appointed by 
their principals : over the Corinthians were 
Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in form of 
a circle, as large as they possibly could, with- 
out leaving open a passage for the ships of the 
enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, 
the stems were turned inwards. Within were 
ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet, 
and five ships that were prime sailers, which 
were to start out at narrow passages, wherever 
the enemy should begin the attack. The 
Athenians drawing up their ships in a line, 
and sailing quite round them, brushed along by 
them in their passage, and msddng successive 
feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a 
smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand 
given strict orders not to engage without the 
signal : for he hoped the enemy could not long 
preserve that order of battle like a land-army, 
but that the ships must fall foul upon one 
another, and the small vessels within give them 
no little embarrassment ; that further, the wind 
wt>uld blow out of the gulf, as was usual every 
morning : in expectation of which he continued 
to sail round about them, and th^i they could 
not poissibly keep firm in their stations for any 
time. He tiiought finrther, that the time of 
engagen^ent was entirely in his power, a? his 
ships were best sailers, and that it was most 
advisable to begin at such a juncture. As 
soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater 
ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were 

s Phormio was watching to eateh them in the open 
sea, iv Til iupu%wpi« as Thaeydides words it above. 
They were now.out of the golf, stretcliing across the sea, 
in the midst of which Phormio came up to them, and 
engaged, *»t» fttTov to irop$/Aov. The sea without the 
capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is in- 
deed a narrow sea, or ^-opS^of, but then it was open sea 
in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phor- 
mio all the advantages which more expert seamen knew 
how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from 
Patre in Achaia, and the Athenian from Ofaalcis in 
^tolia, the situation of those two places easily guides 
to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of 
honour by this action, which Plutarch in his piece about 
the giory of the Athenians, reckons up amongst the 
most remarkable exploits related by our historian. 



84 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



' [book n. 



diiOid«ted both by the wind and the smaller 
veBsels within, one falling foul upon another, 
the poles were applied to push them off again ; 
amidst the noise caused by this confusion, call- 
ing out to take care, and cursing one another, 
they could no longer hear the orders of their 
commanders, or their masters; and the sea begin- 
ning to run so high as to render useless the oars 
of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they 
left the unmanageable ships to the pilot's art. 
Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the sig- 
naL The Athenians engage, and at the first 
shock sink one of the admiral-ships, and several 
more afterwards in the different parts of the en- 
gagement They pursued their success with so 
much fury, that amidst the general disorder not 
one durst think of resisting, but all, with the 
greatest precipitation, fled towards Patrs and 
Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursuing and 
taking twelve of their ships, and having slaugh- 
tered most of the crews, draw off to Molychrium : 
and having erected a trophy on the promontory, 
and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to 
their station at Naupactus. 

The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, 
crept along the coast wijth the remnant of their 
fleet saved at Patr» and Dyme, to Cyllene, a 
dock belonging to the £ leans ; whither, after 
the battle of Stratus, arrive also from Leucas, 
Gnemus and the ships of that station, which 
ought to have been joined by these other. 
The Lacedsmonians send thither Timocrates, 
Brasidas, and Lycophron, to assist Cnemus 
in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready 
for a more successful engagement, and not to 
leave the dominion of the sea to such a small 
number of ships. For their late defeat appear- 
ed to them quite unaccountable, especially as 
this was the first trial they had of an engage- 
ment at sea ; nor could they think it so much 
owing to a want of skill in naval affairs, as to 
a want of courage, never balancing the long 
experience of the Athenians with their own 
short application to these matters. These per- 
sons therefore they sent away in anger, who 
coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders 
to the states for new quotas of shipping, and re- 
fitted what was already there for another engage- 
ment. Phormio also sends messengers to Athens 
with an account of these preparations, and to re- 
port the victory they had already gained; and re- 
questing a further reinforcement of as many ^ps 
-tm they could expeditiously despatch, since he 
was in daily expectation of another fight. 



Twenty ships were the number they agree to 
send him, but they ordered him who was to 
carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For 
Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of 
the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear 
before Cydonia, assuring them that this place, 
which had been an enemy to them, should soon 
be th^ir own. This he insinuated merely to 
gratify the Polychnits, who bordered upon 
the Cydonians. The commander therefore 
with these ships went to Crete, and joining the 
Polychnitffi, ravaged the territory of the Cydo- 
nians ; by which, together with adverse winds 
and weather unfit for sea, no little time was un* 
seasonably wasted away. 

The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the 
time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in 
Crete, having got every thing in readiness for 
another engagement, sailed along the coast to 
Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of 
the Peloponnesians were come to forward their 
attempts. Phormio, likewise, with the twenty 
ships which had fought the former battle, sailed 
up to cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor just 
without it. This cape belonged to the Athe- 
nian alliance, but^ the other cape over-against it 
belonged to the Peloponnesians. The aim of 
sea which divides them is about seven^ stadia 
over ; and this is the mouth of the gnlf of Crissa. 
The Pelopoimesians with a fleet of seventy- 
seven ships rode also at anchor, under the cape 
of Achaia, which is not far distant firom Panor- 
mus, where their land-forces lay. When they 
had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties 
lay for six or seven days over-against each 
other, intent on the needful preparations for 
engaging. The scheme on each side was this : 
— The Peloponnesians, struck with their for- 
mer defeat, would not sail from without the 
capes into the open sea: — The Athenians 
would not enter into the straits, judging it 
would be an advantage to the enemy to fight 
in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, 
Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian com- 
manders, desirous to come soon to an engage- 
ment, before the Athenian squadron should re- 
ceive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers 
together, and seeing some of them not yet re- 
covered from the terror occasioned by the former 



1 The cape on the Peloponnesian side was called 
RMum, or the Rhium of Achaia; the opposite cape An- 
tirrhiuin, or Molychrium. 

9 About three quarters of a mile. 



TEAB III,] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



85 



defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, en- 
deavoured to animate and rouse up their courage 
by the following harangue : 

" If the former engagement, ye men of Pelo- 
ponnesus, affects any of you with sad appre- 
hensions about the event of another, know 
tiiat it by no means affords you any reason- 
able ground for such desponding thoughts. 
That was owing, as you well know, to a defi- 
ciency in all needfiil preparations; for you 
were not then fitted out for service of sea, but 
for the service of land. We then were dis- 
tressed in several respects by the adverse turns 
of fortune ; and in some, we who fought for the 
first time at sea run into errors through want 
of skill. It thus happened that we were de- 
feated, but not through any cowardice of our 
own. There can be no reason for men, who 
were not conquered by superior courage, but 
who can explicitly account for the means of 
their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a 
calamity merely accidental ; but they ought to 
reflect, that though fortune may disconcert the 
human enterprises, yet that men can never be 
deserted by their own valour ; and where true 
valour is, they ought not to catch a plea from 
want of experience to palliate what signs of 
cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is 
by no means a balance for your superior va- 
lour. The expertness of your enemies which 
yon so much dread, if it be accompanied with 
valour, will indeed direct them in a performance 
of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war ; 
but if it wants true valour, those hazards will 
be too hard for all human art For fear ba- 
lusheth the remembrance of what ought to be 
done; and art without strength is quite unavail- 
iiig. Place therefore your own superior valour 
in the balance against their superior skill; 
and remove the apprehensions flowing from 
your defeat by the recollection that you were 
not prepared to fight. You have now tne 
advantage of a larger number of ships, and an 
opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in 
sight of a land army of your own. Victory is 
generally obtained by those who are most in 
number and b^st provided. So that upon close 
oxamination, no reason appears why we should 
dread the event. Our former miscarriages 
make not against us ; nay, the past coinmission 
of them will instruct us now. Let every 
Blaster therefore and every mariner act his part 
^th manly resolution; let each take care to 
perform his duty, nor quit the post to which he 



is appointed. We shall take care to order the 
engagement, in no worse a manner than our 
predecessors have done ; and shall leave no 
man any reason to excuse has cowardice. Yet — 
if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly 
receive the punishment he deserves ; but the 
valiant shall be honoured with rewards propor- 
tioned to their merit'' 

In such terms did their commanders animate 
the Peloponnesians. But Phormio — ^who be- 
gan to apprehend a depression of ^irits in his 
own men, since he plainly saw that by keeping 
their ships close together they were afraid of 
the numerous ships of the enemy — had a mind 
by calling them together to re-inspire them with 
courage, and give them an exhortation suitable 
to their present condition. He had hitherto 
in all his discourses insisted, and induced them 
to give him credit, that '< no number of ships 
could be got together large enbugh to make 
head against them." And his seamen had 
long since been elated with this presui^ption, 
that " as they were Athenians, they ought not 
to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, howr 
ever numerous.'* But, when he saw them intimi- 
dated by the formidable object before their eyes, 
he thought it high time to endeavour to revive 
their sinking courage. The Athenians being 
gathered round him, he harangued them thus : 

«I have observed, my fellow-soldiers, that 
the number of your enemies hath struck yoa 
with fear, — I have therefore called you to- 
gether, as I cannot bear to see you terrified 
with what is by no means dreadful. These 
enemies of yours whom you have already con- 
quered, who in no wise think themselves a 
match for you, have got together a great number 
of ships and a superior force. In the next 
place they come confidently to attack you with 
the vain presumption, that valour is only pe- 
culiar to themselves. Their confidence is oc- 
casioned by their skill in the service of the 
land. Their frequent successes there induce 
them to suppose that they must also for cer- 
tainty be victorious at sea. If they have any 
reason to presume so far upon their excellence 
at land, you have more to form presumptions 
in your own favour, dnce in natural courage 
they are not in the least superior to us, and if 
larger degrees of skill give either side an ad- 
vantage, we have hence an argument to be 
more confident of success. The Lacedsemoni- 
ans, now at the head of their league, merely to 
preserve their own reputation, have dragged 



86 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



Bumbera hither to fight against their will ^ 
otherwise, they durpt never have attempted to 
engage us a second time, after receiving so sig- 
nal a defeat Frighten not yourselves with 
extravagant suspicions of their courage — but 
rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for 
which they have 'more ample reason, as you 
have already gained a victory over them, and 
as they are certain you would not give them an- 
other opportunity to fight, unless you had some 
grand design to execute. An enemy, that like 
them exceeds in number, in action depends 
more on their strength than on their conduct. 
They who are far inferior in strength of num- 
bers, and dare, though uncompelled, to fight, 
must do it through the prevalence of some ex- 
tensive views. This they cannot but know, 
-and hence dread more this our diminutive 
than they would an equal force. Large armies 
defeated, through defect of skill, or sometimes 
through defect of courage, by an inferior force, 
are cases that have often happened. Yet 
neither of these defects can be imputed to us. 
For my own part, I shall not willingly hazard 
the event within the gulf, nor will I sail into 
it For I am not ignorant that want of sea- 
room is very improper for a few ships that sail 
best, and are best managed, against a number 
which those on board them know not how to 
govern. In such a situation, no one can pour 
down to an attack in the proper manner for 
want of having a clear view of the enemy ; nor, 
if he is forced to sheer off, can he do it with 
safety. There is no room to break through, 
or to tack at pleasure, which is the business of 
■hips that are better sailers ; but the fight must 
of necessity be the same with a battle at land, 
and in tiiis case the greats number of ships 
must have the advantage. I shall take the 
greatest care I am able to prevent these incon- 
▼eniencies. And you I expect to stand regu- 
larly to your posts on board every ship. Re- 
ceive ,your orders with alacrity, especially as 
we lie so near our enemy ; and above all things, 
when we come to action, observe the rules of 
discipline without hurry and noise : for these 
are matters of great importance in every scene 
of war, and of not the least in a naval engage- 
ment ; and charge your enemies with a spirit 
worthy of your former achievements. Great 
indeed are the points you are now to de<ftde, 
the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a 
figure at sea are now either to be totally de- 
molished, or the power of the sea must become 



precarious to the Athenians, even near their 
own homes. Once more I call to your remem- 
brance that great part of these enemies you have 
already conquered — and the courage of enemies 
once conquered, is seldom equal to what it was, 
when unconscious of defeat" 

In this manner Phormio encouraged his 
men. — But the Peloponnesians, when they 
found that the Athenians would not sail into 
the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel 
them to it against their inclinations. At 
break of day they began to move, their ^ps 
being ranged in lines, consisting of four, and 
stood along their own coasts within the gulf, 
the right wing leading the course in the same 
order as they had lain at anchor. In this wing 
they had ranged twenty of their best sailers, 
with a view that if Phormio should imagine 
they had a design upon Naupactus, and he 
himself should hasten to its succour, the Athe- 
nians might not be able to out-sail them and 
escape their outermost squadron, which com- 
posed the right wing, but be surrounded on all 
sides. He, just as they expected, being alarm- 
ed for that place, which he knew was de- 
fenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than 
against his will and in no little hurry he got 
on board and sailed along his own coast — ^the 
land forces of the Messenians marching along 
the adjacent shore to be ready with their assist* 
ance. The Peloponnesians seeing them move 
along in a line, ship after ship, and that they 
were now within the gulf and near the shore, 
which was what they chiefly wanted, — on a 
signal given, at once altered their course, pour- 
ing down directly upon the Athenians, all as 
fast as their ships could advance, in full ex- 
pectation of intercepting the whole fleet 
Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were a- 
head of the rest, being too quick for the wing 
of the Peloponnesians and their shifting of 
their course ran safely off,^ Yet intercepting 

1 The Latin translators, whose chief aim is a grsm- 
matical construction, have made a slip here in point of 
chorography; they say, " Subterfugerunt or fng-entut 
in apertum mare.^* fiut it is surprising that Mr Hobbes 
should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make 
eleven Athenian ships " get out into open sea.'* Tin 
Peloponnesians made their tack towards the open sea, 
on purpose to prevent them from getting out of the gnlf, 
which gave opportunity to the foiemost atiips in the 
Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naa- 
pactus, for the sake of securing which, they had thought 
themselves obliged, though contrary to their Judgment 
and inclinatton, to come within the capes. Had they 
run out to sea, they never could have reached Naupac- 
tus, but would have run directly f^om it. 



m.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



87 



aU the rest, they run- them aground and so dis- 
abled them. The Athenians on board, who 
could not escape by swimming, were slaughter- 
ed to a man: some of these empty ships 
they got off again and carried away in tow ; 
and one they had already took with the 
whole crew on board. The Messenians got 
down to the succour of some of them. They 
waded with their arms through the water, and 
climbing on board and fighting from the decks, 
saved some which were already in tow. — In 
this manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and 
destroy the Athenian ships. 

Their twenty ships which were of the right 
wing, gave chase to the eleven Athenians, 
which, on the shifting of the course, had ran 
off amain. But all iJiese, excepting one ship, 
outsailed them, and got safe into Naupactus. 
Having gained their harbour, they tacked about 
under the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to 
defend themselves, in case the enemy should 
make an attempt upon them so near the shore. 
Soon after, they appeared sailing along and 
singing their pean, as having gained a victoiy. 
One ship belonging to Leucas was shot far 
a-head of the rest, giving chase to that only 
ship of the Athenians which was left behind. 
It happened that a trading vessel was then 
lying out at anchor before the harbour. The 
Athenian ship came up first with this vessel, 
and fetching a compass round her, runs directly 
against the Leucadian.that was chasing, and 
instantly sinks her. By this accident so sud- 
den and unexpected, the Peloponnesians are 
thrown into consternation ; and having besides 
followed the chase without any regular order, 
as secure of victoiy, some of the ships now 
dropinng their oars, stopped further motion. 
This was an unlucky expedient when so near 
the enemy ; but their design was to wait for 
the greater number of ships that were yet 
behind. Some of them being ignorant of the 
coast, ran upon the shelves and were stranded. 
When the Athenians saw them suffer these dis- 
tresses, their courage began to revive. Shout- 
ing out aloud with one voice, they encouraged 
one another to attack. The miscarriages of 
which they were this moment sensible, and 
their irrecoverable disorder, prevented the 
others from making any long resistance. And 
they soon were forced to run bade again to^ 
wards the station of Panormus, from whence 
they came. The Athenians chasing them 
thither, took the six shiptf ibat wtsre most be* 



hind, and recovered their own, which were in 
the enemy's hands by having been run ashore, 
and afterwards brought off in tow. Some 
men besides they killed, and made some pri- 
soners. ' 

On board the Leucadian, which was sunk 
near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the 
Lacedaemonian, who, when the ship received 
the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew 
himself,^ and floated afterwards into the har- 
bour of Naupactus. The Athenians returning 
thither again, erected a trophy near the place 
from whence they had pursued this victor^ 
They took up' their dead, and the shattered 
pieces of their ships, whatever they found on 
their own coasts, and by a truce gave pennission 
to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs. 

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, 
in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore 
and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The 
ship they took they consecrated on the Rhium 
of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, 
being in some dread of the reinforcement ex- 
pected from Athens, all of them, except the 
Leucadians, sailed away by favour, of the night 
into the gulf of Orissa and Corinth. The 
Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete, 
that ought to have been up with Phormio 
before the engagement, not long after the above 
retreat of the other ships arrived at Naupactus. 
And here this summer ended. 

Before the separation of the fleet that with- 
drew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa, 
Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders 
of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the 
Megareans, formed a design, in the beginning 
of this winter, to make an attempt on the 
PiriBUs, the haven of the Athenians. It was 
not guarded or secured in the usual manner i 
nor was this judged requisite, as the naval 
power of Athens was become so extensive. 

1 We have here a notable proof of the peculiar spirit 
and genius of the Spartans. They regarded the land as 
their own element, in which they were superior to the 
rest of the world. And yet now they were convinced, 
that without practice at sea, they should never be able 
to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts 
are awkward and unsaceessful. The art shown by the 
Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sink* 
ing a ship at one stroke, put tbem all to a stand; and it 
seems made so sudden and strong an impression on 
Timyrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, vnA 
with wounds all before, that he could not endure the 
thought of perishing in a whole skin, and therefore 
snatched the moment, and killed himself for fear be 
should be drowned. 



89 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



Their project was, that every mariner carrying 
with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern 
thong, should march over-land from Corinth, 
to the' sea on which Athens is situated, and 
that, making the best of their way to Megara, 
and drawing out the forty ships that lay there 
in the Nisaean dock, they should immediately 
stand into the Pineus. For there was not so 
much as one ship appointed to its guard ; nor 
was there the least suspicion at Athens that 
the enemy would attempt in this manner to 
surprise them: for, openly, and in a regular 
train, they durst not attempt it ; nor could a 
project which required deliberate procedure 
have escaped discovery. But no sooner had 
they resolved upon, than they set out to exe- 
cute, the present scheme. Arriving in the 
night, they drew the ships out of the Niseean 
dock; but instead of making directly for the 
Pirffius, as they at first intended, dismayed 
widi the danger of the attempt, and, as it is 
■aid, forced by a contrary wind to steer another 
course, they went over to that promontory of 
Balamis which faceth Megara. Upon this 
promontory was a fort, and three ships were 
stationed below to prevent all importation and 
exportation at Megara. This fort they assault- 
ed, and carried the three ships, though empty, 
away with them. Other parts of Salamis they 
plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of 
this invasion. 

The lights,^ that signify the approach of 
enemies, were however held up and waved to- 
wards Athens, which caused as great a conster- 
nation there as was known during all the series 
of the war. Those in the city imagined the 
enemy to be already within the Pirseus. 
Those in the Pineus concluded the city of the 
Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy 
was only not within their port, which indeed 
they might easily have been, had they not been 
hindered by their own fears and a contrary 
wind. At break -of day, the Athenians ran 
down in general concourse to the Pineus. 
They got their ships afloat, and leaping on 



* These, (according .to the scholiast) were lighted 
torches, which persons on the wall reared aloft in the air, 
to notify o neighbouring and confederate places, that 
they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put 
them on their guard. The same thing was aIs<^done 
at the approach of firiends, to notify what succoar was 
at band. In the latter case, they held the light steady 
ayd unmoved; in the former they waved them to and 
fro, as an indication of fear. 



board with the utmost expedition and uncom- 
moU tumult, sailed away for Salamis, but left 
what land-forces they had to guard the Pirsus. 
When the Peloponnesians had notice of the 
approach of this succour, having now over-run 
great part of Salamis, and got many prisonen 
and a large booty, beside the three ships sta- 
tioned at BudoTus, they made the best of their 
way back to Nissa. They were afraid of 
trusting too much to their ships, which having 
been long laid up were become leaky. After 
thus getting back to Megara, they returned 
again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, 
finding they were gone from Salamis, suled 
home again. But ever after this they gfuarded 
the Pirsus in a stricter mamier, barring up the 
mouth of the haven, and omitting no method 
of securing it effectually for the future. 

About the same time, in the beginning of 
this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, son of 
Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army 
against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king 
of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering 
on Thrace, to enforce the execution of two en- 
gagements, one made to and the other by him- 
self. For Perdiccas, who had entered into 
some engagement to him, for reconciling him 
to the Athenians when he was formerly press- 
ed hard with war, and for not restoring his 
brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his 
throne, had not yet performed that engage- 
ment. And he himself was under an engs^e- 
ment to the Athenians, since the late i^ance 
offensive and defensive made between them, 
that he would finish the war for them against 
the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both these 
accounts, he undertook the present expedition, 
carrying along with him Amyntas the son of 
Philip, to restore to him the kingdom of Mace- 
donia, with the Athenian ambassadors commis- 
sioned to attend him on this occasion, and 
Agnon an Athenian general : though the Afhe» 
nilans had obliged themselves by treaty to 
accompany the expedition with a fleet by sea, 
and a numerous land army. 

Beginning the march himself from Odryse, 
he summons to attend him first all his Thra- 
cian subjects that live within the mountains 
Hffimus and Rhodope, quite down to the 
Hellespont and Euxine sea; next, the Gets 
bc^yond mount Hsmus, and as many other 
nations as lay between the river Ii^r and along 
quite down to the Euxine. The Gets, and the 
nations so situated, border upon the Scythians, 



m.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



89 



wearing the same habiliments of war, and all 
like them drawing the bow on horseback. 
He procured also to join him many of the free 
Thracians that live upon the mountains, and 
make use of scimitars, who are distinguished 
by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them 
about Shodope. Some of these he took into 
pay, bat some of them voluntarily attended. 
He had levies also from amongst the Agriani- 
ans, Leeans, and the other nations of Paeonia 
subject to himself. These Were the furthest 
people in his dominions, reaching up to the 
Grasans and Lesans of Psaonia and the river 
Strymon, which deriving its source from mount 
Scomius waters the Grasans and Leieans, and 
is the boundary of his empire from those Pso- 
nians who still are free. Towards the Tribal- 
lians, who are also a free people, the boundary 
is fonned by the Trerians and Tilateans. 
These live to the north of mount Scomius, and 
reach westerly as far as the liver Oscius, which 
. riseth out of the same mountain with the Nes- 
tus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain 
adjoining to the Bhodope. 

The kingdom of Odrysc is of this large 
extent along the coast, reaching from the city 
of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in 
the Euzine sea. The shortest cut round its 
coast requiieth four days and as many nights 
for a trading-vessel, of the round built, sailing 
directly before the wind. A good walker will 
also be eleven days in going the nearest way by 
land from Abdera to the Ister. So large was 
its extent along the coast But towards the 
continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the 
Leeans and the Strymon, for so fiir does it run 
upwards from the sea, would cost an expedi- 
tious walker thirteen days' continued journey. 
The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of 
Barbaric land, and his cities in Orreece, by 
Seuthes, who succeeding Sitalces in these do- 
minions, very much improved thtf revenue, 
amounted to four hundred talents of silver,* 
though it might be paid either in silver or gold. 
The presents ccmstantly made to him either of 
gold or silver were not less in value, besides 
gifts of vestments ^oth figured and plain, and 
all kinds of fuminire, vridch were not only 
made to him, but )to all his officers, and the 
noble Odiysiana. The custom observed by 
them and genend ko all the Thracians, <«of 
reoetving rather than bestowing," was contrary 



19 



* X78,940 BterliDg. 



to that which prevails in the Persian court, 
where it was a greater shame to be asked and 
to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as 
their power was great, this practice continued 
long in vogue amongst them ; for nothing could 
be obtained by him who brought no present ; 
and this alTorded a large increase of power to 
his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and 
was in other respects the most flourishing, of 
all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf 
of Ionia and the Euxine sea. But in military 
strength and numerous armies, it was the se- 
cond, though at a great distance frnm the Scy- 
thians. For there is no one nation in Europe, 
nor even in Asia, that in these points can in 
any degree be a match for them ; or when stand- 
ing singly, nation against nation, is able to 
make head against the Scythians, united and in 
good harmony with one another. Yet, at the 
same time, in every point of conduct, and 
management of all the necessary afiaira of life, 
they fall vastiy short of other people. 

Sitalces therefore, who was king of so large a 
country, got his army together; and, when 
every thing was ready, marched against Mace- 
donia. He first of all passed through his own 
dominions ; then over Cercine, a desert moun- 
tain, the boundary between the Sintians and 
Psonians. He went over it by a passage he 
had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly 
himself, in an expedition against the Peonians. 
In their march from Odiyse over this moun- 
tain, they left the Peonians on their right, 
but on their left the Sintians and Medians. 
On their descent from it, they arrived at Do- 
berus, a city of Psonia. He lost none of his 
army in the march, but by sickness ; notwith- 
standing which it was very much increased ; 
for many of the free Thracians came daily in 
without invitation, and followed for the sake 
of plunder ; so that the whole number is said 
at last to have amounted to a hundred and fifty 
thousand. Of these, the greater part were 
foot, but about a third of them were horse. 
The greatest share of the horse was provided 
by the Odrysians, and next to them by the 
€^t8B. Of the foot the free Thracians that 
came from about mount Rhodope, and ^ used 
scimitars, were the most valiant : all the rest 
that followed were a mixed crowd, formidable 
only« in their number. All these therefore 
were got together at Dobems, and preparing to 
break into the lower Macedonia, subject to Per- 
diccos, under the ridge of the mountains. For 



90 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR! 



[fiooKn. 



in the general name of Macedonians are com- 
prwed the Lyncestians and Helimiotians and 
other nations lying upwards, allied to and de- 
pendent upon the rest, yet governed as distinct 
kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime 
Macedonia was first obtained by Alexander, 
father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors the 
Temenids, who derived their original from 
Argos. These by a successful war had driven 
the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards 
fixed their residence at Phagres under mount 
Pangffius, on the other side the Strymon, and 
at other places ; for which reason, the tract of 
ground lying (inder Pangsus towards the sea 
is still called the gulf of Pieria. From the 
region called Bottisa they also expelled the 
Bottiieans, who now live upon the confines of 
the Chalcideans. And further, they seized in 
PiBonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of 
land running along from the mountains down to 
Peila, and the sea ; and got possession of that 
which is called Mygdonia, lying between the 
Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the 
Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of 
what is now called Eordia (of whom the great- 
est part were destroyed, but a small number 
dwell now about Physca ;) and out of Almopia, 
the Almopians. These Macedonians also 
conquered other nations, of which they are 
still in possession, as Anthemus, Grestonia 
and Bisaltia, and a large part of the territories 
belonging to the other Macedonians. But 
this whole tract of country hath the general 
name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of 
Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces 
formed this invasion. 

The Macedonians, unable to make head 
against the numerous army by which they were 
invaded, retired within the, walled and fortified 
places of the country, which at this time were 
not many. But Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, 
succeeding his father in the kingdom, built 
those fortresses which are now there, opened 
the roads, and made many other regulations 
both in the military way about horses and arms, 
and in other public matters, more than all the 
eight preceding kings put together. The 
Thracian army firom Doberus broke first into 
that part of the country, which was formerly 
in the possession of Philip. They took Eido- 
mene by storm ^ and got Gortynia, Atalante, 
and some otiier places, by composition, which 
were readily brought to .capitulate, out of their 
regard for Amyntas, whose son Philip now 



appeared amongst them. They also laid ^ege 
to Europus, but were not able to reduce it 
They afterwards advanced into the other Mace- 
donia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. 
Within these, they did not advance into Bot- 
tiiea and Pieria ; but ravaged Mygdonia, Gres- 
tonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never 
once thought of being able to make head 
against them with their foot ; but, sending for 
horse from their allies in the upper Macedonia, 
wherever by the advantage of ground a few 
could encounter with many, they made fre- 
quent attacks upon the Thracian army. They 
made so strong an impression, that nothing 
could resist such excellent horsemen and so 
completely armed. For this reason, the enemy 
inclosed them about with their ^numerous for- 
ces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous 
for them to fight against such manifold odds 
of numbers; so that at last they were forced 
to give over these skirmishes, judging it im- 
prudent to run any hazards against so large an 
inequality of strength. 

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, 
imparted to him the motives of the war. And, 
as the Athenians were not yet come up 
with their fleet, because diffident of his punc- 
tuality to the engagement between them, and 
had only sent him presents and ambassadors, 
he detached part of his army against the Chal- 
cideans and Bottisans ; where, by driving them 
into their fortresses, he ravaged the coun- 
try. During his stay in these parts, the 
southern Thessalians, Magnetians^ and other 
people subject to the Thessalians, and the 
Grecians as far as Thermopyls, grew appre- 
hensive that his army might be turned against 
them, and prepared for their defence. Under 
tho same apprehensions were the northern 
Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit 
the plains, the Pansans, the Odomantians, 
the Droans, and the Denueans, who are all of 
them free and independent. He further gave 
occasion for a rumour that spread amongst the 
Grecians, enemies to Athens^ that this army, 
brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance 
with them, would invade them all in their 
turns. Yet, without advancing any further, 
he was at one and the same time continuing 
his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottisea, and 
Macedonia. But unable to execute any of' 
those points for which he formed this invasion, 
when his army began to waiit provisions, and 
to suiTer by the rigour of the winter's cold, he 



YEAR ni.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



91 



is persuaded by Seuthes the son of ^paradoxus, 
and his own cousinogennaii, who had a greater 
influence over him than any other person, to 
march back again with the utmost expedition. 
This Seuthes had been secretly gained by 
Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, 
and a large dower with her. Thus persuaded, 
after a stay upon the whole of but thirty days, 
and eight of these in Chalcidica, he retired 
precipitately into his own dominions. Perdic- 
cas, according to promise, soon after gives his 
sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And 
to this end came this grand expedition of Si- 
talces.' 

The same winter, the Athenians at Nau- 
partus, after the separation of the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet, coasting from thence under the 
command of phormio, appeared before Astacus. 
Making there a descent, they pierced into the 
midland parts of Acamania, with four hun- 
dred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the 
fleet, and four hundred Messenians ; and ex- 
pelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, 
the disaffected part of the inhabitants; and 
living re-established at Coronta Cynes the 
son of Theolytus, embarked again on board 
their ships. They judged it not advisable, in 
the winter season, to undertake any thing 
>gainst the Oeniads, the only people of Acar- 
nania who had persisted in' continual hostilities 
*gainst them. For the river Achelous, that 
takes its rise from mount Pindus, and runs 
through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agrsans 
<md the Amphilochians, and all the plain of 
Acamania, passing above by the city of Stratus, 

* Bitalcea, and his son Sadocus, who, as Thncydides 
f^tes above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not 
^aped'the boffoonery of Aristophanes, in his comedy 
0' 'The Acharnanians.' Act I. Sc. 4. " Crier. Ambas- 
'^ to Sitalces, come into court. Ambass. Here. 
J>ie€opolis. Oh !. here's another knave summoned to 
i&ake his appearance. Ambass. We shonid not have 
**id 80 long in ThTBce—Diemopolis. I believe you, un- 
leti yon had been well paid for it. Ambass. Had not a 
great mow fallen and covered all the country, and all 
the rivera at the same time been frozen over. When 
Theopiis was contending here for glory, we were drink* 
^8 all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, 
*»d loves Athenians dearly. In good truth, he is dot- 
Niy fond of you all : he is for ever writing upon the 
^aU, '0 rare Athenians I* And his son, whom we 
'Dide an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your 
dainty sausages, and hath pressed his father to succour 
ttii dear countrymen. He, at a solemn sacrifice, swore 
be would ; and hath got such a numerous army at his 
beels, that the Athenians cry out— What a vast swarm 

^guats is coming along here !'* 



and discharging itself into the sea near the 
Oeniade, renders all the adjacent country one 
continued morass, and by a sta^ation of 
water makes it impracticable for an army in 
the winter season. Most of the isles of the 
Echinades lie over-against the Oeniads, not 
greatly distant from the. mouth of the Ache- 
lous; insomuch that the river, being great, 
causeth a continual afflux of sand, and by 
it some of these islands are already joined to 
the main-land; and it is expected that all 
the rest in a short time will be so too : for the 
current is large and rapid, and brings down 
with it great quantities of sand. The isles 
stand thick; and stopping, bind fast together 
from farther dissipation, the sands brought 
down by the current. They lie not in a line, 
but in an alternate situation one from another, 
preventing the straight course of the waters for- 
wards into the sea. They are further unculti- 
vated, and of no large extent The tradition 
is — that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of 
this land to Alcmson the son of Amphiaraus, 
when a vagabond, after the murder of his 
mother, telling him, that « he never should be 
freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he 
found a place for his residence, which at the 
time he slew his mother had never been seen 
by the sun, and then was not land ;" because 
every other part of the earth was polluted by 
the parricide. After great perplexities, he at 
length, as it is said, discovered these rising heaps 
of sand at the mouth of the AchelouA, and 
thought enough cast up to suffice for his sup- 
port, after the long course of wandering about 
to which he had been necessitated ever since 
he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his 
residence in the parts about the Oeniads, he 
grew poweriul, and left to the whole country 
the name of Acamania, from his son Acamas. 
This account of Alcmson we have given ex- 
actly as we have received it from tradition. 

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from 
Acamania, and touching again at Naupactus, 
very early in the spring returned to Athens. 
Thither they brought all the freemen whom 
they had made prisoners in the late naval en- 
gagements (these were afterwards exchanged 
man for man,) and the ships taken from the 
enemy. 

And thus the winter ended, and with it the 
third year of the war, the history of which 
hath been compiled by Thucydides. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK III. 



Year IV. Attica invaded.— LeBbos revolts from the Athenians ; the latter sent out a fleet to redace them.— Con- 
tinaation of the siege of Platiea.-nTlie escape of a body of Platteans over all the works of the besiegers—V. Attica 
invaded.— Surrender of Mitylene in Lesbos. — ^A bloody decree made at Athens against all theMityleneans; but 
re-considered and repealed ; though very near being put in execution. — ^Platsea surrenders : and the inhabitants 
are pat to death. — The sedition at Corcyra. — ^The Athenians meddle in the wars of Sicily. — The plague rageth 
again at Athens.— VI. Earthquakes.— The affairs of Sicily.— Expedition of Demosthenes into ^tolia, where 
lie receives a total defeat. — ^Delos purified by the Athenians. — Invasion of Argob in Amphilochia : battle of 
Oipe: a second battle, or rather slaughter of the Ambraciots at Idomene.— Bruption of Mount iEtna. 



TEAB lY. 

Is the succeeding summer, the Peloponnesians 
and allies, when the com was fiill-grown, made 
incorsions into Attica, under the conmiand of 
Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus jking of the 
Lacedemonians, and having fixed their camp 
ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry 
at all convenient places skirmished with them 
as usual, and checked the greater number of 
the light-armed from advancing before the 
heavy-armed, and infesting the parts adjacent 
to the city. Having continued here till provi- 
sions began to fail, they retired and were dis- 
l)anded to their respective cities. 

Upon this irruption of the Peloponnesians, 
Lesbos immediately revolted from the Atheni- 
ans, excepting Methymne. They were well 
inclined to such a step before the war broke 
oat, but were discountenanced by the Lacedse- 
monians, and now were necessitated to make 
their revolt sooner than they intended. They 
would have been glad to have deferred it, till 
they had completed the works they were about 
for securing their harbour, perfecting their 
walls and the ships then upon the stocks — till 
they had received what they wanted from Pon- 
tos, both archers and eom, and whatever they 
^ aheady sent for thither. 

The reason was — the people of Tenedos 

> Before Christ 4S8. 



then at enmity with them, those of Methymne, 
and even some persons of Mitylene underhand, 
who in a civil broil had received the hospitable 
protection at Athens, had sent the Athenians 
advice — ** That they are compelling all Lesbos 
to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing 
in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lace- 
demonians and their kindred B(sotians; and 
if timely prevention be not giv^i, Lesbos will 
be lost" 

The Athenians, at present miserably distress- 
ed by the plague and a war now grown very 
brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of 
Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was 
of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be 
a terrible blow, and would not listen at first 
to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnest- 
ness of their own wishes, that they might be 
groundless. But when they had in vain des- 
patched an embassy to the Mityleneans to put a 
stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither 
and their other preparations, theit fears were 
increased, and they became intent on some ex- 
pedient of timely prevention — and ordered 
thither on a sudden forty sail that lay ready 
fitted out for a cruize on Peloponnesus. Cleip- 
pides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had 
the command of this fleet Information had 
been given them, that the festival of Apollo 
Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without 
the city, at which solemnity the whole people 
1x2 93 



94 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



of Mitylene are obliged to aMist— It was there- 
fore hoped, that they might surprifle them on 
this occasion, and by one sudden assault com- 
plete the work. Should it so fall out, it would 
be a happy turn : — ^but, if this miscarried, they 
were to order the Hityleneans to deliver up 
their shipping and demolish their works, and, in 
case they refused, to make instant war. 

With these instructions the fleet went to sea. 
And the Athenians seized ten triremes belong- 
ing to the Mityleneans, which happened at that 
time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary 
quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into 
prison all the crews. But a certain person 
passing over from Athens to Eubcea, and hast- 
ening by land to Crenestus, finds a vessel there 
leady to put off, on board of which he gets a 
quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third 
day after his setting out from Athens, gives 
notice to the Mityleneans that such a fleet was 
coming to surprise them. Upon this they ad- 
journed their festival, and patching up their 
half-finished walls and harbours as well as they 
could, stood ready on their guard. Not long 
after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the 
alarm had been given, the commanders notified 
to them the injunctions they brought; with 
which as the Mityleneans refused to comply 
they ranged themselves for action. 

The Mityleneans, unprepared as they were, 
and thus suddenly necessitated to make some 
sesistance, advanced on board their ships a little 
beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing 
to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the 
approach of the Atlienian fleet, they begged a 
parley with the conmianders, from a view, if it 
were possible upon easy conditions, to rid them- 
selves of that fleet for the present. And the 
Athenian commanders readily accorded, from 
the apprehension, that they had not sufiicient 
strength to support the war against all Lesbos. 

Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the 
Mityleneans despatched their agents to Athens, 
and amongst the number one of those persons 
who had sent intelligence of their motions, but 
had now repented of the step— to procure if 
possible the recalment of the fleet, by assurances, 
that they were not bent on any innovation. But 
in the meantime, undiscovered by the Athenian 
fleet which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to 
the north of the city, they send a trireme to 
carry an embassy to Lacedsmon ; for they had 
no room to believe they should succeed in their 
negotiation at Athens.^ This embassy, after 



a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at 
Lacedsmon, began to solicit a speedy succour. 
And when their agents returned from Athens 
totally unsuccessful, the Mityleneans and all the 
rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepare 
for war. This last place sent in aid to the 
Athenians, as did also the Imbrians and Lem- 
nians, and some few other of their allies. 

The Mityleneans once indeed made a gene- 
ral sally with all their people against the sta- 
tion of the Athenians.' Hereupon a battle 
ensued, after which the Mityleneans, though 
by no means worsted, yet durst not eontinue 
all night in the field, but diffident of their own 
strength retreated behind their walls. After 
this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to 
run any more hazards, till they had got some 
additional strength from Peloponnesas, and 
were in other respects better provided. By 
this time Meleas a Lacedsmonian and Her- 
msondas a Theban are arrived among them, 
who had been despatched on some business be- 
fore the revolt, and unable to compass the re- 
turn before the Athenian fleet came up, had 
now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the 
battle. It was the advice of these to despatch 
another trireme and embassy in company with 
them, which is accordingly done But the 
Athenians, as the Mityleneans remained in so 
quiet a posture, became more full of spirits 
than before, and sent summons of aid to their 
confederates, who came in with more than or- 
dinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance 
of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Hav- 
ing now formed a station on the south side of 
the city they fortified by a wall two camps, 
which invested the place on both sides, whilst 
their shipping was so stationed as to shut up 
both the harbours. By this means the commu- 
nication by sea was quite cut off from the 
Mityleneans. Of the land indeed the Mityle- 
neans and other Lesbians, who had now flocked 
to their aid, were for the most part masters. 
The quantity which the Athenians had occu- 
pied by their camps was but inconsiderable, as 
the station of their shipping and their market 
was held chiefly at Melea : and in this posture 
stood the war against Mitylene. 

About the same time this smnmCT, the 
Athenians send out thirty sail of ships against 
Peloponnesus, under the command of Asopios 
the son ef Phormio, in pursuance of some so- 
licitations they had received from the Acar- 
nanians to send them either a son or some re- 



nSABIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



95 



lation of Phormio to command in those psrts. 
These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia 
raraged all the maritime places. After this, 
A8q)iiis sends back the greatest part of his 
ships to Athens, but with a resenre of twelve 
proceeds himself to Naupactus. And raising 
afterwards the ivhole force of the Acamanians, 
he leads them against the Oeniads. With 
his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the 
aimy marching by land laid the country waste. 
But when this was found ineffectual, he dis- 
missed the land-force, and stretching over him- 
self to Leucas, and having made a descent upon 
Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat-^-by 
those of the adjacent country, who ran together 
for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay 
there for guards, — ^with the loss of his own life 
and a part of his army. After this, the Athe- 
nians staid only to take up their dead by favour 
of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and 
then steered homewards. 

The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent 
in the first ship, having been ordered by the 
Lacedsmonians to repair to Olympia, that their 
applications might be addressed, and resolutions 
formed about them, in the grand resort of their 
whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that 
Olympiad in which Dorieus the Rhodian was 
a* second time victor. So, when the solemnity 
was ended, and an' audience was granted them, 
they spoke as follows — 
** Ye taen of Lacediemon, and yon their con- 

» Olympiad 88. 

* In thig manner for private ends and through party 
fcads, was a most noble and sacred institution abused. 
AU Grecians in general paid their attendance at the 
Olympic Games ; and were obliged by all the ties of ho- 
nour and religion to suspend their animosities and quar- 
rels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren, 
with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present 
^'tance, they are going to contrive the means of annoy- 
ing one another, so soon as that solemnity is over,whiGh 
Was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a 
steady attachment to the interests of Greece their com- 
mon mother. The policy however of the present proceed- 
ing u remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the 
games could suspect nothing from the presence of the 
Mityleneans, who were equally bound in duty to attend, 
'be Lacedsmonians and allies had thus an opportunity 
w siaembling together to receive complaints, and to en- 
^'«ge revolts from Atheiu, without danger of sua- 
Piciotts or a detection of their counsels, till they were 
npe for execution. " The Lacedemonians, (it is a re- 
mark which will afterwards occur in this history,) 
I^ODgst one another, and in paying all due regard to 
^ laws of their country, gave ample proofs of honour 
*^ virtue, in regard to the rest of mankind, they re- 

^j^ as honourable the things which pleased them, 

*Bd tt Jut the things whkb promoted their interest." 



federates, we are sensible of that method of 
procedure, which hath hitherto prevailed 
amongst the Grecians — Rdvolters, whilst a war 
is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance 
they readily receive, and so long as their own 
interest is furthered by it, abundantly caress 
them ; yet, judging them' traitors to their for- 
mer friends, they regard them as persons 
who ought not to be trusted. To judge 
in this manner is certainly right and proper^ 
where those who revolt, and those, from whom 
they break asunder, happen to be equal to one 
another in turn of principle, in benevolent 
affection, and well matched together hi expe- 
dients of redress and military strength, and no 
just reason of revolt subsist. — But the case is 
quite different between us and the Athenians. 
And we ought not to be treated with censure 
and reproach, from the appearance of having 
deserted them in extremities, after having been- 
honourably regarded by them in the season of 
tranquility. This our conduct to justify and 
approve, especially as we come to request your 
alliance, our words shall first be employed, as 
we know that friendship can be of no long 
continuance in private life, nor public associa- 
tions have any stability, unless both sides engage 
with an opinion of reciprocal good faith, and 
are uniform in principle and manners. For out 
of dissonancy of temper, diversities of conduct 
continually result. 

« An alliance, it is true, was formerly made- 
between - us and the Athenians, when you 
withdrew yourselves from the Median war, 
and they staid behind you to complete what 
was yet to be done. We grant it — we made 
an alliance with the Athenians — not to enslave 
the rest of Greece to Athenians, but to de- 
liver Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And 
whilst they led us on in just equality, so long 
with alacrity we followed their guidance. But 
when once we perceived that they relaxed in 
their zeal against the Mede, and were grown 
earnest in riveting slavery upon allies, we then 
began to be alarmed. It was impossible, 
where so many parties were to be consulted, 
to unite together in one body of defence, and 
thus all the allies fell into slavery, except our- 
selves and the Cbians. We indeed, left in 
the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nomi- 
nal freedom, continued still to follow them to 
war : but, from the specimens we had hitherto 
seen of their behaviour, we could no longer re- 
gard these Athenians as trusty and £aithfuE 



96 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni« 



leaders. For it was not in the least probable, 
that after enslaving those "who were compre- 
hended in the same treaty with ourselves, they 
would refrain from treating such as yet were 
free in the same tyrannic manner, whenever 
Opportunity served. Had we all indeed been 
left in the free exercise of our own laws, we 
should then have had the strongest proof that 
the Athenians acted upon honest uninnovating 
principles. But now, when they have laid their 
yoke upon the greater number, though they 
still continue to treat us as their equals, yet 
undoubtedly it highly grates them ; and they 
cannot long endure, when such numbers couch 
beneath their power, that our state alone 
should stand up and claim equally. Nor it 
cannot be! For the more their power hath 
■welled in bulk and strength, by so much are 
we become more desolate. The only secure 
pledge of a lasting alliance is that mutual awe, 
which keeps the contracting parties in proper 
balance. For then, if any be disposed to make 
encroachments, he finds he cannot act upon 
advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our 
preservation hitherto hath not been owing 
to their honesty, but their cunning. Their 
scheme hath been, gradually to advance their 
empire by all the specious colourings of justice, 
by the road of policy rather than of strength. 
And thus we have been reserved to justify 
their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, 
that unless those whom they have enslaved had 
deserved their fate, a state upon an equal foot* 
ing with themselves would never have marched 
in conjunction with them to execute their ven- 
geance. By the same strain of policy, their 
first step was to lead out those that were strong- 
est against the weaker parties, designing to 
finish with them, when left destitute of any 
outward resource, by the prior reduction of the 
rest Whereas, if they had begun with us, the 
confederate body remaining yet possessed of 
its strength, and able to make a stand, their 
enslaving project could not have equally suc- 
ceeded. They were besides under some appre- 
hension of our naval force, lest uniting with 
yours or any other state, such an accession 
might have endangered the whole of their plan. 
Some respite was also gained, from the respect 
we have ever shewn to their whole community 
and to the series of magistrates who have pre- 
sided amongst them. We knew, however, that 
we could not long hold out, had not this war 
come timely to our relief. We saw our own 



fate in the examples which had been made ql 
others. 

« What friendship, therefore, what assoiance 
of liberty could subsist, when, receiving each 
other with the open countenance, suspidon lay 
lurking within 1 — ^when, in war apprehensive 
of our power, to us they paid iJieir court ; and 
we, from the same principle, paid our court to 
them in the season of tranquility 1 The bond 
of union, which mutual good-will cements in 
others, was in us kept fast by fear. For 
through the prevalence of fear, and not of 
friendship, we have thus long persisted in alli- 
ance. And whichever side security bad first 
emboldened, that side would first have begun 
encroachments upon the other. Whoever 
therefore chargeth us with injustice for revolt- 
ing, whilst they were only meditating our ruin, 
and before we actually felt the miseries design- 
ed, us, — that person chargeth us without a rea- 
son. For had our situation been sudi, that 
we could have formed equal schemes to their 
prejudice, and disconcerted all their projects, 
what necessity did we lie under to resign our 
equaUty and receive their law 1 But, as the 
power of attempting was ever within their reach, 
we ought certainly to lay hold of every proper 
expedient to ward off the blow. 

« Such are the reasons, ye men of Lacedis- 
mon, and you their confederates, such the 
grievances which induced our revolt ; — ^reasons 
so clear, that all who hear them must justify 
our conduct — grievances so heavy, that it was 
time to be alarmed, and to look for some expe- 
dient of safety. We long since showed our in 
clination to find this expedient, when during 
the peace we sent you to negotiate a revolt, 
but by you rejected, were obstructed in our 
scheme. And now, no sooner did llie Boeotians 
invite, than we without a pause obeyed the call. 
Now we have determined to make a double re- 
volt ; — one from the Grecians, no longer in con- 
cert with the Athenians to force the load of 
oppression upon them, but with you to vindi- 
cate their freedom — another from the Atheni- 
ans, that we may not in the train of afiEairs be 
undone by them, but timely vindicate our own 
safety. 

" Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too pre- 
cipitate and unprepared. But tiiis lays the 
stronger obligation upon you to admit ns to 
alliance, with the utmost expedition to send us 
succours, that you may show your readiness to 
redress the oppressed, and at the oftme i&gtaiit 



TBIS IV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



97 



annoy your foes. Such a juncture for llus 
was never known before. What with the 
plague and the exorbitant expense of the war, 
the Athenians are quite exhausted. Their 
fleet is divided, some to cruise upon your coast, 
others to make head against us. It is not pro- 
bable they can have now the competent reserve 
of shipping, should you invade them a second 
time this sunxmer both by land and sea; so 
that, either they must be unable, thus divided, 
to make head against you, if you singly attack 
them, or the union of us both they will not be 
able to face. 

" Let no one amongst you imagine, that this 
win be endangering your own domestic welfare, 
for the sake of foreigners with whom you have 
no connexion. For though Lesbos lies ap- 
parently at a great distance from you, yet the 
conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your 
service. For the war will not be made in At- 
tica, as such a one supposeth, but in those parts 
whence Attica deriveth its support. . Their 
revenue ariseth from the tribute paid by their 
dependents. And that revenue will be increas- 
ed, if they can compass the reduction of us. 
For then not a soul will dare to revolt, and 
their own will be enlarged by the addition of 
our strength, and more grievous burdens will 
^ laid xxpion us, as being the last who have 
put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with 
proper alacrity you undertake our support, you 
^ gain over a state possessed of a coni^der- 
able navy, that acquisition you so greatly want ; 
^ you will more easily be enabled to demolish 
tile Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents 
from them : for then, every one of that number 
^11 with assurance and confidence revolt — and 
yon yourselves be cleared of the bad imputation 
you at present lie under, of rejecting those who 
fly to you for protection. If, added to this, you 
^'■'Mufest your views to re-establish the general 
freedom, you will so considerably strengthen 
t^e sinews of war, that all resistance will be 
^fflavailing. 

"Reverencing therefore as you ought, these 
hopes which Greece hath conceived of you ; — 
roverencing further Olympian Jove, in whose 
^ple we now stand, like supplicants distress- 
ed and suing for redress — grant to the Mity- 
leneans the honour of your alliance, and under- 
*^ their protection. Reject riot the entrea- 
^es of men, who have now indeed their lives 
•'id properties exposed to dangers merely their 

^"^ but whose deliverance from their present 
20 



plunge will reflect security and advantage upon 
all; and who, if you now continue to be deaf to 
their entreaties, must drop into such a ruin as 
will at length involve you all. At this crisis - 
show yourselves to be the men, which the voice 
of Greece united in your praise and our dread- 
ful situation require you to be." 

In this manner the Mityleneans urged their 
plea; and the Lacedsmonians and confederates, 
having listened with attention, arid owned them- 
selves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into 
their alliance, and decreed an incursion into 
Attica. To put this in execution, orders were 
issued to the confederates then present, expedi- 
tiously to march with two-thirds of their forces 
to the Isthmus. The Lacedemonians them- 
selves arrived there first, and got machines ready 
at the Isthmus to convey their ships over-land 
from Coring to the sea of A&ens, that they 
might invade them at the same time both by 
land and sea. They indeed were eager and in- 
tent on the enterprise : but the other confed- 
erates were very slow in assembling together, as 
they were busy in getting in their harvest, and 
began to be sadly tired of the war. 

When the Athenians found that suchprepara^ 
tions were made against them, as an avowed 
insuH on their imagined weakness, they had a 
mind to convince their foes that such imagina- 
tions were erroneous, and that they were weir 
able, without countermanding their fleet from be- 
fore Lesbos, to make head against any force that 
could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly, 
they manned out a hundred ships, obliging all,, 
as well sojourners as citizens (those excepted 
of the first and second class)^, to go on board.^ 

1 The original is, ** except those wh& were vportir 
five hundred medimns, and the horsemen or knights.**' 
The Athenians were ranged into classes by Solon. Fla- 
tarch hath described the manner in the life of Solon, a» 
thus translated in Fotter*s Antiquities of Greece, v. i. p. 
14. 

" Solon finding the people variously affected, some in- 
clined to a monarchy, others to an (riigarchy, others to- 
a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the 
poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression » 
endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose all their 
differences, to ease the grievances, and give all reason- 
able persons satisfaction. In the prosecution of thia 
design, he divided the Athenians into four ranks, accord- 
ing to every man's estate; those veho were worth five 
hundred medimns of liquid and dry commodities ha 
placed in the first rank, calling them Pentacosiomedim* 
ni. The next were the horsemen, or Tppcis, being mibh 
as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth 
three hundred medimns. The third class consisted of 
those that had two hundred medimns, who were called 



96 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



Showing themselTes first before the Isthmua in 
great parade, they displayed their force, and 
then made descents at pleasure all along the 

. coast The Lacedemonians seeing them thus 
strong beyond what they had imagined, conclud- 
ed that the Lesbians had purposely amused 
them with fictions ; and being perplexed how 
to act, as their confederates were not yet come 
up to join them, and as information was brought 
them, that the first Athenian squadron, consis- 

, ting of thirty sail, was laying waste the territory 
round about their city, they retired to their own 
homes. 

Afterwards they set about the equipment of 
a fleet to be sent to Lesbos ; and ordered the 
confederate cities to send in their contingents, 
the whole amounting to forty sail ; and further 
appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who 
was ready to put himself at the head of the ex- 
pedition. The Athenians departed off the coast 
with their hundred sail, when they saw their 
enemies had retreated. 

During the time this fleet was out at sea, 
though the Athenians at the commencement 
of the war had as large, if not a larger number 
of ships, yet they never had their whole navy 
so completely fitted out for service and with 
so much pomp as now. One hundred of their 
ships were stationed for guards round Attica, 
and Euboea, and Salamis ; and another hundred 
were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside 
those that were at Potidaea, and in other parts, 
— ^insomuch that the whole number employed 
this summer amounted to two hundred and 
fifty sail. The expense of this, with that of 



ZeugitflB. In the last be placed all the rest, calling them 
Thetes, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing 
any office in the government, only gave them a liberty 
to give their votes in all public assemblies; which, 
though at the first it appeared inconsiderable, was after- 
wards found to be a very important privilege; for it be- 
ing permitted every man after the determination of 
the magistrates to make an appeal to the people as- 
sembled in convocation, hereby it came to pass, that 
causes of the greatest weight and moment were brought 
before them. And thus he continued the power and 
magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet nei- 
ther exposed the inferior people to their cruelty {ind op- 
pression, nor wholly deprived them of having a share 
in the government. And of this equality he himself 
makes mention in this manner: 

Wkat power was fit I did on all bcttov, 
Nor niMd the poor too bigb, nor prened too bw; 
The rich that ruled aiki every office bore, 
Confined by lawa they could not preaa the poor: 
Both parties I leeared fh>m lawIeM might, 
So iinie prevail^ upon another'fe right.' 
• Mr Crteeh. 



Potidsa, quite exhausted their treasure. For 
the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed 
at Potidsa, was two drachmas a-day, each of 
them receiving a drachma' for himself and an- 
other for his servant. The number of the 
first body sent thither was three thousand, and 
not fewer than those were employed during the 
whole siege; — but the sixteen hundred who 
came with Phormio were ordered away before 
its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the 
same pay. In this manner was their public 
treasure now for the first time exhausted — and 
such a navy, the largest they ever had, complete- 
ly manned. 

The Mityleneans, during the time the Lace- 
daemonians lay at the Isthmus, with a body of 
their own and auxiliaries, marched by land 
against Methymne, expecting to have it be- 
trayed to them. Having assaulted the place, 
and being disappointed in their expectation^ 
they marched back by way of Antissa, and 
Pyra, and Eressus. In each of these places 
they halted for a while, to settle affairs in as 
firm order as possible, and to strengthen their 
walls, and then vdthout loss of time returned to 
Mitylene. 

Upon their departure, the Methymneans 
marched out against Antissa. The Antisseans 
with a party of Auxiliaries sallying out to meet 
them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of 
them were left dead upon the spot, and those who 
escaped made the best of their way back. 

The Athenians — advised of these incidents, 
and that further- the Mityleneans were quite 
masters of the country, and that their own 
soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle 
their excursions — ^about the beginning of an- 
tumn, send a reinforcement of a thousand hea- 
vy-armed of their own people commanded by 
Paches the son of Epicurus.^ These having 
rowed themselves the transports which brought 
them, arrive ; and build a single wall in circle 
quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of 
ground strengthened it by erecting forfa. Thus 
was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both 
by sea and land. — And by this time it began to 
be winter. 

But the Athenians, wanting money to cany 
on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, 
and by their first contribution raised' two 

1 Seven pence three farthings. 

3 It was a voluntary contribulion: the original term 
implieth it. The manner was no doubt the same as was 
observed in succeeding times,' when the necessities of 



TEAS IV.J 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



99 



hundre<f talents' for the present service ; and 
at the same time despatched twelve ships under 
tile command of Lysicles and four colleagues 
to levy money ahroad. He, intent on raising 
contributions, made a visit for this purpose to 
several places ; and, having landed at Myus in 
Csria, intending to pierce through the plain of 
Meander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was 
attacked on his route by the Carians and Aniei- 
tans, where himself and a great part of his army 
perished. 

This winter the Platsans — ^for they were still 
blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Boeo- 
tians — finding themselves much distressed by 
the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope 
of succour from the Athenians, and quite des- 
titute of all other means of preservation, formed 
a project now in concert with those Athenians 
who were shut up with them in the blockade, 
1^ first of all to march out of the town in com- 
pany, and to compass their escape, if possible, 
over the works of the enemy." The authors 
of this project were Thsanetus the son of Ti- 
medes a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas the son of 
Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. 
But afterwards, half of the number, aiSrighted by 
the greatness of the danger, refused to have a 
share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to 
the number of about two hundred and twenty, 
resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the 
following manner : 

They made ladders equal in height to the 
enemy'g wall. The measure of this they learn- 
ed from the rows of brick, where the side of the 
^all facing them was not covered over with 
plaster. Several persons were appointed to 
count the rows at the same time ; some of them 
'Jiight probably be wrong, but the greater part 
would agree in the just computation ; especial- 
ly as they counted them several times over, and 
were besides at no great distance, since the part 
fflarked out for the design was plainly within 
their view. In this method, having guessed the 
njeasure of a brick from its thickness, they 

t^e state called for an extraordinary supply. In such 

<>«ca8ion8, tbe president of the assembly laid before the 

Alheniana the present want of money, and exhorted 

them with cheerfolness and generosity to contribute to- 

'Nardil the national support. Such as were willing rose 

™P in turn saying, ** I contribute so much," and naming 

1^^ mm. Such as, though rich, were niggardly and 

"frangers to all public spirit, sat silent on these ocea 

'"^t or, as fast as they could, stole out of tbe as- 
•embly. 

1 £36,750. 



found out what must be the total height for the 
ladders. 

The work of the Peloponnesians was of the 
following structure : it was composed of two 
circular walls; one towards Platsa, and the 
other outward, to prevent any attack from 
Athens. These walls were at the distance of 
sixteen feet one from the other ; and this inter- 
mediate, space of sixteen feet was built into 
distinct lodgments for the guards. These 
however, standing thick together, gave to the 
whole work the appearance of one thick entire 
wall, with battlements on both sides. At 
every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the 
same breadth with the whole work, reaching 
from the face of the inward wall to that of the 
outward ; so that there was no passage by the 
sides of a turret, but the communication lay 
open through the middle of them all. By ni^ht, 
when the weather was rainy, they quitted- the 
battlements, and sheltering themselves in the 
turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head^ 
there they continued their watch. Such was the 
form of the work by which the Platsans were 
inclosed on every side. 

The enterprising body, when every thmg 
was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a 
night tempestuous with wind and rain, and 
further at a dark moon, marched out of the 
place. The persons, who had been authors of 
the project, were now the conductors. And 
first they passed the ditch which surrounded 
the town ; then they approached quite up to 
the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the 
guards. The darkness of the night prevented 
their being seen, and the noise they made in 
approaching was quite drowned in the loudneOi 
of the storm. They advanced also at a great 
distance from one another, to prevent any dis- 
covery from the mutual clashing of their arms. 
They were further armed in the most compact 
manner, and wore a covering only on the left 
foot for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. 
At one of the intermediate spaces between the 
turrets they got under the battlements, know- 
ing they were not manned* The bearers of 
the ladders went first, and applied them to the 
wall. Then twelve light-armed, with only a 
dagger and a breast-plate scaled, led by Am- 
meas the son of Chorebus, who was the first 
that mounted. His followers, in two parties 
of six each, mounted next on each side of the 
turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins 
succeeded them. Behind came others holding 



100 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book iHi 



the bucklen of those above them, thus to faua- 
litate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver 
them into their hands, should they be obliged 
to charge. When the greater part of the num- 
ber was mounted, the watchmen within the tur- 
rets perceived it. For one of the Platsans, 
in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile 
from off the battlements, which made a noise in 
the fall ; and immediately was shouted an alarm. 
The whole camp came running towards the 
wall, yet unable to discover the reason of this 
alarm, so dark was the night, and violent the 
storm. At this crisis the Plateaus, who were 
left behind in the city, sallied forth and assaulted 
the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part op- 
posite to that where their friends were attempt- 
ing to pass, from them to divert as much as 
possiUe the attention of the enemy. Great 
was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in 
their posts, for not one durst leave his station 
to run to the place of alarm, but all were great- 
ly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last 
the body of three hundred, appointed for a re- 
serve of succour upon any emergency, marched 
without the work to the place of alarm. Now 
the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were 
held up towards Thebes. On the other side, 
the Platieans in the city held iip at the same 
tilne from the wall many of these torches already 
prepared for this very purpose, that the signals 
given of the approach of foes might be mistak- 
en by their enemies the Thebans, who judging 
the affair to be quite otherwise than it really 
was, might refrain from sending any succour, 
till their friends who had sallied might have 
effectuated their escape, and gained a place of. 
security. 

In the meantime those of the Plateaus, 
who having mounted first, and by killing the 
guards had got possession of the turrets on either 
hai^d, posted themselves there to secure the 
passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruc- 
tion from thence. Applying further their lad- 
ders to these turrets from the top of the wall, 
and causing many of their number to mount, 
those now upon the turrets kept off the ene- 
mies, running to obstruct them both above and 
below, by discharging their darts ; whilst the 
majority, rearing many ladders at the same 
time, and throwing down the battlements, got 
dean over at the intermediate space between 
the turrets. Every one, in the order he got 
over to the outward side, drew up upon the in- 
ner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with 



their darts and javelins, kept off those who 
were flocking towards the work to hinder their 
passage. When all the rest were landed upon 
the outside of the work, those upon the turrets 
coming down last of all, and with difficulty, 
got also to the ditch. By this time the reserve 
of three hundred was come up to oppose theniy 
by the light of torches. The Plateaus by this 
means, being in the dark, had a clear view o£- 
them, and from their stand upon the brink of 
the ditch, aimed a shower of darts a^d javelins 
at those parts of their bodies which had no ar- 
mour. The Plateaus were also obscured ; as 
the glimmering of lights made them less easy 
to be distinguished ; so that the last of their 
body got over the ditch, though not without 
great difficulty and toiL For the water in it 
was frozen, not into ice hard enough to bear, but 
in a watery congelation, the effect not of the 
northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing 
hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, 
that the water was swelled to a height not to be 
forded without some difficulty. However, the 
violence of the storm was the greatest further- 
ance of their escape. 

The pass over the ditch being thus com- 
pleted, the Plateans went forward in a body, 
and took the road to Thebes, leaving on theii 
right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. 
They judged it would never be supposed, that 
they had taken a route which led directly towards 
their enemies : and they saw at the same time 
the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches 
along the road to AUiens, by Cytheron and the 
^Heads of the Oak. For 'six or seven stadia 
they continued their route towards Thebes, 
but then turning short, they took the road 
to the mountains by Erythre and Hysie ; and 
having gained the mountains, two hundred and 
twelve of the number completed their escape 
to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back 
into the city, without once attempting to get 
over; and one archer was taken prisoner at the 
outward ditch. 

The Peloponnesians desisted from the fruit- 
less pursuit, and returned to their, posts. But 
the Plateans within the city, ignorant of the 
real event, and giving ear to the assurances of 
those who turned back, that " they are all to a 
man cut off,'' despatched a herald as soon as it 
was day to demand a truce for fetching off the 
dead ; but learning hence the true state of the 



Dryoicephalc. 



• About half a mile. 



nAM v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



101 



affiur, they remained well Batisfied. And in this 
manner these men of Platsa, by thus forcing a 
passage, wrought their own presenration. 

About the end of this winter, Salethus the 
Lacedemonian was despatched in a trireme 
from Lacediemon to Mitylene; who being 
landed at P3nTha, went from thence by land, 
and having passed the Athenian circumvallation 
by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent 
of water, gets undiscovered into Mitylene. 
His commission was, to tell the governors of 
the place, that " at the same time an incursion 
will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty 
sail be sent to their relief, according to pro- 
mise; that he himself was despatched before- 
hand, to assure them of these, and to take all 
proper dare of other points." Upon this the 
Mityleneans resumed their spirits, and grew 
more averse to any composition with the Athe- 
nians. 

The winter was now past, and in this man- 
ner ended the fourth year of the war, of which 
Thucydides hath compiled the history. 

Iir the beginning of the ensuing summer-— 
after that the Feloponnesians had despatched 
Alddas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two 
ships under his command, to the relief of Mi- 
tylene, with the most pressing orders — ^they 
and their confederates invaded Attica. Their 
design was, by this diversion to give the Athe- 
nians so much employ on all sides, that they 
ought be unable to give any obstruction to their 
squadron bound for Mitylene. This present 
invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his 
Other's brother, in the right of Pausanias son 
of Pleistionax the king, but yet in his minority. 
They now utterly destroyed those parts of 
Attica that had been ravaged already. What- 
ever again began to flourish, and whatever had 
been spared in former incursions, now fell be- 
fore their fury. And this incursion, next to 
the second, was the sharpest they ever made 
Qpdn the Athenians. For, having continued 
their stay so long, as to give time to their squad- 
ron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of 
their success, they had leisure to extend their 
devastations over almost all the country. But 
when all their expectations ended in disappoint- 
ment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew 
md were disbanded to their respective cities. * 

1 Before Christ 427. 



In the meantime the Mityleneans, when 
they saw nothing of the squadron from Pelo- 
ponnesus (which was loitering in the course,) 
and their provisions began to fail, are necessi- 
tated to capitulate with the Athenians upon 
this occasion — Salsthus, who had also himself 
given up all hopes of relief, causeth the popu-_ 
lace, who were before light^armed, to put on 
heavy armour, with a design to make a sally 
on the Athenians. But th^y, so soon as they 
had received their armour, would no longer 
obey their governors, but assembling together 
in bodies, ordered those in authority either pub- 
licly to produce what provisions they had, and 
divide equally among them, or otherwise they 
would immediately make their own terms with 
the Athenians, and give up the city. Those 
in conunand being sensible that they had not 
force sufficient to hinder this, and that their 
own danger would be extreme, should they by 
standing out be excluded the capitulation, join 
with them in procuring the following terms 
from Paches and the Athenians : 

" That it should be submitted to the people 
of Athens to determine as they please in rela- 
tion to the Mityleneans. 

« That the Mitylenians should immediately 
receive their army into the city — aiid despatch 
an embassy to them to know their pleasure. 

« That sufficient respite should be indulged 
for this, during which Paches should put no 
one Mitylenean in chains, should make none a 
slave, should put none to death.'' 

These were the terms of the surrender — But 
those of the Mityleneans who had been most 
active in all the negotiations with the Lacede- 
monians, were thrown into the utmost conster- 
nation, and being quite in despair when the 
army took possession of the place, seat them- 
selves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, 
having ordered them to arise with a promise 
of protecting them from insults, sends them 
over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure 
of the Athenians. Having further despatched 
some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and 
made all other dispositions he judged expedient 
in regard to his army. 

The Peloponnesians on board the squadron 
of forty ships, who ought to have made the ut- 
most expedition, but instead of that had loiter- 
ed upon the coast of Peloponnesus, and made 
the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, 
had proceeded so far as Delos, before their mo- 
tions were known at Athens. Being advan- 
O 



102 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book hi: 



ced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they re- 
ceive the first intelligence that Mitylene was ta- 
ken. But being desirous of certain information, 
they sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythrsea. 
Mitylene had been taken about seven days be- 
fore they came up to Embatus. Here assured 
of the trtith, they consulted what was now to be 
done ; and Teutiaplus an Elean, gave his opin- 
ion thus ; 

« To you, O Aicidas, and as many other 
Peloponnesians as are joined with me in the 
present command, I freely declare it to be my 
own opinion that we should sail to Mitylene, 
as we are, before the enemy is apprized of our 
arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately 
possessed of the city, we shall find it very re- 
missly and imperfectly guarded: and towards 
the sea entirely neglected, as on that side they 
cannot in the least expect the approach of an 
enemy, and our strength in that element is 
superior. It is probable also that their land- 
force is dispersed, in that negligent manner 
which victory indulgeth, into the scattered 
houses of refreshment. If, therefore, we can 
come upon them by surprise and by night, I 
hope by the assistance of our friends within, if 
really within we have a friend remaining, to 
give a new turn to our affairs. Let us not be 
staggered at the danger of the attempt, but re- 
member, that all the turns of war are owing to 
some such reverse as this : which that comman- 
der who is most on his guard against, and who 
can discern and seize such critical moments for 
assaulting his enemies, must be most frequently 
successful." 

He gave his opinion *thus, but it had no 
effect upon Alcidas. Some other persons, 
exiles from Ionia, and some Lesbians who 
were also on board, advised him further 
— <' That since he seemed to be discouraged 
by the apparent danger of that attempt, he 
should seize some city in Ionia, or Cyme in 
^tolia ; that by favour of such a hold for war, 
they might bring about the revolt of Ionia ; 
that in such a step success might justly be 
hoped, as his presence would be highly accept- 
able there : that, if they could cut off the very 
great revenue which accrued thence to the 
Athenians, the loss, added to the expense of 
endeavouring a recovery, must drain their trea- 
sure — That they further thought they could pre- 
vail on Pisuthnes, to join with them in the war." 

But Alcidas would not listen to these pro- 
posals, and got a majority to support his own 



opinion — « That, since it was too late to suc- 
cour Mitylene, they should, without loss of 
time return to Peloponnesus." Weighing 
therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea ; 
and touching at Myonesus of the Teians, he 
there butchered in cold blood a number of pri- 
soners, whom he had taken in the voyage. 
Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was at- 
tended there by an embassy from the Samians 
of AnGBa representing to him — '< That it was 
no honourable method of vindicating the liberty 
of Greece, to butcher men who had not so 
much as lift up the hand against him, who were 
not enemies in heart, but of mere necessity de- 
pendent on the Athenians : that, unless he 
changed his conduct, he would bring over but 
few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a 
far greater number of friends into enemies." — 
He was wrought upon by thia remonstrance, 
and set all the Chians and others, whom he 
had yet reserved, at liberty. For those who 
liad at any time descried this squadron, had 
never thought of flying, but boldly approached 
it as certainly Athenian. They really had no 
ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians 
were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet 
should dare to put over to Ionia. 

From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his 
way, or rather fled outright, for he had been 
discovered by the Salaminian and the Paralus, 
whilst he lay at anchor near Claros. These 
vessels happened at that time to be on a course 
from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a 
chase, and so stretched out to sea ; determining, 
if possible, not to make any land again till he had 
reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came 
first to Paches and the Athenians from Ery- 
thraea; it was then repeated from all parts. 
For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, 
the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast 
had struck a panic, lest, though their intention 
was not to continue there, they should at once 
assault and destroy their cities. The Salami- 
nian* also and Paralus, after they had descried 

» Tliese two vessels seem to have been the packets or 
yachts of the slate of Athens. Their force was small 
in comparison of the ships of war, as they were chiefly 
designed for nimbleness and expeditipn. They carried 
ambassadors to and fro, went on ail public errands 
whether of a civil or religious nature, and transported 
magistrates and generals to and from their posts. They 
Were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, 
who besides receiving more pay, esteemed it also a 
greater honour to serve on board these vessels, which 
were sacred. 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



103 



him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the 
tidings. Pachas set upon the chase with 
warmth, and pursued it as far as the ble of 
Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reach- 
ing him, he turned back again for his post ; and 
since he had not been able to come up with 
them by sea, thought a great point was carried 
in not finding them refuged in any harbour, 
where they must have been under a necessity 
to fortify their station, and oblige him to a re- 
gular procedure and attack. 

In sailing back he touched at Notium of the 
Colophonians, in which at Uiis time the Colo- 
phonians resided, the upper city having been 
taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians who had 
broke in by favour of an intestine sedition. It 
was taken about the time that the Peloponne- 
oans made their second incursion into Attica. 
But in Notium a second sedition broke out, be- 
tween those who resorted thither for refuge and 
the old inhabitants. The latter having obtain- 
ed an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from 
Pisuthnes, kept within a part separated by a 
transverse wall, and the -management of affairs 
was in the hands of some Colophonians of the 
Bpper city, who were in the Medish interest, 
and had been received amongst them as an aid. 
But the former, who had resorted hither for 
refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Pa- 
ches for protection. He invited Hippias, the 
commander of the Arcadians within the trans- 
verse wall, to come out to a conference, assur- 
ing him, « if they came to no. agreement, he 
would replace him within both safe and sound." 
Upon this Hippias came out : and Paches im- 
mediately put him under an arrest, but laid no 
bonds upon him. This done, he on a sudden 
assaults the wall; by favour of the surprise 
carries it : and puts all the Arcadians and Bar- 
barians within to the sword. After this he re- 
placeth Hippias within, in the same state he had 
promised; but when he had him there, imme- 
diately apprehends him again and shoots him to 
death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the 
^ds of the Colophonians, excluding those on- 
ly who were in the interest of the Mede. In 
process of time, the Athenians having sent lea- 
ders thither on purpose, and declared Notium 
SQ Athenian colony, settled in it the Colopho- 
^Jiaiis that were any where to be found, under 
^ accustomed regulations. 

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, complet- 
** the reduction of Pyrra and Eressus ; and 
having apprehended Salsthus the Lacedsmo- { 



nian who had been concealed in the city, sends 
him to Athens along .with those citizens of Mi- 
tylene from Tene<los, whom he had kept in 
safe custody there, and all others who appeared 
to have been concerned in the revolt. As an 
escort to these he sends away also the greater 
part of his army. With the remainder he him- 
self staid behind to regulate the affairs of Mity- 
lene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his 
discretion. 

When the authors of the revolt and SalsBthus 
were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instant- 
ly put Salsthus to death. He made them 
many fruitless proposals to save his hfe ; and 
amongst the rest, that the siege of Platiea 
should be raised, which was still besieged by 
the Peloponnesians. They next entered into 
consultation, what should be done with the re- 
volters ; and in the warmth of anger decreed 
— <«That not only those who were now at 
Athens should be put to death, but the same 
sentence should extend to all the men of Mi- 
tylene who were adult; and the women and 
children be sold for slaves." They were ex- 
asperated against them not only because they 
had revolted, but because they had done it 
without the provocation which others had re- 
ceived in the rigour of their government. The 
Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetu- 
osity toHhis their resentment as they had dared 
to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the rebels. 
For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt 
had not been made without much previous de- 
liberation. In short, they despatch a trireme 
to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to 
see it put in immediate execution upon the Mi- 
tyleneans. 

The day following, repentance on a sudden 
touched their hearts, moved by the reflection, 
that they had passed a savage and monstrous 
decree in dooming a whole city to that destruc- 
tion, which was due only to the authors of the 
guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the 
Mitylenean ambassadors then residing at 
Athens, and such of the Athenians as inclining 
to mercy had a mind to save tl^em, than they 
addressed themselves to the magistrates, beg- 
ging the decree might be again debated. Their 
request was the more easily granted, as the 
magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the 
dtj were desirous to have a second opportunity 
of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of 
the people is again convened, and various opin- 
ions were offered by diiSerent persons, till Cleon 



104 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



tihe ton of Cleanetus, who in the former assem- 
bly had proposed and carried the murdering 
sentence, who in all other respects was the 
most violent of all the citizens, and at this 
time had by far the greatest influence over 
the people, stood forth again and spoke as fol- 
lows : — 

« Upon many other occasions my own expe- 
rience hath convinced me, that a democracy is 
incapable of ruling over others ; but I see it 
with the highest certainly now in this your 
present repentance concerning the Milyleneans. 
In security so void of terror, in safety so ex- 
empt from treachery, you pass your days with- 
in the walls of Athens, that you are grown 
quite safe and secure about your dependents. 
Whenever, soothed by their specious entreaties, 
you betray your judgment or relent in pity, 
not a soul amongst you reflects that you are 
acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer 
obligations upon those dependents, but to en- 
danger your own welfare and safety. It is then 
quite remote from your thoughts, that your 
rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they 
are ever intent on prospects to shake off your 
yoke — ^ihat yoke, to which they ever reluctantly 
submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, 
after injuries received, that can keep them fa^t 
in their obedience, since this must be ever the 
consequence of your own superior power, and 
not of gratitude in them. 

" Above all, I dread that extremity of danger 
to which we are exposed, if not one of your de- 
crees must ever be carried into act, and we re- 
main for ever ignorant — ^that the community 
which uniformly abides by a worse set of laws, 
hath the advantage over another, which is fine- 
ly modelled in every respect, except in prac- 
tice ; — ^that modest ignorance is a much surer 
support than genius which scorns to be con- 
trolled { — and that the duller part of mankind 
in general administer public affairs much bet- 
ter than your men of vivacity and vrit The 
last assume a pride in appearing wiser than the 
laws; in every debate about the public good 
they aim merely at victory, as if there were no 
other points sufficiently important wherein to 
display their superior talents ; and by this their 
conduct they generally subvert the public wel- 
fare : the former, who are diffident of their own 
abilities, who regard themselves as less wise 
than the laws of their country — though unable 
• to detect the specious orator, yet being better 
judges of equity than champions in debate, for 



the most part enforce the rational conduct. 
This beyond denial is our duty at present; we 
should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit, 
nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion 
mislead the judgment of this full assembly. 

« For my part, I persist in my former decla- 
rations, and I am surprised at the men who 
proposed to have the affair of Mitylene again 
debated, who endeavour to protract the execu- 
tion of justice, in the interest of the guilty more 
than of the injured. For by this means the suf- 
ferer proceeds to take vengeance on the cri- 
minal with the edge of his resentment blunted ; 
when revenge, the opposite of wrong, the more 
nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, gen- 
erally inflicts the most condign punishment. 
But I am more surprised at him, whoever he 
be, that shall dare to contradict, and pretend to 
demonstrate, that the injuries done by the Mity- 
leneans are really for our service, and that our 
calamities are hardships on our dependents. 
He certainly must either presume upon his own 
eloquence, if he contends to prove that what 
was plainly decreed was never decreed; or, 
> instigated by lucre, will endeavour to seduce 
you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of 
words. In such contentions, the state indeed 
awards the victory to whom she pleaseth, but 
she sustains all the damage herself. You are 
answerable for this, Athenians — ^you, who 
fondly dote on these wordy competitions — you, 
who are accustomed to be spectators of speeches 
and hearers of actions. Yoii measure the pos- 
sibility of future effects by the present eloquence 
of your orators ; you judge of actions already 
past, not by the certain conviction of your own 
eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your ears, 
when soothed by the inveigling insinuating 
flow of words. You are the best in the world 
to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuse 
to follow the dictates of the approved judicious 
speaker, — slaves as you are to whatever trifles 
happen always to be in vogue, and looking 
down with contempt on tried and experienced 
methods. The most earnest wish that tiie 
heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to 
become a speaker ; if that be unattainable, yon 
range yourselves in opposition against all who 
are so, for fear you should seem in judgment 
their inferiors. When any thing is acutely ut- 
tered, you are ready even to go before it with 
applause, and intimate your own preconception 
of the point, at the same time dull at disceniin^ 
whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in- 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



105^ 



a word, is for things that are not in reality and 
common life ; but of what passeth directly be- 
fore your eyes you hare no proper perception. 
And, firankly, you are quite infisLtuated by the 
lust of hearing, and resemble more the idle 
spectators of contending sophists, than men 
who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. 
From such "vain amusements, endeavouring to 
divert you, I boldly affirm that no One city 
in the world hath injured you so much as 
Mitylene. 

** Those who, unable to support the rigour of 
your government, or who, compelled to do it by 
hostile force, have revolted from you, I readily 
absolve. But for a people who inhabit an 
island, a fortified island ; who had no reason to 
dread the violence of our enemies, except by 
sea ; who even at sea, by the strength of their 
own shipping, were able to g^ard themselves 
against all attacks; who enjoyed their own 
model of government, and were ever treated by 
ns with the highest honour and regard — for such 
a people to revolt in this manner is never to be 
forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one 
series of treachery 1 Have they not rather 
made war upon than revolted against us ? for 
revolt can only be ascribed to those who have 
suffered violence and outrage. Have they not 
^her sought out our implacable foes, and 
^gged to participate with them in our des- 
truction 1 This certainly is a much greater 
aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their 
own domestic strength they had rebelled against 
^« They would not be deterred by the cala- 
mities of their neighbours, who have frequently 
hefore this revolted, and been punished for it 
ty » total reduction : nor would they so far 
acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard 
the dangerous reverse of miseiy. Audacious 
in regard to the future, presumptuous above 
their strength, but below their intention, they 
made war their choice, and in perferring vio- 
lence to the just observance of duty have placed 
their glory. For, though uninjured and un- 
P^oked, the first moment they saw a proba- 
bility of prevailing, they seized it and rebelled. 
'^It is the usual effect of prosperity, especi- 
"ly when felt on a sudden, and beyond their 
hope, to puff up a people into insolence of man- 
^^^^ The successes of mankind, when attain- 
^ by the rational course, are generally of much 
monger continuadbe than when they anticipate 
^^^''Wt. And in a word, men are much more 
•Xpert at repelling adversity than preserving 
21 



prosperity. By this ought we long ago to have 
adjusted our conduct towards the Mityleneans, 
never distinguishing them above others with 
peculiar regard; and then, they never would 
have been that insolent people we have found 
them now. For so remarkably perverse is the 
temper of man, as ever to contemn whoever 
courts him, and admire whoever will not bend 
before him. 

"Let condign punishments therefore be 
awarded to their demerits. Let not the guilt 
be avenged upon the heads of the few, and the 
bulk of o£fenders escape unpunished. The 
whole people to a man have rebelled against us, 
when it was in their power to have been 
sheltered here, and now again to be reinstated 
in their former seats. But they judged the 
danger would be lessened by the general con- 
currence with the few, and so all revolted in 
concert. 

" Extend further your regards to the whole 
body of your dependents ; for if you inflict thcj 
same punishments on those who revolt by com- 
pulsion of enemies, and who revolt on pure 
delib^ate malice, which of them, do you think, 
will not seize the least pretext to throw off 
your yoke ; when^ if he succeeds, his liberty is 
recovered, and, though he fails, the hurt is so 
easy to be cured 1 Besides this, our lives and 
fortunes will be endangered upon every single 
attempt which shall be made. Suppose we 
succeed, we only recover an exhausted ruinated 
city, but shall for the friture be deprived of the 
revenue arising from it, the essence of our 
strength : but if we cannot prevail, we shall 
enlarge the number of enemies we already have ; 
and at a time when we ought to be employed 
in resisting our present adversaries, we shall be 
entangled in wars against our own dependents. 
We ought not therefore to encourage the hope, 
whether raised by the force of entreaty, or pur- 
chased by the force of corruption, that their 
errors are but the errors of men and shall 
therefore be forgiven. The damage they have 
done was not involuntary, but they have been 
deliberate determined villains: forgiveness is 
only for those who erred not by design. 

« Moved by the ardency and zeal of my fop* 
mer plea, you made the decree ; and now I 
earnestly conjure you, not to repent of your 
own determinations, not to plunge yourselves 
in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through 
delight of hearing, and soft forbearance, the* 
three most prejudicial obstacles of power. It 
o2 



106 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book hi. 



is just to show pity to those who are its proper 
objects, and not to men who would never have 
felt compassion for us, nor to foes who of ne- 
cessity must be implacable. The orators, those 
delights of your ears, will have room in debates 
of lesi^r moment to catch at your applause, but 
should be silenced here, where they only can 
give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst 
they embroil it with perplexities not easy to be 
surmounted, and themselves alone, in requital 
of speaking well, will be well rewarded for it. 
Forbearance, further, may be shown to those 
who are willing to be, and will for the future 
prove themselves, our friends ;. but not to such 
inveterate souls as these, who, if suffered to 
live, will live only to wreak their malice against 
you. 

" I shall wave enlargements, and give you 
only one short assurance, that if you hearken 
to my admonitions, you will at the same time 
do justice to the Mityleneans and service to 
yourselves ; but if you resolve in any other 
manner, you will receive no thanks from them, 
and will establish the clearest evidence for your 
own condemnation. For, if these men had 
reason to revolt, it follows that you have ty- 
rannically ruled them. Grant the injustice of 
such a rule, but yet that you have presumed to 
be guilty of it ;— why then, upon the mere 
motive of interest, you ought now to chastise 
them beyond .what is right, or immediately to 
forego your power, and dropping yourselves 
dpwn into impotent security, to set about the 
practice of humanity and virtue. But adieu to 
this vain expedient! and at once resolve to 
make them feel that weight of misery they 
designed for us. Convince them that those 
who have escaped it can feel as strong resent- 
ments as those who projected the fatal blow. 
Determine now, by recollecting with yourselves 
what kind of usage you would have received 
from them, had they succeeded in their plots ; 
they ! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. 
It is an allowed truth, that men who without 
the least provocation have recourse to acts of 
maliee, will be sated with nothing less than com- 
plete destruction, as they must ever be terrified 
at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who 
sufifers from a quarter whence he never deserv- 
ed it, will not so easily lay down his resent- 
ments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled 
the contrition. Be not therefore traitors to 
'your ownselves. Figure to yourselves; as 
strongly as you can, the miseries they designed 



you ; remember how you wished for nothing 
in this world so much as to have them in your 
power, and now retaliate upon them. Relent 
not at the scene of horror imagination may 
present to your fancy, but fix your remembrance 
fast on that weight of misery which was just 
now suspended over your own heads. Punish 
those wretches according to their deserts; 
make them a notable example to the rest of 
your dependents, that death must be the por- 
tion of whoever dares revolt. For when once 
they are certain of this, your arms will be no 
more recalled from your foreign enemies, to be 
employed in the chastisement of your own de- 
pendents." 

In this manner Cleon^ supported the decree, 
and when he had concluded, Diodotus the son 
of Eucrates, who in the former assembly had 
most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence 
against the Mityleneans, stood forth, and thus 
replied : — 

" I neither blame those who proposed the 
resumption of the decree against Mity lene, nor 
do I praise the men who inveigh against re- 
peated consultations on points of the greatest 
importance. But I lay it down for certain, 

1 From tbe short sketch of Cleon's character given 
before by Tbucydides, and the speech he bath now 
made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader. 
Cicero hath styled him "a turbulent but eloquent Athe. 
nian." By mean? of his eloquence, and an impudence 
that never could be dashed, he was now a prime favour- 
ite with the people, but the scorn and terror of all good 
men at Athens. He had ever been a snarler at Pericles, 
but so long as he lived could obtain no share in the pub- 
lic administration. He had now got the ascendant by 
cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives 
against their ministers and commanders. He will make 
a very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. 
AristophaneSfWho had a particular grudge against him, 
hath exhibited him in the most disgraceful light. His 
comedy of the Horsemen or Knights is entirely employ- 
ed to show him off. He calls him throughout the Taph- 
lagonian,' to brand his low and brutal disposition, who, 
" quitting his original trade of selling leather, vile lea- 
ther, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes 
made of it, was now become the leading politician, the 
scourge and pest of the republic." The chorus of the 
play salutes him with the most villainous titles. And 
an oracle is cooked up, which prophesieth that they 
shall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpowered -by a 
greater scoundrel than himself. A dealer in black-pud- 
dings is at last procured to be his competitor. The con- 
test is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility 
that nnbriilled wit could forge for such characters, and 
Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event upon the 
stage, but was by no means so in the state of Athens. 
The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and 
scoundrels; it wounded and was mischievous only to 
the ablest mimaters and the warmest patriots. 



YIIB v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



107 



&ftt Hiere are no two greater impedunents of 
sound mature counsel than precipitation and 
angler ; of which, the one is closely connected 
with madness, the other with raw inexperience 
and short limitary judgment. 

" It may indeed be warmly asserted, that 
words are not the proper guides to actions. 
But the author of such an assertion is either 
wanting in discernment, or confines it only to 
his own selfish views. He is wanting in dis- 
eemment, if he imagines there is any other pos- 
sible method of putting tight into things that 
are future or unseen; or confines it only to 
himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous 
measure, and conscious he hath not eloquence 
enough to support it openly, he launcheth out 
into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his op- 
ponents as well as his audience. 

" Bat odious beyond all support is their pro- 
cedure who prematurely condemn the advice 
of others as purchased and corrupt. For would 
they only acquiesce in the charge of ignorance, 
the defeated opponent goes off with the bare 
character of ^ man less enlightened indeed, 
but quite as honest If he be charged with 
corruption, his point he may carry, but his 
honesty will ever be . suspected : and if his 
point be lost, h.e must pass for knave and block- 
head both. Such methods can never be con- 
ducive to the public good. The men best 
able to advise, are by this means intimidated : 
though the public welfare would then be best 
secured, if every person of so disingenuous a 
temper was iLot able to open his mouth ; for 
then, by his seducements, the public could 
never be misled. But it is the duty of every 
true patriot to despise the slanders of oppo- 
nents, and on fair and impartial views to get his 
<wm advice accepted. It is the duty, of every 
well-regulated public, not indeed to load a man 
with honours for having given the best advice, 
but, never to abridge him of his present por- 
tion ; and if he cannot prevail, by no means to 
<Ii>grace, much less to punish him : for then, 
neither would the successful debater, from a 
▼iew of enhancing his own personal honours, 
ever speak against conscience, or aim merely 
at applause ; nor would he, who hath been un- 
successful in his motions, be greedy of propos- 
ing whatever may cajole, and so earn popularity 
for himself. But the method in vogue with us 
is the reverse of this ; and what is worse, if a 
person be suspected of corruption, though he 
advise the most prudent expedients,^ yet the 



odium raised against him upon the weak sug- 
gestion of lucre, quite weighs him down, and 
we are deprived of the manifest service he could 
do to the state. Nay, such is our method, 
that even the best advice, if readily offered, can 
escape suspicion no more than the worst. And 
hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well upon 
him who would persuade the public into the 
most prejudicial measures, to seduce the peo- 
ple with art ; as upon him who would advise 
the best, to disguise the truth in order to pre- 
vail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone 
is debarred the service of its most able counsel- 
lors, since in a plain and open method they can- 
not possibly act, and artifice must clear the 
way before them. For the man "^rho openly 
bestows any benefit upon it, is constantly sus- 
pected of doing underhand a greater to himself. 

" When affairs therefore of so high concern 
are before you, when the general temper is so 
over-run with jealousy, we,, who presume to 
advise, must enlarge our prospect farther than 
you, who only assist at a transient consulta- 
tion ; because we are accountable for what wo 
propose, and you are not accountable for the 
prejudices with which you hear. For if not 
only he who proposed, but he who complied, 
were equally answerable for events, your deter- 
minations would be better frftmed than they 
are at present. But now, hurried along as you 
are by your hasty resentments on any sinister 
event, you wreak your fury only upon the single 
opinion of the person who advised, and not 
upon your own joint o|Anions, by concurrence 
of which the miscarriage was incurred. 

" For my part, I neither stand up to deny 
certain facts in favour of the Mityleneans, nor 
to waste the time in fruitless accusations. We 
are not debating now ^hat wrongs they have 
done us, since that would be a reproach to 
sehse ; but what determination about them is 
best. For, though I can prove, beyond a scru- 
ple, that they have injured us in the most out- 
rageous manner, yet I shall not for that reason 
advise you to butcher them, unless it be expe- 
dient ; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, 
should I advise forgiveness, unless ^I judged it 
for the interest of the public. I apprehend, 
that our consultations turn more upon a future 
than a present view. And Cleon here most 
confidently asserts, that the surest expedient 
of your future welfare is, to prevent all other 
revolts by inflicting death in doom of this ; but, 
equally confident of the just expedient of future 



108 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



security, I deciaie quite on the other side. 
And I entreat you, by no means to reject the 
real advantage of mine for the specious colour- 
ings of his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may 
be with him ; and, enraged as you are against 
the Mi^leneans, may have a sudden influence 
upon you. But we meet not here in judgment 
upon them, and justly to decide is not now our 
employment; we are only to consult how to 
dispose of them best for our own advantage. 

<< In the public communities of men, death 
is the penalty awarded to several crimes, to 
such as are not enormous like this, but of a less 
guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men 
run all hazards, and no one ever yet hath boldly 
incurred the danger, if self-convinced before- 
hand, that he could not survive the attempt. 
Where was the city so bent on revolt, that, 
when its own domestic strength, or the aid of 
others, were judged unequal to the work, durst 
ever attempt it 1 The whole of mankind, whe- 
ther individuals or communities, are by nature 
liable to sin : and a law of infallible prevention 
will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials 
have enforced all kinds of punishment, attentive, 
if possible, to restrain the outrages of the wick- 
ed. And in the early age it is probable, that 
milder penalties were assigned for the • most, 
enormous wrongs ; but, being found by expe- 
rience ineffectual, they were afterwards extend- 
ed generally to loss of life : this however is not 
yet effective. Some terror therefore must be 
invented, even more alarming than this, or this 
will never sufficiently restrain. But then there 
is a poverty which renders necessity daring ; 
there is a power which renders pride and inso- 
lence rapacious. There are other contingen- 
cies, which, in the fervour of passions, as every 
human mind is possessed by some too stubborn 
to admit a cure, drive them on boldly to con- 
front extremities. But the greatest incentives 
of all are hope and love : this points out a path, 
and that moves along according to direction : 
this thoughtlessly proposeth the scheme, and 
that immediately suggesteth a certainty of suc- 
cess. These are the sources of all our evils ; 
and these invisible principles within us are too 
strong for all the terrors that are seen without. 
To these add fortune, who contributes her am- 
ple share to divest the mind of its balance. 
She shows hers^f by unexpected starts, and 
encourageth even the incompetent to venture 
dangers, and hath a greater influence over com- 
munities, as the ends proposed by them are 



of the greatest concern, such as liberty or do- 
minion, where every individual, amidst the uni- 
versal ardour, unaccountably plumes himself up, 
and acts with a spirit above himself. But in 
truth, it is quite impossible ; it is a proof of 
egregious folly to imagine, when human nature 
is impelled by its own impetuous passions to- 
wards such objects, that the force of laws or 
any intervening terror is strong enougli to di- 
vert them from the mark. Hence therefore 
ariseth the strongest dissuasive to us from con- 
fiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge 
of our future safety, which must betray us into 
weak prejudicial measures, which must drive 
all revolters into utter despair, by showing them 
plainly, that we shall never accept repentance, 
shall not give them one moment's indulgence 
to palliate their offences. 

a Consider with yourselves, in the mercifid 
light, that a revolted city, when for certainty 
assured that it cannot hold out, may submit 
upon our own conditions, whilst yet in a ca- 
pacity to reimburse our expenses, and to ad- 
vance the future tribute. But in the opposite 
case, can you imagine there is any city which 
will not better prepare itself for revolt than 
Mitylene hath done, and hold out a siege to 
the last extremity 1 Is there no difference be- 
tween a quick and a slow submission 1 Shall 
not we be hurt, if forced through their despair 
to continue a tedious and expensive siege ; and, 
when the place is taken, to be masters only of 
one heap of desolation, unable for the future 
to squeeze the least pittance or revenue from 
it 1 It is revenue alone which renders us a 
terror to our foes. We ought not therefore 
with the rigour of judges to inflict the exactest 
punishments upon these offenders. We ought 
rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate 
correction still to preserve those cities in a full 
capacity of paying us the needful tribute. To 
keep men firm in their duty, we should scorn 
the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws, 
since mild discretionary caution would better 
answer the purpose. This prudent conduct we 
are now reversing, if, when re-possessed of a 
city strij^ped of its former liberty and ruled with 
violence, sufficient motives of revolt, that it 
may again become independent ; if now we judge, 
that this ought to be avenged with a weight of 
severity. Men who have known what liberty 
is, ought not to be too severely chastised, if they 
have dared to revolt ; but we ought to observe 
them with timely vigilance before they revolt. 



YKAK v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



109 



to prevent their taking the least step towards 
it or even once entertaining a thought about it; 
at least, when we have quelled the insurrection, 
the guilt should be fastened upon as few as 
possible. 

" Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, 
how greatly you will err in this, and in another 
respect, if Cleon's advice be approved. For 
now, the populace of all the cities are gene- 
rally well-affected towards us. They either re- 
fuse to concur with the few in their revolts ; 
or, if their concurrence be forced, they instant- 
ly turn enemies to those who forced them ; — 
and you proceed to determine the contest, as- 
sured that the populace of the adverse city 
will be active in your favour. But if you doom 
to general excision the people of Mitylene, 
those who had no share in the revolt — who, 
when once they had got arms into their hands, 
spontaneously delivered up the place; — you 
will be guilty, first, of base ingratitude, for mur- 
dering your own benefactors, — and you will, 
next, establish such a precedent, as the factious 
great above all things wish to see. For then, 
wiienever the latter effect the revolt of cities, 
they will instantly have the people attached to 
their party ; since you yourselves have enforced 
the precedent, that punishment must fall upon 
the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of 
the innocent. Whereas, indeed, though they 
l^d been guilty, we ought to have dissembled 
our knowledge of it, that we might not force 
the only party v^hich ever takes our side into 
ntter enmity and aversion. And I esteem it 
much more conducive to the firm support of 
empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may 
have felt, than in all the severity of justice to 
destroy tlv>se persons whom in interest we 
ought to spare. And thus, that union of jus- 
tice to others and duty to yourselves in this in- 
stance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged 
•^y Cleon, is plainly found to be grossly incon- 
watent, to be utterly impossible. 

" Own yourselves therefore convinced, that 
"^e greatest advantages will result from the 
conduct which I have recommended; and, 
Without giving too wide a scppe to mercy or 
torbearance, by which I could never suffer you 
oe seduced, follow my advice, and in pur- 
suance of it resolve—' To judge and condemn, 
** your own discretion, those guilty Mitylene- 
ans whom Pachcs hath sent hither to attend 
your decisions, and to let the others continue as 
*y are.* These are expedients of your fu- 



ture welfare, and of immediate terror to your 
foes. For they who can form the soundest de- 
liberations, stand stronger up against hostile op- 
position, than the men who rush to action with 
indiscreet Wpremeditating strength.^' 

Diodotus ended here. And when these two 
opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, 
had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a 
stiff contest in support of each, and upon hold- 
ing up of hands there seemed near an equality ; 
but the majority proved at last to be along with 
Diodotus. 

Upon this they immediately sent away an- 
other trireme, enjoining all possible despatch, 
lest this second, not coming in time, might 
find the city already destroyed, as the other had 
got the start of a day and a night. The Mity- 
l^ean ambassadors amply furnished them with 
wine and barley-cakes and promised them 
great rewards if they arrived in time. By 
this means they were so eager to accelerate the 
passage, that even whilst plying the oar they 
eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil ; and 
whilst one half of the number refreshed them- 
selves with sleep, the others kept rowing amain. 
So fortunate were they that not one adverse 
blast retarded their course. The former vessel, 
as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hasten- 
ed its passage in the least ; and the latter was 
most intently bent on expedition. That indeed 
got before to Mitylene, but only long enough 
for Paches to read over the decree, and give or- 
ders for its immediate executionj At that crisis 
the latter arriveth, and prevented the massacre. 
To such an. extremity of danger was Mitylene 
reduced. 

The other Mityleneans, whom Paches had 
sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the re- 
volt,^ were there put to death, according to the 
advice of Cleon. And the number of these 
amounted to somewhat above a thousand. 

The Athenians, further, demolished the walls 
of Mitylene and took away their shipping. 
They did not for the future enjoin an annual 
tribute upon the Lesbians, but dividing the 

1 We hear no more in this history of Paches, who 
certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a ^eat 
service to his conntry, and had behaved through the 
whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And 
yet Plutarch tells us in two passages, (in the lives of 
Aristides and Nicias) that at his return he was called 
to account for his conduct during his command, and 
finding he was going to be condemned, his resentment 
and indignation rose so high that he instantly slew him- 
self in court. 



no 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book hi. 



whole island into shares (except Ythai helonged 
to Methynme), three thousand in the whole, 
they set apart three hundred of these as sacred 
to the gods, and sent some of their own people, 
who were appointed hy lot, to take possession 
of the rest, as fuH proprietors. The Lesbians, 
as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them 
two minffi' yearly for every share, in considera- 
tion of which thev had still the use of the soil. 
The Athenians also took from them several 
towns upon the continent, which had belonged 
to the Mitylencans, and which continued after- 
wards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus 
ended the commotions of Lesbos. 

The same summer after the reduction of 
Lesbos — the Athenians, commanded by Nicias* 
the son of Niceratus, executed a design upon 

1 £6 9s. 2d. sterling. 

a Nicias is now for llie first time in the chief command, 
who is to act parts of very great importance in the se- 
quel of the war. We should ilvcrefore take some notice 
of him on liis first appearance. Plutarch, who hath 
wrote bis life, gives light into several circumstances, 
which fall not within the cognizance of a general his- 
torian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and 
was one of the most wealthy citizens. Besides his estnt^ 
he had a large annual income from the silver mines at 
Laurium. Not that those mines belonged to him, as 
one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patri- 
mony of the state, annexed to it hy Themistocles for 
the support of the navy: but, as Xenophon relates in 
his treatise of revenue, Micias had a thousand slaves 
constantly employed in working tliese mines. He hired 
them out to Sosias the Tbracian, who was undertaker 
of the work, on condition to receive a clear obole ad^y 
for every one of them; and he always kept up the num- 
ber. His income from hence was therefore near X2000 
sterling a-year. He acted under Pericles so long as he 
lived, and after his death, was set up by the more so- 
ber and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who 
was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of 
bis country, of unblemished integrity, and very gentle 
and complacent in his manners. His good qualities 
were numerous and shining: his foililes were, a great 
diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which 
made him court them by laying out his wealth in public 
games and shows for their entertainment. He had an 
inward fund of real piety; 1 ut was supcrstitiously at- 
tached to the ceremonial of the religion of his country. 
His great wealth drew a great number of followers and 
parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was 
always jseeking occasions of doing good. In short, says 
Plutarch, "bad men had a suie fund in his pusillani- 
inity, and good men in his humanity.^' Nobody couid 
either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his in- 
terest there was great. He was always cautious, and 
always diffident, and under such an awe of the people 
in the general nasemblica, that they wouid shout out to 
him by way of encouragement, as his modesty was ami- 
able and engaging when opposed to the impudence of 
Cleon. — Thus much rony suffice at present, since his 
military expeditions and the whole of his political con- 
duct will be related bv Thucvdides. 



Minoa; the island which lies before Megara. 
The Megareans, haying built a fort upon it, 
used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme 
of Nicias, to fix the post of observation for the 
Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, 
and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. 
This would prevent the sudden courses of the 
Peloponilesians, frequent from thence; would 
curb the piratical cruises ; and, at the same 
time, stop all importations into Megara. Be- 
ginning therefore with the two forts detached 
from Nissea, he took them by means of the 
engines he played against them from the sea ; 
and having thus opened the channel between 
them and the island, he took in by a wall of 
fortification that part of the mainland from 
whence, only by crossing the morass and the 
help of a bridge, a succour could be thrown 
into the island, which lay at a very small dis- 
tance from the continent. This work was 
completed in a few days, after which Nicias, 
leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison 
to defend the works, drew off the rest of his 
army. 

About the same time this summer, the Pla- 
tsans, whose provisions were quite spent, and 
who could not possibly hold out any longer, 
were brought to a surrender in the following 
manner. The enemy made an assault upon 
their wall, which they had not sufficient strength 
to repel. The Lacedaemonian general being 
thus convinced of their languid condition, was 
determined not to take the place by storm. In 
this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from 
Lacedsmon, with a view that whenever a peace 
should be concluded with the Lacedsmonians, 
one certain condition of which must be recipro^, 
cally to restore the places taken in the war, 
Platjea might not be included in the restitution, 
as having freely and without compulsion gone 
over to them. A herald is accordingly des- 
patched with this demand — " Whether they are 
willing voluntarily to give up the city to the 
Lacedaemonians, and accept them for their 
judges who would punish only the guilty, and 
contrary to forms of justice not even one of 
those." — The herald made this demand aloud. 
And the Platseans, who were now reduced to 
excessive weakness, delivered up the city. 

The Peloponnesians supplied the Platffans 
with necessary, sustenance for the space of a 
few days, till the five delegates arrived from 
Lacedffimon to preside at their trial. And yet, 
when these w^ere actually come, no judicial 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPOxNNESIAxN WAR. 



Ill 



process was fonned against them. T^^ey only 
called them out, and put this short question to 
them — " Whether they had done any service to 
the Lacedemonians and their allies in the pre- 
sent war 1" — Their answer was, " That they 
begged permission to urge their plea at large ;" 
which being granted, they pitched upon Ast^- 
machus the son of Asopalaus, and Laco the 
son of Aeimnestus, who had' formerly enjoyed 
the public hospitality of the Lacedaemonians, 
to be their speakers, who stood forth and plead- 
ed thus : 

« Placing in you, O Laced&Bmonians, an en- 
tire confidence, we have delivered up our city ; 
but never imagined we should be forced to such 
a process as this, when we expected only to be 
tried by justice and laws — ^when we yielded to 
plead, not before other judges as is now our 
fate, but only before yourselves. Then indeed 
we thought that justice might be obtained. — 
But now we have terrible grounds for appre- 
hending, that we have at once been doubly 
ovenreached. Strong motives occur to alarm 
our suspicions, that the point most in view is 
to deprive us of our lives, and that you will 
not provo impartial judges. We cannot but be 
too certain of this, when no manner of crime 
is formally objected, against which we might 
form our defence ; when barely at our own en- 
treaty we are heard, and your concise demand 
is such, that if we answer it with truth we con- 
demn ourselves ; if with falsehood, must be in- 
stantly refuted. 

" Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, 
something of necessity must be said in our own 
behalf; nay, where the danger is so urgent, 
the only small glimpse of security appears in 
hazarding a plea. For persons like us distress- 
ed, in ailence to abandon their own defence — 
this may with sad compunction torture them 
at last, as if their safe^ migh<. have been earn- 
ed by speaking for themselves — though never 
Was persuasion so much to be despaired of as 
at present Were we indeed, who are the per- 
wcuted party, entirely unknown to our judges, 
we might then allege such evidence as through 
Ignorance you could not overturn, and so fur- 
ther our defence. But now we must speak be- 
fore men who are informed of every point, 
^or do our fears result from the prior know- 
ledge you have had of us, as if you were now 
proceeding against us for having in valour been 
inferior to yourselves ; but from our own sad 
forebodings, th«t we are cited to a tribunal 



which hath already condemned us to gratify 
others. Yet, what we can justly say for our- 
selves in regard to all our differences with the 
Thebans, we shall boldly allege ; the good ser'- 
vices we have done to you and the rest of 
Greece we shall fairly recite — and strive, if 
possible, to persuade. 

" To your concise demand — Whether we 
have done any good service in this war to the 
Lacedsemonians and their allies 1 — we answer 
thus : If you interrogate us as enemies, though 
we have done you no good, yet we have done 
you no harm ; if you regard us as friends, you 
have offended more than we, in making war up- 
on us.— In regard to the peace and against the 
Mode, we have ever honestly performed our 
duty: the peace was not violated first by us 
against him ; we alone of all the Boeotians at- 
tended you in the field to maintain the liberty 
of Greece. For, though an inland people, we 
boldly engaged in the sea-fight at Artemisium ; 
and in the battle fought upon this our native 
ground, we assisted you and Pausanias; and 
whatever the danger to which Greece, in that 
troublesome period of time, was exposed, in 
all we bore a share beyond our strength. To 
you in particular, O ye Lacedsemonians, in that 
greatest consternation Sparta ever felt, when 
after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had 
seized upon Ithome, we immediately despatch- 
ed the third part of our force for succour. 
These things you are bound in honour never 
to forget. For thus upon former, and those 
most critical occasions, we with honour showed 
ourselves your friends. — But at length we be- 
came your enemies! — For that blame only 
yourselves: because when we stood in great 
want of support against the 'Violence and op- 
pression of the Thebans, to you we applied, 
and by you were rejected. Yqu commanded 
us then to address ourselves to Athens. Athens, 
you said, was near, but Sparta lay too remote 
to serve us. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the 
present war we have committed no one disho- 
norable act in regard to you, nor should ever 
have committed. You enjoined us indeed to 
revolt from the Athenians, and we refused to 
comply ; but in this we have done no injustice. 
For they marched cheerfully to our succour 
against the Thebans, when you shrunk back ; 
and to betray them afterwards had been base in 
us ; in us, who were highly indebted to them, 
who at our own request were received into their 
friendship, and honoured by them with the 



112 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in. 



freedom of Athens. No, it wt^s rather our 
duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased 
to order. And whenever either you or the 
Athenians lead out your allies ii\to the field, 
not such as merely follow you are to be censur- 
ed for any wrong you may respectively com- 
mit, but those who lead them out to its com- 
mission. 

" Manifold and notorious are the instances 
in which the Thebans have injured us. But 
outrageous above all is the last, about which 
you need no information, since by it we are 
plunged into this depth of distress. A right 
undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging arms 
upon men, who, in the midst of peace, and what 
is more, upon the sacred monthly solemnity, 
feloniously seized upon our city. We obeyed 
herein that great universal law, which justifieth 
self-defence against a hostile invader ; and 
therefore cannot with any appearance of equity, 
* be now doomed to punishment at their own in- 
stigation. For, if your own immediate inter- 
est, and their present concurrence with you in 
war, is to prescribe and regulate ^our sentence, 
you will show yourselves by no means fiedr 
judges of equity, but partially attached to pri- 
vate interest. What though these incendiaries 
seem now a people well worth your gaining 1 
there was a season, a most dangerous and criti- 
cal season, when you yourselves, and the other 
Grecians, were in diiferent sentiments. Now 
indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal 
blow at others ; but at that season, when the 
Barbarian struck at enslaving us all, these 
Thebans were then the Barbarian's coadjutors. 
And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at 
that Reason should be set in the balance against 
our present transgressions, if transgressors at 
present we have been. You then would find 
our greater merits quite outweighing our petty 
offences ; and our merits to be dated at a time 
when it was exceeding rare to see Grecian 
bravery ranged in opposition to the power of 
Xerxes ; when praise was ascribed, not to those 
who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all 
the means of withstanding his invasion, but 
who chose, through a series of danger, coura- 
geously to execute the most glorious acts. Of 
this number are we, and as such have been, 
pre-eminently, most honourably distinguished. 
And yet, from this original we fear our ruin 
now may have taken its rise, as we chose to 
follow the Athenians from a regard to justice, 
rather than you from the views of interest. 



But so long as the nature of things continues 
to be the same, you also ought to convince the 
world, that your sentiments about them are not 
changed, that your principles still suggest it to 
you as your greatest interest, that whenever yoiii 
gallant compatriots have laid uppn you an obli* 
gation strong enough to be eternally in force, 
something on every present occurrence shoold 
be done for us by way of just acknowledg- 
ment. 

«< Reflect further within yourselves, that you 
are now distinguished by the body of Greece 
as examples for upright disinterested conduct 
Should you therefore determine in regard to 
us what in justice cannot be supported— for 
the eyes of the world are now intent on your 
proceedings^ and as judges applauded for their 
worth you sit upon us whose reputation is 
yet unblemished: take care that you do not 
incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent 
sentence against valuable men, though yoo 
yourselves are more to.be valued; nor repo- 
site in her common temples those spoils you 
have taken from us the benefactors of Greece. 
How horribly will it seem for Flatiea to be 
destroyed by Lacedtemonians ; that your fa- 
thers inscribed the city upon the tripod of 
Delphos in justice to its merit, and that you 
expunged its very being from the commu- 
nity of Greece to gratify the Thebans! To 
such excess of misery have we been ever ei- 
posed, that if the Modes had prevailed we must 
have been utterly undone ; and now must be 
completely ruined by the Thebans, in the pre- 
sence of you who were formerly our most cor- 
dial friends ! Two of the sharpest, most pain- 
ful trials we are to undergo, who but lately, 
had wp not surrendered our city, must have 
gradually perished by famine ; and now stand 
before a tribunal to be sentenced to death. 
Wretched Plataeans, by all mankind abandon- 
ed ! We, who beyond our strength were once 
the supports of Greece, are now quite desth 
tute, bereft of all redress ! Not one of our oW 
allies to appear in our behalf; and even job, 
O ye Lacedsemonians, you our only hope, as we 
have too much reason to apprehend, determined 
to give us up. 

" But, by the gods, who witnessed once the 
social oaths we mutually exchanged ! by that 
virtue we exerted for the general welfare w 
Greece ! by those we adjure you to be moved 
with compassion, and to relent, if with the 
Thebans you are combined against us! hi 



TEJLR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



113 



gratitude to us, beg the favour of them, that 
they woirid not batcher whom you ought to 
spare; demand such a modest requital from 
them lor your base concurrence, and entail not 
infamy upon yourselves, to give others a cruel 
satisfaction. To take away our lives will be 
a short and easy task ; but then, to efface the 
infamy of it, will be a work of toil. You have 
no colour to wreak your vengeance upon us as 
enemies, who have ever wished you well, and 
bore arms against you in mere self-defence. 
Your decisions can in no wise be righteous, 
nnless you exempt us from the dread of death. 
Recollect in time, that you received us by free 
SQTTender, that to you we held forth our hands ; 
the law forbids Grecians to put such to death ; 
and that we have been from time immemorial 
benefactors to you.' For cast your eyes there 
upon the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell 
by the swords of the Modes, and were interred 
in this our earth: these we have annually ho- 
noured with vestments, and all solemn decora- 
tions at our public expense. Whatever hath 
been the produce of our soil, to them we have 
ever offered the first-fruits of the whole ; as 
friends, out of earth that was dear to them ; as 
companions, to those who once fought tf)gether 
m the same field ; and, lest all this by a wrong 
determination you instantly disannul, mature- 
ly reflect For Pausanias interred them here, 
judging he had laid them in a friendly soil, and 
in the care of men with friendly dispositions. 
If therefore yoa put us to death, and turn this 
Plataan into Theban soil, what is this but to 
leave your fathers and relations in a hostile 
land, and in the power of those who murdered 
them, never again to receive the sepulchral ho- 
noursl Will you further enslave the spot 
on which the Grecians earned their liberty*? 
Will you lay desolate the temples of those 
Rods to whom they addressed their vows before 
uiat battle against the Modes, and so were vic- 
toriousl And, will you abolish the solemn 
wcrifices, which those gallant patriots have 
founded and anointedl 

** It cannot, O Lacedemonians, be consistent 
With your glory, to violate the solemn institu- 
tions of Greece, the memory of your own fore- 
fathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, 
«U8, merely to gratify the malice of a hostile 
P*'^* to put men to death who have never 
Pronged you. No ; but—to spare, to relent, 
to feel the just emotions of compassion, to re- 
call the idea not only what miseries we are de- 
22 



signed to suffer, but what persons they are for 
whom they are designed; and to remember the 
uncertain attack of calamity; upon whom, and 
how, undeservedly, it may fall ! To you, as in 
honour and necessity too obliged we address 
our entreaties ; invoking aloud the gods whom 
Greece at her common altars and with joint 
devotion adores, — to accept our plea : alleging 
those oaths which your fathers have sworn, — 
to pay them reverence. We are suppliants now 
at the sepulchres of your fathers, we call upon 
the dead reposited there, to be saved from The- 
bans, that the kindest of friends, as we have 
been, may not be sacrificed to the most deadly 
foes. Again, we recall to memory that day, in 
which having performed the most splendid 
achievements in company with them, we are 
yet this day in danger of the most deplorable 
fate. Conclude we must — though it is hard 
for men in our distress to conclude ; when the 
very moment their words are ended, their very • 
lives are most imminently endangered : yet still 
we insist that we surrendered not our city to 
the Thebans, rather than that we should have 
chose the most miserable end by famine ; but 
confiding in you, into your hands we gave it. 
And highly fitting it is, that if we cannot pre- 
vail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us 
there at our own option to take our fate. But 
once more we conjure you, that we, who are 
citizens of Platsea, who have showed ourselves 
the most steady patriots of Greece, and now, 
O Lacedsemonians, your suppliants, — may not 
be turned over, out of your bands, out of your 
protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting 
enemies ; — that you would become our saviours, 
and not doom to utter destruction the men to 
whom all Greece is indebted for her freedom.*'' 

In this manner the Platseans spoke ; and the 
Thebans, fearing lest their words might work 
so far upon the Lacedsemonians as to cause 
them to relent, stood fort^, and declared a de- 
sire to be also heard; " since the Platsans, as 
they conceived, had been indulged in a much 
longer discourse, than was requisite to answer 
the question." Leave accordingly was given, 
and they proceeded thus : 

« We should not have requested your atten- 
tion to any thing we had to offer, if these Platae- 
ans had replied in brief to the question, and had 
not run out into slander and invective against 
us ; — if they had not defended themselves in 
points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at 
all charged against them as crimes; and launched 
P 



114 



PELOPONNBSIAN WAR. 



[40QK m. 



forth into their own praise, uncensuied and 
unprovoked. But now it is incumbent upon 
us, in some points to contradict and in 
some to refute, to prevent the bad effects which 
might result, either from the criminations ut- 
tered against us, or the pompous praise they 
have bestowed upon themselves ; that you, un- 
der proper information with whom the greater 
truth remains, may fairly decide between us. 

" Our enmity against them we openly avow, 
as it proceeded from just and honourable mo- 
tives ; since to us, who were the founders of 
Platsa, afler we had gained possession of 
Boeotia and of other towns as well as Platsa, 
which, after being purged from extraneous mix- 
tures, remained in our jurisdiction, — these men 
disdained to pay submission, and scorned origin- 
al and fundamental laws. They wilfully divi- 
ded from the other Bteotians, transgressing the 
laws of their country, and, when likely to be 
, forced back into their duty, they went over to 
the Athenians, and in concert with them accu- 
mulated wrongs upon us, which have since been 
justly retaliated upon them, 

** But, when the Barbarian invaded Greece, 
they were the only Boeotians who did not join 
the Mede. — This they allege, and hence they 
arrogate applause to themselves, and lavish 
their calumnies upon us. We grant indeed 
they did not join the Mede ; and the reason 
was, because the Athenians did not join him. 
Yet afterwards, when with the same all-grasp^ 
ing ambition the Athenians invaded Greece, 
/they were the only Boeotians then who joined 
those Athenians. But consider further the re- 
spective situation from which such conduct 
ensued in both. Our city at that time was not 
administered by the few who presided with an 
equal and steady rule, nor directed by the gene- 
ral voice of the people. Its state was such, as 
with laws and policy is quite incompatible ; it 
bordered close upon a tyranny : the encroach- 
ing ambition of a handful of men held fast pos- 
session of it These, with no other view than 
the strong establishment of their own private 
authority in the success of the Mede, by force 
overawed the people, and opened their gates 
to the invader. This was not the act of a 
whole city, of a city master of its own conduct ; 
nor ought she to be reproached for offences 
committed in despite of her laws. But on the 
other hand, when the Mede was once repulsed 
and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, 
you ought then to consider — fresh invasions 



being formed by the Athenians, projects at- 
tempted to bring the rest of Greece and oui 
dominions also into their subjection, sedition 
fomented amongst us, by favour of which the; 
seized the greater part — Whether in the field of 
Coronea we fought them and prevailed, recover* 
ed the liberty of Boeotia, proceed even now 
with all alacrity to regain their liberty for othen, 
supplying them with horse and all other mili- 
tary provision, far beyond any other confeder* 
ate. Such is the apology we make for all the 
charge against us in having joined the Mede. 
But — that you have been the most outrageous 
foes to Greece, and are most deserving of whatr 
ever punishment can be inflicted upon you, ve 
shall next endeavour to demonstrate. 

« In order to procure some revenge on us, it 
is your own plea, * you became confederates tM 
citizens of Athens.' — Be it so. You ought 
then to have marched in their company only 
against us ; you ought not to have followed 
them in their expeditions against others. Had 
your own wills been averse to attend them on 
these occasions, it was always in your power 
to have recourse to that Lacedemonian league, 
in which you concurred against the Mede, and 
about which you make at present the greatest 
parade. That would have been amply sufficient 
to turn aside our enmity from you; and, what 
is above all, had securely enabled you to rectify 
your measures. But it wag not against yoor 
will, neither was it upon compulsion, that you 
have solely adhered to the Athenians. 

" But, then you rejoin-—* It was base to be- 
tray your benefactors.'-^ Yet it was much nwre 
base and more enormous to betray at once the 
whole body of Grecians, with whom you had 
sworn a mutual defence, than the single Atheni- 
ans : the Athenians truly have enslaved yom 
country ; and the others would regain its fnfi- 
dom. You have not made your benefactors 
the requital which gratitude eiyoined, or which 
is exempted from reproach.—- < Injured and op* 
pressed, you applied,' it is pretended, 'to 
them for redress ;' — and then you co-opeiat' 
ed with them in oppressing others. But ^ 
is not more dishonourable to be wanting ^ 
any act of gratitude, how justly soever it 
may be due, than to make the return in * 
manner in itself unjust. You yourselves by 
acting thus have afforded undeniablo P'^ 
that you alone did not join the Mede from I 
zeal for the Grecians, but merely because ths 
Athenians did not join him. You were desu- 



rMAR v.] 



PELOPONNESlAN WAR. 



115 



(ms to ftdt ^ eoftcfeit with the latter, but in 
opposition to the formed; atid now modestly 
t^sim to be recompensed by your country, for 
all the iniquitous services you have done to a 
party. But justice will never suffer this* To 
Athenians you gave the piieference, strive 
therefore from them to obtain redress. Cease 
taialy to allege the mutual oaths you once ex- 
changed, as if they were obliged at present to 
preserve you: — ^you renounced, you violated 
first those oaths, who rather concurred to en-, 
slave the iEginets and some other people of the 
same association, than endeavoured to prevent 
it ; and all without compulsion ; still happy in 
the uninterrupted possession of your own rights, 
and not compelled to receive law from others, 
as was our fate. Nay, to the very last moment, 
before this blockade was formed against you, 
when we calmly invited you to be quiet and 
neutral, you insolently refused. Which there- 
fore is the people, on whom all Greece may 
ftsten her hatred more deservedly than on you, 
who have made it a point to exert your bravery 
ihruiningyour icountryl Those former good 
dispositions you have so largely boasted, you 
lutve now shown plainly to be repugnant to 
ywtt genius. What your natural turn hath 
ever been, the e^^nt hath with truth ascertain- 
sd. The Athenians took the road of violence, 
and you attended them through all the journey. 
-^And thus, attiide proof hath been exhibited 
byns, that against our wills we setved the 
Peisiaii, and ftoA you with most cheerful dis- 
positton have promoted the Athenian tyranny. 
"But in regard to your finishing charge 
sg&inst U8 as guilty of excessive outrage and 
mjastice : — that, contrary to every law, in the 
midst of peace, on a day of ftacred solemnity, 
we seized upon your city — ^this great offence, 
in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than 
to yourselves. Had we marched indeed against 
Jonr city m a hostile manner, had we scaledyour 
^Is and put your property to fire and sword, 
Ae charge had then been just. But if nren of 
^e first rank amongst you both for wealth and 
^»rth, desirous to put a stop to yottt foreigA 
oombttetions, and recall you to the cotomon in- 
"titations of all Boeotianv ; if such at their own 
free motion invited our presence, wherein are 
We unjustl for the leaders, in all cases, are great- 
w transgressors thati the followers. TTiough, 
^ ttie preseint, neither are they in our judg- 
ments, nor are we, transgressors. They were 
^^heoB as well as you ; they had larger con- 



cerns at stake; and therefore, opening their 
gate' and receiving us within their walls as 
friends and not &s foes, they intended to pre- 
vent the corrupted part of your body froni 
growing worse, and protect the worthy and 
good according to their merit. They calmly 
studied the welfare of your minds and your 
bodies, not suffering your city to become an 
alien, but recovering it again to its duty and 
relations, exempting it from being the foe of 
any honest Grecian, and re-uniting it in the 
bonds of amity with them all. — There are 
proofs besides, that we did not intermeddle in 
a hostile manner. We did no manner of vio- 
lence to any one : we proclaimed aloud, that 
" whoever was desirous to conform to the 
primitive institutions of all Boeotians, should 
come and join us." — You heard our vpice with 
pleasure; you came in and entered into articles 
with us ; you remained for a time without dis- 
turbance ; but at length, having discovered the 
smallness of our number, and then perhaps we 
were judged to have proceeded inhumanly in 
presuming to enter without the consent of your 
populace, you then returned us not such treat- 
ment as you had received from us, you made 
no remonstrances against innovations, nor 
persuaded us to depart, but in open breach of 
articles you rushed upon us. We lament not 
here so much the death of those wfiom you 
slew in this base attack upon us ; some colour 
of law might be alleged for their destruction : 
but when, contrary to every law, in cold blood, 
you murdered men who had spread their arms 
for mercy, and had surrendered themselves 
prisoners on promise of their lives, — was not 
that a monstrous act? In one short interval of 
time you were guilty of three outrageous 
enormities, an infraction of articles, the suc- 
ceeding butcher^N^of out people, and a breach 
of the solemn promise made to us, that you 
would not kill them,' provided we refrained 
from plundering your lands. Yet still you cry- 
aloud, that we are the breakers of law ; you 
still temonstrate, that you are not debtors to 
justice. It is false. The point, we presume, 
will soon be determined right : and for these, 
for all offences, you shall have your reward. 

<« We have thus distinctly run over this af- 
fair, for your sakes, O ye Jjacedemonians, as 
well as for our own ; that you may be convin- 
ced with how much equity you are going to 
condemn them, and that we have pursued the 
offenders upon ydt stronger obligations of jus- 



116 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



tice. Let not the recital of their former 
Tirtuesy if virtues truly they ever had, mollify 
your hearts. Virtue should be pleaded by men 
who have suffered; but, on those who have 
committed baseness, it should redouble their 
punishment, because they sin in foul contra- 
riety to their former selves. Let them not save 
themselves by lamentations and pathetic com- 
plaints, though they cried out so movingly 
upon the sepulchres of your fathers, and their 
own destitute forlorn condition. For, to stop 
their cries, we have proved against them, that 
our youths, when butchered by them, met with 
a more cruel and unjust fate : those youths, 
some of whose fathers, reconciling Bceotia 
with you, died in the field of Coronea ; the 
rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their 
children, their houses desolate, prefer a suppli- 
cation far more just to you, to avenge them 
upon these Platsans. Those are most de- 
serving of pity, who have suffered some great 
indignity ; but when vengeance is duly inflicted 
on such men as these Platsans, the world hath 
cause to triumph. Their present destitute for- 
lorn condition is the work of themselves. They 
wilfully rejected a better alliance ; and, though 
uninjured, broke every law against us; execu- 
tioners of hatred more than justice, though now 
about to suffer less than the precedent they 
set requireth. For they shall be executed by 
lawful sentence ; not Uke men who with stiretch- 
ed-out hands obtained fair quarter, as they de- 
scribe themselves, but who surrendered on this 
condition — to submit to justice. 

« Avenge therefore, O Lacedsemonians, the 
law of Greece, so grossly violated by them. 
Retaliate all the injuries we have suffered, re- 
quiting so that cheerful friendship we have ever 
shown you ; and let not their flow of words 
overturn our just demands. Make now a pre- 
cedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Show 
them, that decisions must be formed, not ac- 
cording to what men may say, but according to 
what they have done : if their actions have 
been right, that a short simple narration may at 
any time suffice ; but, if those actions have 
been wrong, that all studied ornamental periods 
are intended to disguise the truth. If those 
who preside at judgments, as you at present, 
would proceed in a summary way, to a general 
determination agtunst the guilty, little room 
would be left to disguise unjustifiable actions 
by plausible speeches." 

In this manner the Thebans replied; and 



the Lacedemonian judges agreed in the resohi- 
tion, that the question,-^' Whether they had 
received any good service from them in the 
warl** — was properly and fairly conceived. 
They grounded this, upon the former proposal 
made to them to remain neutral, according to 
the old treaty of Pausanias after the Medish 
invasion, and upon another more lately, which 
they had oflered before they had blocked them 
up, to be common friends to both sides in con- 
formity to the same treaty. But after this dou- 
ble refusal, looking upon themselves as no 
longer bound to observe those articles, which 
others had deliberately infringed to travenw 
their interest, — they now proceed again to 
bring them forwards man by man, and put the 
question-— *< Whether they had done good ser- 
vice to the Lacedemonians and allies in the 
present war V* — and upon their answering <No,' 
led them aside and slew them. Not one of 
the number did they exempt ; so that in this 
massacre there perished of Platsans not fewer 
than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians 
who had been besieged in their company ; and 
all the women were sold for slaves. The 
Thebans assigned the city, for the space of a 
year, to be the residence of certain Megareans, 
who had been driven from home in the rage of 
a sedition, and to those surviving Plateaus 
who had been friends to the Theban interest 
But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, 
rooted up its whole foundation, and near to 
June's temple erected a spacious inn, two hun- 
dred feet square, partitioned within both above 
and below into a range of apartments. In this 
structure they made use of the roofs and dooa 
that had belonged to the Platsans; and of the 
other moveables found within their houses, of ' 
the brass and iron, they made beds, which they 
consecrated to Juno, in whose honour they also 
erected a fane of stone one hundred feet m 
diameter. The land being confiscated to pub- 
lic use, was farmed out for ten years, and occu- 
pied by Thebans. So much, nay, so totally 
averse to the Platsans were the Lacedemoni- 
ans become ; and this, merely to gratify the 
Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to 
serve them in the war which was-now on foot. 



« Thucydides hath here been very sparing of hta«»* 
sure. Nothing bad enough can be said of the Lacedc* 
monian behaviour on thia occasion. To put brave ■*■ 
to death coolly and deliberately, who had moatgallaatly 
defended themselves, and merely fbr their steady at- 
tachment to liberty and the Athenians, were baled by 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



117 



And thus was the destraction of Platsa com- 
pleted in the ninety-third year of its alliance 
with Athens. 

The forty sail of Peloponnesians, which had 
been sent to the relief of Leshos, after Hying 
through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from 
Athens, were driven by a tempest on the coast 
of Crete ; and from thence they separately 
dropped into Cyllene, a Peloponnesian harbour, 
where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadi- 
ans and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of 
TelUs sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas 
with his counsel. It was now the project of 
the LacedsBmonians, since they had miscarried 
at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail im- 
mediately for Corcyra, now embroiled in sedi- 
tion, as there were no Athenians in those parts, 
excepting only twelve ships which were station- 
ed at Naupactus — and thus their design might 
be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to 
obstruct them could be sent from Athens. — 
This was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas 
prepared for its execution. 

The Corcyreans were now embroiled in a 
sedition, excited by the return of the prisoners, 
whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval 
engagements of £pidamnus. They had obtain- 
ed their release, as was publicly given out, for 
the sum of eighty talents,^ for the payment of 
which their former friends at Corinth had 
joined in a security ; but, in fact, for a secret 
promise they had made the Corinthians, to put 
Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their en- 
gagements they tampered with every single Cor- 
cyrean in order to bring about a revolt from the 
Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian 
ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors 
onboard. These were admitted together to 
an audience, at which the Corcyreans decreed 
** to maintain their alliance with the Athenians 
according to treaty, — ^but to be firiends to the 
Peloponnesians as in preceding times." Py- 

the Theh^ns, shows the publicspirit of Spartans at this 
time to have been none at all. — The city of Plateea, thus 
l>arbarou8ly demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of 
Anialcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. 
But not long after, it was again demolished by the The- 
tx^iB, for a refusal to join them against the Lacedemoni- 
ins. However, Alexander the Great once more re-es- 
tablished it, in a generous acknowledgement of the ser- 
vices that little state had rendered to Greece; and the 
PlatBani continued even in the time of Plutarch, to 
^ebrate the annual festival in honour of those, who at 
the famous battle of Platca had died for tbe liberties of 

• £Vi^500 sterling. 



thiaS) who at that time was at the head of the 
people, entertained and lodged the Athenians 
without the pubUc warrant. And therefore 
against him the accomplices prefer an accusa- 
tion, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to < 
Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, 
in his turn exhibits a charge against five of the 
most considerable of their number, for having 
cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and 
Alcinus. The fine for every pale was by law 
a stater.^ Being condemned to pay the whole, 
they fled into the temples and sat down as sup- 
plicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their 
fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, 
who was also strong in the senate, gets a fresh 
order to have it levied in all tl)e rigour of law. 
Thus debarred of any legal redress, and con- 
scious further that Pythias, so long as he con- 
tinued in the senate, would prevail upon the 
people to declare those their friends and those 
their foes who were so to Athens, — they rise 
up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggers rush 
suddenly into the senate-house, where they 
stab Pythias and others both senators and pri- 
vate persons, to the number of sixty. Some 
few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, 
saved themselves on board the Athenian vessels 
which yet lay in the harbour. 

After this bold assassination, they summon- 
ed the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, 
where they justified their proceedings « as most 
highly for the pubUc good, and the only expe- 
dient of preventing Athenian slavery ;'* — advis- 
ing them " for the future to receive neither of 
the rival parties, unless they came peacefully 
in a single vessel ; if in more to declare them 
enemies;" and in conclusion they forced the 
ratification of whatever they had proposed. 
They also instantly despatch ambassadors to 
Athens, representing the necessity they lay un- 
der to act s^s they had done, and to persuade those 
who had fled for refuge thither, not to rush into 
such measures as might hurt the welfare of 
their country, from a dread of the miseries 
which might thence ensue. 

When these ambassadors were arrived at 
Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their 
adherents under an arrest as enemies to the ^ 
state, and sent them prisoners to ^gina. 

In the meantime, those . of the Corcyreans 
who had thus seized the government, animated 
by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a 



t £] 0». M. 



f2 



118 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book iir. 



Lacedstnonian embassy, attack the people and 
overpower them in battle. The people, by 
favour of the night which approached, fly to 
the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, 
where they drew up together and secured their 
posts; they also got possession of the Hyllaic 
harbour. But their opponents seized the fo- 
rum, where most of their own houses were situ- 
ated, and the harbour which points towards the 
forum and the continent. 

The day following they skirmished a little 
with their missive weapons, and both parties 
sent out detachments into the fields, to invite 
the concurrence of the slaves, upon a promise 
of their freedom. A majority of slaves came 
in to the assistance of the people, and the other 
party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the 
continent. 

After one day's respite they come again to 
Blows. The people get the better now, by the 
Advantage of their strong posts and their num- 
bers. The women with notable boldness as- 
sisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from 
the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tu- 
mult beyond their sex. About the close of the 
evening, the few were forced to fly, and then, 
apprehensive lest the people should rush down 
upon, and so at a shout seize the dock and put 
them to the sword, in order to stop their pass- 
age they set fire to the houses all round the 
forum and to such as were adjacent, sparing 
neither their own nor those of their enemies. 
The large effects of the merchants were con- 
sumed in the flames, and the whole city was in 
danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of 
wind arose to drive the flame that way. This 
put a stop to the contest, and brought on a ces- 
sation, when both sides applied themselves to 
strict guard for the night The Corinthian 
vessel, after this victory on the side of the peo- 
ple, stole privately away; and many of the 
auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed 
to the opposite shore. 

The day following, Nicostratus the son of 
Diotrephes, who commanded the Athenian 
squadron, comes up to their assistance with his 
twelve sail from Naupactus and five hundred 
heavy-armed Messenians. He forthwith nego- 
tiated an accommodation, and persuades them 
to make up the aflfair with one another, by in- 
itantly condemning the ten principal authors 
df the sedition (who immediately fled), and 
permitting all others to continue in the city, 
upon articles signed between both parties and ; 



the Athenians — << To have the same friends and 
the same foes." Having so far carried his 
point, he was intent on immediate departure. 
But the managers for the people made him a 
proposal, to leave five ships of his squadron 
with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh 
commotion, which should be replaced by five 
of their own, which they would instantly man 
to attend him on his station. With this pro- 
posal he complied ; and they named distinctly 
the mariners, who to a man were of the op- 
posite party. Affrighted at this as a pretext 
to convey them to Athens, they sit down in the 
temple of the Diosuri. Nicostratus endeavour- 
ed to raise them up and to cheer their despon- 
dency. Yet all he could say was unavailing; 
and the people ran again to arms, pretending 
that such a refusal to put to sea was a plain 
proof, that their intentions were insincere 
throughout Then they rifled their houses of 
all the arms thev could find ; and some of them 
who fell into their hands had immediately been 
butchered, if Nicostratus had not interposed. 

A second party, terrified at these proceed- 
ings, take their seats also as suppliants in the 
temple of Juno. The number of these was 
not less than four hundred. The people, grown 
now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuade 
them to leave their sanctuary; and having 
prevailed, transport them into that island which 
faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing 
needful for their sustenance was carefully sent 
them. 

The sedition continuing in this posture, 
about the fourth or fifth day after the transpor- 
tation of the latter body into that island, the 
Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at 
Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in 
sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas 
was commander-in-chief as before, and Brasidas 
attended as his council. They came to anchor 
in the harbour of Sybota on the main ; and next 
morning, at break of day, steered directly for 
Corey ra. 

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra : they 
were afraid of the malcontents within, and the 
hostile fleet approaching the city. They got 
sixty ships immediately on float, and each so 
fast as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. 
The Athenians indeed proposed to put out first 
to sea themselves; and that the Corcyreans 
should afterwards come out and join them, 
when they had got all their ships together. 
But, as they advanced in a straggling manner 



Y£AS v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



1)9 



towards Uie enemy, two ships went directly 
oTer to them ; and on board others the mari- 
oers were at blows with one another. In short, 
there was no manner of order in any of their 
motions. The Laceda}monians, perceiving 
how it was, with twenty of their ships drew 
up to engage the Corcyreans, and opposed 
the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of 
which were only the Salaminian and the Paralus. 

The Corcyjreans, who charged in this disor- 
derly manner, and with few ships in a line, were 
on their side terribly distressed; while the 
Athenians, fearing lest the other, vastly superiour 
in number, might quite surround their little 
squadron, would not venture to attack them 
when altogether, nor to break upon the mid- 
dle of the enemy's line ; but, assaulting them 
towards one of the extremities, sink one of 
their ships. Upon this, the Peloponnesians 
having fonned a circle, the Athenians sailed 
round and round, and endeavoured to break 
their order. Those who pursued the Corcyre- 
ans perceiving this, and fearing what had hap- 
pened formerly at Naupactus, steered away 
from thence to support their own squadron. 
And now, with their whole embodied strength, 
they designed to pour upon the Athenians. 
They, having already shifted the helm, fell 
gradually away. They were desirous to favour 
the flight of the Corcyreans beyond the possi- 
bility of a chase, and so they fell off entirely 
&t their own leisure, keeping the enemy in 
their front still ranged in order. Such was this 
engagement, which at the setting of the sun 
was quite ended. 

The Corcyreans were afraid lest the enemy, 
in prosecution of their victory, should immedi- 
ately assault the city, or take up the persons in 
the island, or by some other method attempt to 
distress them. For this reason, they removed 
the prisoners again from the island, into the 
temple of Juno, and applied themselves to 
guard the city. But Ijie enemy, thpugh vic- 
torious at sea, durst not Uiink of proceeding to 
attack ihe city ; but satisfied with taking thir- 
teen ships belonging to the Corcyreans, they 
returned to the main, from whence they had 
sallied to the engagement. The next day also, 
they refrained from making any attempt upon 
the city, where the disorder and consternation 
Were as great as ever. Brasidas is reputed u|v 
gently to have pressed it upon Alcidas, but 
^ the council of wsgr it was 4\Ute ovem^led* 



They landed however at cape L^ueyEone, «a4 
plundered the country. 

The Corcyrean people, whose fears were 
still suggesting that they should be attacked by 
the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the 
suppliants and others about the only mcfuis U> 
preserve the city. And some of them they 
persuaded to join in navigating their ships; 
for by some means or other they had again 
manned thirty, expecting every moment the 
enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians 
continued the ravage of their fields only till 
nopn, and then repassed to their former station^. 
Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day, 
they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal 
number of Athe^iian ships advancing from 
Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of tihe 
sedition and the course of the fleet under Alt* 
cidas against Cor«yra, had sent away this rein- 
forcement under the command of IBurymedoQ 
the son of Thucles. Upon this the Pelopoiv- 
nesians, whilst yet it was night, crept home- 
wards along the shore, and carrying their ves- 
sels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they 
should be discovered in going round it, 
are safely retreated within their own con- 
fines. 

When the Corcyreans had discovered the 
approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and 
the departure of the enemy, they received the 
Messenians within their walls, who till now 
had lodged without ; and, having ordered the 
ships which they had manned to come about 
into the Hyllaic harbour, whilst they were going 
about in pursuance of this order, they put all 
the adverse faction whom they found to the 
sword. Those further, who had taken on ix| 
the ships at their persuasion, they threw into 
the sea and then retired. They afterwards 
went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party 
of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to 
undergo a judicial trial, in which they were al) 
condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, 
who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner 
saw the fate of their brethren, than they either 
slew one another within the temple, or hung 
themselves up upon the trees within its verge : 
each finding some expedient for his own des- 
patch. During those seven days that Eury- 
medon with his reinforcement continued at 
Corcyra, the people of that city extended the 
massaere to all whom they judged their enemief. 
T]ie crime on which they justified their pro- 



120 



PELOPONNESIAlSr WAR. 



[fiooKin. 



oeedings, was their attempt to overturn the de- 
mocracy. 

Some perished merely through private en- 
mity ; some for the sums they had lent, by the 
hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death 
was here ejihibited. Every dreadful act usual 
in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpe- 
trated now. For fathers slew their children ; 
some were dragged from altars ; and some were 
butchered at them. And a number of persons 
immured in the temple of Bacchus were starv- 
ed to death. So cruel was the progress of 
this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it 
appear, because the fi|rst of so black a nature 
that ever happened. But afterwards the con- 
tagion spread, one may say, through the whole 
extent of Greece, when factions raged in every 
city, the popular demagogues contending for 
the Athenians, the aspiring few for the Lace- 
dflBmonians. In peace, it is true, they were 
void of all pretext, of all opportunity, Ho invite 
these rivals. But now, amidst declared hostil- 
ities, and the quest of alliance to afflict their 
enemies and add an increase of strength to 
themselves, opportunities were easily found by 
such as were fond of innovations to introduce 
the side they favoured. The consequence of 
this was sedition in cities, with all its nu- 
merous and tragical incidents. Such were 
now, and such things ever will be, so long as 
human nature continues the same ; but under 
greater or less aggravations and diversified in 
circumstances, according to the several vicis- 
situdes of, conjunctures, which shall happen to 
occur. In the seasons of peace and affluence, 
communities as well as individuals have their 
tempers under better regulation, because not 
liable to that violence which flows from neces- 
sity. But war, which snatcheth from them 
their daily subsistence, is the teacher of vio- 
lence, and assimilates the passions of men to 
their present condition. 

By these means were cities harassed with 
seditions. And those to whose fate the later 
commotions fell, through inquiry what had 
happened in such instances before, grew enor- 
mously ambitious to suppress the machination 
of others, both in policy of attempts and ex- 
travagance of revenge. Even words lost now 
their former significance, since to paUiate ac- 
tions they were quite distorted. For truly, what 
liefore was brutal courage, began to be esteemed 
that fortitude which becomes a human and soci- 



able creature; prudent consideration, to be 
specious cowardice ; modesty, the disguise d ef- 
feminacy ; and being wise in every thing, to be 
good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was ad- 
judged the exertion of true manly valour ; caO' , 
tious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pre- 
text for intended knavery. He who boiled with 
indignation was undoubtedly trusty ; who pre- 
sumed to contradict was ever suspected. He 
who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise, 
and he who suspected such practices in others, 
was still a more able genius. But was he pro- 
vident enough, so as never to be in need of 
such base expedients ; he was one that would 
not stand to his engagements, and most shame- 
fully awed by his foes. In short, he who 
could prevent another in executing villany, or 
could persuade a well-designing person to it, was 
sure to be applauded. 

Men now, who were allied in blood, were 
less valued or caressed, than such as "were 
connected by voluntary combination ; since the 
latter, unscrupulous and uninquisitive, were 
more ready to embark in any scheme whateTer. 
For now associations were not formed for such 
mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for 
the execution of such rapines as are contrary 
to human laws. In mutual trust they persist- 
ed, not out of any regard to religious obligation, 
but from the bond of communicated guilt To 
the fair and honest proposals of adversaries, 
they hearkened indeed when such by active 
strength could controul them, but never through 
candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another 
was a more valued possession than never to 
have suffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for 
present reconciliation, had a temporary force, 
so long as neither knew how to break them: 
but never when either party had power to abet 
their violation. He who, at inviting oppor- 
tunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the ad- 
versary was off" his guard, executed his rancour 
with higher spirit than from enmity open and 
avowed. Such a step was thought most se- 
cure ; and, because he had thus surpassed m 
guile, it was certainly extolled as a master-piece 
of cunning. Large is the number of villains, 
and such obtain more easily the reputation oi 
dexterity than their dupes can that of goodness: 
the latter are apt to blush ; the former most im- 
pudently triumph. 

The source of all these evils is a Airst of 
power, in consequence either of rapacious oi 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



1^1 



ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated 
by snch, is ever ready to engage in.party-feudS) 
For the men of large influence in communities 
avowing on both sides a specious cause, some 
standing up for the just equality of the popular, 
others for the fair decorum of the aristocratical 
government, by artful sounds, embarrassed those 
^communities for their own private lucre. Both 
sides, intent on victory, carried on the conten- 
tion with the keenest spirit. 'They most dar- 
ingly projected, and then regularly executed, 
the most dreadful machinations. Their revenge 
was not limited by justice or the public wel- 
fare; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. 
Either side constantly measured it by such re- 
taliation as was judged the sweetest, either by 
a capital condemnation through an iniquitous 
sentence, or by earning the victory with their 
own hands, in which they were always ready to 
glut the present rancour of their hearts, ^nd 
hence it was, that the pious and upright con- 
duct was on both sides disregarded. And, 
when any point of great importance was be- 
fore them, to carry it by specious collusive ora- 
tory was the N greatest enchancement of their 
credit. Yet all this while, the moderate mem- 
bers of such communities, either hated because 
they would not meddle, or envied for such ob- 
noxious conduct, fell victims to both. 

Seditions in this manner introduced every 
■pedes of outrageous wickedness into the 
Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most 
frequently to be found in generous tempers, 
was laughed out of countenance and for ever 
vanished. It was become the universal practice, 
to keep up a constant enmity of intention 
ftgainst one another, and never to believe. No 
promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently 
Bolenm, to banish such mutual diffidence. 
Those who excelled in shrewd consideration 
resigned all hope of any lasting security, and 
stood ever on their guard against whom it was 
inipoasible for them to trust. But persons 
of meaner understandings took more effectual 
means for their preservation. Living in con- 
stant apprehensions, from their own inferiority 
Mid the craft of their opponents, lest by words 
t^ey should be over-reached, or that such sub- 
tile heads might execute their treacheries upon 
them unawares, they boldly seized the present 
moment, and at once despatched the men they 
areaded; who, presuming too much on their 
°^n penetration, and that it was superfluous 
^ aim a blow at those whom they could at any 
23 



time supplant by cunning, despised them so fai 
as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed 
to their own destruction. 

Many such daring outrages were now by way 
of precedent committed at Corcyra ; nay, all 
whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge 
upon such as before were their masters, and 
had exerted their superiority with savageness 
more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upoQ 
them, were executed there.— Some joined in 
these acts of violence to procure a discharge 
from their former poverty; but the greater 
number, through a passionate desire to seize 
the property of their neighbours : or, though 
they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but 
engaged in the contest upon fair and open views, 
yet hurried to wild extravagence through mad 
and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel 
acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole 
order of human life was for a season confounded 
in this city. The human temper, tootipt to trans- 
gress in spite of laws, and now having gained 
the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with ex- 
hibiting this public manifestaticm, that it was 
too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and 
an enemy to all superiority. Men could not 
otherwise have awarded the preference to re- 
venge over righteous duty, and to lucre over 
that habit of justice in which envy never yet 
had power to annoy them. But more than 
this, when the point in view is revenge upon 
others, men haughtily make precedents against 
themselves, by infringing those laws which are 
binding by the ties of nature, and from which 
alone any hope of safety can be extracted for 
themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding 
thus all possibility of redress, should they be 
reduced in some future extremity to make the 
same appeal. 

And thus the Corcyreans continued to ex- 
ecute the rage of such cruel passions, upon the 
heads of one another, within the precincts of 
their own city, of which this was the first ex-» 
ample in Greece, till Eurymedon with the 
Athenian fleet under his command put out 
again to sea. 

But, after his departure, they who by flight 
had preserved their lives, to the number of 
about five hundred, having seized their forts 
upon the opposite shore, got possession of their 
own land, on that side the water. Putting out 
hence, they plundered the Corcyreans in the 
island, and made such havoc that a violent 
famine ensued in the city. They further sent 



122 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



a deputation to Lacedemon and Corinth, to ne- 
gotiate the means of their restoration. But 
nothing of this kind succeeding, they got to- 
gether afterwards a body of auxiliaries and 
transports, and so passed over to the island of 
Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men. 
Having now set fire to their transports, to pre- 
clude every other expedient but gaining firm 
footing where now they were, they marched up 
to the mountain Istone, and having fortified 
themselves there, made cruel work with those 
in the city, and were masters of the country 
round about. 

About the end of the same summer, the 
Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under 
the command of Laches the son of Melanopus 
and Gharceadas the son of £uphiletus. A war 
was now on foot between the Syracusans and 
Leontines. Confederate ^itii the Syracusans 
were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, 
which had formerly entered into alliance with 
the Lacedsmonians before this war broke out, 
but had yet no where effectually joined them. 
With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, 
and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrines sided 
with the Syracusans : and the Rhegians, from 
the motive of consanguinity, with the Leon- 
tines. The allies therefore of the Leontines 
sent to Athens,* petitioning the Athenians in 
respect of their old alliance and their Ionic de- 
scent, to send them a succour of shipping : for 
the Syracusans had now blocked them up both 
by land and sea. The Athenians immediately 
sent one, giving out that they were bound in 
duty to take this step ; but their real motive 
was, to prevent the exportation of com from 
thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the 
possibility of bringing Sicily into their own sub- 
jection. Their squadron therefore arriving at 
Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their 



> One of the persons, or the chief, employed on this 
occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontium, the first 
rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his 
audience from the Athenians to deliver the reasons of 
his embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, 
so new in the manner of its turns, so pretty in the ex- 
pression, and CO nicely diversified by a change and op- 
position of figurca, that he won their hearts, and suc- 
ceeded in his negociatlon. Our historian indeed, who 
takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons 
just after the ready compliance of the Ath euians on this 
occasion. It is a step which draws great consequences af- 
ter it. Thucydides <n the sequel will open all the plan, 
and give nn exact detail of the operations of this new war, 
into which the Athenians are beginning to tmburic. 



allies in the present war ; ^d in this the bobl 
mer ended. 

In the beginning of the winter the plague 
broke out a second time at Athens, not that 
during this whole interval of time it had wholly 
ceased, though its rage had very much abated 
But now the mortality began again, and con- 
tinued not less than a year: but the former 
had raged for the space of two. There was 
nothing which lay upon the Athenians so hard 
as this, or so much impaired their strength. It 
appeared from the muster-rolls, that there per- 
ished foui thousand and four hundred of those 
citizens who wore the heavy armour, and three 
hundred of the horsemen. The number of the 
lower people that died was not to be computed. 
— There happened at the same time many 
earthquakes ; at Athens ; in Euboea ; amongst 
the Boeotians, and especially at the Boeotian 
Orchomenus. 

The same winter, the Athenians and Khe- 
gians, on the coast of Sicily, form an expedi- 
tion with thirty sail, against those which are 
called the isles of ^olus. This was not feasi- 
ble in the stimmer season, for want of water. 
These isles are inhabited by the Liparcans, 
who were a colony from Cnidus. Their resi- 
dence was chiefly in one of them called Lipare, 
though by no means large. They go from 
hence to the tillage of the otheis, Didyme and 
Strongyle and Hiera. It is believed by those 
people, that Vulcan' keeps his forge in Hiera, 
because in the night it visibly throws forth a 
great quantity of fire, and in the day, of smbke. 
These isles are situated over-against the shore 
of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were al- 
lied with Syracuse. The Athenians having 
plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants 
would not come in, put back again to Rhegium. 
— And here the winter ended, and the fifth 
year of this war, the history of which Thucy 
dides hath compiled. 

TEAR YI. 

The following summer, the Peloponnesians 
and confederates assembled at the Isthmus, in 



a So Virgil, 1. viii. 416. 

Inmla SScanium jozta Li1itt£olianqae 
Erigititr Liptnn, fumaBlibnt ardiu axb : 
Quam rabter specus et Cyclopain ezen camiai* 
Antn £tuea touot, vAlidique inendibu ktn 
Attditi fflfenut gunitun, ■triduntqna CKftnm 
Stricturae Chalybum, et fornaeibiu ignU anbeUt; 
Vulcant doiaiM, el Vuleania oomine telloa. 

* Before Christ 436. 



SEAB VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



133 



order to make the usual iroad into Attica; 
and Agis son of Archidamus, kingpof the La- 
cedemonians, was there ready for the command; 
But the frequent earthquakes which happened 
about this time, caused them to return back, 
and entirely put a stop to the designed incur- 
sion. 

About the same space of time shocks of 
earthquakes were felt in Eaboea, where at Oro- 
biiB the sea breaking over what was then land 
with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city 
under water : some of which stagnated there, 
though some washed its way back ; however, a 
tract now continues sea which before was land. 
All those who could not reach the higher 
grounds in time, by running before the surge, 
were drowned. — A similar inundation happen- 
ed at the isle of Atalantas, amongst the Lo- 
crians of Opus, where it wf^hed away the 
Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry 
upon the beach, staved one to pieces. — At 
Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very 
high, hut did not overflow. An earthquake 
however demolished part of the fortification,* 
the tovmhouse, and some few dwelling-houses. 
— My solution of such effects is this: where the 
shock of the earthquake was most violent, it 
forcibly drove away the sea before it, which 
suddenly returning a^ain occasioned these more 
violent swells. And without an earthquake I 
deem all such accidents impossible. 

The same summer, many of the other na- 
tions, as they happened to be drawn into the 
quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as 
well as the Sicilians themselves, who took up 
arms one against another, and the Athenians 
together with their allies. Yet, the most me- 
morable actions alone, either of the alUes thus 
aided by the Athenians, or of the common ene- 
my against the Athenians, shall I now relate. 
— Charoeadas the Athenian commander having 
lost his life in the Syracusan war. Laches who 
had now the sole command of the fleet, in 
junction with the allies, appeared before Myls 
of the Messenians. The garrison of MylsB 
consisted of two companies of Messenians; 
and these had formed an ambuscade to cut ofi* 
the enemy when landed. ■ But the Athenians 
and allies .drive them from the place of ambush 
with great slaughter. Then th«y proceeded to 
assault the works, which necessitated the de- 
fendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, 

> Plytaneum. 



and even to attend them against Messene. But 
after this, the Athenians and allies were no 
sooner approached, than the Messenians also 
compounded, giving hostages and all other secu- 
rities required for their future behaviour. 

The same summer, the Athenians with 
thirty sail of ships commanded by Demos- 
thenes^ the son of Alcisthenes and Procles the 
son of Theodorus, appeared upon the coast of 
Peloponnesus; whilst a larger armament of 
sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was em- 
ployed against Melos, under the command of 
Nicias son of Niceratus. Melos is an island ; 
and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the 
Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede 
to their alliance, they were now bent on its re- 
duction. Having laid the island waste, and the 
Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians 
put again to sea, and crossed over' to Oro- 
pus on the opposite shore ; where arriving at 
night, the heavy-armed were detached to march 
with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of 
Boeotia. Notice being given of their arrival 
there, they were instantly joined by the whole 
force of Athens, which had marched out of the 
city under the orders of Hipponicus the son of 
Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. A 
camp they formed ; and having for the space of 
a day laid the territory waste, they reposed them- 
selves there the succeeding night. But the 
next morning, having gained a victory over the 
Tanagreans, who aided by a party of Thebans 
sallied out upon them, they only staid to gather 
up the arms and erect a trophy, and then march- 
ed away — ^these bslck again to the city ; and 
those to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting 
out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the 
sea-coast of Locris, and then returned into the 
harbour of Athens. 

It was about this time that the Lacedemo- 
nians founded the colony of Heraclea in Tra- 



9 This Demostbenes will make a considerable figure 
in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator 
of the same name hath ranked him amongst the great- 
est of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nic- 
ias. He styles him also an orator; and Thucydides will 
give us hereafter a specimen of his manner of harangu- 
ing. His Tiame-sake indeed hath carried off all the 
glory of eloquence: but the Demosthenes, who is the sub* 
ject of this note was an able general, very enterprising, 
and very brave; always vigilant in the service of his 
country, though more as a soldier than a statesman; and, 
provided his country was served, not too anxious about 
who carried off the honour. In short, he was an open- 
I hearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian. 



124 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bo(« m 



ohinia. Their view in doing it was this; — 
those, who in general are styled Meliensians, 
are divided into three bodies ; Paralians, Hier* 
ensians, and Trachinians. The last o/ these 
the Trachinians, who had been terribly distress- 
ed by a war made upon them by the bordering 
Oetsans, had first of all intended to throw 
themselves nnder the Athenian protection; 
but afterwards, apprehending they might not be 
hearty in their support, they made application 
to Lacedsmon by Tisamenus, the delegate ap- 
pointed by them on this occasion. The Dori- 
ans too, from whom the Lacedtemonians are 
descended, sent their ambassadors also to ac- 
company and join with him in the negotiation, 
for they likewise were infested by these Oets- 
^ans. The Lacedemonians, after an audience, 
resolved to send out this colony, as a sure ex- 
pedient not only to protect the Trachinians and 
Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Atheni- 
ans more sensibly in the course of the war, 
from a 'city so commodiously seated. For 
thence they could at any time make an attack 
npon Euboea, as the passage was but short; and 
further, it lay most conveniently upon the road 
to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager 
about building this city. In the first place, 
therefore, they begged the advice of the god at 
Delphi. His answer being favourable, they 
sent out a colony composed of their own and 
the neighbouring people ; encouraging further 
all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this 
settlement, except lonians and Acheans, and 
some of foreign nations. Three Lacedemoni- 
ans are appointed to be the leaders of this 
colony; Leon, and Alcides, and Damagon. 
These arriving at the spot, erect upon a new 
foundation and wall round the city which is 
now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia^ 
from Thermopylae, and twenty from the sea. 
They proceeded next to build the naval docks ; 
and these they began at Thermopylce close un- 
der the straits, since there they were capable of 
the strongest defence. 

The Athenians, when they saw the large 
resort to this colony, were at first upder great 
apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly 
intended for the annoyance of Eubcea, as the 
passage from it was short to Censum in Eu- 
bcea; though, in the sequel, their apprehen- 
sions proved entirely groundless. Not the 



1 About four miles. 



I 



least damage accrued to them from this colonj ; 
and the reason was this ; the Thessalians, who 
were masters of all the country round aboat it, 
and upon whose very land it was built, fearing 
lest this new settlem^it might prove too powo^ 
ful a neighbouF at last, gave it all poasibie 
annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitanti 
with continual war, till from the large number 
they were at first they mouldered into nothing. 
When the Lacedemonians first declared the 
colony, the whole world was eager to get a set* 
tiement in a ci^ which they thought would 
want no support Not but that its sudden 
decay was owing also in great measure to the 
Lacedemonian leaders. From the first momoit 
of their arrival they had spoiled every thing 
wherein they meddled; they reduced their 
numbers to a handful of men, because their 
fears had driven away the rest, as the govern- 
ment was always severe and not always jiut 
The neighbouring people surprising them in 
such a state, prevailed against them with the 
utmost ease. , 

The same summer, and even during that 
interval of time, the Athenians were employed 
at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty 
sail who were upon the Peloponnesian coast, 
in the first place, having placed an amboah at 
Elomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cntou 
a part of the garrison. In the next place, with 
an augmented force they came up to Leucas, 
being attended now by the whole strengdi of 
the Acarnanians except the Oeniade, by the Za* 
cynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen sail 
of Gorcyreans. The Leucadians, thongh their 
territory was laid waste both without and with- 
in the Isthmus, where the city of Leucas and 
the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not 
venture ,out against such superior numbers. 
Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed 
it upon Demosthenes the Athenian general, 
to block them up by a wall of circumvallation: 
imagining they might easily reduce tfaeo* 
and rid themselves of a city which had been 
their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose, 
rather to hearken at this time to the sng" 
gestions of the Messenians ; « how glonoos 
it would be, as he was now at the head 
of so large a force, to invade the iEtohans, 
who were such plagues to Naupactna; and, 
if their reduction could be completed, «•• 
rest of that continent might easily be bro0g» 
into the Athenian subjection. For, though 
the iEtolians were a great and warlike peopJ«» 



YS.VR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



125 



yet as they dwelled in open villages remote ' in pursuance of an oracle which had ^ed 
from one another, as light armour only was in ! Nemea for the place of his death), he marched 



use amongst them, they presumed he might 
easily complete their reduction, before any 
iuccour could reach them.'' They advised 
him further, "to begin with the Apodoti, to 
take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to 
the Eurytanians (which is the most numerous 
people of ^tolia, reported also to speak in a 
most barbarous dialect, and to feed upon raw 
flesh); that, if these could be surprised, the 
rest of iEtolia would submit of course." He, 
therefore, willing to oblige the Massenians, and 
incited above all by the thought, that without 
exposing the Athenian forces, after he had 
done with the ^Stolians, he might march with 
the allied strength of the continent, and pene- 
trate by land as far as Bceotia, through the 
Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keep- 
ing Parnassus on his right till he got down 
amongst the Phocians, who, he<reckoned, from 
their constant friendship with the Athenians, 
would readily join him, or however might easily 
be compelled to do it ; and then, that Boeotia 
borders next oa the Phocians :'^Demosthenes, 
I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole 
force, to the gpreat regret of the Acamaniana, 
coasted along to Solium. He there communi- 
cated his plan to the Acamanians, in which 
they refused to join, because he had refused 
the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with 
his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messe- 
nians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred 
soldiers draugh.ted from on board the Athenian 
ships (the fifteen Corcyrean were already de- 
P<urted), set about this expedition against the 
•£tolians. He began it from Qeneon in 
Locris : for the Locrians, called Ozols, were 
^lies, and had notice to meet the Athenians 
with all their force in the midland parts. These, 
^ing not only borderers, but using also the 
B^une kind of arms with the uS^tolians, were 
judged most proper to accompany the expe- 
dition, as they knew so well their method of 
hattle, and their country. Having reposed his 
^nny one night within the verge of the temple 
^ the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants 
^▼e a tradition that Hesiod' the poet expired, 



* The itory of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch 
in The Banquet of the seven wise men. Solon inter- 
P<**nf here said, " Such things, Socles, must be re- 
*^fred immediately to the gods, they ore above human 
condition. But the case of Hesiod is within the lot of 
''umanity.and concerns us all. But perhaps you know 



again at break of day, and entered iStolia* 
On the first day he taketh Potidania, on the 
second Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. 
There he halted, and sent away the booty to 
Eupolium, of Locris. It wa* now his resolu- 
tion, afrer he liad subdued the rest, to march last 
of all against the Ophionians, if they did not 
voluntarily submit beforehand, in his retreat 
back to Naupactus. 

This preparation against them did by no 
means escape the .£tolians. The scheme waa 
no sooner formed than they had gained intel- 
ligence of it ; and by the time the army was 
within their borders, they were all drawn to- 
gether in a numerous body for their mutual 
defence; nay, even the most distant Ophio- 
nians, who are seated upon the Meliac bay, 
the Bomiensians and Calliensians, were already 
come up. 

The Messenians continued to amuse Demos- 
thenes with the same suggestions as at first: they 
still insisted, that the conquest of the i£toliana 
would be an easy performance, and advised him 
to advance immediately against their villages, nor 
give them tini^e to gather together in a body to 
oppose him, but to attack every place he came 
to, and take it This advice being quite to his 
own taste, and relying upon his own good for- 



the story." I do not, he replied. " It is then well worth 
your bearfng. A certain Milesian, it seems, in whose 
company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and entertained 
in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their 
host. When the affair came to ligtit, it was suspected 
that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, 
and concealed such base behaviour; and, though he was 
entirely innocent, he fell a victim to hasty resentment 
and foul calumniation. Tliebrotbersof the damsel laid 
wait for, and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, 
and with him bis servant, whose name was Troilns. 
Their bodies being thrown into the sea, tlf^t of Troilus, 
indeed, floating up into the river Daphitus, was stopped 
at a rock quite surrounded with water, n small distance 
from tne sea. But ti.e moment Hesiod's l:ody was 
thrown into the sea, a shoal of dolphins caught it and 
carried it to Rhium and Molycrium. The Locrians that 
very day were assembled at Rhiumfor a so'eron festival 
and sacrifice, which they still rontinue to celebrate at 
the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld 
in ks approach, than full of wonder, as was likely, they 
hurried down to the teach, and, knowing it to be the 
body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every 
other care to the discovery of this murder, from their 
high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done; the assas- 
sins were found out, whom they threw headlong into 
the sea and demolislied their houses. Itut Hesiod was 
buried by tl.em in the trmple of the Nemean Jove." 



Q 



126 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



tune, which hitherto had neTer heen checked, 
without wating for the Locrians who were 
yery much wanted,' and were to have joined 
him (for he stood most in need of light-armed 
darters), he advanced to ^Egitium, and assault- 
ing, takes it by storm. The inhabitants made 
their escape, and posted themselves upon the 
hills which overlook the town. It was situated 
amongst lofty eminences, and distant from the 
sea about eighty stadia.^ 

But now the ^tolians, who were come up 
for the preservation of ^gitium, running down 
in separate hollies from different eminences, 
made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, 
and poured in their javelins amongst them : 
and whenever the Athenian army approached 
to charge, they plied before them ; when they 
again fell back, thel^e again returned to the 
charge. This kind of engagement continued 
for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits 
and retreats, in both which the Athenians 
suffered most. So long however as their 
archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, 
they lost no ground ; for the light-armed JSto- 
liane fell back to avoid the darts. But when 
the chief of the archers dropped, his party was 
soon dispersed, and the whole army began to 
incline. Their strength was quite exhausted 
by so many repeated charges; and now, the 
JStolians pressing hard upon them, and pour- 
ing in whole showers of missive weapons, they 
turned about and fled. Now tumbling into 
caverns from whence they could not recover 
themselves, or bewildered in places of which 
they had no knowledge, they were miserably 
destroyed. For Cromon the Messenian, who 
laid out all the routes, had been killed in the 
battle. The iEtolians pursued with their darts, 
and being not only swift of foot, but also 
lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in 
their flight, •and did great execution. A large 
party, who had lost their way, threw them- 
selves into a wood which was quite impassable. 
The ^tolians set the wood on fire, in the 
flames of which they were all consumed. 
Every affecting species of flight" and destruc- 
tion was now the fate of the Athenian army. 
Those who had the good fortune to escape, 
effected it by reaching the sea and Oeneon of 
Locris, from whence they first began the expe- 
dition. 

The number of the allies who thus perished, 



1 About eight miles. 



was large ; that of heavy armed Athenians was 
about a hundred and twenty ; so considerable 
was the loss, and all of them in the very flower 
of their youth. In the "whole course of this 
war, the state of Athens never lost at any one 
time so many of her most gallant citizens as 
now. Procles also, the other commander in this 
expedition, perished. 

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a 
truce obtained from the ^tolians. This being 
done, they retired to Naupactus, and there 
shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes 
however was left behind at Naupactus, and 
the parts adjacent. After such a miscarriage 
he durst not presume to face the people of 
Athens. 

About the same time, the Athenians on the 
Sicilian station, having sailed towards Locris, 
landed upon that coast. They destroyed a 
party of Locrians who endeavoured to make 
head against t!lem ; and then take Peripoliimi, 
a town situated on the river Halex. 

The same summer the ^tolians, who had 
some time before despatched an embassy to 
Corinth and Lacedsmon, composed of Tolo- 
phus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurysthan- 
ian, and Tisander the Apodotian, prevail there 
in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, 
because the Athenians had invaded their terri- 
tories. It was about autumn when the Lace- 
demonians marched awtiy three thousand heavy- 
armed of their allies ; of which number five 
hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city so 
lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a 
Spartan was appointed to command in the ex- 
pedition, and was accompanied by two other 
Spartans, Macarius and Menedieus. The army 
being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochna 
despatched a herald to the Ozolian Locri'; hit 
route to Naupactus lay through their territory. 
He was also desirous to detach them from the 
Athenian alliance. The Amphissensians were 
the readiest of all the Locri to give their con- 
currence, as standing in perpetual awe of the 
hatred bore them by the Phocians. These 
therefore were the first who sent in hostages, 
and who persuaded others to follow their ex- 
ample, from a dread of this army which was 
now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonen- 
sians, their own borderers, were the first who 
complied ; for their part of Locris is most diffi 
cult of access. These were followed by the 
Ippensians, and Messapians, and Tritaaensians, 
and Ghalheans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and 



YEAB VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



127 



Oeanthians ; and all these gave a personal at- 
tendance in the expedition. The Olpeans 
indeed sent in their hostages, but would not 
attend. The Hysans refused their hostages 
till one of their villages called Folis was seized. 

When all things were ready, and the hosta- 
ges placed securely at Cytinium of Doris, Eu- 
rylochus with his army taking the route of 
Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized 
upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for 
refusing to concur. When they had entered 
the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by 
the ^tolian aid, they wasted the country to the 
very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, 
they took possession. Turning thence to Mo- 
lycrium, a Corinthian colony, but now' subject 
to the Athenians, they reduce it. 

But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he had 
continued at Naupactus ever since the ^tolian 
miscarriage) having received intelligence of 
this army, and dreading the loss* of this place, 
had addressed himself to the Acamanians, and 
^th some difficulty, owing to his departure 
from Leucas, persuades them to send a suc- 
cour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a 
thousand of their heavy-armed under his or- 
ders, whom he threw into the town by sea, 
which eflfectually preserved it. For the danger 
before was manifest, as the wall was very large 
in compass, and the number of defendants in- 
considerable. 

When Eurylochus and his council had dis- 
covered that such a succour' had been received 
mto the town, and that its reduction was now 
impracticable, they marched away their forces, 
not towards Peloponnesus, but to that JBtolia 
which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to 
the neighbouring towns, and to Proschion of 
^tolia. The Ambraciots had now been with 
and prevailed upon them, to join in some at- 
tempts upon Argos in ' Amphilochia, upon the 
rest of that province, and Acarnania ; assuring 
them, that could these be reduced, the whole 
continent there would instantly go over to the 
liacedsmonian league. Eurylochus having 
8«8ured them of his concurrence, and given 
^e -^toUans their dismission, halted there- 
abouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had 
entered upon the expedition against Argos, and 
*^ Was time for him to join them. And here 
^ summer ended. 

*"« Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of 
^e winter, putting themselves at the head of 
^^ Grecian allies, and as many of their 



Sicilian as, unable to support the Syracusan 
yoke, had revolted from Syracuse to join them, 
began fresh operations of war in concert, and 
assaulted Nessa a town of Sicily, the citadel of 
which was in the hands of the Syracusans. 
But the attempt was unsuccessful, and they 
again determined to draw off. During the re- 
treat, the Syracusans sallying forth, fell upon 
those allies of the Athenians who marched in 
the rear, and with such force, that they put a 
part of the army to flight, and slew a consider 
able number, 

After this. Laches and the Athenians, hav- 
ing made some attentpts^ and landed on the 
coast of Locris near the mouth of the river 
Caicinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians 
consisting* of about three hundred, under 
Proxenus the son of Capaton. These the 
Athenians defeated, and having stripped them 
of their arms, went off the coast. 

The same winter also the Athenians purified 
Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus 
the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed 
the whole, but so much of the island as lies 
within the prospect of the temple. The puri- 
fication now was universal, and performed in 
the following manner : 

They broke up all the sepulchres of the 
dead without exception, and prohibited for the 
future any death or birth in the island, both 
which were to be confined to Rhensea. For 
Rhensea lies at so small a distance from Delos, 
that Polycrates the tyrant of Samoa, who was 
formerly of great power by sea, amongst other 
isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhensa 
also, which he consecrated to Delian \Apollo, 
and fastened it to Delos by a chain. And 
after this purification, the Athenians made the 
first institution of the Delian games to be so- 
lemnized every fifth returning year. Not but 
that in the earlier times there was used to be a 
great conflux of lonians and neighbouring 
islanders to Delos. They resorted to the so- 
lemn festivals there with their wives and chil- 
dren, in the same manner as the lonians do 
now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise 
and of music were actually celebrated, and 
cities exhibited their respective choruses. For 
this we hav6 the testimony of Homer in the 
following verses of his hymn to Apollo : 

To thee, O Phobbus, most the Delian isle 
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smile; 
When zny lonians flock around thy fane; 
Men, women, children, a resplendent train, 



128 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book iu. 



Whose flowing garments sweep the sacred pile, 
Whose grateful concourse gladdens all the isle. 
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the 

ground. 
Where cheerful music echoes all around. 
Thy feast to honour, and thy praise to soand. 

That there was also a musical g^ame to which 
artists resorted to maj^e trials of their skill, he 
fully showeth in other verses to be found in the 
same hymn : for, having sung the Delian chorus 
of females, he closeth their praise with these 
lines, in which further he hath made mention 
of himelf : 

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day. 

Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway; 

Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you, 

Ye blooming beauties of the islo, adieu! 

When future guests shall reach your happy shore, 

And refuged here from toils lament no more: 

When social chat the mind unbending cheers, 

And this demand shall greet your friendly ears — 

'* Who was the Dnrd, e*er landed on your coast. 

Who sung the sweetest, and who pleased you most?" 

With voice united, all ye blooming fair, 

Join in your answer, and for me declare; 

Say — "The blind bard the sweetest notes may boast, 

He lives at Chios, and he pleased us most." 

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that 
in early times there was a great concourse and 
festival at Delos. But afterwards the people 
of the islands and the Athenians sent in their 
parties for the chorus with victims. But the 
usual games, and the most of the solemn rites, 
had been disused, through some sinister events, 
till the Athenians now made a fresh institution 
of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot- 
race, which had not formerly been a part of it. 

The same winter, the Ambraciots, in pursu- 
ance of their engagements with Eurylochus, 
who waited their motions, march away with 
three thousand heavy-armed against the Am- 
philochian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into 
Argia, they seize Olps, a strong place, situated 
on an eminence on the sea-side. This place 
had been formerly fortified by the Acamanians, 
who used it for the public tribunal of justice. 
It is distant from the city of Argos, which is 
also a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia.* 
The Acamanians were now in motion, some 
running to the defence of Argos, others to en- 
camp at the important post of Grens in Am- 
philochia, to observe the motions of the Pelo- 
ponnesians commanded by Eurylochus, "that 
they might not perfect their junction with the 



1 About two milps and a half. 



Ambraciots, without some molestation on their 
route. They also send to Demosthenes the 
Athenian general in the uSStolian cxpeditioD, 
to come and put himself at their head ; and to 
the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, whicli 
was then upon the coast of Peloponnesus, un- 
der the command of Aristotle, son of Timo- 
crates, and Hierophon son of Antimncstus. 

The Ambraciots at Olpaj sent also a messen- 
ger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, 
to come out into the field. They were afraid 
lest Eurylochus might not be able to pass the 
Acamanians, and so they should be compelled 
cither to fight alone ; or, should they attempt 
a retreat, to find it full of danger. 

But the Pcloponnesians commanded by 
Eurylochus had no sooner heard that the Am- 
braciots were at Olps, than dislodging from 
Proschium they marched with all expedition to 
their support. After passing the Achelous, they 
took the route of Acamania, desolate at pre 
sent, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence 
of Argos, having on their right the city and 
garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acar- 
nania on their left. When they had passed 
through the territory of the Stratians, they 
crossed Phytia, and again through the extre- 
mity of Medeon, and then marched across 
Limnsa. They now entered the kingdom of 
the Agrsans, which had deserted the Acama. 
nian to favour the Peloponnesian interest 
Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild 
uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and de- 
scended thence by night into Argia. They 
afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the cjty 
of the Argians, and the post of the Acama- 
nians at Crens, and so perfected their junction 
with the Ambraciots at Olpc After this 
junction, their numbers being large, they take 
possession next mom, at break of daj, of* 
post cadled Metropolis, and there fix encamp- 
ment. 

Not long after this the Athenian squadron 
of twenty s|^l comes into the bay of Ambracw, 
to succour the Argians. Demosthenes al« 
arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Met- 
senians, and sixty Athenian archers. The 
station of the fleet was fixed under the fort 
of OlpiB. But the Acamanians, and some 
few of the Amphilochians, who had alreaJj 
gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majon- 
ty of them was obstructed by the Ambraciots.) 
got every thing in readiness to engage the ene- 
my. They elect Demosthenes to be the com- 



TSAB VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



129 



mander of the whole associated force, with the 
issistance of their own generals. He caused 
them to advance near Olps, and there encamped 
ihem. A great hollow lay between the armies. 
For five days they remained in a state of inac- 
tion, bat on the sixth both sides drew up in 
Drder of battle. The Peloponnesians were 
more Numerous, and their lino of course was 
farther extended. Demosthenes therefore, 
that he might not be inclosed, placeth an am- 
buscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the 
number in all of about four hundred, in a hol- 
low way overgrown widi shrubs and bushes, 
with orders that in the heat of the charge they 
should rise up and attack the over-extended 
line of the eneipy in their rear. When all 
things were ready on both sides, they came to 
blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, com- 
posed of the Messenians, and his few Atheni- 
ans. The other consisted of the Acamanians, 
^wn up in the order they happened to £a11 
into as they came up, and the Amphilochian 
darters who were at hand. But the Pelopon- 
nesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pro- 
niiscuously, except the Mantineans. The 
Mantineans stood embodied rather to the left, 
but not in the extremity: for £urylochus» 
with a select party, was posted there over-against 
the Messenians and Demosthenes. 

No sooner was the battle joined, and the 
Peloponnedans on that wing were moving for- 
ward their superior numbers to surround the 
ngbt of their adversaries, than the Acamanians, 
starting up from their ambuscade, falling upon 
them in the rear, assault and put them to flight, 
'^^ey gave way before the very first shock, and 
struck such a consternation into the bulk of the 
"imy, that they also began to run : for they no 
sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and 
which was the flower of their strength, entirely 
brok^, than they felt a panic for themselves, 
•^d the Messenians, who fought at the same 
P<^ with Demosthenes, behaved so very well 
that they finished the rout The Ambracioto 
in the meantime, and those in the right, had 
sot the better of their opponents, and were 
ponuing ihem towards Argos ; for beyond a 
noabt they are the most warlike people of any 
^ those parts. But when they were returned 
^m the punrait, they perceived the bulk of 
th^ army was defeated ; and the rest of the 
Acaiuaiuans beginning to charge them, with 

m^h difficulty tfaey threw themselves into 
24 



Olpa. The number of the slain was great, •• 
they had made their attacks without any order, 
and with the utmost confusion ; we must ex- 
cept the Mantineans, who kept most firmly 
together, and retreated in the best order of the 
whole enemy. The battle was ended only with 
the night. 

The next morning, as Eurylochus was kiUed 
and Macarius also, the command devolved upoa 
Menedffius. The defeat was irrecoverably 
great, and he was highly perplexed — whether 
he should abide a siege, in which he must not 
only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian 
ships be blocked up also by sea,-— or whether 
he should endeavour to secure his retreat At 
length he treats with Demosthenes and the 
Acamanians for a suspension of arms both for 
his own departure and the fetching of the 
dead. The dead they at once delivered, and 
set up a trophy themselves, and took up their 
own dead to the number of about three hundred. 
But a truce for their departure was not openly 
granted to them all. Demosthenes^ in concert 
with the Acamanian generals, agreed to a 
secret article with the Mantiuteans, and Mene- 
dffius and the other Peloponnesian officers, and 
as many others as were of any consideration— 
that « they should depart immediately.'* His 
policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the 
promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite des- 
titute, wishing above all things for such a pre- 
text to calunaniate the Lacednmonians and 
Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those 
parts, «as men who wilfully abandon their 
friends, from a mere selfish treacherous regard 
to their own safety." Having leave therefore 
to fetch off their dead, they interred them all 
as well as their hurry would admit And those 
in the secret, were busy in concerting the means 
of their departure. 

But now intelligence is brought to Demo^ 
thenes and the Acamanians, that the Ambra- 
ciots of the city, with their whole collected 
force, had, in pursuance of the former summons, 
begun their march for Olps, through Amphi- 
lochi, designing to join their countrymen at 
OlpsB, and quite ignorant of the late defeat 
Upon this, he inunediately detacheih a part of 
his army, to beset all the passes, and to seize all 
the advantageous posts upon their route, and 
got ready at the same time to march ag^ainst 
them with the remainder of his force. 

In the meantime, the Mantineans and those 
03 



MO 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



comprchended in ih« Mcret aiticlesy got out 
of the town upon the pretext of gathering 
herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small 
parties, gathering what thej jn^etended to come 
out for as they passed along. But when they 
had thus straggled to a considerable distance 
from Olpe, they moved away in a more nim- 
ble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in 
great numbers came out in their company, when 
they perceived them thus stealing off, felt an 
inclinati<»i to follow, and so taking to their 
heels, ran speedily after them. The Acama- 
nians imagined at first, that they were all equal- 
ly endeavouring to escape without permission, 
and therefore set out in pursuit of the Pelo- 
ponnesians. Their officers endeavoured to 
stop them, crying out, that « leave was given 
for their escape."—- Upon which a soldier, con- 
cluding their officers had been guilty of treach- 
ery, darted his javelin amongst them. But 
afterwards they connived at the escape of the 
Mantineans and the Pelc^nneaans, but made 
alanghter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed 
was the tumult, and the perplexity also to dis- 
tinguish which ^as an Ambraciot, and which 
was a Pelc^onnesian ; and amidst the confusion 
about two hundred were slain. The rest made 
their escape into the bordering kingdom of 
Agneis, where Salythius king of the Agrsans, 
who was their friend, took them under his pro- 
tection. 

The Ambraciots of the city were now ad- 
vanced as far as Idomene. There are two lofty 
eminences which are called by this name. The 
higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the 
detachment sent before by Demosthenes from 
the camp had seized, without being discovered, 
and had posted themselves upon it. The Am- 
braciots had possessed themselves already of 
the lower, and halted there for the night. 
Demosthenes after his evening repast, and the 
remainder of the army, about shut of evening, 
began to march. He himself took half of them 
to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other 
was fetching a compass round the mountains of 
Amphilochia. 

The next morning was no sooner in its dawn, 
than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in 
their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, 
and rather supposing these new-comers to be 
Iheir friends. For Demosthenes had politicly 
placed the Meesenians in the van, and ordered 
thflim to discourse as they moved along in the 
Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from 



their advanced guaida, who farther, so long u 
the dark continued, could not possibly distio* 
guish their feces. By this means, he no sooner 
assaulted the canip than the rout began. Nuid- 
hers of them were slain upon the ^pot The re- 
mainder fled amain towards the mountains. But 
the passes were all beset ; and m<»re than this, 
the Amphilochians, who were well acquaint- 
ed with their ovm country, were pursuing in the 
light enemies who were encumbered with the 
heavy armour. Quite ignorant of the conntiy 
nor knowing whither they were flying, they 
rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the 
ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their 
own destruction. Yet as no possible Boethod 
of escape was unattempted, some of them tuna* 
ed towards the sea, which was not greatly dis- 
tant And when they beheld the Atheniaii 
ships moving along the shore, in so fetal a con- 
currence for their ruin, they plunged into the 
water, and swam up to them, chosing rather, 
in the present consternation, to be destroyed 
by the Athenians on board of those stape, tfaiQ 
by the Barbarians and their most inveterate 
foes, the Amphilochians. Through such i 
series of misfortunes, but few out of the nu* 
merous body of Ambraciots were so happy as to 
escape to their own home. The Acamanian^ 
having stripped tbe dead, and erected the tro- 
phies, marched back to Argos. 

On the foUovring day they were addressed by 
a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who bad 
escaped fix)m Olpee, and were now in tb« 
Agrseis. His commission was to obtain the 
bodies of the dead who had been killed since 
the first engagement, as they were attempting 
without permission to escape along with the 
Mantineans and others who were going off hy 
agreement This herald, casthig hia eyes ap* 
on the arms of the Ambraciots froai the city, 
was astonished at the number. He kn«^ "^ 
thing of that fresh calamity, but concluded 
they all belonged to the party for whom he was 
now employed. Somebody asked him the rea- 
son of his surprise, and what he judged to he 
the number of the dead 1 Now he who asked 
the question supposed the herald to have been 

sent by those of Idomene. «« Not more than tw» 
hundred," says the herald. The demandant 
then repUed, « It should seem otherwiae by the 
arms, for these are the anns of mo™ *|jjf* 
thousand men." The herald rejoined, '| T»J^ 
they cannot belong to those of our p«*f • 
other replied, « They must, if you fongW X**' 



TEAS VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



1^1 



terday at Idomene." « We fought nowheie 
yesterday : we suffered the day before in our 
retreat from Olp®." « But we fought yester- 
day ajj^inst those Ambraciots, who were ad- 
vancing from the city to relieve you." When 
the hqrald heard this, and found that the army 
of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he 
burst into a groan; and, quite overpowered 
with the weight of the present calamities, he 
went off abruptly, and without renewing his de- 
mand about the dead. 

During the whole course of this war, no 
^ other Grecian city suffered so great a loss in so 
short a time. I have not presumed to mention 
the number of the slain, because it is said to 
have been incredibly great, when compared 
with the size of their cily. But I am well con- 
vinced that if, in compliance with the advice of 
the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarna- 
nians and Amphilochians would have proceeded 
to the excision of Ambracia, they might have 
done it with the bare shout of their voice. But 
they dreaded its falling into the hands of the 
Athenians, who might prove worse neighbours 
to them than the old. 

But to return. A third part of the spoils 
was bestowed upon the Athenians, the rest 
was divided amongst the confederate cities. 
Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea. 
For the three hundred suits of armour which 
are reposited in the temples of Athens, were 
selected for Demosthenes, who now returned 
thither, and brought them with him. The 
dread he had been under ever since his mis. 
carriage in iEtolia was quite dispelled by the 
good service he had now performed. 

The Athenians, with their squadron of 
twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus ; 
&Qd, since the departure of the Athenians and 
Demosthenes, the Acarinanians and Amphilo- 
chians had granted by treaty to those Ambra- 
ciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged 
with Salynthius and the Agrseans, a safe retreat 
from amongst the OeniadsB, who had also gone 
over to Salynthius and the Agraeans. And 
^rwards the Acamanians and Amphilochians 
concluded a peace and an alliance for a hun- 
dred years with the Ambraciots, upon these 
conditions : 

" That neither the Ambraciots should be 
obliged to join the Acamanians in any at- 
tempts against the Peloponnesians; nor the 
Acamanians to act with the Ambraciots against 
the Athenians. 



« That if either were attacked, the odiMS 
should march to their defence, 

"That the Amlnraciots should restom all 
the places and frontier belonging to the Am- 
philochians, which were at present in their 
hands. And, 

"That they should in no shape si^p- 
port Anactorium, which was then in hostility 
with the Acamanians." 

These articles being mutually agreed to, the 
war came to a conclusion. But after this, the 
Corinthians sent a party of their own people, 
consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, com- 
manded by Xenoclides the son of Euthycles, 
for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, afler 
great dif&culties, as they marched all the way 
over-land. And this is the account of trans- 
actions in Ambracia. 

The Athenians in Sicily, this same winter, 
made a descent against Himersa from their 
ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from 
the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. 
They steered their course also against the isles 
of ^olus. But when they were returned to 
their old station at Rhegium, they found there 
Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, who was 
commissioned to take upon him the command 
of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the 
confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to 
Athens, to solicit a more ample succour of 
shipping. Because, as in fact the Syracusans 
were masters of all their lands, and they were 
also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, 
they were now intent on gathering together 
such a naval force as might strike an effectual 
terror. The Athenians equipped out forty 
sail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their mo- 
tive was, not only to bring the war in those 
parts to a speedy determination, but also to 
keep their own mariners in constant practice. 
Pythodoms, one of the admirals appointed for 
this service, they sent off immediately with a 
few ships : Sophocles son of Sostratides, and 
Eurymedon son of Thucles, were soon to follow 
with the main body of the fleet. But Pytho- 
dorus, who had now took the command from 
Laches, steered, about the close of the winter, 
against that fortress of the Locrians which 
Laches had taken before. But, being defeated 
at his landing by the Locrians, he returned 
again to his station. 

About the spring of the year, a torrent of 
fire overflowed from mount JEtnn^ in the same 
manner as formerly, which destroyed part of 



133 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



the lands of the Cataneans, who are eitoated at 
the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in 
all Siciljr* It is said that fifty years intervened 
between this flow and the last which preceded ; 
and that in the whole the fire hath thus issued 



thrice since Sicily was inhabited by tiie €iied< 
ans. Such were the occurrences of this winter, 
at the end of which the six& year also of this 
war, the history of which Thucydides aath 
compiled, expired. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK IV. 



TiAK Yn. The Athenian! leize and fortify Pylos in Laconia. The Laeedcmoniani make alight of it at firat, 
yet afterwards exert their ntmoat efforts to dislodge them, though in yain. Their body thrown into Sphacteria 
is intercepted, and blocked up by the Athenian fleet. A suspeesion of arms and a truce ensue, but soon broke. 
Proceedings in Sicily : a naval engagement in the strait of Messene. At Athens, Cleon is drawn in by his own 
bravado to undertake the redaction of Sphacteria. He repairs thither, and completes the work beyond all ex* 
pectation. The Lacedemonians, terribly distressed, send many proposals for a peace, but none are accepted. 
Tbe Athenians^nvade tbe Corinthisns : battle of Boligia. Tragical period of the sedition at Gorcyra. Death 
of ArtazerzesLongimanus.— VIII. Ezpedition against Cytbera. Continuation of affairs in Sicily. The sur^ 
prise of Megara unsuccessfully attempted. A project formed for a total revolution io Bo^otia. Brasidas b^n* 
netb his march for Tbrace, and by his noble behaviour carries all before him. The battle of Delium. Successful 
^ragrssBof Braaidas in Thrace.— IX. Truce for a year. The affairs of Thrace continued. 



TXAB VII.* 

Tn ensning summer, when the com was be- 
ginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan, joined 
^7 an equal number of Eocrean vessels, at the 
invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for 
Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the 
place. And thus Messene revolted from the 
Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing 
to the practices of the Syracusans, who, fbre- 
weing that this town might open the way for 
me reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest 
the Athenians should get established there, 
•hd, with augmented forces, pour out from 
tbence upon them. The Locrians assisted 
ottt of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they 
were desirous to have it in their power to at- 
tack both by land and sea. At the same time 
"■o> these Locrians broke in upon the terri- 
tory of the Rhegians with their entire force, 
t» deter them from any attempt to save Mes- 
*he, and to gratify also those fugitives from 
*hegimn, who acted now in combination with 
them. For Rhegium had for a long time been 
^broiled in sedition, and so was unable to 
take the field against these invaders, who for 



Ote 



>unc reason were more eager to distress 



1 Before Christ 4S5. 



&em. When the ravage was completed, the 
Locrians marched their land-forces back, but 
their ships were stationed on the guard of 
Messene. They also were very busy in the 
equipment of an additional number, which 
were to repair to that station, and be ready to 
move from thence to any future operations of 
war. 

About the same season of the spring, before 
the com was fully grown, the Peloponnesians 
and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, 
the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacede- 
monians, commanded. They fixej their camp, 
and ravaged the country. 

The Athenians now sent out to sea the 
forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian 
voyage, under the command of Eurymedon 
and Sophocles, who staid behind to bring up 
this reinfbrcement, since Pythodoms, the third 
in the commission, was already in his post at 
Sicily. They had orders also in the course of 
the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide 
effectually for the preservation of those in the 
dty, who were sadly infested by the outlaws 
posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the 
Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to 
act in support of those on the mountain, who, 
as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, 
I presumed they should with ease carry all be- 

183 



134 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



fore them. Demosthenes, further, who had 
been in no public employ since his return from 
Acamania, procured leave to go on board this 
fleet, with authority to employ it on the coast 
of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service. 
When they were got to the height of Laco- 
nia, intelligence is brought them, that *< the 
Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eu- 
rymedon and Sophocles were for making the 
best of their way thither. But it was the ad- 
vice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and 
after they had secured that place, to proceed 
in their voyage. This was positively refused ; 
but it so happened, that a storm arose which 
drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes 
insistedUhat they should immediately fortify 
the place, since this was the motive of his at- 
tendance in the fleet. He showed them, that 
« there was at hand plenty of timber and stone 
for the work ; that, besides the strength of its 
natural situation, the place itself was barren, 
as was also the greatest part of the adjacent 
country." For Pylus lies at the distance of 
about four hundred stadia^ from Sparta, in the 
district which was formerly called Messenia ; 
but the name given it by the Lacedemonians 
is Coryphasium. The others replied : « there 
Are many barren capes in the Peloponnesus, 
which those may secure who have a mind to 
plunge the commonwealth into needless ex- 
penses." This place, however, seemed to him 
to be better marked out for this purpose than 
any other, as being possessed of a harbour; 
and as the Messenians, who formerly bore 
some relation to it, and still used the same 
dialect with the Laceda&monians, might from 
hence give them great annoyance, and at the 
same time efiectually keep possession of it. 
But when neither the commanders nor sol- 
diers, nor the inferior offices,^ to whom he 
Afterwards communicated his project, would 
be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it 
drop till the mere love of employment, during 
the idleness of their suspended voyage, sedi- 

* About forty English miles. 

a The word in the origiaal is Taxiarchs. They seem 
to be nearly the same with captains of a company, in 
the modern style, as their command was over about one 
hundred men. Taxiarchs were also officers of a higher 
class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing 
one, whose business it was to marshall the armies, to 
-order the marches and encampments, to take care of 
provisions, and to punish military offences. But the 
former seem to be the officers to whom Demosthenss 
applied himself in the present instance. 



tiously inclined the private soldiers to comptn 
it with a wall. They took the work in hand, 
and plied it briskly. Tools they had none for 
hewing and fitting the stones ; but picked oat 
and carried such as they judged most proper 
for the work, and laid th«n one upon another 
as compactly as they could. The mud that 
was any where requisite, for want of vessels, 
they cfffiied im their shoulders, bending for- 
wards as much as possible, that it might have 
room to stick on, and holding it up with both 
hands clasped fast behind that it might not 
slide down. They spared no pains to prevent 
the LacedemoBiana, and to put the place in i 
proper posture of defence, before Aey could 
come to their disturbance. For the largest 
part of it was so well fortified by nature, that 
it stood in no need of the defence of art. 

The news of this arrived at Sparta during 
the celebration of some public festival. They 
set light by it ; assured, that so soon as they 
appeared in sight, the enemy wo^d dtiier 
abandon it, or the place be recovered by an 
easy efibrt. And tiiiey were something more 
dilatory, because thdr army was yet in Attica. 

The Athenians, having completed their 
works on the side towards the land, and on 
the other necessary spots, in the spaee c( ai 
days, leav« Demosthenes with five slups to 
guard it, and with the lasrger nuxober resumed 
their voyage lor Corcyn and ^dly. 

But the Peloponnesians in Attica were ao 
sooner advertised of this seizure of Pj^ 
than they marched back with all exSpcdhion. 
The LacedsBmonians, and Agis their kinf,T8- 
garded this affair al Pylus as their own do* 
mestic concern. And besides, as they had 
made the inroad early in the year, and whiW 
the com was yet green, many of them laboured 
under a scarcity of provisions. The wearaff 
also, which proved tempestuous beyond what 
was usual in that season, had very much i»* 
commoded the army. In this manner, many 
accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, 
and to render this the shortest of all theu w 
vasions. For the whole of their stay in Attic* 
was but fifteen days. 

About the same time Simonides, an Ata** 
nian commander, having gathered together * 
small party of Athenians from the neigbboo'- 
ing garrisons, and a body of the circumj^c** 
dependents, took possession of £ioD in -^'^^'^ 
a colony of the Medeans. It had dedared 
against the Athenians, but was now put w 



rBAB vxl] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



135 



tteir hands by treachery. Tet, tiie Chalci- 
deans and the Bottisaiia coming immediately 
to its relief, he ifras beat out of it again, and 
kwt a great number of his men. 

Afler the retreat of the Peloponnesians out 
9i Attica, the Spartans,* in conjunction with 
those of their allies, marched without loss of 
time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of 
the Lacedenxonians were longer in their ap- 
proach, as but just returned from another ex- 
pedition. Yet a summons had been sent all 
iDond Peloponnesus, to march directly for 
Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also re- 
manded from CoTcyra, which, being transported 
by land over the isthmus of Leueas, arrive 
before Pylus, undeScried by the Athenians 
who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the 
land army had also approached. 

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the 
Peloponnesian fleet, had timely despatched two 
vetsels to Eurymedon, and the Athenians on 
bosFd that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, press- 
ing them to return, as the place was in danger 
of being lost ; which vessels made &e best of 
their way, in pursuance of the earnest com- 
■umds of Demosthenes. But the Lacedsmo- 
nians were now preparing to attack the fortress 
both by land and sea, presuming it would easily 
be destroyed^ as the work had been raised with 
IS much precipitation and was defended by so 
■mall a number of hands* But, as they also 
•zpected the return of the Athenian ships from 
Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took 
Bot the place before, to bar up the mouths of 
the harbour, so a» to render the entrance im- 
pncticable to the Athenians. For an isle which 
is called Sphaeteria, lying before and at a small 
distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths 
^ the harbour ntfrow; that near the fortress 
^ the Athenians and Pylus, a passage for two 
*bips only abreast ; and that between the other 
points of land, for eight or nine. The whole 
<tf it, as desert, was overgrown with wood and 
4^te untrod, and the compass of it at most is 
^^t flfkeen stadia.' They were therefore 
ttteat on shuttittg up these entrances with 
*|^pa moored close together, ' and their heads 
^^'^"'ds the sea. And to prevent the moles- 
^^n apprehended, should the enemy take 

*• The leader will be pleaaed to take notice, that tbe 
word Spartans is here empbatical. It means those of 
« first daas, the noblest persons In the commnnity, as 
»*»aln from the sequel. 

'OnemtieftD^ahalf. 



possession of this island, they threw into it a 
body of their heavy-armed, and posted another 
body on the opposite shore; — ^for by these 
dispositions the Athenians would be incom- 
moded from the island, and excluded from 
landing on the main land ; and as, on tbe op- 
posite coast of Pylus without the harbour, there 
is no road where ships can lie, they would be 
deprived of a station from whence to succour 
the besieged : and thus, without the hazard of 
a naval engagement, it was probable they should 
get possession of the place, as the quantity of 
provisions in it could be but small, since the 
seizure had been executed with slender pre- 
paration. Acting upon these motives, they 
threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, 
who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. 
These for a time were successively relieved by 
others. But the last body, who guarded that 
post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted 
of about four hundred and twenty, exclusive of 
the Helots who attended them, and these were 
commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus. 
Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispo- 
sitions that the Lacedsmonians would attack 
him by land and sea, provided for his own de- 
fence. The triremes yet remaining with him 
he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of 
palisade before the fortress. The mariners he 
armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most 
of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better 
arms were not to be procured in so desert a 
place. And even these they had taken out of a 
cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belonging 
to Messenians, who happened accidentally to 
put in. The Messenians on board were about 
forty heavy armed, whom he ranged amongst 
his own body. The greater part therefore of 
the unarmed, as well as some who had armour, 
he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress 
towards the continent, with orders to beat oft 
the land army whenever they approached. And 
having selected from his whole number sixty 
heavy armed and a few archers, he marched out 
of the fortress to that part of the beach where 
he supposed the enemy would endeavour to 
land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, 
and bordered on the main sea ; yet, as the wall 
was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would 
soonest tempt and animate an assault. For 
never imagining they should be out-numbered 
in shipping, they had left the wall on this side 
but weak ; and should the enemy now force a 
landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost. 



136 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR: 



[book IV. 



Sensible of this, and determined if possible 
to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted 
himself with his chosen band on the very edge 
of the water, and endeavoured to animate them 
by the following harangue : 

« My fellow soldiers, here posted with me 
in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in 
80 urgent an extremity, to throw away all su- 
perfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst 
you compute the perils which now environ us, 
but regardlef» of the issue and inspirited by 
hope let him charge the foe, and be confident 
of success. A situation desperate like this 
alloweth no room for calm consideration, but 
demands the most precipitate venture. Supe- 
rior advantages however are along with us ; — 
of this I am convinced, provided we only stand 
firm together, and scorning to be terrified at 
the number of our foes, do not wilfully betray 
those advantages which are now in our favour. 
The shore is most difficult of access : — this in 
my judgment makes abundantly for us ; — this 
will support us, if we keep our ground. But 
if we give way, difficult as it is now, their 
landing will be easy — when there are none to 
obstruct it Nay, what is worse, we shall make 
the enemy more furious, when, if we may 
afterwards press hard upon him, it is no longer 
in his power to re-embark with ease. For so 
long as they continue on board they may most 
easily be encountered ; whilst they are busy in 
landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as 
that we ought to shrink before their numbers. 
Large though they be, the spot of action will 
be small for want of ground to draw up in 
order. What though their force be superior 
for the land 1 that advantage will be lost in 
their present service, when they must act from 
their vessels and on the water, where many 
lucky contingencies are xequisite. And thus I 
am satisfied, that with these disadvantages they 
are but merely a balance for our smallness of 
number. 

"As for you, O Athenians, who are now 
present, and who, by the long experience of 
frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that 
men, who stand firm and scorn to give way 
before the dash of the surge or the menacing 
approach of a vessel, can never be beat ofi* — 
from you I insist, that, firmly embodied together 
and charging the enemy on Uie very margin of 
the water, you preserve all us who are here, 
and preserve this fortress." 

In this manner Demosthenes having encour- 



aged his men, the Athenians became more 
animated than ever; and, marching forrcardB 
to the very margin of the sea, posted them' 
selves there in order of battle. The Lacede* 
monians were also in motion ; their land force 
was marching to assault the fortress, and their 
fleet was approaching the shore. It consisted 
of forty- three vessels, and a Spartan, Thrasy- 
melidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board 
as admiral. He steered directly for the spot 
on which Demosthenes expected his comiog. 
In this manner were the Athenians assaulted 
on both sides, by land and sea. 

The ships of the enemy came on in small 
divisions, because there was not room for ]ai- 
ger. They slackened by intervals, and endea- 
voured by turns to force their landing. They 
were brave to a man, and mutually animated 
one another to beat off the Athenians and seize 
the fortress. 

But Brasidas signalized himself above them 
all. He commanded a trireme ; and obserriog 
that the other commanders and pilots, though 
they knew they could run aground, yet kept 
aloof because the shore was craggy, and shun- 
ned every hazard of stavixfg their vessels, he 
shouted aloud, " that it was shameful for the 
saving of timber to suffer enemies to raise 
fortifications within their territory." He en- 
couraged them on the' contrary « to force their 
landing, though they dashed their vessels to 
pieces;" begging the confederates "in this 
juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on 
the Lacedemonians in lieu of the great servi- 
ces they had done them, but to run them ashore, 
and landing at all adventures to seize the e&e* 
my and the fortress." In this manner he ani- 
mated others, and having compelled his own 
pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at once 
upon the stairs, and endeavouring to get down 
was beat back by the Athenians. After many 
wounds received, he fainted with the loss of 
blood ; and falling upon the gunnel, his shield 
tumbled over into the water. It was brought 
ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who 
afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which 
they erected for this attack. 

The others indeed with equal spirit endea- 
voured, but yet could not possibly land, as tw 
ground was difficult of access, and the AtneH' 
ians stood firm, and no where at all ga^« ^^^' 
Such now was the strange reverse of fortune* 



that the Athenians upon land, upon 



La- 



conic 



ic land, beat off the Lacedemonians who 



rxAS vu.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



137 



were fighting from the water ; and the Lacede* 
monians from shipe were endeaTouring a de- 
icent upon their own now hostile territoiy 
tgainst the Athenians. For at this period of 
time it was the general opinion, that those 
were landmen and excelled most in land en- 
gagements, but that these were seamen and 
made the best figure at sea. 

The attack was continued the whole day 
and part of the next before it was given 
op. On the third day, they detached some 
veswls to Asine to fetch timber for engines, 
hoping by them to accomplish the taking of 
the wall adjacent to the harbour, which, though 
of a greater height, yet might easier be ap- 
proached by sea. 

During this pause, forty sail of Athenians 
cUDie up from Zacynthus. This fleet had 
bsen enlarged by the accession of some guard- 
diips from off the station of Naupactus, and 
fow aul of Chians. These no sooner dis- 
ooreied the main land about Pylus and the 
iilsikd Sphaeteria to be full of armed soldiers, 
the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of 
the enemy, which lay quiet in their posts, than, 
perplexed how to act, they sailed back for the 
present to the isle of Prote not far distant and 
Resort, and there spent the night. 

The day following, being formed into the 
<>ider of battle, they showed themselves again 
is ready for engagement, should the enemy 
venture to stand out against them into the 
epen sea; and if not, were determined to 
'erce their way into the harbour. The enemy 
^ kept in the same qmet posture, nor set 
>^t executing their former design of barring 
^ entrances. They continued in their usual 
position akmg the shore, when they had man- 
■sd their vessels, and got every thing ready to 
^gsge the assailants should they break into 
^ harbour, where there was no danger of 
^^g straitened for room. The Athenians, 
perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour 
•t both entrances. Falling there upon the 
gnater number of vessels now advanced into 
^*>P water to obstruct the passage, they put 
^hemto flight ; and following the chase, which 
*^^ be but short, Ihey shattered several, and 
•••k five, one of which had her whole crew on 
^^^» They proceeded to attack the rest, 
^di had fled amain towards the shore. 
'^^ moreover, which had just been manned, 
**>« disabled before they could launch into 
«e deep. Others, deserted by the mariners 
35 



who had fled along the shore, they fastened to 
their own, and towed away empty. The 
Lacedsmonians seeing these things, and pro- 
digiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now 
the communication should be cut off with the 
body in the island, rushed down with all their 
force to prevent it. Armed as ihey were they 
plunged into the water, and catching hold of 
the vessels in tow pulled them back towards 
the shore. It was now the apprehension of 
every soul amongst them, that the business 
flagged wherever he himself was not present. 
Great was the tumult in this contest for the 
ships, inverting the general custom of both con- 
tending parties. For the Lacedsmonians, in- 
flamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it 
may be so expressed) firom the shore: the 
Athenians, already victorious, and eager to 
give their good fortune its utmost completion, 
fought a land-battle from on board. The 
struggle on both sides was long and laborious, 
and blood was abundantly shed before the dii^ 
pute could be ended. But at length the 
Lacedemonians recovered all their empty ves- 
sels, excepting such as had been taken on the 
first onset. Each party being retired to their 
respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
and delivered up the dead, and were masters of 
all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, 
without loss of time, they ranged their vessels 
in circuit quite round the island, and kept a 
strict watch, as having intercepted the body of 
men which was posted there. But the Pelo- 
ponnesians on the main-land, with the accession 
of their auxilliaries who had now joined them, 
remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus. 

When the news of this action at Pylus was 
brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great 
calamity was so urgent, that the magistrates in 
person should repair to the camp, and consult 
upon the very spot what resource they had left. 
And when their own eyes had showed them 
the impossibility of relieving their men, and 
they were loath to leave them in the wretched ex- 
tremity either of perishing by famine, or, over* 
powered by superior numbers, of being shame-* 
fully made prisoners, it was concluded « to send 
to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension 
of arms at Pylus, whilst &ey despatched an em- 
bassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, 
and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch 
off their Spartans.'' These commanders ac- 
cepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed 
upon on the following conditions : 
R 



138 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book iy. 



«That the Lacedsmonians should imme- 
diately deliver up the ships in which they had 
fought ; and all the ships of war in general, 
which they had any where in Laconia, they 
should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the 
Athenians. That they should refrain from 
making any attempt whatever upon the fortress, 
either by sea or land. , 

"That the Athenians should permit the 
Lacediemonians on the main-land to carry over 
a stated quantity of provisions to those in the 
island, two Attic chcenixes^ of meal, with two 
cotyls of wine, and a piece of flesh, for every 
Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. 
These pro.visions to be carried thither under 
the inspection of the Athenians: and no 
vessels whatever to cross over without permis- 
sion. 

"That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be 
at liberty to continue their guard round the 
island, but not to land upon it: and should 
refrain from giving any annoyance to the 
army of the Peloponnesians, cither by sea or 
land. 

" That if either party should violate these 
conditions, either in the whole or any part 
whatever, the truce to be immediately void ; 
otherwise, to continue in force till the return 
of the Lacedemonian embassy from Athens. 

"That the Athenians should convey that 
embassy thither and back again in a trireme. 

" That upon their return the truce should be 
ended, when the Athenians should restore the 
ships now delivered to them, in the same num- 
ber and condition as they were in before." 

On these conditions a suspension of arms 
took place, in pursuance of which the ships 
were delivered up to the number of sixty, and 
the ambassadors despatched away, who arriv- 
ing at Athens, addressed themselves as follow- 
eth: — 

" Hither, O Athenians, we are sent on the 
part of the Lacedsmonians, to negotiate with 
you in behalf of their citizens in the island, and 
to propose an expedient which will tend very 
much to your advantage, and will at the same 
time preserve as much as possible our own 
honour in the great calamity with which we are 
at present beset. It is not our purpose to run 
out into a long unaccustomed flow of words. 
We shall adhere to the rule of our country, to 

1 More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, 
En^ish measure. 



spare many words where few may suffice; 
then only to enlarge, when the important occa- 
sion requireth an exact detail for the more 
judicious regulation of necessary acts. Receive 
therefore our discourse with an attention cleared 
of enmity. Be infoNned 9& men of understand- 
ing ought : and conclude that you are only to be 
put in mind of that judicious method of pro- 
cedure, of which yourselves are such competent 
judges. 

« You have now an opportunity at hand to 
improve a present success to your own interest 
and credit, to secure the possession of what 
you have hitherto acquired, and to adom it 
with the accession of honour and glory. Yoa 
are only to avoid that insolence of mind so fre- 
quent to men who have been, till the present, 
strangers to success. Such men are ever apt 
to presume too much on larger acquisitions, 
though merely because their present prosperity 
was beyond their expectation : whilst they, who 
have experienced the frequent vicissitudes of 
fortune, have gained a more judicious turn, 
and presume the least upon continuance of 
success. And there is the highest reason \ii 
conclude, that experience hath improved the 
commonwealth of Athens and us Lacedemo- 
nians in this piece of wisdom, much more than 
any other people. ^ 

« But be assured of it now, when you behold 
the calamities vnth which we are at present 
environed; we, who are invested with the 
highest honours and dignity of Greece, are 
this moment addressing ourselves to you, 
begging such favours as we formerly thought 
were more peculiarly lodged in our own dis- 
pensation. Not that we are thus reduced 
through failure of our strength, or through 
former strength too haughtily exerted, but 
merely through the weight of such unfore- 
seen disasters as continually happen, and to 
which the whole of mankind alike are ever sub- 
ject. And from hence it is right that you should 
learn, amidst the present strength of your state, 
and its late acquisitions, that fortune may not 
always declare upon your side. Wise indeed 
are they, who in their estimates of success 
make judicious allowances for chance. Suco 
are best able to bear the alternatives of 



calamity with prudence and temper. 



Such 



will form their judgments of war, not as the 
infallible means of accomplishing whatever 
scheme they please to undertake, but as de- 
riving its effects from the guidance of fortuno- 



YEAK VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



139 



Such are the persons who are most of all ex- 
empted from fatal miscarriages ; because they 
are not puffed up by presuming too far on pre- 
sent prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in 
the peaceable enjoyment of what they now 
possess. 

« It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal 
in this manner with us, lest, in case you now 
reject our proposals, when you yourselves in 
future times miscarry (many such events must 
happen), your present good fortune may then 
be perversely ascribed to chance, even though 
you are now able to deliver down to poster- 
ity the fame of your power and moderation be- 
yond a possibility of blemish. The Lacede- 
monians invite you to agre^nent, and a conclu- 
sion of the war. They offer you peace and 
aUiance, nay friendship in its whole extent, and 
the exchange of good offices mutually revived ; 
demanding nothing in return but their citizens 
out of the island. To this step they have con- 
descended rather than be exposed to the dangers 
uicidental on either side, should they either 
ceize some faTourable opportunity to force 
their escape by arms, or holding out to the 
last againi^ your blockade, be reduced with all 
the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in 
OUT opinion, may the soonest be brought to a 
fimi determination — ^not when either party hav- 
ing exerted all their strength, and gained the 
&r greater superiority in war, disdains the fair 
accommodation, and relieth on that forced ac- 
quiescence which necessitated oaths impose ; 
hut rather, when, though victory be within their 
reach, they recollect humanity, and having suc- 
ceeded by valour quite beyond their expecta- 
tions, determine the contest with temper and 
moderation. Then the foe, who hath not felt 
the extremity of force, is henceforth disarmed 
^7 the strengrth of gratitude, and is more se- 
curely bound by the affections of his own mind 
to abide for the future by all his compacts. 
^Qch ready deference mankind are more apt to 
show towards those who have been with a re- 
inarkable superiority their enemies, than to 
such as they have opposed in more equal com- 
petition. It is natural when men take the me- 
thod of voluntary submission, for the pleasing 
contest of generosity to be kindled between 
them; but to hazard the; last extremities and 
even grow desperate against that haughtiness 
which will not relent. 

** Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect 
"^h a ideasing reconciliation between us both. 



before the intervention of some incurable event 
to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us un- 
der the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal 
enmity both public and private in regard to 
you, and you lose the benefit of those advan- 
tageous offers we now lay within your option. 
Whilst the event is yet undetermined, whilst 
the acquisition of glory and of our friendship 
is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel 
the weight of a supportable calamity, and are 
clear from foul disgrace, let us now be mutually 
reconciled ; let us give the preference to peace 
over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries 
to the other Grecians. The honour of such an 
event will by them be more abundantly ascrib- 
ed to you. At present they are engaged in a 
perplexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its 
authors. But in case a reconciliation now 
take place, a point for the most part within 
your decision, they will gratefully acknowledge 
you for generous benefactors. 

" If then you thus determine, you gain an op- 
portunity to render the Lacedsemonians your 
firm and lasting friends, since now they request 
your friendship, and choose to be obliged 
'rather than compelled. Reflect within your- 
selves how many benefits must in all probability 
result from such a lucky coincidence. For you 
cannot but know, that when we and you shall 
act with unanimity, the rest of Greece, con- 
scious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost 
honour and regard." 

The Lacedemonians talked in this strain 
upon the presumption, that the Athenians had 
formerly been desirous of peace, and had been 
obstructed merely through their opposition; 
but now, thus freely tendered, they would ac- 
cept it with joy, and give up the men. The 
Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the 
Spartans in the island already in their power, 
imagined that a peace would be at any time in 
their own option, and were now very eager to 
improve their present success. But such a 
measure was insisted upon most of all by Gleon 
the son of Clenetus, the greatest demagogue at 
this time, and most in credit with the people. 
It was he who persuaded them to return the 
foUovnng answer. 

« That, previous to all accommodation, the 
Spartans shut up in the island must deliver up 
their arms and their persons, and be brought 
prisoners to Athens, When this was done, 
and the Lacedsmonians had surrendered Nissa 
and PegQ, and Troezene and Chalcis, (of which 



/ 



140 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



plaoes they had not poaaeaged themaelvM by 
aims, but in porsuance of a former treaty, when 
diatreaa exacted compliance from the Athenians, 
and they had been obliged upon any terms to 
purchase peace,) then they might fetch away 
their countrymen, and conclude a peace for 
whatever term both parties sholild agree." 

To this answer the Lacedsemonians made no 
direct reply,' they only requested that a com- 
mittee might be appointed, with whom, after 
the arguments on each side should be freely of- 
fered and discussed, they might agree upon 
some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon 
upon this broke out into loud invectives against 
them, affirming, « he knew beforehand that 
. they intended nothing just or fair; but now their 
view was mainfest to all, as they had absolutely 
refused to have any transactions with the body 
of the people, and had thus expressed a desire 
to negotiate with a small committee : if Iheir 
views were fair and upright, he called upon 
them to explain themselves, in the presence of 
alL" But the Laeedismonians, perceiving that 
nothing they could urge would have any influ- 
ence on the people, and in case, to ward off the 
distress they feared, they should make too large 
proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would 
expose them to the censure of their confeder- 
ates; and that further, the Athenians would 
not comply with their demand on any reasona- 
ble terms; they broke off all further confei^ 
ence, and quitted Athens. The very moment 
they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. 
The Lacediemonians re-demanded their ships, 
according to the article for that purpose agreed 
on. But the Athenians objecting some infrac- 
tions to them, such as an incursion towards the 
fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, 
and some other matters of little consequence, 
absolutely refused a restitution. They justi- 
fied the refusal upon this express stipulation 
between them, that « if the conditions were in 
any degree violated, the truce should immedi- 
ately be void.'' The Lacedemonians protested 
against these proceedings, and charging the de- 
tention of their ships with the higest injus- 



*■ Diodorus Siculus, 1. 13. says further, That the La- 
cedemonian ambassadors offered to set at liberty an 
equal number of Athenians, who were now their pri- 
soners. And, when this offer was rejected, the ambas- 
sadoni replied freely, " It was plain they set a higher 
value on Spartans than on their own citizens, since they 
Judged an equal number of the latter not to be an equi- 
valent/* 



tice, broke off all further debase and piepued 

for war. 

Pylus wtm now the scene in which both theao 
warring parties exerted thor utmost efforts. 
The Athenians sailed the whole day round the 
island with two ships in an opposite course ; in 
the night, their whole fleet was statkmed round 
it upon guard, except on that side towards the 
main sea when the weather was tempestuous. 
And to strengthen their guard they had now re- 
ceived a reinforcement of twenty sail from 
Athens, so that the nmnber of their shipping 
amounted in the whole to sev^kty. The Pelo 
ponnesians maintained their post on the conti- 
nent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort: 
intent all aloi^^ to seize the first fevouraUe op- 
portunity, and to accomplish &e preseivatioD 
of their countrymen. 

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusane and con- 
federates, augmenting the number of their 
guard-ships on the station of Messrae with an- 
other squadron they had since equipped, fnan 
Messene renewed the war. The Loczians 
spared no pains to spur them on firoB the gnat 
aversion they bore to the Khegians. They had 
now broke into the territories of the latter with 
their whole force. They had even a mind to 
hazard a naval engagement against thorn, as 
they saw the number of Athenian ships «lhand 
to be very inconsiderable, and had received in- 
telligence that the larger numbero designed kg 
this service were stoi^>ed for the present to 
block Uf> &e isle of Sphacteria. For should 
they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as 
they then might attadc Shegium botii by sea 
and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so tho 
posture of their own affurs would be consider- 
ably strengthened. For as Khegium, whid& is 
a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small di»> 
tance from Messene in Sicily, they could then 
prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be 
entirely masters of the strait. This strait is 
that part of the sea which runs between She- 
gium and Messene, and over which lies the 
shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It is 
the place which was formerly called GhaiybdiB^ 
and through which Ulysses is said to have 
sailed. As the corrait heve sets in st f ong l y 
from two great seas, the Tynhoae and SieiliaBy 
and runs with great rapidity, it is not at aD 
strange that it should have been esteemed a 
dangerous passage. 

Tet in the very middle of this strait tiie 
Sjnracusans and confederates, with a numlwr of 



YXAB vn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



141 



ahips little more than thirty, were forced to 
engage in the eTening of the day, the dispute 
beginning about a YCMel that was passing 
through. They stood away to oppose sixteen 
sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They 
were worsted by the Athenians; but each side 
separated in hurry and confusion, just as they 
could, U> their several stations at Messene and 
Shegium. They lost one ship in this action, 
which was stopped by the sudden approach of 
night 

But after this the Locrians evacuated the 
tenitory of Rheg^um, and the whole coUected 
fleet of the Syracusans and confederates, took 
a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their 
whole land-force attended. The Athenians 
and Khegians sailing up to their station, and 
finding none at present on board the ships, 
rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one 
of their own vessels by the force of a grappling^ 
inm &8teiied upon it, the crew of which was 
sired by swinuning. Immediately after this 
tte Syraeusans got on board, and being towed 
•long the shore towards Messene, the Athe- 
nians came up again to attack them ; but, the 
enemy running off into the deep and giving the 
first chasge, .they lose another of their ships. 
Theu^ continuing to be towed along the 
shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the 
Syracusans, without suilering any loss, got safe 
into the harbour of Messene. And now the 
Athenians, having received intelligence that 
Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by 
Aichias and his aocomj^es, stood away for 
^ place. 

In the meanwhile the Messenians, with 

^heir whole force by land, and accompanied by 

their ships, marched away against Ghalcidic 

NaxQgy which bordered upon their own terri- 

^* The first day they force the Naxians to 

■belter themselves behind their walls, and then 

^^ plundered the country. The' day foUow- 

^1 ■tiling up the river Acesine, they plundered 

■long the shore, and with their land-force made 

*ii aseanlt upon the city. The Siculi, who live 

|4>oa the mountains, were now pouring down 

la nunbefs to repel the Messenians. This the 

Nadami perceiving, became more outrageous, 

•ad animating one another with the thought 

^ Ae Leonttnes and their other Greek allies 

^^oe now tpawliing to their relief, they sud- 

^y sally out of the city and fieJl upon the 

iCcMenians^ whom they .put to flight, and 

'^'vghtered more than a Uiousand of them; 



the remainder with difficulty, escaping to their 
own homes : for the barbarians attacked them 
upon their road^ and made great havoc of them. 
The ships upon the station of Messene broke 
up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their 
own harbours. 

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in 
concert with the Athenians, appeared before 
Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb* 
They assaulted it on all sides ; the Athenians 
making their attempt from their ships on the 
side of the harl)our, whilst the land-forces did 
the same on the body of the place. But the 
Messenians, and a party of Locrians com- 
manded by Demoteles, who after their late blow 
had been left there for the security of the 
place, made a sudden sally from the city, and 
&lling unexpectedly on the army of the Leon- 
tines, put the greater part to flight, and did 
great execution upon them. This was no 
sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they 
threw themselves ashore to succour their con- 
federates, and falling in with the Messenians, 
who had lost the order of their battle, dnwe 
them again behind their walls. This done, 
having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhe- 
gium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily 
continued a land war against one another, in 
which the Athenians had no participation. 

At Pylus, the Athenians stlU kept the 
Lacedsmonians blocked up in the island, and 
the army of the Peloponnesians remained in 
their old post upon the continent, in a state of 
inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the 
Athenians to excessive hardships, since pro- 
visions and fresh water were equally scarce. 
There was but one single fountain for their 
use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, 
and yielded but a slender quantity of water. 
The majority of them were forced to dig into 
the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take 
up with such water as could thus be got They 
were further very much straitened in their 
station for want of room. They had not road 
enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable 
convenience, so that alternately one divicdon lay 
ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the 
other launched more to sea. But what discou- 
raged them most was the length of die blockade, 
so contrary to what they had expected. They 
had imagined a few days' siege would have worn 
out a body of men shut up in a barren island, 
and having only salt water for their drink. 
But this had been redressed by the Laceds- 

]l2^ 



142* 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



IV. 



monians, who had by a public edict encouraged 
all who were willing to carry over into the 
island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any 
other eatable which might enable them to hold 
but, assigning a large pecuniary regard for any 
successful attempt of this nature, and promising 
freedom to every Helot who carried them pro- 
visions. This was performed through a series 
of dangers by several ; but the Helots were 
most active of all, who putting off from Pelo- 
ponnesus (wherever they chanced to be) landed 
by favour of the dark on the side of the island 
which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief 
precaution was to run over in a hard gale of 
wind. For whenever the wind blew from the 
flea, they were in less danger of being discover- 
ed by the guard of triremes, which then could 
not safely lie quite round the island. In ex- 
ecuting this service, they put every thing to 
hazard. As a prior valuation had been given 
in, they run their vessels on shore at all adven- 
tures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were 
ready to receive them at every place most con- 
venient' for landing. Those, however, who 
ventured out when the weather was calm, were 
certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were 
expeit at diving, swam over through tiie har- 
bour, dragging after them by a string bottles 
filled with poppies mixed up with honey and 
the powder of linseed. These for a time 
escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely 
watched. No artifice was left unpractised on 
either side ; some being ever intent to carry 
provisions over, and other to intercept them. 

At. Athens, in the meantime, the people, 
being informed of the hardships to which their 
own forces are . reduced, and that those in the 
island receive supplies of provisions, were per- 
plexed how to act. They were full of appre- 
hensions lest the winter should put a stop to 
their siege, being conscious of the impossibility 
of procuring them subsistence from any part of 
Peloponnesus ; and more so, ^s the soil about 
them was barren, and that even in summer 
they were not able to furnish them with neces- 
sary supplies; that further, as no harbours 
were in the parts adjacent, there would be no 
commodious road for their shipping; so that, 
in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged 
would go securely away; or otherwise, they 
might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, 
in those vessels which brought over provisions. 
But they were most of all alarmed at the con- 
duct of the Lacedaemonians, who because they 



had now a safe resource in prospect, had dis- 
continued all manner of negotiation. In a 
word they highly repented the refusal of their 
former offers. 

Gleon, conscious to himself that the blame 
of baffling that accommodation would be thrown 
upon him, taxed them who brought the last 
advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those 
who had been sent to make the report, demand- 
ed, « since they could not be credited, that a 
deputation might be sent to know its truth." 
For which office Cleon himself was nominated 
by the Athenians, in conjunction with Thc- 
ogenes. 

But now he plainly saw that he must either 
be necessitated to make the same report as 
those had done whom he had charged with 
falsehood ; or, should he report differently, 
must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived 
also, that the inclinations of the people were 
mostly bent on an ample reinforcement; upon 
which he ventured to give them this further 
advice — That " sending a deputation on such 
an errand was quite superfluous, since oppor- 
tunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure : 
if they were really convinced of the truth of 
the report, they should at once put to sea 
against their enemies." He then proceeded 
to a malicious glance against Nicias son of 
Niceratus, who at that time presided over the 
military affairs. He hated him, and sneered 
him thus — That « if their generals were really 
men, it would be an easy matter to sail thither 
with an additional strength, and make a seizure 
of those in the island ; for his own part, was 
he in command, he would do it in a trice." 
The Athenians began immediately to clamour 
and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting 
about that enterprise himself, which to him 
appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, 
chagrined at the same time by the sneer upon 
himself, called upon him aloud — " To take 
what force he pleased, and to perform the ser- 
vice in his stead." Cleon, imagining this to 
be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. 
But when he found that Nicias was earnest in 
the point of resignation, he drew back, alleg- 
ing, that «it could not be, since not he 
but Nicias was general." He trembled now, 
since he never suspected that the other would 
venture to give up his oflSce to him. Nicias 
however called a second upon him, and form- 
ally surrendered his oflice to him, so far as re- 
lated to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be 



YEAR Vn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



143 



his witnesses. The people now, for such is 
the temper of the multitude, the more pains 
Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentan- 
gle himself from his own bravados, called out 
so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to 
give up the command, and roared aloud at the 
other to go on board. Unable now to extricate 
himself, he intimates his acceptance of the em- 
ploy, and standing forth, averred, that « he was 
not under the least dread of the Lacedaemoni- 
ans ; would not be accompanied by so much as 
one Athenian, but would take only what Lem- 
nians and Imbrians were at hand, and those 
targeteers who were come to their aid from 
i£nus, and the four hundred archers from 
other places. With these, he said, added to 
the military force already at Pylus, he would 
either in the space of twenty days bring oS all 
the Lacedaemonians aUve, or put them all to 
death upon the spot'' 

This big way of talking raised a laugh among 
the people ; all men of sense however were not 
a little delighted. They concluded, they should 
compass by it one of these two desirable ends ; 
either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, 
^hich they chiefly expected ; or, should they 
be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedaemo- 
nians into their power.* 

» The honoar of Athens was very deeply concerned 
In the point, which had been the subject of this day*s 
debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it hath 
turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the re- 
public had never been well supported on these occasions, 
since the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all 
kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates ; and it 
was now become quite the same thing to the people, 
whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath 
now railed Nicias, though none but a person of so dif- 
fident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been 
railed, out of an honourable command ; and then is 
laughed himself into it, and though an arrant poltroon 
is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and 
"oon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athe- 
nian good sense, whatever turn Thucydides gives it, 
can hardly he justified on this occasion, in thrusting so 
important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. 
Plutarch says, they always bore his impertinent and 
mad way of talking, because it was humorous and di- 
verting. Once, when the assembly had been met some 
time, and the people had sat long expecting his coming, 
at length he made his appearance with a garland on his 
i^cad, and begged the favour of them to adjourn till the 
borrow," For, at present, said he, I am not ^t leisure, 
«nce I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my 
friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and 
^^en they rose and adjourned. This aflfair of Pylus, 
WW, however, far from a jocular point ; and the Athe- 
nians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had 
not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes 
with him in the command. 



Having thus transacted the requisite points 
in the public assembly, where the Athenians 
had awarded the expedition to him by a formal 
decree, and Demosthenes, at Gieon's own re- 
quest, was joined in the commission of com* 
manders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with 
the utmost speed. His reason for associating 
Demosthenes in the command, was owing to 
some notice received that he was bent on land- 
ing upon the island ; as the soldiers, terribly in- 
commoded by the straitness of their - stations, 
and resembling besieged mote than besiegers, 
were eager for this bold adventure. Demos- 
thenes was animated more to the attempt be- 
cause the island had lately been set on fire. 
Before this accident, as it had been quite cov- 
ered over with wood, and was pathless, because 
ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a 
step, and judged all these circumstances, to be 
for the enemy's advantage. For, though a more 
numerous army should have landed against 
them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them 
from posts undescried. What errors might be 
committed, or how large their strength, might 
be more easily concealed on that side by the 
covert of the woods ; whereas all the errors of 
his own army would lie clear and open to ob- 
servation, when the enemy might suddenly at- 
tack, and in what quarter they pleased, since 
battle must be entirely in their own option. On 
the other side, should he force them to a close 
engagement on rough and woody ground, the 
smaller number by being skilled in the passes, 
he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior 
number without such experience ; that by this 
means his own force, merely on account of its 
numbers, might be imperceptiby destroyed, as 
it could not be discerned which part of it was 
hardest pressed, and stood most in need of sup- 
port. 

These inward suggestions were more preva- 
lent in the mind of Demosthenes from the re- 
membrance of his JStolian defeat, which was 
partly owing to the woods amongst which he 
engaged. But as the narrowness of their station 
had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes 
upon the skirts of the island, and under the 
cover of an advanced guard, to dress their re- 
past, a soldier, though entirely without design, 
set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, 
till a brisk gale happening to arise, the great- 
est part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by 
the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by 
this means a cleftrer view of the Lacedsmo. 



144 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



Biuii^ ibiiiid them more nmneioiu than from 
the quantity of Tictnala sent in by stipulation 
he waa used to compute them. He then judged 
it highly to concern the Athenians to exert 
their iilmost effi>rts: and, as the island was 
now become more opportune for a descent, he 
got erery thing in readiness for its execution, 
having sent for a supply of men from the ad- 
jacent confederates, and busied himself about 
all the dispositions needful for success. He 
had further received an express from Cleon 
notifying his approach, who now, at the head 
of the supply he himself had demanded, ar- 
liveth at I^ylus. No sooner were they joined, 
than ihey despatched a herald to the camp on 
the continent, demanding, « Whether they were 
willing to order their people in the island to 
surrender their arms and persons, without risk- 
ing extremites, on condition to be kept under 
an easy confinement till the whole dispute 
eottid be properly accommodatedl"— This be- 
ing positively refused, they remained quiet one 
day longer; but on the succeeding day, hav- 
ing embarked their whole strength of heavy- 
aimed on hoai;^ a few vessela, they put out by 
night, and a little before the ensuing dawn, 
landed on each side of the island, both from 
the main sea and the harbour, amounting in 
the whole to eight hundred men in heavy ar- 
mour. They advanced with their utmost 
speed towards the first guard on the island. 
Tins waa done in pursuance of a previous dis- 
positiim: for this fixst guard consisted of 
about thirty heavy-armed : the main body un- 
der Epitadas was posted about the centre, 
where the groimd was most level and watery : 
and another party guarded the extremity of Uie 
island facing Pylus, which, towards the sea, 
was a rocky cliff, and by land, altogether im- 
pregnable. On the top, further, of this cliff 
was seated a fort, built some ages before of 
stones picked carefully for the purpose. This 
they judged might be serviceable to them, 
should they be forced to shelter themselves 
from superior violence. In this manner was 
the enemy posted. 

The Athenians immediately, in their first 
career, put the whole advanced guard to the 
sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, 
and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. 
Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the 
•nemy judged their vessels to be only the usual 
gOBid which was every night in motion. 

No sooner also was the dawn completely 



broke, than the remainder of the Athcniii 
force was landed from a number of veHel% 
somewhat more than seventy. All tfas nuri* 
nen came ashore, in their respective diitino 
tiona of arms, excepting the rowors of the low- 
est bench.^ They were eight hundred azchen, 
and a body no less numerous of tsrgetee& 
The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in 
general who had been employed at FylUr ex- 
cept such as were necessarily detained for the 
guard of the fortress. 

According to disposition fnmed by Demoe^ 
thenes, they advanced in separate bodiei, con- 
sisting of near two hundred, more or leas, end 
took possession of all the eminences. The 
design was, thus to reduce the enemy to i 
plunge of distress by surrounding them on ill 
sides, and puzzling them in their choice which 
party first to make head against, that at the 
sight of numbers on all sides they might be 
quite confounded ; and, should they then attick 
the body in their front, they might be haiasaed 
by those in their rear; or diould they wheel 
towards those on either flank, theymifl^tbe 
exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. 
Which way soever the enemy might toni) they 
were sure to have behind them the Ughl-amed 
and less martial of their c^pponents, infesting 
them with their bows, and darts, and etones. 
These would do execution from a distance: an 
enemy could not possibly .engage with them; 
since even flying they would prevail, and when 
the enemy retreated would return hriekly «> 
their work. With so much address had Dej 
mosthenes previously planned the ^^ 'v 
landing, and in close adherence to it brDOgv 
them now to action. 

The body commanded by Epitadas, and 
which was the bulk of the whole force in the 
island, when they saw their advanced gnarf ^ 
tirely cut off, and the enemy advancing to attatf 

t It is in the original, excepting the Th*'»*°?\ J^ 
rowers on the different benches were ^^^^^'^■^ 
a peculiar name. Those of the uppermost ^•'J tJJ 
ThamitB : those of the middle, Zeugite ; aad w« 
the lowest, Thalamii. The labour of the Tha^^ 
the least, thoogh most constant, because ^ T^ ^^ 
nesB to the water, and the etfortnesi ^^^ ^ 
Much more strength and skiU were w'l"'^ ^no 
upper benches, and most of all on the «PP®?j7^ 
for that reason had better pay. Those on tw ^^ 
bench seem to have been mere drudges at tbe w.^ 
qualified for nothing better ; theolhers were ^^^^ 
plete seamen, and ready on all occasioos for 
both of rowing and fighting. 



VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



145 



tiiOB next, drew np in order and marched 

towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, de- 

fflgning to engage them. For Ihe latter were 

80 placed as to oppose them in front; the 

light^armed were posted on either of their 

flanks, and in the rear. But against these 

heayy-armed they could not possibly come to 

action, nor gain an opp<»tunity to exert their 

own distinguishing skill. For the Ught-armed 

pouiing in their darts on either of their flanks, 

compelled them to halt ; and their opposites 

would not moTO forward to meet them, but 

stood qiuet in their posts. Such indeed of the 

light-aimed, as adTentuied in any quarter to 

nm up near their ranks, were instantly put to 

flight; however, they soon faced about and 

eontinued their annoyance. They were not 

encumbered with any weight of armour ; their 

agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach 

of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever 

left desert had never been levelled by culture. 

in such wpotB the Lacedsmonians, under the 

load of their arms, oouM not possibly pursue. 

In this kind of akiimish, therefore, they were 

■fer a small space of time engaged. 

When the Lacedemonians had no longer 
sofiicient agility to check the attacks of these 
•ddnntshing parties, the lightparmed soon took 
notice that they slackened in their endeavours 
to beat them off. It was then, that &eir 
<y«n appearance, many times more large than 
tluit of their foes, and the very sight of them- 
selves began to animate them with excess of 
couage. Experience had now lessened that 
terror in which they had been used to regard this 
^ They now had met with no rough recep- 
tion from them, which fell out quite contrary to 
^"hat they firmly expected at their first landing, 
when fiiieb vpinta had sunk very low at the 
^Ught, that it was against Lacedemonians. 
Oontempt ensued ; and embodying, with a loud 
•hout they mshed upon them; pouring in 
■tones and arrows and darts, whatever came 
flist to hand. At such a shout, accompanied 
with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized 
^^ foes, quite unpractised in such a form of 
wgBgement ; at the same time the ashes of 
^ wood, whidi had been burnt, were moun- 
^ kwyely into the air. So that now each 
kst sight of what was close before him,^ under 
the dmwars of darts and stones thrown by 
inch mmben, and whirling along in a cloud of 
^st 

Amidst BO many difficulties the Lacedemo- 
26 



nians now were sorely distressed. The safs- 
guards on their heads and breasts were no 
longer proof against the arrows, and their jave- 
lins were broke to pieces when poised for throw- 
ing. They were quite at a loss for some means 
of defence ; they were debarred the prospect of 
what was passing just before them ; and the 
shouts of the enemy were so loud that they 
could no longer hear any orders. Dangers thus 
surrounding them on all sides, they quite des- 
paired of the possibility of such resistance as 
might earn their safety. At last, a great part 
of that body being wounded, because obliged to 
adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, 
embodying close, they retreated towards the 
fort on the dort of the island, which lay at no 
great distance, and to their guard which was 
posted there. But when once they began to 
move off, the light-armed, growing more reso- 
lute and shouting louder Ihan ever, pressed 
hard upon their retreat ; and whatever Lacede- 
monian fell within their reach, in the whole 
course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. 
The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the 
fort, and in concert with the guard posted there 
drew up in order to defend it, in whatever 
quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The 
Athenians, speedily coming up, wei^ hindered 
by the natural site of the place from forming a 
circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing 
therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured 
to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long 
time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides 
persisted in the contest, under the painful pres- 
sures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. 
No efforts w^e spared by the assailants to 
drive them from the eminence ; nor by the de- 
fendants to maintain their post. But here the 
Lacedsmonians defended themselves with more 
ease than* in the preceding engagement, be- 
cause now they could not be encompassed en 
their flanks. 

Wlien the dispute could not thus be brought 
to a decision, the commander of the Messeni- 
ans, addressing himself to Cleon and Demos- 
thenes, assured them, " they took a deal of 
pains to no manner of puq>o8e ; but would they 
be persuaded to put under his guidance a party 
of the archers and Hght-armed, to get a round 
about way on the enemies* rear by a tract which 
he himself could find, he was confident he could 
force an entrance.'' Having received the party 
he demanded, marching off from a spot unde- 
scried by the Lacedtemonians, in order to con- 



146 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV 



ceal the motion, and contmuing to mount higher 
and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon 
the verge of the island, in the quarter where the 
Lacedssmonians, depending upon its natural 
strength, had placed no guard, with great diffi- 
culty and &tigue he got behind them undis- 
covered. Now showing himself on a sudden 
upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished 
the enemy with this unexpected appearance ; 
and his friends, who now beheld what they so 
earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. 
The Lacedemonians were now exposed to the 
missive weapons on both sides ; and (if a point 
of less consequence may be compared to one of 
greater) were in a state parallel to that of their 
countrymen at Thermopyl®.* For those being 
hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, 
were utterly destroyed: these now, in like 
manner beset on both sides, were no longer able 
to contend. Being but a handful of men op- 
posed to superior numbers, and much weakened 
in their bodies for want of food, they quitted 
their post And thus- the Athenians became 
masters of all the approaches. 

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly con- 
vinced that should the foe give way too fast, it 
would only conduce to their expeditious 
slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, 
began to stop their fury, and to draw off their 
men. They were desirous to carry them alive 
to Athens, in case they would so far hearken 
to the voice of a herald as to throw down their 
arms dejected as they must be in spirit and 
overpowered with the instant danger. It was 
accordingly proclaimed, that « such as were 
willing should deliver up their arms and their 
persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at 
discretion.'' 

When this was heard, the greater number 
threw down their bucklers and wftved their 
hands, in token of accepting the proposal. A 
suspension of arms immediately took place, and 
a conference was held between Cleon and 
Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son 



4 The famous three hundred Spartans with king Le- 
onidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of 
Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylee, and at length per- 
ished all to a man. They were all afterwards entombed 
on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph ;— 

Tdl, traveller, at Sparta what you saw, 
That here we lie obedient to her bw. 

The same spirit and resolution was at this time gener- 
ally expected from the Spartans, now encompassed 
round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacteriu. 



of Pharax on the other. Of those who had 
preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was 
the first, had been slain, and Uippagretes, who 
was his successor, lying as dead among the 
slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon 
was now the third appointed to take the com- 
mand upon him, according to the provision 
made by their law, in case their generals drop. 
Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send 
over to the Lacedaemonians on the continent for 
advice. This the Athenians refused, but how- 
ever called over some heralds to him from the 
continent. Messages passed backwards and 
forwards twice or thrice; but the last who 
crossed over to them from the Lacedsemonians 
on the continent brought this determination, — 
" The Lacedaemonians permit you to take care 
of your own concerns, provided you submit to 
nothing base." In consequence of this, after a 
short consultation with one another apart, they 
delivered up their arms and their persons. The 
remainder of the day and the succeeding night 
the Athenians confined them under a strong 
guard. But the day following, having erected 
a trophy upon the island, they got themselves 
in readiness to sail away, and distributed the 
prisoners to the custody of the captains of the 
triremes. The Lacedsemonians, having ob- 
tained permission by a herald, fetched off their 
dead. 

The number of those who were slain, and 
those who were taken alive, stood thus : they 
who had thrown themselves into the island 
amounted in the whole to four hundred and 
twenty heavy-armed. Of these three hundred 
wanting eight were carried oflf alive, the rest 
had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were 
about one hundred and twenty Spartans. The 
number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable : 
for it was not a standing fight. The whole 
space that these men were besieged in the 
island, from the engagement at sea, till the 
battle in the island, was seventy-two days. 
Twenty of these during thjB absence of the 
ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, 
they were supplied with food : the remainder 
of the time, they were fed by such as got over 
by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables wen 
found in the island, even when all was over. 
Their commander Epitadas had made a more 
sparing distribution than his stores required. 

Now the Athenians and Peloponneaau 
respectively drew off their forces from Py- 
lus to return home : and the promise of 



YEAS VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



147 



Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. 
For within the twenty days, he brought them 
prisoners to Athens, and made his words good.' 

The expectation of Greece was more disap- 
pointed by this event, than by any other occur- 
rence whatever in the series of the war. It 
was generally presumed that neither famine 
nor any extremity could have reduced these 
Lacedaemonians to deliver up their arms, but 
that, sword in hand and fighting to the last 
gasp, they would have bravely perished. They 
could not afterwards believe that those who 
sanendered were like to those who were slain. 
Some time after, a soldier in one of the con- 
federate bands of the Athenians, demanding 
with a sneer of one of them who were taken 
prisoners in the island, " if the slain were not 
of trae gallantry and courage]" the other re- 
plied, that " a spindle (by which he meant an 
arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew 
bow to distinguish the brave ;" intimating by 
this answer, that the slain were such as stones 
and darts despatched in the medley of battle. 

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, 
it was the public resolution there « to keep 
them in bonds, till some definitive treaty could 
l)e agreed on. And if, previously to this, the 
Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into 
the Attic territory, they should all undergo a 
public execution." They established also a 
Sanison for Pylus. And the Messenians of 
Naupactus sending thither the most proper of 
their own people, as into their own native 
country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient 
Messenia,) infested Laconia with depredations 
And did them vast damage, the more because 
they spoke the same dialect.* 

As for the Lacedemonians, who never knew 
"cfore what it was to be thus plundered, war 

*■ If should be added bere, tbat be also robbed for the 
present a very able ^and gallant officer of the praise he 
Merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus 
Was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a 
successful and glorious issue, by the conduct and bravery 
of Demosthenes. Aristopbanes (in the Knights) hath 
ttade a low comic character of the latter, and in- 
troduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for 
pilfering the honour from him. " This Faphlagonian 
(says he) hath snatched from every one of us whatever 
nice thing we had got to suit the palate of our Lord and 
"^^ster (the people). 'Tis but the other day, I myself 
bad cooked up a noble pasty of tiacedsemonians at 
I^ylUB, when this vilest of scoundrels came running 
tliither, pilfered it away from me, and hath served it 
up to table as if it was of his own dressing." 
* The Doric. 



in such a shape being new to them, and their 
Helots deserting continually to the foe ; ap- 
prehensive farther, lest such' unusual proceed- 
ings within their own district might draw worse 
consequences after them — they had a painful 
sense of their present situation. This com- 
pelled them to send their embassies to Athens, 
desirous however at the same time to conceal 
what they really thought of their own state, 
and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus 
and their people. But the Athenians grew 
more unreasonable in their demands, and after 
many journeys to and fro, sent them finally 
away with an absolute denial. Such was the 
course of proceedings in relation to Pylus. 

The same summer, and immediately on the 
close of the former event, the Athenians set 
out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty 
ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed 
of their own people, and, with some horse- 
transports, on board of which were two hun- 
dred horsemen. They were also attended by 
some of their confederates, by the Milesians, 
and Andrians, and Carysthians. Nicias the 
son of Niceratus with two colleagues com- 
manded this armament. At the early dawn of 
morning they came to anchor between Cer- 
sonesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place 
which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which 
formerly the Dorians possessing themselves 
made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth 
who were of ^olian descent. Upon that 
eminence there is now a village called Solygia. 
From the shore where the armament came now 
to anchor, this village was distant about twelve,' 
the city of Corinth sixty ,^ and the isthmus 
twenty stadia.^ 

The Corinthians, who had already been 
advised from Argos of the approach of the 
Athenian armament, had long since by way of 
prevention drawn their whole force together 
at the isthmus, excepting what was in employ 
without the isthmus, and the five hundred 
absent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. 
With all the rest of their people able to bear 
arms they were posted on the isthmus, to 
watch the approach of the Athenians. But 
when the Athenian. fleet had passed by undis- 
covered by favour of the night, and signals 
notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half 
their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any at- 



* Near one mile and a quarter. 
« Six miles. • Two miles. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bookht. 



tempt of the Athenians upon Crommyoiz, they 
marched with all speed against the enemy. 
Battus, one of their commanders, (for there 
were two such in the field) at the head of a 
separate body marched up to the open village 
of Solygia, in order to defend it, whilst Lyco- 
phron with the remainder advanced to the 
charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the 
right wing of the Athenians, who were but 
just landed before Chersonesus, and then pro- 
ceeded to engage the whole of that army. 
The action was warm, and fought hand to 
hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athe- 
nians, and also the Carysthians, who were 
drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a 
warm reception, and with much difiiculty re- 
pulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to 
a wall built of stone, for the ground was a con- 
tinued ascent, and being there above the enemy, 
they annoyed them with stones ; and having 
sung their psan, rushed down upon them agai^. 
The Athenians having stood the shock, they 
engaged the second time hand to hand. But a 
hand of Corinthians being come up to the 
support of their own left wing, occasioned the 
rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and 
pursued them to the aea-aide. But the Athe- 
nians and Carysthians now turned again* and 
beat them off from the ships. 

In other parts of the action the dispute was 
resolute on both sides, especially where the 
right wing of. the Corinthians, with Lycophron 
at its head, was «agaging the left wing of the 
Ad:ieauans. They were apprehensive the ^le- 
my would endeavour to force their way to the 
village of Solygia. For a considerable space 
the battle was obstinate, neither side giving 
way ; but at length, through the advantage on 
the Athenian side of being assisted by a party 
of hcNTse, whereas their opposites had-none, the 
Corinthians were broke and driven up the 
ascent, were grounding their arms, they came 
down no more to the charge, but remained in a 
qniet posture. In this rout of the right wing, 
numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Ly- 
cophron their general. But the rest of the 
body had the good fortune to make a safe re- 
treat, and so to secure themselves upon the 
eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, 
aad were not compelled to move off with pre* 
cipitation. When the Athenjana perceived 
ilutt the enemy would no more return to the 
charge, \hey rifled the bodies of the foes 
whom they had slain, and earned off their own 



dead, and then without Umm of time oreeted 
their trophy. 

That division of the Corinihiims, which had 
been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any at- 
tempt upon Crommyon, had the view of die 
battle intercepted from them by &e mountain 
Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of 
dust, and thence knew what was doing, they 
marched full speed towards the ej^oL The 
aged inhabitants also, when they are informed 
of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour 
.their own people. The Atheniuis perceirisg 
the approach of such numerous bodies, and 
judging them to be succours sent'" up by the 
neighbouring PeloponnesLans, llirew them- 
selves immediately on board their ships, widi 
what spoil they had taken, and the bodies (£ 
their own dead excepting two, which not find- 
ing in this hurry they left behind. They were 
no sooner re-embarked than they crooaed ever 
to the adjacent islands, from whence they des* 
patched a herald to demand leave, which was 
granted, to fetch off the dead bodies ihef had 
left behind.^ 

The number of Corinthians slain in the bat* 
tie was two hundred and tweWe; that ef 
Athenians somewhat less than fifty. 

The Athenians, leaving the idands, appeaz* 
ed the same day before Crommyon, situated in 
its territory, and distant from the city of Co- 
rinth one hundred and twenty sta&a,^ They 
landed and ravaged the country, and that night 
reposed themselves there. The day following 
they sailed along the coast, first to Epidaoras; 
and, after a kind of descent th^e, anived at 

*! This incident is redated by Plutarch, iji the life of 
Nicias, as a proof of the great piety and hamanityof 
Nicias. His asking leave to fete fa oft these- two bodies 
was, according to that writer, an actual lenmiciatioa 
of the victory; since it was against all rules, for persons 
who had condescended to such a submission, to erect a 
trophy. But, without disparaging the good qnalitiesof 
Nicias, or his obedience to the institutions of his eouDtry 
in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly 
observed, it may be questioned, whether he renoonoed 
the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says, the 
trophy was already erected, which ascertained, with- 
out doubt, the honour of the victory, and Dothiagii 
said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when tbey re- 
ceived this request of truce from Nicias. His re-enh 
barking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had bo 
connection with the late batUe, which bad been eleaiiy 
and fairly won; but was owing to a flrlsb army contag 
into the field on the side of tlie enemy. This stopped 
him indeed from gaining anyfreafa honour, butsneiy 
did not deprive him of what be was already 
of. 

• About 12 English miles. 



YXAX VU.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



149 



Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and 
Trcezen. Possessing themseWes there of the 
irthmus of Chersonesus on which Methone is 
situated, they run up a wall • across it, and 
fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, 
which for the future extended their depreda- 
tions over all the districts of Troezen, Halias, 
and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once 
this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away 
for Athens. 

During the space of time wldch coincided 
with these transactions, Eurymedon and So- 
phocles, who with the ships of the Athenians 
had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to 
Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the 
Corcyreans of the city, marching out against 
those who were posted on the mount of Istone, 
that party who repassing soon after the sedi- 
tion were at this time masters of the country, 
and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they 
assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. 
The defendants, who had fled away in a body 
towanU another eminence, were soon forced to 
capitulate, « giving up their auxiliaries, and 
^n giving up their own arms, to be proceeded 
with afterwards at the pleasure of the people 
of Athens." The commanders removed them 
all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, 
till they could conveniently bo conveyed to 
Athens, with this proviso, that <<if any one 
pnaon should be caught in any attempt to get 
ofil the whole number should forfeit the benefit 
of the capitulation." 

But the leaders of the populace at Corcyra, 
apprehending that the Athenians, should they 
l>e sent to Athens, might possibly save their 
lives, contrive the following machination. — 
They tan^per successfully with some of those 
who were confined in th6 isle, by the means of 
some trusty agents whom they sent privately 
amongst them, and instructed that ^ with great 
professions of regard for them, they should in- 
smuate no other resource was left for them 
bQt to make their escape with all possible ex- 
pedition, and that themselves would undertake 
to provide them with a bark, for it was the 
^^vtain resolution of the Athenian commanders 
to give them up to the fury of the Corcyrean 
populace."— When they had given ear to these 
■uggestions, and were on board the bark thus 
^•acheroiiriy provided for them, and so were 
Mxpnhended in the very act of departure, the 
>ticles oi^ciq[>itu]ation came at once to an end, 
>Qd they were all given up to the Corcyreans. 



Not that the Athenian commanders did not 
highly contribute to the success of this treach- 
ery ; since, in order to make it go down more 
easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in 
the plot, they had publicly declared that « the 
conveyance of those .persons to Athens by any 
other hands would highly chagrin them, be> 
cause, then, whilst they were attendii^ their 
duty in Sicily, others would rim away with all 
the honour." The Corcyreans had them no 
sooner in their power, than they shut them up- 
in a spacious edifice. Hence afterward» they 
brought them out by twenties, and havinfj^ 
formed two lines of soldiers, in all nulitary 
habiliments, facing one another, they con^lled 
them to walk between the lines, chained one 
to another, and receiving blows and wounds a» 
they passed along from those who formed the 
luies, and struck at pleasure so soon as they 
perceived the objects of their hatred. They 
were followed by others who carried scourges^ 
and lashed those forwards who moved not 
readily along. Threescore persons had beenr 
brought forth and destroyed in this maimer^ 
before those who remained in the edifice be* 
came sensible of their fate. For they had 
hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them 
out did it merely to shift their confinement. 
But when they learned the truth from some 
person or other whom they could not die* 
believe, they called out aloud on the Atheni- 
ans, and implored as a favour to be put to 
death by them. To stir from the place of 
their confinement they now absolutely refused, 
and avarred, that to the utmost of their power 
they would hinder every body from coming in 
to tiiem. But the Corcyreans had not the 
least inclination to force an entrance by the 
doors. They mounted up on the top of the 
edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the 
tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The 
others protected themselves to the best of their 
power ; and many of them were employed in 
making away with themselves by cramming' 
the arrows shot from above down their own 
throats. Others tearing away the cordage 
fcom. the beds which happened to be within^ 
or twisting' such ropes as they 'could find fipom 
shreds of their own garmentsj so strangled^ 
themselves to death. No method was omitted 
during the greatest part of the night (for nighfe 
dropped down upon this scene of horror) i6SX^, 
either despatched by their own contrivance, or 
diot to death by those above, their destruetioii 
S 



150 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book iv. 



was completely finished. So soon as it was 
day, the Corcyreans having thrown their 
bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them 
out of the city. But their wives, so man^ 
as had been taken prisoners in company with 
their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for 
Ufe. 

In this manner the Corcyreans from the 
mountains were destroyed by the people. And 
a sedition so extensive was brought to this 
tragical period, so far at least as relates to the 
present war. For nothing of the same nature 
broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need 
a particular relation-. 

The Athenians departed from Corcyra, 
made the best of their way for Sicily, whither 
they were bound at first setting out, and pro- 
secuted the war there in concert With their 
allies. 

In the close of this summer, the Athenians 
on the station of Naupactus, marching in junc- 
tion with the Acarnanians, possessed them- 
selves of Anactorium, a city of the Corin- 
thians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of 
Ambracia. It was put into their hands by 
treachery. In consequence of this, the Co- 
rinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place 
re-peopled by new inhabitants invited thither 
£rom all parts of Acamania. And the sum- 
mer ended. 

The ensuing winter, Aristides, the son of 
Archippus, one of those who commanded the 
squadrons which the Athenians had put out to 
raise contributions among their dependents, ap- 
prehended Artaphemes, a noble Persian, at 
Eion on the river Stiymon. He was going to 
Lacedsmon on a commission from the king. 
Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had 
his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, 
translated and read in public. Their contents 
were large, but the principal was this passage 
addressed to the Lacedaemonians, that <<he 
was not yet properly informed what it was 
they requested of hini. For though he had 
been attended by frequent embassies, yet they 
did not all agree in their demands. If there- 
fore they were desirous to make an explicit 
declaration, they should send some of their 
body to him in company with this Persian." 
But the Athenians afterwards send Artapher- 
nes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an 
embassy of their own, who meeting at that 
place with the news that Artaxerxes, the son 
ef Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about this 



time that monarch died,) the ambassadors re- 
turned back to Athens. 

The same winter also, the Chians demo- 
lished their nev^r fortifications. The Athe- 
nians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that 
they were intent on some innovating schemes. 
It availed nothing, that they had lately given 
the Athenians all possible securities, and the 
strongest assurances that they would in no 
shape attempt or think of innovations. And 
thus the winter ended ; and with it the seventh 
year of this war, of which Thucydides hath 
compiled the history, was brought to a con- 
clusion. 

TEAB VIII.* 

Early in the following summer, at the 
time of the new moon, the sun was partially 
eclipsed; and in the beginning of the same 
month, the shock of an earthquake was felt. 

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in 
general, who, to a great number, had sheltered 
themselves on the continent, assemble in a 
body, and having hired some additional suc- 
cours in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over 
safely from thence, surprise Rhcetiiiin; but, 
in consideration of two thousand Phocean 
staters* paid immediately down, they restored 
it again undamaged. This being done, they 
marched next against Antandrus, and got pos- 
session of it by the treachery of a party within 
the city, who betrayed it to them. It was, 
farther, their ihtention to set at liberty those 
cities styled the Actean, which had formerly 
been possessed by the Mityleneans, but were 
now in the hands of the Athenians. But 
their principal view was the possesion of 
Antandrus, which once effectually secured, 
(for it lay convenient for the building of ships, 
as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida 
stood just above it,) they would then be am- 
ply furnished with all the expedients of war, 
nay, might act offensively from thence, raigp 
terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and 
reduce the JEolian fortresses along the coast 
This was the plan which now they were intent 
to put in execution. 

The same summer the Athenians, with « 
fleet of sixty ships, and taking with **»«"* ^T 
thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, 
Milesians, and others of their confederate*, 



I Before Christ 434. « Above 180W.«terlin«- 



TEAS vm.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



151 



made an expedition against Cythera. The 
command was lodged with Nicias son of Ni- 
ceratus, Nicostratas son of Diotrephes, and 
Aatocles son of Toknsus. Cythera is an 
island : it lies upon the coast of Laconia over- 
against Malea. The inhabitants are Laceds- 
monians, resorting thither from the neighbour- 
ing coast. A magistrate was sent over yearly 
from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera ; 
the garrison of heavy-armed estabUshed there 
was regularly relieved ; and no care omitted in 
the good government and management of the 
place. It was the port which their trading 
ships first entered, in their return from Egypt 
and Libya. It was the chief security of La- 
conia against those piratical parties which 
might infest it from the sea, from whence 
alone they are capable of doing them ^any mis- 
chief; for by its situation it hath entirely the 
command of ihe seas of Sicily and Crete. 
The Athenian armament therefore arriving 
here, with a detachment of ten ships and two 
thousand heavy-armed, surprise a maritime town 
which IB called Scandea. With the rest of 
their force they made a descent on that part of 
the island which is opposite to Malea, and 
advanced towards the city of Cythera, situated 
also on the sea, and they found immediately 
that all the inhabitants were drawn out into 
the field in readiness to receive them. An 
engagement ensued, wherein the Cythereans 
inaintained their ground for a small space of 
^Ci but then turning about, fled amain into 
their citadel. They soon afterwards capitu- 
lated with Nicias and his coUeagnes, submit- 
ung to the Athenians at discretion, barring 
only the penalty of death. Some of the Cy- 
thereans had beforehand obtained a conference 
^rth Nicias. This rendered the capitulation 
more easy and expeditious, and not only the 
present, but all future points were by this 
nieana speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. 
For the Athenians insisted that they should 
evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedse- 
nionians, and because the island lay so conve- 
niently on the Laconic coast The accom- 
niodation being once perfected, the Athenians, 
having secured Scandea, the fortress situated 
Upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cy- 
^ra? stood away for Asine and Helas, and 
^OBt of the adjacent places on the coast 
laere they made descents, and reposing them- 
selves in the nights at the most convenient of 



those places, they spent about seven days in 
ravaging the country. 

The Lacedsmonians, though they saw the 
Athenians had possessed themselves of Cy- 
thera, and expected further that they would 
proceed to make more such descents upon 
their territories, yet nowhere drew together 
in a body to repulse them. They only sta- 
.tioned their parties of guard in such posts as 
were of greatest importance. In other re- 
spects they exerted their utmost vigilance, 
being under apprehensions that the very form 
of their government was in danger of subver- 
sion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected 
and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands 
of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was 
bursting in upon them on all sides with irre- 
sistible impetuosity. This compelled them> 
contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body 
of four hundred horse and archers. If they 
were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, 
at this juncture they were more feelingly so, 
when they saw the necessity of entering the 
lists, contrary to all that practice of war to 
which they had been inured, in a naval contest, 
and in this against the Athenians, whose pas- 
sion it was to compute as so much loss, wha1>- 
ever they left unattempted. Their general mis- 
fortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast 
had poured in upon them, had thrown them in- 
to the utmost consternation. They excessively 
dreaded the weight of such another c$ilamity, 
as they had been sensible of in the blow at 
Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no 
longer think of fighting ; nay, whatever mea^ 
sures they concerted, they at once desponded 
of success, as their minds, accustomed until 
of late to an uninterrupted career of good for- 
tune, were now foreboding nothing but disap- 
pointment Thus, for the most part whilst 
the Athenians were extending their devas- 
tations all along their coasts, they remained in- 
active. Each party on guard, though the ene- 
my made a descent in the face of their post, 
knowing themselves inferior in number, and sad- 
ly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One 
party indeed which was posted near Cortyta 
and Aphrodisia, perceiving the ligh^ armed of 
the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to 
charge them ; but when the heavy-armed ad- 
vanced to their support, they retreated with so 
much precipitation, that some (though few) of 
them were killed and their arms rifled. The 



152 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



IT. 



AikamnM, after erecting a trophy, r^cmbark- 
ed and repassed to Cythera. 

FnMB hence they sailed again along the coast 
43f the Ldmerian Epidannus ; and, after ravag- 
ing paitof that district, they arrived at Thyrea, 
ivhich, thmigh it ties in the district called Cynu- 
lia, is tile frontier town which parts Argia and 
Laoonia. This place belonged to the Lacede- 
nomans, who had assigned it for the residency 
-of the exiled iGginets, in requital of the servi- 
aes they had done them at the time of the earth- 
qnske and the insurrection of the Helots, and 
Anther because, though subject to the Athe- 
Bians they had ever firmly abode in the Laoe- 
domonian infcevest The ^ginete, thus again 
invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the 
ibxtificalion upon the sea-side which they were 
hnsy in throwing np, and retreated into the city, 
which was the place of their residence, seated 
higher up, at tibte distance of about ten stadia^ 
itam the shore. A party 'of Laoedasmonians 
.had been posted there, to assist those who were 
employed in the new fortification ; and yet, 
tiiottgh earnestly pressed by the ^ginete, tiiey 
refused to accompany them within their walls, 
being aiwrse to run the risk of a new blockade. 
They chose rather to retreat towards the emi- 
nences, as they judged themselves disabled by 
the inferiority of their number from facing the 
enemy, and remained there in a state of inac- 
tion. 

By this time the Athenians, having com- 
pleted their landing advanced with their whole 
force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the 
4aty in flames, and destroyed whatever was 
witiiin it. Such of the ^ginets as survived 
the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to 
A&ens ; and with them Tantalus son of Pa- 
frocles, who commanded there as general for 
the Lacedemonians. He had been wounded 
and so taken prisoner. They also carried 
•thither some few persons whom they had taken 
in Cythera, such as for its security it was expe- 
dient to remove. These the Athenians, after 
a consultation, decreed " to be disposed of in 
the islands, but the rest of the Cy thereans still 
to occupy their own land, subjected to the yearly 
tribute of four talents f but the iEginets, as 
many as had been taken prisMiers, to be all in- 
etantly put to de^th," (to gratify that eternal 
mnconr they bore them,) « and Tantalus to be 



kept in prison ahmg with his countrymen taken 
in Sphaoteria." 

The same summer a suspenaon ef arme 
was agreed en in Sicily ; first, between the 
Oamarineans and Geloans : and then, the other 
Sicilians, holding a general congress at Crela, 
whither the ambassadors from the several 
states resorted, entered into eonferencee about 
the terms of a general reconciliation. Many 
diiierent expedients were proposed on all sides, 
and many disputes arose, each insisting on a re- 
paration suitable to their own private sense of 
grievance. But Heimocrate^ the son of 
Hermon a Syracusan, who labouved most of 
any at a firm reunion, delivered his senthnents 
thus: 

« I am here the representative, ye men of 
Sicily, of one and not the meanest of the SiciliaB 
states nor yet the most exhausted by war ; »id 
what I am going to propose is calculated for, 
and will, I am convinced, most effectually secaiv 
the welfare of our common ooontry. And 
what need is there now to run over in miniite 
detail the calamities inseparable from war, in 
the hearing of men who have experimced them 
all 1 None ever plunge headlong imto these, 
through an ultter ignorance of them ; nor, when 
the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are 
men used to be deterred by fear. The acqui- 
sitions proposed in the latter case, aie gena- 
ally imagined to overbalance dangers : and the 
former choose rather to submit to hazards, 
than sufifer diminution of tiieir present enjoy- 
ments. Yet where the parties actuated bj 
these different views, embroil themsdves at a 
juncture when it is impossible to succeed, ex- 
hortations to a mutual agreement axe then 
most highly expedient 

<<To be influenced by such exhortations, 
must at present be highly for the advantage of 
us all. For it was the strong desire of fixing 



> About a mile. 

• Seven handled and seventy five pounds sterling. 



> This great and accomplished Syracnaan seemslote 
ushered into this history with peculiar dignity, as tbe 
very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them all to concord and 
unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing 
the welfare and glory of their common coaatry, upos 
the noblest. This is noted merely to draw upon bin t^ 
attention of the reader. He will act afterwards io tii« 
most illustrious scenes, and show himself on alJ occa- 
sions a man of true honour and probity, a fim and 
disfaiterested patriot, aaeKcsIlentstateanian, aad anost 
able commander. Tbe Athenians never hadamon 
determined or a more generous enemy, fiut that ^i ' 
not hinder our bistorian A:om representing him in all 
bis merit. 



ZBAXTXn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



153 



oar own separate views on a toi establieili- 
ment, which at first embroiled ns in this war, 
and which at present ndseth such mutnal alter- 
cations even during our endeavours to effect an 
accommodation : and, in fine, unless matters 
can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all par- 
ties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But 
then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for 



.securing our separate interests, if we would ..though they have never claimed assistance 



act like men of sense, is this present congress 
opened; but, to concert the best measures 
within our reach to preserve (if possible) our 
country from falling, and, as I judge, in great 
danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian ambi- 
tion. It is to convince you how necessary a re- 
union is, not so much from what I can urge, as 
from the light these very Athenians themselves 
hold out before you. Possessed of a power 
fax superior to any other Grecians, here they 
Ue amongst ns with a few ships, to note down 
our indiscretions ; and, under the plausible pre- 
text of alliance, though with malice lurking in 
their hearts, they are studying to improve them 
in a specious manner to their own advantage. 
For should war "be again our option ; and in it, 
ahonld th^ assistance of men be accepted, who 
thongh uninvited would be glad to invade us ; 
whilat 1^ are harassing and exhausting one an- 
other, and cutting open for these Athenians a 
road to our subjection, it is much to be appre- 
liended that, when once they behold our strength 
at the lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with 
inore formidable armaments, and exert their ut- 
most endeavours to complete our destruction. 

** It becomes each party amongst us, pro- 
ved we know what is really our interest, to 
ibnn alliances and to launch in hazardous 
attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to 
others than to prejudice what themselves at 
present possess ; and to rest assured that sedi- 
tion must ruin our several states, nay, Sicily 
Itself, of which we, the joint possessors, are 
'^y* are all of us ready, to be supplanted by 
Qostile treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in 
our domestic quarrels. It is high time we 
were convinced of this, that every individual 
Bttght be reconciled with his neighbour, and 
community with community, and all in general 
combine together to preserve the whole of 
Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischie- 
vous suggestions, that those amongst us of 
poric descent are enemies to every thing that 
tt Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of 
^ Ionian affinity, are sure of their protec- 
27 



tion. The Athenians 'myade us not firom 
private enmity, because we are peopled here 
from these divided races, but to gratify their 
lust after those blessings in^ which Sicily 
abounds, and which at present we jointly pos- 
sess. Nay, this they have already clearly de- 
clared, by their ready compliance with the in- 
vitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For 



from hence by virtue of their natural attach- 
ments here, yet they have shown a greater 
readiness in support of those than any com- 
pact between them required. Yet, though the' 
Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this 
manner politic, by me at least they ought to 
be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are 
greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to 
bend their necks. to their yoke : because it is 
the constant never-failing turn of the human 
temper, to controul who will submit, but to 
make head against ' more powerful encroach- 
ments. As for us, who know these things, 
and yet will not timely provide against them, 
though each in this assembly be separately 
convinced, that it demands our greatest atten- 
tion to unite in dissipating a storm which 
threatens us all, we eilr strangely in our con- 
duct ; especially, when its diversion might be 
so readily effected, would we only bring our 
private quarrels to an amicable determination : 
for it is not from quarters of their own, that 
the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but 
from ground which belongs to those who in- 
vited them. Thus, of course, without any 
intervening trouble, one war will not be termi- 
nated by another, but dissension will at once 
subside in peace. And these new-comers, who 
under specious colours are here for our ruin, 
must return again with a disappointment, 
which they may as speciously palliate. So 
desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue, 
from proper determinations in. regard to the 
Athenians. 

« That peace is the greatest of human bless- 
ings, is a truth which all the world alloweih ; 
— What hindereth us then, why we should not ^ 
firmly establish it with one another 1 or do you 
rather imagine, that if the condition^ of one 
man be happy and that of another be wretched, 
tranquillity will not contribute so<mer than 
warfare to amend the state of the latter, and 
to preserve the state of the former from a sad 
reverse 1 or that peace is not better calculated 
to preserve unimpaired the honours and splen- 
s2 



154 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book !▼. 



imsn of the hsppy, and all other blessings 
which, should we descend to a minute detail, 
might lazgel J be recounted, or might be set in 
the strongest light by opposing to them the 
calamities which ensue from war 1 Fix your 
Blinds therefore on these considerations, that 
you may not overlook my admonitions, but in 
compliance with them look out respectively in 
time for expedients of prevention. 

** In case it be presumed, that success must 
result from power, without taking into debate 
the justice or violence of the cause, let me 
detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine 
hope, which must be blasted in the end. 
Many are they, it is well known, who would 
have gratified their revenge on violent oppres- 
sors, and many who have exerted their utmost 
force for their own aggrandizement ; yet the 
first, so hi from accomplishing their revenge, 
have met destruction in its pursuit ; and it 
had been the fate of the latter, instead of en- 
larging, to suffer the loss of what they already 
possessed. For revenge is not certain, because 
justly sought afler to retaliate violence ; nor 
is power assuied of its end, because invigorated 
with sanguine expectation. Events are for 
the most part determined by the fallible unsteady 
balance of futurity ; which, though deceivable 
as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the 
most instructive hints. For thus armed equally 
beforehand with needful apprehension, we em- 
baik into mutual contest with wise premedita- 
tion. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy 
dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on 
all sides by the terrors which the presence of 
these Athenians spread amongst us ; deterred 
further by those hopes ahready blasted, which 
assured us alternately of success against one 
another, had not they interfered to obstruct 
and control us; let us send far away from 
Sicily these enemies that are hovering about 
us; let us enter into firm and lasting union 
with^ one another ; at least, let us conclude a 
truce for so long a time as can possibly be 
agreed, and deftr our own private disputes to a 
nmote decision. In a word, let us acknow- 
ledge, that, if my advice takes place, we shall 
eontinue free in our respective communities, 
where, masters of ourselves and accountable to 
lume beside, we shall be enabled to recompense 
bodi our finends and our foes according to 
their deserts. But, in ease it be obstinately 
njected, and the mischievous insinuations of 
others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to 



the just vindieatbn of oar own wrongs ; or, if 
we are violentiy bent upon effiecting it, wa 
must strike up a friendriiip with unrelentiDg 
foes, and must range ourselves in opposition 
there, whero natoic hath most closely attache 
ed us. 

*t For my own part, who now, as I observed 
at setting out, represent the greatest of tha 
Sicilian states, and in thi^ character am more 
accustomed to attack another than to defend 
myself, I here, in her name, conjnre you to 
make use of conviction, and unite together in a 
speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thiral 
afW the damage of our foes as to plunge 
ourselves into irreparable mischiefo. I am not 
conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness 
of heart, which expects to be absolute in its 
own private will ; or that fortune, whose mas- 
ter I am not, should attend my orders ; but I 
am ready to give way to good sense and reason. 
And I require you all respectively thus to give 
way to one another, and not to wait till you 
are compelled to do so by your enemies. It 
can argue no baseness for kinsmen to give way 
to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalci- 
dean to others of his own race. Nay, what is 
most comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all 
joint inhabitants of the same land, a land wash* 
ed round by the sea, and all styled by the sams 
common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed ia 
the course of time I foresee we dmU wage 
upon one another, and future conferences will 
again be held, and mutual firiendship shall thus 
revive. But wheif foreigners invade us, let us 
be wise enough to unite our strength, and 
drive them from our shores: for to be weaken* 
ed in any of our members, must endanger tha 
destruction of the whole; and to such coi^ 
federates and such mediators we will never for 
ihe future have recourse. 

« If to such conduct we adhere, we shsU 
immediately procure a double blessing for 
Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Athen- 
ians, and a domestic war. For the fbtaie 
we shall retain the free possession of her b 
our own hands, and more easily diaconcert 
any projects that hereafter may be f<»nsd 
against her." 

The Sicilians acknowledge the weight ef 
these arguments thus urged by HermocntM^ 
and all the several parties jmned in ana 
common resolution ** to put an end ta tha 
war, each retaining what they were at prs- 
sent possessed of; but that Moigantina should 



ISAB VXDT.] 



PBLOPONNESIAN WA^R. 



W 



bs nttoved te flia CamariamiiSi vpsa. tb« paj- 
xaent of a certain aum of monej to the Syracu- 
MB8." Sa<^ also ai were confederated witb 
the AtlieoMnsy addressing themselves to the 
Athenian commanders, notified their own readi- 
ness to acquiesce in these t^ms, and their 
resolution to be comprehended in the same 
peace. These approving the measure^ the last 
hand was put to the accommodation* 

The Athexuan fleet, which had no longer 
any business there^ sailed away from Sicily. 
But the people at Athens manifested their 
displeasure against the commanders at their 
letum hone, by passing a sMitenoe of banish- 
ment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and 
subjecting Eurymedon, who was Ihe third, to 
a pecuniary mulct ; as if, when able to have 
perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been 
hribed to desist. They bad e^yed so long a 
career of good fortune, that they imagined 
aothing eauld disconeert their schemes; &at 
CBterpiises of the greatest as weU as of smdl 
iinportaiiee, no matter whelher adequatdly &r 
uuttffioMBitly supported, must be ended to their 
wish. TMs was owing to the unexpected good 
Ittck with which most ai their projects had of 
I&te succeeded, sAd now invigorated aU their 
cipeetatisiiis. 

The same aununer, the Megareans of the 
city q{ MegMa, pi>essed hard by the Athenians, 
who eoBstantly twice a year made an inroad 
i>^ their territory with their whole united 
^^i hacaased at the same time hy their own 
outlaws, who having been ejected by the popu- 
^ party in the train of a sedition had settled 
at Pegs, and from thence, were continually 
hindering them, began to have some conference 
about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, 
^ the city might not douUy be exposed to 
^Q* The friends of these exiles, perceiving 
<Qch a design to be in a^tation, insisted more 
openly than ever that the affair should be 
i^larly considered. The leaders of the people 
^iag convinced that their own and the strength 
^ the people united in their present low con- 
dition csfuld not pofMaiUy overrule it, were ao 
^ influenced by iheir fears as to make a se- 
cret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates 
^ son of AripluwB and Demosth e nes the son 
of AlciBthane% «to put the city into their 
hands ;'^ concluding, they should be less en- 
^^^^Soisd by audi a step than by the restoration 
^ the exiles whom ^y themselves had ^ject- 
*^ It was a^preed, that in the &st place the 



Athenians should take possession of the long 
walls (these were eight stadia^ in length, readi^ 
ing down from the city to Nissea their, port) to 
prevent any succour which might be sent from 
Nissa by the Peloponnesians, sinoe there alone 
they kept their garrison for the security of 
Megara. After this, they promised their endea> 
vouratoput them in possession of the upper city. 
And this they would be able to eflfect more easily^, 
when -the former point was once secured. 

The Athenians therefore, when all was Axf 
ed and determined on both sides, crossed over 
by night to Minoa the island of the Megareana 
with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by 
Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a 
hollow whence the bricks for the walls had 
been taken, and which lay near enough for 
their purpose: whilst another body, under 
Demosthenes the other commander, consisting 
of light-armed Platsans, and the Athenian 
patroles, concealed themselves near the tempte 
of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul 
witlun the city knew any thing of these mo> 
tions, excepting those whose vigilance it con- 
cerned this night to observe them. When the 
morning was ready to break, the plotters of 
Megara proceeded thus: 

Through a series of time they had estab- 
lished a custom to have the gates of the long 
walls c^pened to them in the night, by carry- 
ing out a wherry^ upon a carnage, which they 
persuaded the officers posted there, they coi^ 
veyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, 
and so went upon a cruise. And before it was 
light, bringing it back again to the walls upon 
the carriage, they convoyed it through the 
gates, that it might escape the notice of the 
Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means 
might be eluded, as they never would descry 
any boat in the harbour. The carriage was 
now at the gates, which were opened as usual 
for the reception of the wherry. This the 
Athenians observing (for this was the signal 
agreed on) came running from their place of 
ambush to take possession of the gates before 
they could be shut again. The very moment 
the carriage was between, and obstructed the 
closing them together, both they and the Mega- 
rean coadjutors put the watch which was 
pos^ at the gates to the sword. The Plati^- 
ans, and patroling parties under DemostheneSt 
rushed in first to that spot where the trophy 

*■ Abont tbrac quarters of a stUs. 



156 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it. 



ROW stands, and having thus gained an entrance 
(for the Peloponnesians who were hearest had 
taken the alarm), the Plateans made good 
their ground against those who attacked them, 
and secured the gates till the heavy-armed 
Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, 
had entered. Each of these Athenians after- 
wards, so fast as he got in, advanced along the 
wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few 
in numher, made head against them for a time ; 
0ome of them soon dropped, and then the rest 
ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such 
an attack from their enemies in the night ; and, 
as the treacherous Megareans fought against 
ihem, they concluded that all the Megareans 
were combined together in betraying them. 
It happened farther that an Athenian herald 
had proclaimed of his own accord that " such 
Megareans as were willing to side with the 
Athenians should throw down their arms." 
When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at 
once quitted their posts ; and, seriously believ- 
ing that all the Megareans had combined to be- 
tray them, fled amain into Nissa. 

At the time of morning's dawn, the long 
walls being thus surprised, and the Megareans 
within the city thrown into a tumult, the 
agents for the Athenians, in concert with all 
their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the 
necessity to throw open the city gates, and 
march out to battle ; since it had been agreed 
between them, that so soon as ever the gates 
were thus opened, the Athenians should rush 
in. There was a method to be observed on 
their side, in order to be dibtinguished ; this 
was, to besmear themselves with ointment, 
that they might receive no harm. Their secu- 
rity would have been greater, had they opened 
the gates at once ; for now four thousand heavy- 
armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, 
who had marched in the night from Eleusis, 
according to a prior disposition, were at hand. 
But whilst the accomplices, properly be- 
•meared, stood ready at the gates, one of their 
own party, who was privy to the whole plot, 
discovereth it to the other Megareans. These 
drawing up together, came forwards in a body, 
and denied " the expediency of marching out, 
(since formeriy, when stronger than now, they 
ixxnt not hazard such a step,) or running such 
a manifest risk of losing the city ; and, should 
any one affirm the contrary, the point should be 
instantiy determined by blows." They gave 
not tha laait hint as if ^ey had diacoverad the 



design, but strennonsly insisted that their own 
measure was most advisable, and stood firm 
together for the security of the gates. Thus 
it was no longer possible for the conspirators to 
put their plot in execution. 

The Athenian commanders, being sensible 
that the project had been somehow crossed, and 
that they were not able themselves to take the 
city by storm, immediately ran up a wall to 
invest Nissa ; concluding, that could they cany 
it before any succours came up, it would be 
impossible for Megaxa to hold out much loni^. 
liron and workmen, and all proper materials, 
were quickly supplied them from Athens. 
They begun at the wall which they had lately 
surprised, they ran it along for some time 
parallel with Megara, and then down to the 
sea on both sides of Nisea. The work, both 
of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the 
army. They made use of the stones and 
bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some 
trees and wood, they strengthened what was 
weak with an additional palisade. The houses 
of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, 
served the use of turrets. This whole day 
they plied hard at the work ; and about the 
evening of the succeeding day it was only not 
completed. The garrison within Nisea was 
in great consternation. They laboured already 
under a scarcity of provisions, which they had 
been used to fetch daily from the npper city. 
Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could 
not succour them with sufficient ezpedition, 
and imagining the Megareans were combined 
against them, they capitulated viith the Atheni- 
ans on the following terms : 

« To be dismissed, every man at a certain 
ransom, after delivering up their arms. 

« But as for the Lacedemonians, their eom- 
mander, and every other person in that number, 
these to be disposed of by the Atheniuis at dis- 
cretion." 

These terms being agpreed to, they evacuated 
Nisea. And the Athenians, having thus cat 
off their long walls from the city of the Megih 
reans, and possessed themselves of Nisea, wen 
preparing to accomplish what was yet to be 
done. - 

But Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedemo- 
nian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon 
and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thiaoe. 
He was no sooner informed of the surffrisal of 
the walls, than he trembled for the Pelopon- 
nesians in Nisea, and lest Megara should be 



TBAXTin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



157 



taken. He summoni the Boeotians to attend I 
him expeditiously with their forces at Tripo- 
diflcus (the place so named is a village of the 
Megaris under the mountain Geranea), whither 
he was marching himself with two thousand 
seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four 
hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, 
and what levies he had already made upon his 
own account. He imagined he might come up 
before Nisiea could be taken. But hearing the 
contrary (for he came up in the night to Tri- 
podiscus), with a picked body of three hundred 
men, before the news of his march could be 
spread, he approached to the city of Megara, 
undescried by the Athenians, who were posted 
near the sea. He intended to declare that he 
was rea^y to attempt, and in fact would have 
been glad to have effected, the recovery of 
Nisca. But it was principally his view to get 
admission into Megara, and provide for its 
security. He demanded admission, assuring 
them he had gr^At hope of recovering Nisea. 
But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this 
step of Brasidae — on one side, lest he meant 
to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them ; the 
other, lest the people with such an apprehension 
might at once fall upon- them, and their city 
thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be 
lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in am- 
bush, should seize it ; refused him admittance, 
and both factions thought proper, without any 
>tir, to await the event. For it was severally 
their full expectation, that a battle must ensue 
between the Athenians and these new-comers ; 
and then, without plunging themselves into un- 
necessary hazards, they might join their own 
favourite party if victorious. 

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, with- 
^w again to the main of his army. By the 
■ticceeding dawn the Boeotians joined him, 
who had resolved to succour Megara, even 
previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, 
since they regarded the danger that place was 
hi as their own. They were actually advanced 
^th their whole force as far as Platsea ; and, 
^e messenger having met with them here, they 
became much more eager than before. They 
>ont forwards a detachment of two and twenty 
hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horse- 
men, but dismissed the multitude to their own 
homes. When the whole force was thus 
imited, consbting of at least six thousand 
heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians 
^^^^ drawn up in order near Nissa and the 



sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were ttra^ 
gling about the plain, the Boeotian cavalry 
made an unexpected sally against those strag- 
glers, and chased them to the shore : for hither- 
to no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf 
of the Megareans. The Athenian cavalry 
clapped spurs to repel the Boeotian, and a bat- 
tle ensued. The horse were a long time thus 
engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. 
For the general of the Boeotian cavalry, and a 
small number of his party, the Athenians drove 
before them to Nissa, where they put them to 
the sword and rifled them. They remained 
masters of the dead bodies, gave them up 
afterwards by a truce, and erected a trophy : but 
neither side so keeping their ground as to ren- 
der the action decisive, they retreated as it 
were by consent ; the Boeotians to their main 
army, and the Athenians to Nissa. 

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the 
sea and to the city of Megara with his army. 
Having occupied there some advantageous 
ground, they drew up in order and stood still, 
imagining the Athenians would attack them; 
and assured, that the Megareans were intently 
observing for whom the victory might declare. 
In both these respects, they judged their pre- 
sent posture the most judicious; because it 
was not their own business to attack, or volun- 
tarily to run into conflict and danger; and 
thus, having manifestly exhibited their alacrity 
to act defensively, a victory might justly be 
ascribed to them without the expense of a 
battle. In regard further to the Megareantf, 
the consequence could not but be fortunate: 
for, in case the latter had never beheld them 
thus prompt in their succour, they would hvfe 
stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they 
should have lost the city, as men completely 
vanquished; but now, should the Athenians 
decline an engagement, the points for whidi 
they themselves came thither n^ust be secured 
without a blow ; which proved to be the result. 
For the Megarians, when the Athenians came 
out and drew up in order close to the long 
walls, and then, as the enemy did not advance 
to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks; thdir 
commanders also judging the hazard hy no 
means equal, and themselves, who had so fiur 
been successful, not at all concerned to begin 
an engagement against superior numbers, in 
which, should they prevail, they could only take 
Megara, but, should they miscarry, must lose 
the flower of their domestic strengtii ; espeei- 



156 



PELOPONNESIAN WAK. 



[book nr. 



tMHy as their opponents would act in probability 
with more dariag resolution, since as the large 
■trength they had now in the field consisted 
only of quotas from several constituents, they 
hazarded but little; thus facing one another 
for a connderable space, and neither side pre- 
■aming to make an attack, till each at length 
wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nisea, 
/ uid the Peloponnesians again to their former 
post :— ^hen, I say, the Megareans in the inter- 
est of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, 
and animated by the refusal of attack on the 
Athenian side, open the gates of Megara to 
Brasidas himself, and the several commanders 
lh>m ihe auxiliary states; and, having given 
Ihem admission, proceed with them to c<Nisttl- 
tation, whilst the partisans of the Athenian in- 
terest were in the utmost consternation. 

Soon afterwards, the confederates being 
dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas 
ilso himself returned to Corinth, to continue 
Ills preparations for that Thracian expedition, 
in which before this avocation he had been in- 
tently employed. 

The AtheUians also being now marched 
limnewards, the Megareans in the city, who 
had acted most zealously in favour of the 
AtAienians, finding all their practices detected, 
•tole off as fast as possible. The others, after 
concerting the proper steps with the friends of 
^e exiles, fetch them home from PegsB, having 
first administered to them the most solemn 
oaths '<to think no more on former injuries, 
and to promote the true, welfare of the city to 
^e utmost of their power." 

But these, whezv re-invested with authority, 
tad taking a review of the troops of the city, 
having previously disposed some bands of sol- 
diers in a proper manner, picked out about a 
hundred persons of their enemies, uid who 
they thought had busied themselves most in 
fiivour of the Athenians. And having com- 
pelled the people to pass a public vote upon 
them, they were condemned to die and suffered 
•n instant execution. They fardier new-mo- 
delled the government of Megara into almost an 
oligarchy. And this change, though introduced 
by an inconsiderable body of men ; nay, what is 
more, in the train of sedition ; yet continued for 
a long space of time in full force at Magara. 

The same summer, Ihe Mityleneans heing 
intent on executing their design of fortifying 
Antandrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who 
^mBoasodsd the Athenian squadron for levy- 



ing contribRQtidns, and w«re now at Heleapont, 
(for Lamachus the third in tho commiaaion 
had been detached with ten ships towaids 
Pontus,) when informed of what was thus in 
agitation, became apprehensive Aat Antandxus 
might prove of as bad consequence to them as 
Ansa in Samoa had already done : wherein die 
Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were 
not only serviceable to the Peloponttesians at aea, 
by furnishing them wilh pilots; bat farther, 
were continually alarming' the Samians at 
home, and sheltering their deserters. From 
these apprehensions they assembled a force 
from among their dependents, sailed tlutl^r, 
and having defeated in battle those who came 
out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once 
more possession of that town. And no long 
time after, Lamachus, who had been detadied 
to Pontus, having anchored in the itver Calex 
in the district of Heradea, lost all his diipc 
A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, 
and the land>flood rushing suddenly down, bore 
them all away before it. He hims^ and the 
men under his command were forced to maidi 
over land through Bithynia (possessed by those 
Thracians who are seated on the o^r side of 
the strait in Asia) to Chakedon, a colony of 
Megareans in the mouth of the Euxine sea. 

This summer also Demoslhenes, imme&ately 
af%er he had quitted 1h« Megaris, with the com- 
mand of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at 
Naupactus. For with him, and wilti Hippo- 
crates, smne persons of the Bceotian cities in 
those parts had been concerting schemes how 
to change the government of those cities, and 
introduce a democracy on the Athenian model. 
The first author of this scheme was PtoBodorus, 
an exile from Thebes, and matters were now 
ready for execution. 

Some of them had undertaken to betray 
Siphs : Siphffi is a maritime tov^n in the dis- 
trict of Thespi®, upon Ihe gulf of Crissiu 
Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chteronea, 
a town tributary to that Ordiomenus whidi 
was formerly called the Minyeian but now the 
Boeotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the 
chief undertakers qf tins point, and were hiring 
soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. 
Cheronea is situat^ on the edge of Boeoda 
towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is m part in- 
habited by PhociaBs. The diare assigned to 
the Athenians was the suipfisal of Delinm, a 
temple of Apollo in Tanagra, tookiag towsds 
Eubcea. These thhigs failher wene te be 



TBAH Vm.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



IM 



tduered on a day prefixed, that the Beeotians 
might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of 
Delium with ^l their force, by the necessity of 
ftaying at home to defend their respective ha- 
bitations. Should the attempt succeed, and 
Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed 
that, though the change of the Boeotian govern- 
ments might not suddenly be efiected, yet, 
when those towns were in their hands, when 
their devastations were extended all over the 
country, and places of safe retreat lay near at 
hand for their parties, things could not long 
remain in their former posture ; but in process 
of time, when the Athenians appeared in sup- 
port of the revokers, and the BceotianB could 
not unite in a body to c^ppose them, the de- 
signed revolution must necessarily take place. 
TMs was the nature of the scheme at present 
in agitation. 

Hippocrates, having the whole force of 
Athens under his command, was ready at the 
proper time to march into Boeotia. But he 
had despatched Demosthenes beforehand to 
Nanpactus with forty slups, that, after he had 
collected a sufficient force in those parts from 
the Acamanians and their other confederates, 
he should appear with his fieet befcnre Siphs, 
which was then to be betrayed to him. A 
day also was fixed upon between them, in which 
lK>th of them were at once to execute the parts 
assigned them. 

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, 
found the Oeniads already compelled by the 
onited Acamanians into an association with 
the confederates of Athens. He marched 
away, therefore, at the head of the whole con- 
iederacy in those parts, and invaded first Salyn- 
thius and the Agreans; and having carried 
some other points, got all in readiness to show 
lumself before Siphs at the time appointed. 

About the same time this summer, Brasidas, 
it the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, 
^ffan his march towards Thrace. When he 
^•s come up to Heradea in Thachis, he des- 
patched a messeuger beforehand to his corres- 
pondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe-conduct 
for himself and his army. And as soon as he. 
^iB met at Melitia of Adiea, by Panarus, 
^ Boms, and Hippolodudas, and Torylaus, 
vid Strophacus, who had been formerly the 
public host of the Chalcideans, he continued 
his march forwards. Others also of the Thes- 
"^ans assisted in conducting him» and from 
^'^^nau Niconidas the foMvi of PeidiMsu. 



The passage through Thesealy wiihont pvapm 
guides is always difficult, end must be more m 
to an armed body. Besides, to attempt tudht 
a thing through a neighbouring doininion withr- 
out permission first obtained, hath ever been 
regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye^ 
and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever 
welV-affected to the Athenians. Nor could 
Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the 
Thessalian been rather despotic than fieee 
governments. For upon his route he was 
stopped at the river Bnipeus-, by some of con- 
tary sentiments to the rest of their eountix* 
men, who ordered him to proceed at his peiil, 
and taxed him with injustice in having cobm 
so far without the general permisaion. Hia 
conductors told them in return, that « without 
such permission he should not proceed; bu^ 
as he had come amongst them on a sudden* 
they thought themselves obliged in firiendship 
to conduct him.*' Brasidas also gave them 
strong assurances, that « he was come thither 
for the service of Thessaly and of them ; thai 
his arms were not intended against them, but 
against the common enemy, the Athenians; 
that he never suspected any enmity between 
Thessalians and Lacedffiiponians, why they 
might not tread upon one another's ground ; 
that even now, should th^ vidthhold their con* 
sent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to 
proceed ; but," he conjured them, « however, to 
give him no mcdestation." Having heard these 
declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. 
Brasidas now, by the advice of his conduetoi% 
advanced with the utmost speed without ever 
halting, in order to anticipate fresh and mors 
potent obstruction. Nay, the very same ds^ 
that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as 
to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of 
the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to 
Phacium, and from thence into Penebia. Be- 
ing so far advanced, his Thessalian guides r^ 
ceived their dismission ; and the Persbiansy 
who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted 
him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas : il 
is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount- 
Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this maur 
ner Braudas, advancing so expeditiously as to 
prevent all obstruction, completed his passage 
through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominionf 
of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcia. For 
tl^ose in Thrace who revolted from the Athft- 
nians, h^ joined with Perdiccas in procuring 
this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus^ b^ 



100 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IT. 



etnie the great eacceM of the Athenians had 
etruck a terror amongst them. The Chald- 
deans were persuaded, that they should be first 
attacked by the Athenians : and in truth their 
neighbournrtates, who yet persevered in their 
obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. 
Perdlccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself 
their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance of 
the Athenians for former grudges ; and now he 
bad a scheme at heart for the subjection of 
Arribsus king of the Lyncestians. 

Other points concurred to facilitate the pro- 
curement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, 
such as the misfortunes by which the Lacede- 
monians at present were aiBicted. For, the 
Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and 
not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case 
they could equally annoy them in this quarter, 
by thus marching an army against their depen- 
dants, to effect a diversion. And they were 
more encouraged by the ofifers of maintenance 
for their troops, and solicitations to support re- 
volts. They were at the same time glad of a 
pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, 
in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus 
was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to 
rebel. This farther gave rise to the following 
event: — Dreading the youth and number of 
these slaves (for many precautions have ever 
been put in practice by Lacedemonians to 
curb and awe their Helots,) they made public 
proclamation, that « so many of them as could 
claim the merit of having done signal service to 
the Lacedemonians in the present war should 
enter their claims, and be rewarded with free- 
dom." The view in this was, to sound them, 
imagining that such who had the greatness of 
spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their 
merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. 
About two thousand claimants were adjudged 
worthy, and accordingly were led about in so- 
lemn procession to the temple, crovmed vnth 
garlands, as men honoured with their freedom. 
But, in no long time after, they made away with 
them all : nor hath the world been able to dis- 
cover« in what manner they were thus to a man 
destroyed. 

Now also with alacrity they sent away seven 
hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders 
of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mer^ 
oenaiies, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. 
"And it was in compliance vnth his own parti- 
cnlar desire, that Brasidas was employed in this 
service by the Lacedemonians. 



The Chalctdeans, however, were highly satis- 
fied vnth a person who had ever passed in Spar- 
ta for one of the most active and accomplished 
citizens ; and who, in his foreign employments, 
had performed very signal services for his coun- 
tzy. From his first appearance amongst them, 
his justice and moderation so instantly recom- 
mended him to the adjacent cities, that some 
voluntarily submitted, and others were by in- 
trigue put into his possession. By him the 
Lacedemonians were actually empowered, if 
the accommodation they wished for took place, 
which it afterwards did, to make exchange and 
restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponne- 
sus from the hardships of war, 

Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the 
breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and 
prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, 
which some attested by their own experience, 
others upon sound and unsuspected report, im- 
printed a zeal on the Cjonfederates of Athens to 
go over to the Lacedemonians. For, having 
been the first sent out to a foreign trust, and 
approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left 
behind him a strong presumption, that the rest 
of his countrymen were like himself.' 

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens, 
that he was arrived to take upon him the con- 
duct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians de- 
clare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this ex- 
pedition to his cabals, and by. strengthening 
their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their 
dependents in that quarter. 

But Perdiccas vnth hi^ own ftirces^ and ac- 
companied by the body under Brasidas, march- 
eth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribcns 
son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyn- 
cestians : enmity was subsisting between them, 
and the conquest of him was the point in view. 
When he was advanced with his army, .and in 
conjunction vnth Brasidas, to the entrance of 
Lyncns, Brasidas communicated his intentioa 
to hold a parley with Arribeus, before be pro- 
ceeded to act offensively against him ; and if 
possible, to bring him over to the Lacedemo- 
nian alliance ; for Arribeus had already noti- 
fied by a herald, that he was willing to refer the 
points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. 
The Chalcidean ambassadors also, who followed 



i When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thraec, 
he wrote this letter to the ephori at Sparta:— *" I will 
•zecnte your orders in this war, or die.** Plataick% 
lAMmM J8popkth§gwu» 



TEAMrra.} 



PELOPONNESIAN WAk 



161 



the camp, were conttnnally suggesting to him, 
tbiat « he ought not to plunge himself rashly 
into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," de- 
signhig to reserve him more entirely for their 
own service. And besides this, the ministers of 
Peidiccas had declared it at Lacedsmon to be 
their master's intention, to bring over all the 
neighbouring states into this alliance : so that 
it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas 
insisted upon treating with Arribsus. But 
Perdiccas urged in opposition, that « he had 
not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his con- 
troversies, but to execute his vengeance on the 
enemies he should point out to him ; that it 
would be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Ar- 
ribsus, when he supported half the expense of 
his troops." Yet, in spite of such remonstran- 
ces, and in open defiance of him, Brasidas par- 
leyed. And being satisfied with the offers of 
Arribsus, he drew off his troops, without so 
much as entering his dominions. But hence- 
forth Peidiccas, looking upon this step as an 
Injury to himself, reduced his contribution of 
support from a moiety to a third. 

Brasidas however the same summer, without 
loss of time, continued the operations of war ; 
uid, a little before the vintage, being attended 
by the Ghalcideans, marched towards Acan- 
thns, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabi- 
^ts of this place were embroiled in a sedition 
ibont his reception ; a party, who co-operated 
with the Chalcideans, were for it ; but the peo- 
ple opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their 
fruit, which was not quite got in, the people 
were at last prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant 
entrance to himself without any attendants, and 
*fter giving him audience to resolve for them- 
lelvfes. Brasidas is admitted ; and standing 
forth in the presence of the people, for though 
* Lacedsmonian he was an able speaker, he 
bvangued them thus : 

^ My commission from the Lacedemonians 
&ad the march of their troops hither under my 
command verify, O ye Acanthians, the declara- 
tion made by us, when first we began this war 
'gainst tin Athenians, that we were going to 
fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our 
appearance here hath been too long deferred, it 
•hould be as<Sribed to the unexpected turns of 
^w nearer home, whereas we hoped to demo* 
'^ the Athenians speedily without endanger- 
^% you, we ought to be exempted from any 
**'*«tt« here. For now, you behold us oppor- 
28 



tnnely at hand, and intent in conjunction viilStk 
you to pull these tyrants down. 

** I am surprised indeed that your gates 
should be barred against me, or that my pre- 
sence should any way chagrin you. For we 
Lacedemonians, imagining we were going to 
confederates, whose wishes were fastened upon 
us before their eyes could behold us, and from 
whom we might depend upon the most cordial 
reception; we, I say, have pierced forwards 
through a series of dangers, marching many 
days together through hostile territories, and 
surmounting every obstacle by a zeal for 
your service. If therefore your afi^tions are 
alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to 
your own, and to the liberty of the rest of 
Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. 
And that, not only because you yourselves re- 
ject us, but may by such a step deter all others, 
to whom I shall afterwards apply, from co-op- 
erating with me. Such obstacles you will raise 
before me, if you, to whom first I have ad- 
dressed myself, you who are masters of a city 
of great importance, and are in esteem for your 
good sense and discretion, should refuse to re- 
ceive me. I shall be utterly unable to put a 
plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall 
be exposed to reproach, as if I meant injustice 
under the cloak of liberty, or came hither too 
weak and impotent to make head against the 
Athenian strength, should it be exerted against 
me. 

« And yet with that force, of which at thl» 
very moment I am honoured with the command 
I marched myself to the succour of Nissea, and 
openly defied a superior number of Athenians 
who declined the encounter. It is not there- 
fore probable, that they can send hither a force 
to our annoyance equal to that armament 
they employed at Nissa : nor am I sent 
hither to execute the schemes of oppression^ 
but to further the deliverance of Greece. T 
have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn 
by the magistrates of Lacedsmon, that what- 
ever people I bring over to their alliance shall 
remain in free possession of their own liberties 
and laws. And farther, we are forbid the use 
of violence and fraud as the means of render- 
ing you dependent on us ; but, on the contrary, 
are to act in support of you who are oppressed 
with Athenian bondage. Upon reasons so 
valid do I insist upon it, that I am no longer 
suspected by you, having given you the strong- 
T 



162 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it 



eit assuiancesy that I am no impotent avenger, 
and that you may holdly abet my cause. 

« If there be any person in this assembly, 
who hesitates upon the apprehension that I 
may betray the city into the hands of a private 
cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and dis- 
tinguish himself in open confidence. I came 
not hither to be the tool of faction ; I am 
convinced that Uberty can never be re-estab- 
lished by me, if, disregarding ancient constitu- 
tions, I«nslave the multitude to the lew, or 
the few to the crowd. Such things would be 
more grievous than the yoke of foreign do- 
minion. And should we Lacedaemonians pro- 
ceed in this manner, our labours could never 
merit a return of gratitude, but instead of 
honour and glory, foul reproach would be our 
portion. The crimes on which we have 
grounded this war against the Athenians, would 
then appear to be our own, and more odious in 
us for having made parade of disinterested 
virtue, than in a state which never pretended 
to it. For it is more base in men of honour to 
enlarge their power by specious fraud than by 
open force. The latter, upon the right of that 
-fluperior strength with which fortune hath in- 
vested it, seizeth at once upon its prey ; the 
other can only compass it by the treachery of 
wicked cunning. 

« It is thus that in all concerns of more than 
ordinary importance, we are accustomed to 
exert the utmost circumspection. And besides 
the solemn oaths in your favour ; you can re- 
ceive no greater security of our honest intention 
than the congruity of our actions with our 
words, from whence the strongest conviction 
must result, that with what I have suggested 
you are obliged in interest to comply. But if 
all my promises are unavailing, and you declare 
such compliance impossible; if, professing 
yourselves our sincere well-wishers you beg 
that a denial may not expose you to our resents 
ments ; if you allege that the dangers through 
which your liberty must be sought, overbalance 
the prize ; that in justice it ought only to be 
proposed to such as are able to embrace the 
offer, but that no one ought to be compelled 
against his own inclinations ; — I shall beseech 
the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to 
bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve 
you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by 
ravaging your country, endeavour to compel 
you. And, in acting thus, I shall not be -con- 
scious to myself of injustice, but shall justify 



the %tep on two most cogent motives :*->for ths 
sake of the Lacedsmonians ; lest whilst they 
have only your affections, and not your actual 
concurrence, they may be prejudiced through 
the sums of money you pay to the Athenians; 
— for the sake of all the Grecians ; that they 
may not be obstructed by you in their deliver- 
ance from bondage. This is the end we pro- 
pose, and this will justify our proceedings. For 
without the purpose of a public good, we La- 
cedtemonians ought not to set people at liberty 
against their wills. We are not greedy of 
empire, but we are eager to pull down the 
tyranny of others. And how could we answer 
it to the body of Greece, if, when we have 
undertaken to give liberty to them all, we in- 
dolently suffer our endeavours to be traversed 
by you 1 

" Deliberate seriously on these important 
points, and animate yourselves with the glori- 
ous ambition of being the first who enter the 
lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an 
eternal renown, of securing the uninterrupted 
possession of your private properties, and in« 
vesting the state of which you are members 
with the most honourable^ of all titles." 

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acan- 
thians, who had already heard this afiEair largely 
discussed on both sides, and secretly declared 
their votes — ^the majority, because the argu- 
ments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because 
they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to 
revolt from the Athenians. Then they re- 
quired of Brasidas himself to swear the oath 
of their security, which the Lacedemonian ma- 
gistrates had at his departure enjoined him to 
take, that " whatever people was brought over 
into their alliance by him should remain in 
possession of their own liberties and laws," 
and this done, they receive his army. Not 
long after, Stagyrus also, another colony of the 
Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the 
transactions of this summer. 

Very early in the succeeding winter, when 
the strong places of Boeotia were to have been 
betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosdienes the 
Athenian commanders, preparatory to which 
Demosthenes was to show himself with his 
fleet before Siphs, and the other to march to 
Delium, there happened a mistake about the 
days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes in-, 
deed, who steered towards Siphs, and had on 

» Fre«. 



n^s vm.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



168 



board the Acamanianf , and many of the con- 
federates of that quarter, is totally diaappointed. 
The whole scheme had been betrayed by 
Nicomachus the Pbocian of Phanotis, who 
gave information of it to the Lacedsmonians, 
and they to the Bceotians. AH Boeotiaiis now 
taking up arms to prevent consequences (for 
Hippocrates was not yet in their country to 
distress them on that side), Siphs and Ch»- 
Tonea are secured in time. And so soon as 
the conspirators perceived that things went 
wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of 
exciting commotions in the cities. 

Hippocrates having summoned into the field 
the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as 
sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who 
chanced at that time to be there, arriveth 
too late before DeUum, not before the Boeoti- 
ins were retamed home again from Siphe. 
He encamped his forces, and set about fortify- 
ing Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the fol- 
lowing manner. — Round about the temple and 
its precincts they sunk a ditch : of the earth 
thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a 
wall They droye into the ground on each side 
a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines 
they cut from w^ithin the precincts of the tem- 
ple. They did the same by the stones and 
bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been 
demolished, and omitted no expedient to give 
beight and substance to the work. They 
erected wooden turrets upon such spots as 
leeroed most to require it. No part of the old 
pile of the temple was ' now standing : the 
portico, which stood the longest, had lately fal- 
len down. They began the work the third day 
after their marching out from Athens. That 
day they plied it, and the following, and con- 
tinued it on the fifth till the time of repast 
Then, the work being for the most part com- 
pleted, they drew off their army to the distance 
of about ten stadia^ from Delium, in order to 
wtum home. Their light^rmed indeed, for the 
ii^Mt part, marched off directly, but the heavy- 
^'DMd) halting there, sat dovm upon their arms. 
Hippocrates staid behind for the time neces- 
■>ry to post the proper guards, and to put the 
finishing hand to those parts of the fortification 
which were not yet perfectly completed. But 
daring all this space, the Boeotians, had been 
employed in drawing their forces together to 
Tuiagra. When the quotas fimn the several 



» About an English mile. 



cities were come up, and they perceived the 
Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the 
other rulers of Boeotia (for they were eleven 
in all) declared their resolution not to engage, 
since the enemy is no longer on Boeotian 
ground : for the Athenians, when they ground- 
ed their arms, were within the borders of 
Oropia. But Pagondas the son of ^oladas, 
one of the Boeotian rulers \ in the right of 
Thebes, and at this time in the supreme com- 
mand, in concert with Arianthidas the son of 
Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged 
it expedient to hazard an engagement; and 
addressing himself to every battalion apart, 
lest calling them together might occasion them 
to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the 
Boeotians to march up to the Athenians, and to 
ofier battle. His exhortation to each was 
worded thus : 

« It ought never, ye men of Boeotia, to have 
entered into the hearts of any of your rulers, 
that it is improper for us to attack the Atheni- 
ans, because' we find them not upon our own 
soil. For they, out of a neighbouring country, 
have rushed into. Boeotia, and have fortified a 
post in it ; from whence they intend to ravage 
and annoy us. And our enemies in short they 
are, in whatever place we find them, /rom 
wliat place soever they march to execute hos- 
tilities against us. Now therefore let him who 
hath judged this step we are taking hazardous 
and insecure, acknowledge and /brego his error. 
Cautious and dilatory measures are not to 
be adhered to by men who are invaded, and 
whose all is at stake : they are expedient 
only for those whose properties are secure, 
and who bent on rapine exert their malice 
in the invasion of others. But it is eter- 
nally the duty of you Boeotians to combat 
such foreigners as presume to invade you, 
either upon your own or your neighbour's 
ground, no matter which. And this above all 
must be done against Athenians, not only be- 
cause they are Athenians, but because they are 
the nearest borderers upon us. For it is a 
maxim allowed, that no state can possibly pre- 
serve itself free, unless it be a match for its 
neighbouring powers. 

« Let me add farther, that when men are 

bent on enslaving not neighbours only, but 

even such people as are more remote, how can 

it be judged improper to encounter such, so 

I long as we can find ground whereon to stand 1 

I Call to mind for yoiur present information the 



164 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



(book rr. 



£«bcMa» ntoated in yon island opposite to ud ; 
call to mind the^ present disposition of the 
bulk of Greece in regard to these Athenians. 
Why should we forget, that neighbouring states 
so often battle one another about settling their 
various boundaries ; whereas, should we be 
vanquished, our whole country will be turned 
merely into one heap of limitation, and that 
never again by us to be disputed ? for when 
once they have entered upon it, they wLl re- 
main the masters of it all, beyond control. So 
• much more have we to fear from these neigh- 
bours of ours, than any other people. 

« Those again, who in all the daring inso- 
lence of superior strength arc wont to invade 
their neighbours, as these Athenians now do 
us, march with extraordinary degrees of con- 
fidence against such as are inactive, and de- 
fend themselves only on their own soil. His 
schemes are more painfully completed, when 
men sally boldly beyond their borders^ to meet 
t)ie invader, and, if opportunity serveth, attack 
him first. Of this truth our own experience 
will amply convince us. For ever since the 
defeat we gave these veiy men at Coronea, 
when taking the advantage of our seditions 
they had possessed themselves of our lands, 
we have kept Boeotia quiet from every alarm 
till the present. This we ought now to re- 
member, that the seniors among us may pro- 
ceed as they then begun ; that the juniors, the 
sons of those sires who then displayed such 
uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to 
preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. 
We ought all to be confident, that the god will 
fight on our side, whose temple they pollute 
by raising ramparts, and dwelling within its 
verge. And, as the victims we have offered 
are fair and auspicious, we ought at once to 
advance to the charge of these our foes, and 
make them know, that their lust and rapine 
they only then can gratify when they invade 
such cowards as abandon their own defence : 
but from men who were bom to vindicate their 
own country for ever by the dint of arms, and 
never unjustly to enslave another — that from 
Buch men they shall not get away without that 
struggle which honour enjoins." 

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Boso- 
tians, and persuaded th^m to march against 
the Athenians. He put them instantly in 
moUon, and led them towards the enemy ; 
fcr it was now late in the day. When he had 
•fproached the spot on which they were posted, 



he halted in a place from whence, ta sn ead* 
nence lay between, they could have no view of 
one another. There he drew up his men, and 
made all ready for the attack. 

When the news was brought to Hippocrates^ 
who was yet at Delium, that <« the enemy w 
advancing to the charge," he sendelii orders ta 
the main body to form into the order of battle. 
And not long after, he himself came up, hav- 
ing left about three hundred horse at Deliam, 
to guard that place in case an attempt should 
be made upon it, or seizing a favourable op- 
portunity to fall upon the rear of the Bosetiatie 
during the engagement. Not but that die 
Boeotians had posted a party of their own to 
watch their motions, and find them employ- 
ment. When therefore the whole disposition 
was perfected, they showed themselves on the 
top of the eminence, and there grounded their 
arms, remaining still in the same order in 
which they designed to attack ; being in the 
whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, 
mora than ten thousand light-armed, a thou- 
sand horse, and five hundred targeteera. The 
right wing was composed of Thebans and those 
who ranked with them ; the centre of the Ha- 
liartians, and Coroneans, and Copiensians, Und 
others that live about the lake (Copnis) ; and 
the lefl of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and Or- 
chomenians. In the wings were posted the 
cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were 
drawn up in files of twenty five ; the oUiers 
variously, as circumstances required. And 
such was the order and disposition of the Boo- 
tians. 

On the Ath^iian side, the heavy-armed, 
being in number equal to their enemies, were 
drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. 
Their cavalry was posted on either wing. 
But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, 
the Athenians had none at this juncture, nei- 
ther in the field nor in the city. The num- 
ber which had taken the field at first to attend 
this expedition exceeded many times over the 
number of the enemy ; but then most of them 
had no arms at all, since the summons had 
been extended to all who resided in Athens^ 
both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of 
these, so soon as ever the route was pointed 
homewards, were, excepting a few, gone 
speedily oC But, when they were drawn 
up in the order of battle, and were sveiy 
moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates 
the general showing himsslf in the front of 



Tin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



ItiS 



the Athemans, animated libem with the fol- 
lowing harangue : 

<«The admonition, Athenians, I intend to 
give you will be very concise, but such a one 
is sufficient to the brave; I pretend not to 
encourage Athenians, but merely to remind 
diem of their duty. Let the thought be a 
stranger to every heart amongst you, that we 
are going to plunge into needless hazards in the 
territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a 
foe, yet in it you must fight for the security of 
your own. And, if we conquer now, the Pe- 
luponnesians will never again presume, with- 
out the aid of the Boeotian horse, to repeat 
their inroads into Attica. By one battle there- 
fore you acquire this, and secure your own 
land from future annoyance. Charge there- 
fore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit 
worthy of the state of Athens — that state 
which every soul amongst you boasts to be 
the first of Greece — and worthy of your great 
forefathers who formerly at Oenophyta, under 
the conduct of Myronides, defeated these peo- 
ple in the field, and possessed for a time all 
Bmotia as their prize." 

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line 
encouraging them in this manner, when he was 
compelled to desist and leave the greater part 
of his army unaddressed. For the Boeotians, 
lo whom Pagondas also had given but a short 
ezhcHTtation, and had this moment finished the 
pasan of attack, were coming down from the 
eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet 
them, and both sides came running to the 
charge. The skirts of both armies could not 
come to an engagement, as some rivulets that 
lay between stopped them equally on both 
■des. The rest closed firm in a stubborn 
fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. 
The left wing of the Boeotians, even to the 
centre, was routed by the Athenians, who 
pressed upon those who composed it, but 
especially on the Thespiensians. For, the 
others who were drawn up with them giving 
way before the shock, the Thespiensians were 
inclosed in a small compa«i of ground, where 
such of them as were slaughtered defended 
themselves bravely till they were qiute hewed 
down. Some also of the Athenians, disor- 
dered in thus encompassing them about, knew 
not how to distinguish, and slew one another. 
In thia quarter therefore the ^Boeotians were 
nntedy and fied towards those parts where the 
battle waa yet alive. Their right wing, in 



which the Thebans were posted, had the batter 
of the Athenians. They had forced them alt 
first to give ground a little, and pressed upon 
them to pursue their advantage. It happened 
that Pagondas had detached two troops o£ 
horse (which motion was not perceived) to 
fetch a compass round the eminence and sup- 
port the left wing which was routed. These 
suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious 
wing of Athenians, imagining a iresh army 
was coming up to the charge, was struck into 
consternation. And now being distressed on 
both sides by this last turn, and by the The^ 
bans who pursued their advantage close and 
put them into a total disorder, the whola 
Athenian army was routed and fled. Some 
ran towards Delium and the sea, others to 
Oropus, and others towards mount Parses; 
all to whatever place they hoped was safe. 
.But the Boeotians, especially their hosse, and 
the Locrians who had come up to tiie field of 
battle just as the rout began, pursued them 
with great execution. But the night putting 
an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying 
army preserved themselves more easily. 

The day following, such of them as had 
reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a 
garrison in Delium, which still remained in 
their possession, transported themselves by sea 
to Athens. The Boeotians also, having ereeted 
a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled 
those of the enemy, and having posted a guard 
upon the field of battle, retired to Tanagra, 
and called a consultation about the method of 
assaulting Delium. 

A herald, farther, despatched by the Aihe» 
nians about their dead, meets upon his way a 
herald of the Boeotians, who turned him back 
by assuring him that his errand would be (hut* 
less till he himself should be again returned. 
The latter, being come to the Athenians, do* 
dared to them in the name of the Boeotians : 

" That by their late proceedings they had 
enormously violated the laws of the Grecians, 
amongst whom it was an established rule, that 
amidst their mutual invasions religious places 
should be ever spared, whereas the Athenians 
had not only fortified, but had made Delium a- 
place of habitation, and whatever profanations 
mankind can be guilty of, had been there by 
them committed: that the water, which it 
would even he impious for the B<Botiaiis> 
themselves to touch unless by way of ablution^ 
before they- sacrifieed, had been profinudy 
t2 



160 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it. 



drawn by them for common use ; that, for 
these reasons the Boeotians, in the cause of 
the god and in their own, invoking the asso- 
ciated Dxmons and Apollo, gave them this 
early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and 
clear it of all incumbrances." 

This message being thus delivered by the 
hera d, the Athenians returned this answer to 
the Boeotians by a herald of their own : 

« That they were hith3rto guilty of nothing 
illegal in regard to the holy place, nor would 
willingly be so for the future. They had no 
such intention when they first entered into it, 
and their view was merely to give an ejection 
from thence to persons wlio had basely injured 
them. It was a law among the Grecians for 
those who were masters of any district, whether 
great or small, to be also proprietors of its 
temples, which are to be honoured by them 
with the usual form?, and with what additional 
ones they may be able to appoint. Even the 
Boeotians, as well as many other people, who 
this moment were possessed of lands from 
which they had ejected the old proprietors, 
made a seizure first of those temples which had 
belonged to others, and continued in the free 
possession of them. For their own parts, 
could they conquer more of their territory, 
they should manfully retain it ; and as to the 
spot they now occupied, their position there 
was voluntary, and as it was their own they 
would not quit it It was necessity alone made 
them use the water, which ought not to be as- 
cribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to 
the preceding invasions their enemies had 
made, self-preservation against which laid 
them under a present necessity of acting as 
they did. It might with reason be hoped, that 
every proceeding to which war and violence 
indispensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness 
from the god : for the altars are a refuge to 
involuntary offences, and transgression is im- 
puted only to those who are bad without com- 
pulsion, and not to such as urgent necessities 
may render daring. The guilt of impiety be- 
longed more notoriously to such as insisted on 
the barter of temples for the bodies of the 
dead, than to those who are content to lose 
their just demands rather than submit to so 
base an exchange." They farther enjoined 
him in their name to declare, that « they would 
not evacuate Boeotia, since the ground which 
they occupied in it belonged to no Boeotians, 
bat was now their own property, acquired by 



dint of arms. All they required, was a truce 
for fetching off their dead, according to the 
solemn institutions of their common country." 

The Boeotians replied thus : " If they are 
now in Boeotia, let them quit the ground which 
belongeth to us, and carry off what they de- 
mand. But if they are upon ground of their 
own, they themselves know best what they 
have to do." They judged indeed that Oro- 
pia, on which it happened that the bodies of 
the dead were lying, as the battle had been 
fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to 
the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was 
impossible for them to be carried ofi' by force ; 
and truce farther they would grant none, 
where the point related to Athenian ground; 
that it was therefore the most proper reply — 
" they should quit their territory, and so ob- 
tain their demands." The herald of the Athe- 
nians having heard this, departed without 
effect 

Immediately after, the Boeotians having sent 
for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, 
and being reinforced by two thousand heavy- 
armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian 
garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and a 
party of Megareans, all which had joined 
them since the battle, marched against Delium, 
and assaulted the fortification. They tried 
many methods, and took it at last by the help 
of a machine of a very peculiar structure. 
— Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they 
hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together 
again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble 
a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a cal- 
dron by help of chains, into which a snout of 
iron was bent downwards from the yard. The 
inside, farther, of this wooden machine was 
lined almost throughout with iron. They 
brought it from a distance to the fortification 
on carriages, and applied it where the work 
consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And 
when near enough, they put a large bellows to 
that extremity of the yard which was next 
themselves, and began to blow. But the blast, 
issuing along the bore into the caldron, which 
was filled with glowing coals'and sulphur and 
pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This 
set fire to the work, and burnt, with so much 
fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon 
it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled 
away amain : and in this manner was the for- 
tress carried. Of the garrison, some were put 
to the sword, but two hundred were nudfl 



YEAR Tin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



167 



prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throw- 
ing themselves on board their vessels, escaped 
in safety to Athens. 

It was the seventeenth day after the battle 
that Delium was taken. And not long after, 
a herald despatched by the Athenians came 
again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue 
for the dead, which were now delivered by the 
Boeotians, who no longer laid any stress upon 
their former reply. 

In the battle there perished of the Bceotians 
very little under five hundred ; of the Athe- 
nians, few less than a thousand, and Hippo- 
crates the general ; but of light armed and bag- 
gage-men a considerable number indeed.' 

Somewhat later in time than this battle, 
Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before \ 
Siphe, had been disappointed in his hope of 
having it betrayed to him, having the land-force 
still on board his fleet, consisting of four hun- 
dred heavy armed Acamanians, and Agnsans, 
and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia. 
But before all bis vessels could land their men, 
the Sicyonians had marched down to make 
head against them. They defeated those that 
were landed, and chased them again on board. 
Some they killed, and some they .took alive ; 
and after erecting their trophy, they delivered 
up the dead by truce. 

During the former transactions at Delium, 
Bitalces also king of the Odrysians was killed 

^ The AtTieninns received in truth a terrible blow on 
this occasion. Tii« BobOtians, a people heavy and stupid 
to a proyerb, continued ever after the terror of the 
Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people 
upon earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had, 
this day, well nigh completed the destruction of all 
that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon 
earth; and done an hrreparable mischief to sound reason 
and good sense for ever after. Wlicn the two troops of 
l>orse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had com- 
pleted the rout of the Atlienians, who were now flying 
away with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was 
IcA almost alone, facing tiie enemy, and fighting and 
retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who 
wrved in the cavalry, was making off on horseback ; 
i>ut, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode 
aptobim, covered his retreat, and brought him off 
■afe. He thus repnid him the great obligation he had 
formerly received from him at Potidea. Strabo relates 
further, (Geog. I. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day 
owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, 
and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took 
^im upon his shoulders, and carried him to a place of 
>&fety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere 
oodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest 
over all the light and understanding which human 
aatare bath to boast of, that did not come directly down 
"^ beaven. 



in an expedition he had formed against the 
TribalUans, who encountered and vanquished 
him. And Seuthes the son of Sparodocus, 
his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in 
the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of 
Thrace over which he had reigned. 

The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction 
with the allies of Thrace, marched against 
Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the 
river Strymon. 

The spot of ground on which this city now 
standeth, Aristagoras the Milesian formerly, 
when he fled from king Darius, had endeavour- 
ed to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians. 
Two and tliirty years after, the Athenians 
made the same attempt, having sent thither a 
colony consisting of ten thousand of their own 
people and such others as voluntarily came in, 
all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians 
at DrabescuB. But after an interval of twenty- 
nine years, the Athenians came hither again 
with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of 
Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians, 
built this city upon the spot of ground which 
had formerly been called the Nine Roads. They 
rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime 
emporium situated at the river*s mouth, and 
belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty 
stadia^ from the spot where the ci^ now 
standeth, and which by Agnon was named 
Amphipolis, because it is 'almost surrounded 
by the Strymon which floweth along it on both 
sides. Running therefore a wall from the 
river to the river, he planted his colony on a 
spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea. 

Against this place, Brasidas decamped from 
Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. 
About sunset he arrived at Anion and Bro. 
miscus, where the lake Bolbe issueth into the 
sea. From hence, after taking the evening re- 
past, he continued his march by night. It 
was winter, and a snow was falling. This 
favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he 
intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis, 
except such as were privy to his design. For 
there resided in the place a body of ArgyL 
lians, who are an Andrian colony, and others 
who acted in combination with him, some of 
them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others 
at that of the Chalcideans : but in a more par- 
ticular manner the Argyllians, who had a place 
of residence very near it, who farther had ever 

• About two English miles. 



M6 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bciox z^. 



Imbu WMpecitd by the AthenianB. And were 
really intent on the ruin of the phu» when 
.now a fair opportunity was within their reach, 
Mul Brasidas at hand (who long before had 
been tampering with these inhabitants of 
foreign mixture) in order to have the city be- 
trayed to him. The Argyliians at this junc- 
ture received him into their own city, and re- 
volting from the Athenians led his army for. 
wards that very night to the bridge laid over the 
fitxymon. The city is seated at some distance 
Irom this pass ; and it was not then defended 
by a fort as it is now, but was only the station 
of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore 
easily forced the guard, being favoured in some 
degnee by treachery, not a little also by the sea- 
son and his own unexpected approach. He 
then passed the bridge, and was immediately 
master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans 
who reside in all the tract without the walls. 
This passage was so sudden, that those within 
the city had no notice of it ; and as to those 
without, many of them being seized, and 
others flying for preservation within the wall, 
the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast con- 
fusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of 
one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, 
instead of permitting his troops to disperse for 
plunder, had advanced directly against the city, 
it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. 
But he, on the contrary, having ordered them 
to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what 
lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated 
in his favour by accomplices within, he for the 
present desisted. But those his accomplices 
were overpowered in number by the opposite 
party, who prevented their opening the gates 
immediately to Brasidas ; and, acting in con- 
cert with Eucles their commandant, who re- 
sided there by the orders of the Athenians to 
guard the place, they despatch a messenger to 
the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides 
the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, 
and was then in Thasus, (Thasus is an island, 
a colony of the Parians, and distant about half 
a day's sail from Amphipolis,) pressing him to 
come instantly to their relief. 

Thucidides no sooner received this notice, 
than with the utmost expedition he put to sea, 
with seven ships that happened to be at hand. 
He designed nothing so much as to prevent if 
possible the loss of Amphipolis; or, if that 
was impracticable, to throw himself into Eion, 
and secure it in time. 



Brasidas, in the nieairwhile, fearing at die tp> 
proach of (his succour from Thasus, infornh 
ed besides t^at Thucydides drew an ample n> 
venue from the wwking of his gold-mines in this 
quaiter of Thrace, and was on this account of 
great credit amongst the principal persons of 
this part of the continent, tried all possible ex- 
pedients to get possession of the ci^ before hit 
arrival, lest his appearance amongst them 
might animate the AmphipoUtans with the 
hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, 
which the credit of Thucydides might easily 
obtain for their effectual preservation, and in 
pursuance of this they might refuse to capitu- 
late. He sent them therefore Very modcnti 
terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that "the 
Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city 
should, if they desired it, be continued in the 
free possession of their property, and of ail 
their rights and liberties whatever: but thoae 
who refused to stay, should have the space of 
five days adlowed them to quit the town and 
remove their effects.*' 

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the 
inclinations of the many took a new turn. The 
Athenian interest had' bat a few supporters in 
the city : the bulk of the inhabitants were 
a mixture of foreign nations. There were also 
within many persons, relations of those who 
had been made prisoners without And tho^ 
in their present consternation, the proposal was 
generally received as mild and gentle. The 
Athenians for their part, who thought them- 
selves more exposed to danger than the rest, 
and had besides no hope of speedy relief 
were delighted with the offer of quittJug 
the place. So also were all the rest, that they 
were not to lose their rights and liherties if 
citizens, and should thus escape the danger 
they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. 
Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated 
only on the mildness and generosity of the 
terms he had offered, because now they pff* 
ceived that the multitude hod altered their 
sentiments, and would no longer hearken to 
the Athenian commandant In short, an a^ 
commodation was perfected, and they opeD« 
the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he 
had proposed by his herald. And in this man- 
ner did the inhabitante deliver up Arophipol* 

But in the evening of the same day, Thacy 
didcs and the squadron came over to E»^ 
Brasidas was ahready in poasesrion ofAiB* 
phipolis, and designed that vezy night to«itf 



TVABTin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



169 



£ion alio. And imlett fliis flqnadron had 
oome in thus critically to its defence, at Inreak 
cf day it had been lost 

Thucydidea instantly took care to put Eion 
in a posture of defence^ in case Brasidas should 
attack it ; and to proTide ferther for its future 
security, when he had opehed a refuge there 
for such as were willing to remove thither 
from Amphipolis, according to the articles of 
the late surrender. 

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river 
with a lal^ number of boats towaids £i<m, 
designing if possible to seize the point of land 
that juts out from the walls, which would have 
given him the command of the river*s mouth. 
He endeavoured at the same time also to as- 
sault it hy land, but was repulsed in both at- 
tempts. And now he effectually employed his 
care in resettling and securing Amphipolis. 

Myrcinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to 
bim upon the death of Pittacus king of the 
Bdonians, who was killed by the sons of 
Goa^is and his own wife Braures. Gapselus 
aooQ after did the same, and Oesyme: they 
are colonies of the Thracians. Hiese events 
were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who 
came thither in person inmiediately after the 
rorrender of Amphipolis. 

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into 
gnat consternation, and with reason, because 
it was a place of great importance to them, 
>ince fr(»n thence they had materials for build- 
ing ships, and a pecuniary revenue ; and far- 
^} because, after a safe-conduct through 
Thessaly, the route was now open to the 
I'l'cedsmonians as &r as the Strymon, to annoy 
^eir dependents. Yet, had they not possessed 
tikemselves of the bridge, the large lake formed 
above the river, and the check given by the 
triremes stationed at Eion, would have hin- 
dered the Lacedemonians from penetrating 
further. But all obstacles appeared to the 
Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted ; 
and their apprehensions that their dependents 
would revolt, alarmed them much. For Bra- 
ndas in the rest of his conduct gave constant 
proo& of ^ excellent temper ; and the declara- 
tion was ever in his mouth, that « he had been 
#^t thither to restore the liberty of Greece.'* 
Accordingly the cities which were subject to 
9^ Athenians had no sooner heard of the sur- 
iBnder of Amphipolis, together with the brave 
exploits and the mild engaging deportment of 
^'ttidf^ ^han they conceived the most aidant 
29 



inclination to shake oiT the yoke. They 
secretly despatehed their agento to him, ear* 
nestly desiring a visit from him, with respective 
assurances from each, that they would be the 
first to revolt. They judged, there was no 
longer room-to apprehend any bad consequen- 
ces from such a step; falsely estimating the 
Athenian power to be much less considerable 
than it afterwards appeared. But this their 
judgment was founded more upon uncertain 
presumption than deliberate prudence. It is 
the turn of mankind, when their passions are 
warm, to give themselves up to bhnd and 
sanguine hope, and to throw aside with dea* 
potic scorn whatever seeraeth to be counter to 
their wishes. It was but lately that the Athe* 
nians had been vanquished by the Boeotians; 
and Brasidas had been making such recitals as 
might persuade, though in feet they were coW 
luslve, that at Nissa witii his single force he 
offered battle to the Athenians and they de- 
dined it. This n^ade them confident, and they 
became perfectly convinced, that there was no> 
longer a strength sufiicient to chastise theoL- 
But what had the greatest influence on th^ 
thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run aE 
hazards, was the immediate pleasure they 
promised themselves in a change, and tiiat now 
they were going for the first time to experience 
the sweete of Lacedemonian friendship. 

These inclinations were perceived by the 
Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of 
these cities in order to curb them, with as mucit 
expedition as the shortness of time and the 
wintry season would permit 

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedcmon, aolir 
citing a speedy reinforcement, - and was busy 
himself in providing materials to build trireme* 
in the Strymon. But the Lacedemonians n^^ 
glected to supply him, partly through the envy 
which the leading men at Sparta had conceived 
against him, and partly because their attentioQ 
was principally confined torthe recovery of their 
people made prisoners in Sphacteiia, and t^ 
bring the war to a conclusion. 

The same winter the Megareans having 
recovered their long walls, which were in the 
possession of the Athenians, leveled them with 
the ground. 

Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gather* 
ed together the allies, and leadeth them into 
the district called Acte. It is the tract which 
stretoheth out into the sea from the canal 
which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the 



170 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IT 



highest mount in Acte is its utmost Terge upon 
the iE^an sea. The cities in it are, Sane, a 
colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal 
and on that part which faceth the sea towards 
Eubcea; Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and 
Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Diam, which 
are promiscuously inhabited by Yarious sets of 
Barbarians, who speak both languages. There 
is also a small number of Chalcideans amongst 
them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of 
those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lem- 
no8 and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Cresto- 
nians, and Edoniana: they reside in small 
fortresses. Most of them went over to Bra^ 
■idas; but Sane and Dium stood out He 
therefore made his army halt on their lands, 
and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, 
he marched from thence to Torone of Chalci- 
dica, then possessed by the Athenians. He 
hastened thither at the invitation of a small 
party, who were ready to betray the city to 
him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he 
sat down about break of day with his army 
near the temple of- Dioscuri, which lieth not at 
most above three stadia from the city.^ The 
bulk of the Toroneans and the Athenian gar- 
rison were ignorant of his approach : bat the 
accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, 
tent some of their body unperceived to observe 
his approach. When these were thus certainly 
assured he was at hand, they conducted back 
with them to their friends seven men armed 
only with daggers. Twenty had at first been 
•elected for this service, but only seven of 
them now had the courage to proceed : Lysis- 
tratus the Olynthian was the person who com- 
manded. They got in by the wall towards the 
■ea without causing an alarm, and ascending 
from thence slaughtered the guard in the cita- 
del, which is seated upon the most eminent 
spot, the whole city being built on the declivity 
of a hill, and burst open the postern towards 
" Canastrsum. Brasidas, having since advanced 
a little with the rest of his force halted again. 
But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go 
before, that, when the gates should be opened, 
and the signal given which was before agreed 
on, they might break in first. These after an 
interval of time wondered at the delay, and by 
gradually advancing were got close to the city. 
Such of the Toroneans within as acted in 
concert with those who had entered, when once 

< Above a quarter of a mile. 



the postern was burst, and the gates leading to 
the forum were thrown open after bursting the 
bar, in the first place conducting some of them 
about, led them in at the postern, that they 
might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant 
inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank 
and on all sides. This done, they lifted up the 
appointed signal of fire, and gave instant ad* 
mittance to the rest of the targeteers through 
the gates which led to the forum. 

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, 
roused up his army and led them Tanning to- 
wards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and 
thus striking the greatest consternation into the 
inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at 
the gates; others mounted over the square 
wooden machines, which, as the wall had latdj 
fallen down and was now rebuilding, laj dose 
to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with 
the bulk of his force betook himself immedh 
ately to the upper parts of the city ; intending 
to seize the eminence, and possess himaelf 
effectually of the place. The rest dispersed 
themselves equally through every quarter. 

Amidst this surprisal, the majority oi the 
Toroneans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in 
vast confusion. But the agents in it and all 
their party quickly ranged with the assailants. 
The Athenians, (for of them there were about 
fifty heavy-armed asleep in the forum,) when 
they found what was done, some few excepted 
who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away 
for preservation ; and some by land, olbeis m 
the guard ships stationed there, got safe into 
Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept 
this in their own hands, as it was the extrenutj 
of the city towards the sea stretched along on 
a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the 
Toroneans who pers^ered in their fidelity. Am 
to them for refuge. 

It being now broad day, and the dty finnlj 
secured, Brasidas caused proclamation to m 
made to those Toroneans who had fled f« 
refuge to the Athenians, that "such as wen 
willing might return to their old habitatioD^ 
and should enjoy their rights without any mo- 
lestation." But to the Athenians a hertM 
was sent expressly, commanding them *|W 
evacuate Lecythus which rightly belongw 
to the Chalcideans, and a truce shonW be 
granted them to remove themselves and tMO 
baggage." An evacuation they absolutely »; 
fused, but requested one day's truce to fetch off 
their dead: he solemnly accorded two. »^ 



TEAS IX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



171 



ing this space he was veiy busy in atrengthen- 
ing the houses, adjacent to Lecythus, and the 
Athenians did the same within. 

He also convened the Toroneans to a general 
assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the 
same manner as he had done at Acanthus, — 
«that it was unjust to look upon those who 
had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the 
dty, as men worse than their neighbours, or 
as traitors ; they had no enslaving views, nor 
were biassed to such conduct by pecuniary per- 
suasions ; the welfare and liberty of the city 
had been their only object Neither should 
they who had no share in the event, be more 
abridged than those who had. He was not 
come thither to destroy the city, or so much as 
one private inhabitant of it. Fojr this very 
reason he had caused the proclamation to be 
made to those who had sheltered themselves 
amongst the Athenians, because such an at- 
tachment had not in the least impaired them in 
his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their 
ignorance that they had thus undervalued the 
Lacedemonians, whose actions, as they were 
always more just, would for the future entitle 
them much more to their benevolence ; their 
terror hitherto had been merely the result of 
inexperience.'*^ He then exhorted them in 
general « to take care for the future to be 
steady and firm allies, since, should they hence- 
forth offend, they would be made answerable 
for the guilt. They were not chargeable for 
the past, as they had rather been sufferers 
themselves from superior force ; the preceding 
opposition therefore deserved forgiveness." 

Having spoken thus, and revived their spi- 
lits, when the truce was expired he made 
assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians de- 
fended themselves from a paltry rampart and 
the battlements of the houses. One whole 
day they 'effectually repulsed them. But on 
the following, when a machine was to be 
planted against them by the enemy, from 
whence they intended to throw fire upon their 
Wooden fences, and the army was now ap- 
proaching to the spot which seemed convenient 
for lodging their machine, and whence it might 
be played off with effect ; they raised for pre- 
vention a wooden turret, the base of which 
was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and ear- 
ned up many buckets and tubs of water and 
heavy stones; and upon it also many defen- 
dants were mounted. But the edifice, too 
heavily laden, on a sudden .was crushed by the 



weight The crafh with which it fell was 
great : and those of the Athenians who stood 
near and saw it, were rather concerned than ter- 
rified. But those at a distance, and especially 
such as were most remote, imagining the place 
was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to 
the sea and to their vessels. 

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting 
the battlements and had himself beheld the 
accident, he led his army to the. assault, and 
immediately carried the fortress. Such as were 
found within it were instantly destroyed. And 
the Athenians in boats and ships, after having 
thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over 
to the Pallcne. 

But Brasidas, (for in Lecythus there is a 
temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded 
to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that 
a reward of thirty mins^ of silver should be 
given the man who first mounted the rampart,) 
concluding now that it was taken less by hu- 
man than some other means, reposited the 
thirty mime in the temple, as an offering to 
the goddess. And having demolished Lecy- 
thus and cleared all away, he consecrated the 
whole spot as sacred to her. During the re- 
mainder of the winter, he provided for the 
security of the places already in his possession, 
and was planning future conquests. And with 
the end of this winter the eighth year of the 
war expired. 

TEAS IX.' 

Very early in the spring of the ensuing sum- 
mer, the Athenians and Lacedemonians made 
a truce to continue for a year. The motives 
on the Athenian side were these — t^at « Bra- 
sidas might no longer seduce any of their towns 
to revolt, before they were enabled by this .in- 
terval of leisure to act against him ; and be- 
sides, that if they reaped any advantage from 
this truce, they might proceed to a &rther 
accommodation." On the Lacedemonian side 
it was imagined that "the Athenians Were 
under such terrors, as in fact they were, and, 
after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, 
would more eagerly come into some expedients 
for a future reconciliation; of course, would 
deliver up to them their citizens, and come into 
a truce for a larger term." The recovery of 
these Spartans was a point on which they laid 

i 96/. 15*. Bterling. • Before Christ 433. 



172 



.PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book it. 



a greater itreit than ever, even doling the 
career of guccees whidi attended Braaidag. 
They fotemw, that in case he extended his 
conquests, and even brought them to a balance 
with their foes, of those they must for ever be 
deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon 
equal advantages, the dangers also would be 
equal, and the victory still in suspense. 

Upon these motives, both parties and their 
alliee agreed to a truce of the following tenor : 

«A8 to the temple and oracle of the Py- 
thian Apollo, it seemeth good unto us, that 
access be granted to all who desire it, without 
fraud and without fear, according to the laws 
of our country. The same is approved of by 
the Lacedsmonians and their alhes now pre- 
sent; and they promise to send heralds on 
purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the 
consent of the Boeotians and Phocians. 

« As to the treasure belonging to the god, 
care shall be taken by us to find out those who 
have presumed to embezzle it; and this fedrly 
and honestly, according to the laws of our 
country, both by you, and by us, and by all 
others who are willing ; all proceeding respec- 
tively according to the laws of their several 
constitutions. 

« It hath farther seemed good to the Lace- 
dsoAonians and their other allies, if the Athe- 
nians agree to the truce, that both parties 
shall keep within their own bounds, and hold 
what we are at present respectively possessed 
of; that is to say, the former to keep in Co- 
ryphasium,^ within the mountains of Bouphras 
and Tomeus ; the latter in Cythera ; without 
enlarging the communication for the procuring 
of alliance, neither on our side against you, 
nor on your side against us. That those in 
Nissa and Minoa pass not beyond the road 
that leads from the gates of Megara, adjacent 
to the temple of Nisus, towards the temple of 
Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune 
carrieth directly fo the bridge laid across to 
Minoa. That neither the Megareans nor their 
allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the 
island which the Athenians have taken ; both 
keeping within their bounds, and upon no oc- 
4Sasion whatever to have any intercourse with 
one another; the Megareans still to retein 
what they possess in Troezen, and whatever 
dkey hold by compact vrith the Athenians ; to 

■<— *ii*»^i— ^— i'^^.^-^i^^'^ ■■ ■ I ,1 — ^>^^^—i ^^B^— ^^M^— 

« InvhkhsttMdthefortofPyliuL 



haive iiuthor the fi«e use of the sea upon &«r 
own coasts, and those of their alfiance. 

« That the Lacedfemonians and allies shall 
not navigate the sea in a long ship,' but in any 
other vessel rowed with oars, and of no larger 
burden than five hundred talents.' 

« That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct 
be granted both of passage and re-passage^ 
either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesoi 
or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, 
and their whole retinue how numerous soever, 
commissioned to negotiate the determination 
of the war, or to get controverted points ad* 
judged. 

" That so long as thid truce be in force no 
deserters be entertained, neither by yon, nor 
by us, whetiier they be freemen or slaves. 

** You shall do justice in our causes, and wa 
shall do the same for you, according to the 
laws of our respective constitutions, to the end 
that all controversies may be judicially settled 
without a war. 

« These articles have the approbation of the 
Lacedemonians and their allies. But, if any 
thing more honourable or more just occurs (a 
you, you are to repair to Lacedsmoh, and pro- 
pose it there. For whatever points you may 
demonstrate to be just, will in no degree what- 
ever be rejected, neither by the Lacedemoniani 
nor by their allies: provided the persona 
charged with these new commissions be sent 
with full powers to put to them the finishing 
hand, in die same manner as you require tba 
same conditions from us. 

" This truce shall be in force for a year." 
Ratified by the people. 

The Acamantine tribe presided. Fhanipptf 
was the notery public. Nidades was in the 
chair. Laches pronounced — <*Be it for the 
welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, thai 
a suspension of arms is granted upon the tenna 
offered by the LacedaBmonians and allies/ 

Agreed in the public assembly of the people 

<*That this suspension shall continue for* 
year. 

" That it shall teke place this very day, being 
the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion. 

" That during this interval, ambassadora airf 
heralds shall pass between them, to adjust the 
terms upon which the war should be defiiuO'^ 
ly concluded. 

• A ship of war. ■ Flv« and twsntr toss. 



YEiLB IX-.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



173 



« That the generais of the state and the 
preflidente in course shall first at Athens con- 
vene an asdemblj of the people, to adjust the 
terms upon vrhich their embassy should be em- 
powered to put an end to the war. And 

" That the ambassadors, who were now pre- 
sent in the assembly, shall give a solemn rati- 
fication that they will punctually abide by this 
truce for a year.'* 

The Lacedsmonians and their allies agreed 
to these articles, and pledged their oath for the 
observation of them to the Athenians and their 
allies at Lacedaemon, on the twelfth day of the 
month Gerastius. 

The persons vrho settled the articles and 
assisted at the sacrifice were. 

For the Lacedemonians — ^Taurus the son of 

Echetimidas, Atheneus the son of Periclidas, 

Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas. For 

the Corinthians — ^^neas the son of Ocytus, 

Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. For 

the 8iconians — ^Damotimus the son of Nau- 

ctates, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For 

the Megareans — Nicasus the son of Cecalus, 

Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. For the 

Epidaurians — Amphias the son of Eupsidas. 

For the Athenians — Nicostratus the son of 

Biotrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Au- 

tocles the son of Tolmsus, generals of the 

state. 

In this manner was a suspension of arms 
concluded, during which they continued with- 
out interruption to hold conferences with one 
another, about settling the terms of a firm and 
lasting peace. 

During the interval these matters were thus 
In agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene re- 
volted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The 
^ioneans indeed in the Pellene give out that 
^ey are of Peloponnesus ; that their ancestors 
who settled in these other seats were driven 
there originally by a storm, which in their re- 
turn from Troy dispersed the Aehsans. When 
^ey had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas 
passed over to Scione by night A party of 
his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and 
he followed at some distance in a fiy-boat, to 
the end that, if he should fell in with any vessel 
larger than this boat, the trireme might make 
head against her-; but if another trireme of 
^Qftl strength should come up to them, he 
jodged she would neglect his smaller boat, and 
^ould attadL the ship, which would give him 
luoe to eomplete his passage in security. 



When he was safe landed, and had convened 
an assembly of the Scioneans, he harangued 
them as he had done before at Acanthus and 
Torone. But he added farther, that «they 
were a people most deserving of applause, 
since, though the communication with the 
Pellene, as being an isthmus, was cut off by 
the Athenians who were masters of Potidea, 
and they were by this means become islanders 
to all intents and purposes, yet they had, with* 
out prior solicitation, advanced boldly towards 
liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly in- 
activity till necessity forced them to such 
measures as tended to their manifest welfare. 
This was ample proof that they were ready to 
undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain 
the wished for settlement of their state. He 
therefore regarded them, as in truth the most 
gallant friends of thp Lacedemonians, and 
would in all respects do proper honour to their 
worth." 

The Scionians were elevated by these hand- 
some commendations. All of them became 
full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom 
the prior steps had been by no means agree- 
able. They cheerfully determined to sustain 
all future war, and in every shape gave Bra- 
sidas honourable entertainment By public 
vote they placed upon his head a golden crown 
as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single 
Scionean was busy in adorning him with rib- 
bons, and caressing him like a victor in the 
solemn games. His stay at present was short; 
he only placed a small party in the town to 
secure it, and then re-passed to Torone. But 
soon after, he transported thither the greater 
part of his force, designing with the aid of the 
Scioneans to make attempts Upon Mende and 
Potidsa. He concluded however that the 
Athenians would lose no time in throwing a 
succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured 
to be beforehand with them. 

He had already formed an intelligence to 
the prejudice of those cities,' to get them be- 
trayed : and he was now intent on executing 
his schemes against them. But during this 
pause, Aristonymus, despatched by the Athe- 
nians, and Athensus by the Lacedemonians, to 
circulate the news, arrived in a trireme, and 
notify to him the suspension of arms, His foi^ 
ces were then transported back to Torone. 

The persons employed commimicated the 
articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the 
Lacedemonian confederates in Thrace declared 
U 



174 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IT. 



tfaeir acquiescence in what had been done. 
Aristonymus was well satisfied in other res- 
pects, but finding, by computing the days, that 
the revolt of the Scioneans was too late in 
point of time, he protested against their being 
entitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas 
on the other hand urged many arguments to 
prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore 
that city. When therefore Aristonymus had 
reported this afiair at Athens, the Athenians 
in an instant were ready to take up arms again 
for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacede- 
monians, by an embassy purposely despatched, 
remonstrated that « they should regard such a 
proceeding as a breach of the truce," and assert- 
ed « their right to the city, as they reposed en- 
tire credit on Brasidas; however, they were 
ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." 
The others refused to abide by so hazardous a 
decision, but would recover it as soon as pos- 
sible by force of arms. They were irritated at 
the thought, that persons seated as it were upon 
an island should presume to revolt from them, 
and have such confidence in the unprofitable 
land power of the Lacedemonians. There was 
farther more truth in the date of the revolt than 
at present the Athenians could evince : for, in 
fact, the Scioneans revolted two days too late. 
But at the instigation of Cleon they immedi- 
ately passed a decree, that ** the Scioneans 
should be reduced by force, and then put to 
the sword." And their intention was recalled 
from all other points, to expedite the needful 
preparations for the execution of this. 

In the meantime, Mende, also a city in the 
Pellene, and a colonyiof the Eretrians, revolt- 
ed from them. Brasidas received them into 
his protection, thinking himself justified, as 
they had openly come over to him in the time 
of truce. Besides, he had himself some rea- 
sons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as 
violaters of the articles. Upon this account 
the Mendeans were more encouraged to the 
step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to 
support them ; and were conviftced, by the 
affiiir of Scione, that he would not abandon 
them. The design farther had been originally 
set on foot by the few ; who, though tiiey de- 
layed it for a time, were resolved to push it in- 
to execution: for they apprehended that a 
discovery might prove htal to themselves ; and 
flo forced the bulk of the people to act against 
their inclination. But the Athenians, who 
bad quick intelligence of it, were now exas- 



perated much more than before, and redoubled 
their preparations against both those places. 

Brasidas, who soon expected the anival of 
their armament, conveyed away the wives and 
children of the Scioneans and Mendeans to 
Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted 
thither by five hundred heavy-armed Pelopon- 
nesians and three hundred Chalcidic targe- 
teers: the commander of the whole escort 
was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expect- 
ing soon to be visited by the Athenians, united 
their endeavours to get things in good order for 
their reception. 

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas 
marched together a second time into Liyncos 
against Arribsus. They commanded their se- 
parate bodies; one, the forces of the Mace- 
donians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed 
Grecians who dwelled amongst them ; the 
other, the remainder of his own Peloponne- 
slans reinforced by Chacideans and Acan- 
thians, and quotas from other cities such as 
they were able to furnish. The number of 
heavy^armed Grecians computed together, 
amounted to about three thousand: the ca- 
valry that attended, both of Macedonians and 
Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than 
a thousand, and the remaining crowd of Bar- 
barians was great 

Breaking thus into the territory of Arriheus, 
and finding the Lyncestians already in the field 
to oppose them, they also sat down and fiiced 
them. The infantry on each side were posted 
on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. 
This yielding room for the excursions of the 
horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish 
first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so 
soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were mov- 
ing first from the eminence to the aid of their 
cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched 
also down into the plain io oppose them, where 
they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A 
large number of the latter were slain, the rest 
fled for preservation to the eminences, and there 
stood quiet. 

The victors after this, having erected a tro- 
phy, continued for two or three days in the 
same post, waiting for the Ill3nrians who weie 
coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated psy. 
And then Perdiccas intended to advance frrther 
against the villages of Arribeus, and sit no 
longer inactive. Mende however was stiH up- 
permost in the care of Brasidas:— that place 
must be lost, should the Athenians arrive be- 



rBASXK.} 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



175 



fore it in the interval :^die IHyrians besides 
were not yet come up. He relished not the 
project, and WEB m*re inclined to go back. This 
engendered some disputes between them, in 
the midst of which the news was brought, that 
the lilyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined 
themselves with Arribsus. Upon which it 
was soon resolved between them to retire, as 
there was reason to dread the accession of men 
80 renowned for military valour. Yet the dis- 
agreement between them prevented their fixing 
on any certain time for filing ofE, Night came 
on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd 
of Barbarians being struck with a sadden panic 
(as numerpus armies are apt to be, without any 
certain cause,) and imagining that much larger 
numbeht were coming against thefn than in fact 
was true, and that they were only not near 
enough to attack them, they instantly took to 
their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas 
for a time kneYr nothing of the matter, and 
when informed of it, was compelled by the fly- 
ing troops to dislodge in their company, with- 
out being able to get a sight of Brasidas. For 
they were encamped at a distance firom each 
other. 

At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that 
the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the 
lUyrians and Arribsus were approaching to 
attack hiuL He therefore drew his forces to- 
gether, forming a square with his heavy-armed, 
in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd 
of light-armed ; and in this form he intended to 
retreat. He appointed the youngest men to 
sally out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked 
them : and he himself with a picked body of 
three hundred, determined to bring up the rear 
in person, in order to sustain and make good 
their retreat against the van of the enemy who 
should press upon their rear.. And before the 
enemy came near, as well as the hi.rry would 
*dmit, he animated his sofdiers thus : 

** Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, 
that thus abandoned as you are, and ready to be 
attacked by Barbarians, and those numerous 
too, you were in some consternation, I shpuld 
judge it needless to instruct or to encourage 
you. But now, against this desertion of our 
^i^ds, and this multitude of our enemies, I 
^^ endeavour by a short admonition and ex- 
^rtation to raise vrithin you the full grandeur 
^ your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to 
^^^B with gallantry in every martial scene, 
upon the aecounty not merely of acting in the 



open field in tiie presence of so many confeda 
rates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your 
souls ought not to be dismayed at a multilyide 
of foes, since you were not bom under govern- 
ments where the many control the few, but 
where the few command the many. And the 
only means, by which you acquired this noble 
privilege, was victorious perseverance in the 
fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your 
fears of whom are the result of your ignorance, 
you ought to be informed, from what you have 
learned yourselves in former conflicts against 
them with the Macedonians, as well as from 
what I conjecture, and what I depend upon 
from the accounts of others, that in action 
they will be by no means terrible. For when 
a hostile force, though in reality weak, carrieth 
with it the appearance of strength, a true dis- 
covery of its state is no sooner obtained, than 
it redoubleth the courage of their opponents. 
But men in whom valour is firmly implanted, 
none can assault with extraordinary spirit but 
such as know them not. These enemies of 
yours are dreadful for a while, merely till 
brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth 
them terrible to^ the sight; the loudness of 
their shouts is insupportable to the ear. Theii 
weapons, brandished about and clashing in the 
air, have a frightful and menacing look. But 
their spirit will not answer their show, when 
charging against such as will sustain their shock. 
They are not drawn up with skill, nor will 
they blush when compelled to quit their ground. 
To fiy from or to fly after an enemy is equaUy 
a matter of glory to them : by such things is 
their valour established and rescued from re- 
proach. For a battle where every combatant 
is his own commander, leaveth a specious and 
handsome opportunity to each of providing for 
his safety. They this moment judge it more 
safe to intimidate us at a distance than to run 
to the charge : for otherwise, before this they 
had attacked us. And you plainly see, that 
all the terror which now runs before them, 
will vanish at the onset, as terrible only to 
sight and hearing, When therefore they ad- 
vance to the charge, sustain it and repulse 
them ; and when opportunity serveth, fall back 
into your ranks again with regularity and order. 
You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, 
and be convinced for the time to come, that 
such rabbles, to men who can stand the first 
fury of their onset, have only made, at a dis- 
tance and by their pausing, a vain and menacing 



176 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book .IV. 



puade of valour ; but such as will give ground 
and fly before them, they pursue with eager- 
ne^; and are excellently brave when- there is 
no resistance." 

After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his 
army to file leisurely off. The Barbarians per* 
ceiving it pressed forwards with great noise and 
clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they 
might intercept and cut him off. But when 
, the appointed parties sallied out from all quar- 
ters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with 
his picked body sustained their charge, they 
repulsed them at their first assault, to the 
great surprise of the enemy. Afterwards, re- 
ceiving every repeated attack, they beat them 
off continually ; and then, ddring the intervals 
of pause, retfeated in good order ; till at length, 
the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their 
efforts in the plain against the Greeks under 
Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body 
to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the 
rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying 
Macedonia^s, and such as they overtook they 
slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther be- 
tween two hills, which was the entrance into 
the territories of Arribeus, th«y hurried before 
in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only 
route by which Brasidas could retreat. He 
was now drawing near it, and in the most dif- 
ficult part of the passage they were spreading 
themselves circularly to encompass him on all 
sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, 
ordered the three hundred that marched with 
him to advance full speed up that hill which 
he thought was most practicable, and possess 
themselves of it, and this with the utmost 
expedition, each as he was able without re- 
garding form, and endeavour to drive the Bar- 
barians thence, who were already posting them- 
selves upon it, before they were joined by 
larger numbers and could invest him on all 
sides. They did so, attacked, and made them- 
selves masters of the hill, which enabled the 
main body of the Grecians to march up with- 
out obstruction. For now the Barbarians 
were thrown into consternation, when their 
detachment had in this manner been beat off 
from the eminence. And here they discon- 
tinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had 
already passed the frontier, and secured their 
retreat. 

Brasidas, when once he was ir aster of the 
eminences, marched on without molestation; 
and the very same day reached Amiasa, the 



first place within the dominions of Pei^ccu. 
His~ soldiers indeed, who were exasperated 
against the Macedonii^ns iot having thus pre- 
cipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of 
oxen they met with on their route, or what' 
ever baggage lay dropped upon thfe ground, (m 
such things it was likely should happen in i 
retreat by night and confused by fear,) the 
former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and 
secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, 
Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as hifl 
enemy, and ever after forced himself against 
his inclinations to hate the Peloponncsiaos; 
not indeed in his judgment {Hreferring the Athe- 
nians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of 
his own affairs, he cast about for the meaas <rf 
being again reconciled to the latter, and disea* 
tangling himself from the former. 

Brasidas, having retreated through Mace- 
donia to Torone, findeth the AthenianiB alread; 
in possession of Mende. Judging it uopossibie 
now to pass over into the PaHenc and driw 
out the eneidy, he «hose to remain there and 
securely to garrison Torone. For, during the 
time of the expedition into Lyncus, the 
Athenians had put to sea against Mende 
and Scione with the armament they had pro- 
vided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which 
were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of 
their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thou- 
sand mercenary Thracians, and a body of tar- 
geteers furnished by their adjacent dependents: 
Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostnta* 
the son of Diotrephes had the command of 
the whole. They weighed from Potidea, snd 
landing at the temple of Neptune, marched di- 
rectly for Mende. The Mendeans, with their 
own force and three hundred Scioneans who 
were come to their succour, and the Pdopon- 
nesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred hea^* 
armed under the command of Polydamida*^ 
were encamped without the city upon a strong 
eminence. Nicias taking with him a bondred 
and twenty light-armed Methoneans, and siity 
picked men of the heavy-armed AthfflU*''^ 
and all the archers, attempted to mount by « 
path that led up the eminence; hut, hei^ 
galled by the enemy, was not able to foice^ 
ascent Nicostratus, with all the rest ofJi« 
force, having fetched a.compa8s,abont, in «^ 
to mount in a remote quarter, where the ««*" 
was impracticable, was quite thrown m** 
der: and thus the whole Athenian """^^ 
Towly esci^ a total del<Mit At <^^^ 



I 



YEAiriX.) 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



177 



the Mendeans and allies maintained their post | the sea, and posted a g^ard to secure the block 



the whole day, the Athenians drew oS and 
encamped. And, when night came on, the 
Mendeans withdrew into the cif^^. 

The next day, the Athenians sailing round 
to the Scione side possessed themselves of the 
suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging 
the country, as not a soul sallied out to 
obstruct them: for some bustles now were on 
foot in the city inclining to a sedition* The 
three hundred Scioneans departed also in the 
succeeding night to their own home: and 
the day following, Nicias advancing with a 
moiety of the force within their frontier, ravag- 
ed the district of the Scioneans ; whilst Nicos- 
tiatus, with the remainder, sat down before the 
upper gates of Mende, from whence the road 
leadeth to Potidsa. But Polydamidas, as the 
Meudeaiis and the auxiliaries had chanced to 
Scound their arms in this quarter within the 
wall, drew them up in order of battle, and 
exhorted the Mendeans to sally out. It was 
replied in a seditious manner by one of the 
popular faction, that "they would not sally, 
and would have nothing to do with the war." 
At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid 
hands upon the person, a tumult at once ensued, 
in which the people ran immediately to arms, 
Mid, furious writh anger, made towards the 
Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite 
faction who sided with them. They fell upon 
and routed them in an instant, terrified as they 
^ere at this sudden assault; and the gates 
were thrown open at the same time to the 
Athenians. They supposed this insurrection 
had been made against them in consequence of 
some previous combination ; and as many as 
escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away 
*o the citadel, which was before in their pos- 
session. 

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now 
Jietumed before the city) bursting into Mende, 
w it was not opened by composition, with 
tbeir whole united force, plundered it as though 
taken by storm ; nay, the generals had some 
difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting 
the inhabitants to. the swoqI. And after this 
they issued their commands to the Mendeans 
to continue their government in the usual form, 
and to proceed judicially against those of their 
°^y whom they esteemed the principal authors 
of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut 
^P with a wall extending on both sides to 
30 



ade. 

When in this manner they had possessed 
themselves of Mende, they marched against 
Scione, The inhabitants, with the Pelopoo* 
nesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted 
themselves on a strong eminence before the 
city ; which, unless the enemy eould take it, 
would infallibly prevent their walling them 
about. But the Athenians stormed the post, 
and after an engagement forcing them to dis- 
lodge, they formed their camp, and having 
erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness 
for the circumvallation. And no long time 
after, whilst they were busied in this work, the 
auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, 
having forced the guard posted near the sea, 
get away by night ; and the major part of them, 
escaping privily through the Athenian camp 
before Scione, got safe into that town* 

When the circumvallation of Scione was in 
hand, Perdiccas, having ilespatched a herald 
for the purpose to the Athenian generals, 
strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. 
He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasi- 
das, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus ; 
and had , begun from that time to act in their 
favour. For it happened, that at this very 
juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedsmon- 
ian was brining up by land a reinforcement to 
Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige 
Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, 
commanded him to give some conspicuous 
proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as 
to gratify his own i^sentment in refusing 
the Peloponnesians a passage through his do- 
minions, had gained the concurrence of his 
Thessalian friends, since with the chief per- 
sons of that country he had ever been closely 
united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped 
the reinforcement and their convoy that they 
durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. 
Ischagoras, however, and Aminias and Aris- 
teus, reach Brasidas in person, being commis. 
sioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the 
posture of their affairs, and brought with them 
some young men of Sparta, though contrary to 
their laws, who were to take upon them the 
government of the cities which were no longer 
to be trusted to their former managers. In 
effect, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus thtsy 
place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas 
the son of Hegesander in Torone. 
u2 \ 



178 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bCXIK XV. 



This same snmmer, the Thebans demolislied 
the walls of the Thespiensians, alleging as 
the reason, that they were practising with the 
Athenians. This demolition had ever been 
intended, but its execution was now become 
more easy, as the flower of their youth had 
perished in the late battle fought against the 
Athenians. 

This summer also, the temple of Juno *at 
Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the 
priestess had placed a burning torch too near 
the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. 
The flames broke out and were raging all 
^ound before they were perceived. Chrysis 
indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, flies 
away by night to Phlius. They, according to 
the law enacted for that purpose, appointed 
another priestess in her room, whose name was 
Phaeinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, 
and it was the middle of the ninth when 
Chrysis fled. 

The circumvallation of Scione also was com- 
pleted about the clos& of this summer ; and 
the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body 
to guard it, drew off the rest of their army. 

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet 
between the Athenians and Lacedsmonians, 
because of the suspension of arms. But the 
Mantineans, and Tegeats, and the confederates 
on both sides, engaged at Laodicea of Orestis : 
but the victoiy was doubtful. Each party 



routed a wing of their opponents, and both 
sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to 
Delphi. Many however were slain on both 
sides, and the battle was drawn, the night pat- 
ting an end to the contest The Tegeats in- 
deed passed the night upon the field, and 
immediately erected a trophy. But the Man- 
tineans withdrew to BucoUon, and afterwards 
erected their trophy in opposition. 

In the close of this winter, and when the 
spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther 
made an attempt upon Potidsa. For having 
approached it in the night, and applied his 
ladders, so hi he proceeded without causing an 
alarm. For the bell being passed by, during 
that interval, before he that carried it forwards 
could return, the moment was seized for apply- 
ing them.^ However, the alarm was taken 
before he could possibly scale, upon which he 
drew off his army without loss of time, not 
caring to wait for the return of day. And thus 
ended the winter ; and with it the ninth year 
of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled 
the history. 

iThe officers regularly went their rounds to see that 
all the sentinels were at their posts. When they 
approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to 
which the sentinel was to answer, in proof that he 
was at his post and awake. The interval between the 
rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the 
sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relax, 
ed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK V. 



Ykar X. The tmce endeth. Cleon sent commander into Thrace ; his proceedings there. The battle of Ara> 

phipoUfl, in which Brasidas and Cleon are Icilled. A general peace, styled the Nician. An alliance, offensive 

and defensive, between the Athenians and Lacedemonians. — XL The peace merely nominal ; and Thucydidea 

proceedeth in his history of the Peloponnesian war. The Ck>rintliians practise against the Lacedemonians. 

An Argive league. No confidence between the principal states. A train of negotiations. A separate alliance 

between the Lacedemonians and Bobotians, contrary to article. Panactum demolished. — XII. The demolition 

of Panactum and the separate alliance highly resented at Athens. Many are scheming a rupture, but especially 

Alcibiades. By his means a negotiation is brought on at Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argives. 

The Lacedemonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic games. — XIII. War between the Argives and Epidau- 

rians. The Lacedemonians throw a garrison into Epidaurus; and the Athenians replace the Helots and 

Messenians in Pylus. — XIV. The Lacedemonians take the field against the Argives. Two large armies face 

one another within sight of Argos,- yet part without engaging. The Lacedemonians take the field a second 

time. The battle of Mantinea. The Argives enter into league with the Lacedemonians. — XV. Fresh stirs at 

Argos in favour of the Athenians.~XVI. Expedition of the Athenians against the isle of Melos. The con< 

ferenca in form, by way of dialogue. The Athenians become masters of that island. 



TEAB X/ 

Ih the following summer, the truce, made for a 
year, expired, of course, at the time of the 
Pythian Games. And, during this relaxation 
from war, the Athenians caused the Delians 
to evacuate the isle of Delos ; imagining that, 
upon the taint of some crimes long since com- 
mitted, they were not sufficiently pure to per- 
form due service to the god, and that this yet 
was wanting to render that work of purgation 
complete, in which, as I have already related, 
they thought themselves justified in demolish- 
ing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians 
settled again, so &st as they could remove 
themselves thither, at Atramyttium, hestowed 
upon them for this purpose by Fhamaces. 
Cleon,' having obtained the commission 



> Before Christ 4S3. 

• Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he Is 
a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the 
people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, serious- 
ly and deliberately, they intrust him with a most impor 
tant and delicate commission. He now imagines he can 
carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasi- 



from the Athenians, went by sea into the 
Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension 
of arms expired, having under his command 
twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three 



das from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even 
without having Demosthenes for his second. We may 
guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown, 
from the Knights of Aristophanes. And, to set it in the 
most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Ni- 
cias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very inju- 
rious manner ; and, no doubt, it must have been very 
grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low 
buffoonery upon the stage of Athens. " Demosthenes 
begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paph- 
lagonian, Cleon ; Nicias seconds him ; then both of them 
howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next 
lay their heads together about some means of redress. 
Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master 
Cleon's reach. ' Let us go, then,' says Nicias. • Ay ; let 
us go,» cries Demosthenes. « Say more,' says Nicias, Met 
us go over to the enemy.* ' Ay ; over to the enemy/ 
adds the other. * But first> says Nicias, ♦ let us go and 
prostrate ourselves before the images of the gods.* 
*What images?' says Demosthenes ; *dost thou think 
then there are any godsl' * I do.* ♦ Upon what gr oundal' 
* Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred.' 
—Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes 
makes of characters that by no means deserve it I De- 
mosthenes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cleon 

179 



180 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their 
allied forces. His whole armament consisted 
of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet 
blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy- 
armed, stationed there as guards ; and, stand- 
ing away entered the haven of the Colophoni- 
ans, lying at no great distance from Torone. 
Being here informed, by the deserters, that 
Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants 
able to make head against him, he marched 
his forces by land towards that city, and sent 
ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. 
His first approach was to the new rampart, 
which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the 
city in order to inclose the suburbs within its 
cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old 
wall, had rendered, it one entire city. When 
the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitelidas, 
the Lacedemonian, who was commandant, 
and the garrison under his command, exerted 
themselves in its defence. But, when they 
could no longer maintain it, and at the same 
time the ships, sent around on purpose, had en- 
tered the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing lest the 
ships might take the town now left defenceless, 
and, when the rampart was carried by the ene- 
my, he himself might be intercepted, abandons 
it immediately, and retired with all speed into 
the town: but the Athenians were already 
disembarked and masters of the place. The 
land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, 
by rushing along through the aperture in the 
old wall ; and some, as well Peloponnesians as 
Toroneans, they slew in the moment of irrup- 
tion. Some also they took alive, amongst 
whom was Pasitelidas the commandant. Bra- 
sidas was indeed coming up to its ^relief, but 
receiving intelligence on his march that it was 
taken he retired; since he was forty stadia^ 
off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy. 

thus : " He hath one foot fixed in Pyhisy and the other 
in the assembly of the people. When he moves, he 
struts and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in 
Thrace, his hands in ^tolia,and his attention amongst 
the tribes at home." — Nicias then proposeth poisoning 
themselves by drinking bull's blood, like Themistodes; 
— " Or rather," says Demosthenes, *' a dose of good 
wine." This is agreed upon, in order to cheer up their 
spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon,and playoff 
against him, the seller of black-puddings. Nicias ac- 
cordingly goes and steals the wine. — Yet, in spite of 
the most outrageous ridicule, and t^e opposition of all 
wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at 
the bead of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of 
Brasidas. 
*■ About four miles. 



But Cleon and the Athenians now erected 
two trophies ; one upon the harbour, the other 
at the rampart. They farther doomed to 
slavery, the wives and children of the Torone- 
ans. The male inhabitants, together with the 
Peloponnesians and every Chalcidean that was 
found amongst them, amounting in all to seT- 
en himdred, they sent away captives to Athens. 
The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards 
released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty; 
the rest were fetched away by the Oljrnthians, 
who made exchanges for them, body for body. 

About the same time, the Boeotians, by 
treachery, got possession of Panactum, a fort 
upon the frontier, belonging to the Athenians. 

As for Cleon, having established a garrison 
at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round 
Athos, as bound for Amphipolls. 

But two vessels about tjiis time, bound for 
Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour (^ 
Athens, having on board Phsax, the son of 
Erasistrotus, with whom two other persons 
were joined in commission, to execute an em- 
■bassy there. For the Leontines, after the depar- 
ture of the Athenians from Sicily, in conse- 
quence of the joint accommodation, had enrolied 
many strangers as denizens of their city, and the 
populace had a plan in agitation for a distribution 
of the lands. The noble, alarmed at this, gain 
the concurrence of the Syracusans and eject the 
commons. They were dispersed, and wander- 
ed up and dovm as bo nutny vagabonds ; whikt 
the noble, striking up an agreement ifith A« 
Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolitJoa 
their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citi- 
zens of that place. And yet, soon after some of 
this number, dissatisfied even here, fowool 
Syracuse again, and seize upott Phocaa, « 
quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and up- 
on Bricinniffi, which is a fortress in the Leon- 
tine. Hither the greater part of the ejected 
commons resorted to them ; and adhering firn** 
ly together, from these strongholds they annoy- 
ed the country by their hostilities. When A* 
Athenians had intelligence of this, they wn 
out Phieax, to persuade, by all proper saethodj 
their old allies in that country, and to gain, « 
possible, the concurrence of the other SiciutW 
to take up arms for the preservatioa of " 
people of Leontium, against the eneroiM 
power of the Syracusans. Ph»ax, tipon w* ^ 
rival, recommendeth the scheme sUccessW 
the Camarineans and Agrigentines. Bw 
negotiations meeting with some oWacl* 



d 



»J 



PELOPONNE3IAN WAR. 



181 



Gela, he dMrted fron addretong biiaself td 
iho rest, nnce he was awured he could not po»- 
siblj niceeed* Betiriiif therefore through the 
distnct of the Siculi to Gatane, and caliing on 
his road at Briciimis, and having encouraged 
the maleonteots there to persevere, he depart- 
ed. JNot but that, in this Sicilian voyage, 
both passing and repassing, and also upon the 
coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities 
** how expedient for them was the Athenian 
Iriendship." 

He met also in his course with those Lo- 
cnans, who were going to another settlement, 
after expulsicm from Messene. They had been 
driven to this necessity by seditious factions at 
Messene, one of which had invited them thither 
since the joint acc(miraodation among the Si- 
cilians; and now they were forced to shift 
again, though Messene had for a time been 
entirely in their power. Pheax therefore, 
meeting with these in their removal, gave them 
no annoyance ; for the Locrians had been at a 
conference with him, to concert the measures 
of an agreement with the Adienians. These, 
however, were the only party of ail the confe- 
derates, who, when the Sicilians had amicaUy 
ended their dispilles, refused to treat with the 
Athenians, who were brought to such submis- 
sion since aaerely by a war, in which they were 
enftbroiled against the Itoniai^s and Meleans, 
who hindered upon them, and were colonies of 
their own. And, some time after this, Pheax 
truly returned to Athens. 

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone 
about by sea against Amphipolis, n»arching 
away from Eion, maketh an assault upon Sta- 
girus, a cdony of Andriuis, but without suc- 
cess ; yet Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, 
he taketh by storm. He sent farther ambassa- 
dors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance 
in the expedition, according to the tenor of the 
new aUiance. He sent others into Thrace to 
Polles, king of the Odomantians, that he would 
hire as large a body of Tkracians as could be 
got, and bring them up under his own orders. 
And, during thU interval, he himself lay quiet 
at Eion. 

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, 
placed himself in an opposite post at Credylium. 
This place belongeth to ihe Argiiians, and is 
seated on an eminence on the other side of the 
river^ and at no great distance from Amphipo- 
lis. From hence he had a perfect view of all 
Cleon's jikotiona : so that now it was impossi- 



ble for the Utter to make any approach with 
his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without 
being di^MM>vered* Brasidas, however, sus- 
pected that Gelon would approach, and, from 
a contempt of his opponents, would certainly 
advance thither, without waiting for reinforce- 
ments. 

He had at the same time, provided himself 
with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and 
had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and 
horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Ghalcide- 
ans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those 
in Amphipolis. But his whole f<n-ce of heavy- 
armed of all sorts amounted to about two thou- 
sand ; and he had three hundred Grecian horse- 
men. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen 
hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself 
at Cerdylium ; the rest were left in Amphipo- 
lis, under the orders of Clearfdas. 

Cleon remained without stirring for the pre- 
sent, but was soon forced to such a step as 
Brasidas expected. The soldiers were cha- 
grined at their inactivity, and were disparaging 
his conduct by invidious parallels, « against how 
much skill and courage, with how much un- 
skillfulness and cowardice he was matched ;" 
and that <<with the highest regret they had 
attended him from Athens on this expedition.*' 
Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to 
disgust them more by too long a continuance 
in the same post, he drew them up and led 
them on. He acted now upon the vain con- 
ceit with which his success at Pylus had pufied 
him up, as a man of great importance. It 
cold not ent» his heart, that the enemy would 
presume to march out against and offer him 
battle. He gave out that "he was only ad- 
vancing in order to view the place : he waited 
indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if 
they were needful to his security, should the 
enemy attack him, but to enable him completely 
to invest the city, and to take it by storm.'* 
Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a 
strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went 
in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, 
and the situation of the city on the side of 
Thrace, how it really was. He judged he could 
retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not so 
much as one person appeared upon the works, 
or issued out at the gates ; for they were all 
shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of 
a mktake in coming so near the place without 
the machines, «as the town must infallibly 
have been taken, because abandoned.*' 



182 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



[book v. 



Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceiyed 
that the Athenians were in motion, than de- 
scending from Cerdylium, he marcheth into 
Amphipolis. He there waved ail manner of 
sally and all show of opposition against the 
Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much 
to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to 
the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they 
were nearly balanced, but in real worth ; for 
the Athenian force, appointed for this service, 
was composed of the very flower of Athens, 
and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and 
Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to 
assail them with art ; because in case he gave 
the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the 
sorry manner in which they were armed, he 
judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, 
tiian by concealing them till the moment of 
action, and avoiding that contempt which their 
real state would have inspired. Picking out, 
therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty 
heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clea- 
ridas to command the rest, he designed to fall 
suddenly U]K)n the Athenians in their retreat ; 
concluding he should never again find them in 
this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements 
they expected were come up. Calling, there- 
fore, all his soldiers around him, as he was de- 
sirous i»f animating them, and letting them into 
his scheme he harangued them thus : 

«Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice 
tiiat I briefly put you in mind that we are 
natives of that country which hath ever by 
valour preserved itself free, and that you of the 
Doric are now going to attack your opponents 
of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to 
defeat My words are chiefly designed to in- 
form you in what manner I have planned the 
method of attack, lest hazarding the event with 
■o small a party, and not with our entire force, 
may seem unequal to the work, and may too 
much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjecture, 
from an utter contempt of us, and a strong 
presumption that we durst not come out into 
the field against them, have shown themselves 
before this city; and this very moment, dis- 
orderly scattered as they are to view the situa- 
tion, they heartily despise us. The leader, 
therefore, who hath the most acuteness in de- 
tecting such blunders in a foe, and then seizeth 
the proper moment to fall upon*them, as best 
enabled by his own strength ; not so much in 
the open and regular manner of a methodical 
fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in 



the present juncture ; — such a leader may, for 
the most part, be assured of success. Such 
stealths as these draw after them the highest 
glory: by these the man who over-reacheth 
his enemy the most, performeth the most 8ab* 
stantial service for his friends. Whilst, there- 
fore, haughtily presuming on their own worth, 
they remain thus disordered, and, by what 
appeareth to me, are bent more on drawing off 
than remaining here, — during this their inter* 
mission of purpose, and before their resolutions 
can be regularly adjusted, I myself, at the head 
of my chosen party, will be amongst them, if 
possible, and will rush with vigour into the 
centre of their army. And then, Clearidas, 
when once you perceive that I am engaged, 
and, as in probability it must be, have 
thrown them into disorder, then, at the head 
of yours, accompanied by the Amphipolitans 
and the rest of the confederates, throw open 
the gates on a sudden for your sally, and ad- 
vance with your utmost speed to the charge. 
And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the 
enemy must be thrown into the utmost con- 
sternation ; because a second body, thus run- 
ning to the charge, is more terrible to the foes 
than the present which is already engaged. And 
show yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man, 
which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to he. 

" You, in general, ye confederates, I exhort 
to follow with manly resolution, and to remem- 
ber that good soldiers are bound, in duty, to be 
full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to 
obey commanders ; that, this very day, if yoQ 
behave with valour, you are henceforth free? 
and will gain the honourable title of Lacede- 
monian allies ; otherwise, must continue to be 
the slaves of the Athenians; where the best 
that can befall you^ if neither sold for slaTes 
nor put to death as rebels, vrill be a heavier 
yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, 
whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must 
by you for ever be obstructed. But so das- 
tardly behaviour I conjure you to scom, as you 
know for what valuable prizes you are to enter 
the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I 
am not more ready to put others in mind of 
their duty, than personally to discharge my 
own through the whole scene of action.' 

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, p^ 
pared to sally out himself, and placed the m*® 
body under the orders of Clearidas, »t ** 
gates which are called the Thracian, to ^ 
ready to rush out ^t the appointed time. 



».] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



188 



To Cleon now, — ^for Brasidas had been 
plainly seen coming down from Cerdylium; 
and, aa the prospect of the city lay open to 
those without, had been seen also when sacri- 
ficing before the temple of Minerva, and form- 
ing the proper dispositions : — ^to Cleon, I say, 
T^ho was now in a remote quarter to view the 
posts, advice is brought, that " the whole force 
of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the 
city, and that, under the gates, many feet of 
horses and men might be discerned, as ready 
for a sally." Upon hearing this, he went to 
the place, and was convinced by his own sight. 
He determined, however, not to hazard a battle 
before his succours were arrived ; and though 
he knew his motions could not be concealed, 
he went off, and ordered the signal to be given 
for a retreat; commanding farther that the 
left wing should file off first, which indeed was 
the only method of drawing off securely to 
Eion. But as they seemed to him to be long 
about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of 
the right ; and thus, exposing his men to the 
missiye weapons of the enemy, was drawing 
off his army. 

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was 
time to attack, since the army of the Athenians 
was already in motion, says to those about him, 
and to all that were near, — << These gentlemen 
wait not for us, that plainly appeareth by the 
shaking of their spears and heads ; for those 
who make such motions are not used to stay 
for the enemy's approach. But let somebody 
throw me open the appointed gates and let us 
boldly and with all speed sally out against 
them.*' In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the 
gates of the entrenchment, and the first of 
-what was then the long wall, advanced with 
all speed directly along the road, where now 
standeth the trophy, to be seen by those who 
pass along by the strongest part of the town, 
and, falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not 
only at their own irregular situation, but also 
terrified at his bold attack in the very centre of 
their army, he putteth them to the rout. And 
now Clearidas, sallying out according to order 
at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second 
him. The consequence was, that, by such an 
unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, 
the Athenians were thrown into the highest 
confosion. Their left wing, which inclined 
the most towards Eion, as having filed off 
first, was instantly broken, and fled. These 
were no sooner dispersed in flight, than Brasi- 



das, advancing to th/b attack of the right, is 
wounded : — ^he dropped ; — but the Athenians 
are not sensible of it. Those who were near 
him took him up and carried him off. This 
accident, however, enabled the right wing oi 
the Athenians to maintain their ground the 
longer ; though Cleon, who from the first had 
never intended to stand an engagement, flies 
instantly away ; and, being intercepted by a 
Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his h^avy- 
armed, embodying together and gaining an 
eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or 
thrice attacked them, and maintained their 
ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry 
and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in 
their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. 
Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed 
in a laborious flight : the^ ran different ways 
amongst the mountains; numbers had been 
destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalci- 
dic horse and targeteers ; but the ^ remainder 
escaped in safety to Eion. 

Those who took up Brasidas, when he drop>- 
ped in the action, and bore him off, carried him 
into the city yet alive. His senses remained 
till he heard his party were victorious, and soon 
after that he expired.^ 

The rest of the army with Clearidas, being 
come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and 
erected a trophy. 

This done, all the confederates assisted under 
arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they in- 
terred at the public expense within the city near 
the place where the forum now standeth. And 
afterwards the Amphipolitans, having inclosed # 
his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a 
hero. They also enacted solemn games in his 
honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they as- 
cribed their colony to him as founder, after 
demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defao- 
ing every memorial which might continue the 
memory of his foundation. They acted thus, 
partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom 
they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at 



* The first embassy which came from the Groclani in 
Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a 
visit to hia mother Argileonis. The first question she 
asked them was, "Did my son die bravely?'* And 
when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, 
and said, at last, *' there was not such another Spartan 
left alive ;"— " You mistake, gentlemen," said the 
mother : " my son was a pood man ; but there are many 
better men than he in Sparta." Plutarch's Laconic 
Apopktkegmg. 



184 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



this juncture to show iheir high respect for the 
Lacedsmoniau alliance, as they stood in great 
dread of the Athenians. For, considering their 
hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they 
thought it neither for the^ interest nor satis- 
faction to continue the honours of Agnon. 

To the Athenians they also delivered the 
bodies of their dead. The number of them, 
on the Athenian side, amounted to six hundred, 
whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This 
was owing to the nature of the fight, which had 
not been carried on in a regular manner, but 
was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a 
surprise and sudden consternation. After the 
reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed 
away for Athens ; but those under the orders 
of Clearidas applied themselves to re-settle and 
secure Amphipolis. 

About the same time, in the close of this 
summer, Ramphias, and Autocharidas, and 
Bpicydidas, Lacedsemonians, were conducting 
up, for the Thracian service, a reinforcement 
consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being 
arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated 
there such things as .seemed to require an 
amendment; and, during the season they 
halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was 
fought, and the summer ended. 

But, early as possible in the succeeding 
winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias 
proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of 
Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing 
their farther passage, and Brasidas being now 
dead, to whom they were conducting this sup- 
ply, they returned home. They imagined that 
their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athe- 
nians, in consequence of their overthrow, had 
quitted that country : and themselves had not 
sufficient ability to carry the plans into execu- 
tion which Brasidas had been meditating. But 
the principal motive of their return was their 
own consciousness, at setting out, that the 
Lacedemonians were more inclined to peace. 

It so fell out indeed, immediately after the 
battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ram- 
phias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties 
meddled any longer with the operations of war, 
but were more inclined to a peace. The mo- 
tives on the Athenian side were these : — They 
had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a 
second lately at Amphipolis : hence they no 
longer entertained that assured confidence of 
their own strength, which had formerly occa- 
sioned them to reject all accommodations, as 



they imagined, in their then career of sueoeoi, 
they should soon give law to their enemies. Now 
also they were under apprehensions of their 
dependents^ lest buoyed up by ^ late iDi»- 
fortunes of Athena, they might the sooner be 
induced to revolt. And tiiey heartily repentdl 
now, that they had neglected the fine oppor- 
tunity, which their success at Pylus gave 
them, of bringing the dispute to a happy dete^ 
mination. 

On the other hand, the Lacedemopiaiu 
acted on these motives :~-They found theni' 
selves strangely mistaken in the events of war. 
At its commencement, they imagined, that ia 
the space of a few years, they should entirdj 
have demolished the power of the Athemaof 
by laying their territory waste ; but they had 
sufifcred a terrible calamity in the affair of 
Sphacteria, such as never before had been the 
lot of Sparta. Devastations now were eitoid- 
ed over all their country, from Pylus and Cy* 
thera. Their Helots had also in numbers do> 
sorted to the foe ; and they lived in constant 
expectation that those, who yet peisevered a 
their allegiance, gained by the sohcitatioua of 
those who were fled, might, in the preae&t low 
ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their consti- 
tution, as had formerly been the case. It 
happened farther, that the tiiirty years' traca 
with the Argives was on the point of expiring; 
and the Argives were unwilling to roiew it, 
unless the Cynuria was poaviouidy reatorei 
They juded it therefore a plain impossibilitf, 
to make head, at the same time, against both 
Argives and Athenians. They had also a sbs- 
picioH that some cities of Peloponnesus would 
revolt from them to the Argives, which piowd 
afterwards true. 

Both parties, then, being respectively infln- 
enced by such considerations, an accommod8« 
tion was judged to be expedient The aniifl^ 
of the Lacedemonians about it was not taa 
least, as they were eagerly bent on recoveoD? 
their prisoners that had been taken at 8pha» 
teria ; for they were all citizens of Sparta, » 
the first rank, and allied to Ae m«< h<w«^ 
able families. They had begun to solieit iheii 
liberty so soon as ever they were taken ; w" 
the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that 
time disdained to treat Yet, after the \^ 
received at Delium, the LacedsMnoniana, kn*^ 
ing tiien they were beoome nsow tractable, ■» 
hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained* 
cessation of arms for a year, in which spac« 



^•I 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



165 



tlicy were, by article to hdd mutual confer- 
ences, in order to settle an accommodation for 
a longer time. And since the Athenians had 
now again more lately been totally defeated at 
AmpHipoIis, and as well Cleon ;is Brasidas 
was dead, both of whom had most strenuously 
opposed an accommodation ; the latter, because 
he was successful and reaped glories in war ; 
the former, because, in a season of tranquillity, 
his villanies must needs be detected, and his 
bold calumniations lose all credit ; the persons, 
who at present were chief in the management 
of either state, were more strongly disposed 
than ever to adjust disputes. These were, 
Pleistionax, the son of Fausanias, king of the 
Lacedemonians, and Nicias, the son of Nicera- 
tus, by far the most successful general of that 
age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had 
never been defeated, and was bent on securing 
bis own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on 
obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and 
of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, 
and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, 
as one who had never involved his country in 
calamity. These views, he judged, could only 
be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by 
exposing himself, as little as possible, to the 
uncertainties of fortune; and vacuity from 
dangrer was compatible solely with peace. 
Pleistionax had been calumniated by his ene- 
mies on the account of his restoration ; and 
they inviduously suggested to his prejudice, 
upon every loss whatever which the Lacedaemo- 
nians sustained, that such was the consequence 
of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his 
banishment. For they laid to his charge, 
that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he 
had suborned the priestess of Delphi to give 
one general answer to all the deputations sent 
by the Lacedemonians to consult the oracle, 
that « they should bring back the seed of the 
demigod son of Jove from a foreign land into 
their own country : if not, they should plough 
with a silver ploughshare ;" and thus, at length, 
so seduced the Lacedemonians in the favour of 
an exile, residing at Lyceum, upon account of 
his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though 
purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from 
a dread of his coimtrymen dwelling in a house, 
one-half of which was part of the temple of 
Jupiter, that, nineteen years after, they con- 
ducted him home with the same solemn pro- 
cession and sacrifices as those, who were the 
original founders of Lacedemon,had appointed 
31 



lor the inauguration of their kings. Repining, 
therefore, at these calumniations, and judging 
that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, 
and that, farther, if the Lacedemonians could 
recover the prisoners, his enemies would be 
debarred of a handle for detraction ; whereas, 
whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons 
at the helm of government must be liable to 
reproaches for every disaster; he was ear- 
nestly desirous to bring about an accommoda- 
tion. 

This winter, therefore, they proceeded to 
a conference ; and, at the approach of spring, 
great preparations were openly in hand on the 
Lacedemonian side, and a scheme for fortify- 
ing in Attica was circulated .through all the 
states, in order to render the Athenians more 
compliant Many meetings were held, and 
many demands, with large justifications, were 
urged on both si4es, till, at length, it was 
agreed, that «a peace should be concluded, 
each party restoring what they had conquered 
in the war, but Nisea to remain in the hands 
of the Athenians." Platea was re-demanded 
by the latter, but the Thebrns urged that it 
had not fallen into their hands by force or by 
treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance 
of a free and voluntary surrender. And, 
upon the same plea, the Athenians kept 
Nisea. 

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacede- 
monians called together their confederates; 
and all their voices, excepting those of the 
Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Cleans, and 
Megareans, who were not at all satisfied with 
these proceedings, concurring for a peaces 
they ratify the accommodation, and solemnly 
pledged the observance of it to the Atheni- 
ans, who, in exchange, swore the same to the 
Lacedemonians, in effect as foUoweth : — 

<< The Athenians and Lacedemonians, and 
their allies, have made peace on these terms, 
and every state hath sworn to their observ- 
ance. 

" In regard to the common temples : — Per- 
mission is granted, to all who desire it, to 
sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to 
send public deputations, in the prescribed 
forms of every people, both by land and sea, 
without any molestation. 

"That the sacred soil of the temple of 
Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled 
after its own model, be taxed at its own discre- 
tion, and be administered by its own magi- 
X 



186 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



fltrates, whose detenninations to be final, Ixith 
in regard to life and property, according to the 
primitive lawa of the place. 

" That this peace continue for the space of 
fifty years, between the Athenians and the 
confederates of the Athenians, on the one side, 
and the Lacedsmonians and the confederates 
of the Lacedemonians, on the other, without 
fraud and without molestation, both at land and 
sea. 

"Be it farther unlawful for either party to 
take up arms to the detriment of the other, — 
neither the Lacedsmonians and their allies 
against the Athenians and their allies, — nor 
the Athenians and their allies against the 
Lacedsmonians and their allies, without any 
fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any 
difference intervene between the contracting 
parties, let it be adjusted according to equity, 
and upon oath, in such manner as they shall 
agree. 

« Agreed, farther, that the Lacedsmonians 
and allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athe- 
nians. 

** That, whatever cities the Lacedsmonians 
ieliver up to the Athenians^ leave be given 
to the inhabitants to remove at their own dis- 
cretion, with all their effects. 

" That the cities, which pay the assessments 
rated by Aristides, enjoy all their rights and 
privileges whatever. 

« And, be it unlawful for the Athenians 
and their allies to take up arms to the annoy- 
ance of those cities which pay that assessment, 
from the time that this treaty be in force. 
Those cities are, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, 
Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus ; these cities to 
observe a strict neutrality, forming no engage- 
ments with either Lacedsmonians or Athe- 
nians.— Provided, that, if the Athenians can 
by fair means prevail upon these cities, it be 
lawful for the Athenians to admit them con- 
federates at their own free choice. 

"That the Mecybeijieans, and Saneans, 
and Singeans, shall inhabit their own cities in 
the same manner as the Olynthians and Acan- 
thians. 

« Agreed, farther, that the Lacedsmonians 
and allies restore Panactum to the Athenians. 

« That the Athenians restore to the Lace- 
dsmonians Coryphasium,* and Cythera, and 



« This incliideR the fort of Pylus, seated on the cflpe 
of Coryphasium. 



Methone, and Pteleam, and Atalanta, end all 
the Lacedsmonians, now prisoners of th« state 
at Athens, or public prisoners, in any quutor 
soever within the dominions of Athens; and 
to give leave of departure to all the Pelopon* 
nesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the 
confederates of ' the Peloponnesians whatever 
in Scione, and to all persons whatever whoa 
Brasidas placed there. — ^This article also to 
extend to any confederates of the Lacedsmo* 
nians, now public prisoners in Athens, or 
public prisoners in any other quarter of the 
Athenian dominions. ' 

" That, in return, the Lacedsmonians ind 
allies release all the prisoners, both Atheniaai 
and confederates, which are now in their 
hands. 

" That, in regard to the Scioneans, Toro- 
neans, and Sermylians, and any other city 
belonging, of right, to the Athenians, the 
Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, 
and all the others, at their own discretion. 

** That the Athenians shall swear obsff- 
Vance to the Lacedsmonians and their allies, 
separately, according to their cities. Let hoth 
sides swear, in the mo^ solenm manner, ae* 
cording to the forms of each sepaiato state ; 
and the oath to be conceived in these words; 
— " I abide by my compacts and the present 
articles, honestly, and without equivocation^ 
Be an oath taken, to the Athenians, bj the 
Lacedsmonians and allies, to the same pur- 
port. 

« Be this oath renewed aanually hy the con- 
tracting parties. 

« Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pyth* 
at the Isthmus, and at Athens in the dtadel 
and at Lacedsmon in the Amydenm, wi4 
this treaty inscribed upon them. 

« If any point be in any manner or degree, 
for the present, through forgetfidncsB on either 
side, omitted ; or, if any thing, upon a seriew 
consultation holden, be judged more prop^- 
the Lacedsmonians and Athenitfis are to- 
powered, with all due regard to their oath^ to 
make additions and alterations, at their ]o0t 
discretions. 

« Pleistolas, presiding in the college « 
ephori, putteth this treaty in force at Sf^ 
on the twenty-seventh day of the ™<*"**^ 
misius : at Athens, AIcsus, the archon,«»** 
twenty-fiflh day of the month BI«pfc«^* 
« Those who took the oath and sacfifiwo 
I were. 



XEAM X*] 



PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 



187 



<<0n the J^ao^d^momaa Buk^-^Fleigtolas, 
Dtmagetus, Chionis; Metageaeg, Acanthus/ 
Daithus, Ischagoras, Philochardafi, Zeaxidaa, 
Anthippus, Telles, Alcinidas, Empedias, Me- 
nas, LampMlus. 

" On the Athenian, — Lampo, Isthmionicus, 
NicUs, Laches, £iUhydemus, FrocleSy Py- 
thodorosy Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Thea^ 
genes, Aristoccetes, lolcius, Timocrates, Leo, 
Lamachus^ Demosthenes." 

This treaty was perfected upon the close of 
the winter, in the first commencement of the 
spring, inunediately after the Bacchanalian 
festiyals at Athens, Ten complete years, and 
some few days over, were elapsed, since the 
£ist irruption into Attica, and an open com- 
mencement of the war. And let him that 
would be assured of the truth, compute only 
by the seasoQs of the year, and not by those 
wbo, in the contending states, were either 
archons, or, by the offices they bore, had 
events distinguished by an enumeration of 
their names. For it cannot be exactly known 
in what determinate part, whether, in the be- 
ginning or middle, or any other portion, of a. 
inagistraey, any important event occurred. 
But, if the computation proceed by summers 
And winters, which method I have observed, 
nich an inquirer will find, that these two 
halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten 
complete summers, and the same number of 
- winters, elapsed in the coarse of this first part 
of the war. 

The Lacedemonians, for to them it fell by 
k)t to make the first restitutions, released im- 
mediately what priMners th^ had in their 
hands ; and, having dee^tched Ischagoras, and 
Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quaiity of 
their ambassadoiss to the cities of Thraee, or- 
^cied Clearidas to deliver up Amphipoiis to 
^ Athenians^ and all the confederates there 
to submit to the terms of the treaty, according 
to the stipulation given for them. But this 
^y positively refused, as they judged the 
ti^ty prejudidal. Clearidas also, to ingratiate 
himself with the Chalcideans, would not de- 
liver up AmphipoUs, alleging, that, without 
their fiOAcurxence, he could not possibly do it. 
**^ Ivmself returned in person soon afler with 
^ ^mbaasadois, in order to make his defence 
at La«edn(aon, should Ischagoras accuse him 
^^w nf 4isobeyii^ orders. His view was, 
"'ther, to try if the accommodation could by 
any means be evaded. Bu^ when he found it 



fast confirmed, he posted badl^ with all spee^ 
to his government, having express orders from 
the Lacedsmonians to deliver up AmphipoUs ; 
or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all 
the Peioponnesians within thai garrison inr 
stantly to evacuate the place. 

The confederates happened, at this juncture, 
to be at Lacedsmon, where such of them, as 
had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were 
ordered by the Lacedemonians to accede to it. 
But this they positively refused, alleging the 
same reason as before; and plainly affirming, 
that << they would not come in, till better terms 
than the present were obtained for them."- 
Their remonstrance had no effect upon the 
Lacedemonians, who sent them away without 
redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance, 
offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. 
They had reason to conclude that " the Ar- 
gives would come to no agreement with them," 
since they had lately declared a negative to 
their ambassadors, Ampelidas and Lichas; 
" and yet these Argives," they judged, " could 
be no dreadful foe without the Athenians; 
and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not 
now presume to interfere, who, without this 
method ^f prevention, would certainly have 
gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian 
embassy, therefore, being at this crisis resident 
amongst them, a conference was holden, and 
the terms completely adjusted. The ratifica- 
ti<Hi was Blade by solemn oath, and the articles 
of this alliance, offeuiuve and defenoive, were 
these: 

" The Lacedsmonians enter into this alliaaee 
for the term of fifty years. — Provided that 

« If any enemy enter the territories of the 
Lecedfemonians, and commit any manner of 
hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians 
march forthwith to their succour, with all the 
possible means of redress, and with their whole 
united force. 

** And, in case such invaders cdiall have with- 
drawn (themselves, that the state under which 
they acted be declared an enemy both to the 
Lacedsmonians and the Athenians, both which 
are to join in acting offensively against that 
state, nor to lay dowvi their arms without the 
mutual consent of both the contracting states. 

" These terms to be observed with honour, 
with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever. 

« Provided, farther, that, if any enemy enter 
the territories of the Athenians, and. commit 
hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, 



188 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ▼. 



ik«»Laoedsmoiiiaii8 maich fordiwith to their 
miocoury with all the possible means of redress, 
and with their whole united force. 

« And, in case such invaders shall have with- 
drawn themselves, that the state under which 
they acted be declared an enemy both to Lace- 
dsmonians and Athenians, both which are to 
join in acting offensively against that state, 
nor to lay down their arms without the mutual 
consent of both the contracting states. 

" These terms also to be observed with 
honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud 
whatever. 

" Provided, farther, — ^That, if there happens 
any insurrection among the Helots, the Athen- 
ians march to the succour of the Lacedemonians 
with their whole strength, to the full extent of 
-their power. 

«The same persons, on both sides, shall 
swear to the observance of these articles, who 
«wore to the former. 

<*The oaths to be annually renewed; for 
which purpose, the Lacedemonians shall give 
their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian 
festival ; and the Athenians theirs at Laceds- 
mon, at the Hyacinthian. 

«Both parties to erect their pillar; one at 
Lacedsmon, near Apollo's, in the Amycleum ; 
the other at Athens, near Minerva's, in the 
eitadel. 

«And, in case the Lacedemonians and 
Athenians think proper to make any additions 
or alterations in the terms of this alliance, the 
same lawfully to be done by both, at their 
joint discretion. 

" The oath of observance was sworn, 

"On the Lacedemonian side, by ^Pleis- 
fionax, 'Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, 
Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, 
Philocharidas, ^euxidas, Anthippus,- Alcina- 
das, Telles, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. 

"On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isth- 
mlonicus. Laches^ Nicias, Euthydemus, Pro- 
cles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy- 
cles; Theagenes, Aiistocrates, lolcius, Timo- 
crates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes." 

This alliance was concluded in a veiy little 
time after the treaty of peace ; and the Athen- 
ians now released to the Lacedemonians their 
Spartans, who were made prisoners at Sphac- 
teria. The summer also of the eleventh year 



1 The kings sign this aUiance, but jdid not sign the 
Ibrmer treaty. 



was now begun ; and so hi ^e transactioiis of 
these first ten years of this war, closely carried 
on, have been regularly compiled. 

TEAS XI.' 

After the treaty of peace and the alliance^ 
offensive and defensive, between the Lacede- 
monians and Athenians ; both which were con- 
cluded after Uie ten years' war, at the time 
when Pleistolas presided in the college of 
Ephori at Sparta, and Alceus was Archon at 
Athens; the peace became in force amongst 
the acceding parties. But the Corinthians 
and some of the Peloponnesian states were 
endeavouring the overthrow of all these pro- 
ceedings : hnd immediately there arose another 
great combustion, amongst the confederates, 
against Lacedemon. More than this, as time 
advanced, the Lacedemonians became susp^rted 
by the Athenians, as they showed no great 
punctuality in executing the conditions of the 
peace. For the space of six years and ten 
months, they refrained indeed from entering 
one another's territory in a hostile manner; 
but, during such a correspondence which abotind- 
ed in suspicions, they were, in all other re- 
spects, active in a reciprocal annoyance. And 
at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty con- 
cluded at the ten years' period, they engaged 
afresh in open war. 

The same Thucydides, an Athenian, hath 
also compiled an account of these latter trans- 
actions in a regular series, according to the 
summers and winters, down to that period of 
time when the Lacedemonians and their allies 
put an end to the empire of Athens, and be- 
came masters of the long walls and the Pireus. 
The whole continuance of the war to this 
period was twenty-seven years. And, if any 
man be inclined to think that this intervening 
accommodation should not be reckoned as war, 
he will find no arguments to support his opin- 
ion : for, let him only survey the transactions 
as they are distinctly related, and he will find 
it an absurdity to pronounce that an interval o( 
peace, in which neither all the restitutions were 
made, nor the benefits obtained, which the 
mutual stipulations required. And, setting 
these considerations aside, in the Mantinean 
and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions 
were committed on both sides. The conlbde- 

« Before Christ 4S1. 



XI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



189 



BLt«8 also of Thrace continued still to be as 
Teat enemies as ever. And the Boeotians 
levcr agreed to more than a bare cessation of 
Tins, renewable every tenth day. 

Including, therefore, the first war which last- 
rd ten years, and that suspicious interval which 
iixsued, and ended at last in a second open 
xipture, the whole continuance, if computed 
>y summers and winters, will turn out, upon in- 
quiry, to have been so many years, and some 
few additional days. And such as laid stress 
upon the predictions of oracles can assent only 
to this computation as genuine. For my own 
part, I perfectly well remember that, not only 
at the commencement, but even during the 
^pvliole course of the war, many such predictions 
vrere given out, that " it must needs continue 
three times nine years.'' I also lived throagh its 
vsrhole extent, in the very flower of my under- 
standing and strength, and with a close appli- 
cation of my thoughts, to gain an exact insight 
into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot 
to suffer a twenty years* exile from my country 
after my employment in the business of Am- 
phipolis, and to be present at the transactions 
of both parties, and not the least of those of the 
Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banish- 
ment ; by which means I had leisure to gather 
more ample informations about them. I shall 
relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the 
treaty, subsequent to the first ten years, and 
the incidents of the war which afterwards 
ensued. 

Upon the conclusion of the treaty of peace 
for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the 
embassies from the different states of Pelo- 
ponnesus, who had been summoned thither to 
give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedae- 
mon. The rest of them indeed went directly 
home ; but the Corinthians, stopping in their 
return at Argos, began first, at a conference 
with some of the magistracy there, to insinuate 
"that since the Lacedaemonians, not in order 
to serve but to enslave Peloponnesus, had en- 
tered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive 
^d defensive, with their once most inveterate 
*he Athenians, it highly behoved the Ar- 
" to watch over the preservation of 
and to form a public resolution, 
Nin state, which is free and 
>ioyeth and supporteth an 
"* privil^es, might en- 



Bi 
thf 



/ 



ive and defensive, 
^uard of their mu- 



tual properties against their common foe? *- 
This to be communicated only to the few who 
were absolute masters of the decisions of each 
state, and every where to shun all conference 
with the bulk of the people, lest the scheme 
/night be detected, in case the multitude should 
refuse their concurrence." They assured them, 
that the majority of the states were so exas- 
perated against the Lacedaemonians, that they 
would infallibly come in. And, after suggest- 
ing such a course, the Corinthians also return- 
ed home. 

The persons at Argos who had listened to 
these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the 
next place, to the whole magistracy and people 
of Argos. The Argives resolved accordingly, 
and elected a committee of twelve, with whom 
such Grecians as desired it might agree upon 
an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians 
excepted. Neither of these states were per- 
mitted to treat with the Argives, without the 
public consent of the whole people. 

The Argives were the more readily per- 
suaded to such a measure as they plainly saw a 
war was unavoidable between themselves and 
the Lacedaemonians; for the truce between 
them was on the point of expiring. They 
were also animated by the hope of gaining into 
their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. 
For at this juncture of time, Lacedaemon lay 
under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into 
utter contempt upon ' account of their late 
disasters ; whereas the Argives were in the 
high vigour of their strength in all respects, as 
they had never interfered in the Attic war; 
and, having observed an exact neutrality with 
both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. 
The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited 
those Grecians who were willing to enter into 
their alliance. 

The Mantineans and allies were the first 
who, out of a dread of the Lacedaemonians, ac- 
cepted the proposal. For these Mantineans, 
in the heat of the war against the Athenians, 
had seized and appropriated to themselves a 
certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedae- 
mon, and now concluded that the Lacedaemo- 
nians would never leave them in the quiet pos- 
session of it, when they were at liberty to act 
for its recovery. This readily induced them to 
have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded 
by them as a powerful state, which had ever 
been at variance with Lacedaemon, and, like 
their own, was democratical. 
x2 



190 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



V. 



No sooner had the Mantineans revolted, 
than the rest of Peloponnesus began to matter 
that ** they ought aJso to take the same step/' 
imagining that revolt to have been foimded up- 
on some stronger reasons than yet appeared ; 
exasperated also against the Lacedemonians for 
sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in 
the peace with Athens, — ^that, << in case the two 
states of Lacedsmon and Athens think proper to 
make any additions or alterations, the same to 
belawful." For this was the clause which gave 
the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspir- 
ed a jealousy that the Lacedemonians might 
strike up a bargain with the Athenians to en- 
slave the other states : since, in justice, no al- 
teration ought to be made without the concur- 
rence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed, 
therefore, at these proceedings, many of them 
made instant application to the Argives, exert- 
ing their several endeavours to obtain their alli- 
ance. 

But the Lacedemonians, perceiving what a 
combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, prin- 
cipally owing to the insinuations of the Corinth- 
ians, who were also going to enter into this 
league with Argos, they despatch ambassadors 
to Corinth from a desire to prevent what 
might ensue. Here they represented to 
them, — " how criminal their conduct had been, 
in having thus originally fomented the present 
tumult ; and that, in case they abandoned the 
Lacedemonians and went over to the Argive 
league," they assured them, that, " by such a 
step, they must break the most sacred oaths; 
injustice they had already committed in refus- 
ing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pur- 
suant to old stipulations between them, what- 
ever a majority of the confederates resolved 
was to be binding on all, unless some god or 
hero enjoined a dissent." But the Corinthians, 
in the presence of all those of the confederacy 
who had not accepted the peace, and whose at- 
tendance they had previously invited, replied to 
the Lacedemonians without entering into a 
particular detail of the injuries they had done 
them, in not covenanting with the Athenians 
for the restitution of Solium, or Anactorium, 
or any other point in which they thought them- 
selves aggrieved ;^ but speciously pretending, 
that *' they could never abandon their allies in 
Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were 
bound to support ; oaths which they had sever- 
ally sworn when they first revolted in concert 
with the Potideans, and had on other occasions 



since renewed:" arguing from hence that 
«they could not have violated thie common 
oath of the confederates in refusing their ac- 
cession to the Athenian peace, since, as they 
had sworn upon the faith of the gods to the 
former, they could not betray them vrith- 
out the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, in- 
deed, ran thus : unless some god or hero en- 
joined a dissent : — ^theur present dissent, there- 
fore, appeared to them to be a divine injunc- 
tion." So far they argued from their former 
oaths ; and, in regard to the alliance offisnsive 
and defensive with Argos, — " They would hold 
consultations with their friends, and take such 
steps as were expedient and just." And iwith 
this answer the Lacedemonian ambassadors de- 
parted home. An Argive embassy happened 
also at the same time to be at Corinth, ivho 
pressed the Corinthians to enter into their 
leagfue without any farther hesitation. They 
desired them to attend, at the next public 
meeting they held, for a final answer. 

There arrived soon after an embassy from 
the Eleans, who made, in the first place, an 
alliance offensive and defensive with the Cor- 
inthians ; and then from Corinth repairing- to 
Argos, became allies of the Argives, according^ 
to the scheme pre-established for this purpose ; 
for a misund^Rstanding had arisen between tLem 
and the Lacedemonians about Lepreum. In a 
former war of the Lepreate against a province 
of Arcadia, die Eleans had been prevailed upon 
to join the Lepreate for a moiety of the land 
that should be conquered ; and, at the c<mcla- 
sion of the war, the Eleans left all the land in 
the management of the Lepreate, subject to 
the annual tribute of a talent^ to Olympian 
Jove. This was regularly paid till the Athen- 
ian war; but, that war being then made a 
pretence of its discontinuance, the Eleans 
would have exacted it by force. The others 
had recourse to the Lacedemonians. The 
dispute was referred to the Lacedemonian ar- 
bitration; but the Eleans, taking up a sus- 
picion that they should not have justice, would 
not abide the reference, bat began to ravage the 
territory of the Lepreate. The Lacedemoni- 
ans, notwithstanding this, proceeded to a sen- i 
tence : — that << the Lepreate were masters of 
their own conduct, and that the Eleans were 
guilty of injustice :" and, as the latter weuUi 
not abide by their arbitration, they tfaiow * 

1 X193 15». sterling. 



ITEAR XI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



191 



garrison of hea^>armed into Lepreum ; but 
the E leans, regarding this step as the recep- 
tion of a city by the Lacedsemonians which had 
revolted from them, and alleging the treaty in 
which it was stipulated, — that, " of whatever 
places the parties were possessed upon the 
commencement of the Attic war, the same 
they should continue to hold at its expiration,'' 
as if they had met with injustice, they revolt 
to the Argives; and the Eleans entered into 
that league offensive and defensive, as hath been 
sflready related. 

The Corinthians soon followed their ex- 
ample, and with the Chalcideans also of 
Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the 
Boeotians and Megareans, though they had 
threatened the same thing, thought proper to 
drop it. They had been ill used by the Lace- 
dsemonians, but judged however that the demo- 
cracy of the Argives would be less compatible 
with their interests, whose form of government 
was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacede- 
monians. 

About the same time of this summer, the 
Athenians, becoming masters of the Scioneans 
after a long blockade, put all who were able to 
bear arms to the sword, and made their wives 
and children slaves, and gave the land to be 
cultured by the Platieans. 

They also again brought back the Delians 
to Delos ; induced to it by the many defeats 
they had suffered in battle, and the express or- 
acle of the god at Delphi. 

The Fhocians also and Locrians began about 
this time to make war upon one another. 

And now the Corinthians and Argives, 
united in league, go together to Tegea, to per- 
suade its revolt from the Lacedsemonians. 
They saw it was a large district ; and, in case 
they compassed its accession, they imagined 
the whole of Peloponnesus would be tit their 
beck. But, when the Tegeatae declared, that 
« they would in no shape oppose the Lacedse- 
monians," the Corinthians, who till now had 
acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal 
for contention, and began to fear that no more 
of the states would come in. They proceeded, 
however, to the Boeoteans, and solicited them 
« to accede to the league between themselves 
and Argives, and to co-operate with them for 
the common welfare."^— And, as there were 
truces for ten days between the Athenians and 
Boeotians, which were agreed upon soon after 
the peace for fifly years was made, the Corin- 



thians now pressed the Boeotians << to accoin- 
pany them to Athens, and solicit for traces of 
the same nature for them; but, in case the 
Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce 
the suspension of arms, and for the future never 
to treat without their concurrence." The 
Boeotians, thus solicited by tlie Corinthians, 
desired a longer time to consider about their 
accession to the Argive league. To Athens, 
indeed, they bore them company, but could not 
obtain the ten days* truces : for the Athenians 
answered, — "The Corinthians have a peace 
already, if they are confederates of the Lace- 
dsemonians." And, upon the whole, the Boeo- 
tians absolutely refused to renounce their own 
truces, though the Corinthians insisted upon it, 
and urged, with some warm expostulations, 
that it had been so covenanted between them. 
So there was only a mere cessation of arms be- 
tween the Corinthians and Athenians, without 
any solenm ratification. 

This same summer, the Lacedsemonians took 
the field with their whole united force, under 
the command of Pleistionax, the son of Pau- 
sanias, king of the Ls^cedsemonians, and marched 
to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were 
subject to the Mantineans, and, in consequence 
of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But 
it was also designed, if possible, to demolish 
the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans 
had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrha- 
sia, towards the skirts of Laconia, had placed 
a garrison in it. The Lacedsemonians, there- 
fore, ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. 
But the Mantineans, leaving their own city to 
the guard of the Argives, marched themselves 
to the support of their dependents. But, find- 
ing it impossible to preserve the fortress of 
Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they 
retired. The Lacedsemonians also, when they 
had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demo- 
lished the fortress, withdrew their forces. 

The same summer also, upon the return 
from Thrace of those soldiers who had served 
under Brasidas, and who came home after the 
peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the 
Lacedsemonians decreed " those Helots, who 
had served under Brasidas, to be free, and 
to have permission to reside wherever they 
pleased." And, no long time after, they placed 
them together with such persons as were new- 
ly enfranchised, at Lepreum : it is situated 
between Laconia and Elea ; and they were 
now at variance with the Eleans. As for 



192 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book y. 



thpfle Spartans who had been made prisoners 
in Sphacteria, and had dielivered up their arms, 
conceiving some fears about them, lest, should 
ihey lay their late disgrace too much to heart, 
as they were persons of the greatest rank, they 
might introduce some innovations in the state, 
they declared them infamous, even though 
some of the number were, at this time, pos- 
sessed of posts in the government. But this 
infamy extended no farther than to disqualify 
them from offices, and from buying and selling. 
Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again 
restored to their full privileges. 

The same summer also the Dictideans took 
Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and 
confederate with the Athenians. 

Through the whole course of the summer, 
the communication was open between the Pe- 
loponncsians and Athenians. Not but that the 
Athenians and Lacedemonians began to be 
jealous of one another immediately after the 
peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places 
was not punctually performed. For^ though 
it had fallen to the Lacedsmonians' lot to begin 
these restitutions, yet they had not restored 
Amphipolis and other cities. They had com- 
pelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor 
the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept 
the peace, always pretending, that, « should 
they refuse it, they were ready to join with the 
Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they 
limited to them a time, though not by a regular 
written notice, " within which, such as did not 
accede were declared enemies to both." The 
Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these 
points were put in actual execution, became 
jealous of the Lacedsmonians, as men who 
acted insincerely in every step; insomuch, 
that, when Pylus was re-demanded, they re- 
fused its restitution, and heartily repented that 
they had released the prisoners taken at Sphac- 
teria. They also kept possession of other places, 
and intended to do so, till the other side had 
performed their engagements. But the Lace- 
dsmonians alleged « they had done every thing 
in their power; that, for instance, they had 
released such Athenians as were prisoners 
amongst them^ had recalled their soldiers from 
Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of 
the execution, had performed it. As to Am- 
phipolis," they said, "they were not 60 far 
masters of it as to make an actual surrender. 
They had omitted no endeavours to bring the 
Boeotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to 



recover the disposal of Panactam, and to obtaiB 
the dismission of those Athenians who were 
prisoners of war in Boeotia. Pylus, however," 
they insisted, " should immediately be restored 
to them; at least that the Messcniana and 
Helots should be withdrawn, as their people 
had been from Thrace; and then the Athe- 
nians, if they pleased, might continue to gar- 
rison that fortress themselves." Many meetings 
were held, and much argumentation passed 
between them this summer ; and, at last, thej | 
prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw froa 
Pylus the Messenians and others, as well He- 
lots as all deserters whatever, out of Laconia. 
These they transplanted to Crania of Cephal- 
lene. This summer, therefore, was a season 
of inaction, and the intercourse was open be- 
tween them. 

In the ensuing winter, — for other ephori 
were in office, as the authority of those under 
whom the peace was made was now expired, 
and some who were averse to the peace bad 
succeeded— embassies attending from the whol* 
confederacy, the Athenians, and Boeotians, and 
Corinthians also being present, and after much 
reciprocal altercation, coming to no regular 
agreement, the rest of them separated to then 
own homes without effect. But Cleobulus and 
Xenares, those two of the ephori who were 
most inclined to dissolve the peace, detained 
the Boeotians and Corinthians for a private 
conference. In this they exhorted them "to 
act unanimously in promotion of their scaeme, 
in pursuance of which the Boeotians should 
first make themselves a party in the Argi« 
league, and then employ their good offices to 
form an alliance between the Argives m 
Laceuxmonians : for, by these methods, tw 
BcBotians could least of aU be necessitated to 
take part in the Attic peace ; as the Laccdas- 
monians would prefer the renewal of ftiendship 
and alliance with the Argives to the enmity w 
the Athenians and the dissolution of m 
peace ; since, to their certain knowledge, the 
Lacedaemonians had ever been desirous to haw 
the friendship of Argos, consistently withtbeff 
honour ; knowing it would faciUtate the su^ 
of their war without Peloponne8US."--W 
also requested the Bceotians ^ to deliver up 
Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, that, ' 
changing it if possible for Pylus, ^^J.'^^ 
get clear of the main obstacle to a ftesh lup 
with the Athenians." ^ 

The Boeotians and Corinthians, instf^^ 



XT.J 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



193 



by Xexiares and Cleobultts and flie party in 
their inteireat at Lacedsmon, departed, both, to 
report this scheme to their principals. But 
two persons, in the greatest authority in the 
state of Argos, were attending upon the road 
for their return. They met, and conferred 
with them *< about the means of gaining the 
concurrence of the Boeotians in this league, 
upon the same footing with the Corinthians, 
and Eleans, and Mantineans: for they were 
confident, were this point once completed, 
they might easily become the arbiters of war or 
peace, either in relation to the Lacedemonians, 
(if they so determined, and would act together 
with firm unanimity,) or to any other state 
whatever." 

The Boeotian ambassadors wdre highly de- 
lighted with this discourse. The solicitations 
of these Argives happened to coincide with the 
instructions recommended to them by their 
friends at Lacedasmon. And the Argives, find- 
ing them satisfied with their, motion, assured 
them ihey would send ambassadors to the 
Boeotians, and so they parted. 

But the Boeotians, at their return, reported 
to the rulers of Boeotia the proposals from 
Lacedsmon, and tiiose fi'om the Argives upon 
the road. The Boeotian rulers were delighted, 
and grew now more zealous than ever ; because, 
on both sides, from their Lacedsmonian friends, 
and also from the Argives, the solicitations 
were concurrent And, very soon after, the 
Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the des- 
patch of the treaty. The Boeotian rulers, how- 
ever, at present, gave only a verbal, approbation 
of the scheme, and then dismissed them, pro- 
mising to send an embassy of their own to Ar- 
gos, to perfect the alliance. 

But, in the meantime, it was judged to be 
previously expedient, tbat the Boeotian rulers, 
and the Corinthians, and the Mcgareans, and 
the ambassadors from the allies of Thrace, 
«hould mutually interchange their oaths, « to 
act in support of one another, if upon any occa- 
sion such support might be requisite, and to 
enter neither into war nor peace without joint 
consent ;" and then the Boeotians and Mega- 
reans (for these acted in union) to form a league 
with the Argives, bat before such exchange of 
oaths, the Boeotian rulers communicated the 
whole ef the plan to the four Boeotian councils, 
in whom the sovereignty is lodged ; recom- 
jpiending it, as worthy their confirmation, that 
« whatever cities were willing might mutually 
32 



interchange such oaths for tiieir reciprocal 
advantage." Yet the Boeotians who composed 
the councils refused a confirmation ; apprehen- 
sive it might tend to embroil them with the 
Lacedemonians, should they pledge such an 
oath to the Corinthians, who were now aban- 
doning tiie Lacedemonian interest : for the ru- 
lers had not made them privy to the scheme 
from' Lacedemon, how, « Xenarcs and Cleo- 
bulus, of the college of Ephori, and their 
friends, advise them, to enter first into league 
with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to 
extend it to the Lacedemonians." They had 
presumed that the supreme council, though they 
secreted these lights, would not resolve against 
a plan which themselves had pre-digested and 
recommended to them. But now, as tbis affair 
took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and am- 
bassadors from Thrace went home without eS- 
feet ; and the Boeotian rulers, who had all along 
intended, in case their scheme had passed to per- 
fect an alliance with the Argives, made no far- 
ther report to the councils in relation to the Ar- 
gives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence 
of their promise, but sufiered the whole plan to 
sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern. 

In this same winter the Olynthians, after a 
sudden assault, took Mecybeme, which was gar- 
risoned by Athenians. 

After the former proceedings, — for. confer- 
ences were still continued between the Athe- 
nians and- Lacedemonians about those places- 
they held from one another, — ^the Lacedemoni- 
ans, conceiving some hope that, if the Atheni- 
ans could recover Panactum from the Boeoti- 
ans, {hey also might regain Pylus, addressed 
themselves in solemn embassy to the Boeotians, 
and importuned them to deliver up Panactum 
and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return 
might get Pylus from them. B at the Boeotians 
persisted in a refusal, unless they would make 
a separate alliance with them, as they had done 
with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacede- 
monians, though convinced that such a step 
would be injustice to the Atiienians,— since it 
had been stipulated that, *< without joint con- 
sent, they should neither make peace nor war," 
— ^yet,' bent on the recovery of Panactum, that 
they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at 
the same time amongst them, who were medi- 
tating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Boeotian « 
interest, made the requisite alliance in the very 
close of this winter on the approach of sprinfj. 
The consequence was, that Panactum was im- 



194 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



mediately levelled with the gnround; and the 
eleventh year of the war was brought to a eon- 
clnaion* 

TSAB XII.* 

Early in the spring of that summer which 
was now approaching, the Argives, — ^when the 
expected embassy from Bccotia was not arrived 
in pursuance of promise, when they found that 
Panactum was demolished, and a separate alli- 
ance struck up between the Boeotians and 
Lacedsmonians,— began to fear they should 
be totally abandoned, and that their whole con- 
federacy would go over to the Lacedemonians. 
They concluded that, through the prevalence 
of the Lacedsemonian arguments, the Boeotians 
had been persuaded to level Panactum and 
accede to the treaty made with Athens, and 
that the Athenians were privy to all these steps ; 
and so, of consequence, they themselves were 
now utterly excluded from an alliance with the 
Athenians, and their former hopes entirely 
blasted, that, in case disputes should arise, and 
their treaty with the Lacedemonians not be re- 
newed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining 
the Athenian alliance. The Argives, there- 
fore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread 
of being attacked at once by the Lacedsmoni- 
ans and Tegeatae, by the Boeotians and Athe- 
nians, as they had formerly refused an accom- 
modation with the Lacedaemonians, and had 
grasped in thought at the spvereignty of Pelo- 
ponnesus ; — the Argives, I say, had no longer 
one moment to lose, but despatched instantly 
Eustrophus and ^Eson, whom they judged to 
be persons most agreeable there, in embassy 
to Lacedsmon. They now judged it their 
interest to procure the best peace which the 
present posture of affairs would allow from the 
Lacedemonians, and then quietly to attend the 
event of things. In this view, the ambassadors 
on their arrival had a conference with the La- 
cedemonians about the terms of a peace ; and 
at first the Argives insisted, that «to some 
state or private person should be referred, for 
equitable arbitration, the controversy between 
them about the district of Cynuria ;*' concern- 
ing which, as it is frontier to both, they are 
eternally at variance; in this district stands 
, the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the 
possession of it is in the hands of the Lacede- 



Before Cbrist 420. 



monians. But, at length, when the Lacedas* 
monians would not suffer any mention to be 
made of this, declaring only, that, « were tbej 
willing to renew the former truce, they should 
find, them complying,'' the Argive ambassadors, 
however, prevailed upon the Lacedsemonians 
to agree to these proposals : that, « for the 
present, a peace should be concluded for the 
term of fifty years ; provided, notwithstanding, 
that liberty remain to either party to send a 
challenge, when n«ther was embarrassed by 
plague or war, and the right of this district be 
then decided by arms between Lacedaenaon and 
Argos, as had formerly been done^ when the 
victory was equally claimed on both sides : and 
that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the 
pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos 
or Lacedemon." These proposab, it is true, 
appeared at first to the Lacedemonians to be 
foolish : but, at length, as their necessary in- 
terest made them vastly desirous of the Argive 
friendship, they complied with the demand, and 
the terms agreed on were digested into writing. 
But the Lacedemonians, before they put the 
last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previ- 
ous return to Argos, and reporting it to the 
people ; and, in case the ratification was given, 
to repair again to Lacedemon, at the Hyacin- 
thian festival, and swear observance. And upon 
this they returned to Argos. 



a Herodotas relates this remarkable piece of history 
in Clio. " They had a conference," says he, ^* and came i 
to an agreement, that three hundred men on each side 
should decide the point by combat, and the land con- 
tested should remain the propeity of the victors ; tbat 
both armies in the meantime should retire within their 
respective dominions, nor be present at the combat, iest 
by being spectators of it, either of them, seeing their 
countrymen defeated, might run to their assistance. 
When articles were settled, both armies drew off; those 
selected on each side for the combat staid behind and 
engaged. They fought ii out with equal resolution and 
fortune : of six hundred men only three were leA alive, 
two of them Argives, Alcinor and Chromius; and one 
Lacedemonian, Othryades ; these were all the sarrivors 
when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran ia 
haste to Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedemonians, 
having stripped the dead bodies of the Argives, and 
carried off* their arms to the place where his own side 
had encamped, continued upon the field of battle. Next 
morning both parties came to learn the event; and 
then, truly, each party also claimed the victory : one 
averring, that a majority survived on their side ; the 
other maintaining, t(iat even those had fled, whilst their 
own combatant had Icept his ground and spoiled the 
dead. In short, from wrangling they came again to 
blows and a general engagement ; in which, after freat 
slaughter on both sides, the Lacedamoniaiis obtaJoed 
the victory." 



xn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



195 



^Tiilgt the Argives were employed in this 
neg^otiotion, the Lacedemonian ambassadorsi 
Andromenesy and Phsdimus, and Antimenidas, 
^vlio were commissioned to receive Panactum 
stud the prisoners of war from the Boeotians, 
and deliver them over into the hands of the 
A-tlieniansy found, upon their arrival, that 
Panactum was already demolished by the Bceo- 
tians, upon pretext that, " in former times, upon 
occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had 
1>een taken by the Athenians and Boeotians, 
that neither should inhabit that place, excluding 
the other, but should jointly possess it ;" but 
'what Athenian prisoners of war were in the 
hands of the Boeotians were delivered up to 
Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried 
and released them to the Athenians. They 
also reported the demolition of Panactum, de- 
claring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as 
no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for 
the future. 

These words were no sooner heard than the 
A thenians conceived the deepest resentments. 
They thought themselves injured by the Lace- 
dsemonians, not only in the demolition of Pan- 
actum, which ought to have been restored stand- 
ings, but also in the separate alliance made lately 
w^ith the Boeotians, of which they now had no- 
tice, in open contradiction to their own declara- 
tion, « of joining them to compel by force such 
as would not accede to the treaty." They re- 
flected also upon other points in which the en- 
g^ements of the treaty had been in no wise 
fulfilled, and concluded themselves over- 
reached. For these reasons they gave a rough 
answier to the ambassadors, and an instant dis- 
mission. 

Upon so much umbrage, taken by the Athe- 
nians against the Lacedsmonians, such persons 
at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, 
set themselves instantly at work to accomplish 
their views. Others were labouring the same 
point, but none more than Alcibiades, the son 
of Clinias ;* a person, in respect of age, even 

^ Alcibiades is bore beginning his political intrigues, 
to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising 
genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles was bis 
near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and 
guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions 
toon gained the ascendant over him; and he plunged 
into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense appli- 
cation and flexible address, to all persons and all occa- 
sions, which surprised the world; ** more changeable 
ttaan a cameleon, as Plutarch eipresseth it, since that 
creatvre cannot put on a fair or white appearance." His 
ebaracter is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and 



then but a youth ; at least he would have passed 
for such in the other states, though, for the 
dignity of his birth, he was much honoured and 
caressed. It seemed to him the most expedient 
step to form a good understanding with the 
Argives. Not but that his opposition to other 
measures was the result of his ambition and a 
study of contention, because the Lacedemonians 
had employed their interest in Nicias and 
Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting bis as- 
sistance upon account of his youth, nor paying 
him the deference he expected from the ancient 
hospitality between that state and the family 
from which he was descended. This, indeed, 
his grandfather had renounced ; but he himself, 
in the view of renewing it, had shown extraor- 
dinary civilities to the Spartans who were made 
prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself^ 
therefore, in all respects slighted, at this crisis 
he began openly to oppose them : he affirmed,' 
that ** the Lacedsmonians were a people who 
could not be trusted; that they had treacher- 
ously entered into the peace in order to divert 
the Argives from their alliance, that again they 
might attack the Athenians when left alone/* 
Nay, farther ; upon the first dissatisffliction be-- 
tween them, he secretly despatcheth his emissa- 
ries to Argos, exhorting them « at his invitation, 
to come to Athens, in company with the Man- 
tineans, and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, 
since opportunity favoured, and his whole inte- * 
rest should be exerted in their support'' 

The Argives, having heard these sugges- 
tions, and being now convinced that the Boeo- 
tian separate alliance had been made without 
the privity of the Athenians, who, on the con* 
trary, were highly discontented at the Laceds- 

masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos : " Nature, says he, 
seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alcibiades. 
It is agreed, by all writers who have made him the sub- 
ject of tbeir pens, that a more extraordinary man never 
lived, either for virtues or vices. Bom in a most noble 
republic, of a most honourable family, by far the hand- 
somest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of 
address; he was a commander that made the greatest 
figure both by land and sea; an orator whom none 
could surpass; nay, his manner and matter, when he 
spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions re- 
quired, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, 
generous; splendid in all his outward appearance, and 
at his table; full oi affability, proAise of civility, and of 
the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigen- 
cies of time; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and 
when business no longer required him to keep his fa- 
culties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, 
and intemperate. The whole world was astonished 
that so vast an nnlilceness, and so diflTerent a nature, 
should be united in the same person." 



196 



PELOPONNESIAN WAIL 



[bock r. 



took no fiurdier notice of 
duir embassy &t Lacedgmon, though sent ex- 
pressly there to negotiate an accommodation, 
hot recalled all their attention ftom thence to 
the Athenians. Tb^ reflected, that Athens, 
a state which from long antiquity had been 
their friend, which was gOYcmed by a democra- 
cy in the same manner as their own, and which 
was possessed of a great power at sea, could 
most effectually support them in case a war 
should break out against them. In short, they 
lost no time in despatching their ambassadors to 
Ae Athenians to propose an alliance, who were 
accompanied by embassies from the Eleans and 
Manttneans. 

A Lacedemonian embassy also arrived in 
great haste, composed of Philocharidas, and 
LeoB, and Endins, persons who were judged 
most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid 
lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resents 
ments, should clap up an alliance with the Ar- 
gives. They sent also by them a demand of 
the restitution of Pylus, in lieu of Panactum, 
and excuses for the separate alliance they had 
made with the Boeotians, <* which had been 
concluded without any design of prejudicing 
the Athenians." Upon these points they spoke 
before the senate,* notifying at the same time 

1 The Lacedemonian embassy have, on this occasion, 
their first audieace from the senate. The bus iness of 
this history both been hitherto transacted in the assem- 
bly of the people: for, as the generals of the state were 
the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of 
convening the people at their own discretion, all points 
that required a speedy determination were brought be- 
fore the people in the first instance; and the influence of 
the senate, which operated in ordinary occasions, was 
checked and suspended in time of war, which starts 
many extraordinary oecaslons, or left it in the will of 
the generals of the state to call and treat as extraordin- 
ary whatever they pleased. By these means the people 
had engrossed the power, the balanee which Solon de- 
signed always to reserve was in a great measure lost, 
and the aristooratieal influence was quite suspended. 

As, therefore, the popular assembly had its note at 
first selling out, the form and constitution of the senate 
now require an explanation.— At this time it consisted 
of fi«re hundred persons, and for that reason is often 
styled the .council of five hundred, and sometimes by 
Thocydides, the council of the bean, from the manner of 
their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each 
tribe returned the names of their members who were 
qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The 
names were engravedoa jrieeesof brass, aad cast Into a 
vessel; the same number of beans were east into kbp- 
other vessel, fifty of which were- white aa# the rest 
btafCk. They then proceeded to draw out a name atad a 
beaa, and the persons to wham the white beans wne 
drawn became the senatorsof the year. Baeb senator 



lliat <«<hey were oome wHll fUU pow»r fo pat 
an' end to all dispntes;*' by which they give 
some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they 
make the same declaration before the assembly 
of the people, ^t might have an influ^ce upon 
the multitude, and an alliance with the Ar- 
givcs might prove abortive. 

But Alcibiades now contriveth fo baffle 
them by art. He prevailcth upon tlie Lacede- 
monians, by solemnly pledging his fiiith to 
them, that « in case they would disown, before 
the people, the full powers with which they 
were invested, he would engage for the resti- 
tution of Pylus; for he himself would then 
persuade the Athenians to it, with aa mn^ 
zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get aO 
other points adjusted to their satisfaction." 
His view in acting thus was to detach them 
from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of in- 
veighing against them, in the assembly of the 
people, as men who had nothing sincere in their 
intentions, and whose profesaonswere dissonant 
with themselves ; and so to perfect an alliance 
with the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans* 
And this artifice in the sequel took effect : far, 
when they were admitted to an audience before 
the people, and replied to the demand, when 
put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, 
that « they had no such powers,'* the Athe- 
nians in an instant lost all patience. And 

had a drachms, that is, aevMipence three farthings, a 
day for his salary. 

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown 
into a vessel, and into another nine black beansrand one 
white one; the tribe, to whose name the white bean 
was drawn, took the first course of pttfrideaey for a 
tenth partof the year, and the order of the succeeding 
course was determined in the same manner by the bean. 
How the fifty in course were again subdivided into tens, 
and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day, hath 
been already explained, in the nouon the popular as* 
sembly, Book I. 

The senate sat every day in the prytaneum, or state 
house, where the presidents had also their diet. They 
were the grand council of state, took into comdderation 
nil tlie affairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted 
by beans; and whatever determinations were thus made 
in the senate were afterwards carried down to the as- 
sembly of the people, to be ratified and passed into laws. 
By Solon's original constitution, nothing wutto be pro> 
posed to the people liefOTe it had been canvassed and ap- 
proved in the senate: borthis seems to have beea etaded 
by the generals of the state, who had all the mllitaiy 
business i» their dspartttient, aad a power to eoaveae 
the people at their pleasare,anid lay ttatt^is belbie tH&m 
in thefisst instance. Toresiore thearisioemtieal power, 
and reduce that of the people, occasioned a nsurpatieB 
and sad confusion in Athens, as wOI bs ssea in tfte 
eighth book of this history. 



xn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



197 



noir, Aletbiades roaring out aloud against the 
Lfaoedfimomana with much more vehemence 
thatai he had ever done before, they listened 
gi ce d ily to all he said, and were ready instantly 
to call in the Argivcs and their companions, 
and to make them confederates. But the 
sbock of an earthquake being felt before any 
thing could be formally concluded, the assembly 
"WBB adjourned. 

At the next day's assembly, Nicias, — though 
the Lacedsmonians had been thus over-reached, 
and he himself ensnared by their public ac- 
knowledgment that they had no full powers, 
— spoke, however, on the Lacediemoniah side, 
insisting <<on the necessity of maintaining a 
good correspondence with them, and defer- 
ring all agreement with the Argives, till they 
could send to the Lacedemonians, and be dis- 
tinctly informed of their final resolutions." — 
« It maketh," said he, « for your credit, but for 
their disgrace, diat a war should be averted : 
for, as your afiairs aie in a happy posture, it 
is above all things elligible for you to preserve 
your prosperity unimpaired , but they in their 
present low situation, should put all to hazard 
in the hopes of r^ress.'* He carried it, in 
short, that ambassadors should be despatched, 
he himself to be one in the commission, " ear- 
nestly to require of the Lacedsemonians, that, 
if their intentions were honest^ they should 
surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis ; 
and should, £tfther, renounce the alliance mth 
the Boeotians, in case they still refused to ac- 
oedo to the peace ; — ^tlus in pursuance of the 
article, that < neither should make peace with- 
out joint consent.'" They ordered it to be 
added farther, that «they themselves, could 
they have deigned to act unjustly, had con- 
cluded before this an alliance with the Argives, 
as they were already attending and soliciting 
such a measure." And, having subjoined their 
instructions in relation to all other points in 
which they thought themselves aggrieved, they 
sent away the ambassadors in commission along 
with Nicias. These being arrived, and having 
reported their instructions, added, in conclu- 
sion, that, « unless they would renounce their 
alliance with the Bosotians, if still refusing 
their accession to the peace, they would admit 
the Argives and their associates into league." 
The Laeedemenians replied, «ffaey would 
■ever renounce their alliance widi tiie Bcao^ 
tiaas:'' for the party of Xenares the E^^horus, 
and aU those who acted in the same combina- 



tion, had still the majority: however, at the 
request of Nicias, they renewed the oaths. 
Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart 
without settling any one point of his com* 
mission, and of falling under public censare, 
(which really came /to pass,) as undoubted au* 
thor of the peace with the Lacedamonians. 
And when, upon his return, the Athenians 
had heard that no one point was. adjusted at 
Lacedaemon, they immediately conceived the 
warmest indignation ; and, looking upon them- 
selves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing 
the Argives and their associates, who were stili 
at Athens, they entered into treaty and an 
alliance offensive and defensive with them, as 
followeth : 

" The Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, 
and Mantineans, for themselves and their, re- 
spective dependents on all sides, have made a 
peace, to continue for the term of a hundred 
years, without fraud and without violence, both 
at land and at sea. 

« Be it unlawful to take up offensiva arm% 
either by the Argives, and Eleans, and Man- 
tineans, or their dependents, against the Athe- 
nians and dependents of the Athenians, or 
by the Athenians and their dependents, againat 
the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, and 
their dependents, without any artifice or eva- 
sion whatsoever. On these conditions the 
Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Man* 
tineans, to be confederates for one hundred 
years. 

« Provided, that, in case an enemy invade 
the territory of the Athenians^ the Argives, and 
Eleans, and Mantineans march to the succour 
of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a sum- 
mons received from Athens, in the most vigor- 
ous manner they may be able, to the fulness of 
their abilities. • 

" But if the enemy, after ravaging, bo again 
withdrawn, the state under which they act^d 
to be declared an enemy to the Argives, and 
Mantineans, and Eleans, and Athenians ; and 
to be pursued with the offensive arms of all 
those confederate states. 

« And, fiirther, that it be not lawful for any 
of the contracting states to lay down their arfns 
against that state which hath so offended, with- 
out the consent of all the rest 

"The Athenians also to march tofhe sa^ 
courof Argos, and Mantinea, and Clis, in case 
an enemy invade the territory of the Eleans, 
or that of the Mantineans, or that of the Ar- 
Y 



108 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



givefl) in a strict confonnitj to a summons re- 
ceived from any of those states, in the most 
vigorous manner they may be able, to the ful- 
ness of their abilities. 

« But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again 
withdrawn, the state under which they acted to 
be declared an enemy to the Athenians, and 
Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and to be 
pursued with the offensive arms of 'all these con- 
federate states. 

" And, farther, that it be not lawful to lay 
down their arms against the state which hath 
so offended, without the joint consent of all 
these contracting states. 

" That no armed force be admitted to pass 
in order for war through any of their respective 
dominions, or those of their respective depen- 
dents, nor along their sea, unless such a pas- 
sage be granted unanimously by all the contract- 
ing parties, by the Athenians, and Argives, 
and Mantineans, and Eleans. 

" Agreed, farther, that, when the auxiliaries 
attend, the state which summoned them supply 
them with thirty days' provision so soon as 
they shall have entered the territory of the 
state which summoned their attendance, and 
the same at their departure. 

<< And, if there be occasion for the atten- 
dance of such an auxiliary force for a larger 
space, that the state which sent for it maintain 
that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy- 
armed, and light-armed, and every archer, three 
oboli of ^gina* a-day, and a drachma of 
^gina to every horseman. 

« But the state which sent for auxiliaries to 
have the supreme command, so long as the war 
continueth within its district. 

« If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting 
states to act offensively with their united forces, 
the command then to be equally divided among 
all the states. 

" That the Athenians swear to observe these 
articles in their own names and those of their 
dependents ; but the Argives, and Mantineans, 
and Eleans, and the dependents of these, are to 
swear separately, each state for itself. 

** Each party to take the oath in the most 
solemn fashion of their own country, in the 

i Tbe valae of three oboli of JSgina is aboat six. 
pence, and the drachma of .£gina nearly one ihilling 
English ; for, according to Dr Arbuthnot, the tal^t of 
iEgina consisted of a hundred Attic mine, and there- 
fore was larger than the Attic talent in the proportion 
of one hundred to sixty. 



most sacred manner; with the choicest victims. 
The terms of the oaths to be thus conceiwd : 
— * I will stand by the alliance, according to 
covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely ; and 
I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud 
or evasion whatsoever.' 

« To be sworn — 

«At Athens, by the senate and the city- 
magistrates: the presidents in course to ad- 
minister the oath. 

" At Argos, by the senate, and the eighty, 
and the artyns : the eighty to administer the 
oath. 

" At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, and the 
senate, and the other magistrates: the &eori 
and polemarchs to administer the oath. 

« At Elis, by the demiurgi, and the ofncers 
of state, and the six hundred : the demiuigi 
and the keepers of the sacred records to admin- 
ister the oath. 

<< These oaths to be renewed. For which 
purpose, the Athenians to repair to Elis, and 
to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before 
the Olympic Games. But the Argives, and 
Eleans, and Mantineans, are to repair' to 
Athens, ten days before the great Pana- 
thensa. 

** The articles relating to this peace, and 
these oaths, and this alliance, to be inscribed 
on a column of stone, 

<< By the Athenians, in the citadel : 

« By the Argives, in the forum, in the 
temple of Apollo. 

« By the Mantineans, in the temple of Ju- 
piter, in the forum : and 

" All Jointly to erect by way of memorial, a 
brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now 
approaching. 

"If it be judged expedient, by any of the 
contracting states, to make any additions to 
these articles already agreed, whatever, in pur- 
suance of this, be deemed proper,- by the joint 
determination of all parties, the same to be 
valid." 

A peace and alliance, offensive and defen- 
sive, was in this manner concluded : and those 
subsisting between the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians were not, upon this account, re- 
nounced by either side. 

The Corinthians, however, who were con- 
federates of the Argives, refused to accede ; 
but; what is more, they had never sworn to 
the alliance, made previous to this, between 
the Eleans, 'and Argives, and Mantineans, — 



xn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



199 



<« to have the same foes and the same friends.'' 
Tliey pretended that the defensive league al- 
ready made was quite sufficient, — « to succour 
one another, but not to concur in an offensive 
Trar." In this manner the Corinthians were 
drawing off from the league, and again warped 
in their inclinations towards the Lacedsmo- 
nians. 

17he Olympics were solemnized this sum- 
mer, in which Androsthenes, the Arcadian, 
was for the first time victor in the Pancrace, 
and the Lacedsmonians were excluded the tem- 
ple by the Eleans, so that they could neither 
sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not dis- 
charged the fine set upon them by the Eleans, 
by 'virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged 
tUem with a conveyance of arms into the fort 
of Fhyrcon, and with throwing some of their 
heavy-armed into Lepreum, during the Olym- 
pic cessation. The fine imposed was two 
thousand mins,^ at the rate of two mine for 
every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the let^ 
ter of the law. 

The Lacedemonians, upon this, despatched 
an embassy, to remonstrate against the injustice 
of the sentence ; that « the cessation had not 
been notified at Lacedsmon when they threw 
in their heavy-armed." 

The Eleans replied, that « the cessation was 
already in force: for they proclaim it first 
amongst themselves ; and so, whilst they were 
quiet, and expected no such usage, they had 
been wronged by a surprise." 

The Lacedsmonians retorted, that, « if so, 
it was needless for them to proceed to a publi- 
cation of it in Lacedsmon, if the Eleans had 
already judged themselves wronged. But the 
fact was far different in the light they saw it, 
'^ and trespass had not been committed in any 
shape whatever. 

But the Eleans adhered to their first charge, 
that <* they could not be persuaded the Laceds- 
monians had not wronged them ; yet, in case 
they were willing to surrender Lepreum to 
them, they are ready to remit their share of the 
fine, and to pay for them that part of it which 
was due to the god." 

But, when this would not content, it was 
urged again by the Eleans, that, " if they were 
unwilling to part with it, they should by no 
means surrender Lepreum ; but then, as they 
wore desirous to have the use of the temple, 

> 2000 mine— 6,4582. 6«. Qd. sterling. 



they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupi 
ter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, 
that they would hereafter pay the fine." — But, 
as they also refused to comply with this, the 
LacedflBmonians were excluded the temple, the 
sacrifice, and the games; and performed their 
own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the 
Grecians, except the Lepreats, were admitted.to 
assist at the solemnity. 

The Eleans however, apprehensive they 
would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their 
armed youths around the temple. These were 
reinforced by the Argives and Mantineans, a 
thousand of each, and a party of Athenian 
horse who were at Argos, in readiness to attend 
the festival. But a great consternation had 
seized the whole assembly of united Greece, 
lest the Lacedsemonians should return with an 
armed force ; more especially, when Lichas, 
the son of Archesilaus, a Lacedsmonian, was 
scourged in the course by the under-officers, 
because, when his chariot had gained the prize, 
and the chariot of the Boeotian state was pro- 
claimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the 
Lacedaemonians from the race, he stepped into 
the midst of the assembly and crowned the 
charioteer, desirous to make it known that the 
chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole 
assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it 
was fully expected that some strange event 
would follow: the Lacedeemonians, however, 
made no bustle ; and the festival passed regu- 
larly through its train. 

After the Olympics, the Argives and their 
confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to 
soUcit the concurrence of that state. A 
Lacedaemonian embassy happened also to be 
there. Many conferences were held, and no- 
thing finally determined: but, upon feeling 
the shock of an earthquake, they parted each 
to their respective cities. And here the sum- 
mer ended. 

In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought 
by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the 
^nianians, and Dolopians, and Meliensians, 
and some of the Thessalians. For the border- 
ing nations were enemies to the city of Hera- • 
clea, as this latter place had been fortified for 
their more especial annoyance. From its fouU' 
dation they had ever opposed it, preventing its 
growth to the utmost of their power ; and at 
this time they defeated the Heracleots in a 
battle, in which Xenares, the son of Cnidis, 
the LacedoDmonian commandant, was slain ; . a 



200 



PEI^OPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bookt. 



nqmbflir alio of die Horadeoto perished. And 
time the winter ended: and the twelfth year of 
the war came also to an end. 

The racceeding summer was no sooner be- 
gan, than the Boeotians, viewing the low estate 
to which it had been reduced by the late battle, 
look into their own hands the city of Heraeleaj 
and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedsmo- 
nian commandant, as guilty of mal-administra- 
tion. They took this city^ into their own 
hands, from the apprehension that, during the 
embroilments of the Lacedsemonians in Pelo- 
ponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The 
Lacedemonians, however, were chagrined at 
this step of the Boeotians. 

This same summer also, Alcibiades, the son 
of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, 
with the concurrence of the Argives and their 
allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party 
of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and 
enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids 
of the confederates in those quarters ; where 
he not only made such a disposition of affairs 
as might best answer the views of the alliance, 
but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his 
force, he both persuaded the Patreans to con- 
tinue their works quite down to the sea, and 
intended also to execute a plan of his own for 
erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia.' 
But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and all 
such as were alarmed at the annoyance this 
fort might give them, rushed out to prevent 
him, and obliged him to desist 

The same summer a war broke out between 
the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pre- 
text was gprounded on a victim due from the 
Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an 
acknowledgment for their pastures; for the 
Argives were now the chief managers of the 
temple. But, this pretended grievance set 
apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alci- 
biades and the Argives, to get possession, if 
possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent 
* molestation on the side of Corinth, and to ren- 



t Before Christ 419. 

• This was a grand projmt indeed t It aimed at no 
Icsi tlian tbe total min of Corinth, and patting an end 
to all tbe navigation ef that trading and opalent eity 
through the bay of Criasa. The Atheniana were al- 
ready entire masters of the tea on the other side of the 
Isthmus. 



der the paasage of Athenian socooorB more a- 
peditious from iBgina than by fetching a com- 
pass about Scyllsum. The Argives, therefore, 
were intent on their preparations, as iea)lTd 
to take the field and act against Epidaunu, ia 
order to exact the victim by force of arms. 

But, about the same time, the Lacedsmo- 
nians also marched out, with their whole force, 
as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, 
towards Lyceum, under the command of Agii; 
the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a 
mim was privy to the design of their thus 
taking the field, not even the states from vhick 
the quotas were furnished out But, vhei 
the victims they sacrificed for a succea/iii 
campaign proved inauspicious, they again lur- 
ched home, and circulated firesh orders to tbeir 
confederates to be ready to take the field agsii 
after the next nM>nth, which was the montb 
Qameius,' the grand festival of the Donau 
But, when they were thus withdravD, tiie 
Argives, taking the field on the twenty-sereDlk 
day of the month preceding Cameras, aoJ 
though celebrating their own fiestiTal that vei; 
day, continued all this intennediate time to 
make incursions and ravages upon Epidaiini. 
The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the suc- 
cours of their allies ; some of w^om excused 
themselves as bound to observe the approach- 
ing festivals, though others adntnced as £v ts 
the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refosed to 
act And during the space of time that the 
Argives were in Epidauria, emhssoes from 
the several states held a congress at Mantiiiea, 
at the request of the Athenians; and, proceed- 
ing to a conference, Ephamidas, the GoriDtbiaD, 
remonstrated, diat « their words, were hy »• 
means consistent with their actions; forwhibt 
they were here sitting together upon the tentf 
of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and the 
Argives, were opposing one another m arms. 
that, consequentiy, the first thing to be done 
was to send deputations on both sides to dii- 

» This festival was observed by mort cities in Greece, 
but with the greatest pomp and wlcmnity at bp^ 
where it began the thirteenth of the «°"* j^fj, 
according to the Lacedemonian style, and "f^^ 
days. A camp was fbrmed tor its eelebratioa, u w ^ 
they continued daring the whole »*wm»HMV ^ 
served strict miUtary discipline. By ^^J^^ 
we find a litUe lower, the Argiwss, in tMi "^^ 
slaves to superstitfea, attended i» tbe ^f^j^T^ 
fkre at the same time, and annsyed tbe '^^„ 
wlUIst religious awe restrained the fri«°*' .^r",uwa. 
fh»m acting in their defence. S»t Potter tArt^ » 
vol. i. p. 406. 



TEAS XIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR/ 



!301 



band those armies, an^ then orderly to proceed 
to treat of peace/' TieldiDg, therefore, to the 
justice of such a remonstranee, they fetched 
the Argives avA of Kpidauria; and, returning 
to the ccHigress, they were not able even then 
to agree together: upon which the Argives 
once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the 
ravage, ^ 

The Lacedsmonians now had taken the 
field, and were advanced to Carye ; but, as 
no-vp^again the victims sacrificed portended 
no success to a campaign, they once more 
withdrew. 

The Argives also, after ruining about a 
ttHfd of the territory of Epidauria, were return- 
ed home. In this incursion they were assisted 
by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with 
Alcibiades at their head ; who, having heard 
that the Lacedemonians had now left the 
field, as their service was now no longer need- 
ful, marched away. And in this manner the 
snnuner passed. 

In the beginning of the next winter, the 
Laeedsmonians, unknown to the Athenians, 
threw a body ^of men, to the number of three 
hundred, with Agesippidas as commandant, in- 
fo Epidaurus by sea. TTpon this, the Argives 
repured instantly to Athens, with, remon- 
strances, that, « though it was explicitly men- 
tioned kk the treaty that no enemy should be 
mfiered to pass through their respective domin- 
ions, yet they had perrmitted the Lacedsemoni- 
ans to make this passage by sea without moles- 
tation.' Unless, therefore, they would replace 
&e Messenians and Helots in Pylus, to annoy 
the Lacedemonians, they should deem theih- 
selves aggrieved.'' Upon this, the Athenians, 
at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote 
this charge upon the Laconic column, that 
•< the Lacedemonians were guilty of perjury ;" 
and removed the Helots from Crania into Py- 
hm, to resume their depredations, but refrained 
from aiiy other act of hostility. 

In the course of this winter, though tiie 
Argivea and Epidaurians were at war, yet no 
regular battle was fought between them. The 
hostilities consisted of ambuscadea and ^ir- 
mishes, in which, according to the chance of 
action, sonie persons perished on both sides. 

But ki the close of winter, when the spring 



« Tbe Argives. in this remoBStranee, aeknowledgB 
the dominion of the sea, even en the eoait of Pelopon- 
negnSf to belong to Atheni. 
33 



was now approaching, the Argives, provided 
with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, 
hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently 
manned by reason of the war ; but, failing of 
success, they soon withdrew. And then the 
winter ended, and with it ended also the thir- 
teenth year of the war. 

TEAB XIY. 

About the middle of the ensuing summer, 
when their confederates Ihe Epidaurians, were 
sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponne- 
sians had already revolted, and others showed 
plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedemoni- 
ans were clearly convinced that, unless expedi- 
tiously prevented, the mischief would spread 
abroad. Upon this they took the field against 
Argos with their whole force, both themselves 
and their Helots ; and Agis, Ihe son of Arch- 
idamus, king of the Lacedaemonvans, command^ 
ed in chief. They were attended in the field 
by the Tegeate, and all the other Arcadians 
whatever confederated with the Lacedemoni- 
ans. But the allies of the other parts of Pelo- 
ponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were 
assembled at Phlius : — the Boeotians, consist- 
ing of five thousand heavy-armed, and the 
same number of light-armed; five hundred 
horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot<: 
— the Corinthians, of two thousand heavy-arm- 
ed; — the other confederates with their several 
quotas ; — ^but the Phliasians with the whole of 
their force, because the army was assembled in 
their district. 

The Argives, who had some time before in- 
telligence of the Lacedemonian preparations, 
and that since they were filing towards Phlius 
in order to join the forces assembled there, 
now took the field themselves. They were 
joined by a succour of the Mantineans, strength- 
ened by the addition of their dependents, and 
three thousand heavy-armed Eleans. Upon 
their march^ they fell in with the Laceds^moni- 
ans at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party 
posts itself upon a rising ground. The Ar- 
gives got every thing in readiness to attack 
the Lacedemonians whilst yet they were alone ; 
but Agis, dislodged by night and stealing' a 
march, completed his junction with the body of 
confederates at Phlius. When this was per- 
ceived by the Argivies, they drew off early the 
next daWn, first of all to Argos, and then to 



» Before Christ 418. 



i2. 



202 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book V 



the pasB on the route of Nemea, by which 
they expected the Lacedemonians, with their 
confederates, would fall into their country. 
Yet Agis took not that route which they ex- 
pected ; but, having communicated his design 
to the Lacedaemonians, and Arcadians, and 
Epidaurians, he took a different route, though 
much less practicable, and descended into the 
plains of Argos. The Corinthians, and 
Pellenians, and Phliasians, followed by an- 
other more direct route ; and orders had been 
given to the Boeotians, and Megareans, and 
Sicyonians, to take the route which leadeth 
to Nemea, on which the Argives were posted, 
that, in case the Argives should march in- 
to the plain to make head against the Lacedae- 
monians, the last with their cavalry might 
press upon their rear. 

After these dispositions, and such a descent 
into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and 
other places ; upon intelligence of which, the 
Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from 
Nemea, to stop the depredations, and on their 
march met with the body of Phliasians and 
Corinthians; and, encountering, slew some 
few of the Phliasians, whilst not a much 
greater number of their own men were destroyed 
by the Corinthians^ The Bceolians also, and 
Megareans, and Sicyonians, took the route of 
Nemea conformably to orders, and found the 
Argives already dislodged ; but the latter, upon 
entering the plain, and in view of the ravage 
made upon their lands, drew up in order of 
battle. The Lacedaemonians stood regularly 
drawn up on the other side. And now the 
Argives were shut up in the middle of their 
enemies: for, on the side of the plain, the 
Lacedaemonians, and those in their body, inter- 
cepted their return to the city; on the high 
ground above them were the Corinthians, and 
Phliasians, and Pellenians ; on the other part, 
towards Memea, were the Boeotians, and Sicy- 
onians, and Megareans. Calvary they had 
none : for the Athenians were the only part 
of their confederacy who were not yet come 
up. 

The bulk, indeed, of the Argives and con- 
federates apprehended not the danger, which 
at present environed them, to be so great ; but 
rather concluded they might engage with ad- 
vantage, and that they had caught the Lacedae- 
monians fast within their territory, and near to 
Argos itself. Two Argives, however, — Thra- 
syllus, one of the five in command, and Alci- 



phron, the public host of the Lacedaemonians^ 
— the very instant the armies were moving to 
the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis 
and proposed expedients to prevent a battle 
giving their word, that « the Argives were 
ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a 
fair and equitable arbitration, in case the La- 
cedaemonians had any charge against them ; and 
for the future would live at peace, if a present 
accommodation could be effected." 

In this manner these Argives presumed to 
talk, merely of themselves, and vvithout the 
public authority. Agis also, by his own pri- 
vate determination, accepted the proposals; 
and, without reporting them to the council of 
war, without canvassing things maturely him- 
self, or at least communicating only with one 
person of the number which had authority in 
the army, grants them a four months^ truce, 
« in which space they were to make good whi^ 
engaigements they had now made ;'' and then 
instantly drew off the army, without imparting 
the reasons of his conduct to the other con- 
federates. The Lacedaemonians, indeed, and 
confederates, followed when he led them off, 
because their laws enacted . such obedience ; 
yet, amongst themselves, were la^sh of their 
censure against Agis, that, when so fine an 
opportunity of engaging^ was in their power, 
when their enemies were hemmed in on all 
sides, both by their horse and their foot, they 
were drawn off, without performing any tiling 
worthy of such mighty preparations ; for, to 
this very day, a finer army of Grecians had 
never appeared in the field. A inost gallant 
figure, in truth, it made, whilst they were all 
together at Nemea. The Lacedaemonians were 
there to be seen with the whole collected force 
of their state, accompanied by the Arcadians, 
and Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyo- 
nians, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, and 
Megareans. The troops which composed their 
several quotas were all picked men, and were 
judged a match in the field of battle, not only 
for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition 
of double strength. This great army, how- 
ever, laying all the time most heavy imputa- 
tions on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and 
were disbanded to their several habitations. 

.On the other part also, the Argives were 
still much more exasperated against those who 
had made this suspension without public au- 
thority. They imagined the Lacedaemonians 
had escaped them when they had the finest 



rSABXIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



203 



oppoitonity of striking a blow, inasmuch as 
the contest must have been decided under the 
very walls of Argos, and in company with a 
numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, 
upon their retum/,at the Charadnim, the place 
where the crimes committed in an expedition 
are adjudged, before thej enter the city, they 
were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, fly- 
ing to an altar, escapeth with life : his effects, 
however, they confiscated to public use. 

But, after this, came up the Athenian suc- 
cour, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed 
and three hundred horsemen, commanded by 
Laches and Nicostratus. .The Argives, who, 
after all, were afraid to break the agreement 
with the Lacedaemonians, ordered them " to 
be gone forthwith ;"and,*though they requested 
a conference, refused to introduce them into 
the assembly of the people, till the Mantineans 
and Eleans, who were not yet departed, by 
great importunity obtained a compliance. Here 
the Athenians,* in the presence of Alcibiades 
their ambassador, assembled with the Argives 
and their allies, averred, that " the suspension 
was not vaUd, since agreed to without the con- 
sent of the body of the confederates ; now, 
therefore, as themselves were come up oppor- 
tunely to their assistance, they were obliged in 
honour to prosecute the war.^' The confede- 
rates allowed the force of this argument : and 
the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched 
instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. 
But even the Argives, though they staid be- 
hind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, 
and soon after went also to take part in the 
expedition. Thus, imited, they sat down be- 
fore and besieged Orchomenus. They made 
several assaults upon it, desirous for other 
reasons to get it into their hands, but more 
particularly because the hostages from Arcadia 
were lodged in that city by the Lacedsmoni- 
ans. 

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness 
of their walls and the multitude of their be- 
siegeiB, and lest, as no relief appeared, they 
should soon be exhausted, thought proper to 
capitulate on these conditions; — <«to be re- 
ceived ito the confederacy, — to give hostages 
of their own body, — and to deliver up to the 
Mantineans those whom the Lacedemonians 
had lodged with them." 

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, 

1 Ladles and Nicostratus. 



the confederates, in the next place, held a con- 
sultation, « against what other city, in their 
plan of conquest, they should next proceed.*' 
The Eleans exhorted them to march against 
Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea ; 
and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the 
Mantineans. The Eleans, upon this, were 
offended that they had not voted for the siege 
of Lepreum, and separated to their own home. 
But the rest of the confederates set about pre- 
parations at Mantinea, as fully bent on the 
siege of Tegea ; and even some of the citizens 
of Tegea were exerting their efforts within ^at 
city to betray it to them. 

But the Lacedemonians, after they were 
withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of the 
suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy 
charges upon Agis, for not conquering Aigos 
at 80 fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they 
had reason to expect, — " since so numerous and 
so gallant a body of confederates could never 
again, without greater difficulty, be assembled 
together." And when afterwards the news 
arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their in- 
dignation became more violent than ever. In 
such a ferment, they instantly resolved, though 
not consistently with the calm Lacedemonian 
temper, that « his house must needs be demo- 
lished, and a fine of one hundred thousand 
drachmas' be imposed upon Agis." He ear- 
nestly pleaded against the execution of the 
sentence, that, «in another expedition, he 
would purge the charge by some notable service 
to the state ; if not, they might then proceed to 
punish him at pleasure." Upon this, they 
suspended the fine and demolition, but passed 
a law upon the present occasion, such as never 
before had been made amongst them ; for they 
elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend 
him as a council, without whose concurrence 
he was not permitted to lead out their army in- 
to the field. 

In the meantime a message is brought them 
from their friends at Tegea, that « unless they 
come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea 
will revolt from them to the Argives and their 
confederates, and is only not revolted already." 

To prevent this, the whole Lacedemonian 
strength, both of citizens and Helots, is levied 
with more sharpness than had ever been known 
before ; and, taking the field, they marched to 
Oresteum, of Mei^alia. An order was sent 

• £aBS9 3«. id. iterUnf. 



9G4 



PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 



t 



V. 



beforehand to theii Aieadun allies, to awemUe 
and follow ihem directly towards Tegeo. 

But when the whole Lacedemonian strength 
was thus marched to Oresteum, the siz& part 
of the number, consisting of the more aged and 
younger classes, was from thence again dis- 
missed to Sparta, to ^alfie upon them the guard 
of that place, whilst the rest of 'their military 
force marcheth to Tegea ; and, not long after, 
their Arcadian confederates join them. 

They sent also to Corinth, to the Boeotians, 
Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy 
aid into the Mantineans. But, for some of 
these, the summons was too short ; and, for 
Ihe rest, it was by no means an easy task to 
take the field in separate bodies, and, waiting 
for their mutual junction, to force their passage 
Jthrough an enemy's country ; for such lay be- 
tween to obstruct their advance ; however, they 
were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lace- 
daBmonians, in the meantime, enlarged with 
such Arcadian parties as were ahready come 
up, mardied en and broke into the Mantinean ; 
and, having formed their camp near ther temple 
of Hercules, tiiey ravaged the country. 

The Argrves and their allies, when their 
enemy was thns in sight, having posted them- 
selves on a spot of ground by nature strong 
and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as 
ready to engage. The Lacedsmonians also 
inunediately advanced towards them, and ev«i 
approached so near as within the cast of a stone 
or a dart But one of the old experienced 
Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack 
so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,^ 
that « he was going to repur one evil by an- 
other," as if, by his present ill-judged eager- 
ness, he was bent on making reparation for his 
censured retreat from Argos. Upon this, 
either struck witii such an exclamation, or 
whether i^pon a sudden his own thoughts sug- 
gested to him a different conduct, he drew off 
his army again, with all possible expedition, 
tttfore the battle could be joined.' And, wheel- 
ing from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a 
stream of water into the Mantinean, about 
which, as apt to do great damage to the lands 

> Plutarch sayi it was an apophthegm of tUs Agls, 
<liat Laeediemenlans never ask eonceming the^ ene- 
Aias. ** Hew many are they?** hat *' Wheie ai« they t" 
And Chat, when he was htedaied fram fighting at Maa- 
iinea, he said, ** They, who would rule over many, 
most fight against many :** and, being asked what was 
the nomher of the Laeedsmenlaai, he lepUsd ** Enow 
to beat cowards.** 



OB which side soevtr it flowed, the Mmtinwiis 
and Tegeatae are eternally at blows. It was 
his schmne to draw down the Argives and Huai 
allies from their strong post, on the fgninencs, 
in order to prevent the turning of this stream, 
so soon as the]^ knew it was in agitation, and 
thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the 
plain. In pursuance of this, hs halted the 
whole day upon the stream, and accompli s hed 
its divertton. But the Aigives and their allies, 
surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, 
had been, at first, unable to conjecture what it 
meant At length, when the enemy was to- 
tally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, 
after lying inactively in their posta, and no 
orders received for a pursuit, they hegan a 
second time to lay heavy imputations on their 
own commanders ; — ^that, « on the former oc- 
casion, the Lacedsmonians, when fairly can^t 
near Argos, had been sofEered to escape ; that 
now again, though they were openly flying, not 
a soul must pursue them, but, through shame- 
ful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and 
themselves are treacherously betrayed." The 
commanders, upon the first noise of these 
clamours, were highly chagrined, but afisz^ 
wards they mardied them down from the emi- 
nence, and, advancing into the plain, encamped 
them there, as determined to fight the enemy. 
The day following, the Argives and allies were 
drawn up to be in readiness for action, should 
the enemy appear. And the LacedsBmoniaBS, 
marching away firom the stream to xe-occapy 
their former camp near the temple of Hereulei, 
on a sudden perceived that the whole body of 
their foes were ready drawn up in order of bal^ 
tie, and had quitted their strong post on die 
eminence. 

At this crifls, the Lacedsmonians woe 
struck with a greater astonishment tiianlhe 
memory of man could parallel. For now, in 
an interval of time exceeding short, they were 
bound to get every thing in readiness for fight: 
yet, fluch was their diligence, that in an instant 
they were formed into a beautiful array, Agiiy 
their king, issuing all the necessary orders, ae- 
cording to law ; for, when a king leadeth theb 
armies, all orders are given by him : he faisi* 
self deciareth what he wiUeth to he done to 
the general officeni f they cany his oidcn ti> 
the colonels;' these to the captains ;^i^ 
i^fbrwards forward them to the sdiaitens;' 



« Polemarchs. 
« Penteooatalois. 



■ Lochages. 

■ 



.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



905 



Try whom they were commcinicated to all the 
private men under their respective commands. 
The orders, when any such are requinte, are 
in this method dispersed and circulated with 
the greatest expedition : for, in the Lacedemo- 
nian aimies, almost the whole soldieiy, few 
only excepted, have a command assigned in 
regulaa sabordination ; and the care of execu- 
ting orders is incumbent upon numbers. 

In their present array, the left wing consist- 
ed of the Skirits, who, of all the Lacedemo- 
nians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right ; 
next them were posted the Brasidean soldiers 
wrho had served in Thrace, accompanied by 
those who had lately been honoured with the 
freedom of Sparta ; then, along the line, were 
regularly posted all the troops which were com- 
posed of pure Lacedsmonians ; next to them 
stood the Hereans of Arcadia, and beyond 
them the MsnaUans. In the right wing were 
the Tegeats, but in the utmost extent of it 
some few Lacedsmonians. Their cavalry was 
equally posted on both the wings : and in this 
Ibrm was the Laoedsmonian duposition made. 
On the side of the enemy, the Mantineans 
had the right wing, because the business fell 
upon their ground; next to them were the 
allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of 
Argives, to the number of a thousand, who 
long had been exercised in the study of arms 
at the pubUe school at Argos; and next to 
them stood the rest of the Argive forces : these 
were followed by their own confederates, the 
Cleoneans and Omeatse. The Athenians were 
ranged in the outermost body, and composed 
.the left wing^ supported by their own cavalry. 
8udi was die order and disposition on both 
sides. 

The army of the Lacedsmonians had the 
appearance of superior numbers: but exactly 
to write the number, either of the several 
bodies on each aide, or of their whole force, I 
own myself unable. The amount of the Laee« 
dsmonians was not known, because of the pro- 
found secrecy observed in their polity ; and the 
amount of th«r enemies, because of the osten- 
tation, ordinary to mankind in magnifying their 
own strength, hath been still disbelieved. How- 
ever, from the ffrflowing computation, an in- 
quirer may discover the number of the Laceds- 
monians, who on this oeeasioa were drawn up 
mlhe^ld. 

Besides the Skirite, who were in number 
six hundred, seven battahons were in this en- 



gagement Now in every battalion there were 
four companies ; and, in every company, four 
platoons ; in the first rank of every platoon 
were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth 
they were not equally formed, as every colonel 
determined the depth at his own private diwre- 
tion; but generally they were drawn up eight 
deep. The front line of their whole force, ex- 
cepting the Skiritae, consisted of four hundred 
and forty-eight men.^ 

When both sides were ready, the small re»> 
pite before the engagement was employed by 
the several commanders in animating the sol- 
diers under their respective orders. 

To the Mantineans it was urged,—* that 
it the points, for which they were going to fight, 
were their country and their future fate, either 
rule or slavery ; that, of rule, whose sweets 
they had known, they might not be divested, 
and diat they might never feel again what 
slavery is." 

To the Argives,— it was « for their ancient 
sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they 
had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely 
to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, 
and earn revenge for the many injuries a neigh- 
bouring state, unrelenting in its enmity, had 
done them." 

But to the Athenians, — that, «in honour, 
they were obliged to signalize their valour in a 
conspicuous manner, in the company of numer- 
ous and gallant allies : that should they gain 
a victory over the Lacedsmonians on Pelopon- 
nesian ground, their own empire would be 
established and enlarged, and no enemy would 
ever again presume to invade their territories." 

And in this manner were the Argives and 
their confederates animated to the fight 



> Tbe Lacedemonian mora^ or brigade, consisted of 
four loehif or battalions, equal to 2048 men : for a 
loehotf or battalion, consisted of four pentteoatiu^ or 
companies, equal to 51S men ;tLpenteeo»ty^ or company, 
of four momatia^ or platoons, equtil to 128 men ; and 
each momatia or platoon, consisted of 32. This is tbe 
account of Thucydides, who computes tbe platoon by 4 
in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted there- 
fore of 32; which, multiplied by 4, is equal to 198, the 
number of a company ; which also multiplied by 4, is 
equal to 512, tbe number of a battalion. The number 
of battalions was seven, which shows the namber of 
Lacedemonians to have been 3584; and then with the 
addition of 000 Skirit^ who were posted on the left, to 
have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again, 
the whole front line, is equal to 448, multiplied by 8, 
the number in depth, is equal to 3584, added to 800 
Skiritm, is equal to 4184. 



206 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



V. 



But the Lacedsmonians were eneouraging | 
oiie another, and, during martial strains enjoined 
by their discipline, like men of brayery as they ; 
were, each animated his neighbour with the 
recital of the gallant acts they had performed 
together. They were persons, who knew that 
a 4ong experience in the toils of war conduceth 
more to preservation, than a short verbal ha- 
rangue, how finely soever delivered. 

And now the armies were mutually ap- 
proaching : the Argives and their allies ad- 
vanced in a brisk and angry manner; but the 
Lacedsmoniana moved slowly forwards to the 
■sound of many flutes, the music which their 
laws ordained ; not from any religious motive, 
but for advancing with equal steps, keeping 
time with the notes, to prevent all disorders in 
the ranks; accidents very frequent in large 
armies whilst drawing to an encounter.* 

But, during the approach, Agis the king 
bethought himself of making a new disposition. 
-—It is the constant case with all armies, that, 
upon the right, their wings, whilst they ap- 
proach one another, extend themselves too far, 
so that constantly, on both sides, the left wing 
is overreached and flanked by the enemy's 
right. This proceedeth from the dread every 
soldier lieth under of being exposed on his 
unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get 
it covered by the shield of the next person on 
his right, and positive that a firm closing to- 
gether in this manner, will render them im- 
penetrable to the shock of the enemy. This 
turn of the body is first begun by the right- 



> Milton hath made use of this Lacedemonian march 
to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full 
and strong in his imagination, when he wrote the fol- 
lowing lines. Paradise Lost, book I. 

" Anon they move 
In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood 
Of flatet and aoft reeorden ; such as raiaed 
To height of noblest temper heroes old, 
Arming to battle ; and, instead of rage, 
Deliberate valusr breathed, firm, and unmoved 
With dread of death to flight or foul retreat : 
Nor wanting power to mitigate and suage, 
With solemn toiiches, troubled thon^ts, and chase 
Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain, 
From mortal or immortal minds. Thns they, 
Breathing united force, with fixed thought. 
Moved on in nlence to soft pipes, that charm'd 
Their painful steps o'er the bumM soil : And now, 
Advanced in view, they stsod, a horrid front 
Of dreadful length and dazding arnos, in gwse 
Of warriors old with orderM spear and shield. 
Awaiting what command thdr mighty chief 
Had to fanpose. He throng the armed files 
Daiti hisesperieDced eye; and soon, tnverse 
The whole battalion, views their order doe." 



hand man of the whole firont, and is the result 
of his constant care to shift his defenceless 
side from the aim of the foe ; and the dread of 
being in the same manner exp<»ed obligeth all 
the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in 
the present approach, the Mantineans in their 
wing had far overreached the Skiiitie ; but the 
Lacediemonians and Tegeatae had done so, 
more in regard to the Athenians, in propor-* 
tion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis, 
therefore, fearing lest the left wiug of the 
Lacedsmonians might be quite surrounded, 
and judging that the Mantineans quite too far 
overreached them, sent orders to the Skints 
and Brasideans to wheel away from the spot 
where they were first posted, and "fill up the 
extremity of the line, so as to render it equal 
to the Mantineans ; and, to supply the void 
thus made, he ordered from the right wing, 
two battalions, commanded by general oflicers, 
Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, 
and falling in, to close up the ranks ; judging 
that their own right would still be more than 
sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing 
opposed to the Mantineans might, by this dis- 
position, be properly strengthened. But, as 
he issued these orders in the veiy onset and 
close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and 
Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change their 
post, (though for such disobedience, as ap- 
parently the result of cowardice, they were 
afterwards banished from Sparta) ; and before 
the new disposition could be completed, the 
enemy had begun to. charge. Upon the re- 
fusal of these two battalions to change their 
post, Agis countermanded those marching to 
strengthen the Skirits to their former places, 
who now were unable to fall into the ranks, 
or close together with those whom they had 
quitted : but on this occasion, more remarkable 
than ever, the Lacedsmonians, though in all 
respects outdone in the military art, gave sig- 
nal proofs of their superiority in true manly 
valour. 

For, to come to particulars, when once they 
were at blows with the enemy, the right wing 
of the Mantineans routs the Skiritae and Bra- 
sideans. Then the same Mantineans, sup- 
ported by their confederates and the thousand 
pi(^ed Argives, falling in at the void in the 
Lacedsmonian line, which was not yet filled 
up, did great execution upon them ; for, tdcing 
them in flank, they entirely broke them, drove 
them for shelter among their carriages, and 



'STBABXIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



207 



made a slaughter of the old men who were 
appointed for their guard. And in this quar- 
ter, the Lacedemonians were clearly van- 
quished. 

But in the other quarters, and especially in 
the centre, where Agis the king was posted, 
and round him the horse-guards, styled the 
three hundred, falling upon those troops which 
-were composed of the elder Argives, and them 
iprhich are called the pentelochi, and upon the 
Cleoneans, and Omeatie, and those Athenians 
-wlio ranked along with them, they broke them 
in an instant, so that many of them durst not 
stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they 
felt the Lacedsmonian shock, turned about 
at once, and others were trampled under foot 
in the great huny they were in to secure their 
escape. 

But when the main body of the Argives and 
their allies was in this quarter routed, their 
foot, on both the flanks, were instantly dis- 
comfited. Now, also, the right of the Lace- 
dssmonians and Tegeatie, by the advantage of 
snperior numbers, had overreached and en- 
compassed the Athenians. These now, on 
all hands, were beset with- danger; in this 
quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, 
in another they were aheady vanquished ; and 
they must have suffered the most of any part 
of the army, had it not been for the excellent 
support their own cavalry gave them. It 
happened also that Agis, when he perceived 
that the Mantineans and the thousand Argives 
had get the better on the left, commanded 
the whole army to wheel off to the support of 
the vanquished. And whilst this was execu- 
ting, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, 
which this motion of the enemy, and their 
drawing off from around them occasioned, to 
secure their own escape without any opposi- 
tion, accompanied by the Argives, who were 
also vanquished with them. 

But the Mantineans, and those who fought 
in company with them, and the picked band of 
Argives, were now no longer intent on pres- 
sing upon their adversaries; but, perceiving 
their own side to be completely vanquished, 
and the Lacedemonians approaching to their 
attack, they turned about and fled. Yet num- 
bers of them perished, and those chiefly Man- 
tineans ; for the greatest part of the picked 
band of Argives completed their escape. 

The flight however was not precipitate, nor 
the distance to a place of safety great. For 



the Lacedemonians, till the enemy flieth, main* 
tain their combats with long and steady toil; 
but, after a route, pursue them neither long nor 
far. 

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the pro- 
cedure of the whole battle, the greatest that 
for many ages had been fought amongst Gre- 
cians, and where the competition lay between 
most renowned and flourishing states. The 
Lacedemonians, amassing together the arms of 
their enemies who had been slain, immediately 
erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the 
dead. They also took up their own dead, and 
carried them to Tegea, where they received 
the rites of sepulture ; and also delivered, upon 
truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell 
of the Argives, and Omeats, and Cleoneans, 
seven hundred; and two hundred of the Man- 
tineans; two hundred also of the Athenians, 
including the ^ginete, and their several com- 
manders. On the Lacedemonian side, — as the 
confederates were never hard presse4, what 
loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of no- 
tice ; and the exact number of their own dead 
it is difficult to discover, but it was reported to 
have been about three hundred. 

When a battle was certainly to bo fought, 
Pleistionax, the other king, marched out to 
their support, with the whole body of citizens, 
both old men and youths. But when he was 
advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news 
of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The 
Lacedemonians also sent messengers to coun- 
termand their allies from Corinth, and from 
without the isthmus. And, being themselves 
returned to Sparta, after giving dismission to 
their allies, as the Cameian solemnities were 
at hand, they celebrate the festival. The im- 
putation also of cowardice, at that time laid to 
their charge by the rest of Greece, because of 
their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other 
instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by 
this one action, they completely purged away. 
Now it was determined that their depression 
had been merely the result of fortune, but that 
in inward bravery they were still themselves. 

The day before this battle was fought, it 
happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole 
of their strength, had made an incursion into 
Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great 
execution on the guards, left behind at the 
general march of the Argives. 

Three thousand heavy-armed Bleans, as aux- 
iliaries to the Mantineans, came up after the 



306 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



T. 



bittf* ; w did alio a UioiMmd AAcmaiM to join 
tlM fioBMr body, upon wbidi the whole eSi- 
•nce maorched immediitely agahut Epidanme, 
whilst the Lacedemonians were solemnizing 
the Cameian festivaL After an equal distri- 
button of the woik, they began to raise a cir- 
eomvallation aroond thai city. The rest, in- 
deed, soon desisted; bat the Athenians, con- 
Ibnoably to their ordera, completed theirs round 
tile eminence on which stood the temple of 
Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance 
left behind a sufficient number draughted from 
their several bodies, and then departed to 
their icspectiye homes. And the summer was 
now at an end. 

In the first commencement of the succeeding 
winter, and after the celebration of the Car- 
neian festiyal, the Lacedemonians immediately 
took the field; and, adranctng as £u as Tegea, 
aent from thence to Aigos proposals for an 
accommodation. There was already in that 
dty a party in their intelligence, who were 
also bent in orertaning the popular govem- 
ment at Argos; and, since the erent of the 
late fiital battle, they were enabled to use more 
cogent argumento to persuade the many into 
the accommodati<m. Their scheme was, first 
to enter into truce with the Lacedemonians, as 
preparatory to an alliance o£Eensiye and defen* 
aive, which was next in agitation; and, this 
point carried, then immediately to execute their 
plot against the people. 

Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of 
the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, 
charged to make two demands in the name of 
the Lacedemonians; the one, « whether war 
be still their option V* the other, « how if their 
choice be peace V* Upon this a strong debate 
arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the 
party who acted in the Lacedemonian interest, 
prevailed with the Argives to accept their pro- 
posals of an accommodation ; which were as 
foUoweth : 

« Thus resolved, by the Lacedemoman coun- 
cil, to compound witii the Argives. — 

V These to restore their children to the Or- 
chomenians, and their men to the Menalians ; 
to restore also the Lacedsmotiians their citizens 
now detained at Mantinea; to evacuate Epi- 
daurus and demolish their works. 

** And the Athenians, if they will not quit 
Epidaums, to be declared enemies to the Argives 
and to the Lacedemonians, and to the oonfe- 



deiateaof the Lacedemonians and totheoon- 
federatea of the Argives. 

« And, if the LacedemMuans have in ihor 
power any young men, to release them to aD 
the states. 

«In relation to the god,' we consent that 
an oath be administered to the EpidanrianB, 
and we grant the form to* be prescribed by the 
Argives. 

«The stetes of PeloponsesDS, bodi sraalW 
and great to be, none excepted, free, aoeoidiiig 
to their own primitive constitutions. 

** And, if any state without Peloponnesos 
shall enter offensively into the lands of Pdo- 
ponnesus, succours to be mated, in puiauanes 
of a general c<msnlt of Peloponnesians about 
the determinate and most expedient methods. 

" All confederates of the Lacedsemomans 
whatever, vrithout Peloponnesusy shall enjoy 
the same privileges as those of die Lneedsaio- 
nians and those of the Argives enjoy, eadi i»> 
maining in free possssnon of their tenitoriea 

« These artidea to be conununicatod to the 
confederates, and ratification to be made, if 
they approve. If diflerent methods seem ad- 
visable to the confodeiates, aH parties to desist 
and return directly home.'' 

These proposals, by vray of prafiminaiy, the 
Argives accepted ; and the army of the La- 
cedemonians was drawn off from Tegea to 
their own home. And afrerwaids, in flie eovnse 
of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos 
prevailed upon dieir countrymen to renoimce 
their alliance with the Mantineans and EleaiH^ 
and even vrith the Athenians, and to strike vp 
a peace, and an alliance offensive and defca- 
sive, with the Lacedemonians. The tenor of 
it was this: 

« Resolved thus, by the Lacedemonians aad 
the Argives, on a peace and an alliance offen- 
sive and defensive, for the term of fifty yeaisL 

** They shall do justiite to eadi other recipro- 
cally, with impartiality and equity, accov&g 
to their several forms of law. 

« The other stetes in Peloponneaaa^ oompia- 
hended in this peace and aUianoe^ shall cc»- 
tinue in die enjoyment of their own lawa, their 
own independence, holding the same tarvitoiisi^ 
doing justice with impartiality aad vritt etpaty, 
according to their sevoral forms of law. 

t Tbe Pythian ApoDo. This aitiele seenw tai|Md 
to actjust the quarrel about tbe victim, related ia the 
traosaetiona of the hat year. 



TW.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



<<AU eonfedflratM of Hie Lacedamoniaas 
iwltttever, without Peloponnesas, shall enjoy 
HnB flame privilegefl with the Ijacedsmonians 
dBemaeWea ; and the Aigive con&deratee ahall 
eiijoy the aame with the Aigiyea themaelyefl ; 
holding their lespectiTe temtofiea. 
«« If a joint expedition be at any time leqoi- 
a oonaultalion to be held, by the Laceds- 
moniana and the Argiyea, about the determinate 
and moat expedient methods of issuing c«den 
to the rest of the alliance. 

« But, if any controversy arise between the 
fitatea, either those within or those without 
Peloponnesus, either concerning their bound- 
aziea or any other point, it ahall be deter- 
suned by judges. 

« And, if any con£Bderate state have a dis- 
pute with anoUier state, they shall go with a 
xeferance, to that state which to the contending 
states ahall be thought most impartiaL Private 
peraoDSy however, to be judged by the laws of 
that fltate to which tiiey aie subject.*' 

This peace, and such an alliance, was now 
peiliBcted ; and the reciprocal damages of war 
and all other offisneea were now buried in obUv- 
ion. Andy having already aettled all points to 
general satis&ction, they concurred in a suf- 
fiage, « to receive no herald nor embassy from 
liie Athenians^ till tiiey were withdrawn out 
of Peloponnesus, and had given up their forti- 
fications at Epidaurus ;" and fisffther, « for the 
fiitnxe to make neither peace nor war but with 
joint concurrence." Their attention was also 
extended to objects more remote; and in con- 
junction they despatched ambassadors to the 
citiee in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced 
Perdiccaa to swear adherence to their league : 
not that he instantly declared his revolt from 
the Athenians^ but he was bent on accomplish- 
ing it ever since he saw the Argives had done 
it ; linr he was originally descended from Argos. 
They renewed also their ancient oaths to the 
€^ fi^}0Si^^fi fi^ ^1 }^ strengdiened th**i n by the 
aomuoii 01 new. 

The Aigives also despatched an embassy to 
die Athenians, requiring them to quit the 
woriu they had raised at Epidaurus. The 
latter* sensible that their soldiers were but a 
handful of men when compared with those 
who were associated with them in that service, 
aent Demosthenes to draw them o£ He, 
iipon Ufl arrival, pretending to solemniie some 
martial game without the fortress, when the 
rest of the garrison was gone out to the spec- 
34 



tade, barred fast the gates. And afterwarda,* 
the Athenians, having renewed the peace with 
them* surrendered the fortifications they had 
raised, into the hands of the Epidaurians. 

When the Argives had in this manner gone 
off from the alliance, the Mantineans also, who 
at first stood out, finding at length that with- 
out the Argives they could do nothing of them* 
selves, thought proper to accommodate their 
disputes with the Lacedsmonians, and resigned 
their command over the cities of Arcadia. 
The Lacedemonians also and Argives, to the 
number of a thousand each, marched in com- 
pany to $icyon; where, principally by the 
presence of the Lacedemonians, the govem*^ 
ment was Shifted into the hands of a smaller 
number. And after transacting such points 
in concert, they soon procured the demolition 
of the popular government at Argos ; and an 
oligarchy, suited to the Lacedsmonian models 
was erected in its stead. 

As the winter was now in its dose, thsea 
transactions ran out nearly into the spring; 
and the fourteenth year of the war expired. 

TKAB XY»' 

In the following summer, the Bictideans of 
Athos revolted from the Athenians to the 
Chalddeans ; and the Lacedsmonitfis resettled 
the state of Achaia, which for a time had been 
under a management not agreeable to them. 

The people of Argos also, combining gra^ 
dually together and resuming their spirits, made 
an assault upon the few. They waited for a 
favourable opportunity, till the festival of the 
naked games was celebmting at Laoed«moiu 
A battle was fought within the precincts of 
Argos, in which the people was the victor; 
some of their opponents they slew, and otheiv 
they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedn^ 
monians, when their adherents implored their 
succour, were too dilatory in moving ; but at 
last they adjourned the games, and mart^hftit 
away to their support; and hearing, when 
they were come to Tegea, that <<tbe few 
were vanquished," they determined to pro* 
ceed no farther, mangre all the entreatiea of the 
new exiles ; but, retreating forthwith to 8parta» 
they resumed the celebration of the gamea. 
Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations 
from thoae in Argos, i^ well as by such as had 

> BclM«Clinft4M. 



210 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



been lately banished^ in the presence of the 
whole confederacy, after many arguments had 
been urged on both sides, they came to a re- 
solution, that " the Argives in the city were 
guilty of injustice ;" and a decree was passed, 
that "they should march against Argos/' 
But, after all/ their proceedings are dilatory 
and remiss. 

In the meantime, the people of Argos, 
dreading the Lacedemonian strength, and re- 
addressing themselves again to Athens for a 
renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute 
a plan which* they thought the strongest ex- 
pedient of preservation, built long walls quite 
down to the sea, that, in case they should be 
blocked up by land, all proper ^supplies might 
be thrown into the city by sea, through the good 
offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of 
new fortifications some cities also of Pelopon- 
nesus were privy underhand. The whole body 
of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, 
their wives, and their servants forwarded the 
work; and from Athens they were supplied 
with carpenters and masons. And here the 
summer ended. 

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedemonians, 
when advertised of these new fortifications, 
march their forces against Argos, their own, 
and all those of the allies, excepting the Co- 
rinthian. Some new projects in their favour 
were now also in agitation within Argos itself. 
The whole army was commanded by Agis, the 
son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedemo- 
nians. The new turns they expected for their 
service took not effect within the city ; but 
they made themselves masters of the new- 
erected walls, and levelled them with the 
ground. They also took Hysie, a town in 
Argia ; and having put all the freemen found 
within that place to the sword, they drew off, 
and dispersed to their several cities. 

After this, the Argives marched their force 
into Phliasia ; and, after ravaging that district, 
because the exiles firom Argos had met with a 
reception there, they again retired : for many 
of those exiles had taken up their residence at 
Phlius. 

In the same winter, the Athenians, exaspe- 
rated against Perdiccas, prevented all man- 
ner of importations into Macedonia. They 
charged him « with taking part in the late 
treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, 
between the Argives and Lacedemonians ; 
that, farther, when they had made great pre- 



parations against the Chalcideans of Thnce 
and Amphipolis, and Nicias, the son of Ni- 
ceratus, was appointed to command in that 
service, he had violated his obligations to act 
in concert, and that expedition came to no- 
thing purely through his secession: he was 
therefore an enemy to Athens." 

The winter expired in this manner; and 
with it the fifteenth year of the war canae also 
to an end. 

YEAB XVI.^ 

When summer came on, Alcibiades, with 
twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized 
three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to 
the Athenians, and adhei^nce to the Lacede- 
monian interest, was still suspected ; and these 
the Athenians secured in the neighbouring 
island, which were subject to their dominion. 

The Athenians also undertook the reduo* 
tion of Melos with a naval force, consisting of 
thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and 
two of Lesbians ; on board of which were 
transported twelve hundred heavy- armed Athe- 
nians, three hundred archers, and twenty who 
drew the bow on horseback. The number 
also of their dependents, from the continent 
and islands, which attended, was about fifteen 
hundred heavy-armed. The Melians are a 
colony of the Lacedemonians, ^ and had there- 

1 Before Christ 416. 

» The original of this colony is curious, according to 
the account given of it by Plutarch. — " When the Tyr- 
rhenes were masters of Leinnos and Injbrus, and made 
a practice of ravishing the wives of the Athenians, at 
Brauron, a mixed breed was the consequence; wboo, 
as half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out of the isles. 
Tims exiled, they repaired to Tsenarus, and were use- 
ful to the Spartans in their war against the Helots: 
They were afterwards rewarded for their good serricei 
with the freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermar- 
riage. Tet, not being allowed the honour of serving 
the offices of the state, or a seat in the council, they 
became afterwards suspected, as caballing together for 
had designs, and projecting to overthrow the constitn- 
tion : the Lacedeemonians therefore apprehended them 
all ; and, throwing them into prison, kept them cos- 
fined under a strong guard, till they could find oat 
clear and incontestable evidence against them. The 
wives of the prisoners came in a body to the prison, 
and, after much prayer and entreaty, were at length 
admitted by the guard to the sight and discoarse of 
their husbands. When once they had gained access, 
they ordered them immediately to strip, and change 
clothes with them : to leave them their own, and, 
dressed in those of their wives, to make their escape 
directly in that disguise. It was done ; the women 
staid behind, determined to endure whatever might be 



TXABXYI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



211 



fore refused to receive law from the Athenians 
in the same manner as the inhabitants of the 
other islands received it. At first, however, 
they observed a strict neutrality ; but, in pro- 
cess of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging 
their country, would have obliged them to act 
offensively, they open^ took part in the war 
ag^ainst them. 

With a force so strong as hath been de- 
scribed, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, 
and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, landed and 
encamped upon the island. Yet, before they 
proceeded tor hostilities, they sent a deputation 
from the army to demand a conference ; whom 
the Melians refused to introduce into the as- 
sembly of the people, but, in the presence only 
of the magistrates and the few, commanded 
them to deliver their instructions. Upon this 
the Athenian deputation expressed themselves 
aa followeth: 

"Since to the people in full assembly we 
are precluded from speaking, lest the many, — 
hearing their true interest declared at once by 
us in a continued discourse, and proved by ar- 
guments fitted to persuade and too strong to be 
refuted, — ^might be wrought into our views, 
for such, we are sensible, is the plain construc- 
tion of this our guarded audience by the few ; 
to you also, who now sit here, we recommend 
a method of making that point yet more secure, 
— ^that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not 
your objections for one formal deliberate reply, 
but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, 
you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the 
point. And tell us, first, whether or not this 
proposal be agreeable.'* 

The Melians, who composed the synod, an- 
swered thus: • 

« The candour of such leisurely debate, for 
mutual information, is not to be disapproved ; 
and yet there seemeth to be great inconsistency 
between such candour and those warlike pre- 



the consequence; and the guards, deceived by ap- 
pearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. 
They marched off and seized Taygeta ; then seduced 
the Helots to revolt, and promised to support them ; 
which struck a great terror amongst the Spartans. 
They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter 
on these conditions : * that they should have their 
wives restored safe to them ; should be furnished with 
money and vessels for removal ; and, when settled in 
another country, should be reckoned a colony and 
kinsmen of the Lacedsemonians.'— A. body of them 
settled some time after in the isle of Melos.'* Of the 
Firtves of WofMn. 



parations, with which yon no longer intend 
hereafter, but in present act have already beset 
us. For we perceive, that hither you are 
come to be authoritative judges of your own 
plea, and that the decision must needs prove 
fatal to us: since if, superior in debate, we 
for that reason refuse submission, our portion 
must be war ; and, if we allow your pled, from 
that moment we become your slaves.'^ 

Atheniaits. — « To what purpose this 1 If 
here you are met together to retail your suspi- 
cions of future events, or to talk of any thing 
but the proper means of extricating and pre- 
serving your state from the present and mani- 
fest dangers which environ it, we had better be 
silent : but,' if the latter be your purpose, let 
us come to the point.'* 

Meliaiv^s. — « There . is reason for it, and 
there ought to be forgiveness, when. men, so 
situated as we are, are liable to much distrac- 
tion both in speech and thought. The point 
for which we are assembled is, it is true, no 
less than our future preservation : if, therefore, 
it must be so, let the conference proceed in the 
method you require.'* 

Athex. — « As, therefore, it is not our pur- 
pose to amuse you with pompous details, — how, 
after completely vanquishing the Mede, we had 
a right to assume the sovereignty, or how, pro- 
voked by the wrongs received from you, we 
come hither to earn redress, — ^we shall wave 
all parade of words that have no tendency to- 
wards conviction : and, in return, insist from 
you, that you reject all hopes of persuading us 
by frivolous remonstrances, — that, as a colony 
of the Lacedemonians, you were incapacitated 
from accompanying our arms, or that wrongs 
in any shape you have never done us. — But, 
these things apart, let us lay all stress on such 
points as may really, on both sides, be judged 
persuasive : since of this you are as strongly 
convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it, — 
that, in all human competitions, equal wants 
ajone produce equitable determination; and, 
in what terms soever the powerful enjoin obe- 
dience, to those the weak are obliged to sub- 
mit" 

Mbl. — « If this be so, we boldly aver, — 
for, as you have discarded justice from the 
question, and substituted interest in its place, 
we must follow the precedent,— that you also 
it concemeth, we should not be deprived of the 
common privilege of men ; but that to human 
creatures, ever liable to so dangerous a loss, the 



212 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



plew of raaMn and equity, even though urged 
beyond their exact limitations, should he in- 
dulged and allowed their weight. And moie 
to you than to others is this proper to he sug- 
gested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its 
fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may 
teach your enemies how you ought to be 
treated." 

Athek. — « That affecteth us not : for, 
though to our share an overthrow of empire 
iall, the event would render us neither abject 
nor defending ; because men, inured to en- 
larged command, as the Lacedemonians for 
instance, are never terrible to the vanquished. 
But our contest, at present, is not against the 
Lacedemonians. That revenge alone is terri- 
ble, when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain 
the ascendant over such as were once their 
masters; and truly, to avert such dangerous 
extremities, be the care intrusted to us. But, 
on the present occasion, that we are here for 
die enlargement of our own power, and that 
what we have to urge concemeth the preser- 
vation of the state of Melos — these are the 
points we are to establish. We are desirous 
to have our power extended over you without 
obstruction ; and your preservation to be amply 
secured for the common benefit of us both.'' 

MsL. — « And how can it turn out as bene- 
ficial for us to become your slaves as it will for 
you to be our masters V* 

Athek. — " Plainly thus : — ^because, instead 
of suffering the extremities of conquest, you 
may merely become our subjects ; and we, by 
exempting you from a total destruction, shall 
gain your service." 

Mel. — ^«But will not these terms content 
you: — that we be permitted to persevere in 
quiet: to be friends to you, instead of ene- 
aiies; but, in regard to war, to be strictly 
jieutral 1" 

Atheit. — " No : for all your enmity cannot 
hurt us so much as the acceptance of such 
friendship from you. The latter, to those over 
whom we rule, would suggest intimations of 
our weakness : your enmity is a proof of our 
power." 

Mel« — " Are your subjects then such sorry 
judges of equity and right, as to place upon the 
same level those who are under no manner of 
lie, and who were never indebted for their 
settlement to you, and those who, revolting 
^m you, have been again redi(ced V* 

Atbxit. — « Why should they not? They 



know such a sense of things may be well 
grounded in regard to both ; inasmuch as those, 
who are exempted from our yoke, owe such 
exemption to their own superior strength, and 
if we attack them not, it is the pure result of 
fear. And hence, the reduction of yoo, be- 
sides enlarging our empire, will invest it with 
more ample security ; especially when, seated 
on an island, you are bound to submit to the 
masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth 
too weak for resistance, unless your are victori- 
ous at the present crisis." 

Mel. — « Do you then conclude that what 
we have proposed is incompatible with your 
own security 1 — For since, excluding us from 
the plea of justice, you endeavour merely to 
persuade us into subserviency to your interest, 
we also are again necessitated to insist once 
more on the profitable to ourselves, and, by 
showing that with our welfare your own ahe 
coincideth, endeavour to prevail. — What think 
you of all those states which now stand neutrd 
in your disputes 1 How will you avoid their im- 
placable hatred when, terrified at such your 
usage of us, they must live in constant expects* 
tion of your hostilities ? And whither can such 
conduct tend, but to enlarge the number of your 
declared enemies, and to constrain others, who 
never designed to be your foes, to take up arms 
against you, though to their ovfji regret ?" 

Athek.— « That never can be: since ttom 
states seated on the continent we have nothing 
to apprehend; they are under no immediate 
necessity of guarding their tiberty against at- 
tiacks firom us. Those alone we dread who 
are seated in islands ; and who, like you, refoss 
our government ; or who, having felt the pains 
of subjection, are irritated against us. Such 
are most likely to have recourse to violent 
measures, and to plunge themselves and us into 
imminent dangers." 

Mel.— « If this be so; — and if you, ye 
Athenians, can readily embark into so. many 
perils to prevent the dissolution of your own 
empire ; if states, by you enslaved, can do ai 
much to throw off your yoke ; — ^must it not be 
wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who yet 
are free, to leave any method, even to the lait 
extremity, untried, of averting slavery V* 

Atrek.^— ^< If you judge of things as wise 
men ought, we answer — Not. For the point 
in which your are at present concerned, is not a 
trial of valour upon equal terms, in oider to 
escape the reproach of cowardice ; but your 



YSASZVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



218 



delibentioiiB proceed at present about the 
means of self-preservation, that yon may not 
be obliged to encounter those who must by far 
overpower you." 

Mel. — «But we, on the contrary, know, 
that the enterprises of war have sometimes very 
difierent events to those which superiority of 
numbers gave reason to expect ; and, in regard 
to ourselves, that, if we yield at once, eternal 
despair must be our fate ; but, by acting reso- 
lately in our own defence, we may yet enter- 
tain a hope of success.'' 

Athsbt. — «Hope in this manner is ever 
applied to be the solace of danger. And truly, 
in situations which can afford to be disap- 
jK>inted, though ever prejudicial, it is not al- 
ways fatal. But such as idly lavish their last 
resource, their very all, upon hope, (for it is 
prodigal by nature,) are only by their own ruin 
convinced of its delusion ; nay, when its delu- 
sion is thus by sad experience discovered, and 
men should guard themselves against it, it will 
not yet let go its hold in the human heart 
Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for 
yourselves in your present destitute situation, 
hanging as you are on the very brink of ruin. 
Let not your conduct resemble the foolish be- 
haviour of the mob of mankind ; who, though 
by human means their safety might be earned, 
yet, when calamity hath chased away all visible 
hopes of redress, betake themselves to others 
of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracfes, 
and all such vain expedients as hope suggesteth 
to draw them to their destruction." 

Mel.— ^< Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, 
and you well know, the contest must prove to 
ns against your strength and fortune, matched 
as we are so unequally together. Yet the 
confidence still supporteth us, that in fortune, 
since of divine disposal, we shall not be in- 
ferior, as with innocence on our side we stand 
against injustice ; that, farther, our deficiencies 
in strength will be amplified by the addition of 
Lacedsmonian aid ; since it is incumbent upon 
them to sui^rt us, if from no other motive, 
yet from the ties of blood and a sense of 
honour* And thus it is not entirely without 
good grounds that we can form die resolution 
to vrithstand your efforts." 

Atbxit,— -<« Nor have we any reason to ap- 
prehend, on our own account, that the divine 
benevolence will not equally exert itself for us ; 
because neither oar opinions nor our acts are 
worse dian those of the rest of mankind, either 



in regard to the worship of the gods or an ac- 
knowledgment of their providence. For of the 
divine nature we think like the rest of the 
world ; and of men, that beyond a scruple they 
are impelled, by the necessary bent of their 
nature, to seize dominion wherever they have 
power. As for ourselves, we were not the 
authors of this constitution, nor were we the 
first who digested it into practice. We found 
it already in force ; we have accordingly applied 
it, and shall leave it behind us for the practice 
of every future age; conscious that you your- 
selves, and every other 'state, invested vrith 
equal power, would make the same exertion of 
it. And truly, so fiir as relateth to the gods, 
we have no more reason to distrust their pro- 
tection than our neighbours, But your senti- 
ments of the Lacedsmonians are such, that you 
are confident of support from them because it 
will be base in them to refuse it. Here we 
bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. 
The LacedflBmonians, we allow, amongst one 
another, and in paying all due regard to the 
laws of their country, give ample proofs of 
honour and virtue : but their behaviour towards 
the rest of mankind, though it would open a 
large field of censure were it to be minutely 
examined, yet at present shall be shown by one 
concise declaration,^-that according to the best 
lights we have been able to collect, they repute 
as honourable the things which please them, 
and as just the things which promote their in- 
terest Such maxims are not in the least con- 
ducive to your preservation : it is all chimera." 

Mel. — « No. We ground our hopes of relief 
from them upon their own clear conviction of 
what their interest enjoineth them. This never 
can suffer them to entertain a thought of 
abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of 
their own ; of being faithless to the states of 
Greece, who wish them well ; or of promoting 
the schemes of the common foe." 

AxHEiTt — " Of consequence you imagine,^— 
that, their interest is connected with your se- 
curity ; that the duties of justice idiould in hon- 
our be observed, though attended with dangers. 
But these are maxims which the Lacedemo- 
nians, least of all men, have resolution enough 
to observe in fiict." 

Mel. — « We have the strongest grounds to 
imagine, that in our defence they will hazard 
any dangersy fimm a sense diat their own pre- 
servation dependeth more on us than any other 
people, as we are finely situated for doing them 



214 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



■errice in Peloponnesus, and in affection are 
more faithfully attached to them through the 
bands of consanguinity/' 

Athsk. — « But the certainty of obtaining 
succour in the intervals of need seemeth not to 
depend so much on the merit of those who im- 
plore it, as on the consciousness of superior 
strength in those who are implored to give it : 
a maxim this, to which no state adheres so 
strictly as the Lacedemonian. Hence, ever 
through a diffidence of their own domestic 
force, they never dare even to invade their 
neighbours without the concurrence of numer- 
ous allies. There cannot, therefore, be the least 
room to expect, that they will transport an 
aid into an island whilst we are masters of the 



)) 



sea. 

Mel. — " Not perhaps of their own forces ; 
but they have confederates enough to employ 
in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and 
spacious ; a passage through it, even the lords 
of the sea will find it more difficult to obstract, 
than those who are intent on stealing it, to 
effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in 
the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion 
upon your territory, or against the remainder 
of your dependents who escaped the effi)rts of 
Brasidas. And then your attention and your 
arms must be drawn from a quarter where you 
have no right to fix them, for the necessary 
defence of your own home and your own ap- 
pendage." 

Athen. — "Though such turns may inter- 
vene, your own experience should teach you to 
distrust them : for you are not, cannot be ig- 
norant, that the Athenians never yet would 
condescend to raise a siege through hostile 
dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that, 
in the whole course of this debate, though de- 
clared by you to be held as the means of your 
preservation, you have not so much as started 
one single point upon which wise men can pre- 
sume to fasten the least confidence of redress. 
Your firmest security is placed in the faint hope 
of some distant contingencies ; but your pre- 
sent strength is merely trifling against the ex- 
tensive scope of your antagonists. Nay, vic- 
tims you must fall to your own absurd pre- 
sumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn 
to give you time to consult, you determine to 
tiy some other expedient. You will th^n no 
longer be controlled by that sense of shame, 
which, when dishonour glareth before and dan- 



ger presseth on, precipitateth men into ruin. 
For though they see, with their eyes quite 
open, into what an abyss they are going to 
plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what 
the world styleth dishonour, — so prevalent is 
the force of one bewitching sound ! — ^though 
vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, 
wilfully embarrassing themselves with incura- 
ble calamities, and contracting a more shame- 
ful weight of dishonour, through their own mad 
obstinacy, than fortune could award them. 
Such consequences, you are now concerned by 
mature deliberations to avoid. You are next 
to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying 
under the force of a most formidable state ; a 
state which designeth to make the moderate 
demands alone, — ^that you would accept her al- 
liance, and securely enjoy your territory upon 
the condition only to pay her tribute; and, 
when war or safety are left to your own op- 
tion, that you would not peevishly prefer the 
worse. For those are the men to maintain 
themselves in credit and prosperity, who never 
suiTer their equals to insult them, who pay 
proper regard to their superiors, and towards 
their inferiors behave with moderation, Re- 
flect on these points whilst we withdraw ; and 
remember, again and again, that your country 
now calleth for all your prudence, since, by the 
single deliberation of this single day, as either 
it taketh a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate 
will be determined." 

Here the Athenians withdrew from the con- 
ference ; and the Melians, after beii^ some 
time alone, and resolving finally to reject what 
they had already refused, gave in their answer 
thus : 

« We continue, Athenians, in the very same 
sentiments we have already declared. We 
shall not in an instant of time abandon that 
liberty which, in the free possession of oor 
own state, we have enjoyed for the space of 
seven hundred ^^ears; which still we shall 
spare no endeavours to preserve, intrusting it 
to that fortune which, by divine permission, 
hath hitherto preserved it, and to that redress 
we expect from human aid and the Lacede- 
monians. But thus much again we offer:— 
to be friends to you, enemies to neither, on 
condition you quit our lands, after an accom- 
modation ratified between us to our reciprocal 
satisfaction." 

The Melians in this manner delivered their 



YEABXVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



215 



final answer. But the Athenians, the very 
moment they quitted the place of conference, 
uttered themselves thus : 

<< You, Melians, alone of all mankind, are 
the persons, so far as we can ji^dge, who re- 
gard future contingencies as an over-halance 
for instant dangers, and, through mad presump- 
tion, value things yet invisible as really, actuaL 
But, the greater your dependence, the more 
rash, your confidence upon Lacedemonians, 
upon fortune, and upon hope, the more abun- 
dantly fatal your delusions will prove/' 

And, this said, the Athenian deputation re- 
turned to their camp. 

But the Athenian commanders, upon this 
refusal of submission from the Melians, applied 
themselves instantly to the acts of war ; and, 
dividing the work in shares to the several 
parties in their army, completely shut up the 
Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, 
"w^hen this was perfected, and a sufficient num- 
ber, both of the Athenians and their depen- 
dents, were appointed to stay behind and con- 
tinue the blockade both by land and sea, they 
departed with the bulk of their forces. Those, 
farther, who were left for this service, staid 
behind and continued the blockade. 

About the same time, the Argives, making 
an irruption into Phliasia, and caught in an 
ambuscade laid for them by the Phliasians, and 
their own exiles, were slaughtered to the num- 
ber of eighty. 

The Athenians, by their excursions from 
Pylus, committed many depredations on the 
Lacedsmonians. But these had not influence 
enough upon the Lacedemonians to cause a 
renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the 
war. They only proclaimed, that, " their peo- 
ple had free leave to make reprisals on the 
Athenians." 

The Corinthians also had a war with the 



Athenians, on account of some private diffexw 
ences between them ; but the rest of Pelopon- 
nesus interfered not in the quarrel. 

The Melians, farther, assaulting it by night, 
carried that part of the Athenian circumvalla- 
lation which lay close to their market. They 
slew the guards who were posted there ; and, 
having gained a conveyance into the town for 
provisions, and all necessary stores they could 
procure by money, they afterwards withdrew, 
and discontinued all efforts of resistance : but 
the Athenians took care for the future to 
place a stronger guard upon their works. And 
here the summer ended. 

In the winter which followed, the Lacede- 
monians drew out their forces in order to begin 
an expedition into Argia ; but, when the vic- 
tims offered on the frontiers boded no success 
to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet 
the Argives, as such an invasion had been in- 
tended against them, suspected it was owing 
to the intrigues of a faction vdthin their city ; 
some of whom they immediately secured, but 
the rest escaped by flight. 

About the same time also, the Melians 
carried another part of the Athenian circum- 
vallation, as the party by which it was guarded 
was not numerous. But, upon such distur- 
bances, a strong reinforcement was sent from 
Athens, under the command of Philocrates, 
the son of Demeas. The Melians were now 
closely invested on all sides ; and, some schemes 
to betray the town being in agitation amongst 
them, they thought proper to make a volun- 
tary surrender. This they did « at the dis- 
cretion of the Athenians ;"' who put to death 
all they found within the place able to bear 
arms, and made the women and children slaves. 
The town they afterwards re-peopled by send- 
ing thither a colony of five hundred. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK VI. 



The Athenlanf resolve on the expedition to Sicily. Description of that island.— Ykar XYII. The debate in 
the assembly of the people at Athens about the expedition. The generals nominated with full powers. The 
affair of the Mercuries. Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. Proceedings at Syracuse. The Athenian 
fleet arrives on the coast of Italy. Alcibiades recalled, to take his trial about the Mercuries and profanatioa 
of the Mysteries. A digression,— containing the true account of a former revolution at Athens, begun by 
Harmodius and Aristogiton. Alcibiades flies, and is proclaimed a traitor. The Athenians land at Syracuse. 
A battle ensues, in which the Athenians are victorious ; but, soon after, they return to Catana. The negotiS' 
tions at Camarina. Alcibiades at Sparta.— XVII r. The Athenians land again at Syracuse, take Epipolc by 
■orprise, and begin to invest Syracuse in form. Battles ; The Athenians carry on their worlu ; counterwork 
of the Syrocusans. Aid sent to Syracuse from Peloponnesus, under the command of Gylippus ; he arrives at 
Tarentum. The Atheniansi by openly Joining the Argives against the liScedoDmonians, violate the treaty 
of peace in Greece. 



Iv the same winter the Athenians came to a 
resolution, to make a second expedition against 
Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent 
thither heretofore, under Laches and Euryme- 
don, and to attempt its total reduction. The 
bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of 
the largeness of the island, and of the multitude 
of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it 
was inhabited; ignorant, farther, that they 
were going to embark in a war, not much less 
considerable than the Peloponnesian. 

The compass of Sicily is little under eight 
day's sail for a trading vessel ; and, though it 
be so large, it is severed from the main land, 
80 as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, 
in breadth about twenty stadia.* The manner 
in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages 
was this ; and the several nations which pos- 
sessed it these. 

The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be 
the most ancient inhabitants of some part of 
this country ; but, from what stock they were 
derived, or from whence they came hither, or 
what is become of them since, I have nothing 



< About two miles. 



86 



to relate. Poetical amusements must here 8uf« 
fice, or such information as every man picks up 
for his own use. 

The Sicanians appear to be the first people 
who, next those, inhabited this country ; though, 
according to their own accounts, they are prior ; 
because they claim to themselves the original 
tenure : but, according to the truest discoveries, 
they are found to have been Iberians, who 
were compelled to remove from the banks of 
the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And 
from them, at that time, this island received 
the name of Sicania, having before been called 
Trinacria. They continue, to this day, to in* 
habit the western parts of Sicily. 

After the taking of Troy, some of the Tro- 
jans, who had escaped the Achaeans, arrive in 
their vessels upon the Sicilian shore, and, form- 
ing a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, 
they all took jointly the name of Elymi ; and 
their cities were £ryx and Egesta. They were 
also increased by the accession of some Phocians 
from Troy, who, having first been driven to 
Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from 
thence into Sicily. 

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from 

217 



218 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



Italy, for there they originally dwelled. They 
fled before the Opici ; and as the story is told, 
not without probability, having observed how 
the current set within the strait, and seized a 
favourable gale they crossed over upon rafts, 
and perhaps by some other methods. There ' 
are, even to this very day, a people in Italy 
called Siculi ; and that region, in a similar 
manner, obtained its name of Italy from a cer- 
tain Arcadian king, who bore the name of Ita- 
lus. These, crossing into Sicily with formid- 
able numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians 
in battle, drove them into the southern and 
western parts, caused the name of the island 
to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled 
themselves in, and kept possession of, the rich- 
est tracts in the country, since their passage 
hither was near three himdred years earlier than 
the landing of any Grecians in Sicily, Nay, 
they continue, to this very day, in possession 
of the midland and northerly parts of the is- 
land. 

The Phoenicians also had settlements quite 
round the coast of Sicily. They secured the 
capes on the sea and the small circumjacent 
isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sici- 
lians. But when the Grecians, in considerable 
numbers, began to cross over and fix their 
residence here, the Phcenicians abandoned their 
other settlements, and, uniting together, seated 
themselves at Motya, and Soloeis, and Panor- 
mus, near to the Ely mi ; secure of their own 
continuance in these quarters from their friend- 
ship with the filymi, and because, from this 
part of Sicily, the passage to Carthage is ex- 
ceeding short. — So many were the barbarians 
seated in Sicily ; and such the order of their 
settlements. 

The first Grecians who came hither were 
the Chalcideans of Eubcea. Thucles led the 
colony which settled at Naxus, and erected the 
altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to be 
seen without the city ; and on which the depu- 
tations, sent from hence to the oracles, offer 
sacrifice before they begin their voyage. 

In the year following, Archias, a Corinthian, 
of the race of Hercules, founded S3nracuse, 
having previously expelled the Sicilians out of 
that island on which the inner cify is seated, 
though now no longer washed round about by 
the sea. And, in process of time, the upper 
city also, being taken in by a wall, became ex- 
ceeding populous. 

In the fifth year after the foundation of 



Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcideans sallied 
forth out of Naxus ; and having, by force of 
arms, drove away the Sicilians, they build 
Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the 
Cataneans themselves declared Evarchus their 
founder. 

About the eime point of time, Lamis also, 
leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, 
and planted them on a spot called Trotilus, 
upon the river Pantacias. But, removing 
afterwards from thence to Reontium, he asso- 
ciated himself a short time with the Cataneans 
for the protection of his party ; yet, being 
ejected by them, and then having founded 
Thapsus, he dies. His followers, upon this, 
removed from Thapsus; and Hyblon, a Sici- 
lian king, betraying another place into thfeir 
hands, and becoming himself their condoctor, 
they settled those Megareans who are called Hy- 
blsan ; and, after a continued possession of two 
hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled 
out of their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant 
of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejectment, 
about a hundred years after their settlement 
there, they had sent out Pammilus, and built the 
city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither 
more lately from Megara, their mother city, 
and assisted them in making this new settle- 
ment at Selinus. 

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimns 
from Crete, each leading a separate colony, 
founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth 
year after the foundation of Syracuse. The 
name of this new city was taken from the 
river Gela : yet the spot where the city now 
stands, and which was first walled round, is 
called Lindii. But their polity was framed 
upon the Doric model. 

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as 
possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans 
built Acragas, giving the city its name from the 
river Acragas. • They declared Aristonous and 
Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil 
institutions of Gela. 

Zancle was originally founded by a band of 
pirates, who arrived there from Cyme, a 
Chalcidic city in Opicia; though afterwards 
a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and 
the rest of Euboea joined them, and possessed 
that district in community. The fonnden 
were Perieres and Cratiemenes ; one of them 
from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the 
name of Zancle was first of all given it by the 
Sicilians, because in shape it bears a resemblance 



XVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



219 



to a scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe zan- 
clum. But, in process of time, these people were 
driven from thence by the Samians and other 
lonians, who flying from the Medes, had land- 
ed in Sicily. And, after a short interval, An- 
axilas, tyrant of the Rhegians, ejected the 
Samians, repeopled the city with a number of 
mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to 
Mcssene, in honour of the country from whence 
he was originally descended, Himera also was 
founded from Zancle by Euclides, and Simus, 
and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very 
numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles 
farther from Syracuse, who had been worsted 
in a sedition, and were distinguished by the 
title of Miletids, took up their residence 
amongst them. Hence their dialect became a 
mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric ; but 
the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil in- 
stitutions. 

AcrsB and Casmens were founded by the 
Syracusans; Ackb seventy years after Syra- 
cuse, and CasmensB near twenty after Acrs. 
Camarina also was first founded by the Syra- 
cusans, Very nearly one hundred and thirty-five 
years after the building of Syracuse ; its founders 
were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Cam- 
arineans being afterwards driven out by the 
arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in 
process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, 
received the lands of the Camarineans as a ran- 
som for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and 
taking upon himself to be their founder, 
replanted Camarina. Yet once more, again it 
was demolished by Gelon; and replanted a 
third time by the same Gelon. So many 
nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited 
Sicily. 

An island so large and so populous the 
Athenians were passionately bent on invading. 
Their truest and final view was, to compass 
its total reduction ; but the pretext, alleged for 
a colour, was their readiness to succour such 
as by blood were related, or by prior alliances 
had been attached, to them. An Egestean em- 
bassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the 
point with all possible industry, and with ex- 
traordinary earnestness pressed them to engage 
in it. For the Egesteans, who bordered upon 
the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war 
with the latter, about some connubial points, 
and a certain tract of land to which both laid 
claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by 
their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them 



both by land and sea. And hence, the Eges- 
teans were now suggesting at Athens, that 
« they ought not to forget their alliance with 
the Leontines, made by Laches in the former 
war;** requesting farther, that a naval force 
might be sent thither for their succour. To 
this purpose many other arguments were al- 
leged by them, but the principal was this : « If 
the Syracusans, who have overthrown the 
Leontines, be. left in the unmolested enjoyment 
of their conquest, and proceed still farther to 
destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, 
they will get into their hands the whole power 
of Sicily. Such an event would be attended 
with the utmost danger ; lest in consequence 
of it, as they were Doric by descent, they 
might think themselves bound by the ties of 
blood to assist with a powerful armament their 
kindred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, 
might succour those Peloponnesians by whom 
they were originally planted, and thus form a 
combination to demolish the Athenian empire. 
In policy, therefore, the Athenians were 
obliged to support the allies who yet remained, 
in order to make head against the Syracusans ; 
and this the more readily, as they themselves 
would undertake to furnish them with sums of 
money equal to the exigencies of the war." 
With such discourse the Athenians were fre- 
quently entertained in their popular assemblies, 
as the Egestean ambassadors, still urging their 
point, had gained many advocates to second 
their arguments. And at length it was decreed, 
that " ambassadors should be previously des- 
patched to Egesta to inspect the state of their 
wealth, whether they had such sums as they 
talked of in the public treasury and the tem- 
ples ; and also to draw up a report of the pre- 
sent posture of their war against the Selinun- 
tians. And, in pursuance of this, the ambas- 
sadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily. 

The Lacedsmonians, in the ' same winter^ 
joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, 
and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part 
of that territory, and carried off the com, hav- 
ing brought carriages for that purpose. They 
also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and 
left them a small detachment from their main 
army for the security of their persons. A 
temporary truce being also made, during which 
the Omeats and Argives were to .abstain 
from all hostilities against one another, they 
drew off the army to their respective homes. 

However not long after this, the Athenians 



220 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in. 



«mTed with thirty Bail of ships and six 
hundred heavy-armed. The Argives in con- 
junction with the Athenians, took the field 
with all their strength, and besieged those in 
Omea for the space of a day. But, as at 
night the besiegers removed to a distance in 
order for repose, those of Omea made their es- 
cape. On the day following, the Argives, 
when sensible of their escape, levelled Omea 
with the ground, and then withdrew. And 
afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for 
Athens. 

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party 
of horsemen into Methone, a frontier town of 
Macedonia. With these, consisting of their 
own citizens and such Macedonians as had re- 
fuged among them, they harassed the country 
belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedaemoni- 
ans sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the 
Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms with 
the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth 
day : these however refused to march. Thus 
ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth 
year of the war, of which Thucydides hath 
c<Hnpiled the history. 

T£AB XYII.^ 

In the succeeding summer, very early in the 
spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned 
from Sicily, accompanied by the Egesteans. 
They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, 
being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the 
equipment of which for succour they were in- 
stracted to solicit from the Athenians. Upon 
this, an assembly of the people was called, and 
the reports of the Egestean and their own am- 
bassadors were received, consisting of many 
points, specious indeed, but false in fact ; and, so 
far as related to their treasure, that << sums ample 
enough are already reposited in their temples 
and their public treasury." In consequence of 
this, a decree was made that « a fleet of sixty 
ships should sail for Sicily ; the commanders, 
Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the 
son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,^ the son of 

< Before Christ 415. 

* Lamachufl, the third in thia commlaBion, seems to 
have been picked out for the command for the peculiar 
constitution of his own character, which was a proper 
mean between the cautions and phlegmatic disposition 
<tf Nicias and the fiery impetuous ardour of Alcibiades. 
He was now (according to Plutarch) a brave old expe- 
rienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable 
for heat and fire ; a length of service and years mellowed 
him into the right temper, to deliberate beforehand, and 



Xenophanes, to be invested with full pow«i 
to act at their own discretion. The whole 
armament to i^ct as an aid to the Egesteans 
against the Selinuntians ; to replace also the 
Leontines in their former habitations, if the 
state of the war gave them leisure to execute 
that service ; and to manage all other points in 
Sicily as they should judge most beneficial lor 
the Athenian interest." 

But the fifth day after this, another assembly 
of the people was held upon the ways and 
means to expedite the equipment of the fleet, 
and by proper decrees to supply the command' 
ers with what might be requisite to accelerate 
their departure. Nicias, who against his wiB 
had been named for a conmiander, was per- 
suaded that the public determinations were 
rash and* premature, since, on short examina- 
tion, and motives merely specious, they were 
bent on the total reduction of Sicily, — an ar- 
duous undertaking! now therefore he stood 
up ; and, having a mind to stop proceedings, 
he advised the Athenians as follows : 

" I am aware that the present assembly is 
held to concert the means of expediting oui 
preparations, and to get all in readiness for the 
expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, 
we ought once more to resume the considera- 
tion of the previous point, < Whether upon the 
whole it be advisable to equip out such a fleet;* 
and not, by rash and premature resolves on 
points of such vast importance, through too 
easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to 
embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For 
my own part, troly, I am invested with honour 
by the present measures, and no man upon 
earth is so little anxious about his own person- 
then gallantly to carry the point into execution. Bnt 
then, he wanted the means of properly supporting tbe 
authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked 
with two of the most wealthy and noble Athenians; 
whereas his own condition was low ; nay, he was (ac- 
cording to Plutarch) so exceedingly poor, that before he 
went to any foreign command, he was used to petitioa 
the state for a little money to furnish him out. and even 
to buy him some shoes. Mr Wass, in bis notes oa 
Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of 
Aristophanes, (The Acharnians;) that is, to inqoiic 
after the character of a plain blunt officer from a pro- 
fessed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridicaled all 
mankind. Aristophanes hath represented Launacbos 
as a vain-glorious roaring buUy, a mere thing of ams, 
a creature of verbal pomp and parade ; contrary to 
all the truth of history. Writers who live by tiuaiag 
great and good men into ridicule, should never be 
reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of 
characters, when history dissents. 



VfiAB XVU.] 



peloponnesiAn war. 



1^1 



•1 safety. But at the same time I pronoance 
that person to be a valuable member of the 
public, who makes use of all bis prudence to pre- 
serve his own life and property ; for such a one 
purely for his own private benefit, must be desir- 
ous that the public welfare flourish and abound. 
But, however, neither in the preceding assem- 
blies could the pre-eminence of honour award- 
ed to me bias me to speak in contradiction to 
my judgment: nor shall it bias me at present; 
but what I think tends most to the public good, 
that only shall I utter. 

« I am also sensible, that what I can urge 
may have but little influence on Athenians' 
tempers, when I attempt persuading you to se- 
cure what you already possess, and to hazard 
the present for things invisible and future : but 
that your eagerness is quite unseasonable ; and 
that the ends which you too sanguinely propose 
are not easy to be accomplished ; — these things 
I shall clearly demonstrate. 

« To this purpose I aver, that, if the in- 
tended expedition proceeds, you are going to 
leave many enemies behind you here, and to 
take the most certain method of fetching hither 
more numerous opponents. You imagine, 
perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly and 
constantly observed ; though it is merely a no- 
minal peace, and that only so long as you remain 
inactive. Nay, such it hath been made by the , 
conduct of some even of our own community. 
And, should any considerable force of ours 
have the unhappiness to sink under hostile 
efforts, our ,old enemies will be suddenly upon 
us ; since merely by calamities they were re- 
duced to an accommodation, and, in a manner 
more disgraceful to themselves than to us, were 
necessitated to treat. In the next place, we 
have found, that in the treaty itself many arti- 
cles are still controverted. There are, farther, 
divers states, and those by no means the weak- 
est, who have not accepted the accommoda- 
tion ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms 
against us; whilst others are inhibited merely 
by ten-day truces, and that only because the 
Lacedsmonian measures are hitherto pacific. 
But suddenly, perhaps, when once they find 
our strength divided, the very measure into 
which we are now precipitating ourselves, 
they may fall upon us in a general combination 
augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose 
■eoeflsion to their former confederacy they 
would have been glad to purchase at any price. 
On these posabilities we are bound sedately to 



reflect, that we may not plunge a state, so high- 
ly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor fondly 
covet to wrest their empire from the bands 
of others before we have adequately ensur- 
ed our own, since the Chalcideans of Thrace, 
though so many years are now elapsed since 
they first revolted, are not yet reduced ; and 
some other states on the continent render us 
only a precarious obedience. 

«Yet — <to the Egesteans, our old allies, 
who are injuriously oppressed, we are bound in 
honour to send a most speedy succour.' — ^And, 
in the meantime, we continue to defer aveng- 
ing ourselves upon those whose revolt from us 
is of long standing now, and whose injustice 
we are still obliged to suffer. Though the 
latter, could we once bring them back to their 
duty, we might easily control for the future : 
but the former, should we ever become their mas- 
ters, remote and numerous as they are, we should 
not without difficulty be ablo to awe. It must 
be madness, therefore, to invade that people, 
whom, though conquered, you can never retain 
in their obedience ; and who, in case the attempt 
against them miscarry, will for the future be 
much more disaffected towards you than they 
were before that attempt was made. 

« But it is farther my real opinion, that the 
Sicilians, as their affairs are now circumstan- 
tiated, would become less fomiidable to us, if 
once reduced to the Syracusan yoke ;-— and yet 
on this remote contingency the Egesteans have 
chiefly insisted, in order to alarm us. Perhaps 
now it may come to pass, that its single states 
may combine against us to gratify the Lacede- 
monians ; but, in the other case, it is quite im- 
probable that a united empire would hazard 
its own welfare to demolish another. For if, 
acting from a political precaution, they may 
side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our 
empire, those very Peloponnesians may proba- 
bly, from the same principle, concur with us to 
demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Gt^ 
cians there may have reason to dread us most 
if we go not at all amongst them ; and, what 
is next to that, if we only give them a sight 
of our power for a short time, and then with- 
draw. But if, acting offensively, we incur mis- 
carriage, they will instantly despise us, and 
join our neighbouring foes to annoy us here. 
For things that are placed most remotely firom 
us, as Ukewise those which yield no opportunity 
of adjusting our opinion of them by experience, 
such, it is universally known, are mo(rt apt to 
2A 



222 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vi. 



excite admiiation. Reflect, ye citizens of 
Athens, that your present elevation of spirits 
is owing to your success against the Laceds- 
monians and allies. You crouched for fear 
under their first attacks ; till, having gained the 
superiority over them, to their utter disappoint- 
ment, you instantly despised them. And now, 
nothing less than Sicily can content you. We 
by no means ought to be too much buoyed up 
by thfi disasters of our foes, but only to be so 
far confident as we are able to awe their in- 
triguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other 
view to the Lacedemonians, than a vigilant care 
to seize the first opportunity of wiping off their 
disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recover- 
ing their former reputation ; and that they are 
moat earnest on accomplishing this, since, from 
time immemorial, the glory of military valour 
hath been their warmest, most prevailing pas- 
sion. Our welfare therefore, if we knew in 
what our welfare consists, by no means sum- 
mons us to enter the lists in behalf of the 
Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere bar- 
barians ; but to exert our utmost vigilance to 
g^ard our own constitution from ohgarchical 
encroachments. 

" My duty obligeth me also to remind you, 
that we have had but a short respite to breathe 
firom the havoc made amongst us by pestilence 
md war, and to repair the prodigious waste of 
our fortunes and our lives. These, according 
to all the rules of equity, should be reserved for 
our own domestic exigencies, and not to be lav- 
ished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our 
protection, and are bound in interest to tell 
leq^eious falsehoods ; though, whilst plunging 
tlieir neighbours into hazards, they have no- 
thing but words to contribute ; and, should we 
redress them, know not how to be grateful; 
but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must 
involve their friends in their own destruction. 

-« If there be, farther, a person, who, ele- 
vated with his own designation to the command, 
' incites you earnestly to sail ; heedful of nothing 
but his own private views, nor qualified by his 
y<ears for so important a trust ; if his passion 
he merely to excite admiration for his fine 
breed of horses, or, by the gains of his com- 
mission, to repair the havoc of his fortune 
caused by prodigality/; I conjure you to afford 
ne such person an opportunity to make a splen- 
did figure at the expense of your country : but 
rest convinced, that men of such a turn will be 
corrupt in public office, as they are bad econo- 



mists in private life; that the enterprise in 
hand is a very arduous trust, far beyond such 
measures or such exploits as a stripling can 
devise or execute. 

" I own myself intimidated by that crowd of 
youths who sit by this person and abet his 
schemes. I am hence obliged to implore the 
men of years and experience, who happen to 
sit near them, by no means to dread that ap- 
pearance of pusillanimity, which, in case this 
decree of war be revoked, might be objected to 
them ; by no means to indulge the same raw 
passions by which boys are actuated, so as to 
doat upon remote contingencies. Ton, gentle- 
men, by experience are convinced, that success 
exceedingly seldom results from hot and san- 
guine presumption, but most frequently from 
calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf^ 
therefore, of your country, which is now on 
the brink of more critical dangers than ever it 
was known before, hold up your hands in op- 
position, and support what I am going to move ; 
namely, — That < the Sicilians, confining them- 
selves within their present limits, which we do 
not pretend to abridge, with free navigation 
along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and trans- 
acting their own affairs at large through the 
whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty 
to take care of their own concerns without any 
molestation :' — and, in particular, to return the 
Egesteans the following answer: — < Since, 
without the privity of the Athenians, they have 
already involved themselves in a war against 
the Seiinuntians, let them also, vdthout the 
concurrence of the Athenians, bring it to a 
conclusion : that, moreover, we shall form no 
alliance for the future, as hath formerly been 
the case, with men whose indirect behaviour 
we must be forced to abet, though, when we 
stand in need of reciprocal assistance from 
them, we shall get none at all.' 

"And you, sir, who at present preside in 
this assembly, if your are conscious that it is 
your duty to superintend the public welfare, if 
you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, 
put the question, and call upon the Athenians 
once more to give their votes. And, in case 
you are afiraid to act contrary to order, in pro- 
posing what is counter to a former decree; 
reflect that, when so great a crowd of witnesses 
are at hand to justify the step, you only act 
the part of a physician to your country, which 
hath swallowed down pernicious counsels ; and 
that the best dischargeth the duty of first 



YEAB XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



228 



magistrate, who will render to his country all 
Hie service he is able ; at least, with his eyes 
open, will never suffer it to be hurt.'' 

In this manner Nicias delivered his senti- 
ments. But the far greater part of the Athe- 
nians who were present declared for the 
expedition, and against the repeal of what had 
been already decreed. Some however there 
were, who made a fruitless opposition. 

The person who showed most ardonr, and 
pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was 
Alcibiades, the son of Clinias ; partly from a 
resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in 
other political points, he generally clashed, and 
because he had calumniously glanced at him in 
his speech ; but, principally, because he was 
ambitious of being at the head of this expe- 
dition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, 
bat Carthage also, might be reduced by him- 
self; and, when he should be the author of so 
great a success, that he must needs abound in 
wealth and glory. His credit was great, at 
present, amongst the citizens ; but the warmth 
of his passion threw him into larger expenses 
than his fortune could support, being sump- 
tuous in every article of life, and especially in 
horses. And it was chiefly by him that the 
final overthrow of Athens was at length oc- 
casioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed 
at the great irregularity of his private life, the 
excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also 
at that greatness of spirit which he showed in 
every single branch of his conduct, turned out 
enemies to him as a man who affected the 
tyranny. And though, when in public com- 
mands, he conducted the war with the utmost 
bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was 
chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to 
make room for others, which soon drew after 
it the subversion of the state. Upon this 
occasion, therefore, Alcibiades ptood up, and 
advised the Athenians as follows : 

" Yes ; to me, ye citizens of Athens, in pre- 
ference to others, this command is due; — ^for 
with this I must needs begin, since on this 
point Nicias hath attacked me; — and I also 
judge myself deserving of the trust In re- 
gard to those things which have caused me to 
be 80 loudly censured ; those very things give 
splendour to my ancestors and to myself, and 
are of public emolument also to my country. 
The great magnificence I displayed at the 
Olympic solemnities hath raised in the Gre- 
^ans an idea of Athens far beyond its actual 



strength ; though, previous to this', they enter-:, 
tained the hope of being able totally to war her 
down. For I am the man who brought seven 
chariots thither, more than any private person 
ever furnished out before ; who carried off the 
first, and the second, and the fourth prize ; 
and, in all other respects, supported my quality 
as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are 
declared to be honour^ by the laws of Greece ; 
and, whenever achieved, they leave a high opin- 
ion of power behind them. The splenflid 
figure I have made at home, whether in exhi- 
biting entertainments for the public, or any 
other method of munificence, may naturally 
excite the envy of Athenians, but are to stran- 
gers instances of our grandeur. And that man's 
extravagant spirit is not useless to the public, 
who, at his own private expense, does service 
not merely to himself, but to a whole commu- 
nity. Nor can it imply injustice, for a person 
whose sentiments are generous and exalted, to 
soar above the ordinary level ; since, should he 
afterwards be reduced to a state of depression, 
no man is to share in his reverse of fortune. 
As therefore in calamity we are not to expect 
even civil salntati(ms, let others in the mean>- 
time submit, as in justice they ought, to that 
assuming behaviour which prosperity inspireth; 
or, at least, let equality of denoeanor be first 
shown by him who demands it as a debt from 
another. I am indeed aware, that persons of 
such uncommon elevation, and all in genera), 
who, in some splendid qualities, outshine the 
crowd, must, so long as they live, be the objects 
of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality 
with them ; and, in the next place, to those 
amongst whom they are conversant ; and yet, 
to succeeding generations, they leave an ambi- 
tion of claiming affinity to them, though quite 
groundless and chimerical ; and to their country, 
whatever it be, the haughty boast, that they 
were not aliens, were not offenders, but citi- 
zens of its own growth, and patriots of true 
renown and worth. Of such reversionary hon- 
ours I own myself ambitious ; and, in order to 
succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my 
name illustrious in private life ; and, as to my 
public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether 
I am inferior to any person whatever, in per^ 
forming good services to my country. Fot I 
am the person, who, without throwing you into 
hazard or expense, have brought the strongest 
powers of Peloponnesus to act in your concur- 
rence; who reduced the Lacedsemonlans to 



224 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book Vl. 



stake their all upon the fortui^e of one day at 
Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious 
from the contest; but have not even yet so far 
resumed their spirits as to dare to act offen- 
sively. 

« Such are the exploits which my greener 
years, nay even that unnatural giddiness im- 
puted to me, hath achieved ; which, by insinua- 
ting language, hath made the Peloponnesian 
strength to ply before it, and, giving energy to 
my frantic humour, hath now persuaded the 
world that it is no longer to be dreaded, 
whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, 
whilst Nicias yet continues to be esteemed 
fortunate, lay hold of that service we are efich 
of us able to perform ; and by no means repeal 
the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if in- 
tended against a people we are not able to en- 
counter. 

« For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds 
of promiscuous, disunited inhabitants ; inhabi- 
tants for ever used to sudden revolutions and to 
perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of 
those crowds is equipped with such arms as are 
requisite to defend a native soil, or to secure 
even personal safety; nor is the region sup- 
plied with the needful stores of resistance. It 
is the habit of each, either to execute his pur- 
pose by artful language, or to wrest it from 
the public by sedition. These are all his 
resources ; and, if they fail, at the worst, he 
barely shifts his habitation. It is tiierefore 
iii^>robable that a rabble, so jumbled together, 
will ever be unanimously guided by one con- 
certed plan, or combine together for its just 
execution. Each moment they will be veering 
about to such expedients as happen most to 
■oothe their caprice ; and the more, upon ac- 
count of these seditions, in which, we are in- 
formed, they are already embroiled. 

« Their number of heavy-armed, u must 
ako be observed, is not so large as the pom- 
pous accounts of fame have made it ; nor does 
the sum total of the Grecians amongst them 
torn out so considerable as each city hath 
computed for her own. But Greece, in this 
manner ever addicted most terribly to belie 
her own numbers, hath been found, in the 
present war, scarce able to provide herself with 
arms. 

« Such, according to the best informations I 
have been able to collect, is the present con- 
dition of afiairs in Sicily. Nay, there are 
within our reach still more to &cili- 



tate its reduction. For we shall obtain tha 
concurrence of many barbarians seated therey 
who, from inveteracy against the Syracusansy 
will join us to attack them. Neither can any 
obstacles accrue from the situations of our af* 
fairs nearer home, if you only view it in the 
just and proper light. 

" The bravery of our fathers, though oppoe* 
ed by the veiy same enemies, who at present, it 
is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must be left 
behind us, though opposed by all the power of 
the Mede, erected this our empire, by the sole 
resource of their superiority in naval power. 
The Peloponnesians, farther, have never had 
less hopes of being a match for us than at tbii 
very juncture, even though their strength be in 
all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have 
it ever in their option to make inroads into on 
dominions, even though we wave this expedi- 
tion; but, at sea, they never can be able to 
hurt us : the fleet we shall leave behind vriU 
be amply sufficient to make head against them* 

«By what plausible arguments, therefore, 
can we excuse our behaviour, should we now 
pusiUanimously desist 1 what evasion can wo 
find to deny our confederates the suocoor they 
demanded 1 We are bound in honour, by the 
oaths we have sworn, to undertake their redress. 
Unavailing is the pretext, that they have dono 
such ^od offices for us. Our aUiance with 
tj^em was not made on the condition of their sail- 
ing hither to bring us succour, but of giving such 
full employ to our enemies there, as might ef> 
fectually deter them from coming hither. Tho 
ready road to empire, as not Athenians only, 
but every people who have risen to a summit of 
power, by experience know, is ever to sugcoiv 
those who implore our protection, whethei 
they be Greeks or barbarians. For, had it 
been the constant method to cherish indolent 
inactive measures, or minutely to litigate who 
in justice ought to be protected, the enlaig^ 
ment of our empire had been but trifling, or 
rather we had been liable to the lose of our 
original portion. For a state invested with 
superior power is not only openly opposed ia 
the field, but recourse is had to every precau- 
tion to prevent their appearance in it. Neither 
is it in our power to prescribe exact or aihi- 
trary limitations to our own empire ; but «• 
are by necessity compelled to cabal ageiut 
some, and with a high hand to keep others in 
subjection ; because, should we relax our com* 
mand over others we endanger our own author 



.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



225 



ftjTy and thow we will not awe may become 
tmr maatera. Nor, &ither, ought peace to 
be ao much the object of regard to you as it 
IB to other people, nnleaa yon new-model your 
government, and render it conformable to diat 
of yonr neighbours. 

** Weigh therefore theae arguments ; and be 
eonTinoed, that thus only our interest is capable 
of any conaideTable advancement, — ^if we pro- 
ceed against Sicily, and execute the expedition 
in order to deject the haughty Peloponnesian 
spirit, by so plain an instance how much we 
despiae them, how little fond we are at present 
of this inactive interval, and how eager to be- 
gin again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by 
lusting thus, there is probability on our side, 
that, in case we subdue the people there, we 
may gain the sovereignty over all Ghreece ; or, 
at irorat, we shall depress the Syracusan power : 
the latter point alone will be an important ser- 
vice to ourselves and our allies. But, in case 
any measure of success attends us, our ships 
will enaUe us to secure our acquisitions, or at 
worst our departure; for, though the whole 
body of the Sicilians combine together against 
Wh ^o ahall be absolute masters of our own 
retreats 

it Let not therefore the words of Nicias, 
ealciriated merely for the service of sloth, and 
to raise dissensions between the young and the 
old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual 
decorum take place, observant of which our 
Ibxe&therB, at whose consultations both the 
seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this 
•tate to its present height ; and do you now, 
adhering to the estabtished practice, endeavour 
its farther exaltation. Remember also, that 
youth and age, if debarred one" another's reci- 
procal assistance, lose all their influence and 
weight; that, on the other hand, from the 
wildnesB of youth, and the moderation of the 
middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of 
the old, when tempered harmoniously together, 
the most perfect strength must infelUbly result ; 
that a state, which supinely gives way to sloth, 
Hke other things, for want of exercise must in- 
fidlibly droop and pine away, and the whole of 
her akMl grow old and obsolete; but, when 
inured to uninterrupted conflict, it is continually 
inpro'ting by practice, and wilt gain a perfect 
habit of surmounting every obstaole ; not by a 
parade of words, but by active perseverance. 

« Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced, 
that a atate whidi hath been accustomed to full 
36 



employ, must soon droop into destruction if it 
resigns itself to sloth ; and that such persons 
take the best method of infalUbly securing their 
welfare, who adhere most steadily to their pre- 
sent customs and laws, though possibly better 
might be substituted in their stead." 

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the 
Athenians, moved by his arguments, — ^which 
were also seconded by the entreaties of the 
Egestean and L^ontine exiles, who, standing 
forth in the assembly, implored their protection, 
and, reminding them of their oaths^ adjured 
them to redress their wrongs, — declared for the 
expedition with a warmer zeal than at any 
time before, Nicias was convinced by this, 
that whatever dissuasion he could allege would 
be quite incapable to change their resolves. 
Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the 
immense preparations he was going to demand, 
he fuight cause them at once to change their 
sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed 
them as follows : 

«I perceive, Athenians, that your resolu- 
tions are fixed on this expedition beyond the 
power o^ dissuasion ; and may its event be 
such as your wishes portend ! But I shall once 
more beg leave to communicate to you mv own 
sense of the affair. 

« According to the best informations I have 
been able to procure, we are now going to in- 
vade a number of powerful cities, cities inde- 
pendent of one another, nor standing in need 
of public revolutions, which people who cringe 
under the yoke of slavery might readily embrace, 
in order to render their condition more sup- 
portable. Nor is it, farther, to be presumed, 
that they will readily exchange their own' 
liberty for subjection to us, as they are numer- 
ous, at least for one island, and many of them 
inhabited by Grecians. Per, without reckon- 
ing Naxus and Catana, which I hope, upon 
account of their affinity to the Leontines, wilf 
side with us, there are no less than seven pro* 
vided in all respects with as good martiaf 
habiliments and stores as our own armies; 
and more particularly those against which we 
chiefly bend our course, SeHnus and Syracuse. 
These cities abound with soldiers heavy- 
armed, with archers, and with darters. They 
have a great number of triremes, and plenty 
of hands to man them. They possess a 
large quantity of wealth, not only in pri- 
vate purses, but in their public- treasmies. 
So rich are even the Selinuntians. And to 
2a2 



226 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vj. 



the Syracusaiui, farther, a tribute is paid 
by several barbarians. But the points in 
which they most of all excel us, are, that nu- 
merous cavalry of which they are possessed, 
and corn of their own growth sufficient to an- 
swer all demands without foreign importations. 
An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by 
no means be sufficient to cope with such a 
strength. A large land force must accompany 
the naval, if we are desirous of performing 
such achievements as may be worthy the great- 
ness of our plan, and would not be debarred an 
opportunity of landing by their numerous 
cavalry. And this will be yet more needful, 
should the cities, alarmed at our approach, 
combine together against us, and no other 
friends but the Egesteans join us, or supply us 
with a body of cavalry sufficient to countenance 
our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, 
should we be compelled by force to give over 
our design, or to send for a larger supply, as if 
our counsels at first setting out were rash and 
ill-concerted. We must steer at once ag^nst 
them with preparations in all respects well- 
proportioned to the desigpi, since we know that 
we are bound to a land far remote from our 
own, and are under many disadvantages to 
grapple with our foes. It will not be now 
your employment to march to the relief of your 
dependents seated near to Athens against a 
hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies 
would be brought to your camp out of the 
territories of friends : but you are to roam to a 
distant climate, where you cannot call one inch 
of ground your own, and from whence, in the 
four winter months, you will scarcely be able to 
send a messenger to Athens. 

<< In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent 
upon us to carry thither large parties of heavy- 
armed, to be raised out of our own citizens, our 
allies, and our dependents, and an additional 
strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to 
procure it by persuasion or by pay. Our 
archers and slingers must be also numerous, 
that we may be able to make good our descent 
in spite of the SiciUon horse. We must also 
be attended by supernumerary vessels, that we 
may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in 
necessaries for our ariAy. We ilnust also carry 
with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great 
quantity of com, such as wheat and barley, 
parched; with bakers, some of whom, for 
certain wages, must be obliged to grind, that, 
if our armament lie any where weather-bound. 



we may not stand in need of the necessaries of 

life ; for so numerous as we must be, it will 
not be possible for eveiy city to receive us. 
All other provisions must be laid in by ourselves 
to the utmost of our power, and we must trust 
for nothing to the care of others. 

«But what concerns us most is, to cany 
from hence a fund of money as ample as we 
can raise. As for that which the Egesteans 
pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude 
it to be so only so far as words are current 
For, unless we set out from Athens, not barely 
provided as weU as those we are to encounter, 
— ^but, equality in strength for battle alone ex- 
cepted, in all other respects far surpassing 
them in eveiy needful appointment, — ^we shall 
hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, 
or even to protect who are to be protectedi 
We should regard ourselves in the character of 
people who are going to seek a tifew settlement 
among aliens and enemies ; and, as suqh, are 
necessitated to render themselves victors of the 
spot the very day they land ; or to rest assured, 
if they then miscarry, that the whole of that 
region will be in arms against them. Of this 
I own myself afraid; against this I am con- 
vinced that by repeated consultations we ought 
timely to provide; and, after all, must trust 
still farther to the goodness of our fortune, 
hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I 
should be glad to set out in this enterprise with 
as little occasion as possible to rely on uncei^ 
tain fortune, and to be amply provided with 
every expedient for a successful expedition; 
for these, to my apprehension, are the readiest 
means to secure the public welfare, and the 
safety of us who are destined for the voyage. 
But, if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, 
I am ready to resign my command to his supe- 
rior abilities.'' 

In this manner Nicias delivered himself, 
with a view, if possible, to discourage the 
Athenians from proceeding, by so vast a de- 
mand of articles requisite to the design ; or it 
least, that, in case he must be obliged to unde^ 
take the service, he might set out with sneh 
ample expedients of security. 

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing de- 
mand of appointments could not raise in 
the Athenians the least aversion to the ex- 
pedition, but rather fastened their eagemesi 
upon it more intensely than ever ; and Nicias 
prevailed on that side of the question where he 
hoped to have been defeated. It was sow 



HBAM xvn.] 



PELOPOxNNESIAN WAR. 



227 



vniTcraally agreed, that his advice was just and 
proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition mnst 
be attended with all imaginable security. All 
xanka of men were now equally seized with a 
fondness for the voyage ; for such as were ad- 
vanced in years were confident that a career of 
success must attend the enterprise, and that so 
Ibrmidable an armament could not possibly 
muBcarry; the younger sort were animated 
"with the desire of seeing so remote a j:lime, 
and gratifying at large the curiosity of their 
tempers, assured that safety would attend their 
course ; the bulk of the populace and the sol- 
diery in general were pleased with their present 
assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging 
doi;ninion, whichr would afford them perpetual 
employ and subsistence. The passions of the 
generality were for these causes so vehemently 
elated with the project, that such as could by 
no means approve were afraid to oppose it by 
a vote, lest they might be censured as men who 
malevolently opposed the public glory. And 
by this all opposition was effectually quashed. 

At length, a certain Athenian, standing 
forth from amongst the crowd, and calling 
aloud upon Nicias, told him, «he must no 
longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate 
delays; but declare expressly now, in the 
pTesenee of them all, the particulars of the 
prepairations which the Athenians should vote 
him." - 

Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was ob- 
liged to reply, that, *< in order to be exact he 
ought to consult more leisurely with his col- 
leagues. But, so far as he could judge in this 
sudden manner, they ought to set out with a 
fleet consisting of at least one hundred tri- 
remes; that the Athenians themselves ought 
to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed 
soldiers as was possible, and to send for an 
additional number from their dependents ; that 
the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians 
and dependents, should at least be five thou- 
sand, and, if possible, more ; that to these the 
rest of their preparations should be propor- 
tioned, such as archers to be levied at home, 
and procured also from Crete, not forgetting 
•lingers; and, in fine, that whatever should be 
judged in any degree expedient should be pro- 
vided in good time, and carried along with them 
in the fleet." 

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, 
than they instantly voted, « that the generals 
were invested with absohite authority, to de- 



termine the numbers of the expedition, and tiie 
whole procedure of the voyage, at their own 
discretion, as might best promote the public 
welfare." 

In pursuance of this, the preparations were 
immediately in hand. Summonses for the 
quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, 
and the levies at home went briskly forwards. 
Athens was now finely recovered from the 
pestilence and a long-continued destructive 
war ; both in a multitude of young men now 
arrived itt the vigour of their age, and an in- 
crease of the public revenues by favour of the 
peace. By this means all the needful supplies 
were more easily provided ; and thus were the 
Athenians busied for the present in fitting out 
their armament. 

But, at this very juncture, almost all the 
statues of Mercury, wherever found within the 
precincts of Athens, and according to the 
established custom they were very numerous, 
both in the porches of private houses and the 
public temples, >••••* had their feces dis- 
figured in the space of one night. The au- 
thors of this outrage were not known; but 
large rewards were offered by the state in order 
to discover them, and a decree was also passed 
that, " If any person knew of the commission 
of any other impiety of the same nature, he 
should boldly inform the public of it, whether 
he were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave." 

This accident in truth made a deep impres- 
sion on their minds. For it was construed as 
a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, 
and as an evidence of some terrible combina- 
tion to introduce innovations and an overthrow 
of the democracy. 

An information was at length given in by 
some sojourners and their footmen, relating 
indeed not at all to the Mercuries, but to 
the defacements of other images committed 
formerly by some young men in a frolicsome 
and drunken mood ; and now, farther, « they 

1 1 have omitted two words in the originaL, becante 
I cannot translate them with any precision or clearnen. 
They are n rirfuyfovof tfy»rt»^ opu9 quadratumt says 
one Latin translator ; opus «x lapide quadraio, says 
another. Mr Hobhes bath it, Mercuries of square stone ; 
bow such a description can be applicable to a statue 
will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the 
incloffure In which the statues were erected, or to the 
form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury Was carved 
on any or all the sides of a square stone, I am not able 
to decide. The Mercuries were very numerous; and 
many of them, It is certain, were strange, uncouth, and 
very bungling performaneesi 



OOfi 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vl 



bad oelebnted the myiteriet* in private hoiwes 
by way of mockeiy ;** and amongst othen they 
also accosed Alcibiades. The party most in- 
veterate against him caught readily at this 
charge. As he was the main obstacle to the 
advancement of their own popularity and cre- 
dit, they concluded, that, in case they could 
rid themselves of him, they might at once 
become leaders of the state. Hence they 
aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, 
that « those mystic frolics, and the deface- 
ments of the Mercuries, struck at the very 
foundations of the democracy ; and that none 
of these outrageous acts had been committed 
without his participation/' They alleged, as 
a circumstance that corroborated the charge, 
the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly 
Uoentious, and quite inconsistent with a demo- 
cratical constitution. 

Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear 
himself the best he could from all appearances 
of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he 
entered upon the voyage, to submit to a trial, 
(for the armament was now almost completed,) 
and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penal- 
ties of law ; and only, if acquitted, to take 
vpon him the command. He conjured them, 
farther, ** to receive no calumnious accusations 
against him in his absence; but if he was 
really guilty, to put him instantly to death ^^ 
that, in common prudence it could not be 
justified, to intrust to a person, so heavily 
charged, with the command of so large an ar- 
mament, before his innocence had been regpu- 
larly explored.^' 

But his enemies-— apprehensive that, in case 
be vras brought to an immediate trial, he would 
be supported by all the favour of the soldiery ; 
and that the people, whose idol he was, might 
possibly relent, because in compliment to him 
thQ Argives and some of the Mantineans ac- 
companied the expedition, — opposed and put 
off the prosecution. They put the manage- 
ment of this point into the hands of a set of 
orators, who urged that « for the present he 
might proceed in his voyage, that the expedi- 



< The sacred mysteries celebrated by tbe Athenians 
at Eleusis. Plutarch relates, that the informers were 
brought in by one Androcles, a demagogue, a virulent 
foe of Alcibiades. They deposed, that one Theodoras 
acted the part of tbe crier, Folytion of the torch-bearer, 
Alcibiades that of the hierophant, and many of his 
intimates assisted and were initiated in solenn and 
forntti mockery. 



tion ought not to be defored on hia 
and upcNd his return a day should be 
for his trial." Their design was to gaAer 
more heavy matter against him, which in his 
absence could be more easily effected, and &en 
to recall him and force him to his triaL In 
short, it was resolved that « Alcibiades should 
go the voyage." 

Things being thus determined, and the year 
now advanced to the middle of summer, the 
fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been 
issued before for the bulk of the confederates^ 
and victualling-ships, and small craft, and aU 
the tenders in general, to repair to, and aaseift- 
ble together at Corcyra; that, frcnn thence^ 
in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the 
cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects 
of Athens, and such of the ccmSederates at 
were then in the ci^, marching down to the 
Piraus on the appointed day by morning's 
dawn, went on board the ships in order to 
weigh and be gone. They were conducted 
thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the 
whole crowd 6i Athens, both citizens and 
strangers. The former attended, to pedonm 
the parting decorums where their several at- 
tachments claimed it; some to their friends, 
some to their relations, some to their own 
sons. The whole company moved along with 
a medley of hope and hunentation ; with hope, 
that success would attend their course ; with 
lamentation, lest they might never meet again. 
The sad recollection occurred— to how great a 
distance from their native soil they were going 
to be sent ! and now that the hour of departure 
was come, and when this moment they were 
going to be disminBod into aeenee of dttgw, 
the impressions of terror were felt with mui^ 
keener sense than when the expedition wm 
only decreed. However, at the sight of their 
present strength, of the numerous expedieoti 
of a prosperous enterprise whidi their eyei 
beheld, their spirits were again elated. 

As for the strainers and bulk of the carowd, 
they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing 
at the means intended to aooompliah a great 
and stupendous design. Far never did any 
one state of Greeee, before this time, eqiup I7 
its own strength such a poweiful annament 
It was the finest and moat gloiioaa fleet that 
to this day the world had seen. It ia trae,in 
number of ships and heavy-anned on board, 
that which sailed against Ejttdaunis undor 
command of Pericles, and that also 



xvn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



229 



Potidea under Agnon, were by no means infe- 
rior. For those carried four thousand heavy- 
aimed soldiers, all native Atheniana, with three 
hundred hoisemenTthe number of their triremes 
was a hundred ; fifty more were furnished by 
the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large num- 
ber of confederates who attended those expedi- 
tions. But then they were fitted for a voyage 
in comparison trifling, and in a sUght and pe- 
nurious manner. 

On the contrary,, the present equipment was 
calculated for a length of time, and completely 
fitted out for both services, as occasion might 
demand, either of the sea or of the land. The 
shipping, at the great expense of the captains 
pf the several triremes and of the state, was 
quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the 
public to every mariner was a drachma^ a-day. 
The number of new ships for the battle and 
chase was sixty; that of transports for the 
heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of 
the triremes were very choice in making up 
their crews, and gave to such of the mariners 
as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the 
sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over 
and above the public pay. They had farther 
adorned their vessels with images and all kind 
of sumptuous decorations. It was the high 
ambition of every single captain, to have his 
own ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splen- 
dour and in swiftness. 

The land-force was distinguished by the 
choiceness of their levies and their arms ; and 
all the individuals vied with one another in the 
goodness of their accoutrements and equi- 
page whatsoever. It happened also on the 
same account that a warm contention was 
kindled amongst them, under what oflicers 
they should be ranged ; and opportunity afford- 
ed, to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole 
into a mere ostentation of their power and opu- 
lence rather than an effective equipment against 
a foe. For, were a computation to be formed, 
both of the pubUc disbursements of the state 
on this occasion, and the private expenses of 
the whole soldiery ; — of the state, what prodi- 
gious sums ihey had already advanced, and what 
additional sums tiie generals were to cany 
along with them ;— of the soldiery, what each 
had expended on his own equipage, every cap- 
tain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how 
much greater charges he. was still liable ;— - 

«7R 



without taking into the aeeovnt the vast list of 
necessaries which, over and above the public 
allowance, each private person was obUged to 
lay in for so long a voyage, or die goods which 
a soldier or trader might take with him on 
board for the sake of traflSic ; — ^the amount of 
talents now carried out of Athens would turn 
out exceeding large. 

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the 
enterprise or the splendour of its show, that 
the armament was noised abroad, but also for 
the numerous force with which it was provided 
to attack the foe ; for the remoteness of the 
voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from 
their native clime, and that prodigious expecta^ 
tion which was raised of the event; in order 
to which the state had now exerted itself quite 
beyond its strength. 

When the whole force was got on board 
the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary 
stores and all baggage whatever was completely 
adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound 
of trumpet : but the solemn prayers for a suc^ 
cessful expedition were not offered firom every 
vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the 
voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with 
wine ran the circle of the whole armament and 
every crew as well as the commanders poured 
out the libations, and drank success and happi- 
ness out of gold and silver cups. The whole 
crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citi- 
zens and such strangers as were there uid 
wished them prosperity, joined viith them in 
the public prayer. And now, the paan being 
sung and the libation finished, they put out to 
sea.' After moving off at first in a line ahead, 



« Many incidentB are related by Plutarch, in tbe life of 
Nicias, in regard to the denaneiations of the priests 
against this expedition, the coiningand wresting of ora- 
cles both for and against it, and omens which portended 
nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a 
consciousness, that the means were not equal to the end 
proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of* the 
Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. 
Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his 
friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the 
state: this his presentiment, soon became the public 
talk. Meton, the Astronomer, who was named to a 
post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself 
mad and set his house on fire. Others deny that cir- 
cumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, he 
set his bouse on fire by night, and appeared next mom. 
ing on the fomm in an abject manner, and begged of 
his fellow-citixens, in order to comfort him under so 
great a misfortune, to exatse his son, who was to have 
commanded a trireme, fh>m going the voyage. An 
incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of 



23P 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



each Tessel made afterwards the best of her 
way to iEgina. And ibis armament made all 
possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force 
of their allies by which they were to be joined 
was already assembled. 

Though the intelligence of such an in- 
tended invasion had been brought to Syracuse 
ijrom several quarters, yet for a long course of 
time they would yield no credit to its truth. 
Nay more, when an assembly was convened, 
such speeches as follow were made by different 
persons ; some believing the accounts received 
in relation to this armament of the Athenians ; 
others pronouncing them absolutely false. On 
diis occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, 
standing forth in the assembly, and as one con- 
vinced in his own mind that all such accounts 
were true, addressed and advised his country- 
men thus : 

« It will probably be my own fate, as it hath 
been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when 
I speak of this intended invasion as a matter of 
truth and certainty. And I also know, by ex- 
perience, that both those who vent and those 
who retail such accounts of things as seem in- 
credible, are so far from efiectually persuading, 
that they generally incur the imputation of 
madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall in- 
timidate or strike me dumb, when such a 
weight of danger hovers over my country; 
when in my own heart I am convinced, that I 
am more clearly enlightened on the point than 
any other person whatever. 

« For I assert that to be a matter of the 
highest certainty, which you hear only with a 
fit of stupid surprise, that the Athenians have 
already set sail against us with a numerous 
force both for the service of the sea and the 
land. The pretext alleged by them is, execu- 
tion of treaties with the Egesteans and the 
restoration of the Leontines ; but the true mo- 
tive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and 
above all this our own Syracuse, which if once 
reduced, they are well assured that nothing will 
be able afterwards to give a check to their 



the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The 
women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in 
which many representations of deaths and funerals 
were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, ac- 
cording to custom, were making heavy moan and 
lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people 
who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive 
and mighty armament, though now so vigorous and 
magniflcent would soon moulder into ruin. 



arms. Taking it therefore for granted that 
they will be immediately upon us, deliberate 
in what manner you may make the most gallant 
defence in the present posture of your strength ; 
careful that through contempt you be not taken 
unprovided, nor through incredulity abandon the 
means of preservation. Nor, farther, let those 
who are convinced of their immediate appear- 
ance, be terrified at the boldness or strength of 
their undertaking. For they will not be^able to 
hurt us more than we shall be enabled to reta- 
liate upon them. Nor are they more beyond 
our reach, because they invade us with so vast 
an armament ; since this, in regard to the other 
Sicilians, will plead more abundantly in oar 
cause ; for, terrified at the foe, they will be dis- 
posed with higher warmth of friendship to co- 
operate with us. And if thus, in the train of 
affairs, we are either enabled to defeat tiieir 
arms, or merely to force their return, their 
schemes unexecuted and their ambition disap- 
pointed, (for I am not in the least afraid that 
their sanguine expectations can be glutted with 
success,) such events would reflect the highest 
glory upon' you, and complete what I firmly 
hope. 

" It is a truth evinced by facts, that few con- 
siderable armaments of either Grecians or Bar- 
barians, which have been sent out on remote 
expeditions, have returned successful. Nor, 
farther, are our present invaders more nu- 
merous than the Syracusans themselves, or 
their friends of the neighbouring states, whose 
strength mere hostile dread will cement and bind 
fast together. If therefore, though merely for 
want of needful supplies, they incur miscarria- 
ges on a foreign shore ; if they prove unsuccess- 
ful, though chiefly through their own miscon- 
duct ; the whole honour must however rest with 
us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and 
management. Even these veiy Athenians were 
indebted to a parallel coincidence of events for 
the vast enlargement of their strength and em- 
pire, when the Mede, who gave out that he 
aimed the blow at Athens, was, contrary to all 
human expectation, disconcerted by a series of 
errors that were purely his own. And some 
such fortunate coincidence, in our ovni behalf, 
we have at present all imaginable reason to ex- 
pect. 

« Let us therefore with active resolution put 
our domestic affairs into a posture of defence, 
and despatch our ambassadors to the Siculi, to 
keep firm in our friendship such as aie alreadj 



xvn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



231 



our firiends, and to endeavour to procure the 
firiendship and concurrence of the rest Nay, 
let our embassies regularly complete the whole 
circuit of Sicily, where they may represent the 
common danger- which equally threatens them 
all. Let them, farther, cross over to Italy to 
procure for us^eir defensive alliance, or at 
least to negotiate a denial of reception to the 
Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send 
to Carthage: for even the Carthagenians are 
not exempted from the present dangers, but 
have been ever under apprehensions of receiving 
from them a visit at Carthage. It may per- 
haps e£fectually occur to their thoughts, that, 
should they now abandon us, the storm must 
soon extend itself to them ; by which they may 
be determined either secretly or openly, by 
some expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. 
Andy were their inclination equal to their 
power, no people on the globe could so easily 
redress us. For they are possessed of an im- 
mensity of wealth, which gives an easy and 
prompt completion to the schemes of war and 
to every human enterprise. Let us send far- 
ther, to Lacedsmon and Corinth, requesting 
the despatch of immediate succours hither, and 
the renewal of the war against the Athenians. 

« There is one point more, which in my 
opinion is more critical and important than all 
the rest : and which, though perhaps, inured 
as you are to domestic indolence, it may not 
gain your ready approbation, I shall however 
boldly recommend. Would all of us in general 
who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would 
only we Syracusans, with what other people 
we can get to assist us, put out instantly to 
sea with all the ships we have in readiness, 
and victualled but for the space of two months ; 
— ^would we then g^ve these Athenians the 
meeting either at Tarentum or cape Japygia, 
and there convince them, that before they en- 
ter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily, 
they must fight for their passage across the 
Ionian ; — we should then strike them with the 
utmost terror, and infinitely perplex them with 
the thought that from a friendly port we shall 
sally forth to guard our out-works (for Taren- 
tum will readily receive us), whilst they have 
a long tract of sea to pass with all their cum- 
bersome train, and must find it hard, through 
so long a voyage, to be always steering in the 
regular order. As their course must thus be 
slow, and must advance only in exact conform- 
ity to orders, we should have a thousand op- 



portunities to attack them. - If again they clear 
their ships for action, and in a body bear down 
expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at 
their oars; and, when spent with their toil, 
we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may 
not be judged advisable, we have it always in 
our power to retire into the harbour of Taren- 
tum. And thus the Athenians, if in con- 
stant expectation of being fought with at sea, 
they must make their passage with a small por- 
tion only of their stores, will be reduced to great 
distress on coasts which will afford them no 
supply. Should they chose to continue in 
their station, they must infallibly be blocked 
up in it. Should they venture a passage, they 
must unavoidably leave their tenders and store- 
ships behind; and as they have no assurance of 
a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, 
must be terribly dismayed. 

«It is my firm opinion, that amidst that 
great perplexity of thought which must result 
from these obstructions, they will never pre- 
sume to sail from Corcyra ; or, at least, whilst 
they are agitating the forms of procedure, and 
sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers 
and position, the season of the year must 1)e 
protracted to winter ; or, utterly dispirited at ' 
so unexpected a resistance, they will give up 
the voyage. This I more readily expect, aa^, 
I am informed that their most experienced com- 
mander hath been forced into office s^ainst, his 
inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the 
pretext to desist, if such a show of resbtance 
could be made by us as would preserve his 
honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly 
convinced that rumour will increase and aggra- 
vate our strength. Now the ^entiments of 
mankind are constantly adjusted by rumours : 
parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy 
declares he is ready to begin the attack ; and 
such an enemy is always more dreaded than he 
who betrays an intention merely to defend 
himself against an enemy's assaults. Such ex- 
cess of fear must now fall to the lot of the 
Athenians. They are invading us, with the 
fond presumption that we shall not fight They 
think they have grounds for such a presump-. 
tion, because we have not concurred with the 
Lacedaemonians in their demolition. But 
when, to their bitter disappointment, they find 
we have the courage to act offensively, the 
suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more 
than all the reality of our expected strength 
could have done. 



3S2 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[BOOtf VI 



*^ DetermiAA tkerefore to execute with bold 
woA teady rejM>lii1»0B the plan I baire proposed ) 
#y, if tlua must not proTai), with the utmoet 
cxpeditton to get all things at hom^ in readi- 
nesa for war* And let eaeh Byraensan be 
finnly eenvineed, that contempt of an enemy 
onglit never to be shown but in the heat of ae^ 
tion; that the conduct of thoae men must 
tend most highly to the pablic preservation^ 
who, alarmed by a decent fear, judge it needful 
to prepare with all caution and alacri^, as if 
the danger was instant at our doors. But 
these our enemies are actually coming \ they 
are abeady (I know it well) upon the voyage; 
they are this moment only not in caght/* 

In thia manner Hermocrates spoke his sen- 
timents. Btrt the popular assembly of the 
Syracusaaa was embrcMled with much variance 
and contention. One party cried out, that " it 
was Ml a j<^e ; the Atheniana durst not think 
oT invading them.*' Another, « HersEioorateB 
had truth and reason on his side.'' A third, 
^ Let them come ; what damage can they do 
ua whidi we are not able heartily to repay 
theml'* Others betrayed an open contempt 
aft the whirfe aceowit, and Ittughed at it as 
downright ridiuculous. The party was but 
irmii^ which gave credit to Hermocrates, and 
trembled for the future. At length, Athena- 
goras stood up, who being the first magistrate 
of the pci^le, and whose credit at this time 
Was highest with them, delivered himself as 
fofioweth : 

« The man who wishes the Athenians may 
not be so mad as to come hither and run them- 
selves headlong into our subjection, is either a 
eow»d or a traitor to his country. But for 
those who vent such news, and endeavour to 
frighten you by the terrible recital, at their 
audaciousness, truly, I am not in the least 
surprised ; but I am greatly so at their iblly, 
if they imagine their views can escape detec- 
tion! Poor abject souls, quite dispirited with- 
in through their own pusillanimity, ^re glad to 
spread consternation throughout a whole com- 
munity; that under the general panic, their 
own may Me veiled and undistinguished. And 
auch is the effect which the present informa- 
tions may be ready to produce ; not from any 
grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions 
and falsehoods' of an miquitous cabal, who are 
ever dabbling in the pratices of faction. 

*»But you, Sjrracusans, I exhort, to apply 
your good sense on this occasion, and search 



after probability ; not by canaidonng woiA. ae- 
counte as these men have pompoualy detailed, 
but such enterprises as a wise and abundmtly 
enlightened pe<^e (lor soeh I esteem the 
Athenians) are likely to undertake. For what 
probabUity is thercy that, leaving tbe PeIop<»- 
nesians on their backs, when the war at home 
is not yet brought to any settled condusioii, 
they would wilfully embark into another of no 
less importancel For my part, I am persuad- 
ed they rest well contoited, that, so many and 
so powerful states as we SicSians are, we have 
not yet tiiought |Voper to invade thena. 

« But, allowing these informataoDS true, aad 
that they are actually c€»ning, — I aan &nAy 
persuaded, that Sicily is bett^ able than Pelo- 
ponnesus to war them down, by how ipuch is 
all respeeto, it is better furnished wi& eveiy 
resource of war ; and that this our Syracuse 
alone is far superior in strength to &at, nay 
double that armament, which by report now 
threatens its invasiour For I know, assKcdly, 
that Ho horse can follow in their train; tbi^ 
farther, none can be procured for them m tins 
country, if we abate an ineoneidwafble psr^ 
which the Egesteans may furnish.- And I 
know, that a body of heavy-armed, equal in 
number to our ewn, can never be transported 
by them across such a lengfth of sea* The en- 
terprise is bold indeed, to attempt so long a 
voyagd hither with only Gght and iiimMerikq)s, 
and to bring all those militaory stoves-, the roll 
of which must be excessively Iarge> in eider te 
attack so great a city. Shall I t^^refeie be 
terrified at vain reports? I, who am finafy 
persuaded, that, if the Athenians Were posses- 
sed of a city on our coasts as consideraUe in 
all respects as Syracuse itself, and should dara 
to provoke us ; if, masters of the neighbouring 
territory they should from thence msk» wsr 
upon us; — even with such advantages they 
would with difficulty escape a total destraetioB. 
And what therefore, in all human probabihtf, 
must be thar fate, when all Si^^ to a maa 
will be combined to <^^ose &em? For new 
their war must issue froin a camp- <m t^ beadi 
of the sea, of whic|i &eir ships must form thtf 
ramparto. They wilt not be able to nudce I<Migf 
excursionB from their tonte and magannes of 
needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and 
control them. But, in short, i# is mf Ibn 
opinion that they never will be aMe te aeeoai- 
plish a descent, so hat am^ I convkieed that our 
foarce is in all respects superior. 



xvii.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



233 



«I am well persuaded, that all those ob* 
stacles, which I have hitherto recited, their own 
wise Teflections have suggested to the remem- 
brance of the Athenians, and deterred them 
from hazarding their own ruin ; and that our 
own malcontents amuse us with fictitious ac* 
counts of things, that neither have nor can have 
existence. This is by no means the first oc- 
casion on which I have been able to detect 
their schemes. I am no stranger to their con- 
stant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent 
as they are, by forgeries like these, or more 
malicious than these, or even by the open 
efibrts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst 
the Syracusan people, and to seize the helm of 
your government. And I have reason to ap- 
prehend, that, amongst the many projects they 
attempt, some one at length may be fiitally 
SDccessfiil. But this must be charged to our 
own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions 
to aveft impending miseries, nor bravely oppose 
the storm, though we perceive it to be gather- 
ing around us. And from hence it unavoid- 
ably results, that our state is seldom blessed 
with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter 
lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous 
straggles against factions within than public 
hostilities without; nay, sometimes tyranny 
and despotic rule have been our portion. 

«To guard the present times from such 
disastrous contingencies, shall be my constant 
endeavour ; and, if favoured with your concur- 
rence, my care shall be successful. To this 
end I must prevail upon you, who are the 
many, to co-operate with me, whilst I inflict 
upon these artificers of faction the punishment 
fhey deserve, not barely for overt commissions, 
(for in these fhey are not easily caught,) but 
for all the treacherous plots which, how desir- 
ous soever, they are not able to execute. For 
we ought not only to award our vengeance on 
ttte open outrages of an enemy, but to disarm 
his malice by wise precaution; because the 
man who will not thus in time disarm it, will 
feel its Mow before he is aware. 

« On the few I have also to bestow, partly 
some rsproofii, partiy some cautions, and partly 
some instructions. For chiefly by these me- 
thods I judge it feasible to deter them from 
tbeir feetioai designs. Let me therefore re- 
vest from you, ye youths of Syracuse, the 
solution of a point which hath frequentiy 
ecciiniid to my own imaginatioo-^What is it 
37 



you would have?— -An immediate possession 
of the government of your country 1— Why, 
the very laws of that country declare you in* 
capable of it And these very laws were 
intended, rather to exclude you, so long as you 
are unequal, than to give you a disgraceful 
rejection when you shall be equal, to the trust 
But, farther,— are you not piqued at heart at 
being placed upon the same rank and level with 
the bulk of your fellow-citizens 1 And where 
would be the justice in awarding distinctions of 
honour and trust to those who are in no les^ 
pect diflerenced from others ? It may perhaps 
be urged that a democracy is repugnant to the 
dictates both of wisdom and justice ; that the 
most opulent members of a state are entitled 
to its highest honours, are best able to superin* 
tend the public welfare. But to this I reply, 
that, in tiie first place, by the word people is 
signified a whole community, includiilg its 
every individual ; but an oligarchy means only 
a party ; in the next place, that men of opu* 
lence are the most suitable guardians of th# 
public treasure; that men of understanding 
and experience are best qualified to advise; 
but the many, after hearing, are the best judges - 
of measures. And thus, by a democracy, 
equality of right and of privilege it most fairly 
preserved, as well to the separate members as 
to the whole community. An oligarchy in- 
deed bestows an ample portion of dangers on 
the many, but in beneficial points it not only 
assumes the larger share to itself, but by aii 
unbounded rapacity monopoliseth the publio 
harvest — These are the ends which the men 
of power, and the raw inexperienced youths 
amongst you, ambitiously pursue ; ends inoora* 
patiUe with the welfare of a great and flourish* 
ing state. The accomplishment of these, I 
say, you have this very moment in agitation ; 
though the world cannot furnish such a set of 
fools, if you perceive not the pemidous tendency 
of your schemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, 
within my knowledge, equal either your brutal* 
•ity or your villany, if with open eyes you dare 
proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound infoii* 
mation, or repent if already informed, and unite 
in the infallible advancement of the general wet* 
fare of the whole community. And let tiie meii 
of probity amongst you rest perfeotiy satisfied^ 
that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay 
more than a share, in those emoluments which 
will equally redound to all their country. But, 
2B 



234 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



in case you give into different schemes, the 1 
hazard is great ; the whole of your plan will be 
baffled and confounded. 

« Trouble us therefore no farther with your 
informations, as we are privy to and shall cer- 
tainly disconcert the views of their authors. 
For the Syracusan state, even though the 
Athenians actually invade us, will repel their 
efforts with a magnanimity worthy of herself; 
and we have already a set of brave command- 
ers, who will effectually manage the point 
But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions 
be true, which is my firm opinion, the state 
will not be struck into a panic by your rumours, 
will never place the command of her forces in 
your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude 
upon herself. She, on the contrary, will exert 
her own vigilance and discretion; she will 
interpret the ramours you have spread as so 
many acts against her welfare, and will not give 
up her liberty to accounts expressly forged to 
terrify the ear ; but, aware in time, by no means 
to intrust herself into your management, will 
leave no possible method of defence untried.'^ 

Thus spoke Athenagoras. Bat here one 
of the g^erals rising up prevented any other 
person from continuing the debate, and put an 
end to the present heats by delivering himself 
thus: — 

« It is contrary to all decorum, both for those 
who speak to pour forth calumniations against 
one another, and for those who hear to receive 
them with attention. At present, we are 
rather concerned to yield regard to the infor- 
mations which are brought us, that every in- 
dividual and this community may be timely 
prepared to repel the invaders. And, if this 
should prove at last to be mere superfluity of 
care, yet what harm caii possibly accrue from 
such an equipment of the state with horses, 
and arms, and such other habiliments as are the 
glory of warl We ourselves shall take all 
proper care .of the provisions of war and the 
levy of soldiers; and at the same time shall 
circulate our messengers to the cities around 
us, and watch the appearance of the foe ; and 
shall expedite every point judged needful in 
the present emergence. Some care of these 
points hath already been taken, and, what 
more we shall perceive to be expedient, we 
shall on the proper occasions communicate to 
you." 

When the general had expressed himself thus. 



the Syracusans broke up the assembly and de- 
parted. 

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of 
their allies, were by this time all arrived at 
Corcyra. And the first thing dose by die 
commanders was, to take a review of the whole 
equipment, and to settle the order in which 
Aey were to anchor and form their naral sta- 
tion. They also divided it into three squad- 
rons, and casl^lots for the command of each: 
to the end that, in the course of the voyage, 
they might be well supplied with water, and 
harbours, and the proper necessaries, wherever 
they might chance to put in; that, in other 
respects, a better discipline might be heppt vp, 
and the men be more inured to a ready obedi- 
ence, as being under the inspection of an able 
commander in each several division. These 
points being settled, they despatched three 
vessslsto Italy and Sicily, to pick up infomo- 
tions, what cities on those coasts wrouM give 
them a reception. And their orders were, to 
come back in time and meet them upon die 
voyage, fiiat they might be advertised into what 
ports they might safely enter. 

These previous points being adjusted, the 
Athenians, with an equipment already swelled 
to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Cor- 
cyra, stood across for Sicily. The total cf 
their triremes was a hundred and thirty-four, 
to which were added two Khodian vess^ of 
fifty oars. One hundred of these were Adie- 
nian, and, of this number, sixty were tight ships 
fit for service ; the rest were transports for the 
soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted 
of Chians and the other allies. The total of 
the heavy-armed on board was five thousand 
one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred 
were citizens of Athens enrolled ; seven hmn 
dred were Athenians of the lowest class, 
(called Thetes,) who served by way of marines. 
The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of 
their alliance ; some of their own dependents; 
five hundred belonged to the ArgiTes; the 
number of Mantineans and mercenaries was 
two hundred and fifiy ; the archers in the whole 
amounted to four hundred and eighty ; and, of 
these, eighty were Cretans. There were senn 
hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and 
twenty lightrarmed Megarean exiles. • And one 
horse transport attended, which carried thirty 
horsemen. 

So great an equipment sailed out at first to 



n^itxyu.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



2a5 



begin the war. Ahd, in the train of this equip- 
ment, went thirty storeshipo laden with com, 
and canying on board the bakers, and masons, 
and carpenters, and all things requisite in the 
"Works of fortification ; and also a hundred sail 
of small vessels, which necessity demanded to 
attend the ships that carried the stores. A 
large number also of small craft and trading 
vessels, sailed voluntarily in company with the 
fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, 
in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra 
across the Ionian gulf. 

The whole armament being got over to cape 
Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally 
could make the passage, sailed along the coast 
of Italy, — where not one city would receive 
them, would grant them a market, or suffer 
them to land, barely permitting them to anchor 
and to water, — ^though at Tarentum and Locri 
even that was denied them, — till they arrived at 
Khegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium 
the whole fleet was now assembled ; and with- 
out the city (for an iTdmission into it was re- 
fused them) they formed an encampment 
Tvithin the verge of Diana's temple, where also 
they were accommodated by the Rhegians with 
a market 

Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, 
they lay some time for refreshment ; and had a 
conference with the Rhegians, in which they 
pressed them as they were of Chalcidic descent, 
to succour the Leontines who were also Chal- 
cideans. Their answer was, that " they should 
side with neither party, but whatever measures 
were judged expedient by the other Italians 
they should conform to those.'' The Athe- 
nians' councils were now solely bent on the 
affiurs of Sicily, in what manner they might 
most successfully make their approaches. They 
also waited for the return of the three vessels 
from Egesta, >which had previously been des- 
patched thither: longing earnestly for a re- 
port about the state of their treasure, whether 
it was really such as their envoys at Athens 
had represented. 

To the Syracusans, in the meantime, un- 
doubted advice is brought from several quarters, 
and by their own spies, that " the fleet of the 
enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this 
being uncontested, they prepared for their de- 
fence with the utmost attention, and were no 
longer duped by incredulity. They also sent 
about to the Siculi ; to some places, their 
agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon 



their conduct: and, to others, ambassadors. 
And into those towns upon the coast, which 
were exposed to a descent, they threw a garri- 
son. In Syracuse, they examined if' the city 
was provided with -the proper means of a de- 
fence, by a careful inspection of the arms and 
the horses ; and all other points were properly 
adjusted, as against a war coming swiilly upon 
them, and only not already present. ' 

The three vessels detached beforehand to 
Egesta, rejoin the Athenians, yet lying at Rhe- 
gium, with a report that « the great sums which 
had been promised them were quite annihilated 
since they saw only thirty talents* in specie.** 
Upon this the commanders were instantly seiz- 
ed with a dejection of spirit, because their first 
hope was thus terribly blasted ; and the Rhe- 
gians had refused to concur with their attempts, 
upon whom they had made their first essay of 
persuasion, and with whom they had the great- 
est probability of success, as they were by blood 
allied to the Leontines, and had ever shown 
themselves well-disposed to the Athenian state. 
The Egestean affair had indeed taken no other 
turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the 
other two commanders were quite amazed and 
confounded at it. 

The trick, made use of by the Egesteans, at 
the time that the first embassy went thither 
from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, 
was this ; — Having conducted them into the 
temple of Venice at Eryx, they showed the 
offerings reposited there, the cups, the flagons, 
and the censers, and the other furniture of the 
temple, in quantity by no means small. These, 
being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast^ 
show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. 
Having also made entertainments in private 
houses, for those who came in the vessels of 
the embassy, they amassed together all the gold 
and silver cups of Egesta : they borrowed others 
from the adjacent cities, as well Phoenician as 
Grecian ; they carried their guests about from 
one house of feasting to another; and each 
exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all 
of them displaying generally the same vessels, 
and great abundance appearing at every place, 
the Athenians who made the voyage were pro- 
digiously surprised at the splendid shows. 
Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, 
they enlarged with a kind of emulation which 
should magnify it most, on the immensity of 



1 XSSIS 10». sterling. 



386 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



{bomk in. 



wealth tbey had aeen at Egeata. In tfaia man- 
ner, being deceived themselves, they obtroded 
the same fallacy upon others ; but now, when 
the true account was spread amongst them, 
that " there was no suc^ wealth at Egesta,*' 
they were much censured and reproached by 
the soldiers. 

The generals, however, held a consultation 
about the methods of proceeding. And here 
it was the opinion of Nicias, « that with their 
whole armament they should stand immediately 
against Selinus, the reduction of which was the 
principal motive of the expedition; and, in 
ease the Egesteans would furnish the whole 
armament with the proper supplies of money, 
their councils might then be regulated accord- 
ingly; but, otherwise, they should insist on 
their maintaining the sixty sail of ships which 
had been sent expressly at their own request ; 
then, abiding by them, they should reconcile 
their differences with the Selinuntians, either 
by force of arms or negotiation; they after- 
wards might visit other cities, and display be- 
fore them the mighty power of the Athenian 
state; and, having given such conspicuous 
proofii of their alacrity to support their friaids 
and alUes, might return to Aliens ; provided 
that no sudden and unexpected turn of afiairs 
might give them opportunity to do service to 
the Leontines, or bring over some other cities 
to their interest ; ever intent not to bring their 
oWn state into danger by a needless profusion 
of blood and treasure." 

Alcibiades declared « That it could never 
be justified, if, ^&er putting to sea with so 
great an armament, they should return with 
disgrace, and no effectual service done to iheir 
country ; that, on the contrary they ought, by 
heralds dei^atched expressly, to notify thdr 
arrival in these parts to all the cities except 
Selinus and Syracuse; that, further, they 
should tiy what could be done with the Sicnli, 
in order to persuade some of them to revolt 
from ^e Syimcusans, and to strike up treaties 
of alliance and friendship with others, that so 
they might provide a resource of provisiims and 
r^nforcements ; that ^e first trial of this kind 
should be made upon the Messenians, who 
lay in the finest dtuation for favouring their 
passage and descent into Sicily, which must 
C|pen to them die most convmi^it harbour 
and station for their armament : thus, gaining 
the concurrence of the cities, and certain from 
whom they might depend upon assistance, the 



way would then be open for them to make 
attempts upon Syracuse and Sdinds, in case 
the former refused to make up the quarrel with 
the EgesteimB, and the latter to suffer the ra> 
plantation of the Leontines." 

The opii\ion of Lamachus vras diametrically 
opposite, since he advised it <« to be the most 
judicious measure to stand at once against 
Syracuse, and to tiy thdr fortune before that 
city with the utmost expedition, whilst they 
were yet not competently provided fcM* resist- 
ance, and their consternation was still in its 
height: because every hostile force is always 
most terrible on its first ^proach ; and, in case 
it protract the time oi encountering the eyes of 
its foes, they must recover their courage tfaroogfa 
familiarity with danger, and then the sight of 
an enemy is more apt to in^ire cooiempt :-— 
but, should they assault them on a sudden 
whilst yet their approach is with terror expected, 
the victory must infallibly be their own: — in 
this case, all things would eo-operate with 
them to terrify the fbe ;' sudi as, the sight of 
their numbers, which now only could appear in 
their greatest enlargement ; the forebodings cf 
their hearts what miseries were like to ensoe ; 
and, above all, the instant necessity they most 
he under of hazarding a battle: that, more- 
over, it was likely, that numbers of the enemy 
might be surprised yet roaming abroad in die 
adjacent countiy, as still they were incveduloDS 
of the approadi of the Athenians; or, even 
though the Syracusans were sa&Ay retired with 
all their effects into the city, the army nrast 
needs become masters of prod^ons wealth, if 
they should besiege the city, and awe all aronnd 
it ; that, by taking this step, the other Sicilians 
would be more discouraged frodi saooooring 
the Syracusans, and more easily inclined t» 
concur with the Athenians, and all drifts tad 
delays to keep clear of the contest till one aide 
was manifesdy superior, would be prednded." 
He added farther, that « they should take cars 
to possess themselves of Megara, which was 
now deserted and not fiur from Syracose eithsr 
by sea or land, as it would affixd a fine statioo 
for their aSnapi to lie in, would riielter them u^ 
on a retreat, and give expedition to their up* 
proadies." 

But, though Lamachus delivered his senii- 
ments thus, he soon gave xtp his own opinion and 
wort over to that of Alcibiades. And in p»- 
suance of this, Alcibiades with his own sjngie 
ship passed over to Masseme; and, having 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



237 



gained a conference with the Mesaenians 
about an alliance offensive and defeneive, when 
no arguments he brought could persuade, when 
on the contrary they returned this answer, that 
u into their city they would not receive them, 
though they were ready to accommodate them 
with a market without the walls," he repassed 
to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, 
having manned out sixty ships with the choicest 
hands of the whole fleet, and taken in a re- 
quinte stock of subsistence, steered away for 
Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at 
Rhegium under the care of one of those in the 
commission. 

After a reception granted them into their 
city by the Naxians, they stood away from 
thence to Catana. And, when the Cataneans 
refused to receive them, (for in that city was 
a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) 
they put into the river Terias. After a night's 
continuance there, the next day they sailed for 
Syracuse ; keeping the rest of the fleet ready 
ranged in the line of battle ahead. But they 
had attached ten beforehand, who were ordered 
to enter the great harbour of Syraciue, and to 
examine what naval force lay there ready launch- 
ed for service) and to proclaim from their decks 
as they passed along the shore-^^that "the 
Athenians are come into those parts to replace 
the Leontines in their own territory, as they 
were bound in point both of alliance and con- 
sanguinity ; that whatever Leontines therefore 
were now residing at Syracuse, should without 
£sar come over to the . Athenians, as friends 
and bene&ctors." 

When the proclamation had been made, and 
they had taken a view of the city and its har- 
bours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots 
were most convenient for a descent and the 
commencement of the war, they sailed back 
again to Catana. A council of war had been 
held in that city, and the Cataneans were come 
to a resolution, " not to receive the armament ;" 
but, however, they granted an audience to the 
generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades har- 
angued, and the inhabitants of Catana were 
all in the public assembly, the Athenian 
soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down 
a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, 
entered the city, walked up and down in the 
inarket But such of the Cataneans as were 
of the Syracusan party ho sooner found that 
the army was got in, than, struck into a sud- 
den consternation, they stole presently out of 



the city. The number e^ these was but tcifling. 
The rest of the iahalntants decreed an alliance 
with the Athenians, and encouraged them to 
fetch over the remainder of their armament 
from Rhegium. 

This point being carried, the Athenians 
having passed to Rhegium, were soon with 
the whole of their fleet under sail fer Catana, 
and, on their amval there, they formed a pro- 
per station for their ships and men. 

But now intelligence was brought them from 
Camarina that << if they would come to coun- 
tenance them, that city would declare on thdr 
side ;'' and that << the Syracusans are busy ia 
manning their fleet.'' With the whole arma- 
ment therefore they steered along the coast, 
touching first at Syracuse. And when they 
feund that no fleet was there in readiness to put 
to sea, they stood ofif again fer Camarina ; and 
there, approaching . the shore, Uiey notified 
their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admit- 
tance was however refused them, the Cama- 
rineans alleging that ^ they were bound by 
solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of 
the Athenians, unless of their own accord they 
should require a larger number." Thus disap- 
pointed they put out again to sea, and, having 
made a descent on some part of the Syracusan 
territory, they picked- up a booty, till the Syra^ 
cusan cavalry making ahead against them and 
cutting off some of their light-armed who were 
straggled to a idistance, they re-embarked, and 
went again to Catana. » 

On their return thither they find the Sala- 
minian arrived from Athens to fetch back Alci- 
biades,' by public order of the state, to take 
his trial for the crimes charged against him by 
his country, and also some others of the eoldieiy 
who attended him in the expedition, against 
whom informations had been given that they 
were guilty of impiety in the, affair of the 
Mysteries, and against some of them in that of 
the Mercuries. For the Athenians, af)»r the 
departure of the fleet, continued to make as 
strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes 
committed in regard to the Mysteries, and also in 
regard to the Mercuries. What sort of persons 
the informers were, was no part of their concern, 
but, in the height of jealousy, giving credit in- 
discriminately to all, through too great a defer- 
ence to men of profligate and abandoned lives, 
they apprehended and threw into prison the 
most worthy citizens of Athens ; esteeming it 
more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the 
2b2 



288 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book yt. 



£m^ than that a person of irreproachable cha- 
racter, when once accused through the Tillany 
of an informer, should escape without the 
question. 'For the people, having learned by 
tradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistra- 
tus and his sons became at last ; and, what is 
more, that it was not overthrown by themselves 
and Harmodius, but by the industry of the 
Lacedsmonians ; liv«d in a constant dread of 
such another usurpation, and beheld all these 
incidents now widi most suspicious eyes. But, 
in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and 
Aristogiton took its rise merely from a com- 
petition in love. The particulars of which I 
shall here unfold more largely, to convince the 
world, that no other people, no not even the 
Athenians themselves, have any certain ac- 
count, either relating to their own tyrants or 
the transactions of that period. 

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying pos- 
sessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not 
Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hip- 
•pias, th^ eldest of his sons, was his successor 
in power. Harmodius being at this time in 
the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton 
a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle 
rank, doated upon and had him in his posses- 
sion. But, some attempts having been made 
upon Harmodius, by Hipparchus the son of 
Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and 
discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. 
The latter received the account with all that 
anguish which a warm afifection feels ; and, 
alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest 
by force he might seize the youth, he instantly 
forms a project, a project as notable as his rank 
in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. 
And, in the meantime, Hipparchus, who, after 
making a second attempt upon Harmodius, was 
equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not pre- 
vail upon himself to make use of force ; but, 
however, determined, upon some remote oc- 
casions which might cover his real design from 
detection, and was actually studying an oppor- 
tunity to dishonour the youth. — For the power 
he had was never exerted in such a manner as 
to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his 
deportment was neither invidious nor distaste- 
ful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants 
were exact observers of the rules of virtue and 
discretion. They exacted from the Atheni- 
ans only a twentieth of their revenue ; they 
beautified and adorned the city; took upon 
themselves the whole conduct of the wars ; and 



presided over the religious sacrifices. In other 
respects, the state was governed by the laws 
already established, except that they always 
exerted their influence to place their own crea- 
tures in the first offices of the government 
Several of their own family enjoyed the annual 
office of archon at Athens; and, amongst 
others, Pisistratus, the son of Hippias the 
tyrant, who bore the same name with his 
grandfather, and, in his archonship, dedicated 
the altar of the twelve gods in the public 
forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the 
Pythian. The people of Athens, having since 
made additions to it in order to enlarge the 
altar in the forum, by that means effaced the 
inscription: but that in the Pythian is yet 
legible, though the letters are wearing out 
apace, and runs thus : 

Pisistratas, from Hippias born. 
Of Pythian Phoebus, radiant god of day. 

Chose thus the temple to adorn, 
And thus record his own superior sway. 

But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the 
government as the eldest son, I myself can 
positively aver ; as I know it to be so, and have 
examined all the accounts of tradition with 
much greater accuracy than others. But any 
one may be convinced of the fact by what I 
am going to subjoin. — Now, we have abundant 
light to prove, that he was the only one of 
the legitimate brothers who had any sons. 
So much the altar attests, and the column 
erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice 
of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In 
the latter, the inscription makes no mention 
of any son, of either Thessalus or Hippar- 
chus ; but nameth five sons of Hippias, who 
were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter 
of Gallias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is 
certainly most probable that the eldest son 
was married first ; nay, he is named the first 
after his father on the upper part of the 
column. And there were good reasons for this 
preference ; because his seniority gave him this ' 
rank ; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. 
Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, 
that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, 
could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus 
died when invested with it, and he had only 
one day's time to effect his own establishment 
The reverse is the truth ; that, having for a 
length of time been familiarized to the expecta- 
tion, having rendered himself awful to the 
citizens, and being supported by vigilant and 



YEAB XVn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



289 



trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his 
power with abundant security. He nerer had 
caase, as a younger brother must have had, to 
work his way through perplexities and dangers, 
as in that case he could not by practice have 
been made an adept in the affair of government. 
But was accidental, and owing entirely to 
subsequent misfortunes, that' Hipparchus got 
the title, and passed in the opinion of succeed- 
ing ages for one of the tyrants. 

On Harmodius, therefore, who was deaf to 
his solicitations, he executed his resentment in 
the manner pre-determined. For,^ a summons 
having been delivered to a sister of his, a young 
virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some 
public prpcession, they afterwards rejected her ; 
alleging she never had nor could have been sum- 
moned, because she was unworthy of the honour. 
This affront highly provoked Harmodius ; but 
Aristogitoii, out of zeal for him, was far more 
exasperated at it. The points needful to their 
mtended revenge were concerted with the party 
who concurred in the design. But they waited 
for the great Panatheniea, to strike the blow ; 
on which festival alone, without incurring sus- 
picion, such of the citizens as assisted in the 
procession might be armed and gathered to- 
gether in numbers. It was settled, that they 
themselves should begin ; and then, the body of 
their accomplices were to undertake their pro- 
tection against the guards of the.tyrant's family. 

The persons made privy to this design were 
but few, £rom a view to a more secure execu- 
tion of it For they presumed that even such 
as were not in the secret, when the attempt 
was once in whatever manner begun, finding 
themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, 
and readily concur to assert their own freedom. 
When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, 
repairing without the walls to the place called 
Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, 
was prescribing and adjusting the order of the 
procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each 
urmed with a dagger, advanced to execute their 
parts. But, when they saw one of their ac- 
complices in familiar copversation with Hip- 
pias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to 
&U men,) they were struck with fear ; they im- 
agined the whole of their plot had been betray- 
ed, and that already they were only not appre- 
hended. Now, therefore, by a sudden turn 
of resolution, they determined, if possible, to 
•natch a timely revenge upon him by whom 
^ey were aggrieved, and on .whose account 



they had embarked into so dangerous an afSur* 
In this hurry of thought they rushed back into 
the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place 
called Leocorium ; where, without any regard to 
their own safety, they made an instant assault 
upon him. And thus, in all the "fury of pas- 
sion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other 
by resentment, they wounded and they kill 
him. As the people immediately ran together, 
Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes 
for the present, but, being afterwards seized, 
was unmercifully treated: but Harmodius is 
instantly slain on the spot. 

The news of this assassination being carried to 
Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off im* 
mediately ; not to the scene of action, but to« 
wards the armed accomplices. in the procession, 
before they could be informed of the fact, as 
they were stationed at a distance! He art- 
fully suppressed on his countenance all sense 
of the calamity ; and, pointing to a certain spot, 
commanded them aloud to throw down their 
arms and file off thither. This command they 
obeyed, expecting he had something to com- 
municate to them. But Hippias, addressing 
himself to his guards, orders them to take away 
those arms. He then picked out, man by man, 
from amongst them, such as he designed to 
put to the question, and all upon whom a dag- 
ger was found : for, by ancient custom, they 
were to make the procession with a spear and 
a shield. 

In this manner truly, from the anguish of 
irritated love,^ this conspiracy took its rise, and 
this desperate attempt was executed by Har- 
modius and Aristogiton^ from the impulse of 
a sudden consternation. But, after this, the 
tyranny became more grievous upon the Athe- 
nians. Hippias, who was now more than ever 
alarmed, put many of the citizens to death ; 
and cast his thoughts about towards foreign 

31 And yet so violently were tyrants detested at 
Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton 
was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty 
and first authors of the niin of tyrants. Their praises 
were publicly sung at the great Panathenna. No slave 
was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was em* 
ployed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set 
up in the forum : Xerxes indeed carried them away in- 
to Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to 
Athens. Plutarch hath preserved a smart reply of An 
tipho the orator, who will appear in this history, to the 
elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had 
put the question, which was the finest kind of brass ? 
''That," replied Antipho, ** of which the statues of 
Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.** 



tuo 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



pa«rer% to lecwe himidf tn aaylom abroad in 
case of a total rerene at home. To ^anti- 
4aa therefore, the ion of HippodnBy tynmt of 
Lampfl^in»-^to a Larapaacene though he him- 
aelf was an Athenian^ — he mairied hie dangh* 
ter Aichediee, knowing that family to have a 
powerful intereat with king Darius. And the 
JDonument of that lady is now at Lampsacns, 
and hath this inacription : 

From Hippias sprung, with regal power arrayM, 

Within tbli earth Archedice is hiid ; 

Bj father, husband, brothers, sona, alUtd 

To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride. 

For the apace of three years after this, 
Hipptas continued in poaseasion of the tyranny 
at Athens; hut being deposed in the fourth 
by the Lacedamonians, and the exiled AlcnuBO- 
mde, he retired by agreement to Sigeum; 
from Aence, to ^antidas at Lanqwacus ; and 
firom thence, to king Darins : and wiA a com- 
mand under him, he marched twenty years 
alkcr to Manihon; and, thouf^ much ad- 
vanced in yeara^ served m lihat war with ^ 
Modes. 

The people of Athens reBecting on these 
past transactions, and recollecting all the dis- 
mal nairatlTes about then! which tradition had 
handed down, treated with great sorerity, and 
deep suspicions, all such as wen informed 
against in relation to the Mysteiiea : and they 
eonstmed the whole procedure as the dawning 
of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic 
power. And as their passions were ii^amed 
by such apprehensions, many worthy and 
▼alnaUe citizens were already thrown into 
prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition 
was to have no end, since from day to day 
their indignation gave into more increasing 
severity, and mmibers were constantly arrested. 
Here, one of those* who had been imprisoned 
em suspicion (and a suspicion too of being 
most deeply concerned in the crime) is per- 
snaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn 
an evidence, no matter whether of troth or 
fidsehood. Many conjectures have passed on 
both sides; but no <me, neither at that time 
nor since, had been able to discover the men 
who were really concerned in the afiair. The 



* This person, according to Pjutarch in AldUades, 
Andoeides the orator, a man always reckoaed of 
tbeoUgarehiealfaekioa. And one Timeas, his intimate 
fkiendfWho was a man of small consideration at Athens, 
iRitremarkaMe fat a penetrating and enterprising ge- 
ains, was the person who persoaded Um to tarn in- 
fonner. 



argument whidi prevailed upon this pcnMm 
was, « the necessity for his taking stt<^ a step, 
even though he had ito hand in the commis- 
sion, since by this he would inftJiiUy procure 
his own safety,. and deliver the city from its 
present confusion. For he must be much 
more secure of saving his life by such vohm- 
taxy confession tm a promise of indemnity, 
than he could poseiUy be, should he persist in 
an avowal of his innooenoe, and be brought to 
a trial." In sImmI, this man became an evi- 
dence, both against himself and against others, 
in the afhir of the Mercnriee. 

Great was the joy of the Athenian people 
at this, as it was thought, undoubted di^ 
covery. And as they had been bighlj cha- 
grined before at their inabifity to detect the 
criminals, who had so outrageous^ insulted 
the multitude, they immediately discharged 
this informer, and all other pmonen whom 
be did not name as aceoraplices. Upon such 
as he ezpnssiy named, the judicial trials were 
held, dome of thorn they put to deatth, as 
many as were prevented by timely arrests fiom 
flying from justice ; but they pronounced the 
sentence of death agunst the fugitives^ and set 
a price on thdr heads^ Yet all this wMIe, it 
was by no means dear, that those who suffered 
were not ua^ustfy eondesmed. Thus muA 
however is certain, that by such proceedings 
the public tnmqninity was restore d . 

In regard to Aldbtades, the Atheniana were 
highly incensed against him, since the party 
which were his enenues^ and had made their at- 
tacks upon him before his departure, continued 
still to inflame them. And now, as they pre- 
sumed the truth had been detected in rdation 
to the Mercuries, it appeared to them, bey<md 
a scruple, diat he must also have been guilty 
of the crimes charged against him about the 
Mysteries, upon the same ground of a secret 
combination against the democracy. 

At this critical period of time, when die 
public confusion waain all its height, it fiother 
happened, that a Laeednmonian armj, though 
by no means laige^ advanced as fiur as to the 
isthmus, to execute some scheme along with 
the Boeotians. This was in t e r pr ete d to the 
prejudice of Akibiades, as if they had now 
taken the field at his insligatiott, and not on 
any account of obliging the Boeotians; and 
diat «had they not happily appt tBam ded in 
tims audi aahad been infonned against AAens 
had II0W been inftUiUy betisyed.'' If ay, lor 



WiABSVn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



841 



ih9 vpaee of a niglit, they kept guard under anni, 
within the ci^, in the temple of Theeeua. 

About the aame tim^ also, the firienda of 
Alcibiades at Aigoa were suspected of a design 
to assault the people. And those hostages of 
the Argiyea who were kept in custody among 
the islandsy the Athenians on this occasion, de- 
liyered up to the people of Argos, to be put to 
death on these suspicions. 

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter 
for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore 
to bring him to a trial and to execution, they 
accordingly despatched the Salaminian to Sicily, 
to order him and such others as they had in- 
formationB agpainat to repair to Athens. But 
it had been given them in charge to notify to 
him, that «< he should follow them home in 
order to make his defence,'' and by no means 
to put him under arrest. This arrangement 
was owing to a desire of preventing all stirs in 
ttie army or in the enemy ; and, not least of 
•11, to their willingness that the Mantineans 
and Argives should continue in the service, 
whose attendance in the expedition they whdiy 
•scribed to the interest Alcibiades had with 
tbam* 

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board 
his own ship, and accompanied by all those who 
were involved in the same accusation, sailed 
away from BiaHiy with the Salaminian for 
Athens. And when they were got to the 
height of Thuria, they no longer followed; 
but quitting their ship were no longer to be 
eeen. Cenenred as they were, they durst not 
ia fiut undergo a trial. The. crew of the Sala- 
•tinian exmrtad themselves immediately in the 
mureh after Alcibiades and his companions ; but, 
when diey found Ihe search was ineffectual, 
^^ gave it up, and steered away for Athens. 
And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed 
ever in a vessel soon after from Thuria^ to 
Pebponnesns. But the Athenians, upon lus 
4uM afaandoning his defence, pronounced the 
■•ntMice of death agunst him and his aaso- 
dates. 



^ finMlMktIjr at Tkeria, wbe kaew Alelbiadss, asked 
1^ wb|r he W9uld not stand a trial, and trust bis 
country 1 « In other points I would ; but, when my 
Hfb is concerned, I would not trust my own mother, lest 
■h« skaiild make a nalstake, and put in a Mack bean 
VMIai4of a while ose.** And. when ha wasaftarwards 
tol4, that his cojintoymeo had passed the sentence of 
death against him, he briskly replied^" But I'U make 
them know that I am alive.*' Plutarch in Alcibiades. 
38 



After these transactions, the Athenian gene- 
rals who remained in Sicily, having divided 
their whole armament into two squadrons, and 
taken the command of each by lot, set sail with 
all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. 
They were desirous to know, whether the 
Egesteans would pay down the m<«ey: to 
discover also the present posture of the Seli- 
nuntians ; and to learn the state of their quar^ 
rels with the Egesteans. In their course, 
keeping on the left that part of Sicily which 
lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Hi- 
mera, which is the Only Grecian city in this 
part of Sicily ; and, when denied reception here, 
they resumed their course. Touching after- 
wards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress, but an 
annoyance to thd Egesteans, they surprise it \ 
for it was situated close upon the sea; and 
having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves^ 
they delivered the place into the hands of the 
Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending 
on t^e Athenian motions. The land forces 
marched away from hence through the terri- 
tories of the Siculi, till they had again reached 
Oatana ; but the vessels on board of which were 
the slaves, came back along the coasts. 

Nicias had proceede(f from Hyccara directly 
to Egesta, where, after transacthig othev points 
and receivings thirty talents,' he rejdined ^ 
grand armament at Catena. And here they 
set up the slaves to sale,' and raised by the 
money paid for them'' one hundred and twenty 
talents. * 

They also sailed about to their Sicilian alliee, 
summoning them to send in their rmnforee^ 
ments. With a division also of their force they 
appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in 1^ 
district of Gel a, but were not able to take itr 
And here the summw ended. 

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians be^ 
gin immediately to get all things in readiness 
for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracu- 
sans were equally intent on making an attack 
upon them. For, since the Athenians had not 
thought proper, during their first panic and con- 
sternation, to fan instantly upon them, snch a 
protraction re-inspired them day after day witli 
new reviving courage : since, farther, by eruiv> 



« JC5812 10 J. sterling. 

• Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Lais the fh- 

mous eourtezan, at this time a very young ghrl, whom 

her purchasers carried to Ck>rinth, where she set up and 

drove a prodigieus trade indeed. Plutarch in J^eias, 

» X33,S50^ sterling. 



242 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



ing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to 
afifect a remoteness from them; and, though 
showing themselves hefore Hybla, and at- 
tempting the place, they had not been able to 
carry it, the Syracusan^ began now to treat 
them with, an open contempt. They even in- 
sisted, as might he expected from a populace 
who are high in spirits, « that their generals 
should lead out towards Catana, since the ene- 
my durst not venture to march against them." 
The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out 
to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the 
camp of the Athenians, insulting them in 
other respects, but especially with this sneer- 
ing demand, « Whether they were not rather 
come to gain a settlement for themselves on a 
foreign shore, than to replace the Leontines in 
their old possessions V* 

The Athenian generals, informed of these 
bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole 
strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as 
possible from that city, that they might snatch 
an opportunity of transporting thither their 
own forces by favour of the night, and seize 
a proper spot whereon to fix their encamp- 
ment, without any obstruction from the enemy. 
They were well convfhced, that their point 
could not be so easily accomplished, should 
they endeavouri to force a descent in the face 
of the enemy, or by a land-march should give 
them an early notice of their design. For, in 
such cases, their own light-armed, and that 
ciunbersome train which must attend, as they 
had no horse to cover their motions, must suf- 
fer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the 
Syracusans: but, by the other scheme, they 
might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the 
cavalry could not give them any considerable 
annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracu- 
san exiles who followed . their camp, had in- 
formed them of a piece of ground convenient 
for their purpose near Olympisum. 

In order therefore to accomplish the point, 
the generals have recourse to the following ar- 
tifice. — ^They despatch an emissary, of whose 
fidelity (hey were well assured, and who might 
also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well 
afiected to their cause. The person employed 
*was a Catanean. He told them « he was sent 
l^y their friends in Catana,'* with whose names 
they were acquainted, and knew well to be of 
that number in Catana which persisted in 
steadfast attachment to them : he said farther, 
that, «the Athenians reposed themselves by 



night within the city at a distance from their 
arms ; and that in case they (the Syracusans) 
on a day prefixed, would with all the forces of 
their city appear by early davm before the 
Athenian camp, the Cataneans would shut up 
those within the city and set fire to their ship- 
ping, by which means they might force the en- 
trenchments and render themselves masters of 
the camp ; that, farther, the party of Cataneans, 
that would co-operate with them in this scheme, 
was very large, and already prepared to execute 
these points he was now sent to propose." 

The Syracusan generals, whose ardour other 
contingencies had already inflamed, and who 
had formed a resolution, even previous to such 
encouragement, to march their forces towards 
Ca ana, without the least reserve gave implicit 
credit to this .emissary ; and, having instantly 
pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed 
him. They also (for by this time the Seli- 
nuntian and some other auxiliaries had joined 
them) issued out their orders for the whole 
military strength of Syracuse to march out on 
the day appointed. No sooner therefore were 
all the needfril preparations adjusted, and the 
time at hand at which they were to make their 
appearance, than— on the march for Catana, 
they halted one night upon the banks of the 
Symffithus, in the Leontine district But the 
Athenians, when assiured they had thus taken 
the field, decamping instantly with the whole 
of their force, and with all the Sicilian' and 
other auxiliaries who had joined them, and em- 
barking themselves on board their ships and 
transports, steered away by night for Syracuse. 
And, early the next dawn, they landed on the 
intended spot near Olympisum, * intent on 
forming and securing their endampment The 
cavalry of the Syracusans, in the meantime, 
came up first to Catana ; and discovering that 
the whole Athenian army had put to sea by 
night, they return with this intelligence to their 
foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheel^- 
ing about, returned vrith all speed to the de- 
fence of Syracuse. 

In the meantime, the Athenians, as the ene- 
my had a long way to march, formed an en- 
campment on an advantageous spot without 
the least' obstruction. On it, they were pos- 
sessed of the advantage of fighting only at their 
own discretion, and the Syracusan horse could 
not give them the least annoyance, either during 
or before an engagement. On one side, they 
were flanked by ^alls, and houses, and trees, 



TEA» XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



243 



and a marsh ; and on the other by precipices. 
They also felled some trees that grew near ; 
and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled 
them into a barricade for the defence of Uieir 
ships; and to cover them on the side of Das- 
con. They also expeditiously threw up a ram- 
part, on the part which seemed most accessible 
to the enemy, of stones picked out for the pur- 
pose, and timber, and broke down the bridge 
of the Anapus. 

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their 
camp, not so much as one person ventured out 
of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The 
first who appeared to make any resistance, 
were the Syracusan cavalry ; and, when once 
they had shown themselves, the whole body of 
their infantry was soon in sight. They ad- 
vanced first of all quite up to the Athenian 
works; but, when they perceived that they 
would not sally out to fight them, they again 
retreated : and, having crossed the road to He- 
lorum, reposed themselves for the night. 

The succeeding day, the Athenians and al- 
lies prepared for engagement, and their order 
of battle was formed as follows: — ^The Ar- 
gives and Mantineans had the right, the Athe- 
nians the centre, and the rest of the line was 
formed by the other confederates. One half 
of the whole force, which was ranged in the 
first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The 
other half, being posted near the tents, formed 
a hollow square, in which the men were also 
drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, 
if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good 
look-out and advance to their support. And 
within this hollow square they posted all the 
train who attended the service of the army. 

But the Syracnsans drew up their heavy- 
armed, which body consisted of the whole mili- 
tary strength of Syracuse and all the confede- 
rates who had joined them, in files consisting 
of sixteen. Those who had joined with auxili- 
ary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians ; and 
next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in 
the whole to about two hundred: the horse 
also of the Camarineans, about twenty in num- 
ber, and about fifty archers. But their horse- 
men they posted to the right, being not fewer 
in number than twelve hundred ; and next to 
them, the darters. 

The Athenians being now intent on advan- 
cing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in 
regular order to the troops of the several states, 



animated them to the fight by the following 
harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army. 

" What need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long 
exhortation, since we are here, determined, and 
resolute for action? for this our present ar- 
rangement seems to me a stronger confirmation 
of your courage, than any words could be, how 
eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferi- 
or in strength. But when, Argives, and Man- 
tineans, and Athenians, and the flower of the 
isles, we are here assembled together, — ^how is 
it possible, when such brave and numerous 
allies are to fight in company, that we should 
not entertain a steadfast, nay, the warmest 
hope, that the victory will be our own 7 nay 
more, as we have to do with a promiscuous 
crowd, the mob of a city, not selected, for ser- 
vice, as we have had the honour to be ; and 
who, it must be added, are but Sicilians ; who, 
though afiecting to despise us, will never sus- 
tain our charge, because their skill is far be- 
neath their courage. 

« Let every soldier farther recall to his re- 
membrance, that he is now at a vast distance 
from his native soil, and near no friendly land 
but what you shall render such by the efforts 
of your valour. Such things I am bound to 
suggest to your remembrance, the reverse, I 
am well convinced of what your enemies utter 
for their mutual encouragement. They un- 
doubtedly are roaring aloud — «It is for yoiur 
country you are now to fight.* But I tell you, 
that from your country you are now remote ; 
and, as such, must either conquer^ or not with- 
out difficulty ever see it again, since the num- 
erous cavalry of the enemy will press hard upon 
our retreat. Call therefore to mind your own 
dignity and worth; advance with alacrity to 
assault your foes ; convinced that your present 
necessities and wants are far more terrible 
than the enemy you are to engage," 

When Nicias had finished this exhortation, 
he led on his army towards the encounter. 
But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, 
as by no means expecting to be charged so 
soon; and some of the soldiers, as the city 
lay so near, were straggled thither. These 
however came running with all eagerness and 
speed to gain their posts ; too late upon the 
whole; but as each of them met with any 
number intent on action, he ranged himself in 
their company. The Syracusans, to do them 
justice, were not deficient in alacrity or cou- 



^^TW 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[aoDK n. 



i«08, neither in liie present Iwttle nor any of 
the following. They maintained their ground 
gallantly so long as their competence of skill 
enabled them; but when that failed them, 
they were forced, though with reluctance, to 
sladcen in their ardour. However, though 
far from imagining that the Athenians would 
presume to begin the attack, and though ob- 
liged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they 
took up their arms, and advanced immediately 
to meet their foe. 

In the first place, therefore, the flingers of 
stones with either the hand or the sling, and 
the archers, on both sides, began the engage- 
ment ; and alternately chased one another, as 
is generally the ease among the bodies of the 
lightparmed. In the next place, the sooth- 
sayers brought forwards and immolated the 
solenm victims; and the trumpets summoned 
the heavy-armed to close firm together, and ad- 
vance. 

All sides now began to face ; the Syracu- 
sans to fight for their country ; each soldier 
amongst them for his native soil, to earn, for 
the present his preservation, and for the future 
his liberty. — On their enemies* side, the Athe- 
nians to gain possession of a foreign country, 
and not to damage their own by a dastardly 
behaviour ; the Argives and voluntary part of 
the confederates, to procure for the Athenians 
a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and 
again to visit their own country, to which they 
were endeared, victorious and triumphant ; and 
that part oi the confederacy which attended in 
obedience to the orders of their masters, were 
highly animated by the thought, that they 
must earn their safety now at once, or, if de- 
feated now, must for the future despair, and 
then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant 
hope, that, were others reduced to the Athe- 
nian yoke, their own bondage might be render' 
ed more light and eai^. 

The business being now come to blows, 
they for a long time maintained the ground on 
both sides. It hai^pened,&rther, that some claps 
of thunder were heard, attended with lightning 
and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden con- 
sternation in the Syracusans, who now for the 
first time engaged the Athenians, and had 
gained very little experience in the affiiiis of 
war. But by the more experienced enemy, 
these accidents were interpreted as the (xdi- 
naiy eflfeets <^ the season ; and their concern 
rather employed upon the enemy, whom 



they firand Ao easy conquest But the Ax<* 
gives, having first of all defisated the left wing 
of the Syracusans, and the Atheniaiie being 
afterwards successful in their quarter of the 
battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon 
thrown into disorder, and began the flight 
The Athenians however did net coStinne the 
pursuit to any great distance ; for the Syracu- 
san cavalry, as they were numerous a^d un- 
broken, put a stop to the ehase by aasanhing 
those parties of heavy-armed whom th^ saw 
detached for the pursuit, and driving them 
back into their own line. Having parsueii 
only so fiur as they could in an orderly and 
secure manner, they again retreated and erect* 
ed a trophy. 

But the Syracusans, who had tallied again 
in the ro^ad to Helomni, and were drawn up 
as well as the present posture of afiaire Weuld 
permit, send a strong detaduneni from their 
body for the guard of Olympisum, apprehen- 
sive that the Athenians might otherwise seise 
the treasures that were deposited tiieie. And, 
this being done. With the remaiud^ c^ theb 
force they retired within the walls of 9yntnBe» 

The Athehians in the meantiine made ne 
advances against Olympieum ; but) al^r gsH 
thering together the bodies of their slain, and 
laying them upon the funeral pyre, they pass- 
ed the night on the field of battte. 

The next day they delivered up tlieir dead 
under truce to die Syracusans, c^ whom and 
their allies there had perished abottt two him- 
dred and sixty men ; and then gathered up tlie 
bones of their own. Of the AthMiiane and 
their allies about fifty in all were sltdn* And 
now, with all the pillage they had made of the 
enemy) they sailed back to Gatana. 

This was owing to die season c^ the yeat, 
now advanced to winter. It Was no kmger 
judged possible for &em to be able to ee»- 
tinue the war in dieir present post be^re they 
had p ro cured a sup|d^ of horse fiom Atlieiii^ 
and had assembled others from their oonfisd- 
erates in Sicily, that diey Sii^t not he e»> 
tiiety exposed to the horse ^ die enemy. 
They were abo intuit on coUeeting peeiraiary 
aids in those parts, and some were ex p ect ed 
from Athens.^— « They might alee ohtun the 
concurrence of some other oides, which fhef 
hoped would pMve moMtradahle^ since Aey 
had gained a battle: they waiiled, fhrdter, l» 
furnish thenselvee widi pttmHoim and til 
necessary stores, which might enable dieni 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



945 



•arly in the spring to make new attempts on 
Syracnse." Determined by these considera- 
tions, they sailed back to Naxus and Catana, 
in order to winter there. 

The Syracusans, after they had performed 
the obsequies of their slain, called a general 
assembly of the people. And on this occasion 
Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, (a man who 
was inferior to none in all other branches of 
human prudence, who for military skill was in 
high reputation, and renowned for bravery,) 
standing forth among them, endeavoured to 
encourage them, and prevent their being too 
much dispirited by their late defeat. 
. He told them, "that in courage they had 
not been worsted, but their want of discipline 
had done them harm : and yet the harm suf- 
ferred by that was not near so great as they 
might justly have expected ; especially when, 
no better than a rabble of mechanics, they had 
been obliged to enter the lists, against the 
most experienced soldiery of Greece; that 
"what hurt them most was too large a number 
of generals, and the multiplicity of commands 
which was thence occasioned, (for the number 
of those who commanded was fifteen,) whilst 
the bulk of their army observed no discipline, 
and obeyed no orders at all : but were only a 
few skilful generals selected for the trust, 
would they only be intent this winter on train- 
ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish 
others with arms who had none for themselves, 
in order to enlarge their number as much as 
possible and inure them to settled exercise and 
use, — ^he assured them, thus, in all probability, 
they must upon the whole be too hard for 
their foes, as their natural portion of valour 
was great, and skill would be -attained by 
practice: that both of these would progres- 
sively become more perfect; discipline, by 
being exercised through a series of danger; 
and inward braveiy would merely of itself in- 
crease in gallant confidence, when assured of 
the support of skill; as to generals, that few 
only, and those invested with absolute power, 
ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn 
oath from the people, that they were permitted 
to lead the army where and how they judged 
beat for the public service. For by this means, 
what ought to be concealed would be less liable 
to detection, and all the schemes of war might 
be directed with order and a certainty of sue* 



course, decreed whatever he proposed. They 
elected Hermocrates himself to be a general^ 
and Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and 
Sicanus the son of Hexecestus; these threoi 
They also appointed ambassadors to go to 
Corinth and Lacedsmon, to procure the aU 
liance of those states, and to persuade the 
Lacedsmonians to make hotter war upon the 
Athenians, with an open avowal that they 
acted in behalf of the Syracusans ; that, by 
this means, they might either be obliged to 
recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less 
able to send any reinforcements to the army 
already there. 

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana^ 
soon made an excursion from thence to MeA» 
sene, expecting 'to have it betrayed into their 
power. But all the steps taken previously for 
the purpose, were totally disconcerted* For 
Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command 
when recalled to Athens, being convinced 
within himself that exile must be his portion, 
betrayed the whole project (as he had been in 
the secret) to such persons at Messene as 
were attached to the Syracusans. The first 
step this party took was to put to death all the 
persons against whom he informed. And at 
the time of this attempt, being quite in a fer- 
ment and under arms, they carried their pointy 
so that those who wished to give it were ob- 
liged to refuse admission to the Athenians. 
The Athenians, therefore,' after thirteen days' 
continuance on that coast, when the weather 
began to be tempestuous, when their provision* 
failed, and no hope of success appeared, re- 
turned to Naxus**,' wber6, having thrown 
up an entrenchment round their camp, they 
continued the rest of the winteri They Also 
despatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a 
supply of money and horsemen to join them 
without fail, by the beginning of the spring. 

The Syracusans employed themselves this 
winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed 
Temenites within their new works, and carried 
their wall through all that length of ground 
which faceth Epipole, that, in case they should 
be unable to keep the fidd, the enemy might 
have as little room as possible to raise counter- 
works of annoyance. They also placed a gar* 
risen at Megara, abd another in Olympisum* 



f» 



The Syracusans, who had listened to this dis- 



> tti the original tt added *•* OfUMff. But all fHa 
editota ani not«writif« givs itap, and own tbey ~ 
make notbing of it. 
2C 



246 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



JbOOK VI. 



And all along the sea they drove rows of piles, 
wherever the ground was convenient for de- 
scents. Knowing, also, that the Athenians 
wintered at Naxus, they marched out with all 
their force against Catana. They ravaged the 
territory of the Catdneans ; and, after burning 
the tents and camp of the Athenians, they re- 
turned home. 

Having also had intelligence, that the Athe- 
nians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under 
favour of a treaty made formerly with them by 
Laches, to try if it were possible to procure 
their concurrence ; they also despatched an em- 
bassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For 
the Camarineans were suspected by them, as if 
they had not cordially sent in their quota of 
assistance for the first battle, and lest for the 
future they might be totally averse from acting 
in their support, as in that battle they had, seen 
the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by 
the former treaty they had made with the lat- 
ter, might now declare openly on their side. 

When therefore Hermocrates and others 
were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and, 
from the Athenians, Euphemus and his col- 
leagues in the embassy, an assembly of the 
Camarineans was held , in which, Hermocrates, 
desirous to give them a timely distaste against 
the Athenians, harangued them thus : 

« Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, 
hath not been occasioned by any fears we were 
under, that you might be too much terrified at 
the great equipment with which the Athenians 
have invaded us ; but rather by our knowledge 
with what kind of arguments they would im- 
pose on your understanding, by which before 
we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they 
might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily 
in fact they have invaded, upon such pretext as 
you have heard them give out ; but with such 
intentions as We have all abundant reason to 
suspect. And to me it is clear, that their 
schemes have no tendency to replant the Leon- 
tines, but rather to supplant us all. For, how 
is it reconcilable with common sense, that a 
people, who have ever been employed in the 
ruin of the states which are neighbouring to 
Athens, should be sincere in re-establishing a 
Sicilian people ; or, by the bonds of consan- 
guinity, hold themselves obliged to protect the 
Leontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst 
on the Chalcideans of Eubcea, from whom these 
others are a colony, they hold fast-rivetted the 
yoke of slavery? No ; it is the same cruel 



policy, that subjugated the Grecians in that 
part of the world, which now exerts itself to 
glut their ambition in this. 

" These' are those very Athenians, who 
formerly, having been elected their common 
leaders by the well-designing lonians and that 
confederate body which derived from them 
their descent, on the glorious pretence of 
avenging themselves on the Persian monarch, 
abused their trust by enslaving those who 
placed confidence in them ; charging some 
with deserting the common cause, others with 
their mutual embroilments, and all, at length, 
with different but specious criminations. And, 
on the whole, these Athenians waged war 
against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian 
liberty, as neither did the other Grecians in 
the defence of their own : the former fought, 
not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to 
the Mede, but to their ownselves; the lat- 
ter, merely to obtain a change of master; a 
master not inferior in poUcy, but far more 
abundant in malice. 

" But, though Athens, on manifold accounts, 
be obnoxious to universal censure and reproach, 
yet we are not come hither to prove how justly 
she deserveth it, since your own conviction 
precludes the long detail. We are much more 
concerned at present to censure and reproach 
ourselves, since, with all the examples before 
our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts 
have fufiered, who, for want of guarding against 
their encroachments, have fallen victims to 
their ambition, — since, with the certain know- 
ledge that they are now playing the same 
sophistries upon us, — «the replantation of 
their kindred Leontines," — " the support of 
the Egesteans, their allies," — we show no in- 
clination to unite together in our common de- 
fence, in order to give them most signal proofs, 
that in Sicily are neither lonians, nor Helles- 
pontines, nor islanders, who will be slaves, 
though ever changing their master, one while 
to the Mede, and soon after to whoever will 
please to govern ; — ^but, on the contrary, that 
we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that 
seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell 
in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract oar 
union, till, city after city, we are compelled to 
a submission? we, who are convinced that thus 
only we can be conquered, and when we even 
behold that thus our foes have dressed up their 
plan ; amongst some of our people scattering 
dissensions, setting others to war down each 



YSAB xvn.-] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



247 



other for the mighty recompense of their al- 
liance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the 
pride or caprice of each, and avail themselves 
of these methods to work our ruin'? We even 
indulge the wild imagination, that though a 
remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the 
danger can never come home to ourselves ; and 
that he who precedes us in ruin is unhappy 
only in and for himself. 

" Is there now a man amongst you who 
imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not 
kimself, iB the object of Athenian enmity, and 
pronounceth it hard that he must be exposed 
to dangers in which I only am concerned 1 
Let such a one with more solidity reflect that, 
not merely for what is mine, but equally also 
for what is his own, he should associate with 
zne, though within my precincts ; and that this 
may be done with greater security now, since 
as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me 
he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is 
bereaved of all support may hazard the conten- 
tion. And let him farther rest assured, that 
it is not the sole view of the Athenian to 
bridle enmity in a Syracusan ; but, under the 
colour of that pretext, to render himself the 
more secure, by gaining for a time the friend- 
ship of another. 

" If others, again, entertain any envy or 
jealousy of Syracuse, for, to each of these, 
great states are generally obnoxious, and would 
take deUght in seeing us depressed, in order to 
teach us moderation, though not totally de- 
stroyed, from a regard to his own preservation, — 
these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the course 
of human affairs, can never be accomplished ; 
because it is quite impossible, that the same 
person shall build up airy schemes to soothe his 
own passions and then insure their success. 
And thus, should some sinister event take 
place, quite sunk under the weight of his own 
calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing 
again, that I was so replaced as to excite his 
envy. Impossible this, for one who abandoned 
my defence, who refused beforehand to parti- 
cipate my dangers, — dangers, though not in 
name, yet in reality, his own. For, if names 
alone be regarded, he acts in the support of 
my power ; but, if realities, of his own preser- 
vation. 

« Long since, ye men of Gamarina, it was 
incxunbent on you, who are borderers upon us, 
and must be our seconds in ruin, to have fore- 
seen these things, and not to have abetted our 



defence with so much remissness as you have 
hitherto done it. You ought to have repaired 
to our support with free and voluntary aid; 
with such as, in case the Athenians had begun 
first with Gamarina, you would have come with 
earnest prayers to implore from us : so cordial 
and so alert you should have appesired in our 
behalf, to avert us from too precipitate submis- 
sions. But these things never were ; not even 
you, nor any other people, have showed such 
affection or alarcity for us. 

" From timorousness of heart you will study 
perhaps to manage both with us and the in- 
vaders, and allege, that th6re are treaties sub* 
sisting between yourselves and the Athenians. 
Yet these treaties you never made to hurt your 
friends, but to repel the efforts of your foes, 
should they dare to attack you. By them you 
are bound to give defensive aid to the Athe- 
nians' when attacked by others, and not when 
they, as in the present case, injuriously £bl1I 
upon your neighbours. Remember that the 
Rhegians, though even of G|;ialcidic descent, 
have refhsed to concur with them in replanting 
the Leontines,. who are also Ghalcideans. Hard, 
indeed, is your fate, if they, suspecting some 
bad design to lie lurking under a fair justifi- 
cation, have recourse to the wary moderate 
behaviour which appearances will not warrant ; 
whilst you, on the pretended ground of a rational 
conduct, are eager to serve a people who are 
by nature your foes ; and join with most im- 
placable enemies to destroy your own kindred, 
to whom nature hath so closely attached you! 

« In such a conduct there is no justice : the 
justice lies in abetting our cause, and not 
dastardly shrinking before the terror of their 
arms. These arms are not terrible, would 
we only all combine in our mutual defence ; 
they are only so, if, on the contrary, we con- 
tinue disunited, the point which the Athe- 
nians labour with so much assiduity. For, 
even when singly against us they entered the 
lists, and were victorious, yet they were not 
able to effectuate their designs, but were 
obliged percipitately to re-embark. If united, 
therefore, what farther can we have to fearl 
What hinders us from associating together 
with instant alacrity and zeal? especially as 
we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponne- 
sus, who in all the business of war are far supe- 
rior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the vain pre- 
sumption, that either it will be equitable in re- 
gard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselves. 



348 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bOC» VL 



to tek« pert with neither tide, on pretence that 
you have treatieci f absisting with both, there 
If a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under 
plausible words, the event will soon detect 
For if, through your determination to abandon 
his support, the party already attacked be van- 
quished, and the assailant be invigorated by 
success, what can such absenting of yourselves 
avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, 
and afford free scope to the pernicious schemes 
of the otherl And how glorious would the 
reverse of this conduct be, would you exert 
your efforts to redress the injured, who also by 
the ties of consanguinity have a right to expeot 
it from you ; to guard the common welfare of 
Sicily ; and not suffer your friends, your good 
friends, the Athenians, to run out into a course 
of outrage \ 

» In a word, we Syracusans have now only 
tills to add : that arguments are superfluous, 
either for the instruction of you or of others, 
in points whose tendency you know as clearly 
•8 ourselves, ^ut we earnestly oonjure you, 
and, if prayers will not avail, we boldly protest 
against you,^ that, as the worst designs are 
formed against us by our eternal foes, the lo- 
nians, you would act as you ought ;^f not, 
that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by 
Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the 
Athenians we must be destroyed, they will be 
indebted for their success to your determinations, 
but the glory of it will be totally assumed by 
themselves. Nay, the chief reward they will 
reap from the victory will be this, to enslave the 
persons who enabled them to gain it. But then, 
should the victory rest with us, you are the men 
from whom we shall exact revenge for all the 
dangers to which we have been exposed. Exa- 
mine things, therefore, and declare your resolu- 
tion, either at once, without embarking into dan- 
gers, to put on the Athenian chaius ; or, with 
us, to face the storm and earn your preserva- 
tion ; not basely bending to 'the yoke of fo- 
reign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with us 
which will not quickly be appeased." 

In these words Hermocrates harangued the 
Camarineans : and, when Ee had ended, Eu- 
phemus, ambassador of the Athenians, repMed 
as follows ; 

« Our journey hither was intended for the 
renewal of a former alliance ; but, as this 8y- 
raeusan hath taken the liberty to be severe upon 
us, we lie under an obligation to show the ius- 
tiee of our title to that share of dominion whidi 



we now possess. And the stroBgeat evidence 
of this he himself hath been pleased to give, 
by affirming, that lonians have been etemid foes 
to Dorians. The feet is ineontestably true; 
since we, who are lonians, have been necesaits- 
ted to stand ever upon our guard against the en- 
croaching designs of the Peloponnesians, who 
are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, 
and are seated upon our borders. When, there- 
fore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we 
saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted 
our own independence from the govemmeiit 
and guidance of the Lacedemonians, since bo 
shadow of reason could be found why we should 
be obedient to them any more than they to us, 
save only that in this critical period their 
strength was greater. We were afterwards 
appointed, by free election, the leaders of those 
lonians who had formerly been subject to the 
monarch. And the pr^erence awarded to bs 
we continue to support ; assured that only thus 
we shall escape subjection to the Peloponse- 
Man yoke, by keying possession ef a power 
which can effectually awe all thdr encroach- 
ments. And, farther, (that we may eome to 
particulars,) it was not willi injustice that we 
exacted subjection from those lonians, and in- 
habitants of the isles, whom the Syraeusans say 
we thought proper to enslave, though connected 
with us by the ties of blood : for they maieh* 
ed, in company with the Mede, against their 
mother-country, against us, thenr ibundos. 
They had not the courage to expose ihdr own 
homes to ruin and devastation, by an honest re- 
volt, though we with magnanimity abandoned 
even Athens itself. They made slavery their 
choice, and in the same miserable fate weold 
have been glad to envelop us. Thus solid «t 
the grounds on which we found our title to that 
extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly 
deserve it ; since, in the cause of Greece, we 
equipped the largest fleet, and exerted the great* 
est ardour, without the least equivocation ; tai 
since those others acting, with implicit obedienee 
to the Mede, did all they could to di^ieas ns. 
To which let it be added, that we were at the 
same time desirous to obtain a strength suffietent 
to give a check to the ambition of Pelopezmefli- 
ans. Submissive, therelMe, to theai dictates^ we 
are not, will not be ; because, either inretmi far 
the repulse of the barbaritti by our single eflbrts, 
or in requital d the dangers we br ave ly en- 
countered in deface ^ (he liberty ef Aese 
lonians,—- greater than all fiie rest oi Greece^ 



YBARrvn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



249 



or even they themselves, durst hazard for their 
own, — ^we have an undoubted right to empire. 

« But, farther, to guard its own liberties and 
rights is a privilege, which, without either mur- 
mur or envy, will be allowed to every state : 
and now, for the security of these important 
points to ourselves, hate we ventured hither to 
beg your conci^rrence ; conscious, at the same 
time, ye men of Camarina, that your welfare 
too coincides with our own. This we can 
clearly demonstrate, even from those crimina- 
tions which our adversaries here have lavished 
upon us, and from those so terrible suspicions 
"which you yourselves are inclined to entertain 
of our proceedings. We are not now to kam 
that men, who with some high degrees of hor- 
Tor suspect latent mischief, may for the pre- 
sent be soothed by an insinuating flow of 
"words ; but, when summoned to action, will so 
exert themselves as is expedient for their wel- 
fare : and, consonant to this, we have already 
hinted that through fear alone we seized that 
power which we now possess in Greece ; that 
through the same motive we have veptured 
hither, to establish our own security in concert 
with that of our friends ; so far from the view 
of enslaving them to ourselves, that we are 
solely intent on preserving them from being en- 
slaved by others. 

« Let no man here retort upon us, — that all 
our solicitude for you is unmerited and super- 
fluous. Such a one must know, that, so long 
as you are safe, so long as you are able to em- 
ploy the Syracusans, the less liable they will 
be to send reinforcements from hence to the 
Peloponnesians for our annoyance; and as 
this is the real state of things, our concern 
should mast largely be bestowed upon you. 
By parity of reason it also highly concerns us 
to replant the Leontines ; not in order to ren- 
der them vassals to ourselves, as their relations 
of Eubcea are, but to make them as strong and 
powerful as we are able ; that, seated as they 
then will be on her confines, they may com- 
pensate our remote situation in affording a di- 
version to Syracuse. For, if the view be 
carried back to Greece, we ourselves are there 
a match for our foes. The Chalcidean there, 
whom after unjustly enslaving we are taxed 
with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, 
is highly serviceable to us ; because he is dis- 
armed, anid because he furnisheth us with a 
tribute. But, here in Sicily, our interest de- 
mandeth, that the Leontines, and the whole 
39 



body of our friends, be restored to the full en- 
joyment of all their hberty and strength. 

« Now, to a potentate invested with supe- 
rior power, or to a state possessed of empire, 
nothing that is profitable can be deemed ab- 
surd; nothing secure that cannot be safely 
managed. Incidents will arise with which we 
must temporize, and determine accordingly our 
enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes 
most for our interest here, where we ought by 
no means to weaken our friends, but through 
the strength' of our friends, to keep down and 
disable our enemies. Of this you ought not 
to rest incredulous, as you know, that over our 
dependents in Greece, we either hold tight or 
slacken the rein, as squares best with the pub- 
lic service. We permit to the Chians and 
Methymneans the free use of their liberties 
and laws for a quota of shipping ; we do the 
same to many for an annual tribute, exacted 
perhaps with somewhat of rigour. Others 
amongst them, who fight under our orders, are 
absolutely free, though seated upon islands and 
easy to be totally reduced, because they are 
commodiously situated to annoy the Pelopon* 
nesian coast And hence, it may be depended 
upon, that we shall make such dispositions al- 
so here as are most expedient for our own in- 
terest, and may best lessen the dread, which, 
as was said before, we entertain of the Syra- 
cusans. 

« The point at which they aim is an extent 
of their rule over you ; and when, by alarming 
your suspicions of us, they have wrought you 
to their own purpose, either by open force or 
taking advantage of your desolate condition, 
when we are repulsed and obliged to abandon 
your defence, they intend to subdue all Sicily 
to their yoke. Such the event will unavoida- 
bly prove, if at present you adhere to them t 
for never again will it be easy for us to as- 
semble together so large an armament to give 
a check to their ambition ; nor, when we 
are no longer at hand for your support, will 
their strength against you be insufficient It 
is vain in any man to indulge an opinion that 
this may not be the case, since the very train 
of things evinceth its truth. For, when first 
you invited us hither, it was not upon the sug- 
gestion of any other fear than this, that, should 
we sufier you to be subjected by the Syracusans, 
the danger then would extend itself to us. 
And highly nnjust it would be now, if the 
argument you successfully enforced with us 
2c2 



250 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



I 



riioald lose all its inflnence upon you, or should 
you ground suspiciona on our present appear- 
ance against them, with a force superior to 
theirs, when you ought much more to enter- 
tain an endless distrust of them. The truth is 
this, that without your c(Hicurrence we are not 
Me to continue here. And in case, with per- 
fidy open and avowed, we make seizure of your 
cities, yet we are unahle to retain their posses- 
sion, remote as they lie from Athens; as 
cities so large we neTcr could g^arrison ; and 
as they are farther provided in all respects as 
well as any on the continent. But, on the con- 
traiy, the Syracusans will not rush upon you 
from a camp upon the heach; hut, posted in a 
city more f<Nrmidahle in strength than the whole 
of our armament, they are ever meditating your 
nun, and, when they have seized a proper op- 
portunity, will strike the hlow. They have af- 
forded you instances of this already, and a 
flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leon- 
tines. And yet they have the efficontery now, 
hy words, as if you were so to be deluded, to 
exasperate you against us, who have hitherto 
controlled their views, and deterred them to 
this moment from making all Sicily their prey. 
«Our arguments have a tendency directly 
opposite. We have nothing in view but your 
certain and assured preservation, when we 
earnestly conjure you not wilfully to hetray 
the means which at present will result from 
our union, which we can mutually exert in one 
anothe^s behalf; and strongly to represent to 
your own reflections, that, even without the 
concurrence of allies, a road to your reduction 
will at any time be open to these Syracusans 
through their own superior numbers ; but an 
opportunity exceedingly seldom afibrded you 
to make head against them with so large an 
auxiliary body. And if, from groundless sus- 
picions, you sufier now so large a body to de- 
part eitbter unsuccessful or defeated, yet a 
time will come when you will ardently wish to 
see them return, though in a much less pro- 
portion of strength, and they have it no longer 
in their power to cross the sea for your sup- 
port Take care, therefore, Camarineans, that 
neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a 
too credulous belief of the bold calumniations 
these Syracusans utter. We have now laid 
before yon the true ground of all those, sad 
suspicions which are fomented against us; 
but shall again recall them to your remem- 



brance by a short recapitulation, that they may 
have the proper influence upon you. 

« We declare, therefore, that we role in 
Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved ; 
but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, 
to suppress that annoyance which might other- 
wise be given us from hence ; — ^that mere ne- 
cessity obligeth us to embark in many underta- 
kings, because we have many sinister incidenti 
to guard against ; — ^that now and formerly we 
came hither to support those Sicilians who 
have been unjustly oppressed ; nor uninvited, 
but solemnly conjured to take such steps. 
Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuitfl^ 
either by erecting yourselves into censors of 
our proceedings, or into correctors of our poli- 
tics, a point too difficult for yon to manage. 
But, so much of our activity or conduct as you 
can mould into a consistency with your own 
welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your 
best advantage ; and never imagine that our 
politics are equally prejudicial to all the world 
besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of 
the Grecians. For, through every- quarter, 
even those which we cannot pretend to con- 
trol, both such as dread impending- mischiefir 
and such as meditate encroachments, — ^laying 
hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; 
the former, that redress may be obtained by 
our interposition ; the latter, that, if we think 
prop» to oppose them, their own safety will 
be greatly endangered ; — both sides, I say, are 
hence obliged ; the latter, to practice modera- 
tion, though with regret ; the former, to enjoy 
tranquillity without previous embroilmenti of 
the public peace. The security, therefore, 
which now ofiers itself to your acceptance, and 
is always ready for those who want it, you are 
conjured by no means to reject ; but relying, 
like other communities, on that quantity of 
support we are able to afford you, put the 
change for once on the Syracusans ; and, in* 
stead of being ever on the watch ag^ainst them, 
force them at length to be watchful and alarmed 
for themselves.'^ 

Such was the reply of Euphemus. In tbs 
meantime the real disposition of the Cama- 
rineans was this : at bottom they were wdl- 
affected to the Athenians, 'save only for tht 
ambition they showed of enslaving Sicily ; hit 
had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, 
through that jealousy, ever to be found in t 
neighbouring state. But, as the dread of vie- 



TEASXVU.] 



PELOPONiNESIAN WAR. 



S&l 



C017 OB the side of tlie SjncOBtxm, mho were 
close upon their borders, if earned without their 
4»ncurrence, had influenced their measures, 
thej sent a small party of horse to succour 
them on the former occasion ; and looked upon 
themselves as obliged in polic j to serve them 
underhand in future exigencies, but with all 
possible frugality and reserve; and, at tiie 
present juncture, that they might not betray 
any the least partiality against the Athenians, 
as they were come off victorious from a battle, 
to return the same impartial reply to both. 
Determined, therefore, by these considerations, 
they answered, — that, « since a war had broke 
oat between two states, each of which was in 
alliance with themselves, they judged the only 
method of acting consistentiy with their oaths 
would be, to observe a strict neutrality." 
Upon this the ambassadors of both parties took 
their leaves and departed. And the Syracu- 
sans, within themselves, exerted their utmost ap- 
plications to get all things in readiness for war. 

The Athenians, who were now encamped at 
Naxus, opened negotiations with the Sieuli, to 
draw over as many of them as was possible 
into their adfaerenco. Many of these, who 
inhabited the plains, and were most awed by 
the Syracusane, stood resolutely out ; but the 
generality of those who were seated in the 
midland parts, as they were now, and had ever 
kept themselves nncontroUed, sided at once 
with the Athenians. They furnished them 
with com for the service of iAke army, and there 
were some who supplied them with money. 
And then the Athemans, taking the field 
•gainst such as refused to accede, forced some 
to a eompliance, and prevented otSiers from 
receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. 
During vntiter also they removed again from 
Naxus to Catana ; and having repaired their 
camp, which had been burned by the Syracu- 
sans, chose to pass tlie remainder of the winter 
Ihere. 

They also despatehed a trireme to Carthage, 
to ask their friendskip, and whatever assistance 
could possibly be obtained. They sent also to 
Tuscany, as some cities on that coast Itad 
made them voluntary offers of assistance. 
And, fiirther, they circulated their orders among 
the SicuIi, and despatehed in particular one to 
the BSgesteans, « to send them as large a num- 
ber of horses as Hiey could possibly pn)cure.*' 
Hiey bnmed ftemselres in coUectmg materials 



for circunrrallatioB, such as bridos and iron, 
and all other necessary stores; being deter- 
mined to cany on the war with vigour on the 
first approach of spring. 

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were 
sent to Corinth and Laeedemon, endeavoured 
in their passage to prevail with the Italians 
« not to look with unconcern on the Athenian 
proceedings, since they also were equally in- 
volved in the danger." But, when arrived at 
Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, 
in which they insisted on a speedy supply, 
upon the plea of consanguinity ; and the Co- 
rinthians came at once to a resolution, by way 
of precedent to others, that,-«< vrith all possible 
ardour they would join in their defence." 
They even appointed an embassy of their own 
to accompany them to Lacedsmon, whose in- 
structions were, to second them in soliciting 
&e Lacedtemonians « to declare open war at 
home against the Athenians, and to fit out an 
aid for the service of Sicily." 

At the time tiiat these joint embassies arriv- 
ed at Lacedsmon from Corinth, Alcibiades 
was also there. He had no sooner made his 
escape, attended by his companions in exile, 
than in a trading-vessel he passed over from 
Thuria to Cyllene in Elea ; and from thence 
he repaired to Lacedsmon. But, as the 
Lacediemonians had pressed to see him, he 
went thither under the protection of the public 
faith; for he had with reason dreaded his i^- 
cc^on there, since he had acted so large a part 
in the affidr of Mantinea. 

It happened farther, that, when a public 
assembly was convened at Sparte, the Corin- 
thians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all 
urged the same request, and were successful. 
Nay, though the college of ephori, and those 
who presided at the helm of the state, had 
dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they 
were only to send their ambassadors to Syra- 
cuse, to hinder all accommodations with the 
Athenians, and were quite averse to the sup- 
plying them with real succours. — yet Alcibia- 
des, standing up, inflamed the Lacedemonian 
fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the 
following harangue : 

« I lie under a necessity, in the beginning of 
my discourse, to vindicate myself from the 
calumny which hath been charged against me, 
lest a jealousy of me might divert your atten- 
tion from those points which equally affect the 



252 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



▼I. 



oommon canie. My ancefton, therefoiei hav- 
ingy upon some reasonable groundf of com- 
plaint, renounced the privilege of being the 
public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I 
am the man who again re-established this hos- 
pitable intercourse ; who in many other respects 
endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you, 
and particularly in the calamity which fell to 
your share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered 
in these my favourable inclinations towards 
you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodat- 
ing your dififerences with the Athenians, em- 
ployed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs ; 
and as thereby you invested them with autho- 
rity, you of course reflected disgrace on me. 
With reason, therefore, after such provocations, 
you were afterwards thwarted by me^ when I 
supported the interest of the Mantineans and 
the Argives, and introduced new measures into 
the state, in opposition to you. Let therefore 
such of your number as, chagrined at what they 
suffered then, continue unjustly their resent- 
jnents against me, weigh now the force of those 
reasons on which I acted, and return to better 
temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of 
any man, because I have ever manifested an 
attachment to the interest of the people, .let 
him also learn that his enmity to me on that 
account is not to be defended. We have borne, 
from time immemorial, a steadfast unrelenting 
aversion to tyrants : now the whole of opposi- 
tion to the despotic power of one is expressed 
by this word, the people ; and on this principle 
alone our firm and constant adherence to the 
multitude hath been hitherto carried on and 
supported. Besides, as the state of which I 
was a member was purely democratical, I lay 
under a necessity, in many respects, of con- 
forming my conduct to the established model ; 
and yet I endeavoured to give the public 
measures a greater share of moderation than 
the franctic humour of the Athenians was 
Judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries 
started up ; such as, not only in earlier times, 
but even in our pwn, have driven the people to 
more furious measures, and have at length 
effected — the exile of Alcibiades. But, so 
long as the state was in my own management, 
I thought myself justified, could I preserve it 
in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on 
the same model of government, in which I 
found it Not but that the judicious part of 
our community are sensible ' what sort of a 



goveniment a democracy is, — and I myself no 
less than others, who have such abimdant 
occasion to reproach and curse it : — bat, for 
madness open and avowed, new terms of ab- 
honrence cannot be invented ; though totally to 
subvert it we could in no wise deem a measure 
of security, whilst you had declared yourselves 
our foes, and were in the field against us. 
And all those proceedings of mine, which have 
proved most offensive to you, are to be charged 
entirely to such principles as these. 

«And now, in relation to these points on 
which you are here assembled to deliberate, 
(and I also with you,) and about which If I 
am able to give you a greater light, I am bound 
to do it, — attend to what I am going to declare: 
Our principal view in the expedition to Sicily 
was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to our 
yoke. After them, we intended to do the 
same by the Italians. We should next have 
attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians; 
nay, Carthage itself. Had these <our views 
been successful, either in the whole or the 
greater part, we should soon have givea the 
attack to Peloponnesus : assembling for that 
purpose the whole Grecian force, which the 
countries thus subdued must have added to 
our own; taking also into our pay large 
bodies of Barbarians and Iberians, and other 
soldiers of those nations which by general con- 
sent are famed for the most warlike of all 
Barbarians. We should have buUt also great 
numbers of triremes for the enlargement of our 
navy, as Italy would plentifully have supped 
us with timber ; with which blocking up Pelo- 
ponnesus on all sides, and with our land-ferces 
at the same time invading it by land, (after carry- 
ing your cities, some by storm, and some by the 
regular siege,) we hoped without obstruction to 
have warred you down, and in pursuance of 
that, to have seized the empire of universal 
Greece. With money and all needful stores 
adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to be 
conquered in those remoter parts would with 
all proper expedition have supplied us, without 
any demands on our own domestic revenues. 
Such were to be the achievements of that grand 
armament which is now abroad ; such, you nuy 
rest assured upon the evidence of a person who 
was privy to every step, was its original plan; 
and the generals who are left in the command 
will yet, if they are able, cany it into execu- 
tion. And I must farther beg leave to tell 



TEAR XVn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



253 



you, that, if with timely succoura you do not 
interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to 
stand before them. 

" The Sicilians are a people unexperienced 
in war ; and yet, would they unite and combine 
together in their mutual defence, they might 
possibly even now be too hard for the Atheni- 
ans. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as 
they are by the rest, and we already have seen 
their whole force defeated in battle, and who 
are blocked up in their own harbours by the 
enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the 
great force of the Athenians which is already 
there. If, therefore, Syracuse be taken, all 
Sicily is vanquished at a stroke, and Italy be- 
cometh instantly their prey ; and then the 
storm, ivhich, as I intimated before, was to be 
directed against you from that quarter, will in 
a short time gather and come pouring down 
upon you. 

'« Let no one therefore imagine that the end 
of your present deliberation is the safety of 
Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be en- 
dangered, unless some measures of prevention 
be executed with speed ; — unless you send out 
a naval force, for the preservation of Sicily, so 
dexterously appointed, that the hands who man 
the ships and ply the oar, m^iy, on the instant 
of their landing, become a body of heavy- 
armed ; and, what in my judgment is better 
than an army, a citizen of Sparta to take upon 
him the command, that those who are ready he 
may discipline to service, and for such to join 
as on choice would refuse their concurrence : 
for, by such a step, those who are already your 
friends will be animated with higher degrees of 
resolution, and those who fluctuate at present 
will join you with a smaller sense of fear. 

" It behoves you also to make war upon the 
Athenians at home in a more declared and ex- 
plicit manner ; that the Syracusans, convinced 
that you h&ve their welfare at heart, may make 
a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians 
be rendered less able to send reinforcements to 
their troops in Sicily. 

" It behoves you farther to raise fortifica- 
tions at Decelea in Attica ; a step which the 
Athenians have ever most terribly- apprehend- 
ed, and think that in that point alone you have 
not put their resolution to its utmost trial in 
the present war; and that assuredly must be 
pronounced the most effectual method of dis- 
tressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads 
most, and then know how to afflict him in his 



most tender part : for it is a reasonable con- 
clusion, that they will tremble most at in- 
cidents which, should they take place, they 
are inwardly convinced must most sensibly 
affect them. As to the benefits which you 
yourselves shall reap by fortifying Decelea, 
and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass 
over many, and only concisely point out the 
most important. — By this, all the natural com- 
modities of the country will fall into your 
hands ; some by way of booty, the rest by vo- 
luntary contributions. They will instantly be 
deprived of the profits of the silver mines at 
Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates 
and the fees of their courts. The tributes 
from their dependents will also be paid with 
less punctuaUty ; since the latter shall no sdon- 
er perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, 
than they will show an open disregard for 
Athens. 

" That these or any of these points be exe- 
cuted with despatch and vigour, dependeth, ye 
Lacedsemonians, on yourselves alone. I can 
confidently aver that all are feasible, and I 
think I shall not prove mistaken in my senti- 
ments. I ought not to suffer in the opinion of 
any LacedsBmonian, though once accounted the 
warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously 
join the most inveterate foes of my country ; 
nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any, 
as if I suited my words to the sharp resent- 
ments of an exile. I am driven from my coun- 
try, through the malice of men, who have pre- 
vailed against me : but not from your service, 
if you hearken to my counsels. Your enmity 
is sooner to be forgiven, who have hurt you 
enemies alone, than theirli, who by cruel treat- 
ment compel friends to be foes. My patriot- 
ism is far from thriving under the injustice I 
have suflered ; it was merely an effect of grati- 
tude for that protection I once enjoyed from 
my country. Nor have I reason at present to 
imagine, that against my country I am now go- 
ing to march, so much as to recover some 
country to myself, when at present I have none 
at all. And I judge the person to be a true 
lover of his country, — not him who, exiled 
from it, abandons himself without a struggle to 
his own iniquitous fate, but — who, from a fond- 
ness for it, leaves no project unattempted to 
recover it again. 

« As these are my sentiments, I may £Edrly, 
ye Lacedemonians, insist upon your acceptance 
of my service without diffidence or fear, what 



254 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



ertr dangers or whatever miseries may here- 
after result. You well know the maxim, 
which oniversal consent will evince to be good, 
— ^that if, when an enemy, I hurt you much, 
when I am now become your friend, I can help 
you more. Nay, for the latter I am better 
qualified on this very account, that I am per- 
fectly acquainted with the state of Athens ; 
whereas I was only able to conjecture at yours. 
And, as you are now met together to form re- 
«olutions on points of the highest importance, 
I conjure you without hesitation to carry your 
arms at once into Sicily and Attica ; to the 
end that, in the former, by the presence of a 
small part of your forces, you may work out 
signal preservations, and at home pull down 
the present and even the future growth of the 
Athenians ; that, for ages to come, yourselves 
may reap security and peace, and preside at the 
helm of united Greece, which will cheerfully 
acquiesce under your guidance, and pay you a 
free, uncompelled obedience." 

To this pur}k>se Alcibiades spoke. And the 
LacedsBmonians, who had before some sort of 
intention to take the field against Athens, 
though hitherto they protracted its execution, 
were now more than ever animated to it, when 
Alcibiades had given them such a detail of af- 
fairs, whom they judged to have the clearest 
insight in them. Thereupon they turned their 
attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, 
and sending out n body of succour for the pre- 
sent service of Sicily. They also appointed 
GylippuB, the son of Cieandridas, to go and 
take upon him the command at 83n'acui^ ; with 
orders, by concerting measures with the Syra- 
4;usans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for 
the most effectual and most ready conveyance 
of succours thither. 

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders 
to the Corinthians, to attend him, without loss 
of time at Asine, with two ships ; and also to 
expedite the equipment of the fleet which they 
designed for this service, and to keep them in 
readiness to sail when opportunity should re- 
quire. - Having so far concerted measures, the 
ambassadors departed from Lacedemon. 

The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from 
Sicily by the generals on that post, to demand 
•nj^lies of money and a body of horse, was by 
this time arrived at Athens. And .the Athe- 
niaiia, on hearing their demands, drew np a de- 
cree, to send away 8iq>plie8 to that annament, 
■and a body of honemen. 



And here the winter aided ; and the seven- 
teenth year of this war, of which Thii^dides 
hath compiled the history, came also to an end. 



TBAB XTIII 



1 



On the earliest approach of the sptmg which 
led on the following summer, the Athenians in 
Sicily, hoisting from Catana, showed them- 
selves on the coast of Megara, in Sicily, of 
which the Syracusans having dispossessed the 
inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant, 
(as I have already related,) continued masters 
of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged 
the country; till, approaching a fortress be- 
longing to the Syracusans, and attempting it 
without success, they retired, some by land and 
the rest on board the fleet, into the river Te- 
reas ; from whence going again on shove, tiiey 
ravaged the plains and set fire to the growii^ 
com. They also fell in with a small party of 
Syracusans, some of whom they slew^; and 
then, erecting a trophy, went again on board. 
They next returned to Catana ; and, afler vic- 
tualling there, proceeded from thence, wiA 
their whole force, to the attai^ of Centoripa, 
a stropg fort belonging, to the Siculi ; and, hav- 
ing made themselves masters of it by a capitor 
lation, they stood away, burning down in their 
passage the com of the Inesseans and Hyble- 
ans. Upon returning to Catana, they find 
there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived 
from Athens, though without h<Hse8, yet with 
all the proper furniture, as if they could be 
better supplied with ihe former in Sicily ; as 
also thirty aichers, mounted, and three hun- 
dred talents' in silver. 

In the same spring, the Lacedflnnonians also 
took the field against Argos, and advanced as 
far as Cleon» ; but the shock of an earthquake 
being felt there, they again retired. And after 
this, the Argives, making an irraption into the 
Thyreatis, which borders upon themselves, took 
a vast booty from the Lacedsmonians, whidi 
sold for no less than twenty-five talents.' 

And not long after, in the same spring, the 
popular party at ThespisB assaulted those in 
power, buti without success. And, though die 
Athenians marched away to their succour, some 
of them were apprehended, and otben 
obliged to take refuge at Athens. 



I Before €aiiiBt,414. • S8,1SSI. • 4JB«3I. 15*. 



YBAB XVni.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



255 



In the same summer, the SyracuBans had no 
sooner received inteltigence of the arrlTal of a 
body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and 
the design of advancing immediately to assault 
them, than it occurred to their reflections, that, 
" in case the Athenians could not possess 
themselves of Epipole, (a spot of ground 
which is only on^ continued crag, and lies di- 
rectly above the city of Syracuse,) it would be 
difficult to enclose them completely round with 
works of circumvallation, even though they 
should be defeated in open battle." They ap- 
plied {hemselves therefore to the guard of all 
the approaches to Epipols, that the enemy 
might not on a sudden gain the eminence; 
for l^y other methods it was impossible for 
them to carry that post Excepting those ap- 
proaches, the rest of the tract is an impractica- 
ble steep, inclining gradually quite down to 
the city, and commanding the view of every 
thing within it Hence, therefore, because it 
riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by 
the Syracusans Epipols. 

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had 
noiv formally taken upon him the command, 
the whole force of Syracuse marched out, by 
break of day, into a meadow, on the banks of 
the Anapus, to pass under review ; where the 
first thing they did was to select seven hundred 
of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, 
to be commanded by Diolimus, an exile from 
Andrus. These were appointed for the guard 
of Epipole, and to be ready for service, as 
they were always to keep in a body, on any 
sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who 
had mustered their forces on the preceding day, 
had stood away from Catana, and were come 
in the night undiscovered to the spot called 
Xieon, which is distant six or seven stadia* 
from EpipolfB, where they disbarked their land- 
forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the sta- 
tion of Thapsus Thapsus is a peninsula, join- 
ed to the main-land by a narrow isthmus, and jut- 
ting out into the sea, at no great distance from 
the city of Syracuse either by land olr water. The 
naval force of the Athenians, having secured 
their station by a palisade across the isthmus, lay 
quiet in their posts ; but the land-army, without 
loss of time, made a running march towards 
EpipolsB ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, 
before the Syracusans, who were yet in the 

i Above half a milt. 



meadow busied in their review, diflcovered or 
were able to advance to prevent them. And 
now their whole force was in motion to dislodge 
them ; each man with all possible alacrity, and 
more pairticularly the seven hundred command- 
ed by Diomilus ; but, from the meadow to the 
nearest spot where they could come up with 
the enemy, was a march of no less than twenty^ 
five stadia.' To this it was owing that the 
Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly 
manner ; and, being plainly repulsed in battle 
at Epipols, were forced to retire within the 
city. Diomilus also and about three hundred 
more lose their lives in this engagement. 

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having 
erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of 
the slain under truce to the Syracusans, march- 
ed down the next day in order of battle to the 
very gates of the city ; but as the Syracusans 
refrained from sallying out against them, they 
then drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalumy 
on the very steepest edge of Epipole, looking 
towards Megara, which they intended as a re- 
pository for their baggage and money, whilst 
themselves might be called ofi*, either to fight 
or to carry on the works of a siege. 

Soon after this they were joined by a body 
of three hundred Egestean horse, and one hun- 
dred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, 
and some others in their alliance. The Athe- 
nian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty ; 
they had procured some horses from the Eges- 
teans and Gataneans, and had purchased the 
rest ; so that now they had got together a body 
of horse amounting in all to six hundred and 
fifty. 

A garrison was no sooner-eettled in the fort 
of Labdalum, than the Athenians approached 
to Tyche ; where taking post they built a wall 
in circle with great expedition, and by the ra- 
pidity of their work struck consternation into 
the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out 
with the fixed design of hazarding an engage- 
ment, as they saw the danger of dallying any 
longer. The armies on both sides were now 
beginning to face each other; but the Syra- 
cUMin generals, observing that their own army 
was in disarray, and could not easily be formed 
in proper order, made them all wheel off 
again into the city, except a party of their 
horse : these, keeping the field, prevented the 

a Two miles and a half. 



256 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



Athenians from carrying stones and straggling 
to' any distance from their posts. But, at 
length, one Athenian ba^d of heavy-armed, 
supported by the whole body of their cavalry, 
attacked and put to flight these Syracusain horse- 
men. They made some slaughter amongst 
thewif and erected a trophy for this piece of 
success against the enemy's cavalry. 

On the day following, some of the Athe- 
nians began to raise a wall along the northen 
side of the circle ; whilst others were em- 
ployed in carrying stones and timber, which 
they laid down in heaps all along the place 
called Trogilus, near to the line marked out 
for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by 
the shortest compass, from the great harbour 
on one side to the sea on the other. But the 
Syracusans, who were principally guided by 
the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts 
of sallying out for the future, with the whole 
strength of the city, to give battle to the Athe- 
nians. It was judged more advisable to run 
along a wall in length, which would cut the 
line in which the Athenian works were de- 
signed to pass, and which, could they effect it 
in time, must entirely exclude the enemy from 
perfecting their circumvallation. Nay farther, 
in case the enemy should come up in a body to 
interrupt the work, they might give them full 
employ with one division of their force, whilst 
another party might raise pallisades to secure 
the approaches; at least, as the whole of the 
Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose 
them, they would be obliged to discontinue 
their own works. To raise, therefore, the 
projected work, they issued out of the city; 
and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from 
below the Athenian circle, they carried on 
from thence a transverse wall, cutting down 
the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which 
they built wooden turrets to cover their work. 
The Athenian shipping was not yet come 
round from Thapsus into the great harbour, 
But the Syracusans continued masters of all 
the posts upon the sea, and consequently the 
Athenians were obliged to fetch up all neces- 
sary stores from Thapsus across the land. 

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all 
their palisades and the transverse wall were 
sufficiently completed, in which the Athenians 
had given them no manner of interruption, as 
they were under apprehensions that, should 
they divide their force, they might be exposed 
to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently 



intent on perfecting their own circumvallation 
— the Syracusans drew off again into the city, 
leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the 
guard of their counter-wall. 

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the 
pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed 
the drinking-water into the city : and having 
farther observed that the Syracusans kept 
within their tents during the heat of the day, 
but that some had straggled into the town, 
whilst those posted at the palisades kept but a 
negligent guard ; they picked out three hun- 
dred of their heavy-armed, and strengthening 
them with a choice party of their light-armed 
soldiers, ordered them to march with all pos- 
sible speed and attack the counter work. The 
rest of their force was to march another way, 
since, headed by one of the generals, it ad- 
vanced towards the city, to employ the Syra- 
cusans in case they sallied ; whilst the other 
detachment, headed by the other general, at- 
tacked the paUsade which covered the sally- 
port. Accordingly, the three hundred assault 
and carry the palisade, which those who were 
posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for 
shelter behind the works which inclosed Te- 
menites. The pursuers however entered with 
them; but were no sooner got in than they 
were again forcibly driven out by the Syracu- 
sans. And here some of the Argives and a 
small number of Athenians were slain. 

But now the whole army, wheeling about, 
demolished the counter-work, and pulled up 
the palisade. The piles, of which it was com- 
posed, they carried off in triumph, and erected 
a trophy. 

The next morning the Athenians resumed 
their work of circumvallation, and continued it 
across the crag which is above the marsh, and 
lies on the quarter of Epipolse that looks to- 
wards the great harbour. This Was the short- 
est cut for their circumvallation downwards, 
across the plain and the marsh, till it reached 
the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusa^is, issu- 
ing again, raised another palisade, beginning 
from the city, and stretching quite across the 
marsh. They also drew up an entrenchment 
along the palisade, entirely to prevent the 
Athenians from continuing their works quite 
down to the sea. The latter, when they had 
perfected their work along the crag, are bent 
on demolishing the new palisade and entrench- 
ment of the Syracusans. For this purpose, 
they had ordered their shipping to come about 



YBAJi xvpn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



257 



from Thapeutf into the great harbour of Syra- 
cuse. They themselTes, at the moming'B 
dawn, marched down from Epipole into the 
plain; and then, crossing the marsh, where 
the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by 
the help of boards and planks which they laid 
upon the surface, they carry almost the whole 
length of the palisade and entrenchment early 
in the morning, and were soon after masters of 
the whole. This was not affected without a 
battle, in which the Athenians were again Tic- 
torious. The routed Syracusans fled different 
ways; those who had composed their right, 
towards the city ; and those who had composed 
their left, towards the river. But with a yiew 
of intercepting the passage of the latter, the 
three hundred chosen Athenians marched with 
all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, 
alarmed at this step, as the body consisted of 
the bulk of their horse, face about on the three 
hundred, and put them to flight, and then break 
in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By 
so unexpected a shock the first band in that 
wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, 
observing, it, advanced to their support from 
the lefl, with a small party of archers that 
happened to be near him, and the whole body 
of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that 
lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst 
the bulk of his party made a fall stop, he is 
instantly slain ;* ' as were also five or six of 
those by whom he was accompanied. The 
Syracusans caught up their bodies with all 
possible expedition, and bore them off to a 
place of security on the other side of the river. 
They were in great measure obliged to make a 
precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athe- 
nian army was now coming up to attack them. 
But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled 
at first towards the city, having gained leisure 
to observe such turns in their favour, caught 
fresh courage from the sight; and, forming 
again into order, stood their ground against 
that body of Athenians which faced them. 
They also send a detachment to attempt the 



*■ Plutarch, in the life of Nicias circumstantiates the 
manner in which the old general lost his life in chs- 
nicter. Callicrates, a good soldier, but of great im- 
petuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusan horse. 
Being challenged out by Callicrates, Lamachus alone 
engaged personally with him. Lamachus received the 
flnt wound ; he then returned the blow, and dropped. 
His antagonist fUl at the same time, and they both ex- 
pired together 
40 



circle on Bpipola, concluding it .to h6 on* 
manned for the present, and might at once be 
taken. This detachment in fact made itself 
master of the outwork, and demolished it for 
about ten plethres in length; but the circle 
itself was defended by Nicias from all their 
attempts. Tficias, being much out of order, 
had been left to repose himself within the cir- 
cle. He therefore issued orders to his servants 
to set fire to all the machines and the timber 
which were lying before the wall ; for he/ was 
convinced that thus alone, in such a total want 
of hands for their defence, any safety could be 
earned. The event answered his expectation ; 
for when the flames began to mount, the Syra* 
cusans durst not any longer come near, but 
thought proper to diesist and march away. 

For now the Athenians, who by this time 
had chased the enemy from off the plain, were 
remounting the ascent to defend their circle ; 
and, at the. same instant of time, their fleet, 
conformable to the orders they had received, 
was standing into the great harbour. The 
Syracusans upon the high ground beheld the 
sight ; which occasioned them and the whole 
Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the 
city ; concluding themselves no longer able, 
without an augmentation of their present 
strength, to hinder the completion of the 
Athenian works quite down to the sea. 

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their 
slain to the Syracusans, and received in ex- 
change the body of Lamachus, and of those 
who fell with him. 

The junction of their whole armament, both 
of their land and naval force, being now com- 
pleted, they began again, from Epipolae and 
the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a 
double wall, which they were to continue quite 
down to the sea. The necessary provisions to^ 
supply their army were brought in from all the 
coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi^ who 
had hitherto stood aloof, declared now for the 
Athenians, and came into their alliance, who 
were farther joined by t&ree vessels with fifty 
oars from Hetruria. 

All other points equally contributed to ele- 
vate their hopes. For the Syracusans had 
begun to despair of being able to sustain the 
siege, as they had no glimpse of any ap- 
proaching succour from Peloponnesus. They 
were tossing to and fro amongst themselves 
some proposals for an accommodation, and had 
2D 



858 



PELOPON^NESIAN WAR. 



(book ti. 



even sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by 
the death of Lamachus, was left invested with 
the sole command. Nothing definitive was 
however concluded, though (as might reason- 
ably be expected from men in high perplexity, 
and more straitly besieged than ever) many 
proposals were made to him, and many more 
were agitated within the city. The distresses, 
also, which environed them at present, struck 
into them mutual suspicions of one another: 
nay, they even divested ef their charge the 
generals who were in authority when these dis- 
tresses came upon them, as if all was owing to 
their misconduct or treachery, and chose in 
their stead Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tel- 
iias. 

In the meantime, Gylippus, the Lacednmo- 
nian, and the ships from Corinth, were come 
up to Leucas, designing with the utmost ex- 
pedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. 
But terrible accounts came thick upon them 
here, and all agreed in broaching the same un- 
truth, that « Syracuse was completely invested 
on all sides.'' Gylippus upon this gave up all 
hopes of saving Sicily ; but, having the preser- 
vation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen. 
the Corinthian, with the small squadron at 
hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two 
Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian 
gulf with all possible despatch to Tarentum. 
The Corinthians, besides their own ten now 
"fitting out, were to man two belonging to the 
Leucadeans, and three more belonging to the 
Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as pos- 
sible. 

The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at 
Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador 
to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his 
father had been a denizen of that state ; but, 
finding himself unable to gain their concur- 
rence, he weighed from thence and stood along 
the coast of Italy. But in the Terinean gulf 
he met with a hard gale of wind, which in this 
gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally 
with great and lasting violence, and now drove 



him from his course, and blew him out into tte 
open sea, where he stood again ihe rebuff of 
ano&er violent storm, but at length reached 
Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on 
ground, which had been damaged in the foal 
weather, and refitted them for service. 

When Nicias found that he was on his pss* 
sage, he betrayed an open contempt of so 
trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had al- 
ready done before him. It appeared to him, 
that so petty a squadron could only be fitted oat 
for piratical cruizes, and therefore he sent oat 
no detachments to hinder his approach. 

About the same time of this summer, the* 
Lacedemonians, with their own domestic forces 
augmented by the junction of their allies, made 
an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part 
of that territory. The Athenians put out to 
sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, 
which procedure was, beyond aU denial, the 
clearest violation of the treaties between them 
and the Lacedemonians. Hitherto they had 
only exercised robberies upon them from Py- 
lus ; and, making descents rather on any other 
coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had 
left it to the Argives and Mantineans to make 
war against them. Nay, though the Arrives 
had frequently pressed them, that with an 
armed force they would barely land on the 
Laconic coast, and, after committing never 
so small ravage in their company, immediately 
to retire, they had positively refused. But 
now, under the command of Pythodorus, and 
Lsqpodias, and Demaratus, they made a de- 
scent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, com- 
mitted large devastation on the adjacent coun- 
try, and afforded the Lacedsm<Hiians a most 
specious and justifiable pretext to act ofiESensively 
against Athens. 

When the Athenian fleet was sailed home- 
wards from^ Argos, and the Lacedsmonians 
also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into 
Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the La- 
cedemonian territory, and made some slaughter 
of the people, and then retained to Argos. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK VII. 



Tbe liege of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans think of a surrender. At this 
criale arrive the Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus the Spartan, which giveth a new turn to the siege. A 
counter virork is raised, to stop the Athenian circumvallation ; engagements ensue. Nicias )■ now in a bad situ- 
ation. He sendeth home a succinct detail of affairs by letter. A reinforcement is ordered him from Athens, 
under the command of Demosthenes. The Lacediemomans resolve to renew the war at home.— Ykar XIX. At- 
tica invaded, and Decelea fortified. A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenian! 
are superior. In the meantime Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy. A massacre at Mycalesus. A sea-fight 
on the coast of Achaia. A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. 
Tbe reinforcement arriveth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts EpipolaB without success. Debates about 
raining the siege, which at length is resolved. The instant they are embarking the moon is eclipsed , upon 
wiiich Buperstition detaineth them. The Syracusans attack them both by land and water. The Athenians are 
worsted in every engagement ; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly dia- 
tressed, and totally subdued. Nidaa and Demoslbenea are taken prisoners and put to death. 



Gtlippvs and Pythen, when they had refitted 
their ships, stood along the coast from Taren- 
tum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received 
more certain information, that Syracuse was 
not yet completely invested, and that a succour 
of force might be thrown into the town by the 
way of EpipoIflB. They went next to consulta- 
tion, — ^whether, " keeping Sicily on the right, 
they should endeavour at all hazards to enter 
Syratuse by sea ; or, with Sicily on their left, 
should steer first to Himera; from whence, 
attended by the forces of that state and what- 
ever additional strength they could persuade to 
join them, they should march thither over- 
land." It was determined to go first to Hime- 
ra, especially as the four Athenian vessels 
were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias 
at last, upon the certain intelligence that they 
were now at Locri, had detached to observe 
them. To be beforehand, therefore, with this 
detachment, they pass through the straits, and, 
having touched only at Rhegium and Messene, 
arrive at Himera ; whilst, in the latter place, 
they prevailed upon the Himereans to concur 
with them in the war, and not only to intrust 



their troops under their command, but even to 
supply with arms such of the mariners as had 
navigated the vessels, and were therefore un- 
provided ; for their shipping they had drawn 
ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinun- 
tians also, by a messenger despatched on pur^ 
pose, they had summoned to meet them, with 
all their united strength, at a determined place 
upon their route. The Geloans also, and 
some of the Siculi, promised to attend with a 
party, though by no means considerable. The 
latter of these were disposed better than ever 
to the service, since Archonides was lately 
dead, (who, reigning over some of tbe Siculi 
seated in these parts, and having a great influ- 
ence over them, had declared for the Atheni- 
ans,) and since Gylippus appeared to them to 
be sent from Lacedtemon with a full purpose to 
do tbem service. 

And now Gylippus,— -having assembled an 
army, which consisted of about seven hundred 
of those who navigated or came on board his 
vessels, and for whom he had provided arms; 
of heavy-armed and light-armed Himereans, 
amounting together to a thousand men and one 

259 ' 



260 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



hundred horsemen ; of some light-armed Sell- 
nuntians ; a small party of Geloan horse ; and 
a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, — began his 
march for Syracuse. 

The Corinthians in the meantime were send- 
ing out the other ships, as fast as they could 
equip them for the service, to follow with all 
possible expedition from Leucas : and Oongy- 
plus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who 
with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is 
the first who arrives at Syracuse ; and that 
but a small space of time before the approach 
of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his ar- 
rival, that the Syracusans were going forth- 
with to hold a public assembly, in which the 
terms of putting an end to the war were de- 
signed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from 
■o precipitate a step, and animated their droop- 
ing resolutions by strong assurances, that 
« other ships would instantly arrive ;** and that 
"Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent 
thither by the Lacedemonians to take upon 
him the command." The Syracusans accord- 
ingly resumed their spirits, and immediately 
marched out of the town, with the whole of 
their strength, in order to meet Grylippus ; for 
by this time they had received intelligence that 
he was actually approaching. 

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself 
master of legas, a fortress belonging to the 
8iculi; and no^ at the head of his army, 
drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to 
Bpipols. Having mounted by the pass of 
Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their 
first approach, he marched, in conjunction 
with the Syracusans, toward the Athenian 
eircumvallation. He happened to arrive at 
that critical juncture, when the Athenians had 
completely finished seven or eight stadia^ of 
the double wall extending to the great harbour, 
when, in consequence, but a very small part 
remained incomplete^ and on which they were 
labouring with their highest application. On 
tl^e other side of their circle, towards Trogiliis, 
the stones for completing their work had been 
laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, 
and some parts of their work on that side stood 
but half completed, thougH others had received 
the finishing hand. To such extremity of dan- 
ger were the SynicusanB now reduced. 

Oybppufl and the Syracusans coming thtis 



*■ Abmit tbree^uarters of a mile. 



suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first 
were struck with consternation: but formed, 
however, in order of battle, to give thena a re- 
ception. But Gylippus, having ordered his 
forces to halt, despatcheth a herald to the Athe- 
nians, proclaiming that, " in case they would 
evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, 
with their arms and baggage, he would readily 
grant them a truce." Such offers they received 
in a contemptuous manner;^ and, disdaining 
to return an answer, ordered the herald to 
move off. And now both Sides were busy 
in marshalling and disposing their men for 
battle. 

But Gylippus, who had made an observation 
that the Syracusans were in great confusion, 
and could not easily be formed into proper 
order, made his army fiill back into more open 
ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance 
whilst they were making this motion; but, 
without advancing, stood close uiider his works : 
and, when Gylippus found that the enemy 
would not move forwards to attack him, he 
made his forces wheel off to the high ground 
called Temenites, where they reposed them- 
selves for the night. 

The next morning he drew up the greatest 
part of his army before the works of the 
Athenians, to prevent their sending out suo- 
coura to more distant posts: for he had de- 
tached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, 
which he carried by storm, and put all the gar- 
rison found within 'it to the sword. Lab- 
dalum was BO situated, in regard to the Athe- 
nian posts, that they could have no view of what 
was transacting there. The same day also an 
Athenian trireme, as it was entering the hai^ 
hour, is taken by the Symcuaans. 

After so much success, the Syracusans and 
allies set about raising a counterwork along 
Epipolffi. Beginning at the city, they carried 
it upwards towards the single wall which had 
an oblique inclination ; and intended that, in 
case the Athenians could not stop its comple- 
tion, it should entirely exclude them from per- 



aNiciae (saye Plutarch) disdained to return an ta- 
swer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and 
asked 'Mf, h% the arrival of a mantle and staff fnm 
Sparta, the fly raeusaus were beeomesofuUof sfiirifsas 
to despise the Athenians ; who had laMy given ap to 
the Lacedemonians three hundred of their coantrymea 
wDb had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, 
and who eomhed their hair, too, miieb better ttaaa 6y> 
Uppnt.** 



J 



PBLOPONNESIAN WAK. 



961 



ftefcing th^r ciirnmrtlkdoh. Hie Athmiiaiui, 
having perfected their works to tlie teei hid 
now remounted the emiiieiice;and, as toine parts 
of their work were but weak, Gylippns drew 
out his army bj night, and was marching to 
demolish those : but the Athenians, who pass- 
ed the night without their works, were no 
sooner aware of it, than ihey also marched 
away to defend them. Upon which, Gylip- 
pus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made 
his army retreat to their former posts. This, 
however, occasioned the Athenians to raise 
those parts of their wall to a greater height, 
and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as 
amongfst the body of their confederates they 
had divided the guard of the rest of their 
works, allotting a proper charge to each. 

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify 
the spot called Plemmyrium. Flemmyrium 
is a point of land over against Byrscuse, which 
Jutting out before the great harbour, renders 
the mouth of it very narrow. « If this weie 
fortified," he thought, « the importetion of ne- 
cessariee for the army would be better secured ; 
because then, ftom a smaller distance, they 
could at any time command the harbour where 
the Byracnsan shipping isy ; and, should it be 
their ill fortune to be straitened by sea, might 
easier fetch in supplies than in the present sta- 
tion of th^ fleet at the bottom of the great har- 
bour." Now also he began, with greater attention 
than before, to study how to distress them by 
sea ; convinced, siiice the arrival of Gylippus, 
how little room he had to hope for success by 
land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, 
and drew his land-forces down, and immediately 
erected three forte. In these the greatest part 
of the baggage was laid up ; and the transports 
and tight ships were immediately stationed 
there. To this project, however, the havoc 
that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is 
principally to be ascribed ; for, as they suffered 
m this station tmder scarcity of water, and the 
mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both 
Water and wood from a distance, since near at 
hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan 
horse, who were masters of the country slaugh- 
tered them in abundance* The Syracusans had 
posted a third part of their cavalry at dieir for- 
tress of Olympisum, to bridle the marauding 
excursions of Uie enemy at Plemmyrium. 

Now also Nicias received intelligence that 
the other Corinthian lihips were in their pass- 
tge. To watch &eir approach, he therefore 



detached twenty sail, whe were appointed to 
cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the 
capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them. 

Gylippus in the meantime was employed 
in building the counter-wall along Epipolte, 
making use of the stones which the Athenians 
had laid ready in hesps for the continuation of 
their own work. It was also his daily custom to 
draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of 
battle, and lead them out beyond the point of 
the counter-wall ; which obliged the Athenians 
to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. 
And, when Gylippus judged he could attack 
them with advantage, he instantly advanced ; 
and, the charge being given and received, a bat* 
tie ensued, in the space between their respec- 
tive works; but so narrow, that no use could 
be made of the Syracusan and confederate 
horse. The Syracusans and allies were ac- 
cordingly defeated. They fetched oft their 
slain by truce ; and the Athenians erected a 
trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the 
army round him, thought proper to make this 
declaration in the presence of them all : — ^that 
" the defeat was not to be charged on their 
want of bravery, but on his own indiscretion ; 
he had deprived them of the service of their 
own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle 
in too confined a spot between the works ; 
that he would now again lead them out in a 
more judicious manner." He exhorted them, 
therefore « to imprint it strong on their remem- 
brance, that as in real strength they were not 
inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if 
they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and 
Dorians, should not manifest themselves so re- 
solutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of 
their country a parcel of loniuus and islanders, 
and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adven- 
turers." Having addresed them thus, he lay 
on the wateh to seize a proper opportunity; 
and as soon as he had gained it, led them on 
again to the charge. 

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in gener* 
al of all the Athenians, that << though it was 
not their own interest to bring on an engage- 
ment, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop 
to the counter-work which the enemy was 
raising to hinder their progress ;" for, by 
this time the wall of the Syracusans had 
only not over-reached the extreme point to 
which the Athenians had brought their circum- 
vallation, "and, should it be extended farther it 
would give the enemy this double advantage ; 
2i>2 



262 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm 



—a certainty of conquest whenever th«y thought 
proper to fight, and a diBcretLonary power not 
to fight at all/' Determined by these consider- 
ations, they drew out in order to give the Syra- 
cusans battle. 

Gylippus soon began the engagement He 
had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the 
works, and at a greater distance from them 
than before. He had posted the cavalry and' 
the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoc- 
cupied by the works on either side, and posted 
them so that they flanked the Athenians. In 
the ardour of the engagement, the cavalry broke 
in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which 
was ranged against them, and entirely routed 
them. In consequence of which, the remain- 
der of the army was soon defeated by the 
Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired 
for shelter behind their works. And night no 
sooner came on, than the Syracusans, without 
loss of time, began to carry forwards their own 
works, which they soon extended beyond the 
Athenian circumvallation ; by which they gain- 
ed this great point, that they could no longer 
be invested on all sides by the Athenians ; and 
the latter, though masters in the field, were 
henceforwards effectually stopped firom perfect- 
ing their circumvallation. 

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, 
and Ambraciots, and Leucadiahs, the remain- 
der of the, squadron designed for this service, 
having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, 
came into the harbour of Syracuse : they were 
commanded by Herasinides, a Corinthian. By 
these the Syracusans were now assisted in 
carrying on their work, till it was completely 
joined to the traverse wall. 

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily in 
order to promote the common cause ; and to 
procure additional forces for the Services both 
of land and sea ; and to solicit the concurrence 
of such states as hitherto had manifested, either 
no great inclination, or an open repugnance, to 
join in the present war. Other ambassadors 
also were de^atched, by the Syracusans and 
Corinthians, to Lacediemon and Corinth, in- 
structed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to 
be transported into Sicily either in trading ves- 
sels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious 
methods, since the Athenians had also sent for 
reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans 
also assigned complements of men to their 
shipping, and sedulously trained them to the 
service of the sea, as designing on this element 



also to try their fortune ; nay, they laboured 
with alacrity and application to increase their 
strength in all respects. 

Nicias, being sensible of this, and conscioiiB 
that the strength of the enemy and his own 
inability became daily greater, dei^atched his 
messengers also to Athens, a custom he had 
ever observed, and upon all occasions, to report 
the particulars of his proceedings. Bat in his 
present situation it was more requisite than 
ever ; since now he was convinced that he was 
environed with dangers ; and unless, with the 
utmost expedition, they recalled their troops, or 
sent them another, and that a strong, reinforce- 
ment, no hopes of preservation remained. Ap- 
prehensive, farther, that the persons he should 
send, either through want of proper address, or 
through defect (^courage, or a passion to soothe 
the populace, might suppress the truth, he sei^ 
a true account of things in a letter wrote with 
his own hand. By this method he concluded 
that his own sentiments of things could not be 
concealed or invalidated by messengers ; that 
the Athenians would be informed of the truth, 
and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. 
These messengers therefore departed, instruct- 
ed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to 
their care, and what farther they were to add 
by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time 
kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious 
to guard his shattered forces from annoyance, 
than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dan- 
gers. 

In the close of this summer, Euetion, an 
Athenian general, marched, in conjunction 
with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, 
against Amphipolis ; yet could not render him- 
self master of that city. But then, setting out 
from Imereum, he brought his triremes about 
into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the 
side of tbe river. And here this summer ended. 

In the beginning of winter the messengers 
from Nicias arrived at Athens; where they 
gave such accounts of things as he had charged 
them to give, and resolved such questions as 
were asked them. They also delivered his let- 
ter ; which the clerk of the state stood up and 
read aloud to the Athenians. The (j^itf"*" 
were these : 

« ATHEiriAirs, 

« The many letters firom time to tune n- 
ceived from me have given you 'all proper in- 
formation, so &r as relates to past transactions; 



YXAK XTin.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



268 



and it is now high tune you ■honld he made 
acquainted with our preaent aituatioB, that 
your counsels may be adjusted in a proper 
manner. 

« After, therefore, we had defeated, in 
aeveral engagements, the Syracuaans, against 
whom you sent ua out, and when we had thrown 
up those works before their city within which 
we are at this moment iying, Gylippus the La- 
cedemonian came upon us, at the head of an 
army, brought from Peloponnesus, and aug- 
mented by the troops of some Sicilian states. 
In the first battle he is routed by us ; but in 
the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry 
and darters, we have been forced to retire 
within our intrenchments. Being therefore 
obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, 
to discontinue our drcumvallation, we are this 
moment lying upon the defensive. Nor. indeed 
are we able to draw out our whole force for 
action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are 
remotely employed in the guard of our works. 
They have farUier run up a single wall to cut 
our lines ; so that there remains no longer a pos- 
sibility for us to complete the circumvallation, 
unless, reinforced by a numerous body of troops, 
we are enabled to assault and demolish the 
counterwork. And, in consequence of this, 
we, who designed to besiege others, may with 
much mdre propriety be said to suffer a siege 
ourselves, at least by land: for we dare not 
make any distant excursions into the adjacent 
country, for fear of the horse. 

" What is more ; they have sent ambassadors 
to Peloponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. 
Gylippus also is making the tour of the Sicilian 
states, with a view to obtain the concurrence of 
such as are at present neutral, and to prevail with 
the rest to intrust their additional levies for the 
service both of land and sea under his com- 
mand: and, according to my present intelli- 
gence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and 
the same time, our intrenchments, with their 
land-forces by land, and with their ships by 
sea. ,And though I say, by sea, let not the 
sound be too terrible in your ears : for they 
know very well the present state of our navy ; 
which, though at first a most complete equip- 
ment, for the cleanness of the ships and the 
health and vigour of the seamen, yet at present 
hath scarce a ship which is not leaky ; so long 
have they been necessitated to keep the sea, 
whilst their hands have daily been mouldering 
away : for in fact, we have no opportunity to 



lay them diy and careen them ; as we are under 
continual apprehensions of being attacked by 
the ships of the enemy, equal, nay superior, in 
number to our own. That they will attempt 
it, we have most certain ground to betieve ; but 
the seasons of doing it are entirely in their own 
option ; which also enables them to preserve 
their vessels ever fit for service, as they ure 
not necessitated to be continually in action to 
strike awe into others : nay, we should hardly 
be able to do the like, though the number of 
our shipping were much larger than it is, or 
though we were exempted from the necessity 
we now lie under of keeping guard with them 
all. For, in case we make the least abatement 
of our vigilance, we should be distressed for 
want of necessaries, which.even now we fetch 
in with difficulty in the very teeth of the 
enemy. To this must be ascribed the great 
waste of our seamen which hath already been 
made, and whose number lessens firom day to 
day f since, obliged to fetch wood, and water, 
and forage, from remote places, they are in* 
tercepted by the -enemy's horse. Even our 
servants, who have nothing to dread from our 
ruinated condition, desert us daily. And such 
foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, 
depart with impunity to their own cities ; whilst 
others, who were allured to the service by the 
greatness of our pay, and imagined they were 
rather come to plunder than to fight, when, 
contrary to their hopes, they behold the enemy- 
possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a 
brave resistance in every quarter, some catcb 
at the least pretext to go over to the eAemy, 
and others make shift to skulk away, — never 
again to be retrieved in so wide a eoantry as 
Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having attend- 
ed us hither from Athens, and since prevailed 
with the captains of triremes to accept of the 
service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of 
their own,' have by this means subverted our 
naval discipline. 

« I am writing to men well enlightened in 
naval afiairs, and perfectly convinced, that the 
flower of an equipment is but of short duration, 
and how few of those on board are skilled at 
steering the vessel or managing the oar. But 
what gives me the most acute vexation is this, 
— ^that, though commander-in-chief, I am utteriy 
unable to put a stop to these disorders ; since 
your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be man- 
aged ; and am quite at a loss firom whence to 
repair the waste that hath been made of our 



964 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bock vb. 



seamen. The enemy have abundant reaonrcea 
everywhere at hand, whereas necessity points 
not only one to us, — ^ihat placa from whence 
we had who now remain, and who are for erer 
lost : for Naxus and Catana, the cities which 
still perseyere in ouj alliance^ are unable to 
recruit us. And> should the enemy get one 
circumstance more in their favour,— *^that the 
towns of Italy, which at present supply us 
with food, deterred by the discovery of our 
low condition and the non-appearance of a re- 
inforcement from Athens, go over to the Syra- 
cusans, — the war will be finished to their hands 
without costing them a blow, and we shall be 
left to the merey of the enemy. 

« I could have sent you much more pleasing 
accounts of things, but none so proper to give 
you a clear idea of the posture of your affairs 
here, and such as you ought to have before you 
proceed to deliberate upon them; and at the 
same time, — as I am by no means a stranger 
to Athenian tempera, since I know you to be 
fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, 
but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any 
article in event drops short of your expectation, 
•^I thought it highly concerned my own safety 
to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me 
here conjure you, to entertain no resentment 
either against private soldiers or commanders ; 
since, in labouring those points which are the 
principal ends of the expedition, they have 
fully done their duty. 

<• But, once all Sicily is in arms against us, 
and since our enemies expect a reinforcement 
from Peloponneaus, resolve, without loss of 
time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to 
keep the enemy in play, they must either be 
recalled, or be reinforced with a body not in- 
ferior to the first equipment, with bolh a land 
and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply. 
For myself^ I must insist that a successor be 
sent me; since I am quite disabled, by a 
nephritic disorder, from continuing in the com- 
mand : and I think I have just title to expect 
my disnusaion frx>m you ; once, in the vigour 
of my life, I have been intrusted by you with 
several commands, in which I did you some 
signal services. 

" Whatever you determine, put it in execu- 
tion on the first approach of spring ; and, above 
all things, keep clear of delays : for the ready 
supplies given the enemy in Sicily, will soon 
enable them to act ; and those expected from 
Peloponnesus, though they must be longer in 



coming up, yet, depend upon it, that, uileH 
you exert your utmost vigUanee, some of tkem 
will steal hither, as before, through all J9U 
guards, and some will infallibly be here bdore 
you." Such were the advices brought them 
by the letter of Kicias. The Ath«iuiDi, 
however, when they had heard it read, wosid 
not so far comply with the request of Niciii 
as to give him his dismission ; but that, afflicted 
as he was in body, the whole burden of •fbin 
might not lie too heavily upon him, they ap* 
pointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menan- 
der and Euthydemus, to assist him io the gojd- 
mand, till those, who by the pubhe vote ahonld 
be joined with him in the commiadon, can 
arrive. They also decreed him a reinibroe- 
ment, oonabting both of a land and naval force, 
to be levied amongst the Athenians upon ib» 
roll and their dependents ; and, for eoDeagaei 
to share in the command, Demosthenes the 
son of Alcistenes, and Euiymedon the son of 
Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began hii 
passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at 
the head of ten sail of ships, and with a snpply 
of twenty talents of silver ;* empowered, farther, 
to assure them, that «a large leinfbrcemeni 
will soon come up, as the state had serioosfy 
interested it^^lf in their welfare.'' Demos* 
thenes staid behind to fbrwwd the eqaipioeB^ 
and was intending to set out on the fint ap* 
proach of spring. He was busied in assem- 
bling together their eontingents from the depen* 
dent states, and in levying amongst them Mk 
money, and shipping, and soldiers. / 

The Athenians farther sent out twenty sail, 
to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesns, and 
to take care that no one passed «ver &» 
Corinth and Peloponnesus into fficily. ^^ 
the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the ambafr 
sadors, and the advice they brought, that "^J 
face of affairs was much altered for the better, 
(priding themselves in the reflection that then 
former equipment had arrived in time to c«n* 
tribute to this turn,) became now mow il«* 
than ever, and got transporto in "**"**!! 
carry over a body of their own heety-sw"" 
into Sicily, whilst the Laccdamonians if^ 
intent on doing the same fiwm other parts 
Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, ferth« "f[ 
ned out five and twenty sail; derigningto^ 
zard an engagement with the P'^'^^.a^ 
tioncd at Naupactus, or to disable the AtW 

> 3,875;. sterling. 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



205 



oianB who ]ay there from giving theur transporto 
the least moiestationy by keeping their own 
triremes ready ranged in order of battle in the 
▼ery face of that aquadrcm. 

The Lacedemonians also were preparing for 
an invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former 
resolution, and in compliance farther with the* 
pressing instances of both Syracusans and Co- 
linthians. They had no sooner heard of the 
reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athe- 
ni^ns to Sicily, than, by making a diversion, 
they designed to stop its execution* Alcibia- 
des also continued warmly importuning them 
to execute his plan of fortifying Decelea, and 
to proceed briskly with the war. But the 
motives which at this present juncture ani- 
mated the Lacedsmonians most, were, that the 
Athenians, if engaged in a double war both 
against themselves and against the Sicilians, 
must become a much more expeditious con- 
quest; and, further, the Athenians were the 
first aggresson in violating treaties. In the 
former war they were well convinced the first 
offence was cha^;eable on their own heads, 
because the Thebans had surprised Platsa 
whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, 
eontrary to an express stipulation in a preced- 
ing treaty, that « arms should never be taken 
up against the party which was willing to abide 
by a judicial determination," they themselves 
had refused to submit to a trial, though claimed 
by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungene- 
reus they concluded that their ill success in 
the war ought fairly to be imputed ; and re- 
flected, with self-accusations, not only on the 
calamity they had suffered at Pylus, but on all 
their other losses in eveiy quarter of the war. 
But now, since the Athenians, with an equip- 
ment of thirty sail, had committed devastations 
at Epidaurus, at Prasis, and at other places, 
and continued to infest their dominions by 
robberies from Pylus; nay, as often as dis- 
putes had intervened about the intent of articles 
in the last treaty, in which the Lacedemonians 
appealed to a judicial determination, the others 
had haughtily refiised it; concluding hence, 
that, the Athenians were become as guilty ag- 
gressors now as themselves had been on the 
former occasion; with cheerful presages of 
•access, they determined for war. In order to 
it, they demanded this winter, from their allies, 
tbehr contingents of iron, and got all the need- 
ful materials in readiness to execute their plan 
of fortificatbn. Resolved at the same time to 
41 



transport an aid to Sicily in Tesseb of burden, 
they began to levy it at home, and exacted the 
quotas of augmentation from their confederates. 
And thus the winter ended ; and the eighteenth 
year of this war, .of whidk Thucydides hath 
compiled the history, came also to an end. 

The following spring no sooner atpproached, 
than, at an earlier date than on any former oc- 
casion, the Lacedemonians and allies invaded 
Attica; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, 
king of the Lacedemonians, had the command 
of the army. At first they ravaged the country, 
particularly the pkdnn; and this being done, 
having allotted out the work in portions to the 
several states, they set out about fortifying 
Decelea. Now, Decelea is distant at most 
but one hundred and twenty stadia' from the 
city of Athens, and lies at the same distance^ 
or very little more, from Bceotia : but in the 
plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from 
whence efifectually to annoy them, was their 
fortress raised; and might be seen from the 
very walls of Athens. 

In this manner the Peleponnenans and 
allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; 
whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends 
in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy- 
armed on board their transports, and sent them 
off for Sicily. For this service the Lacede- 
monians picked out from the very best of the 
Helots, and of those citizens of Sparta who 
were newly enfranchised, from both together, 
six hundred heavy-armed, and appointed Hec* 
critus, a Spartan, to command them. And 
the Boeotians sent three hundred heavy-armed^ 
commanded by Xeno and-Nicon of Thebes^ 
and Hegesander of Thespie. These were 
first embarked at Tenarus in Laconia, and 
thence put out to sea. 
. Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away 
five hundred heavy-armed ; seme from Corinth 
itself, others hired from the Arcadtuis; and 
appointed Aloxarehus, a Corinthian, to com- 
mand them. The Sieyonians also sent two 
hundred heavy-armed along vrith the Corinthi- 
ans, and at their head Sargeus, a Sicyonian. 

But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, 
which launched out to sea in the depth of win- 
ter, lay ranged in an opposite station to^ the 

> Befbre Christ 413. • Aboat twelve onlefl. 



2M 



FELOFONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



tvranty Attie at NaiipactQ0> t^ give ieitare for 
the embaikatum of the heavy-armed on board 
Ifae . tranaporta from Peiopotmeana. On thia 
aecount, principally, they wera manned and 
iltted out to aea, that they might divert the 
attention of the Atbenians fromilthe tran«port> 
fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it 
wholly upon the hostile appearance of these 
triremes. 

In the meantime, the Athenians, even during 
the fortifications in hand at Decdea, and at the 
earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail 
to cmixe on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under 
tiiA command of Chaiidea, the son of ApoUo- 
dorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch 
at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity 
to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of 
heavy-armed on board the fleet 

Demosthenes, aiso, according to promise, 
they sent away for SicUy, wiA a numerous 
fleet, consistang of sixty ships of Athena and 
five of Chios, on boaid of which were twelve 
hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a 
number of islanders as with the utmost indus- 
try they had been able to draw together. They 
had also amassed, from their other coiifoderales 
subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they 
were able to flimi^ for carrying on the war 
with vigour. Eut Demosthenes was farther 
instructed to saii at first in company with 
Charides, and assist him in the cruize <»i the 
eoaats of Laconia. Demosthenes, 'therefore, 
having stood over to iEg^na, continued there 
tUl the remainder of hia forc^, which was yet 
behind, had completely joined him, and Chan- 
elea had taken on board the Aigive auxiliaries. 

About the same time in this spring Gylippus 
ilso returned to Syracuse, at the head of as 
large a force aa he had been able to collect 
from the several states, with whom his persua^ 
sons had be^i eflectmd ; and, having convened 
the Syracusans, he told them that^-^'they 
ought to man out as large a number of shipping 
M tiiey posnbly could, and tiy their fortune in 
a naval engagement : such a step, he had reason 
to hope, might be attended yviih consequences 
which would amply compensate the danger^ and 
invigorate the war." 

These instances of Glylippus vrere w«li se- 
oonded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon 
pains to encourage hia countrymen to attack 
the Athenians by sea.— ^* The latter, he told 
them, were far from enjoying their naval skill 
as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time 



immemoiial exeSttsivvly their own. Ba fadtf 
they were by natUM landmen much move than 
the >Syxucosans ; and necestdty alone, in the 
Medish invasion, had forced them to try dieir 
fortune ait aea : by enterpriong men, as the 
Athenians weio, such as were most daxing ia 
opposing them must needs be regarded a» the 
most formidable enemies. True — ^they had 
been used to intimidate their neighboma, not 
by a real superiority of strength, but by their 
daring enterprising genius; and now, by the 
same methods, themselves might become fop- 
midable even to Athenians." He assured 
Ihem, «<fbr his own part, he was porfoetly 
convinced that the 8yracusans, if by an efol 
of b(^d resolution they would on a sodden 
attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more 
benefit firom the terror which such a step would 
strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the 
Athenians from their superior skill when eooi- 
paredvrithSyracusaninexperience.'' Hejness* 
ed them therefore « to try their fortone by aes, 
and bid adieu to foar." 

Thus animated by Gytippus, and bj Heiw 
mocrates, and by others, the Syracoaana were 
eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned oat 
their fleet. And, when the whole waa 'ready 
for service^ Gylippus, by fitvour of the niglit, 
at the head of has land«nny, marched down to 
the forts at Plemmyiiuln, SBtendinff to assault 
them on the land-side. The triremev of the 
Syracusans, at the aame inatant of time, as 
had been concerted beforehand, to the num|Mt 
of thirty-five, are aailmg up out of the great 
harbour, whilst forty-five were going- idraot oat 
df the lesser harbour where their doek ky. 
The latter went round, designing to completB 
their junction with the other squadron, and 
then in a body to stand against Plemmyriaai, 
that the Athenians on' both sides waght be 
thrown into eonfusiott. The Athenians lost 
no time, but instantly manned out siactj veaaelL 
With twenty-five of the number th^ engaged 
the thirty-five Syracusan in' the great harbour; 
vrith the rest they went to meet the other squa- 
dron, that was coming about from tiw dock. 
A smart engagement immediately ensoedyin 
the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute 
was a long time obstinately m«iw*aw«*<l ; 
side exerting themsdves to clear the 
but the other to obstract it. 

In the meantime, Gylippus,— -as the Athe- 
nians posted at Plemmyrium had flocked down 
to the seannde, and with their utmoat 



\ 



JUBK.] 



PELOPOT^NESIAN WAR. 



207 



lioa weceloakimg M the Mito on tiia wntnr,^ 
Gyiippiui seiseth tbe oppoickiiiitty ; jnd no 
«ooaer 1i«mI the moming dawned, than, to the 
g]»at «afpnse of the enemy, he ftttodu die 
icnrts. He first aakes lumeelf maeter •£ the 
iaorgest of the three, and afterwaide cairiee the 
two ioo a or , the defiendants of which, seuog'the 
iargest eo easily taken, had abandoned their 
posts; nay,- on the suzpiisal of the fint, those 
who had manned it, throwing ^emsetres on 
board the boats and a transport that lay at 
hand, found no email diifioulty in getting away 
to the canop ; far, as the Syracusans had now 
the better of the engagement with theur squad- 
ron in the great harbour, they detached one of 
their nimblest tikemes to pursue the fliers. 
But, at the time the other two forts were ear- 
lied, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, 
whioh gave them who abandoned the last an 
ojf^rtuaity to sail away without obstruction. 
For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged 
before the harbour'a mouth, having forced their 
way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing for- 
wards in a disorderly manner -and con/tinuaUy 
running foul one upon another, gave the Athe- 
nians an opportunity to regain the day. For 
this squaihron they soon routed, and aftetwards 
that» within the harbour* by which they had 
been ^vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships 
of the enemy, and made a slauj^iter of all their 
crews, those of three ships .excepted, to whom 
they granted quarter; and all this wiih tbeioas 
only of three ships on their own side. Having 
afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the 
Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy 
ou the little isle before Piemmyrium, they re- 
tired to their main enoamj»meat. 

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in 
thdr naval engagement. They had carried, 
however, the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to 
signalize each of their acqusitiona, they erected 
three several trophies. One, also, of the two 
focts that were taken last they levelled with the 
ground, but ihe other two they repaired and 
l^rrisoned. 

In ibis suipriaal of the forts, many were 
slain, and many were made piiBoneni, and a 
great stock of wealth reposited there became 
the prize of the enemy. Foi; as the Athenians 
. had made use of these forts by way of maga- 
zine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and 
com in abundance, were found within ; much 
dso of the stores belonging to the captains of 
the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for 



torenes, and edier matenab of tefitment, had 
been laid up there ; and ttaet triremes wei« 
battled ariiore to be o«Bsenod. Nay, this 
surpsisal ef Plemmynum was one of the ebief, 
if not <the greatest aouioe of ail the distress 
which the Athenian army suffered in the 
sequel ; for no longer was die sea open to them 
for the secure importation of necessary sup- 
plies. From this time the Syracusans rushed 
upon them foom thence, and awed all thetx 
motions. The convoys could no more get in 
without fighting their way. Besides that, in 
all other respects, it struck a great constema- 
ti<m, and even a deiection of mind amongst the 
troops. 

The next step tdsen by the Syracusans was 
to aend out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, 
under the command of Agatharens, a Syracu* 
san. One of these ships was to proceed to 
Pel<^ponnesue, and land an embassy there, 
winch had mstructaons, «io notify a present 
hopeful posture of i^Eairs, and to prcs» the 
prosecution of the w«r in -Greece with all pos- 
sible vigour;" The other eleven stood over to 
the Italian ooast, having received iateMigenoe, 
that .a numher of small vesseki, laden with 
stores for the Athemims, wen eoming up. 
They intercepted and entirely deitn>yed mmi 
ef these ; and the timber pn heard 4bem, which 
was »ady wrought for^ Athentans.to fome 
le at her into slvips, they bmnit to «shes on rthe 
show ^ CiHilonia. This doos, they stpod 
away for Loprij a^ whilst they li^ in^hut 
road, one of the traBsponts^om Peleponueaua, 
baring on beard the heai^-flrmed fsom Theapin, 
came in. The Syraciusans removed tbpfie 
heavy-armed into 'their own id^ps, ^nd returaed 
with them to Sjnraouse. 

The Athenians with twenty sail wen sta- 
tioned at Megara, in order to intoroept thfir 
return ; where ^ne sl^p alone, with aU the 
csew, He^ into their .hands. They were not 
able to come up wiJh 4he rest ; since, elodjog 
all pursuit, they aacever with liiecttriJar their own 
harbours. 

These happefied also a skirmish, in the har* 
hour of Sjiacuset about the pilea which die 
Syracusans had drove down in the sea before 
their old docks, that their vessels might ride 
in aafety behind them, the Atheniaps be' on- 
able to atand in amongst them and do bbj 
d^mnge to their abjpping. Close up to those 
pilefi-tbe Athenians had towed a raft of prodi- 
giaiii sise, on which tunrets and parapets to 



968 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bdok vn. 



<^Ter the defendant! were erected, whilst others 
in long boats were fiistening cables round the 
piles, and, b j the help of a machine convenient 
for the purpose, craning them up ; and such as 
they broke, a set of divers sawed off close at the 
bottom. The Syracusans in the meantime 
were pouring their missive weapons upon them 
from the docks, which were plentifully returned 
by those posted on the raft. In short, the 
Athenians plucked up most of the pil<*e , but 
one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult 
to be demolished, as it lay out of sight ; for 
they had driven down some of the piles in such 
a manner, that their heads emerged not above 
the surface of the water. This rendered all 
aecess exceeding dangerous; since, ignorant 
where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge 
his vessel as if it were upon a shelve. But 
eren these, die divers, for a pecuniary reward, 
searched out and sawed away. And yet, as 
fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove 
down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances 
both of annoyance and prevention were strenu- 
ously exerted on both sides, as might justly be 
expected from two hostile bodies posted so 
near one another ; the skirmishings were often 
renewed, and every artifice of war was succes- 
sively practised. 

The Syracusans, farther, had despatched 
embassies, composed of Corinthians, and Lace- 
dsmonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of 
Sicily, <<to notify the surprisal of Plemmyri- 
um, and to give a just representation of the 
naval engagement in which they had been de- 
feated, not so much by the strength of the 
enemy as by their own confusion ; in other 
respects to assure them, that their hopes of 
success were high, and that they firmly depend- 
ed on receiving soon an aid from them, compo- 
sed both of a land and naval force : since the 
Athenians were also in expectation of a rein- 
forcement from Athens, the approach of which, 
would their friends anticipate, the Athenians 
at present there must be totally destroyed, and 
the war brought at once to an end." Such 
schemes were now in agitation in Sicily. 

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled 
the whole of the armament with which he was 
to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, 
weighing from ^gina, and standing over to 
Peloponnesus, he completes his junction with 
Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of 
Athenians under his command ; and, as a body 
of heavy-aimed had been taken on board the 



latter from Argos, they steered together for the 
coast of Laconia. And here first they ravaged 
in part Epidaurus Limera; and proceeding 
from thence to that part of Laconia which lies 
over-against Cythera, and where stands the 
temple of Apollo, having ravaged purt of the 
adjisu^nt country, they enclosed and fortified a 
neck of land which might serve as a receptacle 
to such of the Helots as deserted the Laceds- 
monians ; from thence, banditti-like, as was 
done from Pylus, to infest the country. This 
convenient spot was no sooner taken in than 
Demosthenes stood away for Corcyra, that he 
might take on board the auxiliaries there, and 
make the best of his way to Sicily. Bat 
Charicles staid till he had put the place into a 
state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in 
it. This being done, he carried back his 
squadron of thirty sail to Athens ; and the 
Argives at the same time received their dismis- 
sion. 

This summer there arrived at Athens thir- 
teen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those 
called Machsrophori, and who are originally 
Dians. This body was intended to have been 
sent with Demosthenes into Sicily ; but, as 
they arrived not till after his departure, the 
Athenians had resolved to send them back 
again to their own homes in Thrace. To re- 
tain them merely for the sake of the war waged 
against them from Decelea, they thought 
would plunge them in too large an expense, 
since the pay of every soldier was a drachma' 
a day. For now, since Decelea, which 
had been fortified this spring by the joint 
labours of the whole united army, continued 
to be garrisoned by detachments from the 
several states, which at certain intervals of 
time relieved one another in a regular suc- 
cession, it gave terrible annoyance to the 
Athenians, and caused amongst them such 
havoc of their effects, and such a destruction 
of their men as threw them into great dis- 
tress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, 
having been only transient, had left them 
in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands 
for the rest of the year; but now, as they 
awed the country by one continued blockade, 
and as by intervals they received considerable 
augmentations to enable them to give greater 
annoyance, as even the regular garrison was 
periodically obliged to scour the country and 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



269 



plunder for their own subsistence, and as Agis, 
king of the Lacedemonians, who with the ut- 
most diligence prosecuted the war, in person 
directed all the operations, — The Athenians 
were sorely pressed: for they were debarred 
the whole produce of their own lands ; more 
than twenty thousand of their slaves had de- 
serted to the enemy, and a large part of these 
were mechanics of the city ; their whole stock 
of sheep and labouring cattle was lost beyond 
retrieve ; their horses, — as the horsemen were 
obliged every day to mount, either to ride to- 
wards Decelea, to awe the excursions of that 
garrison, or to guard some important posts in 
the country, — their horses were either lamed by 
running incessantly over hard or rugged ground, 
or by wounds were disabled for service ; the con- 
stant supplies of provisions for the cijty, which 
used to be fetched from Euboea to Oropus,* 
and to be brought in from thence through De- 
celea as the shortest passage, were now forced 
to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which 
considerably enchanced their price. For want 
also of foreign commodities the city was equal- 
ly distressed ; and Athens was now reduced 
to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard 
on the battlements by day, the citizens were 
obliged successively to relieve one another; 
but the whole body of the city, except the 
horsemen, mounted guard by night. The latter 
ever under arms without, the rest on the con- 
stant g^ard of the city-walls, and this for a 
summer and winter without any intermission, 
were reduced to a very low condition. But 
the point which pressed hardest upon them 
was, having two wars at once upon their hand : 
and yet their obstinacy had rose to so high a 
pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the 
world, the bare mention of its possibility would 
have been quite incredible; for who would 
have believed, that this people, so closely block- 
ed up at home by the Peloponnesians, should 
scorn t(\ give up Sicily 1 nay, should persevere 
with unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of 
Syracuse, a city in no. respect inferior even to 
Athens itself 1 that they should exhibit such an 
astonishing proof of their strength and their 
courage to the eyes of Greece ; where upon the 
fint breaking out of the war, some people had 
imagined, that in case the Peloponnesians in- 
vaded Attica, they could not hold out above 
one year entire, though others had allowed 
them two, and others three, but nobody a 
longer space ? and that, in the seventeenth year 



after the first invasion of this kind, they should 
attempt the conquest of Sicily; and, when 
deeply gashed in every part, by one war already 
upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into 
another, as formidable in all respects as that 
waged against them from Peloponnesus 1 Bat 
now, when, besides what they had suffered al- 
ready, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, 
and other incidents had exacted from them 
very large disbursements, their finaces were 
reduced to a very low ebb. At this period, 
therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by 
their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of 
the value of all commodities imported and ex- 
ported, which they thought would replenish 
their coffers faster than the former method; 
for their disbursements were not as they had 
been in preceding times, but had been inflamed 
in the same proportion as the scenes of war had 
been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was 
constantly decreasing. 

Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of 
their treasures, to defray the charge of this 
body of Thracians, who came too late for De- 
mosthenes, they sent them back to their own 
country with all possible haste. Diitrephes 
was the person pitched upon to conduct them 
home ; and was instructed, that, " In the pass- 
age (for they were to go through the Euri- 
pus) he should employ them, if opportunity 
offered, against the enemy." He landed there- 
fore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner 
carried off a booty from thence. About the 
shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus 
from Chalcis of Eubcea ; and, having landed his 
Thracians in Bceotia, led them against Myca- 
lessus. His design was not discovered that 
night, though he halted at th^ temple of Mer- 
cury, which is distant from Mycalessus but 
sixteen^ stadia at most. But early the next 
morning he assaulted this city, which is of large 
extent ; he carries it on the first attack, as there 
was no gruard to resist him, and the inhabitants 
could never have imagined that a maritime body 
would have marched so far into the country to 
make attempts upqn them. The wall, besides, 
was weak : in some places it was fallen, and 
the remaining part of it was low ; and the gates, 
from too great a confidence of security, had 
been left open. No sooner were the Thracians 
broke into Mycalessus, than they gutted both 



* More than a mile and a half. 



2E 



8T0 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



vn. 



bouses and temples ; they mftssacred the inha- 
bitants, showing no regard to either old age or 
yonth, but venting their fury on all that came 
in their way ; they butchered even the women 
and the children ; nay, all the labouring cattle, 
and every creature that had life which came be- 
fore their eyes ; for the Thracians, when once 
their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood 
as any other the greatest savages in the barba- 
rian world. On this occasion the confusion 
was terrible, and every ghastly method of 
destruction was exemplified in act ; they even 
fell upon the public school, which was a very 
large one, .when the youth of the town were 
but just got in, and hacked all the children to 
pieces. And thus this whole city was involved 
in a calamity, a greater than which no city had 
ever felt ; nay, a calamity unexpected and dread- 
ful indeed ! 

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, 
than they marched to their assistance; but 
came not up with the Thracians till they were 
retired to some distance from the town, where 
they recovered from them their booty, and, 
having put them to flight, continued the chase 
down to the Euripus and the sea, where the 
vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. 
Here they make a slaughter of most of those 
^ who endeavoured to get on board, but could 
not swim ; since the persons left in the vessels, 
when they saw what passed on the shore, 
put them off beyond their reach. But, in the 
other parts of the retreat, the Thracians be- 
haved with some gallantry against the Theban 
horse, which attacked them first ; since, sally- 
ing frequently out on the pursuers, and rally- 
ing again after the discipline of their country, 
they made good their retreat ; and thus few of 
this body were destroyed. A number, farther, 
who staid behind in the city to plunder, were 
found there and put to the sword. The whole 
number of the slain amongst this body of thir- 
teen hundred Thracians amounted to two hun- 
dred and fifty men; though, in return, they killed, 
of Thebans, and others who accompanied by 
way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, 
about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes, one 
of the rulers of Boeotia ; tiie lives of some more 
Mycalessians were also lost in their company. 
Such was the calamity which fell to the unhap- 
by lot of Mycalessus ; and which, for excess of 
horror, is more to be deplored than any other 
of the tragical events of this war. 

Demosthenes, who, after marking out the 



fortification, had stood away from Laconia to 
Gorcyra, surprising a transport vessel -which 
rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eleans, 
on board of which a number of heavy-armed 
Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks 
that vessel. But the mariners, having saved 
themselves by flight, found afterwards another 
vessel, and proceeded in the voyage. 

From hence Demosthenes came np to Za- 
cynthus and Cephallene ; where he took their 
heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of 
the Messenians from Naupactus. He also 
crossed over to the opposite continent of Acar- 
nania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belong- 
ing to the Athenians. Thus employed as he 
was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, re- 
turning from Sicily, whither he had been sent 
in the winter to carry a supply of naon^ for 
' the army, meets him ; and, amongst other in- 
telligence, relates, that " he had heard, since he 
was upon his return, tiiat Plemmyrium had 
been taken by the Syracusans.'* Conon, also, 
who commanded at Naupactus, came to them 
with advice, that "the five and twenty sail 
of Corinthians which lay over-against their 
squadron had not quitted that station, and even 
threatened them with an engagement." He 
exhorted, therefore, these commanders to de- 
tach some vessels thither, since their squadron 
at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, 
was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron 
amounted to twenty five. Upon this. Demos* 
thenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime 
sailers, amongst those under their own com- 
mand, to follow Conon for die reinforcement 
of the squadron at Naupactus. 

The two former continued to assemble forces 
for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this 
purpose, sailed to Corcyra, commanded them 
to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself 
the heavy-armed for the service ; for, as he was 
returned from carrying the stores, he joined 
himself with Demosthenes in the command, in 
pursuance of the prior nomination. Demos- 
thenes was collecting a body of slingers and 
darters from th^ towns of Acamania. 

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were 
sent round to the Sicilian cities after the sor- 
prisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in thfeir 
negotiations; and having assembled a lai;ge 
body of succours, were intent on bringing them 
up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelli- 
gence of their motion, sends to such of the 
Siculi, as lay upon their route and were in 



YS^mxxx.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



271 



his alliaace,'(iiamely, the Centoripes and Haly- 
cysans and others,) « by no means to yield a 
firee passage to the enemy, but to assemble in 
a body and obstruct their march." It was im- 
possible for them to reach Syracuse by any 
other route ; for the Agrigentines had refused 
them a passage through their territories. Now, 
therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, 
the Siculi, in compliance with the request of 
the Athenianb, had placed three different am- 
buscades in their way. From these rushing 
suddenly upon them, as they were advancing 
in a careless manner, they destroyed about 
eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, 
excepting one Corinthian. And this Corintlu< 
an brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those 
who escaped » by flight, the number of whom 
amounted to fifteen hundred. 

About the same time the Camarineans also 
send up a body of succours, consisting of five 
hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, 
and three hundred archen. The Qeloans also 
sent^them a squadron of about five sail, beside 
four hundred darters and two hundred horsfr* 
men. 

Now almost all Sicily, except the Agrigen- 
tines, (for these still adhered to their neutra- 
lity,) all the rest of the island, I say, who 
hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, 
united themselves against the Athenians, in be- 
half of Syracuse : though the Syracusans, after 
the blow they had just received from the Siculi, 
thought it not proper to attack the Athenians 
again upon a sudden. 

But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having 
now completed their embarkations at Corcyra 
and on the continent, at die head of this united 
and powerful armament, crossed over the 
Ionian to cape lapygia ; and, standing away 
from thence, readi the Charades, islands of 
lapygia. Here they take on board their fleet 
a party of lapygion darters, to the number of 
fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian 
nation ; and, aller they had renewed a friend- 
ship of ancient date with Artas^ (who, being 
lord of these islands, supplied them with the 
darters,) they proceed to Meti^ontium in 
Italy. Upon the plea of an ailiance subsisting 
between them, they prevail upon tke Metapon- 
tians to furnish them out three hundred more, 
and two triremes, wUlk wfaidi augmsntatioB 
they stood along the coast to Thwria ; where, 
on their arrival, they find that the party, who 
^ acted agsinat the Athenian inter8Bt,.kad in 



a late sedition been driven out of the city. D» 
sirous here to take a view of the whole arma* 
ment, and to know whether any part had strag^ 
gled and was left behind ; hoping, farther, to 
prevail upon the Thurians to join them with 
their forces in the most cordial manner, and, 
since their welfare was connected with that of 
Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the 
Athenians to be equally their own ; they staid 
some time at Thuria, and completed their de- 
signs. 

To return to the Peloponnesians. About 
the same portion of time, their squadron of 
five and twenty sail, which, to favour the pass- 
age of the transporto to Sicily, lay ranged in 
opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having 
now made all things ready for an engi^ment, 
and equipped out some additional vessels, which 
had almost equali2ed their number to that of 
the Athenian ships, tak« their station in Rhy- 
pica, near Erinus of Achaia. As the place in 
which i&ey rode was bent in the form of a ctefh 
cent, the land force of the Corinthians and the 
adjacent confederates, who marched to their 
assistance, was posted upon each wing of the 
squadron, on the jutting necks of land, whilst 
the ships drawn up close together composed 
the centre of their arrangement, and Polyan- 
thes the Corinthian commanded the fleet. 

The Athenians, with three and thir^ sail, 
under the command of Diphilus, weighed from 
Naupactus and stood in against them. At 
first, the Corinthians lay still without motion ; 
but, so soon as it was judged necessary lor diem 
to act, and the signal flag was accordingly hoist- 
ed, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and 
an engagement ensued. Th^ contention was 
maintained a long time on both sides. Three 
of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst 
not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, 
though seven were disabled for service by blows 
they had received from the enemies' beaks, by 
which their forecastles had been shattered by 
the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for 
this very purpose by stays on each side of the 
beak. The event of the engagement remain- 
ing doubtful, from whence both sides took 
occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians 
however being masters of all the shatters of 
the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove 
right into the sea, and which the Corinthi- 
ans made no efforts to reaver, they drop- 
ped away from each other. Yet no kind 
of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners 



272 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



were taken by either: for the Corinthians and | action had clearly perceived what would gi^e 
PeiopcHinesians, who fought close under the 
shore, were by that enabled to make an easy 
escape ; but, on the Athenian side, not even a 
■ingle ship was sunk. And, yet, when the 
Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the 
Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if 
the victory was their own, because they had 
disabled a larger number of the enemy. They 
farther looked upon themselves as not defeated, 
because their enemies were not clearly victori- 
ous : for it is the way with the Corintliians to 
pronounce themselves victors if they are not 
sadly beaten ; whereas, the Athenians esteem 
themselves defeated if they have not made a 
signal conquest. But, farther, when the Pelo- 
ponnesians were retired from their station, and 
the land army was dismissed, the Athenians 
erected a trophy. The spot they chose, where- 
on to place this token of their victory, was 
distant about twenty stadia from Erineus, the 
station in which the Corinthians rode. Such 
was the event of this naval engagement. 

Demosthenes and • Eurymedon, so soon as 
the Thurians had got in readiness seven hun- 
dred heavy-armed, with tlu'ee hundred darters, 
to attend them in the expedition, ordered the 
fleet to coast along the shore towards the Cro- 
toniatis ; whilst themselves, after having taken 
a review of all their land army upon the banks 
of the Sybaris, marched them over land through 
the Thuriatis. But when they were advanced 
to the river Hylias, they were met by a mes- 
sage from the Crotoniats, intimating to them, 
that ** their consent should never be given for 
the passage of this army through their domi- 
nions ;" upon which they wheeled off down- 
wards towards the sea and the mouth of the 
Hylias, where they halted a night, and were 
joined by the whole body of the fleet. 

The next morning they re-embarked and 
proceeded along the coast, touching at every 
city, except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in 
the district of Rhcgium. 

But during this interval, the Syraeusans, 
who had received advice of the approach of the 
reinforcement; determined to made another at- 
tempt with their fleet and the whole augmented 
body of their land army, which they had assem- 
bled together for this very design of attacking 
the Athenians again before the reinforcement 
arrived. But, like men who in the former 



1 About two miles. 



them advantages over the enemy, thej had 
made some alteration in the structure of their 
vessels : having shortened the heads of their 
ships, they made them more firm and conapact, 
and. fastened very substantial stays to "feach side 
of the beak ; they strengthened these again by 
rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid 
along the ribs both within and vnthoiit, in the 
same manner as the Corinthians had strength- 
ened the whole prow of their ships for the 
last naval engagement against the squadron at 
Naupactus. By these means the Syraeusans 
concluded they should gain an advantage over 
the ships of the Athenians, which were of a 
different structure, as in the prow they were 
but weak, because of their usual practice, in an 
engagement, not to charge a-head, but by tack- 
ing about to strike upon the sides : — ^that, far- 
ther, should the battle be fought in the great 
harbour, where sea-room would be small and 
the ships be crowded, this must be also an 
advantage in their favour ; since, darting them- 
selves a-head, they must needs shatter the 
prows of tfate enemy, when with compact and 
solid beaks they struck against such as were 
hollow and weak: — that again, for want of 
sea-room, the Athenians would be too much 
straitened to make their tacks, or to run 
through their lines, which were points of art 
on which they chiefly relied ; they were deter- 
mined to the utmost of their power to check 
all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow 
space in which they must engage would of 
itself prevent the former ; and now they in- 
tended with dexterity to turn to their own 
advantage the method of striking ahead, which 
on the former occasion appeared to be an error 
in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day 
must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once 
repulsed, would not have room to go round and 
return to the charge, since thus they must di- 
rectly be forced on the shore, which lay but a 
small distance from their camp, and would 
sadly cramp them up; that they themselves 
must be masters of the rest of the harbour, 
whilst the ^lemy, crowded together, in case 
they should be forced to give way, must be 
driven into narrow compass, and even falling 
foul on one another, a total confusion and dis* 
order must certainly follow ; for, what hurt the 
Athenians most, in all their naval engragements, 
was their inability to make use of the whole 
harbour for tacking about or letuming to the 



YEAR HX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



273 



diaige, in the lame maimer as the dyracasens : 
--*thBt, finally, the Atheniane could not po«d- 
bly get out into wider aea, as the entrance of 
the harboor and the space behind the lines of 
battle were in their own command ; nay, other 
obstacles would cooperate, such as Plemmy- 
ritim, which would now oppose any attempt of 
this kind, and the veiy nature of the harbour^s 
moath, which was exceeding narrow. 

By such a project the Syracnsans had giyen 
an increase to their former skill and strength ; 
and animated more than ever by the thought of 
haying improred from their errors in the for- 
mer engagement, they sallied out to encounter 
the enemy both with their land and naval force. 
Gylippus showed himself, a small portion of 
time brfore the rest, at the head of the infan- 
try ; whcmi, sallying out of the city, he drew 
up near the Athenian entrenchment, in that 
quarter where it faced the city. Then the 
garrison of Olympieum, to a man, as well 
heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light- 
armed parties of the Syracusans, came and 
drew up on the other quarters ; and, immedi- 
ately afler, the ships of the Syracusans and 
their allies came sailing forwards. 

The Athenians at first imagined that at 
present th^ were threatened only with an as- 
sault by land ; but when, on a sudden, they 
saw the fleet bearing down against them, they 
were struck with confusion. Some of them 
were, taking post upon and without the en- 
trenchments, to make ' head against the as- 
sailants ; others were sallied forth to encoun- 
ter the troops from Olympisum, and those 
from remoter parts coming on with full speed, 
a numerous body of horsemen and darters. 
The rest were hurrying on board to man the 
ships, or to give what assistance they could 
upon the beach : and no 'sooner were the pro- 
per complements on board, than seventy-five 
ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then 
the number of the enemy's vessels was about 
eighty. 

Great part of this day was spent in advanc- 
ing towurds, and retiring from, one another, 
and in reciprocal endeavours to seize advan- 
tages: but neither side was able to execute 
any remarkable piece of service, excepting that 
tine Syraeusans sunk one or two of the Atheni- 
an ships ; upon which they parted, and at the 
same time the land army drew off from the 
entrenchments. 

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, 
42 



affording the enemy no room to guess at their 
friture designs. 

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hither^ 
to no advantages had been gained by sea, and 
fully expecting that the enemy would repeat 
their attempt, obliged the captains of the tri- 
remes to repair their ships if anywise damaged, 
and stationed the transports before the piles, 
which they had driven down in the sea, to se- 
cure the ships, and lock up as it were that 
space in which they lay. The transports he 
ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth 
of two plethra^ from one another ; that, in 
case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither 
as a place of security, and might again stand 
out without any molestation. In perfecting 
these dispositions the Athenians were all Ihis 
day employed from morning to night. 

The next day, the Syracusans, earfier in the 
morning than belbre, and with the same parade 
of their land and naval force, came out to at- 
tack the Athenians. Now again, facing each 
other in the lines of the engagement, Aey 
spent great part of the day in the same endea- 
vours as before to over-reach and surprise one 
another ; till at length Aristo, the son of Fy^• 
ricus, a Corinthian, and the most expert sea- 
man in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades &e 
commanders of that fleet to despatch their 
orders to the magistrates vrithin the city, — 
« with all expedition to bring the provisions 
which were for sale dovni to the beach of the 
sea, and hold the market there ; nay, further, 
to compel all those who had any meat to selt 
to offer it instantly on the beach, that the ma- 
riners might come ashore and dine under the 
sides of their vessels; so that, after a short 
repast, they might this same day unexpectedly 
fall upon the Athenians.'' This counsel being 
approved, the necessary orders were despatched 
away, and the market was furnished out Then 
suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and 
stood away towards the city; where, £sem' 
barking with all possible haste, they took therr 
repast. 

But the Athenians, who ascribed this drop* 
ping off of the enemy to a consciousness of 
their own inferiority, quitting their own ships 
as if there was nothing farther to be done, 
diverted their attention to their ovm aflairs, 
and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for 

t A plethron is said by some to coatain 1,414, by oth 
ers, IQNDO square feet. 

ana 



274 



PELOPONNESiAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



themselves, confident there would be no en- 
gagement on this day. But, on a sudden, the 
Syracusans, repairing on board, stood out a 
second time to give them battle. Then the 
Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and 
nuyst of them still &sting, re-embarking with- 
out any reg^ularity or order, with great difficulty, 
after a considerable interval, stood out to re- 
ceive them. For a certain space, each stood 
upon their guard, and declined the charge. At 
length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was 
imprudent to daily so long, and exhaust their 
spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which 
ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious 
attack. Upon which animating one another 
with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and 
the engagement begaif. 

The Syracusans received the shock without 
giving way, and, keeping the heads of their 
vessels right against the enemy, executed their 
project, and with their strengthened beaks 
shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships ; 
whilst their darters, who were ranged along the 
decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their 
missive weapons ; though not near so much as 
did the crews of some liglit Syracusan boats, 
which scoured about the enemy's fleet ; some- 
times getting under their wards and gliding along 
the sides of their vessels, and from these close 
positions aiming their darts at the mariners. 
In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this 
manner to gall their foes, were masters of the 
day ; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, 
were obliged to retire, through the intervals of 
the line of transports, into their own station. 
The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this 
line of transports; but were obliged to stop 
there, for fear of the machines^ which hung 
upon the yards of the transports to bar all ap- 
proach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracu- 
sans^ elevated vdth success, approached too 
near, and were sunk ; and another, with all 
her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now 
the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk 
seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, 
had taken many prisoners, and made great 
slaughter, judged it proper to retire. They 
then erected trophies as victorious in two 
engagements, and plumed themselves in the 
assurance, that by sea, they had the superi- 

t Called dolphins^ from their form. They were mas- 
sy, made of lead, and hong upon the sail-yards by cords 
and pulleys; and, when thrown into the enemy's ships, 
either burst or sunk them. 



ority over the enemy ; presuming, at the same 
time, that they must soon be victorious also by 
land: upon which they got every thing in 
readiness to attack them once more on both 
elements. 

But, at this crisis, Demosthenes and Euiy- 
medon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement 
from Athens; which consisted of seventy- 
three sail of ships, including foreigners ; of 
about five thousand heavy-armed of their own 
and their confederate troops ; beside a cour 
siderable number of darters, as well Barbarian 
as Grecian, and slingers, and archero, and a 
complete supply of all military stores. The first 
appearance of this grand reinforcement strud: 
the Syracusans and their allies virith no small 
consternation. It looked as if the war must 
be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers 
that knew no bounds. They saw that, in sjnte 
of the annoyance which Decelea, now forti- 
fied, gave them, the Athenians were arrived 
before Syracuse with another armament as 
great and as formidable as the former; and 
that, in eveiy view, the strength of Athens 
must be quite insurmountable. And now also 
the Athenians, who remained of the former 
armament, respired from that dejection of 
spirit into which a series of misfortunes had 
plunged them. 

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the 
present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely 
necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of 
those errors which had done so much prejudice 
to Nicias : for Nicias, at his first appearance, 
struck an universal consternation ; and yet, by 
declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, 
and loitering a whole winter away at Catana» 
he became an object of contempt; andGylip. 
pus had time to land a succour from Pelopon- 
nesus, which disconcerted all his measures. 
That succour, however, the Syracusans could 
never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them 
on his first approach ; for, deluding themsdves 
with the thought that they were a match for 
their foes, they would have found, by sad ex- 
perience, that they had indulged a crud mis- 
take, and must the same moment have beoi 
invested on all sides : and, in such a state, 
though they had invited those succours, yet no 
effectual relief could have been obtained from 
them. 

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on diese 
past mistakes, and sensible that he iii m«»*f, 
this very moment, on the first day of his ar- 



•1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



275 



rival appeared moit terrible in the eyes of the 
enemy, resolved without loss of time to im- 
prove the present consternation which his re- 
inforcement had struck amongst them. He 
Heurther took notice, the counterwork of the 8y- 
racusans, by which the Athenians had been ex- 
cluded from perfecting their circuinvallation, 
consisted only of a single wall ; and, in case 
the heights of Epipols could again be regained, 
•with the camp which at first had been occupied 
there, that work might easily be carried, since 
the defendants could not now be able to with- 
stand the Athenian strength ;— he determined 
therefore to put this project in execution ; 
judging that, in case it succeeded, it would be 
a means of bringing the war to a speedy con- 
clusion : for, if the scheme took place, the sur- 
rendor of Syracuse must soon follow ; at worst 
he would draw off the army, and not waste the 
lives of those Athenians who were employed 
in this service, and the strength of the whole 
state, to no manner of purpose. 

Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act 
offensively ; and, in the first place, sallying out 
firom theb camp, they ravaged the countiy along 
the banks of the Anapus, and were now again, 
as (Ml the first approach, masters without con- 
trol both by land and sea; for in neither 
element durst the Syracusans any longer come 
out to check their motions, abating what 
small resistance was made by the cavaby and 
darters from Olympiieum. 

In the next place, Demosthenes thought 
proper to try what could be done against the 
-works of the enemy by the help of machines. 
But, when, upon applying them, those ma- 
chines were fired by the Syracusans, who from 
the top of their works made a gallant defence; 
and, though the army attacked in several 
quarters at once, they were every where re- 
pulsed ; he determined to waste no longer time 
upon the trial ; but, having prevailed ,with 
Nictas and his other colleagues in command 
to assent to the scheme he had formed to re- 
cover Epipolffi, he proceeded to put it in exe- 
cution. Yet, by daylight, it was judged im- 
possible for them either to march or to mount 
the ascent without being discovered. Upon 
this, having issued out his orders, that every 
man should take with him subsistence for five 
days, and that all masons and carpenters should 
attend the march, with proper store of missive 
weapons, and ^11 needful materials for rais- 
ing new woriLB in case the attempt was suc- 



cessful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at- 
the head of the whole army, and, assisted by 
Euiymeden and Menander, marched towards 
Epipols. But Nicias was left behind in the 
intrenchments. 

When now they were advanced to the pass 
of Euryalus, by which the first army gained 
formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered 
by the Syraeusan guards ; and, mounting the 
heights, surprise the fort which was there man- 
ned by the Syracusans, and slaughter some of 
the defendants. But the majority flying amain 
towards the camps, of which there were three 
among the advanced intrenchments of EpipolsB, 
(one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, 
and a third of the confederates,) they spread 
the alarm, and also notified the enemy^s ap- 
proach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at 
first were selected for the guard of this quarter 
of EpipoliB. These sallied out instantly to stop 
their progress; and Demosthenes, with his 
Athenians, fiilling in with them, put them to 
flight, afler they had made a gallant stand. 
Upon this success, they immediately pushed 
forwards, that they might improve the present 
ardour of the soldiers to the immediate comple- 
tion of those points for which they had made 
this bold attempt. Another party, which had 
been advancing all along without a check, sur- 
prised the counterwork of the Syracusans ; of 
which, since abandoned by its defendants, they 
were throwing down the battlements. 

But now the Syracusans, and their confede- 
rates, and Gylippus with the body under his 
command, marched out of their intrench- 
ments : yet, having been attacked in so daring 
a manner amidst thd darkness of the night, 
they had not recovered their surprise when 
they fell in with the Athenians ; and thus, not 
able to stand the first shock, they were obliged 
to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians 
pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if 
the victory was quite their own ; eager, fiuther, 
to make themselves masters of all the tract 
not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, 
should they slacken in their ardour, the ene- 
my might have time to rally in a body, 
— ^the Boeotians first put a stop to their ca- 
reer; and, rushing boldly upon them, rout^ 
ed and put them to flight By this turn the 
Athenians were thrown into so much disorder 
and confusion, that the particulars which fol- 
lowed cannot easily be gathered, neither from 
themselves nor their antagonists: for, even 



276 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



ia dajKgkt, when objects are cleereit to tbe 
fltght, men pvoMiit in • batUe are aot able lo 
aee all that pasaetb; each siogle eombatant 
can baftly lelate what hn^peoed about his own 
peTBon. When, therefore, armies engage amidst 
the darimesa of the night (though this is the 
only instance oi it between powerful armiee 
in the present war,) how is it possible to come 
at the knowledge of the seyeral incidents? 
The Aoon indeed shone at thie time; hut 
then ihey only saw one another as objects ap- 
pear by moon-light, so as to discern the appear- 
ance of human bodies, but not to distingniah 
between friends and enemies. The heavy- 
armed, fiurther, numerous on both sides, were 
too much crowded for want of room. One party 
of the Athenians was already clearly defeated ; 
another, unbroken by the first attack upon 
them, was pushing forwards. Of the remain- 
der of their army, a great part had already 
mounted the ascent; yet some were stiU 
busied in mounting up; but none of theee^ 
when they were got upon the eminence, knew 
which way to advance : for, before them (as 
the rout was begun) there was one gruid 
medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud 
that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The 
Syiaousaas and their confederates were taur 
mating one another with" loud exultations (for 
the season of the night made all signals useless) 
to complete the blow, and were clearing before 
them all that came intheu way : but the Adie> 
niana were prying thavA for one another, and 
regarded every thing they met, enen though 
they feu in with their own friends, as the flight 
was now begun, foe an assured enemy. Ob- 
liged, fiurther, by frequent iterations, to demand 
the word, as Uie only method to distinguish 
one another, (all calling out aloud for it at the 
same instant of time,) ihey heightened the 
general diatraetioD, and clearly discovered their 
own word to the enemy. Bat then they had 
not equal opportunities to discover that of the 
enemy ; because^ as the latter w«e now the 
victors and kept more in bodies, it was less 
liable to detection. Hence it came to pass^ 
that, though a stronger party of the Athenians 
fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet 
they Judged it beet to fly; beeanse they were 
sensible that their own word was divulged; 
aaad, as they could not return the word ofi the 
Syiacttsaa% ihey must unavoidab^ be out to 
piooes. Bui whet had the greateateffiBCt, and 
did most hurt to the Athenians, was the sing- 



ing tiie paan ; sinee that used on boUi 
being nearly the same^ raised the ntaxM* 
fusion4 And, when the Argivee and Oonsy- 
reans, and all others of Doric desoent, who iveie 
with the Atlienians, began from time to 
their pean, it struck the same akra into lim 
Athenians as when the enemy themoekves 
it : so that, in short, foiling in amongst 
another in diffisrent quarters of the axmj, vrben 
once the confusion was rose to a height, (fricaide 
i^ainst friends, and citizens againet fellow- 
citizens,) they not only impress a redprocaJ 
terror, but proceed to blows with so nmdi 
fury that they could not easily be parted. 
The pursuit was briskly foUowed; in which 
many of them, plunging headlong down the 
predpioes, were dashed in pieces, because the 
pass downwards from Epipobo vras too nanovr 
for their numbers. But, of those who from 
the heights got down into the i^aia, many, 
and all in general who came in the fint arma- 
ment, since better experienced in the ooontiy, 
escaped in safety to the camp: vidiereae, of 
the last comers, some, straggling into hy-jwmym, 
were bewildered in a ooontiy to which they 
were utter strangers, and at break ef day- wero 
out to pieces by the Syracosan hone, who 
scoured the plains. 

On the day following, the Syracusanaereeted 
two -trophies on Epipole ; one on the eanmit 
of die pass^ and the other where the BoBotians 
first stopped the enemy's pregMss. The Ath^ 
niaoe ilao obtained a truce, to fetch off their 
dead ; the number of whkh was large,* both 
in dieir own troops and those of their aUtee ; 
and yet more arma were taken by tho enemy 
than ban pvopertioa to the slain : for, of the 
number ci light-armed who were pushed ta 
the brink of the precipices, and» throvmg 
away their shieldB, were obliged to leap down, 
though some perished by the frdi^ yet oChen 
escaped with life. 

But, after this, the 8yraensan% highly ani- 
mated agam with this fresh unexpeeted turn 
in their fovour, sent out SiesmM^ at the head 
of fiftem sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled 
in a sedition, widi orders to exert the utmost 
of his power to lednce it to their obedience^ 
GyUppna also mado once more the tour of 
Sicily, to levy MMither army; eonfldent thai, 
with such a reinforeemeBt, he oonld eaify the 



> Pltitaivii pota it at two thoofand ; but INodonu Si- 
cnlas says it was two tboussad five ImadNtf. 



VL YXAJKXIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



8T7 



m 

IB 
II 

na 

1QC3 

Ik 

Nf 

n 
ay. 
ir 

^^ 



very intronchments of the enemy by stonn, 
smce afiaira had taken anch a faTomable tarn 
on £pipol»» 

In the meantime, the Athenian g^erab 
were employed in the needful conaultationa 
since the last misfoitune and the present nni- 
veraal dejection d thmi troops. They saw 
that all their attempts were blasted by ill suc- 
cess and that the soldiers were chagrined at 
the continuance of so fruitless a service : for a 
sickness spread amongst their people from a 
double cause ; from the present season of the 
year, in which the human body is most subject 
to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome 
ground on which they were encamped ; besides 
that, in every respect, th^ situation appeared 
desperate and quite beyond the power of re- 
dress. 

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore 
totally r^ugnant to a longer continuance be- 
fore Syracuse. He urged <<the immediate 
execution of the sdieme he had formed before 
he made the late dangerous attempt upon 
Bfnpols ; which since it had miscarried 
they should no longer protract their departure, 
whilst yet the seascm of the year was proper 
for their voyage homewards, and they had 
strength enough in the last reinforcement to 
force their passage in spite of the enemy." 
He affirmed, ^It would be move conducive 
to the public wdfaie to turn their arms 
agatnat those who were erecting fortifications 
within Attica itself, thanagainsh the Syracusens, 
whose reduction now was ahaost impractica- 
ble ; and that it was madness to perast any 
longer in a siege which dissipated the wealth 
of the state in fruitless vain expenses." In 
this manner Demosthenes declared his senti- 
moats. 

As for Nidas, though convinced within him- 
self dmt &eir affiurs were in a bad situation, yet 
he was unwilling vdth his own mouth to confess 
their low condition, or that a departure should 
be fixed by the general votes of a publis council, 
where aU that passed must be reported to 
the enemy; because, should the determina- 
tion be formed in this manner, the execution 
could not go fbrwaar^ without the etoen^^s 
privity. Besides^ as he knew the state of the 
enemy somewhat more perfectly than others, 
he imagined there were grounds to hope that 
^ state of the latter would mon become worse 
than 6Mir own, would they only eon^ueto 
press the siege. A want of supplies must 



soon reduce them to great straits ; and this tlM 
sooner, as, by the accession of the last sqtui* 
dron, themselves were now again masters of 
the sea. And, what is more, in Syracuse itself 
there was a party which wished to see the city 
fall into their hands. These had despatched 
their agents to Nidas, and insisted he should 
hot quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as 
he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as 
his mind was balanced between two measures, 
which equally required mature deliberation. 
But, for the present, he openly declared him- 
self in council against drawing off the army. 
He told them, " he was perfectly well assured 
that the Athenians would never forgive him, 
should he carry their troops from Sidly with* 
out peremptory orders ; that the affair would 
not then lie under the cognizance of such as 
here advised it, and with thdr own eye» were 
convinced of the necessity of such a step ^ but 
of men who would form thdr judgments upon 
the spiteful calumniations of others, and the 
influence some maHdous demagogues would 
have over thdr understandings, by which thdr 
fate would be determined." He farther repre- 
sented, that « many, nay, the greater part of 
the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and 
make such tragical outcries about the perils that 
environ them at present, would change tiwir 
notes so soon as the^ were landed again at 
Athens, and ascribe their return to the treach- 
ery and corruption of their commanders." For 
, such reasons,, he declared, '< as he was well 
acquainted vrith Athenian tampers, he wouM 
choose, rather than be undone at Athens by 
base criminations and soi unjust sentence, to 
hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it 
must be, under the violence of the enemy." 
He maintdned, however, that «the state of 
the l^rracusans was worse than their own. 
The demand upon them for the pay of fordgn'* 
ers was targe ; their expenses in securing the 
outworits of Syracuse were high ; they had now 
supported a large navy for the space of an en- 
tire year ; want therefore must soon come 
upon them, and' they must shortly be totally 
distressed ; because the sum of two thousand 
talents* they had already expended of their own 
stock, imd had even contracted a large debt 
besidtef. And, in case they abate of their pre- 
sent punctuality or making good the appoint- 
ments of the forces they have on foot, their 
^-'— -'^— ' ^- '- - ' --- / 

1 387,500/. sterling. 



278 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



■trength must moulder away ; ance it consisted, 
not like the Athenians, of troops which most 
serve, but of such as were only discretionaiy^ 
aids." He concluded with « the necessity they 
lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue 
the siege with vigour, and by no means expose 
a superior strength to ruin, through a fiilse 
presumption that they were inferior in point of 
supplies." 

Niciaa expressed himself on this occasion 
with an air of neat confidence, as a person per- 
fectly well acquainted with the state of Syra- 
cuse and the failure of money there, and be- 
cause there was a party within th^ city which 
acted in favour of the Athenians, and had 
advised him, by their agents, « by no means to 
raiae the siege." And, what is more, he placed 
a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than 
ever he had d<me before the late unsuccessful 
engagement. 

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, 
Demosthenes would not yield the least degree 
of attention to it : « If the army must not eva- 
cuate Sicily without a peremptory order from 
Athens, but must persist in this destructive 
service, he judged it would be better to draw 
them off to Thapsus or to Gatana, where they 
might find opportunity enough to make incur- 
sions with the land army upon the territories 
of the enemy, and, by committing devastations, 
might highly distress them. Their fleet might 
th^i engage in the open sea ; not in a space 
confined and straitened, which was the greatest 
advantage to the enemy, but in sufficient sea- 
room, where all their superior skill might 
fairly be exerted, where they would be able to 
make their attacks, and bear down again upon 
the foe with greater agility, and more violent 
diocks, than could be done in the limitary space 
of a close pent-up harbour. Upon the whole, 
he affirmed, that his consent should never be 
given to a longer continuance in their present 
posts, but he was for moving off with all possi- 
ble expedition, and they had not a moment to 
lavish upon delay." 

Eurymedon then declared that his sense of 
things coincided with that of Demosthenes ; 
and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, 
a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended 
with the secret imagination that the positive- 
. ness of Nicias resulted . fi-om some stronger 
hopes of success he had conceived above his 
colleagues. And in this manner the Atheni- 



ans fell into dilatory measures, and continoed 
in iheir camp before Syracuse. 

But in this interval Gylippns and Sicaniu 
returned to Syracuse: Sicanus, truly disap> 
pointed of Agrigentum, for he was advanced 
no £uther than Gela when the sedition in fin 
vour of the Syracusans was brought to an ami- 
cable period ; but then Gylippus was returned 
at the head of a numerous body, consisting of 
levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed 
troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring 
had put to sea on board the transport, but came 
over last from Afiica to Selinus; for into 
Africa they had been driven by contrary winds; 
and, having there been furnished by the Cjre- 
neans with two triremes and a set of pilots, as 
they coasted along the AMcan shore, they re- 
lieved the Evesperitse, then blocked up by tbe 
Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set 
battle ; and, proceeding from thence along the 
shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian 
mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to 
Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a 
night. Hence therefore they stood across, and 
landed at Selinus. 

With this accession of strengdi, the Syracu- 
sans instantly prepared to attack the Athe- 
nians again bodi by land and sea. But the 
Athenian generals, — ^finding they had received 
so large an augmentation, and that the postme 
of their own afiairs was so far from being 
changed for the better, that day after day it 
grew worse in every respect, and, what was 
worst of all, that their troops were quite ex- 
hausted with fatigue and sickness, — ^they re- 
pented now in earnest that they had not drawn 
off in time ; and, as Nicias now no longer op- 
posed that step with the same vehemence as he 
had done before, but merely endeavooied thai 
it should not be determined in public council, 
they issued out orders, with the utmost secre- 
cy, that the whole armament should hold them- 
selves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal 
given. But, all things now ready, the very 
moment they are going to embark, the moon is 
eclipsed, for it was now the time of the foO* 
The bulk of the .army, struck with the awfiil 
appearance, call out upon the generals to halt; 
and Nidas, always addicted too much to tofO' 
stition and such vulgar scruples, positively de- 
clared, that «it should no more be ddsted 
whether they should remove or not, tiO the 
three times nine days were past which ^ 



ITEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



279 



soothsajers prescribe on such occasions." So, 
for this reason, a longer stay was forced upon 
tlie Athenians who had been too dilatory al- 
ready.* 

The Syracusans, who had soon an intelli- 
gence of their designs, were now more animated 
tlian ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on 
men who had given proof of their own inward 
conviction that they were no longer a match 

* That the bulk of an army or a fleet should be fright- 
ened at such appearanccB, is no wonder at all : they are 
ever ignorant; and the most daring of them in other 
respects have been much addicted to superstition. But 
one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance ahd 
superstition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and de- 
ploring the foible of a man who had so good a heart. 
Plutarch expatiates largely on this occasion. " Even 
the vulgar/* says he, " at this time were well apprised 
that an eclipse of the sun WBf often occasioned, about 
the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon: 
but, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, 
and bow on a sudden, at the full, its light fades away or 
emits variety of colour, was not easy for them to con- 
ceive. They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent 
from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first 
person who wrote a clear and bold solution of the en- 
lightening and obscuration of the moon, was Anazago- 
ras, who now had not been long dead ; nor was his ac- 
count in every body's hands, but concealed, imparted 
only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of 
secrecy. The world could not bear that naturalists and 
meteormoDgers, as they were then styled, should seem 
to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, 
invisible operations, and necessary consequences. For 
each attempts Protagoras was banished ; and Pericles, 
with much ado, procured the release of Anazagoras 
when thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never 
meddled with any of these points, was however put to 
death upon the charge of philosophizing. It was not 
till late that the glory of Plato shone abroad ; who, by 
bis irreproachable life, and subjec^ng natural necessi- 
ties to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all 
bad imputations from studies of this kind, and, by a ma- 
thematical beginning, opened a field to other sciences. 
And thus his friend Dion, at what time he was setting 
sail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was not at all 
disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe 
at Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfor- 
tune of Nicias, at this juncture, not to have even a skil- 
ful soothsayer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who 
had cured much of his superstition, had died a little be- 
fore ; since this portent, as Philochorus says, was not 
a bad one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army ; 
since acts which are accompanied with fear stand in 
need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to 
them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was 
the usual custom, as Autoclides hath . informed us, to 
bold only a three da3w' cessation from business. But 
Nicias persuaded himself that a comlpete revolution of 
the moon ought to be waited for ; as if with his own 
eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she 
had passed the shadow and the earth's interposition. 
Yet, throwing up all attention to other points, he mind- 
ed nothing but sacrificing, till his enemies attacked 
him." — Life of JN'ieiaa. 



for theb foes either by sea or on land ; since^ 
with other thoughts, they never could have pro* 
jected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at 
the same time, that, should they remove to any 
other quarter of Sicily, they would become 
more diflpicult of reduction, they saw the ne- 
cessity of engagfng them by sea without a mo- 
ment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage 
in compelling them to fight Upon this, they 
ordered the complements of men on boaid 
their ships, and exercised their crews as many 
days as was judged sufficient But, when op- 
portunity offered of acting with advantage, on 
tne first day they assaulted the Athenian in- 
trenchments ; and, a party of heavy-armed and 
horsemen, though not numerous, sallying out 
at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut 
off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of 
that party, and, having put them to flight, fol- 
low the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on 
which the assault is made, was narrow, the 
Athenians lose seventy horses and a small 
number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more 
happened on this day, as the army of the Syra- 
cusans now made their retreat 

But, on the day following, they stand out 
with their fleet,* to the number of seventy-six 
ships ; and, at the same time, the land army 
marched up to the intrenchments. The Athe- 
nians launched out, with fourscore and six, to 
give them a reception ;. and thus,i charging one 
another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon 
commanded the right wing of the Athenian 
fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and sur- 
round the ships of the enemy. For this pur- 
pose, he opened his line, and stood along too 
close to the land ; which gave the Syracusans 
and their allies, who had now defeated the 
centre of the Athenians, an opportunfty to in- 
tercept him in the bottom and recess of the 
harbour, where they slay Eurymedon himself, 
and destroy the ships which had separated in 
his company : and, this done, they gave chase 
to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them 
ashore. 

9 Plutarch adds, that, " on this occasion, the very Inda 
came out in fishing-boats and skiffs, taunting and in- 
sulting the Athenians. One of these l&di, Heraclides, 
of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in 
great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. 
But PollichuB, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for bis safe- 
ty, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had un- 
der his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now 
alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a 
general engagement." — Life of J^icias. 



880 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



Gylippns now, pereeiviDg that ihe ahipf of 
die enemy were defeated and drove aground 
^uite wide of the piles and their camp, formed 
instantly a dedgn to make slaughter of the 
men as they were leaping on shore, and of giv- 
ing the Syracusans an opportunity easily to 
draw off all the ships from land of which they 
were entire masters. At the head, therefore, 
of one division of the land-force, he marched 
down to the pier to second the fleet The 
Tyrrhenes happened to have heen posted near- 
est hy the Athenians ; who, seeing a body of 
the enemy running down thither in a disorderly 
manner, advanced eargerly to meet them ; and, 
charged briskly on the van, put them to flight 
mad drive them into the lake of LysimeUa. 
But, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans 
and their allies coming up, the Athenians also 
advanced with speed to succour their fiiends, 
and, trembling for their ships, soon came to an 
engagement with them, and, after routing, pur- 
sued them amain. They slaughtered now a 
great number of the heavy-armed; and, what 
was more, preserved the far greater part of thnr 
fleet, and towed again to th^ former moorings 
all their ships, except eighteen, which the Sy- 
racusans and their allies made prises, and put 
all the men on board them to the sword. With 
a view, farther, to destroy the rest by setting 
them on fire, they filled an old transport ship 
with facines and combustible matter, and, as 
the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set 
her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. 
The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put 
all their engines instantly at work to ez- 
tingui^ the flames ; which having at length 
effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of 
their own vessels, they were delivered from 
this imminent danger. 

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy 
for their victorious engagement on the water, 
and/ for the interception of the party of the 
heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where 
they had taken so many horses. The Athe- 
nians also did the same, for the repulse given 
by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the ene- 
my, and their being chased into the lake, and 
the larger success they afterwards obtained 
with the rest of their army. 

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, 
the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the 
large reinforcement of shipping brought against 
them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal 
victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged 



into a total dejection of spirit: they wen 
thunder-struck by the reverse of misfortimesw 
little expected ; and began to r^nt, with 
much more bitterness of thought, that they had 
ever engaged in so &tal an expedition. They 
had invaded states^ whose polity was ahetdj 
of a piece with their own, whose fona of 
government was popular, like that of Atbeni, 
and which flourished in sh^inng, in bono, 
and each article of power : and yet, findiqg 
themselves unable to give any measore of 
success to their projects by introducing dissen* 
sions amongst them through political embroil- 
ments, nor even by a powerful force, superior 
to that of their foes> able to ward off the many 
blows they had received, they had fallen before* 
hand into great anxieties ; and now, sadly 
beaten as they were at sea, one thought of 
which they never could hitherto have conceived, 
their despondency became woore violent than 
ever. 

From this time the Syracusans scoured the 
whole harbour without having any thing to fear. 
They had also formed a scheme of bailing up 
its mouth ; that the Athenians, though nerer 
so intent upon it, might for the fij^tms not have 
it in their power to steal away. Their care 
and diligence were no longer employed on the 
view alone of their own preservation, but on the 
larger view of ruining the Athenians. They 
concluded, and justly too, tiiat the latter tuns 
in their fiivour had given them the ascendant 
over these invaders : and, could they but com' 
pass the total overthrow of this body of Athe- 
nians and their allies, the grand achievement 
would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay 
move, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of 
such success ; of whom some would in an ifr 
stent recover freedom, and others be deKveied 
from the fear of losing it ; for the remaining 
strength of Athens would never be able to 
stand against that weight of war with which 
she must be soon encompassed aboet And 
thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious 
authors of such desirable events, they must 
infallibly become objects ^ wonder net only ^ 
all the present age, hot to latest peeteiity. 
And of ft truth, considered in such a light, it 
was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the 
conquest, not only of ihe Athenians, bat tk» 
of their whole etxtensive and combkied aHianee ; 
and this, not merdy to cam laurels for them- 
selves, but for the auxiliaries' also who had 
engaged in their cause, since, exposed in the 



YBARXIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



281 



front of the war with the Lacedsmonians ! 
and Corinthians, they bad subjected their own 
state to the fury of a storm which threatened 
them all, and, by their own personal valour in 
naval engagements, had contributed most to 
such a height of success. 

Tbe various people, now got together at 
this one city of Syracuse, were so very numer- 
ous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehen- 
sive roll of those who, in the series of the 
present war, sided either with the states of 
Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined 
of those, who mustered in the ofiensive and de- 
fensive armies at Syracuse ; who fought against 
or in behalf of Sicily ; who joined for the re- 
duction or preservation of this island,, not so 
much from just and lawful motives, or a con- 
currence resulting from the ties of blood, as 
from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion. 

The Athenians, truly, in quality of lonians, 
had voluntarily come hither against the Syra- 
cusans, who were Dorians ; attended by those 
who spoke the same dialect and used the same 
institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, 
and Imbrians, and those ^ginets who were 
the present possessors of ^gina. The Hes- 
tisans, farther, now inhabiting Hestisa in 
Subcea, as an Athenian colony, had joined in 
the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, 
some came along with them because they were 
dependents : some, though independent, be- 
cause they were confederates : and some there 
iwere who attended merely for their pay. The 
dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, 
and Chalftideans, and Styrensians, and Carys- 
tians, from Eubcea; from the islands, the 
Ceans, and Andrians, and Teians ; from Ionia, 
the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians ; of 
these the Chians, being not subjected to a 
tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, 
though independent at home, yet followed their 
arms. And all these hitherto recited were 
lonians and Athenian colonies, excepting the 
Carystians, for these last are Dryopes ; but, as 
subjected to Athens, not so much from choice 
as lonians, as by mere compulsion, they now 
followed their masters against Dorians. To 
these were added -^olians ; the Methymneans, 
for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but 
were exempted from tribute ; the Tenedians, 
farther, and ^nians, who were tributaries ; 
but these, being -^olians, were now compelled 
to fight against other ^olians ; namely, their 
own founders, the Boeotians, who adhered to 
43 



the Syracusans. The Platse'ans did the same, 
and were the only Boeotians that acted against 
Boeotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting 
enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cythe- 
rians attended, though both of Doric descent: the 
Cy therians, truly, who are a Lacedsmonian colo- 
ny, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian 
side, against the Lacedsmonians under the 
command of Gylippus; and the Rhodians^ 
Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their 
arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against 
the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting 
in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people 
of tbe isles on the coast of Peleponnesus came 
the Cephallenians and Zacynthians ; indepen- 
dent, in fact, but through their situation, con- 
trolled in some measure by the Athenians, who 
are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans, far- 
ther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is 
more, were even of CorinUiian original, as 
being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied 
to the former, from compulsion, as they gave 
out for a colour, though in truth from deliberate 
malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom 
they hated, followed the Athenians with an 
ardour inferior to none. The Messenians also, 
now styled Messenians of Naupactus, and those 
from Pylus, which was still held by the Athe- 
nians, were brought along to the war ; to whom 
must be added a small party of Megarean 
exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now 
took part against the Selinuntians, who were \ 
also Megarean. The residue of the confede- 
rates were engaged rather upon free and spon* 
taneous choice. The Argives, for instance, 
not more from obligations of subsisting treaties, 
than the rancour they bore the Lacedaemonians,, 
and the gratification of private spleen, though 
Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against 
their Doric kindred. But the MantineaQS and 
the rest of tbe Arcadians, who were mercenaries, 
and eternally habituated to act against any foe 
pointed out to them, were now so far influenced 
by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their 
enemies, who came over on this occasion in 
company with the Corinthians. The Cretan* 
also and .iStolians were there, allured by an 
advantageous pay ; and thus it happened that 
the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodi- 
ans, had founded Gela, readily took part, for 
the sake of gain, iiot with but against a colony 
which themselves had planted. There was 
also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly 
induced to join by the pay they received, but 
2F 



282 



FELOPONNESIAN WAR, 



I 



principally by their personal regard for De- 
mosthenes and their attucfament to the Athe- 
nians. And thus have we ran them over to 
the ntmost honndary of the Ionian guH Of 
the Italic ^tions, the Thurians, and those 
Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced 
to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, 
joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the 
Naxians, and Cataneans; of barbarian^ the 
^gesteans, who were the first movers of this 
grand contention, and the major part of the 
Siculi ; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyr- 
rhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the 
mercenary I^ygians. So many nations were 
assembled together at present under the com- 
mand of the Athenians. 

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracu- 
sans, were the Camarineans, who bordered 
close upon them, and the Geloans, who are 
situated next the Camarineans. To proceed 
regularly: as the Agrigentines were neutral, 
the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated 
beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit 
that tract of the island which fiiceth Afric. 
Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people 
who inhabit that part of the bland which lies 
off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body 
which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. 
The several nations of Greek descent settled 
in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, 
acted together in concert Of the barbarous 
people they had those Siculi alone who did i)ot 
openly revolt to the Athenians; but, out of 
Sicily, the LacedsBmonians sent them a citizen 
of Sparta to command, and a body of Neoda- 
mades and Helots. By a Neodamas is meant a 
citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians 
alone aided them both with shipping and a 
land force, in conjunction with the Leucadians 
and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syra- 
cuse. From Arcadia also came a body of 
mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians ; and the 
Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion; and 
of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus 
were the Boeotians. But, beside these fo- 
reign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great 
and powerful cities, furnished out in all re- 
spects a much greater and well-appointed force ; 
for by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, 
of ships, and horses, and other kinds of mili- 
tary force, in an amazing abundance, were 
raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it 
must be said, that the domestic force of the 
Syracusans was more to be considered than all 



the rest, firom the greatDess of their atste and 
the iouQ^ate uigeou^ of thoae perils 
which they wcce environed. 

These were the aids, tibe muneroBS 
sembled toged)^ by the oontfmding pwties; 
and at this juncture all theae wens pnes^nt on 
each side of the omtest; tad fmm this crisis 
neither party received any aoeessioB. 

The Sjrracusuis therefore and Ihflir conle- 
derates thought, since the sisaia) -iitUnrj they 
had gained upon the water, it would be a bimve 
exploit, and highly for their gloiy, ta make die 
whole extensive camp of the Athemaiia their 
prize, and cut off their retreat on both elemwits, 
both by land and sea. With this project, ^iej 
immediately barred up the great harbour, the 
mouth of which is about eight stadia^ over, 
with a line of triremes placed aide by side, and 
other vessels and boats moored fiurt together by 
anchors ; and got every thing besides in readi- 
ness, in case the Athenians should ventore on 
another engagement Their every view was 
now become large and aspiring. 

When the Athenians saw the haiboor thus 
barred up, and perceived, fiirther, the whole of 
the enemy's designs, it was judged hig^ time 
to go to consultation. The commanders ci 
the different bodies were called to council, with 
the generals ; in which, — upon r^reaentatians 
made « of the great distress ta which th^ 
were reduced, and that they had not a stock oi 
provisions ample enough for their immediate 
subsistence, (for, bent on sailing away, they 
had sent already to Catana to countermand any 
fresh convoys,) and, unless they could recover 
their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable 
for the future to obtain a supply,"— they cams 
to a final resolution, ** To quit th^ intiendi- 
ments on the higher ground, and before the 
station of their shipping to raise a ciicnbr 
work, of as little compass as possible, but suf- 
ficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, 
and to this only to assign a guard ; as for the 
rest of the land army, they were to oblige every 
soldier to go on board, that all the ships, which 
yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for 
want of hands, might be completely manned ; 
and thus they must fight their passage out of 
the harbour ; and, if it succeeded, make di- 
rectly for Catana ; but, if repulsed, they woold 
bum their shipping, and, moving off in one 
body by land, would endeavour, by the most 

* Near a mile. 



Y&UIXIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



383 



ezpeditioiHi maicheB, to leoeh the Bearert pbee 
that would receiTe them, whether Barbanan or 
Gre^an." 

Such was the plan resolved on, and which 
they began immediately to execute ; for now, 
abandoning their upper intrenehments, they 
drew down to the beach, and manned the whole 
of their shipping, on board of which they forced, 
without exception, all such as had youth and 
vigour enough to be of service there. The 
whole number of ships, they were by this means 
enabled to man, amounted to a hundred and 
ten. They also placed on booord the fleet a 
large number of archers, the darters of the 
Acamanians, and other foreign auxiliariep ; and 
provided in all other respects for acfion, as 
well as their condition would permit or the 
nature of the projeet required. 

When things were thus in great forwardness, 
Nicias, taking notice Ihat the soldiery wa» 
much dejected by the great defeats, which, 
contraiy to their wonted custom, ihey had re- 
caved by sea, and yet desirous to hazard an- 
other engagement as so<m as possible, because 
pinched for want of necessaiy subsistence, he 
gathered them all round about himself, and en- 
deavoured to raise their drooj^g q^irits by the 
following exhortation, the first of the kind he 
had ever made : 

« My fellow-soldiezs, whether of the Athe- 
nian or the confederate troops! the bold at- 
tempt ^e are now going *to make is of tqfui 
concern to each individual amongst us ; rince, 
not more for victoiy over our foes than for the 
preservation oi ouradves and our country, we 
are now to fight ; and, if our naval eSotta be 
crowned with victoiy,. each of us may again be 
blessed with the sight of his own native city. 
Away, therefore, with these faces of despair, 
this painful dejection, fit only for a raw unex- 
perienced multitude, who, unsuccessful in their 
first attempts^ for ever after bid adieu to hope, 
and by unmanly fears anticipate mislortiiiiee ! 

<« A^ for you, Athenians, who form so oon« 
aiderable a part of this assembly, experienced 
as you are in such variety of warfare t^-and 
you also^ oar alltes, who have ever foug^ on- 
der our banners ! — ^recall to your iieflection the 
unexpected turns of war ; Mieouiage'lhe hope 
that fortune may at length deelaie for usy and 
determine once more to engage the foe vnih a 
spirit, worthy of that numerous strength of 
which by ocnlur demonstration you see your- 
selves this moment possessed. Those points. 



of which we perceive we may avail evrselves 
agunst the narrowness of the harbour's mouth, 
against snch a multitude of vessels as will be 
crowded together, and against &at particular 
disposition of soldiers on their decks, from 
which on the foimer occasion we suffered so 
much, — aU these, I must tell you, are as welt 
adjusted as oibt present condition will permit, 
by the united care of us your generals and your 
own masters: for many archers and darters 
shall now line your decks, and that crowd of 
soldiers, which, when we engage in the open 
sea, we never can use, because the vessels 
would be too heavily laden to allow the proper 
exertion of our skill ; that crowd, I say, in this 
pent-up contracted space, shaH give to our 
naval battle the strength and stability of a land 
engagement We have also devised the proper 
means to compensate the inferior structure of 
our shops ; andy in return for the consolidated 
beaks of our enemy, have provided the ships 
with grappling irons, which will hold fast a 
vessel that hath run against you^from getting 
clear, provided those on boatd will perform 
their duty ; because, as necessity enforeetb us 
now to fight a mere land battle from o«tr decks, 
it highly oonoema us neither to be beat off 
oursdves, nor to suffer them to get clear from 
omr grapi^ ; especially when aH the ambient 
shore, excepting the smaH tract now occupiecf 
by oilr own army, is hostile in regwd to us. 
Mindful of these things, it behoves you to fight 
it out so lon|^ as strength and vigour shall en- 
aUe you, and never suffer yourselves to be 
driven on such a shore ; but, when once your 
slop hath gprappfed with a foe, never once to 
think of losing your hold, till yoa have cleared 
the enemy's dedES-of aB the defmdants. But 
these pointe I give in charge to the heavy- 
ansed'^ not less than to the seamen ; since this 
method of engagement is more particularly 
your province, and since it still remains within 
your povrer to earn a glorious victory, by put- 
ting your land method into practice. But the 
seamen I exhort, and with my exhortations 
jBoito^ my entreaties, not to shrink too much 
imder the sensibility of past defeats, as your 
decks are now better armed in all respects than 
they were before, and as the number of the 
shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of that 
he«[t*delighting privilege, of wllich you are 
now to secure the continuance :•— to you I 
speak, who, though not of Athenian extrac- 
tion, have hitherto been regarded and honoured 



284 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



as Athenians ; and, for speaking well aur lan- 
. guage, and appropriating our manners, have 
been admired through the whole extent of 
Greece, have participated the benefits of our 
large-extended empire, not less than ourselves 
in point of profit, and much more than our- 
selves in striking awe into your vassals, and 
being exempted from the attacks of injustice. 
Since, therefore, you alone have freely shared 
Qur empire with us, you are bound by all the 
ties of honour, by no means to desert its present 
vindication. Then, in open despite of those 
Corinthians whom you have so often conquer- 
ed, and of those Sicilians not one of whom 
durst look us in the face so long as the vigour of 
our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before 
you, and strike into them the plain conviction 
— that your military skill, though strug- 
gling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet 
far superior to all their strength and luck 
united. 

« But to the native citizens of Athens 
itmongst you, I must once more suggest, that 
you have now no longer in your docks such 
another fleet as this, nor have left behind you 
such another body of heavy-armed. If, there- 
fore, your immediate fate be any thing less than 
victory, your enemies will sail and be directly 
at Athens ; and the remainder of our forces 
^there will no longer be able to repulse the 
united assaults of their domestic foes and such 
foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result 
must be, that you at once put on the chains of 
^ Syracusans, against whom you are conscious 
with what intentions you at first came here, 
whilst your country must be forced to submit 
to a Lacedsmonian bondage. Now, therefore, 
. summon all your courage, to earn the day in 
which your own liberty and that of Athens is 
to be the victor's prize : and let each individual 
amongst you, invigorate himself with the 
thought ; nay, le^ it throw spirit and life into 
the whole army, — ^that those who are now to 
ttigage on board this present fleet are the whole 
of the land and naval force of your country ; 
are the surviving supports of the state, and the 
great name of Athens. In so momentous a 
conflict, whoever amongst you excels in mili- 
tary skill or inward bravery, that person had 
never so fine an opportunity to give demonstra- 
tion of his superior worth, or to perform a 
great service for himself or for the welfare of 
his countiy.'' 
Jf icUs, after he had finished this earnest ex- 



hortation, ordered them to repair directly to 
their posts on board the fleet. 

As all this hurry of preparation lay within 
their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could 
not escape the conviction that the Athenians 
were bent on another engagement. They had, 
moreover, received intelligence of the new 
project of the grappling irons. As, therefore, 
they had provided against every thing besides, 
they also made provision to counterwork that 
project. For this purpose, they had covered 
the prows and almost the whole gunnel of their 
ships with hides; that, when the grappling 
iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no 
hold. And no sooner were all their preparations 
completed, than the Syracusan generals, in con- 
cert with Gylippus, animated their men to en- 
gage with resolution, by the following harangue: 

** That your past achievements have been glo- 
rious indeed, and for the acquisition of greater 
honour and glory that you are now on the 
brink of engaging, the generality of you, ye 
Syracusans and confederates, are well con- 
vinced, and fieed not at present to be informed ; 
for otherwise *you could never have persisted 
so far in this warm career of bravery and suc- 
cess: but, if there be a man amongst you 
whose sense of things drops short of their real 
position, we shall now throw upon it the need- 
ful illustration. 

" This land, our property, the Athenians have 
invaded ; aiming, in the first place, at enslav- 
ing Sicily ; and, had this design succeeded, at 
inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus and 
the rest of Ghreece. And yet these very 
Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract 
of empire that any ancient or modem state of 
Greece hath at any time enjoyed, you are the 
first who have bravely resisted ; and of that 
navy, on which they erected their encroaching 
pile of power, are plainly the victors in several 
engagements ; as again, in that which now ap- 
proacheth,- you will assuredly beat them. For 
men who have received such severe checks in 
a point for which they so highly plumed them- 
selves, will for the future have a much worse 
opinion of their own merit than if they had 
never conceived so high a value of it ; and 
when all their towering pretensions are so un- 
expectedly blasted, their subsequent efforts 
must of course drop short of their real 
strength : and this, you may rest assured, is 
the present state of yonder Athenians. And 
by parity, in regard to ourselves, that proper- 



ITKAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



285 



tion of strength we enjoyed at firat, with 
'which, though far inferior in skill, we boldly 
and successfally presamed to withstand them, 
must now be suitably enlarged ; and, with the 
farther accession of this inward assurance, that 
we are really the^best, since we have beat the 
best seamen in the world, our hopes of success 
are in every light redoubled ; and then human 
experience teacheth us, that, in every competi- 
tion, the warmest .hope is ever accompanied 
w^ith the greatest resolution. 

« But farther, those late alterations which 
they have introduced among their shipping, in 
order to equalize and balance ours, have been 
a long time familiar to our own practice ; and 
each of their new preparations we shall dex- 
terously improve to our own advantage: for 
"when, contrary to the long and inveterate dis- 
cipline of their fleet, there are crowded together 
upon their decks a numerous body of heavy- 
armed, as well as another numerous body of 
mere terra firma darters, as they may properly 
be styled, — ^when thus Acamanians and other 
landmen are forced on board, who even sitting 
would be unable to poise and direct their wea- 
pons, — ^how can they avoid endangering their 
vessels 1 or, jumbled confusedly together, and 
tottering under motions to which they are not 
inured, how can they escape a total disorder 1 

" What * still makes more against them, the 
multitude of their shipping will only serve the 
more to embarrass them ; and let this dispel 
the fears of those who may be afraid of en- 
gaging against their superior numbers; for a 
multitude of ships in a contracted space will 
be more slow in executing orders, and are at 
the same time most easily exposed to the 
annoyance which our preparations are contrived 
to give them. And now attend to the true 
and real situation of the foe, as from good in- 
telligence we are enabled clearly to declare* it to 
you. 

« Environed on all sides with misfortunes, 
and distressed in a present want of the neces- 
saries of life, they are become quite desperate : 
and hence, though they have resigned all confi- 
dence in their real strength, yet in the fury of 
despair they are throwing themselves upon the 
decision of fortune ; that either, if the passage 
can be forced, they may launch out to sea ; or, 
that project failing, may attempt a retreat by 
land ; — as if to a worse condition than their 
present it were not in the power of fortune to 
reduce them. ' Warned, therefore, with brave 



resentments, let us also try the encounter 
against such wild confusion, and against the 
fortune of our inveterate foes now treacher- 
ously bent to finish their destruction. Let us 
charge with the full conviction; that on an 
enemy, who would justify their invasion on 
the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most 
fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of re- 
venge ; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is 
an appetite of nature, and commonly said to be 
the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But 
that those men yonder are our foes, our most 
bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther 
proofs; since, bent on enslaving this our 
country, they first made the voyage ; and, had 
this their odious project been successful, on 
our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel 
torments, on our wives and children the most 
indecent enormities, and on Syracuse the most 
ignominious appellation. In a work of so just 
retaliation, fo indulge a tenderness of mind, or 
to think it gain to let them depart without ad- 
ditional revenge, will be .a matter of just re- 
proach ; for the latter is all they will be able 
to effect, even .though at length they may be 
victors. But to us, could we execute the fair 
and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting 
upon them the punishment they well deserve, 
and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it 
hath been ever enjoyed by us, beyond the reach 
of any future insults, how glorious must such 
achievements be ! for such critical moments of 
adventure are most rarely to be met with ; , 
which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disser- 
vice ; but, if successful, draw after them the 
most valuable acquisitions." 

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by 
Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation 
to their own soldiers, they also, in their turn, 
repaired immediately on board their fleet, as 
they found was already done by the Athenians. 

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with 
present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, 
and how nearly approaching, since this very 
moment they were only not in motion ; and once 
more reflecting, that, as generally happens in 
affairs of such prodigious moment, some points 
might yet be left imperfect, something of en- 
ergy, and weight, and influence, be yet left un- ' 
said; he called out again upon every single 
captain of the fleet, addressing himself sepa- 
rately to them, with the honourable mention 
of their fathers, themselves, and their tribe ; 
and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing 
2f2 



286 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[BOOK vn. 



tfplendonr^ Whatever it was, «not now to be- 
tray it, nor tarnish thoae hereditary Tirtties on 
which their anceetora had founded their glory ;" 
reminding them earnestly of the uninterrupted 
freedom of their country, and the privilege 
they had ever enjoyed of living in it quite 
free and uncontrolled; asserting other argu- 
ments, auch as vrith men who had their all so 
much tt stake, might have influence and 
weight ; no matter now how trite or hackneyed 
by frequent repetitions, or how equally appli- 
cable to every case, as fetched from the endear- 
ments of their wives, and their offspring, and 
their paternal gods ; such as from every topic, 
in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in 
the ears of men, as likely to animate and per- 
suade. And thus at last, though fearful that 
not even yet he had said enough, but all that 
the time would permit, he patted from them ; 
and placing himself at the head of the land- 
army, marched down to the beach'; where he 
drew them up in as large a line as they could 
possibly form, that their appearance might 
have the greater effect in emboldening those on 
board the fleet 

And now Deniosthenes, and Menander, and 
Euthydemus, (for these went on board to com- 
mand the flee^) getting clear from their moor- 
ings, stood away directly towards the barricade 
of the harbour, and that interviU of its mouth 
not yet completely barred, in order to clear the 
passage. .The Byraeusans also and their allies 
had now launched forth against them with their 
usual number of ships. A detachment of these 
were so stationed as to guard the passage ; the 
rest were spread circularly quite round the har- 
bour, that on all sides at once they might at- 
tack the Athenians, and their land army on the 
beach might second them on approaches to the 
shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded 
by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who were respec- 
tively stationed in each of the vnngs, whilst Py- 
then and the Corinthians composed the centre. 

When the Athenians were come up to the 
barricade, they ran boldly at it ; and by the 
violence of the first shock they beat oflT the 
vessels ranged about it, and were intent on 
clearing away the whole barricade. But here, 
the Syracusans and allies felling in amongst 
them from evety quarter, a general engagement 
ensued, not only at the barricade, but in every 
part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, 
and such a battle as they had never fought 
before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of the 



seamen on both sides, in running upon lite 
enemy, whenever the word vras given ; usd 
great was the art exerted by the offl&cen, m 
attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. 
Thel soldiers on board exerted all their efibrts, 
that, when ship eamie close with riiip, no 
stretch of military skili should be ofmitted on 
the hatches. Eveiy individual, abiding firmly 
in his post, strained all hie diligence to signalise 
his ovm behaviour. But, as numerous ships 
were falling in together amongst one another 
in little sea-room, and so largpe a number never 
fought before in so small a space, (since the 
amount of both fleets fell little short of two 
hundred,) the direct incursions vrith the beak 
were few, because room was wanting for tacks 
and passages; but boardings were frequent, as 
the vessels were continually running foul on 
one another, or in dieering off met with others 
which were coming on. And, so long as a 
vessel was in her approach, those on the 
hatches poured plentifully against her whole 
showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones; 
but, when they were once come to grappling, 
the soldiers, ctosmg in firm battalion, endea- 
voured by fonie to board one another. Nay, 
it most frequently happened, through the strait- 
ness of sea-room, that, the very moment one 
party boarded the enemy, the very same mo- 
ment they WffFe also boarded tbemaelveB, as 
two vessels lay often along side ef an enemy ; 
nay, sometimes mate, by necessity nangled and 
squeezed fadt together. In the meantnne, the 
care of the officers was not confined to one 
single pointy but distracted on all sides by a 
whole round of perils: they were here intent 
on thMr own defence, and there on the annoy- 
ance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodi- 
gious crash that was made by such a number 
of ships, running at the same instant upon one 
another, struck sudi dismay and loss of hear- 
ing, that the voices of those who issued out 
orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, 
besides, were the exhortations and- shouts of 
the officers en both sides, partly in conformity 
to rule^ though swelled at present by the ardour 
of contention. Amongst the Albenians it 
was shouted amam^-^'to force Ae passage, 
and now or never to exert their utmost stretch 
of bravery to earn a safe return t* dwir native 
country t^-^^-amongst the Syraensans and dieir 
allies-— « how glorious it would be to hinder 
their escape, and by present vietoty for eveiy 
one amongst them to increase the growing 



•] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAB. 



887 



honours of his eouittry !" The commuiden 
also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel drop- 
pings off before it was overpowered by the 
enemy, called out fdoud by name on the captain, 
demanding on the Athenian side, " did they 
retire on the wild presninption that yonder 
most hostile shore would prove nu»e friendly 
to them than the open sea, which by Umg pre- 
scription they had claimed as their own pro- 
vince V* — But on Had Syracusan-— ^< would they, 
who were perfectly assured that the Athenians 
"wanted nothing so much as tp escape, would 
tl^ey fly first from those who were flying 1" 
The land-army, farther, of each party upon 
the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately 
fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety 
and the most painful conflict of mind ; earnestly 
bent, as the one domestic party was, «on 
gaining accumulated honours ;'' but fearful, as 
the other invading party was become, that 
« their condition might soon become worse 
than it was already :" for the whole hope of 
the Athenians centring at present in that fleet, 
their anguish for the event was more acute 
than ever Huj had felt, and was aggravated by 
their own position on the beach, which gave 
them a clear unint^nrupted prospect of all that 
passed in the battle upon the water. The 
scene was but at a trifling distance from their 
eyes ; and, as the lodes of all of them were 
not at the same instant fastened upon the same 
spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, 
they grew at once exalted, and immediately 
began an invocation to the gods, that the effi>rts 
of their friends might be crowned with success ; 
whilst another party» beholding those who were 
vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended 
in a groan ; and, by the sight of such aflfecting 
turns, wene more subdued in spirit thantiiose mho 
were actually engaged in this medley of honor. 
Others, farther, who were intent upon a qnar- 
ter'of the engagement where the event was yet 
in suspense, and no judgment amidst such con- 
foaioR could be formed, adjusted the contortions 
of th^ bodies to their inward Urars, and passed 
that interval in extremity of angmsh ; for, each 
single moment, they w;ere within a little of 
escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and 
the same army of Athenians, so long as the 
event was under decision, a whole medley of 
noises was heavd toge^^Mr ; . l iiri ekiag^Bhajit- 
ing— viotoiy !— undonel— 'Ondone 1 — and all 
other sounds, of various import, whidi, in suck 



extremity of danger, a muaeroiie body pf ides 
may be forced to utter. 

Those, iarthw, on board, were equally seor 
sible of all the quick altanBtives of passion ; 
till at last, after the battle had for a long time 
been obstinately maintained, the Byraeusfins 
and allies put the Athenians to open flight; 
and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstre- 
perous clamour and loud exultations, drove 
them upon the beach* And here, the land-sol- 
diers wl^eh had served on board, excepting such 
as had been taken in the deeper water, leap- 
ing in all parts, as they severally could, on the 
shore, run in great confusion for shelter to the 
camp. -The army on the beach, with passions 
no longer diversified, but with one and the 
same unifoim vdiemence, having expressed 
their resentment of the horrible conclusion by 
a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried 
along the beach to succour the shipping ; otheiB 
to defend what yet remained of their intrench- 
ments ; whilst a third party, and the bulk of 
the army, confined their whole care to them- 
selves, and were solely intent on their own 
personal preservation. The horrid consterna- 
tion, in which this moment they were univer- 
sally plunged, was greater than Athenians had 
ever felt before. They suffered now what on 
a former occasion th^ had made others 
suffer at Pylus. There the Lacedemonians, 
having first lost their fleet, had the farther 
mortification to see all their gallant Spartans 
in the island undone. And now the desperate 
condition of the Athenians offered no gtimmer- 
ing of safety on the land, unless some miracu- 
lous contingency should take place in their 
favour. 

After an engagement so hardy and well 
disputed, afler the sinking of a large number 
of ships and the death of numbers on both 
sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who 
were masters of the day, took up the shatters 
and the dead. This being done, they sailed in 
triumph to the city, and erected a trophy. 

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the 
weight of their present misfortunes, never so 
much as once entertained the thought of re« 
covering their shattered vessels or their dead, 
but were contriving how to decamp by fevour 
of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon 
this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own 
opinion, that, « manning at once the whole 
number of their vessels, they should exert 



268 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[BOOK'Vn. 



their utmost efforts to force their passage oat 
of the harbour early the next dawn \" affirming 
that " they had still a larger number of shipping 
fit for service than the enemy :** for the Athe- 
nians had yet about sixty left, whereas, those 
of. the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came 
into the proposal , but when both joined in 
issuing proper orders for the execution, the 
seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispi- 
rited as they were l^ the last great blow, they 
had resigned all hope of ever beating these 
enemies again. No measure now remained 
but a retreat by land, on which the universal 
attention was henceforth employed. 

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived 
a suspicion^ that such a step would be taken by 
them ; and, foreseeing what difficulties might 
arise if so large an army should march across 
the country, and, posting themselves afresh 
on Sicilian ground, should again resume their 
spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he 
waited upon those in authority, and suggested 
to them, that, " they ought not, by any rules 
of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night ; 
(inserting here his own sentiments of the af- 
&ir ;) but that all the Syracusans and their 
allies, sallying out in a body, should pre- 
occupy and secure the roads, and in good time 
beset and put strong guards in all the passes.'' 
The magistrates were sensible, as much as 
he who gave this advice, how reasonable it 
was, and declared themselves for its execu- 
tion : but then, « the men, who now, indulg- 
ing their joy for the late victory, were intent 
on recreations, and as besides it was a festi- 
val-time, for this very day they were per- 
forming the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules, 
in all probability would refuse to march; 
because, transported as they were with suc- 
cess, the generality no doubt were celebrating 
the festival with good cheer and wine; and 
any thing might sooner be hoped from them 
than obedience to an order for taking up their 
arms and sallying forth at a minus's notice.'' 
As the magistrates were convinced that things 
would so turn out, the scheme was judged im- 
practicable, and Hermocrates could in no wise 
prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play 
off against the foe : afraid lest the Athenians, 
dislodging quietly by night, might possess them- 
selves of the most difficult passes before any 
opposition could reach them, he despatchetii 
some of his most trusty friends, under an escort 
of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it 



was dark ; who, riding up so near to tile in- 
trenchments that their words might be distinct- 
ly heard, and calling out aloud on some pencms 
to come forth, since they were a party sent 
from his friends in Syracuse to bring Niciss 
some intelligence, charged them to cany word 
immediately to Nicias^ « by no means to draw 
off the army by night, because the Syracusans 
had beset the roads ; but to defer his march til! 
day-light, when he had leisure to make the 
proper dispositions." And after delivering this 
message they rode off, whilst those who re- 
ceived it went and reported it faithfully to the 
Athenian generals. 

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, 
in which they were far from suspecting any 
fraud, they continued all night in their posts ; 
and then, as they had not dislodged at once m a 
hurry, they thought it advisable to stay there but 
one day longer, that the soldiers naight pack up 
and carry away wi& them as large a part as 
was possible of their necessary stores. The 
rest of the baggage it was agreed should be 
aband(med to* the enemy ; they were only to 
cany off, each person for himself, what was ab- 
solutely necessaiy for food and raiment. 

But, in this interval, the SyracusaiM and 
GryUppus, by sallying out with the land-forces, 
had gained a march before them, had blocked up 
the roads along the country by which it was 
judged the Athenians would march, and had 
posted strong guards upon aH the fords of brooks 
and rivers ; nay, their detachments stood ready 
drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from 
the most convenient passes. Standing oat 
farther into the harbour with their fleet, they 
dragged firom the shore the Athenian shipping. 
Some few of these they burnt, as the Adie- 
nians had designed to do ; but the residue at 
their leisure, firom the spot where each lay 
stranded, they took in tow and carried away to 
the city. And, this being done, when Nicias 
and Demosthenes judged that they had com- 
pleted such preparations for their march as werp 
absolutely needfril, the disiodgment of the 
whole army vras put in execution on the third 
day from the naval engagement 

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed 
in one particular light, as that they retreated 
because they had lost the whole of their fleet, 
and all their mighty hopes had terminated in 
such personal danger to themselves, and sodi 
as even boded the ruin of Athens ; but the 
very abandoning of the camp presented to their 



.J 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 



289 



flight the nuMit eutting Bpectaelw, and Btruck 
each MMiI amongrt them with heait-piercing 
anguiah ; for, aa the dead lay ttninterred upon 
the surface oi the earth, when the remains of 
an old acquaintance, tiius miserably laid, out, 
arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly 
seized with regret and horror. But the liiing, 
who on account of wounds and sickness were 
left behind, were causes of much greater afflic- 
tion to the sound than were even the dead, and 
in truth were much more to be deplored than 
those who had no longer a being ; for, bursting 
<mt into prayers and lamentations, they occasion* 
ed a wild irresolution of thought ; earnestly en- 
treating ^at they might not be left behind, and 
screaming out aloud on each by name, as they 
saw a fiiend or an acquaintance, or an old 
comrade, moving off ; throwing their arms about 
their necks, and so dragged along whilst they 
could keep their hold; bat, when strength and 
bodily vigour £uled and left them destitute of 
resource, Ihey gave them the last adieu, not with- 
out a shower of curses and a hideous howL By 
such cutting incidents the whole army was 
filled with tiears and a wild irresolution ; so that 
they could not depart without the highest re- 
gret, though from a spot so hostile, where they 
had sufiered more than tears could alleviate ; 
end the dread of more, which yet might be im- 
pending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the 
head and self-accusation were general through 
all the troops; and they resonbled nothing less 
than a large subjugated city, whose numerous 
inhabitants were escaping from the fiuy of a 
sack ; for the amount of those who were now 
marching off together, was not iess than forty 
thousand men. 

Of these,the generality carried off merely what 
necessary subsistence they had seraped together; 
but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to 
custom, were now obliged to carry their own 
sustenance themselves beneath their armour; 
some, because they had none, others, because 
they durst not trust their servants. The de- 
aertions had for a long time been large, but of 
late in greater numbers than ever. Neither 
were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; 
for there was bo longer any com to be found 
in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity 
and equability of miefortunes which, in many 
eases ^kviate the pain as numbers are involv- 
ed, were unable to render the present evils in 
any degree supportable ; especially when the 
thought occurred, from what a height of splen- 
44 



dour and preceding glory, to what a plunge and 
miserable state they were now reduced ! for a 
Most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to 
a Ghrecian army ; who, coming hither to en- 
slave others, were departing now with the sad 
alternative of fearing to be made slaves them- 
selves; and, instead of the prayers and pieeans 
with which they first began the voyage, were 
now dislodging with omens that portended no^ 
thing but misery : those, farther, who came 
hither as lords of the ocean^ were now stealing 
away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not 
by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land- 
army. However, all these reflections put their 
patience nothing on the stretch, in comparison 
o£ that weight of miseiy which this very instant 
was hovering over their heads. 

Nidas, perceiving the whde army to be 
overwhelmed in de8pair,and sunk in this plunge 
of distress, addressed himself severally to the 
troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every to- 
pic which occun-ed, each single party, whom 
he visited by turns, elevating his voice far be- 
yond the ordinary pitch, to suit the eamestnesa 
of his heart,/n h<^ that, the louder he spoke, 
the more extensive ^fect it might have upon 
the hearers. 

« Even yet, and in the present low ebb of 
our fortune,/my dear countrymen and confede* 
rates, we ought to encourage hope. Instances 
may be given of armies who have been rescued 
from a deeper plunge of dangers tiian that which 
is now our portion. Nor oUght you to torture 
yourselves with too painful regret at what you 
suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this> 
moment environ you about. Bven I myself^ 
who have much less room to boast of a consti- 
tution superior to hardships than the meanest 
soldier in your ranks, (lor your own eyes cui 
witness to how low a state my bodily infirmi- 
ties have reduced me,) who, however^ in the* 
oontinued happiness of my former course of 
life, or in any other regard, am inferior to none 
amongst you, — ^yet am buffeted now, by the 
storms end outrages of fortune, as cmeliy as 
ever wae the vilest and most abject of my feU 
low-creatures. It is true, I have ever habitu- 
ally worshipped the gods, with i^ consciencioua 
deference to established laws ; and have made 
justice and beneficence to man the constant 
practice of my life. Upon the strength of this, 
when I looked forwards to the future, my mind 
is enlivened with invigorating hope ; though I 
own these misfortunes, so far undeserved. 



290 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



strike no little terror on my thoaghts. But 
better times, perhaps, may be approaching ; for 
sure our enemies have been blessed with an 
ample measure of success ; and, though some 
deity may have frowned at first on this our ex- 
pedition, yet by this time his wrath must be 
fully wreaked upon us. We are not the first 
instance of a people who have wantonly inva- 
ded the possessions of another ; many such of- 
fences have taken their rise from the impulse 
of human passions, and have been puni^ed 
with such a measure of vengeance as human 
nature was able to endure. Good reason, 
therefore, have we now to hope for a milder 
fate from the offended deity ; who, depressed 
as we are, seem objects of compassion more 
than of resentment. Cast, therefore, your 
eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and 
the goodly numbers, which even now compo*se 
your retreat ; and let the sight revive and cheer 
your drooping spirits. Conclude that, wher- 
ever you choose to halt, you are of yourselves 
that instant a mighty community ; such as no 
other Sicilian people can presume to stand be- 
fore, should you attack; nor to dispossess, 
wherever you think proper to settle. But, 
that your march be orderly and safe, be that 
the care of each individual amongst your ranks, 
made warm and earnest by the thought, — that, 
on whatever sppt you may be compelled to 
fight, on that, if crowned with victory, you re- 
gain a country and a bulwark of your own. 
But then, our march must be continued both 
day and night, with unabating speed, because 
our stock of provision is but scanty ; and, can 
we but reach some fiiendly territory belonging 
to the Siculi, who, from their excessive dread 
of the Syracusaus, will ever preserve their at- 
tachment to us, conclude yourselves that mo- 
ment to be beyond the reach of danger : send, 
therefore, your messengers beforehand to them, 
with orders to meet us on our route and bring 
us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, 
my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last 
necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave ; 
since to cowardice now no place of shelter is 
any longer open ; and only if you stem the ef- 
forts of your foes — can you again be happy in 
the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so 
fondly regret ; and can Athenians re-erect the 
extensive power o^ the Athenian state, how 
low soever it may be fallen at present : for they 
are men who make a state, not waUs nor ships 
by men abandoned.'* 



With these words of enconragement, Nkias 
ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole 
army ; careful at the same time, if he saw any 
parties straggling from the main body, and 
quitting the order of the march, to fetch them 
up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted 
himself as diligently in his own department, 
encouraging his troops with the same energy 
and ardour of address. The body under Ni- 
cias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the 
march; that under Demosthenes brought up 
the rear : whilst the baggage-men, and the nu- 
merous crowd that attended the camp, Tm>Ty|M>^ 
within the centre of the heavy-armed. 

When they were advanced to the place of 
fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syra- 
cusans and allies drawn up in battalia there to 
oppose the passage. But, putting these to 
flight, they gained the passage of that river, and 
advanced into the country beyond ; though their 
march was terribly harassed by the incursioiis 
of the Syracusan horse, and by the missive 
weapons which the light-armed of the enemy 
poured in from time to time amongst them. 
And yet in thia day's march, the Athenians 
wrought about forty stadia,^ and halted for the 
night upon an eminence. 

On the ensuing day, by eariy dawn, they 
were again in motion, and advanced about 
twenty stadia ;' when, descending into a cer- 
tain plain, they halted end formed an encamp- 
ment Their design in this was to fetch in 
some provisions, for the adjacent country was 
inhabited, and to get a proper supply of water 
to carry along with them ; for in the countiy 
beyond, through which their route was fixed, 
no springs were to be met with for the kngdi 
of several stadia. But, during this halt, the 
Syracusans advancing beyond them, throw up 
a work across their route to stop their fiurther 
progress. The spot chosen for this was a 
strong eminence, flanked on both aides by an 
inaccessible crag, and known by the name of 
Acraeum-Lepas. 

On the day following the Athenians resum- 
ed their march; but the horse and numerous 
darters of the Syracusans and aUies stopped 
their advance, the latter pouring in their wea- 
pons upon, and the former riding up and db> 
ordering their ranks. For a long time, it k 
true, the Athenians maintained the aikirmidies 
against them; but at length they retreated 



< About foar miles. 



• Two miles. 



ITBABXIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



291 



again to their iart encampment. And now all 
farther supplies of provisions were totally cut 
off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any, 
for fear of the horse. 

But, decamping early in the morning, they 
continued their march, and forced their pro- 
gress to the eminence which was fortified by 
the new work. Here they found the Syracu- 
san infmtry drawn up before them in £rm and 
deep battalia, posted also on the strong emi- 
nence they had occupied on purpose ; for the 
pass was very narrow. The Athenians march- 
ed up and assaulted the work ; but, being pelted 
by showers* of darts from the eminence, which 
was yery steep, and so gave those upon it a 
great advantage in throwing their weapons 
home, and finding themselves unable to force 
it, they again drew off, and attempted it no far- 
ther. It happened, at the same time, that 
some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied 
with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as 
the year was now in autumn ; and yet these 
accidents contributed still more to dispirit the 
Athenians, who concluded that every thing 
now acted in combination for their destruction. 
During this interval of inaction, Grylippus and 
the Syracusans send off a detachment of their 
forces to throw up a work in their rear, where 
the enemy had already passed. But the Athe- 
nians sent also a detachment of their own body, 
which prevented its execution ; and, after this, 
wheeling off with their whole body more into 
the plains, they halted there for the night. 

The next morning they began to move for- 
wards again. And now the Syracusans, beset- 
ting them quite round in a circle, poured volleys 
of darte and arrows amongst them, and wound- 
ed numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied 
out against them, they retreated; but when 
the Athenians drew back, they then pressed 
upon their retreat; and, falling in chiefly 
amongst their rear, if at any time they put 
small parties to flight, they struck a consterna- 
tion into the whole army. But, for a long time, 
in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians 
made good their ground ; and advancing after- 
wards the length of five or six stedia,^ they 
halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans 
no longer molested them, but withdrew to their 
own camp, 

This night it was determined by Nicias and 

Demosthenes, that, — since the army was re- 

j ___^ 

* About half a mile. 



duced to so low a condition, and began already 
to be pressed with a total failure of provisions ; 
since, farther, large numbers had been wounded 
in the many incidentel assaults of the enemy ; 
— ^they should first kindle a great number of 
fires, and then march the whole army off, no 
longer by the route which they had first pro- 
jected, but by another towards the sea, quite 
contrary to that which the Syracusans had al- 
ready pre-occupied and guarded. The residue 
of the march was no longer pointed towards 
Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, to- 
wards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in 
that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In 
pursuance of this, a large number fires be- 
ing kindled, they dislodged in the dead of 
night. " 

This part of their retreat (as is the general 
fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ev- 
er subject to fears and panics, particularly wh^n 
moving in the night and on hostile ground, and 
conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at 
their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly 
manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, 
which composed the van, kept firm together in 
a body, and quite out-matohed the rest of the 
army : but that under Demosthenes, being one 
half, at least, if not the major part, of the 
whole force, was separated from the van, and 
came on in great confusion and disorder. How- 
ever, by the dawn of day, they reached the 
eoast; and, gaining the great road which is 
called the Helorine, took their route along it, 
that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis 
they might pierce upwards along the course, of 
that river into the heart of the. country ; for 
thus they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom 
they had summoned to be ready on their route. 
But, when they had gained the sight of that 
river, they found its banks already occupied by 
a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a ram- 
part and palisado to (lefend its passage. This 
party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, 
and from thence advanced towards another 
river, the Erineus ; for thus their guides had 
planned their route. 

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, 
when the day was clearly broke, and they knew 
the Athenians were stole off, began in general 
to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if 
the Athenians had made their escape through 
his connivance. Yet, beginning the pursuit 
with all possible expedition, (and it was easily 
discoverable what route they had taken,) they 



292 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



Tbook -vtl 



come ap\ntli tbem about tlw honr oi repast : 
and, aa th«y fell in fiiat with the colomn under 
(he orden of Demosthenea, which eompowd 
the rear, and had moved in a more ilow and dis- 
orderly manner than the van, because the dark- 
ness of the |ught had so hi^ily incommoded 
and confounded their march, they immediately 
charged them and fought The Syracuaan 
cavalry beset them quite round, (the more 
easily, indeed, as they were separated from the 
van,) and drove them into one crowded heap. 
But the column under Nicies was now fifty 
stadia^ before them ; for Nicias led them for- 
wards with great celerity, concluding that their 
safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at 
so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an 
engagement, but in pushing forwards with their 
utmoat speed, and fighting only when by abso- 
lute necessity they were compelled to fight. 
But then Demosthenes was involved in a much 
more laborious and continued toil ; because, as 
he filed off last, the enemies were left upon 
his rear; and, soon convinced that they had 
begun the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much 
to move forward, as to draw up his troops in 
the order of battle, till by sudi necessitated 
lingering he is environed by them, and himself 
and the body of Athenians under him are 
thrown into hi^h tumult and confusion. For 
now, hemmed in as they were on a certain 
spot, surrounded quite round by walls, and 
whence the issues both on one side and the 
other were full of olive-trees, they were ter- 
ribly galled on theb fianks by the darts of the 
enemy. This kind of umoyance the Syracusans 
wisely chose to give them, and to decline all 
dose engagement ; because, to hazard the lat- 
ter against enemies now become quite desper- 
ate, they judged would make more for the 
advantage of the Athenians than of them- 
selves: though, at the same time, a kind of 
fmgality, inspired by the great career of suc- 
cess they had already obtained, taught them not 
to exhaust their strength on supleifluous en- 
counters, and persuaded them that thus they 
might effectually subdue and make this great 
army their prisoners. When, therefore, for 
^e whole remainder of the day, they had 
galled them on all sides with missive weapons, 
and now -perceived that the Athenians and 
their allies were reduced to a miserable plight, 
by the wounds which they had received and 

1 About five mfles. 



the cMhar calamitisa which lay hard vpon tfaem, 
Gtylippus, in concert with the Syraciisana and 
allies, canseth a herald to proclaim; — ^fiist, 
that « such inhabitants of the isles as would 
come over to them should rest in the secure 
enjoyment of their liberty:" — upon which, 
some cities, though not many, went over to 
them : — and, in the next place, affcer some time, 
a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of 
troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the 
terms, that ** they riiould deliver up their arms, 
and no one should suffer death, ather by public 
execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the 
want of necessary subsistence." Thus tiiis 
whole body, to the number of six thousand 
men, surrendered themselves prisoners, snd 
p'roduced all the silver they had about them, 
which they were commanded to throwr into the 
hoUovra of- shields, four of which in this man- 
ner were filled full with spoil; and these 
prisoners the victors immediately led away to 
Syracuse. 

But Nicias and the column under his com- 
mand arrived the same day on the banks of the 
Erineus ; and having passed that river, halted 
on an eminence. The day following the Sy- 
racusans, coming up to his post, notified to 
Nicias, that " those under Demosthenes had 
surrendered," and summoned him to follow 
their example. Incredulous of the fact, he 
begs leave to send out a horseman to discover 
the truth ; who upon his return .dffinmng that 
" they had actually surrendered," Nicias sends 
an intimation to Grylippus and the Syracusans, 
that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of 
the Athenians, that « whatever sums the Sy- 
racusans had expended in this war should be 
fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under 
his command might have free departure ; but, 
till the money could be paid, he would leave 
with them a number of Athenians as hostages 
for performance, a man for a talent." 

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the 
offer ; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged 
their parties quite round the eminence, and 
poured in their missive weapons upon them till 
the evening. This body of troops was also 
sadly distressed for want of bread and necessaiy 
subsistence. Watohing, however, for the dead 
and silent hours of the night, they were then 
determined to continue their march. They 
accordingly take up their arms; the Syracu- 
sans perceive it, and sing the pean of alarm. 
Tlie Athenians were thus convinced that thev 



YCAB XIX.] 



f ELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



393 



could not dislodge without being diflcoTered,and 
so grounded their anxks again, all bat ohe party 
of three hundred men ; for these having forced 
themselves a passage through the guards, 
gnade off in the night as fast as it was possible. 
So soon as the day appeared, Nicias at the 
liead of his troops led them forwards. But 
the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on 
all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys 
of darts and javelins. The Athenians made 
the best of their way to reach the river Aaina- 
xus ; not only because, annoyed on all sides by 
the irruption of the numerous cavalry and 
skirmishing parties, they concluded they should 
be eased of these could they once pass that 
river, but also through bodily fatigue and a 
vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. 
When, therefore, they are -upon the bank, they 
rush into the river; no longer observant of 
order, but each single soldier intent on passing 
the first of the army. And the enemy, who 
now pressed hard upon them, had rendered the 
passage already a business of toil : for, obliged 
as they were to go down in confused heaps, 
they fell and trampled upon one another; 
some embarrassed by their spears and luggage, 
met with instant destruction ; others, entang- 
led in the crowd, were carried away by the 
current. The hither bank of the river was 
now filled with Syracusans; and, it being 
naturally steep, they poured down their darts 
upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were 
drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly 
hampered together in the hollow of the 
channel. . The Peloponnesians, plunging in 
after them, made a great slaughter of those 
who were in the river. The water was im- 
mediately discoloured with blood : but the 
stream, polluted with mud and gore, deterred 
them not from drinking it greedily, nor many 
of them from fighting desperately for a draught 
of it. But, in short, when the carcases of 
the dead began to lie heaped one upon another 
in the river, and the whole army was become 
a continued carnage ; * of some in the river ; 
of those who were making off from the banks^ 
by the horsemen of the foe ; Nicias surrenders 
himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power 
he chose to fall sooner than into that of the 
Syracusans. He told him, that « he himself 
and the Lacedemonians might decide his fate 



1 Accurding to Diodorua Siculns, the number of the 
slain amounted to eighteen thousand men. 



as best pleased themselves ; but entr^ted that 
a stop might be put to the slaughter of his 
soldiers." Upon this, Gylippus issued out 
orders to give quarter ; and thus they carried 
off the remnants of this body as prisoners of 
war, such excepted as were secreted by their 
captors, the number of which was large. Hav- 
ing, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the 
three hundred, who in the night had broke 
through the guard, they also made them pri- 
soners. The whole number now collected 
together as the. public prize was not large ; 
but very numerous were they who were clan- 
destinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but 
was crowded with them, since these had not 
surrendered upon terms like those under De- 
mosthenes. A considerable number had also 
perished; for this was a (enible slaughter; 
nay, there was no one greater in the course of 
the Sicilian war ; and in the preceding skir- 
mishes, which had happened very frequently 
during the march, not a few had been slain. 
Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their 
escape ; some from the scenes of action, and 
others from their prisons, from whence, they 
afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. 
These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort. 

And now the Syracusans and allies in one 
grand collective body, having amassed to- 
gether as large a number of prisoners as they 
possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in 
triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, 
whether of the Athenians or their confede- 
rates, whom they had taken, they thrust down 
into the quarries, concluding that from such 
a confinement they could not possibly make 
escapes ; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite 
of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they 
butchered: for Gylippus imagined, that the 
finishing of this war would invest himself with 
pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the 
rest of his achievments, he could carry home 
to the Lacedaemonians the generals of the ene- 
my. It had, farther, so happened, that one of 
these, that is Demosthenes, was regarded as 
their most inveterate enemy, because of hip 
exploits against them in the island Sphacteria 
and Pylus ; and the other, Nicias, as their 
most sincere well-wisher, from his behaviour 
on those very incidents. For Nicias had 
strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those 
Lacedemonians who were made prisoners in 
the island. It was he who prevailed with the 
Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of 
2G 



294 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



which they were released. For such services 
done them, the Lacedemonians had a kindness 
for him ; and it had been chiefly owing to his 
assurance of this that he surrendered himself 
prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the 
Syracusans, as was generaUy reported, fearful, 
because they had kept up a correspondence 
with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might 
now, amidst the general prosperity, involve 
them in trouble ; others afso, and, not least of 
all, the Corinthians, lest, as he was rich he 
might purchase the connivance of his keepers 
to get his liberty, and then again might have 
influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their 
prejudice ; obtained the concurrence of their 
allies, and put him to death. For these, or 
reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was 
Nidas doomed to destruction; though the 
man, of all the Grecians in the present age, 
who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, 
since his whole life was one uniform series of 
piety towards the Deity.^ 

As for those who were doomed to the quar- 
ries) the Syracusans treated them at first with 
outrageous severity. As great numbers were 
crowded together in this hollow dungeon, 
the beams of the sun, in the first place, and 
then the suffocating air, annoyed them in a 
more terrible manner, because the aperture 
was left uncovered ; and each succeeding night, 
the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal 
and nipping, through such vicissitudes, threw 
them into strang« disorders. Thus straitened 
as they were for room, they did whatever 
they had to do on one and the same spot ; 
and the carcases of those who died lay heaped 
up promiscuously together, as some expired of 
their wounds, and others perished through the 
vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other 
such deadly cause. At length the stench be- 
came intolerably noisome ; and they were far- 
ther oppressed with hunger and thirst: for, 
during the space of eight months, the allow- 
ance to each was only a cotyl ' of, water and 
two cotylg^ of bread a-day. Nay, whatever 
species of misery numbers cooped up in. so 
close a confinement might be liable to suffer, 
not one of these but pressed cruelly upon them. 
They were all thus thronged and dieted to- 

i Mr. Hobbes, in his translation, has omitted this last 
comma. 

• Little more than half a pint. 

* About 32 solid inches. 



gether for seventy days : but, after this term, 
all but the Athenians, and such of the Sici- 
lians and Italians as had joined with them in 
the invasion, were sold out for slaves.*^ 

What the whole number of prisoners was, it 
is hard exactly to relate ; but, however, they 
could not be fewer than seven thousand. And 
this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit 
of all that happened in the course of this war ; 
and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the 
whole histoiy of Greece ; since the event to 
the victors was most glorious, and to the van- 
quished most calamitous ; for in every respect 
they were totally overpowered, and their mi- 
series in no respect had any mitigation ; in 
short, root and branch, as is commonly said, 
their land-army and their shipping were now 
ruined ; nay, nothing belonging to them was 
exempted from destruction ; and few out of 
all their numbers, had the good fortune to 
revisit their native country. 

Such were the transactions in Sicily.^ 



* " The decent and engaging behaviour of the Athe- 
nians was of great service to tbem ; for by it they 
either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly 
esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some of them 
were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The 
Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euri- 
pides than were even the people who lived in Greece 
itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to 
SicUy, brought them any specimens or morsels of bU 
poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high de- 
light communicated them to tbeir friends. It is said, 
ibat several, who by this means earned their liberty, 
went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of 
tbeir gratitude ; assuring him, some of them, that they 
had been released from slavery for teaching their mas- 
ters what pieces of his writings they w^ere able to re- 
peat; and others, that, when vagabonds after the 
defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink 
for singing some of his lines. This is not to be won- 
dered at : since even a Caunian vessel, which, being 
hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get for 
refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however kept off* 
by force ; till at length, being asked whether they couid 
repeat any of Euripides's verses, they answered in the 
aiiirmative ; upon which they obtained immediate re- 
ception and refuge." Plutarch in the life of JV*tcu». 

■ Some Iambic verses of an unknown author are 
found at the end of this book in the later Greek edi- 
tions ; and I beg the reader to accept the following 
translation of them : 

The pride of floiy, the exalted height, 
The frequent tKq)hiei od the land ud aee, 
The long career of wdl-deaemd mceea, 
On which their great forefathers tower*d aloft, 
Wliilit Persia trembled at the Athenian naoM, 
Mow droop^ at ooce !— A chaos aoon weeBc d ^ 
Of anarchy, destruction, and distress : 
Low cbbM the state, as high it ent bad ftowV. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK' VIII. 



The news of the overthrow in Sicily causeth a great consternation at Athena. All Greece is in combinatioa 
against them ; and their dependents are meditating revolts.— Year XX. Revolt of the Chiang. An alliance 
between Darius Nothus and the Lacedemonians. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Miletas. A second 
alliance between Darias and the Lacedemonians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes. The politic con* 
duct of Alcibiades : his intrigues. A sedition among the Athenians at Samoa in favour of an oligarchy. Phry- 
nichus counterplots Alcibiades.- A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedemonians. — Ykar XXI. Pro- 
ceedings at Chios. The democracy overturned in.several places of the Athenian jurisdiction ; and at Athens, 
by tbe influence of Antipho, Phrynichus, and Theramenes. A council of four hundred take upon them the 
government. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiades, and elects him general. 
Athens full of factions. Phrynichus stabt)ed. A tumult; in the midst of which the fleet of the enemy ap- 
pears in sight. Battle of Eretria ; and revolt of Euboea. The four hundred are deposed ; and a new form of 
government settled at Athens. Tbe banishment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynos-Sema. 



TXAB XIX. 

When the news was reported at| Athens, 
no belief for a long time was given, — even 
though the most creditable part of the soldiery, 
who had made their escape from this disastrous 
business, proved it by a circumstantial, relation, 
— that so total a destruction was become their 
lot.* But no sooner were they convinced of 
its reality, than their resentments bust forth 



i Plutarch, from report, lells an odd story on this oc- 
casion. — ** A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashore 
at the Pireus, and had set him down in- a barber^s shop, 
began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as a point 
well known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before 
any other person had the news, ran with all speed up in- 
to the city ; and, having first, informed the magistrates 
of it, spread the report in an instant all over the forum. 
Consternation and tumuit at once ensued. The magis- 
trates convened an assembly of the people, and produc- 
ed the barber before them. He was called upon to tell 
from whom he had the news ; and when he could not 
name the person, being looked upon as an idle fellow and 
a disturber of the public peace, be was immediately tied 
upon the wheel, and a long time whirled round upon it, 
till several persons arrived who gave a minute and cir- 
cumstantial account of the whole." Life of ^cias. 



against those of the orators who had advised 
and recommended the expedition, as if their 
own suffrages had never concurred to its exe- 
cution. They farther vented their gall against 
those retailers of oracles and foretellers of fu- 
ture events,' against all in general, who, pretend- 
ing privity to the will of heaven, had elevated 
their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily. 
On all sides now all manner of disasters envi- 
roned them about ; and never had Athens been 
thrown into so great a consternation and dejec- 
tion as at the present juncture : for now, be- 
side what e'ach private family suffered, as the 
public at the same time had lost the bulk of its 
heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of 
its youth which they saw it impossible to re- 
place, they were sorely dejected. Conscious, 
farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in 
their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money 
in the public treasury, nor even hands to man 
what vessels they had left, they gave up all 
hope of deliverance in the present plunge. 
Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined, 
would soon enter the Pirsus with a powerful 

296 



296 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bcmml vm. 



navy, especially as ibey were flushed with such 
a career of saccess ; and their enemies nearer 
home, would now, for a certainty, redouble 
their preparations, and with the utmost re- 
solution fall upon them at once both by sea anft 
land, and be further strengthened by the 
revolt of their own temporising oonfederates. 
At last, however) they agreed it was their 
duty to do what might yet be done ; not basely 
to abandon their own preservation, but to 
fit out a navy, by collecting from all pos- 
sible resources both timber and money ; — 
and timely to secure their own dependent 
states, above all Eubcea — and to redooe the 
expenses of the civil administration with all 
possible economy; — and to lodge the sove- 
reignty in the hands of a select body of old ex- 
perienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels 
might, if possible, yet extricate the state from 
its present misfortunes. 8uch an eflbct had 
the geneiml eoDstemation now upon them, an 
effect not unusual with a people, that they be- 
came heartily disposed to or^er their goveia- 
meat aright* And, as to each rasolutions they 
came to, they proceeded, fiuther, to put them 
in execution : and the summer ended. 

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, ani- 
mated by the terrible blow the Athenians had 
received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece 
was alert against them. Even such as had 
hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so 
much as waiting for a formal invitation to 
accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves 
no longer to be absent from the war, but vo- 
luntaxy to enter the lists against the Athenians. 
Not a state but reasoned thus, — ^that<< them- 
selves also these Athenians, had they succeeded 
in SicUy, would undoubtedly have attadied ;" 
and then concluded, — that, « as the war for 
certainty was very nearly finished, it would be 
glorious for them to have a hand in its com- 
pletion." But the old confederates of the 
Lacedemonians, as their desires were greater, 
so they exerted themselves now with higher 
alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxa- 
tion of their heavy burdens. Tet, in a most 
remarkable manner, such states as were depen- 
dent upon Athens manifested their readiness 
to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution ; 
since now they formed their judgments in all 
the warmth of indignation, and could discern no 
probable method by which the Athenians could 
retard their ruin for another summer. 

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lace- 



damonian state became prodigiously alert ; and, : 
above all, with the expectation, that their eon- 
fisderates of Sicily, with a powerful rei nfer ce- 
ment, as their natives must now .of neeeosity 
act in concert, would be with them, in afl pto- 
bability, veiy etariy in the spring.. In evay 
view tkeir hopes wer« gallant and elate. They 
determined to go on with the war wilhsst any 
delay ; concluding that, if once bron^t well to 
a conclusion, they should ever for the fotore 
be released from such dangers as had lately 
threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had 
been reduced ; and, should they now domcJish 
their competitors^ must remain for die fbtme 
supreme leaders oi Greece, without fiear of a 
reverse. 

Instantly, therefore, Agis their kiag, tfaoiq^ 
in the depth of winter, saUying forth with a 
body of troops from Deeelea, mai^died imuid 
ih.9 confederacy, levying sums of money for 
the service of the marine. Turning his route 
to the Melian gul^ he todi a large booty from 
the CEteana, against whon flieir •mnity had 
been of long duration, which he converted into 
money. He also compelled those Adueans 
who were seated in the Pthialii^ and other 
states in this quarter dependent on Tfaesaaly, 
spite of all the con^laints and murmurs of the 
Thessalians, to give him some hostages for 
their good behaviour, and to frtAuaii him with 
money. He disposed of these hostages into 
safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains 
to get them over into the alliance^ 

The Lacedsmonians, fiurther, ciicolated en 
order among the states, for the building of one 
hundred sail of ships. They taxed tlmtMnir- r 
and the Bo&otians to furnish, respectivdy, 
twenty-five; the Phodans and Lomans fi^ 
teen ; the Corinthians fifteen ; the Arcadians, 
and Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten; die Me- 
gareans, and Troezenians, and Epidaurians* 
and Hermionians, ten. They went to wori^ 
with all other needi^l preparations, that iSbt/f 
might prosecute the war briskly upon the first 
approach of spring. 

The Athenians, on the other hand, wcse not 
remiss in {neparing for their own dcfan c je ; 
since, in pursuance of ibe plan they had form- 
ed, they were busy during all the winter in 
building of ships, having eoUeeiad proper qi 
titiBS of timber ; and in fortifyin g Bnniiia^ 
the navigation of their victnallerB round that 
cape might be preserved from molestation. 
They also evacuated the fortress in La- 



] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



297 



conia wbich they had raised in the voyage to 
Sicily ; and in all respects, where they judged 
themselTes involved in any less needful expense, 
they contracted their disbursements with the 
^utmost frugality. But their principal care was, 
keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that 
they might not revolt. 

Amidst these employments of both parties, 
'which were nothing less than most earnest pre- 
parations on all sides, as if war was just in its 
commenWment, the Euboeans took the lead, 
and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with 
Agis, about a revolt from the Athenians. 
Agis accepted what terms they proposed ; and 
sends for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, 
and Melanthus, from Lacedsmon, to pass over 
as commanders into Eubcea. Accordingly 
they arrived; with a body of citizens newly en- 
franchised,^ to the number of about three hun- 
dred ; and Agis was preparing for their trans- 
portation. But in this interval the Lesbians 
arrived, with declarations of their readiness to 
revolt ; and, as they were seconded by the re- 
commendations of the Boeotians, Agis is pei^- 
suaded to put off for 'a time the affair of 
Eubcea, and began to expedite the revolt of the 
Lesbians, having assigned them Alcamenes 
for their governor, who was to have. passed 
over to Eubcea. The Boeotians promised to 
send them ten ships, and Agis ten. These 
points were transacted without the privity of 
the Lacediemonian state : for Agis, so long as 
he continued at Decelea, having under his com- 
mand the army of the state, was invested with 
a power of sending detachments whithersoever 
he thought proper, and to levy men and money 
at bis own discretion : and it may with truth 
be affirmed, that the confederates, during this 
period, paid a much greater deference ip him 
than to the state of Lacediemon ; for, having a 
powerful force under his own orders, he was 
formidable in his every motion. And thus 
he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the 
Lesbians. 

But then the Ghians and the Erythrsans, 
who were also desirous to revolt, addressed 
themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedsmon. 
In their company also went thither an ambas- 
sador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant 
for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the 
maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissapher- 



*■ Neodamodes. 



45 



nes conoenf^ himself now to inflame the Pelo- 
ponnesian ardour, and promise them large 
supplies. For lately h& had been summoned by 
the king to make returns of the revenue of his 
government ; which not being able to exact 
from the Grecian cities, because of the Athe- 
nians, he was run into a large arrear. He 
concluded, therefore, that could he demolish 
the Athenians, he then with great ^se might 
levy the tributes ; what is more, might make 
the Lacedemonians confederates to the king ; 
and might at length convey to him, either alive 
or dead, Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuth- 
nes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king 
had expressly commanded. The Ghians, 
therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now nego* 
tiating this point in concert. 

Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean,' 
and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Gyzi- 
cene, both exiles from their native places, and 
refuged with Phamabazus, the son of Pharna- 
bazus, arrive at Lacedsemon about the sapie 
point of time, commissioned by Phamabazus 
to procure an aid of shipping for the Helles>- 
pont, by which he might be enabled (the very 
same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work 
the revolt of the cities within his district from 
the Athenian obedience, because of the tribute?, 
and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit 
of having procured for his master the alliance 
of the Lacedemonians. As the agents of 
Phamabazus and those also of Tissaphernes 
were negotiating the same point, though apart 
from each other, a great debate arose amoi^g 
the statesmen at Lacedsmon ; one paxty insist- 
ing, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping 
and a land force should be sent to Ionia and 
Chios ; another party, that they should be sent 
first to Hellespont. The Lacedemonians, 
however, complied by far the soonest with the 
demands of the Ghians and Tissaphernes*. 
Alcibiades, indeed, espoused the cause of the 
latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark 
hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this 
juncture presided in the college of ephori. 
On this account it was, that the family of Al- 
cibiades, in coifipliment to this friendship, had 
taken a Lacedemonian name ; for this Endius 
was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, 
the Lacedemonians despatched Phrynis, a per- 
son bom and educated in those parts, to 
Ghios, to inspect the state of affairs there, 
and report, whether they had so large a number 
of shipping as they pretended, and their sttua- 
2a2 



208 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vxn. 



tion in other respects equalized the fine account 
they had given of it. Accordingly, when 
Fhrynifi had reported, " that all the accounts 
they had heard were true," the Chians and 
£rythr»ans were instantly admitted allies. 
They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of 
shipping, as there were already assembled at 
Chios not fewer than sixty from places which 
the Chians named. Ten of these they design- 
ed to despatch, as soon as possible, under the 
command of Melanchridas, who was appointed 
admiraL But afterwards, the shock of an 
earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas 
they sent Chalcideus; and, instead of ten, 
equipped in Laconia only five ships for their 
service. 

Here the winter ended ; and the nineteenth 
year of this war came also to an end, of which 
Thucydides hath compiled the history. 

Summer now coming on, as the Chians were 
most earnestly soliciting the despatch of the 
ships, fnd also afiraid lest the Athenians should 
get notice of their transactions, — ^for the whole 
of the negotiation had been carried on without 
the knowledge of the latter, — ^the Lacedemo- 
nians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, 
to prevail with that state for the transportation 
of their ships with all possible expedition across 
the isthmus, from the other sea into that which 
lies towards Athens, that all in a body might 
stand away for Chios ; as well those which 
Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos as 
the rest The whole number of- shipping 
belonging to the alliance, now assembled to- 
I gether there, amounted to thirty-nine. 

But Calligitus, truly, and Timagoras refused, 
in the name of Phamabazus, to have any par- 
ticipation in the expedition to Chios; nor 
would part with the money they had brought 
with them, which was five and twenty talents,' 
to disburse this equipment They intended to 
get another fitted out, which should sail away 
under their own orders. 

As for Agis, when now he perceived that 
the Lacedemonians were determined to go first 
to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects 
to clash with those of the state ; but the con- 
federates now assembling at Corinth proceeded 
to draw up a plan of operations. It was ao- 

> Before Christ 412. • 48421. \Ss. sterling 



cordingly agreed, that they should go first to 
Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who 
fitted out the five ships in Laconia; from 
thence to Lesbos, under the command of At- 
camenes, whom Agis had destined for that 
service ; in the last place they should proceed 
to Hellespont, and in this service it was agreed 
beforehand, that Clearchus, the sqn of Ram- 
phias, should take upon him the conmiand. 
But the first step should be the transportation 
of a moiety of their shipping across the isth* 
mus, which were immediately to stand out to 
sea, that the attention of the Athenians might 
be less engaged upon such as were already in 
their course than on those which wore to ftA- 
low : fbi now they determined to cross the sea 
in an open insulting manner, as they contemn- 
ed the present impotence of the Athenians, be- 
cause they had no considerable force anywbora 
at sea. 

When these resolutions were formally coin- 
pleted, they immediately tiransporled one and 
twenty ships. Expeditious sailing was ear- 
nestly solicited ; but the Corinthians declared 
a reluctancy to go the voyage till they had ct^ 
brated the Isthmian games, which were at 
hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared 
himself ready to have the whole procedure 
charged to his own account, that they might be 
cleared from a breach of the Isthmian ceasatiw^ 
The Corinthians not complying with this pro- 
posal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, 
the Athenians grained by this an earlier discov- 
ery of the nogotiation of the Chians; and, 
despatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, 
charged them openly with the guilt of such a 
procedure. The Chians as str^oiuously dry- 
ing the charge, they commanded them to send 
away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way 
of pledge for their safety. 

The Chians accordingly sent seven. But 
the detachment of these was entirely owing to 
the popular party of that -island, who had been 
kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. 
The few who were privy to it, had no mind 
to incur tho popular resentment before they 
were enabled to stem its fury; especially as 
now they had resigned all hope of the arrival 
of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were ex- 
ceeding dilatory. 

In the meantime the Istiimian games woe 
solemnized ; and at these the Athenians, who 
had the regular invitation sent them, assisted 
in form. The practices of the Chians became 



.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



299 



liera more 'appannt to them than ever. No 
flooner, therdbre, were they returned to Atheni, 
than they pnt all the needAil expedients in 
readiness, to prevent the squadron which was 
to sail from Cenchres, from passing nndisco- 
covered. 

When the festival was over, the latter, with 
(me and twenty sail, under the command of 
Alcamenes, stood out to sea in order for Chios. 
And the Athenians, advancing against them, 
at first with an equal number of ships, stood 
off again into open sea ; but, when the Pelo* 
ponnesians would not follow them far, but 
atood into the land, the Athenians disappeared ; 
for, having amongst their number the seven 
ahtps of the Ghians, they thought it not safe 
to trust them. But, having afterwards manned 
ojit others, to the amount of thirty seven, they 
drive the enemy along the coast into Pirsus of 
the Corinthians : this is a desert harbour, and 
the last upon the confines of Epidauria. One 
ahip, indeed, which the enemy came up with at 
•ea, the Peloponnesians lost ; but all the rest 
ihey drew together to a station within the har* 
hour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on 
the water with their ships, and by .land with a 
party sent purposely on shore. The attack 
was attended with great confusion, and carried 
en in a disorderly manner. The party of the 
Athenians vrhich attacked from the land, dis» 
i^yie the bulk of the squadron, and kill the 
commander, Alcamenes; some also of their 
own people perished in the action. But when 
the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient 
number of their ships to lie facing those of the 
enemy ; and with the remainder anchor near a 
little isle, on which, as it lay at a small distance, 
they form an encampment, and send away to 
Athens for a reinforcement. 

In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, 
on the day following, not only the Corinthians, 
hut soon after a number also of others, from 
ihe adjacent country, in aid of the squadron ; 
who, perceiving that the preservation of it 
would be a work of laborious toil on so desert 
a eoast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued 
vehemently for setting the ships on fire ; but 
at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, 
and« encamping with tiieir land forces round 
them, to guard them from the enemy till some 
eonveiuent opportunity should otEnt of getting 
t h e m away. Agis, also, when informed of 
their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citixen 
of Sparta. 



To the Lacedemonians the first advice that 
had been sent was this,— -that « the squadron 
had set sail from the isthmus ;" for orders had 
been given Alcamenes by the ephori, that, 
when this point was executed, he should des- 
patch a horseman to them. And immediately 
then they had determined to despatch away the 
commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alci- 
biades, with the five ships of their own equip- 
ment ; but, at the instant they were ready to 
move off, the news arrived,—- that « the squad- 
ron had been drove into Pireus." Dejected 
by this unexpected event, because they had 
stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian 
war, they no longer persisted in the design of 
sending away their own ships, but even thought 
of recalling some of those which were already 
at sea. But, as thi^ was discoyered by Alci- 
biades, he again persuades Endius, and the 
other ephori, by no means entirely to give up 
the expedition; assuring them, that «by a 
timely despatch they yet might make that 
island, before any information of the disaster 
which had befallen the squadron c6uld reach 
the Chians ; and of himself, were he once in 
Ionia, he could easily efiectuate the revolt of 
the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to 
the weakness of the Athenians and the hearty 
and vigourous interposition of the Lacedemo- 
nians, since on these topics he should be heard 
with greater deference than any other person 
whatever." He also privately encouraged En* 
dius with the prospect of " great glory to him- 
self, if through him Ionia could be brought to 
revolt, and the king be made confederate to 
Lacediemon, whilst Agis had no hand in these 
masterly strokes of policy ;*' for he happened 
now to be at variance with Agis.^ By such 



i No reasons are here aligned (br the variance be> 
tween Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones 
might occur from the different tempers and manners of 
the persons ; but we learn, from Plutarch, that Alcibia< 
des had been intriguing with Timiea, the wife of Agis. 
and had had a son by her who was called Leotychides. 
disowned afterwards by Agis and incapacitated f.om 
succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always dis- 
solute ; and yet this (it seems) was merely to gratify 
his pride, since ha declared his intention in (his intrigue 
to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta. 
This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agree- 
able in the eyes of her Spartan majesty ; even though 
bis deportment at Sparta was such, as if he had been 
trained frem his Mrth in the severe discipline of Ly* 
curgus. He was a thorough Spartan— ehaved close, 
plunged into cold water, could malce a meal on dry 
bread, and feast on blaek broth. One would think, 
says Plutarch, he bad never kept a cook in his life, 



aoo 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



iiMBniiations AlciMadps prevailed upon the 
Ephori and Endina, and aailed away with the 
five ships, in company with Chalcidens, the La- 
cedsmonian ; and the voyage they performed 
with all poasihle expedition. 

About the same time, the sixteen ships 
which had been at the war of Sicily under the 
orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Pelo- 
ponnesian ports. They had been intercepted 
near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty- 
seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippo- 
des, the son of Menippus, who was stationed 
there to watch the return of the fleet from Si- 
cily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The 
rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe 
in the harbour of Corinth. 

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were 
now upon their voyage, stopped and detained 
whatever they met, that their course might not 
be divulged : and, touching first at Coiycus on 
the main, and there setting at liberty such as 
they had detained, and gaining a conference 
with some of the Chians who were privy to 
their designs, by whom being advised to make 
directly for the harbour of Chios, without any 
formal notification, they arrive there, entirely 
unexpected by the Chians. By this, the many 
were thrown -at once into astonishment and 
terror ; but the few had so conducted matters, 
that the council was that moment sitting ; in 
which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admit- 
ted to speech it — that ** many other ships are 
coming up," — but suppressing all mention of 
the squadron blocked up at Pirsus, the Chians 
declare a revolt from the Athenians ; and tiie 
Srythrsans soon follow their example. 

So far successful, they passed on with 
three ships to Clazomene, and cause that city 
also to revolt Instantly upon this, the Clazo- 
ment^ns crossed over into the continent, and 
fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort 
for themselves, in case obliged to quit the isle 
they occupied at present All the revolters, 
in short, were warmly employed in fortifying 
their towns, and making preparations for war. 

At Athens soon the news arrives of the 
revolt of Chios. They were now convinced 
that horrid and apparent dangers already en- 
vironed them about, and that the rest of their 
dependents would not long be quiet, when the 
nost powerful state amongst them had throvm 



never wen a perC»rmer nor ever warn a MUenan robe. 



off the yoke. Now, therefore, the thonaand 
talents,^ which through all the oourae of the 
war they had religiously refrained from touch- 
ing, the penalties being discharged which the 
law inflicted upon him who should move, or 
whoever should vote it, amidst their present 
consternation, they decreed " should be em- 
ployed in the public service, and that a bige 
number of ships should by this means be 
equipped ; — that, farther, from the squadron 
which blocked up Fireus, eight ships should 
immediately be detached ;" which, accordingly, 
quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron 
under Chalcideus, but, being unable to cmne 
up with them, returned again. This detach- 
ment was commanded by Strombichides ; the 
son of Biotimus— that "soon after twelve 
others, under the orders of Thrasycles, should 
repair to Chios, there also to be detached firom 
the same blockade.*' Having, moreover, fetch- 
ed off the feven vessels belonging to the Chians, 
which assisted in forming the blockade at Pi- 
rsus, they set at liberty the slaves who were 
on board them, and threw all the freemen into 
prison. But, to replace the whole number 
detached from the blockade of the PeJopon- 
nesians, they lost no time in fitting out other 
vessels and sending them to that post They 
had also a scheme for the expeditious equip- 
ment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their 
ardour ; and nothing of snuill importance was 
taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no 
less than the recovery' of Chios. 

In the mean time, Strombichides, witii the 
eight sail of ^ps, arrived at Samoa ; and 
taking with him one Samian vessel, stood on- 
wards to Teos, and required of them «to 
have no participation in the present com- 
motions." From Chios, also, Chalcideus was 
now coming over to Teos, with a fleet of 
three and twenty sail ; and the land force of 
the Clazomenians, and also of the Brythreans, 
attending his moticms, was marching thither 
by land : but Strombichides, having timely no- 
tice of their approach, put out again befiire 
their arrivaL Standing out aloc^ into open ses, 
he had a view of this numerous fleet in their 
course from Chios ; upon whidi he fled amain 
to Samoa. But the enemy followed in pur- 
suit 

The Teians, who at first refused admiftluKe 
to the land forces, when now the Athenians 

t 193,750/. stertiBg. 



YXA^ XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



301 



plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. 
Here the bulk of them were inactive for a 
time, attending the return of Ghalcideus from 
the pursuit. But, when time wore on without 
his appearing, they demolished of their own 
accord the wail which the Athenians had built 
on the side of Teos facing the continent. In 
this they were also assisted by a small party of 
Barbarians, who in this interval had joined 
them, and were commanded by Tages, the dep- 
uty of Tissaphernes. 

But Ghalcideus and Alcibiades, when they 
had chased Strombichides into Samos, having 
ftimished the mariners of the Peloponhesian 
vessels with proper arms, leave them as a gar- 
rison in Chios. Having manned their vessels 
afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty 
others, they stood away for Miletus, as medi- 
tating its revolt. This was owing to Alci- 
biades ; who, having an interest in persons of 
the first rank among the Milesians, made it a 
point to effectuate their accession before the 
fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and 
to secure the whole honour to the Chians and 
himself, and Chalcideus and Endius who had 
sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to 
work the revolt of the cities with the sole 
power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. 
Having therefore performed the greatest part of 
their voyage thither without being discovered, 
and prevented by a small portion of time 
Strombichides, and also Thrasycles, who was 
lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, 
and in junction vrith the former followed after 
them, they caused Miletus to revolt The 
Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, mrived 
upon their heels ; but, as the Milesians denied 
them a reception, they took their station at 
Lade, an adjacent isle. 

The first alliance between the king and the 
Lacedemonians was made immediately after 
the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and 
Chalcideus, as. foUoweth : 

« On these terms the Lacedemonians and 
confederates make an alliance vrith the king and 
Tissaphernes — 

« Whatever region or cities the king possess- 
eth and the ancestors of the king possessed, be 
those the king's. 

'<And, out of those cities, whatever sums 
of money or any other supply went to the 
Athenians, let the king and the Lacedemonians 
and confederates jointly stop, that the Athe- 



nians may no longer receive those sums of 
money, nor any other such supply. 

« And the war against the Athenians let the 
king and the Lacedemonians and confederates 
jointly carry on. 

« And be it unlawful to put an end to the 
war against the Athenians without the consent 
of both the contracting parties ; of the king on 
one side, of the Lacedemonians and confede- 
rates on the other. 

«If, farther, any revolt from the king, be 
they declared enemies to the Lacedemonians 
and confederates. 

« And, if any revolt from the Lacedemonians 
and confederates, be they declared enemies, in 
the same manner, to the king." 

This alliance was now formally concluded. 
. Immediately after this, the Chians, who had 
manned out ten additional ships, stood away to 
Anea, being desirous to pick up some infor- 
mation of what was doing at Miletus, and at 
the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. 
Here, being reached by an order from Chalci- 
deus to return back to Chios, with an intima- 
tion that Amorges with a land army would 
soon be upon them, they sailed away to the 
temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry 
sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing 
up from Athens, from whence he had sailed 
somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this 
discovery they fled amain with a single ship to 
Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. 
Four indeed of the number, which their crews 
had abandoned, the Athenians take ; yet all the 
hands escaped on shore; but the remainder 
reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, 
the Athenians stood away into Samos. But 
the Chians,' putting again to sea with the re- 
sidue of their ships, and attended by a land 
force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Em. 
And, these points carried, both the land force 
and the squadron returned respectively to their 
own homes. 

About the same time, the twenty sail of 
Peloponnesians, which had been chased into 
Pireus, and lay blocked up there by an equal 
number of Athenians, having made an unex- 
pected sally upon the enemy, and got the^ 
better in a naval engagement, take four of the 
Athenian ships: and sailing away for Cen- 
chree, were again fitting out for the voyage 
to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also came 
down thither from Lacedemon as admiral, in 



80S 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



whom handi the whole command at sea was 
now lodged. 

When the land army had quitted Teos, Tis- 
saphernes in person came thither with a body, 
and, after completely demolishing those parts 
of the wall before Teos which were yet left 
standing, marched away. 

Not long after his departure, Biomedon, aiv 
riving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order 
to gain a reception, made a truce with the Te- 
ians. From thence he coasted along to Erie, 
and assaulted the place ; but, not being able to 
take it, he sailed away. 

Coinciding with this in point of time, an in- 
surrection was made at Samoa by the people 
against the nobility. The Athenians, who 
with three ships were then lying at Samos, as- 
sisted the former. On this occasion the 8a- 
mian people massacred about two hundred per- 
sons, all of the nobility. Four hundred others 
they condemned to exile ; and, having divided 
amongst themselves their lands and houses, and 
obtained from the Athenians a decree of being 
governed by their own constitutions, as men 
whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, 
they assumed the whole civil administration, 
leaving no share of it in the hands of the landed 
gentry, and absolutely prohibiting to the people 
all alliance for the future with them, so as nei- 
ther to give their daughters to them nor ever to 
marry theirs. 

After these transactions, during the same 
summer, the Ghians, proceeding with unabat- 
ieg ardour, left nothing undone to compass the 
revolt of the cities. Even without Pelopon- 
nesian aid they made them visits with their own 
single force ; and, desirous at the same time to 
involve as large a number as possible in their 
own dangers, they undertake a voyage with 
thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared 
exactly with the Lacedemonian plan ; which 
was, to make the second attempt upon that is- 
land, and from thence to proceed to Helles- 
pont. The land force, at the same time, of 
such of the Peloponnesiaus as were at hand, 
and their adjacent allies, attended their mo- 
tions by the route of Clazomens and Cyme : 
these were commanded by Eualas, a Spartan ; 
but the fleet was under the orders of Beixia- 
das, a native of those parts. And those ships, 
steering first towards and arriving at Methym- 
ne, cause its revolt.* • • • • 

- 

1 From what follows it looks as if some words were 



But Astyodius, the Lacedemonian ad|ninl 
in chief, putting to sea from Cenehree, where 
he had taken upon him the command, with four 
sail of shipping, arrives at Chios. And, the 
third day after his arrival there, twenty-five 
sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and 
Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos ; for 
Leon had been lately sent from Athens with 
a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening 
of that day, Astyochus put out again to sea, 
with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood 
away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance 
in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at 
Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day fol- 
lowing to Eressus, where information meets 
him that Mitylene had been taken by the 
Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their 
arrival was entirely unexpected, standing boldly 
into the harbour, seized at once all the Chian 
vessels ; and then landing, and gaining a vic- 
tory over such as made head against them, be- 
came masters of the city. Astyochus, inform- 
ed of this event l»y the Eressians, and the 
Chian ships under the command of Enhulus 
from Methymne : — ^which, having been left in 
the harbour at that place, had fled at once when 
Mitylene was taken ; three of them came up 
safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into 
the hands of the Athenians ; — Astyochus now 
desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Hav- 
ing eflectuated the revolt of Eressus, and provi- 
ded the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the sol- 
diers from on board his own squadron to march 
by land, under the command of Eteonicns, 
towards Antissa and Methymne ; whilst him- 
self, with his own ships and the three Chian, 
advanced along the shore towards the same 
places. He hoped the Methymneans, upon 
the sight of this succour, would resume their 
spirits and abide by their revolt. But, when 
every thing in Lesbos seemed to act in concert 
against his scheme, he took his landmen again 
on board, and made the best of his way back 
again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had 
attended the motions of his squadron, and 
which were toliave proceeded with him to 
Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective 
cities. After this, they were joined at Chios 
by six ships, which were sent thither by the 



wanting iMie. The Latin trantiatots have ciid« 

ed to supply it, thus :— " And the Chians, leaving fiwr 
ships here for the defence of the place, stood away writh 
the rest to Mitylene, and caused it to revolt.** 



irSARXX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WA5. 



808 



confederate fleet of Peloponneeians assembled 
at Cenchree. 

The Athenians in the meantime were em- 
ployed in resettling the state of affairs in 
Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and 
demolishing PoUchhei on the continent, lately 
fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed 
all the latter back again to their city in the isle, 
excepting such as were authors of the revolt ; 
for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus 
Clazomene once more becan^e subject to the 
Athenians. 

The same summer, the Athenians, who 
with twenty ships had stationed themselves at 
Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent 
at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill 
Chalcideus the Lacedsmonian, who with a 
handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. 
The third day after this action, they re-embark- 
ed ; but first erected a trophy ; which the 
Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not 
fixed on a spot which was the property of the 
victors. 

Leon, also, and Diomedon, at the head of the 
Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assem- 
bling together what force they could from the 
Oinusss islands, which lie before Chios, and 
from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their 
own in Erythrsea, stood away from Lesbos in 
a body, and carried on the war by sea against 
the Chians. The land soldieritf on board them 
were some of the heavy-armed of the public 
roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. 
At Cardamyle they landed ; and at Bolissus, 
having routed in battle a body of Chians that 
made head against them, and done great execu- 
tion upon them, they reduced all the places in 
that quarter of the island. At Phane also 
they fought a second time with great success ; 
and, a third time, at Leuconium. But as, 
after these repeated defeats, the Chiana no 
longer showed themselves in the field to oppose 
them, the victcnrs made cruel ravage on that 
rich and fertile country ; and which, from the 
invasion of the Medes to the present period of 
time, had been totally exempted from the 
miseries of war. For, next to the Lacedaemo- 
nians, the Chians are the only people who (as 
far as I have been able to observe) have en- 
joyed a series of public prosperity with a steady 
and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as 
their state increased in wealth and power, made 
suitable accessions to its domestic splendour 
and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if 



this should chance to be ascribed to a want of 
judicious and cautionary measures, they never 
ventured to declare, till they had fortified the 
hazardous step with numerous and gallant con* 
federates, and saw plainly that the Athenians, 
(as even the Athenians themselves could not 
possibly deny,) after the blow received in 
Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of 
impotence and distress. If, therefore, they 
proved mistaken, it was one of those cases 
inseparable from the constant mutability of 
human afiairs, where numbers were .involved in 
the same mistake with themselves, who yet in 
their judgment Were perfectly convinced that 
the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching. 

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by 
sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged 
by the enemy, a party amongst them were con- 
certing the method of delivering up the city 
into the hands of the Athenians. But those 
in the administration, getting wind of their 
design, refrained indeed from making a bustle 
about it in public ; but, fetching over Astyo* 
chus, the Lacedeemonian admiral in chief, with 
his four ships, from Erythne, they consulted 
how to prevent the execution of the plot by 
the mildest and most gentie methods, either 
by taking hostages for the fidelity of the sus- 
pected, or some other such cautionary expe^ 
dients. In this posture stood afiairs at Chios. 

But, from Athens, in the close of the same 
summer, one thousand five hundred heavy- 
armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (for 
five hundred Argives, who were but light- 
armed, the Athenians had equipped in the 
manner more complete,) with the addition of a 
thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail 
of ships, including the transports of the heavy- 
armed, and put under the command of Phry- 
nichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed 
away to Samos, and, thence stretching over to 
Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The 
Milesians marched out into the field, to the 
amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted 
by the Peloponnesians who came over with 
Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries 
furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also 
assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry : 
and thus battle was joined against the Athe- 
nians and confederates. The Argives, of whom 
a whole wing was composed, advanced before 
the rest of the line; and, contemning their 
enemy too much, as lonians, and unable to 
stand their shock, they charged in a disoiderly 



304 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



manner, are routed by the Milenans, and no 
leu a number than three hundred of their body 
are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first 
the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field 
of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the ene- 
my, yet came not at all to an* engagement ^ith 
the Milesians : for the latter, returning towards 
the city from the chase of the Argives, no 
■ooner perceived that their own side was van- 
quished than they quitted the field of battle. 
The, Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted 
themselves under the very walls of Miletus. 
It is observable, that, in this battle, the lonians 
had on both sides the better of the Dorians : 
for the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians 
who were ranged against them ; and the Mile- 
sians did the same by the Argives. But now, 
after erecting a trophy, as the town was seated 
on an isthmus, .the Athenians were preparing 
to cut it oflf by a work of circumvallation ; con- 
cluding that, " if they once could get possession 
of Miletus, they should easily complete the re- 
duction of the other states." 

It was now about the shut of evening, and 
advice is brought them that *<five and fifty 
sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are 
only not at hand.'' For, from Sicily, where 
Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously ad- 
vised to go on with what yet remained in re- 
gard to the total demolitipn of the Athenians, 
twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinum- 
tians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, 
which had been fitting out, was now ready for 
service ; and both these were sent out in con- 
junction, under the orders of Theramenes the 
Lacedsmonian, who was to carry them to As- 
tyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived 
first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being 
there informed that the Athenians lay before 
Miletus, they departed thence; and, steering 
first into the gulf of lasus, were desirous to 
pick up information how things went at Miletus. 
Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the 
Milesian ; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets 
had come to anchor for the night, and receive 
there a full account of the battle. Alcibiades 
had been present at it, and had given his assist- 
ance to the Milesians and Tissaphemes. He 
therefore earnestly pressed them, " unless they 
were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all 
their great expectations blasted at once, to re- 
pair with all possible expedition to the succour 
of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be 
invested by a circumvallation.*' In pursuance 



of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of 
day they would stand away to its succour. 

But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, 
when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival 
of this united fleet, even though his colleagues 
declared openly for keeping their ground and 
hazarding an engagement by sea, protested 
boldly, that " such a step, for bis own part, he 
could not take ; and, were he able to hinder il, 
that neither they nor any one should force hia 
to it : for, since it would be afterwards in their 
power, when they had got better intelligence 
of the numben of the enemy, and made what 
possible accessions they could to their owb^ 
and when they had prepared for action in an 
ample and leisurely manner, — since it would 
be still in their power to fight, the dread of a 
shameful or reproachful imputation should not 
bend him to risk an engagement against his 
judgment. It could be no matter of reproach 
to the Athenians to retire with their fleet 
when the exigencies of time required h ; but, 
in every respect, it would be highly reproach* 
ful to them should they fight and be vanquished. 
He would not, therefore, involve the states 
not only in reproach, but in the greatest of 
dangers; — the state which, but just now re- 
spiring from the terrible blovrs it had received, 
scarce thought it prudential with most amj^e 
preparation to choose voluntaiy hazards, oi 
even, when the last necessity demanded, to 
strike first at the enemy, — ^why now, when 
no neccessity compelled, must it be thrown 
into vnlful spontaneous dangers V* He ex- 
horted ' them, therefore, « without loss of time 
to carry the wounded on board, to re-embaik 
their troops, and, securing what baggage they 
had brought along with them, to leave behind 
what booty they had got from the enemy, that 
their ships might not be too deeply laden, and 
make the best of their way to Samoa ; and firom 
thence, after collecting together what additional 
force they could, to watch for and s^ze the 
seasons of advantage to attack their foes." 
The advice of Phrynichus, thus given, was 
prevailing, and accordingly wasputinexecutioiL 
He was regarded, not only on the present bat 
on future occasions, not only for this, but all 
the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a 
man of an excellent understanding. 

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon 
as the evening was closed, made the best of 
their way from Miletus, and left the victory 
imperfect And the Argives, without making* 



YBXR XX.J 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



305 



the least staj, chagrined as they were at their 
late defeat, departed immediately from Samoa 
to return to Argos. 

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, 
weighing from Teichiussa, stand into Miletus. 
After one day's stay in that harhour, on the 
next, having augmented their squadron with 
the Chian ships which had formerly been 
chased in company with Chalcideus, they de- 
termined to go back again to Teichiussa to 
fetch off what stores they had landed there. 
Accordingly, when they were thus returned, 
Tissaphemes, being come up with his land 
army, persuades them to stand directly against 
lasus, in which his enemy Amorges at that 
instant lay. Thus, falling on lasus by surprise, 
the inhabitants of which expected none but an 
Athenian squadron, they become masters of it 
In this action the Syracusans were the persons 
who gained the greatest honour. Amorges, 
farther, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was 
a revolter from the king, was taken prisoner by 
/ the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up 
to Tissaphemes, that if he pleased he might 
send him to the king, in obedience to his orders, 
lasus, farther, they put to the sack ; and the 
army made on this occasion, a very large booty, 
for this city had ever been remarkable for its 
wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries 
in the service of Amorges: and, without com- 
mitting the least insult upon them, took them 
into their own troops, as the bulk of them 
were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the 
town into the hands of Tissaphemes, as like- 
wise all the prisoners, whether slaves or free- 
men, upon covenant to receive from him a 
Doric stater* for each. This being done, they 
again repaired to Miletus ; and from hence 
they detach Psdaritus, the son of Leon, whom 
the Lacedemonians had sent expressly to be 
governor of Chios, to march over land to Ery- 
thrs, having under his command the auxiliaries 
who had served under Amorges ; and appoint 
Philippus to commmand at Miletus. And the 
summer ended. 

The winter now succeeding, after Tissa- 
phemes had garrisoned and provided for the 
security of lasus, he repaired to Miletus, and 
distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance 
of his engagements at Lacedsmon, to all the 
ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma' to each 
mariner by the day ; but for the remainder of 



> U. 13«. 3i<f. 



7Jd. 



46 



time he declared he would only pay at the rate 
of three oboli,' till he haid consulted the king's 
pleasure ; and, in case his master's orders were 
for it, he said, he would make it up a complete 
drachma. But as Hermocrates, the Syracu- 
san commander, remonstrated sharply against 
this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding 
himself as admiral, since he was now at the 
head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Asty- 
ochus, was very indolent about the article of 
pay,) it was at length compromised, that except- 
ing the five supernumerary ships, the crewiB 
of the rest should receive more .than three 
oboli a man : for to the five and fifty ships he 
paid three talents^ a month ; and, for the rest, 
as many as exceeded that number, pay was to 
be furnished at the rate of only three oboli a 
day. 

The same winter, the Athenians now lying 
at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of 

3 Half a drachma. 

* There is manifegtly a fault here ; for T^tce, three, ia 
the original, should be read T^iMxovTM, thirty, talents a 
month. Mr Hobbes hath taken the pains to compute, 
and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen 
men a piece. What? only so small a crew as eighteen 
men for a ship of war with three banks of oars? or, 
where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did 
Tissaphemes only pay a tenth part of that number? 
Xenophon, in the first book of bis Greek history, ena- 
bles us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating 
with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon 
the former agreement made by Tissaphemes, that 
every ship should receive but thirty mine a month. 
The daily pay of each was of course one mina, or one 
hundred drachmas: whence it appears, that, at three 
oboli, or half a drachma, a man, the pay of sixty ships, 
each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty 
talents. Thirty talents, therefore, paid to fifty-five 
ships for a month, were two talents and a half above 
three oboli a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, 
that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war 
was two hundred men. 

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm 
what hath already been said, and serve at t^e same 
time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship 
of war. In the sixth book Thncydides says, the Eges- 
teans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay 
for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expe> 
dition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised 
to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckon- 
ing thirty days to the month, is two mine a day ; and 
two mine are just two hundred drachmas. Hence, it 
is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two 
hundred men ; and, according to the former computa- 
tion, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might rea- 
sonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a far- 
ther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed 
copies of the original, as was said above ; where, instead 
of three talents, which amount but to 581/. 5*. sterling, 
should have been read thirty talents, amounting ia 
English money to 5813/. 10«. 
2H 



306 



PELOPONNESIAN WAIL 



[ 



five and thirty sail from Athexuiy under the 
commaud of Charminus, and Strombichides, 
and Euctemon ; and they had farther assem- 
bled all their ships from Chios, and others. A 
resolution was therefore taken, after assigning 
each his peculiar command by lot, to make up 
against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus ; 
but to send against Chios both a naval and a 
land force ; and this accordingly they put in 
execution. For, in fact, Strombichides, and 
Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron 
of thirty sail and a body of transports, which 
had on board a detachment from the thousand 
heaTy-armed which came against Miletus, stood 
away for Chios, as this service had fallen to 
them by lot ; but the rest of the commanders 
who now remained at Samoa, having under 
them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of 
the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus. 

Astyochus, who happened at this juncture 
to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a preven- 
tion against treachery, thought proper for the 
present to desist, when he heard of the arrival 
of the squadron under Theramenes, and that 
their engagements with Tissaphemes were 
much altered for the better. But, taking with 
him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chi- 
ans, he putteth to sea ; and, having made an 
attempt upon Pteleum, though without suc- 
cess, he crossed over to Clazomens. He 
there summoned such of the inhabitants as 
were attached to the Athenians to remove with 
their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him in 
possession of the place ; Tamus, farther, the 
subgovemor of Ionia, joined with him in the 
summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected 
this offer, he made an assault upon the city, 
which had no fortifications ; yfet, miscarrying 
in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard 
gale of wind, and reached, with those ships 
that kept up with him, to Phocea and Cyme : 
but t^e rest of the squadron was by stress of 
weather forced over to the isles which lie near 
to ClazomeuflB, — Marathusa, and Pele, and 
Primussa ; and, whatever effects belonging to 
the Clazomenians had by way of security been 
deposited there, during eight days' continuance, 
vhich the stormy weather obliged them to 
stay, they partly plundered and partly destroy- 
ed ; and having secured their booty on board, 
got away to Phocea and Cyme, and joined 
Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this 
station, ambassadors reach him from the Les- 
bians, imparting to hira their desires to revolt 



Him, indeed* tbey penniade ; but, wfaea the 
Corinthians and the rest of the confiaderates 
declared their repugnance, because of the for- 
mer miacarriage, he weighed, from thenoe and 
made sail for ChioSto And now, a storm dis- 
persing his squadron, at last they all come in, 
though from different quarters to which they 
had been driven, and rejoined him at Chios. 

The next step to this was the junction of 
Psdaritus ; who, being now at Erythre, after 
marching by land from Miletus, passed over in 
person with the troops under his command to 
Chios, He had also with him about five hun- 
dred soldiers, taken out of the five shipa under 
Chalcideus, who had been left behind with 
their anna. 

But now, the Lesbians noti^dmg again thdr 
readiness to revolt, Astyochus, in a conference 
with Psedaritus and the Chians, « maintains 
the necessity of going thither with a squadron 
to support the revolt of Lesbos c since, in coo- 
sequence of it, they must either enlarge the 
number of their confederates, or, even thou^ 
miscarrying in the design, must hurt the Athe* 
nians." But they were deaf to this remon- 
strance ; and Fsdaritus positively declared that 
he should not be attended by the ships of 
Chios. Upon this, taking with him five sail 
of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Mia- 
gara, and one more of Hermione, and all the 
Laconian which he himself brought thither, ha 
stood away from thence to his station at Mile« 
tus, uttering grievous threats against the Chi- 
ans, that, " how low soever they might be re- 
duced, they should never receive any succour 
from him." Accordingly, touching first at 
Corycus of Erythrs, he moored there for &e 
night I'he Athenians, who, from Samo^ 
with a considerable strength, were now bound 
against Chios) were lying at the same instant 
of time on the other side of the cape, but so 
stationed that neither party, knew of the near- 
ness of the other. At this juncture, a letter 
being delivered from Piedaritus, that « a party 
of Erythrsans, who had been prisoners at 8«- 
mos and released from thence, are rnmiTig to 
Erythrs to betray that place," Astyochos puts 
out again immediately for Eiythrs ; and thus 
narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape fiUl- 
ing into the hands of the Athenians. Pasdan- 
tus, farther, had made the passage nx»on this 
affair ; and both having joined in maVing all 
necessary inquiries about those who woe ac- 
cused of this piece of treachery, when diey 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



807 



fimiid th0 whflto to hare been a plot of the 
prifloners at'Samos merely to reeoTer their 
tiberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so 
departed ; the latter to Chioa ; 1}at the other, 
in pursuance of his first designation, made the 
best of his way to Miletus. 

In the mean time the armament of the Athe- 
nians, having sailed round from Corycus to 
Arg^num, falls in with three long vessels of 
€tke Chians, and no sooner had descried than 
they gave them chase. And now a violent 
storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians 
with great dilBcuIty escape into harbour : but, 
of the Athenian squadron, three, which had 
most briskly followed the chace, are disabled 
and driven ashore at the city of the Chians : the 
crews of them were partly made prisoners, and 
partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet 
got into a safe harbour which is known by the 
name of Fhcenicus, under the Mimas. From 
hence they afterwards took their course to 
Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise forti- 
fications. 

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hip- 
pocrates the Lacedemonian, putting oat to sea, 
with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Dori- 
eus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, 
with one ship of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, 
aiiiveth at Cnidus. This place was now in 
revolt from Tissaphemes. Those of Miletus 
trere no sooner advised of the arrival of thb 
squadron, than they sent them orders, with 
one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon 
Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves 
at the Triopium, in order to take under their 
eonYoy the trading vessels, which were in their 
oonrse from Egypt The Triopium is a point 
in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the 
sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athe- 
nians, informed of their designs, and standing 
away from Samoa, take six of the ships which 
were stationed at the Triopium: the crews, 
indeed, quit their ships, and reach the shore. 
This bemg done, the victors sailed directly to 
Cnidus ; and, making an assault upon that city 
Which was quite unfortified, had very nearly 
Caken it On the next day they renewed 
the assault Tet as the inhabitants had taken 
care to make it mote secure by favour of the 
night, and the men, escaped from the vessels 
taken at Triopiton, had thrown themselves into 
the place, they did 1^ damage than on the 
preceding day. After scouring and laying 



waste the territory of Cftldtis, lltey sailed back 
to Samoa. 

About the same ,time, Astyochus having re- 
joined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponncsians 
were still abounding in all the needful expedi- 
ents of war. Good pay was regularly advanced 
them, and the soldiers had store of money yet 
remaining of the rich booty they made at 
lasus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with 
alacrity the burden of the war. It was, how- 
ever, the opinion of tbe Peloponnesians, that 
the first treaty made with Tissaphemes by 
Chalcideus was in some articles defective and 
less advantageous to themselves. Upon this 
they drew up and ratified a second in the pre- 
sence of Theramenes. The articles of it are 
these: 

« Stipulated, by the Lacedemonians ahd 
confederates, with king Darius and the sons of 
the king and Tissaphemes, that peace and 
amity subsist on the following condittons : 

«< Whatever province or city soever belong- 
eth to king Darius, or did belong to his fathet 
or ancestors, against them in a hostile manner, 
not to march, and no injury to do, are bound 
both Lacedemonians, and confederates of the 
Lacediemonians. Not to exact tribute from 
any such places, are bound both Lacedsmoni- < 
ans and confederates of the Lacedsemonians. 
Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of 
the king, mareh in a hostile manner against, 
nor do any injury to, the Lacedemonians and 
confederates. 

« But, in case the Lacedemonians or confe- 
derates need any assistance whatever from the 
king ; or the king from the Lacedemonians and 
confederates; whatever either party can con- 
vince the other to be right, let that be done. 

« Be the war against the Athenians and 
confederates carried on by both parties in strict 
conjunction. And, in case an accommodation 
be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties r 
acting in conjimction. 

« But, whatever aimy be brought into the 
territories of the king at the request and sum- 
mons of the king, the king to defiray the ex- 
pense. 

« And, if any of the states, comprehended 
in tills league with the king, invade the terri- 
tories of the king, the others to oppose and 
act with all their power in defence of the king. 

«And, if any province belonging to the 
king, or subject to his dominion, invade the 



ao8 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



territory of the Lacedemoniaiw or confede- 
rates ; the king to oppose, and with all his 
power to defend the party invaded." . 

When the finishing hand was put to this 
treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the 
fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, 
and entirely disappears. 

But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now 
made their passage and landed their forces in 
Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, 
fortified Delphinium ; a place remarkably strong 
by nature towards the land, abounding, farther, 
with harbours, and seated at no considerable 
distance from the city of the Chians. And 
now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats 
ihey had already received, and, what is worse, 
far from being actuated by general unanimity, 
{but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and 
his adherents having been lately put to death 
by Pedaritus for atticizing, and the rest of the 
citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the 
few, each individual amongst them suspecting 
his neighbour,) — ^the Chians now remained 
quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above- 
mentioned*, they neither looked upon them- 
inelves, nor the auxiliaries under Piedaritus, as 
a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last re- 
source, they send to Miletus, requesting As- 
tyochus to come over to their succour. But, 
as he was deaf to their entreatj^s, Psdaritus 
sends a letter to Lacedsmon about him, which 
accused him of injustice. And to this situa- 
tion were brought the Athenian affairs at 
Chios. 

Their squadron also at Samos made several 
visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus ; 
but, as the latter refused to come out to engage 
them, they returned again to Samos, without 
committing any hostilities. 

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, 
twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the 
Lacedffimonians for Phamabazus, at the in- 
stance of his agents, Calligitus the Megarean, 
and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, 
aud made over to Ionia, about the solstice. 
Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as ad- 
miral. With him the Lacedaemonians sent also 
eleven Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus ; 
in the number of whom was Lichas, the son 
of Arcesilaus. To these an order was given, 
that, « when arrived at Miletus, they should 
in concert act in all respects as might be best 
for the service ; and this squadron, or one 
equal in sti'ength, or larger or smaller, at their 



own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont 
for the service of Phamabazus, and be sent 
away under the command of Clearchus the son 
of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the 
voyage ; and, in case it was judged expedient 
by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus 
from the chief command, and substitute An- 
tisthenes." On account of the letters of Peda- 
ritus, they began to suspect the former. This 
squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from 
Melea, arrived first at Melos ; and, falling in 
with ten sail of Athenians, they take and bum 
three of them, which their crews had aban- 
doned. But, apprehensive that those Athe- 
nian ships which had escaped might advertise 
the fleet at Samos of' their approach, as was 
actually the case, they stretched away for Crete ; 
and, for better security, keeping a goo^ look 
out, and taking more time, they made land first 
at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being 
now beyond the reach of danger, they despatch 
a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend 
and bring them up. 

But, about the same juncture of time, the 
Chians and Psedaritus, not bearing to acqui^ce 
under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, press- 
ed liim, by repeated messages, " to come over 
with the whole of his force, and relieve them 
from the present blockade ; and by no means 
to look indolently about him, whilst the most 
important of the confederate states in Ionia was 
shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines." 
For, the domestics of the Chians, — ^being many 
in number, nay, the largest that any one com- 
munity except the Lacedsemonians kept,, and 
accustomed, because of their multitude, to be 
punished with extraordinary severity for their 
misdemeanors, — no sooner judged that the 
Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had 
gained a sure footing in the island, than large 
numbers of them at once deserted to the ene- 
my, and were afterwards the persons who, as 
perfectly well acquainted with the counby, 
committed the heaviest depredations. The 
Chians, therefore, urged, that " the last neces- 
sity called upon him, whilst yet there was hope 
or a possibility of success remaining, (the 
works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and 
a larger circle even still to be takenrin and for- 
tified for the security of the camp and the 
fleet,) to undertake their relief." Upon this, 
Astyochus, who, to verify his threats, -had 
never before thought seriously about it, being 
now convinced that the Vhole confederate 



TSAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



309 



body was bent on their preservation, deter- 
mined in person to go to their succour. 

But, just at this crisis, advice is brought 
him from Caunus, that « twenty-seven sail of 
ships and the assistant-council of Lacediemo- 
nians are arrived.'' Concluding, upon this, 
that every other point ought to be postponed 
to this large risinforcement, that his junction 
"w^ith it might be effected in order to invest 
them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that 
the Lacedaemonians who came to inspect his 
o^Bvn conduct might securely finish their voy- 
ag^e ; throwing up immediately all concern for 
Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, 
having landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, 
the inhabitants of which had refuged them- 
selves in the mountains, he rifled the city, 
i?vhich was quite unfortified, and had lately 
been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the 
greatest that had been felt there in the memory 
of us now living. By excursions, also, through 
all the countiy, he made prize of all he found, 
excepting seamen ; for such he dismissed un- 
hurt 

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he 
is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his 
men ; but, on the contrary, without loss of time 
to get out to sea, and make head against twenty 
sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of 
the commanders from Samos, had under his 
orders, and with them was watching the ap- 
proach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from 
Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now go- 
ing to join. For they at Samos had received 
from Miletus advice of their coming, and Char- 
minus was appointed to cruise for them about 
Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast 
of Lycia ; and by this time he knew, for a cer- 
tainty, that they were laying at Caunus. 

Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, 
stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise 
the ships of the enemy at sea before they could 
get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain 
and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dis- 
persion of his vessels in the dark, and- sadly 
disordered him. 

When morning broke, the fleet being widely 
separated and the left wing driven already 
within the view of the Athenians, the re- 
mainder yet driving in confusion about the 
island, Charminus and the Athenians launch 
out against them with all possible expedition, 
though with fewer than twenty sail, imagining 
this to be the squadron from Caunus whose 



approach they were to observe ; and, proceed- 
ing instantly to action, they sunk three and 
disabled others. They had by far the better 
in the action, till the numerous remainder of 
hostile ships appeared, to their great conster- 
nation, and encompassed them round on all 
sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost 
six of their ships ; but with the remainder reach ^ 
in safety the isle of Teuglussa, and from thence 
proceed to Halicarnassus. 

This being done, the Feloponnesians, put- 
ting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail 
from Caunus completing here their junction 
with them, they put out again to sea in one 
body ; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, 
returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus. 

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no 
sooner been informed of the engagements of 
the squadrons, than with the whole of their 
fleet they put out from Samos, and made the 
best of their way to Cyme. And yet against 
the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as^ 
neither did the enemy against them ; but, after 
taking up the tackling of the vessels left at 
Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on 
the continent, they returned to Samos. 

The whole united fleet of the Feloponne- 
sians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy in re- 
fitting completely for service ; and the Lace- 
dsmonian council of eleven had a conference 
with Tissaphernes, who was now come to 
them, in which they notified to him their dis- 
like of some things in past transactions ; and, 
in regard to the future operations of war, de- 
bated in what manner they might be carried on 
for their joint benefit and convenienqe. But 
Lichas was the person who scrutinized most 
closely into the past, and expressed a dissatis- 
faction with both treaties; affirming, that 
" even the last settled by Theramenes was far 
from being good ; but that terrible it would be, 
should the king now claim, upon that pretext, 
the possession of that tract of country of which 
either he or his ancestors had formerly been 
masters: for thus he might be enabled once 
more to enslave all the islands, and Thessaly, 
and Locri, quite as far as Bceotia ; whilst the 
Lacedemonians, instead of freeing, would be 
obliged to impose ihe Median subjection on, 
the Grecians. He insisted, therefore, that a 
better treaty should be made, or at least the 
former should be instantly disannulled ; for on 
terms like the present they would scorn to take 
pay from the king." Nettled at this, Tissa- 
2h<2 



310 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



pherDM 'went from them in a fit of choler, 
without bringing afiairs to any kind of settle- 
menL 

The scheme now next in agitation was a 
▼oyage to Rhodes, which the most powerful 
persons there had by embassies solicited them 
to undertake. They were full of hopes to 
bring into their subjection an island by no 
means inconsiderable either for number of 
mariners or soldiers; and at the same time 
judged themselves able, by their present allian- 
ees, to defray the expense of their fleet without 
requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accord- 
ingly, this winter, with great despatch, they put 
to sea from Cnidus'; and, arriving first at 
Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety- 
four ships, they struck a consternation into the 
multitude, who knew nothing of paM transac- 
tions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon 
their dwellings as the city was not guarded by 
the least fortification. The Lacedsmonians, 
afterwards, summoning to a conference these, 
and the Rhodians also from two other cities, 
Lindus and lelysus, persuaded them to revolt 
from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly 
went over to the Peloponnesians. 

At the same juncture of time, the Atheni- 
ans, who had dkcovered their design, put out 
with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on 
preventing the scheme. They were seen in- 
deed out at sea by the enemy, but made their 
appearance a little too late. For the present, 
therefore, they put back to Chalce, and from 
thence to Samos; and afterwards, making fre- 
quent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, 
they warred against Rhodes. 

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rho- 
dians a sum amounting to about two and thirty 
talents ;^ and having laid their ships aground, 
continued with them eighty days without sub- 
jecting them to any farther imposition. 

During this interval of time, nay, extended 
farther back, before they undertook this enter- 
prise against Rhodes, the following transaction 
happened : 

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus 
and the battle of Miletus, falfing under the 
suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through 
them a letter having been sent from Lacede- 
mon- to AsCyochus to put him to death, — ^for 
he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in 
other respeets was become notorious, — ^Alci- 

• flMMM. sterling. 



biades, I say, fearfal of his life, withdraws 
himself first to Tissaphernes, and in the next 
place, did all in his power to undermine what 
interest tiie Peloponnesians had in him. 
frrown at length his dictator in every affair, he 
abridged their pay ; that, instead of an Attic 
drachma,' three oboli only should be given 
them, and that too with no punctaaiity. He 
advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with 
them, that « the Athenians, who through a 
long tract of time had gained experience in 
naval affairs, paid only three oboli to their sea- 
men, — not so much through a principle of fni- 
gality, as to prevent their seamen from growiog 
insolent through too much plenty; some of 
them would otherwise render their bodies less 
fit for fatigue, by -having wherewithal to pur- 
chase those pleasures by which weakness is 
occasioned ; and others would desert, and leave 
their arrears to balance their desertion." He 
instructed him farther, how, by seasonable 
gratuities to the commanders of ships and 
generals of the states, he might persotde them 
all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting 
the Syracusans; for, amongst these, Hermo* 
crates alone made loud remonstrances in be- 
half of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades 
himself took upon him to give the denial to 
such states as petitioned for money ; making 
answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, 
for instance, the Chians were void of all 
shame ; who, though the most wealthy of the 
G^recians, and hitherto preserved by the 
auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requir- 
ing strangers to expose their lives and fortunes 
to keep them free." As for other states, he 
maintained « thefy acted basely, if, ^^^ 
subjected to vast expenses before they re* 
volted from the Athenians, they refused to 
lay out as much; nay, a great deal more, in 
their own defence." He was also dextrous at 
proving, that • «* Tissaphernes, since now he 
supported the war at his own private expense, 
was in the right to be frugal ; but assuredly, 
when returns were made him £rom thekmg, he 
would make up the present abatement of pay, 
and do strict justice to every single state.'' He 
&rther suggested to Tissaphernes, that "he 
should not be too much in a huny to bring the 
war to 8 conchiBion ; or entertain the wiA 
either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet iHu« 
he had provided, or by taking hito pay a larger 

• Six oiboH, or 7^. sterling. 



TEAEXX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



311 



number of Grecians, to turn the luperiority at 
land and sea in favour of the Lacedemonians. He 
ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly 
balanced in strength ; and so enable the- king, 
when one of them became troublesome, to let 
the other party loose against them : vrhereaS, 
should the dominion in both elements be given 
exclusively to either, he would then be distressed 
for want of sufficient power to pull down the 
triumphant state ; unless at a prodigious ex- 
pense, and through infinity of danger to himself, 
he should choose to enter the list in person 
and war them down. The risks incurred by 
the other method were far more eligible, be- 
cause attended with a smaller proportion of ex- 
pense ; and his master might lie by with per- 
fect security, whilst he was wearing out the 
Grecians by their own reciprocal embroil- 
ments." He moreover hinted to him, that 
« the Athenians were the best suited of the 
two to share the dominion with him ; because 
they were less desirous of power on the conti- 
nent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and 
military conduct were better adapted for this 
purpose. They would be glad, at the same 
time, to subdue the maritime parts to their own 
yoke, and to that of the king all Grecians 
whatever who live upon the continent The 
Lacedaemonians, on the contraiy, came thither 
with the sole passion to set them free ; nor in 
common prudence could it be judged likely, 
that men, wjbo were this moment employed to 
deliver Grecians from the yoke of Grecians, 
would in that case be stopped by any thing but 
a superior force from delivering them also from 
the yoke of barbarians." He advised him, 
therefore, *^ in the first place, to wear out the 
strength of both ; and, after clipping as much 
as ^ssible the wings of the Athenians, then 
instantly to drive the Peloponnesians from ofif 
hia coast.'* 

The larger part of this advice Tissaphemes 
determined to follow, so far at least as may 
be gathered from his actions ; for, satisfied by 
tkis means with Alcibiades, as a person who 
on these points gave him sound advice, and re- 
signing himself up to his guidance, he paid but 
sorrily their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, 
and would not suffer them to engage at sea. 
By the constant pretext that the PhcBnician 
fleet was coming up, and then with so great a 
superiority of strength the war might be brought 
to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of 
war ; he suffered the vigour of their fleet, which 



in fact was strong and mighty, inseniibly t0 
moulder away, and disconcerted them so open* 
ly, in other respects, that his motives in doing 
it were no longer to be concealed. 

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave 
to Tissaphemes and the king, when he had 
opportunities, and which he really thought to 
be the best in policy ; but at the same time he 
had deep in his heart and in his study his own 
return to his country ; assured, within himself, 
that, if he preserved it from a total destruction, 
he might find a time to compass his own 
restoration : and no^ng, he judged, could ex- 
pedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to 
the world that Tissaphemes was his friend; 
which also was verified by fact. 

For, when the Athenian troops at Samos 
perceived that he had so strong an interest 
with Tissaphemes, and Alcibiades had already 
paved the way by sending intimations before* 
hand to the men of influence and authority 
amongst them, how desirous he was « thej 
should patronise his return with the consent of 
the persons of the greatest honour and worth 
in their company ; since only luder an oligar- 
chy, but not under an iniquitous cabal or that 
democracy which had formerly banished him, 
could he even desire it ; — and, thus recalled, 
he would come and Join his cares with theirs 
for the public welfare, and procure ihem farther 
the friendship of Tissaphemes ;" — when, more 
than this, the ofiicers of those Athenians at 
Samos, and the men of highest authority 
amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put 
an end to the democracy; — the method of 
bringing it about began to be agitated first in 
the army, and from thence soon made a stir in 
Athens itself. , 

Some persons passed over from Samos, to 
concert matters with Alcibiades ; who gave 
them room to hope that << he could render first 
Tissaphemes, and in the next place the king, 
their friend, if they would dissolve the demo- 
cracy ; since, on this sole condition, could the 
king be assured of their sincerity." This con- 
tributed to enhance their sanguine expectations, 
that on this their affairs might take a new turn, 
in which men of first rank in the community, 
who in the present management were most 
depressed, might recover the administration, 
and gain the ascendant over thnr enemies. 
Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in 
the most proper persons there to be assistants 
to the scheme ; and to the many made public 



312 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



declantioSB, that « the king might be made 
their friend, and supply them with money, 
were Alcibiades recalled, and the democracy 
suspended." The efiect of these declarations on 
the many was this, that, though for the present 
they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, 
yet, soothed by the flattering hope of the royal 
subsidies, they refrained from all manner of 
tumult 

But the set which was caballing in favour of 
an oligarchy, after such open declarations to 
the multitude, reconsidered • the promises of 
Alcibiades amongst Uiemselves, and with a 
larger number of their associates. The scheme 
was judged by all the rest to be feasible and 
sure; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the 
command, declared a total dislike of it It ap- 
peared to him (which was really the case) that 
« Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchical 
as a democratical government; and that no 
other thought lay seriously at his heart than 
to throw the present government into some 
state of confusion, which his friends might so 
far improve as to carry his recallment Of 
consequence, the first point themselves should 
guard against was, not to be thrown into sedi- 
tions for the benefit of the king. It was not 
probable, (he plainly told them,) when the 
Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea 
equal to their own, and were masters of cities 
not the most inconsiderable amidst the king's 
dominions, that the latter should turn the 
balance in favour of the Athenians, in whom 
he hath no confidence at all, whilst he might 
firmly depend upon the friendship of the Pelo- 
ponnesians, who had never done him any harm. 
As for confederate states, to whom they were 
to give a certain pledge of future oligarchy by 
setting up that government amongst themselves, 
he told them he was well assured that on that 
account neither sucli as had revolted would the 
sooner return, nor such as were at present 
their own would the longer continue in their 
duty ; since the point on which their wishes 
turned was, not to be enslaved by an oligarchy 
rather than a democracy, but to recover their 
liberty, indifierent equally to either form. As 
for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was 
given the appellation of worthy and good, even 
ihey would perplex the train of government as 
much as the people, when, by cajoling that 
people, and authoritatively leading them into a 
series of bad measures, they would principally 
regard their own private emoluments: and, 



should they be subjected to the caprice of sach, 
to die by violence and without a trial must be 
the general fate ; whereas the people 'was a 
sure resource in seasons of extremity, and ever 
tempered the fuiy of the great He was well 
convinced, the states, enlightened by a long 
tract of experience, judge of their government 
in the same light Upon the whole, therefore, 
the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present 
upon the carpet, could in no wise be approved 
by him." 

The party, however, associated together in 
this design, abiding by their former determina- 
tions, resolved to proceed to their execution, 
and were preparing to se^d Pisander and others 
by way of deputation to Athens, to set on 
foot the negotiations concerning the return of 
Alcibiades, the dissolution of the popular go vein- 
ment there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes 
to the Athenian friendship. 

Phrynichus, — ^now convinced that the retnm 
of Alcibiades would be brought upon the car- 
pet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it; 
apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition 
he had given it at their consultations, he should 
then be exposed to his resentments, as one 
who had endeavoured to stop it, — ^hath recourse 
to the following project : He sends to Asty- 
ochus, admiral in chief of the Lacediemonians, 
who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a 
secret hint, by letter, that Alcibiades is 
ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to gain 
over Tissaphemes to the Athenians;" and, 
after giving him a clear explanation of other 
matters, he pleaded < < the candour of Astyoc^us 
in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner 
to ruin his mortal foe, though with some pre- 
judice to the welfare of his country." But 
Astyochus had given up all thoughts of putting 
Alcibiades to death, especially as now he never 
came within his reach ; yet, on this occasion, 
making a visit to him and Tissaphemes at 
Magnesia, he communicates to them the advices 
sent him from Samoa, and becomes himself ap 
informer. He is accused by report, not only 
on this but many other occasions, to have made 
court to Tissaphemes for his own private 
lucre ; and, for the same reason, when the pay 
was not fully rendered before, he suffered it 
much more pliantly than in duty he ought to 
have done. Alcibiades sends away inunediate 
notice to the managing party at Samos, that 
the treachery of Phrynichus was detected by 
his own letter, and insists upon it that he be 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



313 



put to death. Phrynichiu, terribly alarmed, 
and pushed to the very brink of destruction by 
such a discovery, sends again to Astyochus, 
Dlaming his indiscretion on a ibrmer occasion 
in not keeping his secret, and assuring him 
that « now he was ready to deliver up to his 
fury the whole force of the Athenians at 
Samos," (distinctly reciting to him the partic* 
ulars by which, as Samoa was unfortified, the 
"whole scheme might be accomplished,) and 
that " undoubtedly he ought not to be censured 
if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him 
to such extremity of danger, he chose to do 
this, or even more than this, rather than be 
destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal 
also Astyochus communicates to Alcibiades. 

Phrynichas, perceiving in time that Astyo- 
chus betrayed him, and that notice each mo- 
ment was only not arrived from Alcibiades 
about the contents of his last, anticipated the 
discovery, and becomes himself informer to 
the army, that «the enemy had resolved, as 
Samoa was unfortified, and the whole of their 
fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, 
to endeavour a surprise : of this he had gained 
the most certain informations; and therefore 
Samoa ought necessarily to be put into a pos- 
ture of defence with the utmost expedition, 
and proper guards in every retq;>ect be appoint- 
ed." He himself commanded, and consequently 
was empowered to see this put in execution. 
All hands were instantly at work on the forti- 
fication ; and Samoa, though otherwise intend- 
ed so<m to be, was by this piece of artifice 
immediately secured. And, no long time 
after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing 
that ^ the army was betrayed by Phiynichus, 
and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming 
to surprise them." Their opinion of the good 
faith of Alcibiades was not in the least estab- 
lished by this : it was argued, that, as he was 
privy to the plans of the enemy, from a prin- 
ciple of enmity he had fastened upon Phryni- 
chus the charge of being Uieir accomplice. 
By the last notification, therefore, he was so 
far firom hurting him, that he only confirmed 
his evidence. 

Yet subsequent to this, Alcibiades continu- 
ed to make use of all his address and persua- 
sion with Tissaphernes to gain, him over to the 
Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of 
the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger 
fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was 
inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to 
47 



comply with his suggestions; especially as, 
ever since the jar at Cnidus about, the treaty 
of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against 
the Peloponnesians : for that jar had already' 
happened at the time of their expedition to 
Rhodes; and the suggestion of Alcibiades^ 
formerly mentioned, that « the views of the 
Lacedemonians were to set the cities free," 
was yet more verified by the behaviour of 
Licbas, who had affirmed, that «it was an 
article never to be suffered in treaty, that the 
king should have those cities of which either 
himself or his ancestors had at any time been 
possessed. And in truth Alcibiades, as one 
who bad important concerns at stake, continued 
with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiata 
himself with Tissaphernes. 

The Athenian deputies, with Pisftnder at 
their head, who were sent from Samos, had no 
sooner reached Athens than they obtained an 
audience from the peofde ; where, after touch- 
ing in a summary manner upon many otber 
advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, 
that << by recalling Alcibiades, and making aa 
alteration in the democratical form of govern*, 
ment, they might gain the friendship of th* 
king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians."' 
Large was the number of those who would not 
hear the proposal against the democracy. The 
enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in 
their clamours, that « shameful it would be 
if so enormous a transgressor of the laws 
were recalled; one", to whose crimes, in 
point of the mysteries, the Enmolpids and 
Ceryces^ had borne solemn attestation, the 
consequence of which was his exile ; nay, had 
farther denounced a curse upon those who 
should restore him." Pisander, interposing to 
put a stop to this violent opposition and these 
tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each 
of these opponents, and a^ked them singly, 
" Whether any hope they had left of saving 



1 These were sacerdotal fami]ies at Athens, descend- 
ed from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of thenk 
instituted the Eleusinlan mysteries; ond it was the 
grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and 
regulate those sacred rites. Who (^ryx was, anil 
what the particular privileges of his descendants, any 
farther than that (according to Suidas) they were 
'* holy and venerable," is not agreed. All of them 
were commanded to pronounce the solemn eurse on 
Alcibiades when be was out-lawed. Yet one priestess^ 
(as Plutarch relates,) Theano, the daughter of Menon,. 
refused to obey ; alleging, that ** it was her dvty l» 
bless, and n€»t Jo curse.** 



314 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



their oountiy, now that the Peloponnesians 
had as many ships upon ^e sea as they had 
themselves, hut a larger numher of confe- 
derate states, besides supplies of money from 
the king and Tissaphemes, whilst themselves 
were quite exhausted, unless somebody could 
persuade the king to declare in their favour 1" 
And when those, to whom the demand was 
put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to 
make Uiem this plain declaration — " And yet 
this turn in your favour can never take place, 
unless we temper our form of government with 
greater moderation, and intrust the administra- 
tion in the hands of the few, that the king may 
have room to place confidence in us: for we 
are at present to consult about the very being 
of the state, and not to litigate the forms of its 
administration. The sequel may again enable 
us to return to the primitive form, if we find 
it expedient ; and we shall recover Alcibiades, 
the only man alive who is able to accomplish 
the point." 

The people, in fact, upon the firot mention 
of an oligarchy, were stung to the heart : yet 
afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other 
resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encour- 
aged at the same time by a distant hope that 
another change might in the sequel be brought 
about, they yielded up the point to ^e neces- 
sity of the state. Accordingly they passed a 
decree, that « Pisander and the ten joined with 
him in the deputation should pass the sea, and 
negotiate the afiair with Tissaphemes and Al- 
cibiades, in the method judged by them most 
condudve to the public service." At the 
same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge 
of mal-administration against Phiynichus, they 
discharged him and his colleague Skirondas 
from their commands, and sent away Diomedon 
and Leon to take upon them the command of 
the fleet. The article, with which Pisander 
charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of las- 
us and Amorges. The truth is, he thought 
him by no means a proper person to be let into 
a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades. 

And thus Pisander — after visiting in order all 
the several juntos of the accomplices, already 
formed in the city with the view to thrust them- 
selves into the seats of judicature and the great 
ofiices of state ; and exhorting fJiem severally 
to act with unanimity, and by general concur- 
rence to labour the demolition of the popular 
government ; and, after adjusting all previous 



measures to guard best agtunst dilatory proceed- 
ings — ^repasseth the sea to Tissaphemes, accom- 
panied by his ten associates in the deputation. 

In the same vidnter, Leon and Diomedon, 
being arrived at their post, at the head of the 
Athenian fleet, made an expedition against 
Rhodes ; and there they find the ships of the 
Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a 
descent upon the coast ; and, after defeating in 
battle such of the Rhodians as made head 
against them, they stood away for Chalce, and 
for the future carried on the war more from 
thence than from Cos ; for in that station they 
were better enabled to watch the motions of the 
Peloponnesian fleet. 

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a 
Lacediemonian, despatched by Psdaritns fitmi 
Chias, with advice that «the works of the 
Athenians were almost perfected ; and unless, 
virith the whole of their shipping, they come 
over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios." A 
resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour 
their relief ; but, in the mean time, Psedaritus, 
at the head of his body of auxiliaries and tiie 
Chians, with all the force he could assemble 
together, sallied out against the rampart whidi 
the Athenians had raised around their ships, de- 
molished a part of it, and made hunself master 
of those vessels which were hauled ashore. 
The Athenians ran from all quarters to thor 
defence ; and, having first engaged and put to 
flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under 
Piedaritus are also defeated. Psdaritus is 
killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and 
many arms were taken. And, after this, die 
Chians were blocked up by sea and land more* 
closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged 
amongst them. 

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pi- 
sander, having reached Tissaphemes, enter into 
conference about terms of accommodation. 
Alcibiades now, — as the conduct of Tissapher- 
nes was still dubious and wavering, since he 
stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and 
adhered to that rule of policy he had learned 
from him, « to war both sides out," — ^Alcibia- 
des now had resource to another |Hece of re* 
finement, causing Tissaphemes to insist upon 
such exorbitant terms that no accommodatioDi 
could ensue. Tissaphemes, truly, seems to 
me to have proceeded in this manner from his 
own voluntary motives, because fear was 
dominant in him : but in AldMades it 



YBABXX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



815 



purely art ; since, as he found the other would 
not agree upon any terms whateYer, he affected 
to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it 
really was in his power to manage him at plea- 
Bure, and that he was already wrought to their 
purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas 
the Athenians would not offer enough. For 
Alcihiades himself made such extravagant de- 
mands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at 
the coniference, the other managed it,) that, 
though the Athenians had yielded to the far 
gpreater part, yet the hreaking off the treaty 
fvould he thrown at their doors. It was ^in- 
sisted, beside other demands, that « all Ionia 
should be given up,'* and, what is more, » all 
the islands on the Ionian coast ;" and other 
points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce 
in these, at length upon the third meeting, lest 
the smallness of his own influence should be 
plainly detected, he demanded leave « for the 
the king to build a fleet, and to sail along the 
Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever 
force he pleased." Here all accommodation 
'was over: the Athenians, concluding these 
points insuperable, and that they were abused 
by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation and 
return to Samos. 

In the same winter, immediately after break- 
ing off the conference, Tissaphernes repairs to 
Caunus with intention to bring the Pelopon- 
nesians again to Miletus, and to form other 
compacts with them the best he should be able, 
to supply them farther with pay, and by all 
means to stave off an open rupture. He was 
in &ct apprehensive, that, should so large a 
fleet be deprived of subsistence, or, necessitated 
to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a 
defeat, or should the mariners quit their ves- 
sels, the Athenians then would carry their 
point without thanks to him : but his greatest 
fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence 
they should ravage the continent. Upon all 
these considerations, and the prudential motives 
arising from each, co-operating with his princi- 
pal maxim of balancing the Grecians against 
one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, 
pays them their arrears of subsistence, and 
makes the following treaty, the third of the 
kind, with them : 

« In the thirteenth year of the reign of Da- 
rius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of 
Ephori at Lacediemon, articles are signed, in 
the plain of Meander, between the Lacede- 
monians and confederates on one side; and 



Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of 
Phamacus, on the other; concerning the a& 
fairs of the king and those of the Lacedemoni- 
ans and confederates. 

** The whole of the king's dominions situate 
in Asia belong to the king ; and all his own 
dominions let the king govern as to him seemeth 
meet. 

« The Lacedemonians and confederates are 
not to enter the dominions of the king to com- 
mit any act of hostility whatever; nor he those 
of the contracting parties for any act of hostility 
whatever.' 

** And in case any of the Lacedemonians 
or confederates enter in a hostile manner the 
dominions of the king, the Lacedemonians 
and confederates are bound to restrain them : 
and, in case any subjects of the king act in a 
hostile manner against the Lacedemonians and 
confederates, be the king also bound to restrain 
them. 

« Tissaphernes shall pay subsistence to the 
ships now upon the station, according to the 
rates agreed on, till the king's fleet come up. 

** But the Lacedemonians and confederates, 
so soon as the king's fleet shall be come up, shall 
have it in their own option to'maintain, if ihey 
please, their own fleet; or, in case they 
choose to take subsistence from Tissapher- 
nes, he is bound to supply them. Yet the 
Lacedemonians and confederates, at the ex- 
piration of the war, shall repay to Tissa- 
phernes whatever sums they may thus receive 
from him. 

« When the king's fleet cometh up, let the 
ships of the Lacedemonians, and those of the 
confederates, and those of the king, carry on 
the war in concert, by the joint counsels of 
Tissapheraii and of the Lacedemonians and 
confederates. 

« And, whenever a peace with the Athenians 
be thought advisable, it shall be concluded by 
the joint consent of both parties." 

The treaty was made and ratified in these 
terms. And, after this, Tissaphernes em- 
ployed himself with diligence to bring up the 
Phcenician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and 
duly to perform all the branches whatever of 
his engagements. At least he was willing to 
convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures 
he took, that he was heartily in earnest. 

In the close of this winter the Boeotians got 
possession of Oropus by treachery, though an 
Athenian garrison was in it. The business 



3ia 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



was eflEectaated by the mana|[emeiit of a party 
of Eretriana, and those Oropians who were 
plotting the revolt of Eubcea. For, as this 
town was situated over-against Eretria, it was 
impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it 
must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of 
Euboea. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, 
the Eretrians repaired to Rhodes, inviting the 
Peloponnesians to come over to Euboea; but 
their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, 
now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from 
Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they 
stood away to sea ; and having gained the 
height of Trillium, they descry the Athenian 
■^ttadron OQt at sea in a course from Chalce ; 
yet, neither making any motion to bear down 
upon the other, one fleet pursued their course 
•to Samoa, the other put into Miletus. They 
were now convinced, that, without fighting at 
sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios. 

Here this winter ended : and the twentieth 
year of this war expired, the histoiy of which 
Thueydides hath compiled. 

TXAB xxi.^ 

In the ensuing summer, upon the first com- 
neacement of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan, 
at the head of an army not considerable for 
numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont to 
efiectnate the revolt of Abydus : they are a co- 
lony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst 
AstyodMS was perplexed about tiie method of 
relieving'them, were necessitated, by the intol- 
erable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an 
engagement at sea. It happened, whilst As- 
tyechus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a 
Spartan, who came over with Antisthenes, 
tlMvgh merely as a passenger, had arrived at 
•Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after 
the death of Psdaritus, with twelve sail of 
shipping draughted from the squadron stationed 
at Miletus; of these, Ave were Thurian, four 
Syracusan, one belonged to Anea, another was 
Milesian, and one was Leon*s own. Upon this 
4iie Chians having sallied out with all their 
force and carried a strong post from the enemy, 
and at the same time their fleet, consisting of 
«ix and thirty sail, launching forth against the 
Ihiity-two Athenian, an engagement followed ; 
4Uid, after a battle hotly maintained on both 
dides, the Chians and allies, who had not the 

« Bsfois Gkfkt 411. 



worst (tf the dispute, sheered off again into 
harbour ; for by this time it began to grow 
dark. 

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas, having com- 
pleted his march from Miletus, Abydus in 
Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharna- 
bazus ; and two days after Lampsacus did the 
same. 

But intelligence of this having reached 
Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four and 
twenty sail of Athenians, including the trans- 
ports which carried the heavy-armed, stretch- 
ing thither with all possible expedition, the 
Lampsacenes sallied out to repulse him. He 
defeated them in battle ; and, having at a shout 
made himself master of Lampsacus, which was 
quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and 
slaves for pillage to his men ; and, after re-es- 
tablishing such as were free in their old hab- 
itations, proceeded against Abydus. But, 
finding them deaf to all schemes of accommo- 
dation, and himself unable to reduce them by 
force, crossing over to the spot opposite to 
Abydus, he garrisons Sestus, a city in the 
Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to 
the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard 
the Hellespont. 

During this interval of time, the Chians had 
very much enlarged their room at sea: and 
those stationed at Miletus, and even Astyo- 
chus, upon receiving the particulars of the late 
engagement, and advice that Strombichides 
was drawn off with so many ships, began to be 
high in spirits. Astyochus, accordingly, arri- 
ving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off 
along with him what shipping was there, and 
with the whole force is now at sea, in order to 
make an attempt upon Samos. But when 
the enemy there, because mutually embroiled 
in jealousies, came not out against him, he re- 
turned again to the station of Miletus ; for*, 
about this time, or rather before, the democracy 
was overturned at Athens. 

The deputation, at the head of which .was 
Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos 
firom Tissaphemes, than they found their 
schemes had gained a stronger footing in the 
army, and that the Samians had been encourag- 
ing the men of power amongst the Athenians 
to join their efforts vnttt them for the erection 
of an oligarchy, though a party was veiy busy 
in opposing them, with a view to quash the 
projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, 
at Samos, had in private conferences coiHe to a 



•] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



817 



resolutioDr— ^< to tlunk no longer of Alcibiades, 
since he showed himself so averse to join them, 
and in fact was by no means a proper person 
to have a share in an oligarichical administra- 
tion : baty merely from a principle of self-pre- 
servation, as now they were environed with 
dangers, they shoold take all possible care that 



Pisander and his colleagues in the coarse of 
their voyage observed their instructions, and 
dissolved the popular governments in the cities 
where they touched. From some of these 
they also procured parties of heavy-armed to 
aid them in the grand project, and so landed 
at Athens. Here they find ajQTairs in great for- 



the project should not drop in the execution, j wardness, through the activity of their accom- 
— That, farther, they should prosecute the war I plices : for, some of the younger sort having 



with Tigour, and contribute lai^ely towards it 
from their own private purses, and answer 
every other exigence of service, since, no long- 
er for others, but their own sakes, they must 
continue the struggle.'* Determined, there- 
fore, to proceed in this manner, they despatch 
Pisander and half the former deputation once 
more to Athens, to manage the execution of 
the project there: to whom, farther, instruc- 
tions were given, at whatever places in their 
dependency they should touch upon the voyage, 
to set up the oligarchy. The other half they 
sent severally about to other of the dependent 
states. Diotrephes also, who was now at Chi* 
OS, bat appointed to take upon him the com- 
mand of the Thracian provinces, they ordered 
away immediately to his post. 

Diotrephes, upon, his arrival at Thasus, dis- 
solved the popular government. And, in the 
second month at most after this, the Thasians 
fortified their city as men who no longer cared 
for an aristocracy under Athenian influence, 
but were in daily expectotion of receiving lib- 
erty from the Lacedemonians : for a number 
of their countrymen, driven out by the Athe- 
nians, were now refuged among the Pelopon- 
nesians. These were labouring the point with 
their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off 
their shipping, and declare a revolt. The pre- 
sent alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to 
their own wish ; their state was restored to its 
ancient form without any trouble ; and the peo- 
ple, who alone were able to disconcert them, 
were divested of their power. In Thasus, 
therefore, the event took an opposite turn to 
what those Athenians who laboured the 6li- 
garchy had at heart; and, in my judgment, the 
case was the same with many other of their 
dependent states : for, having now their eyes 
open to their own welfare, and being exempted 
fW>m the dread of suffering for what others did, 
they ran into the scheme of a total independ- 
vnce, which they preferred before the precari- 
ous situation of being well governed by the 
Athenians. i 



combined together in a plot against Androcles, 
who had the greatest sway amongst the people, 
and had also been deeply concerned in banish- 
ing Alcibiades, they secretly despatch him. 
On him, for a double reason, because of his 
influence with the people, and with the thought 
that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recali- 
ment was now expected*, and through his inter- 
est the friendship of Tissaphemes, they chose 
first to wreak their fuiy. Of some others also^ 
whose tractability they doubted, they had rid 
themselves by the same practices. A specious 
harangue, had, farther, been dressed up for the 
purpose, that " none ought to receive the puln 
lie money but such as served the stete in war 
with their persons ; that affairs of stete ought 
,not to be communicated to more than five 
thousand, and those to be men who were best 
qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, 
to serve the public" 

This with the majority of the city had a fiiir 
outeide, since such as should concur in ihe 
change bid fairest for a share in the adminis- 
tration. Yet still the assembly of the people 
and the council of the bean' continued their 
meetings ; but then they pnly passed such de» 
crees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, ai 
this number were all wCb spoke, and who had 
previously considered together what should be 
said upon every occasion. No other person 
presumed at any time to oppose their motions^ 
through dread of a cabal which they law was 
large ; or, did any one venture to open his 
mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was 
certainly put to death. Who were the agento 
in these murders, no inquiry at all ; and of who 
were suspected, no kind of justification. The 
people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid 
gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think 
it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, 
even diough they held their tongues ; imagin- 
ing, besides, that the conspiracy had spread 
much farther than it really had, they were quite 



1 The senate. 



21 



318 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vht. 



dispirited. To discover any certainty of Uieir , 
numben they were quite oiiable, because of the 
great extent of the city and their ignorance how 
far their neighbours might be concerned. On 
the same account it was also impossible for 
him who deeply resented his condition, to be- 
moan himself in the hearing of another, or to 
participate counsels for reciprocal defence ; he 
must either have opened his mind to one whom 
he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom 
he dust not confide ; for all the popular party 
VQgaided one another with jealous eyes, as in 
some measure involved in the present machi- 
nations. Some in fact were concerned who 
could never have been suspected of oligarchical 
principles ; and these men gave rise to the great 
diffidence which spread amongst the many, and 
drew after it the highest security to the schemes 
of the few, as it kept alive that mutual distrust 
which reigned among the people. 

Pisander , therefore, and his associates, ar- 
riving at this very juncture, gave the finishing 
stroke without delay. In the first place, hav- 
ing called an assembly of the people, they 
moved for a decree, — ^" that a committee of ten 
should be elected with full discretionary power. 
This committee of ten should draw up the 
form of a decree, to be reported to the people 
on a day prefixed, in what manner the state 
may be best administered." In the next place, 
when that day came, they summoned an as- 
sembly of the people at Colonus : this is a tem- 
ple of Neptune without the city, and distant 
from it about ten stadia.^ And here the com- 
mittee reported no other proposal than this, — 
that it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver 
whatever opinion he himself thought proper. 
They then enacted heavy penalties against any 
man who hereafter should accuse the speaker 
of a breach of law, or should bring him into 
any trohble whatever. 

This being done, it was now, without the 
least reserve or ambiguity, moved, — ^that « no 
magistrate whatsoever should continue in his 
post upon the old establishment, nor receive a 
public salary ; but that five presidenti^ be 
chosen, who should choose one hundred per- 
sons, and each of these hundred should name 
three persons for associates : that these persons 
should enter into the senate, be invested abso- 
lutely with the administration, and should fiir- 



*■ One Bug lish mile. 



• UfuSft, 



ther be empowered to convene the five thoa« 
sand whenever they should deem it proper." 

Pisander was the person who made this pro- 
posal, and who also in other respects showed 
himself openly one of the most zealous to pull 
down the democracy. But he who contrived 
the whole of the plan, and by what steps the 
affair should be thus carried into execution, 
was Antipho, a inan who in personal merit 
was second to no Athenian then aliTe, and the 
greatest genius of his time to devise with 
sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he 
had once devised. At the assemblies of the 
people, or any public debate, he never assisted, 
if he could possibly decline it, since the multi- 
tude was jealous of the great reputation he had 
gained : yet, in the courts of judicature or ap- 
peals to the people, he was the only person 
who was able effectually to serve those clients 
who could get him for their patron. And this 
same Antipho, when in process of time the 
government of the four hundred was quite de- 
molished, and severely prosecuted by the peo- 
ple, is judged to have defended their conduct, 
and pleaded in a cause where his own life was 
at stake, the best of any person that down to 
this time was ever heard to speak. 

Phrynichus, also, was another who singularly 
distinguished himself in his zeal for the oligar- 
chy. He cfreaded Aldbiades, as conscious 
that he was privy to the whole of the corres- 
pondence he had carried on with Astyochus. 
He proceeded thus, on the supposition that 
Alcibiades would never be restored by an oli- 
garchical government. And then he was a man 
in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, 
the greatest confidence might reasonably be 
placed. 

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, 
a man who both in speaking and acting made 
no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the 
dissolution of the popular government : no won- 
der, therefore, as the business was managed by 
so many and so able agents, that, spite of every 
obstacle, it was brought to effect Grievous, 
indeed, it was to the Athenian people to sub- 
mit to the loss of their liberty, a century after 
the expulsion of their tyrants, during which 
period they had not only been independent, but 
accustomed, for above half that space, to give 
law to others. 

To return. When, in the assonbly of the 
people not a soul was heard to oppose the mo- 



XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



319 



tion, it passed into a law, and the assembly 
vvas cidjourned. They afterwards Introduced 
the four hundred into the senate, in the follow- 
ing^ manner. 

The whole body of the citizens were daily 
under arms, either upon the walls or in the 
fieldy to bridle the excursions of the enemy 
from Decelea. Therefore, on the day appoint- 
ed, they suffered such as were not in the secret 
to repair to their posts as usual : but, to those 
in the plot, it had been privately notified, — « by 
no means to repair to their post, but to lag be- 
hind at a distance ; and, in case any one should 
strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, 
they should take up arms and quell all opposi- 
tion." Those, to whom these orders were 
previously imparted, were the Andrians and 
Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians, and 
other persons now established in JBgina, whom 
the Athenians had sent tnither ^ by way of 
colony, but were now invited to repair to 
Athens with their arms to support the scheme. 
When these dispositions were formed, the four 
hundred (each carrying a concealed dagger, and 
guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of 
Greece, whose hands they had employed when 
assassination was the point) broke in upon the 
counsellors of the bean,^ who were this mo- 
ment sitting in the senate-house, and called out 
to them « to quit the place and take their sala- 
ries." * Accordingly they had ready for them 
the full arrears due to them, which they paid 
to each as he went out of the house. In this 
manner the senate, without giving the least 
opposition, removed themselves tamely from 
their office ; and the rest of the citizens made 
no effort to check such proceedings, and re- 
frained from any the least tumult. 

The four hundred, having thus gained pos- 
session of the senate-house, proceeded immedi- 
ately to ballot for a set of presidents^ from 
amongst their own body ; and made use of all 
the solemn invocations of the deities and the 
sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates 
- execute their office. By their subsequent 
proceedings they introduced considerable al- 
terations m the popular form of government ; 
excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they 
refrained from recalling exiles; .but, in all 



A The senate of five handred. 
« The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a 
drachma^ or sevenpenee three farthings a day. 



Other respects, they ruled with all possible 
severity. Some persons, whose removal was 
deemed convenient, though few in number, 
they got assassinated; some &ey threw into 
prison, and some they banished. To Agis, 
also, king of the Lacedemonians, who was 
still at Decelea, they despatched- a deputa- 
tion ; notifying ** their readiness to accommo- 
date all disputes ; and that with greater con- 
fidence he might proceed to make up matters 
with them than with a democracy which was 
not to be trusted." 

Agis, full of the imagination that the city 
would not quietly submit to these changes, 
and that the people would not thus tamely 
part with their ancient liberty; or, should 
they now behold his numerous army approach- 
ing, that public combustions must ensue 
amongst them ; unable^ to persuade himself that 
at the present juncture, they could possibly be 
kept from tumults, — ^Agis, I say, returned no 
proposal of terms to the deputation which 
came to him from the four hundred. But, 
having sent for a numerous reinforcement 
from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, 
with the garrison of Decelea, and the fresh 
reinforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. 
He took this step on the presumption that 
" thus either thrown into utter confusion, they 
might be mastered whenever he gave the word, 
or even at the first sight of his approach, through 
the great confusion which in all probability 
both must follow vdthin and without ; since, to 
make himself master of the long walls, as there 
could not be hands at leisure for their defence, 
he could not fail." 

But when, upon his nearer approach, the 
Athenians within were thrown into no stir or 
bustle at all; when even they caused their 
cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, 
light-armed and archers, to sally out into the 
field, who made a slaaghter of such as were too 
fiair advanced, and became masters of their arms 
and dead bodies; — finding then he had proceeded 
upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off 
his army. After this, he himself, with the 
former garrison, continued in the post of De- 
celea; but the late reinforcement, after some 
continuance in the country, was sent back to 
Peloponnesus. 

Yet, subsequent to this, the four hundred 
persisted in sendiivg deputies to Agis with as 
much eagerness as ever ; and, he now receiving 
them in a better manner, with encouragements 



920 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[ 



vm. 



to prooeedy iHtuBj even tend an embaisy to Laoo- 
dsmon to propose a treaty, being of all things 
dearooa to obtain an accommodation. 

They also send to Samoa a deputation of 
ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them 
ample assurance that ** the oligarchy was not 
set up for the prejudice either of the state or 
any individuals, but as the only expedient left to 
preserve the whole community; — that the 
number of those, who now had the manage- 
ment, was five thousand and not barely four 
hundred ; and yet, on no occasion whatever, had 
the Athenians, partly through employs in their 
armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever 
met together, to consult on affairs of state, in a 
number so large as five thousand." Having 
instructed them to insert some other alleviating 
pleas, they sent them away upon the first in- 
stant of the change they had made ; apprehen- 
sive of what actually came to pass, that the 
bulk of their seamen would never quietly sub- 
mit to an oligarchical government, and an op- 
position beginning there, might overturn all that 
had hitherto been done. 

For at Samos some stirs had already arisen 
about the oligarchy, and that which is now to 
be recited happened exactly at the time that 
the four hundred seized the administration at 
Athens. 

The party which at this juncture was sub- 
sisting at Bamos against the nobility, and were 
of the popular side, having now altered their 
schemes, and followed the suggestions of 
Pisander ever since his return from Athens, 
and gained the concurrence of Athenians at 
8amos, combined together by oath, to the 
number of about three hundred, and resolved 
to fall upon their antagonists, as &ctious on 
the side of the people. Accordingly, they 
murder one Hyperbolus,^ an Athenian, a 



> This was the person whom the ostracism made in 
some measure famous, and who made the xMrtracism 
quite infamous. Plutarch hath repeated the story 
thrice. The following extract is taken from the life 
ofMicias. 

^ When the opposition was very hot at Athens be- 
tween Alcibiades and Nicias, and the day for ostracizing 
was drawing on, — which at certain intervals the people 
of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a 
ten years* exile, some one citizen suspe^ed of designs 
against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious 
or rich,— each of these grand competitors was under 
grievous apprehensions, and with reason too, that it 
might be his own lot to bo exiled on tliis occasion. 
Alcibiades was hated for \.\i way of life, and for his 
bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on 



scurvy follow, and banidied by die 
not from a dread of his influence or weight, 
but for the profligacy of his life, and his 
being a public disgrace to his coimtij. In 
this they were countenanced by Charminus, 
one of the commanders and some of the Athe- 
nians, associated with them, to whom they gave 
this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of 
the same nature they committed by instructions 
from them, and had it in agitation to multiply 
their blows ; but those mariced out for destruc- 
tion, getting wind of their des^^, communi- 
cate the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who 
thought of an oligarchy with high regret, be- 
cause their credit was high with the pe<^le ; to 
Thrasybulus' also and Thrasylius, the former 



account of his wealth ; his way of living was neitber 
sociable nor popular ; as he avoided a crowd, mA4 lierded 
with a few intimates, be gave great distaste; besides, 
as he had often opposed the caprices of the people, and 
constrained them to pursue tbeir real interest, be was 
deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran 
high between the young and military men on one side, 
and the old pacific Athenians on the ether, whilst each 
were endeavouring to throw the ostracism upon ihs 
hated object. But, 

Atriin nnhi^i, and Mooodnb g|Ol icbowb. 

Such dissentions in the community gave scope to 
knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolos^ 
of Perithade, very aasamiag, without the least reason 
to l)e so ; boweyer, by dint of impudence working him- 
self into power, and the disgrace of his country ao soon 
as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this oc- 
casion Hyperbolas could have no suspicion of becoming 
himself the butt of an ostracisla ; he had a mucli better 
title to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, thai, 
when either of these great men were exiled, he himself 
could easily make head against the other, he manifested 
great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of 
the pe<^le against them both. Nidaa and AlcibiadeSr 
perceiving his roguish intent, conferred prirately to- 
gether ; and, getting tbeir several factions to aniie, se- 
cured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbslns. 
Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much picasare 
and diversion ; yet soon after they were highly chagrin- 
ed, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the ob- 
ject of it was shaming the ostracism for ever. There 
was dignity even in punishments : the ostracism was 
of such a nature as to suit a Thueydides, an Aristides, 
and men of such exalted characters. It was clear 
honour to Hyperbolus ; and gave him room to boast, 
that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished 
like the greatest and best Athenians ; as Plato, the 
comic poet, says of him, 

H« alwmyi teted wortkjr of binali; 
Bat qnita naworthf of Mch high reproof: 
Hie thaD ith neVr dMigoU to honoar 



In a word , no person was ever banished by the oairadm 
after Hyperbolus ; it was he who closed the list.** 

* Thrasybolos, whose name now fitpt occnra, arts a 
very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this 



ITBASXXI.] 



PBLOPONNESIAN WAR. 



321 



a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band 
of heavj-armed; and to inich others aa were 
judged^ most likely to stem the fmy of the 
conspirators* These they conjured «not to 
look calmly on till their destruction shonld be 
completed, and Samoa rent away from the 
A.thenians, by which alone till now their em- 
pire had been preserved and supported." 
Xjistening, therefore, to these representations, 
they privately exhorted every single soldier not 
to suffer such proceedings, and more earnestly 
than others the Paralian, since all that sailed 
in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free 
and enemies determined, from time immemo- 
rial, to an oligarchy, even when it had no ex- 
istence. Leon also and Diomedoii never went 
out to sea without leaving them some ships for 
their guard; insomuch that, when the three 
hundred made their attempt, as all these united 
in their obstruction, but most heartily of all 
the Paralians, the popular party at Samoa was 
rescued from destruction. Thirty of those 
three hundred they even slaughtered, and three 
of the most factious amongst the survivors they 
doomed to banishment. Then, having pub- 
lished an indemnity for the rest, they continued 
to support the democracy at Samos. 

But the Samians and soldiery despatch the 
Paralus with all expedition to Athens, having 
on board her Chereas, the son <^ Achestratus, 
an Athenian, who had borne a considerate share 
in the last turn of affairs, charged with a noti- 
fication of these last transactions; for yet it 
was not known at Samoa that the four hundred 



history. " If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, 
without any regard to outward circumstance, I should 
not hesitate (says Ck>rnelin8 Nepos) to prefer him be- 
fore all the great men in Greece. But I aver, that not 
one of them ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolu- 
tion, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism.— V«, I 
know not how it is, though nobody excelled him in real 
merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. 
In the Peloponnesian war, (the part of it which now 
remains,) Tbrasybulus did many things without Alci- 
blades; Alcibiades did nothing without Thro sybulus; 
and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to 
himself, reaped the glory and benefit of all." So says 
this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see 
some of Thrasybultts's exploits, separately from and in 
concert with Alcibiades : but the glory of his life was 
ridding Athens some years after of thirty tyrants at a 
blow : fo^ which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, 
the most honourable recompense his grateful country- 
men could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, in- 
trepid, disinterested patriot ; and lost his life at last in 
the service of bis country. 

48 



had seized the administration. No sooner, 
therefore, were they come to their moorings, 
than the four hundred caused two or three of 
the crew of the Paralus to be dragged away to 
prison ; the residue they turned over from that 
vessel into another ship of war, and ordered 
them away as a guard-ship for the station of 
Eubcea. But Chereas,' sensible in what train 
affairs were going, had the good fortune to 
make his escape ; and, returning again to Sa- 
moa, related to the soldiery all that had been 
done in Athens, exaggerating every point with 
abundant severity. — That « every citizen was 
now kept in awe with whips and scourges, and 
that even their own wives and children daily 
felt the insolence of those tyrants ; nay, they 
have it now in agitation, that if any on duty at 
Samoa shall presume to oppose their pleasure, 
immediately to arrest and imprison the whole 
of their kindred ; and in ease the former will 
not submit, to put the latter to death." On 
mlmy other points he also expatiated, all ag^ 
gravated with falsehoods. 

His audience, in the first instant of their 
passion, were fully bent on the destruction of 
all those who had appeared most active for an 
oligarchy, and in short of all who had any hand 
in its promotion ; but, being stopped by the 
interposition of others more moderate, and lis^ 
tening to the remonstrance, that << they ought 
not to accelerate the ruin of their countiy, 
now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost rang** 
ed against them for battle,*' they desisted. And-, 
afterwards, those who had openly avowed the 
design of restoring the deqiocratical form at 
Samoa, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus-, 
and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal 
agency in this new revolution,) caused every 
soldier to swear tiie most solemn oaths, more 
especially such as were for an otigarehy, that 
"they would submit to no form but the de»> 
mocracy, and would act in this cause with ge» 
neral unanimity ; and, fitrther, would zealously 
prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians^ 
that eternal enemies they would remain to the 
four hundred, and would enter into- no treaty 
of accommodation with them.''' All the 8a> 
mians, farther, that were old enough to bear 
arms took the same oaths ; and henceforth the 
army communicated all their affiira to the 
Samians, and gave them an insight into all the 
dangers which might attend the sequel ; con* 
vinced thai otherwise no safe resource remained 
2i2 



322 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



[Bocn: VIII. 



for either ; but, if the four hundred 'or the ene* 
my at Miletus proved too hard for them, their 
ruin was unavoidable. 

Terrible were the preaei^t embroibnents of 
the times, whilst those at Samoa were striving 
to re-establish the democracy at Athens, and 
those at Athens to force an oligarchical form 
upon the army. The soldiers, farther, im- 
mediately summoned a general assembly, in 
which they deposed their former commanders, 
and all such captains of triremes as fell under 
their suspicions, and then chose others to fill 
up the vacancies, both captains of triremes aild 
land-commanders, amongst whom were Thra" 
sybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in 
the assembly and encouraged them by eveiy 
topic of persuasion ; particularly, that « they 
had not the least reason to be dispirited, 
though Athens herself had revolted from 
ihem; for this was merely the secession of 
a minority from men whose numbers were 
greater, and who were better furnished for 
every exigence; because the whole navy of 
Athens Was their own, by which they could 
eompel dependent states to pay in their former 
contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed 
on such an errand from Athens itself. Even 
yet they were masters of a city at Samoa, a 
city despicable in no respect, but which once in 
a former war had well nigh wrested the empire 
of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of 
war, in regard to their public enemies, would 
continue the same as it was before ; nay, by 
being masters of the fleet, they 'were better 
enabled to procure all the needful supplies 
than their opponents who were now at Athens. 
It was purely owing to their own peculiar situ- 
ation at Samos that the others had hitherto- 
been masters of the entrance into the Pineus ; 
and they soon should be highly distressed if 
they refused to restore thetn their ancient 
polity, since these at Samos could more easily 
bar them the use of the sea than be barred up 
by them. What assistances Athens had hither- 
to given them against the enemy were but 
trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing 
could be lost from that quarter ; which was no 
longer able to supply them with money, since 
with that they had been supplied by the army ; 
nor to send them any valuable instructions, for 
the sake of which alone the troops abroad were 
submissive to the orders <^ the state at home. 
Nay, in some points those at Athens had most 
egrregiously ofiended since they had overturned 



the laws of thrar country, which those here hsj 
preserved^ and irtite exerting their efibrts to 
compel others to the observance of them; and 
therefore, in every method of valuation, tlie 
men who here provided well for the public 
welfare, were in no respect worse patriots than 
the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should 
they grant him an indenmity and a safe retuin, 
would readily procure them the king's alliance. 
And, what had the greatest weight, should 
they miscarry in every branch of their preaeat 
designs, many places of refuge lay always open 
to men possessed of so considerable a fleet, io 
which they might find fresh cities and another 
country." 

After such occurrences in the assembly con- 
vened by the soldiery, and the conclusion of 
their mutual exhortations, they continued their 
preparations for war with unremitting diligence. 
But the deputation of ten, sent from the four 
hundred to Samos, being informed of these 
proceedings when they were advanced in their 
voyage so far as Delos, thought proper to pnh 
ceed no farther* 

About this very time, the Peloponnesianson 
board the fleet stationed at Miletus clamoared 
loudly amongst themselves, that " they are be- 
trayed by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; as 
the former had already refused to engage, when 
themselves were heurty and in fine conditioo, 
and the fleet of the Athehians was small ; nor 
would do so even noW» when the latter are 
reported to be embroiled with intestine sedi- 
tions, and their own ships are daily impairiog; 
but, under pretext of a Phoenician fleet to be 
brought up by Tissaphernes, an aid merely 
nominal, and which wo'Uld never join them, he 
was ruining all by dilatory measures. And as 
for Tissaphernes, it Was never his intention to 
bring up that fleet ; but he was plainly under- 
mining the strength of theirs, by not supplying 
them constantly and fully with dieir pay. The 
time, therefore, they insisted, ought no longer 
to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement 
hazarded at once." Yet in such clamonn 
those deepest concerned vrerp the Syracasaosi 

The confederates and Astyochus himself 
being affected with these clamours, and having 
declared in a council of war for engaging the 
enemy forthwith, as they had received sd- 
doubted intelHgence of the confusions at St- 
mos ; putting out to sea with the whole of 
their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve 
sail, and having ordered the Milesians tem^rch 



•] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



323 



tlutber over^aivd, tbey flood aW9y for Mycale. 
At Glauc9 of Mycale the Athenians weise 
sow Ijmg, with eighty-two ships of the 8ft* 
mian department : for ijB this quarter of My- 
cale Samos lies, but a small distance from the 
continent : but when they saw the 0eet of the 
Pelopoiuiesians approaching, they retired to 
Samoa, judging their own strength insufficient 
for an engagement with the foe which might 
prove decisive. Besides, as they had dis- 
covered the intention of those at Miletus to 
venture an ^gagement, they expected Strom- 
bichides from the Hellespont, who was to 
bring to their assistance the. ships on the station 
of Chios which had gone up to Abydus ; and 
a message had already been deqiatched to 
hasten him up. For these reasons they plied 
away to Samos. The Peloponnesiaxis, arriv- 
ing at Mycale, encamped upon Hhe shore, along 
with the land forces of tbe Milesians and those 
sent in by the bordering people. On the next 
day, when they w^e fully bent on standing 
directly against Samos, advice is brought them 
that « Strombichides is come up with the ships 
from the Hellespont ;** upon which they made 
the best of their way back again to Miletus. 
And now the Athenians, having gained so 
large. an aooession of strength, show themselves 
immediately before Miletus, with a hundred 
and eight sail, desirous of coming to an en- 
gagement with the enemy. But, as nothing 
stirred out agaiast th^m, they also returned to 
Samos. 

In the same summer, immediately aft^r the 
former movements, the Peloponnesians^^who 
had waived coming out to an engagement, since 
with the whole of their strength they thought 
themselves by no means a match for their ene- 
my, and were now reduced to great perplexities 
about the methods of procuring subsistence for 
so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphemes 
was so remiss in his payroents^-send away 
to Phamabazus (pursuant to the prior instruc- 
tions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son 
of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail : 
for Phamabazus had demanded such a force, 
and was ready to support the expenses of it ; 
and it bad been farther notified to them in 
form that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt 
And thus this detachment of Pelojponnesians, 
having run out far to sea to get dear of the 
Athenians during the course, met with very 
tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it 
is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Pelos, 



and from thence return again to Miletus. But 
Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over- 
land to Hellespont, and took upon him the 
command. Ten ships, however, of the de- 
tachment, under Elixus the Megarean, who 
was joined^ the command, reached the Hel- 
lespont without damage, and effectuate the 
revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Sa- 
mos, informed of these incidents, send away a 
detachment to the Hellespont, to support and 
guard the adjacent cities ; and a small engage- 
ment happens before Byzantium, between eight 
ships on a side. 

Those who were in the management at Sa- 
mos, and above all Thrasybulus, adhering still 
to the sentiments they had entertained ever 
since the last turn of affairs there, that Alci- 
biades must needs be recalled; the latter at 
last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence 
of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had 
voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, 
Thrasybulus repaired immediately to Tissa- 
phemes, and brought Alcibiades back with 
him to Samos ; convinced their last resource ' 
depended. on his being able to alienate Tissa- 
phemes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon 
an assembly being called Alcibiades at largo 
expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of 
his fate, in having been exiled from nis coun- 
try : and th^i, having amply run over every 
topic relating to the present posture of affairs, 
he raised their expectations high in regard to 
the future. He magnified, with a mighty 
parade of words, his own interest in Tissa- 
phemes; from the view, not only to intimi- 
date the patrons of the c^garcbical government 
at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals but 
also to rrader himself more respectable to those 
at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in 
him as high as possible ; — to give the enemy, 
farther, as many handles as he was able to 
calumniate Tissaphemes, and to lower all their 
present sanguinary expectations. These were 
the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all 
imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest 
assurances to bis audience, that « Tissapher- 
nes had pledged his word to him, that, could 
he once firmly depend upon the Athenians, 
they never should be distressed for want of sup- 
plies whikc he had any thing left, nay, though 
at last he should be forced to tvm into ready 
cash the very bed he lay on ; and the Phoeni- 
cian fleet, already come up to Aspendus, he 
would join wiih Uie Athenians but never with 



324 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book Tin. 



the Peloponnesiaiu ; the only pledge of fidel- 
ity he required from the Athenians was, for 
Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word for 
their future conduct. 

The army, delighted with these and many 
other soothing topics, proceed immediately to 
associate him with the rest of the commanders, 
and implicitly trusted every thing to their 
management. Not a man was any longer to 
he found amongst them who would have parted 
with his present confidence of certain security 
and revenge on the four hundred for all the 
treasure in the universe. Nay, they were 
ready this very moment, upon the strength of 
what Alcibiades had said, to slight the enemy 
BOW at hand, and steer directly for the Piraeus. 
But, though numbers with vehemence recom- 
mended the step, he stopped their ardour by 
remonstrances, Uiat ** they ought by no means 
to think of steering for the Pirsus, and leave 
their nearer enemies upon their backs ; but, in 
relation to the operations of war, since he was 
elected a general, (he said,) he would first go 
and confer with Tissaphemes, and would then 
proceed to action.'' Accordingly, the assem- 
bly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately 
departed, that he might appear in all respects to 
be perfectly united with Tissaphernes ; de- 
sirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and 
give him a sensible proof that he was appointed 
a general ; and, by virtue of this, enabled either 
to do him service or to do him harm. It was 
the peculiar fortune of Aldbiades to awe the 
Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes 
by the Athenians. 

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no 
sooner heard of the recall of Alcibiades, than, 
as before they suspected treachery in Tissa- 
phernes, they now loudly vented invectives 
against him. What more inflamed them was, 
that, ever since tiie Athenians showed them- 
selves before Miletus and they had refused to 
put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes 
had slackened more than ever in his payments ; 
and thus, hated by them for that reason suffi- 
ciently before, he now became more odious on 
account of Alcibiades. The soldiers again, as 
on former occasions, ran together in parties, and 
enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of 
higher rank, persons of real importance, and 
not merely the private men, were full of re- 
monstrances, that <( they had at no time re- 
ceived their full subsistence : his payments had 
been always scanty, and even those had'never 



been regular ; in short, unless they were led 
direcUy against the enemy, or carried to some 
other station where they might be sure of sub- 
sistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. 
And the whole blame of all that befell, ought 
to be charged upon Astyochus, who for private 
lucre endured patiently the caprices isi Tissa- 
phernes." Employed as they were in thus 
enumerating grievances, a tumult actually lxt>ke 
out against Astyochus : for the mariners be- 
longing to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, 
by how much they enjoyed the greatest liberty 
of all others in the fleet, by so much the more 
heightened confidence did they flock about 
him and demand their pay. Upon this, As- 
tyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, 
threatening hard that Dorian,^ who seconded 
and encouraged the demands of his men, and 
even lifting his staff and shaking it at him. 
This was no sooner perceived by the militaiy 
crowd, than, seamen as they were, with a loud 
uproar, they rushed at Astyochus to knock him 
down ; but, aware of their design, he flies for 
refuge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, with- 
out any blows, and the fray was ended without 
any harm committed. 

The Milesians also made themselves masters, 
by surprise, of a fort erected by Tissaphernes, 
at Miletus, and obliged the garrison left in it to 
evacuate the place. These things pleased the 
rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syra- 
cusans. Lichas, however, was by no means 
satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted 
« the •Milesians were obliged in duty to be 
submissive to Tissaphernes ; and that all 
others who lived in the dominions of the kmg 
lay under the same obligation, and were bound 
to pay due regard to his just authority, till 
such time as the war was handsomely com- 
pleted.'* This drew upon him the resentment 
of the Milesians ; and, because of these ex- 
pressions and some others of the same na- 
ture, when he afterwards died of a natural 
disease, they would not sufier him to be buried 
in a spot of ground which the Lacedemonians 
who were amongst them had chose for his in- 
terment. 

Whilst afiairs were thus sadly embroiled, 
between the soldieiy on one side, and Astyo- 
chus and Tissaphernes on the other, Mindaros 
arrived from Lacedsmon, as successor to As- 



1 Hennocratsi. 



TBAHXZI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



325 



tyochns in the chief command of the fleet. 
Accordingly he takes the command upon him, 
and Astyochus sailed away for home. But 
'with him, as ambassador, Tissaphemes sent 
one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a 
Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse 
the Milesians about the seizure! of the fort, and 
also to make apologies for his conduct. He 
knew that the Milesians were already set out 
-with an outcry, chiefly against him : and that 
Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed 
"with proofs that Tissaphemes, in concert with 
Alcibiades, baffled all the Peloponnesian 
schemes, and basely tampered with both the 
'warring parties. But an enmity had always 
subsisted between these two about the pay- 
ments of subsistence. And at length, when 
Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and 
other Syracusans came to Miletus to take upon 
them the command of the Syracusan vessels, 
(namely, Patamis, and Myscon, and Demar- 
chus,) Tissaphemes vented his choler more 
bitterly Uian ever against Hermocrates, now an 
exile; and, amongst his other accusations of 
him, aflirmed, that « he had demanded a sum 
of money, which being refused him, he had 
ever since declared himself his enemy."' As- 
tyochus, therefore,' and the Milesians, and 
Hermocrates, are now sailed for Lacedsmon. 

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed 
from Tissaphemes to Samos ; and from Delos 
the deputation sent from the four hundred on 
the late revolution to soothe and gain the con- 
currence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst 
Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assem- 
bly being called, they endeavoured to open the 
cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear 
them, and roared aloud for the murder of those 
who had overturned the popular government 
At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, 
they gave them a hearing. 

The deputies remonstrated, « that not for 
the rain of Athens was this new change intro- 
duced, but purely for its preservation — ^in no 
wise to betray it into the hands of the enemy ; 
because that might have been done efifectually 
upon the late approach of its enemy to her 
walls, since they were in power. Every single 
person amongst the five thousand was intended 
to have a regular share in the administration. 
Their friends and relations are not treated in 
an insolent manner, as Chereas had maliciously 
suggested to them ; nay, were not in> the least 



molested, but everywhere remained in the un- 
disturbed possession of their property.'* 

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, 
yet they were heard with no manner of com- 
placence, but with manifest indignation. Dif- 
ferent methods of proceeding were recommend- 
ed by different persons ; but the majority de- 
clared for sailing away at once for the Pirieus. 
On this occasion Alcibiades first showed him- 
self a trae patriot ; nay, as much a patriot as 
ever Athenian had been ; for, when the Athen- 
ians at Samoa were hurried furiously along to 
invade their own selves, the plain consequence 
of which was giving up at once Ionia ahd 
Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified 
their fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man 
living could have been able to restrain the mul- 
titude, he persuaded them to desist from this 
strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those 
whose private resentments burst out most 
violently against the deputies, prevented mis- 
chief. At length, he himself dismissed them 
with the following answer — That « the ad- 
ministration in the hands of five thousand he 
had no intention to oppose: but he ordered 
them to give an immediate discharge to the. 
four hundred, and to restore the council of 
five hundred to their prior state. If, farther, 
from a principle of frugality, they had made 
retrenchments, in order that those who served 
in the armies of the state migh^be better sub- 
sisted, he praised them altogether. He then 
recommended to them a steady resistence, and 
by no means in any shape to give way to the 
enemy ; for, could the state once be secured 
from its pubUc foes, a reconciliation amongst 
its members might easily be hoped for ; but, 
should either party be once destroyed, either 
this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would 
soon be left to be reconciled at all." 

There were present at this audience am- 
bassadors from the Argives, who brought 
assurances of aid to the people of Athens at 
Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their 
zeal ; and then, exhorting them to hold them- 
selves in readiness to come upon a summons 
sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argives 
came to Samos in company with the Para- 
lians, who had been lately turned over by the 
four hundred into a vessel of war, to craize 
round Euboea, and to carry to Lacedsmon the 
ambassadors, Lespodias, Aiistophon, and Me- 
lesius, sent thither from the four hundred. 



336 



PELOPONNESIAN WAIL 



[ 



But, when ftdTanced to die height of Argos, I 
they put the amharaadon under anest, as chief 
agents in pulling down the democracy^ and de- ' 
liTered them up to the Argires. They had no 
husinem now at Athens, and so came firom 
Argos to Samos, conToying the Argive am- 
hassadon in the trireme which they had 
seized. 

The same summer, Tissaphemes, — aboat 
that juncture of time in which the Peloponne- 
sians were most fiourious against him, for the 
other reasons, and the recalment of Aicibiades, 
as having now pulled off the mdA and declared 
for the Athenians, — desirous, as in truth it ap- 
peared, to effiice the bad impressions they had 
entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspen- 
dtts to the Phoenician fleet, and preyailed with 
Lichas to bear him company, In regard to 
the Peloponneflans, he declared that he sub- 
stituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to pay 
them their subsistence, whilst he himself should 
be absent. Various accounts ave vented about 
this step ; nor can it certainly be known with 
what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, 
when there, he did not bring up the fleet 
That a Phoenician fleet, consisting of one hun- 
dred and forty-eeven sail, was now come up to 
Aspendus, is allowed on all sides; but, why 
they did not come forwards, is yariously con- 
jectured. Some think he went out of sight 
merely to cany on his old scheme of wearing 
away the Peloponnesians ; and, in consequence 
of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which 
he was ordered to pay, not oetter but even 
wone than Tissaphemes. Others say it was, 
that, since he had brought the Phoenicians to As- 
pendus, he might save lai^e eums by disnussing 
them there, as he never had sincerely designed 
to make use of their service. Others, again, 
attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours 
against him at Lacedsmon, and to get himself 
represented there as one abounding in good 
faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a 
fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service. 

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the 
mystery is this : he would not bring them up, 
meiely to wear out and to balance the strength 
of the Grecians, that, during his absence and 
this studied prolongation, the latter might be 
running into ruins ; and, ferther, for the sake of 
balancing, to join with neither party, for fear 
of making them too strong ; for, had he once 
determined to join- heartily in the war, the con- 



sequence was catmvity beyond a doabt. Had 
he brought them up to join theIiTeda»inflnwms, 
he must in all probability have given tliem the 
victory, since already their naval atreng^ was 
rather equal than inferiw to that <»f their ap" 
ponents. But, that their ruin alone was de- 
signed by him is plain fiom the -excuse he made 
for not bringing up that fleet: he pretended 
they were fewer in numlier than the king had 
ordered to be assembled : yet, if this were so, 
he might have ingratiated himself move abun- 
dantly with the king, if he made a great saving 
of money for his master, and with less expense 
had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, 
however, whatever was his view, Tissaphemes 
repairs, and joins the Phoenicians ; nay, Luther, 
at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent 
Philippus, a noble Lacedemonian, with two 
triremes, to take charge of this fleet. 

Aicibiades had no sooner received intdli- 
gence that Tissaphemes was at Aspeodua, 
than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened 
Uiither after him, promising to those at Samos 
an assured and important piece of service : for, 
<( he would either bring the Phoenician fleet to 
the Athenians, or at least prevent thdr junc- 
tion with the Peloponneaans." It is probaUe 
that fiom a long acquaintance, he was privy to 
the whole intention of Tissapheraes never to 
bring up this fleet ; and his project was now, 
to render Titsaphemes still more odious to die 
Peloponnesians for tiie r^;ard he showed to 
himself and the Athenians, that so he might 
at last be necessitated to strike in with die lat- 
ter. He stood away therefore diiectty by 
Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course 
upwards. 

The deputation, sent from the four hun- 
dred, bdng returned from Samos to Athens, 
r^Mrted the answer of Aicibiades ; — how « he 
encouraged them to hold out, and give way in 
no shape to the enemy: and that his confi- 
dence was great, he should be able tfaorougfaly 
to reconcile them with the army, and give 
them victory over* the Peloponnesians." By 
this report ikey very much revived the ^writs 
of many of those who had a tdiare in the ofi- 
garchy, and yet would gladly 'extricate diem- 
selves from the business upon assurances of 
indemnity. They had already begun to faoU 
separate cabals, and diow open discontent at 
the train of a£hin. They were headed hj 
some of principal authority even in the pnseiit 



•1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



327 



oligarchy, and who filled the great offices of 
state, namely, Tberamenes,^ the son of Ag- 
non, and Aristocrates, the son of Sioelitts ; and 
others who were most deeply concerned in 
late transactions; and from a dread, as they 
gave out, of the army at Samoa, and Alcibia- 
<le8 had concurred in sending an embassy to 
Lacedsmon, lest by unseasonable diBsents from 
the majority they might have done mischief to 
the public. Not that they hastened them- 
selves even now to put an utter end to the oli- 
garchical government, but to enforce the neces- 
sity of making use of the five thousand iiot 
merely in n^me, but in act, and to render the 
polity more equal. This was, it must be 
owned, the political scheme which they all pre- 
tended ; but, through private ambition, the 
majority had given into that course, by which 
an oligarchy, founded upon the ruins of a de- 
mocracy, is ripe for subversion : for it was the 
daily claim of each single person concerned, 
not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre- 
eminently the first ; whereas, when out of a 
democracy a preference is awarded, the distino- 
tion is the more easily brooked, as if it were 
the real consequence of superior worth. But 
"what of a certainty elevated them most, was 
the great influence of Alcibiades at Samoa, and 
their own consciousness that this business 
of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect 
of firm or lasting continuance. A conten- 
tion, therefore, ensued among them, which 
of them should show the greatest zeal lor the 
people. 

But such of the four hundred as made the 
greatest opposition to this new scheme, and 
were leaders of their party ; — ^namely, Phryni- 
chus, who formerly, during his employment 
as general at Samoa, had embroiled himself 

1 Thcramenes was very expert at turning about and 
shifting his party. He got by it the nickname of 
Cothurnus, or the Buskin ; because the tragedian's 
buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into 
it. He was however a nan of great abilities, and 
generally regarded as a lover of his country. His 
turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with a 
Tiew of pubHc good. Cieear, when making Cicero a 
compliment, likened hhn to Theraonnet. He was 
deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at 
Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with 
the Lacedemonians after the taking of Athens by 
Lysander, when they demolished their long waHs, 
openad tiielr tiarboan, sad gave «p tbdr sMpping. lie 
was afterwards, nomteaUy, one 4^ the thirty tyrants : 
for he soon began to oppose tbem ; first with modera- 
tion, then with vehemence ; whieb exasperated them 
so, that they pat hira to death. 



with Alcibiades'; and Aristarchus, one of tht 
most violent and also most inveterate oppo- 
nents of the people ; and Pisanoer, and Anti- 
pho, and others of the greatest influence 
amongst them ; who formerly, upon establisb- 
ing themselves first in the government, and 
ever since the army at Samoa had dissented 
firom them in favour of the democracy, had be- 
stirred themselves, in sending embassies to 
Lacedsmon, in more firmly establishing the 
oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on 
the spot which is called Eetioneia ; — these, I 
say, exerted themselves with much greater ar- 
dour than ever, since tiie return of the deputies 
from Samos, as they plainly saw tiie inclinar 
tions of numbers, and some of their own body, 
on whose perseTerance they had highly de- 
pended, were entirely changed. They even 
caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten 
others, to set out with all expedition ; so ap- 
prehensive were they of firesh opposition both 
in Athens itself and from Samos; and charged 
them with instructions to strike up an accom- 
modation with the Lacedasmonians upon any 
tolerable terms they could possibly procure. 
They also carried on with redoubled diligence 
the new works at Eetioneia. These works 
were intended, as was given out by Thera- 
menes and his party, not so much to keep out 
of the Pirsus those from Samos, should they 
endeavour to attempt it, as to enable them- 
selves, at their own discretion, to receive both 
the ships and land forces of the enemy ; for 
Eetioneia is the mole of the Pineus, and the 
entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. 
The new work was therefore joined in such a 
manner to that which guarded it before on the 
side of the land, tiiat a small party posted be- 
hind could command the entrance. For the 
extremities of it were continued down to the 
fort in the very mouth of the harbour, which 
was narrow ; and both the old wall, which was 
built on the land side, and this new fortifica- 
tion within, reached down to* the sea. They 
also enlarged and secured the great portico, 
which adjoined to the new work erected in the 
Pirsus, and kept it entirely in their own cus- 
tody. Here they obliged all the citizens to 
lodge what com they already had, and all that 
fdiould hereafter be imported, and here only to 
expose it to sale and to vend it. 

These proceedings had for a long time drawn 
diarp insinuations frxtm Theramenes; and, 
when the embassy returned from Lacedemon 



328 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



t 



without bringing to any manner of issue a gen- 
eral accommodation for the whole of the state, 
he averred, that ** by this new work the safety 
of the city was visibly endangered." For from 
Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the 
request of the Eubceans, no less than forty-two 
Bail of ships were on the coast of Laconia ; some 
of which were ItaUan, from Tarentum and 
from Locri, and some Sicilian ; and all were 
now bound for Eubcea. At the head of this 
equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the 
soii of Hegesander. Theramenes maintained, 
that ** it was set out less for Kuboea than for 
those who were now fortifying at Eetioneia ; 
and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will 
surprise and complete the ruin of Athens." 
There was really something in the conduct of 
the men he accused, to countenance this charge, 
nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those 
who now composed the oligarchy were princi- 
pally desirous to preserve in their hands the 
whole appendage of the republic ; if this were 
impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, 
and subsist with independence; but, should 
they be unable to campass this, rather than fall 
the first victims to the democracy re-estabUsh- 
ed, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning their 
shipping and fortifications, to make any terms 
whatever for the state, provided they could ob- 
tain security for their own persons.' They 
accelerated, therefore, this new work; which 
was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally- 
ports, and passages enough to let in the enemy ; 
and they proceed with all imaginable despatch, 
in order to outstrip prevention. 

Hitherto, indeed, this charge against them 
had only been whispered with an air of secrecy 
amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon 
his return from the embassy to Lacedsmon, 
was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrole 
in the forum, at the hour of public resort, be- 
ing got but a few steps from the house where 
the council was sitting, and dropped down 
dead upon the spot; — when, farther, the as- 
sassin made his escape ; and a strange from 
Argos, who assisted at the fact, being appre- 
hended and tortured by the four hundred, dis- 
covered not the name of any one person who 
set them on, nor made any farther confession 
than that « he knew large numbers met at the 
house of the officer who commanded the pa- 
trole, and at other places ;" — then, at length, 
as nothing could be made of this affair, Thera- 
menes and Aristocrates, and as many either of 



the four hundred or of othezB as were combined 
with them, proceeded to act in a more open 
and resolute manner. For by this time the 
fleet was come round from Laconia ; and rid- 
ing before Epidaurus, had made ravages upon 
iEgina. Theramenes theielbre averred it im- 
probable, that «were they intended ibr £n- 
bcea, Ihey would ever have put into ^gina, 
and then go again and lie at Epidauros, janless 
they had been sent out at the express invita- 
tion of those whom he had always accused of 
traitorous designs ; and it was impossible to be 
passive any longer under such practices." In 
fine, after many speeches made to excite a to* 
muh, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, 
they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy- 
armed, posted in the Pirsns to carry on the 
new works of Eetioneia, amongst whom Aris* 
tocrates himself was employed at the head of 
his own baud, lay under an arrest Alexicles, 
who commanded there for the oligarchy, and 
was a most vehement adversaiy to the opposite 
party ; and, canying him into a house, put him 
under confinement. To this action they were 
also emboldened by the conconence of others^ 
as well as by Hermon, who commanded the 
patrole assigned for Munichia ; and, what was 
of most impcNTtance, it was openly countenanced 
by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The 
news of it was immediately carried to the four 
hundred, who were this moment assembled to- 
gether in council ; and all, excepting those dis* 
satisfied with their measures, were ready te 
run to arms, and vented terrible threats against 
Theramenes and his associates. 

But he, apologizmg fcnr himsdf, declared his 
readiness to take up arms along with them, , 
and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles ; and, 
taking "with him one of the generals- who was 
in his secret, he hurried down to the Piraeus. 
Aristarchus also ran down to assist; as did, 
farther, the young men belonging to the cavaliy 
of the state. 

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and lull of 
horror : for those who were left in the upper 
city imagined that the Pineus was already 
seized, and that Alexicles was slain ; and they 
in the Pineus each moment expected an as- 
sault from those in the city. Not without 
difficulty could the men of years and experi- 
ence stop such as were wildly nmning up 
and down the streets, and rushing to arms. 
And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public host 
of the state, who happened then to be at 



YKABXn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



329 



JVthens, threw hinuelf with liyelj zeal in the 
'^^ay of all who were flocking; down ; conjuring 
-them earnestly « not to finish the ruin of their 
country, when the enemy lay so near to strike 
the blow." But thus, at length, their fury 
abated, and the efiusion of one another's blood 
-was prevented. 

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got 
down to the Pirsus, than, assuming authority, 
(for he himself was at this time a general,) he 
pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this 
piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere mak- 
ing a noise could do it: whilst Aristarchus 
and all the opposite faction were angry with 
them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy- 
armed drew together in a body, and betray no 
sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, 
they demanded aloud from Theramenes, — « If, 
in his judgment, these new works were raised 
with a good design, or would not better be de- 
molished 1" His reply was this— That, "if 
they thought it expedient to demolish them, his 
opinion should concur with theirs." Hereupon, 
at a signal given, the heavy-armed and many 
others who belonged to the Pirsus rushed on 
in a moment, and pulled down all the new for- 
tification. 

The watch-word now published to the mul- 
titude was this — « Whosoever would have the 
administration lodged in the five thousand in- 
stead of the four hundred, let him join in the 
work." For even still they judged it politic to 
"veil their design under the name of the five 
thousand, and not to say downright— ^< Whoso- 
ever would have the democracy restored," — lest 
possibly the former might have been actually in 
force, and a person speaking to any one of them 
might spoil all by some inadvertent expres- 
sions. And, on the same account, the four 
hundred would neither have the five thousand 
declared, nor yet have it known that they had 
never been appointed. To admit so large a 
number into a share of the government, they 
judged was in fiict a mere democracy ; but that 
leaving the matter in suspense would strike a 
dread of his neighbour into every Athenian. 

The next morning, the four hundred, though 
highly disordered in their politics, assembled 
however in council. But those in the Pirsus, 
after enkorging Alexicles, whom they had put 
under confinement, and completing the demo- 
lition of the new works, marched to the theatre 
of Bacchus in Mnnichia, and there, all armed 
as they were, held a formal assembly ; and 
49 



then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, 
marched directly into the upper city, and posted 
themselves in the Anaceum. Here they were 
accosted by a select committee sent from the 
four hundred, who man to man reasoned calmly 
with them ; and, perceiving any to be tractable, 
plied them with persuasions to proceed in a 
gentle manner, and to restrain the fary of their 
associates; giving them assurance, that «the 
five thousand would be declared; and from 
them, by regular succession, at the pleasure of 
the five thousand, the four hundred should be 
appointed ; conjuring them, in the meantime, 
« not to forward, through impatience, the de- 
struction of the state, nor give it up for a prey 
to the public enemy." The whole multitude 
of, the heavy-armed, attentive to these argu- 
ments, on which many expatiated at large and 
pressed homie upon numbers, became more 
tractable than they were at first, and were most 
terribly alarmed at the mention of the total de^ 
struction of their polity. It was at last con- 
cluded, that, on a set day, an assembly should 
be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an 
accommodation. 

But, when this assembly, to be held in the 
temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties 
were only not completely met, comes in the 
news that « the two and fi)rty sail and Hege- 
sandrides are coasting along from Megara to^ 
wards Salamis." Not one of the heavy-armed 
this moment but pronounced it true, what be^ 
fore was given out by Theramenes and his 
friends, that « to the new fortifications these 
ships are now bound ;" and it was judged that 
in the nick of time they had been levelled 
with the ground. But Hegesandrides, as 
perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only 
hovered about at Epidaurus or th& adjacent 
coast. It is however probable, that, on ao* 
count of the present sedition amongst the 
Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, 
in hope to seize some fiur opportunity to strike 
a blow. 

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner 
heard the news, than, to a man, they flocked 
down amain to tiie Pirsus; less alarmed at 
their own domestic war, than at invasion from 
a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their 
very ports. Some of them threw themselves 
on board what shipping was ready ; others 
launched such as were agro^nd; and others 
posted themselves upon the walls and at the 
mouth of the harbour. 
2K 



890 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vzn. 



But the PelopoanMian fleet, having sailed 
by and doubled the cape of Suninm, comei to 
anchor between Thoricus and FhnuUB, and 
pioceeda afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon 
the Athenians, in all imaginable hnny, man- 
ning out their ships with what hands coold be 
got on this sudden emergency, as in a city dis- 
tracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave 
off the greatest danger that had ever threatened 
it, (for, as Attioa was occupied by the enemy, 
Euboea was now their all,) cause Thymocharis, 
a commander, to stand away with their fleet to 
Eretria. On their arrival these, and their 
jnnctian with such as were already in CSuboBa, 
they a"^**""*^ to ^l and thirty sail, and wefe 
immediately forced to engage: for Hegesanr 
dridas, after the hour of repast, came out inline 
of battle from Qropua. 

The distance of Oropus firom the eity of the 
Eietrians, acroas the seat i« about sixty stadia;* 
and therefcnre, upon his approach, the Athenians 
ordeied their men on board, imagining the 
soldiers to be ready at band to obey their or- 
ders ; whereas Ihey happened not yet to be «»- 
turned from the market, whither they had gone 
to buy pravinons. For^, through the manage- 
ment of the Eretiisns, nothing could be got by 
way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the 
most remote quarters of the dly ; with an in- 
tent that the enemy might attack the Athenians 
before they were all embarked, and oblige 
them in a hunying and disorderly manner to be- 
gin the fight Nvf, a signal had even been 
held out to the eneniy from Eretria towards 
Oropus, at what time they ought to come for- 
ward to the attack. 

Upon 80 short a notice, the Athenians, hav- 
ing formed their line as wdl as they were able, 
and engaging the enemy before the harbour 
of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance 
for a time. At length, being compelled to 
sheer ofi^ they are pursued to land; and as 
many of them as ran for safety to the dty of 
the Eretrians suffered the most cmej treat- 
ment, in being murdered by the hands of men 
whom they supposed their Mends. Sudi, in- 
deed, as could reach the fori (t( iketiia, which 
was garrisoned by Athenians, are safo ; as also 
the vessels which could make Chalcis. 

But the Peloponnesians, after making prises 
jo( two and twenty Athenian vess^, and either 
butchering or making pr»Bonen all on board 

* About six Eogiisfa miles. 



them, eoeeled a trofliy. And, no long- time 
after, they caused all Enbaa to revolt, exoq|it- 
ing Oieus, whidi an Athenian garrison aecnr- 
ed, and then settled the stale of that island at 
their own discretion. 

When advice of wiiai was done mt £aboea 
readied Athens, the greatest oonetemation 
ensued of aU that had to this jday been known. 
Not even the dieadftil blow received in Slidlyi 
though great concern, in tmdi, it gave them, 
nor any other public disaster, caused ao terrible 
an idarm ammigst tfaem. For, at a tune whea 
their army at Samoa was in open revolt, when 
they had no longer either shipfing in stove or 
mariners to go on board, when they were dis- 
tracted with intestine sedition, and ready each 
moment to tear one another to pieces ; — and 
on the oedL of all these this great calamity 
sopervened, in vrfaieh they lost dieir fleet, and 
(what vras more of oonseqnenoe) Eubcea, 
which had better supplied flieir 
than Attica itsel^-^-had Aey not ample 
not to foH into utter dejectioni But what 
akrmed them most was the prorimity oC ruin, 
in case the enemy, flushed wilii flieir late sue* 
cess,dliould iland immediately into the Piisai^ 
now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment 
p»0sed but .ih^ imngined Ihey wose only not 
in the veiyhaibov;whidi,in«Eatti,liad Aej 
been a little more dacing, they mig^ easi^ 
have becB. Nay, had they made this step and 
blocked up the dty, ifaey most inlallibly have 
increased the seditions within it; mnathaw 
ne c es ritftt e d the fleet to eome ever from lonis, 
though averse to the oiigardiy, in oeder to pi» 
vent die ruin of their own iriatioBs and die 
total destruction of Aeir eountiy ; and, in die 
meantime, HeHeqwnt, Ionia, flie isles even 
np to Eubooa, io a word, the ndmle empne ef 
Atheiis, must have been their own. Yet, nd 
in this instance only, bat many othcn, die 
Tiacedgmonianit showed themseWea most com- 
modious enemies for the Athenians to csieoai- 
ter : for, as nothing di&ved mora than Ihcir 
respective tempcn ; the one being active, die 
other dow; enteqnidng tiiese, but tunoraoi 
those, especially in naval competitions; iSbej 
gave them many advantages. The tenth of dm 
the Syracusans most jdainly ehowed, who voy 
nearly resembled die Athenians in disposififln, 
and so waned against Ihemwidi the higher 
spirit and wircfws. 

Terrified, however, at these tidungs, the Athe* 
nians made a shift to man oat twenty vt 



YMAMJXI,] 



PELOPONNE8IAN WAR, 



381 



wokd eenvened an Mseaibly of the people, on 
the first report of their Iom, in the place which 
i« called Uke Pbjx, and where generally that 
assembly was held. In this th^ put an end 
to the administration of the four hundred, and 
decreed <<the supreme power to be tested in 
the £ite thousand, which number to consist of 
all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy 
armour; and that no one i^ould receive a 
salary for, any public magistracy ; whoever 
ofiended in this point they declared a trait«^" 
Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, 
in which they appointed Nomothets,' sold filled 
up the other posts in the government And 
now, at least, though for the first time in my 
opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled 
their goverament aright. A moderaticHi, finely 
tempered between the few and the many, was 
now enforced. And, firom the low situation 
in which their a&tirs were now plunged, this 
enabled Athens to re-erect her head. 
. They decreed, farther, the recalment of Al- 
cibiades and his adherents ; and^ despatching a 
deputation to him and the army at Samoa, ex- 
horted themr to exert their utmost efforts for 
the public service, 

In the first moments of this new revtdution, 

Pisander and Alezidesy with thMr partisans, 

and in general all the great sticklers for the 

oUgpeircfay, withdraw privatd,y to Decelea. But 

Aristardius, who was one of the generals of 

the state, took a different route frcon all the 

rest ; and, carrying off a party of uchers, though 

rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoe: 

Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the 

frontiers of B(Botia.r But the Corinthians, on 

a i»rovoca^on peculiar to themselves, having 

procured the concurrence of the BceotianB, 

held it now blocked up, because a party of their 

countrymen, drawing off firom Becelea, had 

been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison 

from Oenoe. Aristarchuv, therefore, having 

in a conference settled matters with the be- 

siegcnrs, deceives the garrison in Oenoe, by 

assuring them, that, « as their countrymen in 

Athens had made up all their quarrels with 

> The general course of appointing Nomothete was 
by lot. Their number in the whole was a thousand and 
one. Their businees was not, as the name teems to 
impty, to make new lawS) since that belonged to the 
raprerae power lodged in Uie people ; but to inspect 
such as were already made, to reconsider such as were 
thought to be, or were complained of, as grievous, 
and regularly report such as ought to be continued or 
ought to be repealed. 



the Lacedamouiui% they also were bound to 
deliver up this place to the Boeotians ; and that 
this was an express provision in the treaty." 
Giiving evedit therefore to him as in pub* 
lie command, and ignorant of all the late 
transactions, because closely bloeked up, they 
agree with the enemy and evacuate the for- 
tress. In this manner the Boeotians regained 
possession of abandoned Oenoe: and thus 
the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed 
at Athene. 

But, about the same space of time in the 
current summer, in regard to the Peloponne- 
sians at Miletus : — When none of those, who 
were substituted by Tissaphemes during his 
absence at Aspendus, made regular payments ; 
and nothing could be seen either of Tissapher* 
nes or the Phcenidaii fleet, and Philippus, who 
accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the 
admiral in chief; and Hippocrates, farther, a 
citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, 
advised him also, that, « this fleet would never 
join him, and in all respects th^ were shame- 
fully abused l^ Tissaphemes ;" — as Phamaba- 
zus had made them an invitation, and declared 
himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, 
to engage as strongly ae Tissaphemes for the 
revolt of what eities yet remained in subjection 
to the Athenians ;— ^Mindarus, hoping to find 
more punctuiJiity in tfce latter, with notable 
conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, 
that his motions might not be discovered at 
Samoa, weighs from Miletus wit& seventy- 
three sail, and bent his course to the Helles- 
pont But, earlier thist summer, sixteen ships 
had steered their course thither, and ravaged 
part of tiie Chersonesus. Mindarus met with 
tempestoous weather in his passage, which 
for^ him to put into Icarus; and, after 
staying there five or six days for want of 
weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios. 

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the depar- 
ture fipom Miletus, stood after him with five 
and fiily sail, making the best of his way lest 
the other shouM enter the Hellespont before 
he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that 
her was put into Chios, and concluding he de- 
signed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at 
Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if 
the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions 
might be descried. He himself, repairing to 
Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and 
other necessaries to be prepared, that in case 
he should be forced to stay in these parts, he 



382 



PE1.0P0NNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



miglit make fir^qnent cnuMs from Leflbos 
•gainst Chios. 

But, as Erewus in Lesbos had revolted, his 
design was farther to attempt its redaction, in 
case it were feasible. For some of the >Iethy- 
nean exiles, and those not the most inconsider- 
able of the number, having brought over from 
Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most 
firmly attached to their cause, and hired others 
from the continent, which increased their num- 
ber to about three hundred, Anazarchns, the 
Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being 
chosen their leader,— assaulted first Methymne ; 
and, being repulsed in the attempt by the 
Athenian garrison which came up from Mity- 
lene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought 
in the field, they retired across thq mountain, and 
make £ressus revolt Thrasyllus, therefore, 
steering with his fleet against Eressus, project- 
ed an assault. But Thrasybulus, with Bre 
ships from Samos, arrived there before him, 
upon information received of the re-passage 
of the exiles; yet, coming too late before 
Eressus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor 
before it Two- other ships, also, bound home- 
wards from the Hellespont, came in, and the 
Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet 
amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they 
draughted an army for the operations of land, 
as fully bent, if possible, to take Eressus by 
a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of 
attack. 

In the meantime, Mindarus and the Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days 
employment in taking in provisions, and receiv- 
ing from the Chians every man on board three 
Chian tesseracosts,^ on the third day with 
urgent despatch launch out from Chios into 
the wide sea, that they might not be descried 
by the fleet before Eressus; and leaving 
Lebos on the left, stood over to the con- 
tinent. There, putting into the harbour of 
Cratersi on the coast of Phocea, and taking 
their noon repast, they proceeded along the 
coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginuse 
of the continent, against Mitylene. From 
thence, at dead of night, they went forwards 
idong the shore ; and, being arrived at Herma- 

A This, according to Spantaeim, was a month's pay, 
since he explains it by forty-three Chian drachmas. 
But the words will npt bear snch a construction : a 
tcsseracost was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to 
the Chians; but of what value it is not known, nor is 
It of any great importance. 



tus which lies ftcing Methymne,, and having 
eat their dinner there, they passed with the 
utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and 
Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach 
Rhstium of the Hellespont before midnight 
Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no 
farther than to Sigeum and some other adja- 
cent places on that coast 

The Athenians, who were lying with 
eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were 
waved by their own friends for signals, and 
they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sud- 
den on the hostile coast, were well assured 
that the Peloponnesians are approaching. The 
same night, therefore, under &V0U1 of the dark, 
and with the utmost expedition, they crept 
along under the Chersonesus, and reached 
Eleus, desirous to put out to sea, and avoid 
the enemy ; and, for the sixteen ships at Aby- 
dus, they stole apray unperceived of the Aby- 
dians, though notice had been sent them from 
their friends just arrived, to keep a good look- 
out, and not sufier them to steal otL Yet 
morning no sooner appeared, than, finding 
themselves in sight of the fleet under Minda- 
rus, and that they wene actually chased, th^ 
could not all get ofil The greater part, indeed, 
fled safe to the continent and Lemnos; but 
four, that got last under sail, are OTertaken by 
the enemy near Eleus; one, also, that ran 
ashore at the temple of Protesilaus, they seixe 
with all her hands ; and two more, the crews 
of which escaped. One, farther, but aban- 
doned, th^ bum at Imbros. 

This done, the ships from Abydus having 
joined them, and the whole fleet being now 
increased to fourscore and six sail, they spent 
the rest of the day in investing El^us ; but, 
as it would not surrender, they drew off to 
Abydus. 

The Athenians, who had been deceived by 
their scouts, and never imagined that so large a 
number of hostile ships could pass along un- 
descried, were very coolly canying on their siege; 
but yet were no sooner informed of the ene- 
my's motions, than, instantly quitting Eressus, 
they advanced with the utmost expedition to 
secure the Hellespont They also pick up two 
ships of the Peloponnesians ; which, running 
out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in 
amongst them : and, coming up only one day 
after them, they anchor at Eleus, and re-as- 
semble from Imbrus the ships which had fled 
thither. Five whole days they spend here in 



XXT-l 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



333 



g^etting eyery thing in readiness for a general 
eng^agement : and after this respite they came 
to an action in the following manner. 

The Athenians, ranged in line of hattle 
a-lieady stood along shore towards Sestus. The 
Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood 
out to sea from Ahydus, to be ready to receive 
tliem. And, as both sides were determined to 
engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater 
length ; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, 
reaching from Idacus to ArrhianiB, in all sixty- 
eight sail ^ and the Peloponnesians over-against 
them from Abydns to Daidanos, being eighty- 
six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus 
formed : the Syracusans had the right ; and on 
the left was ranged Mindarus, and the fdiips most 
remarkable for being good sailers. Amongst 
the Athenians, Thracyllus had the left, and 
Thrasybulus the right : the rest of the com- 
manders were regularly posted according to 
their rank. The Peloponnesians, showing 
most eagerness to begin the engagement, en- 
deavoured with their left ta over-reach the 
right of the Athenians, in order to exclude 
them, if possible, from stretching out into the 
main sea, and, by keeping them cramped up, to 
force their centre against the shore, which was 
not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the 
enemy's design to shut them up, plying up 
a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in 
velocity beat them all to nothing. 

By these motions, ihe left of their line be- 
came extended beyond the cape called Cynos- 
sema. The consequence of which was expos- 
ing their centre, composed only of the weakest 
ships, and those ranged at too great a distance 
from one another ; especially as in number of 
vessels they were quite inferior, and as the 
coast round the Oynos-sema was sharp, and in 
an acute angle runs out into the water, so that 
part of the line on one side was out of sight of 
the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, 
charging the the cent/e, drove at once the ships 
of the Athenians upon the beach ; and, being 
so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shor% 
to pursue them. But neither those under 
Thrasybulus could assist the centre from the 
right, because of the multitude of ships that 
stood in to awe them ; nor could those 
under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because 
the interposition of cape Cynos-sema hid from 
him the view of what had passed ; and at the 
same time the Syracusans and others, who. 



equal in strength, lay hard upon him, prevented 
his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, 
presuming the victory their own, broke their 
order to give different chase to single ships, 
and in too heedless a manner threw confusion 
upon a part of their own line. And now those 
under Thrasybulus, -finding the squadron op- 
posed to them began to slacken, stopped all far- 
ther extension of their line a-head ; and tack- 
ing upon them, resolutely engaged, and put 
them to flight. Charging next the dispersed 
ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed 
the squadron that presumed itself victorious, 
they made havoc ; and, by striking them with 
a panic, routed the greater part without resis- 
tance. Now also the Syracusans were begin- 
ning to give way before the squadron under 
Thrasyllus ; and seeing others in open flight, 
were more easily tempted to follow their ex- 
ample. The defeat now being manifestly 
given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for 
shelter, first towards the river Pydius, and 
afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made 
prize of only an inconsiderable number of 
shipping; for the Hellespont, being narrow, 
afforded short retreats to the enemy. How- 
ever they gained a victory by sea, most oppor- 
tune indeed in their present situation; for 
hitherto, afraid of thd naval strength of the 
Peloponnesians, because of the rebufls they 
had lately received from it, and the calamitous 
event of the Sicilian expedition, from this 
moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusa- 
tions or groundless exaggerations of the ene- 
my's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy 
in fact they take ; for ii^stance, eight Chian, five 
Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian ; but, 
of Leucadian, and Lacedaemonian, and Syracu- 
san, and Pellenean, a single one of each : but 
then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of 
their own. 

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of 
CynoS-sema, and picking up the shatters of 
the fight, and giving up, under truce, their dead 
to the enemy, they despatched a trireme to 
Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of 
this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news 
of this unhoped-for success, greatly resumed 
their spirits, which had been dejected by the 
recent misfortunes at Euboea and the sad effects 
of the sedition, and hoped the state might again 
resume its power if they cheerfully exerted 
their efforts in its behalf. 
2k2 



3d4 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vnr. 



On the looith day after the hattle, the 
Athenians, having diligently refitted their 
fleet at Sestus, tailed against Cyzictia, which 
had revolted ; and, descrying eight ships from 
Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagimn 
and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them ; 
and, having in battle upon the shore defeated 
their crews, made prizes of them all. Repair- 
ing thenoe against Cyzicus, which was quite 
unfortified, they reduced it once more, and ex- 
acted large contributions from it. 

But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians 
made a trip from Abydus to Eleus, and brought 
off as many of their own ships which had been 
taken as were able to sail; the residue the 
Eleusians burnt. They also despatched Hip- 
pocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch up 
their fieet from thence. 
< About the same space of time, Alcibiades 
also, at the head of hi^ squadron of thirteen sail, 
returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the 
harbour of Samoa, reporting that <«by his 
management he had diverted the junction of 
the Phoenician fieet with the Peloponnesians, 
and made Tissaphemes a faster friend than 
ever to the Athenians.*' After enlarg^g his 
squadron by the addition of nine more just 
manned, he levied large contributions upon the 
Halparnasseans, and fortified Cos. After 
these exploits, and putting the government of 
Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about 
autumn, to Samos.* 



t As ihe Engliflh reader is here to take bis leave of 
Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what 
became of him after.— Every thing succeeded so well, 
under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacede- 
monians, having received seii^ral defeats both by land 
and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again neces- 
aitated to sue for peace. After such great services, 
Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole 
city flocked down to the Pirseus to meet him. All 
strove to get a sight of Alcjbiades : .they caressed 
him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and 
hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There 
he harangued them for a time ; then stopped and shed 
tears in abundance ; then harangued them again. In 
short, they undid all they had ever done against him ; 
and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. 
• Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be 
eluccessful ; a crime which his countrymen very seldom 
forgave. He became a second time an exile from Athens. 
His great abilities made him a continual terror both to 
foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered 
to serve his country, by caballing in their favour, and 
advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain : 
Lysander was soon master of the Pireus and of Athens. 
Alcibiades retired into Phrygfa, and was handsomely 



From Aspendus abo Tissaphones rode back 
post haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the 
departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mil- 
etus for the Hellespont. 

But, as the Pdoponnesians were now in 
the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (who are 
of .^olic descent) having procured from 
Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched 
across mount Ida, received them into their 
cit^, provoked to this step by the injurious 
conduct of Arsaces, a Persian lieutenant to 
Tissaphemes. This man, pretending he had 
enemies to cope with whom yet he never 
named, prevailed with the Delians settled in 
Adramittium, because they had been obliged 
by the Athenians to quit Belos in the afiair 
of the expiation, to attend him in this secret 
expedition with the flower of their strength ; 
and, leading tiiem forwards with all the diow 
of friendship and alliance, watched the oppor- 
tunity when they were busy at their meal, 
surrounded them with a body of his own 
soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. 
Fearing him, therefore, because of this in- 
stance of a cruel temper, lest some such 
act of violence he might execute also upon 
them, as in other respects he had imposed 
some burdens upon them which they could 
not bear, the Antandrians eject his garrison 
out of their citadeL But Tissaj^emes, per- 
ceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were 
concerned in Ihis aflair, and esteeming him- 
self sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus 
(since in those places too his garrisons had 
been ejected;) and firaring they would pro- 
ceed to other commissdons of the same na- 
ture ; chagrined moreover that perhaps Phar- 
nabazus, in less time and with less expense, 
having obtained their concurrence, should 
make a greatn progress against the Athenians ; 
— be determined in person to repair to Helles- 
pont, in order to expostulate with them about 



supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; 
who however was wrought upon at last, by the joint 
solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity 
for the service of the king, to undertake his destruc- 
tion. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt 
him in an open manner, but set fire to his bouse by 
night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames, 
he got out safe, The Barbarians soon spied him, 
shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut 
off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shaO 
only add, that he was but forty years old when he was 
thus destroyed. 



1 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



395 



theii late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe 
off, as handsomely as he could, the aspendons 
thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the 
Phoenician fleet and other points. Arriying 
therefore first at Ephesus, he ofiered sacrifice 
to Diana ••••••.! 



Whoi the winter following this summer 
shall he ended, the twenty-first year of the war 
will he also completed. 

i Here breaks off abruptly the history of the Pelopoii> 
neiian war by Thacydides. The adjustment of time 
aaneied seems plainly of another hand. 



I 



INDEX. 



jibronfekusi 30. 

Jieanthnu, 187. 

jaeamajtioM^; excellent slingera, 83— conqner the Am- 
braciots, 139— make peace with them, 131— enter into 
an aUiance with the Athenians, 77. 

AehamianSf 61. 

Admetusy king of the Moloaiianf, 45. 

JEantidaSf tyrant of Lampsacus, 340. 

JEgineUBy formerly of great power at sea, 6— fltir up the 
war against the Athenians, 21— conqnered by the 
Athenians at sea, 34— how and why expelled iEgina 
by the Athenians, 03— are settled by the Lacedemo- 
nians at Thyrea, ib.— how used by the Athenians 
when they reduced Thjrrea, 153. 

JBEgi/pUans, which of them most warlike, 35. 

JBneatt 173. 

•iSneaiM, 53. 

JEnians, 281. 

JEolianst tributary to Athens, 281. 

JBEaimideSf 16. 

«S««n, 194. 

JBEtkeanSf 33. 

JOStolianst 3— invaded by the Athenians, 125— defeat 
them, 136. 

JifOMMmoHf 4. 

Jigatkarehidasy 83. 

Jigathareusj 267. 

Jlgesandert 47. 

Jigesippidasy SSOl. 

Jigt9t king of Sparta,^123, 133— he comnuinds against 
the Argives, 201— lets them go without a battle, SOS- 
is accused for it at Sparta, 303— marches a second 
time against them, ib.— gains the victory at Manti- 
nea, 307- fortifies Decelea in Attica, 26S|— makes an 
unsuccessful attempt on Athens, 319. 

Jtgnottt 88— the son of Nicias, colleague to Pericles, 38 
— besiegeth Fotidsa, 73— the founder of Amphipolis, 
167, 183. 

JigrmmSf 130. 

Jtgrianian»t 80. 

AgrigetUine9j neutral in the Sicilian war, 383. 

Alemusy archon at Athens, 188. 

Jileammesy 397, 399. 

Jilcibiadett son of Clinias, 195— his expedition into Pelo- 
ponnesus, 300— and to Argos, 310— named for one of 
the commanders in Sicily, 330— his speech on that oc- 
casion, 333 — ^is accused about the Mercuries, and for 
profaning the mysteries, 327,337— insisto on a trial,338 
—sets out for Sicily ,ib.— his opinion at a council of war, 
236-^is recalled to take his trial, 337— flies and is out- 
lawed, 341— takes refUge at Sparta, 351— his speech at 
' Sparta, ib.— adviseth the Lacedemonians about prose- 
cuting the war, 397, 399— sent to Chios with Chalci- 
50 



deus, 300— his transactions at Miletus, 301— goes to 
Tissaphemes, and becomes a favourite, 310— con- 
Uives his own recalment to Athens, 311— his quarrel 
with Phrynichus, 313—18 recalled, 933, 331— bis man- 
agement at Samoa, 333, 325— goes to Aspendns, 326. 

AleidaSf the Lacedemonian admiral, sent to Lesbos, 98, 
101— he flies, 102— returns to Peloponnesus, 117— 
sails to Corcjrra, 118— one of the three leaders of the ' 
colony to Heraclea, 134. 

Mdmdas, 187, 188. 

Aleiphrony 203. 

Alemaon, 01. 

Alcmaonidat 340. 

AlexatxkuSf 365. 

AUxieleSf put under arrest,- 328— flies to Decelea, 331. 

AlexippidaSy 315. 

Ambraciots^i the Corinthians against the Corcjrreans, 
9, 10— make war on the Amphilochians, 77— and the 
Acamanians, 88— make another expe^tion against 
both, 137— take Olpie, 138— are defeated, 139— make 
peace, 131— send aid to the Syracusans, 383. 

Amaniagy 177. 

Amnjuadety 77. 

AminoeleSf 5. 

AmorgeSf revolts Arom the king of Persia, 897— is taken 
prisoner by the Peloponnesians, and delivered to Tis- 
saphemes, 305. 

AmpelidaSf 187. 

Amphiasy 173. 

AmphiloehianSf 77, 130. 

AmpkissensianSf 136. 

Anyntutf 88. 

AmyrtauSf 35. 

Anaxarehusi 333. 

AnaxiUUy 319. 

Andoddesi 18. 

AndroeleSf 317. 

Andromgnesy 194. 

Aiulrosthenett 199. 

Andrianty 381. 

AnthippfMj 187, 188. 

AfUieles, 38. 

Antimenidast 194. 

Antioehusy king of the Orestians, 83. 

Antiph9mu»t 318. 

Autiphot 318, 337. 

ArtHsthtnett 308, 310. 

Antftanianst 83. 

Apodotiy 1524. 

Areadian»t furnished with ships by Agamemnon in the 
Trojan expedition, 4— mercenaries, 381. 

Arehediee, 340. 

Arekelau»y 90. 

387 



338 



INDEX. 



ArekutratiUf 10. 

^reketimust 10. 

JbxhiiUt of Camarlna, 141. 

Arehast the Corinthian, founder of Syracnae, 218. 

Arekidamu», king of Sparta, bis speech about the war, 
26— commandi in the invaaion of Attica, 56 — bis 
speech, ib.— commands in another invaaion, 60— «nd 
against Piatca, 78. 

Arekonides, 259. 

ArgyllianSf a colony of Andrians, 167 

ArgiveSf have thirty-years' truces with the Lacedemo- 
nians, 184— are irritated by the Corinthians against 
he Lacedemonians, 189— aim at being a leading state, 
ib. — malce war upon the Epidaurians, 200— are sur- 
rounded by the Lacedemonians, but let go, S03 — ^are 
defeated at Maqttpe^, ^9A in«k« pete*, 907, 90S. 

AnvUkidatf 16^ 

ArisUigor<Ui 167. 

Aristarekus, 327, 388, .331. 

Ari»t0U9t son of PeUicaa, 10. 

Aristeut, eon of Adimantufi 18» 81« 77. 

AristeuM, the Lacedemoniiui, 177. 

ArUiidesy son of Lyaimaphu*, 30. 

Aristidesj son of Archippus^ 1^ 1^ 

ArittocUSy 185, 206. 

Aristeemtesy 187. 

Arutoeratest 188, 327, 328. 

Aristogitont 7, 238. 

AristOt 273. 

ArUttwnfS, 9( fi«i[i«lft» 69 . 

Ariatopkotiy 325. 

ArUtotU, son of Timocratei, ^88, 

A^hmk9, kiog of the Lyn^fsUans, 16ChrWfJnr«dag<^"^ 
by Bra^idas and, Fordip^as, Uu 174. 

Artdbatu9y ^9. 

Ariapkenust 150. 

Artatt 271. 

AHaxerxes Longimanutj 33— begina to f«ign, 46— diiMi 
—150. 

AtopdiiUt son of P^rmio, his exploit «^4 (lea;t^ 94. 

4*typaci^tt«, 111. 

Aatyockus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 301— SQ^—soes 
to Chios, 302— in great danger, 306— tefusee to suc- 
cour the Chiana, ib.— betrays Phrynichus, 312—10 
mutinied against by his own saiunon, and returna to 
Sparta, 324. 

AtktniaiUi gave shelter at first to all who would settle 
amongst them, 2— had war with the ^inets, 21— 
how they became a naval po wer,7-abandoned Athens 
and fought at Salamis, 24— rebuilt their walls, ^)— 
made war against the king of Persia, under Pausaniaa, 
31 — gain a victory at Eurymedon, 32— reduce the isle, 
of Thasos, ib.— receive the Helots, ai^i settle tliem at 
Naupactus, 33— their war in Egypt, ib. 35— with the 
Corinthians, ib. — and Epidaurians, and JSgineta,34 
—with the Lacedemonians, 35— BoBOtiajQs^ 36— SicyOr 
nians, ib. — Cyprians, ib. — recover Chieronaii ib»— d^ 
feated at Coronea, ib.— reduce Euboa*. 37— make mrar 
upon Samos, 38-rm.iU(e aUia/u^e lyith the Corcyce^nSi. 
15— assist them against the Corinlhians, 16— Ui^ 
measures with the Potidieans, 19— make war upon, 
Perdiccas, ib. — fight the Potidieans and Corinthians, 
20— besiege Potidiea,*21— deliberate about the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, 47— prepare for defence, 55— s«nd 
their fleet to cruise ui>oa P^lppopnesui^ 62'— aJb^ck. 
Hethone, ib.— i^yadq Locsifl* 63— qjoct the J^S^bUr 
from the isle of iEgina, ib.— make an alliance with 
Sitalces, ib.— take Solium and Astacus, 64 — invade 



the Megaris, ib.— fortify AtHlante,ib.— eelebrate tbe 
public funeral, ib. — are afflicted with the plague, eft- 
send their fleets to cruise on Peloponnesus, 72 — are 
angry with Pericles, 73— take Potideea, 78— war upon 
the Chalcideans, 81 — ^fight the Peloponnesians at sea, 
83— send a fleet to Lesbos, 03— besiege Mitylene, 94— 
reduce it, 101 — seize the island of Minoa, 110— send 
a fleet to Sicily, 122— their war in Acarnania, 124— 
are defeated by the ^tolians, 126— their proceedinp 
in Bidly, 133— they seisce and fortify Pylus, 134— 
fight between them and the Lacedemonians, 336— 
fight the Syracusans, 140, 141— invade the Corinth- 
ians, 147 — take Anactorium, 150— conquer Cythera, 
151 — take Thyrea, 152— surprise Nisea, 156 — invade 
Bobotia, and are defeated at Delium, 163, 165 — ^l<jee 
Amphipolis, 167 — ^make a truce with the LaoedeflM>- 
nians, 171— take Mende, 176— besiege Sciooe, 177— ■ 
^ectthe Deiians, 17<h-ftre conqaered by; Braaidas at 
Amphipolis. la^h-mafce % peace, 165— uke Sdooe, 
191— want to break the Reace, 195— make an alUaace 
with the Argives, 197— invade and reduce lfelea,21<l 
—determine on tbe iPicUttii expedition, 217— iheic 
preparations, 227— they Mii) for Sicily, 328— tend at 
' Syracuse, 949— Scm* 243— eolicii the allianee of Ca- 
mariqa, 846— take Epipole, 955— tosiege Syracuse, 
856— fight with dyliHpufb 961— send a reiiU«roeaient 
\o Syracuse, 965— l^ht the Coriothiavs at £rineu, 
971— defefited in the ftt^ftck of $pipole, 27«— are 
raising the siege, ^78— nee Stopped by an ecUpsie of the 
moon, lb.— $g(|ttM9 ^ttJ^ w the harhov, 986— march 
away, 288— forced to surrender, 292, 203r-their eoa- 
stemation at Athens, 295 — their measures, 9flfir— 4ake 
Mitylene, 309— subdue the Clazomenians, 30ft— be- 
siege the Chians,ib.r-ik»fi9aUJi9 Wi§th99, 304-qiiit 
Miletus for fear of the Peloponnesians, |b.-rKtbt aid 
are defeated, 309— solicit the friendship, ef Tissft- 
phernes, 314— fight with the Cbians, 316— low thek 
demficvecy, ib.— ^wi i«ilb«i»», 39M^-4e£e«t tt»t Pete, 
ponnesians in the battle of Cynos-sema, 9001. 

Atkenmusi 173. 

Atkenagorast his speech at SyracusQ, ^9» 

Atreutyi, 

Autoclesy 151, 173. 

B . 

Battusy 148^ 

BiB4ttmn^y «i8et«4 0%% o( Ajaii»% ^^-eomwenA Is tke 
Athenians at Qeii^pl^yia, 3&— heieom^ freea 36— win 
the battle of I>eUim« 1|65— ^ash^f PeUma, 14|6-take 
Panactum, 18tH-send ai4 to Uie 9ynieq|MM, 91(5. 

B^qUom Bulev% elev«i|. in iiun)h0C» US, 103r-lb« 

couAcile* ib^ 
Bomiensiansy 125. 

BoUiaanSy 19y81yW, 

Bnuidat^ saves Methone, and receives the piM>Hf» eon- 
mendaUon at ^fffta, 6Q, OSr-ls qftj^coooc^t^ Alc|- 
das, 118— his gallant behaviqui: «t fyhis, %36-Hiav« 
Megara, 158— marches to Thrace, ISO— his dumctiti^ 
100— B»ajrcheaegaiivit the Ly noesfimw, ih.»hanm;«ei 
thp Aeipthifins, 161— gets pofiesiil^iLQf AwplMpolis, 
l^B— ia repulsedat £ionj.l6ft— ntarchee int4>> Aete, 170 
—takes Toroae, ib,-— aM Leoy thus, l71-^<rowned by 
the Sci<means, 1.73«-mejrchesa seoondrtimeaf^iMtthe 
Lyiicestians, 174— his hsa^e retreet, 175— nakes an 
ugsifocegsfill atteniBt q« 9otid«», 178— o ppqoq s Qto s s 
aA Aw>hipoWa.. l&i— jmolves to atl^ck, ia»^h»- 
r««fue9. ib.— sallies, 183— conquurs aA^-dtee, ih^-^ 
funeiftl, ib» 



INDEX. 






Calliat, son of Calliades, 30— killed, Si. 

CallierateSf 10. 

Calliensians, 135. 

CamarineaiUt twice ejected, 319— their condact ln> tbe 
Sicilian war, 337, 350. 

CambyseStQ. 

Carcinu»i 63. 

Cariangj 3, 3. 

Carthaginians i 6, 331, 35fi. 

Carystians, 33, 281. 

Cataneansj dwell under mount iEtna, 138 — ^reduced by 
the Athenians. 337, 383. 

Ceerops^ king of AthenSf 59. 

CeryeeSi 313. 

Chtnreas, 331, 335. 

Chaleide**^ tbe Lacedemonian admiral, 399 — ^hlB ex- 
ploits, 300, 301— killed by the Athenians, 303. 

Chalcideans of Eubcea, make war with the Eretrians, 
6— subject to the Athenians, 381. 

Chalcideans of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, 19 
— defeat them, 81— enter into league with the Ar- 
gives, 191. 
' Chaonians^ 83. 

Charieles, 366, 368. 

Charminust an Athenian commander, 306 — defeated by 
the Peloponnesians, 309— helps the oligarchial party 
at Samos, 320. 

Charaadas, son of EuphHitus^ 133— killed, 133. 

Chisnis, 187, 188. 

Chians, suspected, 398— revolt from the Athenians, 300 
—their war, 303. 

Chrysis, 53, 178. 

CilieianSf 36. 

Oimonf son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 33— beats the Per- 
siaiM at Eurymedon, ib. — dies in the expedition to 
Cyprus, 36. 

ClearehuSf 333. 

Clearidast commands in Amphipolis, 177, 183— con- 
quers Cleon with Brasidas, 183— endeavours to break 
the peace, 187. 

CleippideSf 93. 

CieobuluSf 193. 

Cleemedesy 311. 

CleomsneSy 43. 

Cleon^ his speech, 103— command at Pylus, 1^3, 144, 146 
—his command in Thrace, 179, 181— conquered by 
Brasidas, and killed, 183. 

CleopompuSf 73. 

Cnemus, the Spartan, commands a squaUron against 2a> 
cynthus, 77— sent into Acamania, 83— retlrea from 
Stratus, 83. 

Cononf ^iS, 

Copiensians, 164. 

CoreyreanSf founders of Epidamnus, ^—^ete tbem- 
selves a Corinthian cblbny , 9— make wai* on Epidam- 
nus, ib.— beat the Corinthians at sea, 10— beg the al- 
liance of Athene, 11— their speech at Athens, IS— 
their success, 15— engage the Corinthians at sea, 16— 
their sedition, 177, 149— aid the Athenians In the war 
of Sicily, 381. 

CorirUhiausi first built ships of War, 5— their quarrel 
with the Corcyreans about Epidamotis, 9— their 



speech at Athens, 13— continuation of their war with 
the Corcyreans, 16— send aid to Potidca, 30— hate 
the Athenians, 31 — ^their first speech at Lacedemon, 
ibid.— their second, 39 — excite discbntent Ife Pelo- 
^Anesui, 188, 189— idske dlllaflM!l i(rith the Ble- 
ans and Argivfes^ 19i-^^A tiie Syfacntaifs, 854, 
964. 

CoronMnSy 164. 

CranianSf 64. 

CranonianSi 63. 

Cratamenesi 318. 

CrestonianSf 170. 

Cretans, 381. 

CrasuSy 6. 

Cyclops, 317. 

Cylon, the history of him, 4L. 

Oynes, 91. * 

Cyrus the elder^ 6. ' 

Cyrus the younger, 33. 



Daithus, 187. 

Damagetus, 187. 

Dame^on, 134. 

DtMMtimus, 173. 

Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Cambyses, 6— redoeea 
the isles, ib. 

Darius, son of Artaxerxes, £897— hii leagues with thB 
Lacedemonians, 301, 307, 315. 

Dascon, 319. 

Delians, removed outof Delos by the AtiMnians, 179— 
brought thither again, 191. 

Demaratus, 358. 

Demarchus, 335. 

Demodochus, 158. 

Demosthenes, 133— his war in JBtOlia, 1$25— his seicare 
of and exploit* at PyhiSj 194, 135— his haraiigutf, 136 
— ^his attempt on Mtgat^, 155^^arrlea np a reinforce- 
ment against Syracuse, 365 — arrives fit Syracuse, 374 
^repulsed at Epipohe, 375^ia for raising the siege, 
S77-^ecl«ipa, 387 — smrenders wfth tbe troops un- 
der his command, 39S— ik put ti5 deaUi, 393; 

Demoteles, 141. 

DereyUdas, 316. 

Derdas, 19. 

DsTS&nis, 90. 

Dians, 89. 

Dictideans, takeThyssus, 193— dwell on mount Athoii, 
309— revolt from the Athenians, ib. 

Diemporus, 53. 

Dixtriphes, 369. 

Diodotus, his speech, 106. 

DloiMdon, besiegf^ Gi& tVUAH, SOSM-favours the de- 
mocracy, 330. 

DiomUus, 16. 

Diotrephes, 317 

Diphilus, 371. 

Do lopes, 33. 

Dorcis, 31. 

Dorians, in Peloponnesus, 5— founders of Lacedemon, 
34, 134— bordering on the Carians, 56— warred upon 
by the Fhochins, 34— perpetual enemies to lonians, 
348. 

DoHeus the Rhodian, 95. 

Dorieus the Thurian, 307. 

Droans of Thrace, 90. 



340 



INDEX. 



E 



Edomams,Z3,W, 170, 

Egtstemu, at war with the SeUnuntiaBS, 219— «>Ikit 

aid of Athena, ib.— their trick, 835. 
ElewMf defeated by the Athenians, 63— an alliance 

with the Ciorinthians and Argivea, 190— with the 

Athenian!, 197. 
Elmuinianst warred a^^nat Erectheus, 59. 
f/ymi, 317. 
Empediast 187, 188. 
Endiua^ the Spartan, 297— ambaasadinr to Athens, 196 

— his enmity with Agia, 299. 
Entimus, the Cretan, founder of Gela, 218. 
Eordian$^ 90. 
Epidamnia%9t harassed with seditions, 9 — ^beg aid at 

Corcyra, ib.— at Corinth, ib. — ^besieged by the Corcy- 

reans, ib. — reduced, 10. 
Epitadast 135, 146. 
EpiUlideUf 177. 
EreetheuSf 59. 
Eretriansy at war with the Chalcideans, 6— subject 

and tributary to Athens, 281. 
ErythrtBans, 300. 
EteonienSy 302. 
EutUatt 302. 
EvarehuSf tyrant of Astacus, 61— another of the name, 

218. 
Eubulus, 302. 
Eueles the Athenian, 168. 
Eueles the Syracusan, 258. 
EucKdest founder of Himera, 219. 
EuetemoTtf 306. 
Evesperita, 278 
"EumaekuSf 64. 
Eumolpidat 313. 
Eumolpua, 59. 
Eupkamidasj 64, 173. 
Euphemust his speech at Camarina, SMS. 
EuryloehuSf the Spartan, 126, 128, 129. 
Eurymaehu9t 53,55. 
EvrymedoTif sent to Corcyra, 119— to Sicily, 134—18 

fined for returning, 155— sent thither again, 264— ar- 
rives at Syracuse, 274— killed, 279. 
Eurystheusj king of Micene, 4. 
EurytanianSf 126. 
Eu9trophuSt 194. 
Euthyd*mu8f 187, 188— a commander at Syracuse, 

264— unsuccessful in the last battle, 286. 



G 



Gelotiy king of Syracuse, 218, 219. 

Oeloans, build Agrigentum, 218— aid the Syracusans, 

282. 
Geta^ 88. 
OlaueOy 18. 
Ooaxitt 169. 

OongyluB, the Eretrian, 4S. 
OongyltUy the Corinthian, 260. 
QreMOUy 89. 
Ortciansy account of the old, 2— how they undertook 

the Trojan expedition, 4— applied themselves to 

maritime affairs, 6, 7. 
Oylippusy sent to command at Syracuse, 254— arrives 

there, 260— his battles, 261— takes Plemmyrium, 266 

—procures succours, 278— fights the Athenians, 279 



—stops their decampment, 288— takes Nicias prison- 
er, 293— brings home the fleet frQm Sicily, 299. 
OyrttfniaiM, 62. 



HaUartia'My 164. 

Harmodiusy history of him, 238. 
Hegesandevi 265. 

Hegeaandridas, 328, 329. 

Hegesippidasy 200. 

Helen, 4. 

Bellanicitay 32. 

Hellen, son of Deucalion, 2. 

HelotSy their revolt from, and war with, the Lacede- 
monians, 32, 33 — are feared, and 2000 of them made 
away with, 160. 

HeraeleotSy 199. 

Heraelidmj kill Eurystheus, 4. 

HeraelideSf the Syracusan, 5245, S258. 

HereanSy 205. 

Hermteondasy 94. 

Htrmocratesy his speech to the Sicilians, 152— to thi 
Syracusans, 230 — ^his character, 245 — encourages the 
Syracusans, ib. — made a commander, ib. — ^his speech 
at Camarina, 246 — his stratagem, 5268— banished, 325. 

Hermouy 328. 

He$xod, 125. 

Hetttansy 126. 

Hestieeans, 37, 281. 

HestiodoruSy 78. 

HierensiaTUt 124. 

Hierophon, 128. 

Hippagretea, 146. , 

Bipparehiu, history of him, 238. 

Hippia»f the eldest son of Pisistratns, history of him, 
238. 

Hippiaa the Arcadian, 103. 

Hippoelusy tyrant of Lampsacus, 240. 

Hippoelue, son of Menippus, 299. 

Hippocrates the Athenian, 155 — ^his attempt on Me- 
gara, ib. — his harangue, 165 — skilled at the battle of 
Delium, 167— tyrant of Gela, 219. 

^ppoloehidas, 159. 

Hipponieus, 123. 

Hipponoidas, 206. 

Homer, 2, 4, 127. 

Hyteansy 127. 

Hyhleanty 254. 

Hyhlon, 218. 

HyperboluSf 320. 

I 

IberiaiUy 217, 252. 

iZ;yrtan«,9, 175. 

ImbrianSy 94, 281. 

Inarus, an African king, revolts fh»m the Pentan mon- 
arch, 33— crucified, 35. 

lolciusy 187, 188. 

loniansy had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and 
were masters at sea, 6— eubdued by Cjrms, ib.— re- 
volt, 31— enemies to the Dorians, 248— used to assem- 
ble at Delos, 127. 

Ippenaiansy 126. 

learchidasy 10. 

Isehagorasy 177, 187, 188 

IsoerateSy 83. 



INDEX. 



341 



l3oerate9, 83. 
Istkmionieust 187« 188. 
Jtalust 218. 
ItamaneSf 103. 
ItouianSf 183. 
Ity», 63 



LaeedemonianSf their power in Peloponneius, 4 — ^their 
dress, 3— were the first who stripped in the public 
games, 3— demolished tyrants, 6 — deluded by The- 
mistocles, 30— accuse him, 45 — war against their 
Helots, 33— at war with the Athenians, ib. — and tire 
Dorians, ib. — beat the Athenians at Tanagra, 35 — 
make a truce for five years, 36— begin the holy war, 
ib. — make a thirty years' truce with the Athenians, 
37 — consult about the Peloponnesian war, 26 — deter- 
mine for it, 28, 29— send embassies to Athens to spin 
out time, 41— invade Attica, 56— assign Thyrea to the 
MginettBi 63 — ^invade Attica, 69— make war on Za- 
cynthus, 77— march to Platsa, and besiege it, 78 — in- 
vade Acarnania, 82— -fight at sea, 83— their project 
to seize the Pireus, 87— invade Attica, 97— resolve 
to succour the Mityleneans, ib. — become masters of 
Platsa, 110— put the Plateaus to death, 116— beat the 
Corcyreans at sea, 119— send a colony to Heraclea, 
123— their expedition against the Amphilochians, 128 
—Invade Attica, 133— their endeavours to recover 
Pylus, 134— send an embassy to Athens to solicit a 
peace, 137— vanquished in Sphacteria, 146 — make 
aw^ with 2000 Helots, 160— take Amphipolis, 168 
— make peace with the Athenians, 172 — march into 
Arcadia, 191— forbid to assist at the Olympic games, 
199— succour the Epidaurians, 201 — gain a victory at 
M antinea, 206— determine to succour the Syracusans, 
254— fortify Decelea, 265— succour the Chians, 299— 
enter into league with the Persian monarch, 301, 
307, 315— take lasus, 305— fight with and beat the 
Athenians, 308— seize Rhodes, 310— are beat at the 
sea-fight of Cynos-sema, 333. 

LaeedemoniuSf son of Cimon, 16. 

Laches J commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 122, 
187, 188— makes war on Myle, 123— defeats the Lo- 
crians, 127. 

LaeOf 111. 

LtBspodiaty 258, 325 , 

Lcsstrigons. 217. 

Lamaehug, loseth a squadron, 158— one of the three 
commanders in Sicily, 220— his opinion at a council 
ofwar, 236— kmed,257 

Lamia, 218. 

Lamphilutj 187, 188. 

Lampo, 187, 188. 

LeesanSj 89. 

Learekus, 77. 

Lemniang, 94, 182— accompany the Athenian! to Sici- 
ly, 281. 

Leoerates, 34. 

LeoH the Lacedemonian, 124. 

Leon the Athenian, 302, 303, 314. 

Leontines, 141— at war with the Syracusans, 122— in 
sedition, 180. 

Leotyehidesy 29. 

Lesbians, 94. 

Leueadians, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyre- 
ans, 9— join the Ambraciots, 82. 



Liehaa, an Olympic victor, but scourged, 190— his em- 
bassies, 187, 2i^ — public host of the Argives,ib. — his 
dispute with Tissaphernes. 309, 324— his death, ib. 

Loerians, Oiolian, 3 — lose Naupactns, 33 — confede- 
rate with the Athenians, 125. 

Locrians, EpiiepKyrioM, 259. 

Lyeophron, 84, 148. 

LyneestianSf 90, 160, 174. 

LysieleSy 99. 

LysistratitSf 170. 



M 



^aearius, 126, 129. 

Maehon, 83. 

Mantineans, 129, 130— war witJi the Tegeate, 178— 
make alliance with the Argives, 189 — at war with 
the Lacedemonians, 191 — ^renew the peace with them, 
209— mercenaries, 281 

Megabetesy 42. / 

MegabaivLs the Persian, 35 — son of Zopyrus, ib. 

Megareans, aid the Corinthians against Corcyra, 10 — 
prohibited the harbours and markets of Athens, 2h 

- 47 — scheme to betray their city to the Athenians, 155 
—demolish their long walls, 169. 

MeleanSf 181. 

Melanehridas, 298. 

Jlielanthust 297. 

Meleas, 94 

Melesander, 78. 

Melians, their conference with the Athenians, 211 — 
besieged, 215— reduced, ib. 

Meliensians, 124— fight with the Heracleots, 199. 

Menander, an Athehian commander in Sicily, 264, 
286. 

Menas, 187, 188. 

Mendeans, 174. 

Meneeolus, 219. 

Meneerates, 173. 

JIfcnon, 62. 

Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected by the Lacedemo- 
nians, 33 — settled by the Athenians at Nanpactos,ib. 
—take Phia, 63— replaced at Pylus, 147. 

Messenians of Sicily, at war with the Nazians, 141 

Metagenes, 187, 188. 

Metapontians, 281. 

Methymneansy 98, 281. 

Miciades, 16. 

Milesians, their war with the Samians, 37— beat the 
Argives, 304 — demolish the fort built by Tissapher- 
nes, 324. 

Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 324, 331 — de- 
feated, 333. 

Minos, his naval power, 2, 3. \ 

Mityleneans, revolt from the Athenians, 93 — ^iheir 
speech at Olympia, 95— reduced, 101— ordered to be 
massacred, 103. 

Molossians, 82. 

My tales sians, massacred, 269. 

Myonensians, 126. 

Myrcinians, 181. 

Myronides, 34, 35, 165, 

Myrrhine, 238. 

Myrtilus, 187, 188. 

Myseon, 325. 

2L 



343 



INDEX. 



N 



Jfanelides^ 53. 

Jfaxiana, favour the AUkenlaiui, S37, SSl—vanquiah the 
MessenianB, 142. 

JfieanoTt 82. 

JVietM, son of Niceratiu, 110, 142, 147, 151, 174— his 
speeches, 2S0, S25. 243, 283, 289— takes Minoa, 110— 
attacks Melos, 123 — invades the Corinthians, 147— 
takes Cythera, 151 — and Mende, 175— besieges Sci- 
one, ib. — author of the peace, 185, 197— named for 
the command in Sicily, 220 — his opinion at a council 
of war, 236— defeaU the Syracusans, 244, 262— his 

' stratagem, 257 — ^left in the sole command, 258 — his 
letter to the Athenians,'283— refuseth to raise the 
siege of Syracuse, 277— raiseth the siege, 288— sur- 
renders to Gylippiis, 293— put to death, ib. 

MHeiatf the Cretan of Gortyna, 84. 

Jficolemay T7. 

Jfieovutehutt 163. 

M'ieomedeSf 34. 

A'tcon, 365. 

Idconidaay 159. 

JVtC0«fra<««,aids the popular faction at Corcyra, 118 — 
takes Cythera, 151— takM Mende, 175— besieges Sci- 
one, ib.— 203. 

JiTymphodorus, 63. 



Odomantiantt 90, 181. 
OdrysiaiUf 89. 
OeanthiaMt 127. 

Omt<ui0, 83, 131— Invaded by the Athenians, 95— re- 
ceived into their alliance, 159. 
Oetitant, 124, S96. 
Olynthiatu, 193. 
OnatimuSf 173. 
OnomaeleSf 306. 
OphioniarUy 125. 
Opieiansy 218. 
Orestes, 95, 
Orestiansy 82. 
Oroedusi 82. 
OropianSf 63. 



Pttchss, sent by the Athenians to reduce Mitylene, 98 
—takes it, 101— and Notiiun, 103— and Pyrrha and 
Eressus, ib. 

PtBdaritus, or Pedaritus, 305, 306, 308— killed, 314. 

PasTtianSf 89. 

Pagondasj his harangues to the Bootian^ 16^— wine 
the battle of Deliam, 165. 

PalirensianSf 64. 

Pammilust 218. 

PatuBonSf 90. 

Pandion, 63. 

Paraliansy 124. 

PartmaanSf 82. 

Parians, 168. 

Pausanias, captain-general of Greece, 31-Hnibdiiee Cy- 
prus, ih.-i-besieges Byzantium, ib.— grows a tyrant. 



ib.— recalled and tried at Sparta, lb.— retomii to Hel- 
lespont, 42— his letter to Xen(«8,tib.— driven from 
Byzantium, 43— betrayed, 44-^tarved to death, ib. 

Pausanias, son of Pleistionaz, 101. 

Pelops, 4. 

Peloponnesians, their colonies, 5— their character, 48 
—originally Dorians, 248— their war with the Athe- 
nians: see Athenians and Lacedemonians: 

Pertebians, 159. 

Perdieeas, king of Macedonia, his political turns, 19, 20, 
63, 88— invaded by Sitalces, 88— in conjunction with 
Bmsidas, invades Arribsus, 160, 177— qnarrels with 
Brasidas, 177-^!Bake8 peace with the Athenian, ib. 
•>-is again their enefny, 210. 

Pericles, commands the Athenians, 3&— eonqnen Eu- 
btea, ib.— and Samos, 37— his speech for war, ^— 
makes the funeral m>atioD, 65— bis speech ia defence 
of hhnself, 73— his desAh and <sharttcter^ 75, 76. 

PerisreSt 218. 

PereioMs, at TlsermopyiB, 146-41ielr noble emstogi, 89. 

Phaaeia»s,9 

PJmox, 180 

Pkmdimiu, 195. 

Phminis, priBstesB of Juno, 178r 

PhansnHuhvs, 78. 

Pkttmabaxus, 297, 306. 

Phamaeest 77. 

PharsalioMS, 63. 

Phermau, 63. 

PhUippuSj the Lacedemonian 305, 33L 

Philoeharidas, 173, 167,188, 196. 

Philoerates, 215. 

PkiloeteteSf 4. 

PkliasianSf 10. 

Phaeeans, YmOt Marseilles, 0*-«beat tlie Carthagiiiiaiis 
at sea, ib. 

Phoeimns, at war with tiie Dtnriansy 91— rteover the 
temple of Delphi, 36. 

Phetnieians, exercised piracy, 3— inhabited the irtee, ib. 
—had settlements in Sicily, 218. 

Pkarmio, an Atheniai^ commander, 31, 38^-Hsonnnand3 
their fleet at Naupactus, 78^— beats the Petoponne- 
sians at sea, 84 — prepares for a second engagement, 
ib. — ^his harangue, 85^beatB them again, 87. 

PkoHus, 82. 

Phrynieus, 303 — ^his intrigue against Alcibiadee, 31:^ 
deprived of the command, 314— is of the oligarchical 
faction, 318, 327— is assassinated* 338. 

Pierians, 90. 

Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, 313, 316, 
327— flie» to Decdea, 331. 

Pisistratus, the tyrant, 127, 338— purifies Delos, 137- 
dies an old man, 238. 

Pisistratus, the son of Bippias, 338 — dedicated al- 
tars, ib. 

Pissuthnes, 37, 103. 

Pittaeus, 169. 

PlatmoM, eonliBderatew^thAthenSr54— beeieged,78— a 
body of them make their escape, 100— surrender, UO 
— their speech to the Lacedemonians, ibi — are pot to 
death, 116. 

Plsistionax, king of Sparta, 34, 37-4MUiisihed, 61--n- 
Btored, 185, 188, 19L 

Plsistolas, 187, 188. 

Pleistarekus, 43. 

PoUs, 77. 

Polles, 181. 

PolyoMthes, 271 



INDEX. 



343 



PolferatM, tyrant of Bamos, powerful at sea, 6— con- 
secrates Rbenea to the Delian Apollo, ib. 137. 

Polydamidaa, 174, 177. 

Polymed$s, 62. 

Potidaansj originally from Corinth, 11^— defeated by 
the Athenians, Sl—besieged, ib. 79->snrrend9f, 78. 

Protod$wui9i 77. 

Prod**, 133, 187, 189. 

Proenej 63. 

Preteas, 16, 6S. 

ProxenuSf 127. 

PtmodoruSf 158. 

Pyttilhu^ 219. 

Pythen, 258, 259. 

Pytkiat, 111 

PftkodoruSf the archon at Athena, 53->tbs aoa «t Uo- 
lochuB, in the command, 131, 187, 188, 258— banish- 
ed, 155. 



B 



Raikphias, 47, \B4. 

Rhegianst 122— attacked by the Loeriana, 133, 140— 

neutral in the Sicilian war, SS35. 
RhodianSf Doric hj dMeenl, 261. 



8 



Sabflinthust 82. 

SaeoHj 219. 

Sadoeof, son of Sitalees, 64— made a citizen of Ath- 
ens, ib. 

Salmthua, sent to Mitylene, 101— taken prisoner and 
put to death by the Athenians, 103. 

SalyrUhiMM, king of the Agrsans, 131. 

Samiantt conquered by the Athenians, 37-.rtheir insur- 
rection, 302. 

SargeuSf 267. 

8eionean»,o( the Pelene, originally f^om Peloponnesus, 
173— revoH, ib.— crown Brasidas, ib. — reduced and 
severely treated by the Athenians, 191. 

SeiroJidaa, 314. 

SeythxaTLs, 89. 

Selinuntiant, 281— at war with the Egesteans, 219l 

Sermyliant, 186. 

Smthetf 89, 167— succeeds Sitalees in the kingdom of 
Odrysc, 89— marries the sister of Perdiccas, 91. 

Sieaniant^ 217. 

Sieiliant, 152, 154. 

Statu, 218, 251, 257. 

Sieyonian9t 35, 36, 167. 

SimonideSf 134. 

Simus, 219. 

Singeant, 186L 

Sintianst 89. 

Sitalees f king of Thrace, 63, 77— ally to the Athenians, 
64— invades the Macedonians, 88— his power, 89— 
conquered by the Triballians, 167. 

Socrates, son of Antigenes, 62. 

Sopkoeles, son of Soetratides, 131— sent to Sicily, 133 
—his acts at Corcyra, 149— banished from Athena, 
155. 

Stesagoras, 38. 

SthtMlaidas, his speech, 28. 

Stratemee, 91. 

Stratianst conquer the Chaonians, 82. 

Strombiehides, 300— his exploits, 306, 333. 



StypkoUf 146. 

Styrensians, 381. 

SyraeusanSf at war with the Leontlnes, 123— are de> 
feated by the Athenians, 140— draw up against tha 
Athenians, 34»^preparefor batUe, ib.— are defeated, 
844— fortify their city, 24&-HMnd ambassadora to Ca- 
marina, 846— to Corinth and Sparta, 251— engage and 
'are defeated by the Athenlana, 855, 857— raise their 
counter-worfca, 8S6*^re about treathig with Nieias, 
257— prepare their fleet, 366— attack the Athenians 
by land and sea, ibv— erect two trophies, 876— prepare 
again for an engagement, 379— defeat them again, ib. 
—prepare for the last battle, 383-engage, 386-are 
victorious, 387— etop the Athenians by a stratagem, 
888— pursue them and take them all prisoners, 890^ 
send aid to the Peloponnesians, 904, 333. 



Tage$, 399. 

Tamus, 306< 

Tantalus, a Lacedemonian commander, 158. 

Taurus, 173. 

TegeaUB, fight with the Mantjneana, 178. 

TeUes, 187, 188. 

Tellias,258, 

Temenidm, 90. 

Tenedians, 93, 381. ^ 

Teians, 103, 381, 300. 

Teres, father of Sitakea, 63F.4kQW he got the kisgdoni 
of Odrysc, ib.— enlarged it, ib. 

Teutiaplus, 103— his advice to Alcidas and the Felo- 
ponnesianB, ib. 

Tharfps, king of the Moloesians, 83. 

Thasians, revolt from Athens, 33 — defeated, ib.— beg 
aid from the Lacedemonians, ib.— surrender, 33. 

Themnetus, 99. 

Tkeagenes, 41. 

Tkebans, surprize Platca, 53— their qieech to the La 
cedemonians against the Plateans, 113 — demolish 
the walls of Thespiae, 177. 

Tkemistoeles, 34, 45, 47— by his advice the battle waa 
IkWght in the strait of Salamis,84— is sent ambassa- 
dor to Sparta, 89— deludes the Lacedemonians, ib.— 
gets the Long-walls and Piraeus secured, 30— banish- 
ed Athens by the Ostracism, 45 — ^resides at Argos,ib. 
— accused by the Lacedemonians, ib. — flies to Corcy- 
ra, ib. — to Admetus, ib.— the danger he escaped, ib.-< 
his letter to the king of Persia, 46— his character, ib. 

Tkeramenes, the Athenian, 318— one of those who 
overturned the democracy, ib. — ^turns to the other 
side, 387. 

Tkeramenes, the Lacedemonian, carries the fleet to 
Asia, 304. 

Thermo, 399. 

Theseus, 59. 

Thessalians, drive the Boeotians from Arne, 5— confe- 
derate with the Athenians, 33— send them aids, 34, 
63— their form of government, 159. 

Theueles, founder of Nazus, 318. 

Thraeians, overthrow the Athenians 33, 167— are free, 
63— their sordid custom,89— fight with the Thebana 
after the massacre at M ycalessus, 370. 
Thrasybulus, 321— supports the democracy, ib — ^ade a 
commander, 333— brings back Alcibiades, 333— heats 
the Peloponnesiana at sea, 333. 
Thrasyeles, 187, 188. 



du 



INDEX. 



rAra«y//iM, the Aripve, 202. 

ThratfUiu^ the Athenian, 320, 322, 331. 

Thrasymelidasj 136. 

Tkuele4t see TkeuelM. 

Th>uydid*9, son of Olonii, why he wrote the history 
of the war, 1, 7, 8, 188— had the plague, 69— his gold 
mines, and great credit in Thrace, 168— commands in 
Thrace, ib.— arrires too late to save Amphipolis, ib. 
—secures Eion, ib.— was an exile for twenty yean, 
189. 

Thueydid69, the colleague of Agnon and Phorraio, 38. 

ThtufdidM, the Pharsallan, 329. 

Thymoeharitt 330. 

THlaUBatUt 89. 

Timagoras of Cyzicus, 297, 296. 

Timagoras of Tegea, 77. 

TYmanor, 10 

Titaoeratest 84— kills himself, 87. 

Tisanunus, 124. 

Tisander, 126. 

TiMias, 211. 

THsaaphemeSf lieutenant of Darius, 287, 303 — ^his com- 
pacts and leagues with the Peloponnesians, 301, 305* 
307, 309, 314, 315— is conquered at Miletus by the 
Athenians, 304— fortifies lasus, 305 — pays the Lace- 
demonian ships, ib. — ^lessens their pay by the advice 
of Alcibiades, 310— wants to be reconciled to the 
Lacedemonians, 314— inveighed against by the mari- 
ners, 322, 3S4— why he did not bring up the Phenician 
fleet, 326. 

TUpoUmuti 38. 

Tolmidati son of Tolmeus, 35, 36. 



TolophonianSf 126. 

TVaehinianSt 124. 

TYerianSf 89. 

Triballiantt conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrynana, 

167. 
Tritmentianst 126 
Trojan*, how enabled to resist the Greeks fmr ten years, 

5— some of them settled in Sicily after the taking of 

Troy, 217. 
Tydeiu, 308. 
Tyndartis, 4. 
7VrrA<nw, 280, 282. 



u 



Ulyates, 140. 



Xmares, Epborus at Sparta, 192. 

Xenaresj commander of the Heradeots, killed, 199. 

Xenoelidesj 16, 131. 

Xeno, 265. 

XenophanUdaSf 314. 

Xenopkon^ son of Euripides, 78, 81. 

Xerxes, 12, 38— his letter to Pausaniaa, 43. 



2Uufnthians, a colony of Aeheans, 77— aid the Athe- 
nians in the Sicilian war, 281 
Zeuxidae, 187, 188. 



THE END. 



OO&SOT'S 

PROGRESSIVE 

FRENCH SCHOOL SERIES. 

ACtmpltU Onine qf StttOg <(ftMe Frmiek Languttge^M Uis Head, Writtm, and Sjfok«». 
J% 6 vaIumm, rofol 18im, hMtaifvUf printed^ aitd bnauL to match. 



1. h TL 

COLLOTS LEVIZAC^ FRESCR 
GRAMMAR AND EXERCISES. 



In this OniniBar, the bna of which h Lnixuft 
Trendi Qmnimr, the valuable bnt ill amnged eootoiti 
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amplified, and carefully revised; and the Inaoctive 
Method, throucfaont the Oraaunar, and particaiarly in 
the Exercises, nas been, se br as practicable, parsoed. 

KEY TO THE EXERCISES IN THE 
GRAMMAR. 

Thb JTcy is intended to aid the Teadier and Aunot, 
who may not be master of the nicer diffleoltles of the 
French buuniage : and also the aelf4aii^t student. The 
Ptablidien hope that It will supply a deficiency which 
has kmg been Mt : and be particularly useAil in those 
large portions of the country where, ftvm the scattered 
condition of the population, hichly qualified IVench 
teaehen eamot be oMained, or where the studies of the 
tfaild are dirsdad by the seidoas and intelUgent parent 

xn, h TV, 

COLLOrS PRONOUNCING AND 
INTERLINEAR FRENCH READER. 
In 2 vols., viz. : 

VOL. I. CoLLOT*fl PROHOUMCUie FRBKCH 

Rkadbr; on a Plan of Pronunciation, 
New, Simple and Effective: being a 
Course of Interesting and Inatructive 
Lessons selected Arom the Works of the 
best French Prose Writers and Poets, 
preceded by Easy Fables. And, 

VOL. II. Collot^sIntbrunbakFrbmch 
RxiiDBa; on Locke's Plan of Instruc* 
tion : being a Key to ** Collot*s Pronoanc- 
iiig French Reader.** 



ThesetwoTolaniesantebensedineo^nneliaB. Tin 
I is devoted to Tnnaintion, the other to noBonetation s 
whioh amnceaMnt is deemed an improvement on tim 
Mdinary mode of oomprisitif the diattnct and independ. 
eot el^jecls of stndy, Tnnalittlon and FreBandation, in 
the same Volume, and en the same fagp. 

The JMsrlinser Fnmk Bmdtr conlninsan bleriiaear 
litenl«Bd-ftee tnuolation of all the Pnm in the Pro- 
tuunent; JVundk Jhedtor, compririaf aboot two4hfads 
of the latter volnme. The Lesstim eommenee with short 
and simple FaUsa, and proceed^ br easynrogrrmkui, to 
varied seiedion firom the finest Prom Writen in the 
French lanfuage. Fundamental rulm, to which fk«qoent 
•refurence is made in the text, are pheed at the end of Oie 
volume ; while feot-aolw give the literal meanine of dl 
such words m cannot be rendered literally into Ei^liafa 
sense. Am the pupil advances, tbew hdps are gradually 
withdrawn, m ihat a knowledge of all that has preceded 
it requisite to a oompetent reheaml of his lesson. 

The Pronaundng M'tneh Reader contains a system 
of ^nmundation. wliich is entirely new, and singularly 
simple and effective. It is believed to be ttw firat attempt 
wliich hu been made to eommonicate a knowledge of 
French pronunciation on scientific principles ; and it con- 
flbrms, u fer u posAl& by a Ronnhig Pronunciatian at 
the hftid of the p^ge, oc., to the plan whidi has been 
made familiar to evoy <x>* ^ Walker^ Euriish Pro- 
y. ThisvolvmeeaaBistsofSBledtions, 



both in Prow and Poetry ; and is divided Into Four Puis, 
to aeoomaodate the pngramive nahire ot the instructions 
on Fronundatioo. The first thrw Parts consist entirdy 
of Pram, and contain the whole of the text of which an 
hiterlinear tnmlation is given in the /nterltncariVciuA 
Reader. The Fourth Put comprism a Sdection of Ex- 
tracts ftam the works of the best French Poets, preceded 
by a short Trmtim on the Reading of French Poady. To 
this Fburth Part there is no translation : and the TrmtiM 
on Reading French Poetry, and the Notea, are given in 
French s u the pupil, wIuq he bu advanced Ihv fer, is 
mpposed and expeded to be able to read Frendi, aausted 
only by his Gnmmar and Dictiouury. 

OoBoPe Pronewnemg and hiterhmar JFVmel Btmder 
mav, therefine, be said to enable n pnpiL if he study 
wltii atteotioB, to pitmoonee, read nnd undlBrdaDd, any 
French which bis teacher or Ills own taste may sded Cor 
him; although entiiely igoonuat of the laoguge, when 
heconmenoed them* 

V. 1^ vz. 

COLLOrS FRENCH DIALOGUES 
AND PHRASES, with an English Trans, 
lation ; consisting of numerous Conversa- 
tions on Familiar Subjects, and a well- 
selected Collection of Idioms and Pro- 
verbs. The whole calculated to facilitate 
the study of the French language ; and 
particularly the Art of Speaking it. Third 
Edition. And, 

COLLOrS FRENCH ANECDOTES 
AND aUESTIONB, written in easy 
style : Intended as a Reciting and Read- 
ing Book for Schools ; and especially, in 
conjunction with " Collot*s French Dia- 
logues and Phrases,** as a Guide to French 
Conversation. Third Edition. 

Tbem Convermtional fVsndk Dtelofws* hrtag Into nsa 
the ordinary odloquial language of polite society. ▲ 
sustai n ed connectioii of ida, and the dramatic fbnn in 
which they are cast, render them easy of aicquidtioa. 
The pnpiL when he hm eonunitted to memory ten or 
twdve of tnem Dtatogoes, will Iwve made some p iogress 
in exnrssaing hfanself in French ; and will then callinto 
plav the Uionu attd Proverbe which he will find at the 
end of the volume, by introdndog them, as occasion 
offers, in his attempite at original conversation. 

The pupil is now pfepued for another step. Let him 
then take the volume of JVcnclk Aisedote* and Qucrtteifc 
and make himmtf fiuniliar witk the incidenti of one or 
flie Anecdotes^ without regard to the words bi which it 
b narrated. He will now recite the anecdote to his 
Teacher, in the iMt French which he can oonunand at 
the moment ; who will aid him if embamused fin* want 
of a word. When the pupil hm recited the anecdote, let 
the teadMT ask him Questions on it in French, and re* 
quire immedtato answers to them in the same language. 
The SeotHid Put of the vdnme oonsirtB of Qusfftoni^ 
prepared for this purpose. 

This oourm of study is to be continued Qmqgboot Am 
two vdumm of Dialoguee and Phran$y and of Anet- 
datu amdi^umfimM; and although the popil may stum- 
ble e little at first, he will be surprised and ddigbted to 
find, ere long, that he has, almost imensibly, scquired 
the enviable acoom|diahment of speaking French. 

Such is the method of using them two volnmm par- 
sned by the Author ; and his success under it has been 
most s|gnal and fiattering. Those, however, who may 
find it moMtvenient, will oonform to the ordinarr plan. 
By any mode of instruction, these ZNologuss ofitf PArusf 
will be finind decidedly preferable to uooonneded CoUo- 
qnial Pbram: and have been already extemively m 
med. Tbe volume of JtnetdaUi and Qaeetione hu aim 
been socoeaAilly introduced into Sdnols m a Reciting 
and Rewling Book ; fcr which, from the fesdnatiiig na- 
ture of the eontent^ it is well calcnided. Tin <Sues> 
tkns, under (his mode of ndng the book, might be givea 
to the pupil m an exerdae, ud writtas aiiiwin u hii 
ovm Fnnch required. 



PI7BU8BKD BT 

J&y 4* Brof Aer, PhOaielpkia ; dmd C. H. Kay ^ Oi., PUMwgh. 



%fk£X 
wDV 



AND FOR 8AUE BY ALL BOOKBKLLBRt.