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.3 bl05 02S S73 650
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^9 ^^ o
IMMANUEL KANT'S
Critique of Pure Reason
In (ZCommcmoratton of t|)e (ZCmtmarg of tt0
Jrtrst ^publtcatton
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
BY
F. MAX MULLER
SECOND EDIT/ON, REVISED
THE MACMILi.AX COMPANY
LONDON: MACMILUXN & CO.. Ltd.
1907
.iC Understanding
All rir^
55
56
Copyright, 1896,
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY.
First edition printed 1881. Reprinted with alteratiofu, 1896;
NoTcmber, xgoo: November, 1908; January, 1905; June, 1907.
i '^\tH:V2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PACV
Dedication xiii
Table of Contents to First Edition xv
Preface to First Edition xvii
Translator's Preface xxvii
Translator's Preface to Second Edition Ixxxi
Introduction 1-12
I. The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy . . . i
II. Division of Transcendental Philosophy . . . • 10
I. The Elements of Transcendentalism . . • 15-39
First Part. Transcendental iCsthetic . . . >5-39
First Section. Of Space 18
Second Section. Of Time 24
General Obser\ations on Transcendental i£sthetic . . 34
Second Part. Transcendental Logic .... 40-5 1
Introduction. The Idea of a Transcendental Logic . . 40
I. Of Logic in General 40
II. Of Transcendental Logic 44
III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and
Dialectic 46
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran-
scendental Analytic and Dialectic .... 49
First Division. Transcendental Analytic . . . 52-237
Book I. Analytic of Concepts 54-106
Chapter I. Method of Discovering all Pure Concepts
of the Understanding 55
Section i. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding
in General ...*.... 56
T
vi Table of Contents
(Book I. Chapter I.)
Section 2. Of the Logical Function of the Under-
standing in Judgments 58
Section 3. Of the Pure Concepts of the Understand-
ing, or of the Categories 63
Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
the Understanding 70
Section i. Of the Principles of a Transcendental
Deduction in General 70
Section 2. Of the a priori Grounds for the Possibil-
ity of Experience 79
1. Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition . 82
2. Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 83
3. Of the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts . 85
4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the
Categories as Knowledge a priori ... 91
Section 3. Of the Relation of the Understanding to
Objects in General, and the Possibility of Know-
ing them a priori 94
Summary Representation of the Correctness, and of
the Only Possibility of this Deduction of the Pure
Concepts of the Understanding .... 105
Book II. Analytic of Principles .... 107-237
Introduction. Of the Transcendental Faculty of Judg-
ment in General 108
Chapter I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of
the Understanding 112
Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Under-
standing 121
Section i. Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical
Judgments 123
Section 2. Of the Highest Principle of all Synthetical
Judgments 126
Table of Contents
VII
(Book IL Chapter 11.)
Section 3. Systematical RepresentatioD of all Syn-
thetical Principles of the Pure Understa tiding
I, Axioms of Intuition . . . . »
2« Anticipations of Perception ....
3. Analogies of Experience ....
First Analogy* Principle of Permanence
Second Analogy. Principle of Production
Third Analogy. Principle of Community
4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General
Chapter III. On the Ground of Distinction of all Sulv
jects into Phenomena and Noumena
Appendix. Of the Amphiboly of Reflective Concepts,
owing to the Confusion of the Empiriad with the
Transcendental Use of the Understanding
192
'^'^3
Transcendental Dialectic
238-564
. 238
. 238
252-
Second Division.
Introduction
I. Of transcendental Appearance (Illusion) .
3. Of Pure Reason as the seat of Transcendcnt.1l Illu-
sion . , , .
A. Of Reason in General
B. Of the Lo^cal Use of Reason . » • ♦
C. Of the Pure Use of Reason ....
Book I. Of the Concepts of Pure Reason
Section i. Of Ideas in General .
Section 2. Of Transcendental Ideas .
Section 3. System of Transcendental Ideas
Book II. Of the Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Reason 275-564
Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason . . 278
First Paralogism. Of Substantiality .... 284
Second Paralogism. Of SimpHcity , . , • 286
Third Paralogism. Of Personality .... 294
Fourth Paralogism. Of Ideality . . . . .298
270
viii Table of Contents
(Book II. Chapter I.) ^^^'
Consideration on the Whole of Pure Psychology, as
affected by these Paralogisms .... 308
r Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason . . . 328
Section i. System of Cosmological Ideas . . • 330
Section 2. Antithetic of Pure Reason . . . 33$
First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas . . 34^
Second Conflict 35J
Third Conflict 3®
Fourth Conflict 37^1
>
Section 3. Of the Interest of Reason in these Con-
flicts
379
Section 4. Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure
Reason, and the Absolute Necessity of their
Solution 3§5
Section 5. Sceptical Representation of the Cosmolog-
ical Questions in the Four Transcendental Ideas . 396
\ Section 6. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the
! , . Solution of Cosmological Dialectic . . . 400
! ,, Section 7. Critical Decision of the Cosmological
Conflict of Reason with itself .... (,40^
Section 8. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason
"^ with Regard to the Cosmological Ideas . .413
Section 9. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative
Principle of Reason with Regard to all Cosmolog-
ical Ideas 419
I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total-
ity of the Composition of Phenomena in an
Universe 420
11. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total-
ity of the Division of a Whole given in Intu-
ition 425
Table of Contents
u
u
(Book IL Chapter 11. Section 9*)
Concluding Remarks on the Solution of the
Transcendental-mathematical Ideas, and Pre^
limrnary Remark for the Solution of the
Transcendental-dynamical Ideas , , . 42S
III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas with Regard
to the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmical
P:\ ents from their Causes .... 432
Possibility of a Causality through Freedom* in Har-
mony with the Universal Law of Necessity . 43^ X
Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom
in Connection with the General Necessity of
Nature 439
IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Total-
ity of the Dependence of Phenomena, with
Regard to their Existence in General . . 452
Chapter ML The Ideal of Pure Reason . . • 459
Section I. Of the Ideal in General .... 459
Section 2. Of the Transcendental Ideal . . . 462
Section 3. Of the Arguments of Speculative Reason
in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being . 471
Section 4. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological
Proof of the Existence of God . . . , 477
Section 5. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological
Proof of the Existence of God .... 486
Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion
in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of
a Necessary Being 495
Section 6. Of the Impossibility of the Physico-theo-
logical Proof 499
Section 7. Criticism of all Theology based on Spec-
ulative Principles of Reason 50S
X Table of Contents
(Book II. Chapter III. Section 7.) ****'
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Of the
Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason . ix.6
Of the Ultimate Aim of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason 537
II. Method of Transcendentalism .... 565-686
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason . . . 569
Section i. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dog-
matical Use 572
Section 2. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Polem-
ical Use 593
The Impossibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of Pure
Reason in Conflict with itself 608
Section 3. The Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard
to Hypotheses 617
Section 4. The Discipline of Pure Reason wjth Regard
to its Proofs 627
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason .... 638
Section i. Of the Ultimate Aim of the Pure Use of
our Reason 640
Section 2. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as
determining the Ultimate Aim of Pure Reason . 645
Section 3. Of Trowing, Knowing, and Believing . . 657
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason . . 667
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason . . . 683
Supplements 687-808
TO HIS EXCELLENCY
THE ROYAL MINISTER OF STATE
BARON VON ZEDLITZ
DEDICATION
SB,
To further, so far as in tis lies, the growth of the sciences
is to work in your Excellency*ii own interest, your own interest
being intimately connected with them, not only through the
exalted position of a patron of science, but through the far more
intimate relation of a lover and enlightened judge. For that
reason I avail myself of the oa!y means within my power of
proving my gratitude for the gracious confidence Vtith which your
Excellency honours me, as if I too could help toward your noble
work.
[Whoever delights in a speculative life finds with moderate
wishes the approval of an enlightened and kind judge a powerful
incentive to studies the results of which are great, but remote, and
therefore entirely ignored by vulgar eyes,]
To you, as such a Judge, and to your kind attention I now sub-
mit this book, placing all other concerns of my literar)^ future
under your special protection, and remaining with profound
respect*
Your Excellency*s
Most obedient Servant,
IMMANUEL KANT,
KONIGSBEIG, March 39, 1781.
1 The second paragraph is lelfe out and tbe last sentence slij^hUjr aJtercd in the
Second Edition,
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO THE
FIRST EDITION'
PACBS
Introduction i (0
I. ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.
PART I. Transcendental ^Csthetic ... 17 (19)
Section I. Of Space 20 (22)
Section II. Of Time 27 (30)
PART II. Transcendental Logic .... 44 (50)
Division I. Transcendental Analytic in two books,
with their chapters and sections . . . • 56 (64)
Division II. Transcendental Dialectic in two books,
with their chapters and sections . . . '254 (293)
II. METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM.
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason . . 607 (708)
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason . .682 (795)
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason . 714 (832)
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason . .731 (852)
1 Instead of this simple Table of Contents, later editions have a much fuller
one (Supplement III), which, as Rosenkranz observes, obscures rather than
illustrates the articulation of the book.
PREFACE^
Our reason (Vernunft) has this peculiar fate that, with
reference to one class of its knowledge, it is always
troubled with questions which cannot be ignored, because
they spring from the very nature of reason, and w^hich
cannot be answered, because they transcend the powers
of human reason.
Nor is human reason to be blamed for this. It begins
with principles which, in the course of experience, it must
follow, and which are sufficiently confirmed by experience.
With these again, according to the necessities of its nature,
it rises higher and higher to more remote conditions. But
when it perceives that in this way its work remains for
ever incomplete, because the questions never cease, it
finds itself constrained to take refuge in principles which
exceed every possible experimental application, and never-
theless seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary com-
mon sense agrees with them. Thus, however, reasoa^
becomes involved in darkness and contradictions, from
which, no doubt, it may conclude that errors must be
lurking somewhere, but without being able to discover
them, because the principles w^hich it follows transcend
all the limits of experience and therefore withdraw them-
^ Thtf preface \t left out in later editions, and replaced by a new preface;
aee Supplement II, pAge 688.
zvit
xviii Preface
selves from all experimental tests. It is the battle-field
of these endless controversies which is called Metaphysic,
There was a time when Metaphysic held a royal place
among all the sciences, and, if the will were taken for the
deed, the exceeding importance of her subject might well
have secured to her that place of honour. At present it
is the fashion to despise Metaphysic, and the poor matron,
forlorn and forsaken, complains like Hecuba, Modo max-
ima rer'um, tot generis natisqtie potens — nunc trahor extil^
inops (Ovid, Metam. xiii. 508).
At first the rule of Metaphysic, under the dominion of
the dogmatists, was despotic. But as the laws still bore
the traces of an old barbarism, intestine wars and complete
anarchy broke out, and the sceptics, a kind of nomads,
despising all settled culture of the land, broke up from
time to time all civil society. Fortunately their number
was small, and they could not prevent the old settlers
from returning to cultivate the ground afresh, though
without any fixed plan or agreement. Not long ago one
might have thought, indeed, that all these quarrels were
to have been settled and the legitimacy of her claims
decided once for all through a certain physiology of the
human understanding, the work of the celebrated Locke,
But, though the descent of that royal pretender, traced
back as it had been to the lowest mob of common ex-
perience, ought to have rendered her claims very sus-
picious, yet, as that genealogy turned out to be in reality
a false invention, the old queen (Metaphysic) continued to
maintain her claims, everything fell back into the old
rotten dogmatism, and the contempt from which metaphy-
sical science was to have been rescued, remained the same
as ever. At present, after everything has been tried, so
I
they say. and tried in vain, there reign in philosophy
weariness and complete indifferentism, the mother of chaos
and night in all sciences but, at the same time, the spring
or, at least, the prelude of their near reform and of a new
light, after an ill-applied study has rendered them dark,
confused, and useless*
It is in vain to assume a kind of artificial indifferentism
in respect to enquiries the object of which cannot be in-
different to human nature. Nay, those pretended indif-
ferentists (however they may try to disguise themselves
by changing scholastic terminology into popular language),
if they think at all, fall back inevitably into those very
metaphysical dogmas which they profess to despise
Nevertheless this indifferentism, showing itself m the
very midst of the most flourishing state of all sciences,
and affecting those very sciences the teachings of which,
if they could be had, would be the last to be surrendered, is
a phenomenon well worthy of our attention and considera-
tion. It is clearly the result, not of the carelessness, but
of the matured judgment ' of our age, which will no
longer rest satisfied with the mere appearance of know-
* We often bear complaints against the shaUowne^a of thougbt in nar own
timev ftod the decay of sound knowledge. But I do nnt sec tliAt sciences
wlikb reft on a sulid foundation, such as mathematics, physics, etc, deserve
this repri»ach in the least. On the contran', they maintain their M reputa-
tkm of soUdity. and with regard to physics, even surpass it. Ihc same spirit
wouhl manifest itself in other branches of knowledge, if only thrir prititiplcs
had first been properly determined. Till that is dune, indinTercnlism and
douht, and uUimately severe criticism, are rather signs of honest thought,
(Jttr age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything
muM submil lo it. Religion, on the strength of iu sanctity, and law, on the
itrmgth of Its majesty^ try to withdraw themiclves from it ; but by so doing
Ihcy arouse just suspicions, and cannot claim that sincere respect which
reason i^ys to those only who have been able to stamt its free and open
examination.
XX
Preface
ledge. It is, at the same time, a powerful appeal
reason to undertake anew the most difficult of its dutie"
namely, self-knowledge, and to institute a court of appeal
which should protect the just rights of reason, but dismiss
all groundless claims, and should do this not by means of
irresponsible decrees, but according to the eternal and
unalterable laws of reason. This court of appeal is i^
other than the Critique of Pure Reason, ^
I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems,
but of the faculty of reason in general, touching that
whole class of knowledge which it may strive after, un-
assisted by experience. This must decide the question of
the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general,
and the determination of its sources, its extent, and its
limits — and all this according to fixed principles.
This, the only way that was left, I have followe4(|
and I flatter myself that I have thus removed all those
errors which have hitherto brought reason, whenever it was
unassisted by experience, into conflict with itself. I have
not evaded its questions by pleading the insuflFiciency of
human reason, but I have classified them according to
principles, and, after showing the point where reason
begins to misunderstand itself, solved them satisfactorily.
It is true that the answer of those questions is not such as |
a dogma-enamoured curiosity might wish for, for such curi-
osity could not have been satisfied except by juggling
tricks in which I am no adept. But this was not the
intention of the natural destiny of our reason, and it
became the duty of philosophy to remove the deception i
which arose from a false interpretation, even though
many a vaunted and cherished dream should vanish at
the same time. In this work I have chiefly aimed at
mea at j
J
I
Preface ^
xn
completeness, and I venture to maintain that there ought
not to be one single metaphysical problem that has not
been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at
least has not been supplied. In fact Pure Reason is so
perfect a unity that, if its principle should prove insuffi-
cient to answer any one of the many questions started by
its very nature^ one might throw it away altogether, as
insufficient to answer the other questions with perfect
certainty.
While I am saying this I fancy I observe in the face
of my readers an expression of indignation* muced with
contempt, at pretensions apparently so self-glorious and
extravagant ; and yet they are in reality far more moder-
ate than those made by the writer of the commonest essay
professing to prove the simple nature of the soul or the
necessity of a first beginning of the world. For, while he
pretends to extend human knowledge beyond the limits
of all possible experience, I confess most humbly that this
is entirely beyond my power I mean only to treat of
reason and its pure thinking, a knowledge of which is not
very far to seek, considering that it is to be found within
myself. Common logic gives an instance how all the
.simple acts of reason can be enumerated completely ^nd
systematically. Only between the common logic and my:
work there is this difference, that my question is, — what
can we hope to achieve with reason, when all the material
and assistance of experience is taken away ?
So much with regard to the completeness in our laying
hold of every single object, and the thoroughness in our
laying hold of all objects, as the material of our critical en-
quiries— a completeness and thoroughness determined, not
by a casual idea, but by the nature of our knowledge itself.
xxii Preface
Besides this, certainty and clearness with regard to
form are two essential demands that may very properly
be addressed to an author who ventures on so slippery an
undertaking.
First, with regard to certainty, I have pronounced judg-
ment against myself by saying that in this kind of enquiries
it is in no way permissible to propound mere opinions, and
that everything looking like a hypothesis is counterband,
that must not be offered for sale at however low a price,
but must, as soon as it has been discovered, be confiscated.
For every kind of knowledge which professes to be cer-
tain a priori^ proclaims itself that it means to be taken for
absolutely necessary. And this applies, therefore, still
more to a definition of all pure knowledge a priori^ which
is to be the measure, and therefore also an example, of all
apodictic philosophical certainty. Whether I have ful-
filled what I have here undertaken to do, must be left to
the judgment of the reader ; for it only behoves the author
to propound his arguments, and not to determine before-
hand the effect which they ought to produce on his judges.
But, in order to prevent any unnecessary weakening of
those arguments, he may be allowed to point out himself
certain passages which, though they refer to collateral
objects only, might occasion some mistrust, and thus to
counteract in time the influence which the least hesitation
of the reader in respect to these minor points might exer-
cise with regard to the principal object.
I know of no enquiries which are more important for
determining that faculty which we call understanding
(Verstand), and for fixing its rules and its limits, than
those in the Second Chapter of my Transcendental Ana-
lytic, under the title of * Deduction of the Pure Concepts
Preface
xxm
of the Understanding,' They have given me the greatest
but, I hope, not altogether useless trouble. This enquiry,
which rests on a deep foundation, has two sides. The
one refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and
is intended to show and explain the objective value of its
concepts a priori. It is, therefore, of essential importance
for my purposes. The other is intended to enquire into
the pure understanding itself, its possibility, and the
powers of knowledge on which it rests, therefore its sub-
jective character; a subject which, though important for
my principal object, yet forms no essential part of it, be-
cause my principal problcni_ is and remains, What and
how much may understanding (Verstand) and reason (Ver-
nunft) know without all experience? and not, How is the
faculty of thought possible } The latter would be an en-
quiry into a cause of a given effect; it would, therefore,
be of the nature of an hypothesis (though, as I shall show
elsewhere, this is not quite so); and it might seem as if I
had here allowed myself to propound a mere opinion, leav-
ing the reader free to hold another opinion also. I there-
fore warn the reader, in case my subjective deduction
should not produce that complete conviction which I ex-
pect, that the objective deduction, in which I am here
chiefly concerned, must still retain its full strength. For
this, what has been said on pp, 82, 83 (92, 93) may possi-
bly by itself be sufficient.
Secondly, as to clearness, the reader has a right to
demand not only what may be called logical or discursive
clearness, which is based on concepts, but also what may
be called aesthetic or intuitive clearness produced by intui-
tions, i.e, by examples and concrete illustrations. With
regard to the former I have made ample provision. That
xxiv Preface
arose from the very nature of my purpose, but it became
at the same time the reason why I could not fully satisfy
the latter, if not absolute, yet very just claim. Nearly
through the whole of my work I have felt doubtful what
to do. Examples and illustrations seemed always to be
necessary, and therefore found their way into the first
sketch of my work. But I soon perceived the magnitude
of my task and the number of objects I should have to
treat ; and, when I saw that even in their driest scholastic
form they would considerably swell my book, I did not
consider it expedient to extend it still further through
examples and illustrations required for popular purposes
only. This work can never satisfy the popular taste, and
the few who know, do not require that help which, though
it is always welcome, yet might here have defeated its very
purpose. The Abbe Terrasson ^ writes indeed that, if we
measured the greatness of a book, not by the number of
its pages, but by the time we require for mastering it,
many a book might be said to be much shorter, if it were
not so short. But, on the other hand, if we ask how a
complicated, yet in principle coherent whole of specula-
tive thought can best be rendered intelligible, we might be
equally justified in saying that many a book would have
been more intelligible, if it had not tried to be so very
intelligible. For the helps to clearness, though they may
be missed^ with regard to details, often distract with re-
gard to the whole. The reader does not arrive quickly
enough at a survey of the whole, because the bright col-
* Terrasson, Philosophic nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse auf alle Gegen-
stande des Geistes und der Sitten, Berlin, 1762, p. 117.
2 Rosenkranz and others change fehUn into helfen^ without necessity, I
think.
Preface
XXV
ours of illustrations hide and distort the articulation and
concatenation of the whole system, which, after all, if we
want to judge of its unity and sufficiency, are more im-
portant than anything else.
Surely it should be an attraction to the reader if he is
asked to join his own efforts with those of the author in
order to carr)' out a great and important work, according
to the plan here proposed, in a complete and lasting man-
ner. Metaphysic, according to the definitions here given,
is the only one of all sciences which, through a small but
united effort, may count on such completeness in a short
time, so that nothing will remain for posterity but to
arrange everything according to its own views for didactic
purposes, without being able to add anything to the sub-
ject itself. For it is in reality nothing but an inventory
of all our possessions acquired through Pure Reason,
systematically arranged. Nothing can escape us, because
whatever reason produces entirely out of itself, cannot
hide itself, but is brought to light by reason itself, so soon
as the common principle has been discovered. This abso-
[ lute completeness is rendered not only possible, but neces-
sary, through the perfect unity of this kind of knowledge,
all derived from pure concepts, without any influence from
experience, or from special intuitions leading to a definite
kind of experience, that might serve to enlarge and in-
crease it Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi curta supel-
/r-r (Persius, Sat. i\^ $2),
Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope
myself to produce under the title of ' Metaphysic of
Nature/ It will not be half so large, yet infinitely richer
than this Critique of Pure Reason, which has, first of all,
to discover its source, nay, the conditions of its possibility.
xxvi Preface
in fact, to clear and level a soil quite overgrown with
weeds. Here I expect from my readers the patience and
impartiality of a judge, there the goodwill and aid of a
fellow-worker. For however completely all the principles
of the system have been propounded in my Critique, the
completeness of the whole system requires also that no
derivative concepts should be omitted, such as cannot be
found out by an estimate a priori, but have to be dis-
covered step by step. There the synthesis of concepts
has been exhausted, here it will be requisite to do the
same for their analysis, a task which is easy and an
amusement rather than a labour.
I have only a few words to add with respect to the
printing of my book. As the beginning had been delayed,
I was not able to see the clean sheets of more than about
half of it. I now find some misprints, though they do not
spoil the sense, except on p. 379, line 4 from below, where
specific should be used instead of sceptic. The antinomy
of pure reason from p. 425 to p. 461 has been arranged in
a tabular form, so that all that belongs to the thesis stands
on the left, what belongs to the antithesis on the right
side. I did this in order that thesis and antithesis might
be more easily compared.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
Why I thought I might translate Kant's Critique
* But /loiv cart you zvastc your time on a translation of
Kant's Critik dcr rcinvn Vernunftf This question, which
has been addressed to me by several friends, I think I
shall best be able to answer in a preface to that translation
itself. And I shall try to answer it point by point.
First, then, with regard to myself. Why should I waste
my time on a translation of Kant's Critik der reinen Ver-
nunft? — that is, Were there not other persons more fitted
for that task, or more specially called upon to under-
take it?
It would be the height of presumption on my part to
imagine that there were not many scholars who could have
performed such a task as wxll as myself, or far better. All
I can say is, that for nearly thirty years I have been wait-
ing for some one really qualified, who would he willing to
execute such a task» and have waited in vain. W^hat I feel
convinced of is that an adequate translation of Kant must
be the w^ork of a German scholar. That conviction was
deeply impressed on my mind when reading, now many
years ago, Kant*s great work with a small class of young
students at Oxford — among whom I may mention the
names of Applcton, Nettleship, and W^allace. Kant's
style is careless and involved, and no wonder that it
xxviii Translator's Preface
should be so, if we consider that he wrote down the whole
of the Critique in not quite five months. Now, beside the
thread of the argument itself, the safest thread through
the mazes of his sentences must be looked for in his ad-
verbs and particles. They, and they only, indicate clearly
the true articulation of his thoughts, and they alone im-
part to his phrases that peculiar intonation which tells
those who are accustomed to that bye-play of language,
what the author has really in his mind, and what he wants
to express, if only he could find the right way to do it.
When reading and critically interpreting Kant's text, I
sometimes compared other translations, particularly the
English translations by Haywood and Meiklejohn,^ and
excellent as, in most places, I found their renderings, par-
ticularly the latter, I generally observed that, when the
thread was lost, it was owing to a neglect of particles and
adverbs, though sometimes also to a want of appreciation
of the real, and not simply the dictionary meaning, of Ger-
man words. It is not my intention to write here a criticism
of previous translations; on the contrary, I should prefer
to express my obligation to them for several useful sugges-
tions which I have received from them in the course of
what I know to be a most arduous task. But in order to
give an idea of what I mean by the danger arising from a
neglect of adverbs and particles in German, I shall men-
tion at least a few of the passages of which I am thinking.
On p. 395 (484), Kant says : Da also selbst die Auflosung
^ I discovered too late that Professor Mahaffy, in his translation of Kuno
Fischer's work on Kant (Longmans, 1866), has given some excellent speci-
mens of what a translation of Kant ought to be. Had I known of them in
time, I should have asked to be allowed to incorporate them in my own
translation.
Translator's Preface
XXIX
dieser Aufgaben ni etna Is in tier Erfahrung vorkommen
kann. This means, * As therefore even the solution of
these problems can never occur in experience,* Le» as,
taking experience as it is, we have no right even to start
such a problem, much less to ask for its solution. Here
the particle also implies that the writer, after what he has
said before, feels justified in taking the thing for granted.
But if we translate, * Although, therefore, the solution of
these problems is unattainable through experience,* we
completely change the drift of Kant's reasoning. He
wants to take away that very excuse that there exists
only some uncertainty in the solution of these problems,
by showing that the problems themselves can really never
arise, and therefore do not require a solution at all, Kant
repeats the same statement in the same page with still
greater emphasis, w^hen he says : Die d&gmatische Aufio-
sung ist also nicht etwa ungewiss^ sandern unmoglich, i.e.
• Hence the dogmatical solution is not, as you imagine,
uncertain, but it is impossible.'
On p. 396 (485). the syntactical structure of the sen-
tence, as well as the intention of the writer, does not allow
of our changing the words so ist es klUglich gehandelt^ into
a question. It is the particle so which requires the trans-
position of the pronoun {ist cs instead of cs ist), not the
interrogative character of the whole sentence.
On p. 401 (492), wenn cannot be rendered by although^
w^hich is wenn atnii in German. Wenn beide nach empi-
riscfun Gesetsen in einer Erfahrung riehtig und durchgangig
SHsammenhdngen means, * If both have a proper and thor-
ough coherence in an experience, according to empirical
laws*; and not, * Although both have/ etc.
SolUn is often used in German to express what, accord-
Kxx Translator's Preface
ing to the opinion of certain people, is meant to be Thus
Kant, on p. 461 (570), speaks of the ideals which painters
have in their minds, and die ein nicht mitziitheilendes
Schattenbild Hirer Producte oder atich Beurtheilungen sein
sollen^ that is, * which, according to the artists' professions,
are a kind of vague shadows only of their creations and
criticisms, which cannot be communicated/ All this is
lost, if we translate, * which can serve neither as a model
for production, nor as a standard for appreciation/ It
may come to that in the end, but it is certainly not the
way in which Kant arrives at that conclusion.
On p. 503 (625), den einzigmoglichen Beweisgnind
{woferti uberall nur ein speadativer Beweis statt findet)
is not incorrectly rendered by * the only possible ground
of proof (possessed by speculative reason) ' ; yet we lose
the thought implied by Kant's way of expression, viz. that
the possibility of such a speculative proof is very doubtful.
The same applies to an expression which occurs on
p. 549 (684), ein solches Schema ^ als ob es ein wirkliches
Wesen ware. Kant speaks of a schema which is con-
ceived to be real, but is not so, and this implied meaning
is blurred if we translate * a schema, which requires us to
regard this ideal thing as an actual existence.*
On p. 572 (712), Kant writes: Methoden, die zwar sonst
der Vemunfty aber nur nicht hier wot anpassen.
This has been translated: 'The methods which are
originated by reason, but which. are out of place in this
sphere.'
This is not entirely wrong, but it blurs the exact features
of the sentence. What is really meant is : * Methods which
are suitable to reason in other spheres, only, I believe, not
here.' It is curious to observe that Kant, careless as he
Translator's Preface
XXXI
was in the revision of his text, struck out woi in the Sec-
ond Edition, because he may have wished to remove even
that slight shade of hesitation which is conveyed by that
particle. Possibly, however, wo! may refer to anpassen,
i.e. pukhre convenire^ the limitation remaining much the
same in either case.
Dock is a particle that may be translated in many
different ways, but it can never be translated by there-
fore. Thus when Kant writes (Suppl. XIV. § 17, note,
p. 748), folglich die Einheit des Bewusstseyns^ als syn-
thetisch, aber dock urspriingHch angctroffen ivird, he means
to convey an opposition between synthetical and primitive,
i.e. synthetical, and yet primitive. To say ' nevertheless
synthetical, and therefore primitive,' conveys the very
opposite.
It may be easily understood that in a metaphysical argu-
ment it must cause serious inconvenience, if the particle
not is either omitted where Kant has it, or added where
Kant has it not. It is of less consequence if not is omitted
in such a passage as, for instance, where Kant says in the
preface to the Second Edition (p. 704), that the obscurities
of the first have given rise to misconceptions 'without his
fault/ instead of * not without his fault/ But the matter
becomes more serious in other places.
Thus (Supplement XIV. § 26, p, 762) Kant says, ohm
difse Tauglichkeit, which means, 'unless the categories
were adequate for that purpose,* but not * if the categories
were adequate.' Again (Supplement XVI**., p. 771), Kant
agrees that space and time cannot be perceived by them-
selves, but not, that they can be thus perceived. And it
must disturb even an attentive reader when, on p. 203
(248), he reads that 'the categories must be employed
xxxii Translator s Preface
empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally/
while Kant writes : Da sie nicht von empirischem Gebrauch
sein sollen^ und von transcendentalem nicht sein konnen.
As regards single words, there are many in German
which, taken in their dictionary meaning, seem to yield
a tolerable sense, but which throw a much brighter light
on a whole sentence, if they are understood in their more
special idiomatic application.
Thus vorrilcken^ no doubt, may mean * to place before,'
hwi Jetnandem etwas vorruckcft, means *to reproach some-
body with something.' Hence (p. 705) die der rationalen
Psychologic vorgenicktcn Paralogismen does not mean
* the paralogisms which immediately precede the Rational
Psychology,' but *the paralogisms with which Rational
Psychology has been reproached.'
On p. 386 (472), nachhdngen cannot be rendered by
* to append.' Er crlaubt der Vernunft idcalischcn Erkld-
riingen der Natur fiachziihdngen means * he allows reason
to indulge in ideal explanations of nature,' but not *to
append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena.'
On p. 627 (781), als ob er die bcjahende Parthei ergriffen
hdttc, does not mean * to attack the position,' but * to adopt
the position of the assenting party.'
On p. 679 (847), Wic kann ich erwarten does not mean
* How can I desire } ' but * How can I expect } ' which
may seem to be not very different, but nevertheless gives
a wrong turn to a whole argument.
I have quoted these few passages, chiefly in order to
show what I mean by the advantages which a German has
in translating Kant, as compared with any other translator
who has derived his knowledge of the language from
grammars and dictionaries only. An accurate and scholar-
Translator's Preface
xxxm
like knowledge of German would, no doubt, suffice for the
translation of historical or scientific works. But in order
to find our way through the intricate mazes of metaphysi-
cal arguments, a quick perception of what is meant by the
sign-posts» I mean the adverbs and particles, and a natural
feeling for idiomatic ways of speech, seem to me almost
indispensable.
On the other hand, I am fully conscious of the advan-
tages which English translators possess by their more
t perfect command of the language into which foreign
thought has to be converted. Here I at once declare my
own inferiority; nay, I confess that in rendering Kant's
arguments in English I have thought far less of elegance,
smoothness, or rhythm, than of accuracy and clearness.
What I have attempted to do is to give an honest, and, as
far as possible, a literal translation, and, before all, a trans-
lation thai wiii construe ; and I venture to say that even
to a German student of Kant this English translation will
prove in many places more intelligible than the German
original. It is difficult to translate the hymns of the Veda
' and the strains of the Upanishads, the odes of Pindar and
the verses of Lucretius ; but I doubt whether the difficulty
of turning Kant's metaphysical German into intelligible
and construable English is less. Nor do I wish my readers
to believe that I have never failed in making Kant's sen-
tences intelligible. There are a few sentences in Kant*s
Critique w^hich I have not been able to construe to my
own satisfaction^ and where none of the friends whom I
consulted could help me. Here all I could do was to give
a literal rendering, hoping that future editors may succeed
in amending the text, and extracting from it a more intel-
ligible sense.
xxxiv Translator's Preface
Why I thought I ought to translate Kant's Critique
But my friends in blaming me for wasting my time on
a translation of Kant*s Critique of Pure Reason gave me
to understand that, though I might not be quite unfit, I
was certainly not specially called upon to undertake such
a work. It is true, no doubt, that no one could have
blamed me for not translating Kant, but I should have
blamed myself; in fact, I have blamed myself for many
years for not doing a work which I felt must be done
sooner or later. Year after year I hoped I should find
leisure to carry out the long-cherished plan, and when at
last the Centenary of the publication of Kant*s Critik der
reinen Vernunft drew near, I thought I was in honour
bound not to delay any longer this tribute to the memory
of the greatest philosopher of modern times. Kant's
Critique has been my constant companion through life.
It drove me to despair when I first attempted to read it, a
mere school-boy. During my university days I worked
hard at it under Weisse, Lotze, and Drobisch, at Leipzig,
and my first literary attempts in philosophy, now just forty
years old, were essays on Kant's Critique. Having once
learnt from Kant what man can and what he cannot know,
my plan of life was very simple, namely, to learn, so far
as literature, tradition, and language allow us to do so, how
man came to believe that he could know so much more
than he ever can know in religion, in mythology, and in
philosophy. This required special studies in the field of
the most ancient languages and literatures. But though
these more special studies drew me away for many years
towards distant times and distant countries, whatever
purpose or method there may have been in the work of
my life was due to my beginning life with Kant.
Translator's Preface
XXXV
'Even at Oxford, whether I had to lecture on German
literature or on the Science of Language, I have often, in
season and out of season, been preaching Kant; and
nothing I have missed s^^ much, when wishing to come to
an understanding on the great problems of life with some
of my philosophical friends in England, than the common
ground which is supph'ed by Kant for the proper discus-
sion of every one of them. We need not be blind wor-
shippers of Kant, but if for the solution of philosophical
problems we are to take any well-defined stand, we must^
in this century of ours, take our stand on Kant. Kant's
language, and by language I mean more than mere words,
has become the Lingua franca of modern philosophy, and
not to be able to speak it, is like studying ancient philoso-
phy> without being able to speak Aristotle, or modern
philosophy, without being able to speak Descartes. What
Rosenkranz, the greatest among Hegel's disciples, said in
1838, is almost as true to-day as it was then : Engldnder,
Frantoscn und Ifalicner miissen, ivenn sic vanmrfs wollcn,
deHScthcn Schritt than, den Kant schon 1 78 1 machte. Nur
so kmnen sie sich von ihrer dcnnaligcn schlechten Meta-
fkysik und den aus einer sokhen sich ergebenden schlechten
CoHsequenzcn befreien.
It is hardly necessary at the present day to produce any
arguments in support of such a view. The number of
books on Kant's philosophy, published during the last
century in almost every language of the world,^ speaks for
itself. There is no single philosopher of any note, even
among those who arc decidedly opposed to Kant, who has
* Daring tb« Tint Icfi years after the appc*r»ticc of the Critique, three
httiulrcij publications have been counted for mnd tgiinit Kant'i philosophy.
Sec VAihLnger« Kumnientju, L, p. 9.
xxxvi Translator s Preface
not acknowledged his pre-eminence among modern phi
losophers. The great systems of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,
Herbart, and Schopenhauer branched off from Kant, and
now, after a century has passed away, people begin to see
that those systems were indeed mighty branches, but that
the leading shoot of philosophy was and is still — Kant.
No truer word has lately been spoken than what, I believe,
was first said by Professor Weisse,^ in the Philosophical
Society at Leipzig, of which I was then a member, and
was again more strongly enforced by my friend and former
colleague. Professor Liebmann of Strassburg, that, if phi-
losophy wishes to go forward, it must go back to Kant,
II faut reciilery pour mieiix saiiter, Lange, in his History
of Materialism, calls Kant the Copernicus of modern
philosophy ; aye, Kant himself was so fully conscious of
the decentralising character of his system that he did not
hesitate to compare his work with that of Copernicus.^
But if Kant was right in his estimate of his own philos-
ophy, it cannot be denied that, with but few, though
memorable exceptions, philosophy in England is still
Ante-Kantian or Ante-Copernican. How little Kant is
read by those who ought to read him, or how little he is
understood by those who venture to criticise him, I never
felt so keenly as when, in a controversy which I had some
time ago with Mr. Herbert Spencer, I was told that space
could not be an a priori intuition, because we may hear
church-bells, without knowing where the belfry stands.
Two philosophers, who both have read Kant's Critique,
may differ from each other diametrically, but they will at
least understand each other. They will not fire at each
^ See Julius Walter, Zum Gedachtniss Kant's, p. 28.
^ See Supplement II, p. 693.
Translator s Preface
xxxvii
other like some of the German students who» for fear of
killing their adversary, fire their pistols at right angles,
thus endangering the life of their seconds rather than that
of their adversaries.
This will explain why, for a long time, I have felt per-
sonally called upon to place the classical work of Kant
within the reach of all philosophical readers in England,
so that no one could say any longer that he could not con-
strue it I thought for a time that Professor Caird*s excel-
lent work, On the Philosophy of Kant, had relieved me
of this duty. And, no doubt, that work has told, and has
opened the eyes of many people in England and in America
to the fact that, whatever we may think of all the out-
works of Kant's philosophy, there is in it a central thought
which forms a real rest and an entrenched ground in the
onward march of the human intellect.
But it is a right sentiment after all, that it is better to
read a book than to read about it, and that, as my friend
iley used to preach again and again, we should never
judge of a book unless we have read the whole of it
ourselves. I therefore pledged myself to finish a new
translation of Kant's Critique as my contribution to the
celebration of its centenary; and though it has taken more
time and more labour than I imagined, I do not think my
time or my labour will have been wasted, if only people in
England, and in America too, will now read the book that
IS a hundred years old, and yet as young and fresh as
ever.
So far I have spoken of myself, and more perhaps than
a wise man at my time of life ought to do. But I have
still to say a few words to explain why I think that,
if the time which I have bestowed on this undertaking has
xxxviii Translator s Preface
not been wasted, others also, and not philosophers by pro-
fession only, will find that I have not wasted their time by
inducing them at the present time to read Kant's master-
work in a faithful English rendering.
Why a study of Kant's Critique seemed necessary
at present
It is curious that in these days the idea of develop-
ment, which was first elaborated by the students of phi-
losophy, language, and religion, and afterwards applied
with such brilliant success to the study of nature also,
should receive so little favour from the very sciences which
first gave birth to it. Long before we heard of evolution
in nature, we read of the dialectical evolution of thought,
and its realisation in history and nature. The history of
philosophy was then understood to represent the continu-
ous development of philosophical thought, and the chief
object of the historian was to show the necessity with
which one stage of philosophical thought led to another.
This idea of rational development^ which forms a far
broader and safer basis than that of natural development,
is the vital principle in the study of the human mind, quite
as much, if not more, than in the study of nature. A
study of language, of mythology, of religion, and philos-
ophy, which does not rest on the principle of development,
does not deserve the name of a science. The chief inter-
est which these sciences possess, is not that they show us
isolated and barren facts, but that they show us their
origin and growth, and explain to us how what is, was the
necessary result of what was. In drawing the stemma of
languages, mythological formations, religious beliefs, and
Translator's Preface
XXXIX
philosophical ideas, science may go wrong, and often has
gone wrong. So have students of nature in drawing their
stemmata of plants, and animals, and human beings. But
the principle remains true, for all that. In spite of all
that seems to be accidental or arbitrary, there is a natural
and intelligible growth in what we call the creations of the
human mind, quite as much as in what we call the works
of nature. The one expression, it may be said, is as
mythological as the other, because the category of sub-
stance cannot apply to either nature or mind. Both, how-
ever, express facts which must be explained ; nay, it is the
chief object of science to explain them, and to explain
them genetically. Is Aristotle possible or intelligible
without Plato ? Is Spinoza possible or intelligible with-
out Descartes? Is Hume possible or intelligible without
Berkeley? Is Kant possible or intelligible without Hume?
These are broad questions, and admit of one answer only.
But if we have once seen how the broad stream of thought
follows its natural bent, flows onward, and never backward,
we shall understand that it is as much the duty of the
science of thought to trace the unbroken course of phi-
losophy from Thales to Kant, as it is the duty of natural
science to trace the continuous development of the single
cell to the complicated organism of an animal body, or
the possible metamorphosis of the Hipparion into the
Hippos.
What I wanted, therefore, as an introduction to my
translation of Kant's Critique, was a pedigree of philo-
sophical thought, showing Kant's ancestors and Kant's
descent. Here, too, Professor Caird's work seemed to
me at one time to have done exactly what I wished to see
done. Valuable, however, as Professor Caird's work is on
xl Translator's Preface
all sides acknowledged to be, I thought that an even more
complete list of Kantian ancestors might and should be
given, and (what weighed even more with me) that these
ancestors should be made to speak to us more in their own
words than Professor Caird has allowed them to do.
At my time of life, and in the midst of urgent work,
I felt quite unequal to that task, and I therefore applied
to Professor Noir^, who, more than any other philosopher
I know, seemed to me qualified to carry out that idea.
Kant's philosophy, and more particularly the antecedents
of Kant's philosophy, had been his favourite study for life,
and no one, as I happened to know, possessed better ma-
terials than he did for giving, in a short compass, the
ipsissima verba by which each of Kant's ancestors had
made and marked his place in the history of thought.
Professor Noir^ readily complied with my request, and
supplied a treatise which I hope will fully accomplish what
I had in view. The translation was entrusted by him to
one of the most distinguished translators of philosophical
works in England, and though the exactness and grace-
fulness peculiar to Professor Noiri's German style could
hardly have full justice done to them in an English ren-
dering, particularly as the constant introduction of the
verba ipsissima of various authors cannot but disturb the
unity of the diction, I hope that many of my English
readers will feel the same gratitude to him which I have
here to express for his kind and ready help.^
If, then, while making allowance for differences of opin-
ion on smaller points, we have convinced ourselves that
Kant is the last scion of that noble family of thinkers
^This introduction is now left out, but will, I hope, be published ^ a
separate work.
Translator's Preface
which Professor Noire has drawn for us with the hand of
a master, what follows? Does it follow that we should
all and on all points become Kantians, that we should
simply learn his philosophy, and be thankful that we know
now all that can be known about the Freedom of the Will,
the Immortality of the Soul, and the Existence of God ?
Far from it. No one would protest more strongly than
Kant himself against what he so well calls 'learning phi-
losophy,' as opposed to 'being a philosopher*' All I con-
tend for is that, in our own modern philosophy, the work
done once for all by Kant should be as little ignored as
the work done by Hume, Leibniz* Berkeley, Locke, Spi-
noza, and Descartes. I do not deny the historical impor-
tance of the Post'Kantian systems of philosophy, whether
of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Herbart, or Schopenhauer in
Germany, of Cousin in France, or of Mill in England.
But most of these philosophers recognised Kant as their
spiritual father.* Even Comte, ignorant as he was of
German and German philosophy, expressed his satisfac-
tion and pride when he discovered how near he had,
I though unconsciously, approached to Kant s philosophy,^
^ Jttliiii Walter, Zum Gcdichtniss Kanl^s, p. 27.
* ^ywk lu et relu avec un plaisir infiiii Ic petit traits de Kant(lde« zu eincr
allgemeincn Geschichte in wclthGrgrrlichcr At^isicht, 1784); il est prudigiciix
pi>ur PepcK]ue, et m^mc, si je l''avai& connu six oy sept an& plus tot, i1 m'aiirait
Ipftrgn^ de la peine. Je suis charme que vous Tavez traduit, il peut tres-
Hkacement contribucr \ prcparcf Ics csprits ^ la philosophic positive. La
concept itin generate ou au moins la methodc y est encore metaphysique, mais
\m Hetails montrent 2k chaque instant Tesprtt positif. J'avais toujours ref^arde
Kant non-fteulemcnt comme une tr^isforte t^te, mais comnic le mctaphysicien
,^ pitta rapproch^ de la phili»suphie positive. . . . Pour moi, je ne me trouve
qa*> present^ apris ccttc lecture^ d'autre valeor que ccllc d'avoir systematise
\ UT^te la conception ehauch^e par Kant ^ mon insu, ce que je dois surtout h.
r^dacaUonacientiKque; et m^me Ic pas le plus positif et Ic plus distintt tpic
j'ai fait apr^a iui, me semble teulemcDt d'Avoif diCQUvert la loi du pas&age dea
xlii Translator's Preface
Some years ago I pointed out that, as far as, amid the
varying aspects of his philosophical writings, it was possi-
ble to judge, Mr. Herbert Spencer also, in what he calls
his Transfigured Realism, was not very far from Kant*s
fundamental position. Mr. Herbert Spencer, however, has
repudiated what I thought the highest compliment that
could be paid to any writer on philosophy, and I gladly
leave it to others to judge.
But although, whether consciously or unconsciously, all
truly important philosophers have, since the publication of
the Critique of Pure Reason, been more or less under the
spell of Kant, and indirectly of Hume and Berkeley also,
this does not mean that they have not asserted their right
of reopening questions which seemed to be solved and
settled by those heroes in the history of human thought.
Only, if any of these old problems are to be taken up
again, they ought at least to be taken up where they were
last left. Unless that is done, philosophy will become a
mere amusement, and will in no wise mark the deep ves-
tiges in the historical progress of the human intellect.
There are anachronisms in philosophy, quite as much as
in other sciences, and the spirit in which certain philo-
sophical problems have of late been treated, both in Eng-
land and in Germany, is really no better than a revival of
the Ptolemaic system would be in astronomy. No wonder,
therefore, that in both countries we should meet with con-
idees humaines par les trois etats theologique, metaphysique, et scientiBque,
loi qui me semble ^tre la base du travail dont Kant a conseiU6 I'execution.
Je rends grice aujourd'hui ^ mon defaut d'erudition; car si mon travail, tel
qu'il est maintenant, avait ete precede chez moi par I'etude du traite de Kant,
il aurait, k mes propres yeux, beaucoup perdu de sa valeur.* See Auguste
Comte, par E. Littre, Paris, 1864, p. 154; Lettre de Comte & M. d'Eichthal,
10 Dec. 1824.
Translator s Preface xliii
stant complaints about this state of philosophical anarchy.
Mr, Challis, in one of the last numbers of the Conttviporary
^^2/i>?£/ (November^ 1881), writes: 'It is another familiar
fact, a much more important one, that the present state
of philosophy is exactly parallel to the present state of
theology, ^ — a chaos of conflicting schools, each able to
edify itself without convincing any other, every one re-
garding all the rest, not as witnesses against itself, but as
food for dialectical powder and shot. The impartial by-
stander sees no sign that we are now nearer to agreement
than in the days of Varro, though the enthusiast of a
school expects the world to be all, some day, of his opinion,
just as the enthusiast of a sect believes vaguely in an ulti-
mate triumph of his faith.'
Exactly the same complaint reaches us from the very
couiitr)^ where Kant*s voice was once so powerful and
respected, then was silenced for a time, and now begins
to be invoked again for the purpose of restoring order
where all seems confusion. * Since the year 1840,' writes
Dr. Vaihinger, 'there has been hopeless philosophical an*
archy in Germany. There were the disciples of Schelling,
Hegel, Herbart, and Schopenhauer, and, by their side,
the founders and defenders of many unknown systems of
philosophy. Then followed the so-called ReaMdealists, or
I deal- Realists, who distilled a philosophical theism out of
the pantheism of greater thinkers, and, as their antipodes,
the Materialists, who on the new discoveries of natural
science founded the saddest, shallowest, and emptiest sys-
tem of philosophy/ *
In England and America, even more than in Germany,
I believe that a study of Kant holds out the best hope of
* Vuhingcr, Zutn jubilfium vun Kanei Kritlk dcr rcben Vcroi&nft, p. 1 1.
xliv Translator's Preface
a philosophical rejuvenescence. In Germany a return to
Kant has brought about a kind of Rettaissance ; in Eng-
land and America Kant's philosophy, if once thoroughly
understood, will constitute, I hope, a new birth. No doubt
there are and there have been in every country of Europe
some few honest students who perfectly understood Kant's
real position in the onward march of human thought.
But to the most fertile writers on philosophy, and to the
general public at large, which derives its ideas of philoso-
phy from them, Kant's philosophy has not only been a
terra incognita, but the very antipodes of what it really is.
Mr. Watson, in his instructive work, ' Kant and his Eng-
lish Critics,' is perfectly right when he says that, till very
lately, Kant was regarded as a benighted a priori philoso-
pher of the dogmatic type, afflicted with the hallucination
that the most important part of our knowledge con-
sists of innate ideas, lying in the depths of consciousness,
and being capable of being brought to the light by pure
introspection.' That Kant was the legitimate successor
of Hume on one side, and of Berkeley on the other, was
hardly conceived as possible. And thus it has happened
that English philosophy, in spite of the large number of
profound thinkers and brilliant writers who have served in
its ranks during the last hundred years, has not yet risen
above the level of Locke and Hume. No one can admire
more than I do the dashing style in which some of the
most popular writers of our time have ridden up to the
very muzzles of the old philosophical problems, but if I
imagine Kant looking back from his elevated position on
those fierce and hopeless onslaughts, I can almost hear
him say what was said by a French general at Balaclava :
Cest magnifiquey — viais ce n'cst pas la guerre. Quite
Translator's Preface
3dv
true it is that but for Hume, and but for Berkeley, Kant
would never have been, and philosophy would never have
reached the heights which he occupies. But, after Kant,
Hume and Berkeley have both an historical significance
only. They represent a position which has been con-
quered and fortified, and has now been deliberately left
behind.
Professor Noir£% when he had written for this work the
antecedents of Kant's philosophy, sent me another most
valuable contribution, containing a full analysis of that
philosophy, considered not only as the continuation, but
as the fulfilment of all other philosophical systems, and
more particularly of the systems of Berkeley and Hume.
For that work it was unfortunately impossible to find
room in these volumes; but I still hope that it will not
be withheld, in German at least, from those who, both in
England and Germany, have learnt to appreciate Pro-
fessor Noir^'s accurate and luminous statements. Leav-
ing therefore the task of tracing minutely the intimate
relation between Kant and his predecessors to the more
experienced hand of my friend, I shall here be satisfied
with pointing out in the broadest way the connection, and,
at the same time, the diametrical opposition between Kant
and those two great heroes of speculative thought, Berke-
ley and Hume.
Berkeley holds that all knowledge that seems to come
to us from without through the senses or through experi-
ence is mere illusion, and that truth exists in the ideas of
the pure understanding and of reason only,
Kant proves that all knowledge that comes to us from
pure understanding and from pure reason only is mere
illusion, and that truth is impossible without experience.
xlvi Translator's Preface
Hume holds that true causality is impossible, whether
in experience or beyond experience.
Kant proves that experience itself is impossible without
the category of causality, and, of course, without several
other categories also which Hume had overlooked, though
they possess exactly the same character as the concept of
causality.^ The gist of Kant*s philosophy, as opposed to
that of Hume, can be expressed in one line : That without
which experience is impossible, cannot be the result of
experience, though it must never be applied beyond the
limits of possible experience.
Such broad statements and counter-statements may seem
to destroy the finer shades of philosophical thought, yet in
the end even the most complicated and elaborate systems
of philosophy rest on such broad foundations ; and what
we carry about with us of Plato or Aristotle, of Descartes
or Leibniz, consists in the end of little more than a few
simple outlines of the grand structures of their philo-
sophical thoughts. And in that respect no system admits
of being traced in simpler and broader outlines than that
of Kant. Voluminous and complicated it is, and yet Kant
himself traces in a few lines the outcome of it, when he
says (Critique, p. 666 (836)) : ' But it will be said, is this
really all that pure reason can achieve, in opening pros-
pects beyond the limits of experience.? Nothing more
than two articles of faith ? Surely even the ordinary un-
derstanding could have achieved as much without taking
counsel of philosophers !
^ This is Kant's statement, though it is not quite accurate. See Adamson,
On the Philosophy of Kant, p. 202. That Kant knew Hume's Treatise on
Human Nature seems to follow from Hamann's Metakritik iiber den Purismus
der reinen Vernunft, p. 3, note.
Translator's Preface
xlvii
*I shall not here dwell on the benefits/ he answers,
which, by the laborious efforts of its criticism^ philosophy
has conferred on human reason, granting even that in the
end they should turn out to be merely negative. On this
point something will have to be said in the next section.
But, I ask, do you really require that knowledge, which
concerns all men, should go beyond the common under-
standing, and should be revealed to you by philosophers
only ? The very thing which you find fault with is the
best confirmation of the correctness of our previous asser-
tions» since it reveals to us, what w*e could not have grasped
before, namely, that in matters which concern all men
without distinction, nature cannot be accused of any par-
tial distribution of her gifts ; and that, with regard to the
essential interests of human nature, the highest philosophy
can achieve no more than that guidance w^hich nature has
vouchsafed even to the meanest understanding/
I hope that the time will come when Kant*s works, and
more particularly his Critique of Pure Reason, will be read,
not only by the philosopher by profession, but by everybody
who has once seen that there are problems in this life of
ours the solution of which alone makes life worth living.
These problems, as Kant so often tells us, are all the
making of reason, and what reason has made, reason is
able to unmake. These problems represent in fact the
mythology of philosophy, that is, the influence of dying
or dead language on the living thought of each succes-
sive age; and an age which has found the key to the
ancient mythology of religion, will know where to look for
the key that is to unlock the mythology of pure reason.
Kant has shown us what can and what cannot be known
by man. What remains to be done, even after Kant, is to
xlviii Translator's Preface
show how man came to believe that he could know so
much more than he can know, and this will have to be
shown by a Critique of Language.^
How strange it is that Kant's great contemporary, * the
Magus of the North,' should have seen this at once, and
that for a whole century his thought has remained dor-
mant. * Language,* Hamann writes, ' is not only the foun-
dation for the whole faculty of thinking, but the central
point also from which proceeds the misunderstanding of
reason by herself.* And again i^ 'The question with me
is not. What is Reason } but. What is Language t And
here I suspect is the ground of all paralogisms and anti-
nomies with which Reason has been charged.* And again :
' Hence I feel almost inclined to believe that our whole
philosophy consists more of language than of reason, and
the misunderstanding of numberless words, the prosopo-
poeias of the most arbitrary abstraction, the antithesis t^
yjrevBayvvfxov yp(oa€(i}<: ; nay, the commonest figures of speech
of the sensus communis have produced a whole world of
problems, which can no more be raised than solved. What
we want is a Grammar of Reason'
That Kant's Critique will ever become a popular book,
in the ordinary sense of the word, is impossible ; but that
* What I mean by this, may be seen in the last Lecture of the Second
Series of my Lectures on the Science of Language, delivered in 1867 (ed. 1880,
Vol. IL, pp. 612 seq.) ; in my article On the Origin of Reason, Contemporary
Review^ February, 1878; my Lectures on Mr. Darwin*s Philosophy of lan-
guage, Fraser^s Magazine^ May, 1 873; also in Professor Noire*s works, Der
Ursprung der Sprache, 1877 ; and Max Miiller and the Philosophy of Lan-
guage (Longmans, 1879). One important problem, in the solution of which
I differ from Kant, or rather give a new application to Kant's own principles,
has been fully treated in my Hibbert Lectures, 1878, pp. 30 seq. All this may
now be seen more fully treated in my Science of Thought, 1887.
2 Gildemeister, Ilamann's Leben und Schriften, Vol. IlL, p. 71.
Translator s Preface
xIlk
\
it will for ever occupy a place in the small tourist's library
which every thoughtful traveller across this short life's
journey will keep by his side, I have no doubt Kant, it
must be admitted, was a bad writer^ but so was Aristotle.
so was Descartes, so was Liebniz, so was Hegel ; and, after
a time, as in climbing a mountain, the very roughness of
the road becomes an attraction to the traveller. Besides,
though Kant is a bad builder, he is not a bad architect,
and there will be few patient readers of the Critique who
will fail to understand Goethe's expression that on reading
Kant, or rather^ I should say, on reading Kant again and
again, we feel like stepping into a lighted room. I have
tried hard, very hard, to remove some of the darkness
which has hitherto shrouded Kant's masterwork from
English readers, and though I know how often I have
failed to satisfy myself, I still hope I shall not have laboured
quite in vain. Englishmen who, in the turmoil of this cen-
tury, found leisure and mental vigour enough to study once
more the thoughts of Plato» and perceiving their bearing
on the thoughts of our age, may well brace themselves to
the harder work of discovering in Kant the solution of
many of the oldest problems of our race, problems which,
with most of us, are still the problems of yesterday and of
to-day. I am well aware that for Kant there is neither
the prestige of a name, such as Plato, nor the cunning of
a translator, such as Jowett. But a thinker who in Ger-
many could make himself listened to during the philosophi-
cal apathy of the Wolfian age, who from his Ultima Thule
of Kdnigsberg could spring forward to grasp the rudder
of a vessel, cast away as unseaworthy by no less a captain
[ian Hume, and who has stood at the helm for more than
century, trusted by all whose trust was worth having,
] Translator's Preface
will surely find in England, too, patient listeners, even
though they might shrink, as yet, from embarking in his
good ship in their passage across the ocean of life.
Kant's Metaphysic in relation to Physical Science
We live in an age of physical discovery, and of complete
philosophical prostration, and thus only can we account
for the fact that physical science, and, more particularly,
physiology, should actually have grasped at the sceptre of
philosophy. Nothing, I believe, could be more disastrous
to both sciences.
No one who knows my writings will suspect me of
undervaluing the progress which physical studies have
made in our time, or of ignoring the light which they
have shed on many of the darkest problems of the mind.
Only let us not unnecessarily move the old landmarks of
human knowledge. There always has been, and there
always must be, a line of demarcation between physical
and metaphysical investigations, and though the former
can illustrate the latter, they can never take their place.
Nothing can be more interesting, for instance, than recent
researches into the exact processes of sensuous perception.
Optics and Acoustics have carried us deep into the inner
workings of our bodily senses, and have enabled us to
understand what we call colours and sounds, as vibrations,
definite in number, carried on from the outer organs
through vibrating media to the brain and the inmost centre
of all nervous activity. Such observations have, no doubt,
made it more intelligible, even to the commonest under-
standing, what metaphysicians mean when they call all
secondary qualities subjective, and deny that anything can
Translator's Preface
be, for instance, green or sweet, anywhere but in the
perceiving subject. But the idea that these physical and
physiological researches have brought us one inch nearer to
the real centre of subjective perception, that any movement
of matter could in any way explain the simplest sensuous
perception, or that behind the membranes and ncrv^es we
should ever catch hold of what we call the soul, or the Ij.
or the self, need only to be stated to betray its utter folly.
That men like Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond should
find Kant's metaphysical platform best adapted for lup-
porting their physical theories is natural enough. But
how can any one wha weighs his words say that the
modern physiology of the senses has in any way supple*
mented or improved Kant*s theory of knowledge?* As
well might we say that spectrum analysis has improved
our logic, or the electric light supplemented our geometry.
• Empirical psychology/ as Kant says, * must be entirely
banished from metaphysic, and is excluded from it by it?
very idea/ ^
Metaphysical truth is wider than physical truth, and
the new discoveries of physical observers, if they are to
be more than merely contingent truths, must find their
appointed place and natural refuge within the immoveable
limits traced by the metaphysician. It was an unfortunate
accident that gave to what ought to have been called pro-
physical, the name of metaphysical science, for it is only
after having mastered the principles of metaphysic that
.the student of nature can begin his work in the right spirit,
[knowing the horizon of human knowledge, and guided by
principles as unchangeable as the polestar. It would be
' Sec Noir6, in />iV Gigmwari, June 2j, t8St»
« Critique, p, 6So (848).
Translator* s Preface
childish to make this a question of rank or precedence^
it is simply a qiiestion of work and order.
It may require, for instance, a greater effort, and display
more brilliant mental qualities, to show that nature con-
tains no traces of repeated acts of special creation, than
to prove that such a theory would make all unity of experi-
ence, and consequently all science, impossible. But what
are all the negative arguments of the mere observer with-
out the solid foundation supplied by the metaphysician ?
And with how much more of tranquil assurance would
the geologist pursue his observations and develop his con-
clusionsp if he just remembered these few lines of Kant :
' When such an arising is looked upon as the effect of a
foreign cause, it is called creation. This can never be
admitted as an event among phenomena, because its very
possibility would destroy unity of experience/ *
What can have been more delightful to the unprejudiced
observer than the gradual diminution of the enormous
number of what were called, by students of nature who
had never troubled their heads about the true meaning of
these terms, genera and species? But when the true
meaning, and thereby the true origin, of genera and species
was to be determined, is it not strange that not one w^ord
should ever have been said on the subjective character of
these terms? Whatever else a genus or species may be,
surely they are, first of all, concepts of the understanding,
and, without these concepts, whatever nature might pre-
sent to us, nothing would ever be to us a genus or a species.
Genus and species, in that restricted sense, as applied to
organic beings, represent only one side of that funda-
mental process on which all thought is founded, namely,
1 Critique, p. i68 {206).
Translator's Preface liii
the conception of the General and the Special Here,
again, a few pages of Kant ^ would have shown that the
first thing to be explained is the process by which we con-
ceive the genus or the general, and that the only adequate
explanation of it is what Kant calls its transcendental
deduction, i.e. the proof that, without it, experience itself
would be impossible ; and that therefore, so far from being
a concept abstracted from experience, it is a sine qua non
of experience itself.
If this is once clearly understood, it will be equally
understood that, as we are the makers of all concepts, we
are also the makers of genera and species, and that long
before logicians came to define and deface these terms,
they were what we now are anxious to make them again,
terms for objects which have either a common origin or
a common form. Long before Aristotle forced the terms
^iv&t and cZfio? to assume a subordinate relation to each
other, language, or the historical logic of the human race.
had formed these terms, and meant them to be not subordi-
nate, but co-ordinate,
Gtnos meant kin, and the first genas was the gens or the
family, comprehending individuals that could claim a com-
mon ancestor, though differing in appearance as much as
a grandfather and a babe. Eidos or species, on the con-
trary, meant appearance or form, and the first eidos was
probably the troop of warriors, comprehending individuals
of uniform appearance, nothing being asserted as to their
common origin. This was the historic or prehistoric be-
ginning of these two fundamental categories of thought
— and what has the theory of evolution really done for
them ? It has safely brought them back to their original
* Critique of Pure Reason, p. 524 (pp. 652 seq.)*
liv Translator's Preface
meaning. It has shown us that we can hold together, or
comprehend, or conceive, or classify, or generalise or speak
in two ways, and in two ways only — either by common
descent (genealogically), or by common appearance (mor-
phologically). Difference of form is nothing, if we classify
genealogically, and difference of descent is nothing, if we
classify morphologically. What the theory of evolution is
doing for us is what is done by every genealogist, aye, what
was done in ancient time by every paterfamilias, namely,
to show by facts that certain individuals, however different
from each other in form and appearance, had a common
ancestor, and belonged therefore to the same family or
kin. In every case where such proof has been given, we
gain in reality a more correct general concept, i.e. we are
able to think and to speak better. The process is the
same, whether we trace the Bourbons and Valois back to
Hugo Capet, or whether we derive the Hippos and the
Hipparion from a common ancestor. In both cases we
are dealing with facts and with facts only. Let it be^
established that there is no missing link between them, or
between man and monkey, and we shall simply have gained
a new concept, as we should gain a new concept by estab-
lishing the unbroken continuity of the Apostolic succes-
sion. Only let us see clearly that in physical and historical
researches, too, we are dealing with facts, and with facts
only, which cannot excite any passion, and that the wider
issues as to the origin of genera and species belong to a
different sphere of human knowledge, and after having
been debated for centuries, have been determined once
for all by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
If one remembers the dust-clouds of words that were
raised when the question of the* origin of species was
Translator' s Preface
Iv
mooted once more in our days, it is truly refreshing to
read a few of Kant's calm pages on that subject, written
one hundred years ago. * Reason,' * he writes, * prepares
the field for the understanding,
•ist Through the principle of ftamogeneousness of the
manifold as arranged under higher genera ;
*2ndly. Through the principle of the variety of the
homogeneous in lower species ; to which,
* 3rdly, it adds a law of affinity of all concepts, which
requires a continual transition from every species to every
other species, by a gradual increase of diversity. We may
call these the principles of homogcneousness^ of specification^
and of continuity of forms.*
And with reference to the practical application of these
metaphysical principles to the study of nature, he writes
again with true philosophical insight:^ * I often see even
intelligent men quarrelling with each other about the char-
acteristic distinctions of men, animals, or plants, nay, even
of minerals, the one admitting the existence of certain
national characteristics, founded on descent, or decided
and inherited differences of families, races, etc., while
others insist that nature has made the same provision for
all, and that all differences are due to accidental environ-
ment. But they need only consider the peculiar character
of the matter, in order to understand that it is far too
deeply hidden for both of them to enable them to speak
from any real insight into the nature of the object. It
IS nothing but the twofold interest of reason, one party
cherishing the one, another party the other, or pretending
to do so. But this difference of the two maxims of mani-
foldness and unity in nature, may easily be adjusted,
* Critique, p, 5*8 (657), « Ibid. p. 536 {667).
Ivi Translator's Preface
though as long as they are taken for objective know-
ledge they cause not only disputes, but actually create
impediments which hinder the progress of truth, until a
means is found of reconciling the contradictory interests,
and thus giving satisfaction to reason.
'The same applies to the assertion or denial of the
famous law of the continuous scale of created beings, first
advanced by Leibniz, and so cleverly trimmed up by
Bonnet. It is nothing but a carrying out of the principle
of affinity resting on the interest of reason, for neither
observation, nor insight into the constitution of nature
could ever have supplied it as an objective assertion. The
steps of such a ladder, as far as they can be supplied by
experience, are far too wide apart from each other, and
the so-called small differences are often in nature itself
such wide gaps, that no value can be attached to such
observations as revealing the intentions of nature, particu-
larly as it must always be easy to discover certain simi-
larities and approximations in the great variety of things.
The method, on the contrary, of looking for order .in
nature, according to such a principle, and the maxim of
admitting such order (though it may be uncertain where
and how far) as existing in nature in general, is certainly
a legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason,
only that, as such, it goes far beyond where experience or
observation could follow it. It only indicates the way
which leads to systematical unity, but does not determine
anything beyond.'
I know, of course, what some of my philosophical
friends will say. * You speak of thoughts,* they will say,
* we speak of facts. You begin with the general, we begin
with the particular. You trust to reason, we trust to our
Translator s Preface
Ivii
senses.* Let me quote in reply one of the most positive
of positive philosophers^ one who trusts to the senses, who
begins with the particular, and who speaks of facts. Con-
dillac in his famous Essai sur TOrigine des Connaissances
humaines, writes : * Soit que nous nous elevions, pour
parler mctaphoriquement, jusque dans les cieux, soit que
nous descendions dans les abimes, nous ne sortons pas de
nous-memes ; et ce n'est jamais que notre pens^e que nous
apercevons.' This was written in 1746.
And w^hat applies to these, applies to almost all other
problems of the day. Instead of being discussed by them-
selves, and with a heat and haste as if they had never been
discussed before, they should be brought back to the
broader ground from which they naturally arise, and be
Ltreated by the light of true philosophy and the experience
^gained in former ages. There is a solid ground formed
by the thoughts of those who came before us, a kind of
intellectual humus on which we ourselves must learn to
march on cautiously, yet safely, without needing those
high stilts which seem to lift our modern philosophers
above the level of Locke, and Hume, and Kant, and prom-
se to enable them to advance across the unknown and the
unknowable with wider strides than were ever attempted
by such men as Faraday, or Lyell, or Darwin, but which
■invariably fall away when they are most needed, and leave
our bold speculators to retrace their steps as best they
can.
Kant's Philosophy as judged by History
If my translation of Kant were intended for a few pro-
fessional philosophers only, I should not feel bound to
produce any credentials in his favour But the few true
Iviii Translator's Preface
students of philosophy in England do not want a transla
tion. They would as little attempt to study Kant, without
knowing German, as to study Plato, without knowing
Greek. What I want, and what I hope for is that that
large class of men and women whose thoughts, consciously
or unconsciously, are still rooted in the philosophy of the
last century, and who still draw their intellectual nutri-
ment from the philosophical soil left by Locke and Hume,
should know that there is a greater than Locke or Hume,
though himself the avowed pupil and the truest admirer
of those powerful teachers. Kant is not a man that re-
quires testimonials ; we might as well require testimonials
of Plato or Spinoza. But to the English reader it may be
of interest to hear at least a few of the utterances of the
great men whose merit it is to have discovered Kant, a
discovery that may well be called the discovery of a new
world.
What Goethe said of Kant, we have mentioned before.
Schiller, after having declared that he was determined to
master Kant's Critique, and if it were to cost him the
whole of his life, says : * The fundamental ideas of Kant*s
ideal philosophy will remain a treasure for ever, and for
their sake alone we ought to be grateful to have been born
in this age.'
Strange it is to see how orthodox theologians, from
mere laziness, it would seem, in mastering Kant's doc-
trines, raised at once a clamour against the man who
proved to be their best friend, but whose last years of life
they must needs embitter. One of the most religious
and most honest of Kant's contemporaries, however, Jung
Stilling, whose name is well known in England also,
quickly perceived the true bearing of the Critique of Pure
Translator's Preface
Reason. In a letter, dated March i, 1789, Jung Stilling
writes to Kant : * You are a great, a very great instrument
in the hand of God. I do not flatter, — but your philoso-
phy will work a far greater, far more general, and far
more blessed revolution than Luther s Reform. As soon
as one has well comprehended the Critique of Reason, one
sees that no refutation of it is possible. Your philosophy
must therefore be eternal and imchangcable, and its benefi-
cent effects will bring back the religion of Jesus to its
original purity, when its only purpose was — holiness/
Fichte, no mean philosopher himself, and on many
points the antagonist of Kant, writes: ' Kant's philosophy
will ill time overshadow the whole human race, and call
to life a new, more noble, and more worthy generation/
Jean Paul Fried rich Richter speaks of Kant * not only
as a light of the world, but as a whole solar system in
one.*
With more suppressed, yet no less powerful apprecia-
tion Wilhelm von Humboldt writes of him: * Some things
which he demolished will never rise again ; some things
which he founded will never perish again. A reform such
as he carried through is rare in the history of philosophy.'
Schopenhauer, the most fearless critic of Kant's Cri-
tique, calls it * the highest achievement of human reflec-
tion/ What he has written of Kant is indi.spensable
indeed to every student of the Critique, and I deeply
regret that I could not have added to my translation of
Kant a translation of Schopenhauer's critical remarks.
I must add, however, one paragraph : ' Never,* Schopen-
hauer writes in his Parerga (1, 183X * never will a philoso-
pher, without an independent, zealous, and often repeated
study of the principal works of Kant, gain any idea of this
Translator's Preface
most important of all philosophical phenomena, Kant is^
I believe, the most philosophical head that nature has ever
produced. To think with him and according to his man-
ner is something that cannot be compared to anything
else, for he possessed such an amount of clear and quite
peculiar thoughtfulncss as has never been granted to any
other mortal. We are enabled to enjoy this with him, if,
initiated by patient and serious study, we succeed, while
reading the profoundest chapters of the Critique of Pure
Reason, in forgetting ourselves and thinking really with
Kant's own head, thus being lifted high above ourselves.
If we go once more through the Principles of Pure Reason,
and, more particularly, the Analogies of Experience, and
enter into the deep thought of the synthetical unity of
apperception, we feel as if lifted miraculously and carried
away out of the dreamy existence in which we are here
lost, and as if holding in our hands the very elements out
of which that dream consists/
If, in conclusion, we look at some of the historians of
modern philosophy, we find Erdmann, though a follower
of Hegel, speaking of Kant as *the Atlas that supports
the whole of German philosophy/
Fortlage, the Nestor of German philosophers,^ who
wrote what he calls a Genetic History of Philosophy since
Kant, speaks of him in the following terms : * In one word>
Kant's system is the gate through which everything that
has stirred the philosophical world since his time, comes
and goes. It is the Universal Exchange where all circu-
lating ideas flow together before they vanish again in
distant places. It is the London of philosophy, sending
its ships into every part of the world, and after a time
> He died November, 1881.
^
Translator's Preface
receivijig them back. There is no place in the whole
globe of human thought which it has not visited, explored,
and colonised/
In more homely language Professor Caird expresses
much the same idea of Kant's philosophy, when he says
(p. 120): *So much has Kant*s fertile idea changed the
aspect of the intellectual world, that there is not a single
problem of philosophy that does not meet us with a new
face; and it is perhaps not unfair to say, that the specula-
tions of all those who have not learned the lesson of Kant,
are beside the point*
Dr. Vaihinger, who has devoted his life to the study of
Kant, and is now bringing out a commentary in four
volumes on his Critique of Pure Reason,^ sums up his
estimate in the following words: *Thc Critique is a work
to which, whether we look to the grandeur of conception,
or the accuracy of thought, or the weight of ideas, or the
power of language, few only can be compared — possibly
Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Spinoza's Ethics
— none, if we consider their lasting effect, their penetrating
and far-reaching influence, their wealth of thought, and
their variety of suggestions/ ^
Nearly the same judgment is repeated by Vacherot,^
who speaks of the Critique as * un livrc immortel, comme
rOrganum de Bacon et le Discours de la Methode de Des-
cartes,' while Professor Noir^, with his wider sympathies
for every sphere of intellectual activity, counts six books,
in the literature of modern Europe, as the peers of Kant's
' CommenUr m K«nt*s Kritik dcf rcincn Vemunft, lum hundcrtj&hrigcn
Jttbilium denetben, herausgcgebcn von Dr. H. Vaihinger, Stuttgart, t88i,
* S^tmi JubiUum von Kant's Kritik Her rcincn W-rnunft, von IL Vaihinger,
Scp«ratabdruck aus der Wochcnschrift Im ntuen Reick^ 1S81, No. 3J, p. 14.
• Re^ui da deux Mandei^ \ S79, Au&l.
Ixii Translator's Preface
Critique, viz. Copernicus, De revolutionibus orbium coeles-
tium(i543); Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia
(1641); Newton, Principia philosophiae naturalis mathe-
matica (1687); Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois (1748);
Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums
(1764); and Adam Smith, Inquiry into the nature and
causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), — but he places
Kant's Critique at the head of them all.
I confess I feel almost ashamed lest it should be sup-
posed that I thought Kant in need of these testimonies.
My only excuse is that I had to defend myself against
the suspicion of having wasted my time, and I therefore
thought that by pointing out the position assigned to
Kant*s Critique among the master-works of human genius
by men of greater weight than I could ever venture to
claim for myself, I might best answer the kindly meant
question addressed to me by my many friends : ' Bttt how
can you waste your time on a translation of Kanfs Critik
der reinen Vemimftf*
On the Text of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
I have still to say a few words on the German text on
which my translation is founded.
I have chosen the text of the First Edition, first of all,
because it was the centenary of that edition which led me
to carry out at last my long-cherished idea of an English
translation. That text represents an historical event. It
represents the state of philosophy, as it was then, it repre-
sents Kant's mind as it was then, at the moment of the
greatest crisis in the history of philosophy. Even if the
later editions contained improvements, these improvements
Translator's Preface hdn
would belong to a later phase in Kant's own development;
and it is this first decisive position, as taken by Kant
against both Hume and Berkeley, that more than anything
else dcsen^es to be preserved in the history of philosophy.
Secondly, I must confess that I have always used my-
self the First Edition of Kant's Critique, and that when I
came to read the Second Edition, I never could feel so at
home in it as in the first The First Edition seems to me
cut out of one block, the second always leaves on my mind
the impression of patchwork.
Thirdly, I certainly dislike in the Second Edition a cer-
tain apologetic tone, quite unworthy of Kant. He had
evidently been attacked by the old Wolfian professors, and
also by the orthodox clergy. He knew that these attacks
were groundless, and arose in fact from an imperfect
understanding of his work on the part of his critics- He
need not have condescended to show that he was as well-
schooled a philosopher as any of his learned colleagues, or
that his philosophy would really prove extremely useful
to orthodox clergymen in their controversies with sceptics
and unbelievers.
So far, and so far only, can I understand the feeling
against the Second Edition, which is shared by some of
the most accurate and earnest students of Kant.
But I have never been able to understand the exagger-
ated charges which Schopenhauer and others bring against
Kant, both for the omissions and the additions in that
Second Edition. What I can understand and fully agree
with is Jacobi's opinion, when he says:' *I consider the
loss which the Second Edition of Kant's Critique suffered
by omissions and changes very considerable, and I am
» Jtcobi'i Works, VoL 11^ p. 391 ("8*5).
Ixiv
Translator's Preface
!•
very anxious by the expression of my opinion to induce
readers who seriously care for philosophy and its history
to compare the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
with the second improved edition. ... It is not sufiR-
ciently recognised what an advantage it is to study the
systems of great thinkers in their first original form. I
was told by Hamann that the very judicious Ch. J, Krause
(or Kraus) could never sufficiently express his gratitude
for having been made acquainted with Hume's first philo-
sophical work, Treatise on Human Nature, 1739, where
alone he had found the right point of view for judging the
later essays.'
Nor do I differ much from Michelet, in his History of
the later systems of Philosophy in Germany (1837, Vol L,
p. 49), where he says, * Much that is of a more speculative
character in the representation of Kant*s system has been
taken from the First Edition. It can no longer be found
in the second and later editions, which, as well as the
Prolegomena, keep the idealistic tendency more in the
background, because Kant saw that this side of his phi-
losophy had lent itself most to attacks and misunder-
standings.'
I can also understand Schopenhauer, when he states
that many things that struck him as obscure and self-con-
tradictory in Kant's Critique ceased to be so when he
came to read that work in its first original form. But
everything else that Schopenhauer writes on the difference
between the first and second editions of the Critique seems
to me perfectly intolerable. Kant, in the Preface to his
Second Edition, which was published six years after the
first, in 17S7, gives a clear and straightforward account of
the changes which he introduced. * My new representa-
Translator's Preface
kir
^M tion/ he writes, 'changes absolutely nothing with regard
~ to my propositions and even the arguments in their sup-
port/ He had nothing to retract, but he thought he had
I certain things to add, and he evidently hoped he could
render some points of his system better understood His
freedom of thought, his boldness of speech, and his love
of truth are, if I am any judge in these matters, the same
in 1787 as in 1781. The active reactionary measures of
the Prussian Government, by which Kant is supposed to
have been frightened, date from a later period. Zedlitz,
Kant*s friend and protector, was not replaced by WoUner
as minister till 1788. It was not till 1794 that Kant was
really warned and reprimanded by the Cabinet, and we
must not judge too harshly of the old philosopher when at
his time of life, and in the then state of paternal despotism
in Prussia, he wrote back to say * that he would do even
more than was demanded of him, and abstain in future
from all public lectures concerning religion, whether nat-
ural or revealed.' What he at that time felt in his heart
of hearts we know from some remarks found after his
death among his papers. * It is dishonourable,* he writes,
•to retract or deny one's real convictions, but silence, in a
case like my own, is the duty of a subject ; and though all
we say must be true, it is not our duty to declare publicly
all that is true.' Kant never retracted, he never even de-
clared himself no longer responsible for any one of those
portions of the Critique which he omitted in the Second
Edition. On the contrary, he asked his readers to look
for them in the First Editian, and only expressed a regret
that there was no longer room for them in the Second
Edition.
Now let us hear what Schopenhauer says. He not only
Ixvi Translator's Preface
calls the Second Edition 'crippled, disfigured, and cor*
nipt/ but imputes motives utterly at variance with all we
know of the truthful, manly, and noble character of Kant.
Schopenhauer writes : ' What induced Kant to make these
changes was fear of man, produced by weakness of old age,
which not only affects the head, but sometimes deprives
the heart also of that firmness which alone enables us to
despise the opinions and motives of our contemporaries,
as they deserve to be. No one can be great without that.'
All this is simply abominable. First of all, as a matter
of fact, Kant, when he published his Second Edition, had
not yet collapsed under the weakness of old age. He was
about sixty years of age, and that age, so far from making
cowards of us, gives to most men greater independence
and greater boldness than can be expected from the
young, who are awed by the authority of their seniors,
and have often to steer their course prudently through
the conflicts of parties and opinions,* What is the use
of growing old, if not to gain greater confidence in our
opinions, and to feel justified in expressing them with
perfect freedom ? And as to *that firmness which alone
enables us to despise the opinions and motives of our con-
temporaries,* let us hope that that is neither a blessing
of youth, nor of old age, Schopenhauer personally, no
doubt, had a right to complain of his contemporaries, but
he would have been greater if he had despised them either
less or more, or, at all events, if he had despised them in
silence.
I am really reluctant to translate all that follows, and
^ * En general la vigucur de I'esprit, soit dans la politiqiie, so it dans la
science, oe ac deploie dans loute &a plenitude qn'i I'tge ou I'activite vitale
vient \ s*aflaiblir.' E, Saisseti L'Amc el la Vie, p. 60.
Translator's Preface
Ixvii
I
I
I
I
I
yet, as Schopenhauer s view has found so many echoes,
it seems necessary to let him have his say.
* Kant had been told/ he continues, 'that his system
was only a rechauffe qI Berkeley's Idealism. This seemed
to him to endanger that invaluable and indispensable
originality which every founder of a system values so
highly (see Prolegomena zu jeder kiinftigen Metaphysik,
pp. 70, 202 sq.). At the same time he had given offence
in other quarters by his upsetting of some of the sacred
doctrines of the old dogmas, particularly of those of
rational psychology. Add to this that the great king, the
friend of light and protector of truth, had just died (1786).
Kant allowed himself to be intimidated by all this, and
had the weakness to do what was unworthy of him. This
consists in his having entirely changed the first chapter
of the Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic (first
ed., p. 341), leaving out fifty-seven pages, which contained
what was indispensable for a clear understanding of the
whole work, and by the omission of which, as well as by
what he put in its place, his whole doctrine becomes full
of contradictions. These I pointed out in my critique of
Kant (pp. 612-18), because at that time (in 1818) I had
never seen the First Edition, in which they are really not
contradictions, but agree perfectly with the rest of his
work. In truth the Second Edition is like a man who has
had one leg amputated, and replaced by a wooden one.
In the preface to the Second Edition (p. xlii), Kant gives
hollow, nay, untnie excuses for the elimination of that
important and extremely beautiful part of his book- He
does not confessedly wish that what was omitted should
be thought to have been retracted by him. ** People
might read it in the First Edition/' he says; '*he had
Translator's Prefa€e
^
wanted room for new additions, and nothing had been
changed and improved except the representation of his
system." But the dishonesty of this plea becomes clear
if we compare the Second with the First Edition, There,
in the Second Edition, he has not only left out that im-
portant and beautiful chapter, and inserted under the
same title another half as long and much less significant,
but he has actually embodied in that Second Edition a
refutation of idealism which says the very contrary of
what had been said in the omitted chapter, and defends
the very errors which before he had thoroughly refuted,
thus contradicting the whole of his own doctrine. This
refutation of idealism is so thoroughly bad, such palpable
sophistry, nay, in part, such a confused "galimatias/' that
it is unworthy of a place in his immortal work. Conscious
evidently of its insufficiency, Kant has tried to improve it
by the alteration of one passage (see Preface, p. xxxix)
and by a long and confused note. But he forgot to cancel
at the same time in the Second Edition the numerous pas*
sages which are in contradiction with the new note, and in
agreement with what he had cancelled. This applies par-
ticularly to the whole of the sixth section of the Antinomy
of Pure Reason, and to all those passages which I pointed
out with some amazement in my critique (which was
written before I knew the First Edition and its later fate),
because in them he contradicts himself. That it was fear
which drove the old man to disfigure his Critique of
rational psychology is shown also by this, that his attacks
on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatism are far
weaker, far more timid and superficial, than in the First
Edition, and that, for the sake of peace, he mixed them
up at once with anticipations which are out of place, nay,
w
Translator' s Preface
Ixix
cannot as yet be understood, of the immortality of the
soul, grounded on practical reason and represented as one
of its postulates. By thus timidly yielding he has in
reality retracted, with regard to the principal problem of
all philosophy, viz, the relation of the idea! to the real,
those thoughts which he had conceived in the vigour of
his manhood and cherished through all his life. This he
did in his sixty-fourth year with a carelessness which is
peculiar to old age quite as much as timidity, and he thus
surrendered his system, not however openly, but escaping
from it through a back-door, evidently ashamed himself
of what he was doing. By this process the Critique of
Pure Reason has, in its Second Edition, become a self-
Contradictory, crippled, and corrupt book, and is no longer
genuine/
'The wrong interpretation of the Critique of Pure
Reason, for which the successors of Kant, both those
who were for and those who were against him, have
blamed each other, as it would seem, with good reason,
arc principally due to the so-called improvements, intro-
duced into his work by Kant's own hand. For who can
understand what contradicts itself ? *
The best answer to all this is to be found in Kant's own
straightforward statements in the Preface to his Second
Edition (Supplement IL, pp. fy^% seq,). That the unity
of thought which pervades the First Edition is broken
low and then in the Second Edition, no attentive reader
can fail to see. That Kant shows rather too much anxiety
to prove the harmlessness of his Critique, is equally true,
and it would have been better if, while refuting what he
calls Empirical Idealism, he had declared more strongly
his unchanged adherence to the principles of Transcen-
Ixx Translator's Preface
dental Idealism.^ But all this leaves Kant's moral character
quite untouched. If ever man lived the life of a true phi-
losopher, making the smallest possible concessions to the
inevitable vanities of the world, valuing even the shadowy
hope of posthumous fame^ at no more than its proper
worth, but fully enjoying the true enjoyments of this life,
an unswerving devotion to truth, a consciousness of right-
eousness, and a sense of perfect independence, that man
was Kant. If it is true that on some points which may
seem more important to others than they seemed to him-
self, he changed his mind, or, as we should now say, if
there was a later development in his philosophical views,
this would seem to me to impose on every student the
duty, which I have tried to fulfil as a translator also, viz.
first of all, to gain a clear view of Kant*s system from his
First Edition, and then to learn, both from the additions
and from the omissions of the Second Edition, on what
points Kant thought that the objections raised against
his theory required a fuller and clearer statement of his
arguments.
The additions of the Second Edition will be found on
pp. 687-808 of this volume, while the passages omitted
in the Second Edition have been included throughout
between parentheses.
Critical Treatment of the Text of Kant's Critique
The text of Kant's Critique has of late years become the
subject of the most minute philological criticism, and it
certainly offers as good a field for the exercise of critical
scholarship as any of the Greek and Roman classics.
* See Critique, p. 300 (369).
2 See Critique of Pure Reason, Supp. XXVII., p. 793.
Translator s Preface
Ixxi
We have, first of all, the text of the First Edition, full of
faults, arising partly from the imperfect state of Kant's
manuscript, partly from the carelessness of the printer,
Kant received no proof-sheets, and he examined the first
thirty clean sheets, which were in his hands when he wrote
the preface, so carelessly that he could detect in them only
one essential misprint. Then followed the Second, * here
and there improved/ Edition (1787), in which Kant not
only omitted and added considerable passages, but paid
some little attention also to the correctness of the text,
improving the spelling and the stopping, and removing a
number of archaisms which often perplex the reader of the
First Edition.
We hardly know whether these minor alterations came
from Kant himself, for he is said to have remained firmly
attached to the old system of orthography ; * and it seems
quite certain that he himself paid no further attention to
the later editions, published during his lifetime, the Third
Edition in 1790, the Fourth in 1794, the Fifth in 1799,
At the end of the Fifth Edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason, published in 1799, there is a long list of Corri-
genda, the authorship of which has exercised the critical
students of Kant's text very much. No one seems to have
thought of attributing it to Kant himself, who at that time
of life was quite incapable of such work. Professor B.
Erdmann supposed it might be the work of Rink, or some
other amanuensis of Kant. Dr. Vaihinger has shown that
it is the work of a Professor Grillo, who, in the Philoso-
phische Anzeiger, a Supplement to L, H. Jacob's Annalen
der Philosophie und dcs philosophischen Geistes, 1795,
published a collection of Corrigenda, not only for Kant's
^ See Kehrbacb, Krttik der reinen Vernuaft, p. viti.
Translator's Preface
Critique of Pure Reason, but for several others of his works
also. Another contributor to the same journal, Meye.%
thereupon defended Kant's publisher (Hartknoch) against
the charges of carelessness, rejected some of Grillo's cor-
rections, and showed that what seemed to be misprints
were in many cases peculiarities of Kant's style. It is
this list of Professor Grillo which, with certain deductions,
has been added to the Fifth Edition of the Critique,
Some of Grillo's corrections have been adopted in the tcxt>
while others, even those which Meyer had proved to be
unnecessary, have retained their place in the list.
With such materials before him, it is clear that a critical
student of Kant's text enjoys considerable freedom in con-
jectural emendation, and that freedom has been used with
great success by a number of German critics. The more
important are : ~
Rosenkranz, in his edition of Kant's Critique (text of
First Edition), 1838.
Hartenstein, in his edition of Kant's Critique (text of
Second Edition), 1838, 1867.
Kehrbach, in his edition of Kant's Critique (text of First
Edition), 1877.
Leclair, A. von, Kritische Beitrage zur Kategorienlehre
Kant's, 1871.
Paulsen, Versuch einer Entwickelungsgeschichte der
Kantischen Erkenntnisslehre, 1875,
Erdmann, B., Kritik der reinen Vernunft (text of Second
Edition), 1878, with a valuable chapter on the Revision of
the Text.
Many of the alterations introduced by these critics affect
the wording only of Kant's Critique, without materially
altering the meaning, and were therefore of no importance
Translator's Preface
btxiii
in an English translation. It often happens, however, that
the construction of a whole sentence depends on a verj
slight alteration of the text In Kant*s long sentences,
the gender of the pronouns der, die^ das, are often our only
guide in discovering to what substantive these pronouns
refer, while in English, where the distinction of gender
is wanting in substantives, it is often absolutely necessary
to repeat the substantiates to which the pronouns refer.
But Kant uses several nouns in a gender which has be-
come obsolete. Thus he speaks * of der Wathsthum, der
Wohigcfalicn, der Gegeniheil, die Hifidcrniss, die Bednrf-
ftiss, die P\'rkdi(niss, and he varies even between die and
das Verhdltniss, die and das Erkenntniss, etc., so that even
the genders of pronouns may become blind guides. The
same applies to several prepositions which Kant construes
with different cases from what would be sanctioned by
modern German grammar.^ Thus ^;/^5^rwith him governs
the accusative, wdhrcnd the dative, etc. For all this, and
many other peculiarities, we most be prepared, if we want
to construe Kant's text correctly, or find out how far we
are justified in altering it.
Much has been achieved in this line, and conjectural
alterations have been made by recent editors of Kant of
which a Bentley or a Lachmann need not be ashamed. In
cases where these emendations affected the meaning, and
when the reasons why my translation deviated so much
from the tcxlus rcaptus might not be easily perceived, I
have added the emendations adopted by me, in a note.
Those who wish for fuller information on these points, wilJ
have to consult Dr. Vaihinger's forthcoming Commentary,
which, to judge from a few specimens kindly communi
> See Erdifuutn, p. 637* ^ Sec ErdmanBt p. 66ow
^
Ixxiv Translator's Preface
cated to me by the author, will give the fullest information
on the subject
How important some of the emendations are which
have to be taken into account before an intelligible trans-
lation is possible, may be seen from a few specimens.
On p. 358 (442) the reading of the first edition Antithesis
must be changed into Thesis.
Page 441 (54S)i Noumcfwn seems preferable to Pfm-
nomenoH.
Page 395 (484), we must read keine, instead of eine
Wakmehm ung.
Page 277 (340X we must keep the reading of the First
Edition transcendentalen^ instead of transcendenten, as
printed in the Second ; while on p. 542 (674), tramcenden-
ten may be retained, though corrected into transccndentalen
in the Corrigenda of the Fifth Edition.
On p. ^2*j (781), the First Edition reads, sind alsa keine
Privatmeimmgefu Hartenstein rightly corrects this into
reine Privatmeinungcu, i.e, they are mere private opinions.
Page 667 (832), instead of cin jeder Theil, it is proposed
to read kein TheiL This would be necessary if we took
vermisst werden kamt^ in the sense of can be spared^ while
if we take it in the sense of can be missed, i.e. can be felt
to be absent, the reading of the First Edition ein Jeder
Theii must stand. See the Preface to the First Edition,
p. XX, note I.
On p. 128 (157) the First Edition reads, Weil sic kein
Drittes^ ndmlich reinen Gegenstand haben. This gives no
sense, because Kant never speaks of a reinen Gegenstand,
In the list of Corrigenda at the end of the Fifth Edition,
reinen is changed into keinen^ which Hartenstein has
rightly adopted, while Rosenkranz retains reinen.
Translator s Preface
Ixxv
On pp. i6 and \^ of the Introduction to the Second
Edition (Supplement IV., p. 717), Dr. Vaihingcr has clearly
proved, I think, that the whole passage from Einige
wenige Gfimdsdtze to Konnen dargcstellt ^venicn interrupts
the drift of Kant's argument. It probably was a marginal
note, made by Kant himself, but inserted in the wrong
place. It would do very well as a note to the sentence:
Eben so tvenig is/ irgcnd ein Gnmdsats der reifien Geome-
trie anaiytisch.
With these prefatory remarks I leave ray translation in
the hands of English readers. It contains the result of
hard work and hard thought, and I trust it will do some
good. I have called Kant's philosophy the Lingua Franca
of modern philosophy, and so it is, and I hope will become
still more. But that Lingna Frama, though it may
contain many familiar w^ords from all languages of the
world, has yet, like every other language, to be learnt.
To expect that we can understand Kant's Critique by
simply reading it, would be the same as to attempt to read
a French novel by the light of English and Latin. A
book which Schiller and Schopenhauer had to read again
and again before they coulfl master it, will not yield its
secrets at the first time of asking. An Indian proverb
says that it is not always the fault of the post, if a blind
man cannot see it, nor is it always the fault of the pro-
found thinker, if his language is unintelligible to the busy
crowed. I am no defender of dark sayings, and I stilt hold
to an opinion for which I have often been blamed, that
there is nothing in any science that cannot be stated
clearly, if only we know it clearly. Still there are limits.
No man has a right to complain that he cannot under-
Ixxvi Translator's Preface
stand higher mathematics, if he declines to advance step
by step from the lowest to the highest stage of that sciencei
It is the same in philosophy. Philosophy represents a
long toil in thought and word, and it is but natural that
those who have toiled long in inward thought should use
certain concepts, and bundles of concepts, w^ith their alge-
braic exponents, in a way entirely bew^ildcring to the outer
world, Kant's obscurity is owing partly to his writing for
himself rather than for others, and partly to his addressing
himself, when defending a cause, to the judge, and not to
the jury. He docs not wish to persuade, he tries to con-
vince. No doubt there arc arguments in Kant's Critique
which fail to convince^ and which have provoked the cavils
and strictures of his opponents. Kant would not have
been the really great man he was, if he had escaped the
merciless criticism of his smaller contemporaries. But
herein too we perceive the greatness of Kant, that those
hostile criticisms, even w-herc they arc well founded, touch
only on less essential points, and leave the solidity of the
whole structure of his philosophy unimpaired. No first
perusal will teach us how much of Kant's Critique may
safely be put aside as problematical, or, at all events, as
not essential. But wnth every year, and with every new
perusal, some of these mists and clouds will vanish, and
the central truth will be seen rising before our eyes with
constantly increasing warmth and splendour, like a cloud-
less sun in an Eastern sky.
And now\ w^hile I am looking at the last lines that I
have written, it may be the last lines that I shall ever
write on Kant, the same feeling comes over me which I
expressed in the Preface to the last volume of my edition
of the Rig- Veda and its ancient Commentary. I feel as if
Translator' s Preface
an old friend, with whom I have had many communings
during the sunny and during the dark days of life, was
taken from me, and I should hear his voice no more.
The two friendsi the Rig-Veda and Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, may seem very different, and yet my life
would have been incomplete without the one as without
the other.
The bridge of thoughts and sighs that spans the whole
histor}^ of the Aryan world has its first arch in the Veda,
its last in Kant's Critique. In the Veda we watch the first
unfolding of the human mind as we can watch it nowhere
else. Life seems simple, natural, childlike, full of hopes,
undisturbed as yet by many doubts or fears. What is
beneath, and above, and beyond this life is dimly perceived,
and expressed in a thousand words and ways, all mere
stammerings, all aiming to express what cannot be ex-
pressed, yet all full of a belief in the real presence of the
Divine in Nature, of the Infinite in the Finite. Here is
the childhood of our race unfolded before our eyes, at least
so much of it as we shall ever know on Aryan ground, —
and there are lessons to be read in those hymns, aye, in
every word that is used by those ancient poets, which will
occupy and delight generations to come.
And while in the Veda we may study the childhood, we
may study in Kant*s Critique of Pure Reason the perfect
manhood of the Aryan mind. It has passed through
many phases, and every one of them had its purpose, and
has left its mark. It is no longer dogmatical, it is no
longer sceptical, least of all is it positive. It has arrived
at and passed through its critical phase, and in Kant's
Critique stands before us, conscious both of its weakness
and of its strength, modest, yet brave. It knows what the
Ixxviii Translator's Preface
old idols of its childhood and its youth too were made of.
It does not break them, it only tries to understand them,
but it places above them the Ideals of Reason — no longer
tangible — not even within reach of the understanding —
yet real, if anything can be called real, — bright and
heavenly stars to guide us even in the darkest night.
In the Veda we see how the Divine appears in the fire,
and in the earthquake, and in the great and strong wind
which rends the mountain. In Kant's Critique the Divine
is heard in the still small voice — the Categorical Impera-
tive— the I Ought — which Nature does not know and
cannot teach. Everything in Nature is or is not, is neces-
sary or contingent, true or false. But there is no room in
Nature for the Ought, as little as there is in Logic, Mathe-
matics, or Geometry. Let that suffice, and let future
generations learn all the lessons contained in that simple
word, I ought, as interpreted by Kant.
I feel I have done but little for my two friends, far less
than they have done for me. I myself have learnt from
the Veda all that I cared to learn, but the right and full
interpretation of all that the poets of the Vedic hymns
have said or have meant to say, must be left to the future.
What I could do in this short life of ours was to rescue
from oblivion the most ancient heirloom of the Aryan
family, to establish its text on a sound basis, and to render
accessible its venerable Commentary, which, so long as
Vedic studies last, may be criticised, but can never be
ignored.
The same with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I do
not venture to give the right and full explanation of all
that Kant has said or has meant to say. I myself have
learnt from him all that I cared to learn, and I now give
TnnttiSsA/rV Ff^fiKtr
faodi
to t£ie worid the text odt hb pcinctpal wvck« critk-jdlv t^
stDced, and so trutslnted tfitit tite trufcsliCioci tt:$elt nuiy
serve xs xq expLiaitivxx xctd in ;$ome pljis.>e$ even Jks^ ;a
commentiry ot the oc%inaL The autem!$ jux*' now ;acv>»-
sible. and the En^it$h-<^peJikin$ race, the race ol the t utun\
vSI have in Kant^s Critique another Aryan heirRvm^ 4$
precious as the Veda — a work that may be criticised* but
can never be ignored.
F. MAX Mi'LLKIt
OxFOUX November ^5« iSSi.
TRANSLATORS PREFACE TO SECOND
EDITION
So much has been done of late towards a critical restora-
tion of the text of Kant^s Critique of Pure Reason that it
was impossible to republish my translation without a
thorough revision. Scholars who are acquainted with the
circumstances under which Kant's work was originally
written and printed will easily understand why the text of
his Critique should have required so many corrections and
conjectural emendations. Not being able myself to find
out all that had been written on this subject in successive
editions of Kant*s works and in various articles scattered
about in German philosophical journals, I had the good
fortune to secure the help of Dr. Erich Adickes, well
known by his edition of Kant*s Critique, published in
1889. and now engaged in preparing a new critical text
under the auspices of the Royal Academy of Berlin.
Dr. Adickes has not only given me the benefit of all the
really important various readings and emendations which
will form part of his standard edition, but he has also
pointed out to me passages in which I seemed to have
misapprehended the exact meaning of Kant's peculiar
and often very ambiguous style.
That emendations of Kant's text are often of great
importance for a right understanding of his philosophi-
cal arguments can easily be seen from the list given in
Dn Adickes* edition of Kant's Critique^ pp. iv-vii. Here
we find, for instance, such mistakes as :
hood
Ixxxii Preface to Second Edition
helfen
instead of
fehlen
er/olgt
u
ver/olgt
alU
(X
allein
Retditat
a
IdealUat
verdnderlich
a
teilbar
Einsicht
u
Einheit
reinen
ii
keinen
priori
u
posteriori
einer
u
seiner
Anleitung
u
Ableitung
Antithese
u
These
eine
u
keine
phaenomenon
u
nooumenon
aUe
u
als
Ungrund
u
Urgrund
More perplexing even than these gross mistakes are
smaller inaccuracies, such as ihr instead of j/>, sie instead
of ihny den instead of dem^ noch instead of nach, which
frequently form very serious impediments in the right
construction of a sentence.
I cannot conclude this preface without an Ave, pia
anima to my departed friend, Professor Ludwig Noir^,
who encouraged and helped me when, in commemoration
of the centenary of its first publication, I undertook the
translation of Kant's Critique. The Introduction which
he contributed, his Sketch of the Development of Philoso-
phy from the Eleatics to Kant, seemed to me indeed the
most valuable part of my book, and the most likely to
remain as a lasting monument of my friend's comprehen-
sive knowledge and clear understanding of the historical
evolution of philosophy. Though it has been left out in
this second edition, I hope it may soon be republished as
an independent work.
R MAX MULLER.
Oxford, November, 1896.
[ExpERiENXE ^ is no doubt the first product of our un-
derstanding, while employed in fashioning the raw material
of our sensations. It is therefore our first instruction, and
in its progress so rich in new lessons that the chain of all
future generations will never be in want of new informa-
tion that may be gathered on that field. Nevertheless,
experience is by no means the only field to which our
understanding can be confined. Experience tells us what
is, but not that it must be necessarily as it is, and not
otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really gen-
eral truths, and our reason, which is particularly anxious i
for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than
satisfied. General truths, which at the same time [p. 2]
bear the character of an inward necessity, must be in-
dependent of experience, — clear and certain by them-
selves. They are therefore called knowledge a priori^
while what is simply taken from experience is said to
be, in ordinary parlance, known a posteriori or empiri-
cally only.
' T>ie beginning of this IntiodtictioTi down to * But what is itill more ex-
Iraorrliiiary/ \% left out in the Second Etlition, Instead of it Supplement IV.
2 Introduction
Now it appears, and this is extremely curious, that even
with our experiences different kinds of knowledge are
mixed up, which must have their origin a priori^ and
which perhaps serve only to produce a certain connec-
tion between our sensuous representations. For even if
we remove from experience everything that belongs to
the senses, there remain nevertheless certain original con-
cepts, and certain judgments derived from them, which
must have had their origin entirely a priori^ and inde-
pendent of all experience, because it is owing to them
that we are able, or imagine we are able, to predicate
more of the objects of our senses than can be learnt
from mere experience, and that our propositions contain
real generality and strict necessity, such as mere empirical
knowledge can never supply.]
But ^ what is still more extraordinary is this, that cer-
tain kinds of knowledge leave the field of all pos- [p. 3]
sible experience, and seem to enlarge the sphere of our
judgments beyond the limits of experience by means of
concepts to which experience can never supply any cor-
responding objects.
And it is in this very kind of knowledge which tran-
scends the world of the senses, and where experience
Call neither guide nor correct us, that reason prosecutes
its investigations, which by their importance we consider
far more excellent and by their tendency far more ele-
vated than anything the understanding can find in the
sphere of phenomena. Nay, we risk rather anything,
even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender
^ The Second Edition gives here a new heading : — III, Philosophy re-
quires a science to determine the possibility, the principles, and the extent oi
all cognitions a priori.
Introduction %
such mvestigarions, either on the ground of their uncer-
tainty, or from any feehng of indilTercnce or contempt,^
Now it might seem natural that, after we have left
the solid ground of experience, we should not at once
proceed to erect an edifice with knowledge which we
possess without knowing whence it came, and trust to
principles the origin of which is unknown, without hav-
ing made sure of the safety of the foundations by means
of careful examination. It would seem natural, I say,
that philosophers should first of all have asked the ques-
tion how the mere understanding could arrive at all this
knowledge a priori, and what extent, what truth, and
what value it could possess. If we take natural [p. 4]
to mean what is just and reasonable, then indeed nothing
could be more natural But if we understand by natural
what takes place ordinarily, then* on the contrary, nothing
is more natural and more intelligible than that this exami-
nation should have been neglected for so long a time. For
one part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has
always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness ; and
thus produces a favourable presumption with regard to
other parts also, although these may be of a totally dif-
ferent nature. Besides, once beyond the precincts of ex-
perience, and we are certain that experience can nevei
contradict us» while the charm of enlarging our know-
ledge is so great that nothing will stop our progress
until we encounter a clear contradiction. This can be
* The Second Edition adds here: 'These inevitable problems of pure
reftson itself are, (7<^/, Frettiom^ and Immortality. The science which wilh
•11 its AppiLTfltus is really intended for the solution uf these problems, is called
Metaphysit, lis procedure is at first di*^matu\ i.e. unchecked by a previous
exam i nation of what reason can and cannot do, before it engages confidently
in fo Arduous an undertaking^/
4 Introduction
avoided if only we are cautious in our imaginations,
which nevertheless remain what they are, imaginations
only. How far we can advance independent of all ex-
perience in a priori knowledge is shown by the brilliant
example of mathematics. It is true they deal with objects
and knowledge so far only as they can be represented
in intuition. But this is easily overlooked, because that
intuition itself may be given a priori^ and be difficult to
distinguish from a pure concept. Thus inspirited [p. 5]
by a splendid proof of the power of reason, the desire of
enlarging our knowledge sees no limits. The light dove,
piercing in her easy flight the air and perceiving its resist-
ance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty
space. It was thus that Plato left the world of sense, as
opposing so many hindrances to our understanding, and
ventured beyond on the wings of his ideas into the empty
space of pure understanding. He did not perceive that
he was making no progress by these endeavours, because
he had no resistance as a fulcrum on which to rest or
to apply his powers, in order to cause the understand-
ing to advance. It is indeed a very common fate of
human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice
as soon as possible, and then only to enquire whether the
foundation be sure. Then all sorts of excuses are made
In order to assure us as to its solidity, or to decline alto-
gether such a late and dangerous enquiry. The reason
why during the time of building we feel free from all
anxiety and suspicion and believe in the apparent solidity
of our foundation, is this: — A great, perhaps the greatest
portion of what our reason finds to do consists in the
analysis of our concepts of objects. This gives us a
great deal of knowledge which, though it consists in no
Introduction 5
more man in simplifications and explanations of [p. 6]
what is comprehcntled in our concepts (though in a con-
fused manner), is yet considered as equal, at least in
form, to new knowledge. It only separates m\A arranges
our concepts, it does not enlarge them in matter or con-
tents. As by this process we gain a kind of real know-
ledge a prion^ which progresses safely and usefully, it
happens that our reason, without being aware of it, ap-
propriates under that pretence propositions of a totally
different character, adding to given concepts new and
strange ones a priori^ without knowing whence they
come, nay without even thinking of such a question. I
shall therefore at the very outset treat of the distinction
between these two kinds of knowledge*
Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical
Judi^ments
In all judgments in which there is a relation between
subject and predicate (I speak of affirmative judgments
only, the application to negative ones being easy), that
relation can be of two kinds. Either the predicate B
belongs to the subject A as something contained (though
covertly) in the concept A ; or B lies outside the sphere
of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In
the former case I call the judgment analytical, in the
latter synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are
therefore those in which the connection of the [p, 7]
predicate with the subject is conceived through identity,
while others in which that connection is conceived without
identity, may be called synthetical The former might be
called illustrating, the latter expanding judgments, because
in the former nothing is added by the predicate to the
Iniraduction
concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into
its constituent concepts which were always conceived as
existing within it, though confusedly ; while the latter add
to the concept of the subject a predicate not conceived as
existing within it, and not to be extracted from it by any
process of mere analysis. If I say, for instance, All
bodies arc extended, this is an analytical judgment, I
need not go beyond the concept connected with the name
of body, in order to find that extension is connected with it.
I have only to analyse that concept and become conscious
of the manifold elements always contained in it, in order
to find that predicate. This is therefore an analytical judg-
ment. But if I say, All bodies arc heavy^ the predicate is
something quite different from what I think as the mere
concept of body. The addition of such a predicate gives
us a synthetical judgment.
[It becomes clear from this,^
[k That our knowledge is in no way extended by
analytical judgments, but that all they effect is [p. 8]
to put the concepts which we possess into better order and
render them more intelligible.
2. That in synthetical judgments I must have besides
the concept of the subject something else {x) on which
the understanding relies in order to |piow that a predicate,
not contained in the concept, nevertheless belongs to it.
In empirical judgments this causes no difficulty, because
this X is here simply the complete experience of an object
which I conceive by the concept A, that concept forming
one part only of my experience. For though I do not in-
clude the predicate of gravity in the general concept of
^ Th«e two paragraph K to ' In synthetical judgments a prhri^ however/
arc left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement V.
Introduction
ay, that concept nevertheless indicates the complete
experience through one of its parts, so that I may add
other parts also of the same experience, all belonging to
that concept. I may first, by an analytical process, realise
the concept of body through the predicates of extension,
impermeability, form, etc., all of which arc contained in it.
Afterwards I expand my knowledge, and looking back to
the experience from which my concept of body was ab-
stracted, I find gravity always connected with the before-
mentioned predicates. Experience therefore is the x
which lies beyond the concept A, and on which rests
the possibility of a synthesis of the predicate of gravity B
with the concept A.]
In synthetical judgments a priori, however, that [p, 9]
help is entirely wanting. If I want to go beyond the con-
cept A in order to find another concept B connected with
it, where is there anything on w^hich I may rest and
through which a synthesis might become possible, con-
sidering that I cannot have the advantage of looking
about in the field of experience? Take the proposition
that all which happens has its cause. In the concept of
something that happens I no doubt conceive of something
existing preceded by time, and from this certain analytical
judgments may be deduced. But the concept of cause is
entirely outside that concept, and indicates something
different from that which happens, and is by no means
contained in that representation. How can I venture then
to predicate of that which happens something totally
diflferent from it, and to represent the concept of cause,
though not contained in it, as belonging to it, and belong-
ing to it by necessity.^ What is here the unknown x, on
which the understanding may rest in order to find beyond
8 Introduction
the concept A a foreign predicate B, which nevertheless
is believed to be connected with it ?V It cannot be ex-
perience, because the proposition that all which happens
has its cause represents this second predicate as added to
the subject not only with greater generality than experience
can ever supply, but also with a character of necessity, and
therefore t)urely a priori^ and based on concepts. All
our speculative knowledge a priori aims at and rests on
such synthetical, i.e. expanding propositions, for [p. lo]
the analytical are no doubt very important and necessary,
yet only in order to arrive at that clearness of concepts
which is requisite for a safe and wide synthesis, serving
as a, really new addition to what we possess already.
[Wc^ have here a certain mystery ^ before us, which
must be cleared up before any advance into the unlimited
field of a pure knowledge of the understanding can become
safe and trustworthy. We must discover on the largest
scale the ground of the possibility of synthetical judgments
a priori ; we must understand the conditions which render
every class of them possible, and endeavour not only to
indicate in a sketchy outline, but to define in its fulness
and practical completeness, the whole of that knowledge,
which forms a class by itself, systematically arranged
according to its original sources, its divisions, its extent
and its limits. So much for the present with regard to
the peculiar character of synthetical judgments.}
It will now be seen how there can be a special [p. ii]
^ This paragraph left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supple-
ment VI.
2 If any of the ancients had ever thought of asking this question, this alone
would have formed a powerful barrier against all systems of pure reason to
the present day, and would have saved many vain attempts undertaken blindly
and without a true knowledge of the subject in hand.
Introduction
science serving as a critique of pure reason. [Every
kind of knowledge is called pure, if not mixed with any-
thing heterogeneous. But more particularly is that know-
ledge called absolutely pure, which is not mixed up with
any experience or vscnsation, and is therefore possible en-
tirely a priori, '\ Reason is the faculty which supplies the
principles of knowledge a priori. Pure reason therefore
is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing
anything entirely a priori. An Organum of pure reason
ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure
knowledge <T/r/^r/ can be acquired and fully established.
A complete application of such an Organum would give
us a System of Pure Reason. But as that would be a
difficult task, and as at present it is still doubtful whether
and when such an expansion of our knowledge is here
possible, we may look on a mere criticism of pure reason,
its sources and limits, as a kind of preparation for a com-
plete system of pure reason. It should be called a critique,
not a doctrine, of pure reason. Its usefulness would be
negative onlVi serving for a purging rather than for an
expansion of our reason, and, \vhat after all is a consid-
erable gain, guarding reason against errors.
I call all knowledge transcendental which is occupied
not so much with objects, as with our a priori concepts
of objects.* A* system of such concepts might be [p. 12J
called Transcendental Philosophy. But for the present
this is again too great an undertaking. We should have
to treat therein completely both of analytical knowledge,
and of synthetical knowledge a priori^ which is more than
wc intend to do, being satisfied to carry on the analysis so
1 * Ab with our manner of knowing objects, la far ts ihU tt meant to be
possible a friori,* Second Edition.
lo Introduction
far only as is indispensably necessary in order to recognise
in their whole extent the principles of synthesis a priori,
which alone concern us. This investigation which should
be called a transcendental critique, but not a systematic
doctrine, is all we are occupied with at present. It is
not meant to extend our knowledge, but only to rectify
it, and to become the test of the value of all a priori
knowledge. Such a critique therefore is a preparation for
a New Organum, or, if that should not be possible, for a
Canon at least, according to which hereafter a complete
system of a philosophy of pure reason, whether it serve
for an expansion or merely for a limitation of it, may be
carried out, both analytically and synthetically. That
such a system is possible, nay that it need not be so com-
prehensive as to prevent the hope of its completion, may
be gathered from the fact that it would have to deal, not
with the nature of things, which is endless, but with the
understanding which judges of the nature of [p. 13]
things, and this again so far only as its knowledge a
priori is concerned. Whatever the understanding pos-
sesses a priori, as it has not to be looked for without, can
hardly escape our notice, nor is there any reason to
suppose that it will prove too extensive for a complete
inventory, and for such a valuation as shall assign to it its
true merits or demerits.^
II
DIVISION OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Transcendental Philosophy is with us an idea (of a
science) only, for which the critique of pure reason should
^ Here follows Supplement VII in Second Edition.
Ittiroduction
1 1
trace, according to fixed principles, an architectonic plan,
guaranteeing the completeness and certainty of all parts
of which the building consists. (It is a system of all
principles of pure reason.)^ The reason why we do not
call such a critique a transcendental philosophy in itself
is sinnply this, that in order to be a complete system, it
oyght to contain likewise a complete analysis of the whole
of human knowledge a priori. It is true that our critique
must produce a complete list of all the fundamental con-
cepts which constitute pure knowledge. But it need not
give a detailed analysis of these concepts, nor a complete
list of all derivative concepts. Such an analysis would
be out of place, because it is not beset with the [p* 14]
doubts and difficulties which are inherent in synthesis,
and which alone necessitate a critique of pure reason.
Nor would it answer our purpose to take the responsi-
bility of the completeness of such an analysis and deriva-
tion. This completeness of analysis, however, and of
derivation from such a priori concepts as we shall have
to deal with presently, may easily be supplied, if only
they have first been laid down as perfect principles of
synthesis, and nothing is wanting to them in that respect
All that constitutes transcendental philosophy belongs
to the critique of pure reason, nay it is the complete idea
of transcendental philosophy, but not yet the whole of
that philosophy itself, because it carries the analysis so
far only as is requisite for a complete examination of
synthetical knowledge a priori.
The most important consideration in the arrangement
of such a science is that no concepts should be admitted
* Adilltion in the Second Etlition.
1 2 Introduction
which contain anything empirical, and that the a priori
knowledge shall be perfectly pure. Therefore, although
the highest principles of morality and their fundamental
concepts are a priori knowledge, they do not [p. 15]
belong to transcendental philosophy, because the con-
cepts of pleasure and pain, desire, inclination, free-will,
etc., which are all of empirical origin, must here be pre-
supposed. Transcendental philosophy is the wisdom of
pure speculative reason. Everything practical, so far as
it contains motives, has reference to sentiments, and these
belong to empirical sources of knowledge.
If we wish to carry out a proper division of our science
systematically, it must contain first a doctrine of the, eU-
mentSj secondly, a doctrine of the method of pure reason.
Each of these principal divisions will have its' subdivisions,
the grounds of which cannot however be explained here.
So much only seems necessary for previous information,
that there are two stems of human knowledge, which per-
haps may spring from a common root, unknown to us, viz.
sensibility and the understandings objects being given by
the former and thought by the latter. If our sensibility
should contain a priori representations, constituting con-
ditions under which alone objects can be given, it would
belong to transcendental philosophy, and the doctrine of
this transcendental sense-perception would neces- [p. 16]
sarily form the first part of the doctrine of elements, be-
cause the conditions under which alone objects of human
knowledge can be given must precede those under which
they are thought.
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
THE
ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
FIRST PART
TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC
Whatever the process and the means may be by
which knowledge reaches its objects, there is one that
reaches them directly^ and forms the ultimate material
of all thought, viz. intuition (Anschauung). This is pos*
sible only when the object is given, and the object can
be given only (to human beings at least) through a cer-
tain affection of the mind (Gemuth).
This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations
(Vorstellungen), according to the manner in which we are
affected by objects, is called sensibility (Sinnlichkeit).
Objects therefore are given to us through our sensi-
bility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions (An-
schauungen). These intuitions become thought through
the understanding (Verstand), and hence arise conceptions
(Begriffe)- All thought therefore must, directly or indi-
rectly, go back to intuitions (Anschauungen), i.e. to our
sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given
to us.
IS
1 6 Transcendental ^Esthetic
The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of
Representation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we [p. 20]
are affected by it, is called sensation (Enipfindung). An
intuition (Anschauung) of an object, by means of sensa-
tion, is. called empirical. The undefined object of such an
empirical intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung).
In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the
sensation its matter; but that which causes the manifold
matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged
in a certain order, I call \X.^ form.
Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again
through which sensations are arranged and placed in
certain forms. The matter only of all phenomena is
given us a posteriori ; but their form must be ready for
them in the mind (Gemiith) a priori, and must therefore
be capable of being considered as separate from all sen-
sations.
I call all representations in which there is nothing that
belongs to sensation, pure (in a transcendental sense).
The pure form therefore of all sensuous intuitions, that
form in which the manifold elements of the phenomena
are seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind
a priori. And this pure form of sensibility may be called
the pure intuition (Anschauung).
Thus, if we deduct from the representation (Vorstel-
lung) of a body what belongs to the thinking of the
understanding, viz. substance, force, divisibility, etc., and
likewise what belongs to sensation, viz. impermeability,
hardness, colour, etc., there still remains some- [p. 21]
thing of that empirical intuition (Anschauung), viz. exten-
sion and form. These belong to pure intuition, which c
priori^ and even without a real object of the senses or (
Trafiscendental ^Esthetic
17
sensation, exists in the mind as a mere form of sensi-
bility.
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori
1 call TransceUiUntal yEstheiic} There must be such
a science^ forming the first part of the Elements of
Transcendentalism, as opposed to that which treats of
the principles of pure thought, and which should be
called Transcendental Logic.
In Transcendental ^-Esthetic therefore we shall [p. 22]
first isolate sensibility, by separating everything which the
understanding adds by means of its concepts, so that
nothing remains but empirical intuition (Anschauung).
Secondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to
sensation ( EmpfindungX so that nothing remains but pure
intuition (reine Anschauung) or the mere form of the
phenomena, which is the only thing which sensibility a
priori can supply. In the course of this investigation it
will appear that there are, as principles of a priori know-
ledge, two pure forms of sensuous intuition (Anschauung),
namely, Space and Time. We now proceed to consider
these more in detail.
1 The Germans arc the only people wha at present (1781) use the word
aiihetic for what others call criticism of taste. ITicre is implied io that name
ft false hope, hrst conceived by the excellent analytical philosopher, Baum-
garten, uf bringing the critical judgment of the beautiful under rational prin*
ciples, and to raise its rules to the rank of a science. Rut such endeavours
are vain. For such rulet or criteria are, accordinj; to their principal sources,
empirical only, and can never serve as definite a priori rules for our judgment
in matters of Itate; on the contrar>% our judgment is the real test of the truth
of such rules. It would be advisable therefore to drop the name in that sense»
and to apply it to a doctrine which is a real sciencet thus approaching more
nearly to the language and meaning of the ancients with whom the division
into gilcBifTiL KoX vojit^ was very famous (or to share that name in commoa
with speculative philosophy, and thus to use xithetic sometimes in a transcen*
dental, tometimes in a psychological teitie).
c
1 8 Of Space
First Section of the Transcendental ^Esthetic
Of Space
By means of our external sense, a property of our mind
(Gcmiith), we represent to ourselves objects as external or
outside ourselves, and all of these in space. It is within
space that their form, size, and relative position are fixed
or can be fixed. The internal sense by means of which
the mind perceives itself or its internal state, does not
give an intuition (Anschauung) of the soul (Seele) itself,
as an object, but it is nevertheless a fixed form under
which alone an intuition of its internal state is [p. 23]
possible, so that whatever belongs to its internal determi-
nations (Bestimmungen) must be represented in relations of
time. Time cannot be perceived (angeschaut) externally,
as little as space can be perceived as something within us.
What then are space and time t Are they real beings }
Or, if not that, are they determinations or relations of
things, but such as would belong to them even if they
were not perceived.? Or lastly, arc they determinations
and relations which are inherent in the form of intuition
only, and therefore in the subjective nature of our mind,
without which such predicates as space and time would
never be ascribed to anything.?
In order to understand this more clearly, let us first con-
sider space.
I. Space is not an empirical concept which has been
derived from external experience. For in order that cer-
tain sensations should be referred to something outside
myself, i.e. to something in a different part of space from
that where I am ; again, in order that I may be able to
Of space
19
represent them (vorstcllcn) as side by side, that is, not
only as different, but as in different places, the representa-
tion (Vorstellung) of space must already be there. There-
fore the representation of space cannot be borrowed
through experience from relations of external phenomena,
but, on the contrary, this external exj^erience becomes
possible only by means of the representation of space.
2. Space is a necessary representation a priori^ form-
ing the very foundation of all external intuitions, [p. 24]
It is impossible to imagine that there should be no space,
though one might very well imagine that there should
be space without objects to fill it. Space^ is therefore
regarded as a condition of the possibility of phenomena,
not as a determination produced by them ; it is a repre-
sentation a priori which necessarily precedes all external
phenomena.
[3. On this necessity of an a priori representation of
space rests the apodictic certainty of all geometrical prin-
ciples, and the possibility of their construction a priori.
For if the intuition of space were a concept gained a
posteriori, borrowed from general external experience, the
first principles of mathcniatica! definition would be noth-
ing but perceptions. They would be exposed to all the
accidents of perception, and there being but one straight
line between two points would not be a necessity, but
only something taught in each case by experience. What-
ever is derived from experience possesses a relative
generality only, based on induction. We should there-
fore not be able to say more than that, so far as hitherto
observed, no space has yet been found having more than
three dimensionsO
4. Space is not a discursive or so-called general [p. 25]
20 Of Space
concept of the relations of things in general, but a pure
intuition. For, first of all, we can imagine one space only
and if we speak of many spaces, we mean parts only
of one and the same space. Nor can these parts be
considered as antecedent to the one and all-embracing
space and, as it were, its component parts out of which
an aggregate is formed, but they can be thought of as
existing within it only. Space is essentially one ; its
multiplicity, and therefore the general concept of spaces
in general, arises entirely from limitations. Hence it
follows that, with respect to space, an intuition a priori^
which is not empirical, must form the foundation of all
conceptions of space. In the same manner all geomet-
rical principles, e.g. 'that in every triangle two sides
together are greater than the third,* are never to be
derived from the general concepts of side and triangle,
but from an intuition, and that a priori^ with apodictic
certainty.
[5. Space is represented as an infinite Quantity. Now
a general concept of space, which is found in a foot as
well as in an ell, could tell us nothing in respect to the
quantity of the space. If there were not infinity in the
progression of intuition, no concept of relations of space
could ever contain a principle of infinity.^]
Conclusions from the Foregoing Concepts [p. 26]
a. Space does not represent any quality of objects by
themselves, or objects in their relation to one another; i.e.
space docs not represent any determination which is
inherent in the objects themselves, and would remain,
1 No. 5 (No. 4) is differently worded in the Second Edition; see Supple-
ment VIII.
Of space
ar
even if all subjective conditions of intuition were removed.
For no determinations of objects, whether belonging to
them absolutely or in relation to others, can enter into our
intuition before the actual existence of the objects them-
selves, that is to say, they can never be intuitions a priori,
b. Space is nothing but the form ^f^aUjibenomena of
the external senses; it is the subjective condition of our
sensibility, without which no external intuition is possible
for_us. If then we consider that the receptivity of the
subject* its capacity of being affected by objects, must
necessarily precede all intuition of objects, w^e shall under-
stand how the form of all phenomena may be given before
all real perceptions, may be, in fact, a priori in the soul,
and may. as a pure intuition, by which all objects must
be determined, contain, prior to all experience, principles
regulating their relations.
It is therefore from the human standpoint only that we
can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we drop
the subjective condition under which alone we can gain
external intuition, that is^ so far as we ourselves may be
affected by objects, the representation of space means
nothing. For this predicate is applied to objects only in
so far as they appear to us, and are objects of our [p. 27]
senses. The constant form of this receptivity, which we
call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in
which objects, as without us, can be perceived ; and, when
abstraction is made of these objects, what remains is that
pure intuition which we call space. As the peculiar con-
ditions of our sensibility cannot be looked upon as condi-
tions of the possibility of the objects themselves, but only
of their appearance as phenomena to us. we may say
indeed that space comprehends all things which may
22
Of Space
appear to us externally, but not all things by themselves,
whether perceived by us or not, or by any subject what-
soever. We cannot judge whether the intuitions of other
thinking beings are subject to the same conditions which
determine our intuition, and which for us are generally
binding. If we add the limitation of a judgment to a
subjective concept, the judgment gains absolute validity.
The proposition ' all things are beside each other in space/
is valid only under the limitation that things are taken as
objects of our sensuous intuition (Anschauung). If I add
that limitation to the concept and say *all things^ as exter-
nal phenomena, are beside each other in space,' the rule
obtains universal and unlimited validity. Our discussions
teach therefore the reality, i.e. the objective validity, of
space with regard to all that can come to us exter- [p. 28]
nally as an object^ but likewise the ideality of space with
regard to things, when they are considered in themselves
by our reason, and independent of the nature of our
senses. We maintain the empirical reality of space, so
far as every possible external experience is concerned, but
at the same time its transcendental ideality; that is to
say, we maintain that space is nothing, if we leave out of
consideration the condition of a possible experience, and
accept it as something on which things by themselves
are in any way dependent.
With the exception of space there is no 01^^ subjective
representation (Vorstellung) referring to something exter-
nal, that would be called a pnori objective. [This ^ sub-
jective condition of all external phenomena cannot there-
fore be compared to any other. The taste of wine does
1 ThU passage to ' mj object lh wbat I hftve 8aid ' u diOerently worded in
the Second Edition; icc Supplement IX,
Of space
23
not belong to the objective determinations of wine, con-
sidered as an object, even as a phenomenal object, but to
the peculiar nature of the sense belonging to the subject
that tastes the wine. Colours are not qualities of a body,
though inherent in its intuition, but they are likewise mod-
ifications only of the sense of sight, as it is affected in dif-
ferent ways by light Space, on the contrary, as the very
condition of external objects, is essential to their appear-
ance or intuition. Taste and colour arc by no means
necessary conditions under which alone things [p, 29]
can become to us objects of sensuous perception. They
are connected with their appearance, as accidentally added
effects only of our peculiar organisation. They are not
therefore representations a prion, but are dependent on
sensation (limpfindungX nay taste even on an affection
(Gefiihl) of pleasure and pain, which is the result of a
sensation. No one can have a priori, an idea(Vorste]lung)
either of colour or of taste, but space refers to the pure
form of intuition only, and involves no kind of sensation,
nothing empirical ; nay all kinds and determinations of
space can and must be represented a priori^ if concepts
of forms and their relations are to arise. Through it alone
is it possible that things should become external objects to
us.]
My object in what I have said just now is only to pre-
vent people from imagining that they can elucidate the
ideality of space by illustrations which are altogether
insufficient, such as colour, taste, etc., which should never
be considered as qualities of things, but as modifications
of the subject, and which therefore may be different with
different people. For in this case that which originally is
itself a phenomenon only, as for instance, a rose, is taken
24 Of Time
by the empirical understanding for a thing by itself, which
nevertheless, with regard to colour, may appear [p. 30]
different to every eye. The transcendental conception, on
the contrary, of all phenomena in space, is a critical warn-
ing that nothing which is seen in space is a thing by itself,
nor space a form of things supposed to belong to them by
themselves, but that objects by themselves are not known
to us at^all^ and that what we call external objects are
nothing but representations of our senses, the form of
which is space, and the true correlative of which, that is
the thing by itself, is not known, nor can be known by
these representations, nor do we care to know anything
about it in our daily experience.
Second Section of the Transcendental iEsTHETic
Of Time
I. Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any
experience, for neither coexistence nor succession would
enter into our perception, if the representation of time
were not given a priori. Only when this representation
a priori is given, can we imagine that certain things happen
at the same time (simultaneously) or at different times
(successively). [p. 31]
II. Time is a necessary representation on which all
intuitions depend. We cannot take away time from
phenomena in general, though we can well take away
phenomena out of time. Time therefore is given a priori.
In time alone is reality of phenomena possible. All
^ In the Second Edition the title is, Metaphysical exposition of the concept
of time, with reference to par. 5, Transcendental exposition of the concept ol
time.
Of Time
2?
phenomena may vanish, but time itself (as the genera'
condition of their possibility) cannot be done away with.
IIL On this a /friori necessity depends also the possi
bility of apodictic principles of the relations of time, or of
axioms of time in general Time has one dimension only ;
different times are not simultaneous, but successive, while
different spaces are never successive, but simultaneous.
Such principles cannot be derived from experience,
because experience could not impart to them absolute
universality nor apodictic certainty. We should only be
able to say that common experience teaches us that it is
so, but not that it must be so. These principles are valid
as rules under which alone experience is possible; they
teach us before experience, not by means of experience.^
IV. Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general
concept, but a pure form of sensuous intuition. Different
times are parts only of one and the same time. Repre-
sentation, which can be produced by a single [p. ^2]
object only, is called an intuition. The proposition that
different times cannot exist at the same time cannot h
deduced from any general concept Such a proposition is
synthetical, and cannot be deduced from concepts only.
It is contained immediately in the intuition and representa*
tion of time.
V, To say that time is infinite means no more than that
every definite quantity of time is possible only by limita-
tions of one time which forms the foundation of all times.
The original representation of time must therefore be
is^
1 I reUin the reading of the First Edition, vor dtrielhtn^ nickt dnrch diiseihe.
Von dtnielhin^ Ihc reading of Uter editions, is wrong; the emendation ol
Rosenkrant, V9r dtmelbtn^ niikt durch diesfiifen, unnecessary. The Second
Edition has likewise i^r dendhtn.
Of Time
given as unlimited. But when the parts themselves and
every quantity of an object can be represented as deter-
mined by limitation only, the whole representation cannot
be given by concepts (for in that case the partial repre-
sentations come first), but it must be founded on immediate
intuition.^
Coficbisions frmn the forr going concepts
a. Time is not something existing by itself, or inherent
in things as an objective determination of them, something
therefore that might remain when abstraction is made of
all subjective conditions of intuition. For in the former
case it would be something real, without being a real
object. In the latter it could not, as a deter- [p, 33]
mination or order inherent in things themselves, be antece-
dent to things as their condition, and be known and per-
ceived by means of synthetical propositions a priori. All
this is perfectly possible if time is nothing but a subjec-
tive condition under which alone ^ intuitions take place
within us. For in that case this form of internal intui-
tion can be represented prior to the objects themselves,
that is, a priori.
b. Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense,
that is, of our intuition of ourselves, and of our internal
state- Time cannot be a determination peculiar to exter-
nal phenomena. It refers neither to their shape, nor
their position, etc., it only determines the relation of rep-
resentations in our internal state. And exactly because
this internal intuition supplies no shape, we try to make
good this deficiency by means of analogies, and represent
^ Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement X.
* Read iiiUin instead of atU,
Of Time
n
to ourselves the succession of time by a line progressing
to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one
dimension only; and we conclude from the properties of
this line as to all the properties of time, with one excep-
tion, i.e. that the parts of the former are simultaneous,
those of the latter successive. From this it becomes
clear also, that the representation of time is itself an
intuition, because all its relations can be expressed by
means of an external intuition,
c. Time is the formal conditioni a priori, of all phenom-
ena whatsoever Space, as the pure form of all [p. 34]
external intuition, is a condition, a pnori, of external phe-
nomena only. But, as all representations, whether they
have for their objects external things or not, belong by
themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner
state, and as this inner state falls under the formal con-
ditions of internal intuition, and therefore of time, time
is a condition, a priori, of all phenomena whatsoever,
and is so directly as a condition of internal phenomena
(of our mind) and thereby indirectly of external phenom-
ena also. If I am able to say, a priori, that all external
phenomena are in space, and are determined, a priori,
[according to the relations of space, I can, according to
the principle of the internal sense, make the general
assertion that all phenomena, that is, all objects of the
senses, are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of
time.
If we drop our manner of looking at ourselves inter-
nally, and of comprehending by means of that intuition
all external intuitions also within our power of represen-
tation, and thus take objects as they may be by them-
selves, then time is nothing. Time has objective validity
28 Of Time
^ith reference to phenomena only, because these are
themselves things which we accept as objects of our
senses; but time is no longer objective, if we [p. 35]
remove the sensuous character of our intuitions, that is
to say, that mode of representation which is peculiar to.
ourselves, and speak of things in general. Time is there-
fore simply a* subjective condition of our (human) intui-
tion (which is always sensuous, that is so far as we are
affected by objects), but by itself, apart from the subject,
nothing. Nevertheless, with respect to all phenomena,
that is, all things which can come within our experience,
time is necessarily objective. We cannot say that all
things are in time, because, if we speak of things in gen-
eral, nothing is said about the manner of intuition, which
is the real condition under which time enters into our rep- •
resentation of things. If therefore this condition is added
to the concept, and if we say that all things as phenomena
(as objects of sensuous intuition) are in time, then such
a proposition has its full objective validity and a priori
universality.
What we insist on therefore is the empirical reality of
time, that is, its objective validity, with reference to all
objects which can ever come before our senses. And as
our intuition must at all times be sensuous, no object can
ever fall under our experience that does not come under
the conditions of time. What we deny is, that time has
any claim on absolute reality, so that, without [p. 36]
taking into account the form of our sensuous condition, it
should by itself be a condition or quality inherent in
things; for such qualities which belong to things by
themselves can never be given to us through the senses.
This is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of
Of Time
29
time, so that, if we take no account of the subjective con-
ditions of our sensuous intuitions^ time is nothing, and can-
not be added to the objects by themselves (without their
relation to our intuition) whether as subsisting or inherent
This ideaUty of time, however, as well as that of space,
should not be confounded with the deceptions of our sen-
sations, because in their case we always suppose that the
phenomenon to which such predicates belong has objective
reality, which is not at all the case here, except so far as
this objective reality is purely empirical, that is, so far as
the object itself is looked upon as a mere phenomenon.
On this subject see a previous note, in section i, on Space.
Explanation
Against this theory which claims empirical, but denies
absolute and transcendental reality to time, even intelli-
gent men have protested so unanimously, that I suppose
that every reader who is unaccustomed to these consider
ations may naturally be of the same opinion. What they
object to is this : Changes, they say, are real (this is proved
by the change of our own representations, even [p. 37]
if all external phenomena and their changes be denied).
Changes^ however, are possible in time only, and there-
fore time must be something real. The answer is easy
enough. I grant the whole argument. Time certainly
is something real^ namely, the real form of our internal
intuition. Time therefore has subjective reality with
regard to internal experience : that is, I really have the
representation of time and of my determinations in it.
Time therefore is to be considered as real, not so far as it
is an object, but so far as it is the representation of myself
as an object. If either I myself or any other being could
30
Of Time
see me without this condition of sensibility, then these
self-same determinations which we now represent to our-
selves as changes, would give us a kind of knowledge in
which the representation of time, and therefore of change
also, would have no place. There remains therefore the
empirical reality of time only, as the condition of all our
experience, while absolute reality cannot, according to
w^hat has just been shown, be conceded to it. Tune is
nothing but the form of our own internal intuition.^ Take
away the peculiar condition of our sensibility, and the idea
of time vanishes, because it is not inherent" In the ob-
jects, but in the subject only that perceives them. Xp. 38]
The reason why this objection is raised so unanimously,
and even by those who have nothing very tangible to say
against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. They
could never hope to prove apodictically the absolute real-
ity of space, because they are confronted by idealism,
w^hich has shown that the reality of external objects does
not admit of strict proof, while the reality of the object of
our internal perceptions (the perception of my own self
and of my own status) is clear immediately through our
consciousness. The former might be merely phenomenal,
but the latter, according to their opinion, is undeniably
something real. They did not see that both, without
denying to them their reality as representations, belong
nevertheless to the phenomenon only, which must always
have two sides, the one when the object is considered by
itself (without regard to the manner in which it is per-
^ I can say indeed that my representations follow one another, but this
means no mure than that we are conscious of them as in a temporal succes-
sion, that is, according to the form of our own internal sense. Time, therefore,
is nothing by itself, nor is it a determination inherent objectively in things.
Of Time
31
I
ceived, its quality therefore remaining always problemati-
cal), the other, when the form of the perception of the
object is taken into consideration ; this form belonging
not to the object in itself » but to the subject which per-
ceives it, though nevertheless belonging really and neces-
sarily to the object as a phenomenon.
Time and space are therefore two sources of knowledge
from which various a priori synthetical cognitions [p. 39]
can be derived. Of this pure mathematics give a splendid
example in the case of our cognitions of space and its vari-
ous relations. As they are both pure forms of sensuous
intuition, they render synthetical propositions a priori pos-
sible. But these sources of knowledge a priori ih€\T\% con*
ditions of our sensibility only) fix their own limits, in that
they can refer to objects only in so far as they are consid-
ered as phenomena, but cannot represent things as they
are by themselves. That is the only field in which they
are valid ; beyond it they admit of no objective applica-
tion. This ideality of space and time, however, leaves the
truthfulness of our experience quite untouched, because
we are equally sure of it, whether these forms are inher-
ent in things by themselves, or by necessity in our intui-
tion of them only. Those, on the contrary, who maintain
the absolute reality of space and time, whether as subsist-
ing or only as inherent, must come into conflict with the
principles of experience itseir For if they admit space
and time as subsisting (which is generally the view of
mathematical students of nature) they have to admit two
eternal infinite and self-subsisting nonentities (space and
time), which exist without their being anything real, only
in order to comprehend all that is reaL If they take the
second view (held by some metaphysical students [p. 40]
3^
Of Time
of nature), and look upon space and time as relations of phe-
nomena, simultaneous or successive, abstracted from expe-
rience, though represented confusedly in their abstracted
form, they are obliged to deny to mathematical proposi-
tions a priori their validity with regard to real things (for
instance in space), or at all events their apodictic cer-
tainty, which cannot take place a fiosieriori, while the a
priori conceptions of space and time are, according to
their opinion, creations of our imagination only. Their
source, they hold, must really be looked for in experience,
imagination framing out of the relations abstracted from
experience something which contains the general charac-
ter of these relations, but which cannot exist without the
restrictions which nature has imposed on them. The
former gain so much that they keep at least the sphere
of phenomena free for mathematical propositions ; but, as
soon as the understanding endeavours to transcend that
sphere, they become bewildered by these very conditions.
The latter have this advantage that they are not bewil
dered by the representations of space and time when
they wish to form judgments of objects, not as phenom-
ena, but only as considered by the understanding; but
they can neither account for the possibility of mathemati-
cal knowledge a priori (there being, according to them,
no true and objectively valid intuition a pHon), nor can
they bring the laws of experience into true harmony with
ih^ a priori doctrines of mathematics. A(^cording to our
theory of the true character of these original [p. 41]
forms of sensibility, both difficulties vanish.
Lastly, that transcendental aesthetic cannot contain
more than these two elements, namely, space and time,
becomes clear from the fact that all other concepts belong-
Of Time
33
ing to the senses, even that of motion, which combines
both, presuppose something empirical. Motion presup-
poses the perception of something moving. In space,
however, considered by itself, there is nothing that moves.
Hence that which moves must be something which, as in
space, can be given by experience only, therefore an empir-
ical datum. On the same ground, transcendental aesthetic
cannot count the concept of change among its a priori
data, because time itself does not change, but only some-
thing which is in time. For this, the perception of some-
thing existing and of the succession of its determinations,
in other words, experience, is required.
I
I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TRANSCEN-
DENTAL ESTHETIC
In order to avoid all misapprehensions it will be neces-
sary, first of all, to declare, as clearly as possible, what is
our view with regard to the fundamental nature of [p. 42]
sensuous knowledge.
What we meant to say was this, that all our inturtion
is nothing: but thp rfprpcpntnt^Tn nf phj^nrimpna ; that
things which we see are not by themselves what we see,
nor their relations by themselves such as they appear to
us, so that, if we drop our subject or the subjective form
of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in spac^
and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish.
Thr^y-rnnnnt, ni p^***t^rfm^^^^| fxj^^ by *hi^mci=*!uf>g hut in
us onj^ It remains completely unknown to us what
objects may be by themselves and apart from the recep-
tivity of our senses. We know nothing but our manner
of perceiving them, that manner being peculiar to us, and
not necessarily shared in by every being, though, no doubt,
by every human being. This is what alone concerns us.
Space and time are pure forms of our intuition, while
sensation forms its matter. What we can know a priori ~
before all real intuition, arc the forms of space and time,
which arc therefore called pure intuition, while sensation
is that which causes our knowledge to be called a poste-
riori knowledge, i,e. empirical intuition. Whatever our
sensation may be, these forms are necessarily inherent
34
Transcendental Esthetic
35
in it, while sensations themselves may be of the most
different character. Even if we could impart the [p. 43]
highest degree of clearness to our intuition, we should
not come one step nearer to the nature of objects by
, themselves. We should know our mode of intuition,
Le, our sensibility, more completely, but always under
the indefeasible conditions of space and time. What the
objects are by themselves would never become known to
us, even through the clearest knowledge of that which
alone is given us, the phenomenon.
It would vitiate the concept of sensibility and phenom-
ena, and render our whole doctrine useless and em^ity, if
we were to accept the view (of Leibniz and WoU), that
our whole sensibility is really but a confused representa-
tion of things, simply containing what belongs to them by
themselves, though smothered under an accumulation of
signs (Merkmal) and partial concepts, which we do not
consciously disentangle. The distinction between con-
fused and well-ordered representation is logical only, and
does not touch the contents of our knowledge. Thus the
concept of Right, as employed by people of common sense,
contains neither more nor less than the subtlest specula-
tion can draw out of it, only that in the ordinary practical
use of the word we are not always conscious of the mani-
fold ideas contained in that thought. But no one would
say therefore that the ordinary concept of Right was
sensuous, containing a mere phenomenon ; for Right can
never become a phenomenon, being a concept of [p. 44]
the understanding, and representing a moral quality be-
longing to actions by themselves. The representation
of a Body, on the contrar)% contains nothing in intuition
that could belong to an object by itself, but is merely
36 Transcendental Esthetic
the phenomenal appearance of something, and the man-
ner in which we are affected by it. This receptivity of
our knowledge is called sensibility. Even if we could
see to the very bottom of a phenomenon, it would remain
for ever altogether different from the knowledge of the
thing by itself.
This shows that the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolf
has given a totally wrong direction to all investigations
into the nature and origin of our knowledge, by repre-
senting the difference between the sensible and the intel-
ligible as logical only. That difference is in truth tran-
scendental. It affects not the form only, as being more
or less confused, but the origin and contents of our
knowledge ; so that by our sensibility we know the nat-
ure of things by themselves not confusedly only, but not
at all. If we drop our subjective condition, the object, as
represented with its qualities bestowed on it by sensuous
intuition, is nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be
found ; because its form, as phenomenal appearance, is
determined by those very subjective conditions.
It has been the custom to distinguish in phe- [p. 45]
nomena that which is essentially inherent in their intuition
and is recognised by every human being, from that which
belongs to their intuition accidentally only, being valid
not for sensibility in general, but only for a particular
position and organisation of this or that sense. In that
case the former kind of knowledge is said to represent
the object by itself, the latter its appearance only. But
that distinction is merely empirical. If, as generally hap-
pens, people are satisfied with that distinction, without
again, as they ought, treating the first empirical intuition
as purely phenomenal also, in which nothing can be found
Transcendental ^^sthetic
n
belon^ng to the thing by itself, our transcendental dis-
tinction is lost, and we believe that we know things by
themselves, though in the world of sense» however far we
may carry our investigation, we can never have anything
before us but mere phenomena. To give an illustration.
People might call the rainbow a mere phenomenal appear-
ance during a sunny shower^ but the rain itself the thing
by itself. This would be quite right, physically speaking,
and taking rain as something which, in our ordinary
experience and under all possible relations to our senses,
can be determined thus and thus only in our intuition.
But if we take the empirical in general, and ask, [p. 46]
without caring whether it is the same with every particu-
lar observer, whether it represents a thing by itself (not
the drops of rain» for these are already, as phenomena,
empirical objects), then the question as to the relation
between the representation and the object becomes tran-
scendental, and not only the drops are mere phenomena,
but even their round shape, nay even the space in which
they fall, are nothing by themselves, but only modifica-
tions or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition,
the transcendental object remaining unknown to us.
The second important point in our transcendental aes-
thetic is, that it should not only gain favour as a plausible
hypothesis, but assume as certain and undoubted a charac*
tcr as can be demanded of any theory which is to serve
as an organ um. In order to make this certainty self-
evident wc shall select a case which will make its validity
palpable.
Let us suppose that space and time are in themselves
abjective, and conditions of the possibility of things by
themselves. Now there is with regard to both a large
n
38
Transcendental ^"Esthetic
number of a pnori apodictic and synthetical propositions,
and particularly with regard to space, which for this rea-
son we shall chiefly investigate here as an illustration.
As the propositions of geometry are known synthetically
a priori, and with apodictic certainty, I ask, whence do
you take such propositions? and what does the [p. 47]
understanding rely on in order to arrive at such absolutely
necessary and universally valid truths ? There is no other
way but by concepts and intuitions, and both as given
either a priori or a posteriori. The latter, namely em-
pirical concepts, as well as the empirical intuition on
which they are founded, cannot yield any synthetical
propositions except such as are themselves also empirical
only, that is, empirical propositions, which can never
possess that necessity and absolute universality which are
characteristic of all geometrical propositions. As to the
other and only means of arriving at such knowledge
through mere concepts or intuitions a priori y it must be
clear that only analytical, but no synthetical knowledge
can ever be derived from mere concepts. Take the
proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space
and cannot therefore form a figure, and try to deduce it
from the concept of straight lines and the number two ;
or take the proposition that with three straight lines it
is possible to form a figure, and try to deduce that from
those concepts. All your labour will be lost, and in the
end you will be obliged to have recourse to intuition, as
is always done in geometry. You then give yourselves
an object in intuition. But of what kind is it ? [p. 48]
Is it a pure intuition a priori or an empirical one? In
the latter case, you would never arrive at a universally
valid, still less at an apodictic proposition, because ex-
Transcendental ^Esthetic
59
perience can never yield such- You must therefore take
the object as given a prion m intuition, and found your
synthetical proposition on that. \i you did not possess
in yourselves the power of a priori intuition, if that
subjective condition were not at the same time, as to the
form, the general condition a priori under which alone
the object of that (external) intuition becomes possible,
if, in fact, the object (the triangle) were something by
itself without any reference to you as the subject, how
could you say that what exists necessarily in your subjective
conditions of constructing a triangle, belongs of necessity
to the triangle itself ? For you could not add something
entirely new (the figure) to your concepts of three lines,
something which should of necessity belong to the object,
as that object is given before your knowledge of it, and
not by it. If therefore space, and time also, were not
pure forms of your intuition, which contains the a pfiari
conditions under which alone things can become external
objects to you, while, without that subjective condition,
they are nothing, you could not predicate anything of
external objects a priori and synthetically. It is there-
fore beyond the reach of doubt, and not possible [p. 49]
only or probable, that spacje and time, as the necessary
conditions of all experience, external and internal, are
purely subjective conditions of our intuition, and that,
with reference to them, all things are phenomena onlyj
and not things thus existing by themselves in such or
such wise. Hence, so far as their form is concerned,
much may be predicated of them a priori, but nothing
whatever of the things by themselves on which these
phenomena may be grounded.^
^ Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XI.
THE
ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
[p. so]
SECOND PART
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
INTRODUCTION
THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
I
Of Logic in General
Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources
of our soul ; the first receives representations (receptivity
of impressions), the second is the power of knowing an
object by these representations (spontaneity of concepts).
By the first an object is given us, by the second the
object is thoughty in relation to that representation which
is a mere determination of the soul. Intuition therefore
and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge,
so that neither concepts without an intuition correspond-
ing to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield any
real knowledge.
Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical
when sensation, presupposing the actual presence of the
40
Transcendental Logic
41
object, is contained in it. They are pure when no sensa-
' tion is mixed up with the representation. The ktter may
be called the material of sensuous knowledge. Pure intui-
tion therefore contains the form only by which [p. 51]
something is seen, and pore conception the form only by
which an object is thought. Pure intuitions and pure
concepts only are possible a priori, empirical intuitions
and empirical concepts a posteriori.
We call sensibility the receptivity of our soul, or
its power of receiving representations whenever it is
in any wise affected, while the understandiftg, on the
contrary, is with us the power of producing representa-
tions, or the spontaneity of knowledge. We are so con-
stituted that our intuition must always be sensuous, and
consist of the mode in which we are affected by objects,
What enables us to think the objects of our sensuous
intuition is the understanding. Neither of these qualities
ror faculties is preferable to the other. Without sensibility
objects would not be given to us» without understanding
they would not be thought by us. Thoughts without con-
tents are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.
Therefore it is equally necessary to make our concepts
sensuous, i.c, to add to them their object in intuition, as
to make our intuitions intelligible. i.e. to bring them under
concepts. These two powers or faculties cannot ex-
change their functions. The understanding cannot see,
the senses cannot think. By their union only can know-
ledge be produced. But this is no reason for confounding
the share which belongs to each in the production of
knowledge. On the contrary, they should al- [p. 52]
ways be carefully separated and distinguished, and we
have therefore divided the science of the rules of sen-
42 Transcendental Logic
sibility in general, i.e. aesthetic, from the science_of the
rules of the understanding in general, i.e. logic.
Logic again can be taken in hand for two objects,
either as logic of the general or of a particular use of the
understanding. The former contains all necessary rules
of thought without which the understanding cannot be
used at all. It treats of the understanding without any
regard to the different objects to which it may be directed.
Logic of the particular use of the understanding contains
rules how to think correctly on certain classes of objects.
The former may be called Elementary Logic^ the latter the
Organum of this or that science. The latter is generally
taught in the schools as a preparation for certain sciences,
though, according to the real progress of the human
understanding, it is the latest achievement, which does
not become possible till the science itself is really made,
and requires only a few touches for its correction and
completion. For it is clear that the objects themselves
must be very well known before it is possible to give rules
according to which a science of them may be established.
General logic is eitherpm-e or applied. In the [p. 53]
former no account is taken of any empirical conditions
under which our understanding acts, i.e. of the influence
of the senses, the play of imagination, the laws of mem-
ory, the force of habit, the inclinations, and therefore the
sources of prejudice also, nor of anything which supplies
or seems to supply particular kinds of knowledge ; for all
this applies to the understanding under certain circum-
stances of its application only, and requires experience
as a condition of knowledge. General but pure logic has
to deal with principles a priori only, and is a canon of the
understanding and of reason^ though with reference to its
Transcendental Logic
43
formal application only, irrespective of any contents,
whether empirical or transcendental. General logic is
called applied^ if it refers to the rules of the use of our
understanding under the subjective empirical conditions
laid down in psychology. It therefore contains empirical
principles, yet it is general, because referring to the use
of the understanding, whatever its objects may be. It
is neither a canon of the understanding in general nor an
organum of any particular science, but simply a cathar-
ticon of the ordinary understanding.
In general logic, therefore, that part which is to con-
stitute the science of pure reason must be entirely sepa-
rated from that which forms applied, but for all [p, 54]
that still general logic. The former alone is a real
science, though short and dry, as a practical exposition
of an elementary science of the understanding ought to
be* In this logicians should never lose sight of two
rules : —
1. As general !ogic it takes no account of the contents
of the knowledge of the understanding nor of the differ-
ence of its objects. It treats of nothing but the mere
form of thought.
2. As pure logic it has nothing to do with empirical
principles, and borrows nothing from psychology (as
3me have imagined) ; psychology, therefore, has no
influence whatever on the canon of the understanding.
It proceeds by way of demonstration, and everything in
it must be completely a priori.
VV^hat I call ap[>lied logic (contrary to common usage
according to which it contains certain exercbes on the
rules of pure logic) is a representation of the understand-
ing and of the rules according to which it is necessarily
44 Transcendental Logic
applied in concreto, i.e. under the accidental conditions
of the subject, which may hinder or help its application,
and are all given empirically only. It treats of attention,
its impediments and their consequences, the sources of
error, the states of doubt, hesitation, and conviction, etc.,
and general and pure logic stands to it in [p. 55]
the same relation as pure ethics, which treat only of the
necessary moral laws of a free will, to applied ethics,
which consider these laws as under the influence of sen-
timents, inclinations, and passions to which all human
beings are more or less subject. This can never con-
stitute a true and demonstrated science, because, like
applied logic, it depends on empirical and psychological
principles.
II
Of Transcendental Logic
General logic, as we saw, takes no account of the con-
tents of knowledge, i.e. of any relation between it and its
objects, and considers the logical form only in the relation
of cognitions to each other, that is, it treats of the form
of thought in general. But as we found, when treating of
Transcendental ^Esthetic, that there are pure as well as
empirical intuitions, it is possible that a similar distinction
might appear between pure and empirical thinking. In
this case we should have a logic in which the contents
of knowledge are not entirely ignored, for such a logic
which should contain the rules of pure thought only,
would exclude only all knowledge of a merely empirical
character. It would also treat of the origin of our know-
ledge of objects, so far as that origin cannot be attributed
Transcendental Logic
45
to the objects, while generaMogic is not at all [p. 56]
concerned with the origin of our knowledge, but only con-
siders representations (whether existing originally a priori
in ourselves or empirically given to us), according to the
laws followed by the understanding, when thinking and
treating them in their relation to each other. It is ron-
fined therefore to the form imparted by the understanding
to the representations, w^hatever may be their origin.
And here I make a remark w^hich should never be lost
sight of, as it extends its influence on all that follows.
Not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called
transcendental (i.e. occupied with the possibility or the use
of knowledge a priori), but that only by which we know
that and how certain representations (intuitional or con-,
ceptual ) can be used or are possible a priori only. Neither
space nor any a priori geometrical determination of it is a
transcendental representation ; but that knowledge only is
rightly called transcendental which teaches us that these
representations cannot be of empirical origin, and how
they can yet refer a priori to objects of experience. The
application of space to objects in general would likewise
be transcendental, but, if restricted to objects of sense, it
is empirical. The distinction between transcen- [p. 57]
dental and empirical belongs therefore to the critique of
knowledge, and does not affect the relation of that know-
ledge to its objects.
On the supposition therefore that there may be con-
cepts,, having an a priori reference to objects, not as pure
or sensuous intuitions, but as acts of pure thought, being
concepts in fact, but neither of empirical nor aesthetic
origin, we form by anticipation an idea of a science of
that knowledge which belongs to the pure understanding
46 Transcendental Logic
and reason, and by which we may think objects entirely
a priori. Such a science, which has to* determine the
origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such
knowledge, might be called Tratiscendental Logic^ having
to deal with the laws of the understanding and reason in
so far only as they refer a priori to objects, and not, as
general logic, in so far as they refer promiscuously to the
empirical as well as to the pure knowledge of reason.
Ill
Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and
Dialectic
What is truth ? is an old and famous question by which
people thought they could drive logicians into a corner,
and either make them take refuge in a mere circle,^ or
make them confess their ignorance and conse- [p. 58]
quently the vanity of their whole art. The nominal defi-
nition of truth, that it is the agreement of the cognition
\ with its object, is granted. What is wanted is to know
a general and safe criterion of the truth of any. and every
kind of knowledge.
It is a great and necessary proof of wisdom and sagac-
ity to know what questions may be reasonably asked.
For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer
where there is no answer, it does not only throw disgrace
on the questioner, but often tempts an uncautious listener
into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said,
the spectacle of one person milking a he-goat, and of
another holding the sieve.
If truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with
' The First Edition has Dialieie, the Second, Dialexe,
Transcendental Logic
47
^
»
I
its object, that object must thereby be distinguished from
other objects ; for knowledge is untrue if it does not agree
with its object^ though it contains something which may
be affirmed of other objects. A genera! criterium of truth
ought really to be valid with regard to every kind of
knowledge, whatever the objects may be* But it is clear,
as no account is thus taken of the contents of knowledge
(relation to its object), while truth concerns these very
contents, that it is impossible and absurd to ask [p. 59]
for a sign of the truth of the contents of that knowledge,
and that therefore a sufficient and at the sarae time
general mark of truth cannot possibly be found. As we
have before called the contents of knowledge its material,
it will be right to say that of the truth of the knowledge,
so far as its material is concerned, no general mark can
be demanded, because it would be self-contradictory.
But. when we speak of knowledge with reference to its
form only* without taking account of its contents, it is
equally clear that logic, as it propounds the general and
necessary rules of the understanding, must furnish in
these rules criteria of truth. For whatever contradicts
those rules is false, because the understanding would thus
contradict the general rules of thought, that is, itself.
These criteria, however, refer only to the form of truth
or of thought in general They are quite correct so far,
but they are not sufficient. For although our knowledge
may be in accordance with logical rule, that is, may not
contradict itself, it is quite possible that it may be
in contradiction with its object. Therefore the purely
logical criterium of truth, namely, the agreement of
knowledge with the general and formal laws of the
understanding and reason, is no doubt a conditio sine
48 Transcendental Logic
qua non, or a negative condition of all truth, [p. 60]
But logic can go no further, and it has no test for dis-
covering error with regard to the contents, and not the
form, of a proposition.
General logic resolves the whole formal action of the
understanding and reason into_its elements, and exhibits
them as principles for all logical criticism of our know-
ledge. This part of logic may therefore be called Ana-
lytic, and is at least a negative test of truth, because all
knowledge must first be examined and estimated, so far
as its form is concerned, according to these rules, before
it is itself tested according to its contents, in order to see
whether it contains positive truth with regard to its
object. But as the mere form of knowledge, however
much it may be in agreement with logical laws, is far
from being sufficient to establish the material or objec-
tive truth of our knowledge, no one can venture with
logic alone to judge of objects, or to make any assertion,
without having first collected, apart from logic, trust-
worthy information, in order afterwards to attempt its
application and connection in a coherent whole accord-
ing to logical laws, or, still better, merely to test it by
t'them. However, there is something so tempting in this
specious art of giving to all our knowledge the form of
the understanding, though being utterly ignorant [p. 61]
as to the contents thereof, that general logic, which is
meant to be a mere canon of criticism, has been employed
as if it were an organum, for the real production of at
I" least the semblance of objective assertions, or, more truly,
has been misemployed for that purpose. This general
, logic, which assumes the semblance of an organum, is
^ called Dialectic, ^
Transcendental Logic
49
Different as are the significations in which the ancients
used this name of a science or art, it is easy to gather
from its actual employment that with them it was nothing
but a logic of semblance. It was a sophistic art of giving
to one's ignorance, nay, to one*s intentional casuistry, the
outward appearance of truth, by imitating the accurate
method which logic always requires, and by using its topic
as a cloak for every empty assertion. Now it may be
taken as a sure and very useful warning that general
logic, if treated as an organum, is always an iltusive logic,
that is, dialectical. For as logic teaches nothing with
regard to the contents of knowledge, but lays down the
formal conditions only of an agreement with the under-
standing, which, so far as the objects are concerned, are
totally indifferent, any attempt at using it as an organum
in order to extend and enlarge our knowledge, at least in
appearance, can end in nothing but mere talk, [p. 62]
by asserting with a certain plausibility anything one likes,
or, if one likes, denying it.
Such instruction is quite beneath the dignity of philos-^
ophy. Therefore the title of Dialectic has rather been
added to logic, as a critique of dialectical semblance ; and
it is in that sense that we also use it.
IV
Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcen^
dental Analytic and Dialectic
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding, as
before in transcendental aesthetic the sensibility, and fix
our attention on that part of thought only which has its
origin entirely in the understanding. The application of
so
Transcendental Logic
this pure knowledge has for its condition that objects are
given in intuition, to which it can be applied* for without
intuition all our knowledge would be without objects, and
it would therefore remain entirely empty. That part of
transcendental logic therefore which teaches the elements
of the pure knowledge of the understandingi and the prin-
ciples without which no object can be thought, is transcen-
dental Analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth.
No knowledge can contradict it without losing at the
same time all contents, that is, all relation to any [p. 63]
object, and therefore all truth. But as it is very tempt-
ing to use this pure knowledge of the understanding and
its principles by themselves^ and even beyond the limits of
all experience, which alone can supply the material or the
objects to which those pure concepts of the understanding
can be applied, the understanding runs the risk of making,
through mere sophisms, a material use of the purely for-
mal principles of the pure understanding, and thus of
judging indiscriminately of objects which are not given
to us, nay, perhaps can never be given. As it is properly
meant to be a mere canon for criticising the empirical use
of the understanding, it is a real abuse if it is allowed as
an organum of its general and unlimited application, by
our venturing, with the pure understanding alone, to judge
synthetically of objects in general, or to affirm and decide
anything about them. In this case the employment of the
pure understanding would become dialectical.
The second part of transcendental logic must therefore
form a critique of that dialectical semblance, and is called
transcendental Dialectic, not as an art of producing dog-
matically such semblance (an art but too popular with
many metaphysical jugglers), but as a critique of the
Transcendental Logic
5'
understanding and reason with regard to their hyper-
physical employment, in order thus to lay bare the false
semblance of its groundless pretensions, and to [p. 64]
reduce its claims to discovery and expansion, which was to
be achieved by means of transcendental principles only,
to a mere critique, serving as a protection of the pure
understanding against all sophistical illusions.
52 Transcendental Logic
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
First Division
Transcendental Analytic
Transcendental Analytic consists in the dissection of all
our knowledge a priori into the elements which constitute
the knowledge of the purejunderstanding. Four points
are'here essential : first, that the concepts should be pure
and not empirical ; secondly, that they should not belong
to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understand-
ing ; thirdly, that the concepts should be elementary and
carefully distinguished from derivative or composite con-
cepts; fourthly, that our tables should be complete and
that they should cover the whole field of the pure under-
standing.
This completeness of a science cannot be confidently
accepted on the strength of a mere estimate, or by means
of repeated experiments only ; what is required for it is an
idea of the totality of the a priori knowledge of the under-
standing, and a classification of the concepts based [p. 65]
upon it; in fact, a systematic treatment. Pure under-
standing must be distinguished, not merely from all that
is empirical, but even from all sensibility. It constitutes
therefore a unity independent in itself, self-sufficient, and
not to be increased by any additions from without. The
sum of its knowledge must constitute a system, compre-
Transcendental Logic
S3
hended and determined by one idea, and its completeness
and articulation must form the test of the correctness and
genuineness of its component parts.
This part of transcendental logic consists of two books,
the one containing the concepts^ the other the prificiples of
pure imderstanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
BOOK I
ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS
By Analytic of concepts I do not understand their
analysis, or the ordinary process in philosophical dis-
quisitions of dissecting any given concepts according to
their contents, and thus rendering them more distinct ;
but a hitherto seldom attempted dissection of the faculty
of the understanding itself, with the sole object of dis-
covering the possibility of concepts a priori, by looking
for them nowhere but in the understanding itself [p. 66j
as their birthplace, and analysing the pure use of the
understanding. This is the proper task of a transcen-
dental philosophy, all the rest is mere logical treatment
of concepts. We shall therefore follow up the pure con-
cepts to their first germs and beginnings in the human
understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on
the occasion of experience, they become developed, and
are represented by the same understanding in their full
purity, freed from all inherent empirical conditions.
54
Transcendental Analytic
5S
ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS
CHAPTER I
METHOD OF DISCOVERING ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE
UNDERSTANDING
When we watch any faculty of knowledge, different
concepts, characteristic of that faculty^ manifest them-
selves according to different circumstances, which, as
the observ^ation has been carried on for a longer or
shorter time, or with more or less accuracy, may be
gathered op into a more or less complete collection.
Where this collection will be complete, it is impossible
to say beforehand, when w^e follow this almost mechan-
ical process. Concepts thus discovered fortuitously only,
possess neither order nor systematic unity, but [p, 67]
are paired in the end according to similarities, and, accord-
ing to their contents, arranged as more or less complex
in various series, which are nothing less than systematical,
though to a certain extent put together methodically.
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, btit
also the. duty of discovering its concepts according to
a fixed principle. As they spring pure and unmixed
from the understanding as an absolute unity, they must
be connected with each other, according to ane concept
or idea. This connection supplies us at the same time
with a rule, according to which the place of each pure
concept of the understanding and the systematical com-
56 Transcendental Analytic
pleteness of all of them can be determined a priori^ in-
stead of being dependent on arbitrary choice or chance.
TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY
OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER-
STANDING
Section I
r Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General
We have before defined the understanding negatively
only, as a non-sensuous faculty of knowledge. As with-
out sensibility we cannot have any intuition, [p. 68]
it is clear that the understanding is not a faculty of intui-
. tion. Besides intuition, however, there is no other kind
of knowledge except by means of concepts. The know-
ledge therefore of every understanding, or at least of the
human understanding, must be by means of concepts,
^ not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, being sen-
suous, depend on affections, concepts on functions. By
this function I mean the unity of the act of arranging
different representations under one common representa-
tion. Concepts are based therefore on the spontaneity
of thought, sensuous intuitions on the receptivity of
impressions. The only use which the understanding can
make of these concepts is to form judgments by them.
As no representation, except the intuitional, refers imme-
diately to an object, no concept is ever referred to an
object immediately, but to some other representation of
it, whether it be an intuition, or itself a concept. A judg-
ment is therefore a mediate knowledge of an object, or
a representation of a representation of it. In every judg-
ment we find a concept applying to many, and compre-
X
Transcendental Analytic
57
bending among the many one sin^e representation, which
is referred immediately to the object. Thus in the judg-
ment that all bodies are divisible,^ the concept of divisible \
applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in
particular to the concept of body, and this concept of
body to certain phenomena of our experience- [p. 69]
These objects therefore are represented mediately by
the concept of divisibility. All judgments therefore are
functions of unity among ouf representations, the know-
ledge of an object being brought about, not by an imme-
diate representation, but by a higher one, comprehending
this and several others, so that many possible cognitions
are collected into one. As all acts of the understanding
can be reduced to judgments, the understanding may be
defined as the faculty of judging. For wx saw before
that the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and
thinking is knowledge by means of concepts, while con-
cepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some
representation of an object yet undetermined. Thus the
concept of body means something, for instance, metal,
which can be known by that concept. It is only a con-
cept, because it comprehends other representations, by
means of which it can be referred to objects. It is there-
fore the predicate of a possible judgment, such as, that
every metal is a body. Thus the functions of the under-
standing can be discovered in their completeness, if it, is
possible to represent the functions of unity in judgments.
That this is possible will be seen in the following
section.
* V'tramiiHifh in the First E^lition is rightly corrected into ikeitbar in
Uler cditioni, though in the Second it is still vtraHi/friUK
58
Transcendental Analytic
METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CON-
CEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING [p. 70]
Section II
Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
ytidgments
If we leave out of consideration the contents of any
judgment and fix our attention on the mere form of the
understanding, we find that the function of thought in a
judgment can be brought under four heads, each of them
with three subdivisions. They may be represented in the
following table : —
Quantity of Judgfptents
Universal.
Particular.
II
Singular.
Ill
Quality
Relation
Affirmative.
Categorical.
Negative.
Hypothetical.
Infinite.
IV
Modality
Problematical.
Assertory.
Apodictic.
Disjunctive.
As this classification may seem to differ in some, though
not very essential points, from the usual technicalities of
logicians, the following reservations against any [p. 71]
possible misunderstanding will not be out of place.
I. Logicians are quite right in saying that in using
judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments may be
.ted like universal ones. For as they have n(
at all, the predicate cannot refer to part only of that
which is contained in the concept of the subject, and be
excluded from the rest The predicate .is valid therefore
of that concept, without any exception, as if it were a
general concept, having an extent to the whole of which
the predicate applies. But if we compare a singular with
a general judgment, looking only at the quantity of know-
ledge conveyed by it, the singular judgment stands to the
universal judgment as unity to infinity, and is therefore
essentially different from it It is therefore, when we
consider a singular judgment {Judicmm singnlare\ not
only according to its own validity, but according to the
quantity of knowledge which it conveys, as compared with
other kinds of knowledge, that we see how different it is
from general judgments {judicia communia\ and how well
it deserves a separate place in a complete table of the
varieties of thought in general, though not in a logic
limited to the use of judgments in reference to each other.
2. In like manner infinite judgments must, in tran-
scendental logic, be distinguished from affirmative ones,
though in general logic they are properly classed to-
gether, and do not constitute a separate part in [p, J2\
the classification. General logic takes no account of the
contents of the predicate (though it be negative), it only
asks whether the predicate be affirmed or denied. Tran-
scendental logic, on the contrary, considers a judgment
according to the value also or the contents of a logical
affirmation by means of a purely negative predicate, and
asks how much is gained by that affirmation, with refer-
ence to the sum total of knowledge. If I had said of the
soul, that it is not mortal, I should, by means of a nega-
6o Transcendental Analytic
tive judgment, have at least warded off an error. Now
it is true that, so far as the logical form is concerned, I
have really affirmed by saying that the soul is non-mortal,
because I thus place the soul in the unlimited sphere of
non-mortal beings. As the mortal forms one part of the
whole sphere of possible beings, the non-mortal the other,
I have said no more by my proposition than that the soul
is one of the infinite number of things which remain,
when I take away all that is mortal. But by this the
infinite sphere of all that is possible becomes limited only
in so far that all that is mortal is excluded from it, and
that afterwards the soul is placed in the remaining part
of its original extent. This part, however, even after its
limitation, still remains infinite, and several more parts of
it may be taken away without extending thereby in the
least the concept of the soul, or affirmatively de- [p. 73]
termining it. These judgments, therefore, though infi-
nite in respect to their logical extent, are, with respect
to their contents, limitative only, and cannot therefore be
passed over in a transcendental table of all varieties of
thought in judgments, it being quite possible that the
function of the understanding exercised in them may
become of great importance in the field of its pure
a priori knowledge.
3. The following are all the relations of thought in
judgments: —
a. Relation of the predicate to the subject.
b. Relation of the cause to its effect.
c. Relation of subdivided knowledge, and of the col-
lected members of the subdivision to each other.
In the first class of judgments we consider two con-
cepts, in the second two judgments, in the third several
Transcendental Anaiyiic
judgments in ihcir relation to each other. The hypo-
thetical proposition, if perfect justice exists, the obsti-
nately wicked is punished, contains really the relation of
two propositions, namely, there is a perfect justice, and
the obstinately wicked is punished. Whether both these
propositions are true remains unsettled. It is only the
consequence which is laid down by this judgment.
The disjunctive judgment contains the relation of two
or more propositions to each other, but not as a conse-
quence, but in the form of a logical opposition, the sphere
of the one excluding the sphere of the other, and at the
same time in the form of community, all the propositions
together filling the whole sphere of the intended know-
ledge. The disjunctive judgment contains there- [p. 74]
fore a relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a given
knowledge, in which the sphere of each part forms the
complement of the sphere of the other, all being con-
tained within the whole sphere of the subdivided know-
ledge. We may say, for instance, the world exists either
by blind chance, or by internal necessity, or by an exter-
nal cause. Each of these sentences occupies a part of
the sphere of all possible knowledge with regard to the
existence of the world, while all together occupy the whole
sphere. To take away the knowledge from one of these
spheres is the same as to place it into one of the other
spheres, and to place it in one sphere is the same as to
take it away from the others. There exists therefore in
disjunctive judgments a certain community of the differ-
ent divisi4>ns of knowledge, so that they mutually exclude
each other, and yet thereby determine in .their totality the
true knowledge, because, if taken together, they constitute
the whole contents ui one given knowledge. This is all
62 Transcendental Analytic
I have to observe here for the sake of what is to follow
hereafter.
4. The modality of judgments is a very peculiar func-
tion, for it contributes nothing to the contents of a judg-
ment (because, besides quantity, quality, and relation, there
is nothing else that could constitute the contents of a
judgment), but refers only to the nature of the copula
in relation to thought in general. Problematical judg-
ments are those in which affirmation or negation are
taken as possible (optional) only, while in assertory Judg-
ments affirmation or negation is taken as real (true), in
apodictic as necessary.^ Thus the two judg- [p. 75]
ments, the relation of which constitutes the hypothetical
judgment {antecedens et consequens) and likewise the
judgments the reciprocal relation of which forms the dis-
junctive judgment (members of subdivision), are always
problematical only. In the example given above, the
proposition, there exists a perfect justice, is not made
as an assertory, but only as an optional judgment, which
may be accepted or not, the consequence only being
assertory. It is clear therefore that some of these judg-
ments may be wrong, and may yet, if taken problemati-
cally, contain the conditions of the knowledge of truth.
Thus, in our disjunctive judgment, one of its component
judgments, namely, the world exists by blind chance, has
a problematical meaning only, on the supposition that some
one might for one moment take such a view, but serves,
at the same time, like the indication of a false road among
all the roads that might be taken, to find out the true one.
^ As if in the first, thought were a function of the understanding, in the
second, of the faculty of judgment, in the third, of reason; a remark which
will receive its elucidation in the sequel.
Transcendental Analytic
63
%
^
\
The problematical proposition is therefore that which ex-
presses logical (not objective) possibility only, that is, a
free choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely
optional admission of it into the understanding. The
assertory proposition implies logical reality or truth.
Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the ante-
cedcns in the major is problematical, in the [p. 76]
minor assertory, showing that the proposition conforms
to the ntiderstanding according to its laws. The apo-
dictic proposition represents the assertory as determined
by these very laws of the understanding, and therefore
as asserting a priori, and thus expresses logical necessity.
As in this way everything is arranged step by step in the
understanding, inasmuch as we begin with judging prob-
lematically, then proceed to an assertory acceptation, and
finally maintain our proposition as inseparably united with
the understanding, that is as necessary and apodictic, we
may be allow^ed to call these three functions of modality
so many varieties or momenta of thought.
METHOD OF THE DISCOVERY OF ALI. PURE CON-
CEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
Section 1 1 1
Of the Pure Concepts of the Understandings or of the
Categories
General logic, as we have often said, takes no account
of the contents of our knowledge, but expects that repre-
sentations will come from elsewhere in order to be turned
into concepts by an analytical process. Transcendental
logic, on the contrary, has before it the manifold contents
64 Transcendental Analytic
of sensibility a priori, supplied by transcendental [p. Tj'\
aesthetic as the material for the concepts of the pure
understanding, without which those concepts would be
without any contents, therefore entirely empty. It is true
that space and time contain what is manifold in the pure
intuition a priori, but they belong also to the conditions
of the receptivity of our mind under which alone it can
receive representations of objects, and which therefore
must affect the concepts of them also. The spontaneity
of our thought requires that what is manifold in the
pure intuition should first be in a certain way examined,
received, and connected, in order to produce a knowledge
of it. This act I call synthesis.
In its most general sense, I understand by synthesis
the act of arranging different representations together,
and of comprehending what is manifold in them under
one form of knowledge. Such a synthesis is pure, if the
manifold is not given empirically, but a priori (as in time
and space). Before we can proceed to an analysis of our
representations, these must first be. given, and, as far as
their contents are concerned, no concepts can arise ana-
lytically. Knowledge is first produced by the synthesis of
what is manifold (whether given empirically or a priori).
That knowledge may at first be crude and confused and
in need of analysis, but it is synthesis which really collects
the elements of knowledge, and unites them to a certain
extent. It is therefore the first thing which we [p. j'i^
have to consider, if we want to form an opinion on the
first origin of our knowledge.
We shall see hereafter that synthesis in general is the
mere result of what I call the faculty of imagination, a
blind but indispensable function of the soul, without
i
Transcendental Analytic
which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of
the existence of which we are scarcely conscious. But
to reduce this synthesis to concepts is a function that
belongs to the understanding, and by which the under-
standing supplies us for the first time with knowledge
properly so called.
Pure synthesis in its most general meaning gives us the
pure concept of the understanding. By this pure syn-
thesis I mean that which rests on the foundation of what
I call synthetical unity a priori. Thus our counting (as
we best perceive when dealing with higher numbers) is
a synthesis according to concepts, because resting on a
common ground of unity, as for instance, the decade.
The unity of the synthesis of the manifold becomes
necessary under this concept.
By means of analysis different representations are
brought under one concept, a task treated of in general
logic; but how to bring, not the representations, but the
pure synthesis of representations, under concepts, that is
what tranjcendental logic means to teach. The first that
must be given us a priori for the sake of knowledge of
all objects, is the manifold in pure intuition. The second
is, the synthesis of the manifold by means of [p. 79]
imagination. But this does not yet produce true know-
ledge. The concepts which impart unity to this pure
synthesis and consist entirely in the representation of this
necessary synthetical unity, add the third contribution
towards the knowledge of an object, and rest on the
understanding.
The same function which imparts unity to various rep-
resentations in one judgment imparts unity likewise to the
mere synthesis of various representations in one intuition,
\ I
J
66 Transcendental Analytic
which in a general way may be called the pure concept
of the understanding. The same understanding, and by
the same operations by which in concepts it achieves
through analytical unity the logical form of a judgment,
introduces also, through the synthetical unity of the mani-
fold in intuition, a transcendental element into its repre-
sentations. They are therefore called pure concepts of
the understanding, and they refer a priori to objects,
which would be quite impossible in;,general logic.
In this manner there arise exactly so many pure con-
cepts of the understanding which refer a priori to objects
of intuition in general, as there wer^.in our table logical
functions in all possible judgments, because those func-
tions completely exhaust the underst«anding, and compre-
hend every one of its faculties. Borrowing a term of
Aristotle, we shall call these conCepts categories, [p. 80]
our intention being originally the same as his, though
widely diverging from it in its practical applicjation.
TABLE
OF CATEGPRIES
Of Quantiij^
II
Unity.
Plurality
Totality.
•
III
Of Quality
Of Relation
Reality.
Of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation.
Limitation.
(substantia et accidens).
Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect).
Of Community (reciprocity be-
tween the active and the
passive).
Transcendental Atmlytic
67
IV
Of Modality
Possibility* Impossibility.
Existence.
Necessity.
Non-existence.
Conlingency,
This then is a list of all oriq^inal pore concepts of syn-
thesis, which belong to the understanding a pnori^ and
for which alone it is called pure imderstanding ; for it
is by them alone that it can understand something in the
manifold of intuition, that is, think an object in it The
classification is systematical, and founded on a common
principle, namely, the faculty of judging (which is the
same as the faculty of thinking). It is not the [p. 81]
result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at hap-
hazard, the completeness of which, as based on induc-
tion onlvt could never be guaranteed. Nor could we
otherwise understand why these concepts only, and no
others, abide in the pure understanding. It was an enter-
prise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to try to
discover these fundamental concepts; but as he had no
guiding principle he merely picked them up as they
occurred to him. and at first gathered up ten of them,
which he called categories or predicaments. Afterw^ards
he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he
added under the name oi post-fndicaments. But his table
remained imperfect for all that, not to mention that we
find in it some modes of pure sensibility {quando, ubi,
situs, also/r///j, simul), also an empirical concept (motus%
none of which can belong to this genealogical register of
the understanding. Besides, there are some derivative
concepts, counted among the fundamental concepts {actio,
passia), while some of the latter arc entirely wanting.
68 Transcendental Afialytic
With regard to these, it should be remarked that the
categories, as the true fundamental concepts of the pure
understanding, have also their pure derivative concepts.
These could not be passed over in a complete system of
transcendental philosophy, but in a merely critical [p. 82]
essay the mention of the fact may suffice.
I should like to be allowed to call these pure but deriva-
tive concepts of the understanding the predicabilia, in
opposition to the predicamenta of the pure understanding.
If we are once in possession of the fundamental and
primitive concepts, it is easy to add the derivative and
secondary, and thus to give a complete image of the
genealogical tree of the pure understanding. As at pres-
ent I am concerned not with the completeness, but only
with the principles of a system, I leave this supplemen-
tary work for a future occasion. In order to carry it out,
one need only consult any of the ontological manuals, and
place, for instance, under the category of causality the pre-
dicabilia of force, of action, and of passion; under the
category of community the predicabilia of presence and
resistance ; under the predicaments of modality the pre-
dicabilia of origin, extinction, change, etc. If we asso-
ciate the categories among themselves or with the modes
of pure sensibility, they yield us a large number of de-
rivative concepts a priori, which it would be useful and
interesting to mark and, if possible, to bring to a certain
completeness, though this is not essential for our present
purpose.
I intentionally omit here the definitions of these cate-
gories, though I may be in possession of them.^ In the
' See, however, Karl's remarks on p. 210 (p. 241 of First Edition).
Transcendental Analytic 69
sequel I shall dissect these concepts so far as is [p. 83]
sufficient for the purpose of the method which I am pre-
paring. In a complete system of pure reason they might
be justly demanded, but at present they would only make
us lose sight of the principal object of our investigation,
by rousing doubts and objections which, without injury to
our essential object, may well be relegated to another
time. The little I have said ought to be sufficient to
show clearly that a complete dictionary of these concepts
with all requisite explanations is not only possible, but
easy. The compartments exist; they have only to be
filled, and with a systematic topic like the present the
proper place to which each concept belongs cannot easily
be missed, nor compartments be passed over which are
still empty.^
^ Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XII.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
[p. 84]
CHAPTER II
OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF
THE UNDERSTANDING
Section I
Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in
General
Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distin-
guish in every lawsuit the question of right {quid juris)
from the question of fact {quid facti\ and in demanding
proof of both they call the former, which is to show
the right or, it may be, the claim, the deduction. We,
not being jurists, make use of a number of empirical
concepts, without opposition from anybody, and consider
ourselves justified, without any deduction, in attaching
to them a sense or imaginary meaning, because we can
always appeal to experience to prove their objective real-
ity. There exist however illegitimate concepts also, such
as, for instance, chance, or fate, which through an almost
general indulgence are allowed to be current, but are yet
from time to time challenged by the question quid juris.
In that case we are greatly embarrassed in looking for
their deduction, there being no clear legal title, whether
70
Transcendental Analytic
71
from experience or from reason, on which their [p. 85]
claim to employment could be clearly established.
Among the many concepts, however, which enter into
the complicated code of human knowledge, there are
some which are destined for pure use a priori^ indepeii-
dertt of all experience, and such a claim requires at all
times a deduction,* because proofs from experience would
not be sufficient to establish the legitimacy of such a use,
though it is necessary to know how much concepts can
refer to objects which they do not find in experience. I
call the explanation of the manner how such concepts
can a priori refer to objects their transcendental deduc-
tion, and distinguish it from the empirical deduction
which show^s the manner how a concept may be gained
by experience and by reflection on experience ; this does
not touch the legitimacy, but only the fact whence the
possession of the concept arose.
We have already become acquainted with two totally
distinct classes of concepts, which nevertheless agree in
this, that they both refer a priori to objects, namely,
the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility,
and the categories as concepts of the understanding. It
would be labour lost to attempt an empirical deduction
of them, because their distinguishing characteristic is
that they refer to objects without having borrowed any-
thing from experience for their representation, [p. 86]
If therefore a deduction of them is necessary, it can
only be transcendental.
It is possible, however, with regard to these concepts,
as with regard to all knowledge, to try to discover in
^ Thftt \% a tninicendenUl deduction.
72 Transcendental Analytic
experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet
the contingent causes of their production. And here
we see that the impressions of the senses give the first
impulse to the whole faculty of knowledge with respect
to them, and thus produce experience which consists of
two very heterogeneous elements, namely, matter for
knowledge, derived from the senses, and a certain form
according to which it is arranged, derived from the inter-
nal source of pure intuition and pure thought, first brought
into action by the former, and then producing concepts.
Such an investigation of the first efforts of our faculty
of knowledge, beginning with single perceptions and ris-
ing to general concepts, is no doubt very useful, and we
have to thank the. famous Locke for having been the
first to open the way to it. A deduction of the pure
concepts a priori, however, is quite impossible in that
way. It lies in a different direction, because, with refer-
ence to their future use, which is to be entirely indepen-
dent of experience, a very different certificate of birth
will be required from that of mere descent from experi-
ence. We may call this attempted physiological deriva-
tion (which cannot properly be called deduction, [p. 87]
because it refers to a quaestio facti\ the explanation of
the possession of pure knowledge. It is clear therefore
that of these pure concepts a priori a transcendental
deduction only is possible, and that to attempt an empiri-
cal deduction of them is mere waste of time, which no
one would think of except those who have never under-
stood the very peculiar nature of that kind of knowledge.
But though it may be admitted that the only possible
deduction of pure knowledge a priori must be transcen-
dental, it has not yet been proved that such a deduction
Transcendetttal Analytic
71
I
I
I
is absolutely necessary. We have before, by means of
a transcendental deduction, followed up the concepts of
space and time to their very sources, and explained and
defined their objective validity a priori, Geometr}% how-
ever, moves along with a steady step, through every kind
of knowledge a prion, without having to ask for a cer-
tificate from philosophy as to the pure legitimate descent
of its fundamental concept of space. But it should be
remarked that in geometry this concept is used with
reference to the outer world of sense only, of which
space is the pure form of intuition, and where geometri-
cal knowledge, being based on a priori intuition, possesses
immediate evidence, the objects being given, so far as
their form is concerned, through their very knowledge
% priofi in intuition. When we come, however, [p. %%'\
tO the pure concepts of the imderstanding, it becomes
absolutely necessary to look for a transcendental deduc-
tion, not only for them, but for space also, because they,
not being founded on experience, apply to objects gener-
ally, without any of the conditions of sensibility ; and,
speaking of objects, not through predicates of intuition
and sensibility, but of pure thought i% prion, are not
able to produce in intuition a priori any object on which,
previous to all experience, their synthesis was founded.
These concepts of pure understanding, therefore, not
only excite suspicion with regard to the objective validity
and the limits of their own application, but render even
the concept of space equivocal, because of an inclination
to apply it beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition,
which was the very reason that made a transcendental
deduction of it, such as we gave before, necessary. Be-
fore the reader has made a single step in the field of
74 Transcendental Analytic
pure reason, he must be convinced of the inevitable
necessity of such a transcendental deduction, otherwise
he would walk on blindly and, after having strayed in
every direction, he would only return to the same igno-
rance from which he started. He must at the same time
perceive the inevitable difficulty of such a deduction, so
that he may not complain about obscurity where the
object itself is obscure, or weary too soon with our re-
moval of obstacles, the fact being that we have [p. 89]
either to surrender altogether all claims to the know-
ledge of pure reason — the most favourite field of all
philosophers, because extending beyond the limits of all
possible experience — or to bring this critical investigation
to perfection.
It was easy to show before, when treating of the con-
cepts of space and time, how these, though being know-
ledge a prioriy refer necessarily to objects, and how they
make a synthetical knowledge of them possible, which is
independent of all experience. For, as no object can
appear to us, that is, become an object of empirical intui-
tion, except through such pure forms of sensibility, space
and time are pure intuitions which contain a priori the con-
ditions of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and the
synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.
The categories of the understanding, on the contrary,
are not conditions under which objects can be given in
intuition, and it is quite possible therefore that objects
should appear to us without any necessary reference to
the functions of the understanding, thus showing that the
understanding contains by no means any of their con-
ditions a priori. There arises therefore here a difficulty,
which we did not meet with in the field of sensibility.
I
namely^ how subjective conditions of thought can have
objective validity, that is, become conditions of the possi-
bility of the knowledge of objects. It cannot be [p. 90]
denied that phenomena may be given in intuition without
the functions of the understanding. For if we take, for
instance, the concept of cause, which implies a peculiar
kind of synthesis, consisting in placing according to a rule
after something called A something totally different from
it, B, we cannot say that it is a fnon qIq^t why phenomena
should contain something of this kind. We cannot appeal
for it to experience, because what has to be proved is the
objective validity of this concept a priori. It would re-
main therefore a priori doubtful whether such a concept
be not altogether emptVi and without any corresponding
object among phenomena. It is different with objects of
sensuous intuition. They must conform to the formal
conditions of sensibility existing a priori in the mind,
because otherwise they could in no way be objects to us.
But why besides this they should conform to the condi-
tions which the understanding requires for the synthetical
unity of thought, does not seem to follow quite so easily.
For we could quite well imagine that phenomena might
possibly be such that the understanding should not find
them conforming to the conditions of its synthetical unity,
and all might be in such confusion that nothing should
appear in the succession of phenomena which could sup-
ply a rule of synthesis, and correspond, for instance, to
the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would
thus be quite empty, null, and meaningless. With all this
phenomena would offer objects to our intuition, because
intuition by itself does not require the functions [p. 91]
of thought.
76 Transcendental Analytic
It might be imagined that we could escape from the
trouble of these investigations by saying that experience
offers continually examples of such regularity of phe-
nomena as to induce us to abstract from it the concept
of cause, and it might be attempted to prove thereby the
objective validity of such a concept. But it ought to be
seen that in this way the concept of cause cannot possibly
arise, and that such a concept ought either to be founded
a priori in the understanding or be surrendered altogether
as a mere hallucination. For this concept requires strictly
that something, A, should be of such a nature that some-
thing else, B, follows from it necessarily and according to
an absolutely universal rule. Phenomena no doubt supply
us with cases from which a rule becomes possible accord-
ing to which something happens usually, but never so that
the result should be necessary. There is a dignity in the
synthesis of cause and effect which cannot be expressed
empirically, for it implies that the effect is not only an
accessory to the cause, but given by it and springing from
it. Nor is the absolute universality of the rule a quality
inherent in empirical rules, which by means of induction
cannot receive any but a relative universality, that [p. 92]
is, a more or less extended applicability. If we were to
treat the pure concepts of the understanding as merely
empirical products, we should completely change their
character and their use.
Transition to a Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
Two ways only are possible in which synthetical repre-
sentations and their objects can agree, can refer to each
other with necessity, and so to say meet each other.
Either it is the object alone that makes the representation
Transcendental Analytic
77
I
I
I
I
I
possible, or it is the representation alone that makes the
object possible. In the former case their relation is em- '
pirical only, and the representation therefore never possible
a friori. This applies to phenomena with reference to
whatever in them belongs to sensation. In the latter case,
though representation by itself (for we do not speak here
of its* causality by means of the will) cannot produce its
object so far as its existence is concerned, nevertheless
the representation determines the object a priori^ if
through it alone it is possible to know anything as an
object To know a thing as an object is possible only I
under two conditions. First, there must be intuition by |
which the object is given us, though as a phenomenonjj
only, secondly, there must be a concept by which [p. 93]//
an object is thought as corresponding to that intuition/jl
From what wc have said before it is clear that the firsV
condition^ namely, that under which alone objects can be
seen, exists, so far as the form of intuition is concerned,
in the soul a priori. All phenomena therefore must con-
form to that formal condition of sensibility, because it is
through it alone that they appear, that is, that they are
given and empirically seen.
Now the question arises whether there are not also
antecedent concepts a priori, forming conditions under
which atone something can be, if not seen, yet thought as
an object in general ; for in that <^se all empirical know-
ledge of objects would necessarily conform to such con-
cepts, it being impossible that anvthing should become an
object of experience without them. All experience con-
tains, besides the intuition of the senses by which some-
1 IteM dertm iiutead of dnun^
yS Transcejidental Analytic
thing is given, a concept also of the object, which is given
in intuition as a phenomenon. Such concepts of objects
in general therefore must form conditions a priori of all
knowledge produced by experience, and the objective
validity of the categories, as being such concepts a priori^
rests on this very fact that by them alone, so far as the
form of thought is concerned, experience becomes possi-
ble. If by them only it is possible to think any object of
experience, it follows that they refer by necessity and
a priori to all objects of experience.
There is therefore a principle for the trans- [p. 94]
cendental deduction of all concepts a priori which must
guide the whole of our investigation, namely, that all
must be recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility
of experience, whether of intuition, which is found in it,
or of thought. Concepts which supply the objective
ground of the possibility of experience are for that very
reason necessary. An analysis of the experience in which
they are found would not be a deduction, but a mere illus-
tration, because they would there have an accidental char-
acter only. Nay, without their original relation to all
possible experience in which objects of knowledge occur,
their relation to any single object would be quite incom-
prehensible.
[There are three original sources, or call them faculties
or powers of the soul, which contain the conditions of the
possibility of all experience, and which themselves cannot
be derived from any other faculty, namely, sense, imagina-
tion, and apperception. On them is founded —
1. The synopsis of the manifold a priori through the
senses.
2. The synthesis of this manifold through the imagination
Transcendental Analytic
79
3. The unity of that synthesis by means of original
apperception.
Besides their empirical use all these faculties have a
transcendental use also, referring to the form only and
possible a priori. With regard to the senses we have dis-
B cussed that transcendental use in the first part, [p. 95]
and we shall now proceed to an investigation of the re*
tmaining two, according to their true nature.^]
EDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE
UNDERSTANDING
Section II
ike a priori Grounds for the Possibility of Experience
• [That a concept should be produced entirely a priori
and yet refer to an object, though itself neither belonging
to the sphere of possible experience, nor consisting of the
■ elements of such an experience, is self-contradictory and
impossible. It would have no contents, because no intui-
tion corresponds to it, and intuitions by w hich objects are
given to us constitute the whole field or the complete
object of possible experience. An a priori concept there-
fore not referring to experience would be the logical form
only of a concept, but not the concept itself by which
something is thought.
If therefore there exist any pure concepts a priori^
though they cannot contain anything empirical, they must
nevertheless all be conditions a prion of a possible ex-
perience, on which alone their objective reality depends,
' The Uit pAragTAph is omitted in the Second Edition^ There is instead %
* criticism of l^cke and Kumc, Supplement XIU. The Deduction of the
I Catq^urics ts much chsngcdf m sceu ia Supplement XIV,
I
8o Transcendental Analytic
If therefore we wish to know how pure concepts of the
understanding are possible, we must try to find out what
are the conditions a priori on which the possibility [p. 96]
of experience depends, nay, on which it is founded, apart
from all that is empirical in phenomena. A concept ex-
pressing this formal and objective condition of experience
with sufficient generality might properly be called a pure
concept of the understanding. If we once have these
pure concepts of the understanding, we may also imagine
objects which are either impossible, or, if not impossible
in themselves, yet can never be given in any experience.
We have only in the connection of those concepts to leave
out something which necessarily belongs to the conditions
of a possible experience (concept of a spirit), or to extend
pure concepts of the understanding beyond what can be
reached by experience (concept of God). But the ele-
ments of all knowledge a priori^ even of gratuitous and
preposterous fancies, though not borrowed from experi-
ence (for in that case they would not be knowledge a
priori^ must nevertheless contain the pure conditions
a priori of a possible experience and its object, otherwise
not only would nothing be thought by them, but they
themselves, being without data, could never arise in our
mind.
Such concepts, then, which comprehend the pure think-
ing a priori involved in every experience, are discovered
in the categories, and it is really a sufficient deduction of
them and a justification of their objective validity, if we
succeed in proving that by them alone an object [p. 97]
can be thought. But as in such a process of thinking
more is at work than the faculty of thinking only, namely,
the understanding, and as the understanding, as a faculty
I
Transcendtntal Analytic
of knowledge which is meant to refer to objects, requires
quite as much an explanation as to the possibility of such
a reference, it is necessary for us to consider the subjective
sources which form the foundation a priori for the possi-
bility of experience, not according to their empirical, but
according to their transcendental character.
If every single representation stood by itself, as if
isolated and separated from the others, nothing like what
we call knowledge could ever arise, because knowledge i
forms a whole of representations connected and compared i ^^jr
with each other. If therefore I ascribe to the senses a \ '
synopsis, because in their intuition they contain something
manifold, there corresponds to it always a synthesis, and
receptivity can make knowledge possible only when
joined with spontaneity. This spontaneity, now, appears
as a threefold synthesis which most necessarily take place
in every kind of knowledge, namely, first, that of the
apprtluHsioH of representations as modifications of the
soul in intuition, secondly, of the reprodfution of them in
the imagination, and, thirdly, that of their recognition
in concepts. This leads us to three subjective sources of
knowledge which render possible the understanding, and
through it all experience as an empirical product of the
understanding. [p. 98]
Preiimhiary Remark
The deduction of the categories is beset with so many
difHculties and obliges us to enter so deeply into the first
grounds of the possibility of our knowledge in general,
that I thought it more expedient, in order to avoid the
Icngthincss of a complete theory, and yet to omit nothing
in so essential an investigation, to add the following four
>^
82 Transcendental Analytic
paragraphs with a view of preparing rather than instruct-
ing the reader. After that only I shall in the third sec-
tion proceed to a systematical discussion of these elements
of the understanding. Till then the reader must not
allow himself to be frightened by a certain amount of
obscurity which at first is inevitable on a road never
trodden before, but which, when we come to that section,
will give way, I hope, to a complete comprehension.
I
Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition
I Whatever the origin of our representations may be,
1 whether they be due to the influence of external things
I or to internal causes, whether they have arisen a priori
or empirically as phenomena, as modifications of the
mind they must always belong to the internal [p. 99]
sense, and all our knowledge must therefore finally be
subject to the formal condition of that internal sense,
namely, time, in which they are all arranged, joined,
and brought into certain relations to each other. This
is a general remark which must never be forgotten in
all that follows.
Every representation contains something manifold,
which could not be represented as such, unless the
mind distinguished the time in the succession of one
impression after another; for as contained in one
moment, each representation can never be anything
but absolute unity. In order to change this manifold
into a unity of intuition (as, for instance, in the repre-
sentation of space), it is necessary first to run through
the manifold and then to hold it together. It is this
V
Transcendcnta! A naiytk
^i
I
I
act which I call the synthesis of apprehension, because
it refers directly to intuition which no doubt offers some-
thing manifold, but which, without a synthesis, can never
make it such, as it is contained in one representation.
This synthesis of apprehension must itself be carried
out a priori also, that is, with reference to representations
which are not empirical For without it we should never
be able to have the representations either of space or time
a priori^ because these cannot be produced except [p, lOo]
by a synthesis of the manifold w^hich the senses offer in
their original receptivity. It follows therefore that we
have a pure synthesis of apprehension.
II
V Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination
I It is no doubt nothing but an empirical law according
to which representations which have often followed or
accompanied one another, become associated in the end
and so closely united that, even without the presence of
I the object, one of these' representations will, according to
an invariable law, produce a transition of the mind to the
other This law of reproduction, however, presupposes
that the phenomena themselves are really sLd:jject to such
I a ruk% and that there is in the variety of these representa-
tions a sequence and concomitancy subject to certain
I rules; for without this the faculty of empirical imagina-
tion would never find anything to do that it is able to
do, and remain therefore buried within our mind as a
dead faculty, unknown to ourselves. If cinnabar were
sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and
sometimes heavy, if a man could be changed now into
84 Transcendental Analytic
this, now into another animal shape, if on the longest day
the fields were sometimes covered with fruit, [p. loi]
sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical
imagination would never be in a position, when represent-
ing red colour, to think of heavy cinnabar. Nor, if a cer-
tain name could be given sometimes to this, sometimes
to that object, or if that the same object could sometimes
be called by one, and sometimes by another name, with-
out any rule to which representations are subject by them-
selves, would it be possible that any empirical synthesis
of reproduction should ever take placd^.
There must therefore be something to make this repro-
duction of phenomena possible by being itself the founda-
tion a priori of a necessary synthetical unity of them.
' This becomes clear if we only remember that all phe-
nomena are not things by themselves, but only the play
of our representations, all of which are in the end deter-
i^minations only of the internal sense. If therefore we
could prove that even our purest intuitions a priori give
us no knowledge, unless they contain such a combination
of the manifold as to render a constant synthesis of repro-
^ duction possible, it would follow that this synthesis of the
imagination is, before all experience, founded on principles
a priori, and that we must admit a pure transcendental
synthesis of imagination which forms even the foundation
of the possibility of all experience, such experience being
impossible without the reproductibility of phe- [p. 102]
nomena. Now, when I draw a line in thought, or if I
think the time from one noon to another, or if I only
represent to myself a certain number, it is clear that I
must first necessarily apprehend one of these manifold
representations after another. If I were to lose from my
Transcendental Analytic
8S
thoughts what precedes, whether the first parts of a line
or the antecedent portions of time, or the numerical unities
representing one after the other, and if, while I proceed
to what follows, I were unable to reproduce what came
before, there would never be a complete representation,
and none of the before-mentioned thoughts, not even the
first and purest representations of space and time, could
ever arise within us.
The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably
connected with the synthesis of reproduction, and as the
former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possi-
bility of all knowledge in general (not only of empirical,
but also of pure a priori knowledge )» it follows that a
reproductive synthesis of imagination belongs to the tran-
scendental acts of the soul. We may therefore call this
faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination,
III [p. 103]
Of the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts
Without our being conscious that what we are thinking
now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all
reproduction in the series of representations would be vain.
Each representation would, in its present state, be a new
one, and in no wise belonging to the act by which it was
to be produced by degrees, and the manifold in it would
never form a whole* because deprived of that unity which
consciousness alone can impart to it. If in counting I for-
get that the unities which now present themselves to my
mind have been added gradually one to the other* I should
not know the production of the quantity by the successive
addition of one to one, nor should I know consequently
86
Transcendental Analytic
the number, produced by the counting, this number being
a concept consisting entirely in the consciousness of that
unity of synthesis.
The very word of concept (Begriff) could have sug-
gested this remark, for it is the one consciousness which
unites the manifold that has been perceived successively,
and afterwards reproduced into one representation. This
consciousness may often be very faint, and we may con-
nect it with the effect only, and not with the act itself, i.e.
with the production of a representation. But in [p. 104]
spite of this, that consciousness, though deficient in pointed
clearness, must always be there, and without it, concepts,
and with them, knowledge of objects are perfectly impos-
sible.
And here we must needs arrive at a dear understanding
of what we mean by an object of representations. We
said before that phenomena are nothing but sensuous rep-
/ resentations, which therefore by themselves must not be
/ taken for objects outside our faculty of representation.
I What then do we mean if we speak of an object corre-
sponding to, and therefore also different from our know-
1 ledge .^ It is easy to see that such an object can only
be conceived as something in general =.r: because, beside
1 our knowledge, we have absolutely nothing which we could
V^ put down as corresponding to that knowledge.
Now we find that our conception of the relation of all
knowledge to its object contains something of necessity,
the object being looked upon as that which prevents our
knowledge from being determined at haphazard, and
causes it to be determined a priori in a certain way, be-
cause, as they are all to refer to an object, they must
necessarily, with regard to that object, agree with each
TranscemUfital Analytic
«7
olher» that is to say, possess that unity which [p. tos]
constitutes the concept of an object.
It is clear also that, as we can only deal with the mani-
fold in our representations, and as the x corresponding^ to
them (the objectX since it is to be something diflFerent
from all our representations, is really nothing to us, it is
clear, I say, that the unit)*, necessitated by the object^ can*
not be anjnhing but the fomial unity of our consciousness
in the synthesis of the manifold in our representations.
B Then and then only do we say that we Jaui3K39 object, if |
we have produced synthetical unity in tluL-Q|anifotd of/
tntuitioii. Such unity b impossible, if the intuition could
not be produced, according to a rule, by such a function
of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold
tf /nrVfT necessary, and a concept in which that manifold
is united, possible. Thus we concei\^e a triangle as an
object, if we are conscious of the combination of three
stiaight lines, according to a rule, which renders such an
intvitiofi possible at all times. This mmiiy of mU deter-
nuoes the manifold and limits it to conditioas which ren-
der the unity of apperception passible, and the concept of
that unity b really the representation of the object s jr»
whkrh I thinks by means of the predicates of a triangle. .
No knowledge is pomble without a concept, [p. io6}ll
bawcver obscure or imperiect it may be. and a ooocepal
is alwa}*s» with regard to its fonn« something general/f
aofDCtliing that can serve as a rule. Thus the concept of
faodf ftcrves as a mie to our Imowledge of external phe*
iMHnmai aocorduig to the unity of the manifold which is
iSbtBia^Eti by it It can only be such a rale of intttitioQs
iD any given phcooama, tlie neees-
of their maittf old clcucatSj, or tlie qm*
88 Transcendental Analytic
thetical unity in our consciousness of them. Thus the
concept of body, whenever we perceive something outside
us, necessitates the representation of extension, and, with
it, those of impermeability, shape, etc.
Necessity is always founded on transcendental condi-
tions. There must be therefore a transcendental ground of
the unity of our consciousness in the synthesis of the man-
ifold of all our intuitions, and therefore also a transcendental
ground of all concepts of objects in general, and therefore
again of all objects of experience, without which it would
be impossible to add to our intuitions the thought of an
object, for the object is no more than that something of
which the concept predicates such a necessity of synthesis.
\ That original and transcendental condition is nothing
else but what I call transcendental apperception, [p. 107]
The consciousness of oneself, according to the determina-
tions of our state, is, with all our internal perceptions, em-
pirical only, and always transient. There can be no fixed
or permanent self in that stream of internal phenomena.
It is generally called the internal sense, or the empirical
apperception. What is necessarily to be represented as
numerically identical with itself, cannot be thought as
such by means of empirical data only. It must be a con-
dition which precedes all experience, and in fact renders it
possible, for thus only could such a transcendental suppo-
sition acquire validity.
No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or
unity of one kind of knowledge with another, without that
unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intui-
tion, and without reference to which no representation
of objects is possible. This pure, original, and unchange-
able consciousness I shall call tramcendental apperception.
Transcendental Analytic
89
I
I
I
That it deserves such a name may be seen from the fact
that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the
concepts a priori (space and time), is possible only by a
reference of all intuitions to it. The numerical unity of
that apperception therefore forms the a prion condition of
all concepts, as does the manifoldness of space and time
of the intuitions of the senses.
The same transcendental unity of appercep- [p. 108]
tion constitutes, in all possible phenomena which may
come together in our experience, a connection of all these
representations according to laws. For that unity of con-
sciousness would be impossible^ if the mind, in the kno%v-
ledge of the manifold, could not become conscious of the
identity of function^ by which it unites the manifold syn-
thetically in one knowledge. Therefore the original and
necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the
same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity
of the synthesis of all phenomena according to concepts,
that is, according to rules, which render them not only
necessarily reproducible, but assign also to their intuition
an object, that is, a concept of something in w^hich they
are necessarily united. The mind could never conceive
the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its rcpresenta*
lions (and this a priori) if it did not clearly perceive the
identity of its action, by which it subjects all synthesis of
apprehension (w^hich is empirical) to a transcendental
unity, and thus renders its regular coherence a priori pos-
sible. When w^e have clearly perceived this, we shall be
able to determine more accurately our concept of an ob-
ject in general All representations have, as representa-
tions, their object, and can themselves in turn become
objects of other representations. The only objects whic^
Transcendental A nalytic
can be given to us immediately are phenomena, and what-
ever in them refers immediately to the object is [p. 109]
called intuition. These phenomena, however, are not
things in themselves, but representations only which have
their object, but an object that can no longer be seen by
us, and may therefore be called the not-empirical, that is^
the transcendental object, = ,r.
The pure concept of such a transcendental object
(which in reality in all our knowledge is always the same
= x) is that which alone can give to all our cmpiricat con-
cepts a relation to an object or objective reality. That
concept cannot contain any definite intuition, and can
therefore refer to that unity only, which must be found
in the manifold of our knowledge, so far as it stands in re-
lation to an object. That relation is nothing else but a
necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of
the synthesis of the manifold, by a common function of
the mind, which unites it in one representation. As that
unity must be considered as a priori necessary (because,
without it, our knowledge would be without an object), we
may conclude that the relation to a transcendental object,
that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge,
rests on a transcendental law, that all phenomena, if they
are to give us objects, must be subject to rules [p. 1 10]
a priori of a synthetical unity of these objects, by which
rules alone their mutual relation in an empirical intuition
becomes possible : that is, they must be subject, in experi-
ence, to the conditions of the necessary unity of apper-
ception quite as much as, in mere intuition, to the formal
conditions of space and time. Without this no knowledge
is possible.
r
Transcendental Anaijik
91
IV
'Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories
as Kmnvlcdge a priori
There is but one experience in which all perceptions
are represented as in permanent and regular connection,
as there is but one space and one time in which all forms
of phenomena and all relations of being or not being take
place. If we speak of different experiences, we only
mean different perceptions so far as they belong to one
■ and the same general experience. It is the permanent
and synthetical unity of perceptions that constitutes the
form of experience, and experience is nothing but the syn-
thetical unity of phenomena according to concepts.
L Unity of synthesis^ according to empirical concepts,
would be purely accidental, nay. unless these [p. iii]
were founded on a transcendental ground of unity, a whole
crowd of phenomena might rush into our soul, without
Wer forming real experience. All relation between our
knowledge and its objects would be lost at the same time.
because that knowledge would no longer be held together
by general and necessary laws ; it would therefore become
I thoughtless intuition, never knowledge, and would be to
us the same as nothing.
The conditions a priori of any possible experience in
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility I
of any objects of our experience. Now I maintain that
the categories of which we are speaking are nothing but
tb$ COOditions of thought which make experience possible,
ittMftieh aa space and time contain the conditions of that'
intuition which forms experience. These categories there-
92 Transcendental Analytic
fore are also fundamental concepts by which we think
objects in general for the phenomena, and have therefore
a priori objective validity. This is exactly what we wish
to prove.
The possibility, nay the necessity of these categories
rests on the relation between our whole sensibility, and
therefore all possible phenomena, and that original apper-
ception in which everything must be necessarily subject
to the conditions of the permanent unity of self-conscious-
ness, that is, must submit to the general functions [p. 1 12]
of that synthesis which we call synthesis according to
concepts, by which alone our apperception can prove its
permanent and necessary identity a priori. Thus the con-
cept of cause is nothing but a synthesis of that which
follows in temporal succession, with other phenomena, but
a synthesis according to concepts: and without such a
unity which rests on a rule a priori^ and subjects all phe-
nomena to itself, no permanent and general, and therefore
necessary unity of consciousness would be formed in the
manifold of our perceptions. Such perceptions would
then belong to na experience at all, they would be without
an object, a blind play of representations, — less even than
a dream.
All attempts therefore at deriving those pure concepts
of the understanding from experience, and ascribing to
them a purely empirical origin, are perfectly vain and
useless. I shall not dwell here on the fact that a concept
of cause, for instance, contains an element of necessity,
which no experience can ever supply, because experience,
though it teaches us that after one phenomenon something
else follows habitually, can never teach us that it follows
necessarily, nor that we could a priori^ and without any
Transcendental Analytic
93
limitation, derive from it, as a condition, any conclusion as
to what must follow. And thus I ask with reference to
that empirical nile of association, which must always be
admitted if we say that everything in the succession of
events is so entirely subject to rules that nothing [p, 1 13]
ever happens without something preceding it on which it
always follows, — What does it rest on, if it is a law of
nature, nay, how is that very association possible ? You
call the ground for the possibility of the association of the
manifold, so far as it is contained in the objects them-
^ selves, the affinity of the manifold. I ask, therefore, how
do you make that permanent aflRnity by which phenomena
stand, nay, must stand, under permanent laws, conceivable
IP yourselves ?
■ According to my principles it is easily conceivable. All
possible phenomena belong, as representations, to the
whole of our possible self-consciousness. From this, as a
transcendental representation, numerical identity is insep-
arable and a priori certain, because nothing can become
knowledge except by means of that original apperception^
■ As this identity must necessarily enter nito the synthesis
of the whole of the manifold of phenomena, if that syn-
_ thesis is to become empirical knowledge, it follows that
P the phenomena are subject to conditions a priori to which
their synthesis (in apprehension) must always conform.
I The representation of a general condition according to
which something manifold can be arranged (with uni-
formity) is called a mle, if it must be so arranged, a laiv.
AH phenomena therefore stand in a permanent connection
according to necessary laws, and thus possess [p. 1 14]
that transcendental affinity of which the empirical is a
mere consequence.
^
Transcendental A na lytic
It sounds no doubt very strange and absurd that nature
should have to conform to our subjective ground of apper-
ception, nay, be dependent on it, with respect to her laws.
But it we consider that what we call nature is nothing but
a w^holc of phenomena, not a thing by itself, but a number
of representations in our soul, we shall no longer be sur-
prised that we only see her through the fundamental
faculty of all our knowledge, namely, the transcendental
apperception, and in that unity without which it could not
be called the object (or the whole) of all possible experience,
that is, nature. We shall thus also understand why we
can recognise this unity a priori, and therefore as nec-
essary, which would be perfectly impossible if it w^ere
given by itself and independent of the first sources of our
ow^n thinking. In that case I could not tell w^hence we
should take the synthetical propositions of such general
unity of nature. They would have to be taken from the
objects of nature themselves, and as this could be done
empirically only, w^e could derive from it none but an
accidental unity, which is very different from that neces-
sary connection which wc mean when speaking of nature.
DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE
UNDERSTANDING [p, 115]
Section III
Of the Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General^
and the Possibility of Knowing Them a priori
What in the preceding section we have discussed
singly and separately we shall now try to treat in con-
nection with each other and as a whole. We saw that
there are three subjective sources of knowledge on
Trmiscendentai Analytic
95
which the possibility of all experience and of the
knowledge of its objects depends, namely, sense, imagi-
nation, and apperception. Each of them may be con-
sidered as empirical in its application to given phenom-
ena ; all, however, are also elements or grounds a priori
which render their empirical application possible. Sense
represents phenomena empirically in perception, imagina-
tion in association {^.nd r^pToductionX apperception in the
empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproduc-
tive representations with the phenomena by which they
were given ; therefore in recognition.
The whole of our perception rests a priori on pure in-
tuition (if the perception is regarded as representation,
[then on time» as the form of our internal intuition), the
association of it (the whole) on the pore syn- [p. 1 16]
thesis of imagination, and our empirical consciousness
of it on pure apperception, that is, on the permanent
identity of oneself in the midst of all possible repre-
sentations.
If we wish to follow up the internal ground of this
^ connection of representations to that point towards
which they must all converge, and where they receive
for the first time that unity of knowledge which is
requisite for every possible experience, we must begin
with pure apperception. Intuitions are nothing to us,
and do not concern us in the least, if they cannot be
received into our consciousness, into which they may
enter either directly or indirectly. Knowledge is im-
possible in any other way. We are conscious a priori
of our own permanent identity with regard to all repre-
sentations that can ever belong to our knowledge, as
forming a necessary condition of the possibility of all
Transcenden tal A na lytic
representations (because these could not represent any-
thing in me, unless they belonged with everything else
to one consciousness and could at least be connected
within it). This principle stands firm a priori, and may
be called the tramccndental principle of the unity of
all the manifold of our representations (therefore also
of intuition). This unity of the manifold in one subject
is synthetical ; the pure apperception therefore supplies
us with a principle of the synthetical unity of [p. 117]
the manifold in all possible intuitions.^
This synthetical unity» however, presupposes [p. iiS]
or involves a synthesis, and if that unity is necessary
a priori^ the synthesis also must be a priori. The tran-
scendental iinitv of n|)j)crLCj>tiun thr;t re refers to the
pure synthesis of imaginatinn as a cuiidition a priori of
1 This point is of great importance an<l should be carefully considered.
All representations have a necessary relation to some possible etnpirkal con-
sciousness, for if tlicy did not possess that relation, and if it were entirely im-
possible to become conscious of them, this would be the same as if they did
not exist. All empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcen-
dental consciousness, which precedes all single experiences, namely, the con-
sciousness of my own self as the original apperception- It is absolutely
necessary therefore that in my knowledge all consciousness should belong
to one consciousness of my own self. Here we have a synlhetical unity of
the manifold (consciousness) which can be known a priori^ and which may
thus supply a foundation for synthetical propositions a priori concerning pure
thinking in Ihe same way as space and time supply a foundation for syn-
thetical propositions which concern the form of mere intuition.
The synthetical proposition that the different kinds of empirical conscious-
ness roust be connected in one self-consciousness^ is the very first and syn-
thetical foundation of all our thinking. It should be remembered that the
mere representation of the Ego in reference to all other representations (the
collective unity of which would be impossible without it) constitutes our
transcendental consciousness. It does not matter whether that representation
is clear (empirical consciousness) or confused, not even whether it is real;
hut the possibility of the logical fonn of all knowledge rests necessarily on the
relation to this apperception ai a faculty*
Transcendental Analytic
the possibility of the manifold being united in one
Jinowledge: NuWllicre can take place a priori the pro-
K iuctive synthesis of imaf^ination only, because the re-
" productive rests on conditions of experience. The
principle therefore of the necessary unity of the pure
((productive) synthesis of imagination, before all apper-
ception, constitutes the g:round of the possibility of all
knowledge, nay, of all experience.
The synthesis of the manifold in imagination is called
transcendental, if, without reference to the difference of
intuitions, it affects only the a priori conjunction of the
I manifold ; and the unity of that synthesis is called tran-
scendental if, with reference to the original unity of ap-
perception, it is represented as a priori necessary. As the
possibility of all knowledge depends on the unity of that
apperception, it follows that the transcendental unity
of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all
possible knowledge through which therefore all objects of
possible experience must be represented a prion.
This unity of apperception with reference to [p, 1 19]
the synthesis of imagination is the understanding, and
the same unity with reference to the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination* the pure understanding.
It must be admitted therefore that there exist in the
understanding pure forms of knowledge a priori, which
contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the
imagination in reference to all possible phenomena.
^ These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts
■ of the understanding. The empirical faculty of know-
ledge of man contains therefore by necessity an under-
standing which refers to all objects of the senses,
though by intuition only, and by its synthesis through
Transcendental Analytic
n
imagination^ and all phenomena, as data of a possible
experience, must conform to that understanding- As
this relation of phenomena to a possible experience is
likewise necessary, (because, without it, we should receive
no knowledge through them, and they would not in the
least concern us), it follows that the pure understanding
constitutes by the means of the categories a formal and
synthetical principle of all experience, and that phenomena
have thus a necessary relation to the understanding.
We shall now try to place the necessary connection of
the understanding with the phenomena by means of the
categories more clearly before the reader, by beginning
with the beginning, namely, with the empirical.
The first that is given us is the phenomenon, [p, I20]
which, if connected with consciousness, is called perception.
(Without its relation to an at least possible consciousness^
the phenomenon could never become to us an object of
knowledge. It w^ould therefore be nothing to us ; and
because it has no objective reality in itself, but exists only
in being known, it would be nothing altogether.) As every
phenomenon contains a manifold, and different percep-
tions are found in the mind singly and scattered, a con-
nection of them is necessary, such as they cannot have in
the senses by themselves. There exists therefore in us an
active power for the synthesis of the manifold which we
call imagination, and the function of which, as applied
to perceptions, I call apprehension} This imagination
1 It has harOly struck any psychologisi that this imaginalion is a necessary
ingredient t>f perception. This was partly owing to their confining this faculty
to reproductiun, partly to our btrlief that the senses do not only give us im-
pressions, but cumpound them also for us, thus producing pictures of objects.
Tills, huucvcr, beyund our receptivity of impressions, requires something
morfii namely p a function for their synthesis.
I
I
I
I
I
is meant to change the manifold of intuition into <ui im-
age, it must therefore first receive the impressions into
its activity, which I call to apprehend.
It must be clear, however, that even this appre- [p. tii]
hension of the manifold could not alone produce a cohe-
rence of impressions or an image, without some subjective
power of calling one perception from which the mind has
gone over to another back to that which follows, and thus
forming whole series of perceptions. This is the repro-
ductive faculty of imagination which is and can be em*
pirical only.
If representations, as they happen to meet with one
another, could reproduce each other at haphazard, they
would have no definite coherence, but would form irregu-
lar agglomerations only, and never produce knowledge.
It is necessary therefore that their reproduction should be
subject to a rule by w*hich one representation connects
itself in imagination with a second and not with a third.
It is this subjective and empirical ground of reproduction
according to rules, which is called the assaciatwn of repre-
sentations.
If this unity of association did not possess an objective
foundation also, which makes it impossible that phenomena
should be apprehended by imagination in any other way
but under the condition of a possible synthetical unity of
that apprehension, it would be a mere accident that phe-
nomena lend themselves to a certain connection in human
knowledge. Though we might have the power of asso-
ciating perceptions, it would still be a matter of [p. 122]
uncertainty and chance w^hcther they themselves arc asso-
ciable; and, in case they should not be so, a number of
perceptions, nay, the whole of our sensibility, might possi-
.^
too
Transcendental Analytic
bly contain a great deal of empirical consciousness, but in
a separate state, nay, without belonging to the one con-
sciousness of myself, which, however, is impossible. Only
by ascribing all perceptions to one consciousness (the origi-
nal apperception) can I say of all of them that I am con-
scious of them. It must be therefore an objective ground,
that is, one that can be understood as existing a priori,
and before all empirical laws of imagination, on which
alone the possibility, nay, even the necessity of a law can
rest, which pervades all phenomena, and which makes us
look upon them all, without exception, as data of the
senses, associable by themselves, and subject to general
rules of a permanent connection in their reproduction.
This objective ground of all association of phenomena I
call their affinity^ and this can nowhere be found except
in the principle of the unity of apperception applied to all
knowledge which is to belong to me. According to it
all phenomena, without exception, must so enter into the
mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of
apperception. This, without a synthetical unity in their
connection, which is therefore necessary objectively also,
would be impossible.
We have thus seen that the objective unity [p. 123]
of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (that
of the original apperception) is the necessary condition
even of all possible perception, while the affinity of all
phenomena (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of
a synthesis in imagination which is a priori founded on
rules.
Imagination is therefore likewise the power of a synthe-
sis a priori which is the reason why we called it produc-
tive imagination, and so far as this aims at nothing but
Transcendental A na lytic
lOl
the necessary unity in the synthesis of all the manifold in
phenomena, it may be called the transcendental function
of imagination.. However strange therefore it may appear
at first, it must nevertheless have become clear by this
time that the affinity of phenomena and with it their asso-
ciation, and through that, lastly, their reproduction also
according to laws, that is, the whole of our experience,
becomes possible only by means of that transcendental
function of imagination, without which no concepts of
objects could ever come together in one experience.
It is the permanent and unchanging Ego (or pure ap- .
perception) which forms the correlative of all our reprc- I
sentations, if we are to become conscious of them, and all
consciousness belongs quite as much to such an all-em-
bracing pure apperception as all sensuous intuitions be-
longs, as a representation, to a pure internal [p. 124]
intuition, namely, time. This apperception it is which I
must be added to pure imagination, in order to render
its function intellectual For by itself, the synthesis of
imagination, though carried out a prion, is always sensu-
ous, and only connects the manifold as it appears in intui-
tion, for instance, the shape of a triangle. But when the
manifold is brought into relation with the unity of apper-
ception, concepts which belong to the understanding be-
come possible, but only as related to sensuous intuition
through imagination.
We have therefore a pure imagination as c
fundamental faculties of the human soul, on whicb
knowledge a priori depends. Through it we bring the
manifold of intuition on one side in connection with the
condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on
the other. These two extreme ends, sense and under-
102
Transcendental Afiaiytic
standing, must be brought into contact with each other
by means of the transcendental function of imagination,
because, without it, the senses might give us phenomena,
but no objects of empirical knowledge, therefore no expe-
rience. Real experience, which is made up of apprehen-
sion, association (reproduction), and lastly recognition of
phenomena, contains in this last and highest [p. 125]
(among the purely empirical elements of experience) con-
cepts, which render possible the formal unity of experi-
ence, and with it, all objective validity (truth) of empirical
knowledge. These grounds for the recognition of the
manifold, so far as they concern the form only of expe-
rience in general, are our categories. On them is founded
the whole formal unity in the synthesis of imagination
and, through it, of* the whole empirical use of them (in
recognition, reproduction, association, and apprehension)
down to the very phenomena, because it is only by means
of those elements of knowledge that the phenomena can
belong to our consciousness and therefore to ourselves.
It is we therefore who carry into the phenomena which
we call nature, order and regularity, nay, wc should never
find them in nature, if we ourselves, or the nature of our
mind, had not originally placed them there. For the
unity of nature is meant to be a necessary and a priori
certain unity in the connection of all phenomena. And
how should wc a priori have arrived at such a synthetical
unity, if the subjective grounds of such unity were not
contained a priori in the original sources of our know-
ledge, and if those subjective conditions did not at the
same time possess objective validity, as being the grounds
1 0/ niay be omitted, if wc read ailer etnpirischer Gehrauck^
Transcendental Analytic
103
[p. 126]
I
I
I
I
on which alone an object becomes possible in
our experience ?
We have before given various definitions of the under-
standing, by calling it the spontaneity of knowledge (as
opposed to the receptivity of the senses), or the faculty
of thinking, or the faculty of concepts or of judgments ;
all of these explanations, if more closely examined, coming
to the same. We may now characterise it as the faculty
of rides. This characteristic is more significant, and ap*
proachcs nearer to the essence of the understanding.
The senses give us forms (of intuition), the understanding
rules, being always busy to examine phenomena, in order
to discover in them some kind of rule. Rules, so far as
they are objective (therefore necessarily inherent in our
knowledge of an object), arc called laws. Although expe-
rience teaches us many laws, yet these are only particular
determinations of higher laws, the highest of them, to
which all others are subject, springing a priori from the
understanding ; not being derived from experience, but,
on the contrary, imparting to the phenomena their regu-
larity, and thus making experience possible. The under-
standing therefore is not only a power of making rules
by a comparison of phenomena, it is itself the lawgiver of
nature, and without the understanding nature, that is» a
synthetical unity of the manifold of pfienomena, [p, 127]
according to rules, would be nowhere to be found, because
phenomena, as such, cannot exist without us, but exist in
our sensibility only. This sensibility, as an object of our
knowledge in any experience, with everything it may con-
tain, is possible only in the unity of appercejition, which
unity of apperception is transcendental ground of the
necessary order of all phenomena in an experience. The
I04 Transcendental Analytic
same unity of apperception with reference to the mani-
fold of representations (so as to determine it out of one)^
forms what we call the rule, and the faculty of these rules
I call the understanding. As possible experience there-
fore, all phenomena depend in the same way a priori m\
the understanding, and receive their formal possibility
from it as, when looked upon as mere intuitions, they
depend on sensibility, and become possible through it, so
far as their form is concerned.
However exaggerated therefore and absurd it may
sound, that the understanding is itself the source of the
laws of nature, and of its formal unity, such a statement
is nevertheless correct and in accordance with experience.
It is quite true, no doubt, that empirical laws, as such,
cannot derive their origin from the pure understanding,
as little as the infinite manifoldness of phenomena could
be sufficiently comprehended through the pure form of
sensuous intuition. But all empirical laws are only par-
ticular determinations of the pure laws of the [p. 128]
understanding, under which and according to which the
former become possible, and phenomena assume a regular
form, quite as much as all phenomena, in spite of the
variety of their empirical form, must always submit to the
conditions of the pure form of sensibility.
The pure understanding is therefore in the categories
the law of the synthetical unity of all phenomena, and
thus makes experience, so far as its form is concerned, for
the first time possible. This, and no more than this, we
were called upon to prove in the transcendental deduction
of the categories, namely, to make the relation of the
1 That is, out of one, or out of the unity uf apperception^
Transcendental Analytic
los
understanding to our sensibility, and through it to all
objects of experience, that is the objective validity of the
pure concepts a priori of the understanding, conceivable,
and thus to establish their origin and their truth.
SUMMARY REPRESENTATION
OF THE CORRECTNESS AND OF THE ONLY POSSIBILITY OF
THIS DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER-
STANDING
If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal
were things by themselves, we could have no concepts a
priori of them. For where should we take them ? If we
took them from the object (without asking even the ques-
tion, how that object could be known to us) our [p. 129]
concepts would be empirical only, not concepts a priori.
If w^e took them from within ourselves, then that which
is within us only, could not determine the nature of an
object different from our representations, that is, supply
a ground why there should be a thing to which something
like what we have in our thoughts really belongs, and
why all this representation should not rather be altogether
empty. But if, on the contrary, we have to deal with
phenomena only, then it becomes not only possible, but
necessary, that certain concepts a priori should precede
our empirical knowledge of objects. For being phenom-
ena, they form an object that is within us only, because a
mere modification of our sensibility can never exist outside
us. The very idea that all these phenomena, and there-
fore all objects with which we have to deal, are altogether
within me, or determinations of my own identical self,
io6 Transcendental Analytic
implies by itself the necessity of a permanent unity of
them in one and the same apperception. In that unity
of a possible consciousness consists also the form of all
knowledge of objects, by which the manifold is thought
as belonging to one object. The manner therefore in
which the manifold of sensuous representation (intuition)
belongs to our consciousness, precedes all knowledge of
an object, as its intellectual form, and constitutes a kind
of formal a priori knowledge of all objects in general, if
they are to be thought (categories). Their syn- [p. 1 30]
thesis by means of pure imagination, and the unity of all
representations with reference to the original appercep-
tion, precede all empirical knowledge. Pure concepts of
the understanding are therefore a priori possible, nay,
with regard to experience, necessary, for this simple rea-
son, because our knowledge has to deal with nothing but
phenomena, the possibility of which depends on ourselves,
and the connection and unity of which (in the repre-
sentation of an object) can be found in ourselves only, as
antecedent to all experience, nay, as first rendering all
experience possible, so far as its form is concerned. On
this ground, as the only possible one, our deduction of the
categories has been carried out.}
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
BOOK II
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
I
General logic is built up on a plan that coincides accu*
rately with the division of the higher faculties of know-
ledge. These arc, Understandings yudgment^ and Reason,
Logic therefore treats in its analytical portion of concepts^
judgfuents^ and syllogisms corresponding with the func-
tions and the order of the above-named faculties [p. 151]
of the mind, %vhich are generally comprehended under the
vague name of the understanding.
As formal logic takes no account of the contents of our
knowledge (pure or empirical), but treats of the form of
thought only (discursive knowledge), it may well contain
in its analytical portion the canon of reason also, reason
being, according to its form, subject to definite rules
which, without reference to the particular nature of the
knowledge to which they are applied, can be found out
a priori by a mere analysis of the acts of reasoning into
their component parts.
Transcendental logic, being limited to a certain content,
namely, to pure knowledge a priori, cannot follow general
logic in this division ; for it is clear that the transcendental
use of reason cannot be objectively valid, and cannot there-
fore belong to the logic of truth, that is, to Analytic, but
must be allowed to form a separate part of our scholastic
107
io8 Transcendental Analytic
system, as a logic of illusion^ under the name of transcen-
dental Dialectic,
Understanding and judgment have therefore a canon
of their objectively valid, and therefore true use in tran-
scendental logic, and belong to its analytical portion. But
reason, in its attempts to determine anything a priori with
reference to objects, and to extend knowledge beyond the
limits of possible experience, is altogether dialectical, and
its illusory assertions have no place in a canon [p. 132]
such as Analytic demands.
Our Analytic of principles therefore will be merely a
canon of the faculty of judgment, teaching it how to apply
to phenomena the concepts of the understanding, which
contain the condition of rules a priori. For this reason,
and in order to indicate my purpose more clearly, I shall
use the name of doctrine of the faculty of judgment^ while
treating of the real principles of the understanding,
INTRODUCTION
OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT IN
GENERAL
If the understanding is explained as the faculty of
rules, the faculty of judgment consists in performing the
subsumption under these rules, that is, in determining
whether anything falls under a given rule (casus datce
legis) or not. General logic contains no precepts for the
faculty of judgment and cannot contain them. For as it
takes no account of the contents of our knowledge, it has
only to explain analytically the mere form of knowledge
in concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, and thus [p. 133]
to establish formal rules for the proper employment of the
Transcendental Analytic
109
I
I
iinderstanding. If it were to attempt to show in general
how anything should be arranged under these rules, and
how we should determine whether something falls under
them or not, this could only take place by means of a new
rule. This, because it is a new rule, requires a new pre-
cept for the faculty of judgment, and we thus learn that,
though the understanding is capable of being improved
and instructed by means of rules, the faculty of judgment
is a special talent which cannot be taught, but must be
practised. Thh is what constitutes our so-called mother-
wit, the absence of which cannot be remedied by any
schooling. For although the teacher may offer, and as
it were graft into a narrow understanding, plenty of rules
borrowed from the experience of others, the faculty of
using them rightly must belong to the pupil himself, and
without that talent no precept that may be given is safe
from abuse.* A physician, therefore, a judge, or [p. 134]
a politician, may carry in his head many beautiful patho-
logical, juridical, or political rules, nay. he may even be-
come an accurate teacher of them, and he may yet in the
application of these rules commit many a blunder, either
because he is deficient in judgment, though not in under-
standing, knowing the general in the abstract, but unable
to determine whether a concrete case falls under it; or, it
may be, because his judgment has not been sufficiently
trained by examples and practical experience. It is the
I Dcliciency in the facalCy of judgment is rcAlly whtit we call stupidity, ind
there is nu remedy for thtt. An obtuse and narrow mind. dcHcicnl in nothing
but A proper degree of understanding and correct concepts, may be improved
by study, so far as to become even Jearned. Uut as even then there is often a
deficiency of juflgmenl {secunda Petri) we often meet with very learned men,
who in handling their learning betray that original deAciency which can never
be mended.
^
TransccudtuUtl Atmiylic
one great advantage of examples that they sharpen the
faculty of judgment, but they are apt to impair the accu-
racy and precimon of the understanding, because they
fulfil but rarely the conditions of the rule quite adequately
(as casus in termims). Nay, they often weaken the effort
of the understanding in comprehending rules according
to their general adequacy, and independent of the special
circumstances of experience, and accustom us to use those
rules in the end as formulas rather than as principles.
Examples may thus be called the go-cart of the judgment,
which those who are deficient in that natural talent^ can
never do without.
But although general logic can give no pre- [p. 135]
cepts to the faculty of judgment, the case is quite differ-
ent with transcendental logic, so that it even seems as if
it were the proper business of the latter to correct and
to establish by definite rules the faculty of the judgment
in the use of the pure understanding. For as a doctrine
and a means of enlarging the field of pure knowledge a
priori for the benefit of the understanding, philosophy
does not seem necessary, but rather hurtful, because, in
spite of all attempts that have been hitherto made, hardly
a single inch of ground h^is been gained by it. P'or criti-
cal purposes, however, and in order to guard the faculty
of judgment against mistakes {iapsits judkii) in its use of
the few pure concepts of the understanding which we pos-
sess, philosophy (though its benefits may be negative only)
has to employ all the acuteness and penetration at its
command.
1 Dtistlben has I teen changed into d^rselben in later editions. Drsselben^
however, may be meant to refer to Urikeii^ as contained in UrthtUskrafU
TJie second edition has dasetben^
Transcendental Anaiydc
III
I
I
I
What distinguishes transcendental philosophy is, that
besides giving the rules (or rather the general condition
of rules) which are contained in the pure concept of the
understanding, it can at the same time indicate a pHori
the case to which each rule may be applied. The superi-
ority which it enjoys in this respect over all other sciences,
except mathematics, is due to this, that it treats of con-
cepts which are meant to refer to their objects a priori, so
that their objective validity cannot be proved [p. 156]
a posteriori, because this would nut affect their own
peculiar dignity. It must show, on the contrary, by
means of general but sufficient marks, the conditions
under which objects can be given corresponding to those
concepts ; otherwise these would be without any contents,
mere logical forms, and not pure concepts of the under-
standing.
Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment
will consist of two chapters. The first will treat of the
sensuous condition under which alone pure concepts of
the understanding can be used. This is what I call the
schematism of the pure understanding. The second will
treat of the synthetical judgments, which can be derived
a priori under these condiUons from pure concepts of the
understanding, and on which all knowledge a priori de-
pends. It will treat, therefore, of the principles of the
pure understanding.
THE
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE
[p- 137]
OF THE
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT
OR
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER I
OF THE SCHEMATISM OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE
UNDERSTANDING
In comprehending any object under a concept, the
representation of the former must be homogeneous
with the latter,^ that is, the concept must contain that
which is represented in the object to be comprehended
under it, for this is the only meaning of the expression
that an object is comprehended under a concept. Thus,
for instance, the empirical concept of a plate is homo-
geneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle,
the roundness which is conceived in the first forming an
object of intuition in the latter.
Now it is clear that pure concepts of the understanding
as compared with empirical or sensuous impressions in
general, are entirely heterogeneous, and can never be met
^ Read dent letzleren^ as corrected by Rosenkranz, for der letzteren.
112
Transcendental Analytic
113
with in any intuition. How then can the latter be com-
prehended under the former, or how can the categories
be applied tn phenomena, as no one is likely to say that
causality, for instance, could be seen through the senses,
and was contained in the phenomenon? It is [p. 138]
really this very natural and important question which
renders a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judg-
ment necessary, in order to show how it is possible that
any of the pure concepts of the understanding can be
applied to phenomena. In all other sciences in which the
concepts by which the object is thought in general are not
so heterogeneous or different from those which represent
it in concrcto, and as it is given, there is no necessity to
enter into any discussions as to the applicability of the
former to the latter.
In our case there must be some third thing homo-
geneous on the one side with the category, and on the
other with the phenomenon, to render the application of the
former to the latter possible. This intermediate repre-
sentation must be pure (free from all that is empirical)
and yet intelligible on the one side, and sensuous on the
other Such a representation is ih^ transcendental schcfna.
The concept of the understanding contains pure syn-
thetical unity of the manifold in general Time, as the
formal condition of the manifold in the internal sense,
consequently of the conjunction of all representations,
contains a manifold a priori in pure intuition. A tran-
scendental determination of time is so far homogeneous
with the category (which constitutes its unity) that it is
general and founded on a rule a priori ; and it is on the
other hand so far homogeneous with the phe- [p. 139]
nomenon, that time must be contained in every empirical
Transcendenta I A mi lytic
/epresentation of the manifold The application of the
category to phenomena becomes possible therefore by
means of the transcendental determination of time, which,
as a schema of the concepts of the understanding, allows
the phenomena to be comprehended under the category.
After what has been said in the deduction of the cate-
gories, we hope that nobody will hesitate in answering the
question whether these pure concepts of the understand-
ing allow only of an empirical or also of a transcendental
application, that is, whether, as conditions of a possible
experience, they refer a priori to phenomena only, or
whether, as conditions of the possibility of things in gen*
eral, they may be extended to objects by themselves (with-
out restriction to our sensibility). For there we saw that
-concepts are quite impossible, and cannot have any mean-
ing unless there be an object given either to them or, at
least, to some of the elements of which they consist, and
that they can never refer to things by themselves (without
regard as to whether and how things may be given to us).
We likewise saw that the only way in which objects can
be given to us, consists in a modification of our sensibility,
and lastly, that pure concepts a priori must contain, besides
the function of the understanding in the category itself,
formal conditions a prioH of sensibility (particu- [p. 140]
larly of the internal sense) which form the general condi-
tion under which alone the category may be applied to
any object. We shall call this formal and pure condition
of sensibility, to which the concept of the understanding
is restricted in its application, its schema ; and the function
of the understanding in these schemata^ the schematism of
the pure undersianding.
The schema by itself is nv ^oubt a product of the imagi-
Transcendental Analytic
IIS
nation only, but as the synthesis of the iraagination does
not aim at a single intuition, but at some kind of unity
alone in the determination of sensibility, the schema ought
to be distinguished from the image, Thns, if I place five
points, one after the other ^ this is an image of the
number five. If, on the contrary, I think of a number in
general, whether it be ^vq or a hundred, this thinking is
rather the representation of a method of representing in
one image a certain quantity (for instance a thousand)
according to a certain concept, than the image itself, which,
in the case of a thousand, I could hardly take in and com-
pare with the concept. This representation of a general
procedure of the imagination by which a concept receives
its image, T call the schema of such concept.
The fact is that our pure sensuous concepts do not
depend on images of objects, but on schemata, [p, 141]
No image of a triangle in general could ever be adequate
to its concept. It would never attain to that generality of
the concept, which makes it applicable to all triangles,
whether right-angled, or acute-angled, or anything else,
but would always be restricted to one portion only of the
sphere of the concept. The schema of the triangle can
exist nowhere but in thought, and is in fact a rule for
the synthesis of imagination with respect to pure forms
in space. Still less does an object of experience or its
image ever cover the empirical concept, which always
refers directly to the schema of imagination as a rule for
the determination of our intuitions, according to a certain
neral concept The concept of dog means a rule ac-
ording to which my imagination can always draw a
general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal,
without being restricted to any particular figure supplied
n
1 16 Tmuscendenial Analytic
by experience or to any possible image which I may draw
in the concrete. This schematism of our understanding
applied to phenomena and their mere form is an art hid-
den in the depth of the human soul^ the true secrets of
which we shall hardly ever be able to guess and reveal.
So much only we can say, that the ima^c is a product of
the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, while
the schema of sensuous concepts (such as of figures in
space) is a product and so to say a monogram of [p, 142]
the pure imagination a priori^ through which and accord-
ing to which images themselves become possible, though
they are never fully adequate to the concept, and can be
connected with it by means of their schema only. ,The
schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the
contrary, is something which can never be made into an
image ; for it is nothing but the pure synthesis determined
by a rule of unity^ according to concepts, a synthesis as
expressed by the category, and represents a transcendental
product of the imagination, a product which concerns the
determination of the internal sense in general, under the
conditions of its form (timc)^ with reference to all repre-
scntations, so far as these are meant to be joined a priori
in one concept, according to the unity of apperception.
Without dwelling any longer on a dry and tedious
determination of all that is required for the transcen-
dental schemata of the pure concepts of the understand-
ing in general, we shall proceed at once to represent them
according to the order of the categories, and in connection
with them.
The pure image of all quantities {quauta) before the
external sense, is space ; that of all objects of the senses
in general, time. The pure schema of quantity {quan-
Transcendental Analytic
117
titas\ however, as a concept of the understanding, is
number, a representation which comprehends the succes-
sive addition of one to one (homogeneous). Number
therefore is nothing but the unity of the syn- [p. 145]
Lthesis of the manifold (repetition) of a homogeneous
[intuition in general, I myself producing the time in the
'apprehension of the intuition. ^^^
Reality is, in the pure concept of the understanding,
that which corresponds to a sensation in general : that,
therefore, the concept of which indicates by itself being
(in time), %vhilc negation is that the concept of which rep-
resents not'being (in time). The opposition of the two
Ltakes place therefore by a distinction of one and the
'same time, as either filled or empty. As time is only
the form of intuition, that is, of objects as phenomena,
that which in the phenomena corresponds to sensation,
constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects, as
things by themselves (reality, Sachheit), Every sensa-
tion, however, has a degree of quantity by which it can
fill the same time (that is, the internal sense, with refer-
Lence to the same representation of an object), more or less,
"till it vanishes into nothing (equal to nought or negation)^
There exists, therefore, a relation and connection, or rather
a transition from reality to negation, which makes every
reality rcpresentable as a quantum ; and the schema of a
reality, as the quantity of something which fills time, is
this very continuous and uniform production of reality in
time ; while we either descend from the sensation which
has a certain degree, to its vanishing in time, or ascend
from the negation of sensation to some quantity of it.
The schema of substance is the permanence [p. 144]
of the real in time, that is, the representation of it as a
Transcendental Analytic
substratum for the empirical determination of time in
general, which therefore remains while everything else
changes, (It is not time that passes, but the existence of
the changeable passes in time. What corresponds there-
fore in the phenomena to time, which in itself is unchange-
able and permanent, is the unchangeable in existence, that
is, substance; and it is only in it that the succession and
the coexistence of phenomena can be determined according
to time.)
The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing in
general is the real which, when once supposed to exist, is
always followed by something else. It consists therefore
in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succes*
sion is subject to a rule.
The schema of community (reciprocal action) or of the
reciprocal causality of substances, in respect to their acci-
dents, is the coexistence, according to a genera! rule, of
the determinations of the one with those of the other.
The schema of possibility is the agreement of the syn-
thesis of different representations with the conditions of
time in general, as, for instance, when opposites cannot
exist at the same time in the same thing, but only one
after the other. It is therefore the determination of the
representation of a thing at any time whatsoever.
The schema of reality is existence at a given time, [p, 145]
The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at
all times.
It is clear, therefore, if we examine all the categories,
that the schema of quantity contains and represents the
production (synthesis) of time itself in the successive
apprehension of an object ; the schema of quality, the
synthesis of sensation (perception) with the representation
Tmnscendentai A naiytic
119
of time or the filling-up of time; the schema of relation,
the relation of perceptions to each other at all times (that
is» according to a rule which determines time); lastly, the
schema of modality and its categories, time itself as the
correlative of the determination of an object as to whether
and how it belonf^s to time. The schemata therefore are
nothing but determinations of time a priori according to
rules, and these, as applied to all possible objects, refer in the
order of the categories to the series of timi\ the eontents of
time, the order if time y and lastly, the eomprehension of time.
We have thus seen that the schematism of the under-
standing, by means of a transcendental synthesis of
imagination, amounts to nothing else but to the unity of
the manifold in the intuition of the internal sense, and
therefore indirectly to the unity of apperception, as an
active function corresponding to the internal sense (as re-
ceptive). These schemata therefore of the pure concepts
^i>f the understanding are the true and only con- [p. 146]
ditions by which these concepts can gain a relation to
objects, that is, a significaftce, and the categories are thus
in the end of no other but a possible empirical use, serv-
ing only, on account of an a priori necessary unity (the
necessary connection of all consciousness in one original
apperception) to subject all phenomena to general rules of
synthesis, and thus to render them capable of a general
connection in experience.
All our knowledge is contained within this whole of
possible experience, and transcendental truth, which pre-
cedes all empirical truth and renders it possible, consists
in general relation of it to that experience.
But although the schemata of sensibility serve thus to
realise the categories, it must strike everybody that they
126 Transcendental Analytic
at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them by con-
ditions foreign to the understanding and belonging to sen-
sibility. Hence the schema is really the phenomenon, or
the sensuous concept of an object in agreement with the
category (numerus est quantitas pkaenmnenon^ sensatio
reafitas p/iaimmtfUiiH^ constans et pcrdurabile re rum sub-
stantia pkacnomenmt — aetcrnitas ncccssitas phaenomenon^
etc.). If we omit a restrictive condition, it would seem
that we amplify a formerly limited concept, and that
therefore the categories in their pure meaning, [p, 147]
free from all conditions of sensibility, should be valid of
things in general, as they are, while their schemata rep-
resent them only as they appear, so that these categories
might claim a far more extended power, independent of
all schemata. And in truth we must allow to these pure
concepts of the understanding, apart from all sensuous
conditions, a certain significance, though a logical one
only, with regard to the mere unity of representations
produced by them, although these representations have
no object and therefore no meaning that could give us
a concept of an object. Thus substance, if we leave out
the sensuous condition of permanence, would mean noth-
ing but a something that may be conceived as a subject,
without being the predicate of anything else. Of such
a representation we can make nothing, because it does
not teach us how that thing is determined which is thus
to be considered as the first subject. Categories, there-
fore, without schemata are functions only of the under-
standing necessary for concepts, but do not themselves
represent any object. This character is given to them
by sensibility only, which realises the understanding by,
at the same time, restricting it
\ -
THE
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE
[p. 148]
OP THE
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT
OR
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER II
SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING
We have in the preceding chapter considered the tran-
scendental faculty of judgment with reference to those
general conditions only under which it is justified in
using the pur.e concepts of the understanding for syn-
thetical judgments. It now becomes cur duty to repre-
sent systematically those judgments which, under that
critical provision, the understanding, can really produce
a priori. For this purpose our table of categories will
be without doubt our natural and best guide. For it is
the relation of the categories to all possible experience
which must constitute all pure a priori knowledge of the
understanding ; and their relation to sensibility in general
will therefore exhibit completely and systematically all
Transcendental Anaifik
the transcendental principles of the' use of the under-
standing.*
Principles a priori arc so called, not only because they
contain the grounds for other judgments, but also because
they themselves are not founded on higher and more gen-
eral kinds of knowledge. This peculiarity, however, does
not enable them to dispense with every kind of proof ; for
although this could not be given objectively, as [p. 149]
all knowledge of any object really rests on it, this does
not prev^ent us from attempting to produce a proof drawn
from the subjective sources of the possibility of a know-
ledge of the object in general ; nay, it may be necessary
to do sOp because, without it, our assertion might be sus-
pected of being purely gratuitous.
We shall treat, however, of those principles only which
relate to the categories. We shall have nothing to do
with the principles of transcendental aesthetic, according
to which space and time are the conditions of the pos-
sibility of all things as phenomena, nor with the limita-
tion of those principles, prohibiting their application to
things by themselves. Mathematical principles also do
not belong to this part of our discussion, because they
are derived from intuition, and not from the pure con-
cept of the understanding. As they are, however, syn-
thetical judgments a prmri, theii possibility will have to
be discussed, not in order to pre^-e their correctness and
apodictic certainty, which would be unnecessary, but in
order to make the possibility of such self-evident know-
ledge a priori conceivable and intelligible^
We shall also have to speak of the piindpk of analv^i-
* The insertion of man^ as suggested by Ro«e^»Ur*i«r, \j* impgiMlible.
m
Transcendental Analytic
123
cal as opposed to synthetical judgments, the [p. ijo]
latter being the proper subject of our enquiries, because
this very opposition frees the theory of the latter from
all misunderstandings, and places them clearly before
us in their own peculiar character.
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE
UNDERSTANDING
Section I
Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical yudgments
Whatever the object of our knowledge may be, and
whatever the relation between our knowledge and its
object, it must always submit to that general, though only
negative condition of all our judgments, that they do not
contradict themselves; otherwise these judgments, without
any reference to their object, are in themselves nothing.
But although there may be no contradiction in our judg-
ment, it may nevertheless connect concepts in a manner
not warranted by the object, or without there being any
ground, whether a priori or a posteriori, to confirm such a
judgment. A judgment may therefore be false or ground-
less, though in itself it is free from all contradiction.
The proposition that no subject can have a [p. 151]
predicate which contradicts it, is called the principle of
contradiction. It is a general though only negative crite-
rion of all truth, and belongs to logic only, because it
applies to knowledge as knowledge only, wnthout reference
to its object, and simply declares that such contradiction
would entirely destroy and annihilate it.
Nevertheless^ a positive use also may be made of that
124 Transcendent ai Analytic
principle^ not only in order to banish falsehood and errori
so far as they arise from contradiction, but also in order
to discover truth. For in an analytical judgment, whether
negative or affirmative, its truth can always be sufficiently
tested by the principle of contradiction, because the oppo-
site of that which exists and is thought as a concept in
our knowledge of an object, is always rightly negatived,
while the concept itself is necessarily affirmed of it, for the
simple reason that its opposite would be in contradiction
I with the object.
It must therefore be admitted that the principle of con-
tradiction is the general and altogether sufficient principle
of all analytical knowledge, though beyond this its au-
thority and utility, as a sufficient criterion of truth, must
not be allowed to extend. For the fact that no knowledge
can run counter to that principle, without destroying
itself, makes it no doubt a conditio sine qna non, [p. 152]
but never the determining reason of the truth of our
knowledge. Now, as in our present enquiry we are
chiefly concerned with the synthetical part of our know*
ledge, we must no doubt take great care never to offend
against that inviolable principle, but we ought never to
expect from it any help with regard to the truth of this
kind of knowledge.
There is, however, a formula of this famous principle —
a principle merely formal and void of all contents — which
contains a synthesis that has been mixed up with it from
mere carelessness and without any real necessity. This
formula is : It is impossible that anything should be and at
the same time not be. Here, first of all, the apodictic cer-
tainty expressed by the word impossibic is added unnec-
essarily, because it is understood by itself from the nature
Transcendental Analytic
125
of the proposition ; secondly^ the proposition is affected
by the condition of time, and says, as it were, something
= A, which is something = B, cannot be at the same
time not-B, but it can very well be both (B and not-B) in
succession. For instance, a man who is young cannot be
at the same time old, but the same man may very w^ell
be young at one time and not young, that is, old, at
another. The principle of contradiction, however, as a
purely logical principle, must not be limited in its appli-
cation by time; and the before-mentioned for- [p, 153]
mula runs therefore counter to its very nature. The mis*
understanding arises from our first separating one predi-
cate of an object from its concept, and by our aftenvards
joining its opposite with that predicate, which gives us
a contradiction, not with the subject, but with its predicate
only which was synthetically connected with it, and this
again only on condition that the first and second predicate
have both been applied at the same time. If I want to
say that a man who is unlearned is not learned. I must
add the condition *at the same time,' for a man who is
unlearned at one time may very well be learned at an-
other. But if I say no unlearned man is learned, then
the proposition is analytical, because the characteristic
(unlearnedness) forms part now of the concept of the
subject, so that the negative proposition becomes evident
directly from the principle of contradiction, and without
the necessity of adding the condition, *at the same time/
This is the reason why I have so altered the wording of
that formula that it displays at once the nature of an
analytical proposition*
Transcen den fa I A na ly tic
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE [p, 154]
UNDERSTANDING
Section II
Of the Highest Principle of all Synthetical Judgments
The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judg-
ments is a subject of which general logic knows nothing,
not even its name, while in a transcendental logic it is the
most important task of all, nay, even the only one, when
we have to consider the possibility of synthetical judg-
ments a priori, their conditions, and the extent of their
validity. For when that task is accomplished, the object
of transcendental logic, namely, to determine the extent
and limits of the pure understanding, will have been fully
attained.
In forming an analytical judgment I remain within a
given concept, wiiilc predicating something of it. If what
I predicate is affirmative, I only predicate of that concept
what is already contained in it ; if it is negative, I only
exclude from it the opposite of it In forming synthet-
ical judgments, on the contrary, I have to go beyond a
given concept, in order to bring something together with
it, which is totally different from what is contained in it.
Here we have neither the relation of identity [p, 155]
nor of contradiction, and nothing in the judgment itself
by which we can discover its truth or its falsehood.
Granted, therefore, that we must go beyond a given
concept in order to compare it synthetically with another,
something else is necessary in which, as in a third, the
synthesis of two concepts becomes possible. What, then,
Transcendental Analytic
127
I
I
that third ? What is the medium of all synthetical
judgments? It can only be that in which all our concepts
are contained^ namely, the internal sense and its a priori
form, time. The synthesis of representations depends on
imagination, but their synthetical unity, which is neces-
sary for forming a judgment, depends on the unity of
apperception. It is here therefore that the possibility of
synthetical judgments, and (as all the three contain the
sources of representations a pnt^H) the possibility of pure
synthetical judgments also, will have to be discovered;
nay, they will on these grounds be necessary, if any
knowledge of objects is to be obtained that rests entirely
on a synthesis of representations.
If knowledge is to have any objective reality, that is to
say, if it is to refer to an object^ and receive by means of
it any sense and meaning, the object must necessarily be
given in some way or other. Without that all concepts
are empty. We have thought in them, but we have not,
by thus thinking, arrived at any knowledge. We have
only played with representations. To give an object, if
this is not meant again as mediate only, but if [p. 156]
it means to represent something immediately in intuition,
is nothing else but to refer the representation of the
object to experience (real or possible). Even space and
time, however pure these concepts may be of all that is
empirical, and however certain it is that they are repre-
sented in the mind entirely a priori^ would lack neverthe-
less all objective validity, all sense and meaning, if we
could not show the necessity of their use with reference
to all objects of experience. Nay, their representation is
is a pure schema, always referring to that reproductive
imagination which calls up the objects of experience,
128 Transcendental Analytic
without which objects would be meaningless. The same
applies to all concepts without any distinction.
It is therefore the possibility cf experience which alone
gives objective reality to all our knowledge a priori.
Experience, however, depends on the synthetical unity
of phenomena, that is» on a synthesis according to con-
cepts of the object of phenomena m general Without
it» it would not even be knowledge, but only a rhapsody
of perceptions, which would never grow into a connected
text according to the rules of an altogether coherent
(possible) consciousness, nor into a transcendental' and
necessary unity of apperception. Experience depends
therefore on a priori principles of its form, that is, on
general rules of unity in the synthesis of phe- [p, 157]
nomena, and the objective reality of these (rules) can
always be shown by their being the necessary conditions
in all experience; nay, even in the possibility of all
experience. Without such a relation synthetical proposi-
tions a priofi would be quite impossible, because they
have no third medium, thai is, no object in which the
synthetical unity of their concepts could prove their
objective reality.
Although we know therefore a great deal a priori in
synthetical judgments with reference to space in general,
or to the figures which productive imagination traces in
it, without requiring for it any experience, this our know-
ledge would nevertheless be nothing but a playing with
the cobwebs of our brain, if space were not to be con-
sidered as the condition of phenomena which supply the
material for external experience. Those pure synthetical
judgments therefore refer always, though mediately only,
to possible experience, or rather to the possibility of
Transcendental Analytic
129
experience, on which alone the objective validity of their
synthesis is founded
As therefore experience, being an empirical synthesis,
is in its possibility the only kind of knowledge that im-
parts reality to every other synthesis, this other synthesis,
as knowledge a priori^ possesses truth (agreement with
its object) on this condition only, that it contains nothing
beyond what is necessary for the synthetical [p. 158]
unity of experience in general.
The highest principle of all synthetical judgments is
therefore this, that every object is subject to the necessary
conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intui-
tion in a possible experience.
Thus synthetical judgments a priori are possible, if we
refer the formal conditions of intuition a priori, the syn-
thesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of it in a
transcendental apperception, to a possible knowledge in
generaU given in experience, and if we say that the con-
ditions of the possibility of experience in general are at
the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects
of experience themselves, and thus possess objective valid-
ity in a synthetical judgment a priori.
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE
UNDERSTANDING
Section III
Systematical Representation of all Synthetical Principles
of the Umlerstanding
That there should be principles at all is entirely due to
the pure understanding, which is not only the faculty of
rules in regard to all that happens^ but itself the source
Transcendental Analytic
of principles, according to which everything lP- I59]
(that can become an object to us) is necessarily iiubject
to rules, because, without such, phenomena would never
become objects corresponding to knowledge. Even laws
of nature, if they are considered as principles of the
empirical use of the understanding, carry with them a
character of necessity, and thus lead to the supposition
that they rest on grounds which are valid a prion and
before all experience. Nay, all laws of nature without
distinction are subject to higher principles of the under-
standing, which they apply to particular cases of expert-
ence. They alone therefore supply the concept which
contains the condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a
rule in general, while experience furnishes each case to
which the general rule applies.
There can hardly be any danger of our mistaking
purely empirical principles for principles of the pure
understanding or vice versa, for the character of neces-
sity which distinguishes the concepts of the pure under- i
standing, and the absence of which can easily be perceived
in every empirical proposition, however general it may
seem, will always prevent their confusion. There arc,
however, pure principles a priori which I should not like
to ascribe to the pure understanding, because they are
derived, not from pure concepts, but from pure intuitions
(although by means of the understanding); the [p. i6o]
understanding being the faculty of the concepts. We
/\ find such principles in mathematics, but their application
to experience, and therefore their objective validity, nay,
even the possibility of such synthetical knowledge a
priori (the deduction thereof) rests always on the pure
understanding.
Transcendental Analytie
131
^
N
¥
^
Hence my principles will not include the principles of
mathematics, but they will include those on which the
possibility and objective validity a priori of those mathe-
matical principles are founded, and which consequently
are to be looked upon as the source of those principles,
proceeding from concepts to intuitions, and not from
intuitions to concepts.
When the pure concepts of the understanding are
applied to every possible experience, their synthesis is
either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly
to the intuition of a phenomenon only, partly to its exist-
incc. The conditions a priori of intuition are absolutely
necessary with regard to every possible experience, while
the conditions of the existence of the object of a possible
empirical intuition are in themselves accidental only.
The principles of the mathematical use of the categories
will therefore be absolutely necessary, that is apodictic,
while those of their dynamical use, though likewise pos-
sessing the character of necessity a priori^ can possess
such a character subject only to the condition of empirical
thought in experience, that is mediately and indirectly,
and cannot therefore claim that immediate evidence which
belongs to the former, although their certainty w*ith re-
gard to experience in general remains unaffected by this.
Of this we shall be better qualified to judge at [p. 161]
the conclusion of this system of principles.
Our table of categories gives us naturally the best in-
structions for drawing up a table of principles, because
these are nothing but rules for the objective use of the
former.
132 Transcendental Analytic
All principles of the pure understanding are there-
fore,
I
Axioms of Intuition.
II III
Anticipations of Analogies of
Perception. Experience.
IV
Postulates of Empirical
Thought in General.
I have chosen these names not unadvisedly, so that the
difference with regard to the evidence and the application
of those principles should not be overlooked. We shall
soon see that, both with regard to the evidence and the
a priori determination of phenomena according to the cat-
egories of quantity and quality (if we attend to the form
of them only) their principles differ considerably from
those of the other two classes, inasmuch as the [p. 162]
former are capable of an intuitive, the latter of a merely
discursive, though both of a complete certainty. I shall
therefore call the former mathematicaly the latter dynami-
cal principles.^ It should be observed, however, that I do
not speak here either of the principles of mathematics, or
of those of general physical dynamics, but only of the
principles of the pure understanding in relation to the
internal sense (without any regard to the actual represen-
tations given in it). It is these through which the former
become possible, and I have given them their name, more
on account of their application than of their contents. I
shall now proceed to consider them in the same order in
which they stand in the table.
* Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XV.
Transcends fitat Analytic
«33
I
[OF THE AXIOMS OF INTUITION ^
Principle of the Pure Understanding
*A11 PheDomena are, with reference to their intuition, extensive
quantities *]
I call an extensive quantity that in which the represen-
tation of the whole is rendered possible by the representa-
tion of its parts, and therefore necessarily preceded by it
I cannot represent to myself any line, however small it
may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, without
producing all its parts one after the other, start- [p. 163]
ing from a given point, and thus, first of all, drawing its
intuition. The same applies to every, even the smallest
portion of time. I can only think in it the successive prog-
i-ess from one moment to another, thus producing in the
end, by all portions of time and their addition, a definite
quantity of time. As in all phenomena pure intuition is
either space or time, every phenomenon, as an intuition,
must be an extensive quantity, because it can be known
in apprehension by a succesMve synthesis only (of part
with part). All phenomena therefore, when perceived in
intuition, are aggregates (collections) of previously given
parts, which is not the case with every kind of quantities^
but with those only which are represented to us and
apprehended as extensive.
On this successive synthesis of productive imagination
in elaborating figures are founded the mathematics of ex-
tension with their axioms (geometry), containing the con-
) Here follows, in the Uter Editions, Supplement XVl.
Transcendental A naiytic
ditions of sensuous intuition a priori^ under which alone
the schema of a pure concept of an external phenomenal
appearance can be produced ; for instance, between two
points one straight line only is possible, or two straight
lines cannot enclose a space, etc. These are the axioms
which properly relate only to quantities {quanta) as such.
But with regard to quantity {quanii(as\ that is, with
regard to the answer to the question, how large something
may be, there are no axioms, in the proper [p, 164]
sense of the word, though several of the propositions
referring to it possess synthetical and immediate certainty
{indcmonstrabilia). The propositions that if equals be
added to equals the wholes are equal, and if equals be
taken from equals the remainders are equal, are really
analytical, because I am conscious immediately of the
identity of my producing the one quantity with my pro-
ducing the other ; axioms on the contrary must be synthet-
ical propositions a prion. The self-evident propositions
on numerical relation again are no doubt synthetical, but
they are not general, like those of geometry, and there-
fore cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulas
only. That 7-1-5== 12 is not an analytical proposition.
For neither in the representation of 7, nor in that of 5,
nor in that of the combination of both, do I think the
number 12. (That I am meant to think it in the addition
of the two, is not the question here, for in every analytical
proposition all depends on this, whether the predicate is
really thought in the representation of the subject.)
Although the proposition is synthetical, it is a singular
proposition only. If in this case we consider only the
synthesis of the homogeneous unities, then the synthesis
can here take place in one way only, although afterwards
Transccnd^ntai Analytic
the use of these numbcTS becomes general. If I say, a
triangle can be constructed with three lines, two of which '
together are greater than the third, I have before me the
mere function of productive imagination, which may draw
the lines greater or smaller, and bring them together at
various angles. The number 7, on the contrary, [p. 165]
is possible in one way only, and so likewise the number
12, which is produced by the synthesis of the former with
5. Such propositions therefore must not be called axioms
(for their number would be endless) but numerical for-
mulas.
This transcendental principle of phenomenal mathemat-
ics adds considerably to our knowledge rz/n'^ri. Through
it alone it becomes possible to make piu'c mathematics
in their full precision applicable to objects of experience,
which without that principle would by no means be self-
evident, nay, has actually provoked much contradiction.
Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical
intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space
and time), and whatever geometry says of the latter is
valid without contradiction of the former. All evasions,
as if objects of the senses should not conform to the
rules of construction in space (for instance, to the rule
of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must cease,
for one w^ould thus deny all objective validity to space
and with it to all mathematics, and would no longer
know why and how far mathematics can be applied to
phenomena. The synthesis of spaces and times, as the
synthesis of the essential form of all intuition, is that
which renders possible at the same time the apprehen*
sion of phenomena, that is, every external [p. 166]
experience, and therefore also all knowledge of its ob-
136 Transcendental Analytic
jects, and whatever mathematics, in their pure use prove
of that synthesis is valid necessarily also of this knowledg^c.
All objections to this are only the chicaneries of a falsely
guided reason, which wrongly imagines that it can sepa-
rate the objects of the senses from the forma! conditions
of our sensibility, and represents them, though they are
phenomena only, as objects by themselves, given to the
understanding. In this case, however, nothing could be
known of them a priori, nothing could be known syn-
thetically through pure concepts of space, and the sci-
ence which determines those concepts, namely, geometry,
would itself become impossible^
n
^^Anticipations af Perception
The principle whicti anticipates all perceptions as such, is this : In
all phenomena sensatmn, and the Real which corresponds to it in
the object (rBafitas phaenom^mff) , has an intensive quantity, that
is, a degree ^ ]
All knowledge by means of which I may know and
determine a priori whatever belongs to empirical know-
ledge, may be called an anticipation, and it is no doubt
in this sense that Epicurus used the expression [p. 167]
7rpdXr}'\jn^. But as there is always in phenomena some-
thing which can never be known ^i priori, and constitutes
the real difference between empirical Rwd a pHori know-
ledge, namely, sensation (as matter of perception), it fol-
lows that this can never be anticipated. The pure
determinations, on the contrary, in space and time, as
1 Here followa in the Second Edition, Supplement XVI b.
Tramcendental A$mlyik
m
regards both figure and quantity, may be called antici-
pations of phenomena, because they represent a priori,
whatever may be given a posteriori in experience. If,
however, there should be something in every sensation
that could be known a priori as sensation in general,
even if no particular sensation be given, this would, in
a very special sense, deserve to be called anticipation,
because it seems extraordinary that we should anticipate
experience in that which concerns the matter of experi-
ence and can be derived from experience only. Yet such
is really the case.
Apprehension, by means of sensation only, fills no more
than one moment (if we do not take into account the suc-
cession of many sensations). Sensation, therefore, being
that in the phenomenon the apprehension of which does
not form a successive synthesis progressing from parts to
a complete representation, is without any extensive quan-
tity, and the absence of sensation in one and the same mo*
mcnt would represent it as empty, therefore — o. [p. f68]
What corresponds in every empirical intuition to sensa-
tion is reality {realitas phaciwmcnon)^ what corresponds to
its absence is negation = o. Every sensation, however, is
capable of diminution, so that it may decrease, and grad*
ually vanish. There is therefore a continuous connection
between reality in phenomena and negation, by means of
many possible intermediate sensations, the difference be-
tween which is always smaller than the difference between
the given sensation and zero or complete negation. It
thus follows that the real in each phenomenon has always
a quantity, though it is not perceived in apprehension, be-
cause apprehension takes place by a momentary sensation,
not by a successive synthesis of many sensations; it does
Transcendental Analytic
f
not advance from the parts to the whole, and though it
has a quantity, it ha>s not an extensive quantity.
That quantity which can be apprehended as unity only,
and in which plurality can be represented by approxima-
tion only to negation — o, I call intensive quantity. Every
reality therefore in a phenomenon has intensive quantity,
that is, a degree. If this reality is considered as a cause
(whether of sensation, or of any other reality in the phe-
nomenon, for instance, of change) the degree of that
reality as a cause we call a momentum, for instance, the
momentum of gravity : and this because the degree indi-
cates that quantity only, the apprehension of [p. i6g]
which is not successive, but momentary. This I men-
tion here in passing, because we have not yet come to
consider causality.
Every sensation, therefore, and every reality in phe-
nomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that
is, an intensive quantity which can always be diminished,
and there is between reality and negation a continuous
connection of possible realities, and of possible smaller
perceptions. Every colour, red, for instance, has a
degree, which, however small, is never the smallest ;
and the same applies to heat, the momentum of gravity,
etc.
This peculiar property of quantities that no part
of them is the smallest possible part (no part indi-
visible) is called continuity. Time and space are qtujuta
continua^ because there is no part of them that is not
enclosed between limits (points and moments), no part
that is not itself again a space or a time. Space con-
sists of spaces only, time of times. Points and moments
arc only limits, mere places of limitation, and as places
Transcendental Analytic
139
presupposing always those intuitions which they are
meant to limit or to determine. Mere places or parts
that might be given before space or time, could [p. 170]
ne%'cr be compounded into space or time. Such quanti-
ties can also be called Jlowifig, because the synthesis
of the productive imagination which creates them is a
progression in time, the continuity of which we are wont
to express by the name of flowing, or passing away.
All phenomena are therefore continuous quantities,
whether according to their intuition as extensive^ or
according to mere perception (sensation and therefore
reality) as intensive quantities. When there is a break
in the synthesis of the manifold of phenomena, we get
only an aggregate of many phenomena, not a phenom-
enon, as a real quantum; for aggregate is called that
what is produced, not by the mere continuation of pro-
ductive synthesis of a certain kind, but by the repeti-
tion of a synthesis (beginning and) ending at every
moment If I call thirteen thalers a quantum of
money, I am right, provided I understand by it the
value of a mark of fine silver This is a continuous
quantity in which no part is the smallest, but every
part may constitute a coin w^hich contains material for
still smaller coins. But if I understand by it thirteen
round thalers, that is, so many coins (whatever their
value in silver may be), then I should be wrong in
speaking of a quantum of thalers, but should call it
an aggregate, that is a number of coins. As every
number must be founded on some unity, every [p. 171]
phenomenon, as a unity, is a quantum, and, as such, a
coniinuum.
If then all phenomena, whether considered as exten-
^
140 Transcendental Analytic
sive or intensive, are continuous quantities, it might seem
easy to prove with mathematical evidence that all change
also (transition of a thing from one state into another) must
be continuous, if the causality of the change did not lie
quite outside the limits of transcendental philosophy, and
presupposed empirical principles. For the understand-
ing a priori tells us nothing of the possibility of a cause
which changes the state of things, that is, determines
them to the opposite of a given state, and this not only
because it does not perceive the possibility of it (for
such a perception is denied to us in several kinds of
knowledge a priori\ but because the changeability
relates to certain determinations of phenomena to be
taught by experience only, while their cause must lie
in that which is unchangeable. But as the only ma-
terials which we may use at present are the pure
fundamental concepts of every possible experience,
from which all that is empirical is excluded, we cannot
here, without injuring the unity of our system, antici-
pate general physical science which is based upon
certain fundamental experiences. [p. 172]
Nevertheless, there is no lack of evidence of the
great influence which our fundamental principle exer-
cises in anticipating perceptions, nay, even in making
up for their deficiency, in so far as it (that principle)
stops any false conclusions that might be drawn from
this deficiency.
If therefore all reality in perception has a certain
degree, between which and negation there is an in-
finite succession of ever smaller degrees, and if every
sense must have a definite degree of receptivity of sen-
sations, it follows that no perception, and therefore no
Transcendintai Analytic
I4[
experience, is possible, that could prove, directly or
indirectly, by any roundabout syllogisms, a complete
absence of all reality in a phenomenon. We see therc-
. fore that experience can never supply a proof of empty
space or empty time, because the total absence of reality
in a sensuous intuition can itself never be perceived,
neither can it be deduced from any phenomenon what-
soever and from the difference of degree in its reality ;
nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of it
For although the total intuition of a certain space or
time is real all through, no part of it being empty, yet
as every reality has its degree which » while the exten-
sive quality of the phenomenon remains un- [p. 173]
changed, may diminish by infinite degrees dow^n to
the nothing or void, there most be infinitely differing
degrees in which space and time arc filled, and the
intensive quantity in phenomena may be smaller or
I greater, although the extensive quantity as given in
intuition remains the same.
We shall give an example. Almost all natural philos-
ophers, perceiving partly by means of the momentum
of gravity or weight, partly by means of the momentum
of resistance against other matter in motion, that there
is a great difference in the quantity of various kinds
of matter though their volume is the same, conclude
unanimously that this volume (the extensive quantity
of phenomena) must in all of them, though in differ-
ent degrees, contain a certain amount of empty space.
Who could have thought that these mathematical and
mechanical philosophers should have based such a
conclusion on a purely metaphysical hypothesis, which
they always profess to avoid, by assuming that the real
^
J 42 Transcendentai Analytic
in space (I do not wish here to call it impenetrability
or weight, because these are empirical concepts) must
always be the same, and can differ only by its extensive
quantity, that is, by the number of parts, I meet this
hypothesis^ for which they could find no ground in
experience, and which therefore is purely metaphysical,
by a transcendental demonstration, which, though it is
not intended to explain the difference in the [p. 174]
filling of spaces, will nevertheless entirely remove the
imagined necessity of their hypothesis which tries to
explain that difference by the admission of empty
spaces, and which thus restores, at least to the under-
standing, its liberty to explain to itself that difference
in a different way, if any such hypothesis be wanted
in natural philosophy.
We can easily perceive that although the same spaces
are perfectly filled by two different kinds of matter, so
that there is no point in either of them where matter is
not present, yet the real in either, the quality being the
same, has its own degrees (of resistance or weight) which,
without any diminution of its extensive quantity, may grow
smaller and smaller in infinitum, before it reaches the
void and vanishes. Thus a certain expansion which fills
a space, for instance, heat, and every other kind of phe-
nomenal reality, may, without leaving the smallest part of
space empty, diminish by degrees in infinitum, and never-
theless fill space with its smaller, quite as much as another
phenomenon with greater degrees. I do not niean to say
that this is really the case with different kinds of matter
according to their specific of gravity. I only want to
show by a fujidamcntal principle of the pure [p. 175]
understanding, that the nature of our perceptions renders
i
Transcendental Analytic
143
such an explanation possible, and that it is wrong to look
upon the real in phenomena as equal in degree, and differ-
ing only in aggregation and its extensive quantity, nay to
maintain this on the pretended authority of an a priori
principle of the understanding.
Nevertheless, this anticipation of perception is apt to
startle ^ an enquirer accustomed to and rendered cautious
by transcendental disquisitions, and wc may naturally won-
der that the understanding should be able to anticipate'^ a
synthetical proposition with regard to the degree of all
that is real in phenomena, and, therefore, with regard to
the possibility of an internal difference of sensation itself,
apart from its empirical qualit)' ; and it seems therefore a
question well worthy of a solution, how the understanding
can pronounce synthetically and a priori '^hont phenomena,
nay, anticipate them with regard to what, properly speak-
ing, is empirical, namely, sensation.
The quality of sensation, colour, taste, etc., is always em-
pirical, and cannot be conceived a priori. But the real that
corresponds to sensations in general, as opposed to nega-
tion =0, does only represent something the concept of
which implies being, and means nothing but the synthesis
in any empirical consciousness. In the internal sense that
empirical consciousness can be raised from o to [p. 176]
any higher degree, so that an extensive quantity of intui-
tion (for instance, an illuminated plain) excites the same
1 Kant wrote, ttmai — etttrnt AnffalieniffS^ the tecond eiwas being the
adverb. RosenkraDZ has left out one etwm^ ^vtlhuut necessity. ]( scemi
necessary, however, to add Ubtrltgut^ after tnfHscfndentaltH^ as done by £rd*
inann.
> Antiiipiren t^nm must certainly be addcd^ as suggested by Scbopeii-
hmuer.
I
144 Transcendental Analytic
amount of sensation, as an aggregate of many other less
illuminated plains. It is quite possible, there fore^ to take
no account of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon,
and yet to represent to oneself in the mere sensation in
any single moment a synthesis of a uniform progression
from o to any given empirical consciousness. All sensa-
tions, as such, are therefore given a posteriori * only, but
their quality, in so far as they must possess a degree, can
be known <»/nm. It is remarkable that of quantities in
general we can know one quality only a priori, namely,
their continuity, while with regard to quality (the real of
phenomena) nothing is known to us a priori, but their in*
tensive quantity^ that is, that they must have a degree.
Everything else is left to experience.
Ill
\_Tke Analogies of Experience
The general principle of them Is : All phenomena^ as far as their ex*
Utence is concerned, are subject a priori to rules, determining their
mutual relation in one and the same time ^] [p. 177]
The three modi of time are pennancncey succession, and
coexistence. There will therefore be three rules of all
relations of phenomena in time, by which the existence of
every phenomenon with regard to the unity of time is
determined, and these rules will precede all experience,
nay, render experience possible.
The general principle of the three analogies depends
on the necessary unity of apperception with reference to
^ The first and btcr editions have a priori. The correction is Hrst made
in the Seventh Edition. 1S28,
' Sec Supplement XVIL
Transcendental Analytic
HS
N
%
^
every possible empirical consciousness (perception) at
every time^ and, consequently, as that unity forms an a
piriori ground, on the synthetical unity of all phenomena,
according to their relation in time. For the original ap-
perception refers to the internal sense (comprehending all
representations), and it does so a priori to its form, that is,
to the relation of the manifold of the empirical conscious-
ness in time. The original apperception is intended to
combine all this manifold according to * its relations in
time, for this is what is meant by its transcendental unity
a priori, to which all is subject which is to belong to my
own and my uniform knowledge, and thus to become an
object for me. This synthetical unity in the time relations
of all perceptions, which is determined a priori^ is expressed
therefore in the law, that all empirical determinations of
time must be subject to rules of the general [p. 178]
determination of time ; and the analogies of experience, of
which we are now going to treat, are exactly rules of this
kind.
These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not
refer to phenomena and the synthesis of their empirical
intuition, but only to the existaice of phenomena and their
mutual relation with regard to their existence. The man-
ner in which something is apprehended as a phenomenon
may be so determined a priori that the rule of its synthesis
may give at the same time this intuition a priori in any
empirical case, nay, may really render it possible. But
the existence of phenomena can never be known a priori,
and though we might be led in this way to infer some
kind of existence, we should never be able to know it
definitely, or to anticipate that by which the empirical
intuition of one differs from that of others.
Transcendental Analytic
The principles which we considered before and which,
as they enable us to apply mathematics to phenomena^ I
called mathematical, refer to phenomena so far only as
they are possible, and showed how, with regard both to
their intuition and to the real in their perception, they can
be produced accortling^ to the rules of a mathematical syn-
thesis, so that, in the one as well as in the other, we may
use numerical quantities, and with them a determination
of all phenomena as quantities. Thus I might, [p. 179]
for example, compound the decree of sensations of the
sunlight out of, say, 200,000 illuminations by the moon,
and thus determine it a prion or construct it Those
former principles might therefore be called comtitutive.
The case is totally different with those principles which
are meant to bring the existence of phenomena under
rules a priori, for as existence cannot be constructed, they
can only refer to the relations of existence and become
merely regfilaiive principles. Here therefore we could
not think of either axioms or anticipations, and whenever
a perception is given us as related in time to some others
(although undetermined), we could not say a priori what
other perception or how great a perception is necessarily
connected with it, but only how, if existing,'^ it is neces-
sarily connected with the other in a certain mode of time.
In philosophy analogy means something very different to
what it does in mathematics. In the latter they are for-
mulas which state the equality of two quantitative relations,
and they are always constitutive so that when three ^
terms of a proposition are given, the fourth also is given
by it, that is, can be constructed out of it. In philosophy,
* The First and Second Editions read ' When two terms of a proposition
arc given, the third also.'
Transcendental Analytic
H7
^
the contrary » analogy docs not consist in the equality.^
of two quantitative, but of two qualitative relations, so that"
when three terms are given I may learn from them a
priori the relation to a fourth only, but not that [p. i8o]
fourth term itself. All I can thus gain is a rule according
to which I may look in experience for the fourth term, or
a characteristic mark by which I may find it. An analogy
of experience can therefore be no more than a rule accord-
ing to which a certain unity of experience may arise from
perceptions (but not how perception itself, as an empirical
intuition^ may arise) ; it may serve as a principle for ob-
jects (as phenomena ^) not in a constitutive, but only in a
regulative capacity.
Exactly the same applies to the postulates of empirical
thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere
intuition (the form of phenomena), the synthesis of per-
ception (the matter of them), and the synthesis of experi-
ence (the relation of these perceptions). They too are
regulative principles only, and differ from the mathemati-
cal, which are constitutive, not in their certainty, which is
established in both a priori, but in the character of their
evidence, that is, in that which is intuitive in it, and there-
fore in their demonstration also.
What has been remarked of all synthetical principles
and must be enjoined here more particularly is this, that
these analogies have their meaning and validity, not as
principles of the transcendent,'^but only as princi- [p. i8i ]
pies of the empirical use of the understanding. They can
be established in this character only, nor can phenomena
ever be comprehended under the categories directly, but
^ Read dtm EruAeiHtin^en,
148 . Transcendental Analytic
only under their schemata. If the objects to which these
principles refer were things by themselves, it would be
perfectly impossible to know anything of them a priori
and synthetically. But they are nothing but phenomena,
and our whole knowledge of them, to which, after all, all
principles a priori must relate, is only our possible experi-
ence of them. /Those principles therefore can aim at
nothing but the conditions of the unity of empirical know-
ledge in the synthesis of phenomena, which synthesis is
represented only in the schema of the pure concepts of
the understanding, while the category contains the func-
tion, restricted by no sensuous condition, of the unity of
that synthesis as synthesis in general. Those principles
will therefore authorise us only to connect phenomena,
according to analogy, with the logical and universal unity
of concepts, so that, though in using the principle we use
the category, yet in practice (in the application to phe-
nomena) we put the schema of the category, as a practical
key, in its^ place, or rather put it by the side of the
category as a restrictive condition, or, as what may be
called, a formula of the category.
1 I read deren^ and afterwards der ersteren^ though even then the whole
passage is very involved. Professor Noire thinks that dessert may be referred
to Gebrauch, and des ersteren to Grundsatg,
Transceftdcn ta i A nalydc
149
A [p. 182]
IFirst Analogy
Pnncipie of Pertnanence^
All phenomena contain the permanent (substance) as the ohject itself,
and the changeable as its determination only, tliat is, as a mode in
which the object exists
Proof of the First Analogy
All phenomena take place in time. Time can deter-
mine in two ways the relation in the existence of phe-
nomena» so far as they are either successive or coexistent.
In the first case time is considered as a series, in the
second as a whole.]
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is
always successive, and therefore always changing. By it
alone therefore we can never determine whether the man-
ifold, as an object of experience, is coexistent or succes-
sive, unless there is something in it which exists ahvays,
that is, something constant and permanent, while change
and succession are nothing but so many kinds {modi) of
time in w^hich the permanent exists. Relations of time
are therefore possible in the permanent only (coexistence
and succession being the only relations of time) [p, 183]
so that the permanent is the substratum of the empirical
representation of time itself, and in it alone all determi-
nation of time is possible. Permanence expresses time
as the constant correlative of all existence of phenomena,
of all change and concomitancy* For change does not
affect time itself, but only phenomena in time (nor is
1 See Supplement XVIIL
Transccndcn ta I A na lytic
coexistence a mode of time itself, because in it no parts
can be coexistent, but successive only). If we were to
ascribe a succession to time itself, it would be necessary
to admit another time in which such succession should be
' possible. Only through the permanent docs existence in
different parts of a series of time assume a quantity which
we call duration. For in mere succession existence always
comes and goes, and never assumes the slightest quantity.
Without something permanent therefore no relation of
time is possible. .Time by itself, however, cannot be per-
ceived, and it is therefore the permanent in phenomena
that forms the substratum for all determination of time,
and at the same time the condition of the possibility of all
synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience ;
while with regard to that permanent all existence and all
change in time can only be taken as a mode of existence
of what is permanent. In all phenomena therefore the
permanent is the object itself, that is, the substance (phe-
nomenon), while all that changes or can change [p. 184]
belongs only to the mode in which substance or substances
exist, therefore to their determinations.
I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but also
the man of common understanding has admitted this
permanence as a substratum of all change of phenomena.
It will be the same in future, only that a philosopher
I generally expresses himself somewhat more definitely by
(saying that in all changes in the world the substance
remains, and only the accidents change. But I nowhere
find even the attempt at a proof of this very synthetical
proposition, and it occupies but seldom that place which
it ought to occupy at the head of the pure and entirely
a priori existing laws of nature. In fact the proposition
Transcendental Analytic
151
that substance is permanent is tautological, because that
permanence is the only ground why we apply the category
of substance to a phenomenon, and it ought first to have
been proved that there is in all phenomena something
permanent, while the changeable is only a determination
of its existence. But as such a proof can never be given
dogmatically and as deduced from concepts, because it
refers to a synthetical proposition a priori, and as no one
ever thought that such propositions could be valid only in
reference to possible experience, and could therefore be
proved only by a deduction of the possibility of [p. 185]
experience^ we need not wonder that, though it served as
the foundation of all experience (being felt to be indis-
pensable for every kind of empirical knowledge), it has
never been established by proof,
A philosopher w^as asked, What is the weight of smoke?
He replied, Deduct from the weight of the wood burnt
the weight of the remaining ashes, and you have the
weight of the smoke. He was therefore convinced that
even in fire matter (substance) does not perish, but that its
form only suffers a change. The proposition also, from
nothing comes nothing, was only another conclusion from
the same principle of permanence, or rather of the con-
stant presence of the real subject in phenomena. For if
that which people call substance in a phenomenon is to be
the true substratum for all determination in time, then all
existence in the past as well as the future must be deter-
mined in it, and in it only. Thus we can only give to a
phenomenon the name of substance because we admit its
existence at all times, which is not even fully expressed by
the word permanence, because it refers rather to future
time only. The internal necessity however of permanence
n
152 Transeendfttiai Analytic
is inseparably connected with the necessity to have been
always, and the expression may therefore stand, [p. 186^
Gigni de nikilo nihil, in niliilnm nil fasse revert i, were
two propositions which the ancients never separated, but
which at present are sometimes parted, because people
imagine that they refer to things by themselves, and that
the former might contradict the dependence of the world
on a Supreme Cause (even with regard to its substance),
an apprehension entirely needless, as we are only speak-
ing here of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the
unity of which would never be possible, if we allowed that
new things (new in substance) could ever arise. For in
that case we should lose that which alone can represent
the unity of time, namely, the identity of the substratum,
in which alone all change retains complete unity. This
permanence, however, is nothing but the manner in w^hich
we represent the existence of things (as phenomenal).
The different determinations of a substance, which are
nothing but particular modes in which it exists, are called
accidents. They are always real, because they concern
the existence of a substance (negations are nothing but
determinations which express the non-existence of some-
thing in the substance). If we want to ascribe a particular
kind of existence to these real determinations of the sub-
stance, as, for instance, to motion, as an accident of mat-
ter, wc call it inherence, in order to distinguish it from the
existence of substance, which ^ we call subsistence. This,
however, has given rise to many misunderstand- [p. 187]
ings, and we shall express ourselves better and more cor-
rectly, if we define the accident through the manner only
^ Read das man.
Transcendental Analytic
153
I
in which the existence of a substance is positively deter-
mined. It is inevitable, however, according to the condi-
tions of the logical use of our understanding, to separate,
as it were, whatever can change in the existence of a
substance, while the substance itself remains unchanged,
and to consider it in its relation to that which is radical
and truly permanent Hence a place has been assigned
to this category under the title of relations, not so much
because it contains itself a relation, as because it contains
their condition.
On this permanence depends also the right understand
ing of the concept of change. To arise and to perish are
not changes of that which arises or perishes. Change is
a mode of existence, which follows another mode of
existence of the same object. Hence whatevxr changes
is permanent, and its condition only changes. As this
alteration refers only to determinations which may have
an end or a beginning, we may use an expression that
seems somewhat paradoxical and say : the permanent only
(substance) is changed, the changing itself suffers no
change, but only an alteration, certain determinations
ceasing to exist, w*hile others begin.
It is therefore in substances only that change [p. 188]
can be perceived. Arising or perishing absolutely, and
not referring merely to a determination of the permanent
can never become a possible perception, because it is the
permanent only which renders the representations of a
transition from one state to another* from not being to
being, possible, which (changes) consequently can only be
known empirically, as alternating determinations of what
is permanent* If you suppose that something has an
absolute beginning, you must have a moment of time in
154 Transcendental Analytic
which it was not. But with what can you connect that
moment, if not with that which already exists ? An empty
antecedent time cannot be an object of perception. But
if you connect this beginning with things which existed
already and continue to exist till the beginning of some-
thing new, then the latter is only a determination of the
former, as of the permanent. The same holds good with
regard to perishing, for this would presuppose the empiri-
cal representation of a time in which a phenomenon exists
no longer.
Substances therefore (as phenomena) are the true sub-
strata of all determinations of time. If some substances
could arise and others perish, the only condition of the
empirical unity of time would be removed, and phenomena
would then be referred to two different times, in which
existence would pass side by side, which is absurd. For
there is but one time in which all different times [p. 189]
must be placed, not as simultaneous, but as successive.
Permanence, therefore, is a necessary condition under
which alone phenomena, as things or objects, can be
determined in a possible experience. What the empirical
criterion of this necessary permanence, or of the substan-
tiality of phenomena may be, we shall have to explain in
the sequel.
Tmnscendenial Afmlytk
«S5
B
\^Second Analogy
Principle of Productian ^
Everything that happens (begins to be)^ presupposes somethitig on
which it follows according to a rule]
Proof
The apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is
always successive. The representations of the parts fol-
low one upon another. Whether they also follow one
upon the other in the object is a second point for rejec-
tion, not contained in the former. We may indeed call
everything, even every representation, so far as we are
conscious of it, an object ; but it requires a more profound
investigation to discover what this word may [p. 190]
mean with regard to phenomena, not in so far as they
(as representations) are objects, but in so far as they only
signify an object So far as they, as representations only,
are at the same time objects of consciousness, they cannot
be distinguished from our apprehension, that is from their
being received in the synthesis of our imagination, and we
must therefore say, that the manifold of phenomena is
always produced in the mind successively. If phenomena
were things by themselves, the succession of the represen-
tations of their manifold would never enable us to judge
how that manifold is connected in the object. We have
always to deal with our representations only ; how things
may be by themselves (without reference to the represen-
tations by which they affect us) is completely beyond the ^
* Sc« Supplement XIX*
n
156 Transcendental Analytic
sphere of our knowledge. Since, therefore, phenomena
are not things by themselves, and arc yet the only thing
vhat can be given to us to know, I am asked to say what
kind of connection in time belongs to the manifold of the
phenomena itself, w^hen the representation of it in our
apprehension is always successive. Thus, for instance,
the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenal
appearance of a house that stands before me, is succes-
sive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of
the house itself be successive by itself, which of course
no one would admit. Whenever I ask for the transcen-
dental meaning of my concepts of an object, I find that a
house is not a thing by itself, but a phenomenon [p. 191]
only, that is, a representation the transcendental object
of which is unknown. What then can be the meaning of
the question, how the manifold in the phenomenon itself
(which is not a thing by itself) may be connected t Here
that which is contained in our successive apprehension is
considered as representation, and the given phenomenon,
though it is nothing but the w^hole of those representa-
tions, as thein object, with which my concept, drawn from
the representations of my apprehension, is to accord. As
the accord between k; . *vledge and its object is truth, it is
easily seen, that we can ask here only for the formal con-
ditions of empirical truth, and that the phenomenon, in
contradistinction to the representations of our apprehen-
sion, can only be represented as the object different from
them, if it is subject to a rule distinguishing it from every
other apprehension, and necessitating a certain kind of
conjunction of the manifold. That which in the phe-
nomenon contains the condition of this necessary rule of
apprehension is the abject.
Transcendental Analytic
m
Let us now proceed to our task. That something takes
piace, that is» that something, or some state, which did
not exist before, begins to exist, cannot be perceived em-
pirically, unless there exists antecedently a phenomenon
which does not contain that state ; for a reality, following
on empty time, that is a beginning of existence, [p. 192]
preceded by no state of things, can be apprehended as
little as empty time itself. Every apprehension of an
event is therefore a perception following on another per-
ception. But as this applies to all synthesis of apprehen-
sion, as I showed before in the phenomenal appearance of
a house, that apprehension would not thereby be different
from any other. But I observe at the same time, that if
in a phenomenon which contains an event I call the ante-
cedent state of perception A, and the subsequent B, B can
only follow A in my apprehension, while the perception A
can never follow B, but can only precede it. I see, (or
instance, a ship gliding down a stream. My perception
of its place below follows my perception of its place higher
up in the course of the stream, and it is impossible in the
apprehension of this phenomenon that the ship should be
perceived first below and then higher up. We see there-
fore that the order in the succession of perceptions in our
apprehension is here determined, and our apprehension
regulated by that order In the former example of a
house my perceptions could begin in the apprehension at
the roof and end in the basement, or begin below and end
above : they could apprehend the manifold of the empirical
intuition from right to left or from left to right There
was therefore no determined order in the succession of
these perceptions, determining the point where [p. 193]
I had to begin in apprehension, in order to connect the
Transcendental Analytic
manifold empirically ; while in the apprehension of an
event there is always a rule, which makes the order of the
successive perceptions {in the apprehension of this phe-
nomenon) necessary.
In our case, therefore^ we shall have to derive the sub-
jective succession in our apprehension from the objective
succession of the phenomena, because otherwise the for-
mer would be entirely undetermined, and unable to dis-
tinguish one phenomenon from another. The former
alone proves nothing as to the connection of the manifold
in the object, because it is quite arbitrary. The latter
must therefore consist in the order of the manifold in a
phenomenon, according to which the apprehension of
what is happening follows upon the apprehension of what
has happened, in conformity with a rule. Thus only can
I be justified in saying, not only of my apprehension,
but of the phenomenon itself, that there exists in it a
succession, which is the same as to say that I cannot
arrange the apprehension otherwise than in that very
succession,
* In conformity with this, there must exist in that which
always precedes an event the condition of a rule, by which
this event follow^s at all times, and necessarily; [p. 194]
but I cannot go back from the event and determine by
apprehension that which precedes- For no phenomenon
goes back from the succeeding to the preceding point of
time, though it is related to some preceding point of time,
while the progress from a given time to a determined fol-
lowing time is necessa^>^ Therefore, as there certainly is
something that follows, I must necessarily refer it to some-
y thing else which precedes, and upon which it follows 6y
rule, that is^ by necessity. So that the event, as being
r
Transcendental Analytic
1 59
I
I
conditional, affords a safe indication of some kind of con-
dition, while that condition itself determines the event.
If we supposed that nothing precedes an event upon
which such event must follow according to rule, all succes-
sion of perception would then exist in apprehension only^
that is, subjectively ; but it would not thereby be deter-
mined objectively, what ought properly to be the antece-
dent and what the subsequent in perception. We should
thus have a mere play of representations unconnected
with any object, that is, no phenomenon would, by our
perception, be distinguished in time from any other phe-
nomenon, because the succession in apprehension would
always be uniform, and there would be nothing in the
phenomena to determine the succession, so as to render
a certain sequence objectively necessary. I could not say
therefore that two states follow each other in a phenome-
non, but only that one apprehension follows [p. 195]
another, which is purely subjective, and does not deter-
mine any object, and cannot be considered therefore as
knowledge of anything (even of something purely phe-
nomenal),
If therefore experience teaches us that something hap-
pens, we always presuppose that something precedes on
which it follows by rule. Othcn^'ise I could not say of
the object that it followed, because its following in my
apprehension only, without being determined by rule in
reference to what precedes, would not justify us in admit-
ting an objective following,' It is therefore always with
reference to a rule by which phenomena as they follow,
that is as they happen, are determined by an antecedent
* Read antunthmen btnthtigi.
1 6o Tra nsct'Hiivn ial A ua lytic
state, that I can give an objective character to my sub-
jective synthesis (of apprehension); nay, it is under this
suppositioTi only that an experience of anything that hap-
pens becomes possible.
It might seem indeed as if this were in contradiction
to all that has always been said on the progress of the
human understanding, it having been supposed that only
by a perception and comparison of many events, following
in the same manner on preceding phenomena, we were led
to the discovery of a rule according to which certain events
always follow on certain phenomena, and that thus only
we were enabled to form to ourselves the concept of a
cause. If this were so, that concept would be [p. 196]
empirical only, and the rule which it supplies, that every-
thing which happens must have a cause, would be as acci-
dental as experience itself. The universality and necessity
of that rule would then be fictitious only, and devoid of
any true and general validity, because not being a priori^
but founded on induction only. The case is the same as
with other pure representations ^ priori {ior instance space
and time), which we are only able to draw out as pure
concepts from experience, because we have put them first
into experience, nay, have rendered experience possible
only by them. It is true, no doubt, that the logical clear-
ness of this representation of a rule, determining the suc-
cession of events, as a concept of cause, becomes possible
only when we have used it in experience, but, as the con-
dition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, it
was nevertheless the foundation of all experience, and
consequently preceded it a priori.
It is necessary therefore to show by examples that we
never, even in experience, ascribe the sequence or conse-
Tramcendental Analytic
l6i
I
I
fuence (of an event or something happening that did not
exist before) to the object, and distinguish it from the sub-
jective sequence of our apprehension, except when there
is a rule which forces us to obser\^e a certain order of per^
ceptions, and no other; nay, that it is this force which
from the first renders the representation of a [p. 197]
succession in the object possible.
We have representations within us, and can become
conscious of them; but however far that consciousness
may extend, and however accurate and minute it may be,
yet the representations are always representations only,
that is> internal determinations of our mind in this or
that relation of time. What right have we then to add
to these representations an object, or to ascribe to these
modifications, beyond their subjective reality, another ob-
jective one ? Their objective character cannot consist in
their relation to another representation (of that which one
wished to predicate of the object), for thus the question
would only arise again, how that representation could
again go beyond itself, .and receive an objective character
in addition to the subjective one, which belongs to it, as a
determination of our mind. If we try to find out what
new quality or dignity is imparted to our representations
by their relation to an object^ we find that it consists in
nothing but the rendering necessary the connection of
representations in a certain w^ay, and subjecting them to
a rule; and that on the other hand they receive their
objective character only because a certain order is neces-
sary in the time relations of our representations.
In the synthesis of phenomena the manifold [p. ig8]
of our representations is always successive. No object
can thus be represented, because through the succession
Transi-endcH la l A mi lytic
which is common to all apprehensions, nothing can be
distinguished from anything else. But as soon as I per-
ceive or anticipate that there is in this succession a rela-
tion to an antecedent state from which the representation
follows by rule, then something is represented as an event,
or as something that happens : that is to say, I know an
object to which I must assign a certain position in time,
which, after the preceding state, cannot he different from
what it is. If therefore l perceive that something ha3>
pens, this representation involves that something preceded,
because the phenomenon receives its position in time with
reference to what preceded, that is, it exists after a time
in which it did not exist Its definite position in time can
only be assigned to it, if in the antecedent state something
is presupposed on which it always follows by rule. It
thus follows that, first of all, I cannot invert the order,
and place that which happens before that on which it
follows; secondly, that whenever the antecedent state is
there, the other event must follow inevitably and neces-
sarily. Thus it happens that there arises an order among
our representations, in which the present state [p. 199]
(as having come to be), points to an antecedent state, as
a correlative of the event that is given ; a correlative
which, though as yet indefinite, refers as determining to
the event, as its result, and connects that event with itself
by necessity, in the succession of time.
If then it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and
therefore ^formal condition of all perception, that a pre-
ceding necessarily determines a succeeding time (because
I cannot arrive at the succeeding time except through the
preceding), it is also an indispensable /fiif of ike em pineal
representation of the series of time that the phenomena of
I
Transcendental Analytic
163
past time determine every existence in succeeding times,
nay, that these, as events, cannot take place except so far
as the former determine their existence in time, that is,
determine it by rule. For it is 0/ course in phenomena only
that we can know empirically this continuity in the coke-
rence of times.
What is required for all experience and renders it pos-
sible is the understanding, and the first that is added by
it is not that it renders the representation of objects
clear, but that it really renders the representation of any
object for the first time possible. This takes place by the
understanding transferring the order of time to the phe-
nomena and their existence, and by assigning to each of
them as to a consequence a certain a priori determined
place in time, with reference to antecedent phenomena,
without which place phenomena would not be in [p. 200]
accord with time, which determines a priori their places
to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be
derived from the relation in which phenomena stand to
absolute time (for that can never be an object of percep-
tion); but, on the contrary, phenomena must themselves
determine to each other their places in time, and render
them necessary in the series of time. In other words, what
happens or follows must follow according to a general rule
on that which was contained in a previous state. We thus
get a series of phenomena which, by means of the under*
standing, produces and makes necessary in the series of
possible perceptions the same order and continuous cohe-
rence which exists a priori in the form of internal intui-
tion (time), in which all perceptions must have their place.
That something happens is therefore a perception
which belongs to a possible experience, and this cxperi-
164 Transcendental Atmiytic
ence becomes real when I consider the phenomenon as
determined with regard to its place in time, that is to saj%
as an object which can always be found, according to a
rule, in the connection of perceptions. This rule» by
w^hich we determine everything according to the succes-
sion of time, is this; the condition under which an event
follows at all times (necessarily) is to be found in what
precedes. All possible experience therefore, that is, all
objective knowledge of phenomena with regard to their
relation in the succession of time, depends on [p. 201]
* the principle of sufficient reason/
The proof of this principle rests entirely on the fol-
lowing considerations. All empirical knowledge requires
synthesis of the manifold by imagination, which is ahvays
successive, one representation following upon the other.
That succession, however, in the imagination is not at at!
determined with regard to the order in which something
precedes and something follows, and the series of succes-
sive representations may be taken as retrogressive as well as
progressive. If that synthesis, how^ever, is a synthesis of
apperception (of the manifold in a given phencmenon),
then the order is determined in the object, or, to speak
more accurately, there is then in it an order of successive
synthesis w^hich determines the object, and according to
which something must necessarily precede, and, when it
is once there, something else must necessarily follow. If
therefore my perception is to contain the knowledge of an
event, or something that really happens, it must consist of
an empirical judgment, by which the succession is sup-
posed, to be determined, so that the event presupposes
another phenomenon in time on which it follows neces-
sarily and according to a rule. If it were different, if the
Transcendental Analytic
165
antecedent phenomenon were thcrt.\ and the event did not
follow on it necessarily, it would become to me a mere
play of my subjective imaginations, or if I thought it to
be objective, I should call it a dream. It is therefore the
relation of phenomena (as possible perceptions) [p. 202]
according to which the existence of the subsequent (what
happens) is determined in time by something antecedent
necessarily and by rule, or, in other w^ords, the relation
of cause and effect, w^hich forms the condition of the
objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard
to the series of perceptions, and therefore also the condk
tion of the empirical truth of them, and of experience. '
The principle of the causal relation in the succession of
phenomena is valid therefore for all objects of experience,
also (under the conditions of succession), because that
principle is itself the ground of the possibility of such
experience.
Here, however, we meet with a difficulty that must first
be removed. The principle of the causal connection of
phenomena is restricted in our formula to their succession,
while in practice we find that it applies also to their coexist-
ence, because cause and effect may exist at the same time.
There may be» for instance, inside a room heat which is not
found in the open ain If I look for its cause, I find a
heated stove. But that stove, as cause, exists at the same
time with its effect, the heat of the room, and there is
therefore no succession in time between cause and effect,
but they are coexistent, and yet the law applies. The
fact is. that the greater portion of the active [p. 203]
■ causes' in nature is coexistent with its eflFects, and the
H * The reading of the Urst Etlttion is Unaeke; Urmcktm ts A conjecture
H iDAde by Rose nk rant and approved by oihen.
Transcendental Analytic
succession nf these effects in time is due only to this, that
a cause cannot produce its whole effect in one moment
But at the moment in which an effect first arises it is
always coexistent with the causality of its cause, because
if that had ceased one moment before, the effect would
never have happened. Here we must well consider that
what is thought of is the order^ not the lapse of time, and
that the relation remains, even if no time had lapsed.
The time between the causality of the cause and its im-
mediate effect can be vanishing (they may be simultane-
ous), but the relation of the one to the other remains for
all that determinable in time. If I look upon a ball that
rests on a soft cushion, and makes a depression in it, as a
cause, it is simultaneous with its effect. But I neverthe-
less distinguish the two through the temporal relation of
dynamical connection. For if I place the ball on a cush-
ion, its smooth surface is followed by a depression, while,
if there is a depression in the cushion (I know not
whence), a leaden ball does by no means follow from it.
The succession in time is therefore the only empirical
criterion of an effect with regard to the causality of the
cause which precedes it. The glass is the cause of the
rising of the water above its horizontal surface, [p, 204]
although both phenomena are simultaneous. For as soon
as I draw water in a glass from a larger vessel, something
follo%vs, namely, the change of the horizontal state which
it had before into a concave state which it assumes in the
glass*
This causality leads to the concept of action, that to
the concept of force, and lastly, to the concept of sub-
stance. As I do not mean to burden my critical task,
which only concerns the sources of synthetical knowledge
Transcendental Analytic
167
a priori, with analytical processes which aim at the ex*
planation, and not at the expansion of our concepts, I
leave a fuller treatment of these to a future system of
pure reason ; nay, I may refer to many well-known man-
uals in which such an analysis may be found I cannot
pass, howcv^er, over the empirical criterion of a substance,
so far as it seems to manifest itself, not so much through
the permanence of the phenomenon as through action.
Wherever there is action, therefore activity and force,
there must be substance, and in this alone the scat of that
fertile source of phenomena can be sought. This sounds
very well, but if people are asked to explain what they
mean by substance, they find it by no means easy to
answer without reasoning in a circle. How can [p. 205]
we conclude immediately from the action to the perma-
nence of the agent, which nevertheless is an essential
and peculiar characteristic of substance {phacnomenon)}
After what we have explained before, however, the an-
swer to this question is not so difficult, though it would
be impossible, according to the ordinary way of proceed-
ing analytically only with our concepts. Action itself
implies the relation of the subject of the causality to the
effect. As all effect consists in that which happens, that
is, in the changeable, indicating time in succession, the last
subject of it is the pennancnt, as the substratum of all
that changes, that is substance. For, according to the
principle of causality, actions are always the first ground
of all change of phenomena, and cannot exist therefore in
a subject that itself changes, because in that case other
actions and another subject would be required to deter-
mine that change. Action, therefore, is a sufficient em-
pirical criterion to prove substantiality, nor is it necessary
n
Transcendental Analytic
that I should first establish its permanency by means of
compared perceptions, which indeed would hardly be pos-
sible in this way, at least with that completeness which is
required by the magnitude and strict universality of the
concept. That the first subject of the causality of all aris-
ing and perishing cannot itself (in the field of phenomena)
arise and perish, is a safe conclusion, pointing in [p. 206]
the end to empirical necessity and permanency in exist-
ence, that is, the concept of a substance as a phenomenon.
If anything happens, the mere fact of something aris-
ing, without any reference to what it is, is in itself a mat-
ter for enquiry. The transition from the not-being of a
state into that state, even though it contained no quality
whatever as a phenomenon, must itself be investigated.
This arising, as we have shown in No. A, does not con-
cern the substance (because a substance never arises), but
its state only. It is therefore mere change, and not an
arising out of nothing. When such an arising is looked
upon as the effect of a foreign cause, it is called creation.
This can never be admitted as an event among phenom-
ena, because its very possibility would destroy the unity
of experience. If, however, we consider all things, not as
phenomena, but as things by themselves and objects of
the understanding only, then, though they are substances,
they may be considered as dependent in their existence
on a foreign cause. Our words would then assume quite
a different meaning, and no longer be applicable to phe-
nomena, as possible objects of experience.
How anything can be changed at all, how it is possible
that one state in a given time is followed by an- [p. 207]
other at' another time, of that we have not the slightest
conception a priori. We want for that a knowledge of
I
I
I
real powers, which can be given empirically only : for
instance, a knowledge of motive powers, or what is the
same, a knowledge of certain successive phenomena (as
movements) which indicate the presence of such forces.
What can be considered a priori^ according to the law of
causality and the conditions of time, are the form of every
change, the condition under which alone, as an arising of
another state, it can take place (its contents, that is, the
state, which is changed, being what it may), and therefore
the succession itself of the states (that which has hap-
pened),^
When a substance passes from one state a into another
*, the moment of the latter is different from the moment
of the former state, and follows it. Again, that second
state, as a reality (in phenomena), differs from the first in
which that reality did not exist, as b from zero ; that is,
even if the state b differed from the state a in quantity
only, that change is an arising of b — a, which in the
former state was non-existent, and in relation to [p. 208]
which that state is = o.
The question therefore arises how a thing can pass from
a state =^ to another =^? Between two moments there
is always a certain time, and between two states in these
two moments there is always a difference which must
have a certain quantity, because al! parts of phenomena
are always themselves quantities. Every transition there-
fore from one state into another takes place in a certain
time between two moments, the first of which determines
^ It thotild be remarked thai I am not speaking here of the change of
cerUin relations, but of the change of a state. Tljcrcforc when a body moves
in a qniform way. it docs not change its ttate ol movement, but it does to
when its motion incremscs or decreasci.
Transcendental Analytic
the state from which a thing arises, the second that at
which it arrives. Both therefore are the temporal hmits
of a change or of an intermediate state between two
states, and belong as such to the whole of the change.
Every change, however, has a cause which proves its
causality during the whole of the time in which the
change takes place. The cause therefore does not pro-
duce the change suddenly (in one moment), but during a
certain time ; so that, as the time grows from the initiatory
moment a to its completion in l\ the quantity of reality
also (b—a) is produced through all the smaller degrees
between the first and the last. All change therefore is
possible only through a continuous action of causality
which, so far as it is uniform, is called a mo- [p. 209]
mentum, A change does not consist of such momenta,
but is ptoduced by them as their effect.
This is the law of continuity in all change, founded on
this, that neither time nor a phenomenon in time consists
of parts which arc the smallest possible, and that never-
theless the state of a thing w^hich is being changed passes
through all these parts, as elements, to its new state. No
difference of the real in phenomena and no difference in
the quantity of times is ever the smallest ; and thus the
new state of reality grows from the first state in which
that reality did not exist through all the infinite degrees
thereof, the differences of which from one another are
smaller than that between zero and a.
It does not concern us at present of what utility this
principle may be in physical science. But how such a
principle, which seems to enlarge our knowledge of nature
so much, can be possible a priori, that requires a careful
investigation, although we can see that it is real and true,
Transcendental Analytic
\'/i
I
and might thus imagine that the question how it was pos-
sible is unnecessary. For there are so many unfounded
pretensions to enlarge our knowledge by pure reason that
we must accept it as a general principle, to be always dis-
trustful, and never to believe or accept any- [p. 210]
thing of this kind without documents capable of a thor-
ough deduction, however clear the dogmatical proof of it
may appear.
All addition to our empirical knowledge and every ad-
vance in perception is nothing but an enlargement of the
determinations of our internal sense, that is, a progression
in time, whatever the objects may be, whether phenomena
or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines
everything, and is itself determined by nothing else, that
is, the parts of that progression are only given in time,
and through the synthesis of time, but not time before
this synthesis. For this reason every transition in our
perception to something that follows in time is reallv a
determination of time through the production of that per*
ception, and as time is always and in all its parts a quantity,
the production of a perception as a quantity, through all
degrees (none of them being the smallest), from zero up
to its determined degree. This shows how it is possible
to know a priori a law of changes, as far as their form is
concerned. We are only anticipating our own apprehen-
sion, the formal condition of which, as it dwells in us
before all given phenomena, may well be known a priari.
In the same manner therefore in which time contains
the sensuous condition a priori of the possi- [p. 21 1]
bility of a continuous progression of that which exists to
H that which follows, the understanding, by means of the
H unity of apperception, is a condition a priori of the possi*
I
172 Transcendental Analytic
bility of a continuous determination of the position of all
phenomena in that time, and this through a series of
causes and effects, the former producing inevitably the
existence of the latter, and thus rendering the empirical
knowledge of the relations of time valid for all times
(universally) and therefore objectively valid.
^^ [Third Analogy
Principle of Community
All substances, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in complete
community, that is, reciprocity one to another^]
Proof
Things are coexistent in so far as they exist at one and
thtf same time. But how can we know that they exist at
one and the same time? Only if the order in the syn-
thesis of apprehension of the manifold is indifferent, that
is, if I may advance from A through B, C, D, to E, or
contrariwise from E to A. For, if the synthesis were
successive in time (in the order beginning with A and
ending with E), it would be impossible to begin the appre-
hension with the perception of E and to go backwards to
A, because A belongs to past time, and can no longer be
an object of apprehension. [p. 212]
If we supposed it possible that in a number of sub-
stances, as phenomena, each were perfectly isolated, so
that none influenced another or received influences from
1 See Supplement XX.
Transcendental Analytic
173
I
ler, then the coexistence of them could never become
an object of possible perception, nor could the existence of
the one through any process of empirical synthesis lead us
on to the existence of another For if we imagined that
they were separated by a perfectly empty space, a percep-
tion, proceeding from the one in time to the other might
no doubt determine the existence of it by means of a sub-
sequent perception, but would never be able to determine
whether that phenomenon followed objectively on the
other or was coexistent with it
There must therefore be something besides their mere
existence by which A determines its place in time for B,
and B for A, because thus only can these two substances
be represented empirically as coexistent. Nothing, how-
ever, can determine the place of. anything else in time,
except that which is its cause or the cause of its deter-
minations. Therefore every substance (since it can be
effect with regard to its determinations only) must contain
in itself the causality of certain determinations in another
substance, and, at the same time, the effects of the causal-
ity of that other substance, that is, substances must stand*
in dynamical communion, immediately or medi- [p, 213]
ately, with each other, if their coexistence is to be known
in any possible experience. Now, everything without
which the experience of any objects would be impossible,
may be said to be necessary with reference to such objects
of experience ; from which it follows that it is necessary
for all substances, so far as they are coexistent as phe-
nomena, to stand in a complete communion of reciprocity
with each other.
The word communion (Gemeinschaft) may be used in
two senses, meaning cither cammunio or tammercium.
<
174
Transcend€H hi I A na lytic
We use it here in the latter sense: as a dynamical com-
munion without which even the local commuma spatii
could never be known empirically. We can easily per-
ceive in our experience, that continuous influences only
can lead our senses in all parts of space from one object
to another ; that the light which plays between our eyes
and celestial bodies produces a mediate communion be-
tween us and them, and proves the coexistence of the
latter; that we cannot change anyplace empirically (per*
ceive such a change) unless matter itself renders the per-
ception of our own place possible to us, and that by means
of its reciprocal influence only matter can evince its simul-
taneous existence, and thus (though mediately only) its
coexistence, even to the most distant objects. Without
this communion every .perception (of any phe- [p. 214]
nomenon in space) is separated from the others, and the
chain of empirical representations, that is, experience
itself, would have to begin de mwo with every new object^
without the former experience being in the least connected
with it, or standing to it in any temporal relation. I do
■ not want to say anything here against empty space.
Empty space may exist where perception cannot reach,
and where therefore no empirical knowledge of coexist-
ence takes place, but, in that case, it is no object for any
possible experience.
The following remarks may elucidate this. It is neces-
sary that in our mind all phenomena, as being contained
in a possible experience, must share a communion of ap-
perception, and if the objects are to be represented as
connected in coexistence, they must reciprocally determine
their place in time, and thus constitute a whole. If this
subjective communion is to rest on an objective ground, or
Transcendental Analytic
175
is to refer to phenomena as substances, then the percep-
tion of the one as cause must render possible the per-
ception of the othen and vice versa: so that the succession
which always exists in perceptions, as apprehensions, may
not be attributed to the objects, but that the objects should
be represented as existing simultaneously. This is a recip-
rocal influence, that is a real commercium of substances,
without which the empirical relation of co-exist- [p, 215]
ence would be impossible in our experience. Through
this commercium, phenomena as being apart from each
other and yet connected, constitute a compound {compost-
turn reaU\ and such compounds become possible in many
ways. The three dynamical relations, therefore, from
which all others are derived, are inherence^ consequence^
and composition.
These are the three analogies of experience. They are
nothing but principles for determining the existence of
phenomena in time, according to its three modes. First,
the relation of time itself, as to a quantity (quantity of
existence, that b duration). Secondly, the relation in
time, as in a series (successively). And thirdly, likewise
in time, as the whole of all existence (simultaneously).
This unity in the determination of time is dynamical only,
that is, time is not looked upon as that in which experience
assigns immediately its place to every existence, for this
would be impossible ; because absolute time is no object of
perception by which phenomena could be held together ;
but the rule of the understanding through which alone the
existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity in
time determines the place of each of them in time, there-
fore a priori and as valid for all time*
^
176
Tra nscendc n ial A na lytic
By nature (in the empirical sense of the word) [p. 216]
we mean the coherence of phenomena in their existence,
according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are
therefore certain laws, and they exist a priori^ which them-
selves make nature possible, while the empirical laws exist
and are discovered through experience, but in accordance
with those original laws which first render experience pos-
sible. Our analogies therefore represent the unity of
nature in the coherence of all phenomena, under certain
exponents, w^hich express the relation of time (as compre*
bending all existence) to the unity of apperception, which
apperception can only take place in the synthesis accord-
ing to rules. The three analogies, therefore, simply say,
that all phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist
because, without such unity a pnori no unity of experi-
ence, and therefore no determination of objects in experi*
ence, would be possible.
With regard to the mode of proof, by which we
have arrived at these transcendental laws of nature
and its peculiar character, a remark must be made
which will become important as a rule for any other
attempt to prove intelligible, and at the same time
synthetical propositions a prion. If we had attempted
to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is from con-
cepts, showing that all which exists is found only in
that which is permanent, that every event [p. 217]
presupposes something in a previous state on which it
follows by rule, and lastly, that in the manifold which
is coexistent, states coexist in relation to each other
by rule, all our labour would have been in vain. For
we may analyse as much as we like, we shall never
arrive from one object and its existence at the existence
Transcendental Analytic
m
of another, or at its mode of existence by means of
the concepts of these things only. What else then
remained? There remained the possibiHty of expe-
rience, as that knowledge in which all objects must
in the end be capable of being given to us^ if their
representation is to have any objective reality for us.
In this, namely in the synthetical unity of appercep-
tion of all phenomena, we discovered the conditions
a priori of an absolute and necessary determination
in time of all phenomenal existence. Without this
even the empirical determinations in time would be
impossible, and we thus established the rules of the
synthetical unity a priori, by which we might antici-
pate experience. It was because people were ignorant
of this method, and imagined that they could prove
dogmatically synthetical propositions which the empir-
ical use of the understanding follows as its principles,
that so many and always unsuccessful attempts have
been made to prove the proposition of the ' sufficient
reason.* The other two analogies have not even been
thought of, though everybody followed them uncon-
sciously,* because the method of the categories [p, 2 1 8]
was wanting, by which alone every gap in the under-
* The ttnity of the univene, in which all phcnoraena arc supposed to be
connected, is evidently a mere deduction of the quietly adopted principle of
the communion of all suhsUnces as coexistent ; for if they were isolnted. they
would not form parts of a whole, and if their connection (^thc reciprocity of
the nuinifold) were not necesimry for the sake of their coexistence, it would be
impottible to use the Utter, which is a purely ideal relation, as a proof of the
former, which is real. We have shown, however, that communion is really
the ground of the possibility of an empirical knowledge of coexistence, and
that really we can only conclude from this the existence of the fonaeri as its
condition, •
Transcendental Analytic
standing, both with regard to concepts and principles,
can be discovered and pointed out.
r
IV
The Postulates af Empirical Thought in General
Wiiflt agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in iatuition
and in concepts) is possible
2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience (saDsa-
tion) is real
3. That which, In its coimection with the real, is determined by uni-
versal conditiona of experience, is (exists as) neceasaiy
Explanation [p. 219]
The categories of modality have this peculiar character
that, as determining an object, they do not enlarge in the
least the concept to which they are attached as predicates,
but express only a relation to our faculty of knowledge.
Even when the concept of a thing is quite complete, I can
still ask with reference to that object, %vhcthcr it is pos-
sible only, or real also, and, if the latter, whether it is
necessary? No new determinations of the object are
thereby conceived, but it is only asked in what relation it
(with all its determinations) stands to the understanding
and its empirical employment, to the empirical faculty of
judgment, and to reason, in its application to experience ?
The principles of modality are therefore nothing but
explanations of the concepts of possibility, reality^ and
necessity, in their empirical employment, confining all
categories to an empirical employment only, and prohibit-
ing their transcendental * use. For if these categories are
* Here the same m tramandtni.
Transcendental Analytic
179
not to have a purely logical characterj expressing the
forms of thought analytically, but are to refer to things,
their possibility, reality, or necessity, they must have
reference to possible experience and its synthetical unity,
in which alone objects of knowledge can be given.
The postulate of the possibility of things [p. 220]
demands that the .concept of these should agree with the
formal conditions of experience in general This, the ob-
jective form of experience in general, contains all synthesis
which is required for a knowledge of objects. A concept
is to be considered as empty, and as referring to no object,
if the synthesis which it contains does not belong to
experience, whether as borrowed from it (in which case it
is called an empirical concept), or as a synthesis on which,
as a condition a /frion, all experience (in its form) depends,
in which case it is a pure concept, but yet belonging to
experience, because its object can only be found in it
For whence could the character of the possibility of an
object, which can be conceived by a synthetical concept
a priori^ be derived, except from the synthesis which con-
stitutes the form of all empirical knowledge of objects?
It is no doubt a necessary logical condition, that such a
concept must contain nothing contradictory, but this is by
no means sufficient to establish the objective reality of a
concept, that is, the possibility of such an object, as is con-
ceived by a concept. Thus in the concept of a figure to
be enclosed between two straight lines, there is nothing
contradictory, because the concepts of two straight lines
and their meeting contain no negation of a fig- [p. 221]
ure. The impossibility depends, not on the concept itself,
but on its construction in space, that is, the conditions of
space and its determinations, and it is these that have ob-
^
Transcendental Analytic
jective reality^ or apply to possible things, because they
contain a priori in themselves the form of experience m
general
And now we shall try to explain the manifold usefulness
and influence of this postulate of possibility. If I repre-
sent to myself a thing that is permanent, while everything
which changes belongs merely to its ^tate, I can never
know from such a concept by itself that a thing of that
kind is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something
so constituted that, when it is given, something else must
at all times and inevitably follow upon it, this may no
doubt be conceived without contradiction, but we have as
yet no means of judging whether such a quality, viz,
causality, is to be met with in any possible object. I.astly,
I can very well represent to myself different things (sub-
stances) so constituted, that the state of the one produces
an effect on the state of the other, and this reciprocally ;
but whether such a relation can belong to any things can-
not be learned from these concepts w^hich contain a purely
arbitrary synthesis. The objective reality of these con-
cepts is only known w^hen w^e see that they [p* 222]
express a ptiori the relations of perceptions in every kind
of experience; and this objective reality, that is, their
transcendental truth, though independent of all experi-
ence, is nevertheless not independent of all relation to the
form of experience in general, and to that synthetical
unity in which alone objects can be known empirically.
But if we should think of framing new concepts of sub-
stances, forces, and reciprocal actions out of the material
supplied to us by our perceptions, without borrowing from
experience the instance of their connection, we should en-
tangle ourselves m mere cobwebs of our brain, the possi-
Transcendental Analytic
iSl
I
I
I
I
bility of which could not be tested by any criteria, because
in forming them we were not guided by experience, nor
had borrowed these concepts from it Such purely imag-
inary concepts cannot receive the character of possibility,
like the categories a priori, as conditions on which all
experience depends, but only a posteriori, as concepts that
must be given by experience, so that their possibility can
either not be known at all, or a posteriori^ and empirically
only. Thus, for instance, a substance supposed to be
present as permanent in space, and yet not filling it (like
that something between matter and the thinking subject,
which some have tried to introduce), or a peculiar faculty
of our mind, by which we can see (not only infer) the
future, or lastly, another faculty, by which we can enter
into a community of thought with other men (however dis-
tant they may be), all these are concepts the [p, 223]
possibility of which has nothing to rest on, because it is
not founded on experience and its known laws. Without
these they are and can only be arbitrary combinations of
thought which, though they contain nothing contradictory
in themselves, have no claim to objective reality, or to the
possibility of such an object as is to be conceived by them.
With regard to reality^ it stands to reason that we cannot
conceive it in the concrete without the aid of experience ;
for reality concerns sensation only, as the material of ex-
perience, and not the form of relations, which might to a
certain extent allow us to indulge in mere fancies.
I here pass by everything the possibility of which can
only be learned from its reality in experience, and I only
mean to consider the possibility of things through con-
cepts ^/nVft. Of these (concepts) I persist in maintain-
ing that they can never exist as such concepts by then;
n
Tra fiscenden tal A naiytic
selves alone, but only as formal and objective conditions
of experience in general.^
It might seem indeed as if the possibility of a triangle
could be known from its concept by itself (being inde-
pendent of all experience), for we can give to it an object
entirely a priori, that is, we can construct it. But as this
is only the form of an object, it would always remain a
product of the imagination only. The possibil- [p, 224]
ity of its object would remain doubtful, because more is
wanted to establish it, namely, that such a figure should
really be conceived under all those conditions on which all
objects of experience depend. That which alone connects
w^ith this concept the representation of the possibility of
such a thing, is the fact that space is a formal condition
a priori of all external experiences, and that the same for-
mative synthesis, by which we construct a triangle in im-
agination, should be identical with that w^hich w^e exercise
in the apprehension of a phenomenon, in order to make
an empirical concept of it. And thus the possibility of
continuous quantities, nay, of all quantities, the concepts
of which are always synthetical, can never be deduced
from the concepts themselves, but only from them, as
formal conditions of the determination of objects in all
experience. And where indeed should we look for ob-
jects, corresponding to our concepts, except in experience,
by which alone objects are given us? If we are able
to know and determine the possibility of things without
any previous experience, this is only with reference to
those formal conditions under which anything may become
1 I have adopted Erdmann's conjecture, ah lokhe Be^iffe instead of am
iokhen Begrijfin,
Transcendental Analytic
183
an object in experience. This takes place entirely a
prion, but nevertheless m c mstant reference to experi-
ence. and within its limits.
The postulate concerning our knowledge of [p. 225]
the reality of things, requires perception, therefore sensa-
tion and consciousness of it, not indeed immediately of
the object itself, the existence of which is to be known,
but yet of a connection between it and some real percep-
tion, according to the analogies of experience which deter-
mine in general all real combinations in experience.
In the nutr concept of a thing no sign of its existence
can be discovered. For though the concept be ever so
perfect, so that nothing should be wanting in it to enable
us to conceive the thing With all its ow^n determinations,
existence has nothing to do with all this. It depends only
on the question whether such a thing be given us, so
that its perception may even precede its concept A con-
cept preceding experience implies its possibility only,
w^hile perception, which sup|)Iies the materia! of a con-
cept, is the only characteristic of reality. It is possible,
however, even before the perception of a thing, and there-
fore, in a certain sense, a priori, to know its existence,
provided it hang together with some other perceptions,
according to the principles of their empirical connection
(analogies). For in that case the existence of a thing
hangs together at least with our perceptions in a possible
experience, and guided by our analogies we [p, 226]
can, starting from our real experience, arrive at some
other thing in the series of possible perceptions. Thus we
know the existence of some magnetic matter perv^ading
all bodies from the perception of the attracted iron filings,
though our organs are so constituted as to render an im-
n
Transcendental Analytic
mediate perception of that matter impossible. According
to the laws of sensibility and the texture of our percep-
tions, we ought in our experience to arrive at an immedi-
ate empirical intuition of that magnetic matter, if only our
senses were more acute, for their actual obtuseness does
not concern the form of possible experience. Wherever^
therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to
empirical laws, there our knowledge also of the existence
of things can reach. Rut if wc do not begin with experi-
ence, or do not proceed according to the laws of the em-
pirical connection of phenomena, we are only making a
vain display, as if we could guess and discover the exist-
ence of anything.^
With reference to the third postulate we find that it
refers to the material necessity in existence, and not to
the merely formal and logical necessity in the connection
of concepts. As it is impossible that the existence of the
objects of the senses should ever be known entirety a
priori^ though it may be known to a certain extent a
priori, namely, with reference to another already given
existence, and as even in that case wc can only [p. 227]
arrive at such an existence as must somewhere be con-
tained in the whole of the experience of which the given
perception forms a part, it follows that the necessity of
existence can never be known from concepts, but always
from the connection only with what is actually perceived,
according to general rules of experience*^ Now, there is
no existence that can be known as necessary under the
condition of other given phenomena, except the existence
1 Set Supplement XXI.
^ Insert man befofe ^euhwohty and lea^e out Mnnen it the end of the
scDtettce.
Transcendental Analytic
i8s
I
of effects from given causes, according to the laws of
causality. It is not therefore the existence of things
(substances), but the existence of their state, of which
alone we can know the necessity, and this from other
states only, which are given in perception, and according
to the empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows that
the criterium of necessity can only be found in the law of
possible experience, viz. that everything that happens is
determined a priori by its cause in phenomena.* We
therefore know in nature the necessity of those effects
only of which the causes are given, and the character of
necessity in existence never goes beyond the field of
possible experience, and even there it does not apply to
the existence of things, as substances, because such sub-
stances can never be looked upon as empirical effects or
as something that happens and arises. Necessity, there-
fore, affects only the relations of phenomena [p. 228]
according to the dynamical law of causality, and the pos-
sibility, dependent upon it, of concluding a priori ivom a
given existence (of a cause) to another existence (that of
an effect). Thus the principle that everything which hap-
pens is hypothetically necessary, subjects all the changes in
the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence,
without which there would not even be such a thing as
nature. Hence the proposition that nothing happens by
blind chance {in mtrndo nan datur casus) is an a priori law
of nature, and so is likewise the other, that no necessity
in nattire is a blind, but always a conditional and there-
fore an intelligible, necessity {non datur fa turn). Both
these are laws by which the mere play of changes is rcn-
> Read teim Un^iAf ttutcid of Mr#.
Transcendentai A nahtic
dered subject to a nature of things (as phenomena), or
what is the same, to that unity of the understanding in
which aloRe they can belong to experience, as the synthet-
ical unity of phenomena. Both are dynamical principles.
The former is in reality a consequence of the principle
of causality (the second of the analogies of experience).
The latter is one of the principles of modality, which to
the determination of causality adds the concept of neces-
sity, which itself is subject to a rule of the understanding.
The principle of continuity rendered every break in the
series of phenomena (changes) impossible (/;/ mundo non
datur saUiis), and likewise any gap between two [p. 229]
phenomena in the whole of our empirical intuitions in
space (fu^n datttr hiatus). For so we may express the
proposition that nothing can enter into experience to
prove a vacuum, or even to admit it as a possible part of
empirical synthesis. For the vacuum, which one may
conceive as outside the field of possible experience (the
world}» can never come before the tribunal of the under-
standing which has to decide on such questions only as
concern the use to be made of given phenomena for em-
pirical knowledge. It is in reality a problem of that ideal
reason which goes beyond the sphere of a possible experi-
ence, and w^ants to form an opinion of that which sur-
rounds and limits experience, and will therefore have to be
considered in our transcendental Dialectic. With regard
to the four propositions (/// nmudo non datur hiatus, non
datus saltus, non datur casus, non datttr fatum)^ it would be
easy to represent each of them, as well as all principles of
a transcendental origin, according to the order of the cate-
gories, and thus to assign its proper place to every one
of them. But, after what has been said before, the versed
Transcendcnta! Analytic
187
and expert reader will find it easy to do this himself, and to
discover the proper method for it. They all simply agree
,in this, that they admit nothing in our empirical synthesis
that would in any way run counter to the understanding, and
to the continuous cohesion of all phenomena, that is, to the
unity of its concepts. For it is the understand- [p. 230]
ing alone through which the unity of experience, in which
all perceptions must have their place, becomes possible.
Whether the field of possibility be larger than the field
which contains everything which is real, and whether this
again be larger than the field of what is necessary, are
curious questions and admitting of a synthetical solution,
which questions however are to be brought before the
tribunal of reason only. They really come to this, whether
all things, as phenomena, belong to the sphere of one
experience, of which every given perception forms a part,
that could not be connected with any other phenomena,
or whether my perceptions can ever belong to more than
one possible experience (in its general connection). The
understanding in reality does nothing but give to experi-
ence a rule a priori^ according to the subjective and formal
conditions of sensibility and apperception, which alone
render experience possible. Other forms of intuition
(different from space and time), and other forms of the
understanding (different from the discursive forms of
thought or conceptual knowledge), even if they were pos-
sible, we could in no wise render conceivable or intelli-
gible to ourselves; and even if we could, they would never
belong to experience, the only field of knowledge in which
objects are given to us. Whether there be [p. 231]
therefore other perceptions but those that belong to our
whole possible experience, whether there be in fact a
n
Transcendental Analytic
completely new field of matter, can never be determined
by the understanding, which is only concerned with the
synthesis of what is given.
The poverty of the usual arguments by which we con-
struct a large empire of possibility of which all that is real
(the objects of experience) forms but a small segment, is
but too apparent When we say that all that is real is
possible, we arrive, according to the logical rules of inver-
sion, at the merely particular proposition that some possible
is real, and thus seem to imply that much is possible that
is not real. Nay, it seems as if we might extend the num-
ber of things possible beyond that of things real, simply
on the ground that something must be added to the pos-
sible to make it real. But this addition to the possible I
cannot recognise, because what would thus be added to
the possible, would be really the impossible. It is only
to my understanding that anything can be added concern-
ing the agreement with the formal conditions of experi-
ence, and what can be added is the connection with some
perception ; and whatever is connected with such a per-
ception, according to empirical laws» is real, though it may
not be perceived immediately. But that, in constant con-
nection with w'hat is given us in experience, [p. 232]
there should be another series of phenomena, and there-
fore more than one all-embracing experience, cannot pos-
sibly be concluded from what is given us, and still less,
if nothing is given us, because nothing can be thought
without some kind of material. What is possible only
tmder conditions which themselves are possible only, is
not possible in the full sense of the word, not therefore
in the sense in which we ask whether the possibility of
things can extend beyond the limits of experience.
Transcemitntal A nalytic
189
I
I have only touched on these questions in order to leave
no gap in what are commonly supposed to be the concepts
of the understanding. But absolute possibility (which
has no regard for the formal conditions of experience) is
really no concept of the understanding, and can never
be used empirically, but belongs to reason alone, which
goes beyond all possible empirica! use of the under-
standing. We have therefore made these few critical
remarks only, leaving the subject itself unexplained for
the present.
And here, when 1 am on the point of concluding this
fourth number and at the same time the system of all
principles of the pure understanding, I think I ought to
explain why I call the principles of modality posiulates.
I do not take this term in the sense which has [p. 233]
been given to it by some modern philosophical writers, and
which is opposed to the sense in which mathematicians
take it, viz. that to postulate should mean to represent a
proposition as certain without proof or justification ; for if
we were to admit with regard to synthetical propositions,
however evident they may appear, that they should meet
with unreserved applause, without any deduction, and on
their own authority only, all criticism of the understanding
would be at an end. And as there is no lack of bold
assertions, which public opinion does not decline to accept,
(this acceptance being, however, no credential), our under-
standing would be open to every fancy, and could not
refuse its sanction to claims w^hich demand admission as
real axioms in the same confident tone, though without
any substantial reasons. If therefore a condition a priori
is to be synthetically joined to the concept of a thing, it
will be indispensable that, if not a proof, at least a deduc-
^
Transccn den fa i A mr lytic
tion of the legitimacy of such an assertion^ should be
forthcoming.
The principles of modality, however^ arc not objectively
synthetical, because the predicates of possibility, reality,
and necessity do not in the least increase the concept of
which they are predicated, by adding anything to its rep-
resentation. But as nevertheless they are synthetical,
they are so subjectively only, i,e. they add to the [p. 234]
concept of a (real) thing, without predicating; anything new,
the peculiar faculty of knowledge from which it springs
and on which it depends, so that, if in the understanding
the concept is only connected with the formal conditions
of experience, its object is called possibit' ; if it is con-
nected with perception (sensation as the material of the
senses), and through it determined by the understanding,
its object is called real : while, if it is determined through
the connection of perceptions, according to concepts, its
object is called necessary. The principles of modality
therefore predicate nothing of a concept except the act
of the faculty of knowledge by which it is produced
In mathematics a postulate means a practical proposi-
tion, containing nothing but a synthesis by which we
first give an object to ourselves and produce its concept,
as if, for instance, w^e draw a circle with a given line
from a given point in the plane. Such a proposition
cannot be proved, because the process required for it is
the very process by which we first produce the concept
of such a figure. We may therefore with the same right
postulate the principles of modalitVi because they never
increase ' the concept of a thing, but indicate the manner
1 No doubt by reality I assert more than by possibility, but not in the thing
itself, which can never contain more tn its reality than what is contained in
Transcendental Atialytic 191
only in which the concept was joined with our faculty of
knowledge.^ [p. 235]
its complete possibility. While possibility is only the positing of a thing in
reference to the understanding (in its empirical use), reality is, at the same
time, a connection of it with perception.
^ See Supplement XXII.
THE
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE
OF THE
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT
OR
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER III
ON THE GROUND OF DISTINCTION OF ALL SUBJECTS INTO
PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA
r ' We have now not only traversed the whole domain of
I the pure understanding, and carefully examined each part
of it, but we have also measured its extent, and assigned
to everything in it its proper place. This domain, how-
ever, is an island and enclosed by nature itself within
limits that can never be changed. It is the country of
truth (a very attractive name), but surrounded by a wide
and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion, where many
I a fog bank and ice that soon melts away tempt us to be-
lieve in new lands, while constantly deceiving the advent-
urous mariner with vain hopes, and involving [p. 236]
him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can
never bring to an end. Before we venture ourselves on
this sea, in order to explore it on every side, and to find
out whether anything is to be hoped for there, it will be
192
Transcendental Analytic
193
I
useful to glance once more at the map of that country
which we are ahoiit to leave, and to ask ourselves, first,
whether we might nol be content with what it contains,
nay, whether we must not be content with it, supposing
that there is no solid ground anywhere else on which we
could settle ; secondly, by what title we possess even that
domain, and may consider ourselves safe against all hos-
tile claims. Although we have sufficiently answered these
questions in the course of the analytic, a summary reca-
pitulation of their solutions may help to strengthen our
conviction, by uniting all arguments in one point
We have seen that the understanding possesses every-
thing which it draws from itself^ without borrowing from
experience, for no other purpose but for experience. The
principles of the pure understanding, whether constitutive
a pnori {as the mathematical) or simply relative (as the
dynamical), contain nothing but, as it were, the pure
schema of possible experience; for that experi- [p, 237]
encc derives its unity from that synthetical unity alone
which the understanding originally and spontaneously
imparts to the synthesis of imagination, with reference
to apperception, and to which all phenomena, as data
of a possible knowledge, must conform a priari. But
although these rules of the understanding are not only
true a priori, but the very source of all truth, that is, of
the agreement of our knowledge with objects, because
containing the conditions of the possibility of experi-
ence, as the complete sphere of all knowledge in which
objects can be given to us, nevertheless we do not seem
to be content with hearing only what is true, but want to
know a great deal more. If therefore this critical investi-
gation does not teach us any more than what, even with-
Transcendental Analytic
out such subtle researches, wc should have practised
ourselves in the purely empirical use of the understand-
it would seem as if the advantages derived from it
were hardly worth the labour. One might reply that
nothing would be more prejudicial to the enlargement
of our knowledge than that curiosity which » before enter-
ing upon any researches, wishes to know beforehand the
advantages hkely to accrue from them» though quite un-
able as yet to form the least conception of such advan-
tages, even though they were placed before our eyes.
There is, however, one advantage in this transcendental
investigation which can be rendered intelligible, [p. 238]
nay, even attractive to the most troublesome and reluctant
apprentice, namely this, that the understanding confined
to its empirical use only and unconcerned with regard to
the sources of its own knowledge, may no doubt fare very
well in other respects, but can never determine for itself
the limits of its own use and know what is inside or out-
side its own sphere. It is for that purpose that such
profound investigations are required as we have just insti-
tuted. If the understanding cannot decide whether cer-
tain questions lie within its own horizon or not, it can
never feel certain with regard to its claims and posses-
sions, but must be prepared for many humiliating correc-
tions, when constantly transgressing, as it certainly will,
the limits of its own domain, and losing itself in follies
and fancies.
That the understanding cannot make any but an empir-
ical, and never a transcendental, use of all its principles
a pnon\ nay, of all its concepts, is a proposition which,
if thoroughly understood, leads indeed to most important
consequences. What we call the transcendental use of a
Transcendental Atmlytic
195
concept in any proposition is its being referred to things
in general and to things by themselves, while its empirical
use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a pt>s-
sible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible
will be clear from the following considerations, [p. 239]
What is required for every concept is, first, the logical
form of a concept (of thought) in general ; and, secondly,
the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without
the latter, it has no sense, and is entirely empty, though
it may still contain the logical function by which a concept
can be formed out of any data. The only way in which
an object can be given to a concept is in intuition, and
though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the
object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object,
and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition
only, of which it is itself nothing but the form. All con-
cepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they
may be possible a priori, refer nevertheless to empirical
intuitions, that is, to data of a possible experience. With-
out this, they can claim no objective validity, but are a
mere play, whether of the imagination or of the under-
standing with their respective representations. Let us
take the concepts of mathematics as an example, and,
first, with regard to pure intuitions. Although such
principles as * space has three dimensions/ 'between two
points there can be only one straight line/ as well as the
representation of the object with which that science is oc-
cupied, may be produced in the mind a priori, they would
have no meaning, if we were not able at all times [p. 240]
to show their meaning as applied to phenomena (empirical
objects). It is for this reason that an abstract concept is
required to be made sensuous^ that is, that its correspond-
Transcendental Analytic
^
ing object is required to be shown in intuition, because^
without this, the concept (as people say) is without sense,
that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfil this require-
ment by the construction of the figure, which is a phe*
nomenon present to the senses (although constructed a
priori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds
its support and sense in number; and this in turn in the
fingers, the beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points
which can be presented to the eyes. The concept itself
was produced a priori, together with all the synthetical
principles or formulas which can be derived from such
concepts ; but their use and their relation to objects can
nowhere be found except in experience, of which those
concepts contain a priori the (formal) possibility only.
That this is the case with all categories and with all the
principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the
fact that we could not define any one of them (really,
that is, make conceivable the possibility of their object)/
without at once having recourse to the conditions of sen-
sibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only
possible objects, these categories must necessarily be
restricted, it being impossible, if wc take away [p. 241]
these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that is,
any relation to an object, or to make it intelligible to
ourselves by an example what kind of thing could be
intended by such concepts.
[When representing the table of the categories, we dis-
pensed with the definition of every one of them^ because
at that time it seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which
concerned their synthetical use only, and because entaii-
^ Additions of the Second Edition.
Transcendental Analytic
197
ing responsibilities which we were not bound to incur.
This was not a mere excuse, but a very important pru-
dential rule, viz. not to rush into definitions, and to attempt
or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of
a concept, when one or other of its characteristic marks
is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that
constitute the whole concept Now, however, we can
perceive that this caution had even a deeper ground,
namely^ that wx could not have defined them, even if we
had wished;^ forjf wc remove all conditions of [p. 242]
sensibility, w^hich distinguish them as the concepts of
a possible empirical use, and treat them as concepts of
things in general (therefore as of transcendental use),
nothing remains but to regard the logical function in
judgments as the condition of the possibility of the things
themselves, without the slightest indication as to where
they could have their application and their object, or how
they could have any meaning or objective validity in the
pure understanding, apart from sensibility.] ^
No one can explain the concept of quantity in general,
except, it may be, by saying that it is the determination
of an object, by which w^e may know how many times
the one is supposed to exist in it But this * how many
times* is based on successive repetition, that is on time,
and on the synthesis in it of the homogeneous.
1 T ftm trmting here of th« real definition, which not only pati in place of
the name of a thing other ami more intelligible wortJfJjut that which contains
a clear mark by which the object {dejimtum) can at all time* be safely recog-
niaed, and by which the dehncd concept becomes til for practical use. A real
definition {KtaliirkiaruHg) must therefjrc render clear the concept il»clf, and
its objective reality also. Of this kind arc the mathematical explanationt
which represent an object in intuition, accrmling to its concept.
* Read Himmt instead of nthmin^ and konnen instead of Jtdnne*
^
Transcendental Analytic
Reality, again, can only be explained in opposition
to a negation, if we think of time (as containing all
being) being either filled or empty.
Were I to leave out permanence (which means ex-
istence at all times), nothing would remain of my con-
cept of substance but the logical representation of
a subject which I think I can realise by imagining
something which is a iiubject only, without [p. 243]
being a predicate of anything. But in this case we
should not only be i^i^norant of all conditions under
which this logical distinction could belong to any-
thing, but we should be unable to make any use of
it or draw any conchisions from it, because no object
is thus determined for the use of this concept, and no
one can tell whether such a concept has any meaning
at all.
Of the concept of cause also (if I leave out time, in
which something follows on something else by rule)
I should find no more in the pure category than
that it is something which enables us to conclude
the existence of something else, so that it would not
only be impossible to distinguish cause and effect
from each other, but the concept of cause would
possess no indication as to how it can be applied
to any object, because, in order to form any such
conclusion, certain conditions require to be known
of w^hich the concept itself tells us nothing. The
so-called principle that everything contingent has a
cause, comes no doubt before us with great solemnity
and self-assumed dignity. But, if I ask what you
understand by contingent and you answer, something
of which the non-existence is possible, I should be
Transcendental Analytic
199
glad to know how you can recognise this possibility of
non-existence, li you do not represent to yourselves,
in the series of phenomena, some kind of succession,
and in it an existence that follows upon non-existence
(or vice versa), and consequently a change ? To say
that the non-existence of a thing is not self- [p. 244]
contradictor)^ is but a lame appeal to a logical condi-
tion which » though it is necessarj' for the concept,
yet is by no means sufficient for its real possibility.
I can perfectly well remove in thought every existing
substance, without contradicting myself, but I can by
no means conclude from this as to its objective con-
tingency in its existence, that is, the possibility of
its non-existence in itself.
As regards the concept of community, it is easy to
see that, as the pure categories of substance and
causality admit of no explanation that would deter-
mine their object, neither could such an explanation
apply to the reciprocal causality in the relation of
substances to each other {commitriifffi).
As to possibility, existence, and necessity, no one
has yet been able to explain them, except by a man-
ifest tautology, so long as their definition is to be
exclusively drawn from the pure understanding. To
substitute the transcendental possibility of things (when
an object corresponds to a concept) for the logical
possibility of the concept (when the concept does not
contradict itself) is a quibble such as could deceive
and satisfy the inexperienced only.
[It seems to be something strange and even illogicaP
* The passagt from * It S€em& to be' to *ohjecttve concepts* i$ teffc out in
the Second Edition, and replaced by a ^ort note^ sec Supplement XXIIL
n
Tra nscen den ta I A n a lytic
that there should be a concept which must have a
raeaning, and yet is incapable of any explanation.
But the case of these categories is peculiar, because
it is only by means of the general sensuous condition
that they can acquire a definite meaning, and a refer-
ence to any objects. That condition being [p. 245]
left out in the pure category, it follows that it can
contain nothing but the logical function by which the
nnanifold is brought into a concept. By means of this
function, that is, the pure form of the concept, nothing
can be known nor distinguished as to the object belong-
ing to it, because the sensuous condition, under which
alone objects can belong to it, has been removed. Thus
we see that the categories require, besides the pure
concept of the understanding, certain determinations of
their application to sensibility in general (schemata).
Without them, they would not be concepts by which
an object can be known and distinguished from other
objects, but only so many ways of thinking an object
for possible intuitions, and giving to it, according to
one of the functions of the understanding, its meaning
(certain requisite conditions being given). They are
needed to define an object, and cannot therefore be de-
fined themselves. The logical functions of judgments
in general, namely » unity and plurality, assertion and
negation, subject and predicate, cannot be defined with-
out arguing in a circle, because the definition would
itself be a judgment and contain these very functions.
The pure categories arc nothing but representations of
♦things in general, so far as the manifold in intuition
must be thought by one or the other of these func-
tions. Thus, magnitude is the determination which can
Transcend€ntal Analytic
201
[only be thought by a judgment possessing [p, 246]
quantity {jndkium commune); reality, the determination
which can only be thought by an affirmative judgment;
while substance is that which, in regard to intuition,
must be the last subject of all other determinations.
With alt this it remains perfectly undetermined, what
kind of things they may be with regard to which we
have to use one rather than another of these func-
tions, so that, without the condition of sensuous intui-
tion, for which they supply the synthesis, the - categories
have no relation to any definite object, cannot define
any object, and consequently have not in themselves
che validity of objective concepts.]
From this it follows in contest ably » that the pure
concepts of the understanding never admit of a tran-
scendental, but only of an empirical use, and that the
principles of the pure understanding can only be re-
ferred, as general conditions of a possible experience,
to objects of the senses, never to things by themselves
(without regard to the manner in which we have to
look at them).
Transcendental Analytic has therefore yielded us this
important resulti that the understanding a priori can never
do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience ;
and as nothing can be an object of experience except the
phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never
go beyond the limits of sensibility, within which alone ob-
jects are given to us. Its principles are prin- [p. 247]
ciples for the exhibition of phenomena only ; and the
proud name of Ontology* which presumes to supply in a
systematic form different kinds of synthetical knowledge a
priori of things by themselves (for instance the principle
n
Transcendent ai Analytic
of causality), must be replaced by tbe more modest name
of a mere Analytic of the pure understanding.
Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an
object. If the mode of such intuition is not given, the
object is called transcendental, and the concept of the
understanding admits then of a transcendental use only, in
producing a unity in the thought of the manifold in gen-
eral. A pure category therefore, in which every condition
of sensuous intuition, the only one that is possible for us, is
left out, cannot determine an object, but only the thought
of an object in general, according to different modes.
Now, if we want to use a concept, we require in addition
some function of the faculty of judgment, by which an
object is subsumed under a concept, consequently the at
least formal condition under which something can be given
in intuition. If this condition of the faculty of judgment
(schema) is wanting, all subsumption is impossible, because
nothing is given that could be subsumed under the con-
cept. The purely transcendental use of categories there-
fore is in reality of no use at all, and has no definite or
even, with regard to its form only, definable object. Hence
it follows that a pure category is not fit for any [p. 248]
synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of
the pure understanding admit of empirical only, never of
transcendental applicationi nay, that no synthetical prin-
ciples a priori are possible beyond the field of possible
experience.
It might therefore be advisable to express ourselves in
the following way : the pure categories, without the formal
conditions of sensibility, have a transcendental character
only, but do not admit of any transcendental use, because
such use in itself is impossible, as the categories are
deprived of all the conditions of being used in judgments,
that is, of the formal condilions of the subsumption of
any possible object under these concepts. As therefore
(as pure categories) they are not meant to be used empiri-
cally, and cannot be used transccndentallyi they admit, if
separated from sensibility, of no use at all ; that is, they
cannot be applied to any possible object, and arc nothing
but the pure form of the use of the imderstanding with
reference to objects in general, and of thought, without
ever enabling us to think or determine any object by their
means alone.
[Appearances,* so far as they are thought as objects
under the unity of the categories, are called phenomena.
But if I admit things which are objects of the [p. 249]
understanding only, and nevertheless can be given as
objects of an intuition, though not of sensuous intuition
(as coram intuitu int€llcctuali\ such things would be called
Noumena (intiUigibiiia),
One might feel inclined to think that the concept of
Phenomena^ as limited by the transcendental aesthetic,
suggested by itself the objective reality of the Noumena^
and justified a division of objects into phenomena and
noumena, and consequently of the w^orld into a sensible
and intelligible world (jnundus sensibilis et intelligibilis) ;
and this in such a way that the distinction between the
two should not refer to the logical form only of a more or
less clear knowledge of one and the same object, but to a
difference in their original presentation to our knowledge,
which makes them to differ in themselves from each other
in kind* For if the senses only represent to us something
^ The pAssagc from * Appenrances ' to * given to mc in tntuitmn ' Is left uut
m the Sccatid Lclitiun» atiil rcpUced by .Supplement XXiV.
^
ranscendental Analytic
as it appears, that something must by itself also be a
thing, and an object of a non-sensuous intuition, i.e. of the
understanding. That is, there must be a kind of know-
ledge in which there is no sensibility, and which alone
possesses absolute objective reality, representing objects
as they are» while through the empirical use of our under-
standing we know things only as they appear. Hence it
would seem to follow that, beside the empirical [p. 250]
use of the categories {limited by sensuous conditions),
there was another one, pure and yet objectively valid, and
that we could not say, as we have hitherto done, that our
knowledge of the pure understanding contained nothing
but principles for the exhibition of phenomena, which,
even a priori, could not apply to anything but the formal
possibility of experience. Here, in fact, quite a new field
would seem to be open, a world, as it were, realised in
thought {nay, according to some, even in intuition), which
would be a more, and not a less, worthy object for the
pure understanding.
All our representations are no doubt referred by the
understanding to some sort of object, and as phenomena
are nothing but representations, the understanding refers
them to a somt'tkiugt as the object of our sensuous intui-
tion, this something being however the transcendental ob-
ject only. This means a something equal to x\ of which
we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our under-
standing, cannot know anything, but which ^ can only
serve, as a correlatum of the unity of apperception, for
the unity of the manifold in sensuous intuition, by means
of which the understanding unites the manifold into the
J Read •meUkts instcftd of wtUfur,
Transcendental Analytic
205
concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot
be separated from the sensuous data, because in that case
nothing would remain by which it could be [p, 251]
thought. It is not therefore an object of knowledge in
itself, but only the representation of phenomena, under the
concept of an object in general, which can be defined by
the manifold of sensuous intuition.
For this very reason the categories do not represent a
peculiar object, given to the understanding only, but serv^e
only to define the transcendental object (the concept of
something in general) by that which is given us through
the senses, in order thus to know empirically phenomena
under the concepts of objects.
What then is the cause why people, not satisfied with
the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phe-
nomena the noumena, which the understanding only is
supposed to be able to realise? It is this, that sensibility
and its sphere, that is the sphere of phenomena, is so lim-
ited by the understanding itself that it should not refer
to things by themselves, but only to the mode in which
things appear to us, in accordance with our own sub-
jective qualification. This was the result of the whole
transcendental aesthetic, and it really follows quite nat-
urally from the concept of a phenomenon in general, that
something must correspond to it, which in itself is not a
phenomenon, because a phenomenon cannot be anything
by itself, apart from our mode of representation, [p. 252]
Unless therefore we are to move in a constant circle, we
must admit that the very word phenomenon indicates a
relation to something the immediate representation of
which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even
without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the
^
Transcendental Afialytic
form of our intuition is founded) must be something by
itself, that is an object independent of our sensibility.
Hence arises the concept of a noumenon, which how-
ever is not positive, nor a definite knowledge of anything,
but which implies only the thinking of something, without
taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition.
But in order that a noumenon may signify a real object
that can be distinguished from all phenomena, it is not
enough that I should free my thought of all conditions
of sensuous intuition, but I must besides have some reason
for admitting another kind of intuition besides the sen-
suous, in which such an object can be given; otherwise
my thought would be empty, however free it may be from
contradictions. It is true that we were not able to prove
that the sensuous is the only possible intuition, though it
is so for us : but neither could w^e prove that another kind
of intuition was possible; and although our thought may
take no account of any sensibility, the question always
remains whether, after that, it is not a mere [p, 253]
form of a concept, and whether any real object would thus
be left.
The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general
is the transcendental object, that is, the entirely indefinite
thought of something in general This cannot be called
the noumenon, for I know nothing of what it is by itself,
and have no conception of it, except as the object of sen-
suous intuition in general, which is therefore the same for
all phenomena. I cannot lay hold of it by any of the
categories, for these are valid for empirical intuitions only,
in order to bring them under the concept of an object in
general, A pure use of the categories is no doubt pos-
sible, that is, not self-contradictory, but it has no kind of
Transcendental Analytic
207
I
objective validity, because it refers to no intuition to which
it is meant to impart the unity of an object The cate-
gories remain for ever mere functions of thought by which
no object can be given to me. but by which I can only
think whatever may be given to me in intuition.]
If all thought (by means of categories) is taken away
from empirical knowledge, no knowledge of any object
remains, because nothing can be thought by mere intui-
tion, and the mere fact that there is within me an affection
of my sensibility, establishes in no way any relation of
such a representation to any object. If, on the contrary,
all intuition is taken away, there always remains [p. 254]
the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an
object for the manifold of a possible intuition. In this
sense the categories may be said to extend further than
sensuous intuition, because they can think objects in
general without any regard to the special mode of sensi-
bility in which they may be given ; but they do not thus
prove a larger sphere of objects, because we cannot admit
that such objects can be given, without admitting the
possibility of some other but sensuous intuitioo, for which
we have no right whatever.
I call a concept problematic, if it is not self-contra-
dictory, and if, as limiting other concepts, it is connected
with other kinds of knowledge, w^hile its objective reality
cannot be known in any way. Now the concept of a
noumenon, that is of a thing which can never be thought
as an object of the senses, but only as a thing by itself
(by the pure understanding), is not self*contradictor)^
because we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only
form of intuition* That concept is also necessary, to
prevent sensuous intuition from extending to things by
r
Transcendental Analytic
themselves ; that is, in order to limit the objective validity
of sensuous knowledge {for all the rest to which sensuous
intuition does not extend is called noumenon, for [p. 255]
the very purpose of showing that sensuous knowledge can-
not extend its domain over everything that can be thought
by the understanding). Rut, after all, w^c cannot under-
stand the possibility of such noumcna, and whatever lies
beyond the sphere of phenomena is (to us) empty ; that is,
we have an understanding which problematically extends
beyond that sphere, but no intuition, nay not even the con-
ception of a possible intuition, by which, outside the field
of sensibility, objects could be given to us, and our under-
standing could extend beyond that sensibility in its asser-
tory use. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely
limitative, and intended to keep the claims of sensibility
within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only.
But it is not a mere arbitrary fiction ^ but closely con-
nected with the limitation of sensibility, though incapable
of adding anything positive to the sphere of the senses,
A real division of objects into phenomena and noumena,
and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world (in
a positive sense),^ is therefore quite inadmissible, although
concepts may very well be divided into sensuous and intel-
lectual. For no objects can be assigned to these intellectual
concepts, nor can they be represented as objectively valid.
If we drop the senses, how arc we to make it [p. 256]
conceivable that our categories (which would be the only
remaining concepts for noumena) have any meaning at
all, considering that, in order to refer them to any object,
something more must be given than the mere unity of
1 Addition of the Second Edition.
I
Transcendental Analytic 209
thought, namely, a possible intuition, to which the cate-
gories could be applied ? With all this the concept of a
noumenon, if taken as problematical only, remains not
only admissible, but, as a concept to limit the sphere of
sensibility, indispensable. In this case, however, it is not
a particular intcUigihIe object for our understanding, but
an understanding to which it could belong is itself a prob-
lem, if we ask how^ it could know an object, not discursively
by means of categories, but intuitively, and yet in a non-
sensuous intuition, — a process of which we could not
understand even the bare possibility. Our understanding
thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it
does not become itself limited by sensibility^ but, on the
contrary, limits it, by calling things by themselves (not
considered as phenomena) noumena. In doing this, it im-
mediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself, by admit-
ting that it cannot know these noumena by means of the
categories, but can only think of them under the name of
something unknown.
In the writings of modern philosophers, however, I meet
with a totally different use of the terms of mundus sensu
bilis and intelligibiiis} totally different from the mean-
ing assigned to these terms by the ancients, [p, 257]
Here all difficulty seems to disappear But the fact is,
that there remains nothing but mere word*mongery. In
accordance with this, some people have been pleased to
call the whole of phenomena, so far as they are seen, the
world of sense ; but so far as their connection, according
to general laws of the understanding, is taken into account,
the world of the understanding. Theoretical astronomy,
' An additional note b the Second Edition is ^ven ta Supplement XXV.
F
^
Transcendental Analytic
which only teaches the actual observation of the starry
heavens, would represent the former ; cnntemplative as-
tronomy, on the contrary (taught according to the Coperni-
can system, or, it may be, according to Newton's laws of
gravitation), the latter, namely, a purely intelligible world.
But this twisting of words is a mere sophistical excuse, in
order to avoid a troublesome question, by changing its
meaning according to one's own convenience. Under-
standing and reason may be applied to phenomena^ but
it is very questionable whether they can be applied at all
to an object which is not a phenomenon, but a nou-
menon; and it is this, when the object is represented as
purely intelligible, that is, as given to the understanding
only, and not to the senses. The question therefore is
whether, besides the empirical use of the understanding
(even in the Newtonian view of the world), a transcen-
dental use is possible, referring to the nou menon, as its
object; and that question we have answered decidedly in
the negative.
When ive therefore say that the senses rep- [p. 258]
resent objects to us as they appear, and the understand-
ing as they are, the latter is not to be taken in a transcen-
dental, but in a purely empirical meaning, namely, as to
how they, as objects of experience, must be represented,
according to the regular connection of phenomena, and
not according to what they may be, as objects of the pure
understanding, apart from their relation to possible experi-
ence, and therefore to our senses. This will always remain
unknown to us ; nay, we shall never know whether such
a transcendental and exceptional knowledge is possible
at all, at least as comprehended under our ordinary cate-
gories. With us understanding and sensibility cannot
Transcendenta I A na lytic
211
determine objects, unless they arc joined together. If we
separate them, we have intuitions without concepts, or
concepts without intuitions, in both cases representations
which we cannot refer to any definite object.
n, after all these arguments, anybody should still hesi-
tate to abandon the purely transcendental use of the cate-
gories, let him try an experiment with them for framing
any synthetical proposition. An analytical proposition
does not in the least advance the understanding, which,
as in such a proposition it is only concerned with what
is already thought in the concept, does not ask whether
the concept in itself has any reference to objects, or ex-
presses only the unity of thought in general [p. 259]
(this completely ignoring the manner in which an object
may be given). The understanding in fact is satisfied if
it knows what it contained in the concept of an object ;
it is indifferent as to the object to which the concept may
refer. But let him try the experiment with any syntheti-
cal and so-called transcendental proposition, as for in-
stance, * Everything that exists, exists as a substance, or
as a determination inherent in it,' or ' Everything con-
tingent exists as an effect of some other thing, namely,
its cause/ etc. Now I ask, whence can the understand-
ing take these synthetical propositions, as the concepts
are to apply, not to some possible experience, but to
things by themselves (noumena) ? Where is that third
term to be found which is always required for a syn-
thetical proposition, in order thus to join concepts which
have no logical (analytical) relation with each other? It
will be impossible to prove such a proposition, nay even
to justify the possibility of any such pure slssertion, with-
out appealing to the empirical use of the understanding,
212 Transcendental Analytic
and thus renouncing entirely the so-called pure and non-
sensuous judgment. There are no principles therefore
according to which the concepts of pure and merely in-
telligible objects could ever be applied, because we cannot
imagine any way in which they could be given, and the
problematic thought, which leaves a place open to them,
serves only, like empty space, to limit the sphere of em-
pirical principles, without containing or indicat- [p. 260]
ing any other object of knowledge, lying beyond that
sphere.
APPENDIX
Of the Amphiboly of Reflective Concepts, owing to
THE Confusion of the Empirical with the Tran-
scendental Use of the Understanding
Reflection {reflcxio) is not concerned with objects them-
selves, in order to obtain directly concepts of them, but is
a state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover
the subjective conditions under which we may arrive at
concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given
representations to the various sources of our knowledge
by which alone their mutual relation can be rightly de-
termined. Before saying any more of our representa-
tions, the first question is, to which faculty of knowledge
they may all belong ; whether it is the understanding or
the senses hy which they are connected and compared.
Many a judgment is accepted from mere habit, or made
from inclination, and as no reflection precedes or even
follows it critically, the judgment is supposed [p- 261]
to have had its origin in the understanding. It is not
all judgments that require an investigation, that is, a
Transcendental Analytic
213
I
I
I
careful attention with regard to the grounds of their
truth; for if they are immediately certain, as for in-
stance, that between two points there can be only one
straight line, no more immediately certain marks of
their truth than that which they themselves convey
could be discovered. But all judgments, nay, all com-
parisons, require reflection, that is, a discrimination of
the respective faculty of knowledge to which any given
concepts belong. The act by which I place in general
the comparison of representations by the side of the
faculty of knowledge to w^hich that comparison be-
longs, and by which I determine whether these repre-
sentations arc compared with each other as belonging
to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I
call transcendental refit ction. The relation in which the
two concepts may stand to each other in one state of the
mind is that of identity and differetice^ of agreement and
opposition^ of the interna! and external^ and finally of the
determinable and the detennination {matter and form).
The right determination of that relation depends on the
question in which facuhy of knowledge they subjectively
belong to each other, whether in sensibiHty or in the
understanding. For the proper distinction of the latter
is of great importance with regard to the manner in
which the former must be considered. [p. 262]
Before proceeding to form any objective judgments, we
have to compare the concepts with regard to the identity
(of many representations under one concept) as the founda-
tion of general judgments, or with regard to their differ-
ence as the foundation of particular judgments, or with
regard to their aj^reement and oppositian serving as the
foundations of affirmative and negative judgmentSi etc.
n
Transcendental Afmlytic
For this reason it might seem that we ought to call
these concepts concepts of comparison {conceptus com-
parafiouis). But as, when the contents of concepts and
not their logical form must be considered, that is, whether
the things themselves are identical or different, in agree-
ment or in opposition, etc., all things may have a two-
fold relation to our faculty of knowledge, namely, either
to sensibility or to the understanding, and as the manner
in %vhich they belong to one another depends on the place
to which they belong, it follows that the transcendental
reflection, that is the power of determining the relation
of given representations to one or the other class of
knowledge, can alone determine their mutual relation.
Whether the things are identical or different, in agree*
nicnt or opposition, etc., cannot be established at once
by the concepts themselves by means of a mere com-
parison {comparaih), but first of all by a proper discrimi-
nation of that class of knowledge to which they belong,
that is, by transcendental reflection. It might therefore be
said» that hgical rtjlcctkm is a mere comparison, because
it takes no account of the faculty of knowledge to which
any gi%^en representations belong, and treats [p. 263]
them, so far as they are all found in the mind, as
homogeneous, while transcendental reflection (which re-
fers to the objects themselves) supplies the possibility
of an objective comparison of representations among
themselves, and is therefore very different from the
other, the faculty of knowledge to which they belong
not being the same. This transcendental reflection is
a duty from which no one can escape who wishes to
form judgments a priori. We shall now take it in hand,
and may hope thus to throw not a little light on the
real business of the understanding.
I
Transcendental Analytic
ZIS
L Identity and Difference
When an object is presented to us several times, but
each time with the same internal determinations {qnaiitas
€t quantitas), it is, so long as it is considered as an object
of the pure understanding, always one and the same, one
fhing, not many {nmnerica identitas). But if it is a phe-
nomenon, a comparison of the concepts is of no conse-
quence, and though everything may be identical with
regard to the concepts, yet the difference of the places of
this phenomenon at the same time is a sufficient ground
for admitting the numerical difftrtnce of the object (of the
senses). Thus, though there may be no internal difference
whatever (cither in quality or quantity) between two drops
of water, yet the fact that they may be seen [p. 264]
at the same time in different places is sufficient to
establish their numerical difference. Leibniz took phe-
nomena to be things by themselves, intclligibilia, that is,
objects of the pure understanding (though, on account of
the confused nature of their representations, he assigned
to them the name of phenomena), and from that point
of view his principle of their indisceniibility {principium
identitas indisceniibiiinm) could not be contested. As,
however, they are objects of sensibility, and the use of
the understanding with regard to them is not pure, but
only empirical, their plurality and numerical diversity are
indicated by space itself, as the condition of external
phenomena. For one part of space, though it may be
perfectly similar and equal to another, is still outside it,
and for this very reason a part of space different from the
first which, added to it, makes a larger space : and this
applies to all things which exist at the same time ia
n
Transcendental Analytic
different parts of space, however similar or equal they
may be in other respects.
IL Agreement and Opposition
When reality is represented by the pure understanding
only {reaiitas nmimemm), no opposition can be conceived
between realities, that is, no such relation that, if connected
in one subject, they should annihilate the effects one of
the other, as for instance 3 — 3—0, The real in [p. 265]
the phenomena, on the contrary {reaiitas phenomenon)^
may very well be in mutual opposition, and if connected
in one subject, one may annihilate completely or in part
the effect of the other, as in the case of two forces moving
in the same straight line, either drawing or impelling a
point in opposite directions, or in the case of pleasure,
counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.
III. The Interfial and the External
In an object of the pure understanding that only is
internal which has no relation whatever (as regards its
existence) to anything different from itself. The inner
relations, on the contrary, of a substantia phenometton in
space are nothing but relations, and the substance itself
a complex of mere relations. We only know substances
in space through the forces which are active in a certain
space, by either drawing others near to it (attraction) or
by preventing others from penetrating into it (repulsion
and impenetrability). Other properties constituting the
concept of a substance appearing in space, and which we
call matter, are unknown to us. As an object of the pure
understanding, on the contrary, every substance must have
Transcendrntal Analytic
217
internal determinations and forces bearing on the interna,
reality. But what other internal accidents can I think
except those which my ow^n internal sense pre- [p. 266^
scnts to me, namely, something which is either itself
thought^ or something analogous to it? Hence Leibniz
represented all substances (as he conceived them as nou-
mena), even the component parts of matter (after having
in thought removed from them everything implying exter-
nal relation, and therefore composition also), as simple
subjects endowed with powers of representation, in one
word, as monads,
IV. Matter and Form
These are two concepts which are treated as the foun-
dation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con-
nected with everj^ act of the understanding. The former
denotes the determinable in general, the latter its deter-
mination (both in a purely transcendental meaning, all
differences in that which is given and the mode in which
it is determined being left out of consideration). Logi-
cians formerly called the universal, matter ; the specific dif-
ference, form. In every judgment the given concepts may
be called the logical matter{for a judgment); their relation,
by means of the copula, the form of a judgment. In every
being its component parts {essentialia) are the matter; the
mode in which they are connected in it, the essential form.
With respect to things in general, unlimited reality was
regarded as the matter of all possibility, and the limitation
thereof (negation) as that form by which one [p. 2671
thing is distinguished from another, according to transcen-
dental concepts. The understanding demands first that
something should be given (at least in concept) in order to
^
Transcendental Anaiytk
be able afterwards to determine it in a certain manner.
In the concept of the pure understand ing therefore, matter
comes before fornij and Leibniz in consequence first as-
sumed things (monads), and within them an internal power
of representation ^ in order afterwards to found thereon
their external relation, and the community of their states,
that is, of their representations- In this way space and time
were possible only, the former through the relation of sub-
stances, the latter through the connection of their deter-
minations among themselves, as causes and effects. And
so it would be indeed, if the pure understanding could be
applied immediately to objects, and if space and time were
determinations of things by themselves. But if they are
sensuous intuitions only, in which we determine all objects
merely as phenomena, then it follows that the form of
intuition (as a subjective quality of sensibility) comes
before all matter (sensations), that space and time there-
fore come before all phenomena, and before all data of
experience, and render in fact all experience possible. As
an intellectual philosopher Leibniz could not endure that
this form should come before things and determine their
possibility: a criticism quite just when he assumed that we
see things as they are (though in a confused representa-
tion). But as sensuous intuition is a peculiar [p. 268]
subjective condition on which all perception a prion de-
pends, and the form of which is original and independent,
the form must be given by itself, and so far from matter
(or the things themselves which appear) forming the true
foundation (as we might think, if we judged according to
mere concepts), the very possibility of matter presupposes
a formal intuition (space and time) as given.
^
I
NOTE ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF REFLECTIVE
CONCEPTS
I beg to be allowed to call the place which we assign to
a concept, either in sensibility or in the pure understand-
ing, its imnsctftdtntai place. If so, then the determination
of this position which belongs to every concept, according
to the difference of its use, and the directions for deter-
mining according to rules that place for all concepts, would
be called transcendental topic; a doctrine which would
thoroughly protect us against the subreptitious claims of
the pure understanding and the errors arising from it, by
always distinguishing to what faculty of knowledge each
concept truly belongs. Every concept, or every title to
which many kinds of knowledge belong, may be called a
logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aris-
totle, of which orators and schoolmasters avail themselves
in order to find under certain titles of thought [p. 269]
what would best suit the matter they have in hand, and
thus to be able, with a certain appearance of thoroughness,
to argue and wrangle to any extent.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains no more
than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and
distinction, which differ from the categories because they
do not serve to represent the object according to what con-
stitutes its concept (quantity, reality, etc.), but only the
comparison of representations, in all its variety, which pre-
cedes the concept of things. This comparison, however,
requires first a reflection, that is, a determination of the
place to which the representations of things which are to be
compared belung, namely, whether they are thought by the
pure understanding or given as phenomena by sensibility.
Transcendental Analytic
Concepts may be logically compared without our asking
any questions as to what place their objects belong,
whether as noumena to the understanding, or to sensi-
bility as phenomena. But if with these concepts we wish
to proceed to the objects themselves, a transcendental
reflection is necessary first of all, in order to determine
whether they are meant to be objects for the pure under-
standing or for sensibility. Without this reflection our use
of these concepts would be very uncertain, and [p. 270]
synthetical propositions would spring up which critical
reason cannot acknowledge, and which are simply founded
on transcendental amphiboly, that is, on our confounding
an object of the pure understanding with a phenomenon.
For want of such a transcendental topic, and deceived
by the amphiboly of reflective concepts, the celebrated
^Leibniz erected an intelicctual system af the world, or
believed at least that he knew the internal nature of things
by comparing all objects with the understanding only and
^ with the abstract formal concepts of his thought. Our
table of reflective concepts gives us the unexpected ad-
vantage of being able to exhibit clearly the distinctive
features of his system in all its parts, and at the same time
the leading principle of this peculiar view which rested on
a simple misunderstanding. He compared all things with
each other by means of concepts only, and naturally found
no other differences but those by which the understanding
distinguishes its pure concepts from each other The
conditions of sensuous intuition, which carry their own
differences, are not considered by him as original and
independent; for sensibility was with him a confused
mode of representation only, and not a separate source of
representations. According to him a phenomenon was
Transcendental Analytic
221
the representation of a thing by itself though different, in
its logical form, from knowledge by means of the [p, 271]
understanding, because the phenomenon, in the ordinary
absence of analysis, brings a certain admixture of collat-
eral representations into the concept of a thing which the
understanding is able to separate. In one word, Leibniz
inteikctmilised phenomena, just as Locke, according to ,
his system of Noogony (if I may use such an expression),
sensualised all concepts of the understanding, that is»
represented them as nothing but empirical, though ab-
stract, reflective concepts. Instead of regarding the
understanding and sensibility as two totally distinct sources
of representations, which however can supply objectively
valid judgments of things only in conjunction wnth each
other, each of these great men recognised but one of them.
which in their opinion applied immediately to things by
themselves, while the other did nothing but to produce
either disorder or order in the representations of the
former.
Leibniz accordingly compared the objects of the senses
with each other as things in general and in the under-
standing only. He did this,
First, so far as they are judged by the understanding
to be either identical or different. As he considers their
concepts only and not their place in intuition, in which
alone objects can be given, and takes no account of the
transcendental place of these concepts (whether the object
is to be counted among phenomena or among things by
themselves), it could not happen otherwise than [p* 272]
that he should extend his principle of indiscernibility.
which is valid with regard to concepts of things in gen-
eral only, to objects of the senses also (fnufuitis pluwHom-
k
n
Transcendental Analytic
emm), and imagine that he thus added no inconsiderable
extension to our knowledge of nature. No doubt, if I
know a drop of water as a thing by itself in all its internal
determinations^ I cannot allow that one is different from
the other, when their whole concepts are identical. But
if the drop of water is a phenomenon in space, it has its
place not only in the understanding {among concepts),
but in the sensuous external intuition (in space), and in
this case the physical place is quite indifferent with regard
to the inner determinations of things, so that a place B
can receive a thing which is perfectly similar or identical
with another in place A, quite as well as if it were totally
different from it in its internal determinations. Difference
of place by itself and without any further conditions ren-
ders the plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena
not only possible, but also necessary. That so-called law
of Leibniz therefore is no law of nature, but only an
analytical rule, or a comparison of things by means of
concepts only.
Secondly. The principle that realities (as mere asser-
tions) never logically contradict each other, is perfectly
true with regard to the relation of concepts, but [p. 273]
has no meaning whatever cither as regards nature or as
regards anything by itself (of which we can have no con-
cept whatever).^ The real opposition, as when A — B=0,
takes place everywhere wherever one reality is united
with another in the same subject and one annihilates the
efifact of the other. This is constantly brought before our
eyes in nature by all impediments and reactions which, as
depending on forces, must be called realitates pkaenomena,
1 * Whatever ' is omitted in the Second Edition.
Transcendental Analytic
223
eneral mechanics can even give us the empirical condi-
tion of that opposition in an a priori rule, by attending to
the opposition of directions; a condition of which the tran-
scendental concept of reality knows nothing. Although
Leibniz himself did not announce this proposition with
all the pomp of a new principle, he yet made use of it
for new assertions, and his followers expressly inserted
it in their system of the Lcibniz-Wolfian philosophy.
According to this principle all evils, for example, are
nothing but the consequences of the limitations o,f created
beings, that is, they are negations, because these can be
the only opposites of reality (which is perfectly true in
the mere concept of the thing in general, but not in things
as phenomena). In like manner the followers of Leibniz
consider it not only possible, but even natural, to unite
all reality, without fearing any opposition, in one being;
because the only opposition they know is that [p. 274]
of contradiction (by which the concept of a thing itself is
annihilated), while they ignore that of reciprocal action
and reaction, when one real cause destroys the effect of
another, a process which we can only represent to our*
selves when the conditions are given in sensibility.
Thirdly, The Leibnizian monadology has really no other
foundation than that Leibniz represented the difTcrcnce of
the internal and the external in relation to the understand-
ing only, Substances must have something internal^ which
is free from all external relations, and therefore from com-
position also. The simple, therefore, or un com pounded,
is the foundation of the internal of things by themselves.
This internal in the state of substances cannot consist in
space, form, contact, or motion (all these determinations
being external relations), and we cannot therefore ascribe
224
Trafiscenden tai A na iy t ic
to substances any other interna! state but that which
belongs to our own internal sense, namely, the state of
representations. This is the history of the monads, which
were to form the elements of the whole universe, and the
energy of which consists in representations only, so that
properly they can be active within themselves only.
For this reason, his principle of a possible community
of substances could only be a pre-established harmony,
and not a physical influence. For, as every- [p, 275]
thing is actively occupied internally only, that is, with its
own representations, the state of representations in one
substance could not be in active connection with that of
another ; but it became necessary to admit a third cause,
exercising its influence on all substances, and making their
states to correspond with each other, not indeed by oc-
casional assistance rendered in each particular case {sys*
tenia assist entiae), but through the unity of the idea of a
cause valid for all, and in which all together must receive
their existence and permanence, and therefore also their
reciprocal correspondence according to universal laws.
Fourthly. Leibniz's celebrated doctrine of space and
time, in which he intellectualised these forms of sensi-
bility, arose entirely from the same delusion of transcen-
dental reflection. If by means of the pure understanding
alone I want to represent the external relations of things,
I can do this only by means of the concept of their
reciprocal action ; and if I want to connect one state with
another state of the same thing, this is possible only in
the order of cause and effect. Thus it happened that
Leibniz conceived space as a certain order in the com-
munity of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence
of their states. That which space and time seem to pos-
Transcendental Analytic
225
sess as proper to themselves and independent [p. 276]
of things, he ascribed to the confusion of these concepts,
which made us mistake what is a mere form of dynamical
relations for a peculiar and independent intuition, ante-
cedent to things themselves. Thus space and time became
with him the intelligible form of the connection of things
(substances and their states) by themselves, and things
were intelligible substances [substaniiae fwumemi). Never-
theless he tried to make these concepts valid for phe-
nomena, because he would not concede to sensibility any
independent kind of intuition, but ascribed all, even the
empirical representation of objects, to the understanding,
leaving to the senses nothing but the contemptible work
of confusing and mutilating the representations of the
understanding.
But, even if we could predicate anything synthetically
by means of the pure understanding of things by them-
selves (which however is simply impossible), this could
never be referred to phenomena, because these do not
represent things by themselves. We should therefore in
such a case have to compare our concepts in a transcen-
dental reflection under the conditions of sensibility only,
and thus space and time would never be determinations of
things by themselves, but of phenomena. What things
may be by themselves we know not, nor need [p. 2yy^
we care to know, because, after all, a thing can never
come before me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
The remaining reflective conceptions have to be treated
in the same manner. Matter is stibstantia phenomenon.
What may belong to it internally, I seek for in all parts of
space occupied by it, and in all eflFects produced by it, all
of which, however, can be phenomena of the external
■n
Transcendental Analytic
senses only. I have therefore nothing that is absolutely,
but only what is relatively internal, and this consists itself
of external relations. Nay, what according to the pure
understanding should be the absolutely internal of matter
is a mere phantom^ for matter is never an object of
the pure understanding, \Vhile the transcendental object
which may be the ground of the phenomenon which we
call matter, is a mere something of which we could not
even understand what it is, though somebody should tell
us. We cannot understand anything except what carries
with it in intuition something corresponding to our words.
If the complaint * that we do not understand the internal
of things/ means that we do not comprehend by means of
the pure understanding what the things which appear to
us may be of themselves, it seems totally unjust and
unreasonable ; for it means that without senses we should
be able to know and therefore to see things, that is, that
we should possess a faculty of knowledge totally different
from the human, not only in degree, but in kind [p. 278]
and in intuition, in fact, that we should not be men, but
beings of whom we ourselves could not say whether they
are even possible^ much less what they would be like.
Observation and analysis of phenomena enter into the
internal of nature, and no one can say how far this may
go in time. Those transcendental questions, however,
which go beyond nature, would nevertheless remain un-
answerable, even if the whole of nature were revealed to
us, for it is not given to us to observe even our own mind
with any intuition but that of our internal sense. In it lies
the mystery of the origin of our sensibility. Its relation
to an object, and the transcendental ground of that unity,
are no doubt far too deeply hidden for us, who can know
Transcendental Arm lytic
227
even ourselves by means of the internal sense only, that is,
as phenomena, and wc shall never be able to use the same
imperfect instrument of investigation in order to find any-
thing but again and again phenomena, the non-sensuous,
and non-phenomenal cause of which we are seeking in vain»
What renders this criticism of the conclusions by means
of the acts of mere reflection extremely useful is, that it
shows clearly the nullity of all conclusions with regard to
objects compared with each other in the understanding
only, and that it confirms at the same time what [p, 279]
we have so strongly insisted on, namely, that phenomena,
though they cannot be comprehended as things by them-
selves among the objects of the pure understanding, are
nevertheless the only objects in w^hich our knowledge can
possess objective reality, i.e. \vhere intuition corresponds
to concepts.
When we reflect logically only, we only compare in our
understanding concepts among themselves, trying to find
oiit whether both have exactly the same contents, whether
they contradict themselves or not, whether something
belongs to a concept, or is added to it, and which of the
two may be given, while the other may be a mode only of
thinking the given concept. But if I refer these concepts
to an object in general (in a transcendental sense), with-
out determining whether it be an object of sensuous or
intellectual intuition, certain limitations appear at once,
warning us not to go beyond the concept, and upsetting
all empirical use of it, thus proving that a representation
of an object^ as of a thing in general, is not only insuffi-
cient, but, if without sensuous determination, and indepen-
dent of empirical conditions, self-contradictory. It is
necessary therefore either to take no account at all of the
Trtmscendentiil A na lytic
n
object (as we do in logic) or, if not, then to think it under
the conditions of sensuous intuition, because the intelligi-
ble would require a quite peculiar intuition which we do
not possess, and, without it, would be nothing to us, while
on the other side phenomena also could never [p, 280]
be things by themselves. For if I represent to myself
things in general only, the difference of external relations
cannot, it is true, constitute a difference of the things
themselves, but rather presupposes it ; and, if the concept
of one thing does not differ at all internally from that of
another, I only have one and the same thing placed in
different relations. Furthermore, by adding a mere affir-
mation (reality) to another, the positive in it is indeed
augmented, and nothing is tajccn away or removed, so
that we see that the real in things can never be in contra-
diction with itself, etc-
A certain misunderstanding of these reflective concepts
has, as avc showed, exercised so great an influence on the
use of the understanding, as to mislead even one of the
most acute philosophers to the adoption of a so*called
system of intellectual knowledge, which undertakes to
determine objects without the interv^ention of the senses.
For this reason the exposition of the cause of the misunder-
standing, which lies in the amphiboly of these concepts,
as the origin of false principles, is of great utility in deter-
mining and securing the true limits of the understanding.
It is no doubt true, that what can be affirmed or denied
of a concept in general, can also be affirmed or denied of
any part of it {dictmn de omni et nniio) \ but it [p. 281]
would be wrong so to change this logical proposition as to
make it say that whatever is not contained in a general
Transcendental Analytic
22g
concept, is not contained either in the particular con-
cepts comprehended under it ; for these are particular
concepts for the %^ery reason that they contain more than
is conceived in the general concept. Nevertheless the
whole intellectual system of Leibniz is built up on this
fallacy, and with it falls necessarily to the ground, to-
gether with all equivocation in the use of the understand-
ing, that had its origin in it
Leibniz's principle of discern ibility is really based on
the supposition that, if a certain distinction is not to be
found in the general concept of a thing, it could not be
met with cither in the things themselves, and that there-
fore all things were perfectly the same {nnmerif fudem),
which arc not distinguished from each other in their con-
cept also, as to quality or quantity. And because in the
mere concept of a thing, no account has been taken of
many a necessary condition of its intuition, it has rashly
been concluded that that which, in forming an abstraction,
has been intentionally left out of account, did really not
exist anywhere, and nothing has been allowed to a thing
except what is contained in its concept. [p, 2^2]
The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and how
many times soever I may think it, is in itself perfectly the
same. But two cubic feet are nevertheless distinguished
in space, by their places alone {nnmcro dwersa), and these
places are conditions of the intuition in which the object
of our concept is given, and which, though they do not
belong to the concept, belong nevertheless to the whole
of sensibility- In a similar manner there is no contra-
diction in the concept of a thing, unless something nega-
tive has been connected with something affirmative; and
simply affirmative concepts, if joined together, cannot
Transcendental Analytic
neutralise each other. But in sensuous intuition, where
we have to dea! with reahty (for instance motion), there
exist conditions (opposite directions) of which in the
concept of motion in general no account was taken, and
which render possible an opposition (not however a logical
one), and from mere positives produce zero^^o, so that
it would be wrong to say that all reality must be in per-
fect ag^reemcnt, if there is no opposition between its con-
cepts.^ \i we keep to concepts only, that which we call
internal is the substratum of all relations or [p. 2S3]
external determinations. If therefore I take no account
of any of the conditions of intuition, and confine myself
solely to the concept of a thing, then I may drop no doubt
all external relations, and yet there must remain the con-
cept of something which implies no relation, but internal
determinations only. From this it might seem to follow
that there exists in everything something (substance) which
is absolutely internal, preceding all external determinations,
nay, rendering them possible. It might likewise seem to
follow that this substratum, as no longer containing any
external relations, must be simple (for corporeal things are
always relations only, at least of their parts existing side
by side); and as we know of no entirely internal deter-
minations beyond those of our own internal sense, that
substratum might be taken, not only as simple, but like-
' If one wishefl to use here the usual suliterfuge that rfalitaies twumena^
at least, can not nppnse each ulhcr, it would be necessary to pro'lutre au
example of such |jure and non-scnsuous reality, to enable iis to sec whether
it was something or nothing** No example, however, can be producedt except
from experience, which never offers us anything but phenomena; so that this
proposition means really nothing but that a concept, which contains affirma-
tives only, contains no negative^ a proposition which we at least have never
doubted.
Transcendental Aftalytk
231
wise (according to the analogy of our own internal sense)
as determined by representations, so that all things would
be really niomids, or simple beings endowed with repre-
sentations. All this would be perfectly true, unless some-
thing more than the concept of a thing in gen- [p. 284]
eral were required in order to give us objects of external
intuition, although the pure concept need take no account
of it. But we see» on the contrary; that a permanent
phenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) may con-
tain mere relations without anything that is absolutely
internal, and yet be the first substratum of all external
perception. It is true that if w^e think by concepts only,
we cannot think something external without something
internal, because conceptions of relations presuppose
things given, and are impossible without them. But as
in intuition something is contained which does not exist
at alt in the mere concept of a thing, and as it is this
which supplies the substratum that could never be known
by mere concepts, namely, a space which, with all that
is contained in it, consists of purely formal, or real rela-
tions also, I am not allowed to say, that, because nothing
can be represented by mere concepts without something
absolutely internal, there could not be in the real things
themselves, comprehended under those concepts, and in
their intnition, anything external, without a foundation of
something absolutely internal. For, if we take no account
of all conditions of intuition, then no doubt nothing re*
mains in the mere concept but the internal in general,
with its mutual relations, through which alone the extcr^
nal is possible. This necessity, however, which depends
on abstraction alone, does not apply to things, if [p. 285]
they are given in intuition with determinations expressive
^
Tmmcendentai A^miyik
of mere relations, and without having for their foundation
anything internal, for the simple reason that they are
phenomena only, and not things in themselves. What-
ever we may know of matter are nothing but relations
(what we call internal determinations are but relatively
internal); but there are among these relations some which
arc independent and permanent^ and by which a certain
object is given us. That I, when abstraction is made of
these relations, have nothing more to think, does not do
away with the concept of a thing, as a phenomenon, nor
with the concept of an object in abstnulo. It only shows
the impossibility of such an object as could be determined
by mere concepts, that is of a noumenon. It is no doubt
startling to hear, that a thing should consist entirely of
relations, but such a thing as we speak of is merely a
phenomenon, and can never be thought by means of the
categories only ; nay, it consists itself of the mere relation
of something in general to our senses. In the same man-
ner, it is impossible for us to represent the relations of
things in abstracts as long as we deal with concepts only,
in any other way than that one should be the cause of
determinations in the other, this being the very concept
of our understanding, with regard to relations. But as
in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, a whole
class of determinations, by which the manifold determines
its place to each of its component parts, that is, the form
of sensibility (space), disappears, though in truth [p. 286]
it precedes all empirical casuality.
If by purely intelligible objects we understand things
which, without all schemata of sensibility, are thought by
mere categories, such objects are simply impossible. It is
our sensuous intuition by which objects are given to us that
Transcendental Analytic
233
forms the condition of the objective application of all the
concepts of our understanding, and without that intuition
the categories have no relation whatever to any object
Nay, even if we admitted a kind of intuition different from
the sensuous, onr functions of thought would have no
meaning with regard to it. If we only mean objects of a
non-sensuous intuition, to which our categories do not apply,
and of which we can have no knowledge whatever (either
intuitional or conceptual), there is no reason why noumena,
in this merely negative meaning, should not be admitted,
because in this case we mean no more than this, that our
intuition does not embrace all things, but objects of our
senses only ; that, consequently, its objective validity is
limited, and space left for some other kind of intuition, and
consequently for things as objects of it. But in that sense
the concept of a noumenon is problematical ^ that is, the
representation of a thing of which we can neither say that
it is possible or that it is impossible, because we have no
conception of any kind of intuition but that of our senses,
or of any kind of concepts but of our categories, [p. 2%t\
neither of them being applicable to any extra-sensuous
object We cannot therefore extend in a positive sense
the field of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions
of our sensibility, or admit, besides phenomena, objects of
pure thought, that is, noumena, simply because they do not
possess any positive meaning that could be pointed out.
For it must be admitted that the categories by themselves
are not sufficient for a knowledge of things, and that, with-
out the data of sensibility^ they would be nothing but
subjective forms of unity of the understanding, and without
an object We do not say that thought is a mere product
of the senses, and therefore limited by them, but it does
Transcendental Analytic
not follow that therefore thought, without sensibility, has
its o%vn pure use, because it would really be without an
object Nor would it be right to call the noumenon such
an object of the pure understandings for the noumenon
means the problematical concept of an object, intended for
an intuition and understanding totally different from our
own, and therefore themselves mere problems. The con-
cept of the noumenon is not therefore the concept of an
object, but only a problem, inseparable from the limitation
of our sensibility, whether there may not be objects inde-
pendent of its intuition. This is a question that [p, 288]
can only be answered in an uncertain way, by saying that
as sensuous intuition does not embrace all things without
exception, there remains a place for other objects, that can-
not therefore be absolutely denied, but cannot be asserted
either as objects of our understanding, because there is no
definite concept for them (our categories being unfit for
that purpose).
The understanding therefore limits the sensibility with-
out enlarging thereby its own field, and by warning the
latter that it can never apply to things by themselves,
but to phenomena only, it forms the thought of an object
by itself, but as transcendental only, which is the cause of
phenomena, and therefore never itself a phenomenon:
which cannot be thought as quantity, nor as reality, nor as
substance (because these concepts require sensuous forms
in which to determine an object), and of which therefore
it must always remain unknown, whether it is to be found
within us only, or also without us; and whether, if sensi-
bility were removed, it would vanish or remain. If we like
to call this object noumenon, because the representation of
it is not sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we
Transcendental Analytic
235
^
cannot apply to it any of the concepts of our understand-
ing, such a representation remains to us empty, sending no
purpose but that of indicating the limits of our sensuous
knowledge, and leaving at the same time an [p. 289]
empty space which we cannot fill either by possible expe-
rience, or by the pure understanding.
The critique of the pure understanding docs not there-
fore allow us to create a new sphere of objects beyond
those which can come before it as phenomena, or to stray
into intelligible worlds, or even into the concept of such.
The mistake which leads to this in the most plausible
manner, and which, though excusable, can never be justi-
fied, consists in making the use of the understanding, con-
trary to its very intention, transcendental, so that objects,
that is, possible intuitions, are made to conform to con-
cepts, not concepts to possible intuitions, on which alone
their objective validity can rest. The cause of this is
again, that apperception, and with it thought, precedes
every possible determinate arrangement of represen-
tations. We are thinking something in general, and
determine it on one side sensuously, but distinguish at
the same time the general object, represented in abstrac-
tion, from this particular mode of sensuous intuition.
Thus there remains to us a mode of determining the
object by thought only, which, though it is a mere logical
form without any contents, seems to us nevertheless a
mode in which the object by itself exists {noffmtmm), with-
out regard to the intuition which is restricted to our
senses. [p. 290]
Before leaving this transcendental Analytic, we have to
add something which, though in itself of no particular
n
236 Transcendental Analyiic
importance, may yet seem to be requisite for the complete-
ness of the system. The highest concept of which all
transcendental philosophy generally begins, is the division
into the possible and the impossible. But, as all division
presupposes a divisible concept^ a higher concept is re-
quired, and this is the concept of an object io general,
taken as problematical, it being left uncertain whether it
be something or nothing. As the categories are the only
concepts which apply to objects in general, the distinction
whether an object is something or nothing must proceed
according to the order and direction of the categories.
L Opposed to the concepts of all^ many^ and oney is
the concept which annihilates everything, that is, notte ;
and thus the object of a concept, to which no intuition
can be found to correspond, is=o, that is, a concept with-
out an object, like the noumena, which cannot be counted
as possibilities, though not as impossibilities either {ens
natiouis) ; or like certain fundamental forces, [p. 291]
which have been newly invented, and have been con*
ccived without contradiction, but at the same time with*
out any example from experience, and must not therefore
be counted among possibilities.
II. Reality is somethings negation is nothing; that is,
it is the concept of the absence of an object, as shadow or
col d {n ih il privativ uni) .
III. The mere form of intuition (without substance)
is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of
it (as a phenomenon), as pure space and pure time (ens
imaginarium), which, though they are something, as forms
of intuition, are not themselves objects of intuition.
IV. The object of a concept which contradicts itself,
is nothing, because the concept is nothing ; it is simply
TransctHtUntal Analytic
237
the impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines
{nihil negativum),
A table showing this division of the concept of nothing
(the corresponding division of the concept of something
follows by itself) would have to be arranged as follows.
Nothing, [p. 292]
as
L Empty concept without an object.
Epts rai'^onis,
IL Empty object of a III. Empty intuition without
concept. an object.
Nil privativuffu Ens imaginarium
IV, Empty object without a concept.
Nihil negativum.
We see that the ens rati&tiis (No. i) differs from the
ens negativum (No. 4), because the former cannot be
counted among the possibilities, being the result of
fancy, though not self-contradictory, while the latter is
opposed to possibility, the concept annihilating itself.
Both, however, are empty concepts. The nihil privati-
vum (No. 2) and the efts imaginarium (No. 3) are, on
the contrary, empty data for concepts. It would be
impossible to represent to ourselves darkness, unless light
had been given to the senses, or space, unless extended
beings had been perceived. The negation, as well as
the pure form of intuition are, without something real,
no objects.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC [p. 293]
Second Division
Transcendental Dialectic
INTRODUCTION
I. Of Transcendental Appearance (Illusion)
We call Dialectic in general a logic of iiiNsiim (eine
Logik des Scheins). This does not mean that it is a
doctrine of pr&babiiity (Wahrscheinlichkeit), for proba-
bihty is a kind of truth, known through insufficient
causes, the knowledge of which is therefore deficient,
but not deceitful, and cannot properly be separated from
the analytical part of logic. Still less can phenomenon
(Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein) be taken as identical
For truth or illusion is not to be found in the objects of
intuition, but in the judgments upon them, so far as they
are thought- It is therefore quite right to say, that the
senses never err, not because they always judge rightly,
but because they do not judge at all Truth therefore
and error, and consequently illusory appearance also, as
the cause of error, exist in our judgments only, that is,
in the relation of an object to our understanding. No
error exists in our knowledge, if it completely agrees with
the laws of our understanding, nor can there be [p. 294]
an error in a representation of the senses, because they
238
Transcendental Dialectic
239
^
involve no judgment^ and no power of nature can, of its
own accord, deviate from its own laws. Therefore neither
the understanding by itself (without the influence of
another cause), nor the senses by themselves could ever
err. The understanding could not err, because as long
as it acts according to its own Jaws, the effect (the judg-
ment) must necessarily agree with those laws, and the
formal test of all truth consists in this agreement with
the laws of the understanding. The senses cannot err,
because there is in them on judgment at all, whether
true or false. Now as we have no other sources of know-
ledge but these two, it follows that error can only arise
through the unperceived influence of the sensibility on
the understandings whereby it happens that subjective
grounds of judgment are mixed up with the objective,
and cause them to deviate from their destination i ^ just
as a body in motion would, if left to itself^ always follow
a straight line in the same direction^ which is changed
however into a curvilinear motion, as soon as another
force influences it at the same time in a different direc-
tion. In order to distinguish the proper action [p. 295]
of the understanding from that other force which is mbced
up with it, it will be necessary to look on an erroneous
judgment as the diagonal between two forces, which de-
termine the judgment in two different directions, forming
as it were an angle, and to dissolve that composite effect
into the simple ones of the understanding and of the sen-
sibility, which must be effected in pure judgments a priori
* Sensibilttf* if subjected to the uaderstandiog as the object on which it
exercises its function, is the source of rcftl knowledge, but sensibility, if it in-
fluences the action uf the undcrstAndiDg itftclf and leads it on to a judgment,
is the cause uf error.
n
240 Transccndcnta! Dialectic
by transcendental reflection, whereby, as we tried to show,
the right place is assigned to each representation in the
faculty of knowledge corresponding to it, and the influence
of cither faculty upon such representation is determined.
It is not at present our business to treat of empirical,
for instance, optical appearance or illusion, which occurs
in the empirical use of the otherwise correct rules of the
understanding, and by which, owing to the influence of
imagination, the faculty of judgment is misled. We
have to deal here with nothing but the transcendental
illusion, which touches principles never even intended
to be applied to experience, which might give us a test
of their correctness, — an illusion which, in spite of all
the warnings of criticism, tempts us far beyond the em-
pirical use of the categories, and deludes us with the mere
dream of an extension of the pure understanding. All
principles the application of which is entirely confined
within the limits of possible experience, we [p. 296]
shall call immanent ; those, on the contrary, which tend
to transgress those limits, transcendent. I do not mean
by this the transcendental use or abuse of the categories,
which is a mere fault of the faculty of the judgment,
not being as yet sufficiently subdued by criticism nor
sufficiently attentive to the limits of the sphere within
which alone the pure understanding has full play, but
real principles which call upon us to break down all
those barriers, and to claim a perfectly new territory,
which nowhere recognises any demarcation at all Here
transcendental and transcendent do not mean the same
thing. The principles of the pure understanding, which
we explained before, are meant to be only of empirical,
and not of transcendental application, that is, they cannot
Transcendental Dialectic
241
transcend the limits of experience. A principle, on the
contrary, which removes these landmarks, nay, insists
on our transcending them, is called transcendent. If our
critique succeeds in laying bare the illusion of those pre-
tended principles, the other principles of a purely em-
pirical use may, in opposition to the former, be called
immanent.
Logical illusion, which consists in a mere imitation
of the forms of reason {the illusion of sophistic syllo-
gisms), arises entirely from want of attention to logical
rules. It disappears at once, when our attention [p, 297]
is roused. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does
not disappear, although it has been shown up, and its
worthlessness rendered clear by means of transcendental
criticism, as, for instance, the illusion inherent in the
proposition that the world must have a beginning in
time. The cause of this is that there exists in our
reason (considered subjectively as a faculty of human
knowledge) principles and maxims of its use, which have
the appearance of objective principles, and lead us to
mistake the subjective necessity of a certain connection
of our concepts in favour of the understanding for an
objective necessity in the determination of things by
themselves. This illusion is as impo.ssible to avoid as
it is to prevent the sea from appearing to us higher at
a distance than on the shore, because we see it by
higher rays of light ; or to prevent the moon from ap-
pearing, even to an astronomer, larger at its risingj V
although he is not deceived by that illusion.
Transcendental Dialectic must, therefore, be content
to lay bare the illusion of transcendental judgments :md
guarding against its deceptions — but it will never sue-
Tnmsct'Hih'n la / D i a ice tic
I teed in removmg the transcendental illusion (like the
j logical)^ and putting an end to it altogether, [p, 298]
For we have here to deal with a natural and inevitable
illusioHj which itself rests on subjectivx' principles, repre-
senting them to us as objective, while logical Dialectic,
in removing sophisms, has to deal merely with a mis-
take in applying the principles, or with an artificial illy-
sion produced by an imitation of them. There exists,
therefore, a natural and inevitable Dialectic of pure rea*
son, not one in which a mere bungler might get entangled
from want of knowledge, or which a sophist might arti-
ficially devise to confuse rational people, but one that
is inherent in» and inseparable from human reason, and
which, even after its illusion has been exposed, will never
cease to fascinate our reason, and to precipitate it into
momentary errors, such as require to be removed again
and again*
%
^
3. Of Pure Reason, as tie Seat of Transcendental Illtision
A. 0/ Reason in Genera!
J All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds
I thence to the understanding, and ends with reason.
\^There is nothing higher than reason, for working up
the material of intuition, and comprehending it under the
highest unity of thought. As it here becomes [p, 299]
necessary to give a definition of that highest faculty of
knowledge, I begin to feel considerable misgivings. There
is of reason, as there is of the understanding, a purely
formal, that is logical use, in which no account is taken
of the contents of knowledge ; but there is also a real
use, in so far as reason itself contains the origin of cer-
Transcendental Dialecik
243
tain concepts and principles, which it has not borrowed
either from the senses or from the understanding. The_
former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the
faculty of mediate conclusions^ in contradistinction to im-
mediate ones {consequtHtiae immediatae) ; but this does
not help us to understand the latter, which itself produees
concepts. As this brings us face to face with the division
of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty, we
must look for a higher concept for this source of know-
ledge, to comprehend both concepts : though, according to
the analogy of the concepts of the understanding, w^e may
expect that the logical concept will give us the key to the
transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the
former will give us the genealogical outline of the con*
cepts of reason.
In the first part of our transcendental logic we defined
the understanding as the faculty of ruies^ and we now
distinguish reason from it, by calling it the faculty of
principles, [p. 300]
The term principle is ambiguous, and signifies com-
monly some kind of knowledge only that may be used as
a principle, though in itself, and according to its origin,
it is no principle at all Every general proposition, even
though it may have been derived from experience (by
induction), may serve as a major in a syllogism of reason ;
but it is not on that account a principle. Mathematical
axioms, as, for instance, that betwxen two points there can
be only one straight line, constitute even general know-
ledge a priori, and may therefore, with reference to the
cases which can be brought under them, rightly be called
principles. Nevertheless it would be wrong to say. that
this property of a straight line, in general and by itself,
^
Transcendental Dialectic
n
is known to us from principles, for it is known from pure
intuition only.
I shall therefore call it knowledge from principles,
whenever we know the particular in the general, by
means of concepts* Thus every syllogism of reason is a
form of deducing some kind of knowledge from a prin-
ciple, because the major always contains a concept which
enables us to know, according to a principle, everything
that can be comprehended under the conditions of that
concept. As every general knowledge may serve as a
major in such a syllogism, and as the understanding
supplies such general propositions a priori, these no
doubt may, with reference to their possible use, be called
principles. [p, 301]
But, if we consider these principles of the pure under*
standing in themselves, and according to their origin, we
find that they are anything rather than knowledge from
concepts. They would not even be possible a priori^
unless we relied on pure intuition (in mathematics) or
on conditions of a possible experience in general That
everything which happens has a cause, can by no means
be concluded from the concept of that which happens ;
on the contrary, that very principle shows in what man-
ner alone we can form a definite empirical concept of
that which happens.
It is impossible therefore for the understanding to sup-
ply us with synthetical knowledge from concepts, and it is
really that kind of knowledge which I call principles abso-
lutely; while all general propositions may be called prin-
ciples relatively.
It is an old desideratum, which at some time, however
distant, may be realised, that, instead of the endless
Transcendental Dialectic
24S
variety of civil laws, their principles might be discovered,
for thus alone the secret might be found of what is called
simplifying legislation. Such laws, howev^er, arc only
limitations of our freedom under conditions by which it
always agrees with itself ; they refer to something which
is entirely our own work, and of which we ourselves can be
the cause, by means of these concepts. But that objects
in themselves, as for instance material nature, should be
subject to principles, and be determined accord- [p. 502]
ing to mere concepts, is something, if not impossible, at
all events extremely contradictor}\ But be that as it may
i^{for on this point we have still all investigations before
us), so much at least is clear, that knowledge from princi-
ples (by itself) is something totally different from mere
knowledge of the understanding, which, in the form of a
principle, may no doubt precede other knowledge, but
which by itself (in so far as it is synthetical) is not based
on mere thought, nor contains anything general, according
to concepts.
If the understanding is a faculty for producing unity
among phenomena, according to rules, reason is the faculty
for producing unity among the rules of the understanding,
according to principles. Reason therefore never looks-^
directly to experience, or to any object, but to the under- I
standing, in order to impart a priori through concepts to I
its manifold kinds of knowledge a unity that may be called [ *
the unity of reason, and is very different from the unity I
which can be produced by the understanding.
This is a general definition of the faculty of reason, so
far as it was possible to make it intelligible without the
help of illustrations, which are to be given hereafter.
ij
Transcendental Dialectic
n
B, Of the Logical Use of Reason [p. 303^
A distinction is commonly made between what is im-
mediately known and what is only inferred That in a
figure bounded by three straight lines there are three
angles, is known immediately^ but that these angles to-
gether are equal to two right angles, is only inferred As
we are constantly obliged to infer, we grow so accustomed
to it, that in the end we no longer perceive this difference,
and as in the case of the so-called deceptions of the senses,
often mistake what we have only inferred for something
perceived immediately. In every syllogism there is first a
fundamental proposition; secondly, another deduced from J
it ; and lastly, the conclusion (consequence), according to
which the truth of the latter is indissolubly connected with
the truth of the former. If the judgment or the conclusion
is so clearly contained in the first that it can be inferred
from it without the mediation or intervention of a third
representation, the conclusion is called immediate (consc'
quentia immediata) : though I should prefer to call it a
conclusion of the understandmg. But if, besides the fun-
damental knowledge, another judgment is required to
bring out the consequence, then the conclusion is called
a conclusion of reason. In the proposition ^{i/I tnen are
fnortal^^ the following propositions are contained : some
men are mortal ; or some mortals are men ; or nothing that
is immortal is a man. These are therefore im- [p. 304]
mediate inferences from the first. The proposition, on
the contrary, all the learned are mortal, is not contained
in the fundamental judgment, because the concept of
learned does not occur in it, and can only be deduced from
it by means of an intervening judgment.
Transcendental Dialectic
247
In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major) by
means of the understanding. I then bring some special
knowledge under the condition of the rule (the minor) by
means of the faculty of judgment, and I finally determine
my knowledge througti the predicate of the rule [con-
clnsio), that is, a /Priori, by means of reason. It is there-
fore the relation represented by the major proposition, as
the rule» between knowledge and its condition, that con-
stitutes the different kinds of syllogism. Syllogisms are
therefore threefold, like all judgments, differing from each
other in the manner in which they express the relation of
knowledge in the understanding, namely, categorical, hy-
pothetical, and disjunctive.
Iff as often happens, the conclusion is put forward as
a judgment* in order to see whether it does not follow from
other judgments by which a perfectly different object is
conceived, I try to find in the understanding the assertion
of that conclusion, in order to see whether it does not ex-
ist in it, under certain conditions, according to a general
rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object of the
conclusion can be brought under the given [p. 305]
condition, then that conclusion follows from the rule
which is valid for t^/her objWts of kmnoleelge also. Thus
we see that reason, in forming conclusions, tries to reduce
the great variety of the knowledge of the understanding
to the smallest number of principles (general conditions),
and thereby to produce in it the highest unity.
C. Of the Pure Use of Reason
The question to which we have at present to give an
answer, though a preliminary one only, is this, whether
reason can be isolated and thus constitute by itself an
r
Transcendental Dialectic
independent source of concepts and judgments, which
spring from it alone, and through which it has reference
to objects, or whether it is only a subordinate faculty for
imparting a certain form to any given knowledge, namely,
a logical form, a faculty whereby the cognitions of the
understanding are arranged among themselves only, and
lower rules placed under higher ones (the condition of the
latter comprehending in its sphere the condition of the
former) so far as all this can be done by their comparison.
Variety of rules with unity of principles is a requirement
of reason for the purpose of bringing the understanding
into perfect agreement with itself, just as the understand-
ing brings the variety of intuition under concepts, and
thus imparts to intuition a connected form. Such a prin-
ciple however prescribes no law to the objects [p. 306]
themselves, nor does it contain the ground on which the
possibility of knowing and determining objects depends.
It is merely a subjective law of economy, applied to the
stores of our understanding; having for its purpose, by
means of a comparison of concepts, to reduce the general
use of them to the smallest possible number, but without
giving us a right to demand of the objects themselves
such a uniformity as might conduce to the comfort and
the extension of our understanding, or to ascribe to that
maxim any objective validity. In one word, the question
is, whether reason in itself, that is pure reason, contains
synthetical principles and rules a priori^ and what those
principles are ?
The merely formal and logical procedure of reason in
syllogisms gives us sufficient hints as to the ground on
which the transcendental principle of synthetical know-
ledge, by means of pure reason, is likely to rest.
Transccfidental Dialectic
249
Firsts a syllogism, as a function of reason, does not
refer to intuitions in order to bring them under rules (as
the understanding does with its categories)> but to con-
cepts and judgments. Although pure reason refers in the
^i\A to objects, it has no immediate relation to them and
their intuition, but only to the understanding and its judg-
ments, these having a direct relation to the [p. 307]
senses and their intuition, and determining their objects.
Unity of reason is therefore never the unity of a possible
experience, but essentially different from it, as the unity
of the understanding. That everything which happens
has a cause, is not a principle discovered or prescribed by
reason, it only makes the unity of experience possible, and
borrows nothing from reason, which without this relation
to possible e.xperience could never, from mere concepts,
have prescribed such a synthetical unity.
Secondly, Reason, in its logical employment, looks for
the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and
the syllogism produced by reason is itself nothing but a
judgment by means of bringing its condition under a gen-
eral rule (the major). But as this rule is again liable to
the same experiment, reason having to seek, as long as
possible, the condition of a condition (by means of a pro-
syllogism), it is easy to ^ec that it is the peculiar principle
of reason (in its logical use) to find for every condi-
tioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned,
whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed.
This logical maxim, however, cannot become a principle
of pure reason, unless we admit that, whenever the condi-
tion^s given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated
to one another, a series, which consequently is [p. 508]
itself uncontiitioned. is likewise given (that is, is contaiiied
in the object and its connection).
Transcendental Diahciic
n
Such a principle of pure reason, however, is evidently
synthetical ; for analytically the conditioned refers no
doubt to some condition, but not to the unconditioned.
From this principle several other synthetical propositions
also must arise of which the pure understanding knows
nothing ; because it has to deal with objects of a possible
experience only, the knowledge and synthesis of which are
always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it is really to
be admittedj has to be especially considered with regard to
all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever
is conditioned, and will thus supply material for many a
synthetical proposition a priori.
The principles resulting from this highest principle of
pure reason will however be transcendent, with regard to all
phenomena ; that is to say» it will be impossible ever to
make any adequate empirical use of such a principle. It
will thus be completely different from all principles of the
understanding, the use of which is entirely immanent and
directed to the possibility of experience only. The task
that is now before us in the transcendental Dialectic
which has to be developed from sources deeply hidden in
the human reason, is this : to discover the correctness or
otherwise the falsehood of the principle that the series of
conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of objective
thought in general) extends to the unconditioned, and
what consequences result therefrom with regard to the
empirical use of the understanding:^ — to find [p. 309]
out whether there is really such an objectively valid prin-
ciple of reason, and not only, in place of it, a logical rule
which requires us, by ascending to ever higher conditions,
to approach their completeness, and thus to bring the
highest unity of reason, which is possible to us, into our
Transcendental Dialectic
251
knowledge : to find out, I say, whether, by some miscon-
ception» a mere tendency of reason has not been mistaken
for a transcendental principle of pure reason, postulating,
without sufficient reflection, absolute completeness iu the
series of conditions in the objects themselves, and what
kind of misconceptions and illusions may in that case have
crept into the syllogisms of reason, the major proposition
of which has been taken over from pure reason (being
perhaps a petitio rather than a postulatum), and which
ascend from experience to its conditions. We shall divide
it into two parts, of which the first will treat of the tran-
scencUnt comepts of pure reason^ the second of trafiscendetU
and dialectical syllogisms.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
[p- 310]
BOOK I
OF THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON
Whatever may be thought of the possibility of con-
cepts of pure reason, it is certain that they are not simply
• obtained by reflection, but by inference. Concepts of the
understanding exist a priori, before experience, and for the
sake of it, but they contain nothing but the unity of reflec-
tion applied to phenomena, so far as they are necessarily
intended for a possible empirical consciousness. It is
through them alone that knowledge and determination of
an object become possible. They are the first to give
material for conclusions, and they are not preceded by any
concepts a priori of objects from which they could them-
selves be deduced. Their objective reality however de-
pends on this, that because they constitute the intellectual
form of all experience, it is necessary that their application
should always admit of being exhibited in experience.
The very name, however, of a concept of reason gives a
kind of intimation that it is not intended to be limited to
experience, because it refers to a kind of knowledge of
which every empirical knowledge is a part only (it may be,
252
Transcendental Diaitxtic
253
the whole of possible experience or of its empir- [p. 311]
ical synthesis) : and to which all real experience belongs,
though it can never fully atlain to it. Concepts of reason
serve for conceiving or comprehending ; concepts of the
understanding for understanding (perceptions). If they
contain the unconditioned, they refer to something to
which all experience may belong, but which itself can
never become an object of experience; — something to
which reason in its conclusions from experience leads up,
and by which it estimates and measures the degree of its
own empirical use, but which never forms part of empirical
synthesis. If such concepts possess, notwithstanding,
objective validity, they may be called conccftus ratiocinatt
(concepts legitimately formed) ; if they have only been
surreptitiously obtained, by a kind of illusory conclusion,
they may be called concept us ratiocinantes (sophistical
concepts). But as this subject can only be fully treated
in the chapter on the dialectical conclusions of pure rea-
son, we shall say no more of it now, but shall only, as we
gave the name of categories to the pure concepts o' the
understanding, give a new name to the concepts of pure
reason, and call them transcendental ideas, a name th?t has
now to be explained and justified. [p 312]
Tra Hscemitnta i Dia ice tic
n
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK I
First Section
Of Ideas in General
In spite of the great wealth of our languages, a thought-
ful mind is often at a loss for an expression that should
square exactly with its concept ; ,and for want of which
he cannot make himself altogether intelligible, either to
others or to himself* To coin new words is to arrogate to
oneself legislative power in matters of language, a proceed-
ing which seldom succeeds, so that, before taking so des-
perate a step, it is always advisable to look about, in dead
and learned languages, whether they do not contain such a
concept and its adequate expression. Even if it should
happen that the original meaning of the word had become
somewhat uncertain, through carelessness on the part of
its authors^ it is better nevertheless to determine and fix
the meaning which principally belonged to it (even if it
should remain doubtful whether it was originally used
exactly in that meaning), than to spoil our labour by
becoming unintelligible.
Whenever therefore there exists one single word only
for a certain concept, which, in its received meaning,
exactly covers that concept, and when it is of [p. 313]
great consequence to keep that concept distinct from other
related concepts, we ought not to be lavish in using it nor
Transcendental Dialectic
2S5
employ it, for the sake of variety only, as a synonyme in
the place of others, but carefully preserve its own pecul-
iar meanings as otherwise it may easily happen that the
expression ceases to attract special attention, and loses
itself in a crowd of other words of very different import*
so that the thought, which that expression alone could
have preserved, is lost with it.
From the way in which Plato uses the term idea^ it is
easy to see that he meant by it something which not only
was never borrowed from the senses, but which even far
transcends the concepts of the understanding, with which
Aristotle occupied himself, there being nothing in experi-
ence corresponding to the ideas. With him the ideas are
archetypes of things themselves, not only, like the cate-
gories, keys to possible experiences. According to his
opinion they flowed out from the highest reason, which
however exists no longer in its original state, but has to
recall, with difficulty, the old but now very obscure ideas,
which it does by means of reminiscence, commonly called
philosophy. I shall not enter here on any literary discus-
sions in order to determine the exact meaning which the
sublime philosopher himself connected with that expres-
sion. I shall only remark, that it is by no [p. 514]
means unusual^ in ordinary conversations, as well as in
written works, that by carefully comparing the thoughts
uttered by an author on his own subject, we succeed in
understanding him better than he understood himself,
because he did not sufficiently define his concept, and thus
not only spoke, but sometimes even thought, in opposition
to his own intentions*
Plato knew very well that our faculty of knowledge
was filled with a much higher craving than merely to
Transcendental Dialectic
^
spell out phenomena according to a synthetical unity,
and thus to read and understand them as experience.
He knew that our reason, if left to itself, tries to soar
up to knowledge to which no object that experience may
Lgive can ever correspond ; but which nevertheless is real,
and by no means a mere cobweb of the brain.
Plato discovered his ideas principally in what is prac-
tica!>^ that is, in what depends on freedom, which again
belongs to a class of knowledge which is a [p. 315]
peculiar product of reason. He who would derive the
concept of virtue from experience, and would change
what at best could only serve as an example or an im-
perfect illustration^ into a type and a source of know-
ledge (as many have really done), would indeed transform
virtue into an equivocal phantom, changing according
to times and circumstances, and utterly useless to serve
as a rule. Everybody can surely perceive that, when a
person is held up to us as a model of virtue, we have
always in our own mind the true original with which
we compare this so-called model, and estimate it accord-
ingly. The true original is the idea of virtue, in regard
to which all possible objects of experience may serve as
examples (proofs of the practicability, in a certain degree,
of that which is required by the concept of reason), but
never as archetypes. That no man can ever act up to
1 It is true, however, that he extended hU concept of ideas to speculative
knowledge also, if only it was pure, and given entirely a priori. He extended
it even to mathematics, although they can have their object nowhere hut in
possihle experience. In this I cannot foHow him, nor in the mystical deduc-
tion of his ideas, and in the exaggerations which led him, as it were, to hypus-
lasisc them, althou^^h the high-flown language which he used, when treating
of this subject, may well admit of a milder interpretation, and one more in
accordance with the nature of things.
Transcendental Dialectic
257
I
the pure idea of virtue does not in the least prove the
chimerical nature of that concept ; for every judgment
as to the moral worth or unworth of actions is possible
by means of that idea only, which forms, therefore, the
necessary foundation for every approach to moral perfec-
tion, however far the impediments inherent in human
nature, the extent of which it is difficult to determine,
may keep us removed from it.
The Platonic Republic has been supposed to [p, 316]
be a striking example of purely imaginary perfection.
It has become a byword, as something that could exist
in the brain of an idle thinker only, and Brucker thinks
it ridiculous that Plato could have said that no prince
could ever govern well, unless he participated in the
ideas. We should do better, however, to follt»w up this
thought and endeavour (where that excellent philosopher
leaves us without his guidance) to place it in a clearer
light by our own efforts, rather than to throw it aside as
useless, under the miserable and very dangerous pretext
of its impracticability. A constitution founded on the
greatest possible human freedom, according to laws
which enable the freedom of each individual to exist by
the side of the freedom of others (without any regard
to the highest possible human happiness, because that
must necessarily follow by itself), is, to say the least, a
necessary idea, on which not only the first plan of a
constitution or a state, but all laws must be based, it
being by no means necessary to take account from the
beginning of existing impediments, which may owe their
origin not so much to human nature itself as to the
actual neglect of true ideas in legislation. For nothin§^
can be more mischievous and more unworthy a philo^*
Transcendental Dialectic
n
pher than the vulgar appeal to what is called adverse
experience^ which possibly might never have existed, if
at the proper time institutions had been framed accord-
ing to those ideas, and not according to crude [p, 317]
concepts, which » because they were derived from ex-
perience only, have marred all good intentions. The
more legislation and government are m harmony with
that idea, the rarer, no doubt, punishments would become;
and it is therefore quite rational to say {as Plato did),
that in a perfect state no punishments would be neces-
sary. And though this can never be realised, yet the
idea is quite correct w^hich sets up this maximum as an
archetype, in order thus to bring our legislative constitu-
tions nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection.
Which may be the highest degree where human nature
must stop, and how wide the chasm may be between
the idea and its realisation, no one can or ought to deter-
mine, because it is this very freedom that may be able
to transcend any limits hitherto assigned to it.
It is not only, however, where human reason asserts its
free causality and ideas become operative agents (with
regard to actions and their objects), that is to say, in
the sphere of ethics, but also in nature itself, that Plato
rightly discovered clear proofs of its origin from ideas.
A plant, an animal, the regular plan of the cosmos (most
likely therefore the whole order of nature), show clearly
that they are possible according to ideas only; [p. 31S]
and that though no single creature, under the singular
conditions of its existence, can fully correspond with the
idea of what is most perfect of its kind {:is little as any
individual man with the idea of humanity, which, for all
that, he carries in his mind as the archetype of all his
Transcendental Dialectic
2S9
■ actions), those ideas are nevertheless determined through-
out in the highest understanding each by itself as un-
changeable, and are in fact the original causes of things,
although it can only be said of the whole of them, con-
nected together in the universe, that it is perfectly
adequate to the idea. If we make allowance for the
exaggerated expression, the effort of the philosopher to
ascend from the mere observing and copying of the
physical side of nature to an architectonic system of
it, teleologically, that is according to ideas^ deserves re-
spect and imitation* while with regard to the principles
of morality, legislation, and religion, where it is the ideas
themselves that make experience of the good possible,
though they can never be fully realised in experience,
such efforts are of very eminent merit, which those
only fail to recognise who attempt to judge it accord-
ing to empirical rules, the very validity of which, as
principles, was meant to be denied by Plato, With re-
gard to nature, it is experience no doubt which supplies
us with rules, and is the foundation of all truth : with
regard to moral laws, on the contrary, experience is, alas!
but the source of illusion ; and it is altogether reprehen-
sible to derive or limit the laws of what we [p, 319]
ought to do according to our experience of what has
been done*
Instead of considering these subjects, the full develop-
ment of which constitutes in reality the peculiar character
and dignity of philosophy, we have to occupy ourselves
at present with a task less brilliant, though not less use-
ful, of building and strengthening the foundation of that
majestic edifice of morality, which at present is under-
mined by all sorts of mole-tracks, the work of our reason,
26o Transcendental Diaitrfk
which thus vainly, but always with the same confidence,
is searching for buried treasures. It is our duty at pres-
ent to acquire an accurate knowledge of the transcenden-
tal use of the pure reason, its principles and ideas, in
order to be able to determine and estimate correctly their
influence and value. But before I leave this preliminary
introduction, I beg those who really care for philosophy
(which means more than is commonly supposed), if they
are convinced by what 1 have said and shall still have to
say, to take the term idea, in its original meaning, under
their special protection, so that it should no longer be lost
among other expressions, by which all sorts of representa-
tions are loosely designated, to the great detriment of
philosophy. There is no lack of names adequate to
express every kind of representation, without our having
to encroach on the property of others, I shall [p. 320]
give a graduated list of them. The whole class may be
called representation {repraesentatio). Under it stands con-
scious representation, perception {perceptio), A perception
referring to the subject only, as a modification of his state,
is sensation {sensatio), while an objective sensation is
called knoiifiedge^ cognition {coguitio). Cognition is either
intuition or concept {intuitus vei eonceptus). The former
refers immediately to an object and is singular, the latter
refers to it mediately, that is, by means of a characteristic
mark that can be shared by several things in common, A
concept is either empirical or pnre, and the pure concept,
so far as it has its origin in the understanding only (not
in the pure image of sensibility) is called notion {notio).
A concept formed of notions and transcending all possible
experience is an idea, or a concept of reason. To any one
who has once accustomed himself to these distinctions, it
Transcendental Dialectic
261
must be extremely irksome to hear the representation of
red colour called an idea, though it could not even be
rightly called a notion (a concept of the understanding).
p
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
[p- 521]
BOOK I
Second Section
Of Transcendental Ideas
We had an instance in our transcendental Analytic,
how the mere logical form of our knowledge could con-
tain the origin of pure concepts a priori^ which represent
objects antecedently to all experience, or rather indicate
a synthetical unity by which alone an empirical knowledge
of objects becomes possible. The form of judgments
(changed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions)
gave us the categories that guide and determine the use
of the understanding in every experience. We may ex-
pect, therefore, that the form of the syllogisms, if referred
to the synthetical unity of intuitions, according to the
manner of the categories, will contain the origin of cer-
tain concepts a />/7'r?r/, to be called concepts of pure reason,
or trafiscendental ideas, which ought to determine the use
of the understanding within the whole realm of experience,
according to principles.
The function of reason in its syllogisms consists in the
universality of cognition, according to concepts, and the
syllogism itself is in reality a judgment, deter- [p. 322]
mined ^/nm in the whole extent of its condition. The
Transccndenia! Dialectic
n
proposition *Caios is mortal/ might be taken from experi-
ence, by means of the understanding only. But what we
want is a concept, containing the condition under which
the predicate (assertion in general) of that judgment is
|:::iven (here the concept of man), and after I have arranged
it under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men
are mortal), I proceed to determine accordingly the know-
ledge of my object (Caius is mortal).
What we are doing therefore in the conclusion of a syl-
logism is to restrict the predicate to a certain object, after
we have used it first in the major, in its whole extent,
under a certain condition. This completeness of its ex-
tent, in reference to such a condition, is called universality
{universaliias) ; and to this corresponds, in the synthesis
of intuitions, the totality {uuiversiias) of conditions. The
transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, nothing
but the concept of the totality of the conditions of any-
thing given as conditioned. As therefore the uncondi-
tioned alone renders a totality of conditions possible, and
as conversely the totality of conditions must always be
unconditioned, it follows that a pure concept of reason in
general may be explained as a concept of the uncondi-
tioned, so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of
the conditioned.
As many kinds of relations as there are, which [p, 323]
the understanding represents to itself by means of the
categories, so many pure concepts of the reason we shall
find, that is, first, the umonditioned of the categorical syn-
thesis in a subject ; secondly, the nnconditiimed of the
hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series ; thirdly,
the umonditimied of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts
of a system.
Transcendental Dialectic
There are exactly as many kinds of syllogisms, each oi
which tries to advance by means of pro-sy!Iogisms to the
unconditioned : the first to the subject, which itself is no
longer a predicate ; the second to the presupposition,
which presupposes nothing else ; and the third to an
aggregate of the members of a division, which requires
nothing else, in order to render the division of the concept
complete. Hence the pure concepts of reason implying
totality in the synthesis of the conditions are necessary,
at least as problems, in order to carry the unity of the
understanding to the unconditioned, if that is possible,
and they are founded in the nature of human reason, even
though these transcendental concepts may be without any
proper application in concrete, and thus have no utility
beyond bringing the understanding into a direction where
its application, being extended as far as possible, is brought
throughout in harmony with itself.
Whilst speaking here of the totality of condi- [p. 324]
tions, and of the unconditioned, as the common title of
all the concepts of reason, we again meet with a term
which we cannot do without, but which, by long abuse,
has become so equivocal that we cannot employ it with
safety. The term absolute is one of those few words
which, in their original meaning, were fitted to a concept,
which afterwards could not be exactly fitted with any
other word of the same language, and the loss of which,
or what is the same, the loose employment of which,
entails the loss of the concept itself, and that of a concept
with which reason is constantly occupied, and cannot dis-
pense with without real damage to all transcendental in-
vestigations. At present the term absolute is frequently
used simply in order to indicate that something applies
264 Transcendental Dialectic
to an object, considered in itself^ and thus as it were inter-
nally. In this way absolutely possible would mean that
something is possible in itself (interne), which in reality
is the least that could be said of it. It is sometimes
used also to indicate that something is valid in all
respects (without limitation), as people speak of absolute
sovereignty. In this way absolutely possible would mean
that which is possible in all respects, and this is again
the utmost that could be said of the possibility of a
thing. It is true that these two significations [p. 325]
sometimes coincide, because something that is internally
impossible is impossible also in every respect, and there-
fore absolutely impossible. But in most cases they are
far apart, and I am by no means justified in concluding
that, because something is possible in itself, it is possible
also in every respect, that is, absolutely possible. Nay,
with regard to absolute necessity, I shall be able to show
hereafter that it by no means always depends on internal
necessity, and that the two cannot therefore be considered
synonymous. No doubt, if the opposite of a thing is in-
trinsically impossible, that opposite is also impossible in
every respect, and the thing itself therefore absolutely
necessary. But I cannot conclude conversely, that the
opposite of what is absolutely necessary is internally
impossible, or that the absolute necessity of things is
the same as an internal necessity. For in certain cases
that internal necessity is an entirely empty expression,
with which we cannot connect the least concept, while
that of the necessity of a thing in every respect (with
regard to all that is possible) implies very peculiar deter-
minations. As therefore the loss of a concept which has
acted a great part tn speculative philosophy can never
Tr&nsandtntal Dialectu
acs
be indifferent to philosophers, I hope they will also take
some interest in the definition 2uid careful preservation of
the term with which that concept is connected.
I shall therefore use the term aisalmie in this [p* 326]
enlarged meaning only, in opposition to that which is
\'alid relatively and in particular respects only, the latter
being restricted to conditions, the former free from any
restrictions whatsoever.
It is then the absolute totality in the synthesis of
conditions at which the transcendental concept of reason
aims^ nor does it rest satisfied till it has reached that
which is unconditioned absolutely and in every respect*
Pure reason leaves e^-erjthing to the understanding* which
has primarily to do with the objects of intuition, or rather
their synthesis in imagination. It is only the absolute
totality in the use of the concepts of the understanding*
which reason reser\-es for itsdl, while trying to canry
the synthetical unity, which is reafised in the category*
to the absolutely unconditioned. We might therefore
call the latter the unity of the phenomena in reason*
the former, which is expressed by the category, the
nnity in the understanding. Hence reason is only con-
cerned with the use of the understandii^ not so far as
it contains the basis of possible experience (for the abso*
hue totality of conditicms is not a concept that can be
used in experience, bccanse no experience is nocondi*
tioned), tmt in order to impart to it a direction towards
a certain unity of which the understanding knows nothing,
and which is mcsuit to comprebend all acts of the under-
standing, with regard to any object, into an [p. 527]
absolute whole. On this account the objective use of
the pore concepts of reason must always be transcendent:
Transcendental Dialectic
"^
while that of the pure concepts of the understanding
must always be immanent^ being by its very nature
restricted to possible experience.
CBy idea I understand the necessary concept of reason,
to which the senses can supply no corresponding object
P The concepts of reason, therefore, of which we have been
speaking, are trausccndcutal ideas. They are concepts of
pure reason, so far as they regard all empirical knowledge
as determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They
are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very
nature of reason, and referring by necessity to the whole
^ use of the understanding. They are, lastly, transcendent,
1 as overstepping the limits of all experience which can
I never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea.
If we speak of an idea, we say a great deal with respect to
the object (as the object of the pure understanding) but
very little with respect to the subject, that is, with respect
to its reality under empirical conditions, because an idea,
(being the concept of a maximum, can never be adequately
given in concrcto. As the latter is really the whole aim
in the merely speculative use of reason, and as [p. 328]
the mere approaching a concept, which in reality can
never be reached, is the same as if the concept were
missed altogether, people, when speaking of such a con*
^cept, are wont to say, it is an idea only. Thus one might
say, that the absolute whole of all phenomena is an idea
only, for as we can never form a representation of such a
jl^^whole, it remains a problem without a solution. In the
practical use of the understanding, on the contrary, where
we are only concerned with practice, according to rules,
the idea of practical reason can always be realised in con-
creto^ although partially only ; nay, it is the indispensable
Transcendental Dialectic
267
condition of all practical use of reason. The practical
realisation of the idea is here always limited and deficient,
but these limits cannot be defined, and it always remains
under the influence of a concept, implying absolute com-
pleteness and perfection. The practical idea is therefore
in this case truly fruitful, and, with regard to practical
conduct, indispensable and necessary. In it pure reason
becomes a cause and active power, capable of realising
what is contained in its concept Hence we cannot say
of wisdom, as if contemptuously, that it is an idea only,
but for the very reason that it contains the idea of the
necessary unity of all possible aims, it must determine
all practical acts, as an original and, at least, limitative
condition.
Although we must say that all transcendental [p. 329]
concepts of reason are ideas only, they are not therefore
to be considered as superfluous and useless. For although
we cannot by them determine any object ^ they may never-
theless, even unobserved, supply the understanding with a
canon or rule of its. extended and consistent use, by which,
though no object can be better known than it is accord-
ing to its concepts, yet the understanding may be better
guided onwards in its knowledge, not to mention that
they may possibly render practicable a transition from
physical to practical concepts, and thus impart to moral
ideas a certain strength and connection with the specu-
lative knowledge of reason. On all this more light will
be thrown in the sequel
For our present purposes we are obliged to set aside
a consideration of these practical ideaSt and to treat of
reason in its speculative, or rather, in a still more limited
sense, its purely transcendental use. Here we must fol-
2^ Transcendental Dialectic
low the same road which we took before in the deduction
of the categories ; that is, we must consider the logical
form o£ all knowledge of reason^ and see whether, per-
haps, by this logical form, reason may become a source
of concepts also, which enable us to regard objects in
themselves, as determined synthetically a priori in rela-
tion to one or other of the functions of reason.
Reason, if considered as a faculty of a certain [p. 330]
I logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of concluding,
that is, of judging mediately, by bringing the condition
of a possible under the condition of a given judgment.
<The given judgment is the general rule {major). Bring-
ing the condition of another possible judgment under the
condition of the rule, which may be called subsuniption,
is the minor^ and the actual judgment, which contains the
assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclu-
sion. We know that the rule asserts something as gen*
eral under a certain condition. The condition of the rule
is then found to exist in a given case. Then that which,
under that condition, was asserted as generally valid, has
to be considered as valid in that given case also, which
complies %vith that condition. It is easy to see therefore
that reason arrives at knowledge by acts of the under-
standing, which constitute a series of conditions. If I
arrive at the proposition that all bodies are changeable,
only by starting from a more remote knowledge (which
does not yet contain the concept of body, but a condition
of such a concept only), namely, that all which is com-
posite is changeable ; and then proceed to something less
remotely known, and depending on the former, namely,
that bodies are composite ; and, lastly, only advance to a
third proposition, connecting the more remote knowledge
Tmnscendcntal Diahctic
(changeable) with tht* givt;n case, and conclude that bodies
therefore are changeable, we see that we have [p. 331]
passed through a series of conditions (premisses) before
we arrived at knowledge (conclusion). Every scries, the
exponent of which {whether of a categorical or hypothet-
ical judgment) is given, can be continued* so that this
procedure of reason leads to rattocinaiio poly syllogistic a,
a series of conclusions which* either on the side of the
conditions {per prosy Uogismos) or of the conditioned {per
episyllogisnws), may be continued indefinitely.
It is soon perceived, however, that the chain or series
of prosyllogisms, that is, of knowledge deduced on the
side of reasons or conditions of a given knowledge, in
other words, the ascending series of syllogisms, must stand
in a very different relation to the faculty of reason from
that of the descending series, that is, of the progress of
reason on the side of the conditioned, by means of episyl-
logisms. For, as in the former case the knowledge em-
bodied in the conclusion is given as conditioned only, it
is impossible to arrive at it by means of reason in any
other way except under the supposition at least that all
the members of the series on the side of the conditions
are given {totality in the series of premisses), because it
is under that supposition only that the contemplated judg-
ment a /wrr is possible; while on the side of the condi-
tioned, or of the inferences, we can only think [p. ii2\
of a growing series, not of one presupposed as complete
or given, that is, of a potential progression only. Hence,
when our knowledge is considered as conditioned, reason
is constrained to look upon the series of conditions in the
ascending line as complete, and given in their totality.
But if the same knowledge is looked upon at the sam©
time as a condition of other kinds of knowledge, which
constitute among; themselves a series of inferences in a
descending line, it is indifferent to reason how far that
progression may go a parte posteriori^ or whether a total-
ity of the series is possible at all, because such a series
is not required for the conclusion in hand, which is suffi-
ciently determined and secured on grounds a parte priori.
Whether the series of premisses on the side of the con-
ditions have a something that stands first as the highest
condition, or whether it be without limits a parte priori f
it must at all events contain a totality of conditions, even
though we should never succeed in comprehending it;
and the whole series must be uncondilionally true, if the
conditioned, which is considered as a consequence result-
ing from il, is to be accepted as true. This is a demand
of reason which pronounces its knowledge as determined
a priori and as necessary, either in itself, and in that case
it requires no reasons, or, if derivative, as a member of a
series of reasons, which itself is unconditionally true.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
[p^ 333]
BOOK I
Third Section
System of Transcendental Ideas
We are not at present concerned with logical Dialectic,
which takes no account of the contents of knowledge, and
has only to lay bare the illusions in the form of syllogisms,
Transcendental Dialectic
%n
but with transcendental Dialectic, which is supposed to^
contain entirely a priori the origin of certain kinds of
knowledge, arising from pure reason* and of certain de-
duced concepts, the object of which can never be given
empirically, and which therefore lie entirely outside the
domain of the pure understanding. We gathered from
the natural relation which must exist between the tran-
scendental and the logical use of our knowledge, in
syllogisms as well as in judgments, that there must be
three kinds of dialectic syllogisms, and no more* corre-
sponding to the three kinds of conclusion by which reason
may from principles arrive at knowledge, and that in all of
these it is the object of reason to ascend from the condi-
tioned synthesis, to which the understanding is always
restricted, to an unconditioned synthesis, which the under-
standing can never reach.
The relations which all our representations share in
common are, ist, relation to the subject; 2ndly, the rela-
tion to objects, either as phenomena, or as ob- [p. 334]
jects of thought in general If we connect this subdivi-
sion with the former division, we see that the relation of
the representations of which we can form a concept or an
idea can only be threefold : ist, the relation to the sub-
ject ; 2ndly, the relation to the manifold of the phenom-
enal object ; 3rdly, the relation to all things in general.
All pure concepts in general aim at a synthetical unity
of representations, while concepts of pure reason (tran-
scendental ideas) aim at unconditioned synthetical unity
of all conditions. All transcendental ideas therefore can
be arranged in three classes: the first containing the
absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject ; the
sicond the absolute unity of the series of conditions of
^v.
272 Transcendental Dialectic
fhenomcfui ; the third the absolute ttnity of the condition
of all objects of thought in general.
- The thinking subject is the object-matter of psychology,
the system of all phenomena (the world) the object-matter
of cosmology, and the being which contains the highest
condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the
Being of all beings), the object^matter of theology. Thus
it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcen-
dental science of the soul (psychologia rational is), of a tran-
scendental science of the world {cosmoiogia rationalis),
and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God (theotogia
transcendentalis). Even the mere plan of any [p. 335]
one of these three sciences does not come from the under-
standing, even if connected with the highest logical use of
reason, that is, with all possible conclusions, leading from
one of its objects (phenomenon) to all others, and on to
the most remote parts of any possible empirical synthesis,
— -but is altogether a pure and genuine product or rather
problem of pure reason.
What kinds of pure concepts of reason are comprehended
under these three titles of all transcendental ideas will be
fully explained in the following chapter. They follow the
thread of the categories, for pure reason never refers
direct to objects, but to the concepts of objects framed by
the understanding. Nor can it be rendered clear^ except
hereafter in a detailed explanation, how first, reason
simply by the synthetical use of the same function which
it employs for categorical syllogisms is necessarily led on
to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking sub-
ject ; secondly, how the logical procedure in hypothetical
syllogisms leads to the idea of something absolutely uncon-
ditioned, in a series of given conditions, and how, thirdly,
Transcendental Dialectic
273
che mere form of the disjunctive syllogism produces
necessarily the highest concept of reason, that of a Being
of all beings ; a thought which, at first sight, seems
extremely paradoxical. [p. 336]
No objective deduction, like that given of the categories,
is possible with regard to these transcendental ideas ;
they are ideas only, and for that very reason they have no
relation to any object corresponding to them in experi-
ence. What we could undertake to give was a subjective
deduction * of them from the nature of reason, and this
has been given in the present chapter.
We can easily perceive that pure reason has no other
aim but the absolute totality of synthesis on the side cf
conditions {whether of inherence, dependence, or concur-
rence), and that it has nothing to do with the absolute
completeness on the part of the conditioned. It is the
former only which is required for presupposing the whole
series of conditions, and thus presenting it a pnori Xo the
understanding. If once we have a given condition, com-
plete and unconditioned itself, no concept of reason is
required to continue the series, because the understanding
takes by itself every step downward from the condition to
the conditioned. The transcendental ideas therefore serve
only for ascending in the series of conditions till they
reach the unconditioned, that is, the principles. With
regard to descending \o the conditioned, there is no doubt
a widely extended logical use which our reason [p. 337]
may make of the rules of the understanding, but no tran-
scendental one ; and if we form an idea of the absolute
totality of such a synthesis (by progressus)^ as> for
1 Instead of Amifilung read AUtiium^n
Transcendental Dialectic
^
instance, of the whole scries of all future changes in the
world, this is only a thought {ens rationis) that may be
thought if we Hke, but is not presupposed as necessary by
reason. For the possibility of the conditioned, the totality
of its conditions only, but not of its consequences, is pre-
supposed. Such a concept therefore is not one of the
transcendental ideas, with which alone we have to deal.
Finally, we can perceive, that there is among the tran-
scendental ideas themselves a certain connection and
unity by which pure reason brings all its knowledge into
one system. There is io the progression from our know-
ledge of ourselves (the soul) to a knowledge of the world,
and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being,
something so natural that it looks like the logical progres-
sion of reason from premisses to a conclusion,* Whether
there exists here a real though hidden relationship, such
as we saw before between the logical and transcendental
use of reason, is also one of the questions the answer to
which can only be given in the progress of these investi-
gations. For the present we have achieved what we
wished to achieve, by removing the transcen- [p. 338]
dental concepts of reason, which in the systems of other
phtlosophers are generally mixed up with other concepts,
without being distinguished even from the concepts of the
understanding, out of so equivocal a position ; by being
able to determine their origin and thereby at the same
time their number, which can never be exceeded, and by
thus bringing them into a systematic connection, marking
out and enclosing thereby a separate field for pure reason.
1 See Supplement XXVI.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
OF THE DIALECTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF PURE REASON
One may say that the object of a purely transcendental
idea is something of which we have no concept* although
the idea is produced with necessity according to the origin
nal laws of reason. Nor is it possible indeed to form of an
object that should he adequate to the demands of reason,
a concept of the understanding, that is, a concept which
could be shown in any possible experience, and rendered
intuitive. It would be better, however, and less [p. 339]
liable to misunderstandings, to say that we can have no
knowledge of an object corresponding to an idea, but a
problematic concept only.
The transcendental (subjective) reality, at least of pure
concepts of reason, depends on our being led to such ideas
by a necessary syllogism of reason. There will be syllo-
gisms therefore which have no empirical premisses, and
by means of which we conclude from something which we
know to something else of which we have no concept, and
to which, constrained by an inevitable illusion, we never-
theless attribute objective reality. As regards their result,
275
2/6
Transcendental Dialectic
such syllogisms are rather to be called sophistical tnan
rational, although, as regards their origin, they may claim
the latter name, because they are not purely fictitious or
accidental, but products of the very nature of reason.
They are sophistications, not of men, but of pure reason
itself, from which even the wisest of men cannot escape.
All he can do is, with great effort, to guard against error,
though never able to rid himself completely of an illusion
which constantly torments and mocks him.
Of these dialectical syllogisms of reason there are there-
fore three classes only, that is as many as the ideas to
which their conclusions lead. In the syllogism [p. 340]
of the ^rj/ class, I conclude from the transcendental con-
cept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the
absolute unity of the subject itself, of which however I
have no concept in this regard. This dialectical syllogism
I shall call the transcendental /^ra/£?^>?;i.
The second class of the so-called sophistical syllogisms
aims at the transcendental concept of an absolute totality
in the series of conditions to any given phenomenon ; and
I conclude from the fact that my concept of the uncon-
ditioned synthetical unity of the series is always self-
contradictory on one side, the correctness of the opposite
unity, of which nevertheless I have no concept either.
The state of reason in this class of dialectical syllogisms,
I shall call the antinomy of pure reason.
Lastly, according to the third class of sophistical syl-
logisms, I conclude from the totality of conditions, under
which objects in general, so far as they can be given to me,
must be thought, the absolute synthetical unity of all con-
ditions of the possibility of things in general; that is to
say, I conclude from things which I do not know accord-
Transcendental Dialectic
277
ing to their mere transcendental ^ concept, a Being of al
beings, which I know still less through a transcendental
concept, and of the unconditioned necessity of which I
can form no concept whatever. This dialectical syllogism
of reason I shall call the ideal of pure reason.
^ Transcendent is a misprint.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
[p. 341]
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURiS REASON
The logical paralogism consists in the formal faulti-
ness of a conclusion, without any reference to its con-
tents. But a transcendental paralogism arises from a
transcendental cause, which drives us to a formally false
conclusion. Such a paralogism, therefore, depends most
likely on the very nature of human reason, and produces
an illusion which is inevitable, though not insoluble.
We now come to a concept which was not inserted in
our general list of transcendental concepts, and yet must
be reckoned with them, without however changing that
table in the least, or proving it to be deficient. This is
the concept, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment,
/ think. It is easily seen, however, that this concept is
the vehicle of all concepts in general, therefore of transcen-
dental concepts also, being always comprehended among
them, and being itself transcendental also, though with-
out any claim to a special title, inasmuch as it serves
only to introduce all thought, as belonging to conscious-
278
Transcendental Dialectic
279
I
ness- However free that concept may be from all that
is empirical (impressions of the senses), it serves [p» 342]
nevertheless to distinguish two objects within the nature
of our faculty of representation. /, as thinking, am an
object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That
which is an object of the external senses is called body.
The term /» as a thinking being, signifies the object of
psychology, which may be called the rational science of
the soul, supposing that wc want to know nothing about
the soul except whatj independent of all experience (which
determines the I more especially and in conarUt), can be
deduced from the concept of I, so far as it is present in
every act of thought.
Now the rational science of the soul is really such an
undertaking ; for if the smallest empirical elcoTcnt of my
thought or any particular perception of my internal state
were mixed up with the sources from which that science
derives its materials, it would be an empirical, and no
longer a purely rational science of the soul There is
therefore a pretended science, founded on the single propo-
sition of / think, and the soundness or unsoundness of
which may well be examined in this place, according to
the principles of transcendental philosophy. It should
not be objected that even in that proposition, which ex-
presses the perception of oneself, I have an internal
experience, and that therefore the rational science of the
soul, which is founded on it, can never be quite [p. 343]
pure, but rests, to a certain extent, on an empirical prin-
ciple. For this inner perception is nothing more than
the mere apperception, / think, without which even all
transcendental concepts would be impossible, in which
we really say, I think the substance, I think thQ cause.
28o
Transcendental Dialectic
etc. This internal experience in general and its pos
sibility, or perception in general and its relation to other
perceptions, there being no special distinction or em-
pirical determination of it, caniiot be regarded as em-
pirical knowledge, but most be regarded as knowledge
of the empirical in general, and falls therefore under
the investigation of the possibility of all experience, which
investigation is certainly transcendental. The smallest
object of perception (even pleasure and pain), if added
to the general representation of self-consciousness, would
at once change rational into empirical psychology.
I think i^, therefore, the only text of rational psychology,
out of which it must evolve all its wisdom. It is easily
seen that this thought, if it is to be applied to any object
(my self), cannot contain any but transcendental predi-
cates, because the smallest empirical predicate would
spoil the rational purity of the science, and its indepen-
dence of all experience.
We shall therefore follow the thread of the [p, 344]
categories, with this difference, however, that as here the
first thing which is given is a thing, the I, a thinking
being, we must begin with the category of substance, by
which a thing in itself is represented, and then proceed
backwards, though without changing the respective order
of the categories, as given before in our table. The
topic of the rational science of the soul, from which has
to be derived whatever else that science may contain,
is therefore the following.
Transcendental Dialectic
28 r
I
The Soul is substance.
II
in
As regards its quality, nmpU.
As r^^ards the diflferent
times in which it exists,
numerically identical, that
is unity (not plurality) .
IV
It b in relation to
passible objects in space,^
All concepts of pure psychology arise from [p. 345]
these elements, simply by way of combination, and with-
out the admixture of any other principle. This sub-
staDce» taken simply as the object of the internal sense,
gives us the concept of immateriality ; and as simple
substance, that of incorruptibility ; its identity, as that
of an intellectual substance, gives us personality : and
all these three together, spirituality: its relation to
objects in space gives us the concept of commercium
(intercourse) with bodies ; the pure psychology thus rep-
resenting the thinking substance as the principle of
life in matter, that is, as soul (anima)^ and as the ground
of afiimality: which again, as restricted by spirituality,
gives us the concept of immortality.
To these concepts refer four paralogisms of a transcen-
1 The retder, who may not guess at once the psychological purport of these
Ccmnscendental and abstract terms, or understand why the latter attribute of
ihc soul belongs to the category of existence, will find their full explanation
and justiticatton in the sequel. Moreover* I have to apologise for the many
Latin expressions which, contrary to gmul taste, have crept in instead of their
native equivalents, not only here, but throughout the whole of the work. My
only excuse ts^ that I thought it better to sacrifice something of the eteganc«
of language, rather than to throw any impediments in the way of real students^
by the use of inaccurate and obscure ejrpressioiis.
^
Transcendental Dialectic
^i
dental psychology, which is falsely supposed to be a
science of pure reason, concerning the nature of our
thinking being. We can, however, use as the foundation
of such a science nothing but the single^ and in itself per-
fectly empty, representation of the /, of which [p, 346]
we cannot even say that it is a concept, but merely a
"^ consciousness that accompanies all concepts. By this /,
or Ae, or it (the thing), which thinks, nothing is repre-
/ sented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts =^ x, \
which is known only through the thoughts that are its
predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never
have the slightest concept, so that we are really turning
round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its
representation, before we can form any judgment about it.
And this inconvenience is really inevitable, because con-
sciousness in itself is not so much a representation, dis-
tinguishing a particular object, but really a form of repre-
sentation in general, in so far as it is to be called
knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think some-
thing by it.
It must seem strange, however, from the very begin-
ning, that the condition under which I think, and which
therefore is a property of my own subject only, should be
valid at the same time for everything which thinks, and
that, depending on a proposition which seems to be em-
pirical, we should venture to found the apodictical and
general judgment, namely, that everything which thinks
is such as the voice of my own consciousness declares it
to be within me. The reason of it is, that we are con-
strained to attribute a priori to things all the qualities
which form the conditions, under which alone [p. 347]
we are able to think them. Now it is impossible for me
Transcendental Dialectic
m
to form the smallest representation of a thinkmg being by
any external experience, but I can do it through self-con-
iciousness only. Such objects therefore are nothing but
a transference of my own consciousness to other things,
which thus, and thus only, can be represented as thinking
beings. The proposition / think is used in this case^ how-
ever, as problematical only ; not so far as it may contain
the perception of an existence (the Cartesian, cogito, ergo
sum), but with regard to its mere possibility, in order to
see what properties may be deduced from such a simple
proposition with regard to its subject^ whether such sub-
ject exists or not.
If our knowledge of thinking beings in general, so far
as it is derived from pure reason, were founded on more
than the cogito, and if we made use at the same time of
observations on the play uf our thoughts and the natural
laws of the thinking self, derived from them, we should
have before us an empirical psychology, which would form
a kind of physiology of the internal sense, and perhaps ex-
plain its manifestations, but would never help us to under-
stand such properties as do not fall under any possible^
experience (as, for instance, simplicity), or to teach apodic-
tically anything touching the nature of thinking beings in
general. It would not therefore be a rational psychology.
As the proposition / think (taken problemati- [p. 548]
cally) contains the form of every possible judgment of the
understanding, and accompanies all categories as their
vehicle, it must be clear that the conclusions to be drawn
from it can only contain a transcendental use of the
understanding, which declines all admixture of experience,
and of the achievements of which, after what has been said
before, we cannot form any very favourable anticipations.
Transcendent a i Diaiectk
We shall therefore follow it, with a critical eye, through all
the predicaments of pure psychology.*
1
\^Tke First Paralogism of Substantiality
That the representation of which is the absolute subject
of our judgments, and cannot be used therefore as the
determination of any other thing, is the substance.
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my
possible judgments, and this representation of myself can
never be used as the predicate of any other thing.
Therefore I, as a thinking being (Soul), am Substance,
Criticism of the First Paralogism of Pure ^ Psychology
We showed in the analytical portion of transcendental
logic, that pure categories, and among them that of sub-
stance, have in themselves no objective meaning, unless
they rest on some intuition, and are applied to [p, 349]
the manifold of such intuitions as functions of synthetical
unity. Without this they are merely functions of a judg-
ment without contents, I may say of everything, that it
is a substance, so far as I distinguish it from what are mere
predicates and determinations. Now in all our think-
ing the I is the subject, in which thoughts are inherent
as determinations only ; nor can that I ever be used as a
determination of any other thing. Thus everybody is con-
strained to look upon himself as the substance, and on
thinking as the accidents only of his being, and determi-
nations of his state.
1 All that fallows fnun here to the beginning of the second chapter, is left
out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement XXVIL
^ Afterwards iramcettdtntal instead of purt.
Transcendental Diahctic
28s
But what use are we to make of such a concept of a
substance ? That I, as a thinking being, continue for nay-
self, and naturally neither arise nor pe risky is no legitimate
deduction from it ; and yet this conclusion would be the
only advantage that could be gained from the concept of
the substantiality of my own thinking subject, and, but for
that, I could do very well without it.
So far from being able to deduce these properties from
the pure category of substance, we have on the contrary
to observe the permanency of an object in our experience
and then lay hold of this permanency, if we wish to apply
to it the empirically useful concept of substance. In this
case, hov^ever, we had no experience to lay hold of, but
have only formed a deduction from the concept [p. 350]
of the relation which all thinking has to the I, as the com-
mon subject to which it belongs. Nor should we, what-
ever we did, succeed by any certain observation in proving
such permanency. For though the I exists in all thoughts,
not the slightest intuition is connected with that repre-
sentation, by which it might be distinguished from other
objects of intuition. We may very well perceive there-
fore that this representation appears again and again in
every act of thought, but not that it is a constant and per-
manent intuition, in which thoughts, as being changeable,
come and go.
Hence it follows that in the first syllogism of transcen-
dental psychology reason imposes upon us an apparent I
knowledge only, by representing the constant logical sub-
ject of thought as the knowledge of the real subject in ,
which that knowledge inheres. Of that subject, however,
we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge,
because consciousness is that which alone changes repre*
Transcendental Dialectic
^
sentations into thoughts, and in which therefore, as the
transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found.
Beside this logical meaning of the I, we have no know-
ledge of the subject in itself, which forms the substratum
and foundation of it and of all our thoughts. In spite of
this, the proposition that the soul is a substance may well
be allowed to stand, if only we see that this concept can-
not help us on in the least or teach us any of the ordinary
conclusions of rationalising psychology, as, for [p, 351]
instance, the everlasting continuance of the soul amid all
changes and even in death, and that it therefore signifies
a substance in idea only, and not in reality.
The Second Paralogism of Simplicity
Everything, the action of which can never be consid-
ered as the concurrence of several acting things, is simple.
Now the Soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing : —
Therefore, etc.
Criticism of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
This is the strong ()'et not invulnerable) syllogism
among all dialectical syllogisms of pure psychology, not a
mere sophisifl contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart
a certain plausibility to his assertions, but a syllogism
which seems able to stand the sharpest examination and
the gravest doubts of the philosopher It is this : —
Every composite substance is an aggregate of many
substances, and the action of something composite, or
that which is inherent in it as such, is an aggregate of
many actions or accidents distributed among many sub-
Transcendental Dialectic
387
stances. An effect due to the concurrence of many acting
substances is no doubt possible, if that effect is [p. 352]
external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the
combined motion of all its parts). The case is different
however with thoughts, if considered as accidents belong-
ing to a thinking being within. For suppose it is the
composite which thinks, then every part of it would
contain a part of the thought, and all together only the
whole of it. This however is self-contradictory. For as
representations, distributed among different beings {like
the single words of a verse), never make a whole thought
(a verse), it is impossible that a thought should be inher-
ent in something composite, as such. Thought therefore
|s possible only in a substance which is not an aggregate
of many, and therefore absolutely simple.^
What is called the nef\'Hs probandi in this argument lies
in the proposition that, in order to constitute a thought,
the many representations must be comprehended under
the absolute unity of the thinking subject. Nobody how-
ever can prove this proposition from concepts. For how
would he undertake to do it ? The proposition [p. 353]
that a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity
of a thinking being, cannot be considered as analytical
For the unity of thought, consisting of many representa-
tions, is collective, and may, so far as mere concepts arc
concerned, refer to the collective unity of all co-operating
substances (as the movement of a body is the compound
movement of all its parts) quite as well as to the absolute
unity of the subject According to the rule of identity
' It would be very c*$y to give to Ihii argument the ordinary icholflistic
dress, tiut for my parposci it is stiffitient to have clearly exhibited* even m a
popular form, the ground on which it rests.
Transcendental Dialectic
1 would be impossible therefore to establish the necessity
of the presupposition of a simple substance, the thought
That, on the other hand, such a propo-
sition mi^ht be established synthetically and entirely a
priori from mere concepts, no one will venture to affirm
who has once understr>od the grounds on which the possi-
bility of synthetical propositions a priori rests, as explained
by us before.
It is likewise impossible, however, to derive this neces-
sary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possi-
bility of the unity of every thought, from experience.
For experience never supplies any necessity of thought,
much less the concept of absolute unity. Whence then
do we take that proposition on which the whole psycho-
logical syllogism of reason rests?
It is manifest that if we wish to represent to ourselves
a thinking being, we must put ourselves in its place, and
supplant as it were the object which has to be considered
by our own subject (which never happens in any [p. 354]
other kind of investigation). The reason why we postu-
late for every thought absolute unity of the subject is
because otherwise we could not say of it, I think (the
manifold in one representation). For although the whole
of a thought may be divided and distributed under many
subjects, the subjective I can never thus be divided and
distributed, and it is this I which we presuppose in every
thought
As in the former paralogism therefore, so here also, the
formal proposition of apperception, I think, remains the
sole ground on which rational psychology ventures to
undertake the extension of its knowledge. That proposi-
tion, however, is no experience, but only the form of
\
Transcendental DiaUcttc
289
apperception inherent in, and antecedent to, every expe-
rience, that is a purely subjective condition, having refer-
ence to a possible experience only, but by no means the
condition of the possibility of the knowledge of objects,
and by no means necessary to the concept of a thinking
being in general ; although it must be admitted that we
cannot represent to ourselves another intelligent being
without putting ourselves in its place with that formula
of our consciousness.
Nor is it true that the simplicity of my self (as a soul)
is really deduced from the proposition, I think, for it is
already involved in every thought itself. The proposition
/ am simple must be considered as the imme- [p. 355]
diate expression of apperception, and the so-called syllo-
gism of Cartesius, cogito, ergo sum, is in reality tautological,
because cogito {smn cogitans) predicates reality immediately.
I am simple means no more than that this representation
of I does not contain the smallest trace of manifoldness,
but is absolute (although merely logical) unity.
Thus we see that the famous psychological argument
is founded merely on the indivisible unity of a representa-
tion, which only determines the verb with reference to a
person ; and it is clear that the subject of inherence is
designated t ran scenden tally only by the I, which accom-
panies the thought, without our perceiving the smallest
quality of it, in fact, without our knowing anything about
it. It signifies a something in general (a transcendental
subject) the representation of which must no doubt be
simple, because nothing is determined in it, and nothing
can be represented more simple than by the concept of
a mere something. The simplicity however of the repre-
sentation of a subject is not therefore a knowledge of the
Transcendental Dialectic
^
simplicity of the subject, because no account whatever is
taken of its qualities when it is designated by the entirely
empty expression I, an expression that can be applied to
every thinking subject.
So much is certain therefore that though I [p. 356]
always represent by the I an absolute, but only logical,
unity of the subject (simplicity), I never know thereby
the real simplicity of my subject. We saw that the propo-
sition, I am a substance, signified nothing but the mere
category of which I must not make any use (empirically)
inconcreto. In the same manner. I may well say, I am a
simple substance, that is, a substance the representation
of which contains no synthesis of the manifold ; but that
concept, or that proposition also, teaches us nothing at
all with reference to myself, as an object of experience,
because the concept of substance itself is used as a func-
tion of synthesis only, without any intuition to rest on,
and therefore without any object, valid with reference to
the condition of our knowledge only, but not with refer-
ence to any object of it. We shall test the usefulness of
this proposition by an experiment.
Everybody must admit that the assertion of the simple
nature of the soul can only be of any value in so far as it
enables me to distinguish the soul from all matter, and
thus to except it from that decay to which matter is at all
times subject. It is for that use that our proposition is
really intended, and it is therefore often expressed by, the
soul is not corporeal. If then I can show that, [p. 357]
although we allow to this cardinal proposition of rational
psychology (as a mere judgment of reason from pure
categories) all objective validity (everything that thinks
is simple substance), we cannot make the least use of it.
Tratisccndental Dialectic
291
in order to establish the homogcneoiisness or non-homo-
geiieoLisness of soul and matter, this will be the same as
if I had relegated this supposed psychological truth to
the field of mere ideas, without any real or objective use.
We have irrefutably proved in the transcendental iEs-
thetic that bodies are mere phenomena of our external
sense, not things by themselves. We are justified there-
fore in saying that our thinking subject is not a body, i,e.
that, because it is represented by us as an object of the
internal sense, it is, so far as it thinks, no object of our
external senses, and no phenomenon in space. This
means the same as that among external phenomena we
can never have thinking beings as such, or ever see their
thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc., exter-
nally. All this belongs to the internal sense. This argu-
ment seems indeed so natural and popular that even the
commonest understanding has always been led [p. 358]
to it, the distinction between souls and bodies being of
very early date.
But although extension, impermeability, cohesion, and
motion, in fact everything that the external senses can
give us» cannot be thoughts, feeling, inclination, and de-
termination, or contain anything like them, being never
objects of external intuition, it might be possible, never-
theless, that that something which forms the foundation
of external phenomena, and which so affects our sense
as to produce in it the representations of space, matter,
form, etc., if considered as a noumenon (or better as a
transcendental object) might be, at the same lime, the
subject of thinking, although by the manner in which
it affects our external sense it produces in us no intui-
tions of representations, will, etc., but only of space and
292 Transcendental Dialectic
its determinations. This something, however, is not ex
tendedi not impermeable, not composite, because such
predicates concern sensibiHty only and its intuition, when-
ever we are affected by these (to us otherwise unknown)
objects. These expressions, however, do not give us any
information what kind of object it is, but only that, if
considered by itself, without reference to the external
senses^ it has no right to these predicates, peculiar to
external appearance. The predicates of the internal sense,
on the contrary, such as representation, think- [p, 359]
ing, etc., are by no means contradictory to it, so that
really, even if we admit the simplicity of its nature, the
human soul is by no means sufficiently distinguished from
matter, so far as its substratum is concerned, if (as it
ought to be) matter is considered as a phenomenon only.
If matter were a thing by itself, it would, as a com-
posite beingi be totally different from the soul, as a simple
being. But what we call matter is an external phenome-
non only, the substratum of which cannot possibly be
known by any possible predicates. I can therefore very
well suppose that that substratum is simple, although in
the manner in which it affects our senses it produces
in us the intuition of something extended, and therefore
composite, so that the substance which, with reference
to our external sense, possesses extension, might very
well by itself possess thoughts which can be represented
consciously by its own internal sense. In such wise the
same thing which in one respect is called corporeal, would
in another respect be at the same time a thinking being,
of which though we cannot see its thoughts, we can yet
see the signs of them phenomenally. Thus the expres-
sion that souls only (as a particular class of substances)
Transcendental Dialectic
zgi
think, would have to be dropt, and we should return to
the common expression that men think, that is, [p. 360]
that the same thing which, as an external phenomenon, is
extended, is internally, hy itself, a subject, not composite,
but simple and intelligent.
j^_But without indulging in such hypotheses, we may
make this general remark, that if I understand by sool
a being by itself, the very question would be absurd,
whether the soul be homogeneous or not with matter
which is not a thing by itself, but only a class of repre
sentatioas within us ; for so much at all events must be
clear, that a thing by itself is of a different nature from
the determinations which constitute its state only.
* If, on the contrary, we compare the thinking I, not with |
matter, but with that object of the intellect that forms the I
foundation of the external phenomena which wc call mat-
ter, then it follows, as we know nothing whatever of the I
matter, that we have no right to say that the soul by
itself is different from it in any respect.
The simple consciousness is not therefore a knowledge
of the simple nature of our subject, so that we might thus
distinguish the soul from matter, as a composite being.
If therefore, in the only case where that concept might
be useful, namely, in comparing myself with objects of
external experience, it is impossible to determine the
peculiar and distinguishing characteristics of its nature,
what is the use, if we pretend to know that the [p. 361]
thinking I, or the soul (a name for the transcendental
object of the internal sense), is simple? Such a propo-
sition admits of no application to any real object, and can-
not therefore eidarge our knowledge in the least.
Thus collapses the whole of rational psychology, with
^
Transcendental Dialectic
its fundamental support, and neither here nor elsewhere
can we hope by means of mere concepts (still less through
the mere subjective form of all our concepts, that is,
through our consciousness) and without referring these
concepts to a possible experience, to extend our know-
ledge, particularly as even the fundamental concept of a
simple nature is such that it can never be met with in
experience, so that no chance remains of arriving at it as
a concept of objective validity.
The Third Paralogism of Personality
Whatever is conscious of the numerical identity of its
own self at different times, is in so far a person.
Now the Soul, etc.
Therefore the Soul is a person.
Criticism of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
Whenever I want to know by experience the numerical
identity of an external object, I shall have to [p, 362]
attend to what is permanent in that phenomenon to which^
as the subject, everything else refers as determination, and
observe the identity of the former during the time that
the latter is changing. I myself, however, am an object
of the internal sense, and all time is but the form of the
internal sense. I therefore refer each and all of my suc-
cessive determinations to the numerically identical self ;
and this in all time, that is, in the form of the inner intui-
tion of myself. From this point of view, the personality
of the soul should not even be considered as inferred, but
Transcendental Dialectic
295
as an entirely identical proposition of self-consciousness in
time, and that is indeed the reason why it is valid a
priori. For it really says no more than this : that dur*
ing the whole time, while I am conscious of myself, I am
conscious of that time as belonging to the unity of my-
self; and it comes to the same thing whether I say that
this whole time is within me as an individual unity» or
that I with numerical identity am present in all that
time.
In my own consciousness, therefore, the identity of
person is inevitably present. But if I consider myself
from the point of view of another person {as an object of
his external intuition), then that external observer con-
siders me, first of all, in time, for in the apperception time
is really represented in me only. Though he admits,
therefore, the I, which at all times accompanies all rep-
resentations in my consciousness, and with [p. 363]
entire identity, he will not yet infer from it the objective
permanence of myself. For as in that case the time in
which the observer places me is not the time of my own,
but of his sensibility, it follows that the identity which is
connected with my consciousness is not therefore con-
nected with his, that is, with the external intuition of my
subject.
The identity of my consciousness at different times is"
therefore a formal condition only of my thoughts and their
coherence, and proves in no way the numerical identity of
my subject, in which, in spite of the logical identity of the
I, such a change may have passed as to make it impossible
to retain its identity, though we may still attribute to it
the same name of I, which in every other state, and even
in the change of the subject, might yet retain the thought
296 Transcendental Dialectic
of the preceding and hand it over to the subsequent
subject,^
Although the teaching of some old schools [p. 364]
that everything is in a flux, and nothing in the world
permanent, cannot be admitted, if we admit substances, yet
it must not be supposed that it can be refuted by the unity
of self-consciousness. For we ourselves cannot judge from
our own consciousness whether, as souls, we are perma-
nent or not, because we reckon as belonging to our own
identical self that only of which wc arc conscious, and
therefore are constrained to admit that, during the whole
time of which we are conscious, we are one and the same.
From the point of view of a stranger, however, such a
judgment would not be valid, because, perceiving in the
soul no permanent phenomena, except the representation
of the I, which accompanies and connects them all, we
cannot determine whether that I (being a mere thought)
be not in the same state of flux as the other thoughts
which are chained together by the I. [p. 365]
It is curious, however, that the personality and what
is presupposed by it, namely, the permanence and sub-
stantiality of the soul, has now to be proved first. For
* An elastic ball, which impinges on another in a straight line, communi-
cates to it Its whole molion, and therefore (if wc only consider the places in
ipace) its whole slate. If then, in analogy with such bodies, wc admit sub-
Etances of which ihe one communicatts to the other representations with
Consciousness, wc could imagine a whole series of ihem, in which the first
communicates its state and xy* consciousness to the sccumlt the secuiid its own
state with that of the lirst substance to a thirUt and this again all the states
of the former, together with its i>wn. and a consciousness of them, tu another.
That last substance would be conscious of all the slates of the previously
changed subslanceSf as of its own, because all of them had been transferred
to it with ihc consciousness of themj but for all that it would not have been
tbe same person in all those states.
Transcendental Dialectic
297
"if we could presuppose these, there would follow, if not
the permanence of consciousness, yet the possibiHty of a
permanent consciousness in one and the same subject, and
this is sufficient to establish personality which does not
cease at once, because its effect is interrupted at the time.
This permanence, however, is by no means given us
before the numerical identity of ourself, which we infer
from identical apperception, but is itself inferred from it,
so that, according to rule, the concept of substance, which
alone is empirically useful, would have to follow first upon
it. But as the identity of person follows by no means
from the identity of the I, in the consciousness of all
time in which I perceive myself, it follows that we could
not have founded upon it the substantiality of the soul.
Like the concept of substance and of the simple, how*
ever^ the concept of personality also may remain, so long
as it is used as transcendental only, that is, as a concept
of the unity of the subject which is otherwise unknown to
us, but in the determinations of which there is an uninter-
rupted connection by apperception. In this sense such a
concept is necessary for practical purposes and suffieient,
but we can never pride ourselves on it as helping to ex-
pand our knowledge of our self by means of [p. 366]
pure reason, which only deceives us if we imagine that we
can concluse an uninterrupted continuance of the subject
from the mere concept of the identical self. That concept
is only constantly turning round itself in a circle, and does
not help us as with respect to any question which aims at
synthetical knowledge. What matter may be as a thing
by itself (a transcendental object) is entirely unknown to
us ; though we may observe its permanence as a phenome-
qon, since it is represented as something external. When
^
Transcendenkil Dialectic
however I wish to observe the mere I during the change
of all representations, I have no other correlative for my
comparisons but again the I itself, with the general condi-
tions of my consciousness. I cannot therefore give any
but tautological answers to all questions, because I put
my concept and its unity in the place of the qualities that
belong to me as an object, and thus really take for granted
what was wished to be known,
i
The Fourth Paralogism of Ideality {with Regard to Exter-
nal Relations)
A That, the existence of which can only be inferred as a
Jt cause of given perceptionSp has a doubtful existence
only:— [p. 367]
All external phenomena are such that their existence
cannot be perceived immediately, but that we can only
infer them as the cause of given perceptions : —
Therefore the existence of all objects of the external
senses is doubtful. This uncertainty 1 call the ideality of
external phenomena, and the doctrine of that ideality is
called idealism ; in comparison with which the other doc-
trine, which maintains a possible certainty of the objects
of the external senses, is called dualism.
Criticism of tlte Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental
Psychology
We shall first have to examine the premisses. We are
perfectly justified in maintaining that that only which is
within ourselves can be perceived immediately, and that
my own existence only can be the object of a mere percep-
tion. The existence of a real object therefore outside me
^.
■>
Transcendental Dialectic
(taking this word in its intellectual meaning) can never be
given directly in perception^ but can only be added in
thought to the perception, which is a modification of the
internal sense, and thus inferred as its external cause.
Hence Cartesius was quite right in limiting all perception,
in the narrowest sense, to the proposition, I (as a thinking
being) am. For it must be clear that, as what [p. 368]
is without is not within me, I cannot find it in my apper-
ception ; nor hence in any perception which is in reality a
determination of apperception only.
In the true sense of the word, therefore, I can never
perceive external things, but only from my own internal
perception infer their existence, taking the perception as
an effect of which something external must be the proxi-
mate cause. An inference, however, from a given effect
to a definite cause is always uncertain, because the effect
may be due to more than one cause. Therefore in refer-
ring a perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful
whether that cause be internal or external ; whether in fact
all so-called external perceptions are not a mere play of
our external sense, or point to real external objects as their
cause. At alt events the existence of the latter is infer-
ential only, and liable to all the dangers of inferences,
while the object of the internal sense {I myself with all
my representations) is perceived immediately, and its
existence cannot be questioned.
It must not be supposed, therefore, that an idealist is
he who denies the existence of external objects of the
senses ; all he does is to deny that it is known by immedi-
ate perception, and to infer that we can never [p. 369]
become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience
whatsoever.
300 Tmnscendentai Dialectic
Before I expose the deceptive illusion of our paralogism,
'et me remark that we must necessarily distinguish two
kinds of idealism, the transcendental and the empirical.
Transcendental idealism teaches that all phenomena are
representations only, not things by themselves, and that
space and time therefore are only sensuous forms of our
intuition, not determinations given independently by them-
selves or conditions of objects, as things by themselves.
Opposed to this transcendental idealism, is ^transcendental
realism, which considers space and time as something in
itself (independent of our sensibility). Thus the tran-
scendental realist represents all external phenomena
(admitting their reality) as things by themselves, existing
independently of us and our sensibility, and therefore
existing outside us also, if regarded according to pure con-
cepts of the understanding. It is this transcendental
S realist who afterwards acts the empirical idealist, and who,
after wrongly supposing that the objects of the senses, if
they arc to be external, must have an existence by them-
selves, and without our senses, yet from this point of view
considers all our sensuous representations insufficient to
render certain the reality of their objects.
The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, [p, 370]
may well be an empirical realist, or, as he is called, a
dualist ; that is, he may admit the existence of matter,
without taking a step beyond mere self-consciousness,
or admitting more than the certainty of representations
within me, that is the cogito, erga sum. For as he con-
siders matter, and even its internal possibility, as a phe-
nomenon only, which, if separated from our sensibility,
is nothing, matter with him is only a class of representa-
tions (intuition) which are called external, not as if they
Transcendental Dialectic
301
referred to objects external by themselves, but because
they refer perceptions to space, in which everything is
outside everything else, white space itself is inside us.
We have declared ourselves from the very beginning
in favour of this transcendental idealism. In our system,
therefore, we need not hesitate to admit the existence of
matter on the testimony of mere self-consciousness, and
to consider it as established by it (i.e. the testimony), in
the same manner as the existence of myself, as a thinking
being. I am conscious of my representations, and hence
they exist as well as I myself, who has these representa-
tions. External objects, however (bodies), are phenomena
only, therefore nothing but a class of my representations,
the objects of which are something by means of these repre-
sentations only, and apart from them nothing, [p. 371]
External things, therefore, exist by the same right as I
myself, both on the immediate testimony of my self-con-
sciousness, with this difference only, that the representa-
tion of myself, as a thinking subject, is referred to the
internal sense only, while the representations which in-
dicate extended beings are referred to the external sense
also. With reference to the reality of external objects, I
need as little trust to inference, as with reference to the
reality of the object of my internal sense (my thoughts),
both being nothing but representations, the immediate
perceptinn (consciousness) of which is at the same time a
sufficient proof of their reality.
The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical
realist* and allows to matter, as a phenomenon, a reality
which need not be inferred, but may be immediately per-
ceived. The transcendental realism, on the contrary, is
necessarily left in doubt, and obliged to give way to
Transcendental Dialectic
empirical idealism, because it considers the objects of the
external senses as something different from the senses
themselves, taking mere phenomena as independent
beings, existing outside us. And while with the very
best consciousness of our representation of these things^
it is far from certain that, if a representation exists, its
corresponding object must exist also, it is clear that in
our system external things, that is» matter in all its shapes
and changes, are nothing but mere phenomena, [p. 372]
that is, representations within us, of the reality of which
we are immediately conscious.
. As, so far as I know, all psychologists who believe in
empirical idealism are transcendental realists, they have
acted no doubt quite consistently, in ascribing great im-
portance to empirical idealism, as one of the problems
from which human reason could hardly extricate itself.
For indeed, if we consider external phenomena as repre-
sentations produced inside us by their objects, as existing
as things by themselves outside us, it is difficult to see
how their existence could be known otherwise but through
a syllogism from effect to cause, where it must always
remain doubtful, whether the cause be within or without
us. Now we may well admit that something which, taken
transcendentally, is outside us, may be the cause of our
external intuitions, but this can never be the object which
we mean by the representations of matter and material
things ; for these are phenomena only, that is, certain
kinds of representations existing always within us, and
the reality of which depends on our immediate conscious-
ness, quite as much as the consciousness of my own
thoughts. The transcendental object is unknown equally
in regard to internal and external intuition.
Transcendental Dialectic
303
■ Of this, however, we are not speaking at [p, ^Ji]
present, but only of the empirical object, which is called
external, if represented in space, and internal, when repre-
sented in temporal relations only, both space and time
being to be met with nowhere except in ourselves.
The expression, outside us, involves however an inevita-
ble ambtguily, because it may signify cither, something
which, as a thing by itself, exists apart from us, or what
belongs to outward appearance only. In order, therefore,
to remove all uncertainty from that concept, taken in the
latter meaning (which alone affects the psychological
question as to the reality of our external intuition) we
shall distinguish empirically external objects from those
that may be called so in a transcendental sense, by calling
the former simply things occurring in space.
Space and time are no doubt representations a priori^
which dwell in us as forms of our sensuous intuition,
before any real object has determined our senses by
means of sensation^ enabling them to represent the ob-
ject under those sensuous conditions. But this some-
thing, material or real, that is to be seen in space,
presupposes necessarily perception, and cannot be fancied
or produced by means of imagination without that per-
ception, which indicates the reality of something in space.
It is sensation, therefore, that indicates reality [p, 374]
in space and time, according as it is related to the one or
the other mode of sensuous intuition. If sensation is once
given (which, if referring to an object in general, and not
specialising it, is called perception), many an object may
be put together in imagination from the manifold materials
of perception, which has no empirical place in space or
time, but in imagination only. This admits of no doubt,
J
304 Transcendeniiii Dialectic
whether we take the sensations of pain and pleasurCp or
the eKternal ones of colour, heat, etc. ; it is always per-
ception by which the material for thinking of any objects
of external intuition must be hrst supplied. This per-
ception, therefore (to speak at present of external in-
tuitions only), represents something real in space. For,
first, perception is the representation of a reality, while
space is the representation of a mere possibility of co-
existence. Secondly, this reality is represented before
the external sense, that is, in space. Thirdly, space itself
is nothing but mere representation, so that nothing in it
can be taken as real, except what is represented in it ; ^ or,
vice versa, whatever is given in it, that is, what- [p. 375]
ever is represented in it by perception, is also real in it,
because, if it were not real in it, that is, given immediately
by empirical intuition, it could not be created by fancy, the
real of intuition being unimaginable a prion.
Thus we see that all external perception proves imme-
diately something real in space, or rather is that real it-
self. Empirical realism is therefore perfectly true, that
is, something real in space always corresponds to our
external intuitions. Space itself, it is true, with all its
phenomena, as representations, exists within me only, but
the real or the material of all objects of intuition is never-
theless given in that space, independent of all fancy or
* We must well master this paradoxical, but quite correct proposition, that
nothing can he in apace, except what is reprcseittesl in it- For space itself is
nothing but reprcsetitiitiyti, antl whatever is in it must therefore be contained
in that rcprcsPiitation. There is nothing whatever in space, except so far as
it is really represented in it. That a thing can exist only in the representation
of it, may no doubt sound strange; but will lost its strangeness if we consider
that Che things with whiuh we have to deal, are not tJblngi by themselves, but
phenomena only, that is^ representations.
Transcendental Dialectic
30s
imagination ; nay» it is impossible that in that space any-
thing outside us (in a transcendental sense) could be
given, because space itself is nothing outside our sensi-
bility. The strictest idealist^ therefore, can never require
that we should prove that the object without us [p, n€\
(in its true meaning) corresponds to our perception. For
granted there are such objects, they could never be repre-
sented and seen, as outside us, because this presupposes
space, and the reality in space, as a mere representation,
is nothing but the perception itself. It thus follows, that
what is real in external phenomena, is real in perception
only, and cannot be given in any other way»
From such perceptions, whether by mere play of fancy
or by experience, know^ledge of objects can be produced,
and here no doubt deceptive representations may arise,
without truly corresponding objects, the deception being
due, either to illusions of imagination (in dreams), or to a
fault of judgment (the so-called deceptions of the senses).
In order to escape from these false appearances, one has
to follow the rule that, ivhatever is connected according to
empirical laws with a perception, is real. This kind of
illusion, however, and its prevention, concerns idealism as
well as dualism, since it affects the form of experience
only. In order to refute empirical idealism and its un-
founded misgivings as to the objective reality of our exter-
nal perceptions, it is sufficient to consider 1) that exter-l
nal perception proves immediately a reality in space,
which space, though in itself a mere form of [p. 377]
representations, possesses nevertheless objective reality
with respect to all external phenomena (which themselves
are mere representations only) ; 2) that without perception, \
even the creations of fancy and dreams would not be pos-
n
Transcendental Dialeciu
sible, so that our external senses, with reference to the
data from which experience can spring, must have real
objects corresponding to them in space.
There are two kinds of idealists, the dogmatic^ who
denies the existence of matter, and the sceptical, wiio
doubts iti because he thinks it impossible to prove it. At
present we have nothing to do with the former, who is an
idealist, because he imagines he finds contradictions in
the possibility of matter in general. This is a difficulty
which we shall have to deal with in the following section
on dialectical syllogisms, treating of reason in its internal
struggle with reference to the concepts of the possibility
of all that belongs to the connection of experience. The
i/ sceptical idealist, on the contrary, who attacks only the
ground of our assertion, and declares our conviction of the
existence of matter, which we founded on immediate per-
ception, as insufficient, is in reality a benefactor of human
reason, because he obliges us, even in the smallest matter
of common experience, to keep our eyes well [p, 378]
open, and not to consider as a well-earned possession what
may have come to us by mistake only. We now shall
learn to understand the great advantage of these idealistic
objections. They drive us by main force, unless we mean
to contradict ourselves in our most ordinary propositions,
to consider all perceptions, whether we call them internal
or external, as a consciousness only of what affects our
sensibility, and to look on the external objects of them,
not as things by themselves, but only as representations
of which, as of every other representation, we can become
immediately conscious, and which are called external,
because they depend on what we call the external sense
with its intuition of space, space being itself nothing but
Transcendental Dialectic
307
an internal kind of representation in which certain per-
ceptions become associated.
If we were to admit external objects to be things by
themselves, it would be simply impossible to understand
how we can arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside
us, considering that we always depend on representations
wdiich are inside us. It is surely impossible that we
should feel outside us, and not inside us, and the whole of
y' our self-consciousness cannot give us anything but our
own determinations. Thus sceptical idealism forces us to \
take refuge in the only place that is left to us, namely, in
the ideality of all phenomena : the very ideality which,
though as yet unprepared for its consequences, we estab-
lished in our own transcendental i^sthetic. If [p. 379]
then we ask whether, consequently, dualism only must be
admitted in psychology, we answer, certainly, but only in
jits empirical acceptation. In the connection of experi-
lence matter, as the substance of phenomena, is really
given to the external sense in the same manner as the
thinking I. likewise as the substance of phenomena, is
given to the internal sense ; and it is according to the
rules which this category introduces into the cm|)irtcal
connection of our external as well as internal perceptions,
that phenomena on both sides must be connected among
themselves. If* on the contrary, as often happens, we
were to extend the concept of dualism and take it in its
transcendental acceptation^ then neither it, nor on one
side \\\^ pneumatism, or on the other side the materialism,
which are opposed to dualism, would have the smallest
foundation ; we should have missed the determination of
our concepts, aiul have mistaken the difference in our
mode of representing objects, which, with regard to what
3o8 Transcendental Dialectic
they are in themselves, remain always unknown to us, for
a difference of the things themselves. -No doubt Ij as
represented by the internal sense in time, and objects in
space outside me, are two specifically different phenomena,
but they are not therefore conceived as different things.
The transcendental object, which forms the foundation or
external phenomena, and the other, which forms the
foundation of our internal intuition, is therefore [p. 380]
I neither matter, nor a thinking being by itself, but simply
' an unknown cause of phenomena which supply to us the
empirical concept of both.
If therefore, as evidently forced to do Ly this very
criticism, we remain faithful to the okl rule, never to
push questions beyond where possible experience can
supply us with an object, we shall never dream of going
beyond the objects of our senses and asking what they
may be by themselves, that is, without any reference to
our senses. But if the psychologist likes to take phe-
nomena for things by themselves, then, whether he admit
into his system, as a materialist, matter only, or, as a
\ spiritualist, thinking beings only (according to the form
of our own internal sense), or, as a dualist, both, as things
existing in themselves, he will always be driven by his
mistake to invent theories as to how that which is not a
thing by itself, but a phenomenon only, could exist by itself.
CONSIDERATION [p. 381]
on the Whole of Pure Psychology^ as affected by these
Paralogisms
i If we compare the science of the soul, as the physi-
I ology of the internal sense, with the science of the body,
\ as a physiology of the objects of external senses, we find.
^
Transcendental Dialectic
309
besides many things which in both must be known empiri-
call}% this important difference, that in the latter many
things can be known a priori from the mere concept of
an extended and impermeable beings while in the former
nothing can be known a priori and synthetically from
the concept of a thinking being. The cause is this.
Though both are phenomena, yet the phenomena of the
external sense have something permanent, which sug-
gests a substratum of varying determinations, and conse-
quentiy a synthetical concept, namely, that of space, and'
of a phenomenon in space ; while time, the only form
of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent, and
makes us to know the change of determinations only,
but not the determinable object. For in what we call
soul there is a continuous flux, and nothing permanent,
except it may be (if people will so have it) the simple
/, so simple because this representation has no contents,
consequently nothing manifold, so that it seems to repre-
sent, or more accurately to indicate, a simple [p. 382]
object. This I or Ego would have to be an intuition,
which, being presupposed in all thought (before all experi-
ence), might as an intuition a priori supply synthetical
propositions, if it should be possible to get any know-
ledge by pure reason of the nature of a thinking being
in general. But this I is neither an intuition nor a
concept of any object, but the mere form of conscious-
ness which can accompany both classes of representa-
tions, and impart to them the character of knowledge^
provided something else be given in intuition which
supplies matter for a representation of an object. Thus
wc see that the whole of rational psychology is impossi-
ble as transcending the powers of human reason^ and
Transcendental Dialectic
^
nothing remains to us but to study our soul under the
guidance of experience, and to keep ourselves within the
limits of questions which do not go beyond the line
where the material can be supplied by possible internal
experience.
But although rational psychology is of no use in ex-
tending our knowledge, but as such is made up of paral-
ogisms only, we cannot deny to it an important negative
utility, if it does not pretend to be more than a critical
investigation of our dialectical syllogisms, as framed by
our common and natural reason.
What purpose can be served by psychology [p. 383]
founded on pure principles of reason ? Its chief pur-
pose is meant to be to guard our thinking self against
the danger of materialism. This purpose however is
answered, as we have shown, by the concept which rea-
son gives of our thinking self. For, so far from there
being any fear lest, if matter be taken away, all thought,
and even the existence of thinking beings might vanish,
it has been on the contrary clearly shown that, if we take
away the thinking subject, the whole material world would
vanish, because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the
sensibility of our own subject, and a certain class of its
representations.
It is true that \ do not know thus this thinking self
any better according to its qualities, nor can I perceive
its permanence, or even the independence of its exist-
ence from the problematical transcendental substratum
of external phenomena, both being necessarily unknown
to us. Rut as it is nevertheless possible that I may
find reason, from other than purely speculative causes,
to hope for an independent, and, during every possible
Transcendental Dialectic
311
change of my states, permanently abiding existence of
my thinking nature, much is gained if, though I freely
confess my own igiiorance, I can nevertheless repel the
dogmatical attacks of a speculative opponent, [p, 384]
showing to him that he can never know more of the nat-
ure of the subject, in order to deny the possibility of
my expectations, than I can know, in order to cling to
them.
Three dialectical questions, which form the real object
of all rational psychology, are founded on this transcen-
dental illusion of our psychological concepts, and cannot
be answered except by means of the considerations in
which we have just been engaged, namely, (i) the qucs-(
ition of the possibility of the association of the soul with
an organic body, that is, <Jf animality and the state of
\ the soul in the life of man ; (2) the question of the be-
ginning of that association of the soul at the time and
before the time of our birth ; (3) the question of the
end of that association of the soul at and after the
time of death (immortality).
What I maintain is, that all the difficulties which we
imagine to exist in these questions, and with which, as
dogmatical objections^ people wish to give themselves an
air of deeper insight into the nature of things than the
common understanding can ever claim, rest on a mere
illusion, which leads us to hypostasise what exists in
thought only, and to accept it in the same quality in
which it is thought as a real object, outside the think-
ing subject, taking in fact extension, which is phenomenal
only, for a quality of external things, existing [p, 385]
without our sensibility also, and movement as their effect,
taking place by itself also, and independently of our
1
senses. For matter, the association of which with the
soul causes so much misgiving, is nothing but a mere
orm, or a certain mode of representing an unknown
object by that intuition which we call the external
sense. There may, therefore, well be something outside
us to which the phenomenon which we call matter cor-
responds ; though in its quality of phenomenon it cannot
be outside us, but merely as a thought within us, although
that thought represents it through the external sense as
existing outside us. Matter, therefore, does not signify ^1
a class of substances totally heterogeneous and different
from the object of the internal sense (the soul), but only
the different nature of the phenomenal appearance of
objects (in themselves unknown to us), the representations
of which we call external, as* compared with those which
we assign to the internal sense, although, like other
thoughts, those external representations also belong to
the thinking subject only. They possess however this
illusion that, as they represent objects in space, they seem
to separate themselves from the soul and to move out-
side it, although even the space, in which they are seen,
is nothing but a representation of which no homogeneous
original can ever be found outside the souL The question
therefore is no longer as to the possibility of an associa-
tion of the soul with other known and foreign [p. 386]
substances outside us, but only as to the connection of
the representations of the internal sense with the modi-
fications of our external sensibility, and how these can
be connected with each other according to constant laws,
and acquire cohesion in experience.
So long as we connect internal and external phenomena
with each other as mere representations in our experience,
Transcendental Dialectic
313
there is nothing irratioaal, nor anything to make the asso-
ciation of both senses to appear strange. As soon how-
ever as we hypostatise the external phenomena, looking
upon them no longer as representations, but as things
existing by themselves and outside ns, with the same qual-
ity in tvhich they exist inside us, and referring to our own
thinking subject their acts which they, as phenomena,
show in their mutual relation, the effective causes outside
us assume a character which will not harmonise with their
efifects within us, because that character refers to the ex-
ternal senses only, but the effects to the internal sense,
both being entirely unhomogeneous, though united in the
same subject We then have no other external effects
but changes of place, and no forces but tendencies, which
have for their effects relations in space only. Within us,
on the contrary, those effects are mere thoughts, without
any relations of space, movement, shape, or local [p. 387]
determination between them ; and we entirely lose the
thread of the causes in the effects which ought to show
themselves in the internal sense. We ought to consider f
therefore that bodies are not objects by themselves which
are present to us, but a mere appearance of we do not
know what unknown object, and that movement likewise i
is not the effect of that unknown cause, but only the I
appearance of its influence on our senses. Both are not
something outside us, but only representation within us,
and consequently it is not the movement of matter which
produces representations within us, but that motion itself
(and matter also, which makes itself known through it) is
representation only. Our whole self-created difficulty
turns on this, how and why the representations of our
sensibility arc so connected with each other that those
n
TratiscendcHtal Dialectic
which we call external intuitions can, according to em-
pirical laws, be represented as objects outside us ; a ques-
tion which is entirely free from the imagined difficulty of
explaining the origin of our representations from totally
heterogeneous efficient causes, existing outside us, the
confusion arising from our mistaking the phenomenal ap-
pearance of an unknown cause for the very cause outside
us. In judgments in which there is a misapprehension
confirmed by long habit, it is impossible to bring its cor-
rection at once to that clearness which can be [p, ^%%\
produced in other cases, where no inevitable illusion con-
fuses our concept. Our attempt therefore at freeing rea-
son from these sophistical theories can hardly claim as yet
that perspicuity which would render it perfectly satisfac-
tory, I hope however to arrive at greater lucidity in the
following manner.
All objcctums may be divided into dogmatical^ critical^
and sceptical. The dogmatical attacks thz proposition y the
critical the proof of a proposition. The former presup-
poses an insight into the peculiar nature of the object
in order to be able to assert the contrary of what the
proposition asserts. It is therefore itself dogmatical, and
pretends to know the peculiar nature of the object in
question better than the opponent. ^ The critical objec-
tion, as it says nothing about the worth or worthlessness
of the proposition, and attacks the proof only, need not
know the object itself better, or claim a better knowledge
of it. All it wants to show is, that a proposition is not
well grounded, not that it is false. The sceptical objec*
tion, lastly, places assertion and denial side by side, as
of equal value, taking one or the other now as dogma,
and now as denial ; and being thus iu appearance dog-
Transcendental Dialectic
3«5
matical on both sides, it renders every judgment [p. 389]
on the object impossible. Both the dogmatical and scep-
tical objections must pretend to so much knowledge of
their object as is necessary in order to assert or deny
anything about it. The critical objection, on the con-
trary, wishes only to show that something purely futile
and fanciful has been used in support of a proposition,
and thus upsets a theory by depriving it of its pretended
foundation^ without wishing to establish itself anything
else about the nature of the object.
According to the ordinary concepts of our reason with
regard to the association between our thinking subject
and the things outside us, we are dogmatical, and look
upon them as real objects, existing independently of our-
selves, in accordance with a certain transcendental dualism
which does not reckon external phenomena as representa-
tions belonging to the subject, but places them, as they
are given us in sensuous intuition, as objects outside us
and entirely separated from the thinking subject. This
mere assumption is the foundation of all theories on the
association between soul and body. It is never asked
whether this objective reality of phenomena is absolutely
true, but it is taken for granted, •and the only question
seems to be, how it is to be explained and understood.
The three systems which are commonly sug- [pJ9o]
gested, and which in fact are alone possible, are those,
1st, of physical injlmnce^ 2nd, of pre-established hannany^
and 3rd, of supernatural assistance,
^ The second and third explanations of the association
between soul and matter arise from objections to the first,
which is that of the ordinary understanding, the objection
being, that what appears as matter cannot by its irame-
3l6 Transceftd^ntai Dialectic
^
diate influence be the cause of representations, these being
a totally heterogeneous class of effects. Those who start
this objection cannut understand by the objects of the
external senses matter, conceived as phenomenon only,
and therefore itself a mere representation produced by
whatever external objects. For in that case they would
really say that the representations of external objects
(phenomena) cannot be the external causes of the repre-
sentations in our mind, which would be a meaningless
objection, because nobody would think of taking for an
external cause what he knows to be a mere representation.
According to our principles the object of their theory can
only be, that that which is the true (transcendental) object
of our external senses cannot be the cause of those repre-
sentations (phenomena) which we mean by the name of
matter As no one has any right to say that he [p. 391]
knows anything of the transcendental cause of the repre-
sentations of our external senses, their assertion is entirely
groundless. And if the pretended reformers of the doc-
trine of physical influence represent, according to the
ordinary views of transcendental dualism, matter, as such,
as a thing by itself {not simply as a mere phenomenal
appearance of an unk'^own thing), and then proceed in
their objections to show that such an external object,
which shows no causality but that of movements, can
never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a
third being must intervene in order to produce, if not
reciprocal action, at least correspondence and harmony
between the two, they would really begin their refutation
by admitting in their dualism the 7rp<Sroi/ -^cOSo? of a
physical influence, and thus refute by their objection, not
so much the physical influence as their own dualistic
Transcendental Dialectic
317
premisses. For all the difficulties with regard to a possi-
ble connection between a thinking nature and matter
arise, without exception, from that too readily admitted
dualistic representation, namely, that matter, as such, is
not phenomenal, that is, a mere representation of the
mind to which an unknown object corresponds, but the
object itself, such as it exists outside us, and independent
of all sensibility, [p, 392]
It is impossible, therefore, to start a dogmatical objec-
tion against the commonly received theory of a physical
influence. For if the opponent were to say that matter
and its movements are purely phenomenal and therefore
mere representations, the only difficulty remaining to him
would be that the unknown object of our senses could not
be the cause of our representations, and this he has no
right to say, because no one is able to determine what an
unknown object may or may not be able to effect ; and,
according to our former arguments, he must necessarily
admit this transcendental idealism, unless he wishes to
hypostasise mere representations and place them outside
himself as real things.
What is quite possible, however, is to raise a well-
founded critical objection to the commonly received opinion
of a physical influence. For the pretended association
between tw^o kinds of substances, the one thinking, the
other extended, rests on a coarse dualism, and changes
the latter, though they are nothing but representations of
the thinking subject, into things existing by themselves.
Thus the misunderstood physical influence may be entirely
upset by showing that the proof which was to establish it,
was surreptitiously obtained, and therefore, valueless.
The notorious problem, therefore, as to a possible asso-
Tra HSCcndiH fa i Dia lectic
^
ciation between the thinking and the extended, would^
when all that is purely imaginative is deducted, [p. 393]
come to this, how external intftition^ namely, that of space
(or what fills space, namely, form and movement), ij pos-
sible in a ay ikhiking sabjed f To this question, however,
no human being can return an answer, and instead of
attempting to fill this gap in our knowledge, all we can do
is to indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a
transcendental object as the cause of this class of repre-
sentations, but which we shall never know, nor be able to
form any concept of. In all practical questions we treat
phenomena as objects by themselves, without troubling
ourselves about the first cause of their possibility {as
phenomena). But as soon as we go beyond, the concept
of a transcendental object becomes inevitable.
The decision of all the discussions on the state of a
thinking being, before this association with matter (life)
or after the ceasing of such association (death), depends
on the remarks which we have just made on the associa-
tion between the thinking and the extended. The opinion
that the thinking subject was able to think before any
association with bodies, would assume the following form,
that before the beginning of that kind of sensi- [p. 394]
bility through which something appears to us in space, the
same transcendental objects, wbicb in our present state
appear as bodies, could have been seen in a totally differ-
ent way. The other opinion that, after the cessation of
its association with the material w^orld, the soul could
continue to think, would be expressed as follows : that, if
that kind of sensibility through which transcendental and,
for the present, entirely unknown objects appear to us as
a material world, should cease, it would not follow that
Transcendental Dialectic
319
thereby all intuition of them would be removed : it being
quite possible that the same unknown objects should con-
tinue to he known by the thinking subject, although no
longer in the quality of bodies.
Now it is quite true that no one can produce from spec-
ulative principles the smallest ground for such an asser-
tion, or do more than presuppose its possibility, but
neither can any valid dogmatical objection be raised
against it. For whoever would attempt to do so, would
know neither more nor less than I myself, or anybody
else, about the absolute and internal cause of external and
material phenomena. As he cannot pretend to know on
what the reality of external phenomena in our present
state (in life) really rests, neither can he know that the
condition of all external intuition, or the thinking subject
itself, will cease after this state (in death). [p. 39Sl
We thus see that all the wrangling about the nature of |
a thinking being, and its association with the material
world, arises simply from our filling the gap, due to our
ignorance, with paralogisms of reason, and by changing
thoughts into things and hypostasising them. On this ani
imaginary science is built up, both by those who assert
and by those who deny, some pretending to know about
objects of which no human being has any conception,
while others make their own representations to be objects,
air turning round in a constant circle of ambiguities and
contradictions. Nothing but a sober, strict, and just
criticism can free us of this dogmatical illusion, which,
through theories and systems, deceives so many by an
imaginary happiness. It alone can limit our speculative
pretensions to the sphere of possible experience, and
this not by a shallow scoffing at repeated failures or by
I
pious sighs over the limits of our reason^ but by a demar-
cation made according to well-established principles, writ-
ing the nihil ultcrins with perfect assurance on those
Herculean columns which Nature herself has erected, in
order that the voyage of our reason should be continued
so far only as the continuous shores of experience extend
— shores which we can never forsake without [p. 396]
being driven upon a boundless ocean, which^ after deceiv-
ing us again and again, makes us in the end cease all our
laborious and tedious endeavours as perfectly hopeless.
We have yet to give a general and clear investigation of
the transcendental, and yet natural illusion, produced by
the paralogisms of pure reason, and the justification of our
systematical arrangement of them, which ran parallel with
the table of the categories. We could not have done this
at the beginning of this section, without running the risk
of becoming obscure, or inconveniently anticipating our
arguments. We shall now try to fulfil our duty.
All illusion may be explained as mistaking the subjec-
tive condition of thought for the knowledge of the object.
In the introduction to the transcendental Dialectic, we
showed that pure reason is occupied exclusively with the
totality of the synthesis of conditions belonging to any-
thing conditioned. Now as the dialectical illusion of pure
reason cannot be an empirical illusion, such as occurs in cer-
tain empirical kinds of knowledge, it can refer only to the
conditions of thought in general, so that there can [p. 397]
only be three cases of the dialectical use of pure reason : —
1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in
general
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thought.
Transcendental Dialectic
321
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thought
In every one of these three cases pure reason is occu-
pied only with the absolute totality of that synthesis, that
is, with that condition, which is itself unconditioned. It
is on this division also that the threefold transcendental
illusion is founded which leads to three subdivisions of the
Dialectic, and to as many pretended sciences flowing from
pure reason, namely, transcendental psychology, cosmol-
ogy» and theology. We are at present concerned with the
first only.
As, in thinking in general, we take no account of the
relation of our thoughts to any object (whether of the
senses or of the pure understanding), what is called (i)
the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general, is
not objective at all, but only a synthesis of thought with
the subject, which synthesis is wrongly taken for the
synthetical representation of an object.
It follows from this that the dialectical conclusion as to
the condition of all thought in general, which condition
itself is unconditioned, does not involve a fault in its con-
tents {for it ignores all contents or objects), but only a
fault in form, and must therefore be called a [p. 398]
paralogism.
As, moreover, the only condition which accompanies all
thought is the /, in the general proposition / think, reason
has really to deal with this condition, so far as that condi-
tion is itself unconditioned. It is however a formal con-
dition only, namely, the logical unity of every thought, no
account being taken of any object ; but it is represented
nevertheless as an object which I think, namely, as the I
itself and its unconditioned unity.
If I were asked what is the nature of a thin^j which
322 Transcendental Dialectic
thinks, I could not give any answer a priori^ for the
answer ought to be synthetical, as an analytical answer
might explain perhaps the meaning of the term ** thought/*
but could never add any real knowledge of that on which
the possibility of thought depends. For a synthetical
solution, however, we should reqiJire intuition, and this
has been entirely left out of account in the general form
given to our problem. It is equally impossible to answer
the general question, what is the nature of a thing which
is moveable, because in that case the impermeable exten-
sion (matter) is not given. liut although I have no
answer to return to that question in general, it might
seem that I could answer it in a special case, namely, in
the proposition which expresses the self-consciousness, I
think. For this I is the first subject, i.e. sub- [p, 399]
stance, it is simple, etc. These, however, ought then to
be propositions of experience, which nevertheless, without
a general rule containing the conditions of the possibility
of thought in general and a priori ^ could not contain such
predicates (which are not empirical). This consideration
makes our knowledge of the nature of a thinking being
derived from pure concepts, which seemed at first so
plausible, extremely suspicious, though we have not yet
discovered the place where the fault really lies.
A further investigation, however, of the origin of the
attributes which I predicate of myself as a thinking being
in general, may help us to discover the fault. They are
no more than pure categories by which I can never think
a definite object, but only the unity of the representations
which is requisite in order to determine an object. With-
out a previous intuition, no category by itself can give me
a concept of an object, for by intuition alone the object is
Transcendental Dialectic
323
given, which afterwards is thought in accordance with a
categor)^ In order to declare a thing to be a substance
in phenomenal appearance, predicates of its intuition must
first be <;iven to me, in which I may distinguish the per-
manent from the changeable, and the substratum (the
thing in itself) from that which is merely inher- [p. 400]
ent in it. If I call a thing simple as a phenomenon,
what I mean is that its intuition is a part of phenomenal
appearance, but cannot itself be divided into parts, etc.
But if I know something to be simple by a concept only,
and not by phenomenal appearance, I have really no
knowledge whatever of the object, but only of my concept
which I make to myself of something in genera], that is
incapable of any real intuition. I only say that I think
something as perfectly simple, because I have really noth-
ing to say of it except that it is something.
Now the mere apperception (the I) is substance in
concept, simple in concept, etc, and so far all the psycho-
logical propositions of which we spoke before are incon-
testably true. Nevertheless what we really wish to know
of the soul, becomes by no means known to us in that
way, because all those predicates are with regard to intui-
tion non-valid, entailing no consequences with regard to
objects of experience, and therefore entirely empty. For
that concept of substance does not teach me that the soul
continues by itself, or that it is a part of external intui-
tions» which itself cannot be resolved into parts, and can*
not therefore arise or perish by any changes of nature.
These are qualities which would make the soul known to
us in its connection with experience, and might give us
an insight into its origin and future state. But [p. 401]
if I say, by means of the category only, that the soul is
324 Transcendental Dialectic
a simple substance, it is clear that the bare rational con-
cept of substance contains nothing beyond the thought
that a thing should be represented as a subject in itself,
without becoming in turn a predicate of anything else.
Nothing can be deduced from this, with regard to the
permanence (of the I), nor can the attribute of simplicity
add that of permanence, nor can we thus learn anything
whatsoever as to the fate of the soul in the revolutions of
the world. If anybody could tell us that the soul is a
simple pari of mailer, we might, with the help of experi-
ence, deduce from this the permanence and, on account
of its simple nature, the indestructibility of the soul.
But of all this, the concept of the I, in the psychological
proposition of / ihink^ tells us nothing.
The reason why that being which thinks within us
imagines that it knows itself by means of pure categories,
and especially by that which expresses absolute unity
under each head, is this. The apperception itself is the
ground of the possibility of the categories, and these
represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold in
intuition, so far as it has unity in apperception. Self-con-
sciousness therefore is the representation of that which
forms the condition of all unity, and is itself uncondi-
tioned. One may therefore say of the thinking [p. 402]
I (the soul), which represents itself as substance, simple,
numerically identical in all time, and as the correlative of
all existence, from which in fact all other existence must
be concluded, that it does not know itself through the cate-
gories, but knows the categories only, and through them
all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, thai is,
through itself. It may seem no doubt self-evident that I
cannot know as an object that which is presupposed in
Transcendental Dialectic
order to enable me to know an object, and that the deter-
mining self (thought) differs from the self that is to be
determined (the thinking subject), like knowledge from its
object Nevertheless nothing is more natural or at least
more tempting than the illusion which makes us look upon
the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity
in the subject of thoughts. One might call it the surrep-
titious admission of an hypostasised consciousness {apper-
ceptianis substantiatae).
If we want to have a logical term for the paralogism in
the dialectical syllogisms of rational psychology^ based on
perfectly correct premisses, it might be called a saphisma
figiirae dictionis. In the major we use the category, with
reference to its condition, transcendentally only ; in the
minor and in the conclusion, we use the same category,
with reference to the soul which is to be com pre- [p. 403]
hended under that condition, empirically. Thus, in the
paralogism of substantiality,^ the concept of substance is
a purely intellectual concept which, without the conditions
of sensuous intuition, admits of a transcendental use only,
that is. of no use at all. In the minor, however, we refer
the same concept to the object of all internal experience,
though without having previously established the condi-
tion of its application in cancrelo, namely, its permanence.
We thus are making an empirical, and therefore entirely
inadmissible use of it.
Lastly, in order to show the systematical connection of
all these dialectical propositions of a rationalising psy*
chology, according to their connection in pure reason,
and thus to establish their completeness, it should be
> SimfiUiiSl was a misprint for iuhiantiaiii^.
326 Transcendental Dialectic
remarked that the apperception is carried through all the
classes of the categories, but only with reference to those
concepts of the understanding, which in each of them
formed a foundation of unity for the others in a possible
perception, namely subsistence, reality, unity (not plu-
rality), and existence, all of which are here represented by
reason, as conditions (themselves unconditioned) of the
possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in
itself: —
I [p. 404]
The unconditioned unity
of the relation,
that is,
itself, not as inherent,
but as
subsisting.
II III
The unconditioned unity The unconditioned unity
of quality, in the manifoldness of time,
that is, that is,
not as a real whole, not as at different times
but as numerically different,
simple.^ but as
one and the same subject.
IV
The unconditioned unity
of existence in space,
that is,
not as the consciousness of many things outside it,
but as the consciousness of the existence of itself only,
and of other things, merely
as its representations.
^ How the simple can again correspond to the category of reality cannot
yet be explained here ; but will be shown in the following chapter, wht n
another use has to be discussed which reason makes of the same concept.
Trafiscendental Dialectic
ZV
Reason is the faculty of principles. The state- [p. 405]
ments of pure psychology do not contain empirical predi-
cates of the soul, but such as, if they exist, are meant to
determine the object by itself, independent of all experi-
ence, and therefore by a pure reason only. They ought
therefore to rest on principles and on general concepts of
thinking beings. Instead of this we find that a single
representation, I think,' governs them all, a representation
which, for the very reason that it expresses the pure
formula of all my experience (indefinitely), claims to be a
genera! proposition, applicable to all thinking beings, and,
though single in all respects, has the appearance of an
absolute unity of the conditions of thought in general, thus
stretching far beyond the limits of possible experience.]
1 Ick ^in was a mistake, it can only be meant for hk dtmke.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
CHAPTER II
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
In the Introduction to this part of our work we showed
that all the transcendental illusion of pure reason depended
on three dialectical syllogisms, the outline of which is sup-
plied to us by logic in the three formal kinds of the ordi-
nary syllogism, in about the same way in which the logical
outline of the categories was derived from the [p. 406]
four functions of all judgments. The first class oi these
rationalising syllogisms aimed at the unconditioned unity
of the subjective conditions of all representations (of the
subject or the soul) as corresponding to the categorical syl-
logisms of reason, the major of which, as the principle,
asserts the relation' of a predicate to a subject. The
second class of the dialectical arguments will, therefore,
in analogy with the hypothetical syllogisms, take for its
object the unconditioned unity of the objective condi-
tions in phenomenal appearance, while the third class,
which has to be treated in the following chapter, will be
concerned with the unconditioned unity of the objective
conditions of the possibility of objects in general.
328
Transcendental Dialectic
329
It is strange, however, that a transcendental paralogism
caused a one-sided illusion only, with regard to our idea of
the subject of our thought \ and that it is impossible to
find in mere concepts of reason the slightest excuse for
maintaining the contrary. AH the advantage is on the
side of pneumatism, although it cannot hide the heredi-
tary taint by which it evaporates into nought, when sub-
jected to the ordeal of our critique.
The case is totally different when we apply reason to
the objective synthesis of phenomena ; here reason tries at
first, with great plausibilitVp to establish its prin- [p. 407]
ciple of unconditioned unity, but becomes soon entangled
in so many contradictions, that it must give up its pre-
tensions with regard to cosmology also.
For here we are met by a new phenomenon in human
Teason, namely, a perfectly natural Antithetic, which
IS not produced by any artificial efforts, but into which
reason falls by itself, and inevitably. Reason is no doubt
preserved thereby from the slumber of an imaginary con-
viction, which is often produced by a purely one-sided
illusion ; but it is tempted at the same time, either to
abandon itself to sceptical despair, or to assume a dog-
matical obstinacy, taking its stand on certain assertions,
without granting a hearing and doing justice to the argu-
ments of the opponent. In both cases» a death*b1ow is
dealt to sound philosophy, although in the former we
might speak of the Eutltanasia of pure reason.
Before showing the scenes of discord and confusion
produced by the conflict of the laws (antinomy) of pure
reason, we shall have to make a few remarks in order to
explain and justify the method which we mean to follow
m the treatment of this subject. I shall call all transccn-
Transcendintal Dialectic
dental ideas, so far as they relate to the absolute totality
in the synthesis of "^h^VkKiva^xvaL^ cosmicai amcepts^ [p. 408]
partly, because of even this unconditioned totality on
which the concept of the cosmical universe also rests
(which is itself an idea only), partly, because they refer
to the synthesis of phenomena only, which is empirical,
while the absolute totality in the synthesis of the con-
ditions of all possible things must produce an ideal of
pure reason, totally different from the cosmical concept,
although in a certain sense related to it. As therefore
the paralogisms of pure reason formed the foundation for
a dialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will
place before our eyes the transcendental principles of a
pretended pure (rational) cosmology, not in order to show
that it is valid and can be accepted, hut, as may be
guessed from the very name of the antinomy of reason,
in order to expose it as an idea surrounded by deceptive
and false appearances, and utterly irreconcileable with
phenomena.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section I
System of Cosmological Ideas
Before we arc able to enumerate these ideas according
to a principle and with systematic precision, we must bear
in mind,
1st, That pure and transcendental concepts arise from
the understanding only, and that reason does not [p, 409]
in reality produce any concept, but Qnly frees, it may be,
the concept of i/u tmdcrsianding of the inevitable limita-
Transcendental Dialectic
331
n of a possible experience, and thus tries to enlarge it,
beyond the limits of experience, yet in connection with
it* Reason docs this by demanding for something that is
given as conditioned, absolute totality on the side of the
conditions (under which the understanding subjects all
phenomena to the synthetical unity). It thus changes
the category into a transcendental idea, in order to give
absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by con-
tinuing it up to the unconditioned (which can never be
met with in experience, but in the idea only). In doing
this, reason follows the principle that, if the conditioned is
given, the ivhole sum of conditions, ami therefore the abso-
luteiy unconditioned must be given likewise, the former being
impossible without the latter. Hence the transcendental
ideas are in reality nothing but categories, enlarged till
they reach the unconditioned, and those ideas must admit
of being arranged in a table, according to the titles of the
categories.
2ndly. Not all categories will lend themselves to this,
but those only in which the synthesis constitutes a series,
and a series of subortlinated (not of co-ordinated) condi-
tions. Absolute totality is demanded by reason, [p. 410]
with regard to an ascending scries of conditions only, not
therefore when we have to deal with a descending line of
consequences, or with an aggregate of co-ordinated condi-
tions. For, with reference to something given as condi-
tioned, conditions are presupposed and considered as given
with it, while, on the other hand, as consequences do not
render their conditions possible, but rather presuppose
them, we need not, in proceeding to the consequences
(or in descending from any given condition to the condi-
tioned), trouble ourselves whether the series comes to an
332 Tranueudiniai Dialectic
end or not, the question as to their lotality being in fact
no presupposition of reason whatever.
Thus we necessarily conceive time past up to a given
moment, as given, even if not determinable by us. But
with regard to time future, which is not a condition of
arriving at time present, it is entirely indifferent, if we
want to conceive the latter, what we may think about
the former, w^hether we take it, as coming to an end some-
where, or as going on to infinity. Let us take the series,
nty n, Oy where n is given as conditioned by i;/, and at the
same time as a condition of o. Let that series ascend
from the conditioned ;/ to its condition m (/, k\ /, etc.),
and descend from the condition n to the conditioned o
(/, qy r, etc.). I must then presuppose the former series, ia
order to take n as given, and according to reason (the total-
ity of conditions) n is possible only by means of that series,
while its possibility depends in no way on the [p, 411]
subsequent series, £?,/, q, r, which therefore cannot be con-
sidered as given, but only as dabiiis, capable of being given.
I shall call the synthesis of a series on the side of the
conditions, beginning with the one nearest to a given phe-
nomenon, and advancing to the more remote conditions,
regressive; the other, which on the side of the con-
ditioned advances from the nearest effect to the more
remote ones, progressive. The former proceeds in ante-
cede fititty the second in ctmscqfieNtin, Cosmological ideas
therefore, being occupied with the totality of regressive
synthesis, proceed in anteccdentia, not ii^ comequentia. If
the latter should take place, it would be a gratuitous, not
a necessary problem of pure reason, because for a com-
plete comprehension of what is given us in experience we
want to know the causes, but not the effects.
Transcendental Dialectic
333
In order to arrange a table of ideas in accordance with
the table of the categories, we must take, first, the two
original quanta of all our intuition, time and space. Time
is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series),
and in it, therefore, with reference to any given present,
we have to distinguish a priori the antecedent ia as conditions
(the past) from the consequentia (the future). Hence the
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of [p. 412]
the series of conditions of anything conditioned refers to
time past only. The whole of time past is looked upon,
according to the idea of reason, as a necessary conditicm of
the given moment With regard to space there is in it
no difference h^X>H(iiix\. progressus and regressuSy because aL
its parts exist together and form an aggregate, but no
series. We can look upon the present moment, with
reference to time past, as conditioned only, but never as
condition, because this moment arises only through time
past (or rather through the passing of antecedent time).
But as the parts of space are not subordinate to one
another, but co-ordinate, no part of it is in the condition
of the possibility of another, nor does it, like time, con-
stitute a series in itself. Nevertheless the synthesis by
which we apprehend the many parts of space is successive,
takes place in time, and contains a series. And as in that
series of aggregated spaces (as, for instance, of fept in a
rood) the spaces added to a given space arc always the
condition of the limit of the preceding spaces, we ought to
consider the fneasunng of a space also as a synthesis of a
series of conditions of something given as conditioned,
with this difference only, that the side of the [p. 413]
conditions is by itself not different from the other side
which comprehends the conditioned, so that regressus and
Transcendental Dialectic
progressus seem to be the same in space. As however
every part of space is limited only, and not given by
another, we must look upon every limited space as con-
ditioned also, so far as it presupposes another space as the
condition of its limit, and so on. With reference to limita-
tion therefore progressus in space is also regressuSj and
the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the
synthesis in the series of conditions applies to space also,
I may ask then for the absolute totality of phenomena in
space, quite as well as in time past, though we must wait
to see whether an answer is ever possible.
SecoHdlj\ reality in space, that is, matter, is something
conditioned, the parts of which are its internal conditions,
and the parts of its parts, its remoter conditions. We
have therefore here a regressive synthesis the absolute
totality of which is demanded by reason, but which can-
not take place except by a complete division, whereby the
reality of matter dwindles away into nothing, or into that
at least which is no longer matter, namely, the simple ;
consequently we have here also a series of conditions, and
a progress to the unconditioned.
Thirdly, when we come to the categories of the real
relation between phenomena, wt find that the [p. 414]
category of substance with its accidents does not lend
itself to a transcendental idea ; that is, reason has here no
inducement to proceed regressively to conditions. We
know that accidents, so far as they inhere in one and the
same substance, are co-ordinated with each other, and do
not constitute a series ; and with reference to the sub-
stance, they are not properly subordinate to it, but are the
mode of existence of the substance itself. The concept
of the substantial might seem to be here an idea of trau-
I
Tramcendendil Dialectic
335
cendental reason. This, however, signifies nothing but
the concept of the object in general, which stiisists, so far
as we think in it the transcendental subject only, without
any predicates ; and, as we are here speaking only of the
unconditioned in the series of phenomena, it is clear that
the substantial cannot be a part of it. The same applies
to substances in community, which are aggregates only,
w^ithout having an exponent of a series, since they are not
subordinate to each other, as conditions of their possibil-
ity, in the same way as spaces were, the limits of which
can never be determined by itself, but always through
another space. There remains therefore only the cate-
gory of caitsaiifVt which offers a series of causes to a given
effect, enabling us to ascend from the latter^ as the condi-
tioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus to answer
the question of reason, [p. 415]
Faurthiy, the concepts of the possible, the real, and the
necessary do not lead to any series, except so far as the
accidental in existence must always be considered as con-
ditioned, and point, according to a rule of the understand-
ing, to a condition which makes it necessary to ascend to
a higher condition, till reason finds at last, only, in the
totality of that series, the unconditioned necessity which it
requires.
If therefore we select those categories which necessa-
rily imply a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we
shall have no more than four cosmological ideas, accord-
to the four titles of the categories.
I
Absolute completeness
uf ihe cumposilioD
of the given whole of all phenomena.
I
Absolute completeness
of the origination
of a phenomenon
In geaeral.
IV
Absolute completeness
of the dependence of the existence
of the changeable in phenomenal appearance.
[p. 416]
It should be remarked, Jirst, that the idea of absolute
totality refers to nothing else but the exhibition of phe-
nomena, and not therefore to the pure concept, formed by
the understanding, of a totality of things in general. Phe-
nomena, therefore, are considered here as given, and rea-
son postulates the absolute completeness of the conditions
of their possibility, so far as these conditions constitute
a series, that is, an absolutely (in every respect) complete
synthesis, whereby phenomena could be exhibited accord-
ing to the Jaws of the understanding.
Secondly, it is in reality the unconditioned alone which
reason is looking for in the synthesis of conditions, con-
tinued regressively and serially, as it were a completeness
in the series of premisses, which taken together require no
further premisses. This unc^nditimted is always con-
tained in the absolute totality of a series^ as represented in
imagination. But this absolutely complete synthesis is
again an idea only, for it is impossible to know beforehand,
whether such a synthesis be possible in phenomena. If we
represent everything by means of pure concepts of the
understanding only, and without the conditions of sensu-
ous intuition, we might really say that of everything given
as conditioned the whole series also of conditions, sub-
}
Transcendental Dialectic
337
I
ordinaled to each other, is given, fur the conditioned is
given through the conditions only. When wc come to
phenomena, however, we find a particular limitation of
the mode in which conditions are given, namely, [p, 417]
through the successive synthesis of the manifold of intui-
tion which should become complete by the ttrgressus.
Whether this completeness, however, is possible* with
regard to sensuous phenomena, is still a question. But
the idea of that completeness is no doubt contained in
reason, without reference to the possibility or impossibil-
ity of connecting with it adequate empirical concepts.
As therefore in the absolute totality of the regressive
synthesis of the manifold in intuition (according to the
categories which represent that totality as a series of
conditions of something given as conditioned) the uncon-
ditiont^d is necessarily contained without attempting to
determine whether and how such a totality be possible,
reason here takes the road to start from the idea of
totality, though her final aim is the unconJitiotud^ whether
of the whole series or of a part thereof.
This unconditioned may be either conceived as existing
in the w^hole series only, in which all members without
exception are conditioned and the whole of them only
absolutely unconditioned — and in this case the regressus
is called infinite — or the absolutely unconditioned is only
a part of the series, the other members being subordinate
to it, while it is itself conditioned by nothing else.* In the
* The absolute tot*! of a scries of comHtions uf anything given as con*
ditioned, is itself always unconditioned; because there are no conditions
beyond on which it could depend. Such an absolute tutal of a series is, how-
ever, an idea only, ur rather a problcmAtical concept, the possibility of which
has tu l>e investigated with reference to the muHJc iti i^hich the uncunditionedi
Transcendental Dialectic
former case the series is without limits a parte [p. 418]
priori (without a beginning), that is infinite ; gi%'en how-
ever as a whole in w^hich the rcgressus is never complete,
and can therefore be called infinite potentially only. In
the latter case there is something that stands first in
the series, which, with reference to time past^ is called the
beginning of the world ; with reference to space, the
limii of the world; with reference to the parts of a lim-
ited given whole, the simple: with reference to causes,
absolute spontaneity (liberty) ; with reference to the exist-
ence of changeable things, the absolute necessity of nature.
We have two expressions, world and nature, which fre-
quently run into each other. The first denotes the math-
ematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their
synthesis of large and small in its progress whether by
composition or division. That world, however, is 'called
nature* if we look upon it as a dynamical [p» 419]
whole, and consider not the aggregation in space and
time, in order to produce a quantity, but the unity in the
existence of phenomena. In this case the condition of
that which happens is called cause, the unconditioned
causality of the cause as phenomenal, liberty, while the
conditioned causality, in its narrower meaning, is called
natural cause. That of which the existence is conditioned
that is, in reality, the transcendental idea with which we are concerned^ may
be contained m It.
1 Nature, if takeo adjedive (^/ormaiiter)^ is meant to exprt'ss the whole
complex of the determinations of a thing, according to an inner principle of
causahty; while, if taken suhfan/tve (mii/fria/ifrr), it denotes the totality
of phenumcna, so far as they arc all held tujjclhtT by an internal princijde of
causality. In the former meaning we speak of the nature of liquid matter,
of fire, etc., using the word adjHtive ; while, if we speak of the objects of
nature, or of natural objects, we have in our mind the idea of a subsisting
whole.
TmmsceHdental Dialectic
339
is called contingent^ that of which it is unconditioned, nec-
essary. The unconditioned necessity of phenomena may
be called natural mcessity.
I have called the ideas, which we are at present dis-
issing, cosmologicaK partly because we understand by
world the totality of all phenomena, our ideas being
directed to that only which is unconditioned among the
phenomena ; partly, because world, in its transcendental
meaning, denotes the totality of all existing things, and we
are concerned only with the completeness of the synthesis
(although properly only in the regressus to the [p. 420]
conditions). Considering, therefore, that all these ideas
are transcendent because, though not transcending in
kind their object, namely, phenomena, but restricted to
the world of sense (and excluded from all noumena) they
nevertheless carry synthesis to a degree which transcends
all possible experience, they may, according to my opinion,
very properly be called cosmical concepts. With reference
to the distinction, however, between the mathematically or
the dynamically unconditioned at which the regressus aims,
1 might call the two former, in a narrower sense, cosmi-
cal concepts (macrocosmically or microcosmically) and the
remaining two transcendent concepts of nature. This dis-
tinction, though for the present of no great consequence,
may become important hereafter
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Sectjok II
Antithetic of Pure Reason
If every collection of dogmatical doctrines is called
Thetic, I may denote by Antithetic^ not indeed dogmatical
340 Trafiscendental Dialectic
assertions of the opposite, but the conflict between dif-
ferent kinds of apparently dog^matical knowledge {thesis
cum antithesi), to none of which we can ascribe [p, 421]
a superior claim to our assent This antithetic, therefore,
has nothing to do with one-sided assertions, but considers
general knowledge of reason with reference to the con-
flict only that goes on in it, and its causes. The tran-
scendental antithetic is in fact an investigation of the
antinomy of pure reason, its causes and its results. If we
apply our reason, not only to objects of experience, in
order to make use of the principles of the understanding,
but venture to extend it beyond the limit of experience,
there arise rationalising or sophistical propositions, which
can neither hope for confirmation nor need fear refutation
from experience. Every one of them is not only in itself
free from contradiction, but can point to conditions of its
necessity in the nature of reason itself, only that, unfortu-
nately, its opposite can produce equally valid and nec-
essary grounds for its support
The questions which naturally arise in such a Dialectic
of pure reason are the following, r. In what propositions
is pure reason inevitably subject to an antinomy? 2. On
what causes does this antinomy depend? 3. Whether, and
in what way, reason may, in spite of this contradiction,
find a way to certainty ?
A dialectical proposition of pure reason must have this
characteristic to distinguish it from all purely sophistical
propositions, first, that it does not refer to a [p. 422]
gratuitous question, but to one which human reason in its
natural progress must necessarily encounter, and, seamdiw
that it, as well as its opposite, carries with itself not a
merely artificial illusion, which when once seen through
Transcendental Dialectic
34t
disappears, but a natural and inevitable illusion, whicA,
even when it deceives us no longer, always remains, and
though rendered harmless, cannot be annihilated.
This dialectical doctrine v^ill not refer to the unity of
the understanding in concepts of experience, but to the
unity of reason in mere ideas, the condition of which,
as it is meant to agree, as a synthesis according to
rules, with the understanding, and yet at the same
time, as the absolute unity of that synthesis, with rea-
son, must either, if it is adequate to the unity of
reason, be too great for the understanding, or, if ade-
quate to the understanding, too small for reason. Hence
a conflict must arise, which cannot be avoided, do what
we will
These apparently rational, but really sophistical asser-
tions open a dialectical battle-field, where that side always
obtains the victory which is allowed to make the attack,
and where those must certainly succumb who [p. 423]
are obliged to keep on the defensive. Hence doughty
knights, whether fighting for the good or the bad cause,
are sure to win their laurels, if only they take care that
they have the right to make the last attack, and are
not obliged to stand a new onslaught of the enemy. We
can easily imagine that this arena has often been entered,
and many victories have been won on both sides, the last
decisive victory being always guarded by the defender of
the good cause maintaining his place, his opponent being
forbidden ever to carry arms again. As impartial judges
we must take no account of whether it be the good or the
bad cause which the two champions defend. It is best
to let thcni fight it out between themselves in the hope
that, after they have rather tired out than injured each
Transcendental Dialectic
other, they may themselves perceive the uselessness of
their quarrel, and part as good friends.
This method of watching or even provoking such a
conflict of assertions, not in order to decide in favour of
one or the* other side, but in order to find out whether the
object of the struggle be not a mere illusion^ which every-
body tries to grasp in vain, and which never can be of
any use to any one, even if no resistance were [p. 424]
made to him, this method, I say, may be called the
sceptical method. It is totally diflfercnt from scepticism,
or that artificial and scientific agnosticism which under-
mines the foundations of all knowledge, in order if pos-
sible to leave nothing trustworthy and certain anywhere.
The sceptical method, on the contrary, aims at certainty,
because, while watching a contest which on both sides is
carried on honestly and intelligently, it tries to discover
the point where the misunderstanding arises, in order to
do what is done by wise legislators, namely, to derive from
the embarrassments of judges in law-suits information as
to what is imperfectly, or not quite accurately, determined
in their laws. The antinomy w^hich shows itself in the
application of laws, is, considering our limited wisdom,
the best criterion of the original legislation (nomothetic),
and helps to attract the attention of reason, which in
abstract speculations does not easily become aware of
its errors, to the important points in the determination
of its principles.
This sceptical method is essential in transcendental
philosophy only, while it may be dispensed with in
other fields of investigation. It would be absurd in
mathematics, for no false assertions can there be hidden
or rendered invisible, because the demonstra- [p. 425]
Transcendental Dmleciic
541
tions must always be guided by pure intuition, and pro-
ceed by e^ndent synthesis. In experinienta] philosophy
a doubt, which causes delay, may be useful, but at least
no misunderstanding is possible that could not be easily
removed, and the final means for deciding a question,
whether found sooner or later, must always be supplied
by experience. Moral philosophy too can always pro-
duce its principles and their practical consequences in
the concrete also, or at least in possible experience, and
thus avoid the misunderstandings inherent in abstraction.
Transcendental assertions, on the contrar)% pretending to
knowledge far beyond the field of possible experience,
can never produce their abstract svTithcsis in any intui-
tion a priori^ nor can their flaws be discovered by means
of any experience. Transcendental reason, therefore,
admits of no other criterion but an attempt to combine
its conflicting assertions, and therefore* preWous to this,
unrestrained conflict between them. This is what we
shall now attempt to do.^
* The antinomies follow each other, according to the order ol the bmn-
scendental ideas mentioned before [p. 355 ^ p, 415]*
344 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
[p. 426]
THE ANTINOMY
FIRST CONFLICT OF THE
Thesis
The world has a beginning in time, and is limited also
with regard to space.
Proof
For if we assumed that the world had no beginning in
time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given
point of time, and therefore an infinite series of succes-
sive states of things must have passed in the world.
The infinity of a series, however, consists in this, that
it never can be completed by means of a successive
synthesis. Hence an infinite past series of worlds is
impossible, and the beginning of the world a necessary
condition of its existence. This was what had to be
proved first.
With regard to the second, let us assume again the
opposite. In that case the world would be given as an
infinite whole of co-existing things. Now we cannot
conceive in any way the extension of a quantum, which
is not given within certain limits to every intuition,^ ex-
cept through the synthesis of its parts, nor [p. 428]
the totality of such a quantum in any way, except through
^ We may perceive an indefinite quantum as a whole, if it is included in
limits, without having to build up its totality by means of measuring;, that is,
by the successive synthesis of its parts. The limits themselves determine its
completeness, by cutting oflF everything beyond.
TrmmurmagmMi i/mu&%c J45
■ OF PURE REASON [^4^7]
I TRANSCENDEXTAL IDE.\S
The world has no beginning and no limits in space, bat
is infinity m respect both to time and space.
For let us assume that it has a beginning. Then, as
beginning is an existence which is pfeceded by a time in
which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently
there w^as a time in which the n-orld was not* that is* an
empt)' time. In an empt)' time, however* it isampossible
that anything should take its beginning* because of such
a time no part possesses any condition as to existence
rather than non-existence, which condition could distin-
guish that part from any other (whether produced by itself
or through another cause). Hence, though many a series
of things may take its beginning in the world, the world
itself can hax'e no beginning, and in reference to time past
is infinite.
With regard to the second, let us assume again the oppo*
site, namely t that the world is finite and limited in space.
In that case the world would exist in an empty space with*
out limits* We should therefore have not only a relation 1
of things in s^ue, but also of things fo sfa^f. As how- (
ever the world is an absolute whole, outside of [p, 429]
which no object of intuition, and therefore no correlate of
Che world can be found, the relation of the world to empty
Transcendental Dialectic
TheiU
a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of
unity to itself.^ In order therefore to conceive the world,
which fills all space, as a whole, the successive synthesis
of the parts of an infinite world would have to he looked
upon as completed ; that is, an infinite time would have
to be looked upon as elapsed, during the enumeration
of all co-existing things. This is impossible. Hence an
infinite aggregate of real things cannot be regarded as
a given whole, nor, therefore, as given at the same time-
Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards
extension in space, but enclosed in limits. This was the
second that had to be proved,
[p. 430] OBSERVATIONS ON THE
I
On the Thesis
In exhibiting these conflicting arguments I have not
tried to avail myself of mere sophisms for the sake of
what is called special pleading, which takes advantage of
the want of caution of the opponent, and gladly allows his
appeal to a misunderstood law, in order to establish his
own illegitimate claims on its refutation. Every one of
our proofs has been deduced from the nature of the case,
and no advantage has been taken of the wrong conclu-
sions of dogmatists on either side,
^ The concept of totality is in this case notbing but the representation of
the completed synthesis of its parts, because, as we cannot deduce the concept
fnun the intuition of the whole (this being in this case impossible), we can
conceive it only through the synthesis of its parts, up to the completion of the
mtinitc, at least in the idea*
)
\
FIRST ANTINOMY
On the AntiUieaifl
The proof of the infinity of the given series of world,
and of the totality of the world, rests, on this, that in the
> Space is merely the form of external intuition (fonnal intuition) and not
a real objrct that can be perceived: by external tntuilion. Space, as prior lo
all things which determine it (fiVl or limit il), or raiher which give an empiri-
cal intuition determined by its furm, is^ under the name of absolute space,
nothing but a mere possibility of external phenumcna, so far as they cither
exist already, or can be added to given phctiumena. Empirical intuition,
therefore, is not a compound of phenomena and of space (perception ajid
empty intmtion). The one is not a correlate of the other in a synthesis, but
the two are only connected as matter and form m one and the same empirical
intuition. If we try to separate one from the i»thcr, and to place space outside
all phenomena, we arrive at a number uf em[ity determinations of external
intuition, which, however, can never be possible |>erccptions; for instance,
motion or rest of the world m an inlinite empty space, i.e, a detcrmiimtion of the
mutual relation of the two, which can never be perceived, and is therefore
nothing but the predicate of a mere idea.
definition of the infinity of a given quantity. I might
have said that the quantity is iujiniie^ if no greater quan-
tity (that is, greater than the number of given units con-
tained in it) is possible. As no number is the greatest,
because one or more units can always be added to it, I
might have argued that an infinite given quantity, and
therefore also an infinite world (infinite as regards both
the past series of time and extension in space) is impos-
sible, and therefore the world limited in space and time.
I might have done this, but, in that case, my definition
would not have agreed with the true concept of an infinite
whole. We do not represent by it how large it is, and
the concept of it is not therefore the concept of a maxi-
mtim, but we conceive by it its relation only [p. 432]
to any possible unit, in regard to which it is greater
than any number According as this unit is either greater
or smaller, the infinite would be greater or smaller, while
infinity, consisting in the relation only to this given unit,
would always remain the same, although the absolute
quantity of the whole would not be known by it. This,
however, does not concern us at present.
The true transcendental concept of infinity is, that the
successive synthesis of units in measuring a quantum, can
never be completed.^ Hence it follows with perfect cer-
tainty, that an eternity of real and successive states cannot
have elapsed up to any given {the present) moment, and
that the world therefore must have a beginning.
* This quantam conta^ins therefore a mulliturk (of given uriUs) which ia
greater Umn any tmmbcr i this is the mathematical concept uf the intimte.
Transcendental Dialectic
349
Antithesis
opposite case an empty time, and likewise an empty space,
would form the limits of the world. Now I am quite
aware that people have tried to escape from this conclusion
by saying that a limit of the world, both in time and space,
is quite possible, without our having to admit an absolute
time before the beginning of the world or an absolute
space outside the real world, which is impossible, I have
nothing to say against the latter part of this opinion, held
by the philosophers of the school of Leibniz. Space is
only the form of external intuition, and not a real object
that could be perceived externally, nor is it a correlate
of phenomena, but the form of phenomena themselves.
Space, therefore, cannot exist absolutely (by itself) as some-
thing determining the existence of things, because it is
no object, but only the form of possible objects. Things,
therefore, as phenomenal, may indeed determine space,
that is, impart reality to one or other of its predicates
(quantity and relation); but space, on the other side, as
something existing by itself, cannot determine the reality
of things in regard to quantity or form, because it is noth-
ing real in itself. Space therefore (whether full or empty ^)
may be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be
limited by empty space outside them. The same [p. 433]
applies to time. But, granting all this, it cannot be denied
that we should be dri\'en to admit these two monsters,
empty space outside, and empty time before the world, if we
assumed the limits of the world, whether in space or time.
1 It is cmBil^ seen thmt what we wish to say is that empty spacer 10 far •»
timited by phenomena^ that is, space within the world, ()oes not at least con*
traditzt transcendental princi(j|c», ami may be admitted, Ihereforet to far as
they arc concerned, though by this iti possibility is not asserted.
350 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
With regard to the second part of the thesis, the diffi-
culty of an endless and yet past series does not exist ;
for the manifold of a world, infinite in extension, is given
at one and tfie same time. But, in order to conceive the
totality of such a multitude of things, as we cannot appeal
to those limits which in intuition produce that totality by
themselves, we must render an account of our concept,
which in our case cannot proceed from the whole to the
determined multitude of the parts, but has to demonstrate
the possibility of a whole by the successive synthesis of
the parts. As such a synthesis would constitute a series
that would never be completed, it is impossible to con-
ceive a totality either before it, or through it. For the
concept of totality itself is in this case the representation
of a completed synthesis of parts, and such a completion,
and therefore its concept also, is impossible.
Transcendental Diaiecfk
351
Antithesis
For as to the plea by which people try to escape from
the conclusion, that if the world has limits in time or space,
the infinite void would determine the existence of real
things, so far as their dimensions are concerned, it is really
no more than a covered attempt at putting some unknown
intclligibk world in the place of ^w^ sensitons world, and an
existence in general, vfhich presupposes no other condition in
the world, in the place of a first beginning (an existence
preceded by a time of non-existence), and boandtirics of the
universe in place of the limits of extension,— thus getting
rid of time and space. But w^e have to deal here w^ith the
miindtis phacnomcnon and its quantity, and we could not
ignore the conditions of sensibility, wdthout destroying its
very essence. The world of sense, if it is limited, lies
necessarily within the infinite void. If we ignore this, and
with it, space in general, as an a prion condition of the
possibility of phenomena, the w^hole world of sense van-
ishes, which alone forms the object of our enquiry. The
mundus inteliigibilis is nothing but the general concept of
any world, which takes no account of any of the conditions
of intuition, and which therefore admits of no synthetical
proposition, whether affirmative or negative-
THE ANTINOMY
SECOND CONFLICT OF THE
Every compound substance in the world consists of
simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple,
or what is composed of it
♦
Proof
For let us assume that compound substances did not
consist of simple parts, then, if all composition is removed
in thought, there would be no compound part, and (as no
simple parts arc admitted) no simple part either, that is,
there would remain nothing, and there would therefore be
no substance at all Either, therefore, it is impossible to
remove all composition in thought, or, after its removal,
there must remain something that exists without composi-
tion, that is the simple. In the former case the com-
pound could not itself consist of substances (because with
them composition is only an accidental relation of sub-
stances, which substances, as permanent beings, must
subsist without it). As this contradicts the [p, 436]
supposition, there remains only the second view, namely,
that the substantial compounds in the world consist of
simple parts.
It follows as an immediate consequence that all the
things in the world are simple beings, that their composi-
Transcendental Dialectic
Astitliesia
353
OF PURE REASON
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
[p^ 43S]
Antithesb
No compound thing in the world consists of simple
parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything
simple.
Proof
Assume that a compound thing, a substance, consists of
simple parts. Then as all external relation, and therefore
all composition of substances also, is possible in space
only, it follows that space must consist of as many parts
as the parts of the compound that occupies the space.
Space, however, does not consist of simple parts, but
of spaces. Every part of a compound, therefore, must
occupy a space. Now the absolutely primary parts of
every compound are simple. It follows therefure that the
simple occupies a space. But as everything real, which
occupies a space, contains a manifold, the parts of which
are by the side of each other, and which therefore is com-
pounded, and, as a real compound, compounded not of
accidents (for these could not exist by the side of each
other, without a substance), but of substances, it would
follow that the simple is a substantial compound, which is
self -contradictory.
The second proposition of the antithesis, that there
354 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
tion is only an external condition, and that, though we are
unable to remove these elementary substances from their
state of composition and isolate them, reason must con-
ceive them as the first subjects of all composition, and
therefore, antecedently to it, as simple beings.
Transcendental Diakctie
355
Antithesis
exists nowhere in the world anything simple, is not
intended to mean more than that the existence [p. 437]
of the absolutely simple cannot be proved from any ex-
perience or perception, whether external or internal, and
that the absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objecti%x
reality of which can never be shown in any possible expe-
rience, so that in the explanation of phenomena it is with-
out any application or object. For, if we assumed that an
object of this transcendental idea might be found in expe-
rience, the empirical intuition of some one object would
have to be such as to contain absolutely nothing manifold
by the side of each other, and combined to a unity. But
as, from our not being conscious of such a manifold, we
cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossi-
bility of it in any objective intuition, and as without this
no absolute simplicity can be established, it follows that
such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception
whatsoever. As, therefore, an absolutely simple object can
never be given in any possible experience, while the world
of sense must be looked upon as the sum total of all
possible experience, it follows that nothing simple exists
in it.
This second part of the antithesis goes far beyond the
first, which only banished the simple from the intuition of
the composite, while the second drives it out of the whole
of nature. Hence we could not attempt to prove it out of
the concept of any given object of external intuition (of
the com pound), but from its relation to a possible experi-
ence in general
3S6
Transccndentai Dialectic
Thesis
[P- 438]
OBSERVATIONS ON THE
On the Thesis
If I speak of a whole as necessarily consisting of sepa-
rate parts, I understand by it a substantial whole only, as
a real compound, that is, that contingent unity of the
manifold, which, given as separate (at least in thought), is
brought into a mutual connection, and thus constitutes one
whole. Wc ought not to call space a compositum, but a
totum, because in it its parts are possible only in the
whole, and not the whole by its parts. It might therefore
be called a campositum ideate^ but not rcaic. But this is
an unnecessary distinction. As space is no compound of
substances^ not even of real accidents, nothing remains of
it, if I remove all composition in it, not even the point, for
a point is possible only as the limit of a space, and there-
fore of a compound. Space and time do not [p. 440]
therefore consist of simple parts. What belongs only to
the condition of a substance, even though it possesses
quantity (as, for instance, change), does not consist of the
simple; that is to say, a certain degree of change does not
arise through the accumulation of many simple changes.
We can infer the simple from the compound in self-sub-
sisting objects only. Accidents of a state, however, are
not self-subsisting. The proof of the necessity of the
simple, as the component parts of all that is substantially
composite, can therefore easily be injured, if it is extended
Transcendental Dialectic
Antithesla
SECOND ANTINOMY
357
Cp- 439]
On the Antithesis
Against the theory of the infinite divisibility of matter,
the proof of which is mathematical only, objections have
been raised by the Mcuiadis/Sy which become suspicious by
their declining to admit the clearest mathematical proofs
as founded on a true insight into the quality of space» so
far as space is indeed the formal condition of the possi-
bility of all matter, but treating them only as conclusions
derived from abstract but arbitrary concepts, which ought
not to be applied to real things. But how is it possible
to conceive a different kind of intuition from that given in
the original intuition of space, and how can its determina-
tions a priori not apply to everything, since it becomes
possible only by its filling that space? If we were to
listen to them, we should have to admit, beside the
mathematical point, which is simple, but no part, but
only the limit of a space, other physical points, simple like-
wise, but possessing this privilege that, as parts of space,
they are able» by mere aggregation, to fill space. Without
repeating here the many clear refutations of this absurd-
ity, it being quite futile to attempt to reason away by
purely discursive concepts the evidence of mathematics, I
only remark, that if philosophy in this case seems to play
tricks with mathematics, it does so because it [p. 441]
forgets that in this discussion wc are concerned with phc-
Transcentienta! Dialectic
Thesis
too far, and applied to all compounds without distinction,
as has often been the case.
I am, however, speaking here of the simple only so far
as it is necessarily given in the composite, which can be
dissolved into the former, as its component parts. The
true meaning of the word Monas (as used by [p, 442]
Leibniz) should refer to that simple only, which is given
immediately as simple substance (for example in self -con-
sciousness), and not as an element of the composite, in
which case it is better called an Ai&pftus} As I wish to
prove the existence of simple substances, as the elements
of the composite only, 1 might call the thesis* of the
second antinomy transcendental Atomistic. But as this
word has long been used as the name of a particular
explanation of material phenomena {moieculae) and pre-
supposes, therefore, empirical concepts, it will be better to
call it the dialectic principle of monadology,
^ Rosen k ran z thinks that aiomns is here used intentionally by Kant as a
mascuiinit to tlUtinguish it from the aiomon^ translated by scholastic philos^
ophers as tptseparahig, indhiernible^ simfltx, etc., while with the Greek phllcss-
opbers at&mus is feminine, Rrdman, however, has shown that Kant has
tued atomus elsewhere also as masculine.
* AniiiAesu is a mispf int.
^
Transcendental Diakctk
359
Antithesis
nomcna only, and their condilions. Herc^ however^ it is
not enough to find for the pure cottccpi, produced by the
understanding, of the composite the concept of the simple»
but we must find for the intuition of the composite (matter)
the intuition of the simple ; and this, according to the laws
of sensibility, and therefore with reference to the objects
of the senses, is totally impossible. Though it may be
true, therefore, with regard to a whole, consisting of sub-
stances, %vhich is conceived by the pure understanding
only, that before its composition there must be the simple,
this does not apply to the totum substantiale phacnomenon
which, as an empirical intuition in space, carries with it
the necessary condition that no part of it is simple, because
no part of space is simple. The monadists, however, have
been clever enough to try to escape from this difficulty, by
not admitting space as a condition of the possibility of the
objects of external intuition (bodies), but by presupposing
these and the dynamical relation of substances io general
as the condition of the possibility of space. But we have
no concept of bodies, except as phenomena, and, as such,
they presuppose space as the necessary condition of the
possibility of all external phenomena. The argument of
the monadists, therefore, is futile, and has been sufficiently
answered in the transcendental TKsthetic, If the bodies
were things by themselves, then, and then only, the argu-
ment of the monadists would be valid.
The second dialectical assertion possesses this [p. 443]
peculiarity, that it is opposed by dogmatical assertion
which, among all sophistical assertions, is the only one
which undertakes to prove palpably in an object of ex-
perience the reality of that which we counted before as
360 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
Transcendental Dialectic
Jfif
ADtithesIs
belonging only to transcendental ideas, namely, the abso-
lute simplicity of a substance, — I mean the assertion
that the object of the internal sense, or the thinking I,
is an absolutely simple substance. Without entering
upon this question (as it has been fully discussed before),
I only remark, that if something is conceived as an object
only, without adding any synthetical determination of its
intuition (and this is the case in the bare representation
of the I), it %vould no doubt be impossible that anything
manifold or composite could be perceived in such a rep-
resentation. Besides, as the predicates through which I
conceive this object are only intuitions of the internal
sense, nothing can occur in them to prove a manifold
(one by the side of another), and therefore a real com-
position. It follows, therefore, from the nature of self-
consciousness that, as the thinking subject is at the same
time its own object^ it cannot divide itself (though it might
divide its inherent determinations) ; for in regard to itself
every object is absolute unity* Nevertheless, when this
subject is looked upon externally, as an object of intuition,
it would most likely exhibit some kind of composition as
a phenomenon, and it must always be looked upon in this
light, if we wish to know whether its manifold constituent
elements are by the side of each other or not
Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
THE ANTINOMY
THIRD CONFLICT OF THE
Thesis
Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the
only causality from which all the phenomena of the
world can be deduced. In order to account for these
phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality,
that of freedom.
Proaf
Let us assume that there is no other causality but that
according to the laws of nature. In that case everything
that takes place, presupposes an anterior state, on which
it follows inevitably according to a rule. But that ante-
rior state must itself be something which has taken place
(which has come to be in time, and did not exist before),
because, if it had always existed, its effect too would not
have only just arisen, but have existed always. The
causality, therefore, of a cause, through which something
takes place, is itself an events which again, according to
the law of nature, presupposes an anterior state and its
causality, and this again an anterior state, and so on.
If, therefore, everything takes place according to mere
laws of nature, there will always be a second- [p. 446]
ary only, but never a primary beginning, and therefore
no completeness of the series, on the side of successive
causes. But the law of nature consists in this, that
nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently deter-
Transcendental Dialectic
Antithesis
363
OF PURE REASON [p. 445]
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
Antitliesis
There is no freedom^ but everything in the world takes
place entirely according to the laws of nature.
Proof
If we admit that there 1% freedom, in the transcendental
sense, as a particular kind of causality, according to which
the events in the world could take place, that is a faculty
of absolutely originating a state, and with it a series of
consequences, it would follow that not only a series would
have its absolute beginning through this spontaneity, but
the determination of that spontaneity itself to produce the
series, that is, the causality, would have an absolute begin-
ning, nothing preceding it by which this act is determined
according to permanent laws. Every beginning of an act,
however, presupposes a state in which the cause is not yet
active, and a dynamically primary beginning of an act
presupposes a state which has no causal connection with
the preceding state of that cause, that is, in no wise follows
from it. Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed
to the law of causality, and represents such a [p. 447]
connection of successive states of effective causes, that no
unity of experience is possible with it. It is therefore an
empty fiction of the mind, and not to be met with in any
experience.
364 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
mined a priori. Therefore the proposition, that all cau-
sality is possible according to the laws of nature only,
contradicts itself, if taken in unlimited generality, and it
is impossible, therefore, to admit that causality as the
only one.
We must therefore admit another causality, through
which something takes place, without its cause being
further determined according to necessary laws by a pre-
ceding cause, that is, an absolute spontaneity of causes, by
which a series of phenomena, proceeding according to
natural laws, begins by itself; we must consequently
admit transcendental freedom, without which, even in
the course of nature, the series of phenomena on the
side of causes, can never be perfect
[p. 448] OBSERVATIONS ON THE
I
On the Thesis
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from forming
the whole content of the psychological concept of that
name, which is chiefly empirical, but only that of the
absolute spontaneity of action, as the real ground of
Transctndental Dialectic
365
Antithesis
We have, therefore^ nothing but nature^ in which we
must try to find the connection and order of cosmica!
events. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature
is no doubt a dfiiverance from restraint, but also from the
guidance of all rules. For we cannot say that, instead of
the laws of nature, laws of freedom may enter into the
causality of the course of the world, because^ if determined
by laws, it would not be freedom, but nothing else but
nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom
differ from each other like legality and lawlessness. The
former, no doubt, imposes upon the understanding the
difficult task of looking higher and higher for the origin
of events in the scries of causes, because their causah'ty
is always conditioned. In return for this, however, it
promises a complete and well-ordered unity of experience;
while, on the other side, the fiction of freedom promises,
no doubt, to the enquiring mind, rest in the chain of
causes, leading him up to an unconditioned causality,
which begins to act by itself, but which, as it is blind
itself, tears the thread of rules by which alone a complete
and coherent experience is possible.
THIRD ANTINOMY
[P- 449] *
II
On the Antitheiie
He who stands up for the omnipotence of nature (tran-
scendental p/iYsiocnuy), in ojiposition to the doctrine of
freedom, would defend his position against the sophistical
conclusions of that doctrine in the following manner* If
366 Transcendental Dialectic
Theaia
imputability ; it is, however, the real stone of offence in
the eyes of philosophy, which finds its unsurmountaDle
difficulties in admitting this kind of unconditioned causal-
ity. That element in the question of the freedom of the
will, which has always so much embarrassed speculative
reason, is therefore in reality transcendental only, and
refers merely to the question whether we most admit a
faculty of spontancoudy originating a scries of successive
things or states. How such a faculty is possible need not
be answered, because, with regard to the causality » accord-
ing to the laws of nature also, we must be satisfied to know
a priori that such a causality has to be admitted, though
we can in no wise understand the possibility how, through
one existence, the existence of another is given, but must
for that purpose appeal to experience alone. The neces-
sity of a first beginning of a series of phenomena from
freedom has been proved so far only as it is necessary in
order to comprehend an origin of the world, while all suc-
cessive states may be regarded as a result in succession
according to mere laws of nature. But as thus [p. 450]
the faculty of originating a scries in time by itself has
been proved, though by no means understood, it is now
permitted also to admit, within the course of the world,
different series, beginning by themselves, with regard to
their causality, and to attribute to their substances a fac-
ulty of acting with freedom. But wc must not allow our-
selves to be troubled by a misapprehension, namely that,
as every successive series in the world can have only a
relatively primary beginning, some other state of things
always preceding in the world, therefore no absolutely
primary beginning of different series is possible in the
Transcendental Dialectic
367
Antitlieab
you do not admit something mathematically the first in the
world zvith reference to time, there is no necessity ivky you
should look for something dynamically the first with refer-
ence to causality. Who has told you to invent an abso-
lutely first state of the world, and with it an absolute
beginning of the gradually progressing series of phenom-
ena, and to set limits to unlimited nature in order to give
to your imagination something to rest on ? As substances
have always existed in the world, or as the unity of expe-
rience renders at least such a supposition necessary, there
is no difficulty in assuming that a change of their states,
that is, a series of their changes, has always existed also,
so that there is no necessity for looking for a first begin-
ning either mathematically or dynamically. It is true we
cannot render the possibility of such an infinite descent
comprehensible without the first member to which every-
thing else is subsequent. But, if for this reason you reject
this riddle of nature, you will feel yourselves constrained
to reject many synthetical fundamental properties (natural
forces), which you cannot comprehend any more, nay, the
very possibility of change in general would be [p. 451]
full of difficulties. For if you did not know from expe-
rience that change exists, you would never be able to con-
ceive a priori how such a constant succession of being and
not being is possible.
And, even if the transcendental faculty of freedom
might somehow be conceded to start the changes of the
world, such faculty would at all events have to be outside
the worid (though it would always remain a bold assump-
tion to admit, outside the sum total of all possible intui-
tions, an object that cannot be given in any possible
i6S
Transcendental Dialectic
Thfsis
course of the world. For we are speaking here of the
absolutely first beginning, not according to time, but
according to causality. If, for instance, at this moment
I rise from my chair with perfect freedom, without the
necessary determining influence of natural causes, a new
series has its absolute beginning in this event, with all its
natural consequences mi infimtiim^ although, with regard
to time, this event is only the continuation of a preceding
series. For this determination and this act do not belong
to the succession of merely natural effects, nor arc they a
mere continuation of them, but the determining natural
causes completely stop before it, so far as this event is
concerned, which no doubt follows them, and does not
result from them, and may therefore be called an abso-
lutely first beginning in a series of phenomena, not with
reference to time, but with reference to causality.
This requirement of reason to appeal in the scries of
natural causes to a first and free beginning is fully con-
firmed if we see that, with the exception of the Epicu-
rean school, all philosophers of antiquity have felt
themselves obliged to admit, for the sake of explaining
all cosmical movements, a prime mover^ that is, a freely
acting cause w^hich, first and by itself, started this series
of states. They did not attempt to make a first be-
ginning comprehensible by an appeal Xo nature only.
■*
Transcendental Dialectic
369
Antithesifl
experience). But to attribute in the worid itself a faculty
to substances can never be allowed, because in that case
the connection of phenomena determining each other by
necessity and according to general laws, which we call
nature, and with it the test of empirical truth, which dis-
tinguishes experience from dreams, would almost entirely
disappear. For by the side of such a lawless faculty of
freedom, nature could hardly be conceived any longer,
because the laws of the latter would be constantly
changed through the influence of the former, and the
play of phenomena which, according to nature, is regular
and uniform, would become confused and incoherent.
2B
Transcendental Dialectic
TbesU
THE ANTINOMY
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE
Tliesis
There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to
the world, either as a part or as a cause of it.
Proof
The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena,
contains a series of changes without which even the
representation of a series of time, which forms the con*
dition of the possibility of the world of sense, would
not be given us.^ But every change has its condition
which precedes it in time, and renders it necessary.
Now, everything that is given as conditional presup-
poses, with regard to its existence, a complete series of
conditions, leading up to that which is entirely uncon-
ditioned, and alone absolutely necessary. Something
absolutely necessary therefore must exist, if there exists a
change as its consequence. And this absolutely necessary
belongs itself to the world of sense. For if we sop-
posed that it existed outside that world, then the series
of changes in the world would derive its origin from it,
while the necessary cause itself would not be- [p, 454]
long to the world of sense. But this is impossible. For
ition of tSfc possibility of/chaRges, time \% no doubt objec-
(read dnyn instead of JEier) ; subjectively, however, and
^ As formal condition \
lively prior to them (read dM^n instead of dEfer) ; subjectively, however, and
in the reality of our consciousness the representation of time, like every otfaci,
is occasioned solely by perceptions.
Transcendental DiaUctu
Aotitbesis
37:
OF PURE REASON
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS
[p. 453]
Antithesis
There nowhere exists an ahsohitcly necessary Being,
either within or without the world, as the cause of it
Proof
If we supposed that the world itself is a necessary
being, or that a necessary being exists in it, there would
then be in the series of changes either a beginning, un-
conditionally necessary, and therefore without a cause,
which contradicts the dynamical law of the determina-
tion of all phenomena in time ; or the series itself would
be without any beginning, and though contingent and con-
ditioned in all its parts, yet entirely necessary and uncon-
ditioned as a whole. This would be self-contradictory,
because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary,
if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.
If we supposed, on the contrary, that there exists an
absolutely necessary cause of the world, outside the
world, then that cause, as the highest member [p. 455]
in the series of causes of cosmical changes, would begin
the existence of the latter and their series.* In that
case, however, that cause would have to begin to act, and
* The word /<? begin is used in two sentn. The first ii active when the
cause begins, or starts (infit), a series of states as its effect. The second is
passive (or neuter) when the causnritv begins in the cause itself (tit). I reason
here from the former to the latter meaning.
372
Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
as the beginning of a temporal series can be determined
only by that which precedes it in time, it follows that the
highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes
must exist in the time when that series was not yet (be-
cause the beginning is an existence, preceded by a time in
which the thing %vhich begins was not yet). Hence the
causality of the necessary cause of changes and that
cause itself belong to time and therefore to phenomena
(in which alone time, as their form, is possible), and it
cannot therefore be conceived as separated from the
world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena. It
follows, therefore, that something absolutely necessary is
contained in the world, whether it be the whole cosmical
series itself, or only a part of it
>' 4S6]
OBSERVATIONS ON THE
I
Oq tlie Thesis
In order to prove the existence of a necessary Being,
I ought not, in this place, to use any but the casmohgical
argument, w^hich ascends from what is conditioned in the
phenomena to what is unconditioned in concept, that
being considered as the necessary condition of the abso-
lute totality of the series. To undertake that proof from
the mere idea of a Supreme Being belongs to another
principle of reason, and will have to be treated separately.
The pure cosmological proof cannot establish the ex-
istence of a necessary Being, without leaving it open,
Transcendental Dialectic
373
Antithesis
its causality would belong to time, and therefore to the sum
total of phenomena. It would belong to the world, and
would therefore not be outside the world, which is contrary
to our supposition. Therefore, neither in the world, nor
outside the world (yet in causal connection with it), does
there exist anywhere an absolutely necessary Being.
FOURTH ANTINOMY
11
[P* 457]
On the Antithcaifl
If, in ascending the series of phenomena, we imagine
we meet with difficulties militating against the existence of
an absolutely necessary supreme cause, such difficulties
ought not to be derived from mere concepts of the neces-
sary existence of a thing in general. They ought not to
be ontological, but ought to arise from the causal connec-
tion with a series of phenomena for which a condition is
required which is itself unconditioned, that is. they ought
to be cosmological, and dependent on empirical laws. It
must be shown that our ascending in the series of causes
374 Transcendental Dialectic
TliesiB
whether that Being be the world itself, or a Being distinct
from it. In order to settle this question, principles are
required which arc no longer cosmological, and do not
proceed in the series of phenomena. We should have
to introduce concepts of contingent beings in general
(so far as they are considered as objects of the under-
standing only), and also a principle according to which
we might connect them, by means of concepts only, with
a necessary Being. All this belongs to a trau- [p. 458]
sccmlcnt philosophy, for which this is not yet the place.
If, however, we once begin our proof cosmologically,
taking for our foundation the series of phenomena, and
the regressus in it, according to the empirical laws of
causality, we cannot afterwards suddenly leave this line
of argument and pass over to something which does not
belong as a member to this series. For the condition
must be taken in the same meaning in which the rela-
tion of the condition to that condition was taken in the
series which, by continuous progress, was to lead to that
highest condition. If therefore that relation is sensuous
and intended for a possible empirical use of the under-
standing, the highest condition or cause can close the
regressus according to the laws of sensibility only, and
therefore as belonging to that temporal series itself. The
necessary Being must therefore be regarded as the highest
member of the cosmical scries.
Nevertheless, certain philosophers have taken the liberty
of making such a salto (fierd^aa-t^ ek aWo jcpo^}. From
the changes in the world they concluded their empirical
contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically de-
termining causes, and they thus arrived at an ascend-
Transcendental Dialectic
375
Antitliesis
(in the world of sense) can never end with a condition
empirically unconditioned, and that the cosmological argu-
mentj based on the contingency of cosmical states, as
proved by their changes, ends in a verdict against the
admission of a first cause, absolutely originating the whole
series
A curious contrast however meets us in this [p, 459]
antinomy. From the same ground on which, in the thesis,
the existence of an original Being was proved, its non-
existence is proved in the antithesis with equal stringency.
We were first told, that a nccessafy Being exists, because
the whole of time past comprehends the series of all con-
ditions, and with it also the unconditioned (the necessar)^).
We are now told //icre is no necessary Being, for the very
reason that the whole of past time comprehends the series
of all conditions (which therefore altogether are them-
selves conditioned). The explanation is this. The first
argument regards only the absolute totality of the series
of conditions determining each other in time, and thus
arrives at something unconditioned and necessary. The
second, on the contrary, regards the eantingeftcy of all that
is determined in the temporal series (everything being pre-
ceded by a time in which the condition itself must again
be determined as conditioned), in which case everything
unconditioned^ and every absolute necessity, [p, 461]
must absolutely vanish. In both, the manner of conclud-
ing is quite in conformity with ordinary human reason,
which frequently comes into conflict with itself, from con-
sidering its object from two different points of view.
Hcrr von Mairan considered the controversy between two
famous astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty,
376 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesifl
ing series of empirical conditions. This was quite right.
As, however^ in this way they could not find a first be-
ginning, or any highest member, they suddt^nly left the
empirical concept of contingency, and took to the pure
category. This led to a purely intelligible series, the
completeness of which depended on the existence of an
absolutely necessary cause, which cause, as no longer
subject to any sensuous conditions, w^is freed also from
the temporal condition of itself beginning its causality.
Such a proceeding is entirely illegitimate, as may be
seen from what follows.
In the pure sense of the category we call contingent
that the contradictory opposite of which is possible.
Now we cannot conclude that intelligible contingency
from empirical contingency. Of what is being [p. 460]
changed we may say that the opposite (of its state) is
real, and therefore possible also at another time. But
this is not the contradictory opposite of the preceding
state. In order to establish that, it is necessary that, at
the same time, when the previous state existed, its oppo-
site could have existed in its place, and this can never
be concluded from change. A body» for instance, which,
when in motion, was A, comes to be, when at rest, ^ non
A. From the fact that the state opposite to the state A
follows upon it, we can in no wise conclude that the con-
tradictory opposite of A is possible, and therefore A con-
tingent only. In order to establish this, it would be
necessary to prove that, at the same time when there was
motion, there might have been, instead of it, rest. But we
know no more than that, at a subsequent time, such rest
was real, and therefore possible also. Motion at one
Transcendental Dialectic
Z77
Antithesis
as to the choice of the true standpoint, as something
sufficiently important to write a separate treatise on it.
The one reasoned thus, the moon revolves on its own axis,
because it always turns the same side towards the earth.
The other concluded, the moon does not revolve on its own
axis, because it always turns the same side towards the
earth. Both conclusions were correct, according to the
point of view from which one chose to consider the motion
of the moon.
3/8 Transcendental Dialectic
Thesis
time, and rest at another, are not contradictory opposites.
Therefore the succession of opposite determinations, that
is, change, in no way proves contingency, according to
the concepts of the pure understanding, and can there-
fore never lead us on to the existence of a necessary
Being, according to the pure concepts of the under-
standing. Change proves empirical contingency only;
it proves that the new state could not have taken place
according to the law of causality by itself, and without a
cause belonging to a previous time. This cause, even
if it is considered as absolutely necessary, must, as we
see, exist in time, and belong to the series of phenomena.
Transcendental Diakciic
379
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 462]
Section III
Of the Interest of Reason in these Cmijikts
Wc have thus watched the whole dialectical play of
the cosmological ideas, and have seen that they do not
even admit of any adequate object being supplied to them
in any possible experience, nay, not even of reason treat-
ing thera in accordance with the general laws of experi-
ence. Nevertheless these ideas are not arbitrary fictions,
but reason in the continuous progress of empirical syn-
thesis is necessarily led on to them, whenever it wants
to free what, according to the roles of experience, can
be determined as conditioned only, from all conditions,
and comprehend it in its unconditioned totality. These
rationalising or dialectical assertions are so many attempts
at solving four perfectly natural and inevitable problems
of reason. There cannot be either more or less of them,
because there are neither more nor less series of synthet-
ical hypotheses, which limit empirical synthesis a priori.
We have represented the brilliant pretensions of reason,
extending its domain beyond all the limits of experience,
in dry formulas only, containing nothing but the grounds
of its claims ; and, as it befits transcendental [p. 463]
philosophy, divested them of everything empirical, al-
though it is only in connection with this that the whole
splendour of the assertions of reason can be fully seen.
In their application, and in the progressive extension of
the employment of reason, beginning from the field of
experience, and gradually soaring up to those sublime
jSO Transcendental Dialectic
ideas, philosophy displays a grandeur which, if it could
only establish its pretensions, would leave all other kinds
of human kn owlet! ge far behind, promising to us a safe
foundation for our highest expectations and hopes for
the attainment of the highest aims, towards which all
the exertions of reason must finally converge. The ques-
tions, whether the world has a beginning and any limit
of its extension in space ; whether there is anywhere, and
it may be in my own thinking self, an indivisible and
indestructible unity, or whether there exists nothing but
what is divisible and perishable ; whether in my acts I
am free, or, like other beings, led by the hand of nature
and of fate ; whether, finally, there exists a supreme
cause of the w^orld, or whether the objects of nature
and their order form the last object which we can reach
in all our speculations, — these are questions for the
solution of which the mathematician would gladly sacri-
fice the whole of his science, which cannot give him any
satisfaction with regard to the highest and dearest as-
pirations of mankind. Even the true dignity and worth
of mathematics, that pride of human reason, rest, [p, 464]
on this, that they teach reason how to understand nature
in what is great and what is small in her, in her order
and regularity, and likewise in the admirable unity of
her moving powers, far above all expectations of a philos-
ophy restricted to common experience, and thus encour-
age reason to extend its use far beyond experience, nay,
supply philosophy with the best materials Intended to
support its investigations, so far as their nature admits
of it, by adequate intuitions.
Unfortunately for mere speculation (but fortunately
perhaps for the practical destinies of men), reason, in the
Transcefuienta I Dia ice tic
38 1
very midst of her highest expectations, finils herself so
hemmed in by a press of reasons and counter reasons,
that, as neither her honour nor her safety adniit of her
retreating and becoming an indifferent spectator of %vhat
might be called a mere passage of arms, stdl less of her
commanding peace in a strife in which she is herself
dee|>ly interested, nothing remains to her but to reflect on
the origin of this conflict, in order to find out whether it
may not have arisen from a mere misunderstanding.
After such an enquiry proud claims would no [p. 465]
doubt have to be surrendered on both sides, but a per-
manent and tranquil rule of reason over the understand-
ing and the senses might then be inaugurated.
For the present we shall defer this thorough enquiry,
in order to consider which side we should like to take, if
it should become necessary to take sides at all As in
this case we do not consult the logical test of truth, but
only our own interest, such an cnquir}% though settling
nothing as to the contested rights of both parties, will
have this advantage, that it makes us understand why
those wlio^ take part in this contest embrace one rather
than the other side, without being guided by any special
insight into the subject. It may also explain some other
things, as, for instance, the zclotic heat of the one and
the calm assurance of the other party, and why the world
greets one party with rapturous applause, and entertains
towards the other an irreconcileable prejudice.
There is something which in this preliminary enquiry
determines the right point of view, from which alone it
can be carried on with proper completeness, and this is
the comparison of the principles from which both parties
start. If we look at the propositions of the antithesis.
^82 Transcendental Dmlectic
we shall find in it a perfect uniformity in the mode of
thought and a complete unity of principle^ [p. 466]
namely, the principle of pure empiricism, not only in the
eitplanation of the phenomena of the world, but also in
the solution of the transcendental ideas of the cosmical
universe itself. The propositions of the thesis, on the
contrary, rest not only on the empirical explanation
within the series of phenomena, but likewise on intelli-
gible beginnings, and its maxim is therefore not simple.
With regard to its essential and distinguishing character-
istic, I shall call it the dogmatism of pure reason.
On the side of dogmatism we find in the determination
of the cosmological ideas, or in the Thesis: —
First, A certain practical interest^ which every right-
thinking man, if he knows his true interests, will heartily
share. That the world has a beginning; that my think-
ing self is of a simple and therefore indestructible nature ;
that the same self is free in all his voluntary actions, and
raised above the compulsion of nature ; that, finally, the
whole order of things, or the world, derives its origin from
an original Being, whence everything receives both unity
and purposeful connection — these are so many foundation
stones on which morals and religion arc built up. The
antithesis robs us» or seems to rob us, of all these sup-
ports.
Secondly y Reason has a certain speculative interest on
the same side. For, if we take and employ the tran-
scendental ideas as they are in the thesis, one may quite
a priori grasp the whole chain of conditions and [p. 467]
comprehend the derivation of the conditioned by begin-
ning with the unconditioned. This cannot be done by
the antithesis, which presents itself in a very unfavourable
Transcendental Dialectic
383
light, because it cannot return to the question as to the
conditions of its synthesis any answer which does not
lead to constantly new questions. According to it one
has always to ascend from a given beginning to a higher
one, every part leads always to a still smaller part, every
event has always before it another event as its cause,
and the conditions of existence in general always rest
on others* %vithout ever receiving unconditioned strength
and support from a self-subsisting thing, as the original
Being,
Thirdly t This side has also the advantage of popularity,
which is by no means its smallest recommendation. The
common understanding does not see the smallest difficulty
in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis,
being accustomed rather to descend to consequences, than
to ascend to causes. It finds comfort in the ideas of the
absolutely first (the possibility of which does not trouble
it), and at the same time a firm point to which the leading
strings of its life may be attached, while there is no pleas-
ure in a restless ascent from condition to condition, and
keeping one foot always in the air
On the side of empiricism^ so far as it deter- [p. 468]
mines the cosmological ideas, or the antithesis, there
is: —
Firsts No such practical interest, arising from the pure
principles of reason, as morality and religion possess.
On the contrary, empiricism seems to deprive both of
their power and influence. If there is no original Being,
different from the world ; if the world is without a be-
ginning, and therefore without a Creator ; if our will is
not free, and our soul shares the same divisibility and
perishablcness with matter, moral ideas also and principles
384 Tramcendenta! Dialectic
lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideaSi
which formed their theoretic support
But, on the other side, empiricism offers advantages
to the speculative interests of reason, which are very
tempting, and far exceed those which the dogmatical
teacher can promise. With the empiricist the under-
standing is always on its own proper ground, namely,
the field of all possible experience, the laws of which
may be investigated and serve to enlarge certain and
intelHgible knowledge without end. Here every object
can and ought to be represented to intuition, both in
itself and in its relations, or at least in concepts, the
images of which can be clearly and distinctly represented
in given similar intuitions. Not only is there no necessity
for leaving the chain of the order of nature in order to lay
hold of ideas, the objects of which are not known, [p. 469]
because, as mere products of thought, they can never be
given, but the understanding is not even allowed to leave
its proper business and, under pretence of its being finished,
to cross into the domain of idealising reason and transcen-
dental concepts, where it w^^A no longer observe and in-
vestigate according to the laws of nature, but only think and
dream, without any risk of being contradicted by the facts
of nature, not being bound by their evidence, but justified
in passing them by, or in even subordinating them to a
higher authority, namely, that of pure reason.
Hence the empiricist will never allow that any epoch of
nature should be considered as the absolutely first, or any
limit of his vision into the extent of nature should be con-
sidered as the last. He will not approve of a transition
from the objects of nature, which he can analyse by
observation and mathematics and determine synthetically
Transcendental Dialectic
3«5
in intuition (the extended), to those which neither sense
nor imagination can ever represent in concreto (the sim-
ple) ; nor will he concede that a faculty be presupposed,
even in nature, to act independent of the laws of nature
(freedom), thus narrowing ihe operations of the under-
standing in investigating, according to the necessary
rules, the origin of phenomena. Lastly, he will never
tolerate that the cause of anything should be [p. 470]
looked for anywhere outside of nature {in the original
Being), because we know nothing but nature, which alone
can offer us objects and instruct us as to their laws.
If the empirical philosopher had no other purpose with
his antithesis but to put down the rashness and presump-
tion of reason in mistaking her true purpose, while boasting
of insight and knoivkdge^ where insight and knowledge
come to an end, nay, while representing, what might have
been allowed to pass on account of practical interests,
as a real advancement of speculative enquiry, in order,
when it is so disposed, either to tear the thread of physical
enquiry, or to fasten it, under the pretence of enlarging
our knowledge, to those transcendental ideas, w*hich really
teach us only that ive know nothing ; if, I say, the em-
piricist were satisfied with this, then his principle would
only serve to teach moderation in claims, modesty in
assertions, and encourage the greatest possible enlarge-
ment of our understanding through the true teacher
given to us, namely, experience. For in such a case we
should not be deprived of our own intellectual presump-
tions or of our faith in their influence on our practical
interests. They would only have lost the pompous titles
of science and rational insight, because true [p. 471]
speculative knowledge can never have any other object
Transcendental Dialectic
but experience ; and, if wc transcend its limits, our syn-
thesis, which attempts new kinds of knowledge indepen-
dent of experience, lacks that substratum of intuition to
which alone it could be applied.
As it is, empiricism becomes often itself dogmatical
with regard to ideas, and boldly denies what goes beyond
the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, and thus becomes
guilty itself of a want of modesty, which here is all the
more reprehensible, because an irreparable injury is
thereby inflicted on the practical interests of reason.
This constitutes the opposition of Epicureanism ^ to
Platmiism,
Either party says more than it knows ; but, [p, 472]
while the fanner encourages and advances knowledge,
although at the expense of practical interests, the latter
supplies excellent practical principles, but with regard to
everything of which speculative knowledge is open to us,
it allows reason to indulge in ideal explanations of natural
phenomena and to neglect physical investigation.
With regard to the third point which has to be con-
1 It is, however, doubtful whether Epicurus did ever teach these princlplcft
as ubjective assertions. If he meant them \o be no more than maxims fur the
speculative use of reasun, he would have shown thereby a truer phHosophical
spirit than any of the philo?-ophers on antiquity. The principles that in ex-
plaining phenomena we must proceed as if the field of investigation were
enclosed by no Hrnit or beginning of the world ; that the material of the world
should be accepted as it must be, if we want to learn anything about it fron*.
cxperience ; that there is no orig^ination of events except as determined by
invariable laws of nature; and, lastly, that we must not appeal to a cause
distinct from the world, all these are still perfectly true, though seldom ob-
served in enlarging the field of speculative philosophy, or m discovering the
principles of morality, independently of foreign aid. It is not permissible
that those who wish only it* ignore those dogmatical propositions, while
still engaged in mere speculation^ should be accused of wishing to dtny
them.
Transcendental Dialectic
387
sidered in a preliminary choice between the two opposite
parties, it is very strange that empiricism should be so
unpopular, though it might be supposed that the common
understanding would readily accept a theory which prom-
ises to satisfy it by experimental knowledge and its ra-
tional connection, while transcendental dogmatism forces
it to ascend to concepts which far surpass the insight
and rational faculties of the most practised thinkers. But
here is the real motive;— the man of ordinary [p. 473]
understanding is so placed thereby that even the most
learned can claim no advantage over him. If he knows little
or nothing, no one can boast of knowing much more, and
though he may not be able to employ such scholastic terms
as others, he can argue and subtilise infinitely more, because
he moves about among mere ideas, about which it is easy
to be eloquent, because na one knows anything about them.
The same person would have to be entirely silent, or
would have to confess his ignorance with regard to sci-
entific enquiries into nature. Indolence, therefore, and
vanity are strongly in favour of those principles. Besides,
although a true philosopher finds it extremely hard to
accept the principle of which he can give no reasonable
account, still more to introduce concepts the objective
reality of which cannot be established, nothing comes
more natural to the common understanding that wants
something with which it can operate securely. The
difficulty of comprehending such a supposition does not
disquiet a person of common understanding, because not
knowing what comprehending really means, it never enters
into his mind, and he takes everything for known that has
become familiar to him by frequent use. At last all specu-
lative interest disappears before the practical, and he
3 88 Transcendental Dialectic
imagines that he understands and knows what his fears
and hopes impel him to accept or to believe. Thus the
empiricism of a transcenden tally idealising reason [p. 474]
loses all popularity and, however prejudicial tt may be to
the highest practical principles, there is no reason to fear
that it will ever pass the limits of the school and obtain
in the commonwealth any considerable authority, or anv
favour with the multitude.
Human reason is by its nature architectonic, and looks
upon all knowledge as belonging to a possible system.
It therefore allows such principles only which do not
render existing knowledge incapable of being associated
with other knowledge in some kind of system. The
propositions of the antithesis, however, are of such a
character that they render the completion of any system
of knowledge quite impossible. According to them there
is always beyond every state of the world, an older state ;
in every part, other and again divisible parts; before every
event, another event which again is produced from else-
where, and everything in existence is conditioned, without
an unconditioned and first existence anywhere. As there-
fore the antithesis allows of nothing that is first, and of
no beginning which could serve as the foundation of an
edifice, such an edifice of knowledge is entirely impossible
with such premisses. Hence the architectonic interest of
reason (which demands not empirical, but pore [p. 475]
rational unity a priori) serves as a natural recommendation
of the propositions of the thesis.
But if men could free themselves from all such interests,
and consider the assertions of reason, unconcerned about
their consequences, according to the value of their argu-
ments only, they would find themselves, if they knew of
Transcendental Dialectic
3S9
no escape from the press except adhesion to one or the
other of the opposile doctrines, in a state of constant
oscillation. To-day they would be convinced that the
human will is free ; to-morrow, when considering the
indissoluble chain of nature, they would think that free-
dom is nothing but self-deceptiooi and nainrc all in all.
When afterwards they come to act, this play of purely
speculative reason w^ould vanish like the shadows of a
dream, and they would choose their principles according
to practical interests only. But, as it well befits a reflect-
ing and enquiring being to devote a certain time entirely
to the examination of his own reason, divesting himself of
all partiality, and then to publish his observations for the
judgment of others, no one ought to be blamcdi still less
be prevented, if he wishes to produce the thesis [p. 476]
as well as the antithesis, so that they may defend them-
selves, terrified by no menace, before a jury of his peers,
that is, before a jury of weak mortals.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section IV
Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason, and the
Absolute Necessity of their Solution
To attempt to solve all problems, and answer all ques-
tions, would be impudent boasting, and so extravagant a
self-conceit, that it would forfeit all confidence. Never-
theless there are sciences the very nature of which requires
that every question which can occur in them should be
answerable at once from what is known, because the
answer must arise from the same sources from which the
Tra nscen den tai D ia lee tic
question springs. Here it is not allowed to plead inevita-
ble ignorance, but a solution can be demanded. We must
be able, for instance, to know, according to a rule, wbat in
every possible case is right or wrongs because this touches
our obligation, and we cannot have any obligation to that
which we cannot know. In the explanation, [p. 477]
however, of the phenomena of nature, many things must
remain uncertain, and many a question insoluble, because
what we know of nature is by no means sufficient, in all
cases, to explain what has to be explained^ It has now to
be considered, whether there exists in transcendental phi-
losophy any question relating to any object of reason
which, by that pure reason, is unanswerable, and whether
we have a right to decline its decisive answer by treating
the object as absolutely uncertain (from all that we are
able to know), and as belonging to that class of objects of
which we may form a sufficient conception for starting a
question, without having the power or means of ever
answering it.
Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy has this
peculiarity among all speculative knowledge, that no ques-
tion, referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble
for the same human reason ; and that no excuse of inevita-
ble ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth on
the side of the problem, can release us from the obligation
to answer it thoroughly and completely ; because the same
concept, which enables us to ask the question, must
qualify us to answer it, considering that, as in the case
of right and wrong, the object itself does not exist, except
in the concept.
There are, however, in transcendental philoso- [p. 478]
phy no other questions but the cosmological, with regard
Transcendental Dialectic
391
to which we have a right to demand a satisfactory answer,
touching the qualify of the object ; nor is the philosopher
allowed here to decline an answer by pleading impenetra-
ble obscurity. These questions can refer to cosmological
ideas only, because the object must be given empirically,
and the question only refers to the adequateness of it to
an idea. If the object is transcendental and therefore
itself unknown, as, for instance, whether that something
the phenomenal appearance of which (within ourselves) is
the thinking {soul)» be in itself a simple being, whether
there be an absolutely necessary cause of all things, etc,
we are asked to find an object for our idea of which we
may well confess that it is unknown to us, though not
therefore impossible.^ The cosmological ideas alone pos-
sess this peculiarity that they may presuppose [p. 479]
their object, and the empirical synthesis required for the
object, as given, and the question w^hich they suggest
refers only to the progress of that synthesis, so far as it is
to contain absolute totality, such absolute totality being
no longer empirical, because it cannot be given in any
experience. As we are here concerned solely with a
thing, as an object of possible experience, not as a thing
* Though we ca^nnot answer the question, what kind of cjuality ft Cranftcen-
dental object may poB»e», or what it is^ wc are well able to aniwcr th»t the
question itself is nothings because it is without an object. All questions, there-
forCf of transcendental psychology are answeraV>le, and have been answered^
for they refer to the transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which
itself is not phenomenal, and not given as an object, and possesses none of the
conditions which make any of the categories (and it is to them tbat the ques-
tion really refers) applicable to it Wc have, therefore, here a case where the
common saying applies, that no answer is is good as an answer, that is, that
the question regarding the quality of something which cannot be conceived
by any definite predicatesp being completely beyond the sphere of objects, ti
entirely noil and void.
392 TransccniitHtai Dialectic
by itself, it is impossible that the answer of the transcen-
dent cosmological question can be anywhere but in the
idea, because it refers to no object by itself ; and in
respect to possible experience we do not ask for that
which can he given in concrcto in any experience, but for
that which lies in the idea, to which the empirical synthe-
sis can no more than approach. Hence that question can
be solved from the idea only, and being a mere creation of
reason, reason cannot decline her responsibility and put it-
on the unknown object.
It is in reality not so strange as it may seem [p. 480]
at first, that a science should demand and expect definite
answers to all the questions belonging to it {quaesiioncs
domesticae)^ although at present these answers have not
yet been discovered There are, in addition to transcen-
dental philosophy, two other sciences of pure reason, the
one speculative, the other practical, pure mathematics, and
pure ethics. Has it ever been alleged that, it may be on
account of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it
must remain uncertain what exact relation the diameter
bears to a circle, in rational or irrational numbers? As
by the former the relation cannot be expressed ade-
quately, and by the latter has not yet been discovered,
it was judged rightly that the impossibility at least of
the solution of such a problem can be known with cer-
tainty, and Lambert gave even a demonstration of this.
In the general principles of morality there can be noth-
ing uncertain, because its maxims are either entirely null
and void, or derived from our own rational concepts only.
In natural science, on the contrary, we have an infinity
of conjectures with regard to which certainty can never
be expected, because natural phenomena are objects given
Transcendental Dialectic
393
to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them
cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world
outside us. For that reason it cannot in many cases
be found at all, and a salisfactory answer must not be
expected. The questions of the transcendental [p. 481]
Analytic, referring to the deduction of our pure know-
ledge, do not belong to this class, because we are treating
at present of the certainty of judgments with reference
to their objects only, and not with reference to the origm
of our concepts themselves.
We shall not, therefore, be justified in evading the obli-
gation of a critical solution, at least of the questions of
reason, by complaints on the narrow limits of our reason,
and by confessing, under the veil of humble self-know-
.edge, that it goes beyond the powers of our reason to
determine whether the world has existed from eternity,
or has had a beginning ; whether cosmical space is filled
with beings ml infinitum^ or enclosed within certain
limits ; whether anything in the world is simple, or
everything can be infinitely divided; lastly, whether there
is a Being entirely unconditioned and necessary in itself,
or whether the existence of everything is conditioned,
and therefore externally dependent, and in itself contin-
gent For all these questions refer to an object which
can be found nowhere except in our own thoughts^
namely, the absolutely unconditioned totality of the syn-
thesis of phenomena. If we are not able to say and
establish anything certain about this from our own con-
cepts, we must not throw the blame on the [p. 482]
object itself as obscure, because such an object (being
nowhere to be found, except in our ideas) can never be
given to us; but we must look for the real cause of
394 Transcendental Diaitclk
obscurity in our idea itself, which is a problem admit
ting of no solution, though we insist obstinately that a
real object must correspond to it. A clear explanation
of the dialectic within our own concept, would soon show
us, with perfect certainty, how we ought to judge with
reference to such a question.
If people put forward a pretext of being unable to
arrive at certainty with regard to these problems, the
first question which we ought to address to them, and
which they ought to answer clearly, is this, Whence do
you get those ideas, the solution of which involves you
in such difficulty? Are they phenomena, of which you^
require an explanation, and of which you have only to
find, in accordance with those ideas» the principles, or
the rule of their explanation ? Suppose the whole of
nature were spread out before you, and nothing were
hid to your senses and to the consciousness of all that
is presented to your intuition, yet you would never be
able to know by one single experience the object of your
ideas in amcrcto (because, in addition to that complete
intuition, what is required is a completed synthesis, and
the consciousness of its absolute totality, which [p. 483]
is impossible by any empirical knowledge). Hence your
question can never be provoked for the sake of explain-
ing any gxv^n phenomenon, and as it were suggested by
the object itself. Such an object can never conie before
you, because it can never be given by any possible expe-
rience. In all possible perceptions you always remain
under the sway of conditions, whether in space or in
time; you never come face to face with anything uncon-
ditioned, in order thus to determine whether the uncon-
ditioned exists in an absolute beginning of the synthesis,
Transcendental Dialectic
395
or in an absolute totality of the series without any begin-
ning. The whole, in its empirical meaning, is always [
relative only. Tlie absolute whole of quantity (the uni- \
verse), of division, of origination, and of the condition of
existence in general, with all the attendant questions as
to whether it can be realised by a finite synthesis or by
a synthesis to be carried on ad in/tnitam, has nothing
to do with any possible experience. You would, for
instance, never be able to explain the phenomena of a
body in the least better, or even differently, whether
you assume that it consists of simple or throughout of
composite parts : for neither a simple phenomenon, nor
an infinite composition can ever meet your senses. Phe-
nomena require to be explained so far only as the condi-
tions of their explanation are given in perception ; but /
whatever may exist in them, if comprehended [p, 484] |_
as an absolute whole, can^ never be a perception. Yet it ,
is this very whole the explanation of which is required in I
the transcendental problems of reason.
As therefore the solution of these problems can never
be supplied by experience, you cannot say that it is un-
certain what ought to be predicated of the object. For
your object is in your brain only, and cannot possibly
exist outside it ; so that you have only to take care to
be at one with yourselves, and to avoid the amphiboly,
which changes your idea into a pretended representation
of an object empirically given, and therefore to be known
according to the laws of experience. The dogmatical
solution is therefore not only uncertain, but impossible ;
while the critical solution, which may become perfectly
* Read keim in original, nut eit$€*
30 Transcendental Dialectic
certain, does not consider the question objectively, but
only with reference to the foundation of the knowledge
on which it is based.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 4SsJ
Section V
Sceptical Representation of the Cosmohgical Questions in
the Fonr Transcendental Ideas
We should no doubt gladly desist from wishing to have
our questions answered dogmatical !y, if we understood
beforehand that, whatever the answer might be, it would
only increase our ignorance, and throw us from one incom-
prehensibility into another, from one obscurity into a still
greater obscurity, or it may be even into contradictions.
H our question can only be answered by yes or no, it
would seem to be prudent to take no account at first of
the probable grounds of the answer, but to consider
before, what we should gain, if the answer was yes, and
what, if the answer was no. If we should find that in
either case nothing comes of it but mere nonsensei we
are surely called upon to examine our question critically,
and to see whether it does not rest on a groundless sup-
position, playing only with an idea which betrays its fal-
sity in its application and its consequences better than
when represented by itself. This is the great advantage
of the sceptical treatment of questions which [p. 486]
pure reason puts to pure reason. We get rid by it, with
a little effort, of a great amount of dogmatical rubbish,
in order to put in its place sober criticism which, as a
true cathartic, removes successfully all illusion with its
train of omniscience.
7 >*i insctUiii niai Dia iectic
397
rlf, therefore, I could know beforehand that a cosmo-
logical idea^ in whatever way it might try to realise the
unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phenomena
(whether in the manner of the thesis or in that of the
antithesis), that, I say, the cosmological idea would always
be either taa large or im smaii for any concept of the muier-
stamiing, I should understand that, as that cosmological
idea refers only to an object of experience which is to
correspond to a possible concept of the understanding, it
must be empty and without meaning, because the object
does not fit into it, whatever I may do to adapt it. And
this must really be the case with all cosmical concepts,
which on that very account involve reason, so long as it
remains attached to them, in inevitable antinomy. For
suppose : —
First, That the ivarld has no beginning, and you will
find that it is too large for your concept, which, as it
consists in a successive regressus, can never reach the
whole of past eternity. Or, suppose, that the world has
a Ihginfiing, then it is again top small for the concept
of your understanding engaged in the necessary empiri-
cal regressus. For as a beginning always pre- [p. 487]
supposes a time preceding^ it is not yet unconditioned ;
and the law of the empirical use of the understanding
obliges you to look for a higher condition of time, so that,
wnth reference to such a law, the world (as limited in time)
is clearly too small
The same applies to the twofold answer to the question
regarding the extent of the world in space. For if it is
infinite and unlimited, it is too large for every possible
empirical concept. If it is finite and limited, you have
a perfect right to ask what determines that limit. Empty
39^ Transcendental Dialectic
space is not an independent correlate of things, and can-
not be a final condition, still less an empirical condition
forming a part of a possible experience ; — for how can
there be experience of what is absolutely void ? Bat, in
order to produce an absolute totality in an empirical syn-
thesis, it is always requisite that the nnconditioned should
be an empirical concept. Thus it follows that a limited
world would be too small for your concept.
Secondly, If every phenomenon in space (matter) con-
sists of an infinite number of parts^ the regressus of a
division will always be too large for your concept, while
if the division of space is to stop at any member {the
simple), it would be too small for the idea of the uncondi-
tioned, because that member always admits of a regres-
sus to more parts contained in it. [p. 488]
Thirdly^ If you suppose that everything that happens
in the world is nothing but the result of the laws of
nature, the causality of the cause will always be some-
thing that happens, and that necessitates a regressus to
a still higher cause, and therefore a continuation of the
series of conditions a parte prion without end. Mere
active nature, therefore, is too large for any concept in
the synthesis of cosmical events.
If you admit, on the contrary, spontaneously produced
events, therefore generation iwm freedom^ you have still,
according to an inevitable law of nature, to ask why, and
you are forced by the empirical law of causality beyond
that point, so that you find that any such totality of con-
nection is too small for your necessary empirical concept.
Fourthly, If you admit an absolutely neeessar)f Being
{whether it be the world itself or something in the world,
or the cause of the world), you place it at a time infinitely
Transcendental Dialectic
399
remote from any given point of time, because otherwise
it would be dependent on another and antecedent exist*
ence. In that case, however, such an existence would
be unapproachable by your empirical concept, and too
large even to be reached by any continued regressus.
But if, according to your opinion, ever)^thing [p. 489]
which belongs to the world (whether as conditioned or
as condition) is contingent, then every given existence
is too small for your concept, because compelling you
to look still for another existence, on which it depends.
We have said that in all these cases, the cosmical idea
is either too large or too small for the empirical regressus,
and therefore for every possible concept of the under-
standing* But why did we not take the opposite view
and say that in the former case the empirical concept is
always too small for the idea, and in the latter too large,
so that blame should attach to the empirical regressus,
and not to the cosmological idea, which we accused of
deviating from its object, namely, possible experience,
either by its too-much or its too-little? The reason was
this. It is possible experience alone that can impart
reality to our concepts ; without this, a concept is only
an idea without truth, and without any reference to an
object. Hence the possible empirical concept was the
standard by which to judge the idea, whether it be an
idea and fiction only, or whether it has an object in the
world- For we then only say that anything is relatively
to something else either too large or too small, if it is
required for the sake of the other and ought to be
adapted to it. One of the playthings of the old dia-
lectical school was the question, whether we [p. 490]
should say that the ball is too large or the hole too small.
J
400 Transcendental Dialectic
if a ball cannot pass through a hole. In this case it is
indifferent what expression we use, because we do not
know which of the two exists for the sake of the other.
But you would never say that the man is too large for
his coat, but that the coat is too small for the man.
We have thus been led at least to a well-founded
suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all
the conflicting sophistical assertions, may rest on an
empty and merely imaginary conception of the manner
in which the object of those ideas can be given, and this
suspicion may lead us on the right track to discover the
illusion which has so long led us astray.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section VI
Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution oj
Cosmological Diaiectic
It has been sufficiently proved in the transcendental
jEsthetic that everything which is perceived in space and
time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us,
are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations
which, such as they are represented, namely, as [p. 491]
extended beings, or scries of changes, have no inde-
pendent existence outside our thoughts. This system
I call Transcendental Idealism} Transcendental realism
changes these modifications of our sensibility into self*
subsistent things, that is, it changes mere representations
into things by themselves.
1 See Supplement XXVIII.
Transcendental Dialectic
401
It would be unfair to ask us to adopt that long-decried
empirical idealism which, while it admits the independent
reality of space, denies the existence of extended beings
in it, or at all events considers it as doubtful and does not
admit that there is in this respect a sufficiently established
difference between dream and reality. It sees no difficulty
with regard to the phenomena of the internal sense in
time, being real things ; nay, it even maintains that this
internal experience alone sufficiently proves the real
existence of its object (by itself), with all the deter-
minations in time.
Our own transcendental idealism, on the contrary,
allows that the objects of external intuition may be real,
as they are perceived in space, and likewise all changes in
time, as they are represented by the internal sense. For
as space itself is a form of that intuition which we call ex-
ternal, and as there would be no empirical repre- [p. 492]
sentation at all, unless there were objects in space, we can
and must admit the extended beings in it as real ; and the
same applies to time. Space itself, however, as well as
time, andwith them all phenomena, are not things by
themselvesTbut representations, and cannot exist outside
our mind ; and even the mterh^l Sl^riiiiRiuh Itimnion of our
mind (as an object of consciousness) which is represented
as determined by the succession of different states in time,
is not a real self, as it exists by itself, or what is called the
transcendental subject, but a phenomenon only, given to
the sensibility of this to us unknown being. It cannot be
admitted that this internal phenomenon exists as a thing
by itself, because it is under the condition of time, which
can never be the determination of anything by itself. In
space and time, however, the empirical truth of phenomena
402 Trans€€iidentai Diaicctk
is sufficiently established, and kept quite distinct from a
dream, if both are properly and completely connected to-
gether in experience, according to empirical laws.
The objects of experience are therefore never given by
themselves, but in our experience only, and do not exist
outside it. That there may be inhabitants in [p. 493]
the moon» though no man has ever seen them, must be
admitted ; but it means no more than that, in the possible
progress of our experience, we may meet with them ; for
everything is real that hangs together with a perception,
according to the laws of empirical progress. They are
therefore real, if they are empirically connected with any
real consciousness, although they are not therefore real by
themselves, that is, apart from that progress of experience.
Nothing is really given to us but perception, and the
empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions.
For by themselves phenomena, as mere representations,
are real in perception only, which itself is nothing but the
reality of an empirical representation, that is, phenomenal
appearance. To call a phenomenon a real thing, before it
is perceived, means either, that in the progress of ex-
perience we must meet with such a perception, or it
means nothing. For that it existed by itself, without any
reference to our senses and possible experience, might no
doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We
here are speaking, however, of a phenomenon only in
space and time, which are not determinations of things
by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that
which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by
itself, but consists in representations only, [p. 494]
which, unless they are given in us {in perception), exist
nowhere.
Transcendental Dialectic
403
The faculty of sensuous intuition is really some kind
of receptivity only, according to which we are affected in
a ceitaiii way by representations the mutual relation of
which is a pure intuition of space and time (mere forms
of our sensibility), and which, if they are connected and
determined in that relation of space and time, according:
to the laws of the unity of experience, are called objects.
The non-sensuous cause of these representations is entirely
unknowia to us, and we can never perceive it as an object,
for such a cause would have to be represented neither in
space nor in time, which are conditions of sensuous rep-
resentations only, and without which we cannot conceive
any intuitioHe We may, however, call that purely in-
telligible cause of phenomena in general, the tran-
scendental object, in order that we may have something
which corresponds to sensibility as a kind of receptivity.
We may ascribe to that transcendental object the whole
extent and connection of all our possible perceptions, and
we may say that it is given by itself antecedently to all
experience. Phenomena, however, are given accordingly,
not by themselves, but in experience only, because they
are mere representations which as perceptions [p. 495]
only, signify a real object, provided that the perception
is connected with all others, according to the rules of
unity in experience. Thus we may say that the real
things of time past are given in the transcendental object
of experience, but they only are objects to me, and real
in time past, on the supposition that I conceive that a
regressive scries of possible perceptions (whether by the
light of history, or by the vestiges of causes and effects),
in one word, the course of the world, leads, according to
empirical laws, to a past scries of time, as a condition of
404 Transcendental Dialectic
the present time. It is therefore represented as real,
not by itself, but in connection with a possible experience,
so that all past events from time immemorial and before
my own existence mean after all nothing but the possi-
bility of an extension of the chain of experience, begin-
ning with present perception and leading upwards to the
conditions which determine it in time.
If, therefore, I represent to myself all existing objects of
the senses, at all times and in all spaces, I do not place
them before experience into space and time, but the whole
representation is nothing but the idea of a possible experi-
ence, in its absolute completeness. In that alone those
objects {which are nothing but mere representations)
are given ; and if we say that they exist before [p, 496]
my whole experience, this only means that they exist in
that part of experience to which, starting from perception,
I have first to advance. The cause of empirical conditions
of that progress, and consequently with what members, or
how far I may meet with certain members in that re-
gressus, is transcendental, and therefore entirely unknown
to me. But that cause does not concern us, but only the
rule of the progress of experience, in which objects,
namely phenomena, are given to me. In the end it is
just the same whether I say, that in the empirical progress
in space I may meet with stars a hundred times more dis-
tant than the most distant which I see, or whether I say
that such stars are perhaps to be met with in space,
though no human being did ever or will ever see them.
For though, as things by themselves, they might be given
without any relation to possible experience, they are
nothing to me, and therefore no objects, unless they can
be comprehended in the series of the empirical regressus.
^
Transcicndentai Dialectic
40s
Only in another relation^ when namely these phenomena
are meant to be used for the cosmological idea of an abso-
lute whole, and when we have to deal with a question that
goes beyond the limits of possible experience, the distinction
of the mode in which the reality of those objects of the
senses is taken becomes of importance^ in order [p. 497]
to gtjard against a deceptive error that would inevitably
arise from a misinterpretation of our own empirical concepts.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section VII
Critical Decision of the Cosmohgical Conflict of Reason with
itself
The whole antinomy of pure reason rests on the dialec-
tical argument that, if the conditioned is given, the whole
series of conditions also is given. As therefore the objects
of the senses are given us as conditioned, it follows, etc.
Through this argument, the major of which seems so
natural and self-evident, cosmological ideas have been
introduced corresponding in number to the difference of
conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena) which consti-
tute a series. These cosmological ideas postulate the
absolute totality of those series, and thus place reason in
inevitable contradiction with itself. Before, however, we
show what is deceptive in this sophistical argument, we
must prepare ourselves for it by correcting and defining
certain concepts occurring in it.
First, the following proposition is clear and admits of no
doubt, that if the conditioned is given, it imposes on us
the regressus in the series of all conditions of [p. 498]
't ; for it follows from the very concept of the conditioned
Transcen t ien ta I Dialectic
that through it something is referred to a condition, and,
if that condition is again conditioned, to a more distant
condition, and so on through all the members of the
series. This proposition is really analytical, and need not
fear any transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate
of reason to follow up through the understanding, as far as
possible, that connection of a concept with its conditions,
which is inherent in the concept itself.
Further, if the conditioned as well as its conditions are
things by themselves, then, if the former be given, the
regressus to the latter is not only rcqitind, but is really
given; and as this applies to all the members of the
series, the complete series of conditions and with it the
unconditioned also is given, or rather it is presupposed
that the conditioned, which was possible through that
series only, is given. Here the synthesis of the condi-
tioned with its condition is a synthesis of the understand-
ing only, which represents things as they arc, without
asking whether and how we can arrive at the knowledge
of them. liut if I have to deal with phenomena, which,
as mere representations, are not given at all, unless I
attain to a knowledge of them (that is» to the [p. 499]
phenomena themselves, for they are nothing but empirical
knowledge), then I cannot say in the same sense that^ if
the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as phenomena)
are also given, and can therefore by no means conclude
the absolute totality of the series. Yqt phenomena in their
apprehension are themselves nothing but an empirical syn-
thesis (in space and time), and are given therefore in that
synthesis only. Now it follows by no means that, if the
conditioned (as phenomenal) is given, the synthesis also
that constitutes its empirical condition should thereby be
Transcendental Dialectic
407
given at the same time and presupposed ; for this takes
place in the regressus only, and never without it. What we
may say in such a case is this, that a regressus to the con-
ditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis in that
direction is required, and that conditions cannot be want*
ing that are given through that regressus.
Hence we see that the major of the cosmological argu-
ment takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of
a pure category, while the minor takes it in the empirical
sense of a concept of the understanding, referring to mere
phenomena, so that it contains that dialectical deceit which
v^z'^Xi^A Sophisma figurae dicdonis. That deceit, [p. yxi\
how^ever, is not artificial, but a perfectly natural illusion of
our common reason. It is owing to it that, in the major,
we presuppose the conditions and their series as it were
on trust, if anything is given as conditioned, because this
is no more than the logical postulate to assume complete
premisses for any given conclusion. Nor does there exist
in the connection of the conditioned with its condition any
order of time, but they are presupposed in themselves as
given together. It is equally natural also in the minor to
look on phenomena as things by themselves, and as objects
given to the understanding only in the same manner as in
the major, as no account was taken of all the conditions of
intuition under which alone objects can be given. But
there is an important distinction between these concepts,
which has been overlooked. The synthesis of the condi-
tioncd with its condition^ and the whole series of condi-
tions in the major, was in no way limited by time, and was
free from any concept of succession. The empirical syn-
thesis, on the contrary, and the series of conditions in
phenomena, which was subsumed in the minor, is neces-
4o8 Transcenienta! Dialectic
sarily successive and given as such in time only. There-
fore I had no right to assume the absolute totality of the
synthesis and of the series represented by it in this case
as well as in the former. For in the former all the mem-
bers of the series are given by themselves (without deter-
mination in time), while here they are possible thjough the
successive regressus only, which cannot exist [p. 501]
unless it is actually carried out.
After convicting them of such a mistake in the argu-
ment adopted by both parties as the foundation of their
cosmological assertions, both might justly be dismissed as
not being able to produce any good title in support of
their claims. But even thus their quarrel is not yet
ended, as if it had been proved that both parti es» or one of
them, were wrong in the matter contended for (in the con-
clusion), though they had failed to support it by vahd proof.
Nothing seems clearer than that, if one maintains that the
world has a beginning, and the other that it has no begin-
ning, but exists from all eternity, one or the other must be
right. But if this were so, as the arguments on both sides
are equally clear, it would still remain impossible ever to
find out on which side the truth lies, and the suit continues,
although both parties have been ordered to keep the peace
before the tribunal of reason. Nothing remains therefore
in order to settle the quarrel once for all, and to the satis*
faction of both parties, but to convince them that, though
they can refute each other so eloquentlvj they are really
quarrelling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental
illusion has mocked them with a reality where no [p. 502]
reality exists. We shall now enter upon this way of ad-
justing a dispute, which cannot be adjudicated.
Transcendental Dialectic
The Eleatic philosopher Zeno, a subtle dialectician^ was
severely reprimanded by Plato as a heedless Sophist who,
in order to display his skill, would prove a proposition by
plausible arguments and subvert the same immediately
afterwards by arguments equally strong. He maintained,
for instancej that God (which to him was probably nothing
more than the universe) is neither finite nor infinite,
neither in motion nor at rest, neither similar nor dissimilar
to any other thing. It seemed to his critics as if he had
intended to deny completely both of the two self-contra-
dictory proposition which would be absurd. But I do not
think that he can be rightly charged with this. We shall
presently consider the first of these propositions more
carefully. With regard to the others, if by the word God
he meant the universe, he could not but say that it is
neither permanently present in its place (at rest) nor that
it changes it (in motion), because all places exist in the
universe only, while the universe exists in no place. If
the universe comprehends in itself everything that exists,
it follows that it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any
other thing, because there is no other thing besides it
with which it could be compared. If two oppo- [p. 503]
site judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they
both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no
real contradiction), fall to the ground, because the condi-
tion fails under which alone either of the propositions was
meant to be valid.
If somebody were to say that everybody has cither a
good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that
it has no smell at all, in which case both contradictory
propositions would be false. If I say that it is either good
smelling or not good smelling {vel suavcoUns vel nan
410 Transcendental Dialectic
suaveolens)^ in that case the two judgments are contradic'
tory, and the former only is wrong, while its contradictory
opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good smelling,
comprehends those bodies also which have no smell at all.
In the former opposition {per disparata) the contingent
condition of the concept of a body (smell) still remained
in the contradictory judgment and was not eliminated by
it, so that the latter could not be called the contradictory
opposite of the former
If I say therefore that the world is either infinite in
space or is not infinite (mm esi injini/ns), then, if the for-
mer proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that
the %vorld is not infinite, must be true. I should thus only
eliminate an- infinite world without affirming another,
namely, the finite. But if I had said the world [p. 504]
is either infinite or finite (not-infinite), both statements
may be false. For I then look upon the world, as by itself,
determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only elimi-
nate in the opposite statement the infinity, and with it, it
may be, its whole independent existence, but I add a deter-
mination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which
may be false, because the world may not be a thing by
itself, and therefore, with regard to extension, neither
infinite nor finite. This kind of opposition I may be
allowed to call dialectical^ that the real contradiction,
the analytical opposition. Thus then of two judgments
opposed to each other dialectically both may be false,
because the one does not only contradict the other, but
8ays something more than is requisite for a contradic*
tion.
If we regard the two statements that the world is in-
finite in extension, and that the world is finite in exten-
Transcendental Dialectic
41!
sion, as contradictory opposites» we assume that the world
{the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself ; for
it remains, whether I remove the infinite or the finite
regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if we
remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion,
and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradic-
tory opposition of the two statements becomes [p. 505]
purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by
itself (independently of the regressive series of my rep-
resentations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite^
nor as a whole by itself finite. It exists only in the em-
pirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere
by itself. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it
can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore
not an inconditioned whole, and does not exist as such,
either with infinite or finite extension.
What has here been said of the first cosmological idea,
namely, that of the absolute totality of extension in phe-
nomena, applies to the others also. The series of condi-
tions is to be found only in the regressive synthesis, never
by itself, as complete, in phenomenon as an independent
thing, existing prior to every regressus. Hence I shall
have to say that the number of parts in any given phe-
nomenon is by itself neither finite nor infinite, because
a phenomenon does not exist by itself, and its parts are
only found through the regressus of the decomposing syn-
thesis through and in the regressus* and that regressus
can never be given as absolutely complete, whether as
finite or as infinite. The same applies to the series of
causes, one being prior to the other, and to the series
leading from conditioned to unconditioned necessary exist-
ence, which can never be regarded either by [p, 506]
4T2 Transcendental Dialectic
'tself finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series
of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical re-
gressiis only, and cannot exist prior to it, by itself, as a
self'Subsistent series of things.
The antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmo-
logical ideas is therefore removed by showing that it is
dialectical only, and a conflict of an illusion produced by
our applying the idea of absolute totality, which exists
only as a condition of things by themselves, to phe-
nomena, which exist in our representation only, and
if they form a series, in the successive regressus, but
nowhere else. We may, however, on the other side,
derive from that antinomy a true, if not dogmatical, at
least critical and doctrinal advantage, namely, by prov*
ing through it indirectly the transcendental ideality of
phenomena, in case anybody should not have been satis-
fied by the direct proof given in the transcendental
-Esthetic. The proof would consist in the following
dilemma. If the world is a whole existing by itself, it
is either finite or infmite. Now the former as well as
the latter proposition is false, as has been shown by the
proofs given in the antithesis on one and in the thesis on
the other side. It is false, therefore, that the world (the
sum total of all phenomena) is a whole existing [p. 507]
by itself. Hence it follows that phenomena in general
are nothing outside our representations, which was what
we meant by their transcendental ideality.
This remark is of some importance, because it shows
that our proofs of the fourfold antinomy were not mere
sophistry, but honest and correct, always under the
(wrong) supposition that phenomena, or a world of sense
which comprehends them all, are things by themselves.
Transcendental Dialectic
4U
The conflict of the conclusions drawn from this shows,
however, that there is a flaw in the supposition, and thus
leads us to the discovery of the true nature of things, as
objects of the senses. This transcendental Dialectic
therefore does not favour scepticism, but only the scep-
tical method, which can point to it as an example of its
great utility, if we allow the arguments of reason to fight
against each other with perfect freedom, from which some-
thing useful and serviceable for the correction of our judg-
ments will always resuU, though it may not be always that
which we were looking for.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON [p. 508]
Section VIII
The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason with Regard to
the Cosmological Ideas
As through the cosmological principle of totality no real
maximum is given of the series of conditions in the world
of sense, as a thing by itself, but can only be required in
the regressus of that series, that principle of pure reason,
if thus amended, still retains its validity, not indeed as an
axiom, requiring us to think the totality in the object as
real, but as a problem for the understanding, and therefore
for the subject, encouraging us to undertake and to con-
tinue, according to the completeness in the idea, the re-
gressus in the series of conditions of anything given as
conditioned. In our sensibility, that is, in space and time,
every condition which we can reach in examining given
phenomena is again conditioned, because these phenom-
ena are not objects by themselves, in which something
Transcendental Diahctic
absolutely unconditioned n>ight possibly exist, but empiri-
cal representations only, wiiich always must have their
condition in intuition, whereby they are determined in
space and time. The principle of reason is therefore
properly a rule only, which in the series of ^con- [p, 509]
ditions of given phenomena postulates a regressus which
is never allowed to stop at anything absolutely uncondi-
tioned* It is therefore no principle of the possibility of
experience and of the empirical knowledge of the objects
of the senses, and not therefore a principle of the under-
standing, because every experience is {according to a
given intuition) within its limits; nor is it a amstitutive
principic of reason, enabling us to extend the concept of
the world of sense beyond all possible experience, but it
is merely a principle of the greatest possible continuation
and extension of our experience, allowing no empiricar
limit to be taken as an absolute limit. It is therefore a
principic of reason, which, as a ruh\ postulates what we
ought to do in the regressus, but does fwi anticipate what
may be given in the objirt, before such regressus. I
therefore call it a regniatizw principle of reason, while, on
the contrary, the principle of the absolute totality of the
series of conditions, as given in the object (the phenom-
ena) by itself, would be a constitutive cosmological prin-
ciple, the hollowness of which I have tried to indicate
by this very distinction, thus preventing what otherwise
would have inevitably happened (through a transcenden-
tal surreptitious proceeding), namely, an idea, which is to
serve as a rule only, being invested with objective reality.
In order properly to determine the meaning of this rule
of pure reason it should be remarked, first of all, that it
cannot tell us what the object is^ but only /iow [p. 510]
Transcendental Dialectic
4IS
the empirical rcgrcssus is to be carried out^ in order to
arrive at the complete concept of the object. If wc
attempted the first, it would become a constitutive prin-
ciple, such as pure reason can never supply. It cannot
therefore be our intention to say through this principle,
that a series of conditions of somethings given as condi-
tioned, is by itself either finite or infinite ; for in that case
a mere idea of absolute totality, produced in itself only,
would represent in thought an object such as can never
be given in experience, and an objective reality, indepen-
dent of empirical synthesis, would have been attributed
to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason can there-
fore do no more than prescribe a rule to the regressive
synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which
that synthesis is to advance from the conditioned, through
all subordinate conditions, towards the unconditioned,
though it can never reach it, for the absolutely uncon-
ditioned can never be met with in experience.
To this end it is necessary, first of all, to define accu-
rately the synthesis of a series, so far as it never is com-
plete. People are in the habit of using for this purpose
two expressions which are meant to establish a difference,
though they are unable clearly to define the ground of the
distinction. Mathematicians speak only of a processus
in infinitum. Those who enquire into concepts (philoso-
phers) will admit instead the expression of a [p. 511]
progressiis in indcfinititm only. Without losing any time
in the examination of the reasons which may have sug-
gested such a distinction, and of its useful or useless
application, I shall at once endeavour to define these
concepts accurately for my own purpose.
Of a straight line it can be said correctly that it may be
416 Transcendental Dialectic
produced to infinity ; and here the distinction between an
infinite and an indefinite progress {progressus in indefini-
tum) would be mere subtilty. No doubt, if we arc told to
carry on a line, it would be more correct to 2/}A in indt'fi-
nitmn^ than in infinifmUy because the farmer means no
more than, produce it as far as you wish^ but the second,
you shall never cease producing it (which can never be
intended). Nevertheless, if we speak only of w^hat is
possible, the former expression is quite correct, because
we can always make it longer, if we like, without end.
The same applies in all cases where wx* speak only of
the progressus, that is, of our proceeding from the con-
dition to the conditioned, for such progress proceeds in
the series of phenomena without end. From a given pair
of parents we may, in the descending line of generation^
proceed without end, and conceive quite well that that
line should so continue in the w^orld. For here reason
never requires an absolute totality of the series, [p. 51:2]
because it is not presupposed as a condition, and as it
were given {daium)^ but only as something conditioned,
that is, capable only of being given {dabile), and can be
added to without end.
The case is totally different with the problem, how far
the regressus from something given as conditioned may
ascend in a series to its conditions ; whether I may
call it a regressus into the infinite, or only into the
indefinite {in indefinitum ; and whether I may ascend, for
instance, from the men now living, through the series of
their ancestors, in infinitum ; or whether I may only say
that, so far as I have gone back, I have never met with
an empirical ground for considering the series limited any*
where, so that I feel justified, and at the same time obliged
Transcendental Dialectic
417
to search for an ancestor of every one of these ancestors,
though not to presuppose them.
I say, therefore, that where the whole is given in
empirical intuition, the regressus in the series of its in-
ternal conditions proceeds in infinitum, while if a mem-
ber only of a series is given, from which the regressus
to the absolute totality has first to be carried out, the
regressus is only in indifinituvt. Thus we must [p. 513]
say that the division of matter, as given between its limits
(a body), goes on in infinitum, because that matter is
complete and therefore, with all its possible parts, given in
empirical intuition. As the comlitiou of that whole con-
sists in its part, and the condition of that part in the part
of that part, and so on, and as in this regressus of decom-
position we never meet with an unconditioned (indivisible)
member of that series of conditions, there is nowhere an
empirical ground for stopping the division; nay. the fur-
ther members of that continued division are themselves
empirically given before the continuation of the division,
and therefore the division goes on in infinitum. The series
of ancestors, on the contrar)% of any g^ven man, exists
nowhere in its absolute totality, in any possible experience,
while the regressus goes on from every link in the gener-
ation to a higher one. so that no empirical limit can be
found which should represent a link as absolutely uncon-
ditioned. As, however, the links too, which might supply
the condition, do not exist in the empirical intuition of the
whole, prior to the regressus, that regressus does not pro-
ceed in infinitum (by a division of what is given), but to an
indefinite distance, in its search for more links in addition
to those which are given, and which themselves arc again
always conditioned only.
21
41 8 Transcendcutai Dialectic
In neither case — ^the regressus in infinitum [p. 514]
nor the regressus in indcfinitum — is the series of conditions
to be considered as given as infinite in the object. They
are not things by themselves, but phenomena only, which,
as conditions of each other, are given only in the regressus
itself. Therefore the question is no longer how great this
series of conditions may be by itself, whether finite or
infinite, for it is nothing by itself, but only how we are to
carry out the empirical regress us, and how far we may
continue it. And here we see a very important difference
with regard to the rule of that progress. If the whole is
given empirically, it is possible to go back in the series of
its conditions in infimtum. But if the whole is not given,
but has first to be given through an empirical regressus, I
can only say that it is possible to proceed to still higher
conditions of the series. In the former case I could say
that more members exist and are empirically given than I
can reach through the regressus (of decomposition); in the
latter I can only say that I may advance still further in the
regressus, because no member is empirically given as abso-
lutely unconditioned, and a higher member therefore always
possible, and therefore the enquiry for it necessary. In the
former case it was necessary to find more members of the
series, in the latter it is necessary to enquire for more, be-
cause no experience is absolutely limiting. For [p, 515]
either you have no perception which absolutely limits your
empirical regressus, and in that case you cannot consider
that regressus as complete, or you have a perception which
limits your series, and in that case it cannot be a part of
your finished series (because what liMits must be different
from that which is limited by it), and you must therefore
continue your regressus to that condition also, and so on
for ever.
Transcendental Dialectic
419
The following section, by showing their appUcation, will
place these observations in their proper light.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON
Section IX
Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason
with Regard to all Cosnwlogical Ideas
No transcendental use, as we have shown on several
occasions, can be made of the concepts either of the
understanding or of reason ; and the absolute totaUty of
the series of conditions in the world of sense is due
entirely to a transcendental use of reason, which demands
this unconditioned completeness from what presupposes
as a thing by itself. As no such thing is contained in
the world of sense, we can never speak again [p. 516]
of the absolute quantity of different series in it, whether
they be limited or in themselves unlimited ; but the ques-
tion can only be, how far. in the empirical regressus» we
may go back in tracing experience to its conditions, in
order to stop, according to the rule of reason, at no other
answer of its questions but such as is in accordance with
the object.
What therefore remains to us is only the validity of the
primiple of reason^ as a rule for the continuation and for
the extent of a possible experience, after its invalidity, as
a constitutive principle of things by themselves, has been
sufficiently established. If we have clearly established
that invalidity, the conflict of reason with itself will be
entirely finished, because not only has the illusion which
led to that conflict been removed through critical analysis,
but in its place the sense in which reason agrees with
420
Transcendental Dialectic
itself, and the misapprehension of which was the only
cause of conflict, has been clearly exhibited, and a prin-
ciple ioxn\^x\^' dialectical changed into a doctrinal oxi^. In
fact, if that priiiciplei according to its subjective meaning,
can be proved fit to determine the greatest possible use of
Lhc understanding in experience, as adequate to its objects,
this would be the same as if it determined, as an ax-
iom (which is impossible from pure reason), the [p. 517]
objects themselves ^7 /Ati?ri; for this also could not, with
reference to the objects of experience, exercise a greater
infliierice on the extension and correction of our know-
ledge, than proving itself efficient in the most extensive
use of our understanding, as applied to experience.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of tlie
Composition of Phenmncnxi in an Universe
Here, as well as in the other cosmological problems,
the regulative principle of reason is founded on the
proposition that, in the empirical regressus, no experience
of an alnolittc limit, that is, of any condition as such, which
empiricailj is absolutely nncondit toned, can exist. The
ground of this is that such an experience would contain
a limitation of phenomena by nothing or by the void, on
which the continued regressus by means of experience
must abut ; and this is impossible.
This proposition, which says that in an empirical
regressus I can only arrive at the condition which itself
must be considered empirically conditioned, [p. 518]
contains the rule in terminis, that however far I may
^ranscendeniai DiaUctic
421
have reached in the ascending series, I must always en-
quire for a still higher member of that series, whether it
be known to me by experience or not.
For the sohition, therefore, of the first cosniological
problem, nothing more is wanted than to determine
whether, in the regressus to the unconditioned extension
of the universe (in time and in space), this nowhere limited
ascent is to be called a regressus in infinitum^ or a regres-
sus in indefinitum.
The mere general representation of the series of all
past states of the world, and of the things which exist
together in space, is itself nothing but a possible empirical
regressus, which I represent to myself, though as yet as in-
definite, and through which alone the concept of such a
series of conditions of the perception given to me can
arise.* Now the universe exists for me as a concept only,
and never (as a whole) as an intuition. Hence [p. 519]
I cannot from its quantity conclude the quantity of the
regressus, and determine the one by the other; but I must
first frame to myself a concept of the quantity of the world
through the quantity of the empirical regressus. Of this,
however, I never know anything more than that, em-
pirically, I must go on from every given member of the
series of conditions to a higher and more distant member*
Hence the quantity of the whole of phenomena is not ab-
solutely determined, and we cannot say therefore that it is
^ This co»ttiicil series can therefore be neither greater noi ainalter than
the possible empirical regre^sui on which alanc its concept rests. And as this
can give neither a delinite infinite, nor a delinite finite (al)sci)ute1y limited ), it
becomes clear that we cannot accept the quantity of the world, cither as finite
or as infinite, because the regressus (by which it is represented) admits of
neither the one nor the other.
422 Transcendental Dialectic
a regressus in infinitum^ because this would anticipate the
members which the regressus has not yet reached, and
represent its number as so large that no empirical synthe-
sis could ever reach it. It would therefore (though nega-
tively only) determine the quantity of the world prior to
the regressus, which is impossible, because it is not given
to me by any intuition (in its totality), so that its quantity
cannot be given prior to the regressus. Hence we cannot
say anything of the quantity or extension of the world by
itself, not even that there is in it a regressus in infiniium ;
but we must look for the concept of its quantity according
to the rule that determines the empirical regressus in it.
This rule, however, says no more than that, however far
we may have got in the series of empirical conditions, we
ought never to assume an absolute limit, but subordinate
every phenomenon, as conditioned, to another, [p, 520]
as its condition, and that we must proceed further to that
condition. This is the regressus in indefimtunu which, as
it fixes no quantity in the objects can clearly enough be
distinguished from the regressus in infinitum,
I cannot say therefore that, as to time past or as to
space, the world is infinite. For such a concept of quan-
tity, as a given infinity, is empirical, and therefore, with
reference to the world as an object of the senses, abso-
lutely impossible. Nor shall I say that the regressus,
beginning with a given perception, and going on to every-
thing that limits It in a series, both in space and in time
past, goes on in infiniium, because this would presuppose
an infinite quantity of the world. Nor can I say again
that it is finite, for the absolute limit is likewise empiri-
cally impossible. Hence it follows that I shall not be able
to say anything of the whole object of experience (the
Transcendental Dialectic
423
world of sense), but only of the rule, according to which
experience can take place and be continued in accordance
with its object.
To the cosmological question, therefore, respecting the
quantity of the world, the first and negative answer is,
that the world has no first beginning in time, and no
extreme limit in space.
For, in the contrary case, the world would be limited
by empty time and empty space. As however, [p. 521]
as a phenomenon, it cannot, by itself, be either, — a phe-
nomenon not being a thing by itself. — we should have to
admit the perception of a limitation by means of absolute
empty time or empty space, by which these limits of the
world could be given in a possible experience. Such an
experience, however, would be perfectly void of contents,
and therefore impossible. Consequently an absolute limit
of the world is impossible empirically, and therefore ab-
solutely also,^
From this follows at the same time the aflirmative
answer, that the regrcssus in the series of the phenomena
of the world, intended as a determination of the quantity
of the world, goes on /// indejtnifnm, which is the same as
if we say that the world of sense has no absolute quantity^
but that the empirical regressus (through which alone it
can be given on the side of its conditions) has its own mle,
' It will have been observed that the ar^ment has here hcen carried on
in a very different way from the dogmaticiil argument, which was prcscntcil
before, in the auhthcsis of the lirst antinomy. There we took the world of
sense, according to the common and dogmatical view, as a thing given by
itself, in its Intalily, before any regressus : and we had denied to it, if it did
not occupy all lime and all space* any place at all in t>oth. Hence the con-
clusion also was different from what it is here, fof it went to the real infmity
of the world.
424 Transcendental Dialectic
namely, to advance from every member of the series, a.^
conditioned, to a more distant member, wb ether by our
own experience, or by the guidance of history, [p. 522]
or through the chain of causes and their effects ; and
never to dispense with the extension of the possible
empirical use of the understanding, this being the proper
and really only task of reason and its principles.
We do not prescribe by this a de6nite empirical regres-
sus advancing without end in a certain class of phe-
nomena ; as, for instance, that from a living person one
ought always to ascend in a series of ancestors, without
ever expecting a first pair; or, in the series of cosmical
bodies, without admitting in the end an extremest sun.
All that is demanded is a progressus from phenomena to
phenomena, even if they should not furnish us with a real
perception (if it is too weak in degree to become experi-
ence in our consciousness), because even thus they belong
to a possible experience.
Every beginning is in time, and every limit of extension
in space. Space and time, however, exist in the world of
sense only. Hence phenomena only are limited in the
world conditionally ; the ivorid itself, however, is limited
neither conditionally nor unconditionally.
For the same reason, and because the world can never
be given amiplete, and even the series of conditions of
something given as conditioned cannot, as a cosmical
series, he given as emnpleie^ the concept of the quantity
of the world can be given through the regressus only,
and not before it in any collective intuition, [p. 523]
That regressus, however, consists otily in the detennin-
ing of the quantity, and does not give, therefore, any
definite concept, nor the concept of any quantity whichp
Transcendental Dialectic
425
with regard to a certain measure, could be called infinite.
It does not therefore proceed to the infinite (as if given),
but only into an indefinite distance, in order to give a
quantity (of experience) which has first to be realised by
that very regressus.
n
Solution of the Cosmologica! Idea of the Totality of the
Division of a Whole given in Intuition
If I divide a whole, given in intuition, I proceetf from
the conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The
division of the parts {subdivisio or decompositio) is a
regressus in the series of those conditions. The absolute
totality of this series could only be given, if the regressus
could reach the simple parts. But if all parts in a continu-
ously progressing decomposition are always divisible again,
then the division, that is, the regressus from the condi-
tioned to its conditions, goes on in infinitum ; because
the conditions (the parts) arc contained in the conditioned
itself, and as that is given as complete in an [p. 524]
intuition enclosed within limits, are all given with it.
The regressus must therefore not be called a regressus
in indefinitum, such as was alone allowed by the former
cosmological idea, where from the conditioned we had to
proceed to conditions outside it, and therefore not given
at the same time through it, but first to be added in the
empirical regressus. It is not allowed, however, even in
the case of a whole that is divisible in infinitum, to say,
that it consists of infinitely many parts. For although all
parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, yet the
whole division is not contained in it^ because it consists
426 Transcendetttal Dialectic
in the continuous decompositionp or in the regressus itself,
which first makes that series real As this regressus is
infinite, all mcmhers (parts) at which it arrives are con-
tained, no doubt, in the given whole as aggregates ; but
not so the whole series of ike division^ which is successively
infinite and never complete, and cannot, therefore, repre-
sent an infinite number, or any comprehension of it as a
whole.
It is easy to apply this remark to space. Every
spacei perceived within its limits, is such a whole the
parts* of which, in spite of all decomposition, are
always spaces again, and therefore divisible in in-
finitum. [p, 525]
From this follows, quite naturally, the second applica-
tion to an external phenomenon, enclosed within its hmits
(body). The divisibility of this is founded on the divisi-
bility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the
body, as an extended whole. This is therefore divisible
in infinitum, without consisting, however, of an infinite
number of parts.
It might seem indeed, as a body must be represented
as a substance in space, that, with regard to the law
of the divisibility of space, it might differ from it,
for we might possibly concede, that in the latter case
decomposition could never do away with all composition,
because in that case all space, which besides has nothing
independent of its own, would cease to be (which is
impossible), while, even if all composition of matter should
be done away with in thought, it wotdd not seem com-
patible with the concept of a substance that nothing
should remain of it, because substance is meant to be the
subject of all composition, and ought to remain in its
Tramcendentai Dialectic
427
elements, although their connection in space, by which
they become a body, should have been removed. But,
what apphes to a thing by itself, represented by a
pure concept of the understanding, does not apply to
what is called substance, as a phenomenon. This is
not an absolute subject, but only a permanent image
of sensibility, nothing in fact but intuition, [p. 526]
in which nothing unconditioned can ever be met with.
But although this rule of the progress in infinitum
applies without any doubt to the subdivision of a phe-
nomenon, as a mere occupant of space, it does not apply
to the number of the parts, separated already in a cer-
tain way in a given whole, which thus constitute a
quantum discretum. To suppose that in every organised
whole every part is again organised, and that by thus
dissecting the parts in infinitum we should meet again
and again with new organised parts, in fact that the
whole is organised in infinitum, is a thought difficult to
think, though it is possible to think that the parts of
matter decomposed in infinitum might become organised.
For the infinity of the division of a given phenomenon
in space is founded simply on this, that by it divisibility
only, that is, an entirely indefinite number of parts, is
given, while the parts themselves can only be given and
determined through the subdivision, in short, that the
whole is not itself already divided. Thus the division
can determine a number in it, which goes so far as we
like to go, in the regressus of a division. In an or-
ganic body, on the contrary, organised in infinitum the
whole is by that very concept represented as [p. 527]
divided, and a number of parts, definite in itself, and yet
infinite, is found in it, before every regressus of division.
428 Transcendental Dialectic
This would be self-contradictory, because we should have
to consider this infinite convolute as a never-to-be-com-
pleted series (infinite), and yet as complete in its (or-
ganised) comprehension. Infinite division takes the phe-
nomenon only as a quantum continuum t and is insepa-
rable from the occupation of space, because in this very
occupation lies the ground of endless divisibility. But as
soon as anything is taken as a quantum discreium, the
number of units in it is determined, and therefore at all
times equal to a certain number How far the organi-
sation in an organised body may go, experience alone can
show us; but though it never arrived with certainty at
any unorganised part, they would still have to be admitted
as lying within possible experience. It is different with
the transcendental division of a phenomenon. How far
that may extend is not a matter of experience, but a
principle of reason, which never allows us to consider
the empirical regressus in the decomposition of extended
bodies, according to the nature of these phenomena, as at
any time absolutely completed.
Cofuhiding Remarks on the Solution of the [p. 528]
Transcendental -mathematical Ideas^ and Preliminary
Remark for the Solution of the Transcendental-djftami-
cai Ideas
When exhibiting in a tabular form the antinomy of
pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, and
indicating the ground of the conflict and the only means
of removing it, by declaring both contradictory statements
as false, we always represented the conditions as belong*
ing to that which they conditioned, according to relations
Transcendental Dialectic
429
of space and time, this being the ordinar)^ supposition
of the common understanding, and in fact the source
from which that conflict arose. In that respect all dialec-
tical representations of the totality in a series of condi-
tions of something given as conditioned were always of
the same character. It was always a series in which the
condition was connected with the conditioned, as mem-
bers of the same series, both being thus homogeneous. In
such a series the regressus was never conceived as com-
pleted, or, if that had to be done, one of the members,
being in itself conditioned, had wrongly to be accepted as
the first, and therefore as unconditioned. If not always
the object, that is, the conditioned, yet the series of its
conditions was always considered according [p, 529]
to quantity only, and then the difficulty arose (which
could not be removed by any compromise, but only by
cutting the knot), that reason made it either too long or
too short for the understanding, which could in neither
case come up to the idea.
But in this we have overlooked an essential distinction
between the objects, that is, the concepts of the under-
standing, which reason tries to raise into ideas. Two of
them, according to the above table of the categories, imply
a mathematical, the remaining two a dynamical synthesis
of phenomena. Hitherto this overlooking w^as of no great
importance, because, in the general representation of all
transcendental ideas, we always remained under plunomc^
nal conditions, and with regard to the two transcenden-
tal-mathematical ideas also, wc had to do with no object
but the phenomenal only. Now, however, as we have come
to consider the dynamical concepts of the understanding,
so far as they should be rendered adequate to the idea ol
I
430 Transcendental Dialectic
reason, that distinction becomes important, and opens to
us an entirely new insight into the character of the suit in
which reason is impHcated. That suit had before been dis-
missed, as resting on both sides on wrong presuppositions.
Now, however, as there seems to be in the dy- [p. 530]
nanrical antinomy such a presupposition as may be com-
patible with the pretensions of reason, and as the judge
himself supplies perhaps the deficiency of legal grounds,
which had been misunderstood on both sides, the suit may
possibly be adjusted, from this point of view, to the satis-
faction of both parties, which was impossible in the con-
flict of the mathematical antinomy.
If we merely look to the extension of the series of con-
ditions, and whether they are adequate to the idea, or
whether the idea is too large or too small for them, the
series are no doubt all homogeneous. But the concept
of the understanding on which these ideas are founded
contains either a synthesis of the homogeneoHs only (which
is presupposed in the composition as well as the decom-
position of every quantity), or of the heterogeneous also,
which must at least be admitted as possible in the dy-
namical synthesis, both in a causal connection, and in the
connection of the necessary with the contingent.
Thus it happens that none but sensuous conditions can
enter into the mathematical connection of the series of
phenomena, that is, conditions which themselves are part
of the series ; while the dynamical series of sensuous con-
ditions admits also of a heterogeneous condition, which is
not a part of the series, but, as merely intelligible, outside
it ; so that a certain satisfaction is given to reason [p, 531]
by the unconditioned being placed before the phenomena,
without disturbing the series of the phenomena, which
Transcendental Dialectic
431
must always be conditioned, or breaking it off, contrary to
the principles of the understanding.
Owing to the dynamical ideas admitting of a condition
of the phenomena outside their series, that is, a condition
which itself is not a phenomenon, something arises which
is totally different from the result of the mathematical
antinomy. The result of that antinomy was, that both
the contradictory dialectical statements had to be declared
false. The throughout conditioned character, however, of
the dynamical series, which is inseparable from them as
phenomena, if connected with the empirically uncon-
ditioned, but at the same time nat sensuous condition,
may give satisfaction to the undersiandiug on one, and
the reason on the other side,^ because the dialectical argu-
ments which, in some way or other, required unconditioned
totality in mere phenomena, vanish; while the [p. 532]
propositions of reason, if thus amended, may both be true.
This cannot be the case with the cosmological ideas, which
refer only to a mathematically unconditioned unity, be-
cause with them no condition can be found in the series
of phenomena which is not itself a phenomenon, and as
such constitutes one of the links of the series,
^ Mathematical, omittcJ in the First and Second Editioni.
* The understanding admits of na condition am^ng pkenomenOy which
thouild itself be empirically unconditiont'd. But if we might conceive an
iMUiiigihlf i0PiJi/i4>Ht that is to &ay» a conditian, not belonging ttself as a link
to the series of phenomena, of something conditioned (as a phenomenon)
without in the least interrupting the series of emptricat conditions, such a con-
dition might be adnittted as impiri€itUy umonditi&ned^ without interfering
with the etaptricil continuoua regrcsaui.
Seiiition of the Cos^naiog^kai Ideas with Regard to the
To ia lit J of the Derivation of Cosmical Events from their
Causes
We can conceive two kinds of causality only with
reference to events, causality either of ftature or oi free-
dom. The former is the connection of one state in the
world of sense with a preceding state, on which it follows
according to a rule. As the causality of phenomena de-
pends on conditions of time, and as the preceding state,
if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect,
which first takes place in time, it follows that the causality
of the cause of that which happens or arises must, accord-
ing to the principle of the understanding, have itself arisen
and require a cause.
By freedom, on the contrary, in its cosmo- [p. S33]
logical meaning, I understand the faculty of beginning
a state spontaneously. Its causality, therefore, does not
depend, according to the law of nature, on another cause^
by which it is determined in time. In this sense freedom
is a purely transcendental idea, which, first, contains noth-
ing derived from cxpeiience^ and, secondly, the object of
which cannot he determined in any experience ; because it
is a general rule, even of the possibility of all experience^
that everything which happens has acause» and that there-
fore the causality also of the cause, which itself has hap-
pened or arisen, must again have a cause. In this manner
the whole field of experience, however far it may extend,
has been changed into one great whole of nature, As,
however, it is impossible in this way to arrive at an ab-
ml
Trafiscendental Dialectic
All
solute totality of the conditions in causal relations, reason
creates for itself the idea of spontaneity, or the power of
beginning by itself, without an antecedent cause determin-
ing it to action* according to the law of causal connec-
tion.
It is extremely remarkable, that the practical concept of
freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom^
which constitutes indeed the real difficulty which at all
times has surrounded the question of the possibility of
freedom* Freedom ^ in its practical sense, is the [p, 534]
independence of our (arbitrary) will from the coercion
through sensuous impulses. Our (arbitrary) wUl is sensu-
ous, so far as it is affected pathologically (by sensuous
impulses) ; it is called animal {arbitrinm brutum), if neces-
sitated pathologically. The human will is certainly sensu-
ous, an arbitrinm sensitivumt but not bmtum, but liberum^
because sensuous impulses do not necessitate its action^
but there is in man a faculty of determination, indepen-
dent of the necessitation through sensuous impulses.
It can easily be seen that, if all causality in the world
of sense belonged to nature, every event would be deter-
mined in time through another, according to necessary
laws. As therefore the phenomena, in determining the
will, w^ould render every act necessary as their natural
effect, the annihilation of transcendental freedom would
at the same time destroy all practical freedom. Practical
freedom presupposes that, although something has not
happened, it ought to have happened, and that its cause
therefore had not that determining force among phenom-
ena, which could prevent the causality of our will from
producing, independently of those natural causes, and
even contrary to their force and influence, something de-
Transcendental Dialectic
termined in the order of time, according to empirical laws,
and from originating entireiy by itself^ series of events.
What happens here is what happens generally [p. 535]
in the conflict of reason venturing beyond the limits of
possible experience, namely, that the problem is not physi-
ological^ but tramccndentaL Hence the question of the
possibility of freedom concerns no doubt psychology ; but
its solution, as it depends on dialectical arguments of pure
reason, belongs entirely to transcendental philosophy. In
order to enable that philosophy to give a satisfactory an-
swer, which it cannot decline to do, I must first try to de-
termine more accurately its proper procedure in this task.
If phenomena were things by themselves, and therefore
space and time forms of the existence of things by them-
selves, the conditions together with the conditioned would
always belong, as members, to one and the same series,
and thus in our case also, the antinomy which is common
to all transcendental ideas would arise, namely, that that
series is inevitably too large or too small for the under-
standing. The dynamical concepts of reason^ however,
which we have to discuss in this and the following section,
have this peculiarity that, as they are not concerned with
an object, considered as a quantity, but only with its ex-
istence^ we need take no account of the quantity of the
series of conditions. All depends here only on [p. 536]
the dynamical relation of conditions to the conditioned,
so that in the question on nature and freedom we at once
meet with the difficulty, whether freedom is indeed possi-
ble, and whether, if it is possible, it can exist together with
the universality of the natural law of causality. The ques-
tion in fact arises, whether it is a proper disjunctive prop-
osition to say, that every efifect in the world must arise,
Transcendental Dialectic
435
either irom nature, or from freedom, or whether botk can-
not coexist in the same event in different relations. The ,
correctness of the principle of the unbroken connection
of all events in the world of sense, according to unchange- '
able natural laws, is firmly established by the transcen-
dental Analytic, and admits of no limitation. The question,
therefore, can only be whether, in spite of it, freedom also
can be found in the same effect which is determined by
nature; or whether freedom is entirely excluded by that
inviolable rule ? Here the common but fallacious suppo-
sition of the absolute reality of phenomena shows at once
its pernicious influence in embarrassing reason. For if
phenomeni are things by themselves, freedom cannot be
saved Nature in that case is the complete and sufficient
cause determining every event, and its condition is always '
contained in that series of phenomena only which, together
with their effect, are necessary under the law of nature.
If, on the contrary, phenomena are taken for [p. 537]
nothing except what they are in reality, namely, not things
by themselves, but representations only, which are con-
nected with each other according to empirical laws, they
must themselves have causes, which are not phenomenal
Such an intelligible cause, however, is not determined
with reference to its causality by phenomena, althou^Lrh its
effects become phenomenal, and can thus be determined
by other phenomena. That intelligible cause, therefore,
with its causality, is outside the series, though its effects
are to be found in the series of empirical conditions. The
effect therefore can, with reference to its intelligible cause,
be considered as free, and yet at the same time, with ref-
erence to phenomena, as resulting from them according to
"the necessity of nature; a distinction which, if thus repre-
436 Transcendental Dialectic
sented, In a general and entirely abstract form, may seem
extremely subtle and obscure, but will become clear in its
practical application. Here I only wished to remark that,
as the unbroken connection of all phenomena in the con-
text (woof) of nature, is an unalterable law, it would
necessarily destroy all freedom, if we were to defend obsti- I
nately the reality of phenomena. Those, therefore, who
follow the common opinion on this subject, have never
been able to reconcile nature and freedom.
\
Possibility af a Causality th rough Freedom, in [p. 538]
Hannony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity
Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself phe-
nomenal, I call intelligible. If, therefore, what in the
world of sense must be considered as phenomenal, pos-
sesses in itself a faculty which is not the object of sensuous
intuition, but through which it can become the cause of
phenomena, the causality of that being may be considered
from tufo sides, as intelligible m its action, as the causality
of a thing by itself, and as sensible in the effects of the
action, as the causality of a phenomenon in the world of
sense. Of the faculty of such a being we should have to
form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of its
causality, both of which consist together in one and the
same effect. This twofold way of conceiving the faculty
of an object of the senses does not contradict any of the
concepts which we have to form of phenomena and of a
possible experience. For as all phenomena, not being
things by themselves, must have for their foundation a
transcendental object, determining them as mere repre-
sentations, there is nothing to prevent us from attribut-'
Transcendental Dialectic
437
-ng to that transcendental object, besides the [p. 539]
quality through which it becomes phenomenal, a causality
also which is not phenomenal, although its effect appears
in the phenomenon. Every efficient cause, however, must
have a character, that is, a rule according to which it
manifests its causality, and without which it would not
be a cause. According to this we should have in every
subject of the world of sense, first, an empirical character,
through which its acts, as phenomena, stand with other
phenomena in an unbroken connection, according to per-
manent laws of nature, and could be derived from them
as their conditions, and in connection with them form the
links of one and the same series in the order of nature.
Secondly, we should have to allow to it an intelligible
character also, by which, it is true, it becomes the cause
of the same acts as phenomena, but which itself is not
subject to any conditions of sensibility, and never phe-
nomenaK We might call the former the character of such
a thing as a phenomenon, in the latter the character of
the thing by itself.
According to its intelligible character, this active sub-
ject would not depend on conditions of time, for time is
only the condition of phenomena, and not of things by
themselves. In \t wo act would arise or perish, [p. 540]
neither would it be subject therefore to the law of determi-
nation in time and of all that is changeable, namely, that
everything zvhich happens must have its cause in the phe-
nomena (of the previous state). In one word its causality,
so far as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the
series of empirical conditions by which the event is ren-
dered necessary in the world of sense. It is true that
that intelligible character could never be known imme-
Transcendental Dialectic
diately, because we cannot perceive anything, except so
far as it appears, but it would nevertheless have to be
conceived, according to the empirical character, as we
must always admit in thought a transcendental object » as
the foundation of phenomena, though we know nothing
of what it is by itself.
In its empirical character, therefore, that subject, as a
phenomenon, would submit, according to all determining
laws, to a causal nexus, and in that respect it would be
nothing but a part of the world of sense, the effects of
which, like every other phenomenon, would arise from
nature without fail As soon as external phenomena be-
gan to influence it, and as soon as its empirical character,
that is the law of its causality, had been known through
experience, all its actions ought to admit of explanation,
according to the laws of nature, and all that is requisite for
its complete and necessary determination would be found
in a possible experience.
In its intelligible character, however (though [p. 541]
we could only have a general concept of it), the same
subject would have to be considered free from all influ-
ence of sensibility, and from all determination through
phenomena : and as in it, so far as it is a nou^nenon,
nothing happens, and no change which requires dynamical
determination of time, and therefore no connection with
phenomena as causes, can exist, that active being would
so far be quite independent and free in its acts from all
natural necessity, which can exist in the world of sense
only. One might say of it with perfect truth that it origi-
nates its effects in the world of sense by itself ^ though the
act does not begin /;/ i is elf. And this woidd be perfectly
true, though the effects in the world of sense need not
Transcendental Dialectic
439
therefore originate by themselves, because in it they are
always determined previously through empirical conditions
in the previous time, though only by means of the empiri-
cal character (which is the phenomenal appearance of the
intelligible character), and therefore impossible, except as
a continuation of the series of natural causes. In this way
freedom and nature, each in its complete signifi cation »
might exist together and without any conflict in the same
action, according as we refer it to its intelligible or to its
sensible cause.
Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom [p. 542]
in Connection with the General Necessity of Nature
I thought it best to give first this sketch of the solution
of our transcendental problem, so that the course which
reason has to adopt in its solution might be more clearly
surveyed. We shall now proceed to explain more fully
the points on which the decision properly rests, and exam-
ine each by itself.
The law of nature, that everything which happens has a
cause, — that the causality of that cause, that is, its activity
(as it is anterior in time, and, with regard to an effect
which has arisen, cannot itself have always existed, but
must have happened at some time), must have its cause
among the phenomena by which it is determined, and that
therefore all events in the order of nature are empirically
determined, this law, I say, through which alone phenom-
ena become nature and objects of experience, is a law of
the understanding, which can on no account be surrendered,
and from which no single phenomenon can be exempted ;
because in doing this we should place it outside all possible
experience, separate from all objects of possible [p. 545]
.■/
440 Transcendinial Dialectic
experience, and change it into a mere fiction of the mind
or a cobweb of the brain.
But although this looks merely like a chain of causes,
which in the regressus to its conditions admits of no absolute
totality, this difficulty does not detain us in the least, be-
cause it has already been removed in the general criticism
of the antinomy of reason when, starting from the series
of phenomena, it aims at the unconditioned. Were we to
yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, we should
have neither nature nor freedom. The question therefore
is, whether, if we recognise in the whole series of events
nothing hut natural necessity, we may yet regard the same
event which on one side is an effect of nature only, on the
other side, as an effect of freedom ; or whether there is a
direct contradiction between these two kinds of causality ?
There can certainly be nothing among phenomenal
causes that could originate a series absolutely and by
itself. Every action, as a phenomenon, so far as it pro-
duces an event, is itself an event, presupposing another
state, in which its cause can be discovered ; and thus
everything that happens is only a continuation of the
series, and no beginning, happening by itself, is possible
in it. Actions of natural causes in the succession of time
are therefore themselves effects, which likewise [p. 544]
presuppose causes in the series of time. A spontaneous
and original action by which something takes place, v%'hich
did not exist before, cannot be expected from the causal
nexus of phenomena.
But is it really necessary that, if effects are phenomena,
the causality of their cause, which cause itself is phenom-
enal, could be nothing but empirical ; or is it not possible,
although for every phenomenal effect a connection with its
TrafiScendi'Htal Dialectic
441
cause, according to the laws of empirical causality, is cer-
tainly required, that empirical causality itself could never-
theless, without breaking in the least its connection with
the natural causes, represent an effect of a non-empirical
and intelligible causality, that is, of a caused action, orig*
inal in respect to phenomena, and in so far not phenom-
enal ; but, with respect to this faculty, intelligible, although,
as a link in the chain of nature, to be regarded as entirely
belonging to the world of sense ?
We require the principle of the causality of phenomena
among themselves, in order to be able to look for and to
produce natural conditions, that is, phenomenal causes of
natural events. If this is admitted and not weakened by
any exceptions, the understanding, which in its empirical
employment recognises in all events nothing but nature,
and is quite justified in doing so, has really all [p. 545]
that it can demand, and the explanations of physical phe-
nomena may proceed without let or hindrance. The under-
standing would not be wronged in the least, if we assumed,
though it be a mere fiction, that some among the natural
causes have a faculty which is intelligible only, and whose
determination to activity does not rest on empirical condi-
tions» but on mere grounds of the intellect, if only the///r-
nomcnal activity of that cause is in accordance with all the
laws of empirical causality. For in this way the active
subject, as cama phacnomenon^ would be joined with nature
through the intlissoluble dependence of all its actions, and
the noumenon * only of that subject (with all its phenomenal
causality) would contain certain conditions which, if we
want to ascend from the empirical to the transcendental
^ It teemi better to read n^umtn^n initcid of pkenamen^n.
442 Transcendental Dialectic
object, would have to be considered as intelligible only
For, if only we follow the rule of nature in that which
may be the cause among phenomena, it is indifferent to us
what kind of ground of those phenomena, and of their con-
nection, may be conceived to exist in the transcendental
subject, which is empirically unknown to us. This intel-
ligible ground does not touch the empirical questions, but
concerns only, as it would seem, the thought in the pure
understanding ; and although the effects of that thought
and action of the pure understanding may be dis- [p. 546]
covered in the phenomena, these have nevertheless to be
completely explained from their phenomenal cause, accord-
ing to the laws of nature, by taking their empirical char-
acter as the highest ground of explanation, and passing
by the intelligible character, which is the transcendental
cause of the other, as entirely unknown, except so far as
It is indicated by the empirical, as its sensuous sign. Let
us apply this to experience. Man is one among the phe-
nomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the
natural causes the causality of which must he subject to
empirical laws. As such he must therefore have an em-
pirical character, like all other objects of nature. We
perceive it through the forces and faculties which he
shows in his actions and effects. In the lifeless or merely
animal nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty,
except as sensuously conditioned. Man, however, who
knows all the rest of nature through his senses only,
knows himself through mere apperception also, and this
in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot
ascribe to the impressions of the senses. Man is thus to
himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely
with reference to certain faculties, a purely intelligible
Transcendental Dialectic
443
object, because the actions of these faculties cannot be
ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We [p, 547]
call these faculties understanding and reason. It is the
latter, in particular, which is entirely distinguished from
all empirically conditioned forces or faculties, because it
weighs its objects according to ideas, and determines the
understanding accordingly, which then makes an empirical
use of its (by themselves, however pure) concepts.
That our reason possesses causality, or that we at least
represent to ourselves such a causality in it, is clear from
the imperatives which, in all practical matters, we impose
as rules on our executive powers. The ought expresses
a kind of necessity and connection with causes, which
we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. The
understanding can know in nature only what is present,
past, or future. It is impossible that anything in it ought
to be different from what it is in reality, in all these rela-
tions of time. Nay, if we only look at the course of
nature, the ought has no meaning whatever. We cannot
ask, what ought to be in nature, as little as we can ask,
what qualities a circle ought to possess. We can only
ask what happens in it, and what qualities that which
happens has.
This ought expresses a possible action, the ground of
which cannot be anything but a mere concept ; while in
every merely natural action the ground must [p. 548]
always be a phenomenon. Now it is quite true that the
action to which the ought applies must be possible under
natural conditions, but these natural conditions do not
affect the determination of the will itself, but only its
effects and results among phenomena. There may be
ever so many natural grounds which impel me to wilt and
444 Transcendental Dialectic
ever so many sensuous temptations, but they can never
produce the ought, but only a willing which is always con-
ditioned, but by no means necessary, and to which the
ought, pronounced by reason, opposes measure, ay, pro*
hibition and authority. Whether it be an object of the
senses merely (pleasure), or of pure reason (the good),
reason does not yield to the impulse that is given em-
pirically, and does not follow the order of things, as they
present themselves as phenomena, but frames for itself,
with perfect spontaneity, a new order according to ideas
to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according
to which it declares actions to be necessary, even though
they have not taken place, and, maybe, never will take
place. Yet it is presupposed that reason may have causality
with respect to them, for otherwise no efifects in experience
could be expected to result from these ideas.
Now let us take our stand here and admit it at least as
possible, that reason really possesses causality [p. 549]
with reference to phenomena. In that case, reason though
it be, it must show nevertheless an empirical character,
because every cause presupposes a rule according to which
certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires
in the effects a homogeneousness, on which the concept of
cause (as a faculty) is founded. This, so far as it is derived
from mere phenomena, may be called the empirical char-
acter, which is permnuentt while the effects, according to
a diversity of concomitant, and in part, restraining con-
ditions, appear in changeable forms.
Every man therefore has an empirical character of his
(arbitrary) will, which is nothing but a certain causality of
his reason, exhibiting in its phenomenal actions and effects
a rule, according to which one may infer the motives of
Transcendental Dialectic
44S
reason and its actions, both in kind and in degree, and
judge of the subjective principles of his will. As that
empirical character itself must be derived from phenomena,
as an efifect, and from their rule which is supplied by
experience, all the acts of a man, so far as they are phe-
nomena, are determined from his empirical character and
from the other concomitant causes, according to the order
of nature; and if we could investigate all the manifesta-
tions of his will to the very bottom, there would be not a
single human action which we could not predict [p, 550]
with certainty and recognise from its preceding conditions
as necessary. There is no freedom therefore with refer-
ence to this empirical character, and yet it is only with
reference to it that we can consider man, when we are
merely observing^ and, as is the case in anthropology, try-
ing to investigate the motive causes of his actions physio-
logically.
If, however, we consider the same actions with refer-
ence to reason, not with reference to speculative reason,
in order to explain their origin » but solely so far as reason
is the cause which produces them ; in one word, if we com-
pare actions with reason, with reference to practical pur-
poses, we find a rule and order, totally different from the
order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything,
it may be, ought not to have happened, which according to
the course of nature has happened, and according to its
empirical grounds, was inevitable. And sometimes we
find, or believe at least that we find, that the ideas of
reason have really proved their causality with reference
to human actions as phenomena, and that these actions
have taken place, not because they were determined by
empirical causes, but by the causes of reason.
r
446 Transcendental Dialectic
Now supposing one could say that reason [p* 55 r]
possesses causality in reference to phenomena^ could the
action of reason be called free in that case, as it is accu*
rately determined by the empirical character {the disposi-
tion) and rendered necessary by it ? That character again
is determined in the intelligible character (way of think-
ing). The latter, however, we do not know, but signify
only through phenomena, which in reality give us imme*
diately a knowledge of the disposition (empirical charac-
ter) Qxily} An action, so far as it is to be attributed to the
way of thinking as its cause, does nevertheless not result
from it according to empirical laws, that is, it is not
preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only by
its effects in the phenomenal form of the internal sense.
Pure reason, as a simple intelligible faculty, is not sub-
ject to the form of time, or to the conditions of the suc-
cession of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible
character does not arise or begin at a certain time in order
to produce an effect; for in that case it would be subject
to the natural law of phenomena, which deter- [p. 552]
mines all causal series in time, and its causality would
then be nature and not freedom. What, therefore, we can
say is, that if reason can possess causality with reference
to phenomena, it is a faculty through which the sensuous
condition of an empirical series of effects first begins.
For the condition that lies in reason is not sensuous, and
1 The true tnorality of actioRS (merit or guilt), even that of our owti cot>-
duct» remains iherefore entirely hidden. Our imputations can refer to the
empirical character only. How much of that may be the pure effect of free-
dom, how much should be ascribed to nature only, and to the faults of tem-
perament, for which man is not responsible, or its happy constitution (meriH
foriunae)^ no one can discover, and no one can judge with perfect justice*
Transcendental Dialectic
447
therefore does itself not begin- Thus we get what we
missed in all empirical series, namely.^ that the condition of
a successive series of events should itself be empirically
unconditioned. For here the condition is really outside
the series of phenomena (in the intelligible), and there-
fore not subject to any sensuous condition, nor to any
temporal determination through preceding causes.
Nevertheless the same cause belongs also, in another
respect, to the series of phenomena. Man himself is a
phenomenon. His will has an empirical character, which
is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is no
condition, determining man according to this character,
that is not contained in the series of natural effects and
subject to their law, according to which there can be
no empirically unconditioned causality of anything that
happens in time. No given action therefore (as it can
be perceived as a phenomenon only) can begin absolutely
by itself. Of pure reason, however, we cannot [p. 553]
say that the state in which it determines the will is pre-
ceded by another in which that state itself is determined.
For as reason itself is not a phenomenon, and not subject
to any of the conditions of sensibility, there exists in it,
even in reference to its causality, no succession of time,
and the dynamical law of nature, which determines the
succession of time according to rules, cannot be applied
to it.
Reason is therefore the constant condition of all free
actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal
world. Every one of them is determined beforehand in
his empirical character, before it becomes actual With
regard to the intelligible character, however, of which the
empirical is only the sensuous schema, there is neither
448
Transcendental Dialectic
before nor after ; and every action, without regard to the
temporal relation which connects it with other phe-
nomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible char-
acter of pure reason. That reason therefore acts freely,
without being determined dynamically, in the chain of
natural causes, by external or internal conditions, anterior
in time. That freedom must then not only be regarded
negatively^ as independence of empirical conditions (for
in that case the faculty of reason would cease to be a
cause of phenomena), but should be determined positively
also, as the faculty of beginning spontaneously a scries of
events. Hence nothing begins in reason itself, [p, 554]
and being itself the unconditioned condition of every free
action, reason admits of no condition antecedent in time
above itself, while nevertheless its effect takes its begin-
ning in the series of phenomena, though it can never
constitute in that series an absolutely first beginning.
In order to illustrate the regulative principle of reason
by an example of its empirical application, not in order to
confirm it (for sych arguments are useless for transcen-
dental propositions), let us take a voluntary action, for
example, a malicious lie, by which a man has produced
a certain confusion in society, and of which we first try
to find out the motives, and afterwards try to determine
how far it and its consequences may be imputed to the
offender. With regard to the first point, one has first
to follow up his empirical character to its very sources,
which are to be found in wrong education, bad society,
in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition, and
a nature insensible to shame, or ascribed to frivolity and
heedlessness, not omitting the occasioning causes at the
time. In all this the procedure is exactly the same as
Traftscendental Dialectic
449
in the investigation of a series of determining causes of
a given natural effect. But although one believes that
the act was thus determined, one neverthe- [p. SSS]
less blames the oflfender» and uot on account of his un-
happy natural disposition^ not on account of influencing
circumstances, not even on account of his former course
of life, because one supposes one might leave entirely out
of account what that course of life may have been, and
consider the past series of conditions as having never
existed, and the act itself as totally unconditioned by
previous states, as if the offender had begun with it a
new series of effects, quite by himself. This blame is
founded on a law of reason, reason being considered as
a cause which, independent of all the before-mentioned
empirical conditions, would and should have determined
the behaviour of the man otherwise. Nay, we do not
regard the causality of reason as a concurrent agency
only, but as complete in itself, even though the sensuous
motives did not favour, but even oppose it. The action
is imputed to a man's intelligible character. At the
moment when he tells the lie, the guilt is entirely his ;
that is, we regard reason, in spite of all empirical condi-
tions of the act, as completely free, and the act has to
be imputed entirely to a fault of reason.
Such an imputation clearly shows that we imagine that
reason is not affected at all by the influences of the senses,
and that it does not change (although its manifestations,
that is the mode in which it shows itself by its [p. 556]
effects, do change) : that in it no stale precedes as deter-
mining a following state, in fact, that reason does not
belong to the series of sensuous conditions which render
phenomena necessary, according to laws of nature. Rea-
10
4SO Transcendentai Dialectic
son. it is supposed, is present in all the actions of man,
in all circumstances of time, and always the same ; but it
is itself never in time, never in a new state in which it
was not hefore ; it is determining^ never determined. We
cannot ask, therefore, why reason has not determined
itself differently^ but only why it has not differently deter-
mined the phenomena by its causality. And here no answer
is really possible. For a different intelligible character
would have given a different empirical character, and if we
say that, in spite of the whole of his previous course of
life, the offender could have avoided the lie, this only
means that it was in the power of reason, and that reason,
in its causality, is subject to no phenomenal and temporal
conditions, and lastly, that the difference of time, though
it makes a great difference in phenomena and their rela-
tion to each other, can, as these are neither things nor
causes by themselves, produce no difference of action in
reference to reason.
We thus see that, in judging of voluntary [p, 557]
actions, we can, so far as their causality is concerned, get
only so far as the intelligible cause, but not beyond. We
can see that that cause is free, that it determines as inde-
pendent of sensibility, and therefore is capable of being
the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena.
To explain why that intelligible character should, under
present circumstances, give these phenomena and this
empirical character, and no other, transcends all the powers
of our reason, nay, all its rights of questioning, as if we
were to ask why the transcendental object of our external
sensuous intuition gives us intuition in space only and no
other. But the problem which we have to solve does not
require us to ask or to answer such questions. Our
Transcendentai Dialect k
45 [
probleni was, whether freedom is contradictory to natural
necessity in one and the same action : and this we have
sufficiently answered by showing that freedom may have
relation to a very different kind of conditions from those
of nature, so that the law of the latter docs not affect the
former, and both may exist independent of, and undisturbed
by, each other.
It should be clearly understood that, in what we have
said, we had no intention of establishing the nality of
freedom, as one of the faculties which contain [p. 558]
the cause of the phenomenal appearances in our world of
sense. For not only would this have been no transcen-
dental consideration at all, which is concerned with con*
cepts only, but it could never have succeeded, because
from experience we can never infer anything but what
must be represented in thought according to the laws of
experience. It was not even our intention to prove \\i^ pos-
sibility of freedom, for in this also we should not have sue*
ceeded, because from mere concepts a priori we can never
know the possibility of any real ground or any causality.
We have here treated freedom as a transcendental idea
only, which makes reason imagine that it can absolutely
begin the series of phenomenal conditions through what is
sensuously unconditioned, but by which reason becomes
involved in an antinomy with its own laws, which it had
prescribed to the empirical use of the understanding.
That this antinomy rests on a mere illusion, and that
nature does not contradict the causality of freedom, that
was the only thing which we could prove, and cared to
prove.
Tra nscenden tai Dialectic
IV Ip. 5S9]
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De-
pendence of Phefwmcna^ with Regard to their Existence
in General
In the preceding article we considered the changes in
the world of sense in their dynamical succession, every
one being subordinate to another as its cause. Now,
however, the succession of states is to serve only as our
guide in order to arrive at an existence that might be the
highest condition of all that is subject to change, namely,
the necessary Being, We are concerned here, not with the
unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned exist-
ence of the substance itself. Therefore the succession
which we have before us is properly one of concepts and
not of intuitions, so far as the one is the condition of the
othen
It is easy to see, however, that as everything compre-
hended under phenomena is changeable, and therefore
conditioned in its existence, there cannot he, in the whole
series of dependent existence, any unconditioned link the
existence of which might be considered as absolutely
necessary, and that therefore, if phenomena were things
by themselves, and their condition accordingly belonged
with the conditioned always to one and the same series of
intuitions, a necessary being, as the condition of [p. 560]
the existence of the phenomena of the world of sense,
could never exist.
The dynamical regressus has this peculiar distinction as
compared with the mathematical, that, as the latter is only
concerned with the composition of parts in forming a whole
or the division of a whole into its partSj the conditions of
Tramcendental Dialectic
455
that series must always be considered as parts of it, and
therefore as homogeneous and as phenomena, while in the
dynamical regressus, where we are concerned, not w^ith the
possibility of an unconditioned whole, consisting of a num-
ber of given parts, or of an unconditioned part belonging
to a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its
cause, or of the contingent existence of the substance itself
from the necessary substance, it is not required that the
condition should form one and the same empirical series
with the conditioned.
There remains therefore to us another escape from this
apparent antinomy : because both conflicting propositions
might, under different aspects, be true at the same time.
That is, all things of the world of sense might be entirely
contingent, and have therefore an empirically conditioned
existence only, though there might nevertheless be a non-
empirical condition of the whole series, that is, an uncon-
ditionally necessary being. For this, as an intelligible
condition, would not belong to the series, as a link of it
(not even as the highest link), nor would it render any
link of that series empirically unconditioned, [p. 561]
but would leave the whole world of sense, in all its mem-
bers, in its empirically conditioned existence. This man-
ner of admitting an unconditioned existence as tlie ground
of phenomena would differ from the empirically uncondi-
tioned causality (freedom), treated of in the preceding
article, because, with respect to freedom, the thing itself,
as cause {substantia phaefiomcnon)^ belonged to the series
of conditions, and its causality only was represented as
intelligible, while here, on the contrary, the necessary be*
ing has to be conceived as lying outside the series of the
world of sense (as ens extramundanum)^ and as purely
454 Traftsccndenta! Dialectic
intelligible, by which alone it could be guarded against
itself becoming subject to the law of contingency and
dependence applying to all phenomena.
The regulative principle of reason, with regard to our
present problem, is therefore this, that everything in the
world of sense has an empirically conditioned existence,
and that in it there is never any unconditioned necessity
with reference to any quality ; that there is no member
in the series of conditions of which one ought not to
expect, and as far as possible to seek, the empirical con-
dition in some possible experience ; and that we are
never justified in deriving any existence from a condition
outside the empirical series, or in considering it as inde-
pendent and self-subsistent in the series itself; without
however denying in the least that the whole [p. 562]
series may depend on some intelligible being, which is
free therefore from all empirical conditions, and itself
contains rather the ground of the possibility of all those
phenomena.
By this we by no means intend to prove the uncondi-
tionally necessary existence of such a being; or even to
demonstrate the possibility of a purely intelligible condi-
tion of the existence of the phenomena of the world of
sense. But as on the one side we limit reason, lest it
should lose the thread of the empirical condition and lose
itself in transcendent explanations incapable of being repre-
sented /;/ concreto^ thus, on the other side, we want to
limit the law of the purely empirical use of the under-
standing, lest it should venture to decide on the possibil-
ity of things in general, and declare the intelligible to be
impossible, because it has been shown to be useless for
the explanation of phenomena. What is shown by this
TriinsceHd€ntai Dialectic
4SS
is simply this, that the complete contingency of all things
in nature and of all their (empirical) conditions, may well
coexist with the arbitrary presupposition of a necessary,
though purely intelligible condition^ and that, as there is
no real contradiction between these two views, they may
well both be true. Granted even that such an absolutely
necessary being, as postulated by the under- [p. 563]
standing, is impossible in itself, we still maintain that this
cannot be concluded from the general contingency and
dependence of all that belongs to the world of sense, nor
from the principle that we ought not to stop at any single
member so far as it is contingent, and appeal to a cause
outside the world. Reason follows its own course in its
empirical, and again a peculiar course in its transcen-
dental use.
The world of sense contains nothing but phenomena,
and these are mere representations which are always sen-
suously conditioned. As our objects are never things by
themselves, we need not be surprised that we are never
justified in making a jump from any member of the sev-
eral empirical series, beyond the connection of sensibility,
as if they were things by themselves, existing apart from
their transcendental ground, and which we might leave
behind in order to seek for the cause of their existence
outside them. This, no doubt, would have to be done in
the end with (Contingent things, but not with mere repn-
sentations of things, the contingency of which is itself a
phenomenon, and cannot lead to any other regressus but
that which determines the phenomena, that is, which is
empirical. To conceive, however, an intelligible ground
of phenomena, that is, of the world of sense, and to con-
ceive it as freed from the contingency of the latter, does
45^ Transcendental Dialectic
not run counter either to the unlimited empirical regressus
in the series of phenomena, nor to their general contin-
gency. And this is really the only thing which [p. 564]
we had to do in order to remove this apparent antinomy,
and which could be done in this wise only. For if every
condition of everything conditioned (according to its exist-
ence) is sensuous, and therefore belongs to the scries, that
series is again conditioned (as shown in the antithesis of
the fourth antinomy). Either therefore there would re-
main a conflict with reason, which postulates the uncondi-
tioned, or this would have to be placed outside the series,
i.e. in the intelligible, the necessity of which neither re-
quires nor admits of any empirical condition, and is there-
fore, as regards phenomena, unconditionally necessary.
The empirical use of reason (with regard to the condi-
tions of existence in the worltl of sense) is not affected by
the admission of a purely intelligible being, but ascends,
according to the principle of a general contingency, from
empirical conditions to higher ones, which again are
empirical This regulative principle, however, does not
exclude the admission of an intelligible cause not compre-
hended in the series, when we come to the pure use of
reason (with reference to ends or aims). For in this
case, an intelligible cause only means the transcendental,
and, to us, unknown ground of the possibility of the sen-
suous series in general, and the existence of this, inde-
pendent of all conditions of the sensuous series, and, in
rrfercnce to it, unconditionally, necessary, is by [p. 565]
no means opposed to the unlimited contingency of the
former, nor to the never-ending rcgressus in the series of
empirical conditions.
Transcendental Dialectic
457
Conduding Remark on the Whole Antinomy of Pure
Reason
So long as it is only the totality of the conditions in the
world of sense and the interest it can have to reason, that
form the object of the concepts of our reason, our ideas
are no doubt transcendental, but yet cosmologicaL If,
however, we place the unconditioned {with which we are
chiefly concerned) in that which is entirely outside the
world of sense, therefore beyond all possible experience,
our ideas become transcendent: for they serve not only for
the completion of the empirical use of the understanding
(which always remains an idea that must be obeyed, though
it can never be fully carried out), but they separate them-
selves entirely from it, ami create to themselves objects
the material of which is not taken from experience, and
the objective reality of which does not rest on the comple-
tion of the empirical series, but on pure concepts a priori.
Such transcendent ideas have a merely intelligible object,
which may indeed be admitted as a transcendental object,
of which, for the rest, we know nothing, but for which, if
we wish to conceive it as a thing dulermined by its inter-
nal distinguishing predicates, we have neither [p. 566]
grounds of possibility (as independent of all concepts of
experience) nor the slightest justification on our side in
admitting it as an object, and which, therefore, is a mere
creation of our thoughts. Nevertheless that cosmological
idea, which owes its origin to the fourth antinomy, urges
us on to take that step. For ihe conditioned existence of
all phenomena, not being founded in itself, requires us to
look out for something different from all phenomena, that
is, for an intelligible object in which there should be no
458
Transcendental Dialectu
more contingency. As, however, if we have once allowed
ourselves to admit, outside the field of the whole of sensibil
ity» a reality existing by itself, phenomena can only be con-
sidered as contingent modes of representing intelligible
objects on the part of beings which themselves are intel-
ligences,^ nothing remains to us, in order to form some
kind of concept of intelligible things, of which in them-
selves we have not the slightest knowledge, but analogy,
applied to the concepts of experience. As we know the
contingent by experience only, but have here to deal with
things which are not meant to be objects of experience,
we shall have to derive our knowledge of them from what
is necessary in itself, that is, from pure concepts of things
in general. Thus the first step which we take [p. 567]
outside the world of sense, obliges us to begin our new
knowledge with the investigation of the absolutely neces-
sary Being, and to derive from its concepts the concepts
of all things, so far as they are intelligible only ; and this
we shall attempt to do in the next chapter.
1 AAer anzusehen, sind may b« added for the sake of cleaine&Sj but it is
often omitted in Kant's at^le.
THE SECOND BOOK OF TRANSCEN-
DENTAL DIALECTIC
CHAPTER III
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section I
Of the Ideal in General
We have seen that without the conditions of seBsibtlity«
it is impossible to represent objects by means of the pure
concepts of the understandings because the conditions of
their objective reality are absent, and they contain the
mere form of thought only. If, however, we apply these
concepts to phenomena, they can be represented in eatt-
crcto, because in the phenomena they have the material
for forming concepts of experience, which are nothing but
concepts of the understanding in eanereto. Ideas, however,
are still further removed from objective reality than the
categories, because they can meet with no phenomenon in
which they could be represented in concrcto. They con*
tain a certain completeness unattainable by any [p, 568I
possible empirical knowledge, and reason aims in them at a
systematical unity onlyi to which the empirically possible
unity is to approximate, without ever hilly reaching it.
Still further removed from objective reality than the
Idea, would seem to be what I call the Ideal, by which I
mean the idea, not only in concreto, but in indiyidua, that
459
_fe Transcendental Dialectic
is, an individual thing determinable or even determined by
the idea alone.
Humanity (as an idea), in its complete perfection^ im-
plies not only all essential qualities belonging to human
nature, which constitute our concept of it, enlarged to a
degree of complete agreement with the highest aims that
woitld represent our idea of perfect humanity, but every-
thing also which, beside this concept, is required for the
complete determination of the idea. For of all contra-
dictory predicates one only can agree with the idea of the
most perfect man. What to us is an ideal, was in Plato's
language an Idea of a divine mind^ an individual object
present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every
kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenom-
enal copies.
Without soaring so high, we have to admit [p. 569J
that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also,
which though they have not, like those of Plato, creative,
yet have certainly practieai power (as regulative prin-
ciples), and form the basis of the possible perfection of
certain acts. Moral concepts are not entirely pure con-
cepts of reason, because they rest on something empirical,
pleasure or pain. Nevertheless, with regard to the prin-
ciple by which reason imposes limits on freedom, which in
itself is without laws, these moral concepts (with regard to
their form at least) may well serve as examples of pure
concepts of reason. Virtue and human wisdom in its per-
fect purity arc ideas, while the wise man (of the Stoics) is
an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in
complete agreement with the idea of wisdom. While the
idea gives rnhs, the ideal serves as the archetype for the
permanent determination of the copy; and we have no
Transcenden ta i Dialed ic
461
other nile of our actions but the conduct of that divine
man within i\% with which we compare ourselves, and by
which we judge and better ourselves, though we can never
reach it. These ideals, though they cannot claim objective
reality (existence), are not therefore to be considered as
mere chimeras^ but supply reason with an indispensable
standard, because it requires the concept of that which is
perfect of its kind, in order to estimate and [p, 570]
measure by it the degree and the number of the defects in
the imperfect To attempt to realise the ideal in an
example, that is, as a real phenomenon, as we might
represent a perfectly wise man in a novel, is impossible,
nay, absurd, and but little encouraging, because the
natural limits, which are constantly interfering with the
perfection in the idea, make all illusion in such an experi-
ment impossible, and thus render the good itself in the idea
suspicious and unreal.
This is the case with the ideal of reason, which must
always rest on definite concepts, and serve as rule and
model, whether for imitation or for criticism. The case
is totally different with those creations of our imagina-
tion of which it is impossible to give an intelligible
concept, or say anything, — ^ which are in fact a kind of
monogram, consisting of single lines without any apparent
rule, a vague outline rather of different experiences than
a definite image, such as painters and physiognomists
pretend to carry in their heads, and of which they speak
as a kind of vague shadow only of their creations and
criticisms that can never be communicabed to others.
They may be termed, though improperly, ideals of sen-
sibility, because they are meant to be the never-attain-
able model of possible empirical intuitions, and yet fur-
462 Transcendentai Dialectic
nish no rule capable of being explained or ex- [p. 571]
amined.
In its ideal, on the contrary, reason aims at a perfect
determination, according to rales a priori ^ and it conceives "^
an object throughout determinable according to principles,
though without the sufficient conditions of experience, so
that the concept itself is transcendent.
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section II
Of the Transcendental Ideal {Prototypon Transcendentale)
Every concept is, with regard to that which is not
contained in it, undetermined and subject to the prin-
ciple of detcrfninabiiity, according to which of every two
contradictorily opposite predicates, one only can belong
to it. This rests on the principle of contradiction, and
is therefore a purely logical principle, taking no account
of any of the contents of our knowledge, and looking
only to its logical form.
Besides this everything is subject, in its possibility,
to the principle of complete determination, according to
which one of all the possible predicates of things, as com-
pared with their opposites, must be applicable [p. 572]
to it. This does not rest only on the principle of contra-
diction, for it regards everything, not only in relation to
two contradictory predicates, but in relation to the whole
possibility^ that is, to the whole of all predicates of things,
and, presupposing these as a condition a priori^ it repre-
sents everything as deriving its own possibility from the
TransccndiuUti Dialectic 463
share which it possesses in that whole possibility.* This
principle of complete determination relates therefore to
the content, and not only to the logical form. It is the
principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are
meant to form the complete concept of a thing» and not
the principle of analytical representation only, by means
of one of two contradictory predicates ; and it contains a
transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the material
for all possibility which is supposed to contain [p. 573]
a priori the data for the particular possibility of everything.
The proposition, that everything which exists is com-
pletely determined^ does not signify only that one of every
pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of all
' possible predicates must always belong to a thing, so that
by this proposition predicates are not only compared with
each other logically, but the thing itself is compared tran-
scendentally with the sum total of all possible predicates.
The proposition really means that, in order to know a
thing completely, we must know everything that is pos-
sible, and thereby determine it either affirmatively or
negatively. This complete determination is therefore a
concept which in concreto can never be represented in
its totality, and is founded therefore on an idea which
belongs to reason only, reason prescribing to the under-
standing the rule of its complete application.
* According to this principle, therefore, everything is referred to a common
correkte, that is, the whole potsihility, which, if it (that is, the matter for all
pomble predicates) could be found in the idea of any single thing, would
prove an affinity of all poisible things, through the identity of the ground of
their complete determtnalion. The dctcrminabiUty of any concept ii subordi-
nate to the univtruttily {Hmverta/i/ai) of the pnncipk uf ihc excluded middle,
while the determination of a thing is subordinate to the Mality {univiriiiiu)^
or the sum total of all poiaibk predicmtei.
1
4^4 Transcendental Dialectic
Now although this idea of the sum iotai of ail possibility,
so far as it forms the condition of the complete determina-
tion of everything, is itself still undetermined with regard
to its predicates, and is conceived by us merely as a sum
total of all possible predicates, we find nevertheless on
closer examination that this idea, as a fundamental con-
cept, exxhides a number of predicates which, being deriva-
tive, are given by others, or cannot stand one [p. 574!
by the side of the other, and that it is raised tn a com
pletely a priori determined concept, thus becoming the
concept of an individual object which is completely deter-
mined by the mere idea, and must therefore be called ar*
ideal of pure reason.
If we consider all possible predicates not only logically,
but transcendentally, that is, according to their content,
which may be thought in them a prion, we find that
through some we represent being, through others a mere
not-being. The logical negation, which is merely indicated
through the small word not, does in reality never apply to
a concept, but only to its relation to another in a judg-
ment, and is very far therefore from being sufficient to
determine a concept with regard to its content. The ex-
pression, not-ffiurta/, can in no wise indicate that mere not-
being if thereby represented in an object, but leaves the
content entirely untouched. A transcendental negation,
on the contrary, signifies not-being by itself, and is opposed
to transcendental affirmation, or a something the concept
of which in itself expresses being. It is called, therefore,
reality (from res, a thing), because through it alone, and
so far only as it reaches, are objects something, while the
opposite negation indicates a mere want, and, if [p. 575]
it stands by itself, represents the absence of everything.
Transccfuicntal Dialectic
465
No one can definitely think a negation, unless he founds
it on the opposite affirmation. A man born blind cannot
frame the smallest conception of darkness, because he has
none of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, be-
cause he does not know ease, and the ignorant has no
conception of his ignorance,* because he has none of know-
ledge, etc. All negative concepts are therefore derivative,
and it is the realities which contain the data and, so
to speak, the material, or the transcendental content, by
which a complete determination of all things becomes
possible.
If, therefore, our reason postulates a transcendental
substratum for all determinations, a substratum which
contains, as it were, the whole store of material whence
all possible predicates of things may be taken, we shall
find that such a substratum is nothing but the idea of the
sum total of reality {omnitudo nalitatis). In [p. 576]
that case all true negations are nothing but iimiiations
which they could not be unless there were the substratum
of the unlimited (the All).
By this complete possession of all reality we represent
the concept of a //////if by itself ^?i, completely determined,
and the concept of an ens realissimmn is the concept of
individual being, because of all possible opposite predicates
one, namely, that which absoUitely belongs to being, is
found in its determination. It is therefore a transcen-
dental ideal which forms the foundations of the complete
' Tlie obscn'ations and calculations of astronomers have tauglit us much
that is wonderful; but the mcfst important is, that ihey have revealed to us
the abysa of our ign&rat^a^ which otherwise human reason could never have
coiH:eived so great. To meditate on this must produce a great change in the
deterniinatlon of the aims of our reason.
2 H
466
Tramcemiental Dialectic
determination which is necessary for all that exists, and
which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete
condition of its possibility, to which all thought of objects,
with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at
the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is
capable, because it is in this case alone that a concept of a
thing, which in itself is general, is complctdy determined
by itself, and recognised as the representation of an in-
dividual
The logical determination of a concept by reason is
based upon a disiunctive syllogism in wdiich the major
contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of
a general concept), while the minor limits that sphere to
a certain part, and the conclusion determines the concept
by that part. The general concept of a reality [p. 577]
in general cannot be divided a priori^ because without ex-
perience we know no definite kinds of reality contained
under that genus. Hence the transcendental major of the
complete determination of all things is nothing but a rep*
resentation of the sum total of all reality, and not only
a concept which comprehends all predicates, according to
their transcendental content, under itself , but xvithin itself ;
and the complete determination of everything depends on
the limitation of this total of reality, of which some part is
ascribed to the thing, whUe the rest is excluded from it,
a procedure which agrees w^ith the ant aut of a disjunctive
major, and with the determination of the object through
one of the members of that division in the minor* Thus
the procedure of reason by which the transcendental ideal
becomes the basis of the determination of all [)ossible
things, is analogous to that which reason follows in dis-
junctive syllogisms, a proposition on which I tried before
Transcendental Dialectic
46T
to base the systematical division of all transcendental
ideas, and according to which they are produced, as
corresponding to the three kinds of the syllogisms of
reason.
It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order
simply to represent the necessary and ccniplete deter-
mination of things, reason does not presuppose [p. 578]
the existence of a being that should correspond to the
ideal, but its idea only, in order to derive from an uncon-
ditioned totality of complete determination the condi-
tioned one, that is the totality of something limited.
Reason therefore sees in the ideal the prototypon of all
things which, as imperfect copies (cctjfa), derive the
material of their possibility from it, approaching more
or less nearly to it, yet remaining always far from reach-
ing it
Thus all the possibility of things (or of the synthesis
of the manifold according to their content) is considered
as derivative, and the possibility of that only which in-
cludes in Itself all reality as original. For all negations
{which really are the only predicates by which every-
thing else is distinguished from the truly real being) are
limitations only of a greater and, in the last instance, of
the highest reality, presupposing it, and, according to
their content, derived from it. All the manifoldness of
things consist only of so many modes of limiting the
concept of the highest reality that forms their common
substratum, in the same way as all figures are only differ-
ent modes of limiting endless space. Hence the object
of its ideal which exists in reason only is called the i^ri^-
inal Being {ens orij^inarium), and so far as it has nothing
above it, the highest Being {ens SHmmam), and so far
468 Transcendcntai Dialectic
as everything as conditioned is subject to it, the B<
all beings {ens cntimn). All this however does not mean
the objective relation of any real thing to other [p. 579]^
things, but of the idea to concepts^ and leaves us in perfect
ignorance as to the existence of a being of such super-
lative excellence.
Again^ as we cannot say that an original being consists
of so many derivative beings, because these in reality pre-
suppose the former, and cannot therefore constitute it,
it follows that the ideal of the original being must be
conceived as simple.
The derivation of all other possibility from that original
being cannot therefore, if we speak accurately, be consid-
ered as a limitation of its highest reality, and, as it were, a
division of it — for in that case the original being would
become to us a mere aggregate of derivative beings, which,
according to what we have just explained, is impos-
sible, though we represented it so in our first rough
sketch. On the contrary, the highest reality would form
the basis of the possibility of all things as a cause, and
not as a sum total The manifoldness of things would
not depend on the limitation of the original being, but
on its complete effect, and to this also would belong all
our sensibility, together with all reality in phenomenal
appearance, which could not, as an ingredient, belong
to the idea of a supreme being.
If we follow up this idea of ours and hypos- [p. 580]
tasise it, we shall be able to determine the original being
by means of the concept of the highest reality as one,
simple, all sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word, determine
it in its unconditioned completeness through all predica-
ments. The concept of such a being is the concept of
Transcendental Dialectic
469
God in its transcendental sense, and thus, as I indicated
above, the ideal of pure reason is the object of a tran-
scendental theology.
By such an employment of the transcendental idea,
however* we should be overstepping the limits of its
purpose and admissibility. Reason used it only, as being
the concept of all reality, for a foimdatiun of the complete
determination of things in general, without requiring that
all this reality should be given objectively and constitute
itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we com-
prehend and realise the manifold of our idea in one ideal,
as a particular being. We have no right to do this, not
even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis ; nor
do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal
concern the complete determination of things in general,
for the sake of which alone the idea was necessary > or
influence it in the least.
It is not enough to describe the procedure [p. 581]
of our reason and its dialectic, we must try also to dis-
cover its sources, in order to be able to explain that illu-
sion itself as a phenomenon of the understanding. The
ideal of which we arc speaking is fountled on a natural,
not on a purely arbitrary idea. I ask, therefore, how does
it happen that reason considers all the possibility of
things as derived from one fundamental possibility,
namely, that of the highest reality, and then presupposes
it as contained in a particular original being ?
The answer is easily found in the discussions of the
transcendental Analytic The possibility of the objects
uf our senses is their relation to our thought, by which
something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought
a priori^ while what constitutes the matter, the reality
Transcendental Diakctic
in the phenomena (all that corresponds to sensation) must
be given, because without it it could not even be thought,
nor its possibility be represented. An object of the
senses can be completely determined only when it is
compared with all phenomenal predicates, and re^lresented
by them either affirmatively or negatively. As, h^^wever,
that which constitutes the thing itself (as a phenomenon),
namely, the real, must be given, and as without this the
thing could not be conceived at all, and as that in which I
the real of all phenomena is given is what we [p. 582]
call the one and all comprehending experience, it is nee-
essary that the material for the possibility of all objects |
of our senses should be presupposed as given in one
whole, on the limitation of which alone the possibility
of all empirical objects, their difference from each other,
and their complete determination can be founded. And
since no other objects can be given us but those of the
senses, and nowhere but in the context of a possible
experience, nothing can be an object to us, if it does not
presuppose that whole of all empirical reality, as the con-
dition of its possibility. Owing to a natural illusion, we
are led to consider a principle which applies only to the
objects of our senses, as a principle valid for all things,
and thus to take the empirical principle of our concepts of
the possibility of things as phenomena, by omitting this
limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility
of things in general.
I£ afterwards we hypostasise this idea of the whole of
all reality, this is owing to our changing dialectically the
distributive unity of the empirical use of our understand-
ing into the collective unity of an empirical whole, and
then represent to ourselves this whole of phenomena as
Transcendental Dialectic
471
an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality.
Afterwards, by means of the aforementioned tran- [p 583]
scendental subreption, this is taken for the concept of a
thing standing at the head of the possibility of all things,
and supplying the real conditions for their complete de*
term mat ion.
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section III
Of the Arguments of Speculative Reason in Proof of tlte
Existence of a Supreme Being
Notwithstanding this urgent want o! reason to presup-
pose something, as a foundation for the complete deter-
mination of the concepts of the understanding, reason
nevertheless becomes too soon aware of the purely ideal
and factitious character of such a supposition to allow
itself to be persuaded by it alone to admit a [p. 584]
mere creation of thought as a real being, unless it were
forced by something else to seek for some rest in its
regrcssus from the conditioned, which is given, to the
unconditioned which, though in itself and according to its
mere concept not given as real, can alone complete the
series of conditions followed up to their causes. This is
^ This ideal of the most real of all things, aUhouj^h mrrdy a representation,
is first re<ilUtd^ that is, changed into ati object, then hypmiauied^ and laitlyj
by the natMral progress of reason towards unity, as wc shall presently show,
ptnonifitd: because the regulative unity of experience does not rest on the
phenomena themselves (sensibility alone), hut on the connection of the mani-
fold, through the underiMndittx (in an ^ppercepHon)^ so that the unity of the
highest reality, and the complete determ inability (p<v5*il>ilitv) of aW things,
seem to reside in a supreme undcrstandingf and therefore in an intelligence.
472 Transcendental Dialectic
the natural course, taken by the reason of every, even the
most ordinary, human heing, although not every one can
hold out in it. It does not begin with concepts, but with
common experience, and thus has something really exist-
ing for its foundation. That foundation however sinks,
unless it rests upon the immoveable rock of that which is
absolutely necessary; and this itself hangs without a sup-
port, if without and beneath it there be empty space, and
everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a
whjf — in fact, if it be not infinite in reality.
If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may
be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity.
For the contingent exists only under the condition of
something else as its cause, and from this the same con-
clusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not con-
tingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary. This is
the argument on which reason founds its progress towards
an original being.
Now reason looks out for the concept of a [p. 585]
being worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned
necessity of its existence, not in order to conclude a priori
its existence from its concept (for if it ventured to do this,
it might confine itself altogether to mere concepts, without
looking for a given existence as their foundation), but only
in order to find among all concepts of possible things one
which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity.
For that something absolutely necessary must exist, is
regarded as certain after the first conclusion. And after
discarding everything else, as incompatible with that
necessity, reason takes the one heing that remains for the
absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity can be
comprehended, that is, derived from its concept alone, or
Transcendental Diakctic
473
not. Now the being the concept of which contains a
therefore for every wherefore, which is in no point and no
respect defective, and is sufficient as a condition every-
where, seems, on that account, to be most compatible with
absolute necessity, because, being in possession of all con-
ditions of all that is possible, it does not require, nay, is
not capable of any condition, and satisfies at least in this
one respect the concept of unconditioned necessity more
than any other concept which, because it is deficient and
in need of completion, does not exhibit any such [p, 586]
characteristic of independence from all further conditions.
It is true that we ought not to conclude that what does
not contain the highest and in every respect complete
condition, must therefore be conditioned even in its
existence ; yet it does not exhibit the only characteristic
of unconditioned existence, by which reason is able to
know any being as unconditioned by means of a concept
a priori.
The concept of a being of the highest reality {ens rea-
lissimum) would therefore seem of all concepts of all pos-
sible things to be the most compatible with the concept of
an unconditionally necessary Being, and though it may
not satisfy that concept altogether, yet no choice is left to
iis» and we are forced to keep to it, because we must not
risk the existence of a necessary Being, and, if we admit
it, can, in the whole field of possibility, find nothing that
could produce better founded claims on such a distinction
in existence.
This therefore is the natural course of human reason.
It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some
necessary Being. In this being it recognises unconditioned
existence. ^ It then seeks for the concept of that which is
Transcendental Dialectic
independent of all condition, and finds it in that [p. 587]
which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things,
that is, in that which contains all reality. Now as the
unlimited all is absolute unity, and implies the concept of
a beings one and supreme, reason concludes that the
Supreme Being, as the original cause of all things, must
exist by absolute necessity.
We cannot deny that this argument possesses a certain
foundation, when we must come to a decision, that is,
when, after haviiig once admitted the existence of some
one necessary Being, we agree that we must dccitle where
to place it ; for in that case we could not make a better
choice, or we have really no choice, but are forced to vote
for the absolute unity of complete reality, as the source of
all possibility. If, however, we are not forced to come to a
decision, but prefer to leave the question open till our con-
sent has been forced by the full weight of arguments, that
is, if we only have to form a judgment of what we really
do know, and what we only seem to know, then our for-
mer conclusion does by no means appear in so favourable
a light, and must appeal to favour in order to make up for
the defects of its legal claims.
For, if we accept everything as here stated, namely, jfrj/,
that we may infer rightly from any given exist- [p. 588]
ence (perhaps even my own only) the existence of an un*
conditionally necessary Being, secondly^ that I must con-
sider a being which contains all reality and therefore also
all condition, as absolutely unconditioned, and that there-
fore the concept of the thing which is compatible with
absolute necessity has thus been found, it follows by no
means from this, that a concept of a limited being, which
does not possess the highest reality, is therefore contra-
Transandental Dialectic
475
dictory to absolute necessity. For, though I do not find
in its concept the unconditioned which carries the whole
of conditions with it, this does not prove that» for the same
reason, its existence must be conditioned ; for I cannot say
in a hypothetical argument, that if a certain condition is
absent (here the completeness according to concepts)^ the
conditioned also is absent. On the contrary, it will be
open to us to consider all the rest of limited beings as
equally unconditioned, although we cannot from the gen-
eral concept which we have of them deduce their neces-
sity. Thus this argument would not have given us the
least concept of the qualities of a necessary Being, in fact
it would not have helped us in the least
Nevertheless this argument retains a certain importance
and authority, of which it cannot be at once deprived on
account of this objective insufficiency. For sup- [p. 589]
pose that there existed certain obligations, quite correct in
the idea of reason, but without any reality in their applica-
tion to ourselves, that is without any motives, unless we
admitted a Supreme Being to give effect to practical laws,
we should then be bound to follow the concepts which,
though not objectively sufficient, are yet, according to the
standard of our reason, preponderant, and more convincin^j
than any others. The duty of deciding would here turn
the balance against the hesitation of speculation by an
additional practical weight; nay, reason would not be justi-
fied, even before the most indulgent judge, if, under such
urgent pleas, though with deficient insight, it had not fol-
lowed its judgment, of which we can say at least, that we
know no better.
This argument, though it is no doubt transcendental, as
based on the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is
r
476 Transcendental Dialectic
nevertheless so simple and natural, that the commonest
understanding accepts it, if once led up to it. We see
things change, arise and perish, and these, or at least
their state, must therefore have a cause. Of [p. 590]
every cause, however, that is given in experience, the
same question must be asked. Where, therefore, could
we more fairly place the last causality; except where there
exists also the supreme causality, that is in that Being,
which originally contains in itself the sufficient cause for
every possihie effect, and the concept of which can easily
be realised by the one trait of an all-comprehending per-
fection > That supreme cause we afterwards consider as
absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely neces-
sary to ascend to it, while there is no ground for going
beyond it. Thus among all nations, even when stili in a
state of blind polytneism, we always see some sparks of
monotheism, to which they have been led, not by medita-
tion and profound speculation, but by the natural bent
of the common understanding, which they gradually fol-
lowed and comprehended.
There are only three kinds of proofs of the existence
of God from speculative reason.
All the paths that can be followed to this end begin
either from definite experience and the peculiar nature
of the world of sense, known to us through experience,
and ascend from it, according to the laws of causality, to
the highest cause, existing outside the world ; or they
rest on indefinite experience only, that is, on any exist-
ence which is empirically given ; or lastly, they leave all
experience out of account, and conclude, entirely a priori
from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme [p. S9i]
cause. The first proof is th^ pfiysicO'iheoiogical, the second
1
Transcendental Dialectic
477
fhe cosmologicaly the third the out logical proof. There
are no more> and there can be no more.
I shall show that neither on the one path, the empirical,
nor on the othcr> the transcendental, can reason achieve
anything, and that it stretches its wings in vain, if it tries
to soar bey on 1 the world of sense by the mere power of
speculation. With regard to the order in which these
three arguments should be examined, it will be the oppo*
site of that, followed by reason in its gradual development,
in which we placed them also at first ourselves. For we
shall be able to show that, although experience gives the
first impulse, it is the transcendental concept only which
guides reason in its endeavours, and fixes the last goal
which reason wishes to retain. I shall therefore begin
with the examination of the transcendental proof, and see
afterwards how far it may be strengthened by the addition
of empirical elements.
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON [p, 59^]
Section IV
Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
Existence of God
It is easily perceived, from what has been said before,
that the concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a con-
cept of pure reason, that is. a mere idea, the objective
reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that
reason requires it. That idea does no more than point to
a certain but unattainable completeness, and serves rather
to limit the understanding, than to extend its sphere. It
seems strange and absurd, however, that a conclusion of
47S Transcendental Dialectic
an absolutely necessary existence from a given existence
in general should seem urgent and correct, and that yet
all the conditions under which the understanding can form
a concept of such a necessity should be entirely against
us.
People have at all times been talking of an absolutely
necessary Being, but they have tried, not so much to under-
stand whether ant^ how a thing of that kind could even be
conceived, as rather to prove its existence. No doubt a
verbal definition of that concept is quite easy, if we say
that it is something the non-exislence of which is impos-
sible. This, however, does not make us much [p. 593]
wiser with reference to the conditions that make it neces-
sary Uo consider the non-existence of a thing as absolutely
inconceivable. It is these conditions which we want to
know, and whether by that concept we arc thinking any-
thing or not. For to use the word unconditioned^ in order
to get rid of all the conditions which the understanding
always requires, when wishing to conceive something as
necessary, does not render it clear to us in the least
whether, after that, we are still thinking anything or per-
haps nothing, by the concept of the unconditionally
necessary.
Nay, more than this, people have imagined that by a
number of examples they had explained this concept, at
first risked at haphazard, and afterwards become quite
familiar, and that therefore all further inquiry regarding
its intelligibility were unnecessary. It was said that
every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that
a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and
* Rca<3 noihwindig instemd of unmdgiich. Noirfe.
Transcendenial Dialectic
479
people began to talk of an object entirely outside the
sphere of our understanding, as if they understood per-
fectly well what, by that concept, they wished to predicate
of it.
But all these pretended examples are taken without ex-
ception from judgments only, not from things, and their
existence. Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments
is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things.
The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned
necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the [p. §94]
judgment. The above proposition did not say that three
angles were absolutely necessary, but that under the con-
dition of the existence of a triangle, three angles are given
(in it) by necessity. Nevertheless, this pure logical neces-
sity has exerted so powerful an illusion, that, after hav-
ing formed of a thing a concept a priori so constituted
that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people
thought they could conclude with certainly that, because
existence necessarily belongs to the object of that concept,
provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing),
its existence also must necessarily be accepted {according
to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must
itself be absolutely necessary, because its existence is
implied in a concept, which is accepted voluntarily only,
and always under the condition that I accept the object
of it as given. /^'^o^VN^t ^ c^
If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and
retain the subject, there arises a contradiction, and hence,
I say, that the former belongs to the latter necessarily.
But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there
is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that can
be contradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject
480 Trauscendentai D take tic
its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradic-
tion at all in admitting the non-existence of the trian^^le
and of its three angles. The same applies to the concept
of an absolutely necessary Being. Remove its [p. 595]
existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its
predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible.
There is nothing external to which the contradiction could
apply, because the thing is not meant to be externally
necessary ; nor is there anything internal that could be
contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence,
you have removed at the same time all its internal quali-
ties. If you say, God is almighty, that is a necessary
judgmenti because almightiness cannot be removed, if yoii
accept a deity, that is» an infinite Being, with the concept
of which that other concept is identical. But if you say,
God is not. then neither his almightiness, nor any other
of his predicates is given ; they are all, together with the
subject, removed out of existence, and therefore there is
not the slightest contradiction in that sentence.
We have seen therefore that, if I remove the predicate
of a judgment together with its subject, there can never
be an internal contradictjon, whatever the predicate may
be. The only way of evading this conclusion would be
to say that there are subjects which cannot be removed
out of existence, but must always remain. But this would
be the same as to say that there exist absolutely necessary
subjects, an assumption the correctness of which I have
called in question, and the possibility of which you had
undertaken to prove. For I cannot form to myself the
smallest concept of a thing which, if it had been removed
together with all its predicates, should leave be- [p. 596]
hind a contradiction ; and except contradiction, I have
i
Transcendental Dialectic
481
no othei test of impossibility by pore concepts a priori.
Against all tliese general arguments (which no one can
object to) you challenge me with a case, which you repre-
sent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and
this one concept only, in which the non-existence or the
removal of its object would be self-contradictory, namely,
the concept of the most real Being {cm rcalissi^num).
You say that it possesses^]! reality, and you are no doubt
justified in accepting such a Being as possible. This for
the present I may admit, though the absence of self-con-
tradictoriness in a concept is far from proving the possi-
bility of its object.^ Now reality comprehends existence,
and therefore existence is contained in the concept of a
thing possible. If that thing is removed, the [p. 597]
intenial^ossibility of the thing would be removed, and
this is self-contradictory.
I answer: — Even in introducing into the concept of a
thing, which you wish to think in its possibility only, the
concept of its existence, under whatever disguise it may
be, you have been guilty of a contradiction. If you were
allowed to do this, yoo would apparently have carried your
point ; but in reality you have achieved nothing, but
have only committed a tautology. I simply ask you,
whether the proposition, that tkis or that thing (which,
' A concept ts Always puMiblc, if it if not self-contradictory. This U Ibc
logical charftcteristtc of pouibility, and by it the object of the concept ii dii^
tinguished rrom the nihil nrgativum. But it may ncvertheleis be an empty
concept, unless the objective reality ^^ii the synthesis, by which the concept i&
gencratcil, has been distinctly shown. Thisi however, as shown above, must
always rest on principles uf possible experience, and not on the principle of
analyst (the principle of contradiction). This is a warning against inferring
at once from the possibilicy of concepts (logical) the poaiibility of things
(real).
JI
I
Transcendental Dialectic
whatever it may be, 1 grant you as possible) exists^ is an
analytical or a synthetical proposition ? If the former,
then by its existence you add nothing to your thought
of the thing; but in that case, either the thought within
you would be the thing itself, or you have presupposed
existence, as belonging to possibility, and have according
to your own showing deduced existence from internal
possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology.
The mere word reality, which in the concept of a thing
sounds different from existence in the concept of the pred-
icate, can make no difference. For if you call all accept-
ing or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you
have placed a thing, with all its predicates^ within the con-
cept of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do
nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the [p. 598]
contrary, you admit, as every sensible man must do, that
I every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how
can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit
of removal without contradiction, a distinguishing property
which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very
character of which depends on it ?
I might have hoped to put an end to this subtle argu-
mentation, without many words, and simply by an accurate
definition of the concept of existence, if I had not seen
that the illusion, in mistaking a logical predicate for a real
one (that is the predicate which determines a thing), resists
all correction. Everything can become a logical predicate^
even the subject itself may be predicated of itself, because
logic takes no account of any contents of concepts. Deter-
minaiion, however, is a predicate, added to the concept of
the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not therefore be
contained in it.
Transcendental Dialectic
483
Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of
something that can be added to the concept of a thing.
It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain deter-
minations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a
judgment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains
two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and
almightiness. The small word />, is not an addi- [p. 599]
tional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in
relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God)
with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and
say, God is^ or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate
to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself,
^with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its
object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing,
and nothing can have been added to the concept, which
expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as
simply given and saying, it is. And thus the real does
not contain more than the possible. A hundred real
dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possi-
ble dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the for-
mer the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in
case the former contained more than the latter, my con-
cept would not express the whole object, and would not
therefore be its adequate concept. In my financial posi-
tion no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dol-
lars, than by their concept only (that is, their possibility),
because in reality the object is not only contained analyti-
cally in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is
a determination of my state), synthetically ; but the con-
ceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased
through the existence which is outside my concept*
By whatever and by however many predicates [p. 6cx>]
484 Transcendental Dialectic
I may think a thing (even in completely determining it;
nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists.
Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists, but some-
thing more than was contained in the concept, and I could
not say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay,
even if I were to think in a thing all reality, except one,
that one missing reahty would not be suppHed by my say-
ing that so defective a thing exists, but it would exist with
the same defect with w^hich I thought it ; or what exists
would be different from what I thought. If, then, I try
to conceive a being, as the highest reaUty (without any
defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not.
For though in my concept there may be wanting nothing ^
of the possible real content of a thing in general, some-
thing is wanting in its relation to my whole state of think-
ing, namely, that the knowledge of that object should be
possible a posteriori also. And here we perceive the
cause of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an
object of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of
a thing for the mere concept of it ; for by the concept the
object is thought as only in harmony with the general
conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its
existence it is thought as contained in the whole content
of experience. Through this connection with the content
of the whole experience, the concept of an object [p. 601]
is not in the least increased; our thought has only received
through it one more possible perception* If, however, we
are thinking existence through the pure category alone,
we need not wonder that we cannot find any characteristic
to distinguish it from mere possibility.
Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may con-
tain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute
Transcendenta I D iaUctic
485
to it existence. With objects of the senses, this takes
place through their connection with any one of my per-
ceptions, according to empirical laws; with objects of pure',
thought, however, there is no means of knowing their ex-\
istence, because it would have to be known entirely a pri-- 1
ofi^ while our consciousness of every kind of existence, •
whether immediately by perception, or by conclusions
which connect something with perception, belongs entirely
to the unity of experience, and any existence outside that
field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impos-
sible, is a presupposition that cannot be justified by any-
thing.
The concept of a Supreme Being is» in many respects,
a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite in-
capable of increasing, by itself alone, our know- [p. 602]
-edge with regard to what exists. It cannot even do so
much as to inform us any further as to its possibility.
The analytical characteristic of possibility, which consists
in the absence of contradiction in mere positions (reali-
ties), cannot be denied to it ; but the connection of all real
properties in one and the same thing is a synthesis the
possibility of which we cannot judge a priori because
these realities are not given to us as such, and because,
even if this were so, no judgment whatever takes place, it
being necessary to look for the characteristic of the pos-
sibility of synthetical knowledge in experience only, to
which the object of an idea can never belong. Thus we
see that t4ie celebrated Leibniz is far from having achieved
what he thought he had, namely, to understand a priori
the possibility of so sublime #in ideal Being.
Time and labour therefore arc lost on the famous onto-
logical (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme
Transcendental Dialectic
Being from mere concepts ; and a man might as well im-
agine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere
ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his
position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account.
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON [p. 603]
Section V
Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Ex^
istcncc of God
It was something quite unnatural, and a mere innovation
of scholastic wisdom, to attempt to pick out of an entirely
arbitrary idea the existence of the object corresponding
to it. Such an attempt would never have been made, if
there had not existed beforehand a need of our reason of
admitting for existence in general something necessary,
to which we may ascend and in which we may rest ; and
if, as that necessity must be unconditioned and a priori
certain, reason had not been forced to seek a concept
which, if possible, should satisfy such a demand and give
us a knowledge of an existence entirely a priori. Such a
concept was supposed to exist in the idea of an ens realis-
simum, and that idea was therefore used for a more defi*
nite knowledge of that, the existence of which one had
admitted or been persuaded of independently, namely, of
the necessary Being, This very natural procedure of
reason was carefully concealed, and instead of ending with
that concept, an attempt was made to begin with it, and
thus to derive from it the netessity of existence, which it
was only meant to supplement. Hence arose [p. 604]
that unfortunate ontological proof, which satisfies neither
Transcendental Dialectic
48;
the demands of our natural and healthy understanding,
nor the requirements of the schools.
The cosmoiogical proof ^ which we have now to examine,
retains the connection of absolute necessity with the high-
est reality, but instead of concluding, like the former, from
the highest reality necessity in existence, it concludes from
the given unconditioned necessity of any being, its un-
limited reality. It thus brings everything at least into
the groove of a natural, though I know not whether of a
really or only apparently rational syllogism, which carries
the greatest conviction, not only for the common, but also
for the speculative understanding, and has evidently drawn
the first outline of all proofs of natural theology, which
have been followed at all times, and will be followed in
future also, however much they may be hidden and dis-
guised We shall now proceed to exhibit and to examine
this cosmological proof which Leibniz calls also the proof
a coHtingentia mundi.
It runs as follows : If there exists anything, there must
exist an absolutely necessary Being also. Now I, at least,
exist ; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary Being.
The minor contains an experience, the major the conclusion
from experience in general to the existence of [p. 605]
the necessary,* This proof therefore begins with experi-
ence, and is not entirely a priori^ or ontological ; and, as
the object of all possible experience is called the world,
this proof is called the cosmological proof. As it takes
* This conclusion is loo well known to rc<|uirc detailed exposition > It
rests on the apparently transcendental law of causality in nature, that everything
nfHtingtHt bus its cause, which, if contingent again, must likewise have a
cause, till the series of su^Hjrdinate causes ends in an absolutely necessary
cause, without which it could not be complete*
4B8 Transcendental Diaiectic
no account of any peculiar property of the objects of expe^
rience, by which this world of ours may differ from any
other possible world, it is distinguished, in its name also,
from the physico-theological proof, which employs as argu-
ments, observations of the peculiar property of this our
world of sense.
The proof then proceeds as follows : The necessary
Being can be determined in one way only, that is, by one
only of all possible opposite predicates ; it must therefore
be determined completely by its own concept. Now,
there is only one concept of a thing possible, which a
priori completely determines it, namely, that of the ens
reaiissimum. It follows, therefore, that the concept of the
ens reaiissimum is the only one by which a necessary Being
can be thought, and therefore it is concluded [p. 606]
that a highest Being exists by necessity.
There are so many sophistical propositions in this cos-
mological argument, that it really seems as if specu-
lative reason had spent all her dialectical skill in order
to produce the greatest possible transcendental illusion.
Before examining it, we shall draw up a list of them, by
which reason has put forward an old argument disguised
as a new one, in order to appeal to the agreement of two
witnesses, one supplied by pure reason, the other by expe-
rience, while in reality there is only one, namely, the first,
who changes his dress and voice in order to he taken for a
second. In order to have a secure foundation, this proof
takes its stand on experience, and pretends to be different
from the ontological proof, which places its whole confi-
dence in pure concepts a priori only. The cosmological
proof, however, uses that experience only in order to make
one step, namely, to the existence of a necessary Being in
Transcendvntal Dialectic
489
general. What properties that Being may have, can never
be learnt froro the empirical argument, and for that pur-
pose reason takes leave of it altogether, and tries to find
QUt» from among concepts only, what properties an abso-
lutely necessary Being ought to possess, i.e. which among
all possible things contains in itself the requisite [p. 607]
conditions {requisita) of absolute necessity. This requisite
is believed by reason to exist in the concept of an ens
reaiissimum only, and reason concludes at once that this
must be the absolutely necessary Being. In this con-
clusion it is simply assumed that the concept of a being of
the highest reality is perfectly adequate to the concept of
absolute necessity in existence ; so that the latter might
be concluded from the former. This is the same proposi-
tion as that maintained in the ontological argument, and
is simply taken over into the cosmological proof, nay,
made its foundation, although the intention was to avoid
it. For it is clear that absolute necessity is an existence
from mere concepts. If, then, I say that the concept of
the ens reaiissimum is such a concept, and is the only con-
cept adequate to necessary existence, I am bound to admit
that the latter may be deduced from the former. The
whole conclusive strength of the so-called cosmological
proof rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof
from mere concepts, while the appeal to experience is
quite superfluous, and, though it may lead us on to the
concept of absolute necessity, it cannot demonstrate it
with any definite object. For as soon as we intend to do
this, we must at once abandon all experience, and try to
find out which among the pure concepts may contain
the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely [p. 608]
necessary Being. But if in this way the possibility of
Transcendental Diahrtic
such a Being has been perceived, its existence also has
been proved : for what we are really saying is this, that
under all possible things there is one which carries with
it absolute necessity, or that this Being exists with absolute
necessity.
Sophisms in arguments are most easily discovered, if
they are put forward in a correct scholastic form* This
we shall now proceed to do.
If the proposition is right, that every absolutely necessary
Being is, at the same time, the most real Being (and this
is the ncn^ns ptvbaHiiioi the cosmological proof), it most,
like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conversion, at
least per accidens. This would give us the proposition
that some eutia realissitfui arc at the same time absolutely
necessary beings. One ens reaiissimum^ however, does
not differ from any other on any point, and what applies
to one, applies also to all. In this case, therefore, I may
employ absolute conversion, and say, that every ens rea-
lissimum is a necessary Being, As this proposition is de-
termined by its concepts a priori only, it follows that the
mere concept of the ens reaiissimnm must carry with it
its absolute necessity ; and this, which was maintained by
the ontological proof, and not recognised by the cosmo-
logical, forms really the foundation of the conclusions
of the latter, though in a disguised form. [p. 609]
We thus see that the second road taken by speculative
reason, in order to prove the existence of the highest
Being, is not only as iUusory as the first, but commits in
in addition an ignoratio ehnchi, promising to lead us by
a new path, but after a short circuit bringing us back to
the old one, which we had abandoned for its sake.
I said before that a whole nest of dialectical assump-
Transcendental Dialectic
491
tions was hidden in that cosmological proof, and that tran-
scendental criticism might easily detect and destroy it. I
shall here enumerate them only, leaving it to the experience
of the reader to follow up the fallacies and remove them.
We find, first, the transcendental principle of inferring
a cause from the accidental This principle, that every-
thing contingent must have a cause, is valid in the world
of sense only, and has not even a meaning outside it. For
the purely intellectual concept of the contingent cannot
produce a synthetical proposition like that of causality,
and the principle of causality has no meaning and no
eriterion of its use, except in the world of sense, while
here it is meant to help us beyond the world of sense.
Secondly, The inference of a first cause, [p. 610]
based on the impossibility of an infinite ascending series
of given causes in this world of sense, — an inference
which the principles of the use of reason do not allow us
to draw even in experience, while here we extend that
principle beyond experience, whither that series can never
be prolonged.
Thirdly. The false self-satisfaction of reason with
regard to the completion of that series, brought about
by removing in the end every kind of condition, without
which, nevertheless, no concept of necessity is possible,
and by then, when any definite concepts have become
impossible, accepting this as a completion of our concept.
Fourthly. The mistaking the logical possibility of a
concept of all united reality (without any internal contra-
diction) for the transcendental, which requires a principle
for the practicability of such a synthesis, such principle
however being applicable to the field of possible experience
OQly» etc.
492 Transcendefittii Dialectic
The trick of the cosniological proof consists only in
trying to avoid the proof of the existence of a necessary
Being a priori by mere concepts. Such a proof would
have to be ontological, and of this we feel ourselves quite
incapable. For this reason we take a real existence (of
any experience whate%^er), and conclude from it, as welt
as may be, sonic absolutely necessary condition of it. In
that case there is no necessity for explaining its possi-
bility, because, if it has been proved that it [p. 6ii]
exists, the question as to its possibility is unnecessary. If
then Wii want to determine that necessary Being more
accurately, according to its nature, we do not seek what is
sufficient to make us understand from its concept the
necessity of its existence. If we could do this, no empiri-
cal presupposition would be necessary. No, we only seek
the negative condition {conditio sim qua non), without
which a Being would not be absolutely necessary. Now,
in every other kind of syllogisms leading from a given
effect to its cause, this might well be feasible. In our
case, however, it happens unfortunately that the condition
which is required for absolute necessity exists in one single
Being only, which, therefore, would have to contain in its
concept all that is required for absolute necessity, and that
renders a conclusion a priori^ with regard to such neces*
sity^ possible. I ought therefore to be able to reason
conversely, namely, that everything is absolutely neces-
sary, if that concept (of the highest reality) belongs to it.
If I cannot do this {and I must confess that I cannot, if
I wish to avoid the ontological proof), I have suffered
shipwreck on my new course, and have come back again
from where I started. The concept of the highest Being
may satisfy all questions a priori which can be asked
Transcendental Dialectic
493
regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and it is
therefore an ideal, without an equal, because the general
concept distinguishes it at the same time as an [p. 612]
individual being among all possible things. But it does
not satisfy the really important question regarding its own
existence ; and if some one who admitted the existence of
a necessary Being were to ask us which of all things in
the world could be regarded as such, we could not answer :
This here is the necessary Being.
It may be allowable to admit the existence of a Being
entirely sufficient to serve as the cause of all possible
effects, simply in order to assist reason in her search for
unity of causes. But to go so far as to say that such a
Being exists necessarily^ is no longer the modest language
of an admissible hypothesis, but the bold assurance of
apodictic certainty; for the knowledge of that which is
absolutely necessary must itself possess absolute necessity.
The whole problem of the transcendental Ideal is this,
either to find a concept compatible with absolute neces-
sity, or to find the absolute necessity compatible with the
concept of anything. If the one is possible, the other must
be so also, for reason recognises that only as absolutely
necessary which is necessary according to its concept.
Both these tasks baffle our attempts at satisfying our
understanding on this point, and likewise our [p. 613]
endeavours to comfort it with regard to its impotence.
That unconditioned necessity, which we require as the
last support of all things, is the true abyss of human
reason. Eternity itself, however terrible and sublime it
may have been depicted by Haller, is far from producing
the same giddy impression, for it only measures the dura-
tion of things, but docs not support them. We cannot
TniH seen den tai Dia ieciic
put off the thought, nor can we support it, that a Being,
which we represent to ourselves as the highest among all
possible beingSj should say to himself, I am from eternity
to eternity, there is nothing beside me, except that which
is something through my will, ^ — but whence am If Here
all sinks away from under us, and the highest perfection,
like the smallest, passes without support before the eyes
of speculative reason, which finds no difficulty in making
the one as well as the other to disappear without the
slightest impediment.
Many powers of nature, which manifest their existence
by certain effects, remain perfectly inscrutable to us,
because we cannot follow them up far enough by obser-
vation. The transcendental object, which forms the
foundation of all phenomena, and with it the ground of
our sensibility having this rather than any other supreme
conditions, is and always will be inscrutable. The thing
no doubt is given, but it is incomprehensible, [p. 614]
An ideal of pure reason, however, cannot be called in-
scrutable, because it cannot produce any credentials of its
reality beyond the requirement of reason to perfect all
synthetical unity by means of it. As, therefore, it is not
even given as an object that can be thought, it cannot
be said to be, as such, inscrutable ; but, being a mere
idea, it must find in the nature of reason its place and its
solution, and in that sense be capable of scrutiny. For
it is the very essence of reason that we are able to give
an account of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions
either on objective or, if they are a mere illusion, on sub-
jective grounds.
Transcendental Dialectic
495
Discovenf and Expfattation of the Dialectical Iliusien in
all TmnsccndtHtai Proofs of the Existence of a Neces-
sary Being
Both proofs, hitherto attempted, were transcendental,
that is, independent of empirical principles. For although
the cosniological proof assumes for its foundation an expe-
rience in general, it does not rest on any particular qual-
ity of it, but on pure principles of reason, with reference
to an existence given by the empirical consciousness in
general, and abandons even that guidance in order to
derive its support from pure concepts only. [p. 615]
What then in these transcendental proofs is the cause of
the dialectical, but natural, illusion which connects the
concepts of necessity and of the highest reality, and
realises and hypostasises that which can only be an idea?
What is the cause that renders it inevitable to admit
something as necessar)^ in itself among existing things,
ami yet makes us shrink back from the existence of such
a Being as from an abyss? What is to be done that
reason should understand itself on this point, and, escap-
ing from the wavering state of hesitatingly approving or
disapproving, acquire a calm insight into the matter?
It is surely extremely strange that, as soon as we sup-
pose that something exists, we cannot avoid the con-
clusion that something exists necessarily. On this quite
natural, though by no means, therefore, certain conclu-
sion, rests the whole cosmological argument. On the
other side, I may take any concept of anything, and I
find that its existence has never to be represented by me
as absolutely necessary, nay, that nothing prevents me,
whatever may exist, from thinking its non-existence. I
may» therefore, have to admit something necessary as the
J
49*6 Transcendental Diaiectic
condition of existing things in general, but I need not
think any single thing as necessary in itself. In other
words I can never complete the regressus to the [p. 6i6]
conditions of existence without admitting a necessary
Being, but I can never begin with such a Being.
If, therefore, I am obliged to think something neces-
sary for all existing things, and at the same time am not
justified in thinking of anything as in itself necessary, the
conclusion is inevitable : that necessity and contingency
do not concern things themselves, for otherwise there
would be a contradiction, and that therefore neither of
the two principles can be objective ; but that they may
possibly be subjective principles of reason only, according
to which, on one side, we have to find for all that is given
as existing, something that is necessary, and thus never
to stop except when we have reached an a priori com-
plete explanation ; while on the other we must never
hope for that completion, that is, never admit anything
empirical as unconditioned, and thus dispense with its
further derivation. In that sense both principles as
purely heuristic and regiiliitive^ and affecting the formal
interests of reason only, may well stand side by side.
For the one tells us that we ought to philosophise on
nature as if there was a necessary first cause for every-
thing that exists, if only in order to introduce systemati-
cal unity into our knowledge, by always looking for such an
idea as an imagined highest cause. The other [p, 617]
warns us against mistaking any single determination
concerning the existence of things for such a highest
cause, i.e. for something absolutely necessary, and bids
us to keep the way always open for further derivation,
and to treat it always as conditioned. If, then, every-
Transcendental Dialectic
497
thing that is perceived in things has to be considered
by us as only conditionally necessary, nothing that is
empirically given can ever be considered as absolutely
necessary.
It follows from this that the absolutely necessary must
be accepted as outside the world, because it is only
meant to ser\'e as a principle of the greatest possible
unity of phenomena, of which it is the highest cause,
and that it can never be reached in the world, because
the second rule bids you always to consider all empirical
causes of that unity as derived.
The philosophers of antiquity considered all form in
nature as contingent, but matter, according to the judg-
ment of common reason, as primitive and necessary. If,
however, they had considered matter, not relatively as
the substratum of phenomena, but as existing by itself^
the idea of absolute necessity would have vanished at
once, for there is nothing that binds reason absolutely to
that existence, but reason can at any time and without con-
tradiction remove it in thought, and it was in [p, 6 1 8]
thought only that it could claim absolute necessity. The
ground of this persuasion must therefore have been a cer-
tain regulative principle. And so it is; for extension and
impermeability (which together constitute the concept of
matter) furnish the highest empirical principle of the
unity of phenomena, and possess, so far as this principle is
empirically unconditioned, the character of a regulative
principle. Nevertheless, as every determination of matter,
which constitutes its reality, and hence the impermeability
of matter also» is an effect (action) which must have a cause,
and therefore be itself derived, matter is not adequate to
the idea of a necessary Beings as a principle of all derived
2K
J
Transcendental Dialectic
unity, because every one of its real qualities is derived
and, therefore, conditionally necessary only, so that it
could be removed, and with it would be removed the
whole existence of matter. If this were not so, we should
have reached the highest cause of unity, empirically,
which is forbidden by the second regulative principle.
It follows from all this that matter and everything in
general that belongs to the world are not fit for the
idea of a necessary original Being, as a mere principle
of the greatest empirical unity, but that we must place
it outside the workl In that case there is no reason
why we should not simply derive the phenomena of the
world and their existence from other phenomena, as if
there were no necessary Being at all, while at the same
time we might always strive towards the completeness
of that derivation, just as if such a Being, as the [p. 6! 9]
highest cause, were presupposed.
The ideal of the Supreme Being is therefore, according
to these remarks, nothing but a regulative prineiple of
reason, which obliges us to consider all connection in
the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary
cause, in order to found on it the rule of a systematical
unity necessary according to general laws for the explana-
tion of the world ; it does not involve the assertion of an
existence necessary by itself. It is impossible, however,
at the same time, to escape from a transcendental subrep-
tion w^hich leads us to represent that formal principle as
constitutive, and to think that unity as hypostasised. It
is the same with space. Space, though it is only a prin-
ciple of sensibility, yet serves originally to make all forms
possible, these being only limitations of it. For that very
reason, however, it is mistaken for something absolutely
Transcendental Dialectic
necessary and independent, nay, for an object a priori
existing in itselL It is the same here, and as this sys-
tematical unity of nature can in no wise become the
principle of the empirical use of our reason » unless we
base it on the idea of an ens realissimum as the highest
cause, it happens quite naturally that we thus represent
that idea as a real object^ and that object again, as it is
the highest condition, as necessary. Thus a regnlatitfe
principle has been changed into a constitutive [p. 620]
principle, which substitution becomes evident at once
because, as soon as I consider that highest Being, which
with regard to the world was absolutely (unconditionally)
necessary, as a thing by itself, that necessity cannot be
conceived, and can therefore have existed in my reason
as a formal condition of thought only, and not as a
material and substantial condition of existence.
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section VI
Of the Impossibility of the Physico-thealogical Proof
If, then, neither the concept of things in general, nor
the experience of any existence in general, can satisfy our
demands, there still remains one way open, namely, to try
whether any definite experience^ and consequently that of
things in the world as it is, their constitution and dis-
position, may not supply a proof which could give us the
certain conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being.
Such a proof we should call physico-theologicaL If that,
however, sl^ould prove impossible too, then it is clear
that no satisfactory proof whatever, from merely specula-
easily understood that we may expect an easy and com-
plete answer to this question. For how could there ever
be an experience that should be adequate to an idea ? It
is the very nature of an idea that no experience can ever
be adequate to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary
and all-sufficient original Being is so overwhelming, so
high above everything empirical^ which is always condi-
tioned, that we can never find in experience enough mate-
rial to fill such a concept, and can only grope about among
things conditioned, looking in vain for the unconditioned,
of which no rule of any empirical synthesis can ever give
us an example, or even show the way towards it.
If the highest Being should stand itself in that chain of
conditions, it would be a link in the series, and would,
exactly like the lower links, above which it is placed,
require further investigation with regard to its own still
higher cause. If, on the contrary, we mean to separate it
from that chain, and, as a purely intelligible Being, not
comprehend it in the series of natural causes, what bridge
is then open for reason to reach it, considering that all
rules determining the transition from effect to cause, nay,
all synthesis and extension of our knowledge in genera],
refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore to
the objects of the world of sense only, and are [p. 622]
valid nowhere else ?
This present world presents to us so immeasurable a
stage of variety, order, fitness, and beauty, whether we
follow it up in the infinity of space or in its unlimited
division, that even with the little knowledge which our
Transcendental Dialectic
SOI
poor understanding has been able to gather, all language,
with regard to so many and inconceivable wonders, loses
its vigour, all numbers their power of measuring, and all
our thoughts their necessary determination ; so that our
judgment of the whole is lost in a speechless, but all the
more eloquent astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain
of causes and effects, of means and ends, of order in birth
and death, and as nothing has entered by itself into the
state in which we find it, all points to another thing as
its cause. As that cause necessitates the same further
enquiry, the whole universe would thus be lost in the
abyss of nothing, unless we admitted something which,
existing by itself, original and independent, outside the
chain of infinite contingencies, should support it, and, as
the cause of its origin, secure to it at the same time its
permanence. Looking at all the things in the world,
what greatness shall we attribute to that highest cause?
We do not know the whole contents of the world, still less
can we measure its magnitude by a comparison [p. 623]
with all that is possible. But, as with regard to causality,
we cannot do without a last and highest Being, why
should we not fix the degree of its perfection beyond every-
thing else that is possible? This we can easily do, though
only in the faint outline of an abstract concept, if we
represent to ourselves all possible perfections united in
it as in one substance. Such a concept would agree with
the demand of our reason, which requires parsimony in
the number of principles ; it would have no contradictions
in itself, would be favourabk to the extension of the
employment of reason in the midst of experience, by
guiding it towards order and system, and lastly, would
never be decidedly opposed to any experience.
502 Transcendental Dialectic
This proof will always deserve to be treated with respect
It is the oldest, the dearest, and most in conformity
with human reason. It gives life to the study of nature,
deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly
acquiring new vigour.
It reveals aims and intention, where our own obser-
vation would not by itself have discovered them, and
enlarges our knowledge of nature by leading us towards
that peculiar unity the principle of which exists outside
nature. This knowledge reacts again on its cause, namely,
the transcendental idea, and thus increases the [p. 624]
belief in a supreme Author to an irresistible conviction.
It would therefore be not only extremely sad, but
utterly vain to attempt to diminish the authority of that
proof. Reason, constantly strengthened by the powerful
arguments that come to hand by themselves, though they
are no doubt empirical only, cannot be discouraged by any
doubts of subtle and abstract speculation. Roused from
every inquisitive indecision, as from a dream, by one
glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the
cosmos, reason soars from height to height till it reaches
the highest, from the conditioned to conditions, till it
reaches the supreme and unconditioned Author of all.
But although we have nothing to say against the
reasonableness and utility of this line of argument,
but wish, on the contrary, to commend and encourage
it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof
advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on
its own merits, requiring no favour, and no help from
any other quarter. It cannot injure the good cause, if
the dogmatical language of the overweening sophist is
toned down to the moderate and modest statements of
a faith which does not require unconditioned submission,
yet is sufficient to give rest and comfort. I therefore
maintain that the physico-theological proof can never
establish by itself alone the existence of a [p. 625]
Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the ontolog-
ical proof (to which it serves only as an introduction),
to supply its deficiency ; so that, after all, it is the onto-
logical proof which contains the only possible argufnent
(supposing always that any speculative proof is possible),
and human reason can never do without it.
The principal points of the physico-theological proof
are the following, ist. There are everywhere ia the
world clear indications of an intentional arrangement
carried out with great wisdom, and forming a whole
indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent.
2ndly, The fitness of this arrangement is entirely
foreign to the things existing in the world, and belongs
to them contingently only ; that is, the nature of differ-
ent things could never spontaneously, by the combina-
tion of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims,
if these means had not been selected and arranged on
purpose by a rational disposing principle, according to
certain fundamental ideas,
jrdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause
(or many), which must be the cause of the world, not only
as a blind and all-powerful nature, by means of uncon-
scious/f-rw^ti/iVy, but as an intelligence, hy freedom.
4thly, The unity of that cause may be inferred with
certainty from the unity of the reciprocal rela^ [p. 626]
tion of the parts of the world, as portions of a skilful edi-
fleet ^^ fa** as our experience reaches, and beyond it, with
plausibility, according to the principles of analogy.
9
504 Transcendental Diaiectic
Without wishing to argue, for the sake of argument
on!y, with natural reason, as to its conclusion in inferring
from the analogy of certain products of nature with the
works of human art, in which man does violence to nature,
and forces it not to follow its own aims» but to adapt it-
self to ours (that is, from the similarity of certain products
of nature with houses, ships, and watches), in inferring
from this, I say, that a similar causality, namely, under-
standing and will, must be at the bottom of nature, and
in deriving the internal possibility of a freely acting nature
(which, it may be, renders all human art and even human
reason possible) from another though superhuman art —
a kind of reasoning, which probably could not stand the
severest test of transcendental criticism ; we are willing
to admit, nevertheless, that if we have to name such a
cause, we cannot do better than to follow the analogy of
such products of human design, which are the only ones
of which we know completely both cause and effect.
There would be no excuse, if reason were to surrender a
causality which it knows, and have recourse to obscure
and indemonstrable principles of explanation, which it
does not know.
According to this argument, the fitness and harmony
existing in so many works of nature might prove [p. 627]
the contingency of the form, but not of the matter, that
is, the substance in the world, because, for the latter pur-
pose, it would be necessary to prove in addition, that the
things of the world were in themselves incapable of such
order and harmony, according to general laws, unless
there existed, even in their substmice, the product of a
supreme wisdom. For this purpose, very different argu-
ments would be required from those derived from the
Transcendental Dialectic
505
r
^H analogy of human art. The utmost, therefore, that could
^H be established by such a proof would be an architect of
^B the worlds always very much hampered by the quality of
^H the material with which he has to work, not a creator,
^P to whose idea everything is subject This w^ould by no
means suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-
sufficient original Being. If we wished to prove the con-
tingency of matter itself, we must have recourse to a
transcendental argument, and this is the very thing which
was to be avoided.
The inference, therefore, really proceeds from the order
and design that can everywhere be observed in the world,
as an entirely contingent arrangement, to the existence of
a cause, proportionate to it. The concept of that cause
must therefore teach us something quite definite about it,
and can therefore be no other concept but that of a Being
which possesses alt might, wisdom » etc.» in one word,
all perfection of an all-sufficient Being. The [p. 628]
predicates of a very great, of an astounding, of an immeas*
urable might and virtue give us no definite concept^ and
never tell us really what the thing is by itself. They are
only relative representations of the magnitude of an object,
which the observer (of the world) compares with himself
and his own power of comprehension, and which would be
equally grand, whether we magnify the object, or reduce
the observing subject to smaller proportions in reference
to it. Where we are concerned with the magnitude {of
the perfection) of a thing in general, there exists no defi-
nite concept, except that which comprehends all possible
perfection, and only the all {omnituda) of reality is thor-
oughly determined in the concept.
Now I hope that no one would dare to comprehend the
Transcendental Dialectic
relation of that part of the world which he has observed
(in its extent as well as in its contents) to omnipotence,
the relation of the order of the world to the highest wis-
dom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the abso-
lute unity of its author, etc. Physico-theology, therefore,
can never give a definite concept of the highest cause of
the world, and is insufficient, therefore, as a principle of
theology, which is itself to form the basis of religion^
The step leading to absolute totality is entirely impos-
sible on the empirical road. Nevertheless, that step is
taken in the physico-theological proof. How then has this
broad abyss been bridged over ? [p. 629]
The fact is that, after having reached the stage of ad-
miration of the greatness, the wisdom, the power, etc, of
the Author of the world, and seeing no further advance
possible, one suddenly leaves the argument carried on by
empirical proofs, and lays hold of that contingency which,
from the very first, was inferred from the order and design
of the world. The next step from that contingency leads,
by means of transcendental concepts only, to the existence
of something absolutely necessary, and another step from
the absolute necessity of the first cause to its completely
determined or determining concept, namely, that of an alU
embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico^heolog-
ical proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly
refuge in the cosmological proof, and as this is only the
ontological proof in disguise, it really carries out its orig-
inal intention by means of pure reason only ; though it sc
strongly disclaimed in the beginning all connection with
it, and professed to base everything on clear proofs from
experience.
Those who adopt the physico-theological argument have
Transcendental Dialectic
no reason to be so very coy towards the transcendental
mode of argument, and with the conceit of enlightened
observers of nature to look down upon them as the cob-
webs of dark speculators. If they would only examine
themselves, they would find that, after they had advanced
a good way on the soil of nature and experience, and
found themselves nevertheless as much removed [p, 630]
as ever from the object revealed to their reason, they
suddenly leave that soil, to enter into the realm of pure
possibilities, where on the wings of ideas they hope to
reach that which had withdrawn itself from all their
empirical investigations. Imagining themselves to be on
firm ground after that desperate leap, they now proceed to
expand the definite concept which they have acquired, they
do not know how, over the whole field of creation; and
they explain the ideal, which was merely a product of
pure reason, by experience, though in a very poor way, and
totally beneath the dignity of the object, refusing all the
while to admit that they have arrived at that knowledge
or supposition by a very different road from that of expe-
rience.
Thus we have seen that the physico-thcological proof
rests on the cosmological, and the cosmological on the
ontological proof of the existence of one original Being as
the Supreme Being; and, as besides these three, there is
no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological
proof, based exclusively on pure concepts of reason^ is the
only possible one, always supposing that any proof of a
proposition, so far transcending the empirical use of the
tmderstandingt is possible at alL
Criticism of all Theology based on Speculative Principles
of Reason
If by Theology we understand the knowledge of the
original Being, it is derived either from reason only {theo-
logia rationalis), or from revelation {revelata). The for-
mer thinks its object either by pure reason and through
transcendental concepts only {ens origiuarium, realissimum,
ens entinm), and is then called tmnscendental theology, or
by a concept, borrowed from the nature (of our soul), as
the highest intelligence, and ought then to be called natural
ytheology. Those who admit a transcendental theology only
j arc called Deists, those who admit also a naiural theology
i^Theists. The former admit that we may know' the exist-
ence of an original Being by mere reason, but that our
concept of it is transcendental only, as of a Being which
possesses all reality, but a reality that cannot be further
determined. The latter maintain that reason is capable of
determining that object more accurately in analogy with
nature, namely, as a Being which, through understanding
rand freedom, contains within itself the original ground of
all other things. The former admits a cause of the [p. 632]
world ox\\y (whether through the necessity of its nature or
through freedom, remains undecided), the latter an author
J of the tvorld.
Transcendental theology, again, either derives the exist-
ence of the original Being from an experience in general
(without saying anything about the world, to which it be-
longs), and is then called Cosmotkeology ; or it believes
Transcendental Dialectic
509
that it can know its existence, without the help of any ex-
perience whatsoever, and by mere concepts, and is then
called Ontotheology.
Natural iluology infers the qualities and the existence
of an author of the world from the constitution, the order,
and the unity, which are seen in this world, in which two
kinds of causality with their rules must be admitted, namely,
nature and freedom. It ascends from this world to the
highest intelligence as the principle cither of all natural or
of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it
is called Physico-theologyy in the other Ethico-theology} ^
As we are accustomed to understand by the concept of I
God, not only a blindly working eternal nature, as the root
of all things, but a Supreme Being, which, through under-
standing and freedom, is supposed to be the [p, 633]
author of all things, and as it is this concept alone in
which we really take an interest, one might strictly deny
to the Deist all belief in God, and allow him only the
maintaining of an original Being, or a supreme cause.
But as no one, simply because he does not dare to assert,
ought to be accused of denying a thing, it is kinder and
juster to say, that the Deist believes in a God, but the
7/ieist in a liviftg Gmi {summa infelligentia). We shall
now try to discover the possible sources of all these
attempts of reason,
I shall not do more, at present, than define theoretical
knowledge as one by which I know what there i>, practical
knowledge as one by which I represent to myself what
ought to be. Hence the theoretical use of reason is that
^ Not theological RtbiiS; for these contain moral laws, which presup^^u
the existence of a supreme ruler of the world, while Ethico«thcology Is the
conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded on moral laws.
'j^
by which I know a priori (as necessary) that something is,
while the practical use of reason is that by which I know
a priori \v\\3X ought to be. If then it is certain, beyond
the possibility of doubt, that something is, or that some*
thing ought to be, though both are conditioned, then a
certain definite condition of it may be either absolutely
necessary or presupposed only as possible and contingent.
In the former case, the condition is postulated {per tlicsin),
m the latter supposed {per kypothesin). As there are
practical laws, which are absolutely necessary (the moral
laws), it follows, if they necessarily presuppose [p. 634]
any existence as the condition of the possibility of their
obligatory power, that the existence of that condition must
hQ postNiaicd, because the conditioned, from which we infer
that condition, has been recognised a priori as absolutely
necessary. On a future occasion we shall show that the
moral laws not only presuppose the existence of a Supreme
Being, but that, as they are in other respects absolutely
necessary, they postulate it by right, though of course
practically only. For the present we leave this mode of
argument untouched.
If we only speak of that which is, not of that which
ought to be, the conditioned given to us in experience is
always conceived as contingent, and the condition belong-
ing to it can therefore not be known as absolutely neces-
sary, but serves only as a relatively necessary, or rather
needful, though in itself an a priori arbitrary supposition
for a rational understanding of the conditioned. If, there-
fore, we wish to know in our theoretical knowledge the
absolute necessity of a thing, this could only be done from
concepts a priori, and never as of a cause in reference to
an existence which is given in experience.
Transcendental Dialectic
511
I call a theoretical knowledge speculative^ if it relates to
an object, or such concepts of an object, which we can
never reach in any experience. It is opposed to our kn4>w-
Icdge of nature, which relates to no other objects [p. 635]
or predicates of them except those that can be given in a
possible experience.
From something that happens (the empirically contin-
gent) as an effect, to infer a cause, is a principle of natural,
though not of speculative knowledge. For if we no longer
use it as a principle involving the condition of possible
experience, and, leaving out everything that is empirical,
try to apply it to the contingent in general, there does not
remain the smallest justification of such a synthetical prop-
osition, showing how from something which is, there can
be a transition to something totally different, .which we
call cause ; nay, in such purely speculative application, the
concepts both of cause and of the contingent lose all
meaning, the objective reality of which would be made
intelligible in the concrete.
If from the existence of things in the world we infer
ttieir cause, we are using reason not naturally^ but spccu-
latively. Naturally, reason refers not the things them-
selves (substances;, but only that which happcfis, their
states^ as empirically contingent, to some cause ; but it
could know speculatively only that a substance itself
(matter) is contingent in its existence. And even if we
were thinking only of the form of the world, the [p. 636]
manner of its composition and the change of this composi-
tion, and tried to infer from this a cause totally different
from the world, this would be again a judgment of specula-
tive reason only; because the object here is not an object
of any possible experience. In this case the principle of
513 Transcendental Diaieciic
causality, which is valid within the field of experience only,
and utterly useless, nay, even meaningless, outside it,
would he totally diverted from its proper destination.
What I maintain then is, that all attempts at a purely
speculative use of reason, with reference to theology, are
entirely useless and intrinsically null and void, while the
principles of their natural use can never lead to any the-
I ology, so that unless we depend on moral laws, or are guided
I by them, there cannot be any theology of reason. For all
^ synthetical principles of the understanding are applicable
immanently only, i.e, within its own sphere, while, in order
to arrive at the knowledge of a Supreme Being, we most
use them transcendentally, and for this our understanding
is not prepared. If the empirically valid law of causality
is to conduct us to the original Being, that Being must
belong to the chain of objects of experience, and in that case
it would, like alt phenomena, be itself conditioned. And
even if that sudden jump beyond the limits of [p. ^n\
experience, according to the dynamical law of the relation
of effects to their causes, could be allowed, what concept
could we gain by this proceeding? Certainly no concept
of a Supreme Being, because experience never presents to
us the greatest of all possible effects, to bear witness of its
cause. If we claim to be allowed, only in order to leave
no void in our reason, to supply this defect in the complete
determination of that cause by the mere idea of the highest
perfection and of original necessity, this may possibly be
granted as a favour, but can never be demanded on the
strength of an irresistible proof. The physico«theo!ogical
proof, as connecting speculation with intuition, might pos-
sibly therefore be used in support of other proofs (if they
existed) ; it cannot, however, finish the task for itself, but
Transcendental Dialectic
5^3
can only prepare the understanding for theological know-
ledge, and impart to it the right and natural direction.
It must have been seen from this that transcendental
questions admit of transcendental answers only, that is, of
such which consist of mere concepts a priori without any
empirical admixture. Our question, however, is clearly
synthetical, and requires an extension of our knowledge
beyond all limits of experience, till it reaches the existence
of a Being which is to correspond to our pure idea, though
no experience can ever be adequate to it. Ac- [p. 638]
cording to our former proofs, all synthetical knowledge a
priori is possible only, if it conforms to the formal con-
ditions of a possible experience. All these principles
therefore are of immanent validity only, that is, they must
remain within the sphere of objects of empirical know-
ledge, or of phenomena. Nothing, therefore, can be
achieved by a transcendental procedure with reference to
the theology of a purely speculative reason.
If people, however, should prefer to call in question all
the former proofs of the Analytic, rather than allow them-
selves to be robbed of their persuasion of the value of the
proofs on which they have rested so long, they surely can-
not decline my request, when I ask them to justify them- [
selves, at least on this point, in what manner, and by what
kind of illumination they trust themselves to soar above
all possible experience, on the wings of pure ideas. I
must ask to be excused from listening to new proofs, or
to the tinkered workmanship of the old. No doubt the
choice is not great, for all speculative proofs end in the
one, namely, the ontological ; nor need I fear to be much
troubled by the inventive fertility of the dogmatical de-
fenders of that reason which they have delivered from the
{
he senses ; nor should I even, without con-
sidering myself a very formidable antagonist, decline the
challenge to detect the fallacy in every one of their
attempts, and thus to dispose of their pretensions. But
I know too well that the hope of better success [p. 639]
will never be surrendered by those who have once accus-
tomed themselves to dogmatical persuasion, and I therefore
restrict myself to the one just demand, that my opponents
should explain in general, from the nature of the human
understanding, or from any other sources of knowledge,
what we are to do in order to extend our knowledge en-
tirely a pnori^ and to carry it to a point where no possible
experience, and therefore no means whatever, is able to
secure to a concept invented by ourselves its objective
reality. In whatever way the understanding may have
reached that concept, it is clearly impossible that the
existcmc of its object could be found in it through anal-
ysis, because the very knowledge of the existence of the
object implies that it exists outside our thoughts. We
cannot in fact go beyond concepts, nor, unless we follow
the empirical connection by which nothing but phenomena
can be given, hope to discover new objects and imaginary
beings*
Although then reason, in its purely speculative appli-
cation, is utterly insufficient for this great undertaking,
namely, to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, it has
nevertheless this great advantage of being able to cornet
our knowledge of it, if it can be acquired from [p. 640]
elsewhere, to make it consistent with itself and every
intelligible view^ and to purify it from everything incom-
patible with the concept of an original Being, and from
all admixture of empirical limitations.
Transcendental Dialectic
51S
In spite of its insufficiency, therefore, transcendental
theology has a very important negative use, as a constant
test of our reason, when occupied with pure ideas only,
which, as such, admit of a transcendental standard only.
For suppose that on practical grounds the admission of
a highest and all-sufficient Being, as the highest intelli-
gence, were to maintain its validity without contradiction,
it would be of the greatest importance that we should be
able to determine that concept accurately on its transcen-
dental side^ as the concept of a necessary and most real
Being, to remove from "*■ what is contradictory to that
highest reality and purely phenomenal (anthropomorphic
in the widest sense), and at the same time to put an end
to all opposite assertions, whether atheistic^ dcistic^ or
anthropomorphistic. Such a critical treatment would not
be difficult, because the same arguments by which the
insufficiency of human reason in asserting the existence
of such a Being has been proved, must be sufficient also
to prove the invalidity of opposite assertions, [p. 641]
For whence can anybody, through pure speculation of
reason, derive his knowledge that there is no Supreme
Being, as the cause of all that exists, or that it can claim
none of those qualities which we, to judge from their
effects, represent to ourselves as compatible with the
dynamical realities of a thinking Being, or that, in the
latter case, they would be subject to all those limitations
which sensibility imposes inevitably on all the intelligences
known to us by experience?
For the purely speculative use of reason, therefore, the
Supreme Being remains, no doubt, an ideal only, but an
ideal without aflauu a concept which finishes and crowns
the whole of human knowledge, and the objective reality
p
dispensable in determining its concept, and in constantly
testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, and
not even always in harmony with its own ideas. Necessity,
infinity, unity, extra-mundane existence (not as a w^orld-
soul), eternity, free from conditions of time, omnipresence,
free from conditions of space, omnipotence, etc., all these
are transcendental predicates, and their purified [p. 642]
concepts, which are so much required for every theology,
can therefore be derived from transcendental theology only*
APPENDIX
TO THE Transcendental Dialectic
Of t/ie Reguiative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason
The result of all the dialectical attempts of \>i\v^ reason
does not only confirm what we proved in the t ran seen*
dental Analytic, namely, that all our conclusions, which
are to lead us beyond the field of possible experience,
are fallacious and groundless, but teaches us also this in
particular, that human reason has a natural inclination
to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are
as natural to it as categories to the understanding, with
this distinction, however, that while the latter convey
truth, that is, agreement of our concepts with their ob-
jects, the former produce merely an irresistible illusion,
against which we can defend ourselves by the severest
criticism only.
Transcendental Dialectic
S«7
Everything that is faunded in the nature of our fac-
ulties must have some purpose, and be in harmony with
the right use of them, if only we can guard against a
certain misunderstanding and discover their [p. 643]
proper direction. The transcendental ideas^ therefore*
will probably possess their own proper and, therefore,
immauctii use, although, if, their object is misunderstood,
and they are mistaken for the concepts of real things,
they may become transcendent in their application, and
hence deceptive. For not the idea in itself, but its use
only can, in regard to the whole of possible experience,
be cither (niNscemknt or immamnt, according as we direct
them either immediately to objects wrongly supposed to
correspond to thenii or only to the use of the understand-
ing in general with reference to objects with which it has
a right to deal All the faults of subreptio are to be
attributed to a want of judgment, never to the under-
standing or to reason themselves.
Reason never refers immediately to an object, but tor
the understanding only, and through it to its own empiri- y-*
cal use. It does not form, therefore, concepts of objects,
but arranges them only, and imparts to them that unity
which they can have in their greatest possible extension,
that is. with reference to the totality of different series ;
while the understanding does not concern itself with this
totality, but only with that connection through which
such series of conditions become possible according to
concepts. Reason has therefore for its object [p. 644]
the understanding only and its fittest employment ; and,
as the understanding brings unity into the manifold of the
objects by means of concepts^ reason brings unity into
the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, making a
certain collective unity the aim of the operations of the
understanding, which otherwise is occupied with distribu-
tive unity only
I maintain, accordingly, that transcendental ideas ought
never to be employed as constitutive, so that by them
concepts of certain objects should be given, and that, if
they arc so employed, they are merely sophistical (dia-
lectic concepts). They have, however, a most admirable
and indispensably necessary regulative use, in directing
the understanding to a certain aim, towards which all
the lines of its rules converge and which, though it is an
idea only {focus ima^imiruts), that is, a point from which,
as lying completely outside the limits of possible experi-
ence, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality
proceed, serves nevertheless to impart to them the greatest
unity and the greatest extension. Hence there arises, no
doubt, the illusion, as if those lines sprang * from an ob-
ject itself, outside the field of empirically possible experi-
ence (as objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror) ;
but this illusion (by which we need not allow ourselves to
be deceived) is nevertheless indispensably necessary, if,
besides the objects which lie before our eyes, [p. 645]
we want to see those also which lie far away at our back,
that is to say, if, as in our case, we wish to direct the
understanding beyond every given experience (as a part
of the whole of possible experience), and thus to its
greatest possible, or extremest extension.
If we review the entire extent of our knowledge sup-
plied to us by the understanding, we shall find that it
is the syst€maiising of that knowledge, that is, its cohe-
1 Read aus^sckfusen.
Transcendental Dialectic
519
rence according to one principICi which forms the proper
province of reason. This unity of reason always presup-
poses am idea, namely » that of the form of a whole of our
knowledge^ preceding the definite knowledge of its parts,
and containing the conditions according to which w*e are to
determine rt/r/f^r/ the place of every pari and its relation to
the rest. Such an idea accordingly demands the complete
unity of the knowledge of our understanding, by which
that knowledge becomes not only a mere aggregate but
a system, connected according to necessary laws. We
ought not to say that such an idea is a concept of an
object, but only of the complete unity of concepts, so far
as that unity can serve as a rule of the understanding.
Such concepts of reason are not derived from nature, but
we only interrogate nature, according to these ideas, and
consider our knowledge as defective so long as it is not
adequate to them. We must confess that [p, 646]
pure earthy pure water, pure air, etc., are hardly to be met
with. Nevertheless we require the concepts of them
{which, so far as their perfect purity is concerned, have
their origin in reason only) in order to be able to deter-
mine properly the share which belongs to every one of
these natural causes in phenomena. Thus every kind of
matter is referred to earths (as mere weight), to salts and
inflammable bodies (as force), and lastly, to water and air
as vehicles (or, as it were, machines, by which the former
exercise their operations), in order thus, according to the
idea of a mechanism, to explain the mutual chemical
workings of matter. For, although not openly acknow-
ledged in these terms, such an influence of reason on the
classifications of natural philosophers can easily be dis-
covered.
520 Transcendental Dialectic
If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from
the general, the general is either certain in itself and
given, or not. In the former case nothing is required
but judgment in subsuming^ the particular being thus
necessarily determined by the general. This I shall call
the apodictic use of reason. In the latter case» when the
general is admitted as problematical only, and as a mere
idea, while the particular is certain, but the universality
of the rule applying to it is still a problem, several par-
ticular cases, which are all certain, are tested by the rule,
whether they submit to it ; and in this case, when it
appears that all particular cases which can be produced
are subjected to it, the rule is concluded to be [p. 647]
universal, and from that universality of the rule conclu-
sions are drawn afterwards with regard to all cases, even
those that are not given by themselves. This I shall call
the hypothetical use of reason.
The hypothetical use of reason, resting on ideas as
problematical concepts, ought not to be used const it utively^
as if we could prove by it, judging strictly, the truth of
the universal rule, which has been admitted as an hypothe-
sis. For how are w^e to know all possible cases, which, as
subject to the same principle, should prove its universality ?
The proper hypothetical use of reason is regulative only,
and intended to introduce, as much as possible, unity into
the particulars of knowledge, and thus to approximate the
rule to universality.
The hypothetical use of reason aims therefore at the
systematical unity of the knowledge of the understanding,
and that unity is the ttntclisfonc of the truth of the rules.
On the other hand, that systematical unity (as a mere idea)
is only a projected unity, to be considered, not as given in
Transcendental Dialectic
521
itself, but as a problem only, though helping us to dis-
cover a principle for the manifold and particular exercise
of the understanding, and thus to lead the understanding
to cases also which are not given, and to render it more
systematicaL
We have learnt, therefore, that the systematical unity,
introduced by reason into the manifold know- [p. 648]
ledge of the understanding, is a logical principle, intended
to help the understanding by means of ideas, where by it-
self it is insufficient to establish rules, and at the same
time to impart to the variety of its rules a certain harmony
(or system according to principles), and by it a certain co-
herence, so far as that is possible. To say, however,
whether the nature of the objects or the nature of the
understanding which recognises them as objects, were in
themselves intended for systematical unity, and whether
to a certain extent we may postulate real nnity a priori^
without any reference to the peculiar interest of reason,
maintaining that all possible kinds of knowledge of the
understanding (therefore the empirical also) possess such
unity and are subject to such general principles from which,
in spite of their differences, they can all be derived, would
be to apply a tramcendcntal principle of reason, and to
render systematical unity necessary, not only subjectively
and logically as a method, but objectively also.
We shall try to illustrate this use of reason by an ex-
ample. One of the different kinds of unity, according to
the concepts of the understanding, is that of the causality
of a substance, which w^e call power The different mani-
festations of one and the same substance display at first
so much diversity that one feels constrained to admit at
first almost as many powers as there are effects. Thus
we see, for instance, in the human mind sensa-
tion, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, discrimina
tion, pleasure, desire, etc. At first a simple logical maxim
tells us to reduce this apparent diversity as much as
possible by discovering, through comparison, hidden iden-
tity, and finding out, for instance, whether imagination
connected with consciousness, be not memory, wit, dis-
crimination, or, it may be, understanding and reason.
The idea of ^ fundamental power ^ of which logic knows
nothing as to its existence, is thus at least the problem of
a systematical representation of the existing diversity of
powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to
produce this unity as far as possible, and the more we
find that manifestations of one or the other power are
identical, the more probable does it become that they are
only different expressions of one and the same power
which, relatively speaking, may be called their fnnda-
mcntai power. The same is done with the others.
These relatively fundamental powers must again be
compared with each other; in order, if possible, by dis-
covering their harmony, to bring them nearer to one only
radical, that is, absolute fundamental power Such a
unity, however, is only an hypothesis of reason. It is not
maintained that such a unity must really exist, but only
that we must look for it in the interest of reason, that is,
for the establishment of certain principles for the various
rules supplied to us by experience, and thus introduce, if
it is possible, systematical unity into our know- [p. 650]
ledge.
If, however, we watch the transcendental use of the
understanding, we find that the idea of a fundamental
power is not only meant as a problem, and for hypotheti-
Transcendental Dialectic
523
cal use, but claims for itself objective reality^ postulating
the systematical unity of the diverse powers of a sub-
stance, and thus establishing an apodictic principle of
reason. For without even having tested the harmony of
those diverse powers, nay, even if failing to discover it,
after repeated e.xperiments, we still suppose that such a
unity exists, and this not only, as in our example, on
account of the unity of the substance, but even in cases
where very many, though to a certain degree homo-
geneous, powers are seen, as in matter in general. Here,
too. reason presupposes a systematical unity of diverse
powers, because particular laws of nature are subject to
more general laws, and parsimony in principles is not only
considered as an economical rule of reason, but as an
essential law of nature.
And, indeed, it is difficult to understand how a logical
principle by which reason demands the unity of rules can
exist without a transcendental principle, by which such a
systematical unity is admitted as inherent in the objects
themselves, and as a priori necessary. For how could
reason in its logical application presume to treat [p. 651]
the diversity of powers which we see in nature as simply
a disguised unity, and to deduce it, as far as possible, from
some fundamental power, if it were open to reason to
admit equally the diversity of all powers, and to look upon
the systematical unity in their derivation as contrary to
nature? In doing this reason would run counter to its
own destination, and propose as its aim an idea contrary
to the constitution of nature. Nor could we say that
reason had previously, according to its principles, deduced
that unity from the contingent character of nature, because
this law of reason, compelling her to look for unity, is
I
524 Tramccndentai Dialectic
necessar)% and without it we should have no reason at
all, and, in the absence of reason, no coherent use of the
understanding, and, in the absence of that, no sufficient
test of empirical truth ; — on which account we must ad-
mit the systematical unity of nature as objectively valid
and necessary.
We find this transcendental presupposition concealed in
the cleverest way in the principles of philosophers, though
they are not aware of it, nor have confessed it to them-
selves. That all the diversities of particular things do not
exclude identity of species, that the varit>us species must
be treated as different determinations (varieties) [p. 652]
of a few genera, and these again of still higher gemra ;
that therefore we ought to look for a certain systematical
unity of all possible empirical concepts, as derivable from
higher and more general concepts, this is a rule of the
schools or a logical principle without which no use of the
understanding would be possible ; for we can only conclude
the particular from the general, if the general qualities of
things form the foundation on which the particular quali-
ties rest
That, however, there exists in nature such a unity, is
only a supposition of the philosophers, embodied in their
well-known scholastic rule, h'ntia practer nccessiiatan non
esse muliiplicanda^ * beginnings or principles should not
be multiplied beyond necessity.' It is implied in this,
that the nature of things itself offers material for the post-
ulated unity of reason, and that the apparent infinite vari-
ety ought not to prevent us from supposing behind it the
existence of unity in fundamental properties, from which
all diversity is derived by mere determination only. That
unity, though it is an idea only, has been at all times so
Transcendental Dhtiectic
525
zealously pursued, that tliere was more ground for moder*
ating than for encouraging the desire for it. It was some*
thing when chemists succeeded in reducing all salts to
two genera, namely, acids and alkalies ; but they tried to
consider even this distinction as a variety only, or as a
different manifestation of one and the same fun- [p. 653]
damental element. Different kinds of earths (the material
of stones and even of metals) have been reduced gradually
to three, at last to two ; but not content with this, chem-
ists cannot get rid of the idea that there is behind those
varieties but one genus, nay, that there may be even a com-
mon principle for the earths and the salts. It might be
supposed that this is only an economical trick of reasoa
for the purpose of saving itself trouble^ and a purely hy
pothetical attempt which, if successful, would impart by
that very unity a certain amount of probability to the
presupposed principle of explanation. Such a selfish pur*
pose, however, can easily be distinguished from the idea
according to which we all presupjx>se that this unity of
reason agrees with nature, and that in this case reason
does not beg but bids, although we may be quite unable,
as yet, to determine the limits of that unity.
If there existed among phenomena so great a diversity,
nut of form, for in this they may be similar, but of con-
tents, that even the sharpest human understanding could
not, by a comparison of the one w^ith the other, discover
the slightest similarity among them (a case which is quite
conceivable), the logical law of genera would [p. 654]
have no existence at all, there would be no concept of
genus, nor any general concept, nay, no understanding at
all, considering that the understanding has to do with
concepts only. The logical principle of genera prcf^
r
poses, therefore, a transcendental one, if it is to be applied
to nature, that is, to all objects presented to our senses.
According to it, in the manifoldness of a possible experi-
ence, some homogeneousness is necessarily supposed {al-
though it many be impossible to determine its degree a
priori), because without it, no empirical concepts, and con-
sequently no experience, would be possible.
The logical principle of genera, which postulates iden*
tity, is balanced by another principle, namely, that of
species, which requires manifoldness and diversity in
things, in spite of their agreement as belonging to the
same genus, and which prescribes to the understanding
that it should pay no less attention to the one than to
the other. This principle, depending on acute observa-
tion or on the faculty of distinction, checks the generalis-
ing flights of fancy, and reason thus exhibits a twofold
and conflicting interest, namely, on the one hand, the
interest in the extent (generality) of genera, on the other
hand, the interest in the contents (distinction) of the
manifoldness of species. Jn the former case the under-
standing thinks more under its concepts, in the latter,
more in its concepts. This distinction shows itself in
the different manner of thought among students [p. 655]
of nature, some of them (who are pre-eminently specula-
tive) being almost averse to heterogeneousness, and
always intent on the unity of genera ; while others, pre-
eminently empirical, are constantly striving to divide
nature into so much variety that one might lose almost
all hope of being able to judge its phenomena according
to general principles.
This latter tendency of thought is likewise based on
a logical principle which aims at the systematical com-
Transcendental DiaUcdc
5^7
pleteness of all knowledge, so that, beginning with the
genus and descending to the manifold that may be con-
tained in it, we try to impart extension to our system,
as we tried to impart unity to it, when ascending to a
genus. For if we only know the sphere of a concept
which determines a genus, we can no more judge how
far its subdivision may be carried than we can judge
how far the divisibility of matter may be carried^ by
knowing the space it occupies. Hence every genm
requires species, and these again sub-species^ and as none
even of these sub-species is without a sphere (extent as
conceptus communis), reason in its utmost extension re-
quires that no species or sub-species should in itself
be considered as the lowest. Every species is always a
concept containing that only which is common to differ-
ent things, and as it cannot be completely determined, it
cannot be directly referred to an individual, but [p. 656]
must always comprehend other concepts, that is, sub-
species. This principle of specification might be ex-
pressed by eniium varietates non temere esse minuendas.
It is easily seen that this logical law also would be
without meaning and incapable of application, unless it
were founded on a transcendental law of specification
which, though it cannot demand a real infinity of variety
in things that are to become our objects (for this would
not be justified by the logical principle^ which only asserts
the indetenninability of the logical sphere with regard to
a possible division), yet imposes on the understanding the
duty of looking for sub-species under every species, and
for smaller varieties for every variety. If there were no
lower concepts, there could not be higher concepts. Now
the understanding knows all that it knows by concepts
S
528 Transcendentai Dialectic
only, and hence, however far it may carry the division,
never by means of intuition alone, but again and again
by lower concepts. In order to know phenomena in
their complete deterniinatioo {which is possible by the
understanding only) it is necessary to carry on without
stopping the specification of its conceptSi and always
to proceed to still remaining differences or varieties of
which abstraction had been made in forming the con-
cept of the species, and still more in forming that of
the genus.
Nor can this law of specification have been [p. 657]
derived from experience, which can never give so far-
reaching a prospect. Empirical specification very soon
comes to a standstill in the distinction of the manifold,
unless it is led by the antecedent transcendental law of
specification* as a principle of reason » and impelled to
look for and to conjecture still differences, even where
they do not appear to the senses. That absorbent earths
are of different kinds (chalk and muriatic earths) could
only be discovered by an antecedent rule of reason, which
required the understanding to look for diversity, because
it presupposed such wealth in nature as to feel justified
in anticipating such diversity. For it is only under a
presupposition of a diversity in nature, and under the
condition that its objects should be homogeneous, that
we have understanding, because it is this very diversity
of all that can be comprehended under a concept which
constitutes the use of that concept, and the occupation
of the understanding.
Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding-^
1st. Through the principle of the homogenemisticss of
the manifold, as arranged under higher genera.
Transcendentai Diaicctk
529
2ndly. Through the principle of the variety of the
Aomogeiicons in lower species ; to which,
3Rlly, it iuUls a law of the affinity of all concepts,
which requires a continual transition from every species
to every other species, by a gradual increase of [p. 658]
diversity. We may call these the principles of homogene-
oitSHcss, of sptrijiiation, and of continuity of forms. The
last arises from the union of the two furmcr, after both
in ascending to higher genera, and in descending to lower
species, the systematical connection in the idea has been
completed ; so that all diversities are related to each
olher, because springing from one highest genus, through
all degrees of a more and more extended determination
We may represent to ourselves the systematical unity
under these three logical principles, in the following
manner. Every concept may be regarded as a point '
which, as the standpoint of the spectator, has its own
horizon, enclosing a number of things that may be repre-
sentetl, and, as it were, surveyed from that point. Within
that horizon, an infinite number of points must exist, each
of which has again its own narrower horizon ; that is,
every species contains sub-species, according to the prin-
ciple of specification, and the logical horizon consists of
smaller horizons (sub-species only), but not of points.
which possess no extent (individuals). Hut for all these
different horizons, that is genera, determined by as many
concepts, a common horizon may be imagined, in which
they may all be surveyed, as from a common centre. This
would be the higher genus, while the highest [p, 659]
genus would be the universal and true horizon, determined
from the standpoint of the highest concept, and compre-
hending all variety as genera, species, and sub-species.
an
530
Transcendental Dialectic
That highest standpoint is reached by the law of
homogeneousness, and all the lower standpoints in their
greatest variety, by the law of specification. As in this
way there is no void in the whole extent of all possible
concepts, and as nothing can be met with outside it,
there arises from the presupposition of that universal
horizon and its complete division » the principle of nan
fdutur vacuum formarum. According to this principle
there arc no different original and first genera, as it were
isolated and separated from each other {by an inter\^ening
void)» but all diverse genera are divisions only of one
/ supreme and general genus. From that principle springs
Y'its immediate consequence, datur continuum formarum ;
that is, all the diversities of species touch each other
and admit of no transition from one to another per
saitum, but only by small degrees of difference, by
^ w^hich from one we arrive at the other In one word,
there are neither species nor sub-species, which {in the
view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other,
but there always remain possible intermediate species,
differing from the first and the second by [p, 660]
smaller degrees than those by which these differ from
each other.
The first law, therefore, keeps us from admitting an
extravagant variety of different original genera, and recom-
mends attention to homogeneousness. The second, on
the contrary, checks that tendency to unity, and pre-
scribes distinction of sub-species before applying any
general concept to individuals. The third unites both,
by prescribing, even with the utmost variety, homogene-
ousness, through the gradual transition from the one
species to another; thus indicating a kind of relation-
Transcendental Dialectic
S3T
ship of the different branches, as having all sprung from
the same stem*
This logical law, however, of the continuum specicnim
{formamm logicarum) presupposes a transcendental law
{iex continui in natura), without which the understand-
ing would only be misled by following, it may be, a path
contrary to nature. That law must therefore rest on
purely transcendental, and not on empirical grounds.
For in the latter case, it would come later than the
systems, while in fact the systematical character of our
knowledge of nature is produced by it. Nor are these
laws intended only for tests to be carried out experiment
tally by their aid, although such a connection, if it is found
in nature, forms a powerful argument in support [p. 66 1 ]
of that unity which %vas conceived as hypothetical only.
These laws have therefore a certain utility in this respect
also, yet it is easily seen that they regard the parsimony
of causes, the manifoldness of effects, and an affinity be-
tween the parts of nature arising from thence, as both
rational and natural, so that these principles carry their
recommendation direct, and not only as aids towards a
proper method of studying nature.
It is easy to see, however, that this continuity of forms
is a mere idea, and that no object corresponding to it can
be pointed out in experience, m>t only because the species
in nature arc actually divided, and must form, each by it-
self, a quantum discretum^ while, if the gradual progression
of their affinity w^ere continuous, nature would contain a
real infinity of intermediate links between every two
given species, which is impossible ; but also, because we
cannot make any definite empirical use of that law*,
considering that not the smallest criterion of affinity is
ought to seek tor triem.
If we now arrange these principles of systematical nuiiy
in the order required for their empirical employ- [p. ^2\
ment, they might stand thus : manifoidHcsSj variety, and
ufiiiy, each of them as ideas taken in the highest degree
of their completeness. Reason presupposes the cognitions
of the understanding in their direct relation to experience,
and looks for their unity according to ideas which go
far beyond the possibility of experience. The affinity of
the manifold, in spite of its diversity, under one principle
of unity, refers not only to things, but even more to the
qualities and powers of things. Thus if, for example, our
imperfect experience represents to us the orbits of the
planets as circular^ and we find deviations from that course,
we look for them in that which is able to change the
circle according to a fixed law, through infinite interven-
ing degrees^ into one of these deviating courses ; that is,
wc suppose that the movements of the planets which are
not circular will approximate more or less to the proper-
ties of a circle, and thus are led on to the ellipse. The
comets display a still greater deviation in their courses,
because, so far as our experience goes, they do not return
in a circle, and we then conjecture a parabolic course
which, at all events, is allied to the ellipse, and if its
longer axis is widely extended, cannot be distinguished
from it in our observations. We thus arrive, [p. 663]
under the guidance of these principles, at a unity of the
different genera or kinds in the forms of these orbits,
and, proceeding still further, at a unity of the cause of all
the laws of their movements, namely, gravitation. Here
Transccndetiiat Dialectic
533
we take our staml and extend our conq nests, trying to
explain all varieties and seeming deviations from those
rules from the same principle, nay, adding more than ex-
perience can ever affirm, namely, imaginary hyperbolic
courses of comets constructed according to the rules of
affinity, in which courses these heavenly bodies may
entirely leave our solar system, and, moving from sun to
sun, unite in their course the most distant parts of a
universe unlimited to our minds, but yet held together
by one and the same moving power.
What is most remarkable in these principles, and is, in
fact, their chief interest for us is, that they seem to be
transcendental, and, although containing mere ideas for
the guidance of the empirical use of reason, ideas which
our reason can only follow as it were asymptotically, that
is» approximately and without our reaching them, they
nevertheless possess, as synthetical propositions a priari^
an objective, though an undeSned validity, serving as a
rule for possible experience, nay, as heuristic principles in
the elaboration of experience. With all this a transcen-
dental deduction of them cannot be produced, [p, 664]
and is, in fact, as we have proved before, always impossi-
ble with regard to ideas.
In the transcendental Analytic we distinguished the
(ivnamical principles of the understanding, as purely regu-
lative principles of the inittiiioti, from the mathematical^
which, in regard to intuition, are constitutive* In spite
irf this, these <lynamical laws are constitutive with regard
to experience, because they render the concepts, without
which there can be no experience, a prion possible. The
principles of pure reason, however, cannot be constitutive,
even with reference to empirical cattcepis, because we cannot
134 Transcendental Dialectic
assign to them any corresponding schema of sensibility ;
they cannot, consequently, have any object in concreta.
If, then, I give up an empirical use of them as constitutive
principles, how can I yet secure to them a regulative
employment, and with it some objective validity, and what
can be the meaning of it ?
The understanding forms an object for reason in the
same manner as sensibility for the understanding. It is
the proper business of reason to render the unity of all
possible empirical acts of the understanding systematical,
in the same manner as the understanding connects the
manifold of phenomena by concepts, and brings it under
empirical laws. The acts of the understanding, however,
without the schemata of sensibility, are undefined^ and in
the same manner the unity of reason is in itself [p. 665]
undefined %vith reference to the conditions under which,
and the extent to which, the understanding may connect
its concepts systematically. But although no schema of
intuition can be discovered for the perfect systematical
unity of all the concepts of the understanding, it is possi-
ble and necessary that there should be an analogon of
such a schema, and this is the idea of the maximum^ both
of the division and of the combination of the knowledge
of the understanding under one single principle. It is
quite possible to form a definite thought of what is great-
est and absolutely complete, when all restrictive condi-
tions that lead to an undefined manifoldness have been
omitted. In this sense the idea of reason forms an analo-
gon of the schema of sensibility, but with this difference,
that the application of the concepts of the understanding
to the schema of reason is not a knowledge of the object
itself, as in the case of the application of the categories
Transcendental Dialectic
535
to sensuous schemata, but only a rule or principle for the
systematical unity in the whole use of the understanding.
Now, as every principle which fixes a prion a perfect
unity of its use for the understanding is valid, though in-
directly only, for the object of experience also, it follows
that the principles of pore reason have objective reality
with reference to that object also, not, however, in order
to detcmiine anything therein, but only in order to indi-
cate the procedure by which the empirical and definite
use of the understanding may throughout re- [p. t^^
main in complete harmony with itself, by being brought
into connection, as much as possible, with the principle of
systematical unity, and being deduced from it.
I call all subjective principles which are derived, not
from the quality of an object, but from the interest which
reason takes in a certain possible perfection of our know-
ledge of an object, maxims of reason. Thus there are
maxims of speculative reason, which rest entirely on its
speculative interest, though they may seem to be objec-
tive principles.
When purely regulative principles are taken for consti-
tutive, they may become contradictory, as objective prin-
ciples. If, however, they are taken for maxims only,
there is no real contradiction, but it is only the differ-
ent interest of reason which causes different modes of
thought. In reality, reason has one interest only, and
the conflict of its maxims arises only from a difference
and a mutual limitation of the methods in which that
interest is to be satisfied.
In this manner one philosopher is influenced more by
the interest of diversity (according to the principle of
specification), another by the interests of unity (according
536 Transcendental Dialectic
to the principle of aggregation). Each beUeves [p, 667]
that he has derived his judgment from his insight into
the object, and yet founds it entirely on the greater or
smaller attachment to one of the two principles, neither^
of which rests on objective grounds, but only on an in-
terest of reason, and should therefore be called maxims
rather than principles. I often see even intelligent men
quarrelling with each other about the characteristic dis-
tinctions of men, animals, or plants, nay, even of minerals,
the one admitting the existence of certain tribal charac-
teristics, founded on descent, or decided and inherited
differences of families, races, etc., while others insist that
nature has made the same provision for all, and that all
differences are due to accidental environment. But they
need only consider the nature of the object, in order to
understand that it is far too deeply hidden for hoth of
them to enable them to speak from a real insight into the
nature of the object. It is nothing but the twofold inter-
est of reason, one party cherishing the one, another party
the other, or pretending to do so. But this difference of
the two maxims of manifoldness or unity in nature may
easily be adjusted, though as long as they are taken for
objective knowledge they cause not only disputes, but
actually create impediments which hinder the progress
of truth, until a means is found of reconciling [p.* 668]
the contradictory interests, and thus giving satisfaction
to reason.
The same applies to the assertion or denial of the
famous law of the continuous scale of created beings, first
advanced by Leibniz, and so cleverly trimmed up by
1 Read kiin^r instead of ktin^.
Transcendental Dialectic
537
Bonnet. It is nothing but a carrying out of the prin-
ciple of affinity, resling on the interest of reason ; for
neither observation nor insight into the constitution of
nature could ever have supplied it as an objective asser-
tion. The steps of such a ladder, as far as they can be
supplied by experiencCj are too far apart from each other,
and the so-called small differences are often in nature
itself such wide gaps that no value can be attached to
such observations as revealing the intentions of nature,
particularly as it must always be easy to discover in the
great variety of things certain similarities and approxi-
mations. The method, on t!ie contrary, of looking for
order in nature, according to such a principle, and the
maxim of admitting such order (though it may be uncer-
tain where and how far) as existing in nature in general,
form certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative prin-
ciple of reason, only that, as such, it goes far beyond
where experience or observation could follow it It only
indicates the way which leads to systematical unity, but
does not determine anything beyond.
Of ike Ultimate Aim of the Natural Dialectic cf
Human Reason [p, 669]
The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in
themselves, but it must be due to their misemployment,
if a deceptive illusion arise from them. They are given
to us by the nature of our reason, and this highest tribu-
nal of all the rights and claims of speculation cannot
possibly itself contain original fallacies and deceits. We
must suppose, therefore, that they had a good and legiti-
mate intention in the natural disposition of our reason.
V
538 Transcendentai Dtakctic
The mob of sophists, however, cry out as usual about
absurdities and contradictions, and blame the govern-
ment the secret plans of which they cannot even under-
stand, while it is to its beneficent influence that they owe
their protection and that amount of intelligence which
enables them to blame and condemn the government.
Wc cannot use a concept a ptiori with any safety,
without having first established its transcendental deduc-
tion. It is true the ideas of pure reason do not allow
of a deduction in the same manner as the categories ;
but if they are to claim any, though only an undefined
objective validity, and are not to represent mere fictions
of thought only (cntia rationis ratiociuantis)^ a [p, 670]
deduction of them must be possible, even though it may
differ from that which we were able to give of the cate-
gories. This will form the completion of the critical
task of pure reason, and it is this which we now mean
to undertake.
It makes a great diflference whether something is repre-
sented to our reason as an object absoluteiy, or merely as
an object in the idea. In the former case my concepts are
meant to determine the object, in the latter there is only
a schema to which no object, not even a hypothetical one,
corresponds directly, but which only serves to represent to
ourselves indirectly other objects through their relation
to that idea, and according to their systematical unity.
Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a
mere idea, that is, that its objective reality is not to con-
sist in its referring directly to any object (for in that sense
we should not be able to justify its objective validity) ; but
that it is only a schema, arranged according to the condi-
tions of the highest unity of reason, of the concept of a
Transcendental Dialectic
539
thing in general, serving only to obtain the greatest syste-
matical unity in the empirical use of our reason, by helping
us> as it were, to deduce the object of experience from the
imagined object of that idea as its ground or cause.
Thus we are led to say» for instance, that the [p. 671] "7
things of the world must be considered as if they owed
their existence to some supreme intelligence ; and the \
idea is thus a heuristic only, not an ostensive concept,
showing us not how an object is really constituted, but
how we, under the guidance of that concept, should look
for the constitution and connection of the objects of
experience in general. If, then, it can be shown that
the three transcendental ideas (the psychological, cosma-
hgical^ and theological)^ although they cannot be used
directly to determine any object corresponding to them,
yet as rules* of the empirical use of reason will leadp
under the presupposition of such an object in the idea^
to a systematical unity, and to an extension of our em*
pirical knowledge, without ever running counter to this
knowledge, it becomes a necessary maxim of reason to act
in accordance with such ideas. And this is really the tran-
scendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason,
considered not as constitutive principles for extending
our knowledge to more objects than can be given by
experience, but as regulative principles for the systemat-
ical unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in
general, which knowledge, within its own limits, can
thus be better arranged and improved than it would
be possible without such ideas, and by the mere use of
the principles of the understanding.
1 Instead of atlt re«d mk*
C40 Transcendental Dialectic
I shall try to make this clearer. Following [p. 672]
these itleas as principles, we shall first {in psychology) con-
nect all phenomena, all the activity and receptivity of our
mind, according to our internal experience, as if our mind
were a simple substance, existing permanently, and with
personal identity (in this life at least), while its states, to
which those of the body belong as external conditions, arc
changing continually. Secondly (in cosmology), we are
bound to follow up the conditions both of internal and
external natural phenomena in an investigation that can
never become complete, looking upon this investigation
as infinite, and without any first or supreme member; but
we ought not therefore to deny the purely intelligible first
grounds of these phenomena, as outside of them, though
not allowed to bring them ever into connection w4th our
explanations of nature, for the simple reason that we do not
know them. Thirdly, and lastly (in theology), we must
consider everything that may belong to the whole of possi*
ble experience as if that experience formed one absolute
but thoroughly dependent, and always, within the world of
sense, conditioned unity ; but, at the same time, as if it,
the whole of phenomena (the world of sense itself), had
one supreme and all-sufficient ground, outside its sphere,
namely, an independent, original, creative reason, in refer-
ence to which we direct all empirical use of our [p. ^'^'^
reason in its widest extension in such a way as if the
objects themselves had sprung from that archetype of all
reason. In other words, we ought nt)t to derive the in-
ternal phenomena of the soul as if from a simple thinking
substance, but derive them from each other, according to
the idea of a simple being; we ought not to derive the
order and systematical unity of the world from a supreme
^
Tra nscvn den (a I Dia Ice tic
541
■nteHigcnce, but borrow from the idea of a supremely wise
cause the rule according to which reason may best be used
for her own satisfaction in the connection of causes and
effects in this world.
Now there is nothing that could in the least prevent us
from admitting these ideas as objective and hypostatical
also, except in the case of the cosmological idea, where
reason, when trying to carry it out objectively, is met by
an antinomy. There is no such antinomy in tlie psycho-
logical and theological idcas» and how could anybody con-
test their objective reality, as he know^s as little how to
deny, as we how to assert, their possibility ?
It is true nevertheless that, in order to admit anything,
it is not enough that there should be no positive impedi-
ment to it, nor are we allowed to introduce fictions of our
thoughts, transcending all our concepts, though contradict-
ing none, as real and definite objects, on the mere credit
of our somewhat perfunctory speculative reason, [p* 674]
They should not therefore be admitted as real in them-
selves, but their reality should only be considered as the
reality of a schema of a regulative principle for the sys-
tematical unity of all natural knowledge. Hence they are
to be admitted as analoga only of real things, and not as
real things in themselves. We remove from the object
of an idea the conditions which limit the concepts of our
understanding, and which alone enable us to have a definite
concept of anything ; and then we represent to ourselves
a something of which we know not in the least what it is
by itself, but which, nevertheless, we represent to ourselves
in a relation to the whole of phenomena, analogous to that
relation which phenomena have among themselves.
\i therefore wc admit such ideal beings, we do not really
542 Transcendental Dialectic
enlarge our knosvledge beyond the objects of possible
experience, but only the empirical unity of those objects,
by means of that systematical unity of which the idea
furnishes us the schema, and which therefore cannot claim
to be a constitutive, but only a regulative principle. For
if we admit a something, or a real* being, corresponding to
the idea, wc do not intend thereby to enlarge our know-
ledge of things by means of transcendental ^ concepts ;
for such a being is admitted in the idea only, and not by
itself, and only in order to express that systematical unity
which is to guide the empirical use of our reason, [p. 675]
without stating anything as to what is the ground of that
unity or the internal nature of such a being on which, as
its cause, that unity depends.
Thus the transcendental and the only definite concept
which purely speculative reason gives us of God is in the
strictest sense deistic ; that is, reason does not even supply
us with the objective validity of such a concept, but only
with the idea of something on which the highest and neces-
sary^ unity of all empirical reality is founded, and which we
cannot represent to ourselves except in analogy with a
real substance, being, according to the laws of nature, the
cause of all things ; always supposing that we undertake
to think it at all as a particular object, and, satisfied with
the mere idea of the regulative principle of reason, do not
rather put aside the completion of all the conditions of our
thought, as too much for the human understanding, which,
however, is hardly compatible with that perfect systematic
J The early etlitioBs read trnnsctndenten^ instead of tranuendentaten^ which
is given in the corrigcnila of the Fifth ^Edition; it is not impoasibltf, however»
that Kant may have meant to write iramcendenUn^ in order to indicate the
illegitimate use of these concepts.
TraHscendental Dialectic
543
cal unity of our knowledge to which reason at least imposes
no limits.
Thus it happens that, if we admit a Divine Being, we
have not the slightest conception either of the interna!
possibility of its supreme perfection, nor of the [p. 676]
necessity of its existence, but are able at least thus to
satisfy all other questions relating to contingent things,
and give the most perfect satisfaction to reason with
reference to that highest unity in its empirical applica-
tion that has to be investigated, but not in reference to
that hypothesis itself. This proves that it is the specu-
lative interest of reason, and not its real insight, which
justifies it in starting from a point so far above its proper
sphere, in order to survey from thence its objects, as be-
longing to a complete whole.
Here we meet with a distinction in our mode of thought,
the premisses remaining the same, a distinction which is
somewhat subtle, bot of great importance in transcen-
dental philosophy. I may have sufficient ground for
admitting something relatively {suppositia rclativa), with-
out having a right to admit it absolutely {suppositio abso-
Ififa), This distinction comes in when we have to deal
with a regulative principle, of which we know the neces-
sity by itself, but not the source of this necessity, and
where we admit a supreme cause» only in order to think
the universality of the principle with greater definiteness.
Thus, if I think of a being as existing which corresponds
to a mere idea, and to a transcendental one, I ought not
to admit the existence of such a being by itself, because
BO concepts through which I can conceive any [p. 67j\
object definitely, can reach it, and the conditions of the
objective validity of my concepts are excluded by the idea
544 Transcendental Dialectic
itself. The concepts of reality, of substance, even of
causality, and those of necessity in existence, have no
meaning that could determine any object, unless they are
used to make the empirical knowledge of an object pos-
sible. They may be used, therefore, to explain the possi-
biHty of things in the world of sense, but not to explain
the possibility of a universe itself^ because such an hy*
pothesis is outside the world and could never be an object
of possible experience, I can, however, admit perfectly
well such an inconceivable Being, being the object of a
mere idea, relative to the world of sense, though not as
existing by itself. For if the greatest possible empirical
use of my reason depends on an idea (on the systemati-
cally complete unity of which I shall soon speak more in
detail), which by itself can never be adequately represented
in experience, though it is indispensably necessary in order
to bring the empirical unity as near as possible to the
highest perfection, I shall not only have the right, but
even the duty, to realise such an idea, that is, to assign
to it a real object, though only as a something in general,
which by itself I do not know at all, and to whith, as the
cause of that systematical unity, I ascribe, in reference to
it, such qualities as are analogous to the concepts [p. 6y^\
employed by the understanding in dealing with experi-
ence. I shall, therefore, according to the analogy of
realities in the world, of substances, of causality, and of
necessity, conceive a Being possessing all these in the
highest perfection, and, as this idea rests on my reason
only, conceive that Being as self-subsistent reason^ being,
through the ideas of the greatest harmony and unity, the
cause of the universe. In doing this I omit all conditions
which could limit the idea, simply in order to render, with
Transcendental Dialectic
545
the help of such a fundamental cause, the systematical unity
of the manifold in the universe, and, through it, the great-
est possible empirical use of reason, possible. I then look
upon all connections in the world as if they were ordered
by a supreme reason, of which our own reason is but a
faint copy, and I represent to myself that Supreme Being
through concepts which, properly speaking, are applicable
to the world of sense only. As, however, I make none
but a relative use of that transcendental hypothesis, as the
substratum of the greatest possible unity of experience, I
may perfectly well represent a Being which I distinguish
from the world, by qualities which belong to the world of
sense only. For I demand by no means, nor am I justi-
fied in demanding, that I should know that object of my
idea, according to what it may be by itself, I have no
concepts whatever for it, and even the concepts [p. 679]
of reality, substance, causality, ay, of the necessity in
existence, lose all their meaning, and become mere titles
of concepts, void of contents, as soon as I venture with
them outside the field of the senses. I only present to
myself the relation of a Being, utterly unknown to me as
existing by itself, to the greatest possible systematical
unity of the universe, in order to use it as a schema of the
regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical use
of my reason.
If now we glance at the transcendental object of our
idea, we find that we cannot, according to the concepts
of reality, substance, causality, etc, presuppose its reality
by itself, because such concepts are altogether inapplicable
to something totally distinct from the world of sense.
The supposition, therefore, which reason makes of a Su-
preme Being, as the highest cause, is relative only, devised
2X
I
for the sake of the systematical unity in the world of
sense, and a mere Something in the idea, while we have
no concept of what it may be by itself. Thus we are able
to understand why we require the idea of an original Beuig,
necessary by itself^ with reference to all that is given to
the senses as existing, but can never have the slightest
conception of it and of its absolute necessity.
At this point we are able to place the results of the
whole transcendental Dialectic clearly before our eyes,
and to define accurately the final aim of the ideas [p. 680]
of pure reason, which could become dialectical through
misapprehension and carelessness only. Pure reason is,
in fact, concerned with nothing but itself, nor can it have
any other occupation, because what is given to it are not
the objects intended for the unity of an empirical concept,
but the knowledge supplied by the understanding for the
unity of the concept of reason, that is, of its connection
according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity
of a system, and that systematical unity does not serve
objectively as a principle of reason to extend its sway over
objects, but subjectively as a maxim to extend its sway
over all possible empirical knowledge of objects. Never-
theless, the systematical connection which reason can im-
part to the understanding in its empirical use helps not
only to extend that use, but confirms at the same time its
correctness ; nay, the principle of such systematical unity
is objective also, though in an indefinite manner {princi-
pium vagtim)y not as a constitutive principle, determining
something in its direct object, but only as a regulative
principle and maxim, advancing and strengthening in-
finitely (indefinitely), the empirical use of reason by the
opening of new paths unknown to the understanding.
Transcendental Dialectic
S47
without ever running counter to the laws of its practical
use.
Reason* however, cannot think this systemat- [p. 68i] ^
ical unity, without attributing to its idea an object, which,
as experience has never given an example of complete
systematical unity, can never be given in any experience, f
This Beings demanded by reason {ens nxtionis raiiocitiatae),
is no doubt a mere idea, and not therefore received as
something absolutely real and real by itsilf. It is only s
admitted problematically (for we cannot reach it by any
concepts of the understanding), in order to enable us to
look upon the connection of things in the world of sense,
as ?/they had their ground in that being, the real intention
being to found upon it that systematical unity which is
indispensable to reason, helpful in every way to the empir-
ical knowledge of the understanding, and never a hin-
drance to it.
We misapprehend at once the true meaning of that idea,
if we accept it as the assertion, or even as the hypothesis
of a real thing to which the ground of the systematical
construction of the world should be ascribed. What we
ought to do is to leave it entirely uncertain, what that
ground which escapes all our concepts may be by itself,
and to use the idea only as a point of view from which
alone we may expand that unity which is as essential to
reason as beneficial to the understanding. In one word,
that transcendental thing is only the schema of [p. 682]
the regulative principle with which reason spreads syste-
mat ical unity, as far as possible, over all experience.
The first object of such an idea is the ego, considered
merely as a thinking nature (soul). Now if I want to
know the qualities with which a thinking being exists in
54^ Transcendeniai Dialectic
itself, I have to consult experience : but of all the cate-
gories, I cannot apply a single one to that object, unless its
schema is given in sensuous intuition. Thus, however, I
can never arrive at a systematical unity of all the phe-
nomena of the internal sense. Reason, therefore, instead
of taking from experience the concept of that which the
soul is in reality, which would not lead us very far, prefers
the concept of the empirical unity of all thought, and by
representing that unity as unconditioned and original, it
changes it into a concept of reason, or an idea of a simple
substance, a substance unchangeable in itself (personally
identical), and in communication with other real things
outside it ; in one word, into a simple self-subsistent intel-
ligence. In doing this, its object is merely to find prin-
ciples of systematical unity for the explanation of the
phenomena of the soul, so that all determinations may be
received as existing in one subject, all powers, as much as
possible, as derived from one fundamental power, and
all changes as belonging to the states of one and the
same permanent beings while all phenomena in [p, 6%i\
space are represented as totally different from the acts of
thought. That simplicity of substance, etc., was only
meant to be the schema of this regulative principle ; it is
not assumed to be the real ground of all the properties of
the soul. These properties may rest on quite different
grounds, of which we know nothing ; nor could we know
the soul even by these assumed predicates by itself, even
if we regarded them as absolutely valid with regard to it,
for they really constitute a mere idea which cannot be
represented /// concreto. Nothing but good can spring from
such a psychological idea, if only we take care not to take
it for more than an idea^ that is, if we apply it only in re-
P
Transcendental Dialectic
549
ration to the systematical use of reason, with reference to
the phenomena of our soul. For in that case no empirical
taws of corporeal phenomena, which are of a totally
dififerent kind, are mixed up with the explanation of what
belongs to the internal sense ; and no windy hypothesis
of generation, extinction, and palingenesis of souls are ad-
mitted. The consideration of this object of the internal
sense remains pure and unmixed with heterogeneous mat-
ters, while reason in its investigations is directed towards
tracing all the grounds of explanation, as far as possible, to
one single principle ; and this can best be achieved, [p. 684]
nay, cannot be achieved otherwise but by such a schema
which attributes to the soul hypothetically the character
of a real being. The psychological idea cannot be any-
thing but such a schema of a regulative concept. The
very question, for instance, whether the soul by itself be
of a spiritual nature, would have no meaning, because, by
such a concept, I should take away not only corporeal, but
all nature, that is, all predicates of any possible experience,
and therefore all the conditions under which the object of
such a concept could be thought ; and, in that case, the
concept would have no meaning at all.
The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the
concept of the universe. For nature is really the only
object given to us in regard to which reason requires
regulative principles. Nature, however, is twofold, cither
thinking or corporeal In order to think the internal
possibility of the latter, that is, in order to determine the
application of the categories to it, we require no idea, that
is, no representation which transcends experience. Nor
is such an idea possible in regard to it, because we are
here guided by sensuous intuition only, different from
5 so Trafiscendcntai Dialectic
what it was in the case of the psychological fundamental
concept of the I, which contains a priari 2. certain form of
thought, namely, the unity of the I. There remains there-
fore for pure reason nothing to deal with hut [p. 685]
nature in general, and the completeness of its conditions
according to some principle. The absolute totality of the
scries of these conditions determining the derivation of all
their members, is an idea which, tbough never brought to
perfection in the empirical use of reason, may yet become
a rule, telling us how to proceed in the explanation of
given phenomena (whether in an ascending or descending
line), namely, as if the series were in themselves infinite,
that is, in indcfinitum ; while, when reason itself is con-
sidered as the determining cause (in freedom), in the case
of practical principles therefore, we must proceed as if we
had to deal, not with an object of the senses, but with one
of the pure understanding. Here the conditions are no
longer placed within the series of phenomena, but outside
it, and the series of states considered, as if it had an ab-
solute beginning through an intelligible cause. All this
proves that cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative
principles, and by no means constitutive, as establishing a
real totality of such series. The remainder of this argu-
ment may be seen in its place, namely, in the chapter on
the Antinomy of Pure Reason.
The third idea of pure reason, containing a merely
relative hypothesis of a Being which is the only and all-
sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the idea of
God, We have not the slightest ground tn [p. 686]
admit absolutely the object of that idea (to suppose it in
itself) ; for what could enable, or even justify us in be-
lieving or asserting a Being of the highest perfection, and
Transcendental Dialectic
551
absolutely necessary from its very nature, on the strength
of its concept only, except the world with reference to
which alone such an hypothesis may be called necessary ?
We then perceive that the idea of it, like all speculative
ideas, means no more than that reason requires us to con-
sider all connection in the world according to the princi-
ples of a systematical unity, and, therefore, as if the whole
of it had sprung from a single all-embracing Being, as its
highest and all-sufficient cause. We see, therefore, that
reason can have no object here but its own formal rule in
the extension of its empirical use, but can never aim at
extension beyond all limits of its empirical application.
This idea, therefore, docs not involve a constitutive princi-
ple of its use as applied to possible experience.
The highest formal unity, which is based on concepts of
reason alone, is the systematical and purposeful unity of
things, and it is the speculative interest of reason which
makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if
it had originated in the purpose of a supreme wisdom.
Such a principle opens to our reason in the field of experi-
ence quite new views, how to connect the things [p. 687]
of the world according to teleological laws, and thus to
arrive at their greatest systematical unity. The admis-
sion of a highest intelligence, as the only cause of the
universe, though in the idea only, can therefore always
benefit reason, and yet never injure it. For if, with re-
gard to the figure of the earth (which is round, though
somewhat flattened ^), of mountains, and seas, etc., we
^ The ailvftntage which amM from the circtilar shape of the earth is well
know^; btit few unly know that its naUcnin)^, which gives it the form of a
tphfroid, alone prevents the etevations of cuntinents, or even of smaller vol-
canically raised mountains, from continiioasly and, within no very great space
552 Tratiscendental Dialectic
admit at once nothing but wise intentions of their author,
we are enabled to make in this wise a number of impor-
tant discoveries. If we keep to this hypothesis as a purely
regulative principle, even error cannot hurt us much ; for
the worst that could happen would be that, when we
expected a teleological connection {nexus finalis)^ wc only
find a mechanical or physical (nexus effectivus)^ in which
case we merely lose an additional unity, but we [p. 688]
do not destroy the unity of reason in its empirical applica-
tion. And even this failure could not affect the law itself,
in its general and teleological character. For although an
anatomist may be convicted of error, if referring any
member of an animal body to a purpose of which it can
clearly be shown that it does not belong to it, it is
entirely impossible in any given case to prove that an
arrangement of nature, be it what it may, has no purpose
at all. Medical physiology, therefore, enlarges its very
limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the mem-
hers of an organic body by a principle inspired by pure
reason only, so far as to admit confidently, and with the
approbation of all intelligent persons, that everything in
an animal has its purpose and advantage. Such a suppo-
sition, if used constitutively, goes far beyond where our
present observation would justify us in going, which
shows that it is nothing but a regulative principle of rea-
son, leading us on to the highest systematical unity, by
of time, considerably allerinfj the a.xis of the earth. The protuberance of the
earth at the pr|uator forms however so considerable a mountain, Uiat the
impetus of every other mountain can never drive it perceptibly out of its
pusilian with reference to the axis of the earth. And yet people do nut hesi-
tate to explain this wise arrangement simply from the equilibrium of the once
fluid mass.
Transcendental Dialectic 553
the" idea of an intelligent causality in the supreme cause of
the world, and by the supposition that this, as the highest
intelligence, is the cause of everything, according to the
wisest design.
But if we remove this restriction of the idea [p. 689]
to a merely regulative use, reason is led away in many
ways. It leaves the ground of experience^ which ought
always to show the vestiges of its progress, and ventures
beyond it to what is inconceivable and unsearchable, be-
coming giddy from the very height of it, and from seeing
itself on that high standpoint entirely cut ofif from its
proper work in agreement with experience.
The first fault which arises from our using the idea of a
Supreme Being, not regulatively only, but (contrary to the
nature of an idea) constitutively, is what I call the indo-
lence of reason {ignava ratio^). We may so term every
principle which causes us to look on our investigation of
nature, wherever it may be, as absolutely complete, so
that reason may rest as if her task were fully [p. 690]
accomplished. Thus the task of reason is rendered very
easy even by the psychological idea, if that idea is used as
a constitutive principle for the explanation of the phe-
nomena of our soul, and afterwards even for the extension
of our knowledge of this subject beyond all possible
experience (its state after death) ; but the natural use of
reason, under the guidance of experience, is thus entirely
^ This was a name given by the utd dialectic iant lo a tophistical argument,
which rat) thus: If it is your fate that you »hould recorv«r from this iUnes«*
you will recover, whether you send for a doctor or not. Cicero says that
this ari^ment was calks I ignava raha^ because, if we followed it, reason
wouM have no use al all in life. It is for this reason that I apply the
name to this sophistical argument of pure remion.
I
554 Transcendental Dialectic
ruined and destroyed. The dogmatical spiritualist finds
no difficulty in explaining the unchanging unity of the
person, amidst all the changes of condition^ from the unity
of the thinking substance, which he imagines he perceives
directly in the I; — or the interest which we take in
things that are to happen after death, from the conscious-
ness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, and
so on, ^ He dispenses with all investigations of the origin
of these internal phenomena from physical causes, passing
by, as it were, by a decree of transcendent reason, the
immanent sources of knowledge given by experience.
This may be convenient to himself, but involves a sacri-
fice of all real insight. These detrimental consequences
become still more palpable in the dogmatism involved in
our idea of a supreme intelligence, and of the theological
system of nature, erroneously based on it {physico-theol-
ogy). For here all the aims which we observe [p, 691]
in nature, many of which we only imagined ourselves,
serve to make the investigation of causes extremely easy,
if, instead of looking for them in the general mechanical
laws of matter, we appeal directly to the unsearchable
counsel of the supreme wisdom, imagining the efforts of
our reason as ended, when we have really dispensed with
its employment, which nowhere finds its proper guidance,
except where the order of nature and the succession of
changes, according to their own internal and general laws,
supply it. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely
consider certain parts of nature, such as the distribution
of land, its structure, the constitution and direction of
certain mountains, or even the organisation of plants and
animals, from the standpoint of final aims, but look upon
this systematical unity of nature as something ^^«*^m/, in
Tmnscendeniai Dialectic
S5S
relation to the idea of a supreme intelligence. For, in
this case, we look upon nature as founded on intelHgent
purposes, according to general laws, no particular arrange-
ment of nature being exempt from them, but only exhibit-
ing them more or less distinctly. We have then, in fact,
a regulative principle of the systematical unity in a teleo-
logical connection, though we do not determine it before-
hand, but only look forward to it expectantly, while follow-
ing up the physico-mcchanical connection accord- [p, 692]
ing to general laws. In this way alone can the principle of
systematical and intelligent unity enlarge the use of rea*
son with reference to experience, without at any time
being prejudicial to it
The second error, arising from the misapprehension
of the principle of systematical unity, is that of per-
verted reason {perversa ratio, wrrtpop Trporepov ratianis).
The idea of systematic unity was only intended as a
regulative principle for discovering that unity, accord-
ing to general laws, in the connection of things, be-
lieving that we have approached the completeness of
its use by exactly so much as we have discovered of
it empirically, though never able to reach it fully. In-
stead of this, the procedure is reversed ; the reality of
a principle of systematical unity is at once admitted and
hypostasiscd, the concept of such a supreme intelligence,
though being in itself entirely inscrutable, is determined
anthropomorphically, and aims are afterwards imposed
on nature violently and dictatorially. instead of Wking
for them by means of physical investigation. Thus
teleology, which was meant to supplement the unity of
nature according to general laws, contributes only [693]
to destroy it, and reason deprives itself of its own aim,
55^ Transcendental Dialectk
namely, that of proving the existence of such an intelli-
gent supreme cause from nature. For, if we may not
presuppose a priori the most perfect design in nature
as belonging to its very essence, what should direct
us to look for it, and to try to approach by degrees to
the highest perfection of an author, that is, to an abso-
lutely necessary and a pnon intelligible perfection ? The
regulative principle requires us to admit absolutely, and
as following from the very nature of things, systematical
unity as an //////;' of naiure^ which has not only to be
known empirically, but must be admitted a priori ^ though
as yet in an indefinite form only. But if I begin with a
supreme ordaining Beings as the ground of all things^ the
unity of nature is really surrendered as being quite
foreign to the nature of things, purely contingent, and
not to be known from its own general laws. Thus
arises a vicious circle by our presupposing what, in reality,
ought to have been proved.
To mistake the regulative principle of the systemat-
ical unity of nature for a constitutive principle, and to pre-
suppose hypostatically as cause, what is only in the idea
made the foundation for the consistent use of [p, 694]
reason, is simply to confound reason. The investigation
of nature pursues its own course, guided by the chain
of natural causes only, according to general laws. It
knows the idea of an author, but not in order to derive
from it that system of purposes which it tries to discover
everywhere, but in order to recognise his existence from
those purposes, which are sought in the essence of
the things of nature, and, if possible, also in the essence
of all things in general, and consequently to recognise his
existence as absolutely necessary. Whether this succeeds
Tmnsctudental Dialectic
117
or not, the idea itself remains always true, as well as its
use^ if only it is restricted to the conditions of a merely
regulative principle.
Complete unity of design constitutes perfection (abso-
lutely considered). If we do not find such perfection
in the nature of the things which form the object of ex-
perience, that is, of all our objectively valid knowledge;
if we do not find it in the general and necessary laws of
nature, how shall we thence infer the idea of a supreme
and absolutely necessary perfection of an original Being,
as the origin of all causality? The greatest systematical
and, therefore, well-planned unity teaches us, and first
enables us, to make the widest use of human reason, and
that idea is, therefore, inseparably connected with [p. 695]
the very nature of our reason. That idea becomes, in
fact, to us a law, and hence it is very natural for us
to assume a conges ponding lawgiving reason {intellect us
tiniietypNs) from which, as the object of our reason, all
systematical unity of nature should be derived.
When discussing the antinomy of pure reason, we
remarked that all questions raised by pure reason must
admit of an answer, and that the excuse derived from the
natural limits of our knowledge, which in many ques*
tions concerning nature is as inevitable as it is just, can-
not be admitted here, because questions are here placed
before us through the very nature of our reason, refer-
ring entirely to its own natural constitution, and not to
the nature of things. We have now an opportunity of
confirming this assertion of ours, which at first sight may
have appeared rash, with regard to the two questions in
which pure reason takes the greatest interest, and of thus
bringing to perfection our considerations on the Dialectic
of pure reason.
If, then, wc are asked the question (with reference to
a transcendental theology),^ Firsts whether there is some-
thing different from the world, containing the [p. 696]
ground of the order of the world and of its connection
according to general laws ? our answer is, Certainly there
is. For the world is a sum of phenomena, and there
most, therefore, be some transcendental ground of it, that
is, a ground to be thought by the pure understanding
only. If, secondly^ we are asked whether that Being is
a substance of the greatest reality, necessary, etc. ? our
answer is, that such a question has no meaning at aii.
For all the categories by which I can try to frame to my-
self a concept of such an object admit of none but an
empirical use, and have no meaning at all, unless they
are applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to
the world of sense. Outside that field they are mere
titles of concepts, which we may admit, but by which we
can understand nothing. If, thirdly^ the question is
asked, whether we may not at least conceive this Being,
which is different from the world, in analogy with the
objects of experience? our answer is. Certainly we may,
but only as an object in the idea, and not in the
reality, that is, in so far only as it remains a [p. 697]
substratum, unknown to us, of the systematic unity,
order, and design of the world, which reason is obliged
to adopt as a regulative principle in the investigation of
' After what 1 have said before about the psychological idea, and its proper
destination to serve as a regulative principle only for the use of reason, there
is no necessity for my discussing separately and in fall detail the transcendental
illusion which leads us to represent hypusialically that systematical unity of
the manifold phenomena of the internal sense. The procedure would here be
very similar to that which we are following in our criticism of the theological
ideal.
M
Transcendental Dialectic
559
nature. Nay, more, we need not be afraid to admit cer-
\ain anthropomorphisms in that idea, which favour the
regulative principle of our investigations. For it always
remains an idea only, which is never referred directly to
a Being, different from the world, but only to the regu-
lative praiciplc of the systematical unity of the world,
and this by some schema of it, namely, that of a supreme
intelHgencCt being the author of it, for the wisest pur-
poses. It was not intended that by it w^e should try to
form a conception of what that original cause of the
unity of the world may be by itself; it was only meant
to teach us how to use it, or rather its idea, with refer*
ence to the systematical use of reason, applied to the
things of the world.
But, surely, people will proceed to ask, we may^ accord-
ing to this, admit a wise and omnipotent Author of the
world .^ Ceriainh\ we answer, and not only we may, but
we must. In that case, therefore, we surely extend our
knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By
no means. For we have only presupposed a something;
of which we have no conception whatever as to [p. 698]
what it is by itself (as a purely transcendental object). We
have only, with reference to the systematical and well-
designed order of the world, which we must presuppose,
if we are to study nature at all, presented to ourselves
that unknown Being in anahgy with what is an empirical
concept, namely, an intelligence ; that is, we have, with
reference to the purposes and the perfection which de-
pend on it, attributed to it those very qualities on which,
according to the conditions of our reason, such a syste-
matical unity may depend. That idea, therefore, is
entirely founded on the employment of our reason in the
56o Transcendental Dialectic
tmrld, and if we were to attribute to it absolute and
objective validity, we should be forgetting that it is only
a Being in the idea which we think : and as we should
then be taking our start from a cause, that cannot be
determined by mundane considerations, we should no
longer be able to employ that principle in accordance
with the empirical use of reason.
But people will go on to ask, May we not then in this
way use that concept, and the supposition of a Supreme
Being in a rational consideration of the world? No doubt
we may, and it was for that very purpose that that idea
of reason was established And if it be asked whether
we may look upon arrangements in nature which have
all the appearance of design, as real designs, and trace
them back to a divine will, though with the [p. 699]
intervention of certain arrangements in the world, we
answer again, Yes, but only on condition that it be the
same to you whether we say that the divine wisdom has
arranged everything for the highest purposes, or whether
we take the idea of the supreme wisdom as our rule in
the investigation of nature, and as the principle of its
systematical and well-planned unity according to general
laws, even when we arc not able to perceive that unity.
In other words, it must be the same to you, when you
do perceive it, whether we say, God has wisely willed it
so, or nature has wisely arranged it so. For it was that
greatest systematical and well-planned unity, required by
your reason as the regulative principle of all investigation
of nature, which gave you the right to admit the idea
of a supreme intelligence as the schema of that regulative
principle. As much of design, therefore, as you discover
in the world, according to that principle, so much of con-
Transcendental Dialectic
S6i
firmation has the legitimacy of your idea received. But
as that principle was only intended for finding the neces-
sary and greatest possible unity in nature, we shall, no
doubt, owe that unity, so far as we may find it, to our
idea of a Supreme Being; but we cannot, without con-
tradicting ourselves, ignore the general laws of nature
for which that idea was adopted ^ or look upon the
designs of nature as contingent and hyper- [p. 700]
physical in their origin. For we were not justified in
admitting a Being endowed with those qualities as above
nature (hyperphysical), but only in using the idea of it
in order to be able to look on all phenomena ^ as being
systematically connected among themselves, in analogy
with a causal determination.
For the same reason we are justified, not only in repre-
senting to ourselves the cause of the world in our idea
according to a subtle kind of anthropomorphism (without
which we can think nothing of it), as a Being endowed
with understanding, the feelings of pleasure and displeas-
ure, and accordingly with desire and will, but also in at-
tributing to it infinite perfection » which therefore far
transcends any perfection known to us from the empirical
knowledge of the order of the world. For the regulative
law of systematical unity requires that we should study
nature as if there existed in it everywhere, with the
greatest possible variety, an infinitely systematical and
well-planned unity. And although we can discover but
little of that perfection of the world, it is nevertheless a
law of our reason, always to look for it and to expect it;
and it must be beneficial, and can never be hurtful, to
* Instead of t/ir Erttkwinwngtn read tHi Mruhnnumgitn*
20
Transcendental Dialectic
carry on the investigation of nature according to this
piinciple. But in admitting this fundamental [p, 701]
idea of a Supreme Author, it is clear that I do not admit
the existence and knowledge of such a Being, but its idea
only, and that in reality I do not derive anything from
that Being, but only from the idea of it, that is, from the
nature of the things of the world, according to such an
idea. It seems also, as if a certain, though undeveloped
consciousness of the true use of this concept of reason
had dictated the modest and reasonable language of phi-
losophers of all times, when they use such expressions as
the wisdom and providence of nature as synonymous with
divine wisdom, nay, even prefer the former expression,
when dealing with speculative reason only, as avoiding
the pretension of a greater assertion than we are entitled
to make, and at the same time restricting reason to its
proper field, namely, nature.
Thus %vc find that pure reason, which at first seemed
to promise nothing less than extension of our knowledge
beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly under-
stood, nothing but regulative principles, w^hich indeed
postulate greater unity than the empirical use of the
understanding can ever achieve, but which, by the very
fact that they place the goal which has to be reached at
so great a distance, carry the agreement of the under-
standing with itself by means of systematical [p. 702]
unity to the highest possible degree ; while, if they are
misunderstood and mistaken for constitutive principles of
transcendent knowledge, they produce, by a brilliant but
deceptive illusion, some kind of persuasion and imaginary
knowledge, but, at the same time, constant contradictions
and disputes.
Transcendental Dialectk
S«53
Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, ad )
vances to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although with^
reference to every one of these three elements, it pos-
sesses a priori sources of knowledge, which at first sight
seemed to despise the limits of all experience, a perfect
criticism soon convinces us, that reason, in its speculative
use, can never get with these elements beyond the field
of possible experience, and that it is the true destination
of that highest faculty of knowledge to use all methods
and principles of reason with one object only, namely, to
follow up nature into her deepest recesses, according to
every principle of unity, the unity of design being the
most important, but never to soar above its limits, outside
of which there is for us nothing but empty space. No
doubt, the critical examination of all propositions which
seemed to be able to enlarge our knowledge [p. 703]
beyond real experience, as given in the transcendental
Analytic, has fully convinced us that they could never
lead to anything more than to a possible experience ; and,
if people were not suspicious even of the clearest, but
abstract and general doctrines, and charming and specious
prospects did not tempt us to throw ofiF the restraint of
those doctrines, we might indeed have dispensed with
the laborious examination of all the dialectical witnesses
which a transcendent 'reason brings into court in support
of her pretensions. We knew beforehand with perfect
certainty that all these pretensions, though perhaps hon-
estly meant, were absolutely untenable, because they re*
late to a kind of knowledge to which man can never
attain. But we know that there is no end of talk, unless
the true cause of the illusion, by which even the wisest
are deceived, has been clearly exhibited. We also know
564 Transcendental Dialectic
that the analysis of all our transcendent knowledge into
its elements (as a study of our own internal nature) has
no little value in itself, and to a philosopher is really a
matter of duty. We therefore thought that it was not
only necessary to follow up the whole of this vain treat-
ment of speculative reason to its first sources, but con-
sidered it advisable also, as the dialectical illusion does
here not only deceive the judgment, but, owing to the
interest which we take in the judgment, possesses and
always will possess a certain natural and irresist- [p. 704]
ible charm, to write down the records of this lawsuit in
full detail, and to deposit them in the archives of human
reason, to prevent for the future all errors of a similar
kind.
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
[p. 705]
II
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
THE
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
If we look upon the whole knowledge of pure [p. 707]
and spcciiiative reason as an edifice of which we possess
at least the idea within ourselves, we may say that in the
Elements of Transcendentalism we made an estimate of
the materials and determined for what kind of edifice and
of what height and solidity they would suffice. We found
that although we had thought of a tower that would reach
to the sky^ the supply of materials would suffice for a
dwelling-house only, sufficiently roomy for all our business
on the level plain of experience, and high enough to enable
us to survey it : and that the original bold undertaking
could not but fail for want of materials, not to mention
the confusion of tongues which inevitably divided the
labourers in their views of the building, and scattered
them over all the world, where each tried to erect his
own building according to his own plan. At present,
however, we are concerned not so much with the material
as with the plan, and though we have been warned not to
venture blindly on a plan which may be beyond our
powers, we cannot altogether give up the erection of a
solid dwelling, but have to make the plan for a building
in proportion to the material which we possess, and suf-
ficient for all our real wants. This determination of the
formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason I
S6?
568 Method of Transcendentalism
call the Method of Transcendentalism. We [p, 708]
shall here have to treat of a discipline^ a canon^ an archi-
tectonic, and lastly, a history of pure reason, and shall
have to do, from a transcendental point of view, what
the schools attempt, but fail to carry out properly, with
regard to the use of the understanding in general, under
the name of practical logic. The reason of this failure is
that general logic is not limited to any particular kind of
knowledge, belonging to the understanding (not for in-
stance to its pure knowledge), nor to certain objects.
It cannot, therefore, without borrowing knowledge from
other sciences, do more than produce titles of possible
methods and technical terms which are used in different
sciences in reference to their systematical arrangement,
so that the pupil becomes acquainted with names only,
the meaning and application of which he has to learn
afterwards.
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
CHAPTER I
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON
Negative judgments, being negative not only in their
logical fornip but in their contents also, do not enjoy a very
high reputation among persons desirous of increasing
human knowledge. They are even looked upon as
jealous enemies of oitr never-ceasing desire for [p. 709]
knowledge, and we have almost to produce an apology, in
order to secure for them toleration, or favour and esteem.
No doubt, all propositions may logically be expressed
as negative : but when we come to the question whether
the contents of our knowledge are enlarged or restricted
by a judgment, we find that the proper object of negative
judgments is solely to prevent error. Hence negative
propositions, intended to prevent erroneous knowledge
in cases where error is never possible, may no doubt be
very true, but they are empty, they do not answer any
purpose, and sound therefore often absurd ; like the well-
known utterance of a rhetorician, that Alexander could not
have conquered any countries without an army.
But in cases where the limits of our possible knowledge
are very narrow, where the temptation to judge is great,
the illusion which presents itself very deceptive, and the
evil consequences of error very considerable, the mgativc
569
element, though it teaches us only how to avoid errors,
has even more value than much of that positive instruction
which adds to the stock of our knowledge. The restraint
which checks our constant inclination to deviate from
certain rules, and at last destroys it, is called discipline.
It is different from ctiliure, which is intended to form a
certain kind of skill, without destroying another kind
which is already present. In forming a talent, therefore,
which has in itself an impulse to manifest itself, [p. 710]
discipline will contribute a negative/ culture and doctrine
a positive, influence.
That our temperament and various talents which like
to indulge in free and unchecked exercise (such as imag-
ination and wit) require some kind of discipline, will easily
"^be allowed by everybody. But that reason, whose proper
duty it is to prescribe a discipline to all other endeavours,
should itself require such discipline, may seem strange
indeed. It has in fact escaped that humiliation hitherto,
because, considering the solemnity and thorough self-
possession in its behaviour, no one has suspected it of
thoughtlessly putting imaginations in the place of concepts,
and words in the place of things.
In its empirical use reason does not require such
criticism, because its principles are constantly subject
to the test of experience. Nor is such criticism [p, 711]
required in mathematics, where the concepts of reason
1 1 am well aware that in the language of the schools, tiiidpline is used as
5)'noTiymous with instruction. Bui there arc so many cases in which the
former tcrm» in the sense of restraini^ is carefully distinguished from the latter
in the sense of itaching, and the nature of things makes it so desirable to pre-
serve the only suitable expressions for that distinction, that I hope that the
former term may never be allowed to be used in any but a negative meaning.
Discipline of Pure Reason
S7I
must at once be represented in concrete in pure intui-
tion, so that everything unfounded and arbitrary is at
once discovered. But when neither empirical nor pure
intuition keeps reason in a straight groove, that is, when
it is used transcendcntly and according to mere con-
cepts, the discipline to restrain its inclination to go be*
yond the narrow limits of possible experience, and to
keep it from extravagance and error is so necessary, that
the whole philosophy of pure reason is really concerned
with that one negative discipline only. Single errors
may be corrected by censure^ and their causes removed
by criticism. But when, as in pure reason, we are met
by a whole system of illusions and fallacies, well connected
among themselves and united by common principles,
a separate negative code seems requisite, which, under
the name of a discipline^ should erect a system of caution
and self-examination, founded on the nature of reason
and of the objects of its use, before which no false sophis-
tical illusion could stand, but should at once betray itself
in spite of all excuses.
It should be well borne in mind, however, [p. 712]
that in this second division of the transcendental critique,
I mean to direct the discipline of pure reason not to its
contents, but only to the method of its knowledge. The
former task has been performed in the Elements of Tran-
scendentalism. There is so much similarity in the use
of reason, whatever be the subject to which it is applied,
and yet, so far as this use is to be transcendental, it
is so essentially different from every other, that, with-
out the warning voice of a discipline, especially devised
for that purpose, it would be impossible to avoid errors
arising necessarily from the improper application of
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
Section I
The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Doginatical Use
The science of mathematics presents the most brill-
iant example of how pure reason may successfully enlarge
its domain without the aid of experience. Such exam-
ples are always contagious, particularly when the faculty
is the same, which naturally flatters itself that it will
meet %vith the same success in other cases which it has
had in one. Thus pure reason hopes to be able to extend
its domain as successfully and as thoroughly [p. 713]
in its transcendental as in its mathematical employment ;
particularly if it there follows the same method which
has proved of such decided advantage elsewhere. It is,
therefore, of great consequence for us to know whether
the method of arriving at apodictic certainty; which in
the former science was called mat/wmaiicai^ be identical
with that which is to lead us to the same certainty in
philosophy, and would have to be called dogmatic.
Phiiosophiail knowledge is that which reason gains from
concepts, mathematical, that which it gains from the con-
struction of concepts. By constructing a concept I mean
representing a priori the intuition corresponding to it.
For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empiri-
cal intuition is required which, as an intuition, is a single
object, but which, nevertheless, as the construction of a
r
Discipline of Pure Reason
573
concept (of a gentTal representation) must express in the
representation something that is generally valid for all
possible intuitions which fall under the same concept
Thus I construct a triangle by representing the object
corresponding to that concept either by mere imagination,
in the pure intuition, or, afterwards on paper also in the
empirical intuition, and in both cases entirely a priori
without having borrowed the original from any expe-
rience. The particular figure drawn on the [p. 714]
paper is empirical, but serves nevertheless to express
the concept without any detriment to its generality, be-
cause, in that empirical intuition, we consider always
the act of the construction of the concept only, to which
many determinations, as, for instance, the magnitude of
the sides and the angles, are quite indifferent, these differ-
ences, which do not change the concept of a triangle,
being entirely ignored.
Philosophical knowledge, therefore, considers the par-
ticular in the general only, mathematical, the general
in the particular, nay, even in the individual^ all this,
however, a priori^ and by means of reason ; so that, as
an individual figure is determined by certain general con-
ditions of construction, the object of the concept, of which
this individual figure forms only the schema, must be
thought of as universally determined.
The essential difference between these two modes
of the knowledge of reason consists, therefore, in the
form, and does not depend on any difference in their
matter or objects. Those who thought they could dis-
tinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying that
the former was concerned with quality only, the latter
with quantity only, mistook effect for cause. It is owing
i
574 Discipline of Pure Reason
to the form of mathematical knowledge that it can refer
to quanta only, because it is only the concept of quanti-
ties that admits of construction, that is, of a priori [p. 715]
representation in intuition, while qualities cannot be repre-
sented in any but empirical intuition. Hence reason can
gain a knowledge of qualities by concepts only. No one
can take an intuition corresponding to the concept of
reality from anywhere except from experience ; we can
never lay hold of il a priori by ourselves, and before we
have had an empirical consciousness of it. We can form
to ourselves an intuition of a cone, from its concept alone,
and without any empirical assistance, but the colour of
this cone must be given before, in some experience or
other. I cannot represent in intuition the concept of
a cause in general in any way except by an example
supplied by experience, etc. Besides, philosophy treats of
quantities quite as much as mathematics ; for instance,
of totality, infinity, etc., and mathematics treats also of
the difference between lines and planes, as spaces of
different quality, it treats further of the continuity of ex-
tension as one of its qualities. But, though in such
cases both have a common object, the manner in which
reason treats it is totally different in philosophy and
mathematics. The former is concerned with general con-
cepts only, the other can do nothing with the pure con-
cept, but proceeds at once to intuition, in which it looks
upon the concept in con^reio ; yet not in an [p. 716]
empirical intuition, but in an intuition which it represents
a priori^ that is, which it has constructed and in which,
whatever follows from the general conditions of the con*
struction, must be valid in general of the object of the
constructed concept also.
Discipline of Pure Reason
575
Let us give to a philosopher the concept of a triangle,
and let him find out, in his own way, what relation the
sum of its angles bears to a right angle* Nothing is
given him but the concept of a figure, enclosed within
three straight lines, and with it the concept of as many
angles. Now he may ponder on that concept as long
as he likes, he will never discover anything new in it
He may analyse the concept of a straight line or of an
angle, or of the number three, and render them more
clear, but he will never arrive at other qualities which
are not contained in those concepts. But now let the
geometrician treat the same question. He will begin
at once with constructing a triangle. As he knows that
two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous
angles which proceed from one point in a straight line,
he produces one side of his triangle, thus forming two
adjacent angles which together are equal to two right
angles. He then divides the exterior of these angles
by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the
triangle, and sees that an exterior adjacent angle has
been formed, which is equal to an interior, etc. In this
way he arrives, through a chain of conclusions, though
always guided by intuition, at a thoroughly [p. 717]
convincing and general solution of the question.
In mathematics, however, we construct not only quan-
tities (ipmttta) as in geometry, but also mere quantity
{quantitas) as in algebra, where the quality of the object,
which has to be thought according to this quantitative
concept, is entirely ignored. We then adopt a certain
notation for all constructions of quantities (numbers),
such as addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, etc,
and, after having denoted also the general concept of
$j6 Discipline of Pure Reason
quantities according to their different relations, we rep-
resent in intuition according to general rules, every opera-
tion which is produced and modified by quantity. Thus
when one quantity is to be divided by another, we place
the signs of both together according to the form denot-
ing division, etc., and we thus arrive, by means of a sym*
bolical construction in algebra, quite as well as by an
ostensive or geometrical construction of the objects
themselves in geometry, at results which our discursive
knowledge could never have reached by the aid of mere
conceptions*
What may be the cause of this difference between two
persons, the philosopher and the mathematician, both
practising the art of reason, the former following his
path according to concepts, the latter according to in-
tuitions, which he represents a pfiori according to con-
cepts ? If we remember what has been said [p, 718]
before in the Elements of Transcendentalism, the cause
is clean We are here concerned not with analytical
propositions, which can he produced by a mere analysis
of concepts (here the philosopher would no doubt have
an advantage over the mathematician), but with syn-
thetical propositions, and synthetical propositions that
can be known a priori. W^e are not intended here to
consider what we arc really thinking in our concept of
the triangle {this would be a mere definition), but we are
meant to go beyond that concept, in order to arrive at
properties which are not contained in the concept, but
nevertheless belong to it. This is impossible, except by
our determining our object according to the conditions
either of empirical, or of pure intuition. The former
would give us an empirical proposition only, through
I
Discipline of Pure Reasan
S77
the actual measuring of the three angles. Such a propo-
sition would be withoot the character of either generality
or necessity, and does not, therefore, concern us here at
all. The second procedure consists in the mathematical
and here the geometrical construction, by means of which
T add in a pure intuition, just as I may do in the empirical
intuition, everything that belongs to the schema of a tri-
angle in general and, therefore, to its concept, and thus
arrive at general synthetical propositions.
I should therefore in vain philosophise, that is, reflect
discursively on the triangle, without ever getting beyond
the mere definition with which I ought to have begun.
There is no doubt a transcendental synthesis, [p. 719]
consisting of mere concepts, and in which the philosopher
alone can hope to be successful Such a synthesis, how-
ever, never relates to more than a thing in general, and to
the conditions under which its perception could be a pos-
sible experience. In the mathematical problems, on the
contrary, all this, together with the question of existence,
does not concern us, but the properties of objects in them-
selves only (without any reference to their existence), and
those properties again so far only as they are connected
with their concept.
We have tried by this example to show how great a
difference there is between the discursive use of reason,
according to concepts, and its intuitive use, through the
construction of concepts. The question now arises what
can be the cause that makes this twofold use of reason
necessary, and how can we discover whether in any given
argument the former only, or the latter use also, takes
place ?
All our knowledge relates, in the end, to possible intui-
J
tions, for it is by them alone that an object can be given.
A concept a priori (or a n on -empirical concept) contains
either a pure intuition, in which case it can be con-
structetl, or it contains nothing but the synthesis of
possible intuitions, which are not given a priori, and in
that case, though we may use it for synthetical [p. 720]
and a priori judgments, such judgments can only be
discursive, according to concepts, and never intuitive,
through the construction of the concept.
There is no intuition a priori except space and time,
the mere forms of phenomena. A concept of them, as
g nan ill y can be represented a priori in intuition, that is,
can be constructed either at the same time with their
quality (figure), or as quantity only (the mere synthesis
of the manifold-homogeneous), by means of number.
The matter of phenomena, however, by which things
are given us in space and time, can be represented in
perception only, that is a posteriori. The one concept
which a priori represents the empirical contents of phe-
nomena is the concept of a thing in general, and the
synthetical knowledge which we may have a priori of a
thing in general, can give us nothing but the mere rule
of synthesis, to be applied to what perception may present
to us a postcnori^ but never an a priori intuition of a reai
object, such an intuition being necessarily empirical.
Synthetical propositions with regard to things in gen-
eral, the intuition of which does not admit of being given
a pfion\ are called transcendental. Transcendental prop-
ositions, therefore, can never be given through a con-
struction of concepts, but only according to concepts a
priori. They only contain the rule, according to which
we must look empirically for a certain synthetical unity
Discipline of Pure Reason
579
of what cannot be represented in intuition a [p. 721^
priori (perceptions). They can ne%^er represent any one
of their concepts a priori, but can do this only a poste-
riori, that is, by means of experience, which itself be-
comes possible according to those synthetical principles
only.
If we are to form a synthetical judgment of any con-
cept, we must proceed beyond that concept to the intui-
tion in which it is given. For if we kept within that
which is given in the concept, the judgment could only be
analytical and an explanation of the concept^ in accord-
ance with what we have conceived in it, I may, however^
pass from the conception to the pure or empirical intui-
tion which corresponds to it, in order thus to consider
it in comreto, and thus to discover what belongs to the
object of the concept, whether a priori or a posteriori.
The former consists in rational or mathematical know-
ledge, arrived at by the construction of the concept, the
latter in the purely empirical (mechanical) knowledge
which can never supply us with necessary and apodictic
propositions. Thus I might analyse my empirical con-
cept of gold, without gaining anything beyond being
able tn enumerate everything that I can really think by
this word. This might yield a logical improvement of
my knowledge, but no increase or addition. If, how-
ever, I take the material which is known by the name
of gold, I can make observations on it, and these will
yield me different synthetical, but empirical [p. 722]
propositions. Again, I might construct the mathemati-
cal concept of a triangle, that is, give it a priori in intui-
tion, and gain in this manner a synthetical but rational
knowledge of it. But when the transcendental concept
S8o Disciplitie of Pure Rcasim
of a reality, a substance, a power, etc., is given me, that
concept denotes neither an empirical nor a pure intuition,
but merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which,
being empirical, cannot be given a priori. No determine
ing synthetical proposition therefore can spring from it,
because the synthesis cannot a priori pass beyond to the
intuition that corresponds to it, but only a principle of
the synthesis * of possible empirical intuitions.
A transcendental proposition, therefore, is synthetical
knowledge acquired by reason, according to mere con-
cepts ; and it is discursive, because through it alone
synthetical unity of empirical knowledge becomes possi-
ble, while it cannot give us any intuition a priori.
We see, therefore, that reason is used in two [p. 723]
ways which, though they share in common the generality
of their knowledge and its production a priori, yet diverge
considerably afterwards, because in each phenomenon
(and no object can be given us. except as a phenomenon),
there are two elements, the form of intuition (space and
time), which can be known and determined entirely a
priori^ and the matter (the physical) or the contents,
something which exists in space and time, and therefore
contains an existence corresponding to sensation. As
regards the latter, which can never be given in a defi-
nite form except empirically, we can have nothing a
priori except indefinite concepts of the synthesis of pos-
* In the concept of cause I reaUy pass beyond the empirical concept of an
event, but not to the Intuition which represents tht concept of cause in cgh-
£reiOf but to the conditions of time in general, which in experience might be
found in accordance with the concept cf cause. 1 therefore proceed here*
•ccording to concepts only, but cannot proceed by nicsins of the construction
of concepts, because the concept is only a rule for the synthesis of perceptions,
which are not pure intuitionSi and ibcrefore cannot be given a priori^
Discipline of Pure Reason
581
sible sensations, in so far as they belong to the unity of
apperception (in a possible experience). As regards the
former, we can determine a priori our concepts in intui-
tion» by creating to ourselves in space and time, through
a uniform synthesis, the objects themselves, considering
them simply as quanta. The former is called the use
of reason according to concepts ; and here we can do
nothing more than to bring phenomena under concepts,
according to their real contents, which therefore can
be determined empirically only, that is a posteriori
(though in accordance with those concepts as roles of
an empirical synthesis). The latter is the use [p, y24\
of reason through the construction of concepts, which,
as they refer to an intuition a priori, can for that reason
be given a priori^ and defined in pure intuition^ without
any empirical data. To consider everything which exists
(everything in space or time) whether, and how far, it
is a quantmn or not ; to consider that we must repre-
sent in it either existence, or absence of existence; to
consider how far this something which fills space or
time is a primary substratum, or merely determination
of it \ to consider again whether its existence is related
to something else as cause or effect, or finally, whether
it stands isolated or in reciprocal dependence on others,
with reference to existence, — this and the possibility,
reality, and necessity of its existence, or their opposites,
all belong to that knowledge of reason, derived from
concepts, which is called philosophical. But to deter-
mine a priori an intuition in space (figure), to divide
time (duration), or merely to know the general character
of the synthesis of one and the same thing in time and
space, and the quantity of an intuition in general which
arises from it (number), all this is the 2tfork of reason by
means of the construction of concepts, and is called mathe-
maiicaL
The great success which attends reason in its mathe-
matical use produces naturally the expectation that it, or
rather its method, would have the same success outside
the field of quantities also, by reducing all concepts to
intuitions which may be given a prion, and by [p. 725]
which the whole of nature might be conquered, while pure
philosophy, with its discursive concepts a priori^ does
nothing but bungle in every part of nature, without being
able to render the reality of those concepts intuitive a
priori^ and thereby legitimatised. Nor does there seem
to be any lack of confidence on the part of those who are
masters in the art of mathematics, or of high expectations
on the part of the public at large, as to their ability of
achieving success, if only they would try it. For as they
have hardly ever philosophised on mathematics (which is
indeed no easy task), they never think of the specific dif-
ference between the two uses of reason which we have
just explained. Current and empirical rules, borrowed
from the ordinary operations of reason, are then accepted
instead of axioms. From what quarter the concepts of
space and time with which alone (as the original quanta)
they have to deal, may have come to them, they do not
care to enquire, nor do they see any use in investigating
the origin of the pure concepts of the understanding, and
with it the extent of their validity, being satisfied to use
them as they are. In all this no blame would attach to
them, if only they did not overstep their proper limits,
namely, those of nature. But as it is, they lose them-
selves, without being aware of it, away from the field of
Discipline of Pure Reason
583
sensibility on the uncertain ground of pure and even
transcendental concepts {instabilis tellus^ innabiiis undo)
where they are neither able to stand nor to [p. 726]
swim» taking only a few hasty steps, the vestiges of which
are soon swept away, while their steps in mathematics
become a highway, on which the latest posterity may
march on with perfect confidence.
We have chosen it as our duty to determine with
accuracy and certainty the limits of pure reason in its
transcendental use. These transcendental efforts, how-
ever» have this peculiar character that, in spite of the
strongest and clearest warnings, they continue to inspire
us with new hopes, before the attempt is entirely surren-
dered at arriving beyond the limits of experience at the
charming fields of an intellectual world. It is necessary
therefore to cut away the last anchor of that fantastic
hope, and to show that the employment of the mathemati-
cal method cannot be of the slightest use for this kind of
knowledge, unless it be in displaying its own deficiencies ;
and that the art of measuring and philosophy are twa
totally different things, though they are mutually useful
to each other in natural science, and that the method of
the one can never be imitated by the other.
The exactness of mathematics depends on definitions,
axioms, and demonstrations* I shall content myself with
showing that none of these can be achieved or imitated by
the philosopher in the sense in which they are understood
by the mathematician. I hope to show at the [p. 727]
same time that the art of measuring, or geometry, will by
its method prodoce nothing in philosophy but card-houses,
while the philosopher with his method produces in mathe-
matics nothing but vain babble. It is the very essence of
584 Discipline of Pure Reason
philosophy to teach the limits of knowledge, and evert the
mathematician, unless his talent is limited already by nat-
ure and restricted to its proper work, cannot decline the
warnings of philosophy or altogether defy them.
I. Of Definitions. To define, as the very name implies,
means only to represent the complete concept of a thing
within its limits and in its primary character^ From this
point of %aew, an empirical concept cannot be defined, but
can be explained only. For, as we have in an empiri-
cal concept some predicates only belonging to a certain
class of sensuous objects, we are never certain whether by
the word which denotes one and the same object, we do
not think at one time a greater, at another a smaller num-
ber of predicates. Thus one man may by the [p, 728]
concept of gold think, in addition to weight, colour, mallea-
bility, the quality of its not rusting, while another may
know nothing of the last. We use certain predicates so
long only as they are required for distinction. New obser-
vations add and remove certain predicates, so that the
concept never stands within safe limits. And of what
use would it be to define an empirical concept, as for in-
stance that of water» because, when we speak of water and
its qualities, we do not care much what is thought by that
word, but proceed at once to experiments ? the word itself
with its few predicates being a designation only and not a
concept, so that a so-called definition would be no more
^ CompUUnesi means clearness and sufHciency of predicates-, limits mean
precision, no more predicates bring given than belong to the complete con-
cept; in its primary ckanufer mtvLV\^ that ihe determination of these limits
is not derived from an) thioj,' else^ and therefore in need of any proof, because
this wnulil render the so-called definition incapable of standing at the head of
ail the judgments regarding its object.
Discipline of Pure Reason
58s
than a deterrni nation of the word Secondly, if we rea-
soned accurately, no a priori given concept can be defined,
such as substance, cause, right, equity, etc. For I can
never be sure that the clear representation of a given but
still confused concept has been completely analysed, unless
I know that such representation is adequate to the object.
As its concept, however, such as it is given, may contain
many obscure representations which we pass by in our
analysis, although we use them always in the practical
application of the concept, the completeness of the analy-
sis of my concept must always remain doubtful, and can
only be rendered probable by means of apt examples, al-
though never apodictically certain. I should [p, 729]
therefore prefer to use the terra exposition rather than
definition, as being more modest, and more likely to be
admitted to a certain extent by a critic who reserves his
doubts as to its completeness. As therefore it is impossi-
ble to define either empirically or a priori given concepts,
there remain arbitrary concepts only on which such an
experiment may be tried. In such a case I can always
define my concept, because I ought certainly to know
what I wish to think, the concept being made intentionally
by myself, and not given to me either by the nature of the
understanding or by experience. But I can never say
that I have thus defined a real object For if the concept
depends on empirical conditions, as, for instance, a ship's
chronometer, the object itself and its possibility are not
given by this arbitrary concept ; it does not even tell us
whether there is an object corresponding to it, so that my
explanation should be called a declaration (of my project)
rather than a definition of an object. Thus there remain
no concepts fit for definition except those which contain
5^6 Discipline of Pure Reason
an arbitrary synthesis that can be constructed a priori.
It follows, therefore, that mathematics only can possess
definitions, because it is in mathematics alone that we
represent a pnori in intuition the object which we think,
and that object cannot therefore contain either more or
less than the concept, because the concept of [p, 730]
the object was given by the definition in its primary char-
acter, that is, without deriving the definition from anything
else. The German language has but the one word Erkia-
rttng (literally clearing up) for the terms exposition, explica-
tion, dee /a raf ion, and dejinitian ; and we must not therefore
be too strict in our demands, when denying to the different
kinds of a philosophical clearing up the honourable name
of definition. What we really insist on is this, that philo-
sophical definitions are possible only as expositions of
given concepts, mathematical definitions as constructions
of concepts, originally framed by ourselves, the former
therefore analytically (where completeness is never apo-
dictically certain), the latter synthetically. Mathematical
definitions fnake the concept, philosophical definitions ex-
plain it only. Hence it follows,
a. That wc must not try in philosophy to imitate mathe-
matics by beginning with definitions, except it be by way
of experiment For as they arc meant to be an analysis
of given concepts, these concepts themselves, although as
yet confused only, must come first, and the incomplete
exposition must precede the complete one, so that we are
able from some characteristics, known to us from an, as
yet, incomplete analysis, to infer many things before we
come to a complete exposition, that is, the definition of
the concept. In philosophy, in fact, the defini* [p. 731]
tion ID its complete clearness ought to conclude rather
Di sap line of Pure Reason
587
than begin our work ; * while in mathematics we really
have no concept antecedent to the definition by which the
concept itself is first given, so that in mathematics no
other beginning is necessary or possible.
b. Mathematical definitions can never be erroneous,
because, as the concept is first given by the definition, it
contains neither more nor less than what the definition
wishes should be conceived by it. But although there can
be nothing wrong in it, so far as its contents are concerned^
mistakes may sometimes, though rarely, occur in the form
or wording, particularly with regard to perfect precision.
Thus the common definition of a circle, that it is a curved
line, every point of which is equally distant from one and
the same point (namely, the centre), is faulty, [p. 732]
because the determination of curved is introduced un-
necessarily. For there must be a particular theorem,
derived from the definition, and easily proved, viz. that
every line, all points of which are equidistant from one
and the same point, must be curved (no part of it being
straight). Analytical definitions, however, may be erro-
neous in many respects, either by introducing characteris-
tics which do not really exist in the concept, or by lacking
that completeness which is essential to a definition, because
' Philosophy swarms with faalty deliciltions, particularly such as contain
some true elements c>f a detinition, but not all. lf» therefore, it were impos-
sible to use a concept until it had been completely defined, philosophy would
fare very ill. As, however, we may use a dclinition with perfect safety, so
far at least as the elements of the analysis will carrv us» imperfect delinitions
also, that is, propi>sitions which are not yet properly dchnitions, hut are yet
true, and» therefore, approximations to a dehnttiun, may be used with great
advantage. In mathematics deHnilions belong •'^'''Jj^ in philosophy Ww/'/imj
tat. It is desirable, but it is extremely diHicuU to construct a proper deliimtion.
Jurists are without a defmitioo of right to the present day.
588 Discipline of Pure Reason
we can never be quite certain of the completeness of our
analysis. It is on these accounts that the method of
mathematics cannot be imitated in the definitions of phi-
losophy.
II. Of Axioms. These, so far as they are immediately
certain, are synthetical principles a priari. One concept
cannot, however, be connected synthetically and yet im-
mediately with another, because, if we wish to go beyond
a given concept, a third connecting knowledge is required ;
and, as philosophy is the knowledge of reason based on
concepts, no principle can be found in it deserving the
name of an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may
well possess axioms, because here, by means of the con-
struction of concepts in the intuition of their object, the
predicates may always be connected a priori and immedi-
ately ; for instance, that three points always lie in a plane.
A synthetical principle, on the contrary, made up of con-
cepts only, can never be immediately certain, [p, 733^
as, for example, the proposition that everything which
happens has its cause. Here I require something else,
namely, the condition of the determination by time in a
given experience, it being impossible for me to know such
a principle, directly and immediately, from the concepts.
Discursive principles are, therefore, something quite dif-
ferent from intuitive principles or axioms. The former
always require, in addition, a deduction, not at all required
for the latter, which, on that very account, are evident,
while philosophical principles, whatever their certainty
may be, can never pretend to be so. Hence it is very far
from true to say that any synthetical proposition of pure
and transcendental reason is so evident {as people some-
times emphatically maintain) as the statement that twice
Discipline of Pure Reason
589
ttifo are four. It is true that in the Analytic, when giving
the table of the principles of the pure understanding, I men-
tioned also certain axioms of intuition ; but the principle
there mentioned was itself no axiom, but served only to
indicate the principle of the possibility of axioms in gen-
eral, being itself no more than a principle based on con-
cepts. It was necessary in our transcendental philosophy
to show the possibility even of mathematics. Philosophy,
therefore, is without axioms, and can never put forward
its principles a priori with absolute authority, but must
first consent to justify its claims by a thorough deduc-
tion, [p. 734]
in. Of Demonstrations. An apodictic proof only, so
far as it is intuitive, can be called demonstration* Experi-
ence may teach us what is, but never that it cannot be
otherwise. Empirical arguments, therefore, cannot pro-
duce an apodictic proof. From concepts a priori^ how-
ever (in discursive knowledge), it is impossible that intui*
tivc certainty, that is, evidence, should ever arise, however
apodictically certain the judgment may otherwise seem to
be. Demonstrations we get in mathematics only, because
here our knowledge is derived not from concepts, but from
their construction, that is, from intuition, which can be
given a priori, in accordance with the concepts. Even
the proceeding of algebra, with its equations, from which
by reduction both the correct result and its proof are
produced, is a construction by characters, though not
geometrical, in which, by means of signs, the concepts,
particularly those of the relation of quantities, are repre-
sented in intuition, and (without any regard to the heuris-
tic method) all conclusions are secured against errors by
submitting each of them to intuitive evidence. Philosoph-
590 DUcipiine of Pure Reason
leaf knowledge cannot claim this advantage, for here we
must always consider the general in the abstract (by con-
cepts), while in mathematics we may consider the gen-
eral in the concrete, in each single intuition, and yet
through pure representation a priori, where every mistake
becomes at once manifest. I should prefer, [p. 735]
therefore, to call the former acroamatic, or audible (discur-
sive) proofs, because they can be carried out by words
only (the object in thought), rather than demonstrations^
which, as the very term implies, depend on the intuition
of the object.
It follows from all this that it is not in accordance with
the very nature of philosophy to boast of its dogmatical
character, particularly in the field of pure reason, and to
deck itself with the titles and ribands of mathematics, an
order to which it can never belong, though it may well
hope for co-operation with that science. All those at-
tempts are vain pretensions which can never be success-
ful, nay, which can only prove an obstacle in the discovery
of the illusions of reason, when ignoring its own limits^
and which must mar our success in calling back, by means
of a sufficient explanation of our concepts, the conceit of
speculation to the more modest and thorough work of self-
knowledge. Reason ought not, therefore, in its tran-
scendental endeavours, to look forward with such confi-
dence, as if the path which it has traversed must lead
straight to its goal, nor depend with such assurance on
its premisses as to consider it unnecessary to look back
from time to time, to find out whether, in the progress of
its conclusions, errors may come to light, which were over-
looked in the principles, and which render it nee- [p. 736]
essary either to determine those principles more accu-
rately or to change them altogether.
p
Discipline of Pure Reason
I divide all apodictic propositions, whether demonstrable
or immediately certain, into Dogmata and Mathcmata. A
directly synthetical proposition, based on concepts, is a
Dogma; a proposition of the same kind, arrived at by
the construction of concepts^ is a Mathema. Analytical
judgments teach us really no more of an object than what
the concept which we have of it contains in itselL They
cannot enlarge our knowledge beyond the concept, but
only clear it. They cannot, therefore, be properly called
dogmas (a word which might perhaps best be translated
by precepts, Lehrsp niche). According to our ordinary
mode of speech, we could apply that name to that class
only of the two above-mentioned classes of synthetical
propositions a priori which refers to philosophical know-
ledge, and no one would feel inclined to give the name of
Dogma to the propositions of arithmetic or geometry. In
this way the usage of language confirms our explanation
that those judgments only which are based on conceptions,
and not those which are arrived at by the construction of
concepts, can be called dogmatic.
Now in the whole domain of pure reason » in its purely
speculative use, there docs not exist a single directly
synthetical judgment based on concepts. We have shown
that reason, by means of ideas, is incapable of any syn-
thetical judgments which could claim objective validity,
while by means of the concepts of our understanding it
establishes no doubt some perfectly certain prin- [p. 737]
ciplcs, but not directly from concepts, but indirectly only,
by referring such concepts to something purely contingent,
n2im^\y, possible experieme. When such experience (any-
thing as an object of possible experience) is presupposed,
these principles are, no doubt, apodiclically certain, but
59- Discipiine of Pure Reason
in themselves (directly) they cannot even be known a priori.
Thus the proposition that everything which happens has
its cause, can never be thoroughly understood by means
of the concepts alone which are contained in it ; hence it
is no dogma in itself, although, from another point of view,
that is, in the only field of its possible use, namely, in
experience, it may he proved apodictically. It should be
called, therefore, a/m/r///^, and not a precept qt a dogma
(though it is necessary that it should itself be proved),
because it has this peculiarity that it first renders its own
proof, namely, experience, possible, and has always to be
presupposed for the sake of experience.
If, therefore, there are no dog>nata whatever in the
speculative use of pure reason, with regard to their con-
tents also, all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from
mathematics or invented on purpose, are alike inappropri-
ate. They only ser\^e to hide mistakes and errors, and
thus deceive philosophy, whose true object is to shed the
clearest light on every step which reason takes. The
method may, however, well be systematicai ; for our reason
(subjectively) is itself a system, though in its [p. 'J^^]
pure use, by means of mere concepts, a system intended
for investigation only, according to principles of unity, to
which experience alone can supply the material. We can-
not, however, dwell here on the method of transcendental
philosophy, because all we have to do at present is to take
stock in order to find out whether we are able to build at
all, and how high the edifice may be which we can erect
with the materials at our command (the pure concepts
a priori).
Discipline of Pure Reason
593
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
Section II
7714" Discipline of Pure Renson in its Polemical Use
Reason in all her undertakings must submit to criticism,
and cannot attempt to limit the free exercise of such crit-
icism without injury to herself, and without exposing
herself to dangerous suspicion. There is nothing so
important with reference to its usefulness, nothing so
sacred, that it could withdraw itself from that searching
examination which has no respect of persons. The very
existence of reason depends on that freedom ; for reason
can claim no dictatorial authority, but its decrees are
rather like the votes of free citizens, every one of whom
may freely express, not only his doubts, but even [p, 739]
his veto.
But, though reason can never refuse to submit to criti-
cism, it does not follow that she need always be afraid oi
it, while pure reason in her dogmatical (not mathematical)
use is not so thoroughly conscious of having herself
obeyed her own supreme laws as not to appear with a
certain shyness, nay, without any of her assumed dog-
matical authority, before the tribunal of a higher judicial
reason.
The case is totally different when reason has to deal,
not with the verdicts of a judge, but with the claims of
her fellow-citizens, and has to defend itself only against
these claims. For as these mean to be as dogmatical in
their negations as reason is in her affirmations, reason
may justify herself icar" atfOpwrrou^ so as to be safe against
■ own property
that need not fear any foreign claims, although xar'
aXiqffeiav it could not itself be established with sufficient
evidence.
By the polemical use of pure reason I mean the defence
of her own propositions against dogmatical negations.
Here the question is not, whether her own assertions may
not themselves be false, but it is only to be shown that no
one is ever able to prove the opposite with apodictic cer-
tainty, nay, even with a higher degree of plausibility.
For we are not on sufferance in our possession, [p. 740]
when, though our own title may not be sufficient, it is
nevertheless quite certain that no one can ever prove its
insufficiency.
It is sad, no doubt, and discouraging, that there should
be an antithetic of pure reason, and that reason, being the
highest tribunal for all conflicts, should be in conflict with
herself. We had on a former occasion to treat of such an
apparent antithetic, but we saw that it arose from a mis-
understanding, phenomena, according to the common prej*
udice, being taken for things in themselves, and an
absolute completeness of their synthesis being demanded
in one way or other (being equally impossible in either
way), a demand entirely unreasonable with regard to
phenomena. There %vas, therefore, no real contnidktwn
in r*fax£?« herself when making the two propositions, ^rj/,
that the series of phenomena given by themselves has an
absolutely first beginning; and, seeondiy, that the series is
absolutely and by itself without any beginning ; for both
propositions are perfectly consistent with each other,
because phenomena, with regard to their existence as
phenomena, are by themselves nothing, that is, something
Discipline of Pure Reason
595
sel^contradictor)% so that their hypothesis must naturally
lead to contradictory inferences, [p. 741]
We cannot^ however, appeal to a similar misunderstand-
ing» in order to remove the conflict of reason, when it is"^
said, for instance, on one side, theistically, that there is a
Supreme Beipig, and on the other, athcistically, that there
is no Supreme Being: or if in psychology it is main* i
tained that everything which thinks possesses an abso-
lute and permanent unity and is different, therefore, from
all perishable material unity, while others maintain that
a soul is not an immaterial unity, and not exempt, there-
fore from perishahleness. For here the object of the
question is free from anything heterogeneous or contradic-
tor}^ to its own nature, and our understanding has to deal
with things by themselves only and not with phenomena.
Here, therefore, we should have a real conflict, if only on
the negative side pure reason could advance anything like
the ground of an assertion. We may well admit the criti-
cism of the arguments advanced by those who dogmati-
cally assert, without therefore having to surrender these
assertions, which are supported at least by the interest
of reason, to which the opposite party cannot appeal.
I cannot share the opinion so frequently expressed by
excellent and thoughtful men (for instance Sulzer) who,
being fully conscious of the weakness of the proofs hitherto
advanced, indulge in a hope that the future would supply
us with evident demonstrations of the two cardinal prop-
ositions of pure reason, namely, that there is a God, and
that there is a future life. I am certain, on the [p. 742]
contrary, that this will never be the case, for whence
should reason take the grounds for such synthetical asser-
tions, which do not refer to objects of experience and
59^ Discipline of Pure Reason
their internal possibility? But there is the same apodictic
certainty that no man will ever arise to assert the contrary
with the smallest plausibility, much less dogmatically.
For, as he could prove it by means of pure reason only,
he would have to prove that a Supreme Being, and that
a thinking subject within us, as pure intelligence, is im-
possibii\ But whence will he take the knowledge that
would justify him in thus judging synthetically on things
far beyond all possible experience? We may, therefore,
Test so completely assured that no one will ever really
prove the opposite, that there is no need to invent any
scholastic arguments. We may safely accept those prop-
ositions which agree so well with the speculative inter*
ests of our reason in its empirical use, and are besides the
only means of reconciling them with our practical inter-
ests. As against our opponent, who must not be consid-
ered here as a critic only, we are always ready with our
Non liquet. This must inevitably confound our adversary,
while we need not mind his retort, because w^e can always
fall back on the subjective maxim of reason, [p. 743]
which our adversary cannot, and can thus, protected
by it, look upon all his vain attacks with calmness and
indifference.
Thus we see that there is really no antithetic of pure
reason, for the only arena for it would be the field of pure
theology and psychology, and on that field it is not able
to support a champion in full armour and with weapons
which we need be afraid of. He can only use ridicule
and boasting* and these we may laugh at as mere child's
play. This ought to be a real comfort and inspire reason
with new courage ; for what else could she depend on, if
she herself, who is called upon to remove all errors, were
I
Discipline of Pure Reason
divided against herself, without any hope of peace and
quiet possession ?
Whatever has been ordained by nature is good for some
purpose or other. Even poisons serv^e to counteract other
poisons which are in our own blood, and they must not
be absent therefore in a complete collection of medicines.
The objections against the vain persuasions and the con-
ceit of our own purely speculative reason are inspired
by the very nature of that reason, and must therefore
have their own good purpose, which must not be lightly
cast aside. Why has Providence placed certain things,
which concern our highest interests, so far be- [p. 744]
yond our reach that we are only able to apprehend them
very indistinctly and dubiously, and our enquiring gaze is
more excited than satisfied by them } It is very doubtful
whether it is useful to venture on any bold answers with
regard to such obscure questions, nay, whether it may not
be detrimental But one thing is quite certain, namely,
that it is useful to grant to reason the fullest freedom,
both of enquiry and of criticism, so that she may consult
her own interest without let or hindrance. And this is
done quite as much by limiting her insight as by enlarg-
ing it, while nothing but mischief must arise from any for-
eign interference or any attempt to direct reason, against
her own natural inclination, towards objects forced upon
her from without.
Allow, therefore, your adversary to speak reason, and
combat bim with weapons of reason only* As to any
practical interests you need not be afraid, for in purely
speculative discussions they are not involved at all. What
comes to light in these discussions is only a certain anti-
nomy of reason which, as it springs from the very nature
of reason, must needs be listened to and examined. Rea-
son is thus improved only by a consideration of both sides
of her subject. Her judgment is corrected by the very
limitations imposed upon hen What people may differ
about is not the matter so much as the tone and manner
of these discussions. For, though you have to surrender
the language of knowledge, it is perfectly open [p. 745]
to you to retain the language of the firmest faith, which
need not fear the severest test of reason.
If we could ask that dispassionate philosopher, David
Hume, who seemed made to maintain the most perfect
1 equilibrium of judgment, what induced him to undermine
\ by carefully elaborated arguments the persuasion, so use-
\ful and so full of comfort for mankind, as that reason is
Isufficient to assert and to form a definite concept of a
/Supreme Being, he would answer, Nothing but a wish to
advance reason in self-knowledge, and at the same time
a certain feeling of indignation at the violence which
people wish to inflict on reason by boasting of her powerSp
and yet at the same time preventing her from openly con-
fessing her weakness of which she has become conscious
by her own self-examination. If, on the contrar)^ you
were to ask Priestley, who was guided by the principles
of the empirical use of reason only and opposed to all
transcendental speculation, what could have induced him
to pull down two such pillars of religion as the freedom
and immortality of our soul (for the hope of a future life
is with him an expectation only of the miracle of a resus-
citation), he, who was himself so pious and zealous a
teacher of religion, could answer nothing but that he was
.concerned for reason, which must suffer if certain subjects
Jare withdrawn from the laws of material nature, the only
laws which we can accurately know and fix. It [p. 746]
would be most unjust to decry the latter, who was able to
combine his paradoxical assertions with the interests of
religion, and to inflict pain on a well-intentioned man,
simply because he could not find his way, the moment
he strayed away from the field of natural science. And
the same favour must be extended to the equally well-
intentioned, and in his moral character quite blameless,
Hume, who could not and would not leave his abstract
speculations, because he was rightly convinced that their
object lies entirely outside the limits of natural science,
and within the sphere of pure ideas.
What then is to be done, especially with regard to the
danger which is believed to threaten the commonwealth
from such speculations ? Nothing is more natural, nothing
more fair than the decision which you have to come to.
Let these people go ! If they show talent, if they produce
new and profound investigations, in one word, if they show
reason, reason can only gain. If you have recourse to any*
thing else but untrammelled reason, if you raise the cry
of high treason, and call together the ignorant mob as
it were to extinguish a conflagration — you simply render
yourself ridiculous. For here the question is not what
may be useful or dangerous to the commonwealth, but
merely how far reason may advance in her speculations,
which are independent of all practical interests ; [p. 747]
in fact, whether these speculations are to count for anything,
or are to be surrendered entirely for practical considera*
tions. Instead of rushing in, sword in hand, it is far wiser
to watch the struggle from the safe seat of the critic. That
struggle is very hard for the combatants themselves, while
to you it need not be anything but entertaining, and, as
6oo Discipline of Pure Reasan
the issue is sure to be without bloodshed, it may become
highly improving to your own intellect. For it is ex-
tremely absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and
yet to prescribe to her beforehand ori which side she must
incline. Besides, reason is naturally so subdued and
checked by reason, that you need not send out patrols in
order to bring the civil law to bear on that party whose
victory you fear. In this dialectical w^ar no victory is
gained that need disturb your peace of mind.
Reason really stands in need of such dialectical strife,
and it is much to he wished that it had taken place sooner,
and with the unlimited sanction of the public, for, in that
case, criticism would sooner have reached complete ma-
turity, and disputes would have come to an end by each
party becoming aware of the ilhisions and prejudices which
caused their diiTerences.
There is in human nature a certain disingenuousness
which, however, like everything that springs [p> 748]
from nature, must contain a useful germ, namely, a ten-
dency to conceal one's own true sentiments, and to give
expression to adopted opinions which are supposed to be
good and creditable. There is no doubt that this tendency
to conceal oneself and to assume a favourable appearance
has helped towards the progress of civilisation, nay, to a
certain extent, of morality, because others, who could not
see through the varnish of respectability, honesty, and
correctness, were led to improve themselves by seeing
everywhere these examples of goodness which they be-
lieved to be genuine. This tendency, however, to show
oneself better than one really is, and to utter sentiments
which one does not really share, can only serve pro-
visionally to rescue men from a rude state, and to teach
Discipliuc of Pure Reason 60 r
them to assume at least the appearance of what they know
to be good. Afterwards, when genuine principles have
once been developed and become part of our nature, that
disingenuousness must be gradually conquered, because it
will otherwise deprave the heart and not allow the good
seeds of honest conviction to grow up among the tares of
fair appearances.
I am sorry to observe the same disingenuousness, con-
cealmenti and hypocrisy even in the utterances of specu-
lative thought, though there are here fewer hindrances in
uttering our convictions openly and freely as we ought,
and no advantage whatever in our not doing [p. 749]
so. For what can be more mischievous to the advance-
ment of knowledge than to communicate even our thoughts
in a falsified form, to conceal doubts which w^e feel in our
own assertions, and to impart an appearance of conclusive-
ness to arguments which we know ourselves to be incon-
clusive ? So long as those tricks arise from personal
vanity only (which is commonly the case with speculative
arguments, as touching no particular interests, nor easily
capable of apodictic certainty) they are mostly counter-
acted by the vanity of others^ with the full approval of the
public at large, and thus the result is generally the same
as what would or might have been obtained sooner by
means of pure ingenuousness and honesty. But where
the public has once persuaded itself that certain subtle
speculators aim at nothing less than to shake the very
foundations of the common welfare of the people, it is
supposed to be not only prudent, but even advisable and
honourable, to come to the succour of what is called the
good cause, by sophistries, rather than to allow to our
sup{>09ed antagonists the satisfaction of having lowered
our tone to that of a purely practical conviction, and hav-
ing forced us to confess the absence of all speculative
and apodictic certainty. I cannot believe this, nor can I
admit that the intention of serving a good cause can ever
be combined with trickery, misrepresentation, and fraud.
That in weighing the arguments of a speculative discus-
sion wc ought to be honest, seems the least that [p. 750]
can be demanded ; and if we could at least depend on
this with perfect certainty, the conflict of speculative
reason with regard to the important questions of God,, the
immortality of the soul, and freedom, would long ago have
been decided, or would soon be brought to a conclusion.
Thus it often happens that the purity of motives and senti-
ments stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the
cause, and that its supposed assailants are more honest
and more straightforward than its defenders.
Supposing that I am addressing readers who never wish
to see a just cause defended by unjust means^ I may say
that* according to our principles of criticism, and looking
not at what commonly happens, but at what in all common
fairness ought to happen, there ought to be no polemical
use of reason at all For how can two persons dispute on
a subject the reality of which neither of them can present
either in real, or even in possible experience, while they
brood on the mere idea of it with the sole intention of
eliciting something more than the idea, namely, the reality
of the object itself? How can they ever arrive at the end
of their dispute, as neither of them can make his view
comprehensible and certain, or do more than attack and
refute the view of his opponent ? For this is the fate of
all assertions of pure reason. They go beyond the condi-
tions of all possible experience, where no proof [p. 751]
Discipline of Pure Reason
of truth is to be found anywhere, but they have to follow,
nevertheless, the laws of the understanding, which are
intended for empirical use only, but without which no step
can be made in synthetical thought Thus it happens
that each side lays open its own weaknesses, and each can
avail itself of the weaknesses of the other.
The critique of pure reason may really be looked upon
as the true tribunal for all disputes of reason ; for it is not
concerned in these disputes which refer to objects imme-
diately, but is intended to fix and to determine the rights
of reason in general, according to the principles of its
original institution.
Without such a critique, reason may be said to be in a
state of nature, and unable to establish and defend its as-
sertions and claims except by war The critique of pure
reason, on the contrary, which bases all its decisions on
the indisputable principles of its own original institution,
secures to us the peace of a legal status, in which disputes
are not to be carried on except in the proper form of a laiv-
suit. In the former state such disputes generally end in
both parties claiming victory, which is followed by an un*
certain peace, maintained chiefly by the civil power, while
in the latter state a sentence is pronounced which, [p, 752]
as it goes to the very root of the dispute, must secure an
eternal peace. These never-ceasing disputes of a purely
dogmatical reason compel people at last to seek for rest and
peace in some criticism of reason itself, and in some sort
of legislation founded upon such criticism. Thus Hobbes
maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice
and violence, and that we must needs leave it and submit
ourselves to the constraint of law, which alone limits our
freedom in such a way that it may consist with the free-
dom of others and with the common good.
6o4 Discipline of Pure Reason
It is part of that freedom that we should be allowed
openly to state our thoughts and our doubts which we
cannot solve ourselves, without running the risk of being
decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens.
This follows from the inherent rights of reason, which
recognises no other judge but universal human reason
itself. Here everybody has a vote ; and, as all improve-
ments of which our state is capable must spring from
thence, such rights arc sacred and must never be minished.
Nay, it %%^ould really be foolish to proclaim certain bold
assertions, or reckless attacks upon assertions which en-
joy the approval of the largest and best portion of the
commonwealth^ as dangerous j for that would be to impart
to them an importance which they do not pos- [p. 753]
sess. Whenever I hear that some uncommon genius has
demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the
hope of a future life, or the existence of God, I am always
desirous to read his book, for I expect that his talent will
help me to improve my own insight into these problems.
Of one thing I feel quite certain, even without having
seen his book, that he has not disproved any single one of
these doctrines; not because I imagine that I am myself
in possession of irrefragable proofs of them, but because
the transcendental critique^ by revealing to me the whole
apparatus of our pure reason, has completely convinced
me that, as reason is insufficient to establish affirmative
propositions in this sphere of thought^ it is equally, nay,
even more powerless to establish the negative on any of
these points. For where is this so-called free-thinker to
take the knowledge that, for instance, there exists no
Supreme Being? This proposition lies outside the field
of possible experience and, therefore, outside the limits of
r
Discipline of Pure Reason
605
all human cognition. The dogmatical defender of the
good cause I should not read at all» because I know before-
hand that he will attack the sophistries of the other
party simply in order to recommend his own. Besides, a
mere defence of the common opinion does not supply so
much material for new remarks as a strange and ingeniously
contrived theory. The opponent of religion, himself
dogmatical in his own way, would give me a [p. 754]
valuable opportunity for amending here and there the
principles of my own critique of pure reason, while I
should not be at all afraid of any danger arising from his
theories.
But it may be argued that the youth at least, entrusted
to our academical teaching, should be warned against such
writings, and kept away from a too early knowledge of
such dangerous propositions, before their faculty of judg-
ment, or we should rather say, before the doctrines which
we wish to inculcate on them, have taken root, and are
able to withstand all persuasion and pressure, from what-
ever quarter it may proceed.
Yes, if t\\^ cause of pure reason is always to be pleaded
dogmatically, and if opponents are to be disposed of
polemically, i.e. simply by taking up arms against them
and attacking them by means of proofs of opposite opin-
ions, nothing might seem for the moment more advisable,
but nothing would prove in the long run more vain and
inefficient than to keep the reason of youth in temporary
tutelage, and to guard it against temptation for a time at
least. If, however, curiosity or the fashion of the age
should afterwards make them acquainted with such writ-
ings, will their youthful persuasion then hold good? He
who is furnished with dogmatical weapons only in order to
resist the attacks of his opponent, and is not able to ana-
lyse that hidden dialectic which is concealed in his own
breast quite as much as in that of his opponent, sees
sophistries which at all events have the charm of [p. 755]
novelty, opposed to other sophistries which possess that
charm no longer, and excite the suspicion of having im-
posed on the natural credulity of youth. He sees no
better way of showing that he is no longer a child than by
ignoring all well-meant warnings, and^ accustomed as he is
to dogmatism, he swallows the poison which destroys his
principles by a new dogmatism.
The very opposite of this is the right course for aca-
demical instruction, provided always that it is founded
on a thorough training in the principles of the criti*
cism of pure reason. For, in order to practically apply
these principles as soon as possible, and to show their
sufficiency even when faced by the strongest dialectical
illusion, it is absolutely necessary to allow the attacks,
which seem so formidable to the dogmatist, to be directed
against the young mind whose reason, though weak as
yet, has been enlightened by criticism, so as to let him
test by its principles the groundless assertions of his
opponents one after the other. He cannot find it very
difficult to dissolve them all into mere vapour, and thus
alone does he early begin to feel his own power and
is able to secure himself against all dangerous illusions
which in the end lose all their fascination on him. It is
true, the same blows which destroy the strong- [p. 756]
hold of his opponent must prove fatal also to his own
speculative structures, if he should wish to erect such.
But this need not disturb him, because he does not wish
to shelter himself beneath them, but looks out for the
Discipline of Pure Reasan
607
fair field of practical philosophy, where he may hope
to find firmer ground for erecting his own rational and
beneficial system.
There is, therefore, no room for real polemic in the
sphere of pure reason. Both parties beat the air and
fight with their own shadows, because they go beyond
the limits of nature, where there is nothing that they
could lay hold of with their dogmatical grasp. They
may fight to their hearts' content, the shadows which
they are cleaving grow together again in one moment,
like the heroes in Valhalla, in order to disport themselves
once more in these bloodless contests.
Nor can we admit a sceptical use of pure reason, which
might be called the principle of neutrality in all its dis-
putes. Surely» to stir up reason against itself, to supply
it with weapons on both sides, and then to look on
quietly and scoffingly while the fierce battle is raging,
does not look well from a dogmatical point of view,
but has the appearance of a mischievous and malevolent
disposition. If, however, we consider the in- [p. 757]
vincible obstinacy and the boasting of the dogmatical
sophists, who are deaf to all the warnings of criticism,
there really seems nothing left but to meet the boasting
on one side by an equally justified boasting on the other,
in order at least to startle reason by a display of opposi-
tion, and thus to shake her confidence and make her
wilhng to listen to the voice of criticism. But to stop
at this point, and to look upon the conviction and con-
fession of ignorance, not only as a remedy against dog-
matical conceit, but vis the best means of settling the
conflict of reason with herself, is a vain attempt that
will never give rest and peace to reason. The utmost
6o8
Discipline of Pure Reason
it can do is to rouse reason from her sweet dogmatical
dreams, and to induce her to examine more carefully her
own position. As, however, the sceptical manner of avoid-
ing a troublesome business seems to be the shortest way
out of all difficulties, and promises to lead to a permanent
peace in philosophy, or is chosen at least as the highroad
by all who, under the pretence of a scornful dislike of all
investigations of this kind, try to give themselves the air
of philosophers, it seems necessary to exhibit this mode of
thought in its true light.
The hfipossibiiity of a Scepticai Satisfaction of [p, 758]
Pure Reason in Conflict tmth itself
The consciousness of my ignorance (unless we recog-
nise at the same time its necessity) ought, instead of
forming the end of my investigations, to serv^e, on the
contrary, as their strongest impulse. All ignorance is
either an ignorance of things, or an ignorance of the limits
of our cognition. If ignorance is accidental, it should
incite us, in the former case, to investigate things dog-
maiicaiiy, in the latter to investigate the limits of possible
knowledge cniicaiiy. That my ignorance is absolutely
necessary and that I am absolved from the duty of all
further investigation, can never be established empirically
by mere observation, but cnticaliy only, by a thorough
examination of the first sources of our knowledge. The
determination of the true limits of our reason, therefore,
can be made on f/ /n*m grounds only, while its limitation,
which consists in a general recognition of our never en-
tirely removable ignorance, may be realised a posteriori
also, by seeing how much remains to be known in spite of
Discipline of Pure Reason
609
all that can be known. The former knowledge of oiir igno-
rance, possible only by criticism of reasoOi is truly scicn-
iijic, the latter is merely matter of experience, [p. 759]
where it is never possible to say how far the inferences
drawn from it may reach. If I regard the earth, accord-
ing to the evidence of ray senses, as a flat surface, I can-
not tell how far it may extend. But what experience
teaches me is, that wheresoever I go, I always see before
me a space in which I can proceed further. Thus I am
conscious of the limits of my actual knowledge of the
earth at any given moment, but not of the limits of all
possible geography. But if I have got so far as to know
that the earth is a sphere and its surface spherical, I am
able from any small portion of it, for instance, from a
degree, to know definitely and according to principles a
priori, the diameter, and through it, the complete periph-
ery of the earth ; and, though I am ignorant with regard
to the objects which are contained in that surface, I am
not so with regard to its extent, its magnitude, and its
limits.
In a similar manner the whole of the objects of our
knowledge appears to us like a level surface, with its
apparent horizon which encircles its whole extent, and
was called by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To
reach this limit empirically is impossible, and all attempts
have proved vain to determine it a priori according to a
certain principle. Nevertheless, all questions of pure
reason refer to what lies outside of that horizon, or, it
may be, on its boundary line. [p. 760]
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geog^ra-
phcrs of hyman reason who supposed that all those
questions were sufficiently disposed of by being relegated
am
outside that horizon, which, however, he was not able
to determine. He was chiefly occupied with the princi-
ple of causality, and remarked quite rightly, that the
truth of this principle {and even the objective validity of
the concept of an efficient cause in general) was based
on no knowledge, i.e. on no cognition a priori^ and that
Its authority rested by no means on the necessity of such
a law, but merely on its general usefulness in experience,
and on a kind of subjective necessity arising from thence,
which he called habit. From the inability of reason to
employ this principle beyond the limits of experience he
inferred the nulUty of all the pretensions of reason in her
attempts to pass beyond what is empiricaL
This procedure of subjecting the facts of reason to
examination, and, if necessary, to blame, may be termed
the censorship of reason. There can be no doubt that
such a censorship must inevitably lead to doubts [p. 761]
against all the transcendental employment of such princi-
ples. But this is only the second and by no means the last
step in our enquiry. The first step in matters of pure reason,
which marks its infancy, is dogmatism. The second, which
we have just described, is scepticism, and marks the stage
of caution on the part of reason, when rendered wiser by
experience. But a third step is necessary, that of the
maturity and manhood of judgment, based on firm and
universally applicable maxims, when not the facts of
reason, but reason itself in its whole power and fitness
for pure knowledge a priori com^s to be examined. This
is not the censura merely, but the true criticism of reason,
by which not the barrier only, but the fixed frontiers of
reason, not ignorance only on this or that point, but
ignorance with reference to all possible questions of
Discipline of Pure Reason
6il
a certain kind, must be proved from principles^ instead of
being merely guessed at Thus scepticism is a resting-
place of reason, where it may reflect for a time on its
dogmatical wanderings and gain a survey of the region
where it happens to be, in order to choose its way with
greater certainty for the future : but it can never be its
permanent dwelling-place. That can only be found in
perfect certainty, whether of our knowledge of the objects
themselves or of the limits within which all our knowledge
of objects is enclosed. [p. 762]
Our reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely*^
extended plain, the limits of which are known in a general
way only, but ought rather to be compared to a sphere
the radius of which may be determined from the curva-
ture of the arc of its surface (corresponding to the nature
of synthetical propositions a priori)^ which enables us
likewise to fix the extent and periphery of it with perfect
certainty. Outside that sphere (the field of experience)
nothing can become an object to our reason, nay, ques*
tions even on such imaginary objects relate to the sub-
jective principles only for a complete determination of
all the relations which may exist between the concepts
of the understanding within that sphere.
It is a fact that we are in possession of different
kinds of synthetical knowledge a priori, as shown by
the principles of the understanding which anticipate
experience. If anybody finds it quite impossible to under-
stand the possibility of such principles, he may at first
have some doubts as to whether they really dwell within
us a priori I but he cannot thus, by the mere powers
of the understanding, prove their impossibility^ and
declare all the steps which reason takes under their
t
fl3
Discipline of Pure Reason
guidance as null and void. All he can say is that, i£
we could understand their origin and genuineness, we
should be able to determine the extent and limits of
our reason, and that, until that is done, all the [p. 761]
assertions of reason are made at random. And in this
way a complete scepticism with regard to all dogmatical
philosophy, which is not guided by a criticism of reason,
is well grounded, though we could not therefore deoy to
reason such further advance, after the way has once been
prepared and secured on firmer ground. For all these
concepts, nay, all the questions w^hich pure reason places
before us, have their origin, not in experience, but in
reason itself, and must therefore be capable of being
solved and tested as to their validity or invalidity. Nor
are we justified, while pretending that the solution of these
problems is really to be found in the nature of things,
to decline their consideration and further investigation,
under the pretext of our weakness^ for reason alone
begets all these ideas by itself, and is bound therefore to
give an account of their validity or their dialectical vanity.
All sceptical polemic should properly be directed against
the dogmatist only who, without any misgivings about
his own fundamental objective principles, that is, without
criticism, continues his course with undisturbed gravity »
and should be intended only to unsettle his brief and to
bring him thus to a proper self-knowledge. With regard
to what we know or what we cannot know, that polemic is
of no consequence whatever. All the unsuccessful dogmat-
ical attempts of reason are/^tV^, and it is always [p, 764]
useful to submit them to the ccnsura of the sceptic. But
this can decide nothing as to the expectations of reason in
her hopes and claims of a better success in future attempts ;
I
I
Discipiine of Pure Reason
6n
and no mere censura can put an end to the disputes
regarding the rights of human reason. ,
Hume iSi perhaps, the most ingenious of all sceptics, (
and without doubt the most important with regard to \
the influence which the sceptical method may exercise
in awakening reason to a thorough examination of its
rights. It wili therefore be worth our while to make
clear to ourselves the course of his reasoning and the
errors of an intelligent and estimable man, who at the
outset of his enquiries was certainly on the right track of
truth.
' - "J
Hume was probably aware, though he never made it
quite clear to himself, that in judgments of a certain kind /
we pass beyond our concept of the object. I have called
this class of judgments synthctkaL There is no difficulty
as to how I may, by means of experience, pass beyond the
concept which I have hitherto had. Experience is itself
such a synthesis of perceptions through which a concept,
which I have by means of one perception, is increased by
means of other perceptions. But we imagine that we are
able also a priori to pass beyond our concept [p. 765]
and thus to enlarge our knowledge. This we attempt to do
either by the pure understanding, in relation to that which
can at least be an object of experience^ or even by means
of pure reason, in relation to such qualities of things, or
even the existence of such things, as can never occur in
experience. Hume in his scepticism did not distinguish
between these two kinds of judgments as he ought to have
done, but regarded this augmentation of concepts by
themselves, and, so to say, the spontaneous generation of
our understanding (and of our reason), without being im-
pregnated by experience, as perfectly impossible. Con-
6i4
Discipline of Pure Reason
sidering all principles a priori as imaginary; he arrived at
the conclusion that they were nothing hut a habit arising
from expcncnce and its laws ; that they were therefore
merely empirical that is, in themselves, contingent rules
to which we wrongly ascribe necessity and universality.
In order to establish this strange proposition, he appealed
to the generally admitted principle of the relation between
cause and effect. For as no faculty of the understanding
could lead us from the concept of a thing to the existence
of something else that should follow from it universally
and necessarily, he thought himself justified in concluding
that» without experience, we have nothing that could
augment our concept and give us a right to form a judg-
ment that extends itself a priori. That the light of the
sun which shines on the wax should melt the wax and at
the same time harden the clay, no understand- [p, 766]
ing, he maintained, could guess from the concepts which
we had before of these things, much less infer, according
to a law, experience only being able to teach us such a law.
We have seen, on the contrary, in the transcendental logic
that, though we can never pass immcdiateiy beyond the
content of a concept that is given us, we are nevertheless
able, entirely a priori, but yet in reference to something
else, namely, possible experience, to know the law of its
connection with other things. If, therefore, wax, which
was formerly hard, melts, I can know a priori that some-
thing else must have preceded (for instance the heat of
the sun) upon which this melting has followed according
to a permanent law, although without experience I could
never know a priori definitely either from the effect the
cause, or from the cause the effect. Hume was therefore
wrong in inferring from the mere contingency of our
Discipline of Pure Reason
6is
being determined according to the law of causality, the
contingency of that law itself, and he mistook our passing
beyond the concept of a thing to some possible experience
(which is entirely a priori and constitutes the objective
reality of it) for the synthesis of the objects of real expe-
rience which, no doubt, is always empirical. He thus
changed a principle of affinity which resides in the under*
standing and predicates necessary connection, into a rule
of association residing in the imitative faculty of imagina-
tion, which can only represent contingent, but [p, J^y'l
never objective connections.
The sceptical errors of that otherwise singularly acute""?
thinker arose chiefly from a defect, which he shared, how- \
ever, in common with all dogmatists, namely^ of not having
surveyed systematically all kinds of synthesis a priori of
the understanding. For in doing this he would, without
mentioninf^ others, have discovered, for instance, the prin-
cipie of permanency as one which, like causality, anticipates
experience. He would thus have been able also to fix
definite limits to the understanding in its attempts at
expansion a priori and to pure reason. He only narrows
the sphere of our understanding, without definitely limit-
ing it, and produces a general mistrust, but no definite
knowledge of that ignorance which to us is inevitable.
He only subjects certain principles of the understanding
to his censura^ but does not place the understanding, with
reference to all its faculties, on the balance of criticism.
He is not satisfied with denying to the understanding
what in reality it does not possess, but goes on to deny to
it all power of expanding a priori^ though he has never
really tested all its powers. For this reason, what always
defeats scepticism has happened to Hume also, namely,
6i6 Discipiine of Pnrv Reason
that he himself becomes subject to scepticism, because his
abjections rest on facts only which are contingent, and not
on principles which alone can force a surrender of the
right of dogmatical assertion. [p, 768]
As, besides this, he does not sufficiently distinguish
between the well-grounded claims of the understanding
and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which,
however, his attacks are chiefly directed, it so happens
that reason, the peculiar tendency of which has not in the
least been destroyed, but only checked, does not at all
consider itself shut out from its attempts at expansion,
and can never be entirely turned away from them, al-
though it may be punished now and then. Mere attacks
only provoke counter attacks, and make us more obstinate
in enforcing our own views. But a complete survey of all
that is really our own, and the conviction of a certain
though a small possession, make us perceive the vanity of
higher claims, and induce us, after surrendering all dis-
putes, to live contentedly and peacefully within our own
limited, but undisputed domain.
These sceptical attacks are not only dangerous, but
even destructive to the uncritical dogmatist who has not
measured the sphere of his understanding, and has not,
therefore, determined, according to principles, the limits
of his own possible knowledge, and does not know before-
hand how much he is really able to achieve, but thinks
that he is able to find all this out by a purely tentative
method. For if he has been found out in one single
assertion of his, which he cannot justify, or the fallacy
of which he cannot evolve according to prin- [p. 769]
ciples, suspicion falls on all his assertions, however plausi-
ble they may appear.
Discipline of Pure Reason
617
And thus the sceptic is the true schoolmaster to lead
the dogmatic speculator towards a sound criticism of the
understanding and of reason. When he has once been
brought there, he need fear no further attacks, for he
has learnt to distinguish his own possession from that
which lies completely beyond it, and on which he can
lay no claim, nor become involved in any disputes regard-
ing it. Thus the sceptical method, though it cannot in
itself satisfy with regard to the problems of reason, is
nevertheless an excellent preparation in order to awaken
its circumspection, and to indicate the true means whereby
the legitimate possessions of reason may be secured against
alt attacks.
DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON
Section III
The Discipline of Pure Reason with Regard to Hypotheses
As then the criticism of our reason has at last taught
us so much at least, that with its pure and speculative
use we can arrive at no knowledge at all, would not this
seem to open a wide field for hypotheses, as, where we
cannot assert with certainty, we arc at all events at
liberty to form guesses and opinions?
If the faculty of imagination is not simply to [p. 770]
indulge in dreams, but to invent and compose under the
strict surveillance of reason, it is necessary that there
should always be something perfectly certain, and not
only invented or resting on opinion, and that is the possi-
bility of the object itself. If that is once given, it is
6t8
Discipline of Pure Reason
then allowable, so far as its reality is concerned, to have
recourse to opinion, which opinion, however, if it is not to
be utterly g^roundlcss, must be brought in connection with
what is really given and therefore certain, as its ground
of explanation. In that case, and in that case only, can
we speak of an hypothesis.
As we cannot form the least conception of the possi-
bility of a dynamical connection a priori, and as the
categories of the pure understanding are not intended
to invent any such connection, but only» when it is given
in experience, to understand it, we cannot by means of
these categories invent one single object as endowed
with a new quality not found in experience, or base any
permissible hypothesis on such a quality ; otherwise we
should be supplying our reason with empty chimeras, and
not with concepts of things. Thus it is not permissible
to invent any new and original powers, as, for instance,
an understanding capable of perceiving objects without
the aid of the senses ; or a force of attraction without
any contact ; a new kind of substances that should exist,
for instance, in space, without being impenetrable, and
consequently, also, any connection of substances, differ-
ent from that which is supplied by experience; [p. 771]
no presence, except in space, no duration, except in time.
In one word, our reason can only use the conditions of
possible experience as the conditions of the possibility
of things ; it cannot invent them independently, because
such concepts, although not self-contradictory, would
always be without an object.
The concepts of reason, as was said before, are mere
ideas, and it is true that they have no ohject correspond-
ing to them in experience \ but they do not, for all that,
Discipline of Pure Reason
619
refer to purely imaginary objects, which are supposed to
be possible. They are purely problematical, in order
to supply (as heuristic fictions) regulative principles for
the systematical employment of the understanding in the
sphere of experience. If they are not that, they would
become mere fictions the possibility of which is quite
indemonstrable, and which, therefore, can never be em-
ployed as hypotheses for the explanation of real phe-
nomena. It is quite permissible to represent the soul
to ourselves as simple, in order, according to this idea,
to use the complete and necessary unity of all the facul-
ties of the soul, although we cannot understand it in
concreto^ as the principle of all our enquiries into its
internal phenomena. But to assume the soul as a simple
substance (which is a transcendent concept) would be
a proposition, not only indemonstrable (this is the case
with several physical hypotheses), but purely [p, JT2\
arbitrary and rash: because the simple can never occur
m any experience, and if by substance we understand
the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the very
possibility of a simple phenomcmm is perfectly incon-
ceivable. Reason has no right whatever to assume, as
an opinion, purely intelligible beings, or purely intelligible
qualities of the objects of the senses ; although, on the
other side, as we have no concepts whatever, either of
their possibility or impossibility, we cannot claim any
truer insight enabling us to deny dogmatically their pos-
sibility.
In order to explain given phenomena, no other things or
reasons can be adduced but those which, according to the
already known laws of phenomena, have been put in con-
nection with them* A transcendental hypothesis, adduc-
>20
Discipline of Pure Reason
-ng a mere idea of reason for the explanation of natural
things, would therefore be no explanation at all, because
it would really be an attempt at explaining what, accord-
ing to known empirical principles, we do not understand
sufficiently by something which we do not uaderstand
at all. Nor would the principle of such an hypothesis
serve to help the understanding with regard to its objects,
but only to satisfy our reason. Order and design in
nature must themselves be explained on natural grounds
and according to natural laws ; and for this [p. 773]
purpose even the wildest hypotheses, if only they are
physical, are more tolerable than a hyperphysical one,
— that is, the appeal to the Divine Author, who is
called in for that very purpose. This would be a prin-
ciple of ratio ignava, to pass by all causes the objective
reality of which, in their possibility at leasts may be
known by continued experience, in order to rest on a
mere idea, which no doubt is very agreeable to our
reason. With regard to the absolute totality of the
ground of explanation in the series of causes, there can
be no difficulty, considering that all mundane objects
are nothing but phenomena, in which we can never hope
to find absolute completeness in the synthesis of the
series of conditions.
It is impossible to allow transcendental hypotheses in
the speculative use of reason, or the use of hyperphysical
instead of physical explanations ; partly, because reason
is not in the least advanced in that way, but, on the con-
trary, cut off from its own proper employment, partly
because such a licence would in the end deprive reason
of all the fruits that spring from the cultivation of its own
proper soil, namely, experience. It is true, no doubt, that
Discipline of Pure Reason
621
whenever the explanation of nature seems difficult to us^
we should thus always have a transcendent explanation
ready to hand, which relieves us of all investigation ; hot
in that case we are led in the end, not to an [p, 774]
understanding, but to a complete incomprehensibility of
the principle which, from the very beginning, was so
designed that it must contain the concept of something
which is the absolutely First.
What is, secondly, required in order to render an hy-
pothesis acceptable, is its adequacy for determining a
priori^ by means of it, all the consequences that are given.
If, for that purpose, we have to call in the aid of supple-
mentary hypotheses, they rouse the suspicion of a mere
fiction, because each of them requires for itself the same
justification as the fundamental idea, and cannot serve
therefore as a sufficient witness. No doubt, if we once
admit an absolutely perfect cause, there is no difficulty in
accounting for all the order, magnitude, and design which
are seen in the world. But if we consider what seem to
us at least deviations and evils in nature, new hypotheses
will be required in order to save the first hypothesis from
the objections which it has to encounter. In the same
manner, whenever the simple independence of the human
soul, which has been admitted in order to account for all
its phenomena, is called into question on account of the
difficulties arising from phenomena similar to the changes
of matter (growth and decay), new hypotheses have to be
called in, which may seem plausible, but possess no au-
thority, except what they derive from the opinion [p. 775]
which was to yield the chief explanation, and which they
themselves were called upon to defend.
If the two hypotheses which we have jtist mentioned
as examples of the assertions of reason (the incorporeal
unity of the soul, and the existence of a Supreme Being)
are to be accepted, not as hypotheses, but as dogmas
proved a priori, we have nothing to say to them. Great
care, however, should be taken in that case that they
should be proved with the apodictic certainty of a demon-
stration. It would be as absurd to try to make the reality
of such ideas plausible only, as to try to make a geomet-
rical proposition plausible. Reason, independent of all
experience, knows everything either a priori^ and as neces-
sary, or not at all. Its judgment, therefore, is never
opinion, but either an abstaining from all judgments, or
apodictic certainty. Opinions and guesses as to what
belongs to things can be admitted in explanation only of
what is really given, or as resulting, according to empirical
laws, from something that is really given. They belong,
therefore, to the series of the objects of experience only.
Outside that field to opine is the same as to play with
thoughts, unless we suppose that even a doubtful and un-
certain way of judging might lead us perhaps on to the
truth.
But although, when dealing with the purely [p. 776J
speculative questions of pure reason, no hypotheses are
admissible in order to found on them any propositions,
they are perfectly admissible in order, if possible, to defend
them ; that is to say, they may be used for polemical, but
not for dogmatical purposes. Nor do I understand by
defending the strengthening of the proofs in support of
our assertions, but only the refutation of the dialectical
arguments of the opponent which are intended to invali-
date our assertions. All synthetical propositions of pure
reason have this peculiarity that, although the philosopher
Discipline of Pure Reasan
623
who maintains the reality of certain ideas never possesses
sufficient knowledge in order to render his own proposi*
tions certain, his opponent is equally unable to prove the
opposite. It is true, no doubt, that this equality of fort-
une, which is peculiar to human reason^ favours neither
of the two parties with regard to their speculative know-
ledge» and hence the never-ending feuds in this arena.
But we shall see nevertheless that, in relation to its practi-
cal employment, reason has the right of admitting what,
in the sphere of pure speculation, it would not be allowed
to admit without sufficient proof. Such admissions, no
doubt, detract from the perfection of speculation, but
practical interests take no account of this. Here, there-
fore, reason is in possession, without having to prove the
legitimacy of its title, which, indeed, it would be [p. 7771
difficult to do. The burden of proof rests, therefore, on
the opponent ; and as he knows as little of the point in
question, to enable him to prove its non-existence, as the
other who maintains its reality, it is evident that there is
an advantage on the side of him who maintains something
as a practically necessary supposition {melior est conditio
possiiicnfts). He is clearly entitled, as it were in self-
defence, to use the same weapons in support of his own
good cause, which the opponent uses against it, that is, to
employ hypotheses, which are not intended to strengthen
the arguments in favour of his own view, but only to show
that the opponent knows far too little of the subject under
discussion to flatter himself that he possesses any advan-
tage over us, so far as speculative insight is concerned.
In the field of pure reason, therefore, hypotheses are
admitted as weapons of defence only, not in order to
establish a right, but simply in order to defend it ; and it
624
Discipline of Pure Reason
is our duty at all times to look for a real opponent within
ourselves. Speculative reason in its transcendental em-
ployment is by its very nature dialectical. The objections
which we have to fear lie in ourselves. We must look for
them as we look for old, but never superannuated claims,
if we wish to destroy them, and thus to estabHsh a per-
manent peace. External tranquillity is a mere illusion. It
is necessary to root up the very germ of these objections
which lies in the nature of human reason ; and how can
we root it up, unless we allow it freedom, nay, [p. 778]
offer it nourishment, so that it may send out shoots, and
thus discover itself to our eyes, so that we may afterwards
destroy it with its very root ? Try yourselves therefore
to discover objections of which no opponent has ever
thought ; nay, lend him your weapons, and grant him the
most favourable position which he could wish for. You
have nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for,
namely, that you may gain a possession which no one will
ever again venture to contest.
In order to be completely equipped you require the
hypotheses of pure reason also, which, although but leaden
weapons (because not steeled by any law of experience),
are yet quite as strong as those which any opponent is
likely to use against you. If, therefore (for any not specu-
lative reason), you have admitted the immaterial nature of
the soul, which is not subject to any corporeal changes,
and you are met by the difficulty that nevertheless experi-
ence seems to prove' both the elevation and the decay of
our mental faculties as different modifications of our organs,
you can weaken the force of this objection by saying that
you look upon the body as a fundamental phenomenon
only, which, in our present statr {m this life), forms the
DiscipHfU of Pure Reason
625
condition of all the faculties of our sensibility, and hence
of our thought. In that case the separation from the body
would be the end of the sensuous employment and the
beginning of the intelligible employment of our faculty of
knowledge. The body would thus have to be [p, 779]
considered, not as the cause of our thinking, but only as a
restrictive condition of it, and, therefore, if on one side as
a support of our sensuous and animal life, on the other, all
the more, as an impediment of our pure and spiritual life,
so that the dependence of the animal life on the constitu-
tion of the body would in no wise prove the. dependence
of our whole life on the state of our organs. You may go
even further and discover new doubts which have either
not been raised at all before, or at all events have not
been carried far enough.
Generation in the human racc» as well as among irra-
tional creatures, depends on so many accidents, on occasion,
on sufficient sustenance, on the views and whims of govern-
ment, nay, even on vice, that it is difficult to believe in
the eternal existence of a being whose life has first begun
under circumstances so trivial, and so entirely dependent
on our own choice. As regards the continuance (here on
earth) of the whole race, there is less difficulty, because
the accidents in individual cases are subject nevertheless
to a rule with regard to the whole. With regard to each
individual, however, to expect so important an effect from
such insignificant causes seems very strange. But even
against this you may adduce the following transcendental
hypothesis, namely, that all life is really intelligible only,
not subject to the changes of time, and neither [p, 780]
beginning in birth, nor ending in death. You may say
that this life is ph^nonxenal only, that is, a sensuous repre-
set! tat ion of the pure spiritual life, and that the whole
world of sense is but an image passing before our present
mode of knowledge, but, like a dream, without any objec-
tive reality in itself; nay, that if we could see ourselves
and other objects also as (hey really are^ we should see
ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our community
with which did neither begin at our birth nor will end with
the death of the hody, both being purely phenomenal.
Although it is true that we do not know anything about
what we have here been pleading hypothetically against
our opponents, and that we ourselves do not even seriously
maintain it, it being simply an idea invented for self-
defence and not even an idea of reason, yet we are acting
throughout quite rationally. In answer to our opponent
who imagines that he has exhausted all possibilities, and
who wrongly represents the absence of empirical conditions
as a proof of the total impossibility of our own belief, we
are simply showing him that he can no more, by mere laws
of experience, comprehend the whole field of possible
things by themselves than we are able, outside of experi-
ence, to establish anything for our reason on a really secure
foundation. Because we bring forward such hypothetical
defences against the pretensions of our boldly denying
opponent, we must not be supposed to have [p. 781]
adopted these opinions as our own. We abandon them so
soon as we have disposed of the dogmatical conceit of our
opponent. It seems no doubt very modest and moderate
to maintain a simple negative position with regard to the
assertions of other people; but to attempt to represent
objections as proofs of the opposite opinion is quite as
arrogant as to assume the position of the affirming party
and its opinions.
r>
Discipiifie of Pure Reason
621
It is easy to see, therefore, that in the speculative em
ployment of reason hypotheses are of no value by them-
selves, but relatively oiily» as opposed to the transcendental
pretensions of the opposite party. For to extend the prin*
ciples of possible experience to the possibility of things in
general is quite as transcendent as to ascribe objective
reality to concepts which cannot have an object except
outside the limits of all possible experience. The asser-
lory judgments of pure reason must (like everything known
by reason) be either necessary or nothing at all. Reason,
in fact, knows of no opinions. The hypotheses, however,
which we have just been discussing are problematical
judgments only, which, at least, cannot be refuted^ though
they can neither be proved by anything. They are noth-
ing but private* opinions, but (for our own satis- [p. 782]
faction) we cannot well do without them to counteract
misgivings that may arise in our minds. In this character
they should be maintained, but we must take great care
less they should assume independent authority and a cer-
tain absolute validity, and drown our reason beneath fic-
tions and phantoms.
THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON
Section IV
T^ Disciplitte of Pure Reason with Regard to its Proofs
What distinguishes the proofs of transcendental and syn-
thetical propositions from all other proofs of a syntheti-
cal knowledge a priori is this, that reason is not allowed
here to apply itself directly to an object through its con-
1 Reftd riim imteftd of keint^
628
Discipline of Pure Reason
cepts, but has first to prove the objective validity of those
concepts and the possibility of their synthesis a priori.
This rule is not suggested by prudence only, but refers to
the very nature and the possibility of such proofs. If I
am to go beyond the concept of an object a priori^ this is
impossible without some special guidance coming to me
from without that concept. In mathematics it is intuition
a pnori which thus guides my synthesis, so that all our
conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intui-
tion. In transcendental knowledge the same [p, ^%^
guidance, so long as we are dealing with concepts of the
understanding only, is to be found in possible experience.
For here the proof does not show that the given concept
(for instance, the concept of that which happens) leads
directly to another concept (that of a cause). This would
be a salt us which nothing could justify. What our proof
really shows is, that experience itself and therefore the
object of experience would be impossible without such a
(causal) connection. The proof, therefore, had at the
same time to indicate the possibility of arriving syntheti-
cally and a priori at a certain knowledge of things which
was not contained in our concept of them. Unless we
attend to this point, our proofs, like streams which have
broken their banks, run wildly across the fields wherever
the inclination of some hidden association may chance to
lead them. The semblance of a conviction, based on sub-
jective causes of association and mistaken for the percep-
tion of a natural affinity, cannot balance the misgivings
which are justly roused by such bold proceedings. Hence
all attempts at proving the principle of sufficient reason
have, according to the universal admission of all competent
judges, been %'ain ; and before the appearance of transcen-
Discipline cf Pure Reason
629
dental criticism it was thought better^ as that principle
could never be surrendered, to make a sturdy appeal to the
common sense of mankind (an expedient which [p, 784]
always shows that the cause of reason is desperate) than
to attempt new dogmatical proofs of it.
But, if the proposition that has to be proved is an
assertion of pure reason, and if I even intend by means of
pure ideas to go beyond my empirical concepts, it would
be all the more necessary that the proof should contain
the justification of such a step of synthesis (if it were
possible) as a necessary condition of its own validity.
The so-called proof of the simple nature of our thinking;
substance (soul), derived from the unity of apperception,
seems very plausible ; but it is confronted by an inevi-
table difficulty, because, as the absolute unity is not a
concept that can be immediately referred to a perception,
but, as an idea, can only be inferred, it is difficult to
understand how the mere consciousness which is, or at
least may be, contained in all tfwughi, though it may be
so far a simple representation, can lead mc on to the
consciousness and the knowledge of a thing, in which
thought alone is contained. For if I represent to myself
the power of my body, as in motion, it is then to me
an absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple
one. I can, therefore, very well express this representa-
tion by the motion of a point ; because the volume of the
body is here of no consequence, and can, without any
diminution of its power, be conceived as small as one
likes, and, therefore, even as existing in one point. But
I should never conclude from this that, if noth- [p. 785]
ing is given to me but the motive power of a body, that
body can be conceived as a simple substance, because its
representation is independent of the quantity of its vol-
ume, and, therefore, simple, I thus detect a paralogism,
because the simple in the abstract is totally difTerent from
the simple as an object, and the e^o which, conceived in
the abstract, contains nothing manifold, can, as an object,
when signifying the soul, become a very complex concept,
comprehending and implying many things. In order to
be prepared for such a paralogism (for unless we suspected
it, the proof might excite no suspicion), it is absolutely
necessary to be always in possession of a criterion of such
synthetical propositions, which are meant to prove more
than experience can ever supply. This criterion consists
in our demanding that the proof should not be carried
directly to the predicate in question, but that, first, the
principle of the possibility of expanding our given concept
a priori into ideas and realising them, should be estab-
lished. If we always exercised this caution, and, before
attempting any such proof, wisely considered ourselves,
how, and with what degree of confidence, we might expect
such an expansion through pure reason, and whence we
might take, in such cases, knowledge which cannot be
evolved from concepts nor anticipated with ref- [p. 786]
erence to possible experience, we might spare ourselves
many difficult, and yet fruitless endeavours, by not asking
of reason what evidently is beyond its power, or rather, by
subjecting reason, which when once under the influence of
this passion for speculative conquest, is not easily checked,
to a thorough discipline of moderation.
The first rule, therefore, is to attempt no transcendental
proofs before having first considered from whence we
should take the principles on which such proofs are to be
based, and by what right we may expect our conclusions
Discipiiue of Pure Reason
631
to be successful. If they are principles of the understand-
ing (for instance of causality), it is useless to attempt to
arrive, by means of them, at ideas of pure reason ; because
they are valid only with regard to objects of experience.
If they arc principles of pure reason, it is again labour
lost, because, though reason possesses such principles^
they are all, as objective principles, dialectical and cannot
be valid, except perhaps as regulative principles, for the
empirical use of reason, in order to make it systematically
coherent If such so-called proofs exist already, we ought
to meet their deceptive pleadings with the nofi Hqtwi of a
mature judgment ; and although we may be unable to
expose their sophisms^ we have a perfect right [p. jEj^
to demand a deduction of the principles employed, which,
if these principles arc to have their origin in reason alone,
will never be forthcoming. You may thus dispense with
the analysis and refutation of every one of these sophisms,
and dispose in a lump of the endless fallacies of Dialectic,
by appealing to the tribunal of critical reason, which
insists on laws.
The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is this,
that for every transcendental proposition one proof only
can be found. If I have to draw conclusions, not from
concepts, but from the intuition which corresponds to a
concept, whether it be pure intuition, as in mathematics,
or empirical, as in physical science, the intuition on which
my conclusions are to rest supplies me with manifold
material for synthetic d pro^wsitions, which I may connect
in more than one way. so that, by starting from different
puints. I can arrive at the same conclusion by different
paths.
Every transcendental proposition, on the contrary, starts
632
Discipline of Pure Reason
from one concept only, and predicates the synthetical cnr-
dition of the possibility of the object, according to that
concept. There can therefore be but one proof, becaiisei
beside that concept there is nothing else whereby that ob-i
ject could be determined. The proof therefore [p. 788]
can contain nothing more but the determination of an
object in general according to that concept^ which is itself
one only. In the transcendental Analytic, for instance,
we had deduced the principle, that everything which
happens has a cause, from the single condition of the
objective possibility of the concept of an event in general,
namely, that the determination of any event in time, and
therefore the event itself also, as belonging to experience,
would be impossible, unless it were subject to such a dy-
namical rule. This is therefore the only possible proof;
for the event which we represent to ourselves has objec-
tive validity, that is, truth, on this condition only, that
an object is determined as belonging to that concept by
means of the law of causaUty. It is true that other argu-
ments in support of this proposition have been attempted,
for instance, one derived from contingency ; but if that
argument is examined more carefully, we can discover no
characteristic sign of contingency, except the happenings
that is, existence preceded by the non-existence of the
object, which leads us back to the same argument as be-
fore. If the proposition has to be proved that everything
which thinks is simple, no attention is paid to what is
manifold in thought, and the concept of the ego only is
kept in view, which is simple, and to which all thinking
is referred. The same applies to the transcendental proof
of the existence of God, which rests entirely on the re-
ciprocability of the two concepts of a most real [p. 789]
Discifilifu 0f Purr Rras^m
<»
p
^1 and a necessary Being, and cannot be found anywhere
^M else*
H By this caution the criticism of the assertions of reason
H is much simplified* Wherever reason operates with con-
V cepts only, only one proof is possible, if any. If therefore
we see the dogmatist advance with his ten proofs, we may
be sure that he has none. For if he had one which (as
it ought to be in all matters of pure reason) had a|K3dictic
powefj what need would he have of others? His object
can only be the same as that of the parliamentary lawyer
who has one argument for one person, and another for
another. He wants to take advantage of the weakness
of the judges, who, without enquiring more ticcply, ant I
in order to get away as soon as possible, lay hold of the
first argument that catches their attention, and dccitle
accordingly.
The third peculiar rule of pure reason, if it is once sub*
jected to a proper discipline with regard to transcendental
proofs, is this, that such proofs must never be apngogital
or circumstantial, but always osti-nsive or direct. The
direct or ostensive proof combines, with regard to every
kind of knowledge, a conviction of its truth with an in-
sight into its sources ; the apagogical proof, nn tlie con-
trary, though it may produce certainty, cannot help us lo
comprehend the truth in its connection with the grounds
of its possibility. It is therefore a mere ex- [p. 790]
pedient, and cannot satisfy all the requirements of reason.
The apagogical proofs have, however, this advantage with
regard to their evidence over direct proofs, that contradic-
tion always carries with it more clearness in the repre-
sentation than the best combination, and thus approaches
more to the intuitional character of a demonstration.
634
Discipline of Pure Reason
The real reason why apagogical proofs are so rnuch
employed in different sciences, seems to be this. If the
grounds from which some knowledge is to be derived are
too numerous or too deeply hidden, one tries whether
they may not be reached through their consequences.
Now it is quite true that this modus ponens, that is, this
inferring of the truth of some knowledge from the truth
of its consequences, is only permitted, if all possible con-
sequences flowing from it are true. In that case they
have only one possible ground, which therefore is also
the true one. This procedure, however, is impracticable,
because to discover all possible consequences of any given
proposition exceeds our powers. Nevertheless, this mode
of arguing is employed, though under a ceitahi indul-
gence, whenever something is to be established as a hy-
pothesis only, in which case a conclusion, according to
analogy, is admitted, namely, that if as many consequences
as one has tested agree with an assumed ground, all others
will also agree with it. To change in this way a hypothe-
sis into a demonstrated truth, is clearly impossi- [p, 791]
ble. The modus ioilens of reasoning, from consequences
to their grounds, is not only perfectly strict, but also
extremely easy. For if one single false consequence
only can be drawn from a proposition, that proposition is
wrong. Instead, therefore, of examining, for the sake of
an OS tensive proof, the whole series of grounds that may
lead us to the truth of a cognition by means of a perfect
insight into its possibility, we have only to j^rove that one
single consequence, resulting from the opposite, is false,
in order to show that the opposite itself is false, and
therefore the cognition, which we had to prove, true.
This apagogical method of proof, however, is admissible
Discipline of Pure Reason
635
in those sciences only where it is impossible to foist the
subjective elements of our representations into the place
of what is objective, namely, the knowledge of that which
exists in the object. When this is not impossible, it must
often happen that the opposite of any proposition contra-
dicts the subjective conditions of thought only, but not
the object itself, or, that both propositions contradict each
other under a subjective condition, which is mistaken as
objective, so that, as the condition is false, both may be
false» without our being justified in inferring the truth of
the one from the falseness of the other.
In mathematics such subreptions are impos- [p. 792]
sible ; and it is true, therefore, that the apagogical proof
iias its true place there. In natural science, in which
everything is based on empirical intuitions, that kind of
subreption can generally be guarded against by a repeated
comparison of observations ; but even thus, this mode of
proof is of little value there. The transcendental endeav-
ours of pure reason, however, are all made within the
very sphere of dialectical illusion, where what is subjective
presents itself, nay, forces itself upon reason in its pre-
misses as objective. Here, therefore, it can never be
allowed, with reference to synthetical propositions, to jus-
tify one's assertions by refuting their opposite. For, either
this refutation may be nothing but the mere representa-
tion of the conflict of the opposite opinion with the sub-
jective conditions under which our reason could alone
comprehend it, and this would be of no avail for rejecting
the proposition itself^ — - (thus we see, for instance, that
the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a Being
cannot possibly be comprehended by us, which subjectiifely
bars every speculative proof of a necessary Supreme Being,
636
Discipline of Pure Reason
but by no means, the possibility of such a Being by itself)^
— or, on the other hand, it may be that both the affirma-
tive and the negative party have been deceived by the
transcendental illusion, and base their arguments on an
impossible concept of an object. In that case the rule
apphes, non cutis nuiia snnt pmcdicata, that is, [p, 793]
everything that has been asserted with regard to an ob-
ject, whether affirmatively or negatively, is wrong, and we
cannot therefore arrive apagogically at the knowledge of
truth by the refutation of its opposite. If, for example,
we assume that the world of sense is given by itscif in its
totality, it is wrong to conclude that it must be cither
infinite in space, or finite and limited ; for either is wrong,
because phenomena (as mere representations) which never-^
the! ess are to be things by themselves (as objects) are
something impossible, and the infinitude of this imaginary
whole, though it might be unconditioned, would (because
everything in phenomena is conditioned) contradict that
very unconditioned quantity which is presupposed in its
concept.
The apagogical mode of proof is also the blind by which
the admirers of our dogmatical philosophy have always
been deceived. It may be compared to a prizefighter who
is willing to prove the honour and the incontestable rights
of his adopted party by offering battle to all and every
one who should dare to doubt them. Such brawling, how-
ever, settles nothing, but only shows the respective
strength of the two parties, and even this on the part of
those only who take the offensive. The spectators, seeing
that each party is alternately conqueror and con* [p«794]
quered, are often led to regard the very object of the dis-
pute with a certain amount of scepticism. In this, how-
Discipiine of Pure Reason
^17
ever, they arc wrongj and it is suflficient to remind them
of non dcfcnsoribus istis tempus cget. It is absolutely
necessary that every one should plead his cause directly
by means of a legitimate proof based on a transcendental
deduction of the grounds of proof. Thus only can we see
what he may have to say himself in favour of his own
claims of reason. If his opponent relics on subjective
grounds only, it is easy, no doubt, to refute him ; but this
does not benefit the dogmatist, who generally depends
quite as much on the subjective grounds of his judgment,
and can be quite as easily driven into a corner by his
opponent If, on the contrary, both parties employ only
the direct mode of proof, they will either themselves per-
ceive the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of finding any
title for their assertions, and appeal in the end to pre-
scription only, or, our criticism will easily discover the
dogmatical illusion, and compel pure reason to surrender
its exaggerated pretensions in the sphere of speculative
thought, and to retreat within the limits of its own domain^
— that of practical principles.
It is humiliating, no doubt, for human reason that it can
achieve nothing by itself, nay, that it stands in need of a
discipline to check its vagaries, and to guard against the
illusions arising from them. But, on the other hand, it
elevates reason and gives it self-confidence, that it can
and must exercise that discipline itself, and allows no
censorship to any one else. The bounds, moreover, which
it is obliged to set to its own speculative use check at the
same time the sophistical pretensions of all its opponents,
and thus secure everything that remains of its formed
exaggerated pretensions against every possible attack.
The greatest and perhaps the only advantage of all philos-
ophy of pure reason seems therefore to be negative only ;
because it serves, not as an organon for the extension,
but as a discipline for the limitation of its domain, and
instead of discovering truth, it only claims the modest
merit of preventing error.
Nevertheless, there must be somewhere a source of
positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure
reason, and which perhaps, owing to some misunderstand-
638
Canan cf Pure Reason
639
ing only, may lead to error, while they form in [p. 796]
reality the true goal of all the efforts of reason. How else
could we account for that inextinguishable desire to gain
a footing by any means somewhere beyond the limits of
experience ? Reason has a presentiment of objects which
possess a great interest for it. It enters upon the path of
pure speculation in order to approach them, but they fly
before it. May we not suppose that on the only path
which is stil! open to it, namely, that of its practkal em-
ployments, reason may hope to meet with better success ?
I understand by a canon a system of principles a priori
for the proper employment of certain faculties of know-
ledge in general. Thus general logic, in its analytical
portion, is a canon for the understanding and reason in
general, but only so far as the form is concerned, for it
takes no account of any contents. Thus we saw that the
transcendental analytic is the canon of the pure under-
standing, and that it alone is capable of true synthetical
knowledge a priori. When no correct use of a faculty of
knowledge is possible, there is no canon, and as all syn-
thetical knowledge of pure reason in its speculative em*
ployment is, according to all that has been hitherto said,
totally impossible, there exists no canon of the speculative
employment of reason (for that employment is entirely
dialectical), but all transcendental logic is, in this respect,
disciplinary only. Consequently, if there exists [p. 797]
any correct use of pure reason at all, and, therefore, a
canon relating to it, that canon will refer not to the specu-
lative, but to the practical use of reason^ which we shall
now proceed to investigate.
Of ilie Ultimate Aim ef the Pure Use of our Reason
Reason is impelled by a tendency of its nature to go
beyond tbe field of expertence» and to venture in its pure
employment and by means of mere ideas to the utmost
limits of all knowledge ; nay^ it finds no rest until it has
fulfilled its course and established an independent and sys-
tematic whole of all knowledge. The question is, whether
this endeavour rests on the speculative, or rather, exclu-
sively on the practical interests of reason ?
I shall say nothing at present .of the success which has
attended pure reason in its speculative endeavours, and
only ask which are the problems, the solution of which
forms its ultimate aim (whether that object be really
reached or not), and in relation to which all other prob-
lems are only means to an end. These highest aims must
again, according to the nature of reason, possess [p. 798]
a certain unity in order to advance by their union that
interest of humanity which is second to no other
The highest aim to which the speculation of reason in
its transcendental employment is directed comprehends
three objects : the freedom of the will, the immortality of
the soul, and the existence of God. The purely specu-
lative interest of reason in every one of these three
questions is very small, and, for its sake alone, thfs
fatiguing and ceaseless labour of transcendental investi-
gation would hardly have been undertaken, because what-
ever discoveries may be made, they could never be used
Canon of Pure Reason
641
in a way that would be advantageous in comreto^ that is,
in the investigation of nature.
Our will may be free, but this would only refer to the
intelligible cause of our volition. With regard to the
phenomena in which that will manifests itself, that is, our
actions, we have to account for them (according to an
inviolable maxim without which reason could not be em-
ployed for empirical purposes at all), in no other way than
for all other phenomena of nature, that is, according to
her unchangeable laws.
Secondly, the spiritual nature of the soul, and with it
its immortality, may be understood by us, yet we could not
base upon this any explanation, either with regard to the
phenomena of this life, or the peculiar nature of a [p. 799]
future state, because our concept of an incorporeal nature
is purely negative and does not expand our knowledge in
the least, nor does it offer any fit material for drawing
consequences, except such as are purely fictitious, and
could never be countenanced by philosophy.
Thirdly, even admitting that the existence of a highest
intelligence had been proved, we might, no doubt, use it
in order to make the design in the constitution of the
world and its order in general intelligible, but wc should
never be justified in deriving from it any particular ar-
rangement, or disposition, or in boldly inferring it where
it cannot be perceived. For it is a necessary rule for the
speculative employment of reason, never to pass by natural
causes, and, abandoning what we may learn from experi-
ence, to derive something which we know, from something
which entirely transcends all our knowledge.
In one word, these three propositions remain always
transcendent for speculative reason, and admit of no
ST
642
Canon of Pure Reason
immanent employment, that is, an employment admissible
for objects of experience, and therefore of some real utility
to ourselves, but are by themselves entirely valueless and
yet extremely difficult exertions of our reason.
If, therefore, these three cardinal propositions are of no
use to us, so far as knotvledge is concerned, and are yet so
strongly recommended to us by our reason, their true
value will probably be connected with our [p. 800]
practical interests only*
I call practical whatever is possible through freedom.
When the conditions of the exercise of our free-will are
empirical, reason can have no other but a regulative use,
serving only to bring about the unity of empirical laws.
Thus, for instance, in the teaching of prudence, the whole
business of reason consists in concentrating all the objects
of our desires in one, namely, happiness, and in co-ordinat-
ing the means for obtaining it. Reason, therefore, can
give us none but pragmatic laws of free action for the at-
tainment of the objects recommended to us by the senses,
and never pure laws, determined entirely a priori. Pure
practical laws, on the contrary, the object of which is given
by reason entirely a priori, and which convey commands,
not under empirical conditions, but absolutely, would be
products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws, and
these alone, therefore, belong to the sphere of the practical
use of reason, and admit of a canon.
All the preparations of reason, therefore, in what may
be called pure philosophy, are in reality directed to those
three problems only. These themselves, however, have a
still further object, namely, to know zvhat ought to be done^
if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a future
world. As this concerns our actions with reference to the
1
I
Canon of Pure Reason
643
hignest aim of life, we see that the last intention [p. 801]
of nature in her wise provision was really, in the constitu-
tion of our reason, directed to moral interests only.
Wc must be careful, however, lest, as we are now con-
sidering a subject which is foreign to transcendental
philosophy,^ we should lose ourselves in episodes, and
injure the unity of the system, while on the other side, if
we say too little of this new matter, there might be a lack
of clearness and persuasion. I hope to avoid both dangers
by keeping as close as possible to what is transcendental,
and by leaving entirely aside what may be psychological,
that is, empirical in it.
I have, therefore, first to remark that for the present
I shall use the concept of freedom in its practical meaning
only, taking no account of the other concept of freedom
in its transcendental meaning, which cannot be presup-
posed empirically as an explanation of phenomena, but is
itself a problem of reason and has been disposed [p. 802]
of before. A will is purely animal {arbitrinm brutuni) when
it is determined by nothing but sensuous impulses, that is,
pathologically. A will, on the contrary, which is indepen-
dent of sensuous impulses, and can be determined therefore
by motives presented by reason alone, is called Free-mill
{arbitrinm liberum), and everything connected with this,
whether as cause or effect, is called practical Practical
freedom can be proved by experience. For human will is
' All practical concepts relate to objects of pleasure or displeasure, that is^
of )oy or pain. and. therefore, at least indirectly, to objects of our feeling*.
Bui, as feeling is not a fAculty of reprei^enting things, but lies outside the whole
(leld of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, stj far as they
relate to pleasure or pain» that is, the elements of practical judgments, <lo not
belong to transcendental philosophy, which is concerned exclusively with pure
cognitions a priori.
644 Canon of Pure Reason
not determined by that only which excites, that is, im-
mediately affects the senses ; but we possess the power to
overcome the impressions made on the faculty of our sen-
suous desires, by representing to ourselves what, in a more
distant way, may be useful or hurtful These considera-
tions of what is desirable with regard to our whole state,
that iS| of what is good and useful, arc based entirely on
reason. Reason, therefore, gives laws which are im-
peratives, that is, objective laws of freedom^ and tell us
what ought to take place, though perhaps it never does take
place, differing therein from the laws of nature, which
relate only to zvhat does take place. These laws of free-
dom, therefore, are called practical laws.
Whether reason in prescribing these laws is [p, 803]
not itself determined by other influences, and whether
what, in relation to sensuous impulses, is called freedom,
may not, with regard to higher and more remote causes,
be nature again, does not concern us while engaged in
these practical questions, and while demanding from reason
nothing but the rule of our conduct. It is a purely specula-
tive question which, while we are only concerned with what
we ought or ought not to do, may well be left aside. We
know practical freedom by experience as one of the natural
causes, namely, as a causality of reason in determining the
will, while transcendental freedom demands the indepen-
dence of reason itself (with reference to its causality in be-
ginning a series of phenomena) from all determining causes
in the world of sense, thus running counter, as it would
seem, to the law of nature and therefore to all possible
experience, and remaining a problem. Reason, however,
in its practical employment has nothing to do with this
problem^ so that there remain but two questions in a
I
Canon of Pare Rat sou
64s
canon of pure reason which concern the practical interest
of pure reason, and with regard to which a canon of their
employment must be possible, namely: Is there a God?
Is there a future life ? The question of transcendental
freedom refers to speculative knowledge only, and may be
safely left aside as quite indififerent when we are concerned
with practical interests, A sufficient discussion [p. 804]
of it may be found in the antinomy of pure reason.
CANON OF PITRE REASON
Section II
Of the Ideal of the Summnm Bottnm as dcterfnining tJu
Ultimate Aim of Pure Reason
Reason, in its speculative employment, conducted us
through the field of experience, and, as it could find no
perfect satisfaction there, from thence to speculative ideas
which, however, in the end conducted us back again to
experience, and thus fulfilled their purpose in a manner
which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with
our expectation. We may now have one more trial,
namely, to see whether pure reason may be met with in
practical use also, and whether thus it may lead to ideas
which realise the highest aims of pure reason as we have
just stated them, and whether therefore from the point of
view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to
grant us what it entirely refused to do with regard to its
speculative interest.
The whole interest of my reason, whether speculative or
practical, is concentrated in the three following ques-
tions:— [p. 805]
The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I
flatter myself, exhausted all possible answers, and found,
at last, that with which no doubt reason must be satisfied,
and, except with regard to the practical, has just cause to
be satisfied. We remained, however, as far removed from
the two great ends to which the whole endeavour of pure
reason w^as really directed as if we had consulted our ease
and declined the whole task from the very beginning. So
far then as knowledge is concerned, so much is certain and
clear that, with regard to these two problems, knowledge
can never fall to our lot.
The second question is purely practical. As such it
may come within the cognisance of pure reason, but is,
even then, not transcendental, but moral, and cannot, con-
sequently, occupy our criticism by itself.
The third question* namely, what may I hope for, if I
do what I ought to do ? is at the same time practical and
theoretical, the practical serving as a guidance to the an-
swer to the theoretical and, in its highest form, specula-
tive question ; for all hoping is directed towards happiness
and is, with regard to practical interests and the law of
morality, the same as knotviug and the law of nature, with
regard to the theoretical cognition of things. The former
arrives at last at a conclusion that something is [p. 806]
(which determines the last possible aim) because some-
thing ought to take place : the latter, that something is
(which operates as the highest cause) because something
does take place.
I
Canon of Pure Reason 647
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, txtiU-
sivtly, in regard to their man i fold ness, intrmivefy, in re-
gard to their degree, and protcfisively^ in regard to their
duration. The practical law, derived from the motive of
happiness, I call pragmatical (rule of prudence) ; but the
law, if there is such a law, which has no other motive hut
to deserve to be happy, I call moral (law of morality). The
former ad\^ses us what we have to do, if we wish to pos-
sess happiness ; the latter dictates how we ought to con-
duct ourselves in order to deserve happiness. The former
is founded on empirical principles, for I cannot know,
except by experience, what desires there are which are to
be satisfied, nor what are the natural means of satisfying
them. The second takes no account of desires and the
natural means of satisfying them, and regards only the
freedom of any rational being and the necessary conditions
under which atone it can harmonise with the clistribution
of happiness according to principles. It c;m therefore be
based on mere ideas of pure reason, and known a priori,
I assume that there really exist pure moral laws [p. 807]
which entirely a priori (without regard to empirical
motives, that is, happiness) determine the use of the
freedom of any rational being, both with regard to what
has to be done and what has not to be done, and that
these laws are imperative absolutely (not hypothetically
only on the supposition of other empirical ends), and
therefore in every respect necessary. I feel justified in
assuming this, by appealing, not only to the arguments of
the most enlightened moralists, but also to the moral
judgment of every man, if he only tries to conceive such
a law clearly.
Pure reason, therefore, contains not indeed in its specu-
648
Canon of Pure Reason
5ative, yet in its practical, or, more accurately, its moral
employment, principles of the possibility of cxpcrieticc^
namely, of such actions as might be met with in the his-
tory of man according to moral precepts. For as reason
commands that such actions should take place, they must
be possible* and a certain kind of systematical unity also,
namely, the moral, must be possible ; while it was impossi-
ble to prove the systematical unity of xi-xX^wx^ according to
the speculative pmtciples of reason. For reason, no doubt,
possesses causality with respect to freedom in general,
but not with respect to the whole of nature, and moral
principles of reason may indeed produce free actions, but
not laws of nature. Consequently, the principles of pure
reason possess objective reality in their practi- [p, 808]
cal and more particularly in their moral employment.
I call the world, in so far as it may be in accordance
with all moral laws which, by virtue of the freedom of
rational beings it may, and according to the necessary
laws of morality it ought to be, a moral imrld. As here
we take no account of all conditions (aims) and even of
all impediments to morality {the weakness or depravity of
human nature), this world is conceived as an intelligible
world only. It is, therefore, so far a mere idea, though a
practical idea, which can and ought really to exercise its
influence on the sensible world in order to bring it, as
far as possible, into conformity with that idea. The idea
of a moral world has therefore objective reality, not as
referring to an object of intelligible intuition (which we
cannot even conceive), but as referring to the sensible
world, conceived as an object of pure reason in its prac*
tical employment, and as a corpus mysticum of rational
beings dwelUng in it, so far as their free-will, placed under
Canon of Pare Reason
649
moral laws, possesses a thorough systematical unity both
with itself and with the freedom of everybody else.
The answer, therefore, of the first of the two questions
of pure reason with reference to practical in- [p. S09]
terests, is this, *do that which will render thee liesen'tng
of happiness' The second question asks, how then, \l I
conduct myself so as to be deserving of happiness, may
I hope thereby to obtain happiness ? The answer to this
question depends on this, whether the principles of pure
reason which a priori prescribe the law, necessarily also
connect this hope with it ?
I say, then, that just as the moral principles arc neces-
sary according to reason in its practical employment, it is
equally necessary according to reason in its theoretic em-
ployment to assume that everybody has reason to hope
to obtain happiness in the same measure in which he has
Tendered himself deserving of it in his conduct; and that,
therefore, the system of morality is inseparably, though
only in the idea of pure reason, connected with that of
happiness.
In an intelligible, that is, in a moral world, in conceiv-
ing which we take no account of any of the impediments
to morality (desires, etc), such a system, in which happi-
ness is proportioned to morality, may even be considered
as necessary, because freedom, as repelled or restrained
by the moral law, is itself the cause of general happiness,
and rational beings therefore themselves, under the guid-
ance of such principles, the authors of the permanent
well-being of themselves, and at the same time of others.
But such a system of self-rewarding morality is [p. 810]
an idea only, the realisation of which depends on every-
body doing what he ought to do, that is, on all actions of
650
Canon of Pure Reason
reasonable beings being so performed as if they sprang
from one supreme will, comprehending within itself or
under itself all private wills. But, as the moral law re-
mains binding upon every one in the use of his freedom,
even if others do not conform to that law, it is impossible
that cither the nature of things in the world, or the causaK
ity of the actions themselves, or their relation to morality,
should determine in what relation the consequences of
such actions should stand to happiness> If, therefore,
we take our stand on nature only, the necessary connec-
tion of a hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour
of rendering oneself deserving of happiness, cannot be
known by reason, but can only be hoped for, if a highest
reason^ which rules according to moral laws, is accepted
at the same time as the cause of nature.
I call the idea of such an intelligence in which the most
perfect moral will, united with the highest blessedness, is
the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as it corre-
sponds exactly with morality, that is, the being worthy
of happiness, the ideal of the supreme good. It is, there-
fore, in the ideal only of the supreme original good that
pure reason can find the ground of the practically neces-
sary connection of both elements of the highest [p, 811]
derivative good, namely, of an intelligible, that is, moral
world. As we are bound by reason to conceive ourselves
as belonging necessarily to such a world, though the
senses present us with nothing but a world of phenomena,
we shall have to accept the other world as the result q\
our conduct in this world of sense (in which we see m
such connection between goodness and happiness), anei*
therefore as to us a future world. Hence it follows that
God and a future life are two suppositions which, accord-
Canon of Pure Reason
ing to the principles of pure reason, cannot be separated
from the obligation which that very reason imposes on us.
Moral it)\ by itself, constitutes a system, but not so
happiness, unless it is distributed in exact proportion to
morality. This, however, is possible in an intelligible
world only under a wise author and ruler. Such a ruler,
together with life in such a world, which we must con-
sider as future, reason compels us to admit, unless all
moral laws are to be considered as idle dreams, because,
without that supposition, the necessary consequences,
which the same reason connects with these laws, would
be absent. Hence everybody looks upon moral laws as
commands^ which they could not be if they did not con-
nect a priori adequate consequences with their rules, and
carried with them both promises and threats. Nor could
they do this unless they rested on a necessary Being, as
the supreme good, which alone can render the [p. 812]
unity of such a design possible.
Leibniz called the world, if we have regard only to the
rational beings in it, and their mutual relations according
to moral laws and under the government of the supreme
good, the kingiiom of grace ^ distinguishing it from the
kingdom of nature^ in which these beings, though stand-
ing under moral laws, expect no other consequences from
their conduct but such as follow according to the course
of nature of our sensible world. To view ourselves as
belonging to the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness
awaits us, except in so far as we have diminished our
share in it through our unworthiness of being happy, is
a practically necessary idea of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they become at the same
time subjective grounds of actions, that is, subjective
652 Canon of Pure Reason
principles, are called maxims. The criticism of morality,
with regard to its purity and its results, takes place ac-
cording to ideas, the practical observance of its laws, accord-
ing to maxims.
It is necessary that the whole course of our life should
be subject to moral maxims ; but this is impossible, unless
reason connects with the moral law, which is a mere idea,
an efficient cause^ which assigns to all conduct, in accord-
ance with the moral law, an issue accurately corresponding
to our highest aims, whether in this or in another [p. 813]
life. Thus without a God and without a world, not
visible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of
morality are indeed objects of applause and admiration,
but not springs of purpose and action, because they fail
to fulfil all the aims which are natural to every rational
being, and which are determined a priori by the same
pure reason, and therefore necessary.
Our reason does by no means consider happiness alone
as the perfect good. It docs not approve of it {however
much inclination may desire it), except as united with
desert, that is, with perfect moral conduct Nor is
morality alone, and with it mere desert of being hap[>y,
the perfect good. To make it perfect, he who has con-
ducted himself as not unworthy of happiness, must be
able to hope to participate in it. Even if freed from all
private views and interests reason, were it to put itself in
the place of a being that had to distribute all happiness
to others, could not judge otherwise; because in the
practical idea both elements are essentially connected
though in such a way that our participation in happiness
should be rendered possible by the moral character as a
condition, and not conversely the moral character by the
Canon of Pure Reasan
653
prospect of happiness. For, in the latter case, the [p. 814]
character would not be moral, nor worthy therefore of
complete happiness ; a happiness which, in the eyes of
reason, admits of no limitation but such as arises from
our own immoral conduct.
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the
morality of rational beings who are made worthy of happi-
ness by it, constitutes alone the supreme good of a world
into which we must necessarily place ourselves according
to the commands of pure but practical reason. But this
is an intelligible world only, and a sensible world never
promises us such a systematical unity of ends as arising
from the nature of things. Nor is the reality of this unity
founded on anything but the admission of a supreme
original good, so that independent reason, equipped with
all the requirements of a supreme cause, founds, mairv
tains, and completes, according to the most perfect
design, the universal order of things which, in the world
of sense, is almost completely hidden from our sight.
This moral theology has this peculiar advantage over
speculative theology, that it leads inevitably to the con-
cept of a soh\ most perfect, and rational first Being, to
which speculative theology does not even lead its <w»
on objective grounds, much less give us a convict hn of
it. For neither in transcendental nor in natural theology^
however far reason may carry us on, do wc find any real
ground for admitting even one sole being which we should
be warranted in placing before all natural causes [p. 815]
and on which we might make them in all respects to
depend. On the other hand, if, from the point of view
of moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, we
consider what cause alone could give to it its adequate
r
effect, and therefore its binding force with regard to
ourselves, we find that it must be one sole supreme will
which comprehends all these laws within itself. For
how with different wills should we find complete unity
of ends? That will must be omnipotent, in order that the
whole of nature and its relation to morality and the world
may be subject to it ; omniscient, that it may know the
most secret springs of our sentiments and their moral
worth ; omnipresent, that it may be near for supplying
immediately all that is required by the highest interests
of the world ; eternal, that this harmony of nature and
freedom may never fail, and so on.
But this systematical unity of ends in this world of
intelligences which, if looked upon as mere nature, may
be called a sensible world only, but which, if considered
as a system of freedom, may be called an intelligible,
that is, a moral world {regnum gratiae)^ leads inevitably
also to the admission of a unity of design in all things
which constitute this great universe according to general
natural laws, just as the former (unity) was according to
general and necessary laws of morality. In this way prac-
tical and speculative reason become united. The w^orld
must be represented as having originated from an idea,
if it is to harmonise with that employment of reason
without which we should consider ourselves [p. 8i6]
unworthy of reason, namely, with its moral employment,
which is founded entirely on the idea of the supreme
good. In this way the study of nature tends to assume
the form of a teleological system, and becomes in its
widest extension physico-theology. And this, as it starts
from the moral order as a unity founded on the essence
of freedom, and not accidentally brought about by ex-
i
Canon of Pure Rtason
temal commands, traces the design of nature to grounds
which inust be inseparably connected a prion with the
internal possibility of things, and leads thus to a iran-
scendcntai theology^ which takes the idea! of the highest
ontological perfection as the principle of systematical
unity which connects all things according to general and
necessary laws of nature, because they all have their
origin in the absolute necessity of the one original Being.
What use can we make of our understanding, even
in respect to experience, if we have not aims before
us? The highest aims, however, are those of morality,
and these we can only know by means of pure reason.
Even with their help and guidance, ho^vever, we could
make no proper use of the knowledge of nature, unless
nature itself had established a unity of design : for with-
out this we should ourselves have no reason, [p. 817]
because there would be no school for it, nor any culture
derived from objects which supply the material for such
concepts. This unity of design is necessary and founded
on the essence of free-will, which must, therefore, as con-
taining the condition of its application in concreto^ be so
likewise ; so that, in reality, the transcendental develop-
ment of the knowledge obtained by our reason would be,
not the cause, but only the effect of that practical order
and design which pure reason imposes upon us.
We find therefore in the histor)' of human reason also
that, before the moral concepts were sufficiently purified
and refined, and before the systematical unity of the ends
was clearly understood, according to such concepts and in
accordance with necessary principles, the then existing
knowledge of nature and even a considerable amount of
the culture of reason in many other branches of science
656
Canmi of Pure Reason
could only produce crude and vague conceptions of the
Deity, or allow of an astonishing indifference with regard
to that question. A greater cultivation of moral ideas,
which became necessary through the extremely pore moral
law of our religion, directed our reason to that object
through the interest which it forced us to take in it,
and without the help either of a more extended know-
ledge of nature, or of more correct and trustworthy tran-
scendental views (which have been wanting in all ages),
A concept of the Divine Being was elaborated [p. 8i8]
which we now hold to be correct, not because speculative
reason has convinced us of its correctness, but because it
fully agrees with the moral principles t)f reason. And
thus, after all, it is pure reason only, but pure reason in
its practical employment, which may claim the merit of
connecting with our highest interest that knowledge
which pure speculation could only guess at without
being able to establish its validity, and of having made
it, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a supposition
absolutely necessary to the most essential ends of reason.
But after practical reason has reached this high point,
namely, the concept of a sole original Being as the
supreme good, it must not imagine that it has raised
itself above all empirical traditions of its application and
soared up to an immediate knowledge of new objects, and
thus venture to start from that concept and to deduce
from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very
laws the internal practical necessity of which led us to the
admission of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of
the world that should give effect to them. We ought not,
therefore, to consider them afterwards again as accidental
and derived from the mere will of the ruler, particularly as
Canon of Pure Reason
657
we could have no concept of such a will, if we had not
formed it in accordance with those laws. So [p. 819]
far as practical reason is entitled to lead us we shall
not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the
commands of God, but look upon them as divine com-
mands because we feel an inner obligation to follow
them. We shall study freedom according to the unity
of design determined by the principles of reason, and
we shall believe ourselves to be acting in accordance
with the Divine will in so far only as we hold sacred
the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature
of actions themselves. We shall believe ourselves to be
serving Him only by promoting everything that is best
in the world, both in ourselves and in others. Moral
theology is, therefore, of immanent use only» teaching
us to fulfil our destiny here in the world by adapting
ourselves to the general system of ends, without either
fanatically or even criminally abandoning the guidance
of reason and her moral laws for our proper conduct in
life, in order to connect it directly with the idea of the
Supreme Being. This wouki be a transcendent use of
moral theology which, like a transcendent use of mere
speculation, must inevitably pervert and frustrate the
ultimate aims of reason.
CANON OF PURE REASON [p, 820]
Section III
0/ Trowhtg, Knowing, and Believing
The holding a thing to be true is an event in our under-
standing which, though it may rest on objective grounds,
2V
requires also subjective causes in the mind of the person
who is to judge. If the judgment is valid for everybody,
if only he is possessed of reason, then the ground of it
is objectively sufficient, and the holding it to be true is
called convicfion. If, on the contrary, it has its ground
in the peculiar character of the subject only, it is called
persuasion.
Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judg-
ment, though it lies solely in the subject, being regarded
as objective. Such a judgment has, therefore, private
validity only, and the holding it to be true cannot be
communicated to others. Truth, however, depends on
agreement with the object, and, with regard to it, the
judgments of every understanding must agree with each
other {consentient ia uni tcrtio consent iunt inter se, etc.).
An external criterion, therefore, as to whether our hold-
ing a thing to be true be conviction or only persuasion,
consists in the possibility of communicating it, and finding
its truth to be valid for the reason of every man. P'or,
in that case, there is at least a presumption that the
ground of the agreement of all judgments, in [p. 821]
spite of the diversity of the subjects, rests upon the
common ground, namely, on the object with which they
all agree, and thus prove the truth of the judgment.
Persuasion, therefore, cannot be distinguished from con-
viction, subjectively, so long as the subject views its
judgment as a phenomenon of his own mind only ; the
experiment, however, which we make with the grounds
that seem valid to us, by trying to find out whether
they wi!! produce the same effect on the reason of others,
is a means, though only a subjective means, not indeed
of producing conviction, but of detecting the mere
Canon of Pure Reason
659
private validity of the judgment, that is, of discovering
in it what is merely persuasion.
If we are able besides to analyse the subjective causes
of our judgment, which we have taken for its objective
grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as a
phenomenon in our mind, without having recourse to the
object itself, we expose the illusion and are no longer
deceived by it, although we may continue to be tempted
by it, in a certain degree, if, namely, the subjective cause
of the illusion is inherent in our nature,
I cannot maintain anything, that is» affirm it as a judg-
ment necessarily valid for everybody, except it work con*
viction. Persuasion I may keep for myself, if it [p. 822]
is agreeable to me, but I cannot, and ought not to attempt
to make it binding on any but myself.
The holding anything to be true, or the subjective valid-
ity of a judgment admits, with reference to the conviction
which is at the same time valid objectively, of the three
following degrees, trounng, believing^ knowing. Trowing is
to hold true, with the consciousness that it is insufficient
iot/i subjectively and objectively. If the holding true is
sufficient subjectively, but is held to be insufficient objec-
tively, it is called believing ; while, if it is sufficient both
subjectively and objectively, it is called /mowing. Subjec-
tive sufficiency is called conviction (for myself), objective
sufficiency is called certainty (for everj^body). I shall not
dwell any longer on the explanation of such easy concepts.
I must never venture to trow^ or to be of opinion, with-
out knoiving at least something by means of which a judg-
ment, problematical by itself, is connected with truth,
which connection, though it involves not a complete truth,
is yet attended with more than arbitrary fiction. More-
66o
Canon of Pure Reason
over» the law of such a connection must be certain. For
if, even with regard to this law, I should have nothing but
an opinion, all would become a mere play of the imagina-
tion, without the least relation to truth.
In the judgments of pure reason opinion is not per-
mitted. For, as they are not based on empirical grounds,
but everything has to be known a priori, and [p. 823]
everything therefore must be necessary, the principle of
connection in them requires universality and necessity,
and consequently perfect certainty, without which there
would be nothing to lead us on to truth. Hence it is
absurd to have an opinif>n in pure mathematics ; here one
must either know, or abstain from pronouncing any judg-
ment. The same applies to the principles of morality,
because one must not hazard an action on the mere opinion
that it is allowed, but must know it to be so.
In the transcendental employment of reason, on the
contrary, mere opinion, no doubt, would be too little, but
knowledge too much. Speculatively, therefore, we cannot
here form any judgment at all, because the subjective
grounds on which we hold a thing to be true, as for in-
stance those which may very well produce belief, are not
approved of in speculative questions, as they cannot be
held without empirical support, nor, if communicated to
others, can produce the same effect on them.
Nor can the theoretically insufficient acceptance of truth
be called belief, except from 3. pnii-tiiai point of %ne7iK And
this practical view refers either to skill or to morality, the
former being concerned with any contingent and casual
ends and objects whatsoever, the latter with absolutely
necessary ends only.
If we have once proposed an object or end to ourselves.
Canon of Pure Reason
66[
the conditions of attaining it arc hypothetical ly necessary.
This necessity is subjective, and yet but rela- [p. 824]
tively sufficient, if I know of no other conditions under
which the end can be attained : it is sufficient absolutely
and for every one, if I am convinced that no one can know
of other conditions, leading to the attainment of our end.
In the former case my assuming and holding certain condi-
tions as true is merely an accidental belief, while in the
latter case it is a necessary belief. Thus a physician, for
instance, may feel that he must do something for a patient,
who is in danger. But as he does not know the nature of
the illness» he observ^es the symptoms^ and arrives at the
conclusion, as he knows nothing elsc« that it is phthisis.
His belief, according to his own judgment, is contingent
only, and he knows that another might form a better judg-
ment. It is this kind of contingent belief which, neverthe-
less, supplies a ground for the actual employment of means
to certain actions, which I call pragma (ic belief.
The usual test, whether something that is maintained
be merely persuasionj or a subjective conviction at least,
that is, firm belief, is bettinj^. People often pronounce
their views with such bold and uncompromising assurance
that they seem to have abandoned all fear of error. A bet
startles them. Sometimes it turns out that a man has
persuasion sufficient to be valued at one ducat, but not at
ten ; he is ready to venture the first ducat, but [p. 825]
with ten, he becomes aware for the first time that, after
all, it might be possible that he should be mistaken. If
we imagine that we have to stake the happiness of our
whole life, the triumphant air of our judgment drops con-
siderably; we become extremely shy, and suddenly discover
that our belief does not reach so far. Thus pragmatic
belief admits of degrees which, according to the difference
of the interests at stake, may be large or small.
Now it is true, no doubt, that, though with reference to
an object of our belief, we can do nothing, and our opinion
is, therefore, purely theoretical, yet in many cases we can
represent and imagine to ourselves an undertaking for
which we might think that we had sufficient inducements,
if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of the mat-
ten Thus, even in purely theoretical judgments, there is
an amriogtm of practical judgments to which the word
belief may be applied, and which we shall therefore call
doctrinal belief. If it were possible to apply any test of
experience, I should be ready to stake the whole of my
earthly goods on my belief that at least one of the planets
which we see is inhabited. Hence I say that it is not only
an opinion, but a strong belief, on the truth of which I
should risk even many ad\^antages of life, that there are
inhabitants in other worlds.
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the [p, 826]
existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For although, '
with reference to my theoretical knowledge of the world,
I can produce nothing which would make this thought a
necessary supposition as a condition of my being able to
explain the phenomena of the worlds but on the contrary^
am bound to use my reason as if evcrj^thing were mere
nature, nevertheless, the unity of design is so important
a condition of the application of reason to nature that I
cannot ignore it, especially as experience supplies so many
examples of it. Of that unity of design, however, I know
no other condition, which would make it a guidance in
my study of nature, but the supposition that a supreme
intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest
Canon of Pure Reason
663
ends. As a condition, therefore, of, it may be, a contin-
gent, but not unimportant end, namely, in order to have a
guidance in the investigation of nature, it is necessary to
admit a wise author of the world The result of my ex-
periment confirms the usefulness of this supposition so
many times, while nothing decisive can be adduced against
it, that I am really saying far too little, if I call my accep-
tation of it a mere opinion, and it may be said, even with
regard to these theoretical matters, that I firmly believe in
God. Still, if we use our words strictly, this belief must
always be called doctrinal, and not practical, such as the
theology of nature (physical theolog}') must al- [p 827]
ways and necessarily produce. In the same wisdom, and
in the prominent endowments of human nature, combined
with the inadequate shortness of life, another sufficient
ground may be found for the doctrinal belief in the future
life of the human soul.
The expression of belief is in such cases an expression
of modesty from the objective point of view, and yet, at
the same time, a firm confidence from a subjective. If
even I were to call this purely theoretical acceptance an
hypothesis only, which I am entitled to assume, I should
profess to be in possession of a more complete concept of
the nature of a cause of the world, and of another world,
than I really can produce. If I accept anything, even as
an hypothesis only, I must know it at least so much ac-
cording to its properties, that I need not imagine its con-
cepts, but its existence only. But the word belief refers
only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its
subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which
makes me bold it fast, though I may not be able to give
an account of it from a speculative point of view.
664
Canon of Pure Reason
Purely doctrinal belief, however, has always a somewhat
unstable character Speculative difficulties often make
us lose hold of it, though in the end we always [p, 828]
return to it.
It is quite different with morai biiiif. For here action
is absolutely necessary, that is^ I must obey the moral law
on all points. The end is here firmly established, and,
according to all we know, one only condition is possible
under which that end could agree with all other ends» and
thus acquire practical validity ^ namely, the existence of a
God and of a future world. I also know it for certain that
no one is cognisant of other conditions which could lead
to the same unity of ends under the moral law. As, then,
the moral precept is at the same time my maxim, reason
commanding that it should be so, I shall inevitably believe
in the existence of God, and in a future life, and I feel
certain that nothing can shake this belief, because all my
I moral principles would be overthrown at the same time,
I and I cannot surrender them without becoming hateful in
my own eyes.
We see, therefore, that, even after the failure of all the
ambitious schemes of reason to pass beyond the limits of
all experience, enough remains to make us satisfied for
practical purposes. No one, no doubt, will be able to
boast again that he knows that there is a God and a future
life. For a man who knows that, is the very man [p. 829]
whom I have been so long in search of. As all knowledge,
if it refers to an object of pure reason, can be communi-
cated, I might hope that, through his teaching, my own
knowledge would be increased in the most wonderful way.
No, that conviction is not a iogicai, but a moral certainty ;
and, as it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral senti-
Cattim pf Pun Rcasem
665
ment), I must not even say that it is morally certAin that
there is a God, etc, but that / am mondly certain, etc
What I realty mean is, that the belief in a God and in
another world b so intenroiren with my moral sentiment,
that as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there
is quite as little fear lest I should ever be depn%-ed of the
former
The only point that may rouse misgivings is that this
rational belief is based on the supposition of moral senti-
ments. If we surrender this, and take a man who is en-
tirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question
proposed by reason becomes merely a problem for specula-
tion, and may in that case be stilt supported with strong
grounds from analogy, but not such to which the most
obstinate scepticism has to submit^
No man, however, is with regard to these ques- [p, 830]
tions free from all interest. For although in the absence
of good sentiments he may be rid of all moral interest,
enough remains even thus to make \i\m fear the existence
of God and a future life. For nothing is required for this
but his inability to plead certaintv with regard to the «<>i»-
existrnce of such a being and of a future life As this
would have to be proved by mere reason, and therefore
apodictically, he would have to establish the impossibility
of both, which I feel certain no rational being would vent-
ure to do. This would be a negative belief which, though
^ The interest wbicli tbc Iminaii miDd takes ia monlitir (an iotercst w1iicb«
w I beliere, a neccsary to cvcnr ratii>Dal betas) ^ aatacal. tiM»agb it ts aol
undivided, and always pfacttcally prtfioofleraiit U yon il«ngthcf» and mh
crease that inCrrest, you wiTl fiitd reason rery docile, and rven nK»re enligtit*
cned, io as to be able ta join the speculative iritb the practical interest!. If
yi»u do nol take care that you tint make men at least mixlerately good, yOQ
wfl] never make tbem honeil betieren.
666
Canon of Pure Reason
it could not produce morality and good sentiments, would
still produce something analogous, namely, a check on
the outbreak of evil
But, it will be said, is this really all that pure reason
can achieve in opening prospects beyond the limits of
experience ? Nothing more than two articles of faith ?
Surely even the ordinary understanding could have
achieved as much without taking counsel of [p. 831]
philosophers !
I shall not here dwell on the benefits which, by the
laborious efforts of its criticism, philosophy has conferred
on human reason, granting even that in the end they
should turn out to be merely negative. On this point
something will have to be said in the next section. Rut
I ask, do you really require that knowledge, which con-
cerns all men, should go beyond the common understand-
ing, and should be revealed to you by philosophers only ?
The very thing which you find fault with, is the best con- ,
firmation of the correctness of our previous assertions,
since it reveals to us what we coukl not have grasped
before, namely, that in matters which concern all men
without distinction, nature cannot be accused of any
partial distribution of her gifts ; and that with regard to
the essential interests of human nature, the highest phi-
losophy can achieve no more than that guidance which nat-
ure has vouchsafed even to the meanest understanding.
r
METHOD OF
TRANSCENDENTALISM
[p- S32]
CHAPTER in
THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON
Bv architectonic I understand the art of constructing
systems. As systematical unity is that which raises com-
mon knowledge to the dignity of a science, that is, changes
a mere aggregate of knowledge into a system, it is easy
to see that architectonic is the doctrine of what is really
scientific in our knowledge, and forms therefore a neces-
sary part of the doctrine of method.
Under the sway of reason our knowledge must not
remain a rhapsody, but must become a system, because
thus alone can the essential objects of reason be supported
and advanced. By system I mean the unity of various
kinds of knowledge under one idea. This is the concept
given by reason of the form of the whole, in which concept
both the extent of its manifold contents and the place
belonging to each part are determined a friari. This
scientific concept of reason contains, therefore, the end
and also the form of the whole which is congruent with it.
The unity of the end to which all parts relate and through
the idea of which they are related to each other, enables
us to miss any part, if we possess a knowledge of the rest,
and prevents any arbitrary addition or vagueness of pcr-
6d7
668
Architectonic cf Pure Reason
fection of which the limits could not be determined a
priori. Thus the whole is articulated {articiilatio), [p. 833]
not aggregated {auucnHitio). It may grow internally {per
intussusceptionem)^ but not externally {per appositionem)^
like an animal body, the growth of which does not add
any new member, but, without changing their proportion,
renders each stronger and more efficient for its purposes.
The idea requires for its realisation a schema, that is
an essential variety, and an order of its parts, which
are determined a priori, according to the principles inher-
ent in its aim. A schemai which is not designed accord-
ing to an idea, that is, according to the principal aim of
reason, but empirically only, in accordance with accidental
aims (the number of which cannot he determined before*
band) gives technical unity; but the schema which origi-
nates from an idea only (where reason dictates the aims
a priori diViA does not wait for them in experience) supplies
architectonical unity. Now what we call a science, the
schema of which must have its ootHne {monfl^ramma) and
the division of the whole into parts devised according to
the idea, that is, a priori, and keep it perfectly distinct
from everything else according to principles, cannot be
produced technically according to the similarity of its
various parts or the accidental use of knowledge in con-
creto for this or that externa! purpose^ but architectoni-
cally only, as based on the affinity of its parts and their
dependence on one supreme and internal aim through
which alone the whole becomes possible. [p. 834]
No one attempts to construct a science unless he can
base it on some idea ; but in the elaboration of tt the
schema, nay, even the definition, which he gives in the
beginning of his science, corresponds very seldom to his
Architectonic of Pun Reason
669
idea which, like a germ, lies hidden in reason, and all the
parts of which are still enveloped and hardly distinguish-
able even under microscopical observation. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to explain and determine all sciences,
considering that they are contrived from the point of view
of a certain general interest, not according to the descrip-
tion given by their author, but according to the idea which,
from the natural unity of its constituent parts, we may
discover as founded in reason itself. We shall often find
that the originator of a science, and even his latest suc-
cessors are moving vaguely round an idea which they have
not been able to perceive clearly, failing in consequence
to determine rightly the proper contents^ the articulation
(systematical unity), and the limits of their science.
It is a misfortune that only after having collected for a
long time at haphazard, under the influence of an idea that
lies hidden in us, materials belonging to a science, nay,
after having for a long time fitted them together [p. 835]
technically, a time arrives when we are able to see its
idea in a clearer light, and to devise architectonically a
whole system according to the aims of reason. Systems
acem to develope like worms through a kind of generatia
acquivoca^ by the mere aggregration of numerous concepts^
at first imperfect, and gradually attaining to perfection^
though in reality they all had their schema, as their origi-
nal germ> in reason which was itself being developed.
Hence, not only is each of them articulated according to
an idea, but all may be properly combined with each other
in a system of human knowledge, as members of one
whole, admitting of an architectonic of all human know-
ledge which in our time, when so much material has been
collected or may be taken over from the ruins of old
Architectonic of Pure Reason
systems, is not only possible, but not even very diflficult.
We shall confine ourseU^es here to the completion of our
proper business, namely^ to sketch the arcliitectonic of all
knowledge arising ixQm pure reason, beginning only at the
point where the common root of our knowledge divides
into two stems, one of which is reason. By reason, how-
ever, I understand here the whole higher faculty of know-
ledge, and I distinguish therein rational from empirical
knowledge.
If T take no account of the contents of knowledge, ob-
jectively considered, all knowledge is» from a subjective
point of view, cither historical or rational. His- [p. 836]
torical knowledge is cognitia ex tfatis, rational knowledge
cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the first origin
of some branch of knowledge, it is always historical, if he
who possesses it knows only so much of it as has been
given to him from outside, whether through immediate
experience, or through narration, or by instruction also
(in general knowledge). Hence a person who, in the
usual sense, has karnt a system of philosophy, for in-
stance the Woifian, though he may carry in his head all
the principles, definitions, and proofs, as well as the divis-
ion of the whole system, and have it all at his fingers*
ends, possesses yet none but a complete historical know-
ledge of the Woifian philosophy. His knowledge and
judgments are no more than what has been given him.
If you dispute any definition, he does not know whence
to take another, because he formed his own on the reason
of another. But the imitative is not the productive fac-
ulty, that is, knowledge in his case did not come from
reason, and though objectively it is rational knowledge,
subjectively it is historical only. He has taken and kept,
Architectonic of Pure Reason
671
that is, he has well learned and has become a plaster cast
of a living man. Knowledge, which is rational objectively
(that is, which can arise originally from a man's own rea-
son only), can then only be so called subjectively also,
when they have been drawn from the general resources
of reason, that is, from principles from which [p. %n\
also criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been
learnt, may arise.
All knowledge of reason is again either based on con-
cepts or on the construction of concepts ; the former
being called philosophical, the latter mathematical. Of
their essential difference I have treated in the first chap-
ter. Knowledge, as we saw, may be objectively philo-
sophical, and yet subjectively historical as is the case
with most apprentices, and with all who never look be-
yond their school and remain in a state of pupilage all
their life. But it is strange that mathematical knowledge,
as soon as it has been acquired, may be considered, sub-
jectively also, as knowledge of reason, there being no such
distinction here as in the case of philosophical knowledge.
The reason is that the sources from which alone the math-
ematical teacher can take his knowledge lie nowhere but
in the essential and genuine principles of reason, and can-
not be taken by the pupil from anywhere else, nor ever be
disputed, for the simple ground that the employment of
reason takes place here in concreto only, although a priori^
namely, in the pure and therefore faultless intuition, thus
excluding all illusion and erron Of all the sciences of
reason (a priori)^ therefore, mathematics alone can be
learnt, but philosophy (unless it be historically) never ;
with regard to reason we can at most learn to philosophise.
The system of all philosophical knowledge [p. 838]
672
Architecianic of Pare Reason
is called philosophy. It must be taken objectively, if we
understand by it the type of criticising all philosophical
attempts, which is to serve for the criticism of every sub-
jective philosophy, however various and changeable the
systems may be. In this manner philosophy is a mere
idea of a possible science which exists nowhere in can-
creto, but which we may try to approach on dififerent
paths, until in the end the only true path, though over-
grown and bidden by sensibility, has been discovered, and
the image, which has so often proved a failure, has become
as like the original type as human power can ever make it
Till then we cannot learn philosophy ; for where is it,
who possesses it, and how shall we know it ? We can
only learn to philosophise, that is, to exercise the talent
of reason, according to its general principles, on certain
given attempts always, however, with the reservation of
the right of reason of investigating the sources of these
principles themselves, and of either accepting or rejecting
them.
So far the concept of philosophy is only scholastic^ as of
a system of knowledge which is sought and valued as a
science, without aiming at more than a systematical unity
of that knowledge, and therefore the iogicai perfection of
it. But there is also a mtiversai^ or, if we may say so, a
cosmical concept {conccpius cosmicus) of philosophy, which
always formed the real foundation of that name, [p. 839]
particularly when it had, as it were, to be personified and
represented in the ideal of the phiiosopher, as the original
type. In this sense philosophy is the science of the rela-
tion of al! knowledge to the essential aims of human
reason {teleoiogia rationis kitmatiac), and the philosopher
stands before us, not as an artist, but as the lawgiver of
Architectonic of Pure Rt'ason
^7i
nyman reason. In that sense it would be very boastful to
call oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to have equalled
the type which exists in the idea only.
The mathematician, the student of nature, and the
logician, however far the two former may have advanced
in rational, and the last, particularly, in philosophical
knowledge, are merely artists of reason. There is be-
sides, an ideal teacher, who controls them all, and uses
them as instruments for the advancement of the essential
aims of human reason. Him alone we ought to call phi-
losopher : but as he exists nowhere, while the idea of his
legislation exists everywhere in the reason of every human
being, we shall keep entirely to that idea, and determine
more accurately what kind of systematical unity philoso-
phy, in this cosmical concept,^ demands from the stand-
point of its aims. [p. 840]
Essential ends are not as yet the highest ends ; in fact,
there can be but one highest end, if the perfect systemati-
cal unity of reason has been reached. We must distin-
guish, therefore, between the ultimate end and subordinate
ends, which necessarily belong, as means, to the former.
The former is nothing hot the whole destination of man,
and the philosophy which relates to it is called moral
philosophy. On account of this excellence which distin-
guishes moral philosophy from all other operations of
reason, the ancients always understood under the name of
philosopher the moralist principally: and even at present
the external appearance of self-control by means of reason
^ Cosmical concept is meani here for a concept relating to what muat be of
interest to evcf7botly : while I determine the character of a fcience, according
to sck&iastu ronceptSy if 1 luuk upoo it otily a$ one of many crafts intended for
certain objects.
as
Architectonic of Pure Reason
leads us, through a certain analogy, to call a man a phu
losopher, however limited his knowledge may be. The
legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects
only, nature and freedom, and contains therefore both the
law of nature and the law of morals, at first in two sepa-
rate systems, but combined, at last, in one great system
of philosophy. The philosophy o£ nature relates to all
that is; that of morals to that only that ought io be\
All philosophy is either knowledge derived from pure
reason, or knowledge of reason derived from empirical
principles. The former is called pure, the latter empirical
philosophy.
The philosophy of pure reason is either pro- [p. 841]
paedcutic (preparation), enquiring into the faculties of rea-
son, with regard to all pure knowledge a prion, and called
critic, or, secondly, the system of pure reason (science),
comprehending in systematical connection the whole (both
true and illusory) of philosophical knowledge, derived from
pure reason, and called metaphysicy — although this name
of metaphysic may be given also to the whole of pure phi-
losophy, inclusive of the critic, in order thus to compre-
hend both the investigation of all that can ever be known
a priori and the representation of all that constitutes a '
system of pure philosophical knowledge of that kind,
excluding all that belongs to the empirical and the mathe-
matical employment of reason.
Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and
that of the practical n%^ of pure reason, and is, therefore,
either metaphysic of nature or metaphysic of morals. The
former contains all the pure principles of reason, derived
from concepts only (excluding therefore mathematics), of
the theoretical knowledge of all things, the latter, the prin-
Architectonic of Pure Reascm
675
ciples which determine a priori and necessitate all doing
and not doing. Morality is the only legality of actions
that can be derived from principles entirely a priori.
Hence the metaphysic of morals is really pure moral phi-
losophy, in which no account is taken of anthropology or
any empirical conditions, Metaphysic of specu- [p. S42]
lative reason has commonly been called metaphysic, in the
more limited sense ; as however pure moral philosophy
belongs likewise to this branch of human and philosophi-
cal knowledge, derived from pure reason, we shall allow it
to retain that name, although we leave it aside for the
present as not belonging to our immediate object.
It is oE the highest importance to isohxtc various sorts
of knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from
others, and to take great care lest they be mixed up with
those others with which, for practical purposes, they arc
generally united. What is done by the chemist in the
analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in pure
mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher,
in order to enable him to define clearly the part which,
in the promiscuous employment of the understanding, be-
longs to a special kind of knowledge, as well as its peculiar
value and influence. Human reason, therefore, since it
first began to thinks or rather to reflect, has never been
able to do without a metaphysic, but it has never kept
it suflSciently free from all foreign admixture. The idea
of a science of this kind is as old as speculation itself,
and what human reason does not speculate, whether in a
scholastic or a popular manner? It must be admitted,
however, that even thinkers by profession did [p, 843]
not clearly distinguish between the two elements of our
knowledge, the one being in our possession completely a
irchitectonic of Pure Reason
priori^ the other deducible a posteriori only from experi-
ence, and did not succeed therefore in fixing the hmits
of a special kind of knowledge, nor in realising the true
idea of a science which had so long and so deeply en-
gaged the interest of hinnan reason. When it was said
that metaphysic is the science of the first principles of
human knowledge, this did not mark out any special
kind of knowledge, but only a certain rank or degree,
with regard to its character of generality, which was
not sufficient to distinguish it clearly from empirical
knowledge. For among empirical principles also, some
are more general, and therefore higher than others ; and
in such a series of subordinated principles (where that
which is entirely a priori is not distingxiished from that
which is known a posteriori only), where should one draw
the line to separate the first part from the last, and the
higher members from the low^er ? What should we say
if chronology should distinguish the epochs of history
no better than by dividing it into the first centuries and
the subsequent centuries ? We should ask, no doubt,
whether the fifth or the tenth belongs to the first centu-
ries? and I ask in the same way whether the concept of
what is extended belongs to metaphysic? If you say,
yes! I ask, what about the concept of a body? and of
a liquid body ? You then . hesitate, for you [p. 844]
begin to see, that if I continue in this strain, every-
thing would belong to metaphysic. It thus becomes
clear that the mere degree of subordination of the
special under the genera! cannot determine the limits
of a science ; but, in our case, only the complete differ-
ence in kind and origin. The fundamental idea of
metaphysic was obscured on another side because, as
1
k.
Architectonic of Pure Reason
677
knowledge a priori^ it showed a certain similarity in kind
with mathematics. The two are» no doubt, related with
regard to their origin a priori^ but, if we consider how»
in metaphysici knowledge is derived from concepts, while
ill mathematics we can only form judgments through the
construction of concepts a priori, we discover, in com-
paring philosophical with mathematical knowledge, the
most decided difference in kind, which was no doubt
always felt, but never determined by clear criteria. Thus
it has happened that, as philosophers themselves blun-
dered in developing the idea of their science, its elabora-
tion could have no definite aim, and no certain guidance;
and we may well understand how metaphysical science
was brought into contempt in the outside world, and at
^ast among philosophers themselves, considering how
arbitrarily it had been designed, and how constantly
those very philosophers, ignorant as to the path which
they ought to take, were disputing among themselves
about the discoveries which each asserted he had made
on his own peculiar path. [p. 845]
All pure knowledge a priori constitutes, therefore, ac-
cording to the special faculty of knowledge in which alone
it can originate, a definite unity ; and metaphysic is that
philosophy which is meant to represent that knowledge
in its systematical unity. Its speculative part, which
has especially appropriated that name, namely, what we
call metaphysic of nature, in which everything is con*
sidered from concepts a priori^ so far as it is (not so far
as it ought to be), will have to be divided in the following
manner,
Metaphysic* in the more limited sense of the word»
consists of transcendiHtal philosophy and the physiology
£3
6;8
Afrhiiectonic of Pure Reason
cff pure reason. The former treats only of onderstand-
ing and reason themselves, in a system of all concepts
and principles which have reference to objects in general,
without taking account of objects that may be given
{ontoiogia) : the latter treats of nature, that is, the sum
of given objects (whether given to the senses, or, if you
like, to some other kind of intuition) and is therefore
pkjsioiog}\ although ratumaiis only. The employment
of reason in this rational study of nature is either physi-
cal or hyperphysical, or, more accurately speaking, im-
manent or transeendent. The former refers to nature,
in so far as its knowledge can take place in experience
{in concretd) ; the latter to that connection of objects of
experience which transcends all experience. This tran-
scendeni physiology has for its object either an [p. 846]
internal or an external connection, both transcending
every possible experience ; the former is the physiology
of nature as a whole, or traHsecndentnl kmmflfdge of the
worlds the latter refers to the connection of the whole
of nature with a Being above nature, and is therefore
transcendental knowledge of God,
Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature
as the sum total of all objects of the senses, such, there-
fore, as it is given nsy but only according to conditions
a priori, under w^hich alone it can be given us. It has
two kinds of objects only; first, those of the external
senses, which constitute together corporeal nature i sec-
ondly, the object of the internal sense, the soul, and
what, according to its fundamental principles in general,
may be called thinking nature. The metaphysic of cor-
poreal nature is called physic, or, because it must contain
the principles of an a priori knowledge of nature only,
Architectonic of Pure Reason
679
rational physic, Mctaphysic of the thinking nature is
called psychology, and for the same reason, is here to be
understood as the rational knowledge only of that nature.
Thus the whole system of metaphysic consists of four
principal parts, 1. Ontology, 2. Rational Physiology,
3. Rational Cosmology, 4* Rational Theology, The second
part, the physiology of pure reason, contains two divisions,
namely, physica rationalis} and phychologia [p. 847]
rational is.
The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason pre-
scrihes itself this division. It is therefore architectonicaU
adequate to its essential aims, and not technical only^ con-
trived according to any observed similarities, and, as it
were, at haphazard. For that very reason such a division
is unchangeable and of legislative authority. There are,
however, a few points which might cause misgivings, and
weaken our conviction of its legitimate character.
First of all, how can I expect knowledge ^7 priori, that
is metaphysic, of objects so far as they are given to our
senses, that is a posteriori f and how is it possible to
know the nature of things according to principles a priori,
and thus to arrive at a rational physiology ? Our [p, 848]
answer is, that we take nothing from experience beyond
what is necessary to give us an object, either of the exter-
* It must not be supposed that I mean by this what is commonly called
pkysUa generatis^ and which is rather juathcRiaticsT than a philusophy of
nature. For the metaphysic of nature is entirely separate from mathematics,
and does not enlarge our knowledge as much as mathematics; but it is, never-
thelesa, very important, as supplyinf; a criticism of the pure knowledge of the
understanding that should be applied to nature. For want of its guidance,
even mathematicians, given to certain common concepts which in reality are
metaphysical^ have unconsciously encumbered physical science with hyp>(>theses
which vanish under a criticism of those principles, without however causing
the least detriment to the necesaary employment of mathematics in this field.
680
Architectonic of Pure Raison
nal or of the internal sense. The former is done by the
mere concept of matter (impermeable, lifeless extension)^
the latter through the concept of a thinking being (in the
empirical internal representation, I think). For the rest,
we ought in the whole metaphysical treatment of these ob-
jects to abstain from all empirical principles, which to the
concept of matter might add any kind of experience for
the purpose of forming any judgments on these objects*
Secondly. What becomes of empirical psychology^ which
has always maintained its place in metaphysic and from
which, in our time, such great things were expected for
throwing light on metaphysic, after all hope had been
surrendered of achieving anything useful a priori ? I
answer, it has its place where the proper (empirical) study
of nature must be placed, namely, by the side of applied
philosophy, to which pure philosophy supplies the principles
a priori ; thus being connected, but not to be confounded
with it. Empirical psychology, therefore, must be entirely
banished from metaphysic, and is excluded from it by its
very idea. According to the tradition of the schools, how-
ever, we shall probably have to allow to it (though as an ep-
isode only) a small corner in metaphysic, and this [p. 849]
from economical motives, because, as yet, it is not so rich
as to constitute a study by itself, and yet too important
to be banished entirely and to be settled in a place where it
would find still less affinity than in metaphysic. It is,
therefore, a stranger only, who has been received for a long
time and whom one allows to stay a little longer, until he
can take up his own abode in a complete system of anthro-
pology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.
This then is the general idea of metaphysic which, as
in the beginning more was expected of it than could justly
Architectonic of Pure Reason
68 1
be demanded, fell into general disrepute after these pleas-
ant expectations liad proved fallacious. The whole course
of our critique must have convinced us suiliciently that,
although metaphysic cannot supply the foundation of
religion, it must always remain its bulwark, and that
human reason, being dialectical by its very nature, cannot
do without a science which curbs it and> by means of a sci-
entific and perfectly clear self -knowledge* prevents the rav-
ages which otherwise this lawless speculative reason would
certainly commit both in morals and religion. We may
be sure, therefore, that, in spite of the coy or contemptu-
ous airs assumed by those who judge a science, not accord-
ing to its nature, but according to its accidental [p. 850]
effects, we shall always return to it as to a beloved one
with whom we have quarrelled, because reason, as essential
interests are here at stake, cannot rest till it has either
established correct views or destroyed those which already
exist.
Metaphysic, therefore, that of nature as well as that of
morals, and particularly the crilicism of our adventurous
reason, which forms the introduction and preparation of
it, constitute together what may be termed philosophy
in the true sense of the word. Its only goal is wisdom,
and the path to it science, the only path which, if once
opened, is never grown over again, and can never mis-
lead. Mathematics, natural science, even the empirical
knowledge of men, have, no doubt, a high value, as means
for the most part to accidental, but yet in the end neces-
sary and essential aims of mankind. But they have that
value only by means of that knowledge of reason based on
pure concepts which^ call it as you may, is in reality
nothing but metaphysic.
682 Architectonic of Pure Reason
For the same reason metaphysic is also the completion
of the whole culture of human reason, which is indispen-
sable, although one may discard its influence as a science
with regard to certain objects. For it enquires [p. 851]
into reason according to its elements and highest maxims,
which must form the very foundation of the possibility of
some sciences, and of the use of all. That, as mere spec-
ulation, it serves rather to keep off error than to extend
knowledge does not detract from its value, but, on the
contrary, confers upon it dignity and authority by that
censorship which secures general order and harmony, ay,
the well-being of the scientific commonwealth, and pre-
vents its persevering and successful labourers from losing
sight of the highest aim, the general happiness of all
mankind.
METHOD OF
TRANSCENDENTALISM
[p. 852]
CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON
This title stands here only in order to indicate the
place in the system which remains empty for the present
and has to be filled hereafter. I content myself with
casting a cursory glance, from a purely transcendental
point of view, namely, that of the nature of pure reason,
on the labours of former philosophers, which presents to
my eyes many structures, but in ruins only.
It is very remarkable, though naturally it could not well
have been otherwise, that in the very infancy of philoso-
phy men began where we should like to end, namely, with
studying the knowledge of God and the hope or even the
nature of a future world. However crude the religious
concepts might be which owed their origin to the old cus-
toms, as remnants of the savage state of humanity, this
did not prevent the more enlightened classes from devot-
ing themselves to free investigations of these matters, and
they soon perceived that there could be no better and
surer way of pleasing that invisible power which governs
the world, in order to be happy at least in another world,
than good conduct. Thus theology and morals [p. 853]
became the two springs, or rather the points of attraction
for all abstract enquiries of reason in later times, though
68j
History of Ptnr Reason
it was chiefly the former which gradually drew speculative
reason into those labours which afterwards became so
celebrated under the natne of mctaphysic.
I shall not attempt at present to distinguish the periods
of history in which this or that change of metaphysic took
place, but only draw a rapid sketch of the difference of
the ideas which caused the principal revolutions in meta-
physic. And here I find three aims with which the most
important changes on this arena were brought about
1, With reference to the object oi all knowledge of our
reason, some philosophers were mere sensuatists, others
mere inicitectHaiists. Epicurus may be regarded as the
first among the former, Plato as the first among the latter.
The distinction of these two schools, subtle as it is, dates
from the earliest days, and has long been maintained.
Those who belong to the former school maintained that
reality exists in the objects of the senses alone, everything
else being imagination ; those of the second school, on the
contrary, maintained, that in the senses there is nothing
but illusion, and that the true is known by the [p. 854]
understanding only. The former did not, therefore, deny
all reality to the concepts of the understanding, but that
reality was with them logical only, with the others it was
mjsiical. The former admitted intellectual concepts, but
accepted sensible objects only. The latter required that
true objects should be intelligible only, and maintained an
intuition peculiar to the understanding, separated from the
senses which, in their opinion, could only confuse it,
2. With reference to the origin of the pure concepts of
reason, and whether they are derived from experience, or
have their origin independent of experience, in reason,
Aristotle may be considered as the head of the empiricists^
History of Pure Reason
685
Plato as that of the fwohgists. Locke, who in modern
times followed Aristot/i\ and Leibm:z, who followed Plato
(though at a sufficient distance from his mystical system),
have not been able to bring this dispute to any conclusion,
Epicurus at least was far more consistent in his sensual
system (for he never allowed his syllogisms to go heyond
the limits of experience) than Aristotle and Locke, more
particularly the ]alter» who, after having derived all con-
cepts and principles from experience, goes so far in their
application as to maintain that the existence of God and
the immortality of the soul (though both lie entirely out-
side the limits of all possible experience) could [p. 855]
be proved with the same evidence as any mathematical
proposition,
3. With reference to method. If anything is to be called
method, it must be a procedure according to primiples.
The method at present prevailing in this field of enquiry
may be divided into the uatHralistic and the scientific.
The naturalist of pure reason lays it down as his principle
that, with reference to the highest questions which form
the problems of metaphysic, more can be achieved by
means of common reason without science (which he calls
sound reason), than through speculation. This is the
same as if we should maintain that the magnitude and
distance of the moon can be better determined by the
naked eye than by roundabout mathematical calculations.
This is pure misology reduced to principles, and, what is
the most absurd, the neglect of all artificial means is
recommended as the best way of enlarging our knowledge.
As regards those who are naturalists because they know
no better^ they are really not to be blamed. They simply
follow ordinary reason, but they do not boast of their
ms
History of Pure Rtasoft
ignorance, as the method which contains the secret how
we are to fetch the truth from the bottom of the well of
Democritus. ^Qnod sapio satis est mi hi, non ego euro, esse
quod Arcesiias acrmnnosique So! ones ' (Pers.), is the motto
with which they may lead a happy and honoured life, with-
out meddling with science or muddling it, [p. 856]
As regards those who follow a scientific method, they
have the choice to proceed either dogmaticaiiy or scepti-
caiiy^ but at all events, sysianaticaliy. When I have
mentioned in relation to the former the celebrated Woif,
and in relation to the other David Hume, I may for my
present purpose leave all the rest unnamed.
The only path that is still open is the critical. If the
reader has been kind and patient enough to follow me to
the end along this path, he may judge for himself whether,
if he will help, as far as in him lies, towards making this
footpath a highroad, it may not be possible to achieve,
even before the close of the present century, what so
many centuries have not been able to achieve, namely,
to give complete satisfaction to human reason with regard
to those questions which have in all ages exercised its
desire for knowledge, though hitherto in vain.
SUPPLEMENT I
MOTTO TO SECOND EDITION
Baco de Verulamio
Instauratio magna: Praefatio
De nobis ipsis silemus : de re autem, quae agitur, petimus, ut
homines earn non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro
certo habeant, non sectae nos alicujus aut placid, sed utilitatis et
amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis com-
modis aequi ... in commune consulant, . . . et ipsi in partem
veniant. Praeterea, ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nos-
tram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo con-
cipiant ; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.
687
WrrETHER the treatment of that class of knowledge with which
reason is occupied follows the secure method of a science or not,
can easily be determined by the result. If, after repeated prep-
arations, it comes to a standstill, as soon as its real goal is ap-
proached, or is obliged, in order to reach it, to retrace its steps
again and again, and strike into fresh paths ; again, if it is impos-
sible to produce unanimity among those who are engaged in the
same work, as to the manner in which their common object
should be obtained, we may be convinced thai such a study is far
from having attained to the secure method of a science, but is
groping only in the dark. In that case we are conferring a great
benefit on reason, if we only fmd out the right method, though
many things should have to be surrendereti as useless, which were
comprehended in the original aim that had been chosen without
sufhcient reflection.
That Z^?^/V, from the e^irliest limes, has followed tlut [p, viii]
secure method, may be seen from the fact that since Aristotle it
has not had to retrace a single step, unless we choose to consider
as improvements the removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or
the clearer definition of its matter, both of w^hich refer to the
elegance rather than to the solidity of the science. It is remark-
able also, that to the present day, it has not been able to make
one step in advance, so that, to all appearance, it may be con-
sidered as completed and perfect. If some modern philosophers
thought to enlarge it, by introducing psychoio^ka! chapters on the
different faculties of knowledge (faculty of imagination, wit, etc.),
or metaphysical chapters on the origin of knowledge, or the dif-
6^8
Suppkmcnt II
689
ferent degrees of certainty according to the diflerence of objects
(idealism, scepticism, etc.), or lastly, anihropohgicai chapters on
[trejudices, their causes and remedies, this could only arise from
their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do
not enlarge, but we only disfigure the sciences, if we allow their
respective limits to be confounded : and the limits of logic: arc
definitely tixed by the fact, that it is a science which has nothing
to da Imt fully to exhibit and strictly to prove all formal [p. ix]
rules of thought (whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be
its origin or its object, and whatever be the impediments, acci-
dental or natural, which it has to encounter in the human mind).
That logic should in this respect have been so successful, is due
entirely to its limitation, whereby it has not only the right, but the
duty, to make abstraction of all the objects of knowledge and
their differences, so that the understanding has to deal with
nothing beyond itself and its own forms. It was, of course, far
more difficult for reason to enter on the secure method of science,
when it has to deal not with itself oniy, but also with objects.
Ix)gic, therefore, as a kind of preparation {propaedeittic^ forms, as
it were, the vestibule of the sciences only, and where real know-
ledge is concerned, is presupposed for critical purposes only, while
the acquisition of knowledge must be sought for in the sciences
themselves, properly and objectively so called.
If there is to be in those sciences an element of reason, some-
thing in them must be known a priori ^ and knowledge may stand
in a twofold relation to its object, by either simply dfter- [p. x]
mining it and its concept (which must be supplierl from else-
where), or by making it real also. The former is theoretical^ the
latter practical knenu ledge of reason. In both the pure part,
namely, that in which reason determines its object entirely a
priori (whether it contain much or little), must lie treated first,
without mixing up with it what comes from other sources ; for it is
itad economy to spend blindly whatever comes in» and not to l)e able
to determine, when there is a stoppage, which part of the income
can bear the expenditure, and where reductions must lie made.
K
Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences of
'
reason^ which have to determine their adjects a priori; the
690
Suppietnent II
former quite purely, the latter partially so, and partially from other
sources of knowledge besides reason.
Mathematics, from the earliest times to which the history of
human reason can reach, has followed, among that wonderful peo-
ple of the Greeks, the safe way of a science. But it must not be
supposed that it was as easy for mathematics as for logic, in
which reason is concerned with itself alonej to find, or rather to
make for itself that royal road. I believe, on the contrary,
that there was along period of tentative work (chiefly [p, xi]
still among the Egyptians), and that the change is to be as-
cribed to a rtv&lution^ produced by the happy thought of a
single man, whose experiment pointed unmistakably to the path
that had to be followed, and opened and traced out for the
most distant times the safe way of a science. The history of
that intellectual revolution, which was far more important than
the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good
Hope, and the name of its fortunate author, have not been pre-
served to us. But the story preserved by Diogenes Laertius, who
names the reputed author of the smallest elements of ordinary
geometrical demonstration, even of such as, according to general
opinion, do not require to be proved, shows, at all events, that the
memory of the revolution, produced by the very first traces of
the discovery of a new method, appeared extremely important to
the mathematicians, and thus remained unforgotten. A new light
flashed on the first man who demonstrated the properties of the
isosceles triangle^ (whether his name was Thaks or any other
name), for he found that he had not to investigate what [p. xii]
he saw in the figure, or the mere concept of that figure, and thus
to learn its properties ; but that he had lo produce (by construc-
tion) what he had himself, according to concepts a priori, placed
into that figure and represented in it, so that, in order to know
anything with certainty a pri&riy he must not attribute to that
I
I
1 Kant himself in a letter to Scbiitz (Darstcllung seines Lcbetis von seinem
Sohn, Halle, 1S35, Band. II. S. 208) pointed out the mistake which appears
in the preface to the 2nd edition, namely, glcichseitig (equilateral) ^ instead of
gleichschenkclig (isosceles).
Supplement II
691
figure anything beyond what necessarily follows from what be has
himself placed into it, in accordance with the concept
It took a much longer time before physics entered on the high
way of science : for no more than a century and a half has elapsed,
since Bacon's ingenious proposal partly initiated that discovery,
partly, as others were already on the right Irack, gave a new
impetus to it, — a discovery which, like the former, can only be
explained by a rapid intellectual revolution. In what I have to
say, I shall confine myself to natural science, so far as it is founded
OB empiricai principles.
When Galilei let balls of a particular weight, which he had
determined himself, roll down an inclined plain » or Torricelli
made the air carry a weight, which he had previously determined
to be equal to that of a definite volume of water; or when, in
later times, Stahl* changed metal into lime, and hme again into
metals, by withdrawing and restoring something, a new [p. xiii]
light flashed on all students of nature. They comprehended that
reason has insight into that only, which she herself produces on
her own plan, and that she must move fonvard with the principles
of her judgments, according to fixed law, and compel nature to
answer her questions, but not let herself be led by nature, as it
were in leading strings, because otherwise accidental observations,
made on no previously fixed plan, will never converge towards a
necessary law, which is the only thing that reason seeks and
requires. Reason, holding in one hand its principles, according
to which concordant phenomena alone can be admitted as laws
of nature, anfl in the other hand the experiment, which it has
devised according to those principles, must approach nature, in
order to be taught by it: but not in the character of a pupil, who
agrees to everything the master likes, but as an appointed judge^
who compels the witnesses to answer the questions which he
himself proposes. Therefore even the science of physics entirely
owes the beneficial revolution in its character to the happy
thought, that we ought to seek in nature (and not [p, xiv]
1 I nm not closely following here the course of the history of the experimcntftl
methiHl, nor &re the hnt beginnings of it very well knowiu
692
Sttppkmcnt If
import into it by means of fiction) whatever reason must learn
from nature, and could not know by itself, and that we must
do this in accordance with what reason itself has originally
placed into nature. Thus only has the study of nature entered
on the secure method of a science, after having for many centuries
done nothing but grope in the dark.
Mciaphysk^ a completely isolated and speculative science of
reason, which declines all teaching of experience, and rest? on
concepts only (not on their application to intuition, as mathe-
matics), in which reason therefore is meant to be her own piipil,
has hitherto not been so fortunate as to enter on the secure path
of a science, although it is older than all other sciences, and
would remain, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss
of an all-destroying barbarism. In metaphysic, reason, even if it
tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws
which are confirmed by the commonest exjierience, is constantly
brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to re-
trace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go ;
while as to any unanimity among those who are engaged [p, xv]
in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has
rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for
those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no
combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that
he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore,
that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in gTopjng
only, and, what is the ivorst, in groping among mere concepts.
What then can be the cause that hitherto no secure method of
science has been discovered ? Shall we say that it is impossible ?
Then why should nature have visited our reason with restless
aspiration to look for it, as if it were its most important concern?
Nay more, how little should we be justified in trusting our reason
if, with regard to one of the most important objects we wish to
know, it not only abandons us, but lures us on by vain hopes, and
in the end betrays ns ! Or, if hitherto we have only failed to
meet with the right path, what indications are there to make us
hope that, if we renew our researches, we shall be more successful
than others before us ?
b.
Suppicmcnt II
^3
The examples of mathematics atid natural science^ which by
one revolution have become what they now are, seem [[>, xvi]
to me sufficiently remarkable to induce us to consider, what may
have been die essential element in that intellectual revolution
which has proved so bencficiai to them, and to make the exjieri-
nient» at least, so far as the analogy between them, as sciences of
reason, with metaphysic allows tt, of hnitating ihem. Hitherto it
has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to the
objecte: but, under that supposition, all attempts to cstalilish
anything about them a priori^ by means of concepts, and thus to
enlarge our knowledge, have come to nothing. The experiment
therefore ought to be made, whether we should not succeed better
with the problems of metaphysic, by assuming that the objects
must conform to our mode of cognition^ for this woukl better
agree with the demanded possibility of an a prion knowledge of
them, which is to settle something about objects, before they are
given us. We have here the same case as with the first thought
of Copernicus, who, not being able to get on in the explanation
of the movements of the heavenly bodies, as long as he assumed
that all the stars turned round the spectator, tried, whether he
ctmld not succeed better, by assuming the spectator to be turning
round, and the stars to be at rest. A similar experiment may be
tried in metaphysic, so far as the intuiiitfn of objects is [p. xvii]
concerned. If the intuition had to conform to the constitution of
objects, I do not see how we could know anything of it a pfiori ;
but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the
ronstilution of our faculty of intuition, I can very well conceive
such a iK>ssibility. As, however, 1 cannot rest in these intuitions,
if they are to become knowledge, but have to refer them, as repre-
sentations, to something as their object, and must determine that
object by them, I have the choice of arlmitling, cither that the
concepts^ by which I carry out that determination, conform to the
object, being then again in the same perplexity on account of
the manner how I can know anything about it a priori : or that
the objects, or what is the same, the experience in which alone
they are known (as given objects), must conform to those con*
cepts. In the latter case^ the solution becomes more easy^
694
Supplement II
because experience, as a kind of knowledge, requires under
standing, and I must therefore, even before objects are given to
me^ presuppose the rules of the understaniling as existing within
rae a prhri, these rules being expressed in concepts a priori, to
which all objects of experience must necessarily conform, antT
with which they must agree. With regard to objects, [p, xviii]
'SO far as they are conceived by reason only, and conceived as
necessary, and which can never be given in experience, at least
in that form in which they are conceived by reason, we shall find
that the attempts at conceiving them (for they must admit of
being conceived) will furnish afterwards an exceUent test of our
new method of thought, accord ing to which wc do not know of
things anything a priori except what we ourselves put into
them.^
This experiment succeeds as well as we could desire, and
promises to metaphysic, in its first part, which deals with con-
cepts a pnon\ of which the corresponding objects may be given
in experience, the secure method of a science. For by [p. xix]
thus changing our point of view, the possibility of knowledge
a priori can well be explained, and, what is si ill more, the laws
which a priofi lie at the foundation of nature, as the sum total
of the objects of experience, may be supplied with satisfactory
proofs, neither of which was possible with the procedure hitherto
^ This method, bonowed from the student of nature, consists in our looking
for the elements of pure reason in that wkuh can bt confirnud cr rr/uteci h>
experiment. Now it is impossible, in order to test the propositions of pure
reason, particularly if they venture heyund all the limits of possible expeficnce,
to make any experiment with their oBJetts (as in natural science) ; we can
therefore only try with concepts and propositions which we admit a priori, by
%o contriving that the same objects may be considered on one side as objects
of the senses and of the understanding in experience, and, on the othtr, as
objects which are only thought, intended, it may be, for the isolated reason
which strives to go beyond all the limits of experience. This gives us two
different sides to he looked at ; and if we find that, by Jooking on things from
that twofold point of view, there is an agreement with the principle of pure
reason, while by admitting one point of view only, there arises an inevitable
conflict wilb reason, then the experiment decides in favour of the correctness
of that distinctioa.
Supplement II
69s
adopted. ^ But there arises from this deduction of our faculty of
knowing a priori^ as given in the first part of metaphysic, a some
what starding resuh, apparently most detrimental to the objects
of metaphysic that have to be treated in the second part^ namely,
the impossibility of going with it beyond the frontier of possible
experience, which is precisely the most essential purpose [p, xx]
of metaphyseal science. Rut here we hav e exactly the experi-
ment which, by disproving the opposite, establishes the troth of
our first estimate of the knowledge of reason a priori^ namely,
that it ran refer to phenomena only, but must leave the thing
by itself as unknown to ns, though as existing by itself* For that
which impels us by necessity to go beyond the limits of experience
and of all phenomena, is the uncondiHoned^ which reason postu-
lates in all things by themselves, by necessity and by right, for
everj'thing conditioned, so that the series of conditions should
thus become complete. If then we find that, under the supposi-
tion of our experience conforming to the objects as things by
themselves, it is impossible to conceive the unconditioned without
contraiiiction^ while, under the supposition of our representation
of things, as they are given to us, not conforming to them as
things by themselves, but, on the contrar}^, of the objects con-
forming to our mode of representation, that contrattiction van-
ishes^ and that therefore the unconditioned must not be looked
for in things, so far as we know them (so far as they are given
to us), but only so far as we do not know them (as things by
themselves), we clearly perceive that, what we at first assumed
tentatively only, is fully confirmed.* But, after all [p. xxi]
progress in the field of the supersensiioys has thus been denied
* This exptriment of pure reason has a grcAt similarity with that of the fktm^
islit which they sometimes call the experiinenl of reMudon^ or the synthttital
pr&ctsi in general. The analyiii i»f the mf(nf>hysiciftn (livi<left pure knoW'
ledge a /rftiri uitn two very heierogcneotis elements, namely, the knowledge
yf things OS phenuiiKMia aiiil of things liy themselves, DtaUitu conibincs
these two again* to bring them into harmony with the necessary idea of the
HHfont/iftottfi/, demanded by reason, and then tinds that this harmony can
never be obtained, except through the above distinction, which therefore must
be supposed to be true.
696
Supphment IF
to speculative reason, it is still open to us to see, whether in the
practical knowledge of reason data may not be found which
enable xis to determine that transcendent concept of the uncon-
ditioned which is demanded by reason, in order thus, according
to the wish of metaphysic, to get beyond the limits of all possible
experience, by means of our knowledge a priori, which is possible
to us for practical purposes only, In this case, speculative reason
has at least gained for us room for such an extension of know-
ledge, though it had to leave it empty, so that we arc not only
at liberty* but are really called upon to fill it up, if we are able,
hy practical data of reason.^ [p. xxii]
The very object of the critique of pure speculative reason
consists in this attempt at changing the old procedure of meta-
physic, and imparling to it the secure method of a science, after
ha^^ng completely revolutionised it, following the example of
geometry and physical science. That critique is a treatise on
the method {Traitc de la methods) ^ not a system of the science
itself; but it marks out nevertheless the whole plan of that
science, both with regard to its limits, and to its internal organi-
sation. For pure speculative reason has this peculiar [p, xxiii]
advantage that it is able, nay, bound to measure its own powers,
according to the different ways in which it chooses its own objects,
and to completely enumerate the different ways of choosing prob-
lems ; thus tracing a complete outHne of a system of metaphysic.
^ In the aanne manner the laws of gravity, deteraiming the inovemetits of
the Iieavenly bodies, iniparterl the character of estahhshed certainty tu what
Copernicus had assumed at lirst as an hypothesis only, and proved at the same
lime the invisihle force (the Newtunian attraction) which holds the universe
together, which ^vould have remained for ever undiscovered, if Copernicus had
not dared, by an hypothesis/which, though contradicting the senses, was yet
true, to seek the observed movements, not in the heavenly bodies, but in the
spectator. I also propose in this preface my own view uf metaphysics, which
has so many analogies with the Copcrnican hypothesis, as an hypothesis only,
though, in the Criti«iuc itself, it is proved by means of our representations of
space and time, and the elementary concepts of the understanding, not hypo-
theticallyi but apodiclicaliy; for I wish that people should observe the dfst
attempts at such a change, which must always be hypothetical.
Supplement II
697
This is due to the fact that, with regard to the first point, nothing
can be attributed to objects in knowledge a frum, except what
the thinking subject takes from within itself; while, with regard
to the second point, reason, so far as its principles of cognition
are concerned, forms a separate and independent unity, in which,
as in an organic body, every member exists for the sake of all
others, and all others exist for the sake of the one, so that no
principle can be safely applied in one relation, unless it has been
carefully examined in a// its relations, to the whole employment
of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysic has this singular advan-
tage, an advantage which cannot be shared by any other science.
in which reason has to deal with objects (for Logic deals only
with the form of thought in general) that, if it has once attained,
by means of this critique, to the secure method of a science, it
can completely comprehend the whole field of know- [p. xxiv]
ledge pertaining to it, and thus finish its work and leave it to
posterity, as a capital that can never be added to, because it
has only to deal with principles and the limits of their employ-
ment, which are fixed by those principles themselves. And this
completeness becomes indeed an obligation, if it is to be a
fundamental science, of which we must be able to say, * nil actum
repufans, si quiJ sufieresset agendum, ^
But it will be asked, what kind of treasure is it which we mean
to l>equealh to posterity in this metaphysic of ours, after it has
been purified by criticism, and thereby brought to a permanent
condition ? After a superficial view of this work, it may seem that
its advantage is negative only, warning us against venturing with
siieculalive reason beyond the limits of experience. Such is no
doubt its primary tise : but it becomes posiiir^^ when we perceive
that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond
its limits, lead inevitably, not to an exfeftsiim, but, if carefully con-
sidered, to a narrowing of the employment of reason, because, by
indefinitely extending the limits of sensibility, to which [p, xxv]
they properly belong, they threaten entirely to supplant the pure
(practical) employment of reason. Hence our critique^ by limit-
ing sensibility to its proper sphere, is no doubt negative ; but by
thus removing an impediment, which threatened to narrow, or
698
Snppiement I!
even entirely to destroy its practical employment, it is in realitf
oi positive, and of very important use, if only we are convinced
that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason
(the moral use), in which reason must inevitably go beyond the
limits of sensibility, and though not requiring for this purpose the
assistance of speculative reason, must at all events be assured
against its opposition, lest it be brought in conflict with itself.
To deny that this service, which is rendered by criticism, is a
positive advantage, would be the same as to deny that the police
confers upon us any positive advantage, its principal occupation
being to prevent violence, which citizens have to apprehend from
citizens, so that each may pursue his vocation in peace and secu-
rity. We had established in the analytical part of our critique the
following points : — First, that space and time are only forms of
sensuous intuition, therefore conditions of the existence of things,
as phenomena only ; Secondly, that we have no concepts of the
understanding, and therefore nothing whereby we can arrive at
the knowledge of things, except in so far as an intuition [p. xxvi]
corresponding to these concepts can be given, and conseriuently
that we cannot have knowledge of any object, as a thing by itself,
but only in so far as it is an object of sensuous intuition, that is, a
phenomenon. This proves no doubt that all speculative know-
ledge of reason is limited to objects of experience ; but it should
be carefully borne in mind, that this leaves it perfectly open to us,
to thifik the same objects as things by themselves, though we can-
not knaw them.* For otherwise we should arrive at the absurd
conclusion, that there is phenomenal appearance with- [p. xxvii]
* In order to know an object, I must be able to prove its possiliility, either
from its reality, as attested by experience, or a prwri by means of reason.
Bat I can ihink whatever 1 please, providc<l only I <lo not contrattict my-
self, that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may
be unable to answer for Ibe eKistence of a corresponding ubject in I he sum
total of all possibilities. Before I can attribute to such a concept objective
reality (real possibility^ as distinguished frutn the former, which is purely logi-
cal), something more is required. This something more, however, need not
be sought for in the suurces of theoretical knowledge, for it may be found in
those of practical knowledge also.
Supplement If
699
out something that appears, I^et us suppose that the necessary
distinctioD, established in our critique, between things as objects
of experience and the same things by themselves, had not been
made. In that case, the principle of causality, and with it the
mechanism of nature, as determined by it, would apply to all
things in general, as efficient causes, I should then not be able
to say of one and the same being, for instance the human soul,
that its will is free, and, at the same time, subject to the necessity
of nature, that is, not free, without involving myself in a palpable
contradiction : and this because I had taken the soul, in both prop-
ositions, in one and the same sense^ nameiy, as a thing in general
(as something by itself), as, mthout previous criticism, I could
not but take it* If, however, our criticism was true, in teaching
us to take an object in two senses, namely, either as a phenom-
enon, or as a thing by itself, and if the deduction of onx concepts
of the understanding was correct, and the principle of causality
applies to things only, if taken in the first sense, namely, so far as
they are objects of experience, but not to things, if taken in their
second sense, we can, without any contradiction, think the same
will when phenomenal (in visible actions) as necessarily [p. xxviii]
conforming to the law of nature, and so far, not free ^ and yet, on
the other hand, when belonging to a thing by itself, as not subject
to that law of nature, and therefore free. Now it is quite true
that 1 may not kmnv my soul, as a thing by itself, by means of
speculative reason (still less through empirical observation), and
consequently may not know freedom either, as the quality of a be-
ing to which I attribute effects in the world of sense, because, in
order to do this, 1 should have to know such a being as determined
in its existence, and yet as not determined in time (which, as I
cannot provide my concept w^ith any inmition, is impossible).
This, however, does not prevent me from thinking freedom ; that
is, my representation of it contains at least no contradiction
within itself, if only our critical distinction of the two modes of
representation (the sensible and the intelligible), and the conse-
quent limitation of the concepts of the pure understanding, and of
the principles based on them, has been properly carried out. If,
then, morality necessarily presupposed freedom (in the strictest
TOO Supplement II
sense) as a property of our will, producing, as a priari data of it,
practical principles, belonging originally to our reason, which, with-
out freedom, would be absolutely impossible, while speculative
reason had proved that such a freedom cannot even [p, xxix]
be thought, the former supposition, namely, the moral one, would
necessarily have to yield to another, the opposite of which in-
volves a palpable contradiction, so that freedom^ and with it
morality (for its opposite contains no contradiction, unless free-
dom is presupposed), would have to make room for the mechan-
ism of nature. Now, however, as morality requires nothing but
that freedom should only not contradict itself, and that, though
unable to understand, we should at least be able to think it, ihere
being no reason why freedom should interfere with the natural
mechanism of the same act (if only taken in a different sense),
the doctrine of morality may well hold its place, and the doctrine
of nature may hold its place too, which would have been impossi-
ble, if our critique had not previously taught us our inevitable
ignorance with regard to things by themselves, and limited every-
thing, which we are able to know theoretically, to mere phenom-
ena. The same discussion as to the positive advantage to be
derived from the critical principles of pure reason might be re-
peated with regard to the concept of God^ and of the simple nature
of our sotii; but, for the sake of brevity, 1 shall pass this by. I
am not allowed therefore even to assume, for the sake [p. xxx]
of the necessar\^ practical employment of my reason, God ^ freedom^
and imnwriaiit\\ if I cannot deprive speculative reason of its pre-
tensions to transcendent insights, because reason, in order to
arrive at these, must use principles which are intended originally
for objects of possible experience only, and which, if in spite of
this, they are applied to w^hat cannot be an object of experience,
really changes this into a phenomenon, thus rendering all practical
extensitm of pure reason impossible. I had therefore to remove
humded^e^ in order to make room for he lief. For the dogmatism
of metaphysic, that is, the presumption that it is possible to
achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of
pure reason, is the source of all that unbelieC whtrh is always very
dogmatical, and wars against all morality.
^ai
Supplement 11
701
If, then, it may not be too difficult to leave a bequest to pos-
terity, in the shape of a systematical metaphysic^ carried out
according to the critique of pure reason, such a bequest is not to
be considered therefore as of \\\x\^ value, whether we regard the
improvement which reason receives through the secure method
of a science, in place of its groundless groping and uncritical
vagaries, or whether we look to the better employment [p, xxxi]
of the time of our enquiring youth, who, if brought up in the
ordinary dogmatism, are early encouraged to indulge in easy
speculations on things of which they know nothing, and of which
they, as httle as anyboiiy else, will ever iimlersLind anything;
neglecting the acquirement of sound knowledge, while bent on
the discovery of new metaphysical thoughts and opinions. The
greatest benefit however will be, that such a work will enable us
to put an end for ever to all objections to morality and religion,
according to the Socralic method, namely, by the clearest proof
of the ignorance of our opponents. Some kind of metaphysic has
always existed, and will always exist, and with it a dialectic of pure
reason, as being natural to it. It is therefore the first and most
important task of philosophy to deprive metaphysic, once for all,
of its pernicious influence, by closing up the sources of its errors.
In spite of these important changes in the whole field of science,
and of the iasses which speculative reason must suffer in its fancied
possessions, all general human interests, and all the [p. xxxii]
advantages which the world hitherto derived from the teachings
of pure reason, remain just the same as before. The loss, if any,
affects only the monopi^iy of the schools, and by no means the
interests of humanity, 1 appeal to the staimchcst dogmatist,
whether the proof of the continued existence of our soul after
death, derived from the simplicity of the substance, or that of the
freedom of the will, as opposed to the general mechanism of nat-
urc, derived from the subtle, but inefficient, distinction between
subjective and objective pnictical necessity, or that of the existence
of God, derived from the concept of an Ens realissimum (the con-
tingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover),
have ever, after they had been started by the schools, penetrated
tlie public mind, or exercised the slightest influence on its con-
702
Supph'ffii'nt II
victions ? If this has not been, and in fact could not be so, on
account of the unfitness of the ordinary understanding for such
subtle speculations ; and if, on the contrary, with regard to the
first point, the hope of a fiftttre iift has chiefly rested on that
peculiar character of human nature, never to be satisfied by what
is merely temporal (and insufficient, therefore, for the character
of its whole destination) ; if w*ith regard to the second, the clear
consciousness o{ Jreetiom was produced only by the [p. xxxiiij
clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of sensu- i
ous desires ; and if, lastly, with regard to the third, ihe belief in a
great and wise Author of the world has been supported entirely
by the wonderful beauty, order, and providence, everywhere dis-
played in nature, then this possejasion remains not only undis-
turbed, but acquires even greater authority^ because the schools
have now been taught, not to claim fur thenis elves any higher or
fuller insight on a point which concerns general human interests,
than what is equally within the reach of the great mass of men,
and to confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally
comprehensible, ami, for moral purposes, quite sufiiciem proofs.
The change therefore affects the arrogant pretensions of the
schools only, which would fain be considered as the only judges
and depositaries of such truth (as they are, no doubt, with regard
to many other subjects), allowing to the public its use only, and
trying to keep the key to themselves, qt4od me cum ntscit, solus
vull scire vukri. At the same time full satisfaction is given to
the more moderate claims of speculative philosophers, [p. xxxiv]
They still remain the exclusive tlepositors of a science which bene-
fits the masses without their knowing it, namely, the critique of
reason. That critique can never become popular, nor does it need
to be so, because, if on the one side the public has no understanding
for the line*drawn arguments in sui>purt of useful tniths, it is not
troubled on the other by the equally subtle objections. It is dif-
ferent with the schools which, in the same way as every man who has
once risen to the height of speculation, must know both the pro^s
and the con's and are bound, by means of a careful investigation
of the rights of speculative reason, to prevent, once for all, the
scandal which^ sooner or later, is sure to be caused even to the
SuppUment II
703
masses, by the quarrels in which metaphysicians (and as such,
theologians also) become involved, if ignorant of our critique, and
V)y which their doctrine becomes in the end entirely perverted,
1 hus, and thus alone, can the very root be cut off of materialism^
fatalism^ atheism^ free- thinking, unbeliefs fanaticism^ and supersti-
tion, which may become universally injurious, and finally of iiieal'
ism and scepticism also, which are dangerous rather to the schools,
and can scarcely ever penetrate into the public. If [p. xxxv]
governments think proper ever to interfere with the affairs of the
learned, it would be far more consistent with their wise regard for
science as well as for sifciet), to favour the freedom of such a criti-
cism by which alone the labours of reason can be established on
a firm footing, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the
schools, which raise a loud clamour of public danger, whenever
the cobwebs are swept away of which the public has never taken
the slightest notice, and the loss of which it can therefore never
perceive.
Our critique is not opposed to the dogma tic a! procedure of
reason, as a science of pure knowledge (for this must always be
dogmatical, that is, derive its proof from sure principles a priori),
but to dogmatism only, that is, to the presumption that it is possi-
ble to make any progress with pure (philosophical) knowledge,
consisting of concepts, and gtjided by principles, such as reason
has long been in the habit of employing, without first enquiring
in what way, and by what right, it has come possessed of them.
Dogmatism is therefore the dogmatical procedure of pure reason,
without a previous criticism 0/ its oit*n pcnifers ; and our opposition
to this is not intended to defend either that loquacious [p, xxxvi]
shallowness which arrogates to it&elf the good name of popularity,
much less thut scepticism which makes short work with the whole
of metii physic. On the contrary, our critique is meant to form a
necessary preparation in support of a thoroughly scientific system
of metaphysir, which mtist necessarily be carried out dogmatically
and strictly systematically^ so as to satisfy all the demands, not so
much of the public at large, as of the schools, this being an indis-
pensable condition, as it has undertaken to cany out its work
entirely a priori^ and thub lo the couiplete satisfaction of specula*
704
Supplement //
tive reason. In the execution of this plan, as traced out by the
critique^ that is, in a future system of metaphysics we shall have
to follow in the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest
of all dogmatic philosophers, who first showed (and by his exanriple
called forth, in Germany, that spirit of thoroughness, which is nut
yet extinct) how the secure method of a science could be attained
only by a legitimate establishment of principles, a clear definition
of concepts, an attempt at strictness of proof, and an avoidance
of all bold combinations in concluding. He was therefore most
eminently qualified to raise metaphysics to the dignity of a science,
if it had only occurred to him, by criticism of the organum, namely,
of pure reason itself, first to prepare his field, — an omission to be
ascribed, not so much to himself as to the dogmatical [p. xxxvii]
spirit of his age, and with regard to which the philosophers of his
own, as well as of all previous times, have no right to reproach
each other. Those who reject, at the same time, the method of
Wolf, and the procedure of the critique of pure reason, can have
no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science altogether, and
thus to change work into play, conviction into opinion, and phi-
losophy into philodoxy.
With regard to this second edition, I have tried, as was but
fair, to do all I could in order to remove, as f:\r as possible, the
difficulties and obscurities which, not perhaps without my fault,
have misled even acute thinkers in judging of my book. In the
propositions themselves, and their proofs, likewise in the form and
completeness of the whole plan, I have found nothing to alter,
which is due partly to the long- continued examination to which
I hati subjected them, before submitting them to the public, and
partly to the nature of the subject itself. For pure speculative
reason is so constituted that it forms a true organism, in which
everything is organic^ the whole being there for the [p. xxxviii]
sake of every part, and every part for the sake of the whole, so
that the smallest imperfection, whether a fault or a deficiency,
must inevitably betray itself in use. I venture to hope that thii
I
Supplement II
705
system will maintain itself unchanged for the future also. It is
not self-conceit which justifies me in this confidence, but the
experimental evidence produced by the identity of the result,
whether we proceed progressively from the smallest elements to
the whole of pure reason, or retrogressively from the whole (for
this also is given by the practical objects of reason) to every
single part ; the fact being, that an attempt at altering even the
smallest item produces at once contradictions, not only in the
system, but in human reason in general. With regard to the styie^
however, much remains to be done ; and for that purpose, I have
endeavoured to introduce several improvements into this second
edition, which are intended to remove, first, misapprehensions in
the .^esthetic, especially with regard to the concept of time :
secondly, obscurities in the deduction of the concepts of the
understanding : thirdly, a supposed want of sufficient evidence, in
proving the propositions of the pure understanding : fourthly, the
false interpretation put on the paralogisms with which we charged
rational psychology. To this point (only to the end of the first
chapter of transcendental Dialectic) do the changes [p. xxxix]
of style and representation ^ extend, and no further. Time was
' The only thing which might be called Jin adctition, though in the method
of proof only, is the new refutatiun of piythohgiial idealism^ and the strict
(and as I believe the only possible) proof of the objective reality of ejcternol
phenomena on p. 275 (Suppl, XXI) . That idealism may be considered entirely
innocent with respect to the essential aims of metaphysic (though it is not so in
reality), yet it remains a scandal to philosophy^ and lo human reasriii in generaj,
that we should have to accept the existence of things without us (from which
we derive the whole material of knowledge for our own internal sense) on faith
only, unable to meet with any satisfactory proof an opponent » who is pleased
to doubt it, (Sec p. 476.) It will probably be urged against this proof
that, after alt^ I am immediately conscious of that only which is within me,
thai 11, of my rtpntentnti^n of external things, and that consequently it must
still remain uncertain whether there be outside me anything corresponding to it
or not. But by internal ixptritnce I am conacious of my tjtitien^e it$ [p. id]
timf (consequently also, of its dctermin ability in time) ; and this is more than
to be conscious of my representation only, and yet identical with the empirical
tpnsdoHsness ef my txiiftnte^ which can be itself cteCermined only by something
connected with my existence, yet outside me. This consciousness of my exist-
ence in time is therefore connected as identical with the consciousness of relation
2Z
too short for doing more, nor did I, with regard to the [p. xl]
rest, meet with any miis apprehensions on the part of [p. xU]
competent and impartial judges. These, even though 1 must not
name them with that praise which is due to them, will easily per-
ceive in the proper place, that 1 have paid careful attention to
their remarks. [p. xiii]
to something fftiiside me; so that it is experience, and not fiction^ sense, and
not imagination, which indissolubly connects the external with my internal sense.
The external sense is by itself a relatiun of itiluitiun tu something real outside
me; and its real, in contradistinction to a purely imaginary character, rests
entirely on its being iiidissolubly connected with internal experience, as being
the condition of its possibility. This is what happens here. If with the in/fi-
iirciaal amstiottsntss of my existence in the reprcsentatiuii, / i/w, which accom-
panies all my judgments and all acts of my understanding, I could at the same
time connect a determination of that existence of mine by means of inttilertual
intuition^ then that determination would not recjuiTe the consciousness of rela-
tion to something outside ine. But although that intellectual consciousness
comes first, the inner intuition, in which alone any existence can be determined,
is sensuous and dependent on the condition of time; and that iletermination
again, and therefore internal experience itself, depends on something perma-
nent which is not within me, consequently on something outside me only, to
which I must consider myself as standing in a certain relation. Hence the
reality of the external sense is necessarily connected, in order to make experi-
ence possible at all, with the reality of the internal sense; that is, T am con-
scious, with the same certainty, that there are things outside tne which have a
reference to my sense, as that 1 exist myself in time. In order to ascertain to
what given intuitions objects outside me really correspond if these intuitions
belonging to the external sense, and not to the faculty of imagination), we must
in each single case apply the rules according to which experience in general
(even internal) is distinguished from imaginations, the proposition that there
really is an external experience being always taken for granted. It may be well
to add here the remark that the repreientation of something permanent in exist*
cnce is not the same as ^permanent repreientation ; for this (the representation
of something permanent in existence) can change and alternate, as aU our rep-
resentations, even those of matter, and may yet refer to something permanent,
which must therefore be something external, and diflerent from all my rep-
resentations, the existence of which is necessarily involved in the determtnati&n
of my own existence, and constitutes with it but one experience, which couU
never take place internally, unless (in part) it were external also. The how
admits here of as little explanation as the permanent in time in general, the
CO- existence of which with the variable produces the concept of change.
Supplement II
707
These improvements, however, entai! a small loss to the reader.
It was inevitable, without making the book too vol u mi nous, to
leave out or abridge several passages which, though not essential
to the completeness of the whole, may yet, as useAil for other pur-
poses, be missed by some readers. Thus only could I gain room
for ray new and more intelligible representation of the subject
which, though it changes absolutely nothing with regard to propo-
sitions, and even to proofs, yet deviates so considerably from the
former, in the method of the treatment here and there, that mere
additions and interpolations would not have been sufficient. This
small loss, which ever}' reader may easily supply by reference to
the first edition, will I hope be more than compensated for by the
greater clearness of the present.
I have observed w^ith pleasure and thankfulness in various pub-
lications (containing either reviews or separate essays) that the
spirit of thoroughness is not yet dead in Germany, but has only
been silenced for a short time by the clamour of a fashionable
and pretentious licence of thought, and that the rlifficul- [p, xliii]
ties which beset the thorny path of my critique, which is to lead
to a truly scientific and, as such, permanent, and therefore most
necessary, science of pure reason, have not discouraged bold and
clear heads from mastering my book. To these excellent men,
who so happily blend thorough knowledge with a talent for lucid
exposition (to which I can lay no claim), I leave the task of bring-
ing my, in that respect far from perfect, work to greater perfec-
tion. There is no danger of its being refuted, though there is of
its being misunderstood. For my own part, I cannot henceforth
enter on controversies, though I shall carefully attend to all hints,
whether from friends or opponents, in order to utilise them in a
future elaboration of the whole s)'stcm, according to the plan
traced out in this propacdeutk. As during these lalxjurs I have
ailvanred pretty far in years (this ver}' month, into ray sixty-fourth
year), I must be careful in spending my time, if I am to carry out
my plan, of furnishing a melaphysic of nature, and a metaphysic
of morals, in confirmation of the tnith of my critique both of spec-
ulative and of practical reason, and must leave the elucidation
of such obscurities as could at first be hardly avoided [p» xhv]
708 Supplement II
in such a work, and likewise the defence of the whole, to those
excellent men who have made it their own. At single points
every philosophical treatise may be pricked (for it cannot be
armed at all points, like a mathematical one), while yet the
organic structure of the system, considered as a whole, has not
therefore to apprehend the slightest danger. Few only have that
pliability of intellect to tike in the whole of a system, if it is new ;
still fewer have an inclination for it, because they dislike every
innovation. If we take single passages out of their connection,
and contrast them with each other, it is easy to pick out apparent
contradictions, particularly in a work written with all the freedom
of a running speech. In the eyes of those who rely on the judg-
ment of others, such contradictions may throw an unfavourable
light on any work ; but they are easily removed, if we ourselves
have once grasped the idea of the whole. And, if a theory pos-
sesses stability in itself, then this action and reaction of praise
and blame, which at first seemed so dangerous, serve only in time
to rub off its superficial inequalities : nay, secure to it, in a short
time, the requisite elegance also, if only men of insight, impar-
tiality, and true popularity will devote themselves to its study.
KONIGSBERG, April, 1 787.
SUPPLEMENT III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF THE Second Edition (r787)» with the paging or that
EDITION
thSA
Introduction 1-30
L Of the difference between pure and empirical know-
ledge I
n. We are in possession of certain cognitions a prior i, and
even the ordinary understanding is never without
them 3
III. Philosophy requires a science, to determine the possi-
biJity, the principles, and the extent of all cognitions
a priori , . . 6
IV. Of the difference between analytical and synthetical
judgments ....,,,.. 10
V. In dl theoretical sciences of reason synthetical judg-
ments a priori are contained as principles ... 14
VL The general problem of pure reason . . , . 19
VII. Idea and division of an independent science under the
name of Critique of Pyre Reason .... 24
I. ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM . . '31-732
Firat Part. Transcendental Esthetic . , » . 33-73
Introduction. § J 33
First Section. Of Space. § 2, 3 37
Second Section. Of Time, § 4-7 46
General Observations on transcendental ^Esthetic. %% -59
Conclusion of transcendental .Esthetic 73
709
Second Part* Transcendental Logic . , . , . 74-732
Iniroductton, The idea of a transcendental Logic . 74-88
I. Of Logic in general 74
IL Of transcendental Logic '79
IIL Of the division of general Logic into analytical and
dialectical ,,,..... 82
IV. Of the divi.sion of transcendental Logic into transcen-
dental Analytic and Dialectic . , . * 87
First Division. Transcendental Analytic . . . 89-349
First Baok. Analytic of concepts ... - 90-169
First Chapter. Method of discovering all pure con-
cepts of the understanding 91
First Section, Of the logical use of the understand-
ing in general . , , . . . .92
Second Section . Of the logical function of the under-
standing in judgments* §9 . . . -95
Third Section . Of the pure concepts of the under-
standing, or of the Categories. §10-12 . , 102
Second Chapter. Of the deduction of the pure con-
cepts of the understanding * . . . .116
First Sectitm . Of t h e pri nci pies of a t ransce n dental
deduction in general. §13 . . . .116
Transition to a transcendental deduction of the
Categories. § 14 -124
Second Section. Transcendental deduction of the
pure concepts of the understanding. §15-27 . 129
Second Book. Analytic of principles (transcendental doc-
trine of the faculty of judgment) , » . 169-349
Introduction, Of the transcendental faculty of judg-
ment in general , . . . . . ,171
First Chapter. Of the schematism of the pure con-
cepts of the understanding . . . . .176
' Second Chapter. System of all principles of the pure
understanding . . , . . , ,187
First Section, Of the highest principle of all ana-
lytical judgments i8g
Second Section, Of the highest principle of all
synthetical judgments . . - . '193
Third Section . S \'stematical representation of all syn-
thetical principles of the pure understanding 197-294
l»
Supple$Hcnt III
711
1. Axioms of intuition
2. Anticipations of perception ... *
3. Analogies of experience . . » .
First Analogy* Principle of the perma-
nence of substance
Second Analogy. Principle of the succes-
sion of time* according to the law of
causality .,».,..
Thixd Analog)', Principle of coexistence,
according to the law of reciprocity .
4. Postulates of empirical thought in general
General note on the system of the prin-
ciples .,,,...
Third Chapter. On the ground of distinction of all
subjects into phenomena and noumena
Appendix. On the amphiboly of reflective concepts
owing to the confusion of the empirical with the tran-
scendental use of the understanding
Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic
InirodiiCiiaH
L Of transcendentalillusion
11. Of pure reason as the scat of transcendental UlU'
sion .......
A. Of reason in general .
B. Of the logical use of reason
C. Of the pure use of reason .
First Book. Of the concepts of pure reason .
First Sect iofi. Of ideas in general
Second Section. Of transcendental ideas
Third Section , System of transcendental ideas
Second Book, Of the dialectical conclusions of pure
reason 396-731
224
23^
288
294
. 316
349-732
349-366
349
First Chapter. Of ihe Paralogisms of pure reason
General note on the transition from rational psydiology
to cosmology ,..,,,
Second Chapter. The Antinomy of pure reason
First Section, System of cosmological ideas
Second Section, Antithetic of pure reason
First Antinomy
Second Antinomy ....
399
712
Supphment III
PACE
Third Antinomy 472
Fourth AQtinomy ..,,.. 480
Third Section. Of the interest of reason in these
conflicts 490
Fourth Section, Of the transcendental problems of
pure reason *ind the absolute necessity of their
solution 504
Fifth Sectimt. Sceptical representation of the cos-
mological questions in the foitr transcendental
ideas . « . . . . . . * 5' 3
Sixiii Section. Transcendental idealism as the key
to the solution of cosmo logical Dialectic . . 518
Se%f£nth Section. Critical decision of the cosmolog-
ical conflict of reasoo with itself .... 525
Eighth SutioH, The regulative principle of pure
reason with regard to the cosmological ideas . 536
Ninth Section, Of the empirical iifse of the regula-
tive principle of reason with regard to al! cosmo-
lo^cal ideas ..»,... 543
I. Solution of the cosmological idea of the
totality of the composition of phenomena
of an universe 545
II. Solution of the cosmological idea of the
totality of the division of a whole given in
intuition . . . . . , * SS'
Concluding remarks on the solution of the
transcendental mathematical ideas^ and
prelimmary remarks for the solution of the
transcendental dynamical ideas . 556
III. Solution of the cosmological ideas of the
totality of the derivation of cosmical events
from their causes . . . . , 560
Possibility of causality through freedom . 566
Explanation of the cosmological idea of
freedom in connection with the general
necessity of nature , . * . . 570
IV. Solution of the cosmological idea of the to-
tality of the dependence of phenomena
with regard to their existence in gen-
eral ... 587
Supplement III
7«3
PACK
Concluding remiirks on the whole antinomy
of pure reason ..,.,. 593
Third Chapter. The ideal of pure reason . . . 595
First Section. Of the ideal in general . . , 595
Second Section. Of the transcendental ideal . , 599
Third Section, Of the arguments of speculative
reason in proof of tlie existence of a Supreme
Being 61 1
pQurth Section, Of the impossibility of an onto-
logical proof of the existence of God , » . 620
Fifth Section Of the impossibility of a cosmolog-
ical proof of the existence of God . , , 6ji
Discovery and explanation of the dialectical illusion
in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a
necessary Being ....... 642
Sixth Section. Of the impossibility of the physico-
theological proof 648
Seventh Section. Criticism of all Iheologj* based on
speculative principles of reason , . . , 659
Appendix to the transcendental Dialectic . . 670
Of the regulative use of the ideas of pure
reason ........ 670
Of the ultimate aim of the natural Dialectic of
human reason 697
IL TILAJSfSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD 733-884
Introduction . . . 735
First Chapter. The discipline of pure reason . 736-823
First Section, The discipline of pure reason in its
dogmatical use , 740
Second Section. The discipline of pure reason in its
polemical use ......* 766
Of the impossibility of a sceptical satisfaction of pure
reason in conflict with itself .... 786
l^ird Section. The discipline of pure reason with
regard to the hypotheses ..... 797
Fourth Section. The discipline of pure reason with
regard to its proofs . . . . . .810
Sicond Chapter. The canon of pure reason 823-884
First Section. Of the ultimate aim of the pure use
of our reason 825
714 Supplement HI
PACK
Second Section, Of the ideal of the Summum
BonupHj as determining the ultimate aim of Pure
Reason 832
Third Section, Of trowing, knowing, and be-
lieving 848
Third Chapter, The architectonic of pure reason . 860
Fourth Chapter, The history of purie reason . . 880
SUPPLEMENT IV
[See page i]
INTRODUCTION
Of ike Difference between Pure and Empiricai Knowledge
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be
no doubt For how should the flitulty of knowledge be called
into activity, if not by objects which affect our senses, and which
either produce representations by themselves, or rouse the activity
of our understanding to compare, to connect, or to separate them ;
and thus to convert the raw materiai of our sensuous impressions
into a knowledge of objects, which we call experience? In re-
spect of time, therefore, no knowledge within us is antecedent
to experience, but all knowledge begins with it.
But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it docs
not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible
that even our empirical experience is a compound of that which
we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty
of knowledge (incited only by sensuous impressions), supplies from
itself, a supplement which we do not distinguish from that raw
material, until long practice has roused our attention and rendered
us capable of separating one from the other.
It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investi-
gation, and cannot be disposed of at first sight, whether there
exists a knowledge independent of experience, and even of all
impressions of the senses? Such kmnvied^e is called a priori^
and distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its sources
a posteriori ^ that is, in experience.
71S
7i6
Stipplement fV
This terra a priori, however, is not yet definite enough lo indi-
cate the full meaning of our question. For people are wont to
say, even with regard to knowledge derived from experience^ that
we have it, or might have it, a priori^ because we derive it from
experience, not ifnmediaifi}\ but from a general nile, which, how-
ever, has itself been derived from experience. Thus one would
say of a person who undermines the foundations of his house,
that he might have known a priori that it would tumble down,
that is, that he need not wait for the experience of its really
tumbling down. But still he could not know this entirely a priaH^
because he had first to learn from experience that bodies are
heavy, and will fall when their supports are taken away.
We shall therefore, in what follows, understand by knowledge
ii /r/m knowledge which is ab&oiutdy independent of all experi-
ence, and not of this or that experience only. Opposed to this
is empirical knowledge, or such as is possible a posteriori only,
that is, by experience. Knowledge a priori, if mixed up with
nothing empirical, is called pure. Thus the proposition, for ex-
ample, that ever>^ change has its caose, is a proposition a priori,
but not pure : because change is a concept which can only be
derived from experience,
n
We are in Possession of Certain Cognitions a priori, and even the
Ordinary Understanding is never wit^iout them
All depends here on a criterion, by w^hich we may safely dis-
tinguish between pure and empirical knowledge. Now experi-
ence teaches us, no doubt, that something is so or so, but not
that it cannot be different. Firsts then, if we have a proposition,
which is thought, together with its necessity, we have a judgment
a priori: and if, besides, it is not derived from any proposition,
except such as is itself again considered as necessary, we have an
absolutely a /w« judgment. Secondiy, experience never imparts
to its judgments true or strict, but only assumed or relative uni-
versality (by means of induction), so that we ought always to say,
so far as we have observed hitherto, there is no exception to this
Supplement IV
717
or that rule. If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict uni-
versality, so that no exception is admitted as possible, it is riot
derived from experience, but valid absolutely a prhri. Empirical
universality, therefore, is only an arbitrary extension of a validity
which applies to must cases, to one that applies 10 all : as, for
instance, in the proposition, all bmlies are heavy. If, on the con-
trary, strict universality is essential to a judgment, this always
points to a special source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of
knowledge a priori. Necessity, therefore, and strict universality
are safe criteria of knowledge a priori^ and are inseparable one
from the other As, however, in the use of these criteria, it is
sometimes easier to show the contingency than the empirical lim-
itation * of judgments, and as it is sometimes more convincing to
prove the unlimited universality which we attribute to a judgment
than its necessity, it is advisalile to use both criteria separately,
each being by itself infallible.
That there really exist in our knowledge such necessar)% and
in the strictest sense universal^ and therefore pure judgments
a priori y is easy to show. If we want a scientific example, we
have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics ; if
we want one from the sphere of the ordinary understanding, such
a proposition as that each change must have a cause, will answer
the purpose ; nay, in the latter case, even the concept of cause
contains so clearly the concept of the necessity of its connection
with an elTcct, and of the strict universality of the nile, that it
would be destroyed altogether if we attempted to derive it, as
Hume does, from the frequent concomitancy of that which
happens with that which precedes, and from a habit arising
thence (therefore from a purely subjective necessity), of con-
necting representations. It is possible even, without having
recourse to such examples in proof of the reality of pure proposi-
tions a priori within our knowledge, to prove their indispcnsa-
bility for the possibility of experience itself, thus proving it a
priori. For whence should experience lake its certainly, if all
the rules which it follows were always again and again empirical,
Accofdisg to fin emctidAtian Adopted both by Vaihingcr and Adickes.
7i8 Supplement IV
and therefore contingent and hardly fit to serve as first princi-
ples? For the present, however, we may be satisfied for having
shown the pure employment of the faculty of our knowledge as
a matter of fact, with the criteria of it.
Not only in judgments, however, but even in certain concepts,
can we show their origin a priori. Take away, for example, from
the concept of a body, as supplied by experience, everything that
is empirical, one by one; such as colour, hardness or softness,
weight, and even impenetrability, and there still remains the
space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied : that
you cannot take away. And in the same manner, if you remove
from your empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorpo-
real, all properties which experience has taught you, you cannot
take away from it that property by which you conceive it as a
substance, or inherent in a substance (although such a concept
contains more determinations than that of an object in general).
Convinced, therefore, by the necessity with which that concept
forces itself upon you, you will have to admit that it has its seat
in your faculty of knowledge a priori.
SUPPLEMENT
[See page 6]
V
ElkfpmiCAL judgments, as such, are all synthetical ; for it would
be absurd to found an analytical judgment on experience, because,
in order to form such a judgment, I need not at all step out of
my concept, or appeal to the testimony of experience. That a
body is extended, is a propositbn perfectly certain a priori, and
not an empirical judgntient. For, before I call in experience, I
am already in possession of all the conditions of my judgment
in the concept of botiy itself. 1 have only to draw out from it,
according to the principle of contradiction, the required predi-
cate, and I thus become conscious, at the same time, of the
necessity of the judgment, which experience could never teach
me. But, though I do not include the predicate of gravity in
the general concept of body, that concept, nevertheless, indicates
an object of experience through one of its parts : so that I may
add other parts also of the same experience, besides those which
belonged to the former concept. I may, first, by an analytical
process, realise the concept of bo<ly, through the predicates of
extension, impermeability^ form, etc*, all of which are contained
in it. Afterwards I expand my knowledge, and looking back to
the experience from which my concept of body was abstracted, I
find gravity always connected wiih the before- mentioned predi"
cates, and therefore I add it synthetically to that concept as a
predicate. It is, therefore, experience on which the possibility
of the synthesis of the predicate of gravity with the concept of
body is founded : because both concepts, tiiough neither of them
is contained in the other, belong to each other, though acct*
dentally only, as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which
is itself a synthetical connection of intuitions,
719
R
r. All mathematical judgments are synthetical. This proposi-
tion, though incoetestably certain, and very important to us for
the future, seems to have hitherto escaped the observation of those
who are engaged in the anatomy of human reason : nay, to be
direcdy opposed to all their conjectures. For as it was found
that all mathematical conchisions proceed according to the prin-
ciple of contradiction (which is required by the natiire of all
apodictic certainty), it was supposed that the fundamental prin-
ciples of mathematics also rested on the authority of the same
principle of contradiction. This, however, was a mistake : for
though a synthetical proposition may be understood according
to the principle of contradiction^ this can only be if another syn-
thetical proposition is presupposed, from which the latter is
deduced, but never by itself First of all, we ought to observe,
that mathematical propositions, properly so called, are always
judgments a pfiori^ and not empirical, because they carry along
with them necessity, which can never be deduced from experi-
ence. If people should object to this, I am quite willing to con ►
fine my statement to pure mathematics, the v^xy concept of which
implies that it does not contain erapirical, but only pure know-
ledge a priori.
At first sight one might suppose indeed that the proposition
74-5 = 12 is merely analytical, following, according to the prin-
ciple of contradiction, from the concept of a sum of 7 and 5.
720
Supplement VI
721
But^ if we look more closely, we shall find that the concept of the
sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing beyond the union of both sxmis
into one, whereby nothing is told us as to what this single number
may be which combines both. We by no means arrive at a con-
cept of Twelve, by thinking that union of Seven and Five ; and
we may analyse our concept of such a possible sum as long as we
will, still we shall never discover in it the concept of Twelve. We
must go beyond these concepts, and call in the assistance of the
inmition corresponding to one of the two. for instance, our five
fingers, or, as Segner does in fiis arithmetic, five points^ and so by
degrees add the units of the Five, given in intuition, to the con-
cept of the Seven. For I first take the ntmiber 7. and taking the
intuition of the fingers of my hand, in order to form with it the
concept of the 5, I gradually add the units, which I before took
together, to make up the number 5, by means of the image of my
hand, to the number 7, and I thus see the number 12 arising
before me. That 5 should be added to 7 was no doubt implied
in my concept of a sum 7 + 5. but not that that sum should be
equal to 12, An arithmetical proposition is, therefore, always
synthetical, which is seen more easily still by taking larger num-
bers, where we clearly perceive that, turn and twist our concep-
tions as we may, we could never, by means of the mere analysis
of our concepts and without the help of intuition, arrive at the
sum that is wanted.
Nor is any proposition of pure geometry analytical. That the
straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetical
proposition. For ray concept of %trai^ht contains nothing of
magnitude (qyantity), but a quality only. The concept of the
shtnteit is» therefore, purely adventitious, and cannot be deduced
firom the concept of the straight line by any analysis whatsoever.
The aid of intuition, therefore, must be called in, by which alone
the synthesis is possible.
[It is true that some few propositions, presu|*posed by the
geometrician, are really analytical, and depend on the principle
of contradiction : but then they serve only, like identical proposi-
tions, to form the chain of the method, and not as principles.
Such are the propositions, a—a^ the whole is equal to itself, or
722
Supplement VI
(aH-^) > ^, that the whole is greater than its part. And even
these, though they are valid according to mere concepts, are only
admitted in mathematics, because they can be represented in
imuition,'] What often makes us believe that the predicate of
such apodictic judgments is contained in our concept, and the
judgment therefore analytical, is merely the ambiguous cliaracter
of the expression. We are told that we ought to join in thought
a certain predicate to a given concept, and this necessity is inhe-
rent in the concepts themselves* But the question is not what we
oH^ht to join to the given concept, but what we really think in it,
though confusedly only, and then it becomes clear that the predi-
cate is no doubt inherent in those concepts by necessity, not,
however, as thought in the concept itself, but by means of an
intuition, which must be added to the concept.
2. Natural science {physka) c&ntaim synthetical judgments
2i \>non as principles. I shall adduce, as examples, a few prop-
ositions only, such as, that in all changes of the material world
the quantity of matter always remains unchanged : or that in all
communication of motion, action and reaction must always equal
each other. It is clear not only that both convey necessity, and
that, therefore, their origin is a priori^ but also that they are syn-
thetical propositions. For tn the concept of matter I do not con-
ceive its permanency, but only its presence in the space which it
fills. 1 therefore go beyond the concept of matter in order to
join something to it a prii^n\ which I did not before conceive /«
it. The proi>osition is, therefore, not analytical, but synthetical,
and yet a priori^ and the same applies to the other propositions
of the pure part of natural science.
3. Metaphysic^ even if we look upon it as hitherto a tentative
science only, which, however, is indispensable to us, owing to the
very nature of human reason, is meant to contain synthetical
knmvledge a priori. Its object is not at all merely to analyse such
concepts as we make to ourselves of things a prii^ri^ and thus to
explain them analytically, but to expand our knowledge a priori.
' This paragraph from ft is trne to intuition seems to have been a margi-
nal note, 8t3 shiiwn by Dr. Vadbinger. See Translator'a Preface, p. lii,
Supplement VI
m
This we can only do by means of concepts which add something
to a given concept that was not contained in it ; nay, we even
attempt, by means of synthetical judgments a priori^ to go so far
beyond a given concept that experience itself cannot follow us :
as, for instance, in the proposition that the world must have a
firet beginning. Thus, according at least to its intentions, meta-
physic consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori.
VI
The General Problem of Pure Reason
Much is gained if ue are able to bring a number of investi-
gations under the formula of one single problem. For we thus
not only facilitate our own work by defining it accurately, but en-
able also everybody else who likes to examine it to form a judg-
ment, whether we have really done justice to our purpose or not.
Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the riuestion,
Hmv are synthetical Judgments a priori possible f
That metaphysic has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state
of ignorance and contradiction is entirely due to people not
having thought sooner of this problem, or perhaps even of a dis-
tinction between a nalytieal a nd syn the tic a I j u d gm e n ts. Th e sol u -
tion of this problem, or a sufficient proof that a possibility which
is to be explained does in reality not exist at all, is the question
of life or death to metaphysic. David Hume^ who among all
philosophers approached nearest to that problem, though he was
far from conceiving it with sufficient definiteness and universality,
confining his attention only to the synthetical proposition of the
connection of an effect with its causes (principium causalitatis)^
arrived at the conclusion that such a proposition a priori is
entirely impossible. According to his conclusions, everything
which we call metaphysic would turn out to be a mere delusion
of reason, fancying that it knows by itself what in reality is only
borrowed from experience, and has assumed by mere habit the
appearance of necessity. If he had grasped our problem in all
its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion which
724
Supplement VI
destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived
that, according to his argument, no pure mathematical scienot
was possible either, on account of its certainly contaming syn-
thetical propositions a priori; and from such an assertion his
good sense woulti probably have saved him.
On the solution of our problem depends, at the same time, the
possibiUty of the pure employment of reason, in establishing and
carrying out all sciences which contain a theoretical knowledge
a priori of objects, i,e, the answer to the questions
H&w is pure matkematicai sciencf possible 7
Hmv is pure natural set en re po^ stifle f
As these sciences really exist, it is quite proper to ask, Haw
they are possible? for thut they must be jjossible, is proved by
their reality.^
But as to metaphysic^ the bad progress which it has hitherto
made, and the impossibility of asserting of any of the metaphysical
systems yet brought forward that it really exists»so far as its essen-
tial aim is concerned, must fill every one with doubts as to its
possibihty.
Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge also must be
looked upon as given, and though not as a science, yet as a nat-
ural disposition (metaphysiia mrtt/rtilis) metaphysic is real. For
human reason, without being nioved merely by the conceit of
omniscience, advances irresistibly, and urged on by its own need,
to questions such as cannot he answered by any empirical employ-
ment of reason, or by principles thence derived, so that we may
really say, that all men, as soon as their reason became ripe for
speculation, have at all times possessed some kind of metaphysic,
and will always continue to possess it. And now it will also have
to answer the question
* One might doubt this with regard to pure natural science; but one has
only to consi<ler the difTercnt propositions which stand at the beginning of real
(empirical) physical science, those» fur example, relating to the permanence of
the same quantity of matter to the Tt's inertine^ the equality of action and reac-
tion, etc., in order to become convinced that they constitute ^ phyfi(^a pura^ or
rationaiis^ which well deserves Co stand by itself as an independent scie&cc, in
its whole extent, whether narrow or wide.
Supplement VI
How is mefyipkysii possible^ as a natural disposition f that i^
how does the nature of universal htiman reason give rise to ques-
tions which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is urged
on by its own need to answer as well as il can?
As, however, all attempts which have hitherto been niade at
answering these natural questions (for instance, whether the world
has a beginning, or exists from all eternity) have always led to
inevitable contradictions, we cannot rest satisfied with the mere
natural disposition to metaphysic, that is, with the pure faculty
of reason itself, from which some kind of metaphysic (whatever it
may be) always arises ; but it must be possible to arrive with it
at some certainty as to our either knovmg or not knowing its
objects ; that is, we must cither decide that we can judge of the
objects of these questions, or of the power or want of power of
reason, in deciding anything upon them, — therefore that we can
either enlarge our pure reason with certainty, or that we have
to impose on it fixed and firm limits. This last question, whicji
arises out of the former more general problem, would properly
assume this form,
How is metaphysic possible ^ as a science t
The critique of reason leads, therefore, necessarily, to true sci-
ence, while its dogmatical use, without criticism, lands us in ground-
less assertions, to which others, equally specious, can always be
opposed, that is, in scepticism.
Nor need this science be very farmidable by its great prolixity,
for it has not to deal with the objects of reason, the variety of
which is infinite, but with reason only, and with problems, sug-
gested by reason and placed before it, not by the nature of things,
which are different from it, but by its own nature ; so that, if rea-
son has only first completely understood its own power, with refer-
ence to objects given to it in experience, it will have no difficulty
in determining completely and safely the extent and limits of its
attempted application beyond the hmits of all experience.
We may and must therefore regard aU attempts which have
hitherto been made at building up a metaphysic dogmatically, as
non-avenu. For the mere analysis of the concepts that dwell in
our reason a priori^ which has been attempted in one or other
726 Supplement VI
\ of those metaphysical systems, is by no means the aim, but only
\ a preparation for true metaphysic, namely, the answer to the ques-
tion, how we can enlarge our knowledge a priori synthetically ;
nay, it is utterly useless for that purpose, because it only shows
what is contained in those concepts, but not by what process
a priori we arrive at them, in order thus to determine the validity
of their employment with reference to all objects of knowledge
in general. Nor does it require much self-denial to give up these
pretensions, considering that the undeniable and, in the dogmatic
procedure, inevitable contradictions of reason with itself, have long
deprived every system of metaphysic of all authority. More firm-
ness will be required in order not to be deterred by difficulties
fi-om within and resistance from without, from trying to advance
a science, indispensable to human reason (a science of which we
may lop off every branch, but will never be able to destroy the
root), by a treatment entirely opposed to all former treatments,
which promises, at last, to ensure the successful and fiiiitful growth
I of metaphysical science.
i
I
SUPPLEMENT VII
[See page lo]
Still less ought we to except here a criticism on the books and
systems treating of pure reason, but only on the faculty of pure
reason itself It is only if we are in possession of this, that we
possess a safe criterion for estimating the philosophical value of
old and new works on this subject. Otherwise, an unqualified
historian and judge does nothing but criticise the groundless
assertions of others by means of his own, which are equally
groundless.
7*7
SUPPLEMENT VIII
[See page 20]
4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now
it is quite true that every concept is to be thought as a repre-
sentation, which is contained in an infinite number of different
possible representations (as their common characteristic), and
therefore comprehends them : but no concept, as such, can be
thought as if it contained in itself an infinite number of represen-
tations. Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all parts of in-
finite space exist simultaneously). Consequently, the original
representation of space is an intuition a priori^ and not a concept.
§3
Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space
I understand by transcendental exposition i^Erortcrung), the
explanation of a concept, as of a principle by which the possibility
of other synthetical cognitions a priori can be understood. For
this purpose it is necessary, i. That such cognitions really do
flow from the given concept. 2. That they are possible only
under the presupposition of a given mode of explanation of such
concept.
Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet a priori. What then must be the repre-
sentation of space, to render such a knowledge of it possible?
It must be originally intuitive ; for it is impossible from a mere
concept to deduce propositions which go beyond that concept,
as we do in geometry (Introduction V. See Suppl. VI). That
intuition, however, must be a prion\ that is, it must exist within
us before any perception of the object, and must therefore be
728
Sttppiancfti Mi!
pure, not empirical intuition. For all geometrical propositions
are apodictic, that is, connected with the consciousness of thei'
necessity, as for instance the proposition, that space has only
three dimensions ; and such propositions cannot be empirical
judgments^ nor conclusions from them (Introduction IL See
Suppl. IV, II).
How then can an external intuition dwell in the mind anterior
to the objects themselves, and in which the concept of objects
can be determined a ptiori f Evidently not otherw^ise than so
far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal condition
under which the subject is affected by the objects and thereby is
receiving an immtdiatt repreitntation^ that is, intuition of them ;
therefore as a form of the external seme in general,
it is therefore by our explanation only that the possibility of
geometry as a synthetical science a priori becomes intelligible.
Every other explanation, which fails to account for this possibility,
can best be distinguished from our own by that criterion, although
it may seem to have some similarity with it*
SUPPLEMENT IX
[See page 22]
With the exception of space there is no other subjective repre-
sentation, referring to something external, that could be called
a priori objective. For from none of them can we derive syn-
thetical propositions a priori^ as we can from the intuition in
space § 3. (See Suppl. VIII.) Strictly speaking, therefore,
they can claim no ideality at all, though they agree with the repre-
sentation of space in this, that they belong only to the subjective
nature of sensibility, for instance, of sight, of hearing, and feeling,
through the sensations of colours, sounds, and heat. All these,
however, being sensations only, and not intuitions, do not help
us by themselves to know any object, least of all a priori.
730
Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time
I CAN here refer to No. in. p. 27, where, for the sake of
brevity, I have placed what is properly transceodetital under the
head of metaphysical exposition. Here I only add that the con-
cept of change, and with it the concept of motion (as change of
place), is possible only through and in the representation of time ;
and that, if this representation were not intuitive (internal) a
priori^ no concept, whatever it be, could make us understand
the possibility of a change, that is, of a connection of contradic-
torily opposed predicates (for instance, the being and not-being
of one and the same thing in one and the same place) in one
and the same object It is only in time that both contradictorily
opposed determinations can be met with in the same object, that
is, one after the other Our concept of time, therefore, exhibits
the possibility of as many synthetical cognitions a priori as are
found in the general doctrine of motion, which is very rich in
them,
731
SUPPLEMENT
[See jasc 39]
XI
IL As a confirmation of this theory of the ideality both of the
external and of the internal sense, and therefore of all objects of
the senses as mere phenomena, we may particularly remark, that
everything in our knowledge which belongs to intuition (exclud-
ing therefore the feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will,
which are no knowledge at all) contains nothing but mere rela-
tions, namely, of the places in an intuition (extension), change
of places (motion), and laws, according to which that change is
determined (moving forces) » Nothing is told us thereby as to
what is present in the place, or what, besides the change of
place, is active in the things, A thing by itself, however, cannot
be known by mere relations, and we may, therefore, fairly con-
clude that, as the external sense gives us nothing but representa-
tions of relations, that sense can contain in its representation only
the relation of an object to the subject, and not what is inside the
object by itself. The same applies to internal intuition. Not
only do the representations of the exUrnal senses constitute its
proper material with which we fill our mind, but time, in which
these representations arc placed, and which precedes even our
consciousness of them in experience, nay, forms the formal condi-
tion of the manner in which we place them in the mind, contains
itself relations of succession, coexistence, and that which must be
coexistent with succession, namely, the permanent. Now that
which, as^a representation, can precede every act of thinking
something, is the intuition : and, if it contains nothing but rela-
tions, then the form of intuition. As this represents nothing
except what is being placed in the mind, it can itself be the
manner only in which the mind, through its own activity, that is,
73a
Supplement XI
733
by this placing of its representation, is aflected by itself, in other
wonls, an internal sense with rcs|)ect to its form. Whatever is
represented by a sense is so far always phenomenal, and we should
therefore have either to admit no internal sense at all, or the snt)-
jcct, which is its object, could be represented by it as phenomenal
only, and not, as it might judge of itself, if Its intuition were spon-
taneous only, that is, if it wrre intellectuaL The diffi cully here
lies wholly in this, how a subject can have an internal intuition of
itself: but this difficulty is common to every theor>'. The con-
sciousness of self (apperception) is the simple re])rt'scntation of
the egf>f and if by it alone all the manifold (reprtstntations) in
the subject were given sponianeomly^ the inner intuition would be
intellectual. In man this consciousness re«quires internal percep-
tion of the manifokl, which is previously giv^cn in the sul>ject, and
the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity,
must, on account of this difference, be called sensibility. If the
faculty of self-consciousness is to seek for, that is, to apprehend,
what lies in the mind, it must affect the mind, and can thus only
produce an intuition of itself. The form of this, which lay ante-
cedently in the mind, determines the manner in which the mani-
fold exists together in the mind, namely, in the representation of
time. The intuition of self, therefore, is not, as if it could repre-
sent itself immediately and as spontaneously and independently
active, but according to the manner in which it is internally
affected, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.
III. If I say that the intuition of external objects and the self-
intuition of the mind^ represent both (viz. the objects and the
mind) in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as
they appear, I do not mean, that these objects are raerc ilittsian.
For the objects, as phenomena, nay, even the properties which
we ascrilie to them, are always looked upon as something really
given : and all we do is, that, as their quality depends only on
the manner of intuition on the part of the subject in relation to a
given object, we distinguish the object, as pktm>memrn, from itself,
as an object by itself- Thus, if I assert that the quality of space
and time, according to which, as a condition of their existence, 1
accept both external objects and ray own soul, lies in my manner
734
Suppkmefit Xi
of intuition and not in these objects by themselves, I do not mean
to say that bodies seim only to exist ootside me, or that my soul
stems only to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my
own fault, if 1 changed that, which I ought to count as phenome-
naJ, into mere illusion,^
This cannot happen, however, according to our principle of the
ideality of all sensuous intuitions ; on the contrary, it is; only when
we attribute objective reaiify to those forms of intuition that every-
thing is changed inevitably into mere iUuswn. For if we take
space and time as properties that ought to exist as possible in
things by themselves, and then survey the absurdities in which we
should be involved in having to admit that two infinite things,
which are not substances, nor something inherent in substances,
but nevertheless must be something existing, nay, the necessary
condition of the existence of all things, would remain, even if all
existing things were removed, we really cannot blame the good
Bishop Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusion. Nay, it
would follow that even our own existence, which would thus be
made dependent on the independent reality of such a non-entity
as time, must become a mere illusion, an absurdity which hitherto
no one has been guilty of.
IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object which
not only can never be an object of intuition to us, but which even
to itself can never be an object of setiUHun intuition, great care is
taken to remove alt conditions of space and lime from its intui-
^ Phenomenal predicate! can be attributed to the object in it* relation to
our scnae : as for instance to the rose its red colour, and its scent. But what
is merely illusion can never be attributed to an object as a predicate, for the
simple reason that the illusion attributes to the object by itself something
which belongs to it only in its relation to the senses, or to a subject in general ;
ai for instance the two handles, which were formerly attributed to Saturn.
That which is never to be found in the object itself, but alu ays in its relation
to a subject, and is inseparable from its representation by a subject, is phenom-
enal, and the predicates of space and time arc therefore rightly attributed to ]
objects of the senses, as such. In this there is no illusion. If, on the contrary,
I were to attribute to the rose by x/jc^redncss, handles to Saturn, and! extension
to all external objects, without restricting my judgment to the relation of these
objects to a subject, we should have illusion.
Supplement XI
735
tion (for all its knowledge must be inttiitive, and not thought,
which always involves limitation). But how are we justified in
doing this, when we have first made space and time forms of
things by themselves, such as would remam as conditions of the
existence of things a priori, even if the things themselves had
been removed? If conditions of all e>fistence» they would also be
conditions of the existence of God. If we do not wish to change
space and time into objective forms of all things, nothing remains
but to accept them as subjective forms of our external as well as
internal intuition, which is called sensuous, for the very reason
that it is not originally spontaneous, that is such, that it could itself
give us the existence of the objects of intuition (such an intuition,
so far as we can understand, can belong to the First Being only),
but dependent on the existence of objects, and therefore possible
only, if the faculty of representation in the subject is alTected by
them.
It is not necessary, moreover, that we should limit this intuition
in space and time to the sensibility of man ; it is quite possible
that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with us on
this point (though w^e cannot decide this). On account of this
universal character, however, it does not cease to be sensibility,
for it always is, and remains derivative {intuitu s derivativus), not
original {intuitus originarius)^ and therefore not intellectual intui-
tion. For the reason mentioned before, the latter intuition seems
only to belong to the First Being, and never to one which is
dependent, both in its existence and its intuition (xvhich intuition
determines its existence with reference to given objects). This
latter remark, however, must only be taken as an illustration of
our aesthetic theory, and not as a proof.
Conclusion of ihi Transcendental .'Esthetic
Here, then, we have one of the requisites for the solution of
the general problem of transcendental philosophy. How are syn-
thetical pro po si tions a priori possible t namely, pure intuitions a
priori^ space and time. In them we U\\^^ if in a judgment a pfi&ri
736 Supplement XI
we want to go beyond a given concept, that which can be discov-
ered a priori y not in the concept, but in the intuition correspond-
ing to it, and can be connected with it synthetically. For this
very reason, however, such judgments can never go beyond the
objects of the senses, but are valid only for objects of possible
experience.
SUPPLEMENT
[See page 69]
XII
This table of categories suggests some interesting considera-
tionSj which possibly may have important consequences with re-
gard to the scientific form of all knowledge of reason. For it is
clear that such a table will be extremely useful, nay, indispensable,
in the theoretical part of philosophy, in order to trace the corn-
pit ft p/an of a tvhok science^ so far as it rests on concepts a priori ,
and to divide it systematically according io ficKcd principks^ because
that table contains all elementary concepts of the understanding
in their completeness, nay, even the form of a system of them in
the human understanding, and indicates therefore all the momenta
of a projected speculative science, nay, even their onUn Of this
1 have given an example elsewhere,' Here follow some of the
considerations.
The first is, that this table, w*hich contains four classes of the
concepts of the understanding, may, in the first instance, be
divided into two sections, the former of which refers to objects of
intuition (pure, as well as empirical), the latter to the existence
of those objects (either in their relation to each other, or to the
understanding).
The first section I shall call that of the matkematicai, the
second, that of the dynamical categories. The first section has
no correlates, which are met with in the second section only.
Must not this diflTcrence have some ground in the nature of the
understanding?
Our second remark is, that in every class there is the same
number of categories^ namely three, which again makes us ponder,
^ Metipbyttcftl Elements of Natural Science.
3B 737
738
Supplement XII
because generally all division a priori by raeans of concepts must
be dichotomy. It should be remarked alijo, that the third cate-
gory always arises from the combination of the second with the
first. Thus ioiaiity is nothing but jjiurality considered as unity ;
iimiiatii>n nothing but reality connected with negation \ community
is the casuality of a substance as determining another reciprocally \
lastly, n€€cmt\\ the existence which is given by possibihty itself.
It must not be supposed, however, that therefore the third cate-
gory is only a derivative, and not a primary concept of the pure
understanding. For the joining of the first and second concepts,
in order to produce the third, requires an independent act of the
understandings which is not identical with the act that produces
the first and second concepts. Thus the concept of a number
(which belongs to the category of totality) is not always possible
when we have the concepts of plurality and unity (for instance,
in the concept of the infinite) ; nor can we understand by simply
combining the concept of a lause and that of a substance^ the
influence^ that is, how a substance can become the cause of some-
thing in another substanct. This shows that a separate act of the
understanding is here required, and the same applies to all the
rest.
Third ob&enmtion. With regard to one category, namely, that
q{ community, which is found in the third class, its accordance with
the form of a disjunctive jiidgmenl, which corresjionds to it in the
table of logical functions, is not so evident as elsewhere.
In order to become quite certain of that accordance, we must
remark that in all disjunctive judgments their sphere (that is, all
that is contained in theui ) is represented as a whole, divided into
parts (the subordinate concepts), and that, as one of them cannot
be contained under the other, they are conceived as co-ordinate,
not as subordinate, determining each other, not in one direction
only, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate (if one
member of the division is given, all the rest are excluded, and
vice versa) ,
A similar connection is conceived in a whole of things , in which
one, as effect, is not subordinated to another as the cause of its
existence, but is co-ordinated with it, simultaneously and recipro-
Supplement XIT
739
cally, as cause of the detcrrai nation of the other (as, for instance,
in a body of which the parts reciprocally atiract and repel each
other). This is a kind of connection totally diderent from that
which exists in a mere relation of cause to effect (of ground to
consequence), for here the consecinence does not reciprocally
determine the ground again, nor {as in the case of the Creator
and the creation) constitute with it a whole. The process of the
understanding, in representing to itself the sphere of a diyiiit^d
concept, is the same as that by which it thinks a thing ajjiivisible :
and in the same manner in which, in the former, the members of
a division exclude each other, and are yet connected in one
sphere, the understanding represents to itself the part^ of the
latter as existing (as substances), each independent of the rest,
and yet united in a whole.
§ 12
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there is another
chapter containing concepts of the understanding which, though
they are not counted among the categories, are yet considered by
them as concepts a priori o[ f||ij^r-tg- If so, they would increase
the number of the categories, which cannot be. They are set
forth in the famous proposition of the Schoolmen, ^quiuilibei ens
fst unum^ Vfrum* bonum* Now, although the inferences to be
drawn from this principle (yielding nothing but tautological propo-
sitions) were veiy meagre, so that modern metaphysicians mention
it almost by courtesy only, a thought which has maintained itself
so long, however empty it may seem, deserves an investigation
with regard to its origin, nay, leads us to suspect that it may have
its foundation in some rule of the understanding which, as often
happens, has only been wrongly interpreted. What are supposed
to be transcendental predicates of things are nothing but logical
requirements and criteria of all knowledge of things in geneml.
whereby that knowledge is founded on the categories of quantits
namely, umi\\piuraiity^ and tataiity. Only, instead of taking them
as materiaUy belonging to the possibility of things by themselves.
740
Stippkment XII
they (the predicates, or rather those who employed them) used
them, in fact, in their formal meaning only, as forming a logical
requisite for every kind of knowledge, and yet incautiously made
these criteria of thought to be properties of the things by them-
selves* In every cognition of aii object there is unity of concept,
which may be called quaiitative unity, so far as we think by it only
the unity in the comprehension of the manifold material of our
knowledge ; as, for instance, the unity of the subject in a play, or
a speech, or a fable. Secondly, there is truth, in respect to the
deductions from it. The more true deductions can be made from
a given concept, the more criteria are there of its objective reality.
This might be called the qualitative pluraiity of criteria, which
belong to a concept as their common ground (but are not con-
ceived in it, as quantity). Thirdly, there is compkteness,'m\\\c\v
consists in this, that the plurahty together leads back to the unity
of the concept, according completely with this and with no other
concept, which may be called the quaiitative c^mpktefiess ( totality) »
This shows that these logical criteria of the possibihty of know-
ledge in general do nothing but change the three categories of
^juantity, in which the unity in the production of the quantum
must throughout be taken as homogenrmts^ for the purpose of
connecting heterogeneous elements of knowledge also in one con-
sciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition as the princi-
ple of the connection. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a
concept (but not of its object) is the definition of it, in which the
unity of the concept, the truth of a!l that may be immediately de-
duced from it, and lastly, the compkteness of what has been deduced
from it, supply all that is necessary for the constitution of the
whole concept. Fn the same manner the criterion 0/ an hypothesis
consists, first, in the intelligibility of the ground \\\\\Q\i has been
admitted/(?r the sake of explanation^ or of its umty (without any
Auxiliarj' hypothesis) ; secondly, in the truth of the consequences
to be deduced from it (their accordance with themselves and with
experience) ; and lastly, in the completeness of the ground admitted
for the explanation of these consequences, which point back to
neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis,
and agree in giving us again, analytically a posteriori^ wliat had
i
Supplement XII
741
been thought synthetically a priori. The concepts of unity, truth,
and perfection, therefore, do not supplement the transcendental
table of the categories, as if it were imperfect, but they sen'e only,
after the relation of these concepts to objects has been entirely
set aside, to bring their employment under general logical rules,
for the agreement of knowledge with itself.
Locke, for want of this reflection, and because he met with
pure concepts of the understanding in experience, derived them
also from experience, and yet acted so incofisiskniiy that he at-
tempted to use them for knowledge which L\i exceeds all limits
of experience. David Hume saw that, in order tu be able to da
this, these concepts ought to have their origin a prh}n : but as
he could not explain how it was possible that the understanding
should be constrained to think concepts, which by themselves axe
not united in the understanding, as necessarily united in the object,
and never thought that possibly the understanding might itself,
through these concepts, be the author of that experience in which
its objects are found, he was driven by necessity to derive them
from experience (namely, from a subjective necessity, produced
by frequent association in experience, which at last is wrongly
supposed to be objective^ that is, from habit). He acted, however,
very consistently, by declaring it to be impossible to go with these
concepts, and with the principles arising from them, beyond the
limits of experience. This empirical deduction, which was adopted
by both philosophers, cannot be reconciled with the reality of our
scientific knowledge a priori, namely^ pure mathematics and general
naturai science^ and is therefore refuted by facts. The former of
these two celebrated men opened a wide door Iq fantasHc extrava-
ganciy because reason, if it has once established such pretensions,
can no longer be checked by vague praises of moderation ; the
other, thinking that he had once discovered so general an illusion
of our faculty of knowledge, which had formerly been accepted as
reason, gave himself over entirely to scepticism. We now intend
to make the experiment whether it is not possible to conduct
742
Supphmcnt XIH
743
reason safely between these two rocks, to assign to her definite
limits, and yet to keep open for her the proper field for all her
activities ?
I shall merely premise an explanation of what I mean by ihe
categories. They are concepts of an object in general by which
its intuition is regarded as determined with reference to one of the
logicaifunciiofn in judgments. Thus the function of the categorical
judgmem was that of the relation of the subject to the predicate;
for instance, all bodies are divisible. Here, however, with refer-
ence to the pure logical employment of the understandings it re-
mained undeterminetl to which of the two concepts the function
of the subject, or the predicate, was to be assigned. For we could
also say, some divisible is body. But by bringing the concept of
body under the category of substance, it is determined that its
emiiirical intuition in experience must always be consiilered as
subject and never as predicate only. The same applies to all
other categories.
SUPPLEMENT XIV
[See page 79]
OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF
THE UNDERSTANDING
Second Section
Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding
Of the Possibility of Connecting (conjunctio) in General
The manifold of representations may be given in an intuition
which is purely sensuous, that is, nothing but receptivity, and the
form of that intuition may lie a priori in our faculty of representa-
tion, without being anything but the manner in which a subject is
affected. But the connection (conjunctio) of anything manifold
can never enter into us through the senses, and cannot be con-
tained, therefore, already in the pure form of sensuous intuition,
for it is a spontaneous act of the power of representation ; and as,
in order to distinguish this from sensibiUty, we must call it under-
standing, we see that all connecting, whether we are conscious of
it or not, and whether we connect the manifold of intuition or
several concepts together, and again, whether that intuition be
sensuous or not sensuous, is an act of the understanding. This
act we shall call by the general name of synthesis , in order to
show that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as connected
in the object, without having previously connected it ourselves,
and that of all representations connection is the only one which
cannot be given through the objects, but must be carried out by
744
Supplement XIV
745
the subject itself, because it is an act of its spontaneity. It can
be easily perceived that ihis act must be originally one and the
same for ^\tx^ kind of connection^ and that its dissolution, that is,
the analysis^ which seems to be its opposite, does always presup-
pc^e it* For where the understanding has not previously con-
nected, there is nothing for it to diiaconnect» because, as connected,
it could only be given by the understanding to the faculty of
representation.
But the concept of connection includes, besides the concept of
the manifold and the synthesis of it, the concept of the *inity of
the manifold also. Connection is representation of the synthetical
unity of the manifold.*
The representation of that unity cannot therefore be the result
of the connection ; on the contrary, the concept of the connection
becomes first possible by the representation of unity being added
to the representation of the manifold. Ami this unity, which pre-
cedes a priori 3X1 concepts of connection, must not be mistaken for
that category of unity of which we spoke on p, 68 ; for all cate-
gories depend on logical functions in judgments, and in these we
have already connection, and therefore unity of given concepts.
The category, therefore, presupposes connection, and we must con-
sequently look still higher for this unity as qualitative (see Suppl.
XIL § 1 2) J in that, namely, which itself contains the ground for
the unity of different concepts in judgments, that is, the ground
for the very possibility of the understanding, even in its logical
employracnt.
§16
Hie Original Synthetical Unity &f Apperception
It must be possible that the / think should accompany all my
representations: for otherwise something would be represented
' Whether the representations themselve:t are identicali and whether there-
fore one cftii be thought analyticmUy by the other, U a matter of no consequence
here. The €0mciousn^is of the one hai always to be di&tinf^mshed from the
consciotisness of the other, so far as the manifotd ii concerned ; and everything
here depends on the synthesis only of this (possible) coDsciousuesa.
745
Supplement XfV
within me that caiild not be thought, in other words, the repre-
sentation would either be impossible or nothing, at least so far as
I am concerned. That representation which can be given before
all thought, is called intuition^ and all the manifold of intuition
has therefore a necessary relation to the / think in the same sub-
ject in which that maiiitoKl of intuition is found. That representa-
tion, however (that / think), is an act of spontaneii\\ that is, it
cannot be considered as belonging to sensibilit>'. I call it pure
apperception^ in order to distinguish it from empirical appercep-
tion, or original appercfption also, because it is that self-conscious-
ness which by producing the representation, / think (which must
accompany all others, and is one and the same in every act of
consciousness), cannot itself be accompanied by any other. I
also call the unity of it the transcendental unity of self-conscious-
ness, in order to indicate that it contains the possibility of know-
ledge a priori.
For the manifold representations given in any intuidon would
not all be my representations, if they did not all belong to one
self-consciousness. What I mean is that, as my representations
(even though 1 am not conscious of them as such), diey must
be in accordance with that condition, under which alone they
can stand together in one common self- consciousness, because
otherwise they would not all belong to me. From this orig-
inal connection the following important conclusions can be
deduced.
The unbroken identity of apperception of the manifold that is
given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is
possible only through the consciousness of that synthesis. The
empirical consciousness, which accompanies various representa-
tions, is itself various and disunited, and without reference to the
identity of the subject. Such a relation takes place, not by my
simply accompanying every relation with consciousness, but by
my adding one to the other and being conscious of that act of
adding, that is, of that synthesis. Only because 1 am able to con-
nect the manifold of given representations in one eomciousness^ is
it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the cen-
se to us ness in these representations y that is, only under the supposi-
Supplement XIV
747
don of some synthetical unity of apperception does the analytical
unity of apperception become possible,^
The thought that the representations given in intuition belong
all of them to me, is therefore the same as that I connect them in
one self-consciousne&s, or am able at least to do so ; and though
this is not yet the consaousness of the synthesis of representations,
it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of this synthesis. In
other words, it is only because I am able to com pre ii end the
manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call ihem
altogether my representations, for olherwise^ I should have as
manifold and various a self as I have representations of which I
am conscious. The synthetical unity of the manifold of intuitions
as given a priori is therefore the ground also of the identity of that
apperception itself which precedes a priori all definite thought.
Connection, however, does never lie in the objects, and cannot be
borrowed from them by perception, and thus be taken into the
understanding, but it is always an act of the understinding, which
itself is nothing but a faculty of connecting a pnon\ and of bring-
ing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apper-
ception, which is, in fact, the highest principle of all human
knowledge.
It is true, no doubts that this principle of the necessary unity of
apperception is itself identical, and therefore an analytical proposi-
tion ; but it shows, nevertheless, the necessity of a synthesis of the
> This analytical unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as
such. If, for instance, I think nd in general, 1 represent tu myself a property,
which (as a characteristic mark) may he found in 8*»mcthing, or can be con-
nected with other representations ; that is to sav% only under a presuppusefl
possible synthetical unity can I represent to myself the analyiicaL A repre-
sentation which is to be thought as commoa to tiiffnnt representations, is
looked upon as belongini; to such as possess, Itcsides it« something difffrtnt.
It must therefore have been thought in synthetical unity H-ith other (though
only possible) representations, before I can think in it that analytical unity of
consciousness which makes it a catt(ef*tns tommnHts. [Tlie synthetical unity
of apperception is, therefore, the hi|{hest point with which all employ ment *»f
the UDcjerstanding, anil even the whole of logic, and afterwards the whole of
truucendental philcttophy, must be connected; »y, that faculty is the ujider*
[ itself. •
748
Siipflemenf XFV
raanifolci which is given in intuition, without which synthesis it
would be impossible to think the unbroken identity of self-con-
sciousness. For through the Ego, as a simple representation,
nothing manifold is given ; in the intuition, which is different from
that, it can be given only, and then, by conneciion^ be thought in
one consciousness. An understanding in which, by its self-con-
sciousness, all the manifold would be givTn at the same time, would
possess intuiiiont our understanding can do nothing but think,
and must seek for its intuition in the senses. I am conscious,
therefore, of the identical self with respect to the manifold of the
representations, which are given to me in an intuition, because
I call them, altogether, my representations, as constituting ime^
This means, that I am conscious of a necessary synthesis of them
a priaH^ which is called the original synthetical unity of appercep-
tion under which all representations given to me must stand, but
have to be brought there, first, by means of a synthesis,
§«7
The Principie of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is ihe
Highest Principie of ail Empioyment of the Understanding
The highest principle of the possibiHty of all intuition, in rela- j
tion to sensibility, was, according to the transcendental /Esthetic,'
that all the manifold in it should be subject to the formal condi-
tions of sp.ice and time. The highest principle of the same possi-
bility in relation to the understanding is, that all the manifold in
intuition must be subject to the conditions of the original syn-
thetical unity of apperception.*
All the manifold representations of intuition, so far as they
' Space and time, and all portions thereof, arc intuitions^ and consequently
single representations with the nianifokl of their content. (See the transcen-
dental /Esthetic.) They arc not, therefore, mere concepts, lb rough which the
lamc cotisciousness, as existing in many representations, but intuitions tbrough
which many representations are brought to ns, as contained in one and in its
consciousness; this latter, therefore, is compounded, and these intuitions repre-
sent the unity of consciousness as synthetical^ but yet as primitive. Thi$ char-
acter of sin^Ientss in them is practically ftf great importance (see { 25).
Supplement XIV
749
Bre given m, are subject to the former, so far as they must admit
of being connected in one consciousness, to the latter ; and with-
out that nothing can be thought or known by ihem, because the
given representations would not share the act of apperception (I
think) in common, and could not be comprehended in one self-
consciousness.
The understanding in its most general sense is the faculty of
cogfiitions. These consist in a definite relation of given repre-
sentations to an object ; and an olrfect is that in the concept of
which the manifold of a given intuition is connected. All such
connection of representations requires of course the unity of the
cunscioubncss in their synthesis ; consequently, the unity of con-
sciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of repre-
sentations to an object, that is, their objective validity, and
consequently their becoming cognitions, so that the very possi-
bility of the understanding depends on it.
The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, on
which all the rest of its employment is founded, and which at the
same time is entirely independent of all conditions of sensuous
intuition, is this very principle of the original synthetical unity
of apperception. Space, the mere form of external sensuous
intuition, is not yet cognition : it only supplies the manifold of
intuition a priori for a possible cognition* In order to know
anything in space, for instance, a line, I must draw it, and pro-
duce synthetically a certain connection of the manifold that is
given, so that the unity of that art is at the same time the unity
of the consciousness (in the concept of a line), and (so that) an
object (a determinate space) is then only known for the first
time. The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an ob-
jective condition of all knowledge ; a condition, not necessary for
myself only, in order to know an object, but one to which each
intuition must be subject, in onler to become an otfjectior me,
because the manifold could not become connected in one con-
sciousness in any other way, and without such a synthesis.
No doubt, that proposition, as I said before, is itself analytical,
though it makes synthetical unity a condition of all thought, for it
really says no more than that al! my representations in any given
750
Supplement XIV
intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I
can ascribe them, as my representations, to the identical self, and
therefore compreheml them, as synthetically connected, in one
apperception through the general expression^ / think.
And yet this need not be a principle for every possible under-
standing, but only for that which gives nothing manifold through
its pure apperception in the representation, / am. An under-
standing which through its self-consciousness could give the mani-
fold of intuition, and by whose representation the objects of that
representation should at the same time exist, would not require a
special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of its con-
sciousness, while the human understanding, which possesses the
power of thought only, but not of intuition, requires such an act.
To the human understamling that finit principle is so indispen-
sable that it really cannot form the least concept of any other pos-
sible understanding, whether it be inttutive by itself, or possessed
of a sensuous ijituition, different from that in space and time.
What is the Objeetive Unity of Seif-cansciausness t
The transcendental i^w//^' of apperception connects all the mani-
fold given in an intuition into a concept of an object. It is there-
fore called ^Vy>^//?r, and must be distinguished from the sul>Jectiv€
unity of consciousness, which is a form of tlie interttai sense^ by
which the manifold of intuition is empirically given, to be thus
connected. Whether I cun become empiricaliy conscious of the
manifold, as either simultaneous or successive, depends on cir-
cumstances, or empirical conditions. The empirical unity of con-
sciousness, therefore p through the association of representations,
is itself phenomenal and wholly contingent, while the pure form of
intuition in time, merely as general intuition containing the mani-
fold that is given, is subject to the original unity of the conscious-
ness, through the necessary relation only of the manifold of intui-
tion to the on^, I think, — that is» through the pure synthesis of
the understanding, which forms the a priori ground of the empiri-
Suppknunt XIV
751
cal S3mthes!s. That unity alone is, therefore, valid objectively;
the empirical unity of apperception, which we do not consider
here, and which is only derived from the former, under given
conditions in cmicreia^ has subjective validity only. One man
connects the representation of a word with one thing, another with
another, and the unity of consciousness, with regard to what is
empirical, is not necessary nor universally valid wnth reference to
that which is given.
The Lo^cal Form cf all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity
of Apperception of the Concepts contained therein
I could never feel satisfied with the definition of a judgment in
general, given by oirr logicians, who say that it is the representation
of a relation between two concepts. Without disputing with them
in this place as to the defect of that explanation, that it may pos-
sibly apply to categorical, liut not to hypothetical and disjunctive
judgments (the latter containing* not a relation of concepts, but
of judgments themselves), — though many tedious consequences
have arisen from this mistake of logicians, — I must at least make
this observationj that we are not told in what that relation con-
sists.^
But, if I examine more closely the relation of given cognitions
in every judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging to the under-
standing, from the relation according to the rules of reproductive
imagination {which has subjective validity only), I find that a
judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions
* The 1e;igthy doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns categorical *
tyllogisms only, and though it is really nothing but a trick for obtaining the
tppearance of more mude« uf concluding than that of the lirst figure, by
secretly introducing immediate conclusions {cameqMntiae tmmftiitUae) Among
the pfcmisses of a pure syllogism, this would hardly have secure*! its great
mcceM, had not its authors succeeded, at the same lime, in establishing the
exclusive authority of categorical jutJgmenti, as those to which §X\ others muat
be referred* This as we showed in § % p. 62, is wrong.
752
Supplement XIV
into the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended
by the copula />, which is meant to distinguish the objective unity
of given representations from the subjective. It (the copula is)
indicates their relation to the original apperception, and their
necessary umt}\ even though the judgment itself be empirical, and
therefore contingent ; as, fur instance, bodies are heavy. By this
I do not mean to say that these representations belong mcesuirify
to each other, in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to
each other by means of the necessary unity of apperception in the
synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to the principles of the
objective determination of all representations, so far as any cogni-
tion is to arise from them, these principles being all derived from
the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Thus,
and thus alone, does the relation become a judgment^ that is, a
relation that is valid objectively, and can thus be kept sufficiently
distinct from the relation of the same representations, if it has
sulijective validity only, for instance, according to the laws of
association. In the latter case, I could only say, that if I carry a
body I feel the pressure of its weight, but not, that it, the body, is
heavy, which is meant to say that these two representations are
connected together in the o bject, whatever the state of the sub-
ject may be, and not only associated or conjoined in the percep-
tion, however often it may be repeated.
§20
I
Ail Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories as to Condi-
tions under lidiich alone their Manifold Contents can came
together in one Consciousness
The manifold which is given us in a sensuous intuition is
necessarily subject to the original synthetical unity of appercep-
tion, because by it alone the unity of intuition becomes possible
(§7). That act of the understanding, further, by which the
manifold of given representations (whether intuitions or concepts)
is brought under one appercef>tion in general, is the logical func-
tion of a judgment (5 19). The manifold, therefore, so far as it
po.-^c'-.
Supplement XIV
7S3
is given in an empirical intuition, is determined with regard to
one of the logical functions of judgment, by which, indeed, it is
brought to consciousness in general. The categories^ however, are
nothing but these functions of |udgment, so far as the manifold of
a given intuition is determined with respect to them (§ ij, see
p. 84). Therefore the manifold in any given intuition is naturally
subject to the categories.
§21
Note
The manifold, contained in an intuition which I caJl my own,
is represented through the synthesis of the understanding, as be-
longing to the necessar}^ unity of self-consciousness^ and this takes
place through the category.^
This category indicates, therefore, that the empirical conscious-
ness of the manifold, given in any intuition, is subject to a pure
self-consciousness a priori, in the same manner as the empirical
intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition which likewise
lakes place a priori.
In the above proposition a beginning is madt; of a deducti0n
of the pure concepts of the understanding. In this deduction,
as the categories arise in the understanding only, independent of
ait sensibility^ I ought not yet to take any account of the manner
in which the manifold is given for an empirical intuition, but attend
exclusively to the unity which, by means of the category, enters
into the intuition through the understanding. In what follows
(§26) we shall show, from the manner in which the empirical
intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that
which is prescribed by the category (according to g 20) to the
manifold of any given intuition. Thus only, that is, by showing
their validity a priori with respect to all objects of our senses, the
purpose of our deduction will be fully attained,
* The proof of this rests on the represented tmity of intuition, by which an
object is given, and which ftlwjiys iiicludcs a synthesis nf the niAnifuld which is
given for an intuition, and contains the relation of the Utter to tlic tiuity of
Rpperccption.
JC
754
Supplamnt XIV
There is one thing, however, of which, in the above demonstra
tion, I could not make abstraction : namely, that the manifold for
an intuition must be given antecedently to the synthesis of the
understanding, and independently of it; — how, remains uncer-
tain. For if I were to imagine an understanding, itself intuitive
(for instance, a divine understanding, which sbould not represent
to itself given objects, but produce them at once by his repre-
sentation), the categories would have no meaning with respect to
such cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding whose
whole power consists in thinking, that is, in the act of bringing the
synthesis of the manifold, which is given to it in intuition from
elsewhere, to the unity of apperceptiun ; an understanding which
therefore knows nothing by itself, but connects only and arranges
the material for cognition, that is, the intuition which must be
given to it by the object. This peculiarity of our understanding
of producing unity of apperception a priori by means of the cate*
gories only, and again by such and so many, cannot be further
explained, any more than why we have these and no other func-
tions of judgment, and why time and space are the only forms of
a possible intuition for us.
§22
7%€ Category admits of no other Employmeftt for the Cognition of
Things, hit its Application to Directs of Exptnence
We have seen that to think an object is not the same as to
know an object. In order to know an object, we must have the
concept by which any object is thought (the category), and like-
wise the intuition by which it is given. If no corresponding in-
tuition could be given to a concept, it would si ill be a thought,
so iM as its form is concerned : but it would be without an object,
and no knowledge of anything would be possible by it, because,
so far as I know, there would be nothing, and there could be
nothing, to which my thought could be referred. Now the only
possible intuition for us is sensuous (see j^sthetic) ; the thought
of any object, therefore, by means of a pure concept of the under-
standing, can -with us become knowledge only, if it is referred to
Supplement XIV
objects of the senses. Seesuotis intuition is either pure (spac
and time), or empirical, i.e. if it is an intuition of that which .;,
represented in space and time, through sensation as immcdiaielv
real. By means of pure intuition we can gain knowledge a firii^ri
of things as phenomena (in mathematics), but only so far as their
form is concerned ; but whether there are things which must be
perceived, according to that form, remains unsettled. Mathe-
matical concepts, by themselves, therefore, are not yet knowledge,
except under the supposition that there are things which admit of
being represented by us, according to the form of that pure sensu-
ous intuition only. Consequently, as things in space and fime are
only given as perceptions (as representations accompanied by sen-
sations), that is, through empirical representations^ the pure con-
cepts of the understanding, even if applied to intuitions a priory
as in mathematics, give us knowledge in so far only as these pure
intuitions, and therefore through them the concepts of the under-
standing also, can be applied to empirical intuitions. Conse-
quently the categories, by means of intuition, do not give us any
knowledge of things, except under the supposition of their possi-
ble application to empirical intuition; they serve, in short, for the
possibility of empirical iitwwledge only, which is called experience.
From this it follows that the categories admit of no other employ-
ment for the cognition of things, except so far only as these are
taken as objects of possible experience*
§23
The foregoing proposition is of the greatest importance, for it
determines the limits of the employment of the pure concepts
of the understanding with reference to objects, in the same man-
ner as the transcendental ^-Esthetic determined the limits of the
employment of the pure form of our sensuous intviition. Space
and time are conditions of the possibility of how objects can be
given to us, so far only as objects of the senses, therefore of
experience, are concerned. Beyond these limits they re[»resent
nothing, for they belong only to the senses, and have no reality
beyond them* Pure concepts of tiie understanding arc free from
7S6
Supplement XIV
this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general,
whether that intuition be like our own or not, if only it is sensu-
ous and not intellectual This further extension, however, of con-
cepts beyond our sensuous intuition, is of no avail to us ; for they
are in that case empty concepts of objects, and the concepts do
not even enable us to say, whether such objects be possible or not.
They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality : because
we have no intuition at hand to which the synthetical unity of apper-
ception, which is contained in the concepts aione, could be applied,
so that they might determine an object. Nothing can give them
sense and meaning, except our sensuous and empirical intuition.
If, therefore^ we assume an object of a non-sensuous intuition
as given, we may, no doubt, determine it through all the predi-
cates, which follow from the supposition that noihuig behnging
to sensuous intuition belongs to it, that, therefore, it is not extended,
or not in space, that its duration is not lime, that no change
(succession of determinations in time) is to be met in it, etc.
But we can hardly call this knowledge, if we only indicate how
the intuition of an object is tK^t^ without being able to say what is
contained in it, for, in that case, I have not represented the jiossi-
bility of an object, corresponding to my pure concept of the
understanding, because 1 could give no intuition corresponding
to it, but could only say that our intuition did not apply to it.
But what is the most important is this, that not even a single
category could be applied to such a thing ; as, for instance, the
concept of substance, that is, of something that can exist as a
subject only, but never as a mere predicate. For I do not know
whether there can be anything corresponding to such a determi-
nation of thought, unless empirical intuition supplies the case for
its application. Of this more hereafter,
§24
0/ the Application of the Categories ta Objects of the Senses in
General
The pure concepts of the understanding refer, through the mere
understanding, to objects of intuition^ whether it be our own, or any
Supplemcni XIV
757
other, if only scnstious inUiition^ but they are, for that very reason,
mere/^rwj of thought, by v%*hich no definite object can be known.
Tlje synthesis, or connection of the manifold in them, referred
only to the unity of apperception^ and became thus the ground
of the ixjssibility of knowledge a priori, so far as it rests on the
understanding^'and is therefore not only transcendental, but also
purely ioteileciual. Now as there exists in us a certain form of
sensuous intuition a priori, which rests on the receptivity of the
faculty of representation (sensibility) J the onderstanding, as
spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense through the
manifold of given representations, according to the synthetical
unity of apperception, and can thus think synthetical unity of
the apperception of the manifold oi sensuous intuition a pnori)i3is
the condition to which all objects of our (human) intuition must
necessarily be subject. Thus the categories, though pure farms of
thought, receive objective reality, that is, application to objects
which can be given to us in intuition, but as phenomena only ; for
it is with reference to them alone that we are capable of intuition
a priori.
This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is
possible and necessary a priori, may be called Jigurativf {synthe-
sis speciosa), m order to distinguish it from that which is thought
in the mere category, with reference to the manifold of an inlui'
tion in general, and is called intellectual synthesis (synthesis
intet/eetr/a/is). Both are transcendental, not only because they
themselves are carried out a priori, but because they establish
also the possibility of other knowledge a prion.
But this figurative synthesis, if it refers to the original syntheti-
cal unity of apperception only, that is, to that transcendental
unity which is thought in the categories, must be called the tran*
scendental synthesis of the faculty of imagination, in order thus
to distinguish it from the purely intellectual synthesis. Imagina-
tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its pres-
ence in intuition. As all our intuition is sensuous, the faculty of
imagination belongs, on account of the subjective condition under
which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts
of the understanding, to our sensihiiity. As, however, its syulhcsis
P^ T.
758
Supplement XIV
r
is an act of spontaneity, determining, and not, like the senses,
determinable only^ and therefore able to determine a priori the
senses, so far as their form is concerned, according to the unity
of apperception, the faciilt>^ of imagination is, so far, a faculty of
determining our sensibiUty a priori^ m tliat the synthesis of the
intuitions, according to the cakgories^ must be the transcendental
synihesis of the faculty of imagination. This is an effect, produced
by the understanding on our sensibility, and the first application
of it (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects
of the intuition which is only possible to us. As figurative, it is
distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, which takes place by
the understanding only, without the aid of the faculty of imagina-
tion. In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I call it occasionally
productive imagination : distinguishing it from the reprotf active,
which in its synthesis is subject to empirical laws only, namely,
those of association, and which is of no help for tlie explanation
of the possibility of knowledge a priori, belonging, therefore, to
psychology, and not to transcendental philosophy.
This is the proper place for tr)ing to account for the paradox,
which must have struck everybody in our exposition of the form
of the internal sense (§ 6, see p. 28) ; namely, how that sense
represents to the consciousness even ourselves, not as we are by
ourselves, but as we appear to ourselves, because we perceive
ourselves only as we are affected internally. This seems to be
contradictory, because we should thus be in a passive relation to
ourselves ; and for this reason the founders of the systems of
psychology have preferred to represent the internat sense as
identical with the faculty of apperception, while we have carefully
distinguished the two,
What determines the internal sense is the understanding, and
its original power of connecting the manifold of intuition, that is,
of bringing it under one apperception, this being the very ground
of the possibility of the understanding. As in \\% men the under-
standing is not itself an intuitive faculty, and could not, even if
intuitions were given in our sensibility, take ihem into itself, in
order lo connect, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the
Supplement XIV
759
synthesis of the understanding, if considered by itself alone, is
nothing but the unity of action, of which it is conscious without
sensibiUty also, but through which the understanding is able to
determine that sensibility internally, with respect to the manifold
which may be given to it (the understanding) according to the
form of its intuition. The understanding, therefore, exercises its
activity, under the name of a transcendental synthtsis of the faculty
of imagination^ on the passive subject to which it belongs as a
faculty, and we are right in sapng that the internal sense is
affected by that activity. The apperception with its synthetical
unity is so far from being identical with the internal sense, that, as
the source of all synthesis, it rather applies, under the name of
the categories, to the manifold of intuitiom in general, that is, to
objects in general before all sensuous intuition ; while the internal
sense, on the contrary, comains the mere form of intuition, but
without any connection of the manifold in it, and therefore, as
yet, no definite intuition, which becomes possible only through the
consciousness of the determination of the internal sense by the
transcendental act of the faculty of imagination (the synthetical
influence of the understanding on the internal sense) which I have
called the figurative synthesis.
This wc can always perceive in ourselves. We cannot think a
line without drawing it in thought ; we cannot think a circle with-
out describing it ; we cannot represent, at all, the three dimen-
sions of space, without placing, from the same point, three lines
perpendicularly on each other ; nay, wc cannot even represent
time, except by attending, during our drawing a straight line
(which is meant to be the external figurative representation of
time) to the act of the synthesis of the manifold only by which
we successively determine the internal sense, and thereby to the
succession of that determination in it. It is really motion, as the
act of the subject (not as the determination of an object*), therc-
J Motion of an cifjtct in space does not belong to a pure science, con-
sequently not to geometry, because the fact that a thing is moveable canno(
l>e known a prieri^ but from experience only. Motion, however, considered
as describing a space, is a pure act of successive synthesis of the tnanifold in
760 Supplement XIV
fore the synthesis of the manifold in space (abstraction being
made of space, and our attention fixed on the act only by %vhit:h
we determine the internal sense ^ according to its form), which
first produces the very concept of succession. The understanding
does not, therefore, yf//^/ in the internal sense such a connection
of the nianitbld, hwX prod lues it by affecting the internal sense. It
may seem difficult to understand how the thinking eg0 can be
different from the ego which sees or perceives itself (other modes
of intuition being at least conceivable), and yet identical with
the latter as the same subject, and how, therefore, I can say : I,
as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object
thought so far as being given to myself in intuition also, but like
other phenomena, not as I am to the understanding, but only as
I appear to myself. In reality, however, this is neither more nor
less difficult than how I can be, to myself, an object, and, more
especially, an object of intuition and of internal perceptions. But
that this must really be so, can clearly be shown — if only we
admit space to be merely a pure form of the phenomena of the
external senses — by the fact that we cannot represent to our-
selves time, which is no object of external intuition, in any other
way than under the image of a line which we draw, a mode of
representation without which we could not realise ihc unity of its
dimension ; or again by this other fact that we must always derive
the determination of the length of time, or of points of time for
all our internal perceptions, from that which is represented to us,
as changeable by external things, and have therefore to arrange
the determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time, in
exactly the same way in which we arrange the determinations of
the external senses in space. If, then, with regard to the latter,
we admit that by them we know objects so far only as we are
affected externally, we must also admit, with regard to the in-
ternal sense, that by it we only are, or perceive ourselves, as we
are internally aflfected by ourselves, in other words, that with
eitcrnal intuition in gcneitil by means of productive imaginsition, and belongs
therefore, by right, not only to geometry, but even t^ transceoclenta] philo»-|
ophy.
Supplement XIV
761
regard to internal intuition we know our own self as a phenome-
non only, and not as it is by itself.'
§25
In the transcendental synthesis, however, of the manifold of
represenutiotis in general, and therefore in the origin.il syntheti-
cal ynity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, neither as I
appear to myself, nor as 1 am by myself, but only that I am.
This rtpreseniation is an act of thought, not of intitititm. Now,
in order to kmnv ourselves, we require, besides the act of think-
ing, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the
unity of apperception, a definite kind of intuition also by which
that manifold is given, and thus, though my own existence is not
phenomenal (much less a mere illusion), yet the determination
of my existence* can only take place according to die form of
the internal sense, and in that special manner in which the mani-
foid, which I connect, is given in the internal intuition. This
shows that I have no know/edge of myself as I am, but only as I
^ I do not tee bow lo much difficulty should ht found in idmitting tbat the
internaLl sense is afTectcd by ourselves. Every act of attention gives us an in-
slancc of it. In such an act the umlcrsUoding always determines the interna)
tefiie» according to tlic connet Lion which it thinks, to such an internal intuition
as corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding, ilow
much the mind is commonly affected thereby anybo<dy will l>e able to perceive
in himself*
* llie / thitiJk expresses the act of determining my own existence. What
5 thus given is the existence, hut what ts not yet given, is the manner in
which I am to determine il» that is, in which I am to place within me the
manifold belonging to it For that purpose self-intuition is required, which
depends on an a priori form, that is, on time, which is sensuous, and belongs
to our receptivity of what is given to us as determinable. If, thent 1 have not
another self-intuition which, iikewise hr/ore the act of ttftirminatit^n^ gives tlic
dtttrminitt^ within me, of the spontaneity of which I am conscious only, as
time gives the determinable, 1 cannot determine my existence as that of a
spontaneously acting being, bat I only represent to myself the spontaneity of
ray thinking, that is, of the act of determination, my existence remaining sen-
suous only, that is, determinable, as the existence of a phenomenon. )t is,
however, on account of this s|K>ntancity that I call myself an tnttliigtnte.
762 Supplement XIV
I
appear to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore very
far from being a knowledge of oneself, in spite of all the cate-
gories which constitute the thinking of an object in general^ by
means of the connection of the manifold in an apperception. A3
for the knowledge of an object d liferent from myself I require,
besides the thinking of an object in general (in a category), an
intyition also, to determine that general concept, I require for the
knowledge of my own self, besides consciousness, or besides my
thinking myself, an intuition also of the manifold in me, to deter-
mine thai thought. I exist, therefore, as such an intelligence,
which is simply conscious of its power of connection, but with
respect to the manifold that has to be connected, is subject to a
limiting condition which is called the internal sense, according to
which that connection can only become perceptible in relations of
time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of the un<lerstanding.
Such an intelligence, therefore, can only know itself as it appears
to itself in an intuition (which cannot be intellectual and given
by the understanding itself), and not as it would know itself, if its
intuition were intellectual,
§26
Transcendental Deduction of the Universaliy Possible Employment
of the Pure Concepts 0/ the Understanding in Experience
In the metaphysical ifeditction of the categories their a priori
origin was proved by their complete accordance with the general
logical functions of thought, while in their tramcendentat deduc-
tion we established their possibility as knowledge a priori of
objects of an intuition in general (§ 2o» 21). Now we have to
explain the possibility of our knowing a priori, by means of the
categories, whatever objects may come he/ore our senses, and this
not according to the form of their intuition, but according to the
laws of their connection, and of our thus, as it were, prescribing
laws to nature, nay, making nature possible. Unless they were
adequate to that purpose, we could not understand how every*
thing that may come before our senses must be subject to laws
which have their origin a priori in the understanding alone*
Supplement XI V O^^^ 763 ^QY%^^
First of alU I obsope that by the synthesis of apprehension I
DTidersland the coappsrtWTTjf the manifalil 10 an emfjincal inten-
tion, by which perception, that is, empirical consciousness of it
(as phenomenal), becomes possible.
We have forms of the extf rnal as well as the internal intuition
a priori^ m our representations of space and lime : and lo these
the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold in phenomena
must always conform, because it can take place according to that
form only. Time and space, however, are represented a prion^
not only as forms of sensuous intuition, but as intuitions them-
selves (containing a manifold), and therefore with the determina-
tion of the unity of that manifold in them (see transcendental
j^lsthetic^). Therefore umty of the synthesis of the manifold
without or within us, and consequently a connection to which
everything that is to be represented as determined in space and
time must conform, is given a priori as the condition of the
synthesis of all apprehension simultaneously with the intuitions,
not in them, and that synthetical unity can be no other but that
of the connection of the manifold of any intuition whatsoever in
an original consciousness, according to the categories, only ap-
plied to our sensuous intuition. Consequently, all synthesis,
without which even perception would be impossible, is subject
to the categories ; and as experience consists of knowledge by
means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of
the possibility of experience, and valid therefore a priori 2lso for
all objects of experience.
^ Sp(ice« rqtresented as an object (as required in geometry), contains more
than the mere form of intuition, namely, the coftiprthrmion of the n anifoldt
which is given according ta the form of ^ensibihty, into a ptrctpHhlt (intui-
table) representation, so that the y^rm of inimHon gives the manifold only^
■vfhWt i\it formal intniticH gives unity of representation. In the .^ihetic I
had simply ascribed this unity to sensibility, in order lo show that it precedes
all concepts^ though it presupposes a synthesis not belonging to the senses,
and by which all concepts of space and time become first possible. For as by
that synthesis (the anderstandtng determining the sensibility) space and time
are first given as intuitions, the unity of that intuition a priori belongs to space
and time, and not to the concept of the understanding. (See § 24.)
Supplement XIV
If, for instance, I raise the empmcal intuition of a house,
through the apprehension of the manifold con Limed therein, into
a perception, the necessary unity of space ami of external sensuous
intLiitiun in general is presupposed, and I draw, as it were, the
shape of the house according to that synthetical unity of the mani-
fold in space. But this very synthetical unit)^, if I niake abstrac-
tion of the form of space, has its seat in the iniderstanding, and
is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in intui-
tion in general ; that is, the category of quantity^ to which that
synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must always
conform.^
Or if, to take another example, I perceive the freezing of water,
I apprehend two stales (that of fluidity and that of solidily), and
these as standing to each other in a relation of time. Rut in the
time, which as internal intuititni I make the foundation of the
phenomenon, I represent to myself necessarily synthetical unity
of the manifold, without which that rehition could not be given as
determined in an intuition (with reference to the succession of
time). That synthetical unity, however, as a condition a prian\
under which I connect the manifold of any intuition^ turns out to
be, if I make abstraction of the permanent form of my intuition,
namely, of time, the category of cause ^ through which, if I apply
it to ray sensibility, I determine everything that happens, according
to its reiatian in time. Thus the apprehension in such an event,
and that event itself considered as a possible perception, is subject
to the concept of the relation of cause and effects The same
applies to all other cases.
Categories are concepts which a priori prescribe laws to all
phenomena, and therefore to nature as the sum total of all phe-
nomena {natura materialiier speitata)* The tfuestion therefore
' In thia roanncr it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is
empidcaU must necessarily conform to the synthesis of apperception, which
U intellectual, and contaiocd in the category entirely n priori. It is one and
the same spontaneity, which there, untter the name of imagination, and here,
under the name of understanding, brings connection into the manifold of
tn tuition.
Supplement XIV
arises, as these laws are not derived from nature, nor conform to
it as their model (in which case ihey would he empirical only),
how we can onderstand that nature should conform to them, that
is, how they can determine a prian the connection of the manifold
in nature, without taking that connection from nature. The solu-
tion of that riddle is this.
It is no more surprising that the laws of phenomena in nature
must agree with the understanding and its form a priori ^ that is,
with its power <}{ connecting the manifold in genera!, than that the
phenomena themselves must agree with the form of sensuous intui-
tion a priori. For laws exist as little in phenomena themselves,
but relatively only, with respect to the subject to which, so far as
it has understanding, the [jhenomena belong, as phenometu exist
by themselves, but relatively only, with respect to the same being
so far as it has senses, Thijigs by themselves would necessarily
possess their conformity to the law, independent also of any under-
standing by which they are known. But phenomena are only
representations of things, unknown as to what they may be by
themselves. As mere representations they are subject to no law
of connection, exct-pt that which is prescribed by the connecting
iaculty. Now that which connects the manifold of sensuous intui-
tion is the faculty of imagination, which receives from the under-
standing the unity of its intellectual s}Titbesis, and from sensibihty
the manifoldness of apprehensior^ Thus, as all possible percep-
tions depend on the synthesis of apprehension, and that synthesis
itself, that empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental, and,
therefore, on the categories, it follows that all possible perceptions,
everything in fact that can come to the empirical consciousness,
that is, all phenomena of nature, must, so far as their connection
is concerned, l>e subject to the categories. On these categories,
therefore, nature (considered as nature in general) depends, as on
the original ground of its necessary conformity to law (as natura
/ormaliter sptctafa). Ileyond the laws, on which nature in gen*
era/, as a lawful order of phenomena in space and time depends,
the pure faculty of the understanding is incapable of prescribing
a f*rion\ by means of mere categories, laws to phrnomena. Special
laws, therefore, as they refer to phenomena which are empirically
766
Suppiement XiV
determined, cannot be completely derived from the categories,
although they are all subject to them. Experience must be super-
added in order to know such special laws : while those other a
priori laws inform us only with regard to experience in geoeral,
and what can be known as an object of it.
§27
Risuiis of this Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding
We cannot think any object except by means of the categories ;
we cannot knotv any subject that has been thought, except by
means of intuitions, corresponding to those concepts. Now all
our intuitions are sensuous, and this knowledge, so far as its object
is given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience, and
therefore no kfiowkdge a priori is possible to us, except of objeeh
of possible experience only.*
This knowledge, however, though limited to objects of expe-
rience, is not, therefore, entirely derived from experience, for both
the pure intuitions and the pure concepts of the understauding are
elements of knowledge which exist in us a priori. Now there are
only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with
the concepts of its objects can be conceived ; either experience
makes these concepts possible, or these concepts make experience
possible. The former will not hold good with respect to the
categories (nor with pure sensuous intuition), for they are con-
cepts (I priori J and therefore independent of experience. To
ascribe to them an empirical origin, would be to admit a kind
1 Lest anybody shoulil be unnecessarily frightened by the dangerous con-
sequences of this proposition, T shall only remark that the categories are not
limited for the purpose of thought by the confbtions of our sensuous intuition,
but have really an unliniitcfl lit-KL hi* only the kmnuUtfj^e of that which we
think, the determining of an object, that requires intuition, and even in the
absence of intuition, the thought uf tbe object may still have its true and use-
ful consequences, so far as the subjective use (*f reason is concerned. Tliat ose
of reason, however, as it is not always directed to the determination of the
object, that is, to knowledge, but also to the dctenninalion of Ibe subject, and
its volitign, cannot be treated of in this place*
Supplement XIV
767
of generaJio aequivaca. There remains, therefore, the second alter-
native only (a kind of system of the epi^fnesis of pure reason),
namely, that the categories, on the part of the understanding, con*
tain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general.
How they render experience possible, and what principles of the
possibility of experience they supply in iheir employment on phe-
nomena, will be shown more fully in the following chapter on the
transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment.
Some one might propose to adopt a middle way between the
two, namely, that the categories are neither self-produced first
principles a priori of our knowledge, nor derived from experience,
but subjective dispositions of thought, implanted in us with our
existence, and so arranged by our Creator that their employment
should accurately agree with the laws of nature, which determine
experience (a kind of system of preformation of pure reason).
But, in that case, not only would there be no end of such an
hypothesis, so that no one could know how far the supposition of
predetermined dispositions to future judgments might be carried,
but there is this decided objection against that middle course
that, by adopting it, the categories would lose that necessity
which is essential to ihem. Thus the concept of cause, which
asserts, under a presupposed condition, the necessity of an effect,
w*ould become false, if it rested only on some subjective neces-
sity implanted in us of connecting certain empirical representations
according to the nite of causal relation. I should not be able to
say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (that
is. by necessity), but only, I am so constituted that I cannot
think these representations as connected in any other way.
This is exactly what the sceptic most <lesires, for in that case all
our knowledge, resting on the supposed objective validity of our
judgments, is nothing but mere illusion, nor wculd there be want-
ing people to say they know nothing of such subjective necessity
(which can only be felt) ; and at all events wc could not quarrel
with anybody about what depends only on the maimer in which
his own subject is organised.
768 Supplement XIV
Comprehensive View of this Deduction
The deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding (and
with them of all theoretical knowledge a priori^ consists in repre-
senting them as principles of the possibility of experience, and in
representing experience as the determination of phenomena in
space and time, — and, lastly, in representing that determination
as depending on the principle of the original synthetical unity of
apperception, as the form of the understanding, applied to space
and time, as the original forms of sensibility.*
^ Kant does not carry the division into paragraphs in his second edition
further, because, as he says, he has to treat no more of elementary concepts,
and prefers, in representing their employment, to adopt a continuous treat-
ment, without paragraphs.
SUPPLEMENT XV
[See page 152]
All conjunctitm {conjunetio) is either composition {composition
or connection {nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold
the parts of which do not belong to each other necessarily. The
two triangles, for instance, into which a square is divided by a
diagonal, do by themselves not necessarily belong to each other.
Such is also the synthesis of the homogeneous^ in everything that
can be considered mathematically, and that synthesis can be
divided again into aggregation, and coalition, the former referring
to extettsive^ the latter to intensive qualities. The latter conjunc-
tion (nexus) is the sjnthesis of a manifold, in so far as its ele-
ments helong to each other necessarily. Thus the accident
belonging to a substance, or the effect belonging to a cause,
though heterogeneous, are yet represented as a priori connected,
which connection, as it is not arbitrary, I call dynamical, because
it concerns the connection of the existence of the mantfokl This
may again be divided into the /-*)w<i/ connection of phenomena
among each other, and their metaphysical connection in the
faculty of cognition a priori, (This forms a note in the 2nd
Edition*)
3i>
769
SUPPLEMENT XVI
[See page 133]
In the 2nd Edition the title is
I
Axioms of Intuition
Their principle is : All intuitions are extensive quantities.
Proof
All phenomena contain, so far as their form is concerned, an
intuition in space and time, which forms the a priori foundation
of all of them. They cannot, therefore, be apprehended, that is,
received into empirical consciousness, except through the synthe-
sis of the manifold, by which the representations of a definite
space or time are produced, i.e. through the synthesis of the
homogeneous, and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of
that manifold (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of the
manifold and homogeneous in intuition, so far as by it the repre-
sentation of an object is first rendered possible, is the concept of
quantity (quantum). Therefore even the perception of an object
as a phenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical
unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, by which
the unity of the composition of the manifold and homogeneous is
conceived in the concept of a quantity ; that is, phenomena are
always quantities, and extensive quantities ; because as intuitions
in space and time, they must be represented through the same
synthesis through which space and time in general are determined.
770
SUPPLEMENT XVI b
[See page 136]
II
Anticipations of Perception
Their principle is : In all phenomena the Reai^ which is the object
of a sensation^ has intensive quantity^ that is, a degree.
Proof
Perception is empincal consciousness, that is, a consciousness
in which there is at the same time sensation. Phenomena, as
objects of perception, are not pure (merely formal) intuitions,
like space and time (for space and time can never be perceived
by themselves). They contain, therefore, over and above the
intuition, the material for some one object in general (through
which something existing in space and time is represented) ; that
is, they contain the real of sensation, as a merely subjective repre-
sentation, which gives us only the consciousness that the subject
is affected, and which is referred to some object in general. Now
there is a gradual transition possible from empirical to pure con-
sciousness, tilt the real of it vanishes completely and there remains
a merely formal consciousness {a priori) of the manifold in space
and time ; and, therefore, a synthesis also is possible in the pro-
duction of the quantity of a sensation, from its beginning, that is,
from the pure intuition =0, onwards to any quantity of it As
sensation by itself is no objective representation, and as in it the
intuition of neither space nor time can be found* it follows that
though not an extensive, yet some kind of quantity must belong
to it (and this through the apprehension of it, in which the era*
piricai consciousness may grow in a certain time from nothing = o
to any amount). That quantity must be intensive, and corre-
sponding to it» an intensive quantity, i.e. a degree of influence
upon the senses, must be attributed to all objects of perception,
so far as it contains sensation.
77«
SUPPLEMENT XVII
[See page 144]
III
Analogies of Experience
Their principle is: Experience is possible only through the
representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.
Proof
Experience is empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge which
determines an object by means of perceptions. It is, therefore,
a synthesis of perceptions, which synthesis itself is not contained
in the perception, but contains the synthetical unity of the mani-
fold of the perceptions in a consciousness, that unity constituting
the essential of our knowledge of the objects of the senses, i.e. of
experience (not only of intuition or of sensation of the senses).
In experience perceptions come together contingently only, so
that no necessity of their connection could be discovered in the
perceptions themselves, apprehension being only a composition of
the manifold of empirical intuition, but containing no representa-
tion of the necessity of the connected existence, in space and time,
of the phenomena which it places together. Experience, on the
contrary, is a knowledge of objects by perceptions, in which there-
fore the relation in the existence of the manifold is to be repre-
sented, not as it is put together in time, but as it is in time,
objectively. Now, as time itself cannot be perceived, the deter-
mination of the existence of objects in time can take place only
by their connection in time in general, that is, through concepts
connecting them a priori. As these concepts always imply neces-
sity, we are justified in saying that experience is possible only
through a representation of the necessary connection of percep-
tions.
772
SUPPLEMENT XVIII
[See page 149]
A. Ffitsrr Analogy
Principle of the Permanence of Substance
In all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent, and its
quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.
Proof
All phenomena exist in time, and in it alone, as the substratum
(as permanent form of the internal intuition) , can simuitaneousness
as well as successinn be represented. Time, therefore, in which
all change of phenomena is to be thought, does not change, for it
is that in which simuitaneousness and succession can be repre-
sented only as determinations of it. As time by itself cannot be
perceived, it follows that the substratum which represents time in
general, and in which all change or simuitaneousness can be per-
ceived in apprehension, through the relation of phenomena to it,
must exist in the objects of perception, that is, in the phenomena.
Now the substratum of all that is real, that is, of all that belongs to
the existence of things, is the suditaacr^ and all that belongs to
existence can be conceived only as a determination of it. Con-
sequently the permanent, in reference to which alone all temporal
relations of phenomena can be delermined, is the substance in
phenomena, that is, what is real in them, and, as the substratum of
all change, remains always the same. As therefore std>stance can-
not change in existence, we were justified in saying that its quan-
tum can neither be increased nor diminished in nature.
771
SUPPLEMENT XIX
[See page 155]
B. Second Analogy
Principle of the Succession of TimCy according to the Law of
Causality
All changes take place according to the law of connection between
cause and effect.
Proof
(It has been shown by the preceding principle, that all phenom-
ena in the succession of time are changes only, i.e. a successive
being and not-being of the determinations of the substance, which
is permanent, and consequently that the being of the substance
itself, which follows upon its not-being, and its not-being, which
follows on its being, — in other words, that an arising or perish-
ing of the substance itself is inadmissible. The same principle
might also have been expressed thus : all change (succession^ of
phenomena consists in modification only, for arising and perishing
are no modifications of the substance, because the concept of
modification presupposes the same subject as existing with two
opposite determinations, and therefore as permanent. After this
preliminary remark, we shall proceed to the proof.)
I perceive that phenomena succeed each other, that is, that
there is a state of things at one time the opposite of which existed
at a previous time. I am therefore really connecting two percep-
tions in time. That connection is not a work of the senses only
and of intuition, but is here the product of a synthetical power
of the faculty of imagination, which determines the internal sense
774
Supplement XIX
with reference to relation in time. Imagination, however, can
connect those two states in two ways, so that either the one or
the other precedes in time : for time cannot be perceived by
itself, nor can we determine in the object empirically and with
reference to time, what precedes and what follows. I am, there-
fore, conscious only that my imagination places the one before,
the other after, and not, that in the object the one state comes
before the other. In other words, the objective rebtion of phe-
nomena following upon each other remains undetermined hy mere
perception. In order that this may be known as determined, it
is necessary to conceive the relation between the two states in such
a way that it should be determined thereby with necessity, which
of the two should be taken as coming first, and which as second,
and not conversely. Such a concept, involving a necessity of
synthetical unity, can be a pure concept of the understanding only,
which is not supplied by experience, and this is, in this case, the
concept of the relation of cause ami effect, the former determining
the latter in time as the conseqttence, the cause not l>eing some-
thing that might be antecedent in imagination only, or might not
be perceived at all. Experience itself, therefore, that is, an em-
pirical knowledge of phenomena, is possible only by our subject-
ing the succession of phenomena, an<l with it all change, to the
law of causahty, and phenomena themselves, as objects of experi-
ence, are consequently possible according to the same law only.
SUPPLEMENT XX
[See page 172]
C. Third Analogy
Principle of Coexistence^ according to the Law of Reciprocity or
Community
All substances, so far as they can be perceived as coexistent in
space, are always affecting each other reciprocally.
Proof
Things are coexistent when, in empirical intuition, the percep-
tion of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and
vice versa y which, as was shown in the second principle, is impos-
sible in the temporal succession of phenomena. Thus I may first
observe the moon and afterwards the earth, or, conversely also,
first the earth and afterwards the moon, and because the percep-
tions of these objects can follow each other in both ways, I say
that they are coexistent. Now coexistence is the existence of
the manifold in the same time. Time itself, however, cannot be
perceived, so that we might learn from the fact that things exist
in the same time that their perceptions can follow each other
reciprocally. The synthesis of imagination in apprehension would,
therefore, give us each of these perceptions as existing in the sub-
ject, when the other is absent, and vice versa : it would never tell
us that the objects are coexistent, that is, that if the one is there,
the other also must be there in the same time, and this by neces-
sity, so that the perceptions may follow each other reciprocally.
Hence we require a concept of understanding of the reciprocal
sequence of determinations of things existing at the same time,
776
Supplement XX
777
but outside each other, in order to be able to say, that the recip-
rocal sequence of the perceptions is founded in the object, and
thus to represent their coexistence as objective. The relation
of substances, however, of which the first has determinations the
ground of which is contained in the other, is the relation of in-
fluence, and if, conversely also, the first contains the ground of
determinations in the latter, the relation is that of community
or reciprocity. Hence the coexistence of substances in space can-
not be known in experience otherwise but under the supposition
of reciprocal action : and this is therefore the condition also of
the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience.
Aq important protest, however, against these niles for proving
existence mediately is brought forward by Idealism, and this is
, therefore the proper place for its refutation.
Refutathn of Idealism
Ideausm (I mean material idealism) is the theory which de-
clares the existence of objects in space, without m, as either
doubtfiil only and not demonstrable, or as false and impossible.
The former is the pr&hkmatical i<lealism of Descartes, who de-
clares one empirical assertion only to be undoubted, namely, that
of / atn ; the latter is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who
declares space and all things to which it belongs as an inseparable
condition, as something impossible in itself, and, therefore, the
things in space as mere imaginations, DogiTiatic idealism is in-
evitable* if we look upon space as a property belonging to things
by themselves, for in that case space and all of which it is a con-
dition, would be a non- entity. The ground on which thai idealism
rests has been removed by us in the transcendental ^^sthetic.
Problematical idealism, which asserts nothing, but only pleads our
inability of proving any existence except our owm by means of
immediate experience, is reasonable and in accordance with a
sound philosophical mode of thought, which allows of no decisive
judgment, before a sufficient proof has been found. The required
proof will have to demonstrate that we may have not only an im-
agination^ but also an experience of external things, and this it
seems can hardly be effected in any other way except by proving
that even our interna^ experience, which Descartes considers as
778
Supplement XXI
779
nndoubted, is possible only under the supposition of external
experience*
TTuorem
The simple, hut empiricaily determined Consciousness of my own
existence, proves the Existence of objects in space outside
myself
Proof
1 am conscious of my own existence as determined in time,
and all determination in time presupposes something permanent
in the perception.* That permanent^ however, cannot be an intui-
tion within me, because all the causes which determine my exist-
ence, so far as they can be found within me, are representations,
and as such require themselves something permanent, difTerent
from them, in reference to which their change, and therefore my
existence in time in which they change, may be determined. The
perception of this permanent, therefore, is possible only through
a thing outside me, and not through the mere representation of a
thing outside me, and the determination of my existence in time
is, consequently, possible only by the existence of real things,
which I perceive outside me. Now, as the consciousness in time
is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility
of that determination of time, it is also necessarily connected with
the existence of things outside me, as the condition of the deter-
mination of time. In other wonls, the consciousness of my own
existence is, at the same time, an immediate consciousness of the
existence of other things*
Note t. — It will have been perceived that in the foregoing
proof the trick played by idealism has been turned against it,
and with greater justice. Idealism assumed that the only im-
mediate experience is the internal, and that from it we can no
more than infer external things, though in an imirust worthy man-
ner oidy, as always happens if from given effects we infer definite
' This passage has been translated as amended by Kant himself in the
Preface to the Second Edition (p. 386).
78o Supplement XXI
causes : it being quite possible th^t the cause of the representa-
tions, which are ascribed by us, it may be wrongly, to external
things, may lie within ourselves. We, however, have proved that
t-xternal ex|icrience is really immediate,^ and that only by means
o(*it, though not the consciousness of our own existence, yet its
determination in time, that is, internal experience, becomes pos-
sible. No doubt the representation a( I am, which expresses thc^
consciousness that can accompany all thought, is that which im
mediately includes the existence of a subject : but it does not yet
include a knowkdge of it, and therefore no empiricai knowledge,
that is, experience. For that we require, besides the thought of
something existing, intuition also, and in this case internal intuition
in respect to which, that is, to time, the subject must be deter-
mined. For that purpose external objects are absolutely neces-
sary, so that internal experience itself is possible, mediately only,
and through external experience*
Note 2, — This view is fully confirmed by the empirical use of
our faculty of knowledge, as applied to the determination of time.
Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time,
except through a change in external relations (motion) with
refeience ta what is permanent in space (for instance, the
movement of the sun with respect to terrestrial objects), but we
really have nothing permanent to which we could refer the con-
cept of a substance^ as an intuition, except maikr only ; and
even its permanence is not derived from external experience, but
1 The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is not
simply assumed in the preccditig theorem, but proved, whether ue can under*
stand the possibility of this consciousness or not. The qucslion with regard to
that possibility would come to this, whether \vc have an interoal sense only,
and no external sense, but merely an external imagination. It is clear, how-
ever, that, even in order to imagine only something as external, that is, to
represent it to the senses in intuition, we must have an external sense, and
thus distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external intuition from
that spontaneity which characteri^fcs every act of imagination. For merely tu
imagine an external stmt svouid really be to destroy the faculty of intuition,
which is to be determined by the faculty of imagination.
I
Supplement XXI
781
presupposed a priori as a necessary condition of all determination
of time, and therefore also of* the determination of the internal
sense with respect to our own existence through the existence of
external things. The consciousness of myself^ in the represen-
tation of the tgo^ is not an intuition, but a merely inicUectuai
representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. Hence
that ego has not the slightest predicate derived from intuition,
which predicate, as permanent^ might serve as the correlate of
the determination of Ume in the internal sense : such as is, for
instance, impermeability in matter, as an empirical intuition.
Note 5. — Because the existence of external objects is re-
quired for the possibility of a definite consciousness of ourselv^es,
it does not follow that every intuitional representation of external
things involves, at the same time, their existence ; for such a rep-
resentation may well be the mere effect of the faculty of imagi-
nation (in dreams as well as in madness) ; but it can be soch an
effect only through the reproduction of former external percep-
tions, which, as we ha\^e shown, is impossible without the reality
of external objects. What we wanted to prove here was only
that internal experience in general is possible only ih rough exter-
nal experience in general. Whether this or that supposed expe-
rience be purely imaginary, must be settled according to its
own particular determinations, and through a comparison with
the criteria of all real experience.
^ Read dtr Instead of a//.
SUPPLEMENT XXII
[See page 191]
General Note on the System of the Principles
It is something very remarkable that we camiot understand the
possibility of anything from the category alone, but must always
have an intuition in order to exhibit by it the objective reality of
the pure concept of the understanding. Let us take, for instance,
the categories of relation. It is impossible to understand, from
mere concepts alone : —
Firsty how something can exist as subject only, and not as
a mere determination of other things, that is, how it can be a sub-
stance: or.
Secondly y how, because something is, something else must be,
that is, how something can ever be a cause : or,
Thirdly^ how, when there are several things, something could
follow from the existence of one of them as affecting the rest, and
vice versa, so that there should exist, in this way, a certain com-
munity of substances. The same applies to the other categories,
as, for instance, how-#thing could be of the same kind as many
others, and thus be a quantity. So long as there is no intuition,
we do not know whether by the categories we conceive an object,
nay, whether any object can at all belong to them : and thus we
see again that by themselves the categories are not knowledge^
but mere forms of thought, by which given intuitions are turned
into knowledge.
It likewise follows from this, that no synthetical proposition can
be made out of mere categories, as, for instance, if it is said that
in everything existing there is substance, i.e. something that can
782
Supplement XXII
783
exist as subject only, and not as a mere predicate ; or, ever>^thing
is a quantum, etc. Here we have really nothing whatever which
would enable us to go beyond a given concept, and to connect
with it another. Hence no one has ever succeeded in proving
a synthetical proposition by pure concepts of the understanding
only : as, for instance, the proposition that everything which exists
contingently, has a cause» All that could be proved was, tlial,
without such a relation, we could not conceive the existence of
what is contingent, that is, that w*e could not know a priori
through the understanding the existence of such a thing ; from
which it does not follow in the least that the same condition
applies to the possibility of things themselves. If the reader will
go back to our proof of the principle of causaUty, he will per-
ceive that we could prove it of objects of possible experience
only, by saying that everything which happens (every event) pre-
supposes a cause. We could prove it only as the principle of the
possibility of experience, that is, of the ktnnvltJg^ of an object,
given in empirica! infuitian^ but not by means of mere concepts.
It is perfectly tnie, that nevertheless this proposition, that every-
thing contingent must have a cause, carries conviction to every-
body from mere concepts : but it should be obser\*ed, that in this
case the concept of the contingent contains no longer the cate-
gory of modahty (as something the non-existence of which can
be conceived), but that of relation (as something which can only
exist as the consequence of something else). It thus becomes
in reality an identical proposition, namely, that that which can
exist as a consequence only has its cauge. And thus, when we
have to give examples of contingent existence, we have always
recourse to changes^ and not only to the possibility of concainng
the opposite} Change, however, is an event which, as such, is
^ It is easy enough to conceive the non-existence cf matter, but the ancienti
did not infer from this its contingency. Not even the cliaiigc of being and not-
being of any given state of a thing, which cunstitutes all change, can prove the
contingency of that state, as if from the reality of its opposite. The rest of a
body, for instance, following on its motion, does not yet prove the contingency
of that motion, because the former is the opposite of the latter. The opposite
here is ppp&sed to the other, not nalittr^ but logically only, In order to prove
7H'
Supplement XX!!
possible through a cause only, and the non-existence of which
is therefore possible in itself. \Ve thus mean by contingency, that
something can exist as the etlect of a cause only ; and if there-
fore a thing is assumed to be contingent, it becomes a merely
analytical proposition to say that it has a cause.
It is still more remarkable, however, that^ in order to under-
stand the possibility of things according to the categories, and
thus to establish the objtciive reality of the latter, we require not
only intuitions, but always external in fat lions. Thus, if we take,
for instance, the pure concepts of relation, we find that : —
Firsts in order to give something permam'nf in intuition, cor-
responding to the concept of suManee (and thus to show the
objective reality of that concept), we require an intuition in space j
(of matter), because space alone can determine anything as per-
manent, while time, and therefore everything that exists in the
internal sense, is in a constant flux.
Stconiil)\ that in order to exhibit change, as the intuition corre-
sponding to the concept of eausalit\\ we must use motion as change
in space for our example, nay, can thus only gain an intuition of
changes the possibility of which no pure understanding can ever
conceive. Change is the connection of contradictory opposites
in the existence of one and the same thing* Now, how it is
possible that from a given state another state, opposed to it,
should arise in the same thing, no reason can comprehend with-
out an example; nay, without an intuition* cannot even render
it intelligible to itself. That intuition, however, is that of the
motion of a point in space, the presence of which in different
places (as a consequence of opposite determinations) gives us,
for the first time, an intuition of change ; so that, in order ta
make even internal changes afterwards conceivable to ourselves,
we must make time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively
comprehensible to ourselves by means of a line, and the internal
Ihe contingency of llie motion of a body, we should have to prove that instead
of the motion &t the antecedent puint of tirnc, it wouhJ have been possible for
the body to have bceiv at rest at that very time^ not that it is at rest afttrwardi;
for in tkb case both opposites are quite consistent with each other.
Supplement XXII 785
change by means of the drawing of lh.it line (motion): in other
words, the successive existence of ourselves in different states, by
means of an external inluition. The real reason of this lies in the
fact that all change presupposes something permanent in intuition,
in order that it may itself be perceived as change, while no per-
manent intuition is to be found in the internal sense.
Thirdly^ and lastly, ihe category of community cannot, so far as
its possibilily is concerned, be conceived by mere reason alone :
and the objective reality of that concept cannot therefore be
possibly understood without intuition, and without external in-
tuition in space. For how should we conceive the possibility
that, when several substances exist, something (as an eflfecl)
could follow from the existence of one of them as affecting
reciprocally the existence of the other, and that, therefore,
because there is something in the former, something must also
be in the latter, which, from the existence of the latter alone,
could not be understood? For this is necessary to establish
community, though it is utterly inconceivable among things,
each of which completely isolates itself through its sul>stantiality»
Leibniz^ therefore^ as he attribyted comnnmity to the substances
of the world, as conceived by the understanding alone, required
the interference of a Deity ; because, as he justly perceived, such
community would have been inconceivable from the existence of
such substances only. We, on the contrar)', can render the possi-
bility of such a communion (of subsLinces as phenomena) per-
fectly conceivable to ourselves, if we represent them to ourselves
in space, that is, in external intuition. For space contains, even
a priori ^ formal external relations, as conditions of the possibility
of the real relations of action and reaction, thai is, of community.
It is easy to show, in the same manner, that the possibiUty of
things as i^uanta^ and therefore, the objective reality of the cate-
gory of quantity, can be exhibited in external intuition only, and,
by means of it alone, be afterwards applied to the internal sense.
But, in order to avoid prolixity, 1 must leave it to the reflection
of the reader to find the examples of this.
The whole of these notes is of great importance, not only as
confirming our previous refutation of idealism, hut even more.
786 Supplement XXII
when we come to treat of self-knowledge by mere internal con-
sciousness, and the determination of our own nature, without the
help of external empirical intuitions, in order to show us the
limits of the possibility of such knowledge.
The last result of the whole of this section is therefore this :
All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than
a priori principles of the possibility of experience ; and to ex-
perience alone do all synthetical propositions a priori relate:
nay, their possibility itself rests entirely on that relation.
SUPPLEMENT XXIII
[See page 199]
In one word, none of these concepts admit of being authenti-
cated^ nor can their real possibility be proved, if all sensuous
intuition (the only one which we possess) is removed, and there
remains in that case a logical possibility only, that is, that a con-
cept (a thought) is possible. This, however, does not concern
us here, but only whether the concept refers to an object and
does therefore signify anything.
787
SUPPLEMENT XXIV
[See page 203]
We are met here by an illusion which is difficult to avoid. The
categories do not depend in their origin on sensibility, like the
forms of intuitiofiy space, and time, and seem, therefore, to admit
of an application extending beyond the objects of the senses.
But, on the other side, they are nothing \i\x\ forms of thought, con-
taining the logical faculty only of comprehending a priori in one
consciousness the manifold that is given in intuition, and they
would therefore, if we take away the only intuition which is possi-
ble to us, have still less significance than those pure sensuous
forms by which at least an object is given, while a peculiar mode
of our understanding of connecting the manifold (unless that
intuition, in which the manifold alone can be given, is added),
signifies nothing at all.
Nevertheless, it seems to follow from our very concept, if we
call certain objects, as phenomena, beings of the senses, by dis-
tinguishing between the mode of our intuition and the nature of
those objects by themselves, that we may take either the same
objects in that latter capacity, though they cannot as such come
before our intuition, or other possible things, which are not
objects of our senses at all, and place them, as objects thought
only by the understanding, in opposition to the former, calling
them beings of the understanding {notdmefia). The question
then arises, whether our pure concepts of the understanding do
not possess some significance with regard to these so-called beings
of the understanding, and constitute a mode of knowing them ?
At the very outset, however, we meet with an ambiguity which
may cause great misapprehension. The understanding, by calling
788
Supplement XXIV
;89
an object in one aspect a phenomenon only, makes to itself, apart
from that aspect, another representation of an object by itseif^ and
imagines itself able to form loncepis of such an object. As, then,
the understanding yields no other concepts but the categories, it
supposes that the object in the latter aspect can be thought at
least by those pure concepts of the understandings and is thus
induced to take the entirely indefinite concept of a being of the
understanding, as of a something in general outside our sensibil-
ity, as a iiefinite concept of a being which we might know to a
certain extent through the tmderstanding.
If by noomenon we mean a thing so far ns it is not an object
of our senmoiis intuition, and make abstraction of our mode of
intuition, it may be called a noumenon m a negative sense. If,
however, we mean by it an object of a nan-sensuous intuition^ we
admit thereby a peculiar mode of intuition, namely, the intellect-
ual, which, however, is not our own^ nor one of which we can
understand even the possibility. This would be the noumenon in
a positive sense.
The doctrine of sensibility is at the same lime the doctrine of
noumena in thfir negative sense ; that is, of things which the
understanding must think without reference to our mode of intui-
tion, and therefore, not as phenomena only, but as things by
themselves, but to which, after it has thus separated them, the
understanding knows that it must not, in this new aspect, apply
its categories ; because these categories have signifirance only
with reference to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and
can therefore a priori determine that unity, on account of the
mere ideality of space and time only, by means of general con-
necting concepts. Where that unity in time cannot be founds
i.e. in the noumenon, the whule use, nay, the whole significance
of categories comes to an end : because even the possibility of
things that should correspoml to the categories, would be unin-
telligible. On this point I may refer the reader to what I have
said at the very beginning of the general note to the previous
chapter (Suppl XXU). The possibility of a thing can never be
proved from the fact that its concept is not self- contradictory, but
only by being authenticated by an intuition corresponding to it.
790 Supplement XXIV
If, therefore, we attempted to apply the categories to objects
which are not considered as phenomena, we should have to admit
an intuition other than the sensuous, and thus the object would
become a noumenon in a positive sense. As, however, such an
intuition, namely, an intellectual one, is entirely beyond our
faculty of knowledge, the use of the categories also can never
reach beyond the limits of the objects of experience. Beings of
the understanding correspond no doubt to beings of the senses,
and there may be beings of the understanding to which our faculty
of sensuous intuition has no relation at all ; but our concepts of
the understanding, being forms of thought for our sensuous intui-
tion only, do not reach so far, and what, is called by us a noume-
non must be understood as such in a negative sense only.
SUPPLEMENT XXV
[See page 209]
We must not speak, as is often done, of an intellectual world,
for intellectual and sensitive apply to knowledge only. That, how-
ever, to which the one or the other mode of intuition applies,
that is, the objects themselves, must, however harsh it may sound,
be called intelligible or sensible.
791
SUPPLEMENT XXVI
[See page 274]
Metaphysic has for the real object of its investigations three
ideas only, God, Freedom, and Immortality ; the second concept
connected with the first leading by necessity to the third as
conclusion. Everything else treated by that science is a means
only in order to establish those ideas and their reality. Meta-
physic does not require these ideas for the sake of natural
science ; but in order to go beyond nature. A right insight into
them would make theology, morality, and, by the union of both,
religion also, therefore the highest objects of our existence, depend-
ent on the speculative faculty of reason only, and on nothing
else. In a systematical arrangement of those ideas the above
order, being synthetical, would be the most appropriate ; but in
their elaboration, which must necessarily come first, the analytical
or inverse order is more practical, enabling us, by starting from
what is given us by experience, namely, the study of the soul
(psychology), and proceeding thence to the study of the 7vorld
(cosmology), and lastly, to a knowledge of God (theology), to
carry out the whole of our great plan in its entirety.
792
SUPPLEMENT XXVII
[See page 284]
We shall therefore follow it with :a critical eye through all the
predicaments of pure psychology ; but we shall, for the sake of
brevity, let their examination proceed uninterni[Jtedly.
The following general remark may at the very outset make us
more attentive to this raode of syllogism, I do not know any
object by merely thinking, but only by determining a given intui-
tion with respect to that unity of consciousness in which all thought
consists ; therefore, I do not know myself by being conscious of
myself, as thinking, but only if I am conscious of the intuition
of myself as determined with respect to the function of thought.
All modes of self-consciousness in thought are therefore by them-
selves not yet concepts of understanding of objects {categories),
but mere logical functions, which present no object to our thought
to be known, and therefore do not present myself either as an
object. It is not a consciousness of the tffUrmimtt^^ but only
that of the de(€rminable self, that is, of my internal intuition (so
far as the manifold in it can be connected in accordance with Ihc
general condition of the unity of apperception in thought) which
forms the object,
I. In all judgments I am always the determining suhjecf on\y
of the relation which constitutes the judgment. That I, who
think, can be considered in thinking as suh/fei only, and as some-
thing not simply inherent in the thinking, as predicate, is an
apotJictical and even identiidi proposition ; but it does not mean
that, as an object, I ara a stif-iUpemitnt being or a substame.
The latter would be saying a great deal, and requires for its sup-
port data which are not foimd in the thinking, perhaps (so far as
793
794
Sufplement XXVII
I consider only the thinking subject as such) more than I shall
ever find in it
2. That the Ega of apperception, and therefore the Ego in
every act of thought, is a singuiar which cannot be dissolved into
a plurality of subjects, and that it therefore signifies a logically
simple subject, follows from the very concept of thinking, and is
consequendy an analytical proposition. But this does not mean
that a thinking Ego is a simple substame, which would indeed be
a synthetical proposition. The concept of substance always re-
lates to intuitions which, with me, cannot be other but sensuous,
and which therefore lie completely outside the field of the under-
standing and its thinking, which alone is intended here, when we
say that the Ego^ in thinking, ts simple. It would indeed be
strange, if what elsewhere requires so great an effort, namely, to
distinguish in what is given by intuition what is substance, and
still more, whether that substance can be simple (as in the case
of the component parts of matter) , should in our case be given
to us so readily in what is really the poorest of all representations,
and, as it were, by an act of revelation.
3. The proposition of the identity of myself amidst the mani-
fold of which I am conscious, likewise follows from the concepts
themselves, and is therefore analytical ; but the identity of the
subject of which, in all its representations, 1 may become con-
scious, does not refer to the intuition by which it is given as an
object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person,
by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's
own substance, as a thinking being, in all the changes of circum-
stances. In order to prove this, the mere analysis of the propo-
sition, I think, would avail nothing : but different synthetical
judgments would be required, which are based on the given
intuition,
4. To say that I distinguish my own existence, as that of a
thinking being, from other things outside me (one of them being
my body) is likewise an analytical proposition ; for 4>fher things
are things which I conceive as different from myself. But, whether
such a consciousness of myself is even possible without things
outside me, whereby representations are given to me, an^i whether
Suppletnent XXVII
795
I coukl exist merely as a thinking being (withoot being a man),
I do not know at all by that |>roposition.
Nothing therefore is gained by the analysis of the conscious-
ness of myself, in thought in general, towards the knowledge of
myself as an object. The logical analysis of thinking in general
is simply mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the
object.
It would be a great, nay, even the only objection to the whole
of our critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that
all thinking beings are by themselves simple substances, that as
such (as a consequence of the same argument) personality is in-
separable from them, and that they are conscious of their exist-
ence as distinct from all matter. For we should thus have made
a step beyond the world of sense and entered into the field of
noumena, and after that no one could dare to question our right
of advancing further, of settling in it, and, as each of us is
favoured by luck, taking possession of it. The proposition that
every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance, is synthetical
a priori^ because, first, it goes beyond the concept on which it rests,
and adds to act of thinking in general the mode of exiiience; and
secondly, because it adds to that concept a predicate (simplicity)
which cannot be given in any experience. Hence synthetical
propositions a priori w^ould be not only admissible, as we main-
tained, in reference to objects of possible experience, and then
only as principles of the possibility of that experience, but could
be extended to things in general and to things by themselves, a
result which would put an end to the whole of our critique, and
bid us to leave ever)ihing as we found it. However, the danger
is not so great, if only we look more closely into the matter.
In this process of rational psychology, there lurks a paralogism,
which may be represented by the following syllogism.
That which cannot be conceived otherwise than as a subject,
does not exist otherwise than as a subject, and is therefore a
substance.
A thinking being, considered as such, cannot be conceived
otherwise than as a subject.
Therefore it exists also as such only, that is, as a substance.
796
Stippiement XXVIf
In the major they speak of a being that can be thought m
ever)' respect, and therefore also as it may be given in intuition.
In the minor, however, they speak of it only so far as it considers
itself, as subject, with respect to the thinking and the unity of
consciousness only, but not at the same time in respect to the
intuition whereby this unity is given as an object of thinking.
The conclusion, therefore, has been drawn by a sophism^ and more
especially by sopkismtifiguraf dutiimii}
That we are perfectly right in thus resolving that famous argu-
ment into a paralogism, will be clearly seen by referring to the
general note on the systematical representation of the principles,
and to the section on the noumena, for it has been proved there
that the concept of a thing, which can exist by kself as a subject,
and not as a mere predicate, carries as yet no objective reality,
that is, that we cannot know whether any object at all belongs to
it, it being impossible for us to understand the possibility of such
a mode of existence. It yields us therefore no knowledge at all.
If such a concept is to indicate^ under the name of a substance, an
object that can be given, and thus become knowledge, it must be
made to rest on a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condi-
tion of the objective reality of a concept, that is, as that by which
alone the object can be given. In internal intuition, however, we
have nothing permanent, for the Ego is only the consciousness of
my thinking ; and if we do not go beyond this thinking, we are
without the necessary condition for applying the concept of sub-
1 The thioking is taken in each of the Iwo prciniasea in a totally dlfFerent
meiuiing : — in the major, as it refers to an object in general (and tbercfore
also as it m^y ht given in intuition), but In the minor, only as it exists in its
relation to sclf-cunsciousness, wliere no object is tbought of, but where we
only represent the relation to the self as the subject (as the form of thought).
In the former, things are spoken of that cannot be conceived otherwise than
as subjects; while in the second we do not speak of ikings^ but of the thinking
(abstraction being made of all objects), wherein the Ego always serves as the
subject of consciousness. The conclusion, therefore, uught not to be that I
cannot exist otherwise than as a subjectj but only, that in thinking my existence
I can use myself as the subject of a judgment only. This is an identical
proposition, and teaches us nothing whatever as to the mode of our cKi&teuce.
Sttppiemeut AM'/ 7/
797
stance, that is, of an independent subject, to the self, ixh a thinking
being. Thus the simpUcity of the substance entirely disappears
with the objective reality of the concept : and is changed into
a purely logical qualitative unity of self-consctoiisness in thinking
in general, whether the subject be composite or not.
Refutation &f MenddssohfCs Proof of the Permanefue af the Sam
This acute philosopher perceived very quickly how the ordinary
argument that the soul (if it is once admitteil to be a simple
being) cannot cease to exist by tiftompcsiihnt^ was ijisufficicnt to
prove its necessary continuance, because it might cease to exist
by simply vanishing. He therefore tried, in his Fha^don, to prove
that the soul was not liable to that kind of perish iog which would
be a real annihilation, by endeavouring to show that a simple
being cannot cease to exist, because as it could not be diminished,
and thus gradually lose something of its existence, and be changed,
by little and little, into nothing (it having no parts, and therefore
no plurality in itself), there could be no time between the one
moment in which it exists, and the other in which it exists no
longer; and this would be impossible.
He did not consider, however, that, though we might allow to
the soul this simple nature, namely, that it contains nothing mani-
fold, nothing by the side of each other, and therefore no extensive
quantity, yet we could not deny to it, as little as to any other
existing thing, intensive quantity^ i.e, a degree of reality with
respect to all its faculties, nay, to all which constitutes its exist-
ence. Such a degree of reality might diminish by an infinite
number of smaller degrees, and thus the supposed substance (the
thing, the permanence of which has not yet been estabUshed)>
might be changed into nothing, not indeetl through decomposi-
tion, but through a gradual remission of its powers, or, if I may
say so, through elanguescence. For even consciousness has always
a degree, which admits of being diminished,' and therefore also
1 QearncM is not, as the logicians niAintAin« ihe consciousness of a repre-
ftenUiioa^ for a certain degree uf conacioiiiiics, thougK insufficient for recol-
798
Supplement XXVII
the faculty of being conscious of oneself, as well as
faculties.
The permanence of the soul, therefore, considered merely as
an object of the internal sense, remains undemonstratcd and un-
demonstrable, though its permanence in life, while the thinking
being (as man) is at the same time to itself an object of the
external senses, is clear by itself. But this does not satisfy the
rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove, from mere con-
cepts, the absolute permanence of the soul, even beyond this
life.1
lection, must exist, even in raany dark representations, because without «11
consciousness we should make no distinction in the connection of dark repre-
sentations, which yet we are able to do with the mytae of many concepts (such
as those of right and justice, or as the musician docs who in improvising
strikes several keys at once), A representation is clear in which ihc con-
sciousness is sufficient for a consciousness of its difference from others. If the
consciousness is suflicicnt for distinguishing, hut not for a consciousness of the
difference, the representation would still have to be called dark. There is,
therefore, an infinite number of degrees of consciousness, down to its com-
plete vanishing.
^ Those who, in establishing the possibility of a new theory, imagine that
they have done enough if .they can show triumphantly that no one can show
a contradiction in their premisses (as do those who believe that they under-
stand the possibility of thinking, of which they have an example in the empiri-
cal intuitions of human life only, even after the cessation of life) can be greatly
embarrassed by other possible theories, vvhich are not a whit bolder than their
own. Such is, for instance, the possibihty of a division of stmple substance into
several, or of the coalition of several substances into one simple substance.
For although divisiljilily presupposes a composite, it does not necessarily re-
quire a composite of substances, but of degrees only (of the manifold faculties)
of one ant! the same substance. As, then, we may conceive all powers and
faculties of the soul, even that of consciousness, as diminished by one-half, the
substance still remaining, wc may also represent to ourselves, without any con-
tradiction, that extinguished half as preserved, though not within it, but outside
it, so that as the whole of what is real in it and has a degree, and therefore
the whole existence of it, without any rest, has been halved, another separate
substance would arise apart from it. For the plurality, which has been
*livided, existed before, though not as a plurality of substances* yet of every
reality as a quantum of existence in it, and the unity of substance was only a
mode of existence, which by mere division has been changed into a plurality
Supplement XXVII
If now we lake the a!>ove propositions in Jv/iM^/irVtf/ connection,
as indeed they must be taken, as valid for a!l thinking beings^ in
a system of rational psychology, and proceed from the category of
relation, with the proposition, all thinking beings, as such, arc
substances, backwards through the series till the circle is com-
pleted, we arrive in the end at their exisiencCj and this, according
to that system, they are not only conscious of, independently of
external things, but are supposed to be able to determine it even
of themselves (with respect to that permauence which necessarily
belongs to the character of substance) . Hence it follows, that in
this rationalistic system idealism is inevitable, at least problematical
idealism, because, if the existence of external things is not required
at all for the determination of one's own existence in time, their
existence is really a gratuitous assumption of which no proof can
ever be given.
If, on the contrary, we proceed analyticaih\ taking the proposi-
tion, I think, which involves existence (according to the category
of substatiliality. In the same matitier several simple sulfttatices tnight coalesce
again into one, nothing being lost thereby, but merely the plurality \A sulislan*
tiality; so that one substance would contain in itself the degree of reality \A
all foniicr su1>stances together. We might suppose that the simple &ut>stfiin€e»
which give us matter as a phenomenon (not indeed through a mechanical or
chemical influence upon each othcr» but yet» ii may be, by some unknown
influence, of which the former is only a manifestation), produce by such a
dymimiml ^wmssn of parental souls, taken as intensive quantitiei, what may
be called child-souls^ while they themselves repair their loss again through a
coalition with new matter of the same kind* I am far from at lowing the
slightest value of validity to such vague speculations, and I hupc that the
principles of our Analytic have given a sulhcient warning against using
the categories (as, for instance, that of substance) for any but empirical pur*
poses. Bui if the rationalist is hi>ld enough to create an independent being
out of the mere faculty of thought, without any permanent intuition, by which
an object can be given, simply because the unity of apperception tn thought
does not allow him to explain it as something composite, instead of simply
confessing that he cannot explain the possibility of a thinking nature, why
should not a maUrialist, though he can as little appeal to experience in
support of his theories, be entitled to use the tame boldness, and use hit
principle for the opposite purpose, though retaining the formal unity on
which bis opponent relied ?
Supplement XXV! I
of modality) as given, and analyse it, in order to find our whether,
and how, the E^o determines its existence in space and time by
it alone, the propositions of rational psychology would not start
from the concept of a thinking being, in general, but from a reality,
and the inference would consist in determining from the manner
in which that reahty is thought, after everything that is empiric^
in it has been removed, what belongs to a thinking being in gen-
eral. This may be shown by the following Table.
I thinks
2.
as Subject^
as simple Subject,
as identical Subject,
in every state of my thought.
As it has not been determined in the second proposition, whether
I can exist and be conceived to exist as a subject only, and not
also as a predicate of something else, the concept of subject is
here taken as logical only, and it remains undetermined whether
we are to understand by it a substance or not. In the third
proposition, however, the absolute unity of apperception, the
simple I, being the representation to which all connection or
separation (which constitute thought) relate, assumes its own
importance, although nothing is determined as yet with regard
to the nature of the subject, or its subsistence. The appercep-
tion is something real, and it is only possible, if it is simple. In
space, however, there is nothing real that is simple, for points
(the only simple in space) are limits only, and not themselves
something which, as a part, serves to constitute space. Frotra
this follows the impossibility of explaining the nature of myself,
as merely a thinking subject, from the materialistic point of view.
As, however, in the first proposition, my existence is taken for
granted, for it is not said in it that every thinking being exists
(this would predicate too much, namely, absolute necessity of
them), but only, / exist, as thinking, the proposition itself is
empirical, and contains only the determ inability of my existence,
in reference to my representations in time, Bivt as for that pur-
pose again 1 ret |u ire, first of all, something permanent, such as
IS not given to nie at all in internal intuition, so far as 1 think
myself, it is really impossible by that simple self- consciousness to
determine the manner in which I exist, whether as a substance
or as an accidtnt. Thus, if makriaium was inadec[uaie to ex-
plain my existence, sphifnaiism is equally insufficient for that
purpose, anil the conclusion is, that, in no way whatsojever can
we know^ anything of the nature of our soul, so far as the possi*
bility of its separate existence is concerned.
And how indeed should it be possible by means of that unity
of consciousness which we only know because it is indispensable
to us for the very possibility of experience, to get beyond expe-
rience (our existence in life), and even to extend our knowledge
to the nature of all thinking beings in general, by the empirical,
but, with reference to every kind of intuition, undetermined
proposition, I think.
There is, therefore, no rational psychology, as a doctrine^ fur-
nishing any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a iiiscipHne^
fixing impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, partly
to keep us from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless
materialism, partly to warn us against losing ourselves in a vague,
and, with regard to practical life, baseless spiritualism. It reminds
us at the same time to look upon this refusal of our reason to
give a satisfactory answer to such curious questions, which reach
beyond the limits of this life, as a hint to turn our self- knowledge
away from fm ill ess sjieculations to a fruitful practical use — a use
which, though directed always to objects of experience only,
derives its principle from a higher source, and so regulates our
conduct, as if our destination reached far beyond experience^
and therefore far beyond this life.
We see from all this, that rational psychology owes its origin
to a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, on
which the categories are founded, is mistaken for an intuition
of the subject as object, and the category of substance applied
to it. But that unity is only the unity in thought, by which alone
no object is given, and to which, therefore, the category of sub-
3F
802
SuppIcfPtent XX ill
stance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be
applied, and therefore the subject cannot be known. The sub-
ject of the categories^ therefore^ cannot^ by thinking them, receive
a concept of itself, as an object of the categories ; for in order to
think the t?ategories, it must presuppose its pure self- conscious-
ness, the very thing that had to be explained. In like manner
the subject, in which the representation of time has its original
source, cannot determine by it its own existence in time ; and if
the latter is impossible, the former, as a determination of oneself
(as of a thinking being in general) by means of the categories,
is equally so J
Thus vanishes, as an idle dream, that knowledge which was to
go beyond the limits of possible experience, and was connected
no doubt with the highest interests of humanity, so far at least
1 The ' \ think ' is, as has been stated, an empirical proposition, and con-
tains within itself the proposition, 1 exist. I cannot say, Ivowever, everything
which thinks exists; for in that case the property of thinking would make all
beings which possess it necessary beings. Therefore, my existence cannot, as
Descartes supposed, be considered as derived from the proposition^ 1 think
(for in that case the major* everything that thinks exists, ought to have pre-
ceded), but is identical with it. It expresses an intletinitc empirical intuition,
that iSi a perception (and proves, therefore, that this proposition, asserting
existence, is itself based on sensation, which belongs to sensibility), but it
precedes experience, which is meant to determine the object of perception
through the categories in respect to time. Existence, therefore, is here not
yet a category, which never refers to an indelinitely given object, but only to
one of which we have a concept, and of which we wish to know whether it
exists also apart from that conception or no. An indefinite perception sig-
nities here something real only that has been given merely for thinking in
general, not therefore as a phenomenon, nor as a thing by itself {nuumenon)|
but as somfiMng that really exists and ts designated as such in the proposition,
I think. For it must be oijserved, that if I have called the proposition, I
think, an empirical proposition, I did not mean to say thereby, that the ^go in
that proposition is an empirical representation; it is rather purely intellectual,
because it belongs to thought in general. Without some empirical represen-
tation, however, which supplies the matter for thought, the act. 1 think,
would not take place, and the empirical Is only the condition of the applica-
tiou or af the lisc of the pure intcllccttial faculty.
Supplement XX MI
803
as spectilatii^e philosophy wa^ to supply iL Yet no uomiportant
semce has thus been rendered to reason by the severity of our
criticism, in proving, at the same time, the impossibiUty of settling
anything dogmatically with reference to an object of experience,
beyond the limits of experience, and thus securing it against all
possible assertions to the contrary. This can only be done in
two ways, either by proving on€*s own proposition apodictically,
or, if that does not succeed, by trying to discover the causes of
that failure, which, if they lie in the necessary limits of our reason,
must force every opponent to submit to exacdy the same law of
renunciation with reference to any claims to dogmatic assertion.
Nothing is lost, however, by this with regard to the rights nay^
the necessity of admitting a future hfe, according to the princi-
ples of practical, as connected with the s[jeculative employment
of reason. It is known besides, that a purely speculative proof
has never been able to exercise any influence on the ordinary
reason of men. It stands so entirely uf>on the point of a hair,
that even the schools can only keep it from falling so long as
they keep it constantly spinning round like a top, so that, even
in their own eyes, it yields no permanent foundation upon which
anything could be built. The proofs which are useful fi^r the
world ai large retain their value undiminished, nay, they gain in
clearness and natural power, by the sunender of those dogmatical
pretensions, placing reason in its own peculiar domain, namely,
the system of ends, which is, however, at the s^ime time the
system of nature; so that reason, as a practical faculty by itself,
without being limited by the conditions of nature, becomes justi-
fied in extending the system of ends, and with it, uur own exist-
ence, beyond the limits of experience and of life. According to
the analogy with the nature of living beings in this world, in
which reason must necessarily admit the principle that no organ,
no faculty, no impulse, can be found » as being either superfluous
or disproportionate to its use, and therefore purposeless, but that
everything is adequate to its destination in life, man, who alone
can contain in himself the highest end of all this, would be the
only creature excepted from it. For, his natural dispositions, not
only so far as he uses them according to his talents and impulses^
804
Supplement XX III
Init more especially the moral law within him, go so far beyond
all that is useful and advantageous in this life, that he is taught
thereby, in the absence of all advantages, even of the shadowy
hope of posthumous fame, to esteem the mere conscioosiiess oi
righteousness beyond everything else, feeUng an inner call, by
his conduct in this world and a surrender of many advantages,
to render himself fit to become the citizen of a better worlds which
exists in his idea only. This powerful and incontrovertible proof,
accompanied by our constantly increasing recognition of a design
pervading all that we see around us, ami by a contemplation of
the immensity of creation, and therefore also by the consciousness
of an unlimited possibility in the extension of our knowledge, and
a desire commensurate therewith, all this remains and always will
remain, although we must surrender the hope of ever being able
to understand, from the mere theoretical knowledge of ourselves,
the necessary continuance of our existence.
Conciumn &f the Soiuti&n of the Fsy€h&hgi£al Paralogism
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our
confounding an idea of reason (that of a ptire intelligence) with
the altogether indefinite concept of a thinking being in general.
What we are doing is, that we conceive ourselves for the sake of
a possible experience, taking no account, as yet, of any real ex-
perience, and thence conclude that we are able to become con-
scious of our existence, independently of experience and of its
empirical conditions. We are, therefore, confounding the possible
ab&tmctwn of our own empirically determined existence with the
imagined consciousness of a possible separate existence of our
thinking self, and wc bring ourselves to believe that we know the
substantial within us as the transcendental subject, while what we
have in our thoughts is only the unity of consciousness, on which,
as on the mere form of knowledge, all determination is based.
The task of explaining the community of the soul with the
body does not properly fall within the province of that psychology
of which we are here speaking, because that psychology tries to
prove the personality of the soul, apart also from that community
SuppUmeni XXV!!
(after death), being therefore transcendent^ in the proper sense of
that word, inasmuch as, though dealing with an object of experi-
ence, it deals with it only so far as it has ceased to be an object
of experience. According to our doctrine, however, a sufficient
answer may be returned to that question also. The difficulty of
the task consists, as is well known, in the assumed heterogeneous-
ness of the object of the internal sense (the soul), and the objects
of the external senses, the formal condition of the intuition with
regard to the former being time only, with regard to the latter,
time and space. If we consider, however, that both kinds of
objects thus differ from each other^ not internally, but so far only
as the one appears externally to the other, and that possibly what
is at the bottom of phenomenal matter, as a thing by itself, may
not be so heterogeneous after all as we imagine, that difficulty
vanishes, and there remains that one difficulty only, how a com-
munity of substances is possible at all ; a difficulty which it is not
the business of psychology to solve, and which, as the reader will
easily understand, after what has l)een said in the Analytic of
fundamental powers and faculties, lies undoubtedly beyond the
Jimits of all human knowledge,
Gifural Nctt an the Transition from HaHonal Psychology to
Cosmology
The proposition, I think, or, I exist thinking, is an empiric-al
proposition. Such a proposition is based on an empirical intuition,
and its object is phenomenal : so that it might seem as if, accord-
ing to our theory, the soul was changed altogether, even in think-
ings into something phenomenal, and our consciousness itself, as
merely phenomenal, would thus indeed refer to nothing.
Thinking, taken by itself, is a logical function only, and there-
fore pure spontaneity, in connecting the manifold of a merely
possible intuition. It tloes not represent the subject of conscious-
ness, as phenomenal, for the simple reason, that it takes no account
whatsoever of the manner of intuition, whether it be sensuous or
intellectual. I do not thereby represent myself to myself, either
as I am, or as I appear to myself, but I only conceive of myself,
8o6 Supplement XXVII
as of any other object, without taking account of the manner of
intuition. If thereby I represent myself as the suhjeci of my
thoughts, or as iki^ ground f:A thinking, these modes of representa-
tion are not the categories of substance or cause, because these
are functions of thought {judgment) as applied already to our
sensuous intuition, such sensuous intuition being necessary, if I
wish to know myself. But I only wish to become conscious of
myself as thinking, and as I take no account of what my own self
may be as a phenomenon, it is quite possible that it might be a
phenomenon only to me, who thinks, but not to me, so far as I am
thinking. In the consciousness of myself \i\ mere thinking I ara
the substance itself^ but of that substance nothing is thus given
me for thinking.
The proposition I think, if it means / exist thinking, is not
merely logical function, but determines the subject (which then
is at the same time object) with reference to its existence, and is
impossible without the internal sense, the intuition of which always
supplies the object, not as a thing by itself, but as phenomenal
only. Here, therefore, w-e have no longer mere spontaneity of
thinking, but also receptivity of intuition, that is, the thinking of
myself applied to the empirical intuition of the same subject. In
that empirical intuition the thinking self would have to look fur
the conditions under which its logical functions can be employed
as categories of substance, cause, etc., in order not only to dis-
tinguish itself as an object by itself, through the Ego, but to deter-
mine the mode of its existence also, that is, to know itself as a
noumenon. This, as we know, is impossible, because the internal
empirical intuition is sensuous, and supplies us with phenomenal
data only, which fiirnish nothing to the object of the pure can-
seiousrtess for the knowledge of its own separate existence, but
can sen^e the purpose of experience only.
Supposing, however, that we should hereafter discover, not in-
deed in experience, but in certain (not only logical rules, but) a
priori established laws of pure reason, concerning our existence,
some ground for admitting ourselves, entirely a priori^ as deter-
mining and ruling our own existence, there would then be a spon-
taneity by which our reality would be determinable without the
Supplement XXVH
807
I
conditions of empirical intuition, and we should then perceive
that in the consciousness of our existing there is contained a
/>wn something which may serve to determine with respect to
some inner faculty, our existence, which otherwise cnn he deter-
mined sensuously only with reference to an intelligible^ though, of
course^ an ideal world only.
This, however, would not in the least benefit the attempts of
rational psychology. P'or though through that wonderful faculty,
which becomes first revealed to myself by the consciousness of
a moral law, I should have a principle, purely intellectual, for a
determination of my existence, what would be its determining
predicates ? No other but those which must be given to me in
sensuous intuition ; and 1 should therefore find myself again in
the same situation where I was before in rational psychology, re-
fjuiring sensuous intuitions in order to give significance to the
concepts of my understamling, such as substance, cause, etc, by
which alone I can gain a knowledge of myself; and these in-
tuitions can never carry me beyond the field of experience. Nev-
ertheless, for practical purposes, which always concern objects of
experience, I should be justified in applying these concepts, in
analogy with their theoretical employment, to liberty also and to
the subject of liberty, by takmg them only as logical functions of
subject and predicate,' of <iause and effect. According to thera,
acts or effects, as following those (moral) laws, would be so deter-
mined that they may together with the laws of nature be explained
in accordance with the categories of substance and cause ; though
arising in reality from a totally different principle. All this is
only meant to prevent a misunderstanding to which our doctrine,
which represents self-intuition as purely phenomenaf, might easily
be exposed. In what follows we shall have occasion to make
good use of it.
1 It k necesaary to put a comma after Pr&dicaU,
SUPPLEMENT XXVIII
[See page 400]
I HAVE sometimes called \\. formal idealism also, in order to dis*
tinguish it from the material or common idealism, which doubts
or denies the very existence of external things. In some cases it
seems advisable to use these terms rather than those in the text,
in order to prevent all misunderstanding. (This is an additional
note in the Second Edition.)
808
DONISTHOHPE. — Iniivi^ualiam. A System of Politics. By Words-
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