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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

(COMMUNIST DESIGNS ON INDONESIA AND
THE PACIFIC FRONTIER)

STAFF CONSULTATION WITH
GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY

FORMER CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EASTERN
COMMAND, UNDER GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 16, 1957
(INCLUDING INDEX)

Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99024° WASHINGTON : 1958

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

United States House of Representatives ^«^r? , J ^ i < I w
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman "
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York

CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California

JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana ROBERT J. McINTOSH, Michigan

Richard Arens, Staff Director
II

CONTENTS

Page
Synopsis 1

December 16, 1957, staff consultation with :

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby 5

Index i

Public Law 601, 79th Congress

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American
Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter
753, 2d session, which provides :

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, * * *

PART 2— RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Rule X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES
*******

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

Rule XI

POWEUS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,
is authorized to make from time to time investiagtions of (1) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and
(iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any
necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi-
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such
times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting,
has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person
designated by any such chairman or member.

Rule XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

Sec. 136. Tc assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem neces-
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the juris-
diction of such committee ; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent re-
ports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch
of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957
*******

Rule X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Con-
gress,

*******

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

*******

Rule XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American prop-
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress
in any necessary remedial legislation.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person
designated by any such chairman or member.

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary,
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that
purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by
the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

SYNOPSIS

Communist encroachments in Indonesia, actively abetted by Pres-
ident Sukarno, now threaten the entire United States defense line in
the Pacific, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby warned in a consultation
with the staff of the Committee on Un-American Activities.

The current crisis in that area, General "Willoughby charged, can be
traced directly to Communist subversion in Washington which in-
duced the United States Government to champion Sukarno in his
efforts to "liberate" the former Dutch Republic, despite his previous
role as one of Japan's chief wartime collaborators.

General Willoughby, former Chief of Intelligence in the Far East
for Gen. Douglas MacArthur, declared that the Russian plans for
conquest duplicate those of the Japanese in Southeast Asia in World
War II. The Japanese at that time and the Russians today, he de-
clared, were primarily concerned with —

(a) Control of strategic raw materials, such as oil, rubber, and
tin.

(b) Driving a wedge to separate the West from Asia, i. e., con-
trol of the Malay Barrier in terms of control of sealanes from the
Indian Ocean to the China Sea.

(d) Seizure of Dutch New Guinea and part of Australian
Papua and reaching for the Moluccas.

"The United States fought the Pacific war precisely to stop Japa-
nese expansion. Are they to capitulate to indirect infiltration by
world communism, aiming at the same strategic targets, that is, con-
trol of the Malay Barrier ?" he asked.

"In the face of brutal realities today, the decisions and actions
of the United States and the United Nations in the critical period
1945-49 have demonstrated once more an appalling ignorance of facts,
international prejudice, and political tendencies that played into the
hands of the Soviet Union and paved the way for the Communist
takeover of the Malay Barrier," General Willoughby continued.

"Most Americans were not aware that Washington was honey-
combed with Communist cells and Communist agents, many of them
in high places. They saw to it that the ultimate interests of global
communism were served by diverting, suppressing, or supplanting
public and governmental reports. Please bear in mind that this was
1947, the year of great betrayals from Peking to Madrid," General
Willoughby declared.

General Willoughby stated that Sukarno had been one of Japan's
leading collaborators during the war, and before that had been in
close contact with Communist leaders in Indonesia.

During the war, he said, "the Japanese had to draw on special
cements for their anti-Western propaganda and the elimination of
Western influence. They f oimd them in existing Communist factions,

2 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

their leaders and associates, which involved the nationalist inde-
pendence movement, Sukarno, Hatta, Dr. Radjiman, Dewantoro, and
others.

"These leaders promptly adopted the Japanese line. Their col-
laboration with the Japanese was complete. Sukarno promoted the
delivery of 2 million Indonesians for work on the southern coast of
Java, Papua, Borneo, Burma, and Siam, where they were treated as
coolie slaves. In their public speeches, these people adopted Japanese
slogans: 'Amerika kitta tarika — we shall flatten out America,' and
'Inggris kitta linggis — we shall overturn England.' Sukarno pressed
for the internment of all Dutch nationals. Postwar interrogation of
Japanese furnished the evidence.

"Nationalist leaders of substance were divided," General TVillough-
by continued; "some thought Japanese hegemony inevitable. Some
secretly abhorred Japanese domination, particularly the democratic,
Socialist, and Communist groups, and prepared for action by the time
Japan would be beaten. The leading figure among them was
Sukarno, who had come to the fore through his oratorical talent and
was imprisoned in the 1930's for sedition. He was made general polit-
ical adviser to the Japanese military government in Java and was
joined as deputy by Mohammed Hatta, an alumnus of the economic
faculty of Rotterdam.

"Before the war, Sukarno was in close touch with Communist
leaders through the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) and neglected
no opportunity to glorify the Soviet Union. In 1945, Sukarno tele-
graphed Stalin, congratulating him on cessation of hostilities and
'ultimate attainment of Russian aspirations.' At Madiun on Novem-
ber 6, 1949, Sukarno stated that 'Pesidino' (the youth section of
Sjahrir's Socialist Party) were expected to put Marx' theories into
practice. Speaking before a teachers congress at Solo, he repeated the
same confession of faith."

General Willoughby stated: "The links with communism and the
Kremlin are demonstrably present; indeed, the so-called nationalist
movements contain elements of Communist agitation and guidance,
in every known instance. Russia is exploiting the traditional Amer-
ican predilection for 'freedom' and 'anticolonialism' as a smokescreen
for the Czarist-Communist colonial expansion from Tashkent to
Mongolia. The 'nationalist' leaders are frequently Communist
stooges or Socialists en route to Marxism.

"The Communist Party theoretical Monthly 'Political Affairs,'
September 1947, laid down the official American Communist policy on
Indonesia one year before a United Nations Commission headed by
Mr. Graham, began to operate. The U. N. C. I. appeared to follow
the 'Political Affairs' piece almost to the letter.

"Further 'coincidental' action is noted in boycott of the Australian
waterfront federation of all Dutch shipping. The American Na-
tional Maritime Union then urged its membership to vote for such a
boycott.

"The local military leaders are worried over Sukarno's proposed
'administrative plans' that appear to them as sharply gravitating into
the Soviet orbit.

"In this connection, the person of Mohammed Hatta seems to emerge
in a new and favorable light. In spite of his Communist antecedents

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 3

(in the early phases of his career) Hatta has become distinctly luke-
warm vis-a-vis Soviet blandishments and actually broke with Sukarno
last year, because of the latter's growing pro-Soviet tendencies and
rather clumsy attempts to maneuver the Communists into his Cabinet
and the Government. This break must be regarded as a courageous
and significant act.

"The United States has declared itself and has defined an ultimate
Pacific defense line; the island chain running from South Korea,
Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines to New Guinea and Aus-
tralia. Encroachments on this line, via the Sundas and Moluccas
and aspirations for Dutch New Guinea (one of Sukarno's most active
political items) are an obvious threat to Australia and the southern
flank of the United States defense line.

"The weakening of this line is a prime Sino-Russian objective.
It explains their war against Korea and the endless pressures to
retrieve Formosa. If and when they dominate Indonesia and the Outer
Islands, they are at grips with Australia and can start to roll up
that defense line from the West. The situation and the thesis are
more readily understood on maps that (a) show the Pacific defense
lines; and (b) the southern flank of this line; that is, the significance
of the Moluccas and New Guinea.

"Most recent press reports quote an American authority not to be
taken lightly: Adm. Felix Stump, the commander in chief of the
Pacific. Stump's views are substantially as follows :

"i. Subversion might get out of hand before (the United States)
could do anything about it.

"ii. Indonesia has gone so far 'playing ball with the Eeds' that
the present government may not be able to turn back.

"iii. The Indonesian administration has relied heavily on its native
Communist Party, has yielded to pressures and concluded trade agree-
ments with several Communist countries.

"iv. The Indonesian Eeds appear to have reached a point where
they will demand to be paid off for past services.

"Indonesia is not a member of the SEATO defense organization.
Hence, we could not interfere with any overt or covert 'Red aggres-
sions.' The Soviets could and probably will obtain bases and ports
in much the same surreptitious manner in which they obtained them
in Syria. I maintain that the Russians are starting where the Japa-
nese left off. They want control of the Malay Barrier to seal off
southeast Asia and drive a wedge between our Pacific defense line,
the Indian Ocean areas, and Eastern sealanes."

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
(Communist Designs on Indonesia and the Pacific Frontier)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1957

United States House of Representatives,

Committee on Un-American Activities,

Washington, D. C.

staff consultation

The following consultation with Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby,
United States Army, retired, was held with the staff of the Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities at 10 a. m. December 16, 1957, in the
Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C, pursuant to the au-
thorization of the Committee on Un-American Activities composed of :

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York

CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON. California

JAMES B. FRAZ1ER, Jr., Tennessee GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana ROBERT J. McINTOSH, Michigan

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director (presiding) ;
Richard S. Weil and William F. Heimlich, staff members.

Mr. Arens. Pursuant to the policy of the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities to assemble factual material from authoritative sources
respecting international communism, we shall today take up the matter
of Communist designs on Indonesia and the Pacific frontier.

We are privileged to welcome to the consultation a distinguished
soldier and author, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, now retired,
whose experience and outstanding military career in the service of
this Nation are now a part of history. He is here at the request of
Chairman Francis E. Walter.

MAJ. GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(RETIRED)

Mr. Arens. General Willoughby, for the purpose of this record,
would you please sketch your background, beginning with your name
and your present address '?

General Willoughby. My name is Charles A. Willoughby, and I
reside at 3602 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C. I was com-
missioned in the United States Army in 1915. I served on the Mexican
border and in the First World War. I attended various service
schools, including the Command and General Staff School and the
War College. Throughout the Second World War and later, during
the occupation of Japan and the Korean conflict, I was chief of intel-
ligence on the staff of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. For more than a
decade, therefore, I was in the Pacific and South Pacific areas. I
returned home with General MacArthur and accepted retirement.

Mr. Arens. As you know, General, the subject today centers on the
Indonesian area. Would you please sketch for us at the outset the
extent and quality of your sources of information \

G INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

General TVilloughby. Since my retirement, I have had access to
no intelligence reports. My present views are private and personal,
based on long experience in the area and upon 40 years of training
and deduction. Both political and military intelligence are largely
a matter of files and indices. Our press services are good examples
of intelligence, as witness recent articles on Indonesia in various news-
papers and magazines. Evaluation and interpretation of data are,
of course, a matter of experience in a particular field. As a linguist,
I read essential French, Spanish, Italian, and German papers regu-
larly, and it is astonishing how much they and the technical journals
reveal. The magazine "Zeit," published in Hamburg, for instance,
recently ran a minutely detailed article on how the Soviet Union ab-
ducted and emplo}^ed German scientists in the rocket and missile field.
I have here a brief bibliography of documentations and sources.1
Finally, I specifically invite your attention to my years in the Pacific
as chief of the information-gathering services, a position which
brought me into intimate contact with people and events that are
today the subject of inquiry.

Mr. Arens. What current basic preparations have you made for
your presentation today ?

General Willoughby. The individuals whose reports I have digested
for you are those whom I have known in peace and war. They are
Adm. C. E. L. Helfrich, wartime commander in chief of the Nether-
lands East Indies Navy ; Dr. Albert Hyma, of the University of Mich-
igan; Maj. Gen. W. F. Spoor, of the Royal Netherlands East Indies
Army, and who was attached to my office in the Allied Information
Bureau during the war and conducted the successful police action
against the Jakarta Republic in 1947 ; Hon. C. van der Plas, a high-
ranking Javanese administrator; Dr. E. Van der Vlught, interna-
tional lawyer and editor; Sir Viner Brooks, the Rajah of Sarawak,

1 See appendix for Bibliography — Documentation and Sources, p. 37.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 7

and numerous British, Dutch, and Australians of authority and long
experience in southeast Asia. Incidentally, I divorce myself from
any critical comments on our policies in those areas, since the Govern-
ment probably has far more data at hand than I. I abstain from
speculating on why United States and United Nations pursued cer-
tain policies in the Indonesian area in 1946-47, and you can draw
your own conclusions from the facts.

Mr. Arens. Have you filed your reports with United States author-
ities since your retirement ?

General Willoughby. The eclipse of MacArthur affected his imme-
diate staff — sic transit gloria mundi. They do not enjoy the confi-
dence or favor of the Pentagon. They have not asked my views, and
I assume that they do not want them. I have offered my services, and
they were declined. However, I have written extensively for publica-
tion; books and magazine articles have appeared in Readers Digest,
Cosmopolitan, National Review, and elsewhere. Some of these arti-
cles have found their way into the Congressional Record. My pur-
pose, of course, was not capricious criticism, but an effort to offset the
leftist trends in some quarters and the obviously calculated attempts
to brainwash an uninformed public by certain tax-exempt founda-
tions— sociological brood sows, suckling a weird assortment of leftists,
Marxists, and pseudointellectuals.

Mr. Arens. Would you characterize the significance of Indonesia
in the global struggle between the forces of the West and of inter-
national communism ?

General Willoughby. The term "significance" can best be defined
in its relation to (a) the economy of natural resources and (b) the
geopolitical value of the "Malay Barrier."

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

I -SS5J?

* .S*

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 9

The wealth of natural resources of this area is well known : rubber,
oil, tin, and bauxite. The Japanese General Staff understood this
perfectly. Indonesia became one of its chief economic targets. The
Japanese fleet, based on Singapore and Brunei was self-supporting
as regards oil. Today, Soviet Russia, in its drive toward warm
water ports and the Indian Ocean, will simply adopt the Japanese
plans of conquest, though they may operate (as usual) through pup-
pet governments. Conversely, at the beginning of World War II,
the Allies were compelled to defend, retain, and control the strategic
raw materials in the Indonesia area. The last line of defense was
the so-called "Malay Barrier."

Mr. Arens. What is the Malay Barrier ?

General Willoughby. The term "Malay Barrier" originated in
prewar British- American conferences. The Malay Barrier was de-
fined as the "chain of peninsulas and islands between the Isthmus of
Kraa and West Australia, comprising Malaya, Sumatra, Java, the
Simda Islands, and Timor."

The Barrier had first-rate ports, airfields, good communications by
road, rail, and sea. Then and now it could not be reached by land;
it required a naval expedition. The fall of the Barrier would (and
did) entail the fall of Singapore and expose India and Australia;
in fact, the loss of the Barrier would split the Western World and
force eventual allied advances (for reconquest) to base on the United
States or Europe.

All allied prewar strategic planning, conferences and decisions,
from Alfred Duff Cooper to Gen. Archibald Wavell, stressed the
enormous significance of the Malay Barrier and decided on its de-
fense. The fact that it was a case of "too late" and "not enough,"
does not diminish its strategic value, then or now.

If we substitute Japan (as of 1942) with China-Russia (as of
1957) the Barrier remains as important as ever and its potential loss,
in wrong hands, remains a direct threat to Australia and the defense
of the Western Pacific.

Like the Suez, the Malay Barrier is one of the great strategic areas
of the world. In the wrong hands, it spells diplomatic problems
and military danger for the West. Had it remained in Dutch hands,
for the orderly, evolutionary transition from the Netherlands East
Indies to a federation of native states (as planned), Indonesia could
have remained firmly allied to the West. Today, it represents a power
vacuum, probably to be filled by imperialist communism.

Mr. Arens. What transpired in Indonesia during the Japanese
occupation ?

General Willoughby. During the period of occupation (1942-45),
the Japanese planned and executed the deliberate destruction of
every vestige of white dominion. The Dutch population was herded
into concentration camps to endure every privation and indignity.
The mass of simple Indonesians did not participate in this action.
They had no real grievances against the Dutch. Lt. Gen. Reikichi
Tada, Japanese Army, reported (1943) textually:

* * * The Dutch Colonial Administration has been able, to a high degree.
The N. E. I. became self-supporting as regards rice. There was no trouble with
food and housing. The natives lived happily under the Dutch, who cared for
the Indonesian people remarkably well. Only 200,000 Dutch ably governed 60
million natives * * *.

10 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The Japanese had to draw on special elements for their anti-
Western propaganda and the elimination of Western influence. They
found them in existing Communist factions, their leaders and asso-
ciates, which involved the "nationalist independence movements,"
Sukarno, Hatta, Dr. Eadjiman, Dewantoro, and others. These lead-
ers promptly adopted the Japanese "line." Their collaboration with
the Japanese was complete. Sukarno promoted the delivery of
2,000,000 Indonesians for work on the southern coast of Java, Papua,
Borneo, Burma, and Siam, where they were treated as coolie slaves.
In their public speeches, these people adopted Japanese slogans:
"Amerika kitta tarika — we shall flatten out America" and "Inggris
kitta linggis — we shall overturn England." Sukarno pressed for the
internment of all Dutch nationals. Postwar interrogation of Japa-
nese furnished the evidence.

* * * in 1942, the Japanese did not proceed to intern all Netherlands subjects.

* * * The Japanese Civil Service strongly urged the employment of Dutch
officials. This development was a thorn in the flesh of leading Indonesian
personages.

* * * Sukarno and Hatta were in close touch with Headquarters of the Japa-
nese 16th Army. In a conversation with Major General Haiada, Sukarno said :

(confirmed by separate report of the Chief of the Kempetal in
Batavia) —

* * * You assured us that Dutch influence would be eliminated. Instead
you are placing the Dutch in employment. I request you to intern the Dutch
population as quickly as possible and repay them in their own coin for their
tyrannical past record * * *.

Sukarno's ruthless hostility against the Dutch is the posture
adopted by all Japanese collaborators, from Manila to Saigon, a play
ostensibly to protect "national independence" from the Japanese con-
querors. The ruse seemed to work. These political opportunists
were actually supported by the West, in the postwar period. The
"double standard" of the U. N. (so evident in the Hungarian upris-
ing) also operated in the Far East: The "Quislings" in Europe were
tried as war criminals; in the Far East, they became chief magis-
trates.

Mr. Arens. What is your appraisal of the many so-called national-
ist movements?

General Willoughby. The links with communism and the Kremlin
are demonstrably present; indeed, the so-called "nationalist move-
ments" contain elements of Communist agitation and guidance, in
every known instance. Russia is exploiting the traditional American
predilection for "freedom" and "anticolonialism" as a smoke screen
for the Czarist-Communist colonial expansion from Tashkent to
Mongolia. The "nationalist" leaders are frequently Communist
stooges or socialists en route to Marxism.

Mr. Arens. Is this the case in Indonesia ?

General Willoughby. Yes, before the war, Sukarno was in close
touch with Communist leaders through the P. N. I. (Partai Nasional
Indonesia) and neglected no opportunity to glorify the Soviet Union.
In 1945, Sukarno telegraphed Stalin, congratulating him on cessation
of hostilities and "ultimate attainment of Russian aspirations." At
Madiun on November 6, 1949, Sukarno stated that "Pesidino" (the
youth section of Sjahrir's Socialist Party) were expected to put Marx's
theories into practice. Speaking before a teachers congress at Solo,
he repeated the same confession of faith.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 11

Sukarno's associate Hatta, the vice president of the Jokja regime,
was long before 1940, the leader of the "Perhimpunan Indonesia," a
student movement organized along strict Communist lines. As far
back as 1927, Hatta had been a delegate of the "International Congress
of the Leagues for the Prevention of Colonial Oppression," a flam-
boyant Communist front. For years, Hatta kept on close terms
with Alimin, then in residence in Moscow.

Another intimate, Sjahrir was in close contact with Alimin, i. e., the
Soviet Cominform. It was Sjahrir who appointed the notorious C. II.
Campbell as Trade Commissioner in Australia. This first representa-
tive of the Kepublic abroad also happened to be Secretary of the Com-
munist Party in Sidney.

The record of pro-Communist connections by persons high in the
councils of the Republic is voluminous. The advent of these people
to unrestricted power was predicated on conditions of chaos and an-
archy, immediately following the Japanese surrender.

Mr. Arexs. What was the political situation in Indonesia in the
period immediately following cessation of hostilities in 1915 ?

General Willoughby. I will quote here in full, a letter released
by Adm. C. E. L. Helfrich, N. E. I. N., who commanded the naval
forces in the battle of Maccassar Straits (1912). Admiral Helfrich
addressed himself to Gen. Douglas MacArthur through the N. E. I.
Command. It had in the meantime been passed to Mountbatteivs
command. The Admiral's letter is of sharp historical significance.

Batavia, 20th October, 1945
General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Pacific,
G. H. Q.-AFPAC

I regret to have to intrude on your precious time but I feel I want to write to
you personally, because conditions in the Netherlands East Indies are developing
so unfavourably that, if no action is taken immediately, only a catastrophe can
follow.

My return to this country after a long period of exile was none but a great
disillusion. Political and military mistakes are made which seem unbelievable,
but none the less are true, whilst there is no prospect yet of any improvement.

In the first place, I have to state that the N. E. I. [Netherlands East Indies]
and its population had to wait for a long time before the British and Allies re-
turned to the country. Only on the loth of September one British cruiser and
one Netherlands cruiser arrived and the first small British landing only took
place on the 29th of that month.

Meanwhile Soekarno (the "President of the Indonesian Republic") with his
satellites had moved about freely, taking advantage of the obvious proof of
inability we showed.

On the 2nd of October I arrived at Batavia and noticed a hostile atmosphere
which especially was marked by the Indonesian flags (red and white), as well as
by the many insulting slogans on public buildings, streetcars and other means of
transport.

In my opinion the British made their first political mistake when they did not
declare immediately and clearly that they solely recognized the Netherlands
Authority. On the contrary, at press conferences the general impression
was made that they had nothing to do with "internal" politics, as a consequence
of which one generally concluded that the Netherlands Authority and that of
Soekarno were put on the same level. It is true that later on the Supreme
Commander declared that the statements of the British General Christison had
been interpreted absolutely wrongly, but the above mentioned impression had
been made, and the reactions to it were very unfavourable.

I simply cannot understand that the British did not explain from the very
beginning that first of all Netherlands Authority had to be restored. For had
not Japan surrendered to the United Nations of which the Kingdom of the
Netherlands forms an integral part? A Netherlands representative signed the

SC024'— 5S 3

12 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Document of Surrender in Tokyo Bny on behalf of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands. In the clause, which you personally signed, it is indicated clearly that
this signing was also done in the interest of all United Nations at war with
Japan.

The foundation of the Republic Indonesia by Soekarno, led and supported by
the Japanese oppressors, was clearly unlawful and even a semblance of rec-
ognition thereof would mean a strengthening of the Japanese political game.

The untenable situation which at present exists is mainly created by this
political weakness of the British. It is my firm conviction that nothing would
have happened if it would have been stated from the very beginning that first
the Netherlands Authority had to be restored and that only after that dis-
cussions would be held between this Netherlands Authority and the representa-
tives of the Indonesian political parties concerning (a) the structure of the
Government of the N. E. I., and (b) the place which this country would hold
in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Moreover, it should have been stated that these discussions would be based
on the radio speech delivered by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina on December 7,
1942, for in that speech Her Majesty made it clear that after the end of the
war a conference would be held by representatives of all parts of the Kingdom
(all members of the conference having equal rights) in order to discuss the
new political structure of the Kingdom with a view to a higher grade of in-
dependence for all parts concerned. (It is very unfortunate that (a) through
lack of proper propaganda, and (b) because Her Majesty made this speech
in exile during the German occupation of Holland as well as the N. E. I., this
speech could not then be made sufficiently clear to all of Her Majesty's sub-
jects.)

However, when Soekarno noticed that one did not entirely reject the new
Republic, he and his satellites automatically became encouraged to go on with
their unlawful business, stimulated by British and Dutch military impotence
and by an unbelievably weak British military generalship.

The reasons for the Dutch inability are well known to you. Through the late
liberation of the Netherlands we were unable to strengthen our forces in time.
Moreover, we did not get shipping at our disposal to transport the troops already
available, and other reinforcements. One even denied us the ships under the
Dutch flag, although during the whole war we put our entire shipping at the
disposal of the Allied cause.

The British impotence could be explained by the fact that through the change
of the boundaries of the war theatres they fairly suddenly were put before a
much bigger commitment. I am convinced, however, that even with the available
weak power one could have performed miracles if one would have taken action
immediately.

Neither did I understand the British attitude toward the Japanese from the
very beginning onward. The Japanese army soon backed out of their obligations
to maintain law and order. The Japs interned themselves, withdrew into well-
equipped camps, gathered big stores and even gave or sold their arms to the
Indonesian rebels.

It is possible that there still are many moderate Indonesian leaders with whom
one could talk, but I am strongly convinced that the whole movement tends to
the side of the extremists, which is very powerful, and which under Japanese
propaganda and leadership has created some sort of guerrilla army; moreover,
tbis army at present is supplied with Japanese arms.

This guerrilla army, under fanatical leadership, mainly consists of youths of
between 10 and 20 years of age, which I should like to compare with the "Hitler
Jugend," and which adhere to complete independence free from any foreign
influence or domination (Indonesia Merdekal ) .

The things that happen, in the meantime, are unbelievable. At present the
P. O. W. and Internee Camps for women and children are still overcrowded.
Though of course the food situation has improved a little bit, the same misery
exists as under Japanese domination, but what is more, the thousands and
thousands of women and children in the camps in the middle and eastern part
of Java are a prey for the armed Indonesian bands which in those parts are the
absolute rulers. Fear for reprisals is the main reason which withholds us now,
now that it is too late, to take powerful action, but even if I should like to
maintain law and order myself, this is impossible to me because the British
General wishes this to be done solely by British troops. Up till now the entry
of Dutch troops was even forbidden for fear of reprisals in the above-mentioned
camps.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 13

One can even say that public life is entirely in the hands of the republicans ;
even in areas occupied by the British, such as Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bandoeng,
all public works (telephone, telegraph, electrical supply, water supply, indus-
tries, railroads and means of transport) are in the hands of the rebels and the
British declare themselves incapable to take over these works.

The weapons trade is in full swing. The "Hitler Jugend" disposes of the
most modern small arms, machine guns, hand grenades and even tanks and
armoured cars. Uninterrupted they build up supplies of arms, unpunished they
terrorize the whole population, especially Europeans, Indo-Europeans, Ambonese
and Menadonese.

Even Batavia is absolutely unsafe. Murdering and looting is the order of the
day, even in full daylight. The entire British and Netherlands Authority is a
farce and I am unable to undertake anything myself because I am under the
orders of the Supreme Commander and because only he is fully responsible.

I need not tell you what value under these circumstances one has to attach to
the Authority of the Netherlands Indies Government.

Even the Prisoners of War and Internee Relief Agency can only perform its
duties with the permission of the Indonesians and during the last weeks it was
even impossible for this organization to carry on with its work.

The rebels have the entire broadcasting system at their disposal which, un-
disturbed, extends its mischievous influence over the whole of the N. E. I. The
British are doing nothing to prevent this.

In Tandjong-Priok harbour I had to unload ships with European personnel,
because all native labour went on strike and because the British hesitated to use
Japanese P. O. W.s for this work.

The whole situation is bewildering and greatly discouraging.

We will ultimately succeed, but only after a great loss of prestige, a hard
struggle against extremists and an enmity between the white and coloured parts
of the population which will only abate after a long period.

I am convinced that only strong political pressure by the well-meaning mem-
bers of the United Nations on the British Labour Government could change the
situation in a favourable way ; this action should be combined with a clear state-
ment addressed to the rebels that continuation of the present situation could only
result in the use of powerful military means.

Finally, a quick removal of the Japanese troops will greatly contribute to
the restoration of law and order.

The Netherlands East Indies in the hands of Soekarno and his followers or
any other Indonesian party will only bring chaos to this country and will only
create a permanent danger for peace in the Pacific. An independent Indonesia
is impossible and will within a short time become a target for political and mili-
tary powers which aim at upsetting the hard-won peace.

So much for the situation in the Netherlands East Indies.

Wishing you strength and courage in your extremely difficult task, which
no doubt is also being made more difficult by outside subversive political in-
fluences, I am,

C. E. L. Helfrich
Admiral, R. N. N.

Mr. Heimlich. Did General MacArthur have any proposed solu-
tion to the deteriorating situation in Indonesia in 19-45 ?

General Willoughby. General MacArthur had just completed the
recapture of Borneo, utilizing the Australian Army under General
Blarney. If MacArthur had had his way, the Borneo campaign
would have been extended to include the recapture of Java and the
Netherlands East Indies. Responsibility for the N. E. I. was abrupt-
ly transferred from MacArthur to Mountbatten, who had no immedi-
ate means to occupy the islands and disarm the Japanese. A small
British Force finally appeared after weeks of a virtual interregnum,
since the Japanese pulled back to self-appointed camps, thus leaving
local Government to their wartime collaborators, who promptly
launched the present "Republic" with Sukarno as the head. The
General made a comment of historical significance :

I had planned to move immediately on to Java with the Australian troops
and restore the Dutch Government under Van Mook, which would have rapidly
brought law and order there as it had done in New Guinea.

14 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

For some reason never understood, this proposed movement was peremptorily
called off and forbidden from Washington, in spite of my insistence of its com-
plete success with little loss. This was one of the grave mistakes of the war,
and ultimately resulted in the chaotic conditions which followed in that part
of Indonesia. It completely violated the basic principle of American foreign
policy to support the orderly development of dependent areas toward self-
government.

I foresaw this, but my counsel was Ineffective to change what I regarded
as a political interference in a basically military problem. I was to find this
deadly weapon in constant future use against me.

Mr. Arens. Why did the Dutch Government relinquish control of
Indonesia ?

General Willoughby. The pattern is confused. I could summar-
ize events as (a) the effect of British pressure on Queen Wilhelmina
in exile, a sort of dog-in-the-manger advice since the British Gov-
ernment was then contemplating getting out of India ; ( b ) a sudden
shift of command authority from MacArthur to Mountbatten; (c)
the vacillating attitude of General Christison, the initial British
occupation commander; (d) Japanese duplicity in sponsoring the
"Republic of Indonesia" on the eve of their surrender as a malicious
blow against the Dutch ; (e) the illegal transfer of weapons and arma-
ment to the "Republicans," i. e. the Jokja (Sukarno) Government;
(/) the negotiations of Van Mook with Sukarno; (g) relentless pres-
sure of the U. N. on the Dutch, the by now habitual attitude of this
body to be tough with "small" nations and "cautious" with the big
fellows, i. e. Russia.

The crazyquilt of the story from 1947 to 1949, is covered by a com-
petent American historian, Dr. Albert Hyma, of the University of
Michigan, and the erudite notes of the late Dr. Ebed Van der Vlugt,
international lawyer and editor of "Le Monde Nouveau"; he served
as an intelligence officer with the British. My own information is
entirely confirmatory of the general pattern.

Dr. Hyma's analysis may be quoted as follows :

* * * On December 6, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, then in exile in
England, laid down certain principles of liberation after the war.

* * * The Queen proposed a revised structure of Government in which the
Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curacao would jointly participate on a
footing of independence. In this structure, there would be no place for dis-
crimination on the ground of race or country- * * *

* * * Queen Juliana fulfilled her mother's promise when she signed a treaty
giving Indonesia her independence in 1949.

In Indonesia there was initially no more pro- Japanese sentiment
than in the Philippines or in any of the British possessions.
Throughout the year 1941, and the first half of 1942, the loyalty of
the Indonesian population wTas unquestioned. The "Federation of
Nationalists" including labor unions and the Moslem groups declared
in support of the Dutch Government. It took special Japanese prop-
aganda efforts to dislodge this trend. The great majority of Indo-
nesian nationalists were men of integrity ; they knew that national in-
dependence was certain to come, for in each decade some progress
had been made in that direction.

Leaning on their public collaborators in mid-1944, the Japanese
made some vague promises of independence (following Wilhelmina
belatedly after a lapse of 3 years). When military defeat was im-
minent, Count Terauchi, the Japanese Supreme Commander, sum-
moned Sukarno and Hatta to Saigon, August 9, to receive instruc-

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 15

tions. The Japanese-sponsored "Republic of Indonesia" was not de-
clared until August 17, 1945, 2 days after the Japanese acceptance of
surrender terms. There was no consultation with proper representa-
tives of the people. Actually, the Republic was declared by "The
Communist Students Committee." The Japanese forces then with-
drew ostensibly from further responsibility for public law and order.

There was a lapse of 6 weeks before a small British force appeared
under General Christison. The Dutch were unable to mobilize ade-
quate forces except a naval contingent under Admiral Helfrich. The
British would not return the Dutch ships that were pooled during the
war. Instead, the British employed them to repatriate their own
forces. This circumstance must be viewed in the light of General
MaeArthur's plan to move from Borneo into the Netherlands East
Indies, which could have been done easily. "Higher authorities"
(whoever they were) suddenly shifted command to Mountbatten, who
had no troops to spare.

Shrewdly, the group centered on Jokja and Sukarno, took ad-
vantage of the hiatus to expedite their own plans for complete in-
dependence. "Home Guard" units had been trained by the Japanese
and thus formed an immediately available sizable Republican Army.
Contrary to the terms of surrender, the Japanese continued to fur-
nish arms and materiel. Thus even before the British appeared, the
new regime was ostensibly a going concern.

It was an "opportunist" creation — without popular sanction or
elections and without power to establish law and order. In the riot-
ous employment of irresponsible, immature elements, thousands of
Chinese and Eurasians were killed. One Governor of East Java has
estimated that in the Republican disorders between 1915 and 1919,
some 2 million natives and other inhabitants lost their lives and
property. The basis for these outrages are clearly discernible in
Admiral Helfrich's "on the spot" report of October 1945. The Dutch
exercised considerable patience before taking military measures —
"police actions" as they were compelled by public disorder. The
Dutch Government was already pledged to a Federation of Indo-
nesian States. Sukarno's slogan: "Merdeka" — which means one na-
tion, one people, one language, was sheer demagoguery. The Indo-
nesian reality comprised 58 races with 58 languages and dialects, vary-
ing customs, laws, characteristics and stages of development. Hostile
attitudes toward one another was the rule rather than the exception.
The Dutch had managed to respect and preserve local autonomy over
the centuries. Against a background of British, U. N. and Australian
pressure, they accepted the de facto Jokja Republic (central Java) to
the extent of their actual control. The Republicans pledged accept-
ance of the principle of Federation and a Netherlands-Indonesian Un-
ion— a pledge they had no intention to fill.

Mr. Arens. What role did the British Occupation authorities play
at this juncture?

General Willoughby. Lord Mountbatten appeared to realize that
he had made a political mistake. On September 3, 1915, he ordered
the Japanese to dissolve the newly proclaimed Republic. Later in
the month, he gave orders to the Japanese to refrain from giving
over the administration of Java to any political party.

Contrary to these instructions, Mountbatten's deputy, General
Christison, made immediate concessions to the Sukarno group.

16 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Admiral Helfrich protested violently. Christison issued orders that
no Dutch troops were to land in Java, although the island was as
much of a Dutch possession as Malaya was British.

Evidently there were influences operating behind the scenes.
Mountbatten changed his tune and recommended that the Dutch also
"negotiate" with the "nationalists." Helfrich's main concern was
the establishment of law and order, the release and care of Dutch
internees. Christison now proposed a "round table" discussion with
the Indonesian "Nationalists." This act amounted to de facto recog-
nition.

The Netherlands Government was already committed to the estab-
lishment of an Indonesian Federation. The Outer Islands, however,
declined to recognize the Javanese, the "Jokja" Republic. The legit-
imate Dutch solution was a "federation" composed of the de facto
Jokja Republic plus at least two states in the Outer Islands, which
had already formed Governments of their own and welcomed the re-
turning Dutch. The clash that was impending was therefore be-
tween the Dutch, the Outer Islands and the central Javanese regime.
This split was to be repeated again hi 1956 and 1957, along similar
geographical lines.

In this critical phase, the Netherlands Home Government fumbled
badly. Instead of backing Helfrich against Christison, they prac-
tically repudiated the Admiral. Initially, the Hague refused to let
their representatives deal with Sukarno. In November 1945 Dr. Van
Mook, long associated with the Netherlands East Indies appeared on
the scene and conferred with Sukarno. In the presence of van der
Plas (attached to Mac Arthur's Headquarters in the early days) Van
Mook advised Helfrich that the Dutch Minister of Overseas Terri-
tories had given him permission to negotiate with Sukarno. This
statement has later been questioned. While pushing the Dutch
against the wall, the British confirmed their possession of Sarawak,
on Borneo, by proclaiming it a "Crown Colony". At the same time
British forces were withdrawn from Java to reinforce the British
colony of Malaya. Here we see once again that international cancer,
the "dual standard."

Conceding legitimate nationalist aspirations, the Republic of Jokja
as of 1945, can hardly be considered as "representative" in the parlia-
mentary sense, or an expression of popular universal will.

Mr. Arens. What actions were taken by Communists and/or anti-
Communists ?

General Willoughby. At this point, the P. K. I. (Communist
Party) entered the picture aggressively. "Red Army" units were
organized in Java and Sumatra. There were some interesting fea-
tures: Tan Malakka, old-time Communist, was arrested and jailed.
Actually it was a victory of one Communist faction over another.
Amir Sjarifuddin, Moscow's secret agent, had orders to purge
Malakka. As he was at that time Secretary of Defense of the Jokja
Republic he was most effective. This obviously strengthened the
Stalinist Communists. Prewar Red leaders returned from exile head-
ed by Alimin. Understanding the predilection of the West for seman-
tic generalities, they adopted the cover of "independence" and "na-
tionalism." The year 1948 brought another attempt at Communist
armed insurrection. There were intimate discussions with party

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 17

leaders in Russia, Australia and England. Tom Driberg of the left-
wing British Labor Party figured in these contacts. The veteran
Muso, backed by the full weight of the Kremlin returned to Indonesia.
This will illustrate the shifting character of Indonesian politics: In
1946 the Republicans crushed the diversionist Tan Malakka by an
alliance with the Comintern Alimin. Now, they engaged Tan Mal-
akka, in turn, to assist in the liquidation of Muso-Alimin and Sjari-
fuddin. Muso was executed and about 35,000 of his adherents placed
in concentration camps. The Jokja Government gained great prestige
abroad by this anti-Communist action. Later events were to demon-
strate that the orientation of Indonesian leaders toward Soviet Russia
had not abated.

In the meantime, nothing was done to activate the "federation"
agreed upon at the Linggadjati Agreement, March 25, 1947. The Re-
publicans had demonstrated complete intransigence. The Dutch posi-
tion was supported by the later Renville Agreement (aboard the Amer-
ican ship Renville) , Jan. 17, 1948. The "sovereignty" of the Nether-
lands was again confirmed until effective transfer to the Federated
States of Indonesia. The Jokja Republic (Sukarno) was that of a
"component" state. As late as January 20, 1948, the United States
State Department considered the agreement "a healthy basis for the
political and economic development of Indonesia."

There is evidence that the Republicans had no intention to abide
by these agreements. On January 25, 1948, General Sudirman said in
a formal broadcast : "* * * that he did not consider the armed forces
bound by that agreement."

At this juncture, the Dutch applied military force and quickly occu-
pied all important points in Republican-controlled territory. With-
out bloodshed, the entire Republican administration was captured in
its capital Jogjakarta.

This brilliant military action was conducted by Maj. Gen. Spoor,
Netherlands East Indies Army, who had been attached to G-2 at
MacArthur's Headquarters in 1942. He controlled the N. E. I.
branch of the "Allied Intelligence Bureau" which handled operations
in enemy territory during the war. He died in 1951, frustrated and
embittered, his successful operations completely nullified.

This drastic action raised a worldwide furor, based on ignorance
of the complex situation. If. was a Roman holiday for "neutralists"
and Communist sympathizers. Naturally India took a lead and sum-
moned a protest assembly to be held in the spring of 1949. United
Nations action was demanded.

I wish to pause here and bring to your attention an important Com-
munist paper of American origin, the September 1947 issue of "Politi-
cal Affairs", the American Communist Party organ, delineating pol-
icy, at a high level. The date is important.

Mr. Arens. The committee assumes that you develop this document
as a feature of international Communist planning, postwar or current,
and that it has a direct bearing on the Indonesian situation?

General Willoughby. The relationship of this document (of
American origin) with the Indonesian embroglio, of the period, is so
striking that it cannot be called a "coincidence."

We have already established the quasi-Communist background of
certain Indonesian leaders who vaulted into political control after afiil-

18 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

iations or sympathetic collaboration with the Japanese occupation
troops. Considering the international character of Communist ma-
neuvers, light is thrown on the Indonesian situation in an article by
Charles Bidien in "Political Affairs," the American Communist Party
organ, September 1947. Bidien is a Kremlin trained Communist agi-
tator; he was finally arrested for deportation (1949). This Commu-
nist "insider" revealed that the Indonesian Government was about
two-thirds Communist controlled. The sinister implications of this
article, laying down Communist policy for Indonesia (1947) is the
fact that a U. N. commission, headed by Frank Porter Graham (1948)
appeared to have followed Bidien's recommendations almost to the
letter. Note these extracts from the Bidien article :

(1) * * * the impact of the Socialist revolution in czarist Russia gave tre-
mendous impetus to the colonial liberation movement (in Indonesia and else-
where) * * * (Communist) revolts broke out in Java and Sumatra (1926-27),

* * * The Socialist Party of Indonesia, basing its political position on Mao
Tse-tung's writings, has worked in harmony with the Indonesian Gommunist
Party for the past two years (1946-47) .

* * * Today, the government is a coalition of the Nationalist, Moslem,
Socialist, Labor, Peasant and Communist Parties.

* * * They must insist that no American supplies be sent to the Dutch * * * ;
and a boycott should be declared here on Dutch goods, and an embargo on
Dutch * * * shipping * * *.

* * * the National Maritime Union in the United States has called on its
members to vote affirmatively that the entire membership "boycott all vessels
designed to aid the Dutch in their war of aggression." * * *

* * * the demands of the (Sukarno) Republic are clear: (a) international
supervision of the cease-fire order * * *; (b) withdrawal of Dutch troops
from Indonesia; * * * (c) * * * diplomatic recognition ; * * * (d) member-
ship in the United Nations ; (e) * * * there must be no bypassing of the U. N. by
the United States * * *.

This is the year 1947, when Soviet influence in the U. N. was strong
enough to indict "colonialism" as a smokescreen of their own Siberian
and Central Asian conquests and almost succeeded in ostracizing
Catholic Spain, the only European power to defeat Stalin in the
Civil War of 1936-39. We have here one of many examples of the
TJ. N. operating for and in behalf of Communist-front governments
and, as an end result, to facilitate Communist ultimate takeover.

The Communist Party theoretical Monthly "Political Affairs,"
September 1947, laid down the official American Communist policy
on Indonesia one year before a United Nations Commission headed
by Mr. Graham, began to operate. The U. N. C. I. appeared to fol-
low the "Political Affairs" piece almost to the letter.

Further "coincidental" action is noted in boycott of the Australian
waterfront federation of all Dutch shipping. The American Na-
tional Maritime Union then urged its membership to vote for such
a boycott.

Mr. Arens. General, there were newspapermen in that area at the
time. Do you recall their summaries of the situation there?

General Willoughby. The press representatives are always a su-
perior factfinding mechanism; indeed, they provide superior intelli-
gence although their on-the-spot reports may be subject to editing in
the home office. The shrewd, able, and sometimes cynical reporters
were well aware of the ambiguous part played by the United Nations
Indonesian Commission. Fifteen reputable reporters traveled to
southeast Asia to get at the truth of the Indonesian situation. Thir-
teen of them were killed in a plane crash at Bombay on their way home.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 19

I have here extracts from their eyewitness reports that are most
significant.

H. R. Knickerbocker wrote :

What we have done new is to force out the Dutch so fast that the place of
power they leave empty will be filled either by the Soviet Union or the United
States. If we had been less hasty, the Dutch might have and I think would have
filled this power vacuum. Now the United States will have to take over from
the Dutch the task of keeping communism out of Indonesia. Considering our
record in China, the only people that can be happy about this are the Communists.

Mr. Knickerbocker also said the following :

United Nations interference in the Dutch East Indies has greatly increased
the danger of communism here and has promoted the interests of the Soviet
Union * * * the most disturbing single discovery we made here was that the
U. N. observers seem to be proceeding as the most unscientific of "scientists."
They came here with a thesis to uphold ; the thesis that the Dutch were always
wrong and the Indonesian Republic always right. Their reports coincide with
this preconceived thesis. * * *

One of the reporters out there was a Pulitzer prize winner, Mr.
S. Burton Heath. He wrote this :

Only two things have been established beyond doubt. One is that the repre-
sentatives of the State Department here actively resent the coming of American
newspapermen who almost unanimously condemn the State Department's Indo-
nesian policy as a menace to American security. The other is that American
and Australian junior officers assigned as field observers for the United Nations
are convinced that their factual reports are being distorted before they are
passed on to Washington, Canberra, and Lake Success. They say it is useless
to submit antirepublican or pro-Dutch reports. * * *

Most reporters wrote similar complaints. Mr. William H. Newton
said :

American observers representing the United Nations here say they are unable
to send objective reports to either the United States Government or the United
Nations concerning the situation in Indonesia. Instead, the reports are "con-
solidated" or distorted to favor the Republican cause. Both American and Aus-
tralian officers in the field are gravely concerned over the fact that their reports
are, in effect, censored and distorted before they reach the top levels of the United
Natious or their respective governments.

Finally, let me quote from a report filed by Mr. N. A. Barrows :

Certainly, even a newcomer out here cannot penetrate without wondering why
the picture given the outside world is so often distorted and falsely emphasized.

Mr. Arens. General, would you care to venture an opinion as to
why these distortions were made, particularly in regard to our own
Government ?

General Willoughbt. If we refer to Mr. Barrow's wonderment we
can only assume that he, like most Americans, was not aware that
Washington was honeycombed with Communist cells and Communist
agents, many of them in high places. They saw to it that the ulti-
mate interests of global communism were served by diverting, sup-
pressing, or slanting public and governmental reports. Please bear
in mind the fact that this was 1947, the year of great betrayals from
Peking to Madrid.

Mr. Arens. In terms of the Bidien study, what happened in 1948
and 1949?

General Willoughbt. I will resume my narrative of "evolution"
leading to the final expulsion of the Dutch. Months of complex nego-
tiations followed, involving the United Nations, the United States and

20 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

the immediate parties. The Dutch suggested a "roundtable confer-
ence" in The Hague. At this point, the views and desires of substan-
tial areas of Indonesia collectively called "Federalist" must be ac-
cepted as an element proper for U. N. intervention though in the
end, nothing was done for them. The Federalist states were many
times larger in area than the Jokja Republic. They looked to the
Dutch as their champion against "centralist" designs and control. If
the U. N. Charter was to be taken seriously, other than with pious
phrases, these areas were entitled to self-determination. It soon be-
came clear, however, that pressure from Britain, Australia and the
United States was too heavy for the Dutch to resist. The subsequent
Hague Conference of 1949 merely ratified what outside pressure had
already made inevitable. The Dutch moved out. The conference gave
lip service to the organization of Indonesia on a federal pattern ; the
actual effect of transfer of sovereignty was to place the Jokja Repub-
lic in a position first to dominate and then to subdue the remaining
parts of the archipelago.

The Dutch virtually capitulated to U. N. and United States pres-
sures. The vacillation of their political parties at home, of course,
was a deciding factor. The Roman Catholic Party had joined with
the Socialists in a common front. A reliable source reports a conver-
sation with H. E. Johannes Cardinal de Jong: "* * * It is an alli-
ance de raison; my heart is not in it." The "double standard" of the
U. N. was again apparent, in the speed with which the Security
Council acted on the rather stereotyped invocation of Australia and
India of Articles 35 and 39 of the Statute, calling for a ''cease-fire."
Compare that with the fact that the Security Council has ignored the
appeals of South Moluccas under like conditions. Incidentally, the
Australians are now changing their tune, since they discovered Su-
karno's aspirations to take over Dutch New Guinea. That area is
geographically and ethnographically identical with Papua. Are the
Australians willing to give it up to the natives ?_

Throughout Indonesia, there remains a continuous resistance to the
creation of unitarian or centralized dominion. The "VVesterling af-
fair was for the most part an attempt at self defense on the part of
the Sudanese. Capt. Abdul Aziz organized similar resistance in
Makassar (Celebes) ; in true oriental fashion, he was decoyed to Java
under false pretenses and then arrested.

Centers of underground resistance continued to function. Sultan
Hamid II of Borneo was taken prisoner because of opposition to the
Jokja regime. Dr. Mansur of East Sumatra tried to protect his State
by a genuine federal status. The Atjehers of North Sumatra are
restless. The Amboinese took up armed resistance. The Republic
of South Moluccas is still fighting. They feel that the Javanese
group are a tyranny, covertly oriented toward Moscow.
= Mr. Arens. Do you have other documentations on the situation
leading up to U. N. intervention in Indonesia ?

General Willottghby. I have mentioned Mr. van der Plas, at-
tached to MacArthur's Headquarters, a longtime civil servant, in high
position in Eastern Indonesia. Equally significant, and indeed in a
higher administrative echelon, we must mention Dr. H. J. Van Mook,
the last Deputy Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies.
Both men were interesting types though greatly differing in personal
and psychic characteristic. Van der Plas was a trained diplomat,

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 21

cultured, erudite, of enormous patience and enormous tact. Ho
played a great role in channeling the energy of his people, refugees
from Indonesia in Australia, into proper and effective channels.
With an odd prescience, he concentrated on Dutch New Guinea and
the Moluccas, as if he knew that this immense area would become the
last remnant of the century old Netherlands East Indies domain.

Dr. Van Mook was a different personality. An expert colonial ad-
ministrator in responsible positions, he was dynamic. An execu-
tive "driver," he cut through redtape and the lethargy of defeat.
It was he who picked Colonel Spoor then attached to G-2 to eventu-
ally command the Dutch forces that made such a brilliant showing,
later on, in the police actions in Java.

I select pertinent comments from his papers, generally confirming
Admiral Helfrich and suggestive of the completely idiotic perform-
ance of some "statesmen" of the period :

Ee Japanese Imperialism :

* * * There is no other example in human history of a nation which less than
a hundred years after its emergence from two and a half centuries of almost
complete medieval and feudal seclusion, became one of the most aggressive
and powerful military empires. Neither are there many examples of self-
delusion which made it take on half the world at one time to satisfy its greed.
It was as if all the national energy had been bottled up for centuries to explode
in a raging expansionism, once a crack was made in the containing wall * * *.

Ee Japan and Eussia :

* * * Here was a coloured people who had successfully challenged the white
race on its own preserves. Asiatic nationalism got a tremendous fillip out of
the defeat of Russia in 1905, then considered as a purely Western nation in those
years.

Ee Japan and the West :

* * * At the end of every victorious war, Japan had to relinquish part of her
spoils under Western pressure. Russia, Germany and the United States forced
her every time to mitigate territorial, economic and political demands.

Ee Japan and Asiatic Co-prosperity :

* * * Japan might have found (in her own experience) the spiritual impulse
to become the leader of Asiatic emancipation. Instead she distorted her great
opportunities. The only strong nation among disunited peoples and amorphous
populations, the only "progressive" state among backward or inert races, she
acted like wolves among herds of sheep. (During the war) the most profoundly
upsetting activities were Japan's violent and systematic anti-Western propaganda
and her perversion of the youth of South East Asia. In this field, the Japanese
proved themselves master craftsmen * * *.

Ee Japan in Occupation :

* * * The Dutch and Eurasian prisoners of war and the internees were very
harshly treated. Very many in the first category were transported to other parts
of the coprosperity paradise; thousands were worked and starved to death on
the horrible railroad from Thailand to Burma. The treatment of women and
children was, if possible, worse than that of the men. * * * It will probably
remain unknown how many Indonesians were killed, raped or starved to death.
Labor slaves (romushas) were shipped by the thousands to the Japanese forces
in New Guinea and the northern Moluccas and were left to die of hunger and
neglect * * *.

Ee Sukarno :

Nationalist leaders of substance were divided; some thought Japanese hege-
mony inevitable. Some secretly abhorred Japanese domination, particularly
the democratic, socialist and Communist groups and prepared for action by the

22 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

time Japan would be beaten. The leading figure among them was Sukarno, who
had come to the fore through his oratorical talent and was imprisoned in the
1930's for sedition. He was made general political adviser to the Japanese
Military Government in Java and was joined as deputy by Mohammed Hatta, an
alumnus of the economic faculty of Rotterdam. Sukarno's gifts as a dema-
gogue were useful to the Japanese. But the ideal of an independent Indonesia
was a very real part of an otherwise rather vain and unstable character. The
more serious leaders turned away from the transparent devices (of Japan).
Hatta was closely connected to the last group. Sukarno, however, went on and
on, praising Japan, reviling the Allies, urging his people to aid the war effort.
Was he only putting up a smoke screen to hide plotting for revolt? There is no
evidence that he was very active in "planning." Aid to the "war effort" merely
impoverished the people. Estates and factories rusted and decayed ; plantations
were uprooted. This meant unemployment for hundreds of thousands ; it meant
poverty for all — but a few henchmen of the Japanese and the black marketeers.

Re Communications:

* * * There was no contact with the outer world. Dutch submarines were
constantly on war duty ; the Allied Command refused to free them for secret
reconnaissance. Indonesia was practically bypassed. A. I. B. (MacArthur)
dispatched several parties to the N. E. I. including itinerant "Hadjis" but the
underground was nothing like the Philippines. Left to their own fantasies, the
Indonesians plotted and dreamed. And the Japanese whispers always gave the
same direction to those dreams. * * *

Re Japanese Godfathers to Independence :

* * * When the Japanese realized that defeat was imminent, they fostered a
"committee for the preparation of independence" May 28, 1944. Sukarno and
Hatta were designated chairman and vice chairman. On August 7th, Field Mar-
shal Count Terauchi summoned Sukarno and Hatta to his Headquarters in Saigon
for last-minute instructions. On the 15th Japan capitulated.

Re Allied Military and Political Postwar Vagaries :

* * * It was generally understood that war would result in an accelerated
growth of nationalism. Queen Wilhelmina agreed to Indonesian independence
as early as 1942. Restoration of prewar colonialism (except for Russian Asiatic
conquests) was heavily underscored by the United States; Secretary of State
Sumner Welles formulated this point: "We must assure the sovereign equality
of the people the world over. The age of imperialism is ended. The right of
people for freedom must be recognized." Acceptance of a principle is a far cry
from orderly implementation. American public opinion was manipulated to view
European democracies with colonial interests in Asia with distrust. This prop-
aganda hardly ever mentioned the political and military efforts of British and
Dutch Allies. A spate of leftists and fellow travelers entered into the activities
of the Offices of War Information and Strategic Services (O. W. I. and O. S. S.)
in the Far East ; the same happened in the British and Australian intelligence
and propaganda services. Their action overshot the mark, ignoring the fact that
a badly organized liberation would expose millions of people to the miseries of
revolution and chaos. * * *

Re Impact of Allied Delays :

* * ♦ There were hundreds of indispensable men and women in the Nether-
lands twiddling their thumbs (needed for Indonesian rehabilitation). The
transportation of 5,600 men (Dutch) was reduced to a paltry 600. We could not
even obtain the use of our own (Dutch) transports (27 ships with a carrying
capacity of 60,000 men) ; Malaya, Thailand and French Indo-China were given
priority. The sweet taste of victory turned to gall in the mouths of the thousands
who had suffered patiently. This feeling grew worse when it became known that
even for evacuation of prisoners and internees, other nationalities got priorities
though the Dutch stood third in their contribution of transport vessels.

Re Mountbatten and Christison :

* * * It has been previously established that the shift from MacArthur to
Mountbatten was engineered in London and Washington. The job was beyond

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 23

Mountbatten's capacity. It Is obvious that MacArthur's expedition that took
Borneo without effort could have been extended to Java.

* * * In Indonesia, as in Annam, the Japanese assisted at the outbreak
of a revolution they had helped to foment.

Mr. Arens. Exactly when was the so-called Republican Govern-
ment established ?

General Willoughby. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed
August 17, 1945, in the house of Japanese Rear Admiral Maeda, at
Batavia.

On September 6, Admiral Mountbatten ordered Marshal Terauchi
to stop the revolutionary movement and maintain Japanese responsi-
bility for law and order. The order was ignored.

A cruiser H. M. S. Cumberland arrived at Tandjung September 15.
This was no protection to 60,000 cooped-up, starved, and exhausted
men, women, and children, in the interior.

General Christison only learned on September 27 that he was ap-
pointed to the occupation command in Java. He had never been in
Indonesia before. Admiral Mountbatten suddenly reversed his for-
mer nonrecognition of the revolutionary Republic and Christison took
the precipitate step to invoke the assistance of "Republican authori-
ties" and thus gave them a kind of international recognition which
irrevocably prejudiced the future.

The withdrawal of the Japanese to their own camps, the absence
of any sign of Allied troops and Allied activity, the absolute vacuum
of authority, spawned criminal and irresponsible elements, as it
always will.

The months from October until the end of December 1945 saw
horrible scenes of cruelty and mass hysteria. In Surabaya all the
succeeding phases of the French Revolution from the first seizure of
power to the terror, seemed to follow each other in a few weeks, ending
with a gruesome "people's tribunal" in the principal club where a
number of defenseless Dutch and Eurasians were tried" and deliv-
ered to the mob to be clubbed and speared to death.

"Bersiap" meaning "Be Ready," was a slogan, a cry for mob vio-
lence against some unfortunate passerby. Some two to three thou-
sand Dutch and Eurasians, men and women, were thus murdered.

Re Negotiations with a Shadow Government :

The first Republican cabinet which contained a number of avowed collabora-
tors and some very shady characters, had been replaced on November 14th by a
much more competent group under Sutan Sjahrir. I decided to explore possi-
bilities and previously contact Sukarno — especially to afford some protection to
our internees. The British (technically still in occupation since Dutch forces
were delayed) furnished Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who later
became Lord Inverchapel and Ambassador in Washington.

Sjahrir appeared reasonable but under pressure demanded full
recognition without guaranty of protection of (Dutch) interests.
Communist youths actually kidnaped him on the night of June 27th.
At this point Sukarno and Hatta stepped in and cleared up the con-
fusion. It was obvious, however, that armed bands and chieftains
were not controlled.

* * * A brighter scene was presented by the outer Islands, Borneo, Celebes,
the Moluccas, the Lesser Sunda Islands from Bali to Timor and New Guinea.
Representatives assembled July 14, 1946, at Malino. The prevailing fashion of
the time, which found a Machiavellian design in everything the Dutch proposed,
failed to note that the conferences were held in a peaceful atmosphere and dele-
gates coming from every corner of the area were overwhelmingly in favor of a

24 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

federal structure of Indonesia (Federalists). Current separatist movement had
its root in the free formation of those states : East Indonesia, West Borneo,
West Java, and East Sumatra, etc. They did not feel compelled (then as now)
to maintain an artificial unitarianism. Another British ambassador appeared
on the scene, Lord Killearn. This effort resulted in the Linggadjati Agreement
It is possible that the Dutch home Government fumbled, at this point.

Be Violation of the Linggadjati Agreement :

* * * The efforts for implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement failed.
The Jogjakarta Government had no real authority beyond Central Java. Only
the propaganda machine worked efficiently : Its constant theme was the perfidy
of the Dutch.

Shooting at Dutch outposts and kidnaping of people continued.
Tampering with the waterworks of Surabaya, flooded the country-
side. Two months went by in fruitless talks. The Dutch occupied
the works by force; the flood was stopped within 2 days by very
simple repairs. General Spoor initiated his police action that prom-
ised to bring order in a surprisingly short time — but equally prompt
was the intervention of the U. N. Security Council at the behest of
Australia and India, August 1, 1947.

Re U. N. Intervention:

It seems beyond doubt that the U. N. had no prima facie right to take action.
The N. E. I. under current agreements was still sovereign. Belgium filed a
resolution to test the competence of the U. N. Security Council with the Inter-
national Court of Justice : It was denied.

This is one of the first instances of the "dual morality" of that body.
It is the year of Stalin's drive to boycott Catholic Spain. Much more
serious civil wars were raging in China, and Vietnam. The Council
did not act. Even in Palestine, the Council "reconsidered." This
evasive posture accentuated the almost scornful peremptoriness with
which the Dutch were treated.

The rapidity and success of the (Dutch) police action were beyond
expectation. It met with no popular uprising (as was alleged) ; in
most places the common people evinced a sense of relief. After the
Security Council intervened, Jogjakarta began again its campaign
of subversion. Yet law and order improved constantly for over a
year. Even elections began to take place (never possible under the
Republic) to form the States of East Sumatra, Madura, and Pasudan.
Here again, the U. N. Security Council intervened arbitrarily and
refused admittance of representatives. At last, in 1949, they were
recognized at the Round Table Conference in the Hague.

Dr. Van Mook, normally conservative in his style, is almost bitter
in his reference to the U. N. "Good Offices Committee" composed of
Messrs. Kirby, van Zeeland, and F. P. Graham :

* * * The members were not impartial ; they were influenced by the Govern-
ments that appointed them. The Secretariat was definitely partial. The Secre-
taries (an Indian, an Australian who was a naturalized American citizen)
and a man with a chequered past exercised unwarranted influence over their
principals. The Committee encouraged Republican intransigence. "You are
what you are" said Frank Graham. The first fruit of this liberal counsel was a
surreptitious Consular Treaty, concluded by Mr. Suripno, Republican "envoy"
at Prague, with U. S. S. R., the opening wedge for Communist infiltration.
During months of negotiation, the Dutch had the impression that the "Good
Offices Committee" was very critical of their actions while Republican irregu-
larities were ignored or hushed up.

I am prepared to confirm Dr. Van Mook's statement. MacArthur
dispatched a group of American officers to assist in the TJ. N. "cease-

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 25

fire" order; my own office sent a senior colonel, J. R. Myers, whose im-
pressions appear to confirm the general Dutch posture.

Mr. Arens. Have you any data on the Red Chinese factor in
Indonesia ?

General Willoughry. It is a factor that has become important
throughout East Asia. There are millions of Chinese emigres who
form sizable minorities from Singapore to Manila. They are divided
in allegiance between Red China and the remnant of Nationalist
China on Formosa. There are 2i/> million Chinese in Indonesia. The
oversea's Chinese (Hua Chiao's) have always been under the influence
of the Chinese Government of that period. It was active under the
Manchu Dynasty ; it continued under Chiang and under Red Peking.
The influence which the Chinese Government exerted was mainly in
the field of education. Special secret agents were sent to the South
Seas to guide and coordinate education at the numerous local Chinese
schools. Textbooks printed in China or Singapore stressed love and
obedience to their fatherland. With the rise of communism in the
thirties not only Kuomintang literature but increasing amounts of
Communist texts were distributed.

The Netherlands East Indies Government was able to cope with this
subtle indoctrination through an efficient secret service until it was
replaced by the Sukarno Republic. Chinese communism stepped into
the shoes of Manchu Emperors and their successor, the Kuomintang.
The Chinese Embassy took over the control of the Chinese schools.

As early as 1951 all schools in Jakarta were issued new textbooks
with a clear-cut Communist slant. Geography texts, for example,
consist of four sections, two of which are completely dedicated to
Communist China. The Soviet Union is referred to "as the staunch
supporter of world peace and China's faithful ally." The termi-
nology is identical with texts for Russian children.

The next step was the gradual removal of anti-Communist teachers,
by terror and intimidation. As an interesting sidelight on the role
of "the family" as opposed to Communist indoctrination, the con-
spirators were confronted by the conservative and critical attitude
of the parents. To offset this "adverse influence," the Chinese pupils
in Indonesia were submitted to a rigid discipline, requiring complete
secrecy about their work and the teachings at school. If stenciled
subjects for instruction had to be taken home, they had to be returned
next morning. If one of the stencils was missing the teacher con-
sidered the pupil, who was responsible for this, as a "leak" and he was
severely punished. The efforts of Chinese parents to get hold of
those stencils (in order to pass them on to the (indifferent) Indone-
sian authorities) were opposed and thwarted by their own children.

Through these practices, the Chinese youth in Indonesia is rapidly
being communized. Of the Chinese population in Indonesia 70 to 80
percent are Indonesian subjects (Warga Wegaras). When the Com-
munist educated children reach voting age, it is expected that they
will form a hard core of Communist agitators, who will be of great
value to the Indonesian Communist leaders.

Mr. Arens. Is there an exchange of student youth groups ?

General Willoughby. Many Chinese youths from Indonesia and
other countries in the South Seas are already going to their Commu-
nist "fatherland" where they are studying at Communist colleges.

26 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

They are specifically trained as Communist agitators after which they
are returned to their country of origin. They are then accompanied
by secret agents and propagandists, who control their activities. In
Canton, a school has been established where Chinese youth from
abroad is educated for special services. After their return from the
Chinese mainland, the Communist college graduated Chinese start
their activities in Indonesia. They keep in close contact with leftist
Indonesian youth and join it in propagandist activities. They are
active in both the Indonesian and Chinese press. They also form
propaganda teams, moving about the country in a blend of entertain-
ment and Communist speeches.

It is no secret that the Indonesian Communist Party maintains
close contact with the Eed Chinese Embassy in Jakarta and it is an
open secret in Indonesia that most of the funds of the Communist
Party are supplied by the Red Chinese Embassy and by certain ele-
ments of the Chinese community. The Chinese merchants are fre-
quently pressured to contribute to so-called welfare funds. During
the Korean war, they were openly urged in the Chinese press in Indo-
nesia to contribute money for funds out of which airplanes were to be
bought to help the "heroic peoples' volunteers" in their fight against
the "American imperialists."

Mr. Arens. What does the Sukarno government do to lessen or
stop these activities by the Red Chinese ?

General Willoughbt. One could expect that this dangerous trend of
"communizing" the Chinese population in Indonesia would be opposed
with the utmost vigor by the Indonesian Government; however, it lms
done nothing in this respect. On the contrary, Sukarno was and still is
the main promoter of "cooperation" between the Communist and Na-
tionalist Parties in Indonesia, the PKI and the PjSTL In the first
cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953), Sukarno's figurehead, crypto-
Communists entered the Government and the PKI pledged support.
The Communist Party then saw its chance to start a vigorous campaign
among the Indonesian population, especially in Java, which is the most
densely populated island of the archipelago, containing more than
three-fourths of Indonesia's population.

Consequently, at the first elections in Indonesia in 1955, the Com-
munist Party emerged as one of the four largest parties in Indonesia.
During recent elections for councils in Java the Communists increased
their lead and in many towns like Semarang, Surabaya, Bandung, etc.,
they now have an absolute majority.

The impact as well as the internal cohesion of the Chinese is reflected
in relative statistics of newspaper circulation and the percentage of
literacy. The percentage of Chinese who read in the vernacular is
25 to 35 percent, while only 10 percent of Indonesians read adequately.
Consequently, only 1.2 percent of the Indonesians will buy daily
papers ; this is largely explicable on the grounds that the bulk of the
Indonesian population are farmers and live in cohesive but isolated
village communities while the Chinese, primarily retail merchants, are
concentrated in the cities. There are about 15 newspapers published
in Chinese. The total issues amount to about 100,000 copies. This
modest circulation is not conclusive as papers are circulated from hand
to hand within local groups. The political orientation is about equal

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 27

as between Communists and Kuomintang adherents. "Sin Po," the
leading Chinese daily, also prints an Indonesian edition. This marks
the Chinese segment of population as relatively literate and aware of
foreign affairs.

Mr. Arens. What efforts have the present Indonesian Governments
made to resist the encroachments by agents of the Soviets ?

General Willoughby. As regards Soviet encroachments, a variety
of factors will have to be considered. On the surface it would seem
that the Jokja Republic has a good anti-Communist record, since they
suppressed at least two armed uprisings. In the act of suppression,
however, this Government allied itself successively with two Commu-
nist factions. The record suggests that Sukarno wanted to stay in
power and that in order to stay, both Malakka and Alimin had to be
broken.

It has been shown that both Sukarno and Hatta had longtime affili-
ation with Communists. Lately Sukarno has supported the Com-
munist Party as an entity. While Hatta has the same general back-
ground, he broke with Sukarno last year over his sponsorship of Com-
munists in Government. If we simplify matters and ascribe genuine
"nationalism" to both, it would appear that Hatta is the more con-
servative type and worthy of the careful attention of the West.

Recent reports, in the period 1956-57 (though repetitious), indicate
Sukarno's marked predilection for Soviet Russia. His visit to Mos-
cow must have impressed him deeply. He talked against the "West-
ern parliamentary system" and called for "guided democracy on the
basis of discipline," etc.

There is no question that the Communists are gaining in Indonesia,
in a climate of official tolerance. The June elections, with parallelism
in the provinces, show Communist gains in local contests. In Jakarta,
the Communists moved from fourth place (96,000 in 1955) to second
place (137,000 in 1956). Nationwide, the Communists won about
1,500,000 more votes than in 1955.

Mr. Arens. What about the economic factors ?

General Willoughby. I would clarify this point by developing
certain relations between irresponsible "nationalism," the confiscation
of property, the collapse of a delicately balanced economy which, in
turn, created a climate favorable to a Communist takeover. My
sources are in substantial agreement on this interrelation.

The Asiatic is an individualist; if he is commercially gifted, like
the Chinese and Indians, he is out for profit. The chaos of revolu-
tion, however, is tailormade for Asian as well as Western "carpet-
baggers."

The Chinese spotted valuable raw materials in Sumatra, stocked
during the war, without a chance for export. Singapore was the
prime mover. Relatives and business associates on the spot did the
collecting; every kind of craft that had escaped wartime destruc-
tion was used for transport. Moreover, there were important stocks
on the estates belonging to absent Dutch and foreign companies and
all sorts of equipment and movable property which were stolen.

Trade began to boom, but the Singapore traders always made
100/200 percent profit — and Malaya obtained a lot of extra United
States dollars for rubber and other products. The Dutch could
not prevent it until they had sufficient small ships to patrol the
coast. The traffic was possible only with the connivance of the lo-
cal Republican bosses, both military and civilian.

28 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Opportunistic sharp practices were, of course, not limited to the
"carpetbaggers" of Singapore. The case of Mr. Matthew Fox, vice
president of Universal Pictures, must be considered one of the more
exotic flowerings of the free economy. He appeared, when Indo-
nesia was invited to attend the "U. N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil of International Trade" at Havana, November 1347. The Indo-
nesian delegates were Mr. A. K. Gani, Minister of Economic Affairs ;
Mr. A. Maramis, Minister of Finance; and the Republican Trade
Commissioner in New Guinea, Mr. Sumitro Joyohadikusumo. Such
delegations are expensive and hard money (in Indonesia) was scarce.
Here enters Mr. Fox and on the strength of advance in dollars —
$'25,000 according to the draft as first initialed in Havana, $80,000
as subsequent rumor had it — the big "dignitaries" of the Republic
concluded an agreement with the American financier.

A corporation in which Mr. Fox was to possess the majority of
voting shares was to be set up as "the sole and exclusive agent of
the Republic for every conceivable transaction, in the United States,
covering purchases, concessions, licenses, franchises, and development
enterprises." Every precaution was taken that no outlay should be
made unless covered by Indonesian produce; the remuneration was
to be a modest 7y2 percent commission on all payments, including
costs of transportation, etc. The Indonesian Government waived
its sovereignty with regard to claims or controversies, submitting
its agencies to United States arbitration proceedings. Gradually,
the authorities concerned realized their position; adverse political
agitation was feared in America if this curious monopoly were to be
exposed officially and, for a time, pressure was brought to bear to pre-
vent its publication. Eventually, the Fox Corporation modified its
demands for a closed shop.

If the Fox maneuver can be charged to rampant, amoral "capital-
ism," there is another case in which "international communism" was
to play a covert role.

Mr. Campbell was an Australian manufacturer in a small way but
closely allied with Communist circles in Australia. He offered to
"assist the Republic" as trade commissioner, asking no pay. The
Republic, in its infancy in 1946, gratefully accepted. Mr. Campbell
must have had early training amongst the Madison Avenue boys,
since one of his colorful proposals was "the entry of an Indonesian
winter sports team" in the Australian annual event on Mount Koscius-
ko. Mr. Campbell was not nearly as amusing, when he attempted to
put an Australo-Indonesian corporation together which was going to
monopolize trade between the two countries, with Republican "prefer-
ences" and the assistance of the tightly organized Australian dock-
workers, who would see to it that "noncorporation cargoes were de-
layed by special treatment." Mr. Campbell, of course, was to officiate —
but not gratis — in this corporation.

Fiscal responsibility is one of the prime requisites of orderly Gov-
ernment. Nationalist aspirations can hardly be made an excuse for
practices that are unacceptable under the norms of the free economy.
There is indeed a growing tendency amongst these fly-by-night estab-
lishments to repudiate financial obligations and to confiscate prop-
erties without proper compensation. Indonesia has just recently
repudiated her international indebtedness to the Netherlands. Cer-
tain U. N. proposals are becoming rather vague and fuzzy with provi-
sions to protect individual property against confiscatory practices.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 29

The very recent outbreaks against the Dutch, the seizure of legiti-
mate business by Communist controlled labor unions, and so forth,
confirm the fiscal and economic irresponsibility of the Sukarno
"Republic."

Mr. Arens. Are there any counterbalancing influences in this situ-
ation ?

General Willoughby. They are found within the Mohammedan
party, initially called Serika, later "Masjumi," in the immediate en-
tourage of former Vice President Mohammed Hatta (who split with
Sukarno, though a rapprochement may be possible this year) and a
portion of the "intelligentsia" who support the Socialist, Sutan
Sjahrir.

In the "outer islands," Communists have not been successful except
along the east coast of Sumatra, the plantations area of Deli and the
oilfields of South Sumatra.

The "separatist" tendencies, a recent phenomenon which completely
vindicates the initial Dutch plan for a federation of several states may
become a counterbalancing factor. The Borneo coup of March 1957
was the latest in a separatist series beginning with Sumatra (Decem-
ber 1956) followed by the Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Lesser Sun-
das. The resistance of South Moluccas is within this separatist cate-
gory. The leadership in every case was military. These leaders
object to Sukarno's pro-Communist tendencies though their real rea-
sons were economic. They coined the phrase "Javanese Centralism."
Java contributes less than 20 percent toward the exports that sustain
Indonesia's foreign exchange. The other 80 percent comes from out-
side Java. The "provincials" feel that Java absorbs a major share of
income at the expense of local improvements. The much maligned
Dutch "colonialism" was managed much more efficiently, while main-
taining peace and order and prosperity.

Finally, the local military leaders are worried over Sukarno's pro-
posed "administrative plans" that appear to them as sharply gravitat-
ing into the Soviet orbit.

In this connection, the person of Mohammed Hatta seems to emerge
in a new and favorable light. In spite of his Communist antecedents
(in the early phases of his career) Hatta has become distinctly luke-
warm vis-a-vis Soviet blandishments and actually broke with Sukarno
last year, because of the latter's growing pro-Soviet tendencies and
rather clumsy attempts to maneuver the Communists into his Cabinet
and the Government. This break must be regarded as a courageous
and significant act. Hatta's stand coincides with the separatist move-
ments in Sumatra and Borneo. Sukarno appears to realize the grav-
ity of a permanent political crisis. He has made a gesture of recon-
ciliation. The "separatist" chieftains were invited to a conference
under "safe conduct" in Jakarta this last September. A "Committee
of Seven" was appointed comprising Sukarno, Hatta, Djuanda, Lei-
mena, Azis Saleh, Hamengku Buwono, and Major General Nasution.
This committee is expected to resolve the "separatist" movement but
as a byproduct may well stop the drift toward communism of the
"central" government, i. e., Sukarno. At this moment, the outcome is
not clear though it is doubtful that the "separatist" local governments
will give up the advantageous economic position on which their move-
ment was based in the first place. It is ironical that "separatism"
must lead to some structure of "federalism" which was the initial plan
of the Dutch, backed by their intimate knowledge of the country.

30 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The United Nations Indonesian Council failed to understand this —
and seemed to care less.

Mr. Arens. Have you any comments on the status of Dutch New
Guinea, recently called "Irian" ?

General Willoughby. The roundtable conference could not come
to an agreement regarding the status of "Western New Guinea.
"Irian" is a hitherto unknown designation, cooked up in Jakarta
circles. The Republic has reached out for that Asiatic piece of real
estate under the sweeping slogan of "Merdeka" ; the open sesame for
postwar confiscation and thinly disguised brigandage. The acquisi-
tion of "Irian" is obviously one of Sukarno's pet idiosyncrasies. Be-
cent separatist movements ranging from Sumatra to the Moluccas
would mark this project hardly feasible. Nationalist aspirations
which are now tenderly nursed by the West could be academically
carried to the ludicrous extreme to return Mexico to the Aztecs,
Alaska to the Eskimos, and the American Southwest to the Apaches ;
their historical claims are probably more legitimate than the current
crop of "liberators" from Kashmir to Ceylon.

The Dutch must have reflected that the Australians, who occupy
the eastern half of New Guinea, were not induced to relinquish their
possession; they must have noted that Sarawak remained a British
Crown entity, while the rest of Borneo went to Sukarno's domain;
they could hardly overlook that the British took their time in relin-
quishing Malaya while retaining commercial rights and a strong
financial position. The Dutch must have reflected on the dubious
"rewards" of their wartime alliance and sacrifices (1941-45), the re-
cent Indonesian repudiation of their monetary claims — which does
not disturb the U. N. in the least who appear to have accepted con-
fiscation and repudiation as attributes of "national sovereignty".
The whole case of "Irian" is another exhibition of the "double stand-
ard" of the U. N. political morality.

British New Guinea (Australian Papua) was "annexed" in 1883,
while Dutch New Guinea was acquired by treaty as early as 1660.
After the fall of Napoleon, the British specifically confirmed Dutch
possession by the Conventions of 1814.

Just as the Australians did, the Germans wedged in along the
north coast in Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and the Bismarck Archipelago.
The Germans were kicked out by the League of Nations in 1919. A
cynic might recognize here a natural affinity between the paternal
league and its quasi-offspring, the present U. N. It was not in the
nature of a surprise that the area became somebody's "mandate," i. e.,
Australia's.

With an eye on neighboring Australian Papua, the Dutch drew
proper conclusions and declared New Guinea a part of the Nether-
lands. The area is about 157,789 square miles and the population is
estimated at 195,460. The territory is thus practically undeveloped.
In racial type, the natives differ completely from the Indonesians.
They are Negritos, Papuans and Melanesians. The tribes are savage,
almost stone age ; head hunting and cannibalism are prevalent. _ Since
"sago" is a principal diet and can be found anywhere, there is little
incentive for work. "Colonialism" i. e. the energy and skill of ex-
perienced administrators, like the Dutch, may develop this raw land;
the Javanese are not remotely likely to do it.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 31

Mr. Heimlich. How does the Indonesian situation fit into the
overall pattern for the lied conquest of Southeast Asia ?

General Willougiiby. The Russian plans, utilizing: Red China
cannon fodder, may copy the Japanese advance in Southeast Asia in
1942. The Japanese were primarily concerned with the following:

(a) Control of strategic raw materials, such as oil, rubber, and tin.

\b) Driving a wedge to separate the West from Asia, i. e., control
of the Malay Barrier in terms of control of sea lanes from the Indian
Ocean to the China Sea.

(d) Seizure of Dutch New Guinea and part of Australian Papua
and reaching for the Moluccas.

The United States fought the Pacific war precisely to stop Japa-
nese expansion. Are they to capitulate to indirect infiltration by
world communism, aiming at the same strategic targets, that is con-
trol of the Malay Barrier ?

The United States has declared itself and has defined an ultimate
Pacific defense line: the island chain running from South Korea,
Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines to New Guinea and Aus-
tralia. Encroachments on this line, via the Sundas and Moluccas
and aspirations for Dutch New Guinea (one of Sukarno's most active
political items) are an obvious threat to Australia and the southern
flank of the United States defense line.

The weakening of this line is a prime Sino-Russian objective. It
explains their war'against Korea and the endless pressures to retrieve
Formosa. If and when they dominate Indonesia and the outer
islands, they are at grips with Australia and can start to roll up that
defense line from the west. The situation and the thesis are more
readily understood on maps that (a) show the Pacific defense lines
and (b) the southern flank of this line; that is, the significance of the
Moluccas and New Guinea.

Most recent press reports quote an American authority not to be
taken lightly: Adm. Felix Stump, the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific. Stump's views are substantially as follows :

i. Subversion might get out of hand before (the United States)
could do anything about it.

ii. Indonesia has gone so far "playing ball with the Reds" that the
present Government may not be able to turn back.

iii. The Indonesian administration has relied heavily on its native
Communist Party, has yielded to pressures and concluded trade agree-
ments with several Communist countries.

iv. The Indonesian Reds appear to have reached a point where they
will demand to be paid off for past services.

Indonesia is not a member of the SEATO defense organization.
Hence, we could not interfere with any overt or covert "Red aggres-
sions." The Soviets could and probably will obtain bases and ports
in much the same surreptitious manner in which they obtained them
in Syria. I maintain that "the Russians are starting where the Japa-
nese left off." They want control of the Malay Barrier to seal off
Southeast Asia and drive a wedge between our Pacific defense line,
the Indian Ocean areas and Eastern sea lanes.

32 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Mr. Heimlich. Can the United States salvage the deteriorating
situation or reverse the trends toward "centralism" and, ultimately,
toward the Soviet orbit ?

General Willoughbt. It is fairly obvious that the United States,
together with the U. N., is largely responsible for the course of events
since 1945. Both were parties to various political agreements that
would have normalized the progressive transfer of authority from
the Netherlands East Indies Government to a federation of autono-
mous States. Both failed to support these agreements in the end.
The Holland Government itself must share the blame for "buckling
under" instead of adopting the British and French intransigence, in
the disposition of their "colonies." A firm hand was certainly in-
dicated when "liberation forces" or "independence aspirants" created
disorder and chaos. This appears to be the age of irresponsible in-
dependence movements in which confiscation of properties, terrorism,
repudiation of international debts, and undisguised Communist meas-
ures are fashionable and appear to be tolerated by the West without
a murmur.

There has never been an election in Indonesia. "Parliament" in
Jakarta consists of the original "revolutionary council," who have
subsequently appointed a number of former Federalists. No con-
stitution "by the will of the people" has been written. President
Sukarno himself was never elected.

A United Nations Commission UNCI was a party to the evolution
of Indonesia. The action involved the Security Council which es-
sentially has done nothing. UNCI was morally obliged to supervise
and/or activate the execution of the Agreement of Linggadjati, March
25, 1947, the Renville Agreement, January 17, 1948, and the subse-
quent "roundtable agreements" (1949). All these "agreements" spe-
cifically guarantee the "right of self determination"; this is a basic
United Nations Charter principle. It would seem appropriate that
reference is established to this principle, favoring U. S. recognition
of "separatist movements" in Indonesia or rather a return to, and re-
pudiation of, acts in violation of the above agreements. A first step
should be the recognition of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" ;
this action is long overdue.

The trend toward "separatism" in Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and
the Moluccas, i. e. the Outer Islands, was foreseen by the Dutch in
their proposals of 1942 and 1949. They involved precisely a "Federa-
tion of Autonomous States" — a scheme no better nor worse than cur-
rent British Commonwealth structure. These proposals, the Ling-
gadjati, Renville, and roundtable agreements were formally accepted
by the United States and U. N. and thus constitute the juridical basis
for recognition now.

The orderly development of separatists areas contains elements of
resistance to communism on religious and racial grounds and will
tend to offset the purely politic and opportunist "centralism'^ that ap-
pears to be susceptible to, and is drifting into, the Communist orbit.

The interest of the United States and the West can best be served in
terminating the fiction of "Merdeka" and its power vacuum and in
supporting the economic and ethnographic divisions that have sprung
up spontaneously in 1956 and 1957. A first step should be the^ recog-
nition of the "Republic of the South Moluccas," a Christian minority

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

clearly entitled to the same kind of benevolent treatment that the
U. N. has accorded Ghana and the crop of current "nationalist inde-
pendence movements" from Morocco to Yemen, from Kashmir to
Ceylon. A second step should lead to recognition of the separatist
movements in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes.

Trends toward economic and ethnographic independence fit
smoothly into the pious generalities of the U. N. "charter", etc., in
that they represent bona fide aspiration for self-determination of
minorities.

Location and Extent of the South Molucgan Republic

S J* ■ i \ ••'.?

■/ V i^£ PHILIPPINES . I

Mr. Arens. Can you comment on the Amboinese or South Moluccan
independence movement ?

General Willougiiby. I prefer to follow my usual method of ab-
staining from personal opinions and, instead, select authoritative state-
ments by a competent expert. In this case, an Indonesian naval officer
who served under Admiral Helfrich, one Lt. Comdr. K. J. V. Nikiju-
luw, a native of Amboina. Note extracts covering various phases of
the current civil war between the provisional Republic of the South
Moluccas and the Javanese, viz :

LOCATION AND EXTENT OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN REPUBLIC

The South Moluccan Republic is located among the islands between
the Moluccan and Araf ura Seas ; between New Guinea and Celebes on a
horizontal plane and between the southern Philippines and Australia
on a vertical plane. Territorially, it includes the following island
groups :

34 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The Spice Islands (Ceram, Burn, Amboina, Haruku, Saparus, and
Nusa Laut), the Banda group, the Kai group, the Aru group, the
Tanimbar group, the Southwesterly Islands, and a number of smaller
groups of inhabited islets and atolls. The total area of the Republic
approximates 39,000 square miles, and the population is about a mil-
lion and a half. In racial distinction to the rest of Indonesia, the popu-
lation is Melanesian.

During the Pacific war, MacArthur advanced in a series of land-
ings on the north coast of Dutch New Guinea. His outpost position
to guard against Japanese air attacks on northwest Australia (Dar-
win) was in the Moluccas, specifically Aru and Tanimbar Islands.

Halmaheira was one of MacArthur's intermediate positions before
moving on to the Philippines. It is obvious that this wartime con-
tingency may occur again. The South Moluccan Republic is thus a
strategic outpost of prime importance and a link in the general
Pacific defense line: Philippines-New Guinea- West Australia.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS

The islands of the South Moluccas were discovered by the Portu-
guese during the great period of European exploration in the 15th
century.

Amboina became the Portuguese base of operations in their voyages
among the other islands, and a fort was built at Hitoelama on the
northern coast of Amboina, ruins of which are still standing on the
outskirts of the modern village of the same name. After the Portu-
guese came the Spanish and, in 1599, the Dutch took over the admin-
istration of the islands but still used Amboina's protected deep water
harbor and surrounding hills for the establishment of a naval base.

During World War II, the Japanese used it for the same purpose
after the Dutch Navy was destroyed in 1941-42.

Mr. Arens. Was the South Moluccan Eepublic legally entitled to
declare itself independent of Indonesia ?

General Willoughby. The South Moluccan Republic had full legal
right to declare itself independent. Under the provisions of articles
3 and 4 of the Treaty of Linggadjati of March 25, 1947, any minority
was so enabled.

ARTICLE 3

The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the
Netherlands Indies, with the provision, however, that in case the population
of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should
decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join
the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for
such territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.

ARTICLE 4

(1) The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the
Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East without prejudice to the
right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its
position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

This careful provision for the right of minorities in the vast and
racially intricate structure of the Indonesian Archipelago was uni-
laterally repudiated without warning by the Republic of Indonesia
as early as December 1949, although the official repudiation did not
take place until August 17 of the following year.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 35

Besides violating the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement, as
noted above, the Republic of Indonesia also rejected their commit-
ments under the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, and the
Roundtable agreements of 1949. Paragraph 2 of the Renville Agree-
ment's 12 principles affirmed that —

It is understood that neither party (Indonesia and the Netherlands) hag
the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward
political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati
agreement.

The final provisions of the roundtable conference, which was at-
tended by members of the United Nations as delegates and signatories,
specifically provides for United Nations action in the event of their
being dishonored or repudiated.

Article VI of the covering resolution is explicit :

The United Nations Commission for Indonesia or another United Nations
agency shall observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements reached
at the roundtable conference.

Thus, painstakingly, the negotiators of the Linggadjati Agreement,
the Renville Agreement, and the Roundtable conference did attempt
to safeguard the right of minorities in the Indies.

Mr. Arens. What is the present political condition in the South
Moluccan Republic ?

General Willoughby. There is now a state of siege and military
occupation which was imposed by the Republic of Indonesia after
the declaration of independence. While the entire Republic of South
Moluccas is blockaded, so that food and medicines are unattainable by
the population, only small areas of the islands of Amboina, Buru, and
Ceram are actually held by the armed forces of the Republic of
Indonesia.

On September 28, 1950, after a 5-month hunger blockade, using ves-
sels belonging to the KPM (Royal Dutch Packet Co.) , the Indonesians
landed between 18,000 and 20,000 soldiers on the island of Amboina.
This landing was stoutly opposed by the population, armed with shot-
guns and spears, backed by about 1,000 regular Amboinese troops,
former members of the Netherlands Indies Army. Instead of an
operation lasting "3 or 4 days," as the Indonesians predicted, almost
a full week was required to land the troops against defensive gunfire.
Even when tanks were landed and supported by aircraft and warships,
6 weeks of continuous fighting were necessary before the Indonesians
could establish beachheads along the Amboina coast. It should be
noted that during the heat of the Indonesian assault they were assisted
by the confusion caused by a severe earthquake and tidal wave, which
added to the damage already produced by Indonesian flamethrowers
and heavy artillery. And it should be further noted that the Am-
boinese had already undergone the privations and shortages caused
by the Indonesian hunger blockade which was thrown about the Spice
Islands shortly after the declaration of independence in April (1950).

Mr. Arens. Are the armed forces of the South Moluccan Republic
still offering resistance?

General Willoughby. Yes. While ammunition is extremely low,
the Moluccans have not forgotten the use of their ancient weapons
of klewang (cutlasses) spear and bow and arrow, and the occupying
forces are unable to expand their beachheads to effect full control of

36 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

the islands. The Moluccan people have sworn that they will never
surrender their lands to the Republic of Indonesia.

The settlement of the war is a matter for the United Nations Security
Council. The Renville Agreement and the Roundtable conference
were supervised by the United Nations and it is, therefore, a matter of
moral concern to the United Nations when the provisions of those
agreements are repudiated.

Mr. Arens. General Willoughby, we are deeply indebted to you
for this scholarly presentation of the historical developments which
have led to the present crisis in Indonesia. In conclusion, would you
summarize the situation?

General Willoughby. The establishment of local military rule has,
in recent months, left the puppet leader, Sukarno, in control of nothing-
more than the island of Java. The Outer Islands have successively
developed separatist movements based on economic necessity and
ethnographic differences. These include (1) the Celebes, the lesser
Sundas, and the Moluccas; (2) Sumatra; and (3) South Borneo.

It is significant that this subdivision was initially proposed by the
Dutch in 1942 as a federation to be associated with the Netherlands
Crown — a structure similar to the British Commonwealth. The
Dutch proposals were reiterated and confirmed by the Linggacljati
(1947) and the Renville (1948) Agreements under the auspices of the
United States and the United Nations. The story of the pressures
exerted on the Dutch to relinquish these agreements has been detailed
in this consultation. It is now obvious that this was a concession
which has resulted in chaos, disorder, and probable Communist
domination.

One must credit the Dutch with expert knowledge of a country
which they had successfully and humanely governed for more than
300 years, and with their proposal for a practicable, federated struc-
ture, suited to the limitations of the average Indonesian.

Recent events have proven the Dutch right, and the spontaneous
political evolution of Indonesia confirms the fact that a conglomerate
of 3,000 islands, 58 races with 58 languages, varying customs, laws,
and ethnic characteristics cannot be unified by a phony propaganda
slogan such as "Merdeka." Instead, there is a drift into separate
entities with uncertain economic future and certain temptation to
grasping political forces such as Asiatic communism.

In the face of the brutal realities today, the decisions and actions
of the United States and the United Nations in the critical period
1945-49 have demonstrated once more an appalling ignorance of facts,
international prejudice, and political tendencies which have played
into the hands of the Soviet Union, and paved the way for the
Communist takeover of the Malay Barrier.

Mr. Arens. General Willoughby, may we once more express our
appreciation to you, on behalf of Chairman Walter and the entire
committee, for your courtesy in 'meeting with us here today.

The consultation is concluded.

(Thereupon at 1 p. m., Monday, December 16, 1957, the staff con-
sultation was concluded.)

APPENDIX

Partial Bibliography — Documentation and Sources

1. The Malay Barrier : A Strategic Vacuum, 1953 ; author, C. E. L. Helf rich, ad-

miral, Royal Netherlauds Navy ; commander in chief, Allied Na\ al Forces,
A. B. D. A., 1941.

2. Report on Indonesia ; Batavia, 24 October 1945.

3. Last Round Before World War III, May 20, 1954; Asia Aflame, the Devin-

Adair Go., New York, 1953 ; Dr. E. Van der Vlught, lawyer ( Court of
Justice, Amsterdam) and editor, Le Monde Nouveau, author and lecturer
on southeast Asia.

4. The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia, W. W. Norton Co., New York,

1950; Hon. H. J. Van Mook, Chief, Department of Economics, Nether-
lauds Indies.

5. A History of the Dutch in the Far East, Dr. Albert Hyma, professor of

history, University of Michigan ; G. Wahr Publishing Co., Ann Arbor, Mich.

6. MacArthur : 1941-45 ; McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., New York, N. Y., 1954 ;

Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby and John Chamberlin.

7. Indonesia : Asian New Democracy ; Political Affairs, September 1947.

8. Chinesan Zuhause in Indonesia, W. T. Thomas, 1954.

9. Communist and United Nations Policy in Indonesia, 1955, Alfred Kohlberg.

10. Forgotten War — Republic of South Moluccas, 1953 ; Comdr. K. J. V. Nikiju-

luw, Royal Netherlands East Indian Navy.

11. New York Times, April 25, May 27, and September 15, 1952.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

■f -

SOVHsT

l$Hli>*4

H"\ ... • l

The American Defense Line in the Western Pacific

American aircraft, based on (1) Okinawa, (2) the Philippines, and (3) For-
mosa, acts as a barrier, as a protective shield against enemy debouchment into
the Pacific. Similar air positions in Malaya and Thailand represent connecting
links, tied in a common defense under SEATO, recently formulated in the
Manila Pact. Note that in World War II, Dutch New Guinea (5) and Australia
(6) were our last line of defense in Japan's conquest of southeast Asia, in which
Formosa played an important role. It was from Formosa that the Philippines
were "air blitzed," and the air and naval bases of this island continued to play
a role for 4 more years.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Sowjet- Union..

I.Sachalm *

i Kunlen

Ln d & n k s i e ju /?

The Aib Chain: Japan, Korea, Formosa, Okinawa, Philippines, British
Borneo, British Malaya, and Thailand

The central, dominant role of Formosa is self-evident, an indispensable link in
the interlocking defense of the West Pacific. Conversely, Formosa in Red hands
will break this chain irreparably and will jeopardize Okinawa and the Philip-
pines, at flight radii of 660 miles, as shown by the heavy circle.

k ,int

INDEX

Individuals

Page

Alimin 11, 16, 17,27

Aziz, Abdul 20

Barrows, N. A__ 19

Bidien, Charles 18

Blarney 13

Brooks, Viner . 6

Buwono, Hamengku 29

Campbell, C. H 11, 28

Chamberlin, John 37

Chiang Kai-shek__„ 25

Christison (Alexander) 11, M-10, 22, 23

Cooper, Alfred Duff 9

de Jong, H. E. Johannes Cardinal 20

Dewantoro 2, 10

Djuanda 29

Driberg, Tom 17

Fox, Matthew 28

Ga A. K 2S

Graham, Frank Porter 2, 18, 24

Haiada 10

Hamidll 20

Hatta, Mohammed 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 22, 23, 27, 29

Heath, S. Burton 19

Kelfrich, C. E. L 0, 11, 13, 15, 16, 21, 33, 37

Hyma, Albert 6, 14, 37

Joyohadikusumo, Sumitro 28

Juliana, Queen of the Netherlands 14

Kerr, Archibald Clark 23

Killearn (British Lord; family name Mile? Wedderburn Lampson) 24

Kirby (Justice) 24

Knickerbocker, H. R 19

Kohlberg, Alfred 37

Leimena 29

MacArthur, Douglas 1, 5, 7, 11, 13-15, 23, 24, 34

Maeda 23

Malakka, Tan 10, 17, 27

Mansur 20

Mao Tse-tung 18

Maramis, A 28

Mountbatten (Louis) 11, 13-16, 22, 23

Muso 17

Myers, J. R 25

Nasution 29

Newton, William H 19

Nikijuluw, K. J. V 33, 37

Rad jiman 2, 10

Rajah of Sarawak 6

Saleh, Azis 29

Sastroamidjojo, Ali 26

Sjahrir, Sutan 2, 10, 11, 23, 29

Sjarifuddin, Amir 16, 17

Spoor, W. F 6, 17, 21, 24

ii INDEX

Page

Stump, Felix _ 3, 31

Sudirmau 17

Sukarno... --- 1-3, 10-16, 20-23, 26, 27, 29-32, 36

Suripno — 24

Tada, Reikichi 9

Terauchi 14, 22, 23

Thomas, W. T__ _._ 37

van der Plas, C 6, 16, 20

Van der Vlught, Ebed 6, 14, 37

Van Mook, (Hubertus) J 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 24, 37

van Zeeland (Paul) 24

Wavell, Archibald 9

Welles, Sumner 22

Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands 12, 14, 22

Willoughby, Charles A_ 1, 2, 5-36 (statement)

Organizations

Communist Party, Indonesia (P. K. I.) 16, 18, 26

Communist Party, Sidney, Australia 11

Communist Students Committee, The 15

International Congress of the Leagues for the Prevention of Colonial

Oppression 11

Maritime Union of America, National 2, 18

Nationalist Party, Indonesia (PNI) 2, 10, 26

Prisoners of War and Internee Relief Agency 13

Royal Dutch Packet Co. (KPM) 35

Socialist Party, Indonesia 10, 18

United Nations 24, 35

United Nations Commission for Indonesia (U. N. C. I.) 2, 18, 32, 35

Publications

Monde Nouveau, Le 14, 37

Political Affairs (September 1947) . 2, 17, 18

Zeit.. - 6

tfHffft

3 9999 05445 309^

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