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HE WORW WAR

COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN

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RALPH EMERSON FORBES

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SACHUSETTS BOSTON LIBRARY

IN THE WORLD WAR

COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN

IN
THE WORLD WAR

COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN Z^" ^^J ^uChuJer.

Former Austro-Hungarian Minister
of Foreign Affairs

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Harper & Brothers Publishers

New York and London

In the World War

Printed in the United States of America

Published March, 1920

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CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

Preface vii

I. Introductory Reflections i

II. Konopischt 39

III. William II 60

IV. Rumania 87

V. The U-Boat Warfare 129

VI. Attempts at Peace 150

VII. Wilson 209

VIII. Impressions and Reflections 217

IX. Poland 222

X. Brest-Litovsk 235

XL The Peace of Bukharest 287

XII. Final Reflections 302

Appendix 3^7

Index . . . 369

PREFACE

It is impossible in a small volume to write the history
of the World War in even a partially exhaustive manner.
Nor is that the object of the book.

Rather than to deal with generalities, its purpose is
to describe separate events of which I had intimate
knowledge, and individuals with whom I came into
close contact and could, therefore, observe closely; in
fact, to furnish a series of snapshots of the great drama.

By this means the following pages may possibly pre-
sent a conception of the war as a whole, which may,
nevertheless, differ in many respects from the hitherto
recorded, and possibly faulty, history of the war.

Every one regards people and events from his own
point of view ; it is inevitable. In my book, I speak of
men with whom I was in close touch; of others who
crossed my path without leaving any personal im-
pression on me; and finally, of men with whom I was
often in grave dispute. I endeavor to judge of them
all in objective fashion, but I have to describe people
and things as I saw them. Wherever the description
appears to be at fault, the reason will not be due to a
prematurely formed opinion, but rather, probably, to a
prevailing lack of the capacity for judging.

Not everything could be revealed. Much was not
explained, although it could have been. Too short a
period still separates us from those events to justify the
lifting of the veil from all that happened.

But what remains unspoken can in no way change the
whole picture which I describe exactly as imprinted on
my mind.

Count Ottokar Czernin.

/ i

IN THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS

THE bursting of a thunder-storm is preceded by cer-
tain definite phenomena in the atmosphere. The
electric currents separate, and the storm is the result
of atmospheric tension which can no longer be repressed.
Whether or no we become aware of these happenings
through outward signs, whether the clouds appear to
us more or less threatening, nothing can alter the fact
that the electric tension is bound to make itself felt
before the storm bursts.

For years the political barometer of the European
Ministries of Foreign Affairs had stood at ' ' storm. ' ' It
rose periodically, to fall again; it varied — naturally;
but for years everything had pointed to the fact that
the peace of the world was in danger.

The obvious beginnings of this European tension
date back several years, to the time of Edward VII.
On the on ehand, England's dread of the gigantic growth
of Germany; on the other hand, Berlin's politics, which
had become a terror to the dwellers by the Thames;
the belief that the idea of acquiring the dominion of
the world had taken root in Berlin. These fears, partly
due merely to envy and jealousy, but partly due also

2 IN THE WORLD WAR

to a positive anxiety concerning existence — these fears
led to the encircHng poHcy of Edward VII, and thus
was started the great drive against Germany. It is
well known that Edward VII made an attempt to
exercise a direct influence on the Emperor Francis
Joseph to induce him to secede from the Alliance and
join the Powers encircling Germany. It is likewise
known that the Emperor Francis Joseph rejected the
proposal, and that this decided the fate of Austria-
Hungary. From that day we were no longer the in-
dependent masters of our destiny. Our fate was
Imked to that of Germany; without being conscious
of it, we were carried away by Germany through the
Alliance.

I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the
years preceding war, it would still have been possible
for Germany to avert it if she had eradicated from
European public opinion all suspicion respecting her
dream of world-dominion, for far be it from me to assert
that the Western Powers were eager for war. On the
contrary, it is my firm conviction that the leading
statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the situation
as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Ger-
many, the unavoidable result would be a German
world-domination. I mention the Western Powers, for
I believe that a strong military party in Russia, which
had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch,
thought otherwise, and began this war with satisfac-
tion. The terrible tragedy of this, the greatest mis-
fortune of all time — and such is this war — lies in the
fact that nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of
a situation created first by a Serbian assassin and then
by some Russian generals keen on war, while the events
that ensued took the monarchs and statesmen com-
pletely by surprise. The Entente group of Powers is
as much to blame as we are. As regards this, however,

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 3

a very considerable difference must be made between
the enemy states. In 19 14 neither France nor England
desired war. France had always cherished the thought
of revenge, but, judging from all indications, she had
no intention of fighting in 19 14; but, on the contrary
— as she did fifty years ago — left the decisive moment
for entering into war to the future. The war came
quite as a surprise to France. England, in spite of her
anti-German policy, wished to remain neutral and only
changed her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium.
In Russia the Tsar did not know what he wanted, and
the military party urged unceasingly for war. As a
matter of fact, Russia began military operations with-
out a declaration of war.

The states that followed after — Italy and Rumania
— entered into the war for purposes of conquest,
Rumania in particular. Italy also, of course, but,
owing to her geographical position, and being exposed
to pressure from England, she was less able to remain
neutral than Rumania.

But the war would never have broken out had it not
been that the growing suspicion of the Entente as to
Germany's plans had already brought the situation to
boiling-point. The spirit and demeanor of Germany,
the speeches of the Emperor William, the behavior of
the Prussians throughout the world — whether in the
case of a general at Potsdam or a commis voyageur out
in East Africa — these Prussian manners inflicting them-
selves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting of their
own power and the clattering of swords, roused through-
out the whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm,
and effected that moral coalition against Germany
which in this war has founds such terribly practical
expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced
that German, or rather Prussian, tendencies have been
misunderstood by the world, and that the leading Ger-

4 IN THE WORLD WAR

man statesmen never had any intention of acquiring
world-dominion. They wished to retain Germany's
place in the sun, her rank among the first Powers of
the world; it was undoubtedly her right, but the real
and alleged continuous German provocation and the
ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence
created just that fatal competition in armaments and
that coalition policy which burst like a terrible thunder-
storm into the war.

It was only on the basis of these European fears that
the French plans of revenge developed into action.
England would never have drawn the sword merely
for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French
plan of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the
policy inaugurated by King Edward, which was derived
not from French, but from English motives.

Out of this dread of attack and defense arose that
mad fever for armaments which was characteristic of
pre-war times. The race to possess more soldiers and
more guns than one's neighbor was carried to an absurd
extreme. The armaments which the nations had to
bear had become so cumbersome as to be unbearable,
and for long it had been obvious to every one that the
course entered upon could no longer be pursued, and
that two possibilities alone remained — either a volun-
tary and general disarmament, or war.

A slight attempt at the first alternative was made
in 191 2 through negotiations between Germany and
England respecting naval disarmament, but never got
beyond the first stage. England was no readier for
peace, and no more disposed to make advances, than
was Germany, but she was cleverer and succeeded in
conveying to the world that she was the Power en-
dangered by Germany's plans for expansion.

I recollect a very telling illustration of the German
and British points of view, given to me by a prominent

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 5

politician from a neutral state. This gentleman was
crossing the Atlantic on an American steamer, and
among the other travelers were a well-known German
industrial magnate and an Englishman. The German
was a great talker and preferred addressing as large
an audience as possible, expatiating on the ''uprising"
of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for expansion
to be found in the German people, on the necessity of
impregnating the world with German culture, and on
the progress made in all these endeavors. He dis-
coursed on the rising prosperity of German trade in
different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns
where the German flag was flying; he pointed out
with emphasis how ''Made in Germany" was the term
that must and would conquer the world, and did not
fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on
solid foundations upheld by military support. Such
was the German. When my informant turned to the
silent, quietly smiling Englishman and asked what he
had to say to it, he simply answered, ' ' There is no need
for me to say anything, for I know that the world
belongs to us." Such was the EngHshman. This
merely illustrates a certain frame of mind. It is a
snapshot, showing how the German and the EngHsh
mentahty was reflected in the brain of a neutral states-
man; but it is symptomatic, because thousands have
felt the same, and because this impression of the Ger-
man spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe.
The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were
accustomed to on the Ballplatz, pursued ambitious
plans for expansion with the greatest strength and
energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world
regarding us. For the belief gained credence that the
Vienna policy was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and
that the same line of action would be adopted in
Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of anxiety

6 IN THE WORLD WAR

rose higher. Blacker and blacker grew the clouds;
closer and closer the meshes of the net ; misfortune was
on the way.

I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak
of war, and while there had a lengthy discussion of the
political situation with the Markgraf Pallavicini, our
most efficient and far-seeing ambassador there. He
looked upon the situation as being extremely grave.
Aided by his experience of a decade of political observa-
tions, he was able to put his finger on the pulse of
Europe, and his diagnosis was as follows: that if a
rapid change in the entire course of events did not
intervene, we were making straight for war. He
explained to me that he considered the only possibility
of evading a war with Russia lay in our definitely
renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and
leaving a field to Russia. Pallavicini was quite clear
in his own mind that such a course would mean our
resigning the status of a great Power; but apparently
to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was pref-
erable to the war which he saw was impending.
Shortly afterward I repeated this conversation to the
Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, and saw that he
was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of
Pallavicini, of whom, like every one else, he had a very
high opinion. The Archduke promised to discuss the
question as soon as possible with the Emperor. I
never saw him again. That was the last conversation
I had with him, and I do not know whether he ever
carried out his intention of discussing the matter with
the monarch.

The two Balkan wars were as a summer lightning
before the coming European thunder-storm. It was
obvious to any one acquainted with Balkan conditions

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 7

that the peace there had produced no definite result,
and the Peace of Bukharest in 19 13, so enthusiastically
acclaimed by Rumania, carried the germs of its death
and its birth. Bulgaria was humiliated and reduced;
Rumania and, above all, Serbia, enlarged out of all
proportion, were arrogant to a degree that baffles
description. Albania, as the apple of discord between
Austria-Hungary and Italy, was a factor that gave no
promise of relief, but only of fresh wars. In order to
understand the excessive hatred prevailing between
the separate nations, one must have lived in the Bal-
kans. When this hatred came to an outburst in the
World War the most terrible scenes were enacted, and
as an example it was notorious that the Rumanians
tore their Bulgarian prisoners to pieces with their teeth,
and that the Bulgarians, on their part, tortured the
Rumanian prisoners to death in the most shocking
manner. The brutality of the Serbians in the war
can best be described by our own troops. The Em-
peror Francis Joseph clearly foresaw that the peace
after the second Balkan war was merely a respite to
draw breath before a new war. Prior to my departure
for Bukharest in 19 13 I was received in audience by
the aged Emperor, who said to me: ''The Peace of
Bukharest is untenable, and we are faced by a new
war. God grant that it may be confined to the Bal-
kans." Serbia, which had been enlarged to double
its size, was far from being satisfied; but, on the con-
trary, was more than ever ambitious of becoming a
great Power.

Apparently the situation was still quiet. In fact, a
few weeks before the catastrophe at Sarajevo the pre-
vailing state of affairs showed almost an improvement
in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade. But it
was the calm before the storm. On June 28th the veil
was rent asunder and from one moment to the next a

8 ' IN THE WORLD WAR

catastrophe threatened the world. The stone had
started rolHng.

At that time I was Ambassador to Rumania. I was
therefore only able from a distance to watch develop-
ments in Vienna and Berhn. Subsequently, however,
I discussed events in those critical days with numerous
leading personalities, and from all that I heard have
been able to form a definite and clear view of the pro-
ceedings. I have no doubt whatever that Berchtold,
even in his dreams, had never thought of a world war of
such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all, was
persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the
German Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the
conviction that a war against France and Russia would
inevitably end in victory. I believe that the state of
mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the ultima-
tum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either —
and this is the most favorable view — Serbia will accept
the ultimatum, which would mean a great diplomatic
success; or she will refuse it, and then, thanks to Ger-
many's help, the victorious war against Russia and
France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger
monarchy. It cannot for a moment be denied that
this argument contained a series of errors ; but it must
be stated that, according to my convictions. Count
Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum,
but hoped to the very last to gain the victory by the
pen, and that in the German promises he saw a guar-
antee against a war in which the participators and the
chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.

Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that
a Serbian war would bring a Russian one in its train.
At any rate, the reports sent by my brother, who was a
business man in Petersburg, left him in no doubt on the
matter.

Serbia's acceptance of the ultimatum was only par-

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 9

tial, and the Serbian war broke out. Russia armed and
joined in. But at this moment extremely important
events took place.

On July 30th, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold
the contents of a telegram received from Lichnowsky.
This important telegram contained the following: He
(Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who
was very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing
out that the situation was becoming more and more
complicated. Sassonoff had intimated that after the
declaration of war he was no longer in a position to
negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested
England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessa-
tion of hostilities to be taken for granted. Grey pro-
posed a negotiation between four, as it appeared pos-
sible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after occu-
pying Belgrade, would state her terms.

To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lich-
nowsky's attention to the fact that a war between
Russia and Austria-Hungary would facihtate England's
neutrality, but that the conditions would inevitably
change in the event of Germany and France being
involved. Public opinion in England, which after the
assassination was very favorable to Austria, was now
beginning to fluctuate, as it was difficult to understand
Austria's obstinacy.

Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian
Ambassador that he thought Austria would receive
every satisfaction on accepting negotiation. In any
case the Serbians would be punished. Even with-
out a war Austria would receive a guaranty for the

future.

Such were the contents of the communication sent
from London by Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added
that he urgently requested the Vienna Cabinet to

10 IN THE WORLD WAR

accept the negotiation. On receiving this information,
Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His
position was this : that Russia was already at war with
the Monarchy on the evening of the same day on
which the order for general mobilization was to be sub-
mitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to
him whether a postponement of their own mobilization
would be possible in view of the Russian attack. He
had also to take into consideration the different parties
prevailing in Russia, and no guaranty was obtainable
that those who were in favor of negotiation would gain
the day. Any postponement of mobilization might
in this case lead to incalculable military consequences.
Obviously hostihties had begun without the knowledge
and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they were also
to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary
would be too late.

I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but
the material placed at my disposal leaves no doubt
that he felt bound to inquire into this side of the ques-
tion and then leave the decision to the Emperor Francis

Joseph.

On the following day, July 31st, therefore, Tschirsky,
at the Ballplatz, communicated the contents of a tele-
gram from King George to Prince Henry of Prussia.
It ran as follows :

Thanks for telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to
concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly de-
sirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be
averted. My government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia
and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will
consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and the neigh-
boring Serbian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement
of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war
preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce
Austria to accept his proposal, thus proving that Germany and
England are working together to prevent what would be an inter-

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS ii

national catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall
continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of

Europe.

George.

Both the telegrams cited were received in Vienna on
July 3 ist, subject to certain military precautions, a pro-
ceeding that did not satisfy London.

In London, as in Berlin, an effort was made to confine
the conflict to Serbia. Berchtold did the same. In
Russia there was a strong party working hard to
enforce war at any price. The Russian invasion was a
fact, and in Vienna it was thought unwise to stop mo-
bihzation at the last moment for fear of being too late
with defense. Some ambassadors did not keep to the
instructions from their governments; they communi-
cated messages correctly enough, but if their personal
opinion differed they made no secret of it, and it cer-
tainly weighed in the balance.

This added to the insecurity and confusion. Berch-
told vacillated, torn hither and thither by different
influences. It was a question of hours merely; but
they passed by and were not made use of, and disaster
was the result.

Russia had created strained conditions which brought
on the World War.

Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long
conversation on all these questions with the Hungarian
Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza. He was decid-
edly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw a
war and did not wish for it. It is one of the most
widely spread errors to stigmatize Tisza to-day as one
of the instigators of the war. He was opposed to it,
not from a general pacifist tendency, but because, in
his opinion, an efficiently pursued poHcy of alliance
would in a few years considerably strengthen the
powers of the Monarchy. He particularly returned to

12 IN THE WORLD WAR

the subject of Bulgaria, which then was still neutral
and whose support he had hoped to gain before we
went to war. I also obtained from Tisza several details
concerning the activities of the German government
as displayed by the German Ambassador immediately
preceding the war. I purposely made a distinction
between the German government and German diplo-
macy, as I am under the impression that Herr von
Tschirsky had taken various steps without being
instructed so to do, and when I previously have alluded
to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the
language enjoined by their governments, I was allud-
ing specially to Herr von Tschirsky, whose whole tem-
perament and feelings led him to interfere in our affairs
with a certain vehemence and not always in the mos-t
tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its
lethargy.

There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschir-
sky's private speeches at this time were attuned to the
tone of ''Now or Never," and it is certain that the
German Ambassador declared his opinion to be ''that
at the present moment Germany was prepared to sup-
port our point of view with all her moral and military
power, but whether this would prove to be the case in
futtu-e if we accepted the Serbian rebuff appears to me
doubtful." I believe that Tschirsky in particular was
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany
would have to go through a war against France and
Russia, and he considered that the year 1914 would be
more favorable than a later date. For this reason,
because first of all he did not believe in the fighting
capacity of either Russia or France, and secondly
because — and this is a very important point — he was
convinced that he could bring the Monarchy into this
war ; while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged
and peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 13

the sword for Germany on any other occasion where the
action would center less round him, he wished to make
use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of Austria-
Hungary in the deciding struggle. That, however, was
his policy, and not Bethmann's.

This, I repeat, is the impression produced on me by
lengthy conversations with Count Tisza — impressions
which have been confirmed from other sources. I am
persuaded, however, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he
did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of
activity. Iswolsky was not the only one of his kind. I
conclude this to be so, since Tschirsky, as intimated in
a former despatch, was never in a position to make an
official declaration urging for war, but appears only to
have spoken after the manner of diplomatic repre-
sentatives when anxious to adapt the policy of their
government to their own point of view. Undoubtedly
Tschirsky transmitted his instructions correctly and
loyally, nor did he keep back or secrete anything. An
ambassador attains more or less according to the energy
expended by him in carrying out the instructions of his
government; and the private opinion of the ambas-
sador is, under certain circumstances, not easy to dis-
tinguish from his official one. At all events, the latter
will be influenced by the former, and Tschirsky's pri-
vate opinion aimed at a more vigorous policy.

In complete ignorance of impending events, I had
arrived at Steiermark a few days before the ultimatum
in order to establish my family there for the summer.
While there I received a message from Berchtold to
return to my post as quickly as possible. I obeyed at
once, but before leaving had one more audience with
the Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl. I found the
Emperor extremely depressed.^ He alluded qu i te briefly
to the coming events, and merely asked me if, in case
Qf a war, I could guarantee Rumania's neutrality. I

14 IN THE WORLD WAR

answered in the affirmative, so long as King Carol was
alive ; beyond that any guaranty was impossible.

Ill

Certain extremely important details relating to the
time immediately preceding the outbreak of war can
only be attributed to the influence of the group repre-
sented by Tschirsky. It is incomprehensible why we
granted to our then allies, Italy and Rumania, facilities
for playing the part of seceders by presenting them with
an ultimatum before action was completed, instead of
winning them over and involving them also.

I am no accurate judge of the events in Rome, but
King Carol in Rumania had certainly tried everything
to induce Serbia to yield. In all probability he would
not have succeeded, as Serbia had no idea of renounc-
ing her plans for a Greater Serbia; but presumably
an anxious feeling would have arisen between Bukha-
rest and Belgrade, which would strongly have influenced
further Rumanian policy in our favor.

Bukharest has made enormous capital out of the
diplomatic proceedings.

Before the first decisive Cabinet Council Baron
Fasciotti, the Italian Ambassador, harangued all the
members in this spirit, and declared that the situation
in Rumania and Italy was similar, and in each case
there was no reason for co-operation, as neither Rome
not Bukharest had previously come to an under-
standing regarding the ultimatum. His efforts were
crowned with success.

On August I, 1 914, I sent the following telegram to
Berchtold :

The Prime Minister has just notified me the result of the Cabinet
Council. After a warm appeal from the King to bring the treaty

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 15

into force, the Cabinet Council, with one exception, declared that
no party could undertake the responsibility of such action.

The Cabinet Council has resolved that as Rumania was neither
notified nor consulted concerning the Austro-Eungarian action in
Belgrade no casus foederis exists. The Cabinet Council further
resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier be
undertaken, which would be an advantage for the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its frontiers would thereby
be covered.

The Prime IMinister added that he had already given orders to
strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general mobiliz-
ation would follow.

The government intends only to publish a short communique
relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the country.

Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the
ultimatum was drawn up as it was. It was not so
much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for war as of
other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870
Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was
of quite a different character.

In the present case it appears incomprehensible why
a note should have been selected which by its wording
gave umbrage to many who hitherto were favorably
disposed toward us.

Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassina-
tion, secretly and confidentially furnished proofs to the
great Powers who were not inimical to us, and espe-
cially to England, that trouble was impending over a
political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have
evoked a very different frame of mind in those govern-
ments. Instead, we flung the ultimatum at them and
at the whole of Europe.

It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any
communication to the Powers would result in their
intervention in the form of a new conference of ambas-
sadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the
year 19 14 the case was very different from former days

i6 IN THE WORLD WAR

—before the ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on
our side.

At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an
insipid solution, and had insisted, therefore, on drastic
action. In 1 8 70 Bismarck was the attacking party, and
he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We also
succeeded, but in an^opposite sense.

Then came our greatest disaster — the German entry
into Belgium.

Had England remained neutral we should not have
lost the war. In his book, Ursachen und Ausbruck des
Krieges, page 172, Jagow tells howon August 4th, toward
the close of the Reichstag session, the EngHsh Ambas-
sador appeared there and again asked whether Ger-
many would respect Belgium's neutrality. At that
time German troops were already on Belgian soil. On
hearing that, the Ambassador retired, but, returning
in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed
in before midnight, that the further advance of the Ger-
man troops into Belgium would cease, otherwise he was
instructed to ask for his passport and England would
then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and the
consequence was a declaration of war by England.

That England on the same day sent word to Belgium
that she would resist with her utmost strength any
violation of her neutrality is fully in accordance with
the steps taken at Berlin by the EngHsh Ambassador.

Two days before, on August 2d, the English Cabi-
net certainly gave France the assurance that, in ad-
dition to the protection of Belgian neutrality, she had
demanded that there should be no naval action against
France. The contradiction between both points of
view is clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 17

the only explanation is that on August 4th England no
longer adhered to her standpoint of August 2d, for
the German acceptance of the English ultimatum
on the evening of August 4th had wrested from
England the moral possibiHty of making further
claims. If England, on August 4th, had sought a pre-
text for war, she would have put forward, besides the
Belgian demand, also that referring to the abstention
from naval action. But she did not do so, and con-
fined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby
t^n'ng her own hands in the event of Germany accepting
the ultimatum. On the night of August 4th, between the
hours of nine and midnight, the decision as to whether
England would remain neutral or no lay with Germany.

Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian
neutrahty in spite of the certainty of the English
declaration of war resulting therefrom. That was the
first fateful victory of the militarists over the diplomats
in this war. The former were naturally the motive
power.

The German military plan was to overrun France
and then make a furious onslaught on Russia. This
plan was shattered on the Marne.

In more respects than one, German policy foundered
on the heritage left by Bismarck. Not only was the
conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a lasting obstacle to
friendly relations with France, perpetually forcing the
latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but
Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because
the Germans, though desirous of following in his foot-
steps, had no one sufficiently competent to lead them
therein.

Bismarck created the German Empire out of Diippel,
Koniggratz, and Sedan. His poHcy was one of "blood
and iron"— and for fifty years that poHcy of violence
and violent means had been ingrained in the mind of

i8 IN THE WORLD WAR

every German school-boy as the gospel of diplomatic
art — but Bismarck was not able to bequeath to the
German people his genial efficiency, wisdom, and
prudence in the use of his violent means. Bismarck
carefully prepared the wars of 1866 and 1870, and
struck when he held good cards in his hands. The
Germany of W^illiam II had no desire for war, but one
day plunged headlong into it, and during the first week
had already created political situations which were
beyond her power to cope with. Belgium and Luxem-
burg were treated on the Bismarckian principle of
"might before right," and the world rose against
Germany. I say world, because England's power
extended over the world.

At the beginning of the war England stood at ** order
arms." It would have been entirely true to her tradi-
tional policy to allow Germany to fight against France
and Russia and mutually weaken one another, then at a
given moment to intervene and enjoin peace. England
was forced to join in by Germany threatening to
establish herself in Belgium. How far the German
invasion of Belgium can morally be extenuated owing
to a French purpose to do likewise has still not been
made clear — but this argument does not apply to
Luxemburg, and the breach of right remains the same
whether the country where it occurs be large or small.

The invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg was a
stroke of the Bismarckian policy of violence, not carried
out by politicians, but by generals, though they were
devoid of Bismarck's power of calculating the devas-
tating consequences.

Later on, during the course of the war, the German
Supreme Command made repeated use of violent means,
which were more detrimental than useful to us, though
subsequently these means were morally justifiable
and comprehensible; in fact, were directly forced on

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 19

us, seeing that Germany was fighting for her existence,
and her adversaries, who would not come to an under-
standing, left her no choice of means. The use of
noxious gas, aerial attacks on open towns, and the U-
boat war were means used in desperation against a
merciless enemy, who left women and children to die
of starvation and declared day by day that Germany
must be annihilated.

When war was declared, that murderous element was
lacking, and it was only the entry into neutral territory
that fostered an atmosphere of such terrible hatred and
vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war of anni-
hilation.

England's policy concerning Napoleon III had been
also more of a diplomatic than a military nature, and
everything tends to show that in the present case
England originally had no intention of joining in the
conflagration, but was content to see Germany weak-
ened by her own confederates.

So far as I am in a position to review the situation
no blame for the wrongly estimated English attitude
can be attached to our ambassadors in London. Their
predictions and warnings were correct, and the final
decision respecting the previously mentioned English
ultimatum was taken in Berlin and not in London.
Moreover, the German Foreign Office w^ould never
voluntarily have consented to the act of violence,
but the military party, who cared neither for diplo-
matic reports nor political complications, carried every-
thing before them.

It will always be particularly difficult in a war to
define the limits of miHtary and poHtical spheres of
action. The activities of both encroach to so great an
extent on each other as to form one whole, and very
naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs.
Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians

20 IN THE WORLD WAR

into subordinate positions which was effected in Ger-
many and thereby made manifest the fact that the
German Supreme MiHtary Command had possessed
itself of all state power of command, was a misfortune.
Had the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there
would never have been any invasion of Belgium, nor
yet the ruthless U-boat war, the abstention from which
would in both cases have saved the life of the Central
Powers.

From the very first day the Emperor William was as
a prisoner in the hands of his generals.

The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was,
like so much else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the
** Prussian lieutenant, inimitable save in Germany,"
became her doom. The entire German people believed
in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the
arms of his generals and took upon himself a responsi-
bility far surpassing the normal limit of what was bear-
able. Thus the Emperor William allowed his generals
full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their tactics
seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne
was a godsend for the Entente in their direst need.
Again, later, when the war long since had assumed a
totally different character, when the troops were made
stationary by the war of position and fresh enemies
were constantly rising up against us, when Italy,
Rumania, and finally America appeared on the scene,
then did the German generals achieve miracles of
strategy. Hindenburg and Ludendorff became gods
in the eyes of the German people; the whole of Ger-
many looked up to them and hoped for victory through
them alone. They were more powerful than the
Emperor, and he, therefore, less than ever in a position
to oppose them.

Both the generals drew the well-nigh unlimited meas-
iire of their power direct from the Entente, for the

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 21

latter left the Germans in no doubt that they either
must conquer or die. The terrified and suffering
people clung, therefore, to those who alone could give
them victory.

Anglo- German competition, the increasing deca-
dence of the Monarchy, and the consequent growing lust
of conquest evinced by our neighbors had prepared the
soil for war. Serbia, by the assassination, brought
about an acute state of tension, and Russia profited
thereby to fling herself on the Central Powers.

That appears to me to be briefly an objective history
of the beginning of the war. Faults, errors, and
omissions from the most varied sources may occur in it,
but can neither alter nor affect the real nature of the
case.

The victorious Entente gives a different interpreta-
tion of it. She maintains that Germany let loose the
war, and the terrible peace of Versailles is the product
of that conception, for it serves as punishment.

A neutral court of justice, as proposed by Germany,
was refused. Her own witnesses and her own judges
suffice for her. She is judge and prosecutor combined
in one person. In Doctor Bauer, the German-Austrian
Secretary of State, she has certainly secured an impor-
tant witness for her view of the case. In the winter
of 191 8 the latter openly declared that *' three Austro-
Htmgarian counts and one general had started the
war."i

Were that true, then Germany would also have to
bear a vast amount of blame. For the four "guilty
ones" could not have incited to war without being
sure of having Germany at their back, and, were it true,

* Supposed to be the Counts Berchtold, Tisza, and Stuergkh, and
Gen. Conrad von Hohendorf.
3

22 IN THE WORLD WAR

there could only have been a question of some plot laid
by the Austro-Hungarian and the German govern-
ments, in which case Germany, being the vastly
superior military element, would undoubtedly have
assumed the role of leader.

Bauer's statement shows that they who inflicted the
punitive peace were right.

While the war was going on, a separate peace on our
side that would have delivered up Germany would have
been treachery. But had attempts at peace failed
owing to the claims put forward by Germany, we
should have been morally justified in breaking away
from them, as we were united together in a war of
defense and not in a war of conquest. Although the
German military party both dreamed and talked
incessantly of conquest, which doubtless gave rise
to a misunderstanding of the situation, that was by
no means the exclusive reason why peace could not be
attained. It simply was because on no consideration
could the Entente be induced to pardon Germany. I
have already mentioned this in my speech of December
II, i9i8,Mn which I discoursed on politics in the World
AVar: ''Ludendorff is exactly like the statesmen of
France and England. None of them wishes to com-
promise, they only look for victory; in that respect
there is no difference between them." As long as I was
in office the Entente would never come to an agreement
with Germany inter pares, thereby directly forcing us to
assume the part of a war of defense. Had we suc-
ceeded in what we so often attempted to do, namely, to
make the Entente pronounce the saving word; and

iSee AoDendix.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 23

had we ever been able to make the Entente state that it
was ready to conclude a status quo peace with Germany,
we would have been relieved of our moral obligations.
Against this may be quoted : ''Salus rei publicas supreme
lex'' — in order to save the Monarchy Germany would
have to be given up, and therefore the other question
must be inquired into as to whether the ' * physical pos-
sibility" of a separate peace really did exist. I also
mentioned this matter in the aforesaid speech, and
expressly stated then, and withdraw nothing, that after
the entry of England, then of Italy, Rumania, and
finally of America into the war, I considered a victory
peace on our side to be a Utopian idea. " But up to the
last moment of my official activities I cherished the
hope of a peace of understanding from month to month,
from week to week, even from day to day, and believed
that the possibility would arise of obtaining such a
peace of understanding, however great the sacrifices.
Just as little as anyone else could I foresee the end which
practically has arrived, nor yet the present state of
affairs. A catastrophe of such magnitude and such
dimensions was never what I feared. This is confirmed
in the published report of my aforesaid speech, sent by
me to the Emperor Karl in 191 7 and reprinted later,'
where I say : "A victory peace is out of the question ;
we are therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacri-
fice." The Imperial offer to cede Galicia to Poland,
and, indirectly, to Germany, arose out of this train
of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the Entente,
which always clearly intimated that we were ready for
endurable sacrifices.

It had always been oovious that the Entente would
tear the Monarchy in shreds, both in the event of a
peace of understanding and of a separate peace. It

1 See Appendix.

24 IN THE WORLD WAR

was quite in keeping with the terms of the Treaty of
London of April 26, 191 5.

The resolutions passed at that Congress, which pre-
pared for Italy's entry into the war, determined the
further course of the war, for they included the division
of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into a desper-
ate war of defense. I believe that London and Paris,
at times when the fortune of war was on our side, both
regretted the resolutions that had been adopted, as
they prevented the dwellers on both the Seine and the
Thames from making any temporarily desired advances
to us.

As far back as 191 5 we received vague news of the
contents of this strictly secret London Agreement ; but
only in February, 191 7, did we obtain the authentic
whole, when the Russian revolutionary government
published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently
was reproduced in our papers.

I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,^ as,
in spite of its being so eminently important, it has not
received adequate attention on the part of the public.

According to the settlements, which were binding
for the four states — England, France, Russia, and
Italy — the last-named was awarded the Trentino, the
whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass, Trieste,
Goritz, Gradisca, the w^hole of I stria, with a number of
islands, also Dalmatia.

In the course of the war the Entente had further
made binding promises to the Rumanians and Serbians,
hence the need for the dissolution of the Monarchy.

Having made these statements, I wish to explain why
a separate peace was a sheer impossibility for us. In
other words, what were the reasons that prevented us
from ending the war and becoming neutral — reasons

1 See Appendix.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 25

which only left one possibiHty open to us: to change
our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente,
together with Germany, to join the Entente and with it
fight against Germany? It must, above all, be kept
in mind that up to the last days that I held office the
eastern front was manned by Austro-Hungarian and
German troops all mixed together, and this entire army
was under the Imperial German command. We had
no army of our own in the east — not in the true sense of
the word, as it had been merged into the German army.
That was a consequence of our military inferiority.
Again and again we resorted to German aid. We
called repeatedly for help in Serbia, Rumania, Russia,
and Italy, and were compelled to purchase it by giving
up certain things. Our notorious inferiority was only
in very sHght degree the fault of the individual soldier ;
rather did it emanate from the general state of Austro-
Hungarian affairs. We entered the war badly equipped
and sadly lacking in artillery ; the various Ministers of
War and the Parliaments were to blame in that respect.
The Hungarian Parliament neglected the army for
years because their national claims were not attended to,
and in Austria the Social Democrats had always been
opposed to any measures of defense, scenting therein
plans for attack and not defense.

Our General Staff was in part very bad. There were,
of course, exceptions, but they only prove the rule.
What was chiefly wanting was contact with the troops.
These gentlemen sat with their backs turned and gave
their orders. Hardly ever did they see the men at the
front or where the bullets whistled. During the war
the troops learned to hate the General Staff. It was
very different in the German army. The German Gen-
eral Staffs exacted much, but they also achieved much;
above all, they exposed themselves freely and set an
example. Ludendorff, sword in hand, took Liege,

26 IN THE WORLD WAR

accompanied by a couple of men! In Austria arch-
dukes were put into leading posts for which they were
quite unsuited. Some of them were utterly incompe-
tent; the Archdukes Friedrich, Eugen, and Joseph
formed three exceptions. The first of these in par-
ticular very rightly looked upon his post not as that of a
leader of operations, but as a connecting link between
us and Germany, and between the army and the Em-
peror Francis Joseph. He acted always correctly and
with eminent tact, and overcame many difficulties.
What was left of our independence was lost after Luck.

To return, therefore, to the plan developed above : a
separate peace that would have contained an order for
our troops on the eastern front to lay down their arms
or to march back would immediately have led to con-
flict at the front. Following on the violent opposition
that such an order would naturally have aroused in the
German leaders, orders from Vienna and counter-orders
from Berlin would have led to a state of complete dis-
organization, even to anarchy. Humanly speaking, it
was out of the question to look for a peaceful and blood-
less unravelment at the front. I state this in order to
explain my firm conviction that the idea that such a
parting of the two armies could have been carried out
in mutual agreement is based on utterly erroneous
premises, and also to prove that we have here the first
factor showing that we would not have ended the war
by a separate peace, but would, on the contrary, have
been entangled in a new one.

But what would have been enacted at the front
would also, and in aggravated fashion, have been
repeated throughout the entire country — a civil war
would have been inevitable.

I must here explain a second misunderstanding,
resulting also from my speech of December nth, which
is due to my statement that ''if we came out Germany

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 27

could not carry on the war.'' I admit that this state-
ment is not clearly expressed, and was interpreted as
though I had intended to say that if we came out the
immediate collapse of Germany was a foregone con-
clusion. I did not intend to say that, nor did I say or
mean it. I meant to say that our secession from Ger-
many would render impossible a victorious ending of
the war, or even a lasting successful continuance of the
war ; that Germany through this would be faced by the
alternative of either submitting to the dictates of the
Entente or of bringing up her supremest fighting powers
and suppressing the Monarchy, preparing for her the
same fate as Rumania met with. I meant to say that
Austria-Hungary, if she allowed the Entente troops to
enter, would prove such a terrible danger to Germany
that she would be compelled to use every means to
forestall us and paralyze the move. Whoever imagines
that the German military leaders would not have seized
the latter eventuality knows them but badly, and has a
poor opinion of their spirit. In order to be able to
form an objective judgment of this train of thought one
should be able to enter into the spirit of the situation.
In April, 19 16, when I sent in my resignation for other
reasons, Germany's confidence in victory was stronger
than ever. The eastern front was free; Russia and
Rumania were out of action. The troops were bound
westward, and no one who knew the situation as it was
then can repudiate my assertion that the German mili-
tary leaders beUeved themselves then to be nearer than
ever to a victory peace; that they were persuaded they
would take both Paris and Calais and force the Entente
to its knees. It is out of the question that at such a
moment and under such conditions they could have
rephed to the falling away of Austria-Hungary other-
wise than by violence.

All who will not admit the argument, I would refer to

28 IN THE WORLD WAR

a fact which it would be difficult to evade. Six months
afterward, when there was already clear evidence of the
German collapse, when Andrassy declared a separate
peace, the Germans, as a matter of fact, threw troops into
the Tyrol. If they, when utterly exhausted, defeated,
and ruined, with revolution at their back, still held
firmly to this decision and endeavored to make a battle-
field on Austrian territory, how much more would they
have done that six months earlier, when they still stood
full of proud defiance and their generals dreamed of
victory and triumph? What I, secondly, also would
maintain is that the immediate consequence of a
separate peace would have been the conversion of
Austria-Hungary into a theater of war. The Tyrol, as
well as Bohemia, would have become fields of battle.

If it be maintained now that the great exhaustion
from the war that prevailed throughout the Monarchy
before April, 191 7, had caused the entire population
of the former Monarchy to rally round the Minister
who had concluded the separate peace, it is a conscious
or unconscious untruth. Certainly the Czechs were
decidedly against Germany, and it would not have been
reasons of political aUiance that would have prevented
them from agreeing. But I would like to know what
the Czech people would have said if Bohemia had been
turned into a theater of war and exposed to all the
sufferings endured by this and all other peoples, and
when to it had been added the devastation of the father-
land, for, let there be no doubt about it, the troops
advancing with flying colors from Saxony would have
made their way to Prague and penetrated even farther.
We had no military forces in Bohemia; we should not
have been able to check the advance, and quicker than
either we or the Entente could have sent troops worth
mentioning to Bohemia, the Germans, drawing troops
from their well-nigh inexhaustible reserves, would have

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 29

marched either against us or against the Entente on
our territory. The German-Austrian pubhc would
not have been in agreement with such a Minister; but
the German NationaHsts and the German bourgeoisie
have no say in the matter.

On October 28th the German Nationalists published
their own particular point of view in the following
manner :

The members of the German Nationalist parties were highly-
indignant at the way in which Count Andrassy answered Wilson's
note. Count Andrassy came from Hungary, and neither came to
any agreement with the Imperial German government nor with the
representatives of the Executive Committee before drawing up the
note. Although the peace negotiations were most warmly welcomed
and considered most necessary, still the one-sided action of Count
Andrassy in despatching the note to Wilson without previous
arrangement with the German Empire has roused the greatest indig-
nation in the German parties. A few days ago a delegation from
the German Executive Committee was in BerHn and was favorably
received by the German Imperial government in the matter of pro-
viding for German-Austria. Although German soldiers fought by
the side of ours in the Alps and the Carpathians, the alliance has now
been violated by this effort to approach Wilson without the consent
of the German Empire, as is expressly stated in the note. Besides
which, no previous agreement with the representatives of the Ger-
man Executive Committee was sought for. They were ignored and
the answer was sent to Wilson. The German Nationalist parties
strongly protest against such an unqualifiahle act and will insist in
the German Executive Committee that German- Austria's right of
self-determination be unconditionally upheld and peace be secured
in concert with the German Empire.

Neither would the German-Austrian Social Demo-
crats have been a party to such a movement.

A conscious and intended misrepresentation of fact
lies before us if it be maintained to-day that either the
National Assembly or the Austrian Social Democrats
would have approved of and supported such policy. I
again have in mind the Andrassy days.

30 IN THE WORLD WAR

On October 30th the National Assembly took up its
position for action. Doctor Sylvester drew up the
report and pointed out the following:

It was, however, neither necessary nor desirable to make the
attempt in such a way as to create an incurable rupture between
German-Austria and the German Empire that would endanger the
future of our people. The German-Austrian National Assembly
asserts that the note of October 27th from the Royal and Imperial
Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up and despatched to
President Wilson without in any way coming to an agreement with
the representatives of the German- Austrian people. The National
Assembly protests all the more insistently against this proceeding
as the nation to which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs
belongs has expressly refused any joint dealings. The National
Assembly states that it and its organs alone have the right to repre-
sent the German-Austrian people in all matters relating to foreign
affairs and particularly in all peace negotiations.

The protest met with no opposition in the National
Assembly.

Afterward the chairman, Doctor Ellenbogen, the
Social Democrat, spoke as follows:

Instead of now telling the Geiman Emperor that his remaining
in office is the greatest obstacle to peace [loud applause from the
Social Democrats], and if there ever were an object in Curtius's
famous leap, it would be comprehensible now were the German
Emperor to copy it to save his people, this coalition now seizes the
present moment to break away from Germany and in doing so
attacks German democracy in the rear. Those gentlemen arrived
too late to gain any profit from the peace. What now remains is
the bare and shameful breach of faith, the thanks of the House of
Austria, so styled by a celebrated German poet. [Applause from the
Social Democrats and the German Radicals.]

It was the attack on the separate peace that furnished
the exceptional opportunity for Social Democrats and
German Radicals to unite in common applause, prob-
ably the first instance of such a thing in all these years
of war.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 31

If that could happen at a moment when it already was
obvious that there was no longer a possibility of making
a peace of understanding together with Germany —
what would have happened, I ask, at a time when this
was by no means so clear to the great majority of the
population ; at a time when it was still far from certain,
or, at least, not to be proved mathematically, that we
in time and together with Germany might still be able
to conclude a peace of understanding? Disbandment
at the front, where all would be fighting against all, civil
war in the interior, such would have been the result of a
separate peace. And all that in order finally to impose
on us the resolutions passed in London! For never — •
as I shall presently show — had the Entente given up its
decision, as it was bound to Italy, and Italy would
allow of no change. Such a policy would have been as
suicide from the sheer fear of death.

In 191 7 I once discussed the whole question with the
late Dr. Victor Adler, and pointed out to him the proba-
bilities ensuing from a separate peace.

Doctor Adler repHed: ''For God's sake, do not
plunge us into a war with Germany!" After the entry
of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was then a
secretary in the Foreign Affairs Department) he re-
minded me of our conversation, and added: ''The
catastrophe we spoke of then has arrived. The Tyrol
will become a theater of war."

Every one in Austria wished for peace. No one
wanted a new war — and a separate peace would have
brought about, not peace, but a new war with Germany.

In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically
unlimited powers; he was far more powerful than the
entire Wekerle Ministry put together. As apphed to
Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the
carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the
largest and richest territories in the north and south of

32 IN THE WORLD WAR

Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Serbia. Is there any-
one who can honestly maintain that the Hungarians in
191 7 would have agreed to these sacrifices without
putting up the bitterest resistance? Every one who
knows the circumstances must admit that in this case
Tisza would have had the whole of Hungary behind him
in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I took office
I had a long and very serious conversation with him on
the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed
out that the Germans were difficult to deal with; they
were arrogant and despotic ; yet without them we could
not bring the war to an end. The proposal to cede
Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan
to enforce an internal Hungarian reform in favor of the
subject nationaHties were matters that were not capable
of discussion. The congress in London in 191 5 had
adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never
could be realized, and the desire for destruction pre-
vailing in the Entente could be suppressed only by
force. In all circumstances, we must keep our place
by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many differ-
ent currents of feeling — but the moment that Vienna
prepared to sacrifice any part of Hungary the whole
country would rise as one man against such action. In
that respect there was no difference between him —
Tisza — and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's atti-
tude of Parliament, and said that if peace was to be
made behind Hungary's back she would separate from
Austria and act independently.

I replied that there was no question either of separat-
ing from Germany or of ceding any Hungarian territory,
but that we must be quite clear as to what we had to
guard should we be carried farther through the German
lust of conquest.

Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was
different. It was not known for certain what had been

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 33

determined at the conference in London (the protocol
had not then been pubhshed), but that Hungarian
territory was promised to Rumania was just as certain
as that the Entente was planning to intervene in Hun-
garian internal affairs, and both contingencies were
equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give Hun-
gary a guaranty for the status quo ante and to desist
from any internal interference, it would alter the situa-
tion. Until then Tisza must declare against any
attempt at peace.

The conversation as it proceeded became more ani-
mated, owing particularly to my accusing him of view-
ing all politics from a Hungarian point of view, which he
did not deny, though he maintained that the dispute
was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms
appeared to be such that Austria would be left with
much less than Hungary. I was also first to state the
terms under which we could make peace; then only
would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to
bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no
sense in Germany's advocating peace if she intended to
continue fighting. For Germany was fighting, above
all, for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be
lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. What-
ever German politicians and generals said was of little
consequence. As long as England remained bent on
satisfying her allies with our territory, Germany was
the only protection against these plans.

Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier
protection from Rumania, and he was decidedly opposed
to the dismemberment of new states (Poland); that
would be to weaken, not to strengthen, Hungary.

After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind our-
selves to the following policy :

(i) So long as the determination made at the conference in
London — i.e.. the destruction of the Monarchy— continues

34 IN THE WORLD WAR

to be the Entente's objective, we must fight on in the cer-
tain hope of crushing that spirit of destruction.

(2) But as our war is purely a defensive war, it will on no account
be carried on for purposes of conquest.

'(3) Any semblance of the weakening of our allied relations must
be avoided.

(4) No concession of Hungarian territory may take place without
the knowledge of the Prime Minister.

'(5) Should the Austrian IMinistry agree with the Foreign ]\Iin-
ister respecting a cession of Austrian territory, the Hun-
garian Prime Minister will naturally acquiesce.

When the conference in London and the destruction
of the Monarchy came into question, Tisza was entirely
in the right, and that he otherwise to the end adhered to
his standpoint is proved on the occasion of his last visit
to the Southern Slavs, which he undertook at the request
of the Emperor immediately before the collapse, and
where he in the most marked manner showed himself to
be opposed to the aspirations of the Southern Slavs.

Whoever attempts to judge in objective fashion must
not, when looking back from to-day, relegate all that
has since happened to former discernible facts, but
should consider that, in spite of all pessimism and all
fears, the hopes of a reasonable peace of understanding,
even though involving sacrifices, still existed, and that
it was impossible to plunge the Monarchy in a catas-
trophe at once for fear of its coming later.

If the situation is described to-day as though the
inhabitants of the Monarchy, and especially the Social
Democrats, were favorably disposed for any eventual-
ity, even for a separate peace, I must again most em-
phatically repudiate it. I bear in mind that Social
Democracy without doubt was the party most strongly
in favor of peace, and also that Social Democracy in
Germany, as here with us, repeatedly stated that there
were certain limits to its desire for peace. The German
Social Democrats never agreed that Alsace-Lorraine

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 35

ought to be given up, and never have our Social Demo-
crats voted for ceding Trieste, Bozen, and Meran.
This would in any case have been the price of peace —
and also the price of a separate peace — for, as I have
already pointed out, at the conference in London,
which dates back to 1915, binding obligations had been
entered into for the partition of the Monarchy, while
all that had been promised to Italy.

The fall of the Monarchy was quite inevitable,
whether through the separation from Germany or
through the vacillation in the Entente ranks — for the
claims of the Italians, the Rumanians, the Serbians,
and the Czechs had all been granted. In any case the
Monarchy would have fallen and German-Austria have
arisen as she has done now; and I doubt whether the
part played by that country during the proceedings
would have recommended it to the special protection of
the Entente. It is a very great mistake, whether con-
scious or unconscious, to believe and to maintain that
the population of German-Austria, and especially the
present leaders of Social Democracy, are devoid of any
strong national feeling. I refer to the part played by
the Austrian Social Democracy in the question of union.
It was the motive power in the union with Germany,
and the papers repeated daily that no material advan-
tages which the Entente could offer to Austria could
alter the decision. How, therefore, can this same
Social Democracy, whose entire political views and aims
are subordinate to the desire for a union with Germany
— how can this Social Democracy demand a policy
which, without doubt, must lead not only to a separa-
tion from Germany, but to a fratricidal war with the
German nation? And why condemn the upholding of
allied relations when Andrassy Was abused for doing the
opposite ?

But what was the situation in March, 191 8, shortly

36 IN THE WORLD WAR

before my resignation? Germany stood at the height
of her success. I do not pretend to say that her success
was real. In this connection that is of no moment;
but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite
near a victorious end, that after leaving the eastern
front they would throw themselves on to the western
front, and that the war would end before America had
time to come in. Their reckoning was at fault, as we
all know to-day. But for the German generals the will
to victory was the leading spirit, and all decisions
arrived at by Germany against the defection of Austria-
Hungary proceeded from that dominant influence.

As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of
December nth, on foreign policy, that neither the
Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of renun-
ciation. Since then I have had opportunity to speak
with several men of the Entente, and, consequent on
the views that I obtained, I feel I must formulate my
previous opinion in still stronger terms. I came to the
firm conclusion that the Entente — England above all —
from the summer of 191 7, at any rate, had formed an
unbending resolve to shatter Germany.

From that time onward England, with the obstinacy
which is her chief characteristic, appears to have been
determined not to treat with Germany any more, nor to
sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to earth.
It makes no difference in the matter that the German
military party — though for other reasons — from a total
misconception of their chances of victory, steadily
refused a peace involving sacrifice at a time when it
might have been possible. This is a historical fact,
but as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that
I doubt whether concessions would have changed the
fate of Germany. We could have gone over to the
enemy — in 191 7 and also in 1918 ; we could have fought
against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hunga-

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS 37

rian soil, and would doubtless have hastened Germany's
collapse; but the wounds which Austria-Hungary
would have received in the fray would rot have been
less serious than those from which she is now suffering ;
she would have perished in the fight against Germany, as
she has as good as perished in her fight allied with Ger-
many.

Austria-Hungary s watch had run down. Among the
few statesmen who in 19 14 wished for war — like Tschir-
sky, for instance — there can have been none who after
a few months had not altered and regretted his views.
They, too, had not thought of a world war. I believe
to-day, nevertheless, that even without the war the fall
of the Monarchy would have happened, and that the
assassination in Serbia was the first sign.

The Archduke Heir Apparent was the victim of
Greater Serbia's aspirations; but these aspirations,
which led to the breaking away of our Southern Slav
provinces, would not have been suppressed, but, on the
contrary, would have largely increased and asserted
themselves, and would have strengthened the centrif-
ugal tendencies of other peoples within the Monarchy.

Lightning at night reveals the country for a second,
and the same effect was produced by the shots fired at
Sarajevo. It became obvious that the signal for the
fall of the Monarchy had been given. The bells of
Sarajevo, which began to toll half an hour after the
murder, sounded the death knell of the Monarchy.

The feeling among the Austrian people, and especially
at Vienna, was very general that the outrage at Sarajevo
was a matter of more importance than the murder of an
Imperial prince and his wife, and that it was the alarm
signal for the ruin of the Hapsburg Empire.

I have been told that during the period between the
assassination and the war warlike demonstrations
were daily occurrences in the Viennese restaurants and

38 IN THE WORLD WAR

people's parks; patriotic and anti-Serbian songs were
sung, and Berchtold was scoffed at because he could not
* ' exert himself to take any energetic steps. ' ' This must
not be taken as an excuse for any eventual mistakes on
the part of the leaders of the nation, for a leading states-
man ought not to allow himself to be influenced by the
man in the street. It is only to prove that the spirit
developed in 1914 appears to have been very general.
And it may perhaps be permitted to add this comment :
how many of those who then clamored for war and
revenge and demanded ** energy," would, now that the
experiment has totally failed, severely criticize and con-
demn Berchtold's ''criminal behavior"?

It is, of course, impossible to say in what manner the
fall of the Monarchy would have occurred had war
been averted. Certainly in a less terrible fashion than
was the case through the war. Probably much more
slowly, and doubtless without dragging the whole
world into the whirlpool. We were bound to die. We
were at liberty to choose the manner of our death, and
we chose the most terrible.

Without knowing it, we lost our independence at the
outbreak of war. We were transformed from a subject
into an object.

This unfortunate war once started, we were powerless
to end it. At the conference in London the death
sentence had been passed on the Empire of the Haps-
burgs and a separate peace would have been no easier
a form of death than that involved in holding out at
the side of our allies.

CHAPTER II

KONOPISCHT

KONOPISCHT has become the cradle of manifold
legends. The lord of the castle was the first victim
of the terrible world conflagration, and the part that he.
played before the war has been the subject of much and
partly erroneous commentary.

The Archduke and heir to the throne was a man of a
very peculiar nature. The main feature of his char-
acter was a great lack of balance. He knew no middle
course and was just as eager to hate as to love. He was
unbalanced in everything; he did nothing like other
people, and what he did was done in superhuman
dimensions. His passion for buying and collecting
antiquities was proverbial and fabulous. A first-rate
shot, sport was for him a question of murdering en
masse, and the number of game shot by him reached
hundreds of thousands. A few years before his death
he shot his five thousandth stag.

His ability as a good shot was phenomenal. When in
India, during his voyage round the world, and while
staying with a certain Maharajah, an Indian marks-
man gave an exhibition of his skill. Coins were thrown
into the air which the man hit ^ith bullets. The Arch-
duke tried the same and beat the Indian. Once when I
was staying with him at Eckartsau he made a coup
double at a stag and a hare as they ran ; he had knocked

40 IN THE WORLD WAR

over a fleeing stag, and when, startled by the shot, a
hare jumped up, he killed it with the second bullet.
He scorned all modern appUances for shooting, such as
telescopes or automatic rifles; he invariably used a
short double-barreled rifle, and his exceptionally keen
sight rendered glasses unnecessary.

The artistic work of laying out parks and gardens
became in latter years his dominating passion. He
knew every tree and every bush at Konopischt, and
loved his flowers above everything. He was his own
gardener. Every bed and every group was designed
according to his exact orders. He knew the condi-
tions essential to the life of each individual plant, the
quality of the soil required ; and even the smallest spot
to be laid out or altered was done according to his
minute instructions. But here, too, everything was car-
ried out on the same gigantic lines, and the sums spent
on that park must have been enormous. Few people
had the artistic knowledge possessed in many respects
by the Archduke ; no dealer could palm off on him any
modern article as an antique, and he had just as good
taste as understanding. On the other hand, music to
him was simply a disagreeable noise, and he had an
unspeakable contempt for poets. He could not bear
Wagner, and Goethe left him quite cold. His lack of
any talent for languages was peculiar. He spoke
French tolerably, but otherwise no other language,
though he had a smattering of Itahan and Czech. For
years — indeed, to the end of his life — he struggled with
the greatest energy to learn Hungarian. He had a
priest living permanently in the house to give him
Hungarian lessons. This priest accompanied him on
his travels, and at St. Moritz, for instance, Franz Fer-
dinand had a Hungarian lesson every day; but, in
spite of this, he continued to suffer from the feeling that
he would never be able to learn the language, and he

KONOPISCHT 41

vented his annoyance at this on the entire Hungarian
people. * ' Their very language makes me feel antipathy
for them," was a remark I constantly heard him make.
His judgment of people was not a well-balanced one;
he could either love or hate, and, unfortunately, the
number of those included in the latter category was
considerably the greater.

There is no doubt about it that there was a very
hard strain in Franz Ferdinand's mentality, and those
who only knew him slightly felt that this hardness of
character was the most notable feature in him, and his
great unpopularity can doubtless be attributed to this
cause. The public never knew the splendid qualities
of the Archduke, and misjudged him accordingly^

Apparently he was not always like that. He suf-
fered in his youth from severe lung trouble, and for long
was given up by the doctors. He often spoke to me
of that time and all that he had gone through, and
referred with intense bitterness to the people who were
only waiting day by day to put him altogether on one
side. As long as he was looked upon as the heir to the
throne, and people reckoned on him for the future, he
was the center of all possible attention; but when he
fell ill and his case was considered hopeless, the world
fluctuated from hour to hour and paid homage to his
younger brother, Otto. I do not for a m.oment doubt
that there was a great deal of truth in what the late
Archduke told me; and no one knowing the ways of
the world can deny the wretched, servile egotism that
is almost always at the bottom of the homage paid to
those in high places. More deeply than in the hearts
of others was this resentment implanted in the heart of
Franz Ferdinand, and he neverforgave the world what
he suffered and went through in those distressful
months. It was chiefly the ostensible vacillation of
the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchow-

42 IN THE WORLD WAR

ski, that had so deeply hurt the Archduke, who always
imagined that Goluchowski was personally attached to
him. According to Franz Ferdinand's account, Go-
luchowsld is supposed to have said to the Emperor
Francis Joseph that the Archduke Otto ought now to
be given the retinue and household suitable for the
heir to the throne, as he — Franz Ferdinand — "was in
any case lost." It was not so much the fact as the
manner in which Goluchowski tried "to bury him
while still living " that vexed and hurt him whom a long
illness had made irritable. But besides Goluchowski,
there were numberless others whose behavior at that
time he took greatly amiss, and his unparalleled con-
tempt of the world, which, when I knew him, was one of
his most characteristic features, appears — partly, at
any rate — to date from his experiences during illness.

In connection with pohtics, too, this bitterness exer-
cised a lasting influence on his entire mental outlook. I
have been told by an authentic witness that the Arch-
duke, when suffering and combating his terrible disease,
saw one day an article in a Hungarian paper which, in
brutal and derisive tones, spoke of the Archduke's
expectations of future government as laid aside, and
gloated openly, with malicious dehght, over the prob-
able event. The Archduke, who while reading the
article had turned ashen gray with rage and indigna-
tion, remained silent for a moment and then made the
following characteristic remark: "Now I must get better.
I shall live from now only for my health. I must get
better in order to show them that their joy is prema-
ture." And though this may not have been the only
reason for his violent antipathy to everything Hun-
garian, there is no doubt that the episode influenced
his mind considerably. The Archduke was a "good
hater"; he did not easily forget, and woe betide those
upon whom he vented his hatred. On the other hand,

KONOPISCHT 43

though but few knew it, he had an uncommonly warm
corner in his heart; he was an ideal husband, the best of
fathers, and a faithful friend. But the number of
those he despised was incomparably greater than those
who gained his affection, and he himself was in no
doubt whatever as to his being the most unpopular per-
son in the Monarchy. But there was a certain grandeur
in this very contempt of popularity. He never could
bring himself to make any advances to newspapers or
other organs that are in the habit of influencing public
opinion either favorably or unfavorably. He was too
proud to sue for popularity, and too great a despiser of
men to attach any importance to their judgment.

The Archduke's antipathy to Hungary runs like a
scarlet thread through the political chain of his thoughts.
I have been told that at the time when the Crown-
Prince Rudolf was frequently in Hungary shooting, the
Archduke was often with him, and that the Hungarian
gentlemen took a pleasure in teasing and ridicuHng the
young Archduke in the presence and to the delight of
the considerably older Crown Prince. Ready as I am
to beheve that the Crown-Prince Rudolf enjoyed the
jokes — and little do I doubt that there were men there
who would act in such fashion so as to curry favor with
the Crown Prince — I still think that these unpleasant
incidents in his youth weighed less in the balance with
Franz Ferdinand than the already mentioned occur-
rences during his illness.

Apart from his personal antipathies, which he trans-
ferred from a few Hungarians to the entire nation,
there were also various far-reaching and well-founded
political reasons which strengthened the Archduke in
his antagonistic relations with Hungary. Franz Fer-
dinand possessed an exceptionally fine political flair,
and this enabled him to see that Hungarian poHcy was
a vital danger to the existence of the whole Hapsburg

44 IN THE WORLD WAR

Empire. His desire to overthrow the predominance of
the Magyars and to help the nationahties to obtain
their rights was ahvays in his thoughts, and influenced
his judgment on all political questions. He was the
steady representative of the Rumanians, the Slovaks,
and other nationalities living in Hungary, and went so
far in that respect that he would have treated every
question at once from an anti-Magyar point of view
without inquiring into it in an objective and expert
manner. These tendencies of his were no secret in
Hungary, and the result was a strong reaction among
the Magyar magnates, which he again took as purely
personal antagonism to himself, and as the years went
on existing differences increased automatically, until
finally, under the Tisza regime, they led to direct

hostility.

The Archduke's antipathy to party leaders in Hun-
gary was even stronger than that he felt for Tisza, and
he showed it particularly to one of the most prominent
figures of that time. I do not know for certain what
took place between them ; I only know that several years
before the catastrophe the gentleman was received in
audience at the Belvedere, and that the interview came
to a very unsatisfactory end. The Archduke told me
that the gentleman arrived, bringing a whole library
with him in order to put forward legal proofs that the
Magyar's standpoint was the right one. He, the Arch-
duke, snapped his fingers at their laws, and said so. It
came to a violent scene, and the gentleman, pale as
death, tottered from the room.

Certain it is that Ministers and other officials rarely
waited on the Archduke without beating hearts. He
was capable of flying out at people and terrifying them
to such a degree that they lost their heads completely.
He often took their fright to be obstinacy and passive
resistance, and it irritated him all the more.

KONOPISCHT 45

On the other hand, it was extremely easy to get on
with him if one knew him well and did not stand in awe
of him. I had many scenes with him, and often lost my
temper, too ; but there was never any lasting ill-feeling.
Once when at Konopischt we had a scene one evening
after dinner because, he said, I always worked in opposi-
tion to him and rewarded his friendship by treachery.
I broke off the conversation, remarking that, if he could
say such things, any further sensible conversation would
be impossible, and I also stated my intention of leaving
the next morning. We separated without saying good
night to each other. Quite early next morning — I was
still in bed — he appeared in my room and asked me to
forget what he had said the previous evening, that he
had not meant it seriously, and thus completely dis-
armed my still prevailing vexation.

A despiser of men, with his wits sharpened by his own
experiences, he never allowed himself to be fooled by
servile cringing and flattery. He listened to people,
but how often have I heard him say: ''He is no good;
he is a toady." Such people never found favor with
him, as he always mistrusted them at the outset. He
was protected more than others in such high spheres
from the poison of servility that attacks all monarchs.

His best two friends, and the men to whom — after his
own nearest relations — he was most attached, were his
brother-in-law Albrecht von Wiirttemberg and the
Prince Karl of Schwarzenberg.

The former, a man of charming personality, great
intelligence, and equally efficient in political as in mili-
tary matters, lived on a footing of true brotherly unity
with Franz Ferdinand, and also, naturally, on terms of
perfect equality.

Karl of Schwarzenberg was the most sincere, honor-
able, and straightforward character I have ever en-
countered ; a man who concealed the truth from no one.

46 IN THE WORLD WAR

Rich, independent, and devoid of personal ambition, it
was quite immaterial to him whether the Archduke was
pleased with what he asserted or no. He was his friend ,
and considered it his duty to be honest and open — and,
if necessary, disagreeable. The Archduke understood,
appreciated, and valued this attitude. I do not think
there are many monarchs or heirs to the throne who
would have suffered, as the Archduke did, Schwarzen-
berg's sayings and doings.

Franz Ferdinand was on very bad terms with Aehren-
thal, who easily became abrupt and repellent. Still,
there was another reason why two such hard millstones
could not grind together. I do not believe that the
many reproaches launched against Aehrenthal by the
Archduke were consequent on political differences; it
was more Aehrenthal's manner that invariably irritated
the Archduke. I had occasion to read some of Aehren-
thal's letters to Franz Ferdinand which, perhaps unin-
tentionally, had a slight ironical flavor which made the
Archduke feel he was not being taken seriously. He
was particularly sensitive in this respect.

When Aehrenthal fell ill the Archduke made unkind
remarks about the dying man, and there was great and
general indignation at the want of feeling shown by
him. He represented the Emperor at the first part of
the funeral service, and afterv/ard received me at Bel-
vedere. We were standing in the courtyard when the
procession, with the hearse, passed on the way to the
station. The Archduke disappeared quickly into a
cottage close by, the windows of which looked on to the
road, and there, concealed behind the window-curtain,
he watched the procession pass. He said not a word,
but his eyes were full of tears. When he saw that I
noticed his emotion he turned away angrily, vexed at
having given proof of his weakness. It was just like
him. He would rather be considered hard and heart-

KONOPISCHT 47

less than soft and weak, and nothing was more repug-
nant to him than the idea that he had aroused suspicion
of striving to enact a touching scene. I have no doubt
that at that moment he was suffering the torture of
self-reproach, and probably suffered the more through
being so reserved and unable to give free play to his
feelings.

The Archduke could be extremely gay, and possessed
an exceptionally strong sense of humor. In his hap-
piest years he could laugh like any youth, and carried
his audience with him by his unaffected merriment.

Some years ago a German prince, who was unable to
distinguish between the numerous archdukes, came to
Vienna. A dinner was given in his honor at the Hof-
burg, where he was seated next to Franz Ferdinand.
Part of the program was that he was to have gone
the next morning with the Archduke to shoot in the
neighborhood. The German prince, who mistook the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand for some one else, said to
him during the dinner: "I am to go out shooting to-
morrow, and I hear it is to be with that tiresome Franz
Ferdinand; I hope it will be changed." As far as I
know, the expedition did not take place; but I never
heard whether the prince discovered his mistake. The
Archduke, however, laughed heartily for days at the
episode.

The Archduke invariably spoke of his nephew, the
present Emperor Charles, with great affection. The
relations between the two were, however, always
marked by the absolute subordination of the nephew
to the uncle. In all political discussions, too, the Arch-
duke Charles was always the listener, absorbing the
precepts expounded by Franz ^Ferdinand.

Charles's marriage met with the full approval of his
uncle. The Duchess of Hohenberg, too, entertained
the warmest affection for the young couple.

4$ IN THE WORLD WAR

The Archduke was a firm partizan of the Great-
Austrian program. His idea was to convert the
Monarchy into numerous more or less independent
national states, having in Vienna a common central
organization for all important and absolutely necessary
affairs — in other words to substitute federalization for
dualism. Now that, after terrible mihtary and revo-
lutionary struggles, the development of the former
Monarchy has been accomplished in a national spirit,
there cannot be many to contend that the plan is
Utopian. At that time, however, it had many oppo-
nents who strongly advised against dissecting the state
in order to erect in its place something new and ''pre-
sumably better," and the Emperor Francis Joseph was
far too conservative and far too old to agree to his
nephew's plans. This direct refusal of the idea cher-
ished by the Archduke offended him greatly, and he
complained often in bitter terms that the Emperor
turned a deaf ear to him as though he were the ' ' lowest
serving-man at Schonbrunn."

The Archduke lacked the knowledge of how to deal
with people. He neither could nor would control him-
self, and, charming though he could be when his natural
heartiness was allowed free scope, just as httle could he
conceal his anger and ill-humor. Thus it came about
that the relations between him and the aged Emperor
grew more and more strained. There were doubtless
faults on both sides. The standpoint of the old Em-
peror, that as long as he lived no one else should inter-
fere, was in direct opposition to that of the Archduke,
who held that he would one day have to suffer for the
present faults in the administration, and any one
acquainted with life at court will know that such differ-
ences between the highest individuals are quickly raked
together and exaggerated. At every court there are
men who seek to gain their master's favor by pouring

KONOPISCHT 49

oil on the flames, and who, by gossip and stories of all
kinds, add to the antipathy that prevails. Thus it
was in this case, and, instead of being drawn closer
together, the two became more and more estranged.

The Archduke had but few friends, and under the
old monarch practically none at all. That was one of
the reasons for the advances he made to the Emperor
WilHam. In reality, they were men of such a different
type that there could be no question of friendship in
the true sense of the word, or any real under-
standing between him and the Emperor William,
and the question was practically never mooted.
The only point common to both their characters was a
strongly defined autocratic trait. The Archduke had
no sympathy with the speeches of the Emperor William,
nor yet with his obvious desire for popularity, which the
Archduke could not understand. The Emperor Will-
iam, on his part, undoubtedly grew more attached to
the Archduke during his latter years than he had been
originally. Franz Ferdinand was not on such good
terms with the Crown Prince of Germany. They
spent some weeks together at St. Moritz in Switzer-
land, without learning to know each other any better;
but this can readily be explained by the difference in age
and also by the much more serious views of life held by
the Archduke.

The isolation and retirement in which the Archduke
lived, and the regrettably restricted intercourse he had
with other circles, gave rise to the circulation of some
true, besides numerous false, rumors. One of these
rumors, which is still obstinately kept up, was to the
effect that the Archduke was a fanatic for war and
looked upon war as a necessary aid to the realization of
his plans for the future. Nothing could be more untrue,
and, although the Archduke never openly admitted
it to me, I am convinced that he had an instinctive feel-

50 IN THE WORLD WAR

ing that the Monarchy would never be able to bear the
terrible test of strength of a war, and the fact is that,
instead of working to encourage war, his activities lay
all in the opposite direction. I recollect an extremely
symptomatic episode. I do not remember the exact
date, but it was some time before the death of the
Archduke. One of the well-known Balkan turmoils
threw the Monarchy into a state of agitation, and the
question whether to mobilize or not became the order
of the day. I chanced to be in Vienna, where I had an
interview with Berchtold, who spoke of the situation
with much concern and complained that the Archduke
was acting in a warlike spirit. I offered to draw the
Archduke's attention to the danger of the proceeding,
and put myself in telegraphic communication with him.
I arranged to join his train that same day when he
passed through Wessely on his way to Konopischt. I
had only the short time between the two stations for
my conversation. I therefore at once took the bull
by the horns and told him of the rumors current about
him in Vienna and of the danger of promoting a conflict
with Russia by too strong action in the Balkans. I did
not meet with the slightest opposition from the Arch-
duke, and in his usual expeditious way he wrote, while
still in the train, a telegram to Berchtold in which he
expressed his perfect agreement in maintaining a
friendly attitude and repudiated all the reports of his
having been opposed to it. It is a fact that certain of
the military, who were anxious for war, made use of the
Archduke, or rather misused him, in order to carry on
a military propaganda in his name and thus to give rise
to so wrongful an estimate of him. Several of these
military men died a hero's death in the war; others
have disappeared and are forgotten. Conrad, Chief of
the General Staff, was never among those who misused
the Archduke. He could never have done such a

KONOPISCHT 51

thing. He carried out himself what he considered
necessary and did it openly and in face of everybody.

In connection with these reports about the Archduke
there is one remarkable detail that is worthy of note.
He told me himself how a fortune-teller once predicted
that ' ' he would one day let loose a world war. ' '

Although to a certain extent this prophecy flattered
him, containing as it did the unspoken recognition that
the world would have to reckon on him as a powerful
factor, still he emphatically pointed out how mad such
a prophecy was. It was fulfilled, however, later,
though very differently from what was meant originally,
and never was prince more innocent of causing blood to
flow than the unhappy victim of Sarajevo.

The Archduke suffered most terribly under the con-
ditions resulting from his unequal marriage. The sin-
cere and true love he felt for his wife kept alive in him
the wish to raise her to his rank and privileges, and the
constant obstacles that he encountered at all court
ceremonies embittered and angered him inexpressibly.
The Archduke was firmly resolved that when he came
to the throne he would give to his wife, not the title of
Empress, but a position which, though without the
title, would bestow upon her the highest rank. His
argument was that, wherever he was she would be the
mistress of the house, and as such was entitled to the
highest position. *' Therefore, she will take precedence
of all the archduchesses." Never did the Archduke
show the slightest wish to alter the succession and put
his son in place of the Archduke Charles. On the con-
trary, he was resolved that his first official act on coming
to the throne would be to publish a solemn declaration
containing his intention, in order to counteract the
ever-recurring false and biased statements. As regards
his children, for whom he did everything that a loving
father's heart could devise, his greatest wish was to see

52 IN THE WORLD WAR

them become wealthy, independent private individuals,
and be able to enjoy life without any material cares.
His plan was to secure the title of Duke of Hohenberg
for his eldest son. It was, therefore, in harmony with
this intention that the Emperor Charles conferred the
title on the youth.

One fine quality in the Archduke was his fearlessness.
He was quite clear that the danger of an attempt to
take his life would always be present, and he often
spoke quite simply and openly of such a possibility. A
year before the outbreak of war he informed me that the
Freemasons had resolved to kill him. He even gave
me the name of the town where the resolution was
passed — it has escaped my memory now — and men-
tioned the names of several Austrian and Hungarian
politicians who must have been in the secret. He also
told me that when he went to the coronation in Spain
he was to have traveled together with a Russian grand
duke, but shortly before the train started the news
came that the grand duke had been murdered on the
way. He did not deny that it was with mixed feehngs
that he stepped into his compartment. When at St.
Moritz news was sent him that two Turkish anarchists
had arrived in Switzerland, intending to murder him,
that every effort was being made to capture them, but
that so far no trace of them had been discovered, and he
was advised to be on his guard. The Archduke showed
me the telegram at the time. He laid it aside without
the shghtest sign of fear, saying that such events, when
announced beforehand, seldom were carried out. The
Duchess suffered all the more in her fears for his life,
and I think that in imagination the poor lady often
went through the catastrophe of which she and her
husband were the victims. Another praiseworthy
feature in the Archduke was that, out of consideration
for his wife's anxiety, he tolerated the constant pres-

KONOPISCHT S3

ence of a detective, which not only bored him terribly,
but in his opinion was absurd. He was afraid that if
the fact became known it would be imputed to timidity
on his part, and he conceded the point solely with the
view of calming his wife's fears.

But he anxiously concealed all his good qualities and
took an obstinate pleasure in being hard and disagree-
able. I will not endeavor here to excuse certain traits
in his character. His strongly pronounced egotism
cannot be denied any more than the hardness of char-
acter which made him insensible to the sufferings of all
who were not closely connected with him. He also
made himself hated by his severe financial proceedings
and his inexorable judgment on any subordinate whom
he suspected of the slightest dishonesty. In this con-
nection there are hundreds of anecdotes, some true,
some false. These petty traits in his character injured
him in the eyes of the great pubHc, while the really great
and manly qualities he possessed were unknown to
them, and were not weighed in the balance in his favor.
For those who knew him well his great and good quali-
ties outweighed the bad ones a hundredfold.

The Emperor was always very perturbed concerning
the Archduke's plans for the future. There was also a
stern trait in the old monarch's character, and in the
interests of the Monarchy he feared the impetuosity
and obstinacy of his nephew. Nevertheless, he often
took a very magnanimous view of the matter. For
instance. Count Stiirgkh, the murdered Prime Minister,
has given me details respecting my nomination to the
Herrenhaus which are very characteristic of the old
monarch. It was Franz Ferdinand's wish that I
should be in the Herrenhaus, as he was anxious for me
to be one of a delegation and also to profit by my ex-
tensive training in the province of foreign policy. I

must mention here that it had been impressed on the
5

54 IN THE WORLD WAR

Emperor on all sides that the Archduke's friends and
trusted men were working against him; a version of
affairs which to a certain degree he obviously believed,
owing to his numerous disputes with Franz Ferdinand.
On Stiirgkh mentioning my name as a candidate for
the Herrenhaus, the Emperor hesitated a moment
and then said: "Ah yes. That is the man who is to
be Minister for Foreign Affairs when I am dead. Let
him go to the Herrenhaus that he may learn a little
more."

PoHtical discussions with the Emperor Francis Jo-
seph were often very difficult, as he kept strictly to the
individual government department and discussed only
what referred thereto. While I was ambassador the
Emperor would discourse on Rumania and the Balkans,
but on nothing else. Meanwhile, the different ques-
tions were often so closely interwoven that it was im-
possible to separate them. I remember at one audi-
ence where I submitted to the Emperor the Rumanian
plans for a closer connection with the Monarchy —
plans which I shall allude to in a later chapter — and in
doing so I was naturally bound to state what the
Rumanians proposed respecting the closer connection
with Hungary, and also what changes would be neces-
sitated thereby in the Hungarian administration. The
Emperor at once broke off the conversation, saying that
it was a matter of Hungarian internal policy.

The old Emperor was almost invariably kind and
friendly, and to the very last his knowledge of the
smallest details was astonishing. He never spoke of
the different Rumanian Ministers as the Minister of
Agriculture, of Trade, or whatever it might be, but
mentioned them all by name and never made a
mistake.

I saw him for the last time in October, 191 6, after
my definite return from Rumania, and found him then

KONOPISCHT 55

quite clear and sound mentally, though faiHng in bodily
health.

The Emperor Francis Joseph was a ''grand seigneur"
in the true sense of the word. He was an Emperor and
remained always unapproachable. Every one left his
presence feeling he had stood before an Emperor. His
dignity in representing the monarchical idea was unsur-
passed by any sovereign in Europe.

He was borne to his grave at a time of great military
successes for the Central Powers. He lies now in the
Im^perial vault, and a century seems to have elapsed
since his death; the world is changed.

Day by day streams of people pass by the little
church, but no one probably gives a thought to him
who lies in peace and forgotten, and yet he, through
many long years, embodied Austria, and his person
was a common center for the state that so rapidly was
falling asunder.

He is now at rest, free from all care and sorrow; he
saw his wife, his son, his friends all die, but fate has
spared him the sight of his expiring Empire.

Franz Ferdinand's character held many sharply de-
fined corners and edges; judging him objectively, no one
can deny his great faults. Though the circumstances of
his death were so tragic, it may well be that for him it
was a blessing. It is hardly conceivable that, once on
the throne, the Archduke would have been able to
carry out his plans. The structure of the Monarchy
which he was so anxious to strengthen and support was
already so rotten that it could not have stood any great
innovations, and if not the war, then probably the
revolution, would have shattered it. On the other
hand, there seems to be no doubt that the Archduke,
with all the vehemence and impulsiveness of his char-
acter, would have made the attempt to rebuild the

S6 IN THE WORLD WAR

entire structure of the Monarchy. It is futile to com-
ment on the chances of his success, but according to
human foresight the experiment would not have suc-
ceeded, and he would have succumbed beneath the ruins
of the falling Monarchy.

It is also futile to conjecture how the Archduke would
have acted had he lived to see the war and the upheaval.
I think that in two respects his attitude would have
differed from that taken. In the first place, he never
would have agreed to our army being under German
control. It would not have been consistent with his
strongly developed autocratic tendencies, and he was
too clever politically not to see that we should thereby
lose all political freedom of action. In the second
place, he would not, like the Emperor Charles, have
yielded to revolution. He would have gathered his
faithful followers round him and would have fallen
fighting, sword in hand. He would have fallen as did
his greatest and most dangerous enemy, Stephen Tisza.

But he died the death of a hero on the battle-field of
honor, valiantly and in harness. The golden rays of
the martyr's crown surrounded his dying head. Many
there were who breathed more freely on hearing the
news of his death. At the court in Vienna and in
society at Budapest there was more joy than sorrow,
the former having rightly foreseen that he would have
dealt hardly with them. None of them could guess
that the fall of the strong man would carry them all
with it and engulf them in a world catastrophe.

Franz Ferdinand will remain ''portrayed in history,
divided between two parties — love and hate." But his
tragic end at the side of his wife, who would not allow
death to separate them, throws a mild and conciliatory
light on the whole life of this extraordinary man, whose
warm heart to the very last was devoted to his father-
land and duty,

KONOPISCHT 57

There was a widely spread but wrongful idea in the
Monarchy that the Archduke had already drawn up a
program of his future activities. This was not the
case. He had very definite and pronounced ideas for the
reorganization of the Monarchy, but the ideas never
developed into a concrete plan — they were more like
the outline of a program that never was completed
in detail. The Archduke was in touch with experts
from the different departments; he expounded the
fundamental views of his future program to promi-
nent mihtary and poHtical officials, receiving from them
hints on how to materialize these views; but a really
finished and thought-out program was never actu-
ally produced. The ground lines of his program
were, as already mentioned, the abolition of the dual-
ism and the reorganization of the Monarchy to form a
federative state. He was not clear himself into how
many states the Hapsburg Monarchy would be con-
verted, but the principle was the rebuilding of the
Monarchy on a national basis. Having always in view
that prosperity depended on the weakening of the Mag-
yar influence, the Archduke was in favor of a strong
preference for the different nationalities living in Hun-
gary, the Rumanians in particular. Not until my
return to Bukharest and following on my reports did the
Archduke conceive the plan of ceding Transylvania
to Rumania and thus adding Greater Rumania to the
Hapsburg Empire.

His idea was to make of Austria separate German,
Czech, Southern Slav, and Pohsh states, which in some
respects would be autonomous; in others, would be
dependent on Vienna as the center. But, so far as I
know, his program was never quite clearly defined and
was subject to various modifications.

58 IN THE WORLD WAR

The Archduke had a great dislike for the Germans,
especially the Northern Bohemia :s, who were partizans
of the Pan- Germanic tendencies, and he never forgave
the attitude of the Deputy Schonerer. He had a
decided preference for all Germans in the Alpine coun-
tries, and altogether his views were very similar to those
of the Christian SociaHsts. His political ideal was
Lueger. When Lueger was lying ill the Archduke said
to me: ''If God will only spare this man, no better
Prime Minister could be found. ' ' Franz Ferdinand had
a keen desire for a more centralized army. He was a
violent opponent of the endeavors of the Magyars,
whose aim was an independent Hungarian army, and
the question of rank, word of command, and other
incidental matters could never be settled so long as
he lived, because he violently resisted all Hungarian
advances.

The Archduke had a special fondness for the navy.
His frequent visits to Brioni brought him into close
touch with our navy. He was always anxious to trans-
form the Austrian navy into one worthy of a great
Power. In regard to foreign pohcy, the Archduke was
always in favor of a Triple Alliance of the three Em-
perors. The chief motive of this idea must have been
that, in the three then apparently so powerful mon-
archs at Petersburg, Berhn, and Vienna, he saw the
strongest support against revolution, and wished
thereby to build up a strong barrier against disorgan-
ization. He saw great danger to the friendly relations
between Russia and ourselves in the rivalry between
Vienna and Petersburg in the Balkans, and, contrary to
the reports that have been spread about him, he was
rather a partizan than an opposer of Serbia. He was
in favor of the Serbians because he felt assured that the
petty agrarian pohcy of the Magyars was responsible
for the constant annoyance of the Serbians. He favored

KONOPISCHT 59

meeting Serbia half-way, because he considered that
the Serbian question was a source of discord between
Vienna and Petersburg. Another reason was that he
was no friend of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who con-
stantly pursued an anti-Serbian policy. I believe that
if those who were responsible for the organization of the
assassination of the Archduke had known what little
justification there was for supposing him to be the man
they thought him, they would have desisted.

Franz Ferdinand had a very pronounced feeling that
in spite of all alliances the Monarchy must remain inde-
pendent. He was opposed to any closer combine with
Germany, not wishing to be bound to Germany more
than to Russia, and the plan that was formulated later
as *' Central Europe" was always far removed from
his wishes and endeavors.

His plans for the future were not worked out, not
complete, but they were sound. This, however, is not
sufficient to enable one to say that they could have been
successfully carried out. Under certain circumstances
more harm than good will result from energy devoid of
the necessary calm, prudence, wisdom, and, above all,
patience.

CHAPTER III

WILLIAM II

THE Emperor William has been for so long the center
of historic events, so much has been written about
him, that he appears to be known to all the world ; and
yet I believe he has often been misrepresented.

It is well known that the scarlet thread running
through the whole character of William II was his firm
conviction that he was the "elect of God," and that the
dynasty was inextricably bound to the German people.
Bismarck also believed in the dynastic fidelity of the
Germans. It seems to me that there is just as little
dynastic as republican spirit in nations — just as little in
the Germans as in others. There is merely a feeling of
content or discontent which manifests itself either for or
against the dynasty and the form of government. Bis-
marck himself was a proof of the justice of this argument.
As he himself always maintained, he was thoroughly
dynastic — but only during the lifetime of the Emperor
William I. He had no love for William II, who had
treated him badly, and made no secret of his feelings.
He hung the picture of the "yo^^^S man " in the scullery
and wrote a book about him which, owing to its con-
tents, could not be published.

The monarchists who derive benefit from their
attachment to the reigning monarch deceive them-
selves as to their true feelings. They are monarchists

WILLIAM II 6i

because they consider that form of government the
most satisfactory one. The repubHcans, who appar-
ently glorify the majesty of the people, really mean
themselves. But in the long run a people will always
recognize that form of government which soonest can
give it order, work, prosperity, and contentment. In 99
per cent, of the population, the patriotism and enthu-
siasm for one or other form of government is nothing
but a matter of material considerations. They prefer a
good king to a bad republic, and vice versa; the form of
government is the means to the end, but the end is the
contentment of the people governed. Nor has the
liberty of those governed anything to do with the form
of government. Monarchical England is just as free as
republican America, and the Bolshevists have demon-
strated ad oculus to the whole world that the proletariat
exercises the greatest tyranny.

The war that was lost swept away the monarchs, but
the republic will be maintained only if it can convince
the people that it is more successful in satisfying the
masses than the monarchs were, a proof which — it
seems to me — the German-Austrian Republic has hith-
erto failed to give.

The conviction that these questionable statements
not only are false but also objectionable and criminal
errors, that the divine will has placed the monarch at
his post and keeps him there — this conviction was sys-
tematically imprinted in the German people and
formed an integral part of the views attributed to the
Emperor. All his pretensions are based on this; they
all breathe the same idea. Every individual, however,
is the product of his birth, his education, and his ex-
perience. In judging William II it must be borne in
mind that from his youth upward he was deceived and
shown a world which never existed. All monarchs
should be taught that their people do not love them;

62 IN THE WORLD WAR

that they are quite indifferent to them; that it is not
love that makes them follow them and look up to them,
but merely curiosity; that they do not acclaim them
from enthusiasm, but for their own amusement, and
would as soon hiss at them as cheer them. The loyalty
of subjects can never be depended on; it is not their
intention to be loyal, but only contented; they only
tolerate the monarchs as long as they themselves are
contented, or as long as they have not enough strength
to abolish them. That is the truth, a knowledge of
which would prevent the monarchs from arriving at
unavoidably false conclusions.

The Emperor WilHam is an example of this. I do
not think there is another regent who had better inten-
tions than he had. He lived only for his calling — as he
viewed it. All his thoughts and longings were centered
round Germany. His relations, pleasures, and amuse-
ments were all subservient to the one idea of making
and keeping the German people great and happy, and if
good-will were sufficient to achieve great things the
Emperor William would have done it. From the
very beginning he was misunderstood. He made
statements and gestures intended to win not only his
listeners, but the whole world, which had just the con-
trary effect. But he never was conscious of the
practical effect of his actions, because he was system-
atically misled, not by those in his immediate presence,
but by the entire German people. How many millions,
who to-day only fling curses at him, could not bow low
enough when he appeared on the horizon in all his
splendor; how many felt overjoyed if the Imperial
glance fell on them? — and none of them realize that
they themselves are to blame for having shown the
Emperor a world which never existed, and driven him
into a course which he otherwise would never have
taken. It certainly cannot be denied that the whole

WILLIAM II 63

nature of the Emperor was peculiarly susceptible to
this characteristically German attitude, and that mon-
archs less talented, less keen, less ready, and, above all,
less impregnated with the idea of self-sufficiency, are not
so exposed to the poison of popularity as he was.

I once had a chance of studying the Emperor William
in a very important phase of his life. I met him at the
house of a friend in the celebrated days of November,
1908, when great demonstrations against the Emperor
occurred in the Reichstag, and when the then Imperial
Chancellor, Prince Biilow, exposed him. Although he
did not allude to the matter to us with whom he was
not familiar, the powerful impression made upon him
by these events in Berlin was very obvious, and I felt
that in William II I saw a man who, for the first time
in his life, with horror-stricken eyes, looked upon the
world as it really was. He saw brutal reality show its
countenance on the horizon. For the first time in his
life, perhaps, he felt his position on his throne to be a
little insecure. He forgot his lesson too quickly. Had
the overwhelming impression which prevailed for sev-
eral days been a lasting one it might perhaps have
induced him to descend from the clouds to which his
courtiers and his people had raised him, and once more
feel firm ground beneath his feet. On the other hand,
had the German people often treated the German Em-
peror as they did then, it might have cured him.

A remarkable incident which occurred on this occasion
is characteristic of the way in which the Emperor was
treated by many of the gentlemen of his suite. I had
opportunity, while waiting at a (J-erman station restau-
rant for the arrival of the next train, to watch and study
the excitement of the population at the events in Berlin,
which bore signs of a revolutionary character. The
densely crowded restaurant re-echoed with discussion
and criticisms of the Emperor, when suddenly one of the

64 IN THE WORLD WAR

men stood up on a table and delivered a fiery speech
against the head of the government. With the im-
pression of this scene fresh in my mind, I described it to
the members of the Emperor's suite, who were just as
disagreeably affected by the episode, and it was sug-
gested that nothing should be said about it to the Em-
peror. One of them, however, protested most energetic-
ally and declared that, on the contrary, every detail
should be told to the Emperor, and, as far as I know, he
himself probably undertook this disagreeable task.
This case is characteristic of the desire to keep all un-
. pleasantness from the Emperor and to spare him even
the most well-founded criticisms; to praise and exalt
him, but never to show that he was being blamed.
This systematic putting forward of the Emperor's divine
attributes, which in reality was neither due to love of
his personality not any other dynastic cause, but to the
purely egotistical wish not to get into disfavor them-
selves or expose themselves to unpleasantness; this un-
wholesome state must in the long run act on mind and
body as an enervating poison. I readily believe that
the Emperor William, unaccustomed to so great an
extent to all criticism, did not make it easy for those
about him to be open and frank. It was, nevertheless,
true that the enervating atmosphere by which he was
surrounded was the cause of all the evil at his court. In
his youth the Emperor William did not always adhere
strictly to the laws of the Constitution ; he subsequently
cured himself of this failing and never acted indepen-
dently of his counselors. At the time when I had official
dealings with him he might have served as a model of
constitutional conduct.

In the case of so young and inexperienced a man as
the Emperor Charles it was doubly necessary to uphold
the principle of ministerial responsibility to the fullest
extent. As according to our Constitution the Emperor

WILLIAM II 65

is not responsible to the law, it was of the greatest im-
portance to carry out the principle that he could under-
take no administrative act without the cognizance and
sanction of the responsible Ministers, and the Emperor
Francis Joseph adhered to this principle as though it
were gospel.

The Emperor Charles, though full of good intentions,
was devoid of all poHtical training and experience, and
ought to have been brought up to understand the prin-
ciples of the Constitution. This, however, had never
been taken into consideration.

After my resignation in April, 1918, a deputation from
the Constitutional and Central party in the Herrenhaus
waited on the Prime Minister, Doctor von Seidler, and
pointed out the importance of a severely constitutional
regime, whereupon Doctor von Seidler declared that
he took upon himself the full responsibility of the
''letter incident."

This was quite preposterous. Doctor von Seidler
could not be responsible for events that had occurred a
year before — at a time when he was not Minister —
apart from its being an established fact that during his
tenure of office he was not aware of what had happened,
and not until after my resignation did he learn the Im-
perial views on the situation. He might just as well
have accepted responsibility for the Seven Years' War
or for the battle of Koniggratz.

In 191 7 and 1918, when I had certain official dealings
with the Emperor William, his horror of an unpleasant
discussion was so great that it was a matter of extreme
difficulty to impart the necessary information to him.
I recollect how once, at the cost of the consideration due
to an Emperor, I was compelled to extract a direct
statement from him. I was with the Emperor Charles
on the eastern front, but left him at Lemberg, and,
joining the Emperor William in his train, traveled with

66 IN THE WORLD WAR

him for a couple of hours. I had certain things to sub-
mit to him, none of which was of an unpleasant nature.
I do not know why it was, but it was obvious that the
Emperor was expecting to hear some disagreeable state-
ments, and offered a passive resistance to the request
for a private interview. He invited me to breakfast
with him in his dining-car, where he sat in the company
of ten other gentlemen, and there was no possibility of
beginning the desired conversation. Breakfast had
been over some time, but the Emperor made no sign of
moving. I was several times obliged to request him to
grant me a private interview before he rose from the
table, and even then he took with him another official
from the Foreign Ministry to be present at our conver-
sation, as though to have some protection against
anticipated troubles. The Emperor William was never
rude to strangers, though he often was so to his own
people.

With regard to the Emperor Charles, the situation
was very different. He was never anything but
friendly; in fact I never saw him angry or vexed.
There was no need for any special courage im making
an unpleasant statement to him, as there was no danger
of receiving a violent answer or any other disagreeable
consequences. And yet the desire to believe only
what was agreeable and to put from him anything dis-
agreeable was very strong in the Emperor Charles, and
neither criticism nor blame made any lasting impression
on him. But in his case, too, the atmosphere that
surrounded him rendered it impossible to convince him
of the brutal realities prevailing. On one occasion,
when I returned from the front, I had a long conversa-
tion with him. I reproached him for some act of
administration and asserted that not only on me but on
the whole Monarchy his action had made a most un-
favorable impression. I told him in the course of the

WILLIAM II 67

conversation that he must remember how, when he
came to the throne, the whole Monarchy had looked
to him with great hopes, but that now he had already-
lost 80 per cent, of his popularity. The interview
ended without incident; the Emperor preserved, as
usual, a friendly demeanor, though my remarks must
have affected him unpleasantly. Some hours later we
passed through a town where not only the station, but
all buildings, were black with people, standing even on
the roofs, waving handkerchiefs and loudly welcoming
the Imperial train as it passed through. The same
scenes were repeated again and again at other stations
that we passed. The Emperor turned to me with a
smile and a look that showed me he was firmily con-
vinced everything I had told him as to his dwindling
popularity was false, the living picture before our eyes
proving the contrary.

When I was at Brest-Litovsk disturbances began in
Vienna, owing to the lack of food. In view of the whole
situation, we did not know what dimensions they would
assume, and it was considered that they were of a
threatening nature. When discussing the situation
with the Emperor, he remarked, with a smile : ' 'The only
person who has nothing to fear is myself. If it happens
again I will go out among the people and you will see the
welcome they will give me." Some few months later
this same Emperor disappeared silently and utterly out
of the picture, and among all the thousands who had
acclaimed him, and whose enthusiasm he had thought
genuine, not one would have lifted a little finger on his
behalf. I have witnessed scenes of enthusiasm which
would have deceived the boldest and most skeptical
judge of the populace. I saw the Emperor and the
Empress surrounded by weeping women and men well-
nigh smothered in a rain of flowers ; I saw the people on
their knees with uplifted hands, as though worshiping

68 IN THE WORLD WAR

a Divinity; and I cannot wonder that the objects of
such enthusiastic homage should have taken dross for
pure gold in the firm belief that they personally were
beloved of the people, even as children love their own
parents. It is easy to understand that after such
scenes the Emperor and Empress looked upon all the
criticism of themselves and the discontent among the
people as idle talk, and held firmly to the belief that
grave disturbances might occur elsewhere, but not in
their own country. Any simple citizen who has held
for a time a higher position experiences something of the
kind, but in a lesser degree. I could mention names
of many men who could not bow low enough as long as
I was in power, but after my resignation would cross the
street to avoid a bow, fearing that Imperial disfavor
might react on them. But years before his rise the
simple citizen has an opportunity of learning to know
the world, and, if he be a man of normal temperament,
will feel the same contempt for the servility shown
during his time in office as for the behavior he meets
with afterward. Monarchs are without training in the
school of life, and therefore usually make a false esti-
mate of the psychology of humanity. But in this tragi-
comedy it is they who are led astray.

It is less easy, however, to understand that respon-
sible advisers, who are bound to distinguish between
reality and comedy, should also allow themselves to be
deceived and draw false political conclusions from such
events. In 191 8 the Emperor, accompanied by the
Prime Minister, Doctor von Seidler, went to the
Southern Slav provinces to investigate matters there.
He found, of course, the same welcome there as every-
where, curiosity brought the people out to see him ; pres-
sure from the authorities, on the one hand, and hope
of Imperial favors, on the other, brought about ovations
similar to those in the undoubtedly dynastic provinces.

WILLIAM II 69

And not only the Emperor, but Von Seidler, returned in
triumph, firmly convinced that everything stated in
Parliament or written in the papers respecting the
separatist tendencies of the Southern Slavs was pure
invention and nonsense, and that they would never
agree to a separation from the Hapsburg Empire.

The objects of these demonstrations of enthusiasm
and dynastic loyalty were deceived by them, but I
repeat those who were to blame were not the monarchs,
but those who themselves were the instigators and
organizers of such scenes and who omitted to enlighten
the monarchs on the matter. But any such explana-
tion could only be effectual if all those in the immediate
neighborhood of the ruler concurred in a similar reck-
less disregard of truth. For if one out of ten people
declares such scenes to be not genuine, and the others
contradict him and assert that the demonstrations of
the ''love of the people" are overwhelming, the mon-
arch will always be more inclined to listen to the many
pleasant rather than to the few unpleasant counsels.
Willingly or unwillingly, all monarchs try, very hu-
manly, to resist awakening out of this hypnotic com-
placency. Naturally, there were men in the entourage
of the German Emperor whose pride kept them from
making too large an offering to the throne,. but as a rule
their suffering in the Byzantine atmosphere of Ger-
many was greater than their enjoyment. I always
considered that the greatest sycophants were not those
living at court, but generals, admirals, professors,
officials, representatives of the people, and men of
learning — people whom the Emperor met infrequently.

During the second half of the war, however, the
leading men around the Kaiser were not Byzantine —
Ludendorff certainly was not. His whole nature was
devoid of Byzantine characteristics. Energetic, brave,
sure of himself and his aims, he brooked no opposition

70 IN THE WORLD WAR

and was not fastidious in his choice of language. To
him it was a matter of indifference whether he was con-
fronted by his Emperor or any one else — he spoke
unrestrainedly to all who came in his way.

The numerous burgomasters, town councilors, pro-
fessors of the universities, deputies — in short, men of
the people and of science — had for years prostrated
themselves before the Emperor William; a word from
him intoxicated them — but how many of them are
there now among those who condemn the former
regime with its abuses and, above all, the Emperor
himself !

His political advisers experienced great difficulty in
their business dealings with the Emperor William dur-
ing the war, as he was always at headquarters and
seldom in Berlin. The Emperor Charles's absence
from Vienna was also at times most inconvenient.

In the summer of 191 7, for instance, he was at
Reichenau, which necessitated a two hours' motor
drive; I had to go there twice or three times a week,
thus losing five or six hours which had to be made good
by prolonged night-work. On no account would he
come to Vienna, in spite of the efforts made by his
advisers to persuade him to do so. From certain
remarks the Emperor let fall I gathered that the reason
of this persistent refusal was anxiety concerning the
health of the children. He himself was so entirely free
from pretensions that it cannot have been a question of
his own comfort that prevented his coming.

The Emperor's desire to restore the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand to a post of command was for me a source of
much unpleasantness. The Archduke is said to have
been to blame for the Luck episode. I cannot judge
whether wrongly — as the Emperor maintained — or
rightly ; but the fact remains that the public no longer
had confidence in him. Quite accidentally I learned

WILLIAM II 71

that his reinstatement was imminent. As a matter of
fact, this purely military proceeding in no way con-
cerned me, but I had to reckon with the feeling of the
populace, who were in no mood for further burdens, and
also with the fact that, since Conrad had gone, none of
those in the Emperor's entourage showed the slightest
disposition to acquaint him with the truth. The only
general who, to my personal knowledge, was in the
habit of speaking frankly to the Emperor was Alvis
Schonburg, and he was at this time somewhere on the
Italian front. I therefore told the Emperor that the
reinstatement was an impossibility, giving as my reason
the fact that the Archduke had forfeited the confidence
of the country, and that no mother could be expected to
give up her son to serve under a general whom every one
held to be guilty of the Luck catastrophe. The Em-
peror insisted that this view was unjust, and that the
Archduke was not culpable. I replied that, even so,
the Archduke would have to submit. Every one had
lost confidence in him, and the most strenuous exertions
of the people could neither be expected nor obtained if
the command were handed to generals who were unani-
mously regarded as unworthy of the confidence placed
in them.

My efforts were vain.

I then adopted another course. I sent an official
from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Arch-
duke with the request that he would resign voluntarily.

It must be admitted that Joseph Ferdinand took both
a loyal and a dignified attitude, as he himself notified
the Emperor that he would relinquish his command at
the front. A short correspondence followed between
the Archduke and myself, which ..on his side was couched
in an indignant and not over-polite tone; this, however,
I did not take amiss, as my interference had been suc-
cessful in preventing his resuming the command.

72 IN THE WORLD WAR

His subsequent appointment as chief of the Air Force
was made without my knowledge; but this was of no
importance when compared with the previous plans.
• ••••••

There is no doubt that the Byzantine atmosphere of
Berlin took a more objectionable form than ever was the
case in Vienna. The very idea of high dignitaries kiss-
ing the Emperor's hand, as they did in Berlin, would
have been impossible in Vienna. I never heard of any
one, even among the keenest sycophants, who demeaned
himself by such an act, which in Berlin, as I know
from personal observation, was an every-day occur-
rence. For instance, after a trip on the Meteor, during
the ''Kiel Week," the Emperor presented two German
gentlemen with scarf-pins as a souvenir. He handed
the pins to them himself, and great was my surprise to
see them kiss his hand as they thanked him.

Many foreigners were in the habit of coming for the
Kiel Week — Americans, French, and English. The
Emperor paid them much attention, and they nearly
always succumbed to the charm of his personality.
Apparently William II had a preference for America;
on the subject of his feelings regarding England it is
difficult to express an opinion. My impression always
was that the Emperor resented the scant sympathy
shown him in England; he strove to make himself
beloved, and the failure of his efforts caused him a cer-
tain annoyance. He was quite aware that the extent
of his popularity in England would proportionately
influence Anglo-German relations, and his desire to
find favor in England did not proceed from personal
vanity, but from political interests.

King Edward was known to be one of the best judges
of men in all Europe, and his interest in foreign policy
was predominant. He would have been an ideal am-
bassador. There was never a very good understanding

WILLIAM II 73

between uncle and nephew. When the nephew was
already Emperor, and his much-older uncle still only a
prince, the difference in their positions was character-
ized by the satirical Kiderlen-Wachter in the following
terms : ' * The Prince of Wales cannot forgive his nephew,
eighteen years younger than himself, for making a more
brilliant career than has fallen to his lot."

Personal sympathy and personal differences in lead-
ing circles are capable of influencing the world's his-
tory. Politics are, and always will be, made by men,
and individual personal relations will always play a
certain part in their development. Who can to-day
assert that the course of the world might not have been
different had the monarchs of Germany and England
been more alike in temperament? The encircling
policy of King Edward was not brought into play until
he was persuaded that an understanding with the Em-
peror Williami was impossible.

The difficulty the Emperor experienced in adapting
himself to the ideas and views of others increased as the
years went by ; a state of things largely the fault of his
entourage.

The atmosphere in which he lived would have killed
the hardiest plant. Whatever the Emperor said or did,
whether it was right or wrong, was received with en-
thusiastic praise and admiration. Dozens of people
were always at hand to laud him to the skies.

For instance, a book was published during the war
entitled Der Kaiser im Felde, by Dr. Bogdan Kriegen.
The Emperor presented me with a copy when at
Kreuznach in May, 191 7, and wrote a suitable inscrip-
tion inside. The book contained an accurate account
of all the Emperor had done during the campaign — ^but
it was entirely superficial matter ; where he had driven
to, where breakfasted, with whom he had spoken, the
jokes he had made, what clothes he wore, the shining

74 IN THE WORLD WAR

light in his eyes, etc., etc. It also recorded his speeches
to the troops, dull and uninteresting words that he
addressed to individual soldiers, and much more in the
same strain. The whole book is impregnated and per-
meated with boundless admiration and unqualified
praise. The Emperor gave me the book when I was
leaving, and I read it through when in the train.

I was asked a few weeks later by a German officer
what I thought of the book. I rephed that it was trash
and could only harm the Emperor, and that it should be
confiscated. The officer shared my opinion, but said
that the Emperor had been assured on all sides that the
book was a splendid work and helped to fire the spirit
of the army; he therefore had it widely distributed.
Once, at a dinner at Count Hertling's, I called his
attention to the book and advised him to suppress it, as
such a production could only be detrimental to the Em-
peror. The old gentleman was very angry, and
declared: ''That was always the way; people who
wished to ingratiate themselves with the Emperor in-
variably presented him with such things." A pro-
fessor from the university had warmly praised the book
to me, but he went on to say, ''The Emperor had, of
course, no time to read such stuff and repudiate the
flattery; neither had he himself found time to read it,
but would make a point of doing so now." I did not
know much of that professor, but he certainly was not
in frequent touch with the Emperor, nor was the author
of the book.

In this instance, as in many others, I concluded that
many of the gentlemen in the Emperor's suite were far
from being in sympathy with such tendencies. The
court was not the principal offender, but was carried
away by the current of sycophancy.

During my period of office Prince Hohenlohe, the
Ambassador, had numerous interviews with the Em-^

WILLIAM II 75

peror William, and invariably spoke most freely and
openly to him, and yet always was on the best footing
with him. This was, of course, an easier matter for a
foreign ambassador than for a German of the Imperial
Empire, but it proves that the Emperor accepted it
when done in proper form.

In his own country the Emperor was either glorified
and exalted to the skies or else scorned and scoffed at by
a minority of the press in a prejudicial manner. In the
latter case it bore so evidently the stamp of personal
enmity that it was discredited a priori. Had there
existed earnest papers and organs that would, in digni-
fied fashion, have discussed and criticized the Em-
peror's faults and failings, while recognizing all his
great and good qualities, it would have been much more
satisfactory. Had there been more books written
about him showing that the real man is quite different
from what he is made to appear to be ; that he is full of
the best intentions and inspired with a passionate love
of Germany; that in a true and profound religious
sense he often wrestles with himself and his God, asking
himself if he has chosen the right way; that his love for
his people is far more genuine than that of many of the
Germans for him ; that he never has deceived them, but
was constantly deceived by them — such literature
would have been more efficacious and, above all, nearer
the truth.

Undoubtedly the German Emperor's gifts and talents
were above the average, and had he been an ordinary
mortal would certainly have become a very competent
officer, architect, engineer, or politician. But for lack
of criticism he lost his bearings, and it caused his undo-
ing. According to all the records of the Emperor,
William I was of a very different nature. Yet Bis-
marck often had a hard task in dealing with him,
though Bismarck's loyalty and subservience to the

76 IN THE WORLD WAR

dynastic idea made him curb his characteristically ruth-
less frankness. But William I was a self-made man.
When he came to the throne and began to govern, his
kingdom was tottering. Assisted by the very capable
men he was able to find and to retain, he upheld it, and
by means of Koniggratz and Sedan created the great
German Empire. William II came to the throne when
Germany had reached the zenith of her power. He had
not acquired what he possessed by his own work, as his
grandfather had ; it came to him without any effort on
his part, a fact which had a great and far from favor-
able influence on his whole mental development.

The Emperor William was an entertaining and inter-
esting causeur. One could listen to him for hours with-
out wearying. Emperors usually enjoy the privilege of
finding a ready audience, but even had the Emperor
William been an ordinary citizen he would always have
spoken to a crowded house. He could discourse on art,
science, politics, music, religion, and astronomy in a
most animated manner. What he said was not always
quite correct; indeed, he often lost himself in very
questionable conclusions; but the fault of boring others,
the greatest of social faults, was not his.

Although the Emperor was always very powerful in
speech and gesture, still, during the war he was much
less independent in his actions than is usually assumed,
and, in my opinion, this is one of the principal reasons
that gave rise to a mistaken understanding of all the Em-
peror's administrative activities. Far more than the pub-
lic imagine he was a driven rather than a driving factor,
and if the Entente to-day claims the right of being prose-
cutor and judge in one person in order to bring the Em-
peror to his trial, it is unjust and an error, as, both pre-
ceding and during the war, the Emperor William never
played the part attributed to him by the Entente.

The unfortunate man has gone through much, and

WILLIAM II Tj

more is, perhaps, in store for him. He has been carried
too high and cannot escape a terrible falL Fate seems
to have chosen him to expiate a sin which, if it exists at
all, is not so much his as that of his country and his
times. The Byzantine atmosphere in Germany was
the ruin of Emperor William; it enveloped him and
clung to him like a creeper to a tree; a vast crowd of
flatterers and fortune-seekers who deserted him in the
hour of trial. The Emperor William was merely a
particularly distinctive representative of his class. All
modern monarchs suffer from the disease; but it was
more highly developed in the Emperor William and,
therefore, more obvious than in others. Accustomed
from his youth to the subtle poison of flattery, at the
head of one of the greatest and mightiest states in the
world, possessing almost unlimited power, he succumbed
to the fatal lot that awaits men who feel the earth recede
from under their feet and who begin to believe in their
divine semblance.

He is expiating a crime which was not of his making.
He can take with him in his solitude the consolation
that his only desire was for the best. And notwith-
standing all that is said and written about William II in
these days, the beautiful words of the text may be
applied to him, ''Peace on earth to men of good will." ^

When he retires from the world his good conscience
will be his most precious possession.

Perhaps in the evening of his days William II will
acknowledge that there is neither happiness nor unhap-
piness in mortal life, but only a difference in the strength
to endure one's fate.

War was never in William^ IPs program. I am
not able to say where, in his own mind, he had fixed the

^ This is a literal rendering of the famous text from the German.

78 IN THE WORLD WAR

limits he proposed for Germany and whether it was
justifiable to reproach him with having gone too far in
his ambition for the fatherland. He certainly never
thought of a unified German world-dominion; he was
not so simple as to think he could achieve that without
a war, but his plan undoubtedly was permanently to
establish Germany among the first Powers of the world.
I know for certain that the Emperor's ideal plan was to
come to a world agreement with England and, in a cer-
tain sense, to divide the world with her. In this pro-
jected division of the world a certain part was to be
played by Russia and Japan, but he paid little heed to
the other states, especially to France, convinced that
they were all nations of declining power. To maintain
that William intentionally prepared and started this
war is in direct opposition to his long years of peaceful
government. Helfferich, in his work Die Vorgeschichte
des Weltkrieges, speaks of the Emperor's attitude during
the Balkan troubles, and says :

A telegram sent by William II at that time to the Imperial
Chancellor explains the attitude of the German Emperor in this
critical position for German politics, being similar to the situation
in July, 1 91 4. The contents of the telegram are as follows : ''The
Alliance with Austria-Hungary compels us to take action should
Austria-Hungary be attacked by Russia. In that case France would
also be involved, and in those circumstances England would not
long remain quiescent. The present prevailing questions of dispute
cannot be compared with that danger. It cannot be the intention
of the Alliance that we, the life interest of our ally not being endan-
gered, should enter upon a life-and-death conflict for a caprice of
that ally. Should it become evident that the other side intend to
attack, the danger must then be faced."

This calm and decided standpoint, which alone could maintain
peace, was also the German policy observed in further developments.
It was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as
also against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in
Vienna.

WILLIAM II 79

Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I
cannot say, but I believe the account is correct.

It has already been mentioned that all the warlike
speeches flung into the world by the Emperor were due
to a mistaken understanding of their effect. I allow
that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to
terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle
of si vis pacem para helium, and by emphasizing the
military power of Germany he endeavored to prevent
the many envious enemies of his Empire from declaring
war on him.

It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both
unfortunate and mistaken, and that it contributed to
the outbreak of war; but it is asserted that the Em-
peror was devoid of the dohis of making war; that he
said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred
up war.

Had there been men in Germany ready to point out
to the Emperor the injurious effects of his behavior and
to make him feel the growing mistrust of him through-
out the world, had there been not one or two, but dozens
of such men, it would assuredly have made an impres-
sion on the Emperor. It is quite true that of all the
inhabitants of the earth, the German is the one the
least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of
other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were per-
haps but few in the immediate entourage of the Em-
peror who recognized the growing anxiety of the world.
Perhaps many of them who so continuously extolled the
Emperor were really honestly of opinion that his
behavior was quite correct. It is, nevertheless, impos-
sible not to believe that among the many clever Ger-
man politicians of the last decade there were some who
had a clear grasp of the situation, and the fact remains
that, in order to spare the Emperor and themselves,
they had not the courage to be harsh with him and tell

§0 IN THE WORLD WAR

him the truth to his face. These are not reproaches,
but reminiscences which should not be superfluous at a
time when the Emperor is to be made the scapegoat of
the whole world. Certainly the Emperor, being such
as he is, the experiment would not have passed off with-
out there being opposition to encounter and overcome.
The first among his subjects to attempt the task of
enlightening the Emperor would have been looked upon
with the greatest surprise; hence no one would under-
take it. Had there, however, been men who, regardless
of themselves, would have undertaken to do it, it would
certainly have succeeded, as not only was the Emperor
full of good intentions, but he was also impressionable,
and consistent purposeful work on a basis of fearless
honesty would have impressed him. Besides, the Em-
peror was a thoroughly kind and good man. It was a
genuine pleasure for him to be able to do good ; neither
did he hate his enemies. In the summer of 191 7 he
spoke to me about the fate of the deposed Tsar and of
his desire to help him and subsequently bring him to
Germany, a desire due not to dynastic but to human
motives. He stated repeatedly that he had no desire
for revenge, but "only to succor his fallen adversary."

I firmly believe that the Emperor clearly saw the
clouds grow blacker and blacker on the political hori-
zon, but he was sincerely and honestly persuaded that
it was not through any fault of his that they had accu-
mulated, that they were caused by envy and jealousy,
and that there was no other way of keeping the threat-
ening war danger at bay than by an ostentatious atti-
tude of strength and fearlessness. "Germany's power
and might must daily be proclaimed to the world, for as
long as they fear us they will do us no harm " — that was
the doctrine that obtained on the Spree. And the echo
came back from the world, "This continued boasting
of German power and the perpetual attempts at intimi-

WILLIAM II 8i

dation prove that Germany seeks to tyrannize the

world."

When war broke out the Emperor was firmly con-
vinced that a war of defense was being forced on him,
which conviction was shared by the great majority of
the German people. I draw these conclusions solely
from my knowledge of the Emperor and his entourage
and from other information obtained indirectly. As I
have already mentioned, I had not had the sHghtest con-
nection with Berlin for some years previous to the war,
and certainly not for two years after it broke out.

In the winter of 191 7, when I met the Emperor again
in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, I thought
he had aged but was still full of his former vivacity. In
spite of marked demonstrations of the certainty of vic-
tory, I believe that WilHam II even then had begun to
doubt the result of the war and that his earnest wish
was to bring it to an honorable end. When in the
course of one of our first conversations I urged him to
spare no sacrifice to bring it to an end, he interrupted
me, exclaiming: ''What would you have me do? No-
body longs for peace more intensely than I do. But
every day we are told the others will not hear a word
about peace until Germany has been crushed." It was
a true answer, for all statements made by England cul-
minated in the one sentence Germaniam esse delendam.
I endeavored, nevertheless, to induce the Emperor to
consent to the sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, persuaded
that if France had obtained all that she looked upon in
the Hght of a national idea she would not be inclined to
continue the war. I think that, had the Emperor been
positively certain that it would have ended the war, and
had he not been afraid that .so distressing an offer
would have been considered unbearable by Germany,
he would personally have agreed to it. But he was
dominated by the fear that a peace involving such a loss,

82 IN THE WORLD WAR

and after the sacrifices already made, would have driven
the German people to despair. Whether he was justi-
fied in this fear or not cannot now be confirmed. In
191 7, and 19 18 as well, the belief in a victorious end was
still so strong in Germany that it is at least doubtful
whether the German people would have consented
to give up Alsace-Lorraine. All the parties in the
Reichstag were opposed to it, including the Social
Democrats.

A German official of high standing said to me in the
spring of 1 9 1 8 : * * I had two sons ; one of them fell on the
field of battle, but I would rather part with the other
one, too, than give up Alsace-Lorraine," and many were
of the same opinion.

In the course of the year and a half when I had fre-
quent opportunities of meeting the Emperor, his frame
of mind had naturally gone through many different
phases. Following on any great military success, and
after the collapse of Russia and Rumania, his generals
were always able to enroll him on their program of
victory, and it is quite a mistake to imagine that
William II unceasingly clung to the idea of "Peace
above all." He wavered, was sometimes pessimistic,
sometimes optimistic, and his peace aims changed in
like manner. Humanly speaking, it is very compre-
hensible that the varying situation at the theater of
war must have influenced the individual mind, and
every one in Europe experienced such fluctuations.

Early in September, 191 7, he T\Tote to the Emperor
Charles on the subject of an impending attack on the
Italian front, and in this letter was the following pas-
sage: "I trust that the possibility of a common offen-
sive of our allied armies will raise the spirits of your
Foreign Minister. In my opinion, and in view of the
general situation, there is no reason to be anything but
confident." Other letters and statements prove the

WILLIAM II 83

Emperor's fluctuating frame of mind. He, as well as
the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse, made use, with
regard to the *' war- weary Austria-Hungary," of such
tactics as demonstrated a pronounced certainty of
victory in order to strengthen our powers of resistance.
• ••••••

The Archduke Friedrich deserves the greatest praise
for having kept up the friendly relations between Vienna
and Berlin. It was not always easy to settle the delicate
questions relating to the conduct of the war without
giving offense. The honest and straightforward nature
of the Archduke and his ever friendly and modest
behavior saved many a difficult situation.

After our collapse and overthrow, and when the Im-
perial family could be abused with impunity, certain
newspapers took a delight in covering the Archduke
Friedrich with contumely. It left him quite indifferent.
The Prince is a distinguished character, of faultless
integrity, and always ready to put down abuse. He pre-
vented many disasters, and it was not his fault if he did
not succeed every time.

When I saw the Crown-Prince Wilhelm again after
several years, it was the summer of 191 7, I found him
very tired of war and most anxious for peace. I had
gone to the French front on purpose to nieet him and to
try if it were possible through him to exercise some con-
ciliatory pressure, above all, on the military leaders. A
long conversation that I had with him showed me very
clearly that he — if he had ever been of warlike nature — •
was now a pronounced pacifist.

Extract from My Diary

On the Western front, igi^.—We drove to the Camp des Remains,
but in detachments, in order not to attract the attention of the
enemy artillery to our cars, for in some places the road was visible
to the enemy. I drove together with Bethmann. When dis-

84 IN THE WORLD WAR

cussing the military leaders, he remarked, ''The generals will
probably throw hand-grenades at me when they see me."

An enemy flier cruised high up in the clouds over our heads.
He circled around, paying little heed to the shrapnel bursting on
all sides. The firing ceased, and the human bird soared into
unapproachable heights. The artillery fire a long way ofi sounded
like distant thunder.

The French lines are not more than a couple of hundred meters
distant from the camp. A shot fell here and there and a shell
was heard to whistle; otherwise all was quiet. It was still early.
The firing usually begins at ten and cease sat noon — interval for
lunch — and begins again in the afternoon.

Poincare's villa is visible on the horizon in the green landscape.
A gun has been brought to bear on the house — they mean to destroy
it before leaving — they call this the extreme unction.

The daily artillery duel began on our return drive, and kept up
an incessant roar.

St.-Mihiel. — We stopped at St.-Mihiel, where many French peo-
ple still remain. They were detained as hostages to prevent the
town from being fired at. People were standing about in the
streets, watching the cars go by.

I spoke to an old woman, who sat by herself on her house steps.
She said: "This disaster can never be made good, and it cannot
well be worse than it is now. It is quite the same to me what
happens. I do not belong here; my only son has been killed and
my house is burned. Nothing is left me but my hatred of the
Germans, and I bequeath that to France." And she gazed past
me into vacancy. She spoke quite without passion, but was terribly
sad.

This terrible hatred! Generations will go to their graves before
the flood of hatred is abated. Would a settlement, a peace of
understanding, be possible with this spirit of the nations? Will
it end by one of them being felled to earth and annihilated?

St.-Privat. — We passed through St.-Privat on our way to Metz.
Monuments that tell the tale of 1S70 stand along the road. Every-
where the soil is historic, soaked in blood. Every spot, every
stone, is reminiscent of past great times. It was here that the seed
was sown that brought forth the plan of revenge that is being
fought for now.

Bethmann seemed to divine my thoughts. "Yes," he said,
*'that sacrifice would be easier for Germany to bear than to part
with Alsace-Lorraine, which would close one of the most brilliant
episodes in her history."

WILLIAM II 8s

Sedan. — On the way to the Crown Prince's quarters. There
stands the Httle house where the historic meeting between Napoleon
III and Bismarck took place. The woman who lived there at the
time died only a few weeks ago. For the second time she saw the
Germans arrive, bringing a Moltke, but no Bismarck, with them, a
detail, however, that cannot deeply have interested the old lady.

With the Crown Prince, — A pretty little house outside the town.
I found a message from the Crown Prince asking me to proceed
there immediately, where I had almost an hour's private conversa-
tion with him before supper.

I do not know if the Crown Prince ever was of a warlike dis-
position, as people say, but he is so no longer. He longs for peace,
but does not know how to secure it. He spoke very quietly and
sensibly. He was also in favor of territorial sacrifices, but seemed
to think that Germany would not allow it. The great difficulty
lay in the contrast between the actual military situation, the
confident expectations of the generals, and the fears entertained
by the miUtary laymen. Besides, it is not only Alsace-Lorraine.
The suppression of German militarism spoken of in London means
the one-sided disarmament of Germany. Can an army far advanced
on enemy soil whose generals are confident of final victory, can a
people still undefeated, tolerate that?

I advised the Crown Prince to speak to his father on the question
of abdication, in which he fully agreed. I then invited him to come
to Vienna on behalf of the Emperor, which he promised to do as
soon as he could get leave.

On my return the Emperor wrote him a letter, drawn
up by me, which contained the following passage :

My Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed me of the interesting
conversation he had the honor to have with you, and it has been
a great pleasure to me to hear all your statements, which so exactly
reflect my own views of the situation. Notwithstanding the super-
human exertions of our troops, the situation throughout the country
demands that a stop be put to the war before winter, in Germany as
well as here. Turkey will not be with us much longer, and with her
we shall also lose Bulgaria; we two will then be alone, and next
spring will bring America and a still stronger Entente. From other
sources there are distinct signs that we could win over France if Ger-
many could make up her mind to certain territorial sacrifices in

Alsace-Lorraine. With France secured to us we are the conquerors,
7

86 IN THE WORLD WAR

and Germany will obtain elsewhere ample compensation. But I
cannot allow Germany to be the only one to make a sacrifice. I too
will take the lion's share of sacrifice, and have informed His Majesty
your father that under the above conditions I am prepared not only
to dispense with the whole of Poland, but to cede Galicia to her
and to assist in combining that state with Germany, who would
thus acquire a state in the east while yielding up a portion of her
soil in the west. In 19 15, at the request of Germany and in the
interests of our Alliance, we offered the Trentino to faithless Italy
without asking for compensation in order to avert war. Germany
is now in a similar situation, though with far better prospects. You,
as heir to the German Imperial crown, are privileged to have a say
in the matter, and I know that His Majesty your father entirely
shares this view respecting your co-operation. I beg of you, there-
fore, in this decisive hour for Germany and Austria-Hungary, to
consider the whole situation and to unite your efforts with mine to
bring the war to a rapid and honorable end. If Germany persists
in her standpoint of refusal and thus wrecks the hope of a possible
peace the situation in Austria-Hungary will become extremely
critical.

I should be very glad to have a talk with you as soon as possible,
and your promise conveyed through Count Czernin soon to pay us a
visit gives me the greatest pleasure.

The Crown Prince's answer was very friendly and full
of anxiety to help, though it was also obvious that the
German military leaders had succeeded in nipping his
efforts in the bud. When I met Ludendorff some time
afterward in Berlin this was fully confirmed by the
words he flung at me: "What have you been doing to
our Crown Prince? He had turned so slack, but we
have stiffened him up again."

The game remained the same. The last war period
in Germany was controlled by one will only, and that
was Ludendorff's. His thoughts were centered on
fighting, his soul on victory.

CHAPTER IV

RUMANIA

MY appointment as Ambassador to Bukharest in the
autumn of 19 13 came as a complete surprise to me,
and was much against my wishes. The initiative in the
matter came from the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. I
had never had any doubt that sooner or later the Arch-
duke would take part in politics, but it took me by sur-
prise that he should do so in the Emperor Francis
Joseph's lifetime.

A great difference of opinion prevailed then in Vienna
on the Rumanian question, a pro-Rumanian spirit fight-
ing against an anti- Rumanian one. The head of the
former party was the Archduke Franz, and with him,
though in less marked degree, was Berchtold. Tisza
was the leader on the other side, and carried with him
almost the entire Hungarian Parliament. The pro-
Rumanians wished Rumania to be more closely linked
to the Monarchy; the others, to replace that alliance
by one with Bulgaria; but both were unanimous in
seeking for a clear knowledge of how matters stood
with the alliance, and whether we had a friend or a foe
on the other side of the Carpathians. My predecessor,
Karl Furstenberg, had sent in a very clear and correct
report on the subject, but he shared the fate of so many
ambassadors — his word was not believed.

The actual task assigned to me was, first of all, to find

88 IN THE WORLD WAR

out whether this alHance was of any practical value, and,
if I thought not, to suggest ways and means of justify-
ing its existence.

I must mention in this connection that my appoint-
ment as Ambassador to Bukharest had raised a perfect
storm in the Hungarian Parliament. The reason for
this widely spread indignation in Hungary at my
selection for the post was owing to a pamphlet I had
written some years previously, in which I certainly
had attacked the Magyar policy somewhat vehemently.
I maintained the standpoint that a policy of suppression
of the nations was not tenable in the long run, and that
no future was in store for Hungary unless she definitely
abolished that policy and allowed the nations equal
rights. This pamphlet gave serious displeasure in
Budapest, and representatives in the Hungarian Parlia-
ment were afraid I should introduce that policy in
Rumania, which, following the spirit of the pamphlet,
was directed against the official policy of Vienna and
Budapest. It was at this period that I made Tisza's
acquaintance. I had a long and very frank conversa-
tion with him on the whole subject, and explained to
him that I must uphold the standpoint I put forward in
my pamphlet, as it tallied with my convictions, but that
I clearly saw that from the moment I accepted the post
of ambassador I was bound to consider myself as a part
of the great state machinery, and loyally support the
policy emanating from the Ballplatz. I still maintain
that my standpoint is perfectly justifiable. A unified
policy would be utterly impossible if every subordinate
official were to publish his own views, whether right or
wrong, and I for my part would never, as Minister, have
tolerated an ambassador who attempted to pursue an
independent policy of his own. Tisza begged me to
give my word of honor that I would make no attempt
to introduce a policy opposed to that of Vienna and

RUMANIA 89

Budapest, to which I readily agreed, provided that the
Archduke was agreeable to such decision. I then had a
conversation with the latter, and found that he quite
agreed with my action, his argument being that as long
as he was the heir to the throne he would never attempt
to introduce a policy opposed to that of the Emperor;
consequently he would not expect it from me, either.
But should he come to the throne he would certainly
make an effort to carry out his own views, in which
case I should no longer be at Bukharest, but probably
in some post where I would be in a position to support
his efforts. The Archduke begged me for the sake of
my friendship for him to accept the post, which I
finally decided to do after I obtained a promise from
Berchtold that, at the end of two years as the longest
term, he would put no obstacle in the way of my retire-
ment.

The Archduke Franz drew his pro-Rumanian pro-
clivities from a very unreliable source. He hardly
knew Rumania at all. So far as I know, he had been
only once in the country, and paid a short visit to King
Carol at Sinaia; but the friendly welcome accorded to
himself and his wife by the old King and Queen entirely
took his warm heart by storm, and he mistook King
Carol for Rumania. This is again a proof how greatly
the individual relations of great personalities can influ-
ence the policy of nations. The royal couple met the
Archduke at the station; the Queen embraced and
kissed the Duchess and, placing her at her right side,
drove with her to the castle. In short, it was the first
time that the Duchess of Hohenburg had been treated
as enjoying equal privileges with her husband. During
his short stay in Rumania the Archduke had the pleas-
ure of seeing his wife treated as his equal and not as a
person of slight importance, always relegated to the
background. At the court balls in Vienna the Duchess

90 IN THE WORLD WAR

was always obliged to walk behind all the archduchesses,
and never had any gentleman allotted to her whose arm
she could take. In Rumania she was his wife, and
etiquette was not concerned with her birth. The
Archduke valued this proof of friendly tactfulness on
the part of the King very highly, and always afterward
Rumania, in his eyes, was endowed with a special
charm. Besides which he very correctly estimated
that a change in certain political relations would effect
a closer alliance between Rumania and ourselves. He
felt, rather than knew, that the Transylvanian question
lay like a huge obstacle between Vienna and Bukha-
rest, and that this obstacle once removed would alter
the entire situation.

To find out the real condition of the alliance was my
first task, and it was not difficult, as the first lengthy
conferences I had with King Carol left no doubt in my
mind that the old King himself considered the alliance
very unsafe. King Carol was an exceptionally clever
man, very cautious and deliberate, and it was not easy
to make him talk if he intended to be silent. The
question of the vitality of the alliance was settled by
my suggesting to the King that the alliance should re-
ceive pragmatic sanction — i.e., be ratified by the Par-
liaments at Vienna, Budapest, and Bukharest. The
alarm evinced by the King at the suggestion, the very
idea that the carefully guarded secret of the existence
of an alliance should be divulged, proved to me how
totally impossible it would be, in the circumstances, to
infuse fresh life into such dead matter.

My reports sent to the Ballplatz leave no doubt that I
answered this first question by declaring in categorical
fashion that the alliance with Rumania was, under the
existing conditions, nothing but a scrap of paper.

The second question, as to whether there were ways
and means of restoring vitality to the alliance, and what

RUMANIA 91

they were, was theoretically just as easy to answer as
difficult to carry out in practice. As already men-
tioned, the real obstacle in the way of closer relations
between Bukharest and Vienna was the question of
Great Rumania; in other words, the Rumanian desire
for national union with her ''brothers in Transylvania."
This was naturally quite opposed to the Hungarian
standpoint. It is interesting, as well as characteristic
of the then situation, that shortly after my taking up
office in Rumania, Nikolai Filippescu (known later as a
war fanatic) proposed that Rumania should join with
Transylvania, and the whole of united Great Rumania
enter into relations with the Monarchy similar to the
relation of Bavaria to the German Empire. I admit
that I welcomed the idea warmly, for if it were launched
by a party which justly was held to be antagonistic to
the Monarchy there can be no doubt that the moderate
element in Rumania would have accepted it with still
greater satisfaction. I still believe that had this plan
been carried out it would have led to a real linking of
Rumania to the Monarchy, that the notification would
have met with no opposition, and consequently the out-
break of war would have found us very differently
situated. Unfortunately, the plan failed at its very
first stage, owing to Tisza's strong and obstinate resist-
ance. The Emperor Francis Joseph held the same
standpoint as Tisza, and it was out of the question to
achieve anything by arguing. On the other hand, no-
body had any idea then that the great war, and with it
the testing of the alliance, was so imminent, and I con-
soled myself for my unsuccessful efforts in the firm hope
that this grand plan, as it seemed to me both then and
now, would be realized one day under the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand.

When I arrived in Rumania a change was proceeding
in the government. _ Majorescu's Conservative Minis-

92 IN THE WORLD WAR

try gave way to the Liberal Ministry of Bratianu.
King Carol's policy of government was very peculiar.
From the very first his principle was never to proceed
with violence or even much energy against injurious
tendencies in his own country; but, on the contrary,
always to yield to the numerous claims made by extor-
tioners. He knew his people thoroughly, and knew
that both parties, Conservatives and Liberals, must
alternately have access to the manger until thoroughly
satisfied and ready to make room the one for the other.
Almost every change in government was accomplished
in that manner — the Opposition, desirous of coming
into power, began with threats and hints at revolution.
Some highly unreasonable claim would be put forward
and vehemently insisted upon and the people incited to
follow it up; the government would retire, unable to
accede to the demands, and the Opposition, once in
power, would show no further signs of keeping their
promise. The old King was well versed in the game;
he allowed the opposition tide to rise to the highest pos-
sible limit, when he effected the necessary change of
individuals and looked on until the game began again.
It is the custom in Rumania, when a new party comes
into power, to change the whole personnel, even down
to the lowest officials. This arrangement, obviously,
has its drawbacks, though on the other hand it cannot be
denied that it is a practical one.

In this manner the Bratianu Ministry came into
office in 1913. Majorescu's government gave entire
satisfaction to the King and the moderate elements in
the country. In the eyes of the Rumanians he had
just achieved a great diplomatic success by the Peace
of Bukharest and the acquisition of the Dobrudja,
when Bratianu came forward with a demand for vast
agrarian reforms. These reforms are one of the hobby-
horses of Rumanian policy which are always mounted

RUMANIA 93

when it is a question of making use of the poor unfor-
tunate peasants, and the maneuver invariably succeeds,
largely owing to the lack of intelligence prevailing
among the peasant population of Rumania, who are
constantly made the tools of one or other party, and
simply pushed on one side when the object has been
obtained. Bratianu also, once he was in office, gave
no thought to the fulfilment of his promises, but calmly
proceeded on the lines Majorescu had laid down in his
time.

Still, it was more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory
settlem^ent in foreign affairs with Bratianu than it had
been with Majorescu, as the former was thoroughly
conversant with all West European matters, and at the
bottom of his heart was anti-German. One of the dis-
tinctions to be made between Liberals and Conserva-
tives was that the Liberals had enjoyed a Parisian edu-
cation— they spoke no German, only French; while the
Conservatives, taking Carp and Majorescu as models,
were offshoots of Berlin. As it was impossible to carry
out the plan of firmly and definitely linking Rumania to
us by a change of Hungarian internal policy, the idea
naturally, almost automatically, arose to substitute
Bulgaria for Rumania. This idea, which found special
favor with Count Tisza, could be carried out, both
because, since the Bukharest peace of 1913, it was out
of the question to bring Rumania and Bulgaria under
one roof, and because an alliance with Sofia would have
driven Rumania straight into the enemy camp. But
Berchtold, as well as the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
was opposed to this latter eventuality, nor would the
Emperor Francis Joseph have approved of such pro-
ceedings. Hence no change was made; Rumania was
not won, nor was Bulgaria substituted for her, and they
were content in Vienna to leave everything to the future.

In a social sense the year that I spent in Rumania

94 IN THE WORLD WAR

before the war was not an unpleasant one. The rela-
tions of an Austrian-Hungarian ambassador with the
court, as with the numerous Bojars, were pleasant and
friendly, and nobody could then have imagined what
torrents of hatred were so soon to be launched against
the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

Social life became less pleasant during the war, as will
be seen from the following instance. There lived at
Bukharest a certain Lieut. -Col. Prince Sturdza, who
was a noted braggart and brawler and an inveterate
enemy of Austria-Hungary. I did not know him per-
sonally, and there was no personal reason for him to
begin one day to abuse me publicly in the papers as
being an advocate of the Monarchy. I naturally took
not the slightest notice of his article, whereupon he
addressed an open letter to me in the Adeverul, in which
he informed me that he would box my ears at the first
opportunity. I telegraphed to Berchtold and asked
the Emperor's permission to challenge this individual,
as, being an officer, he was, according to our ideas,
entitled to satisfaction. The Emperor sent word that
it was out of the question for an ambassador to fight a
duel in the country to which he was accredited, and
that I was to complain to the Rumanian government.
I accordingly went to Bratianu, who declared that he
was totally unable to move in the matter. According
to the laws and regulations of the country it was impos-
sible to protect a foreign ambassador against such
abuse. If Sturdza carried out his threats he would be
arrested. Until then nothing could be done.

Upon this I assured Bratianu that if such were the
case I would in future arm myself with a revolver and,
if he attacked me, shoot the man; if one lived in a coun-
try where the habits of the Wild West obtained, one
must act accordingly. I sent word to the lieutenant-
colonel that each day, at one o'clock, I could be found

RUMANIA 95

at the Hotel Boulevard, where he would find a bullet
awaiting him.

The next time I saw the Emperor Francis Joseph he
asked for further information concerning the episode,
and I told him of my conversation with Bratianu and of
my firm intention to be my own helper. The Emperor
rejoined: "Naturally you cannot allow yourself to be
beaten. You are quite right; if he lays hands on you,
shoot him."

I afterward met Sturdza several times in restaurants
and drawing-rooms without his attempting to carry out
his threats. This man, whose nature was that of a
daring adventurer, afterward deserted to the Russian
army and fought against us at a time when Rumania
still was neutral. I then completely lost sight of him.

The absolute freedom of the press, combined with the
brutality of the prevailing customs, produced the most
varied results, even going so far as abuse of their own
kings. In this connection King Carol gave me many
drastic instances. While King Ferdinand was still
neutral, one of the comic papers contained a picture of
the King taking aim at a hare, while underneath these
words were supposed to come from the hare: *'My
friend, you have long ears, I have long ears; you are a
coward, I am a coward. Wherefore would my brother
shoot me?"

On the day when war broke out this freedom of the
press was diverted into a different channel and replaced
by the severest control and censorship.

Rumania is a land of contrasts, as regards the
landscape, the climate, and social conditions. The
mountainous north, with the wonderful Carpathians, is
one of the most beautiful districts. Then there are the
endless, unspeakably monotonous, but fertile plains of
Wallachia, leading into the valley of the Danube, which
is a very paradise. In spring particularly, when the

96 IN THE WORLD WAR

Danube each year overflows its banks, the beauty of
the landscape baffles description. It is reminiscent of
the tropics, with virgin forests standing in the water,
and islands covered with luxuriant growth scattered
here and there. It is an ideal country for the sports-
man. All kinds of birds, herons, ducks, pelicans, and
others, are to be met with, besides wolves and wildcats,
and days may be spent in rowing and walking in this
paradise without wearying of it.

The Rumanians usually care but little for sport, being
averse to physical exertion. Whenever they can they
leave the country and spend their time in Paris or on
the Riviera. This love of travel is so strong in them
that a law was passed compelling them to spend a cer-
tain portion of the year in their own country or else pay
the penalty of a higher tax. The country people, in
their sad poverty, form a great contrast to the enor-
mously wealthy Bojars. Although very backward in
everything relating to culture, the Rumanian peasant
is a busy, quiet, and easily satisfied type, unpretentious
to a touching degree when compared with the upper
classes.

Social conditions among the upper ten thousand have
been greatly complicated, owing to the abolition of
nobility, whereby the question of titles plays a part un-
equaled anywhere else in the world. Almost every
Rumanian has a title derived from one or other source;
he values it highly, and takes it much amiss when a
foreigner betrays his ignorance on the subject. As a
rule, it is safer to adopt the plan of addressing every one
as ''Mon prince.'' Another matter difficult for a for-
eigner to grasp is the inner status of Rumanian society,
owing to the incessant divorce and subsequent re-
marriages. Nearly every woman has been divorced at
least once and married again, the result being, on the
one hand, the most complicated questions of rela-

RUMANIA 97

tionship, and, on the other, so many breaches of per-
sonal relations as to make it the most difficult task to
invite twenty Rumanians, particularly ladies, to dinner
without giving offense in some quarter.

In the days of the old regime it was one of the duties
of the younger members of the Embassy to develop
their budding diplomatic talents by a clever compila-
tion of the list for such a dinner and a wise avoidance
of any dangerous rock ahead. But as the question of
rank in Rumania is taken just as seriously as though it
were authorized, every lady claims to have first rank — ■
the correct allotment of places at a dinner is really a
question for the most efficient diplomatic capacities.
There were about a dozen ladies in Bukharest who
would actually not accept an invitation unless they
were quite sure the place of honor would be given to
them.

My predecessor cut the Gordian knot of these diffi-
culties by arranging to have dinner served at small
separate tables, thus securing several places of honor,
but not even by these means could he satisfy the am-
bition of all.

While at Sinaia I received the news of the assassina-
tion of the Archduke from Bratianu. I was confined to
bed, suffering from influenza, when Bratianu tele-
phoned to ask if I had heard that there had been an
accident to the Archduke's train in Bosnia, and that
both he and the Duchess were killed. Soon after this
first alarm came further news, leaving no doubt as to
the gravity of the catastrophe. The first impression in
Rumania was one of profound and sincere sympathy
and genuine consternation. Rumania never expected
by means of war to succeed in realizing her national
ambitions; she only indulged in the hope that a friendly

98 IN THE WORLD WAR

agreement with the Monarchy would lead to the union
of all Rumanians, and in that connection Bukharest
centered all its hopes in the Archduke and heir to the
throne. His death seemed to end the dream of a
Greater Rumania, and the genuine grief displayed in all
circles in Rumania was the outcome of that feeling.
Take Jonescu, on learning the news while in my wife's
drawing-room, wept bitterly; and the condolences that
I received were not of the usual nature of such messages,
but were expressions of the most genuine sorrow.
Poklewsld, the Russian Ambassador, is said to have
remarked very brutally that there was no reason to
make so much out of the event, and the general indig-
nation that his words aroused proved how strong was
the sympathy felt for the murdered Archduke in the
country.

When the ultimatum was made known the entire situ-
ation changed at once. I never had any illusions
respecting the Rumanian psychology, and was quite
clear in my own mind that the sincere regret at the
Archduke's death was due to egotistical motives and to
the fear of being compelled now to abandon the national
ambition. The ultimatum and the danger of war
threatening on the horizon completely altered the
Rumanian attitude, and it was suddenly recognized
that Rumania could achieve its object by other means,
not by peace, but by war — not with, but against the
Monarchy. I 'would never have believed it possible
that such a rapid and total change could have occurred
practically within a few hours. Genuine and simulated
indignation at the tone of the ultimatum was the order
of the day, and the universal conclusion arrived at was :
UAutriche est devenue folle. Men and women with
whom I had been on a perfectly friendly footing for the
last year suddenly became bitter enemies. Every-
where I noticed a mixture of indignation and growing

RUMANIA 99

eagerness to realize at last their heart's dearest wish.
The feeling in certain circles fluctuated for some days.
Rumanians had a great respect for Germany's military
power, and the year 1870 was still fresh in the memory
of many of them. When England, however, joined the
ranks of our adversaries their fears vanished, and from
that moment it became obvious to the large majority
of the Rumanians that the realization of their aspira-
tions was merely a question of time and of diplomatic
efficiency. The wave of hatred and lust of conquest
that broke over us in the first stage of the war was much
stronger than in later stages, because the Rumanians
made the mistake we all have committed of reckoning
on too short a duration of the war, and therefore im-
agined the decision to be nearer at hand than it actu-
ally was. After the great German successes in the
west, after Gorlitz and the downfall of Serbia, certain
tendencies pointing to a policy of delay became notice-
able among the Rumanians. With the exceptions of
Carp and his little group all were more or less ready at
the very first to fling themselves upon us.

Like a rock standing in the angry sea of hatred, poor
old King Carol was alone with his German sympathies.
I had been instructed to read the ultimatum to him the
moment it was sent to Belgrade, and never shall I for-
get the impression it made on the old King when he
heard it. He, wise old politician that he was, recog-
nized at once the immeasurable possibilities of such a
step, and before I had finished reading the document
he interrupted me, exclaiming, *'It will be a world war."
It was long before he could collect himself and begin to
devise ways and means by which a peaceful solution
might still be found. I may mention here that a short
time previously the Tsar, with Sassonoff, had been in
Constanza for a meeting with the Rumanian royal
family. The day after the Tsar left I went to Con-

loo IN THE WORLD WAR

stanza myself to thank the King for having conferred
the Grand Cross of one of the Rumanian orders on me,
obviously as a proof that the Russian visit had not
made him forget our alliance, and he gave me some
interesting details of the said visit. Most interesting
of all was his account of the conversations with the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. On asking whether
Sassonoff considered the situation in Europe to be as
safe as he (the King) did, Sassonoff answered in the
affirmative, ''Pomtvu que VAutriche ne touche pas a la
Serhie.'' I at once, of course, reported this momentous
statement to Vienna; but neither by the King nor by
myself, nor yet in Vienna, was the train of thought
then fully understood. The relations between Serbia
and the Monarchy were at that time no worse than
usual; indeed, they were rather better, and there was
not the slightest intention on our part to injure the
Serbians. But the suspicion that Sassonofif already
then was aware that the Serbians were planning some-
thing against us cannot be got rid of.

When the King asked me whether I had reported
Sassonoff 's important remark to Vienna, I replied that
I had done so, and added that this remark was another
reason to make me believe that the assassination was a
crime long since prepared and carried out under
Russian patronage.

The crime that was enacted at Debruzin, which made
such a sensation at the time, gave rise to suspicions of a
Russo-Rumanian attempt at assassination.

On February 24, 1914, the Hungarian Correspond-
ence Bureau published the following piece of news :

A terrible explosion took place this morning in the official
premises of the newly instituted Greek-CathoUc-Hungarian bishop-
ric, which are on the second floor of the Ministry of Trade and Com-
merce in the Franz Deak Street. It occurred in the office of the
bishop's representative, the Vicar Michael Jaczkovics, whose secre-

RUMANIA loi

tary, Johann Slapowszky, was also present in the room. Both of
them were blown to pieces. The Greek-Cathohc bishop, Stephan
Miklossy, was in a neighboring room, but had a most marvelous
escape. Alexander Csatth, advocate and soUcitor to the bishopric,
who was in another room, was mortally wounded by the explosion.
In a third room the bishop's servant with his wife were both killed.
All the walls in the ofhce premises fell in, and the whole building is
very much damaged. The explosion caused such a panic in the
house that all the inhabitants took flight and vanished. All the
windows of the neighboring Town Hall in the Verboczy Street were
shattered by the concussion. Loose tiles were hurled into the street
and many passers-by were injured. The four dead bodies and the
wounded were taken to the hospital. The bishop, greatly distressed,
left the building and went to a friend's house. The daughter of the
Vicar Jaczkovics went out of her mind on hearing of her father's
tragic death. The cause of the explosion has not yet been discovered.

I soon became involved in the affair when Hungary
and Rumania began mutually to blame one another as
originators of the outrage. This led to numerous inter-
ventions and adjustments, and my task was intensified
because a presumed accomplice of the murderer Catarau
was arrested in Bukharest, and his extradition to Hun-
gary had to be effected by me. This man, of the name
of Mandazescu, was accused of having obtained a false
passport for Catarau.

Catarau, who was a Rumanian-Russian from Bessara-
bia, vanished completely after the murder and left no
trace. News came, now from Serbia, then from Albania,
that he had been found, but the rumors were always
false. I chanced to hear something about the matter
in this way. I was on board a Rumanian vessel bound
from Constanza to Constantinople, when I accidentally
overheard two Rumanian naval officers talking to-
gether. One of them said, ''That was on the day
when the police brought Catarau on board to help
him to get away secretly."

Catarau was heard of later at Cairo, which he ap-
pears to have reached with the aid of Rumanian friends.

102 IN THE WORLD WAR

It cannot be asserted that the Rumanian govern-
ment was implicated in the plot — but the Rumanian
authorities certainly were, for in the Balkans, as in
Russia, there are many bands like the cerna ruka, the
narodna odhrena, etc., etc., who carry on their activities
alongside the government.

It was a crime committed by some Russian or Ru-
manian secret society, and the governments of both
countries showed surprisingly little interest in investi-
gating the matter and delivering the culprits up to
justice.

On June 15 th I heard from a reliable source that
Catarau had been seen in Bukharest. He walked
about the streets quite openly in broad daylight, and
no one interfered with him ; then he disappeared.

To return, however, to my interview with the old
King. Filled with alarm, he despatched that same
evening two telegrams, one to Belgrade and one to
Petersburg, urging that the ultimatum be accepted
without fail.

The terrible distress of mind felt by the King when,
like a sudden flash of lightning from the clouds, he saw
before him a picture of the World War may be accounted
for because he felt certain that the conflict between his
personal convictions and his people's attitude would
suddenly be known to all. The poor old King fought
the fight to the best of his ability, but it killed him.
King Carol's death was caused by the war. The last
weeks of his life were a torture to him; each message
that I had to deliver he felt as the lash of a whip. I was
enjoined to do all I could to secure Rumania's prompt
co-operation, according to the terms of the alliance,
and I was even obliged to go so far as to remind him
that "a promise given allows of no prevarication : that a
treaty is a treaty, and his honor obliged him to un-
^sheathe, his sword.'' I recollect one particularly pain-

RUMANIA 103

ful scene, where the King, weeping bitterly, flung him-
self across his writing-table and with trembling hands
tried to wrench from his neck his order Pour la Merite.
I can affirm without any exaggeration that I could see
him wasting away under the ceaseless moral blows
dealt to him, and that the mental torment he went
through undoubtedly shortened his life.

Queen EHzabeth was well aware of all, but she never
took my action amiss; she understood that I had to
deliver the messages, but that it was not I who com-
posed them.

Queen EHzabeth was a good, clever, and touchingly
simple woman, not a poet qui court apris V esprit, but a
woman who looked at the world through conciliatory
and political glasses. She was a good conversational-
ist, and there was always a poetic charm in all she did.
There hung on the staircase a most beautiful sea picture,
which I greatly admired while the Queen talked to me
about the sea, about her little villa at Constanza, which,
built on the extreme end of the quay, seems almost to
lie in the sea. She spoke, too, of her travels and im-
pressions when on the high seas, and as she spoke the
great longing for all that is good and beautiful made
itself felt, and this is what she said to me: ''The sea
lives. If there could be found any symbol of eternity it
would be the sea, endless in greatness and everlasting in
movement. The day is dull and stormy. One after
another the glassy billows come rolling in and break
with a roar on the rocky shore. The small white crests
of the waves look as if covered with snow. And the sea
breathes and draws its breath with the ebb and flow of
the tide. The tide is the driving power that forces the
mighty waters from equator to North Pole. And thus
it works, day and night, year by year, century by cen-
tury. It takes no heed of the perishable beings who
^call themselves lords of the world, who only live for a

104 IN THE WORLD WAR

day, coming and going and vanishing almost as they
come. The sea remains to work. It works for all, for
men, for animals, for plants, for without the sea there
could be no organic life in the world. The sea is like a
great filter, which alone can produce the change of
matter that is necessary for life. In the course of a
century numberless rivers carry earth to the sea. Each
river carries without ceasing its burden of earth and
sand to the ocean ; and the sea receives the load which
is carried by the current far out to sea, and slowly and
by degrees in the course of time the sea dissolves or
crushes all it has received. No matter to the sea if the
process lasts a thousand years or more — it may even
last for ages. Who can tell?

*'But one day, quite suddenly, the sea begins to
wander. Once there was sea everywhere, and all con-
tinents are born from the sea. One day land arose out
of the sea. The birth was of a revolutionary nature;
there were earthquakes, volcanic craters, falling cities,
and dying men — but new land was there. Or else it
moves slowly, invisibly, a meter or two in a century,
and returns to the land it used to possess. Thus it
restores the soil it stole from it, but cleaner, refined, and
full of vitality to live and to create. Such is the sea
and its work."

These are the words of the old, half -blind Queen who
can never look upon the beloved picture again, but she
told me how she always idolized the sea and how her
grandnephews and grandnieces shared her feelings and
how she grew young again with them when she told
them tales of olden times.

One could listen to her for hours without growing
weary, and always there was some beautiful thought or
word to carry away and think over.

Doubtless such knowledge would be more correct
were it taken from some geological work. But Carmen

RUMANIA 105

Sylva's words invariably seemed to strike some poetic
chord ; that is what made her so attractive.

She loved to discourse on politics, which for her
meant King Carol. He was her all in all. After his
death, when it was said that all states in the world were
losing in the terrible war, she remarked, ''Rumania has
already lost her most precious possession." She never
spoke of her own poems and writings. In politics her
one thought besides King Carol was Albania. She was
deeply attached to the Princess of Wied, and showed
her strong interest in the country where she lived.
Talking about the Wieds one day afforded me an op-
portunity of seeing the King vexed with his wife ; it was
the only time I ever noticed it. It was when we were
at Sinaia, and I was, as often occurred, sitting with the
King. The Queen came into the room, which she was
otherwise not in the habit of entering, bringing with her
a telegram from the Princess of Wied in which she
asked for something — I cannot now remember what — ■
for Albania. The King refused, but the Queen insisted,
until he at last told her very crossly to leave him in
peace as he had other things to think of than Albania.

After King Carol's death she lost all her vital energy
and the change in the political situation troubled her.
She was very fond of her nephew Ferdinand — hers was
a truly loving heart — and she trembled lest he should
commit some act of treachery. I remember once how,
through her tears, she said to me: ''Calm my fears.
Tell me that he will never be guilty of such an act." I
was unable to reassure her, but a kind Fate spared her
from hearing the declaration of war.

Later, not long before her death, the old Queen was
threatened with total blindness. She was anxious to
put herself in the hands of a French oculist for an opera-
tion for cataract, who would naturally be obliged to
travel through the Monarchy in order to reach Bukha-

io6 IN THE WORLD WAR

rest. At her desire I mentioned the matter in Vienna,
and the Emperor Francis Joseph at once gave the
requisite permission for the journey.

After a successful operation the Queen sent a short
autograph poem to one of my children, adding that it
was her first letter on recovering her sight. At the
same time she was again very uneasy concerning
politics.

I wrote her the following letter:

Your Majesty, — My warmest thanks for the beautiful Uttle poem
you have sent to my boy. That it was granted to me to contribute
something toward the recovery of your sight is in itself a sufficient
reward, and no thanks are needed. That your Majesty has ad-
dressed the first written Hues to my children deUghts and touches me.

Meanwhile your Majesty must not be troubled regarding politics.
It is of no avail. For the moment Rumania will retain the policy of
the late King, and God alone knows what the future will bring forth.

We are all like dust in this terrible hurricane sweeping through
the world. We are tossed helplessly hither and thither and know not
whether we are to face disaster or success. The point is not whether
we live or die, but how it is done. In that respect King Carol set
an example to us all.

I hope King Ferdinand may never forget that, together with
the throne, his uncle bequeathed to him a political creed, a creed
of honor and loyalty, and I am persuaded that your Majesty is the
best guardian of the bequest.

Your Majesty's grateful and devoted

CZERNIN.

When I said that King Carol fought the fight to the
best of his ability I intended to convey that no one
could expect him to be different from what he always
was. The King never possessed in any special degree
either energy, strength of action, or adventurous cour-
age, and at the time I knew him, as an old man, he
had none of those attributes. He was a clever diplomat,
a conciliatory power, a safe mediator, and one who
avoided trouble, but not of a nature to risk all and

RUMANIA 107

weather the storm. That was known to all, and no one,
therefore, could think that the King would try to put
himself on our side against the clearly expressed views
of all Rumania. My idea is that if he had been dif-
ferently constituted he could successfully have risked
the experiment. The King possessed in Carp a man
of quite unusual, even reckless, activity and energy,
and from the first moment he placed himself and his
activities at the King's disposal. If the King, without
asking, had ordered mobilization, Carp's great energy
would have certainly carried it through. But, in the
military situation as it was then, the Rumanian army
would have been forced to the rear of the Russian, and
in all probability the first result of the battle-fields
would have changed the situation entirely, and the
blood that was shed mutually in victorious battles
would have brought forth the unity that the spirit of
our alliance never succeeded in evolving. But the
King was not a man of such caliber. He could not
change his nature, and what he did do entirely con-
curred with his methods from the time he ascended the
throne.

As long as the King lived there was the positive
assurance that Rumania would not side against us,
for he would have prevented any mobilization against
us with the same firm wisdom which had always enabled
him to avert any agitation in the land. He would then
have seen that the Rumanians are not a warlike peo-
ple like the Bulgarians, and that Rumania had not the
slightest intention of risking anything in the campaign.
A policy of procrastination in the wise hands of the
King would have delayed hostilities against us indefi-
nitely.

Immediately after the outbreak of war Bratianu
began his game, which consisted of intrenching the
Rumanian government firmly and willingly in a posi-

io8 IN THE WORLD WAR

tion between the two groups of Powers, and bandying
favors about from one to the other, reaping equal
profits from each until the moment when the stronger
of the two should be recognized as such and the weaker
then attacked.

Even from 1914 to 1916 Rumania was never really
neutral. She always favored our enemies, and as far
as lay in her power hindered all our actions.

The transport of horses and ammunition to Turkey
in the summer of 191 5 that was exacted from us was
an important episode. Turkey was then in great
danger and was asking anxiously for munitions. Had
the Rumanian government adopted the standpoint
not to favor any of the belligerent Powers, it would have
been a perfectly correct attitude, viewed from a neutral
standpoint, but she never did adopt such standpoint,
as is shown by her allowing the Serbians to receive
transports of Russian ammunition via the Danube,
thus showing great partiality. When all attempts
failed, the munitions were transmitted, partially, at any
rate, through other means.

At that time, too, Russian soldiers were allowed in
Rumania and were not molested, whereas ours were
invariably interned.

Two Austrian airmen once landed by mistake in
Rumania, and were, of course, interned immediately.
The one was a cadet of the name of Berthold and a
pilot whose name I have forgotten. From their prison
they appealed to me to help them, and I sent word that
they must endeavor to obtain permission to pay me a
visit. A few days later the cadet appeared, escorted
by a Rumanian officer as guard. This officer, not
being allowed without special permission to set foot
on Austro-Hungarian soil, was obliged to remain in the
street outside the house. I had the gates closed, put the
cadet into one of my cars, sent him out through the

RUMANIA 109

back entrance, and had him driven to Giurgui, where
he got across the Danube, and in two hours was again
at hberty. After a lengthy and futile wait the officer
departed. His protests came too late.

The unfortunate pilot who was left behind was not
allowed to come to the Embassy. One night, however,
he made his escape through the window and arrived.
I kept him concealed for some time, and he eventually
crossed the frontier safely and got away by rail to
Hungary.

Bratianu reproached me later for what I had done,
but I told him it was in consequence of his not having
strictly adhered to his neutrality. Had our soldiers
been left unmolested, as in the case of the Russians,
I should not have been compelled to act as I had done.

Bratianu can never seriously have doubted that the

Central Powers would succumb, and his sympathies

were always with the Entente, not only on account

of his bringing up, but also because of that political

speculation. During the course of subsequent events

there were times when Bratianu to a certain extent

seemed to vacillate, especially at the time of our great

offensive against Russia. The break through at

Gorlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior

of Russia had an astounding effect, in Rumania.

Bratianu, who obviously knew very little about

strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian

millions, whom he imagined to be in a fair way to

Vienna and Berlin, should suddenly begin to rush

back, and a fortress like Warsaw be demoHshed like a

house of cards. He was evidently very anxious then

and must have had many a disturbed night. On the

other hand, those who, to begin with, though not for,

still were not against Austria began to raise their heads

and breathe more freely. The victory of the Central

Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event.

no IN THE WORLD WAR

That was the historic moment when Rumania might
have been coerced into active co-operation, but not
the Bratianu Ministry. Bratianu himself would never
in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we
could have made up our minds then to install a Ma-
jorescu or a Marghiloman Ministry in office, we could
have had the Rumanian army with us. In connection
with this were several concrete proposals. In order to
carry out the plan we should have been compelled
to make territorial concessions in Hungary to a Majo-
rescu Ministry — Majorescu demanded it as a primary
condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs,
and this proposal failed, owing to Hungary's obstinate
resistance. It is a terrible but a just punishment that
poor Hungary, who contributed so much to our definite
defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from the
consequences thereof, and that the Rumanians, so
despised and persecuted by Hungary, should gain the
greatest triumphs on her plains.

One of the many reproaches that have been brought
against me is to the effect that I, as Ambassador at
Bukharest, should have resigned if my proposals were
not accepted in Vienna. These reproaches are dictated
by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsi-
bility. It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe
the situation as he sees it and to make such proposals
as he considers right, but the responsibility for the
policy is with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and it
would lead to the most impossible and absurd state
of things if every ambassador whose proposals were
rejected were to draw the conclusion that his resigna-
tion was a necessary consequence thereof. If officials
were to resign because they did not agree with the
view of their chief, it would mean that almost all of
them would send in their resignations.

Espionage and counter-espionage have greatly flour-

RUMANIA III

ished during the war. In that connection Russia
showed great activity in Rumania.

In October, 19 14, an event occurred which was very
unfortunate for me. I drove from Bukharest to
Sinaia, carrying certain pohtical documents with me
in a despatch-case, which, by mistake, was tied on
behind instead of being laid in the car. On the way the
case was unstrapped and stolen. I made every effort
to get it back, and eventually recovered it after a
search of three weeks, involving much expense. It
was found at last in some peasant's barn, but nothing
had apparently been abstracted save the cigarettes
that were in it.

Nevertheless, after the occupation of Bukharest,
copies and photos of all my papers were found in
Bratianu's house.

After the loss of the despatch-case I at once tendered
my resignation in Vienna, but it was not accepted by
the Emperor.

The Red Book on Rumania, published by Burian,
which contains a summary of my most important
reports, gives a very clear picture of the several phases
of that period and the approaching danger of war.
The passing defeats that Rumania suffered justified
the fears of all those who warned her against premature
intervention. In order to render the situation quite
clear, it must here be explained that during the time
immediately preceding Rumania's entry into war there
were really only two parties in the country: the one
was hostile to us and wished for an immediate declara-
tion of war, and the other was the "friendly" one that
did not consider the situation ripe for action and
advised waiting until we were weakened still more.
During the time of our successes the ''friendly" party
carried the day. Queen Marie, I believe, belonged to
the latter. From the beginning of the war she was

Ill IN THE WORLD WAR

always in favor of ''fighting by the side of England,'*
as she always looked upon herself as an Englishwoman,
but at the last moment, at any rate, she appears to
have thought the time for action premature. A few
days before the declaration of war she invited me to a
farewell lunch, which was somewhat remarkable, as
we both knew that in a very few days we should be
enemies. After lunch I took the opportunity of telling
her that I likewise was aware of the situation, but that
''the Bulgarians would be in Bukharest before the
Rumanians reached Budapest." She entered into the
conversation very calmly, being of a very frank nature
and not afraid of hearing the truth. A few days later
a letter was opened at the censor's office from a lady-
in-waiting who had been present at the lunch. It
was evidently not intended for our eyes ; it contained a
description of the dejeuner fort embetant, with some
unflattering remarks about me.

Queen Marie never lost her hope in a final victory.
She did not, perhaps, agree with Bratianu in all his
tactics, but a declaration of war on us was always an
item on her program. Even in the distressing days
of their disastrous defeat she always kept her head
above water. One of the Queen's friends told me
afterward that when our armies, from south, north, and
west, were nearing Bukharest, when day and night
the earth shook with the ceaseless thunder of the guns,
the Queen quietly went on with her preparations for
departure, and was firmly persuaded that she would
return as "Empress of all the Rumanians." I have
been told that after the taking of Bukharest Bratianu
collapsed altogether, and it was Queen Marie who
comforted and encouraged him. Her English blood
always asserted itself. After we had occupied Walla-
chia I received absolutely reliable information from
England, according to which she had telegraphed to

RUMANIA 113

King George from Jassy, recommending ''her little
but courageous people" to his further protection.
After the Peace of Bukharest strong pressure was
brought to bear on me to effect the abdication of the
King and Queen. It would not in any way have
altered the situation, as the Entente would naturally
have reinstated them when victory was gained; but I
opposed all such efforts, not for the above reason,
which I could not foresee, but from other motives,
to be mentioned later, although I was perfectly certain
that Queen Marie would always remain our enemy.

The declaration of war created a very uncomfortable
situation for all Austro-Hungarians and Germans. I
came across several friends in the Austro-Hungarian
colony who had been beaten by the Rumanian soldiers
with the butt ends of their rifles on their way to prison.
I saw wild scenes of panic and flight that were both gro-
tesque and revolting, and the cruel sport lasted for days.

In Vienna all subjects of an enemy state were ex-
empt from deportation. In my capacity as Minister I
ordered reprisals on Rumanian citizens, as there was
no other means to relieve the fate of our poor refugees.
As soon as the neutral Powers notified that the treat-
ment had become more humane, they were set free.

If we showed ourselves at the windows or in the
garden of the Embassy the crowd scoffed and jeered
at us, and at the station, when we left, a young official
whom I asked for information simply turned his back
on me.

A year and a half later I was again in Bukharest.
The tide of victory had carried us far and we came to
make peace. We were again subjects of interest to
the crowds in the streets, but in very different fashion.
A tremendous ovation awaited us when we appeared in
the theater, and I could not show myself in the street
without having a crowd of admirers in my wake.

114 IN THE WORLD WAR

Before all this occurred, and when war was first
declared, the members of the embassy, together with
about one hundred and fifty persons belonging to the
Austro-Hungarian colony, including many children,
were interned, and spent ten very unpleasant days,
as we were not sure whether we should be released or
not. We had occasion during that time to witness
three Zeppelin raids over Btikharest, which, seen in the
wonderful moonlit, cloudless nights under the tropi-
cal sky, made an unforgetable impression on us.

I find the following noted in my diary :

''Bukharest, August, igi6.

**The Rumanians have declared war on my wife and
daughter, too. A deputation composed of two officials
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in frock-coats
and top hats, appeared last night at eleven o'clock in
my villa at Sinaia. My wife was roused out of her
sleep, and by the light of a single candle — more is for-
bidden on account of the Zeppelin raids — they informed
her that Rumania had declared war on us.

*'As the speaker put it, 'Vous avez declare la guerre.'*
He then read the whole declaration of war aloud to
them both. Bratianu sent word to me that he would
have a special train sent to take my wife and daughter
and the whole personnel of the embassy to Bukharest.

''Bukharest, September, igi6.

''The Rumanians really expected a Zeppelin attack
at once. So far it has not occurred, and they begin
to feel more at ease, and say that it is too far for the
Zeppelins to come all the way from Germany. They
seem not to be aware that Mackensen has Zeppelins
in Bulgaria. But who can tell whether they really
will come?

RUMANIA 115

Bukkarest, September, igi6.

Last night a Zeppelin did come. About three
o'clock we were roused by the shrill police whistles
giving the alarm. The telephone notified us that a
Zeppelin had crossed the Danube, and all the church-
bells began to peal. Suddenly darkness and silence
reigned, and the whole town, like some great angry
animal, sullen and morose, prepared for the enemy
attack. Nowhere was there light or sound. The
town, with a wonderful starry firmament overhead,
waited in expectation. Fifteen, twenty minutes went
by, when suddenly a shot was fired and, as though it
were a signal, firing broke out in every direction. The
anti-aircraft guns fired incessantly, and the police, too,
did their best, firing in the air. But what were they
firing at? There was absolutely nothing to be seen.
The searchlights then came into play. Sweeping the
heavens from east to west, from north to south, they
search the firmament, but cannot find the Zeppelin.
Is it really there, or is the whole thing due to excited
Rumanian nerves?

Suddenly a sound was heard — the noise of the pro-
peller overhead. It sounded so near in the clear,
starry night, we felt we must be able to see it. But
the noise died away in the direction of Colbroceni.
Then we heard the first bomb. Like a gust of wind it
whistled through the air, followed by a crash and an
explosion. A second and third came quickly after.
The firing became fiercer, but they can see nothing
and seem to aim at where the sound comes from. The
searchlights sway backward and forward. Now one of
them has caught the airship, which looks like a small
golden cigar. Both the gondolas can be seen quite
distinctly, and the searchlight keeps it well in view,
and now a second one has caught it. It looks as though

ii6 IN THE WORLD WAR

this air cruiser is hanging motionless in the sky, bril-
liantly lit up by the searchlights right and left. Then
the guns begin in good earnest. Shrapnel bursts all
around, a wonderful display of fireworks, but it is
impossible to say if the aim is good and if the monster
is in danger. Smaller and smaller grows the Zeppelin,
climbing rapidly higher and higher, until suddenly
the miniature cigar disappears. Still the searchlights
sweep the skies, hoping to find their prey again.

"Suddenly utter silence reigns. Have they gone?
Is the attack over? Has one been hit? Forced to
land? The minutes go by. We are all now on the
balcony — the women, too — watching the scene. Again
comes the well-known sound — once heard never for-
gotten— as though the wind were getting up, then a
dull thud and explosion. This time it is farther away
toward the forts. Again the firing breaks out and
machine-guns bark at the friendly moon; searchlights
career across the heavens, but find nothing. Again
there falls a bomb — much nearer this time — and again
comes the noise of the propellers louder and louder.
Shrapnel bursts just over the Embassy, and the Zep-
pelin is over our heads. We hear the noise very dis-
tinctly, but can see nothing. Again a sudden silence
everywhere, which has a curious effect after the terrible
noise. Time passes, but nothing more is heard. The
first rays of dawn are seen in the east ; the stars slowly
pale.

''A child is heard to cry somewhere, far away;
strange how clearly it sounds in the silent night. There
is a feeling as though the terrified town hardly dared
breathe or move for fear the monster might return.
And how many more such nights are there in prospect ?
In the calm of this fairy-like dawn, slowly rising, the
crying of the child strikes a note of discord, infinitely
sad. But the crying of the child, does it not find an

RUMANIA 117

echo in the milHons whom this terrible war has driven
to desperation?

''The sun rises Hke a blood-red ball. For some
hours the Rumanians can take to sleep and gather
fresh strength, but they know that the Zeppelin's visit
will not be the last.

' Bukharest, September, igi6.

'The press is indignant about the nocturnal attack.
Bukharest is certainly a fortress, but it should be known
that the guns no longer are in the forts. It was stated
in the Adeverul that the heroic resistance put up in
defense was most successful. That the airship, badly
damaged, was brought down near Bukharest, and that
a commission started off at once to make sure whether
it was an airplane or a Zeppelin !

'Bukharest, September, igiO.

'The Zeppelin returned again this evening and took
us by surprise. It seemed to come from the other side
of Plojest, and the sentries on the Danube must have
missed it. Toward morning the night watch at the
Embassy, whose duty it is to see that there is no light
in the house, saw a huge mass descending slowly on the
Embassy till it almost touched the roof.. It hovered
there a few minutes, making observations. No one
noticed it until suddenly the engines started again,
and it dropped the first bomb close to the Embassy.
A direct hit was made on the house of the Ambassador
Jresnea Crecianu, and twenty gendarmes who were
there were killed. The royal palace was also damaged.
The government is apparently not satisfied with the
anti-aircraft forces, but concludes that practice will
make them perfect. Opportunity for practice will cer-
tainly not be lacking.

**Our departure is being delayed by every sort of

ii8 IN THE WORLD WAR

pretext. One moment it seems as though we should
reach home via Bulgaria. This idea suited Bratianu
extremely well, as the Bulgarian willingness to grant
permission was a guaranty that they had no plans of
attack. But he reckoned in this without his host.
E. and W. are greatly alarmed because the Rumanians
intend to detain them, and will probably hang them as
spies. I have told them, 'Either we all stay here or
we all start together. No one will be given up.' That
appears to have somewhat quieted their fears.

**As might be expected, these nocturnal visits had
disagreeable consequences for us. The Rumanians
apparently thought that it was not a question of Zep-
pelins, but of Austro-Hungarian airships, and that my
presence in the town would afford a certain protection
against the attacks; after the first one they declared
that for every Rumanian killed ten Austrians or Bul-
garians would be executed, and the hostile treatment
to which we were subjected grew worse and worse.
The food was cut down and was terribly bad, and
finally the water-supply was cut off. With the tropical
temperature that prevailed and the overcrowding of a
house that normally was destined to hold twenty
and now housed one hundred and seventy persons, the
conditions within the space of twenty-four hours became
unbearable, and the atmosphere so bad that several
people fell ill with fever, and neither doctor nor medicine
was obtainable. Thanks to the energetic intervention
of the Dutch Ambassador, Herr von Vredenburch, who
had undertaken to take charge of our state interests,
it was finally possible to alter the conditions and to
avert the outbreak of an epidemic."

It was just about that time that our military attache,
Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Randa, made a telling
remark. One of our Rumanian slave-drivers was in the

RUMANIA 119

habit of paying us a daily visit and talking in the
bombastic fashion the Rumanians adopted when boast-
ing of their impending victories. The word * * Macken-
sen" occurred in Randa's answer. The Rumanian
was surprised to hear the name, unknown to him,
and said :

*'Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce Mackensen? Je connais
beaucoup d'Allemands, mais je n'ai jamais fait la con-
naissance de M. Mackensen."

**Eh bien," replied Randa, patting him on the
shoulder, "vous la ferez cette connaissance, je vous en
guarantie."

Three months after that Mackensen had occupied
all Wallachia and had his headquarters at Bukharest.
By that time, therefore, his name must have been
more familiar to our Rumanian friend.

At last we set off for home via Russia and had a very
interesting journey lasting three weeks, via Kieff,
Petersburg, Sweden, and Germany. To spend three
weeks in a train would seem very wearisome to many;
but as everything in this life is a matter of habit, we
soon grew so accustomed to it that when we arrived in
Vienna there were many of us who could not sleep
the first few nights in a proper bed, as we missed the
shaking of the train. Meanwhile, we had every com-
fort on the special train, and variety as well, especially
when, on Bratianu's orders, we were detained at a
little station called Baratinskaja, • near Kiefi[. The
reason of this was never properly explained, but it was
probably owing to difficulties over the departure of the
Rumanian Ambassador in Sofia and to the wish to
treat us as hostages. The journey right through the
enemy country was remarkable. Fierce battles were
just then being fought in Galicia, and day and night
we passed endless trains conveying gay and smiling
soldiers to the front, and others returning full of pale,

120 IN THE WORLD WAR

bandaged, wounded men, whose groans we heard as we
passed them. We were greeted everywhere in friendly-
fashion by the population, and there was not a trace
of the hatred we had experienced in Rumania. Every-
thing that we saw bore evidence of the strictest order
and discipline. None of us could think it possible that
the Empire was on the eve of a revolution, and when the
Emperor Francis Joseph questioned me on my return
as to whether I had reason to believe that a revolution
would occur, I discountenanced the idea most em-
phatically.

This did not please the old Emperor. He said after-
ward to one of his suite, ''Czernin has given a correct
account of Rumania, but he must have been asleep
when he passed through Russia."

Ill

The development of Rumanian affairs during the war
occurs in three phases, the first of which was in King
Carol's reign. Then neutrality was guaranteed. On
the other hand, it was not possible during those months
to secure Rumania's co-operation, because we, in the
first period of the war, were so unfavorably situated
in a military sense that public opinion in Rumania
would not voluntarily have consented to a war at our
side, and, as already mentioned, such forcible action
would not have met with the King's approval.

In the second phase of the war, dating from King
Carol's death to our defeat at Luck, conditions were
quite different. In this second phase were included
the greatest military successes the Central Powers
obtained altogether. The downfall of Serbia and the
conquest of the whole of Poland occurred during this
period, and, I repeat, in those months we could have
secured the active co-operation of Rumania. Never-

RUMANIA 121

•
theless, I must make it clearly understood here that
if the political preliminaries for a like intervention
on the part of Rumania were not undertaken, the fault
must not be ascribed to the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, but to the vis major which opposed the project
under the form of a Hungarian veto. As previously-
stated, Majorescu, as well as Marghiloman, would only
have given his consent to co-operation if Rumania
had been given a slice of the Hungarian state. Thanks
to the attitude of absolute refusal observed at the
Ballplatz, the territory in question was never definitely
decided on, but the idea probably was Transylvania
and a portion of the Bukowina. I cannot say whether
Count Burian, if he had escaped other influences,
would have adopted the plan, but certain it is that,
however ready and willing he was to act, he would never
have carried out the plan against the Hungarian
Parliam.ent. According to the Constitution, the Hun-
garian Parliament is sovereign in the Hungarian state,
and without the use of armed means Hungary could
never have been* induced to cede any part of her
territory.

It is obvious, however, that it would have been
impossible during the World War to have stirred up an
armed conflict between Vienna and Budapest. My
then German colleague, von dem Busche, entirely
agreed with me that Hungary ought to make some
territorial sacriflces in order to encourage Rumania's
intervention. I firmly believe that then, and similarly
before the Italian declaration of war, a certain pressure
was brought to bear direct on Vienna by Berlin to this
end — a pressure which merely contributed to strengthen
and intensify Tisza's opposition. For Germany, the
question was far simpler; she fiad drawn payment for
her great gains from a foreign source. The cession of
the Bukowina might possibly have been effected, as

122 IN THE WORLD WAR

Sturgkh did not object, but that alone would not have
satisfied Rumania.

It was quite clear that the opposition to the ceding of
Transylvania originated in Hungary. But this opposi-
tion was not specially Tisza's, for whichever of the
Hungarian politicians might have been at the head of
the Cabinet would have adopted the same standpoint.

I sent at the time a confidential messenger to Tisza,
enjoining him to explain the situation and begging
him in my name to make the concession. Tisza treated
the messenger with great reserve, and wrote me a letter
stating once for all that the voluntary session of Hun-
garian territory was out of the question — ''Whoever
attempts to seize even one square meter of Hungarian
soil will be shot."

There was nothing to be done. And still I think
that this was one of the most important phases of the
war, which, had it been properly managed, might have
influenced the final result. The military advance on
the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the
opinion of our military chiefs, an advantage not to be
despised, and through it the clever break through at
Gorlitz would have had some results; but as it was
Gorlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any
lasting effect.

The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be
accounted for in two ways: the Hungarians, to begin
with, were averse to giving up any of their own ter-
ritory, and, secondly, they did not believe — even to
the very last — ^that Rumania would remain permanently
neutral or that sooner or later we would be forced to
fight against Rumania unless we in good time had
carried her with us. In this connection Tisza always
maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment
held to the belief that Rumania would not dare take
it upon herself to attack us. This is the only reason

RUMANIA 123

that explains why the Rumanians surprised us so much
by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able
to carry off so much rich booty. I would have been
able to take much better care of the many Austrians
and Hungarians living in Rumania — whose fate was
terrible after the declaration of war, which took them
also by surprise — if I had been permitted to draw their
attention more openly and generally to the coming
catastrophe; but in several of his letters Tisza implored
me not to create a panic, ''which would bring incal-
culable consequences with it." As I neither did, nor
could, know how far this secrecy was in agreement
with our military counter-preparations, I was bound to
observe it. Apparently, Burian believed my reports
to a certain extent; at any rate, for some time before
the declaration of war he ordered all the secret docu-
ments and the available money to be conveyed to
Vienna, and intrusted to Holland the care of our
citizens ; but Tisza told me long after that he considered
my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid
to give orders for the superfluous evacuation of Tran-
sylvania.

After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic
and rage ran high in the Hungarian Parliament. The
severest criticism was heaped upon me, as no one
doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my
false reports. Here Tisza was again himself when,
in a loud voice, he shouted out that it was untrue;
my reports were correct; I had warned them in time
and no blame could be attached to me, and thus took
upon himself the just blame. Fear was unknown to
him, and he never tried to shield himself behind any
one. When I arrived back in Vienna after a journey
of some weeks in Russia, and only then heard of the
incident, I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the
honorable and loyal manner in which he had defended

124 IN THE WORLD WAR

my cause. He replied with the ironical smile char-
acteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course.

But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no
means such a matter of course. We have had so many
cowards on the Ministerial benches, so many men who
were brave when dealing with their subordinates,
but toadied to their superiors, and were intimidated
by strong opposition, that a man like Tisza, who was
such a contrast to these others, has a most refreshing
and invigorating effect. The Rumanians attempted
several times to make the maintenance of their neu-
trality contingent on territorial concessions. I was
always opposed to this, and at the Ballplatz they were
of the same opinion. The Rumanians would have
appropriated these concessions and simply attacked
us later to obtain more. On the other hand, it seemed
to me that to gain military co-operation a cession of
territory would be quite in order, since, once in the field,
the Rumanians could not draw back and their fate
would be permanently bound up with ours.

Finally, the third phase comprises the comparatively
short period between our defeat at Luck and the out-
break of the war in Rumania, and was simply the
death throes of neutrality.

War was in the air and could be foreseen with cer-
tainty.

As was to be expected, the inefficient diplomacy
displayed in the preparations for the World War brought
down severe criticism of our diplomatic abilities, and
if the intention at the Ballplatz was to bring about a
war, it cannot be denied that the preparations for it
were most inadequate.

Criticism was not directed toward the Ballplatz only,
but entered into further matters, such as the qualifi-
cations of the individual representatives in foreign
countries. I remember an article in one of the

RUMANIA 125

most widely read Viennese papers, which drew a
comparison between the "excellent" Ambassador at
Sofia and almost all of the others; that is, all those
whose posts were in countries that either refused their
co-operation or even already were in the field against us.

In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I wish
to state here that in my opinion our then Ambassador
to Sofia, Count Tarnowski, was one of the best and
most competent diplomats in Austria-Hungary, but
that the point of view from which such praise was
awarded to him was in itself totally false. Had Count
Tarnowski been in Paris, London, or Rome, these states,
in spite of his undeniable capabilities, would not have
adopted a different attitude; while, on the other hand,
there are numbers of distinguished members of the
diplomatic corps who would have carried out his task
at Sofia just as well as Count Tarnowski.

In other words, I consider it is making an unwarrant-
able demand to expect that a representative in a
foreign land should have a leading influence on the
policy of the state to which he is accredited. What
may be demanded of a diplomatic representative is a
correct estimate of the situation. The ambassador
must know what the government of the state where
he is will do. A false diagnosis is discreditable. But
it is impossible for a representative, whoever he may be,
to obtain such power over a foreign state as to be able
to guide the policy of that state into the course desired
by him. The policy of a state will invariably be sub-
servient to such objects as the government of that period
deems vital, and will always be influenced by factors
which are quite outside the range of the foreign repre-
sentative.

In what manner a diplomatic representative obtains
his information is his own affair. He should endeavor
to establish intercourse, not only with a certain class

126 IN THE WORLD WAR

of society, but also with the press, and also to keep
in touch with other classes of the population.

One of the reproaches made to the *'old regime'*
was the assumed preference for aristocrats in diplomacy.
This was quite a mistake. No preference was shown
for the aristocracy, but it lay in the nature of the career
that wealth and social polish were assets in the exercise
of its duties. An attache had no salary. He was,
therefore, expected to have a tolerably good income
at home in order to be able to live conformably to his
rank when abroad. This system arose out of necessity,
and was also due to the unwillingness of the authorities
to raise salaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The consequence was that only sons of wealthy parents
could adopt such a career. I once told some delegates
who interviewed me in connection with the subject
that a change of the system depended entirely on
themselves and their increased munificence.

A certain amount of social polish was just as necessary
for diplomats of the old regime as was the requisite
allowance for their household and a knowledge of
foreign languages. So long as courts exist in Europe,
court life will always be the center of all social life,
and diplomats must have the entry of such circles.
A young man who does not know whether to eat with his
fork or his knife would play a sorry part there — his
social training is not an indifferent matter. Preference
is, therefore, not given to the aristocracy, but to young
men of wealth familiar with European social form.

That does not mean that a diplomat is to consider
it his duty only to show himself at all the parties
and fetes given by the upper ten thousand, but it is
one of his duties, as at such places he might gain infor-
mation unobtainable elsewhere. A diplomat must be
in touch with all sources from which he can glean
information.

RUMANIA 127

Individual capabilities and zeal will naturally play a
great part; but the means that a government places
at the disposition of its foreign missions are also of the
highest importance.

There are people in the East — I do not know whether
to say in contradistinction to the West — who are not
immune to the influence of gold. In Rumania, for
instance, Russia, before the war, had completely under-
mined the whole country and had lavished millions
long before the war in the hope of an understanding
with that country. Most of the newspapers were
financed by Russians, and numbers of the leading
politicians were bound by Russian interests, whereas
neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had made any
such preparations. Thus it happened that, on the
outbreak of war, Russia was greatly in advance of
the Central Powers, an advance that was all the more
difficult to overtake as from the first day of war Russia
opened still wider the flood-gates of her gold and
inundated Rumania with rubles.

If the fact that the scanty preparation for war is a
proof of how little the Central Powers reckoned on
such a contingency, it may, on the other hand, explain
away much apparent inactivity on the part of their
representatives. Karl Furstenberg, my predecessor
at Bukharest, whose estimate of the situation was a
just one, demanded to have more funds at his disposal,
which was refused at Vienna on the plea that there was
no money. After the war began the Ministry stinted
us no longer, but it was too late then for much to be
done.

Whether official Russia, four weeks in advance, had
really counted on the assassination of the Archduke
and the outbreak of a war ensuing therefrom remains
an open question. I will not go so far as to assert it
for a fact, but one thing is certain, that Russia within a

128 IN THE WORLD WAR

measurable space of time had prepared for war as
being inevitable and had endeavored to secure Ru-
mania's co-operation. When the Tsar was at Con-
stanza a month before the drama at Sarajevo, his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sassonoff, paid a visit to
Bukharest. When there, he and Bratianu went on a
walking tour together to Transylvania. I did not
hear of this tactless excursion until it was over, but I
shared Berchtold's surprise at such a proceeding on
the part of both Ministers.

I once, in 19 14, overheard by chance a conversation
between two Russians. It was at the Hotel Capsa,
known later as a resort for anti-Austrians. They were
sitting at the table next to mine in the restaurant and
were speaking French quite freely and openly. They
appeared to be on good terms with the Russian Ambas-
sador and were discussing the impending visit of the
Tsar to Constanza. I discovered later that they were
officers in mufti. They agreed that the Emperor Fran-
cis Joseph could not live very much longer, and that
when his death occurred and a new ruler came to the
throne it would be a favorable moment for Russia to
declare war on us.

They were evidently exponents of the ''loyal'*
tendency that aimed at declaring war on us without
a preceding murder; and I readily believe that the
majority of men in Petersburg who were eager for war
held the same view.

CHAPTER V

THE U-BOAT WARFARE

MY appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was
thought by many to indicate that the Emperor
Charles was carrying out the poHtical wishes of his
uncle Ferdinand. Although it had been the Arch-
duke's intention to have made me his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, my appointment to the post by the
Emperor Charles had nothing to do with that plan.
It was due, above all, to his strong desire to get rid of
Count Burian and to the lack of other candidates whom
he considered suitable. The Red Book that was pub-
lished by Count Burian after the outbreak of war with
Rumania may have attracted the Emperor's attention
to me.

Although the Emperor, while still Archduke, was for
several years my nearest neighbor in Bohemia — he was
stationed at Brandeis, on the Elbe — we never became
more closely acquainted. In all those years he was
not more than once or twice at my house, and they
were visits of no poHtical significance. It was not
until the first winter of the war, when I went from
Rumania to the headquarters of Teschen, that the
then Archduke invited me to^ make the return jour-
ney with him. During this railway journey that
lasted several hours politics formed the chief subject
of conversation, though chiefly concerning Rumania

130 IN THE WORLD WAR

and the Balkan questions. In any case I was never
one of those who were in the Archduke's confidence,
and my call to the Ballplatz came as a complete
surprise.

At my first audience, too, we conversed at great
length on Rumania and on the question whether the
war with Bukharest could have been averted or not.

The Emperor was then still under the influence of
our first peace offer so curtly rejected by the Entente.
At the German headquarters at Pless, where I arrived
a few days later, I found the prevailing atmosphere
largely influenced by the Entente's answer. Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff, who were apparently opposed to
Burian's demarche for peace, merely remarked to me
that a definite victory presented a possibility of ending
the war, and the Emperor William said that he had
offered his hand in peace, but that the Entente had
given him a slap in the face, and there was nothing for
it now but war to the uttermost.

It was at this time that the question of the unre-
stricted U-boat warfare began to be mooted. At
first it was the German navy only, and Tirpitz in par-
ticular, who untiringly advocated the plan. Hohen-
lohe,^ who, thanks to his excellent connections, was
always very well informed, wrote, several weeks before
the fateful decision was taken, that the German navy
was determined and bent on that aim. Bethmann
and Zimmermann were both decidedly against it. It
was entirely in keeping with the prudent wisdom of the
former not to risk such experiments; Bethmann was
an absolutely dependable, honorable, and capable
partner, but the unbounded growth of the military
autocracy must be imputed to his natural tendency to
conciliate. He was powerless against Ludendorff and

1 The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst.

}■

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 131

little by little was turned aside by him. My first
visit to Berlin afforded me the opportunity of thor-
oughly discussing the U-boat question with the Im-
perial Chancellor, and we were quite agreed in our
disapproval of that method of warfare. At all events,
Bethmann pointed out that such essentially military
matters should in the first instance be left to military
decision, as they alone were able to form a coiTect
estimate of the result, and these reflections made me
fear from the very first that all reasonable political
scruples would be upset by military arguments. On
this my first visit to Berlin, when this question naturally
was the dominating one, the Chancellor explained to me
how difficult his position was, because the military
parties, both on land and at sea, declared that if the
unrestricted U-boat warfare were not carried out they
would not be able to guarantee the western front.
They thus brought an iron pressure to bear on him,
for how could he, the Chancellor, undertake to guaran-
tee that the western front could hold out ? As a matter
of fact, the danger of introducing the unrestricted
U-boat campaign became greater and greater, and the
reports sent by Hohenlohe left no doubt as to the
further development of affairs in Berlin.
On January 12th he reported as follows:

The question of the extension of the U-boat warfare, as your
Excellency is aware from the last discussions in Berlin, becomes
daily more acute.

On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities
insist on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they
declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand,
all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on
America and other neutrals.

The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on
a very large scale is immin^it in the west and that the armies which
are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the navy
should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at any rate to

132 IN THE WORLD WAR

decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to our adversaries.
The absence of co-operation on the part of the navy in the terrible
battles the troops on the western front will again have to face will
have a most injtirious effect on the morale.

The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might
have on America are met in military circles by the assumption
that America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact,
would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United
States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves
what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a possible
breaking off relations with America does not necessarily signify war.

Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they
may be reUed on, even though they are not considered capable of
crushing England, at least to be able, before America can come in,
so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire will be
left to English politicians, that of seating themselves with us at the
Conference table.

To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guaranty
that the navy were right and in what position should we find our-
selves in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty
promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to
find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the
U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to
beg for peace.

And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances
for or against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of
positively determining which decision was the right one.

Doubtless the German government in the near future will be
constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the question,
and it is obvious — whatever the decision may be — that we also shall
be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me that when the
German government does approach us in that connection we should
act with all possible reserve. As the matter now stands, a positive
decision as to which course is the right one is not possible. I have
therefore thought it inadvisable to take side definitely with either
party and thus remove much of the responsibility from the German
government and render it possible for them to lay it upon us.
The Imperial and Royal Ambassador,

G. HOHENLOHE, M.P.

The concluding passage of the above-cited report had
already been anticipated by me in a telegraphic com-

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 133

munication in which I begged the Ambassador with all
possible energy to urge the political arguments opposed
to the unrestricted U-boat warfare, which is proved by
a telegram from Hohenlohe on January 13th as follows:

Reply to yesterday's telegram No. 15.

In accordance with the telegram mentioned, and after discussing
it with Baron Flotow, I went to the Secretary of State— not being
able to see the Chancellor to-day — and in conformity with your
Excellency's intentions called his attention to the fact that we should
participate in the results of the U-boat war just as much as Ger-
many, and that, therefore, the German government is boimd to
listen to us also. All the leading German statesmen know that your
Excellency, during your stay here, expressed yourself as opposed
to the movement, but that I had come once more as your Excel-
lency's representative to repeat the warning against too hasty action.
I further emphasized all the arguments against the U-boat war-
fare, but will not trouble your Excellency with a repetition of them,
nor yet with the counter-arguments, already known to your Ex-
cellency, that were put forward by the Secretary. I gave a
brief summary of both these standpoints in my yesterday's report
No. 6 P.

Herr Zimmermann, however, laid special stress on the fact that
the information he was receiving convinced him more and more that
America, especially after the Entente's answer to Mr. Wilson, which
was in the nature of an insult, would very probably not allow it to
come to a breach with the Central Powers.

I did all I possibly could to impress upon him the responsibility
Germany was taking for herself and for us by her decision in this
question, pointing out very particularly that before any decision was
arrived at our opinion from a nautical-technical standpoint must also
be heard, in which the Secretary of State fully concun-ed.

I have the feeling that the idea of carrying out the U-boat warfare
is more and more favorably received, and your Excellency had the
same impression also when in Berlin. The last word as to the final
attitude to be adopted by the German government will no doubt
come from the military side.

In conformity with the instructions received, / will nevertheless
uphold with all firmness the political urguments against the U-boat
warfare.

Baron Flotow will have occasion to meet the Secretary of State
this afternoon.
10

134 IN THE WORLD WAR

I had sent Baron Flotow, a chief of department, to
Berlin at the same time, in order that he might support
all Hohenlohe's efforts and spare no pains to induce
Germany to desist from her purpose.

Flotow sent me the following report on January 15th:

After a two days' stay in Berlin my impression is that the question
of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought to the
front by the leading men in the German Empire. This question —
according to Herr Zimmermann — under conditions of the greatest
secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under debate between
the heads of the army and navy and the Foreign Office; they insist
on a decision. For if the unrestricted U-boat warfare is to be opened
it must be at a time when, in view of the vast impending Anglo-
French offensive on the western front, it will make itself felt. The
Secretary of State mentioned the month of February.

I wish in the following account to siunmarize the reasons put
forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted
U-boat warfare:

Time is against us and favors the Entente; if, therefore, the
Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less prospect
of our obtaining a peace on our own terms. The enemy's last note
to Wilson is again a striking example of their war energy.

It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war
after 191 7 with any prospect of success. Peace must, therefore,
unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in the
course of this year, which means that we must enforce it.

The military situation is tmfavorable owing to the impending
Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with great
force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme. To m.eet
the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other fronts.
Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to bring that
enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have been
possible, can no longer be reckoned on.

If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the east
becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in
the west, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat
warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding
the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral flag.

In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat
warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the trans-
port of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to such a degree

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 135

as would render it impossible for the English to continue the war.
In Italy and in France this will be felt no less severely. The neutrals,
too, will be made to suffer, which, however, might serve as a pretext
to bring about peace.

America will hardly push matters further than breaking off
diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on
a war with the United States.

It must not be overlooked that the United States — as was the
case in regard to Mexico — are not well prepared for war, that their
one anxiety is Japan. Japan would not allow a European war with
America to pass unheeded.

But even if America were to enter the war it would be three to
four months before she could be ready, and in that space of time
peace must have been secured in Europe. According to the estimate
of certain experts (among others, some Dutch com merchants),
England has provisions sufficient for only six weeks, or three months

at the outside.

It would be possible to carry on the U-boat warfare on England
from fifteen bases in the North Sea, so that the passage of a large
vessel through to England would he hardly conceivable. Traffic in the
Channel, even if not entirely stopped, would be very limited, as
traveling conditions in France exclude the possibility of suitable
connection.

And if the unrestricted U-boat warfare once were started, the
terror caused by it (the sinking of the vessels without warning)
would have such an effect that most vessels would not dare to
put to sea.

The above already hints at the rejoinder to be put forward to the
arguments advanced by us against the opening of the unrestricted
U-boat warfare, and also combats the view that the corn-supply from
the Argentine is not at the present moment so important for the
United States as would be a prompt opening of the U-boat campaign,
which would mean a general stoppage of all traffic.

The fact that America would not be ready for war before the end
of three months does not exclude the possibility that it might even
be as long as six or eight months, and that she therefore might join
in the European war at a time when, without playing our last card,
it might be possible to end it in a manner that we could accept. It
must not be forgotten, however, that in America we have to do with
an Anglo-Saxon race, which — once it had decided on war — will enter
on it with energy and tenacity, as England did, who, though impre-
pared for war as to military matters, can confront to-day the Ger-
mans with an anny of millions that commands respect. I cannot^

136 IN THE WORLD WAR

with certainty make any statement as to the Japanese danger to
America at a time when Japan is bound up with Russia and England
through profitable treaties and Germany is shut out from that part
of the world.

Among other things I referred to the great hopes entertained of
the Zeppehns as an efficient weapon of war.

Herr Zimmermann said to me: "Believe me, our fears are no
less than yours; they have given me many sleepless nights. There
is no positive certainty as to the result; we can only make our
calc\ilations. We have not yet arrived at any decision. Show nie a
way to obtain a reasonable peace and I would be the first to reject
the idea of the U-boat warfare. As matters now stand, both I and
several others have almost been converted to it."

But whether, in the event of the ruthless U-boat warfare being de-
cided on, it would be notified in some way, has not yet been decided.

Zimmermann told me he was considering the advisability of
approaching Wilson, and, while referring to the contemptuous
attitude of the Entente in the peace question, give the President
an explanation of the behavior of the German government, and
request him, for the safety of the Ufe and property of American
citizens, to indicate the steamers and shipping fines by which traffic
between America and other neutrals could be maintained.

Flotow, M.P.

Vienna, January 15, 1917 '

On January 20th Zimmermann and Admiral Holtzen-
aorff arrived in Vienna, and a council was held, presided
over by the Emperor. Besides the three above-men-
tioned, Count Tisza, Count Clam-Martinic, Admiral
Haus, and I were also present. Holtzendorff expounded
his reasons, which I recapitulate below. With the
exception of Admiral Haus, no one gave unqualified
consent. All the arguments which appear in the official
documents and ministerial protocols were advanced,
but did not make the slightest impression on the
German representatives. The Emperor, who took no
part in the debate, finally declared that he would decide
later. Under his auspices a further conference was
held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at two o'clock;
the report is as follows:

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 137

keport of a conference held January 20, 191 7, in the Imperial and
Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Doctor
Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs
Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval
Staff; Count Czemin, Imperial and Royal Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count
Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus,
the German naval attache in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the
Imperial and Royal naval attache ir Berlin; Count B. Colloredo-
Mannsfeld.

On January 20th a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the question of estabHshing unrestricted U-boat warfare.

As evidenced by Admiral von Holtzendorff 's statements, the Ger-
man naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an
absolute necessity for the quickest possible inaugiu-ation of an
unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in sup-
port of this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and
Royal Ambassador in BerHn (report of 1/12/17 No. 6/P and tele-
gram of 1/13 No. 22), and may be summarized in the following
sentences: Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central
Powers, progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-
French offensive on the western front with improved and increased
means for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent
or at least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking,
the impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of
raising the morale of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results, and
the use of every available means in war, certainty of the success
of an imrestricted U-boat warfare in view of provisions in England
being sufficient for only two to three months, as well as the stoppage
of the munitions output and industrial production owing to the
lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying coal to France
and Italy, etc., etc.

Concerning the carrymg out of the plan, the German navy owns
at present for that purpose 1 20 U-boats of the latest type. In view
of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of the
war, when there were only nineteen of an antiquated type, the
present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guaranty of

success.

February ist is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date
on which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to
announce the blockade of the EngHsh coast and the west coast
of France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed
without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to

138 IN THE WORLD WAR

reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral
von Holtzendorff expressis verbis guaranteed the results.

As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading
German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic views.
It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or Holland
will interfere with us, although, in view of the possibility of such
happening, military precautions have been taken. The measures
taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will, in the opinion of the
Germans, hold those coimtries in check, and the possibility of
sharing the fate of Rumania will frighten them. Indeed, it is
expected that there will be a complete stoppage of all neutral
shipping, which in the matter of suppHes for England amounts to
39 per cent, of the cargo space. Meanwhile concessions will be
granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit for the withdrawal
of such of their vessels as may be at sea on the opening day of the
U-boat warfare.

With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all
possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central
Powers by adopting a friendly attitude toward America (acting
upon the proposals made at the time of the Lusitania incident),
but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever attitude
America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the opinion
that the United States will not go so far as making a breach with
the Central Powers. If that should occur, America would be too
late and could only come into action after England had been beaten.
America is not prepared for war, which was clearly shown at the
time of the Mexican crisis; she Hves in fear of Japan and has to
fight against agricultural and social difficulties. Besides which,
Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the Germans presume that after his
election will adopt a still more decided tendency that way, for
his election will not be due to the anti-German Eastern States,
but to the co-operation of the Central and Western States that are
opposed to war, and to the Irish and Germans. These considera-
tions, together with the Entente's insulting answer to President
Wilson's peace proposal, do not point to the probability of America
plunging readily into war.

These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German
demand for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare
is based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign
Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views.

Both the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian
Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would
ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral, agricultural,

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 139

and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of the success
of a blockade of England. Count Czemin held that the Germans
overlooked the possibiUty of lowering the consumption in England,
taking into consideration the fact that since the war consumption
in the countries of the Central Powers had been reduced by half.
Further, Count Czemin referred to the very vague and by no means
convincing data of the German naval authorities. It was also
debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to the present
extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons per month)
would not be more hkely to achieve the desired end, and if it were
not more advisable not to play our last and best card until all other
means had been tried. The possibility of being able to start a ruth-
less U-boat warfare hung Hke a Damocles's sword over the heads of
our adversaries, and would perhaps be a more effectual means of
ending the war than the reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of
war, carrying with it the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the
effect expected by Germany was not reaUzed, which was within the
bounds of possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war
in the enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanish-
ing of the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact.
Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put forward
by the Germans show a complete novum, namely, the danger on the
western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive that is
expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the attacks
of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered necessary to
relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy into the line of
action. If these fears are justified, then most certainly should all
other considerations be put on one side and the risk ensuing from the
ruthless employment of the U-boats be accepted. Both Count
Czemin and Count Tisza expressed their grave doubts in this
connection.

To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out
the necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the
neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the Central
Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to them in
a proper Hght ; and then later, after introducing unrestricted U-boat
warfare, it would be seen that no other choice was left to the peaceful
tendencies of the Quadmple Alliance as the means for a speedy
ending of the struggle between the nations.

The leaders of the foreign policy- agreed to take the necessary
steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements had
already been made.

Admiral Haus agreed unreservedly with the arguments of the

140 IN THE WORLD WAR

German navy, as he declared that no great anxiety need he felt
as to the HkeUhood of America's joining in with military force,
and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a ruthless
torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been practised for
some time past in the Adriatic. The admiral urged that this fact
be properly recognized and dealt with, to which the Foreign Affairs
leaders on both sides gave their consent.

The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said
that the definite decision to be made must be left to the conclusions
arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th inst. was fixed
for a meeting to be held for that purpose.

After the general discussion, I had a private talk
with the Emperor, and found that he still had the same
aversion to that means of warfare and the same fears
as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany
had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign
in any case, and that all our arguments would be of no
practical value. It remained to be decided whether
we should join them or not. Owing to the small num-
ber of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have
had any great effect on the final issue of the experiment,
and for a moment I entertained the idea of proposing
to the Emperor that we should separate from Germany
on that one point, although I was aware that it might
lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty
was that the U-boat effort would also have to be car-
ried on in the Mediterranean in order that it should
not lose its effect in the North Sea. If the Mediter-
ranean remained exempt, the transports would take
that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and
Dover, and thus render the northern U-boat warfare
of no effect. But in order to carry it on in the Medi-
terranean, Germany would need our support in the
Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed
her at those places it involved us in the campaign,
and if we refused to let our few U-boats go out, it would
be attacking Germany in the rear and we should

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 141

become embroiled with her, which would lead to the
definite severance of the alliance.

This was again one of those instances that prove
that when a strong and a weak nation concert in war,
the weak one cannot desist unless it changes sides
entirely and enters into war with its former ally.
None who were in the government would hear of that,
and with a heavy heart we gave our consent. Bul-
garia, who was not in this phase of the war, and who
had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was
differently situated, being able to stand aside without
paralyzing the German plans. Apart from this, I
was already persuaded then that Bulgaria's not joining
in would make a bad impression on the outside world,
and would not help her in any way. Although her
relations with America were maintained up to the
last, they did not, as a matter of fact, make her fate
easier.

Had we been able to make Germany desist from
the unrestricted U-boat warfare, the advantage would
have been very great; whether we joined in or not
was a matter of indifference viewed from the stand-
point of our treatment by the Entente, as it proved
by the instance of Bulgaria. As soon as America
had declared war on Germany, a conflict with us was
inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and
artillery were then on the western front, facing Ameri-
cans. We were compelled to go to war with America,
seeing that Germany was already at war with her.

It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a
state of even nominally peaceful relations with America,
such as existed between her and Bulgaria to the very-
end of the war.

It is not quite clear when Germany really recognized
the fact that the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no
effect and was thus a terrible mistake, To the public,

142 IN THE WORLD WAR

as well as to the allied Cabinets, the German military
authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism,
and when I left my post in April, 191 8, the standpoint
held in Berlin was still that England would be defeated
by the naval war. Writing on December 14, 191 7,
Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles
the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however,
certainly perceived certain signs of doubt beginning
in some German minds, and Ludendorff in replying to
the reproaches I made to him said: ''Everything is
dangerous in war; it is impossible before an operation
to be sure of the results. I admit that the time limit
was a mistake, but the final result will show that I
was right." In order to exculpate themselves all the
leaders in Germany declared that America would,
in any case, have gone to war, and that the U-boat had
merely given the last impetus. Whether this is quite
true appears doubtful; it cannot either be asserted or
denied positively.

The world has become used to looking upon Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff as one; they belonged together.
Together they rose to the highest power, to be forcibly
separated in their fall. In all business transactions
Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great
speaker, but always in a sharp tone, suggestive of the
Prussian military system. It usually aroused a scene,
but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his anger
vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's
retiring modesty made him attractive. Once when
we were speaking of the photographers who besieged
every conference in Berlin, the old gentleman remarked :
* ' I have lived to be seventy and nobody ever thought
there was anything wonderful about me; now they
seem all at once to have discovered that I have such an
interesting head." He was much more staid and quiet
than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to public

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 143

opinion as the latter. I remember once how Luden-
dorff, when I exhorted him to yield on the peace ques-
tion, rejoined with vigor: **The German people wish
for no peace of renunciation, and I do not intend to
end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty would
never survive such a peace." The dynasty has
departed, the stones have been thrown, and the peace
of renunciation has become a reality, and is certainly
more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever
have believed !

The rupture between America and Germany occurred
on February 3, 191 7.

The Ambassador, Count Tamowski, remained in
Washington, but was not received by Wilson, and had
intercourse with Lansing only. I still hoped to main-
tain these semi-official relations with America, in case
America, in breaking off relations with Germany,
might be content with that and not declare war on her.
The German government would have preferred our
breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with
them.

On February 12 th Count Wedel called on me, and his
request and my settlement of it appear in the following
telegram to Hohenlohe:

Vienna, Fehniary 12, 1917.

To notify Your Excellency.

Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following
three requests from his government:

(i) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the
situation between Germany and America is clear.

(2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his
having tried to make the neutr-als turn against Germany.

(3) On the outbreak of war with Gennany Count Tarnowski must
be recalled.

I have refused the first two items and accepted the last.

144 IN THE WORLD WAR

As we should not have been able to prevent Germany
from beginning the U-boat warfare, the only alternative
for us was to use all means in our power to maintain
our relations with America, and thus enable us later
to play the part of mediator, although this could be for
only that period during which America, having broken
off relations, had not yet declared war. My answer
of March 5, 191 7, to America's request for an explana-
tion of our standpoint was sent with the object of pre-
venting America from breaking off relations with us,
and also to keep from the public the knowledge of our
divergence from Germany. This will be found noted
in the appendix. It met with success so far that
America for a time continued diplomatic relations with
us; they were not broken off until April 9, 191 7.

I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen
Tisza in consequence of m^y answer. I received the
following letter on March 3d:

Dear Friend, — In the interests of the cause I can only greatly
regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the definite sense
of our aide-memoire before it was despatched. Apart from other
less important matters, I cannot conceal my painful surprise that
we repeatedly and expressly admit having given a promise in our
Ancona note. I am afraid that we have placed ourselves in a very
awkward position with Wilson, which so easily could have been
avoided, as it was not in accordance with my views that we had
given a promise.

An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to
detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different legal
character, and from the point of view of a third person has no
legal authority in favor of that person as a promise.

By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans
a promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them.
In spite of the fine and clever argument in our note, it will be easy
for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot be
reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a
promise, then the American government has the right to look for
the fulfihnent of it, and we will then be in an awkward predicament.

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 145

I remarked In my notification that I would prefer to omit the admis-
sion that we had made any promise; there would have been the
possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in their hands
we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a checkmate, and I very
much fear that we shall greatly regret it.

Naturally this rem^ains between us. But I was constrained to
pour out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of
all such important state documents which involve such far-reaching
consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and com-
ment on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the cause
and in every respect can only be for the best.

In sincere friendship, your devoted Tisza*

Inclostcre.

It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace
wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson, influ-
enced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a
decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my
presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as possible
the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America.

Therefore the answer to the American aide-memoire, to be de-
spatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give it the
appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put forward
on the American side without falling into the trap of the question
put forward in the aide-memoire.

If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to
avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer
we shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on
January 31st.

The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is
provided by the aide-memoire itself, as it identifies our statements
in the Ancona and Persia question with the attitude of the German
note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite consistent
if we, as we did in our note of December 14, 191 5, were to declare
that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice.

In our correspondence with the American government respecting
the Ancona, Persia, and Petrolike questions we treated the concrete
case always without going deeper into the individual principles of
legal questions. In our note of December 29, 1915, which con-
tains the expression of opinion cited in the aide-memoire (it may also
be noted that our expression of opinion was no pledge, as we had
promised nothing nor taken any obligation upon oiurselves), the

146 IN THE WORLD WAR

Austrian government distinctly stated that they would refer later
to the difficult international questions connected with the U-boat
warfare.

Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion.
In consequence, however, of the deaUngs of our enemies, events have
occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on our side
also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat question
unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever attain-
able, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the enemy.
Our adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most aggra-
vated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals offering
any assistance.

The Entente when laying its mine-fields displayed the same
ruthlessness toward the free shipping and the lives of neutrals. ^

Mines are considered as a recognized weapon for the definite
protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of blockading
an enemy port. But the use made of them as an aggressive factor
in this war is quite a new feature, for vast areas of open sea on
the route of the world's traffic were converted into mine-fields
impassable for the neutrals except at the greatest danger of their
lives.

There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the
freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests
than estabUshing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited
and clearly marked out zone, leaving open channels for neutral
shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the
interests of the neutrals.

Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire
belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our
group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to con-
clude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh
and larger mine-field was laid down in the North Sea on the route
of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble initiative
of the United States, a war of destruction against our groups of
Powers was announced by the Entente.

We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American
government : the quickest possible cessation of the fearful slaughter
of men and the founding of an honorable, lasting, and blessed peace
by combating with the greatest energy our enemies' furious war for
conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common aims of our-
selves and the American government, and we cannot give up the
hope of finding understanding in the people and the government of
the United States. TiszA.

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 147

I answered as follows:

March 5th.

Dear Friend, — I cannot agree with you. After the first Ancona
note you veered round and declared in a second note that ''we
agreed with the German standpoint in the main" — that was an
obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise.

I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and
if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any farther.

But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with
words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it ; either
they will make straight for war and then no notes will avail, or they
will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and will find it in our
note.

So much for the merits of the matter.

What you demand is technically impossible. The note was not
easy to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; his
Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations, and sanctioned
it. Meanwhile Penfield^ importuned me and telegraphed even a
week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans, too, had
to be won over for that particular passage.

You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you,
but ultra posse nemo tenetur — it was physically impossible to upset
everything again and to expect his Majesty to alter his views.

In true friendship, your Czernin.

I thereupon, on March 14th, received the following
answer from Tisza :

Dear Friend, — I also note with genuine pleasure the success of
your American aide-memoire (meaning thereby America's resolve
not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter my opinion
that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given. It may be
requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it would have been
easy not to broach the subject for the moment.

Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final
word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think
me better than I am.

Au revoir, in true friendship, yourj TiszA.

Tisza was strongly opposed .to the U-boat warfare,
and tolerated it onl}^ from reasons of vis major ^ because

1 Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna.

148 IN THE WORLD WAR

we could not prevent the German military leaders from
adopting the measure, and because he, and I, too, were
convinced that ''not joining in" would have been of
no advantage to us.

Not until very much later — in fact, not until after
the war — did I learn from a reliable source that Ger-
many, with an incomprehensible misunderstanding of
the situation, had restricted the building of more
U-boats during the war. The Secretary of State,
Capelle, was approached by competent naval technical
experts, who told him that, by stopping the building
of all other vessels, a fivefold number of U-boats could
be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext
"that nobody would know what to do with so many
U-boats when the war was at an end." Germany had,
as mentioned, one hundred submarines; had she pos-
sessed five hundred she might have achieved her aims.

I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was
from a source from which I invariably gleaned correct
information.

Seldom has any military action called forth such
indignation as the sinking, without warning, of enemy
ships. And yet the observer who judges from an
objective point of view must admit that the waging
war on women and children was not begun by us, but
by our enemies when they enforced the blockade.
Millions have perished in the domains of the Central
Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest
and weakest people — the greater part women and
children — -were the victims. If, to meet the argument,
it be asserted that the Central Powers were as a
besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved
Paris in similar fashion, there is certainly some truth
in the argument. But it is just as true — as stated in
the note of March 5 th — that in a war on land no regard
is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war zone,

THE U-BOAT WARFARE 149

and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should
be subject to different moral conditions. When a
town or village is within the range of battle, the fact
has never prevented the artillery from acting in spite
of the danger to the women and children. But in
the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy
states who are in danger can easily escape it by not
undertaking a sea voyage.

Since the debacle in the winter of 19 18, I have
thoroughly discussed the matter with English friends
of long standing, and found that their standpoint was —
that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had
roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature
of the proceedings so opposed to international law.
Also, the torpedoing of hospital-ships by the Germans,
and the firing on passengers seeking to escape, and so on.
These accounts are flatly contradicted by the Germans,
who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English
brutality, as instanced by the Baralong episode.

There have, of course, been individual cases of
shameful brutality in all the armies; but that such
deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the German or
English Supreme Commands I do not believe.

An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court
would be the only means of bringing light to bear on
the matter.

Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be con-
demned, no matter who the perpetrators are; but in
itself the U-boat warfare was an allowable means of
defense.

The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible
and necessary proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat
warfare is stigmatized as a crime against international
law. That is the sentence passed by might, but not
by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise.

CHAPTER VI

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE

THE constitutional procedure which prevails in
every parliamentary state is ordered so that the
Minister is responsible to a body of representatives.
He is obliged to account for what he has done. His
action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the
body of representatives. If the majority of that body
are against the Minister, he must go.

The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy was in the hands of the delegations.

Besides which, however, there existed in the Hun-
garian Constitution a regulation to the effect that the
Hungarian Prime Minister was responsible to the
country for the foreign poHcy, and, consequently, the
"foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out,
in conjunction, by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs
in office and the Prime Minister."

It depended entirely on the personality of the Hun-
garian Prime Minister how he observed the regulation.
Already, under Burian, it had become the custom for
all telegrams and news, even of the most secret nature,
to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then
brought his influence to bear on all decisions and tacti-
cal events. Tisza possessed a most extraordinary
capacity for work. He always found time to occupy
himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwith-

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 151

standing his own numerous departmental duties, and it
was necessary, therefore, to gain his consent to every
step taken. The control of our foreign policy was,
therefore, twofold — both by the delegation and the
Prime Minister.

Great as was my esteem and respect for Count
Tisza and close the friendship between us, still his
constant supervision and intervention put boundless
difficulties in the way of the discharge of business.
It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with,
on top of all the existing difficulties that confront a
Minister of Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an
impossibility. The unqualified presumption behind
such twofold government would have been that the
Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions
from the standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not
from that of the Magyar center, a presumption which
Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians. He did not
deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriot-
ism save the Hungarian, but that it was in the inter-
ests of Hungary to keep together with Austria; there-
fore he saw most things with a crooked vision. Never
would he have ceded one single square meter of Hun-
garian territory; but he raised no objection to the
projected cession of Galicia. He would rather have
let the whole world be ruined than give up Transyl-
vania; but he took no interest whatever in the Tyrol.

Apart from that, he apphed different rules for Austria
than for Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest
alteration in Hungary's internal conditions, as they
must not be effected through external pressure. When
I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of provi-
sions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the
Austrian Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide
Galicia in two, Tisza was fully in accordance there-
with. He went even farther. He opposed any expan-

152 IN THE WORLD WAR

sion of the Monarchy, as it might weaken Hungary's
influence. All his life he was an opponent of the Austro-
Polish solution, and a mortal enemy of the tripartist
project; he intended that Poland at most should rank
as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her
over to Germany. He did not even wish Rumania
to be joined with Hungary, as that would weaken the
Magyar influence in Hungary. He looked upon it
as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to
the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural
products when he was in need of them; nor would he
leave an open door for the Serbian pigs, as he did
not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered.
Tisza went still farther. He was a great stickler for
equality in making appointments to foreign diplo-
matic posts, but I could not pay much heed to that.
If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for the post
of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him
in spite of eventual disagreement.

This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well-
founded, was unbearable and not to be maintained in
war, and led to various disputes between Tisza and
myself ; and now that he is dead, these scenes leave me
only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty
word that escaped me. We afterward made a com-
promise. Tisza promised never to interfere except
in cases of the greatest urgency, and I promised to
take no important step without his sanction. Soon
after this arrangement he was dismissed by the Em-
peror for very different reasons.

I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the dif-
ficulties he had caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-
Central standpoint was not a specialty of Tisza's;
all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly, Tisza
had one great point in his favor; he had no wish to
prolong the war for the purpose of conquest ; he wished

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 153

for a rectification of the Rumanian frontier and nothing
beyond that. If it had come to peace negotiations, he
would have supported me in taking as a basis the
status quo ante. His support — and that was the third
reason — was of great value, for he was a man who knew
how to fight. He had become hard and old on the
battle-field of parliamentary controversy. He stood
in awe of nothing and nobody — and he was true as
gold. Fourthly, this upright man was one of the few
who openly told the Emperor the truth, and the Em-
peror made use of this, as we all did.

I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change
would not improve the situation for me. Esterhazy,
who succeeded Tisza, certainly never put obstacles
in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed
the strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and
the stem voice that warned the Emperor, and I did
not place the same rehance on Wekerle as on Tisza,
perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friend-
ship with him as with Tisza.

Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one
of the dearest reminiscences of my time of office that,
up to the death of this remarkable man, our friendship
remained unchanged. For many years Hungary and
Stephan Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose
brave and manly character, stem and resolute nature,
fearlessness and integrity, raised him high above the
average man. He was a thorough man, with brilliant
qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare
in Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast
long shadows; but he was great, and modeled out of
the stuff from which the heroes of old were made —
heroes who understood how to fight and die. How
often did I reproach him with his unhappy ''puszta"
— patriotism, — that was digging a grave for him and all
of us. It was impossible to change him; he was

154 IN THE WORLD WAR

obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was
that all his life he was under the ban of a petty ecclesi-
astical poHcy. Not a single square meter would he
yield either to Rumania in her day, or to the Czechs
or the Southern Slavs. The career of this wonderful
man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove
like none other for his people and his country; for years
he filled the breach and protected his people and his
Hungary with his powerful personality, and yet it was
his obstinate, unyielding policy that was one of the
chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so
dearly loved ; the fall that he saw when he died, killed
by the accursed hand of some cowardly assassin.

Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that some one had
said to him that his greatest fault was that he had come
into the world as a Hungarian.

I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a
human being and as a man, he was prominent; but all
the prejudices and faults of the Magyar way of think-
ing spoiled him.

Hungary and her Constitution — dualism — were one
of our misfortunes in the war.

Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other
plan but that of doing away with dualism, he would
on that account alone have merited love and admira-
tion. In Aehrenthal and Berchtold's time Hungarian
policy settled the Serbian disputes ; it made an alHance
with Rumania an impossibility; it accompHshed the
food blockade in Austria during the war; prevented
all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment,
through Karolyi's petty short-sighted selfishness, the
front was beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's
influence on the war remains true, in spite of the un-
doubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops. The
Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly dis-
position; therefore, almost always an excellent soldier;

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 155

but, unfortunately, in the course of the last fifty years,
Hungarian policy has done more injury than the Hun-
garian soldier possibly could make good in the war.
Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches
with the rejoinder that we could be quite sure about
the Hungarians, they were so firmly linked to Austria.
*'Yes," said I, ** Hungary is firmly linked to us, but like
a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."

If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with
the Magyars would have been inevitable, because it is
impossible to conceive that any sensible European
consortium would consent to be brought into partner-
ship with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.

But, of course, during the war an open fight with
Budapest was impossible.

Whether the nations that once composed the Haps-
burg Empire will ever be reunited is an open question ;
should it come to pass, may a kind fate preserve us
from a return of dualism.

On December 26, 191 6 — four days after entering upon
office — I received a letter from Tisza in which he im-
parted to me his views on the tactics to be observed:

All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously
threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Rumania,
etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favor,
and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared
with that of the Entente — if consistently and cleverly carried out —
will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.

From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that
our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war aims
may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a plan for
peace for tactical reasons and do nOt really earnestly desire peace.

We must, theretore, furnish our representatives accredited to
neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the
necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for our

156 IN THE WORLD WAR

cautious attitude and explian the reasons that keep us from making
a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.

An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose
the beUigerent parties in both camps to unfavorahle criticism and
might easily make the situation more strained ; a one-sided announce-
ment of the war aims would simply aford the leader of the beUigerent
enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything.

It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication oj
the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially,
but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints
concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting
interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief
aim, the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the
English at sea, is in the interests of the entire world, and that our
peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the
future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral side.

I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest
friendship, your devoted Tisza.

My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had
drawn up a peace proposal together with Bethmann.
The Entente's scornful refusal is still fresh in every
one's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and there
have been opportunities of talking to members of the
Entente, I have often heard the reproach made that
the offer of peace could not have been accepted by the
Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a conqueror
who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although
I will not attempt to deny that the tone of the peace
proposal was very arrogant — an impression which
must have been enhanced by Tisza's speeches in the
Hungarian Parliament— I think, nevertheless, that
even had it been differently worded it had small pros-
pect of success. However that may be, the stem
refusal on the part of the Entente only strengthened
the situation for the war-keen military party, who,
with increased vehemence, maintained the point that
all talk of peace was a mistake, and that the fighting
must go on to the end.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 157

In the winter of 191 7 Italy made a slight advance.
What territorial concessions was the Monarchy pre-
pared to make ? This did not proceed from the Italian
government, but was a step taken by a private individ-
ual which was communicated to me through a friendly
government. It is extremely difficult to judge of the
true value of such a step. A government can make
use of a private individual to take the first step — it will
probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it
may also be that a private person, without instructions
from, or the knowledge of, his government, might do
the same. Cases similar to the last-mentioned occurred
frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative
steps for peace, even when a ministerial source could
not be proved a priori, should be treated with prudence,
but in a friendly spirit. In the above-mentioned case,
however, the fact was that Italy neither could sepa-
rate from her allies, not did she wish to do so. Had
that been her purpose, it would have involved her
in a conflict with England, whose aim in war was
the conquest of Germany and not any Italian aspira-
tions. A separate peace with Italy — ^her separation
from her allies — ^was entirely out of the question, but
a general peace would only be possible if the West-
em Powers could come to an understanding with
Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have
been to confirm the extent of our exhaustion from the
war. Had I answered that I was ready to give up
this or that province, it would have been interpreted
as a conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness,
and would not have brought peace any nearer, but
rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the
Monarchy did not aim at conquests, and that I was

158 IN THE WORLD WAR

ready to negotiate on the basis of pre-war conditions
of possession. No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly
not competent to judge, that my tactics had been mis-
taken, as Italy would have separated from her allies
and concluded a separate peace. Further accounts
given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof.
But it is easy now to confirm the impression that there
was not a single moment while the war lasted when
Italy ever thought of leaving her allies.

An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of
February, 191 7. A person came to me on February
26th who was in a position to give credentials show-
ing him to be a recognized representative of a
neutral Power, and informed me on behalf of his
government that he had been instructed to let me know
that our enemies — or at least one of them — were ready
to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions
would be favorable for us. In particular, there was
to be no question of separating Hungary or Bohemia
from the empire. I was asked, if agreeable to the
proposition, to communicate my conditions through
the same agency, my attention being called, however,
to the proviso that these proposals riade by the enemy
government would become null and void from the moment
that another government friendly to us or to the hostile
country heard of the step.

The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its
contents. The final sentence made it obvious that
one of the enemy Powers was anxious to negotiate
unknown to the others.

I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question
of Russia, and my authority confirmed my conviction
by stating distinctly that he could not say so positively.
I answered at once by telegram on February 27 th
through the agency of the intervening neutral Power

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 159

that Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an
end to further bloodshed, and did not look for any
gains from the peace, because, as stated several times,
we were engaged in a war of defense only. But I drew
attention to the rather obscure sense of the application,
not being able to understand whether the state apply-
ing to us wished for peace with us only, or with the
entire group of Powers, and I was constrained to em-
phasize the fact that we did not intend to separate
from our allies. I was ready, however, to offer my
services as mediator if, as presumed, the state making
the advance was ready to conclude peace with our
entire group of Powers. I would guarantee secrecy,
as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify
our allies. The moment for that would only be when
the situation was made clear.

This was followed on March 9th by a reply accepting,
though not giving a direct answer to the point of
whether the proposal was for a peace with us alone or
together with our allies. In order to have it made
clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further
time, I answered at once, requesting the hostile Power
to send a confidential person to a neutral country,
whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I
hoped that the meeting would have a favorable result.

I never received any answer to this second telegram.
A week later, on March i6th, the Tsar abdicated. Ob-
viously, it was a last attempt on his part to save the
situation, which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier,
would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but
that of the whole world.

The Russian revolution placed us in an entirely new
situation. After all, there was no doubt that the East
presented an obvious possibility of concluding peace,
and all our efforts were turned in that direction, for
we were anxious to seize the first available moment

i6o IN THE WORLD WAR

to make peace with the Russian Revolutionary party,
a peace which the Tsar, faced by his coming downfall,
had not been able to achieve.

If the spring of 191 7 was noted for the beginning
of the unrestricted U-boat warfare and all the hopes
centered on its success and the altered situation
anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer
of the same year proved that the proceeding did not
fulfil all expectations, though causing great anxiety
to England. At that time there were great fears in
England as to whether, and how, the U-boat could be
paralyzed. No one in London knew whether the new
means to counteract it would suffice before they had
been tried, and it was only in the course of the summer
that the success of the anti-submarine weapons and
the convoy principle was confirmed.

In the early summer of 191 7 very favorable news was
received relative to English and French conditions.
Information was sent from Madrid, which was always
a reHable source, that some Spanish officers returning
to Madrid from England reported that the situation
there during the last few weeks had become very much
worse and that there was no longer any confidence in
victory. The authorities seized all the provisions
that arrived for the troops and the munition-workers;
potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the
poorer classes; the majority of sailors fit for service
had been enrolled in the navy, so that only inefficient
crews were left in the merchant service, and they
were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats,
and, therefore, many British merchantmen were lying
idle, as there was no one to man them.

This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming
from different sources. Similar accounts, though in
slightly different form, came from France. It was
stated that in Paris great war-weariness was noticeable.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE i6i

All hope of definite victory was as good as given up;
an end must certainly come before the beginning of
winter, and many of the leading authorities were
convinced that if war were carried on into the winter
the result would be as in Russia — a revolution.

At the same time news came from Constantinople
that one of the enemy Powers in that quarter had made
advances for a separate peace. The Turkish govern-
ment replied that it would not separate from its allies,
but was prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis
of non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once
of the request and his answer. Thereupon nothing
more was heard from the enemy Power. At the same
time news came from Rumania evincing great anxiety
concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and
acknowledging that she considered the game was lost.
The revolution and the collapse of the army in Russia
still continued.

Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more
hopeful picture for us, and justified the views of those
who had always held that a little more ''endurance" —
to use a word since become ominous — would lead to a
decision.

During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must
attach an important and adequately estimated signif-
icance to confidential reports. The hermetic isolation
which during the World War divided Europe into two
separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is
inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they
must be accepted, for various reasons, with a certain
amount of skepticism. Those persons who write and
talk, not from any material, but from political interests,
from political devotion and sympathy, are, from the
nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for
their own personal reasons, more optimistically than
is justified. But they are apt to be deceived. Nations,

i62 IN THE WORLD WAR

too, are subject to feelings, and the feelings of the masses
must not be taken as expressing the tendencies of the
leading influences. France was tired of war, but how
far the leading statesmen were influenced by that con-
dition, not to be compared to our own war-weariness,
was not proved.

In persons who make this metier their profession, the
wish is often present, alongside the comprehensible
mistakes they make, to give pleasure and satisfaction
by their reports, and not run any risk of losin;2: a
lucrative post. I think it will be always well to esti-
mate confidential reports, no matter from what source
they proceed, as being 50 per cent, less optimistic
than they appear. The more pessimistic opinion that
prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin, was due,
first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news
coming from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was
quite certain that we were losing time, although Beth-
mann once thought fit in the Reichstag to assert the
contrary; but the German mihtary leaders and the
politicians looked at the situation among our opponents
differently from us.

When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the
summer of 191 7 he related to me some instances of the
rapidly increasing food trouble in England, and was
genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was
convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress,
there was no question of a famine. I told the Emperor
that the great problem was whether the U-boats would
actually interfere with the transport of American troops,
as the German military authorities asserted, or not,
but counseled him not to accept as very serious facts
a few passing incidents that might have occurred.

After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat war-
fare, J repeat that many grave fears were entertained
in England. It is a well-known fact. But it was a

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 163

question of fears, not deeds. A person who knew how
matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral
country in the summer of 191 7, said: ''If the half
only of the fears entertained in England be realized,
then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide
difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's
hopes, on the one hand, and subsequent events, on the
other, which had not been taken into account by
German opinion.

However that may be, I consider there is no doubt
that, in spite of the announced intervention of America,
the summer of 191 7 represented a more hopeful phase
for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it was
essential to make the most of the situation. Germany
must be brought to see that peace must be made,
in case the peace wave became stronger.

I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor
that he should make the first sacrifice and prove to
Berlin that it was not only by words that he sought
for peace. I asked him to authorize m.e to state in
Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an
agreement with France on the Alsace-Lorraine ques-
tion, Austria would be ready to cede Galicia to Poland,
which was about to be reorganized, and to make efforts
to insure that this Great-Polish state should be attached
to' Germany — not incorporated^ but, say, some form of
personal union.

The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where T first
of all made the proposal to Bethmann and Zimmer-
mann, and subsequently, in the presence of the Em-
peror Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Em-
peror William. It was not accepted unconditionally,
nor yet refused, and the conference terminated with a
request from the Germans for consideration of the
question.

In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that

i64 IN THE WORLD WAR

it involved. If Germany accepted the offer, and we in
our consequent negotiations with the Entente did not
secure any noteworthy alterations in the Treaty of
London, we could count on war only. In that case,
we should have to satisfy not only Italy, Rumania,
and Serbia, but would also lose the hoped-for com-
pensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor
Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at
once, nevertheless, to take the proposed step.

I, however, thoroughly believed then — though wrong-
fully— that in the circumstances London and Paris
would have been able to effect an amendment in the
Treaty of London. It was not until much later that a
definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.

In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I
sent a report to the Emperor Charles explaining the
situation to him, and requesting that he would submit
it to the Emperor William.

The report was as follows:

Will your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me
from the first day of my appointment, to submit to your Majesty
my responsible opinion of the situation?

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an
end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to
take up your Majesty's time needlessly.

I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production
of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and,
above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to
under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of
the sufferings from the war.

Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next
few months and carry out a successful defense, I am nevertheless
quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely
out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in
the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs.

Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace negotia-
tions at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the fact of
our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a moment

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 165

when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the coming
breakdown, every step will have been in vain, and the Entente will
agree to no terms except such as would mean the absolute destruc-
tion of the Central Powers. To begin at the right time is, therefore,
of extreme importance.

I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the
whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising
on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is
demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarch s have been
dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the
strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make
us feel anxious and call to our memory the saying, exempla trahunt.
Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria -Hungary the conditions
are different; let it not be contested that the firmly rooted mon-
archist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the possibility of
such an event. This war has opened a new era in the history of
the world; it is without example and without precedent. The
world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be vain
to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the happenings
that have now become daily occurrences.

The statesman who is neither bhnd nor deaf must be aware how
the dull despair of the population increases day by day ; he is bound
to hear the sullen grumbUng of the great masses, and if he be con-
scious of his own responsibiHty he must pay due regard to that factor.

Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of
the town. Two things are obvious. The Russian revolution affects
our Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for
the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the monarch
whose country is united only through the dynasty than for the one
where the people themselves are fighting for their national inde-
pendence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the
population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; your
Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any
day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances
occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal
the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all fiulher efforts
to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely

different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military

circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I am

firmly convinced that Germany, too,-Uke ourselves, has reached the

limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders in Berlin

do not seek to deny it.
12

i66 IN THE WORLD WAR

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to
embark on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval
in the interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse
than a peace concluded by the monarchs. If the monarchs of the
Central Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few
months, it will be done for them by their people, and then will the
tide of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and
brothers fought and died.

I do not wish to make any oratio pro domo, but I beg your Majesty
graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the Rumanian
war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when I, two
months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very
day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as
convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and
I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the
dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly
aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America
can throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact,
the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the
situation to an unfavorable stage for us, because our enemies have
more time before them than we have and can afford to wait longer
than we, unfortimately, are able to do. It cannot yet be said what
course events will take in Russia. I hope — and this is the vital
point of my whole argument — that Russia has lost her motive
power for a long time to come, perhaps forever, and that this im-
portant factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless, that a
Franco-EngUsh, probably also an Italian, offensive will be launched
at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we shall be
able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds — and I reckon it
can be done in two or three months — we must then, before America
takes any further military action to our disadvantage, make a more
comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not shrink from
the probabjy great and heavy sacrifices we may have to make.

Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider
such hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the
fabulous deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that
the tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the
success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been
achieved.

Your Majesty will remember that Admiral von HoltzendorfT,
when last in Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat
warfare would bring England to her knees within six months.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 167

Your Majesty will also remember how we combated the prediction
and declared that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign
would seriously affect England, yet the looked-for success would be
discounted by the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is
now two and a half m.onths (almost half the time stated) since the
U-boat warfare started, and all the information that we get from
England is to the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful
and most dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in spite
of many scruples, your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and
consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian navy to take part in the
U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the Ger-
man arguments, but because your Majesty deemed it to be abso-
lutely necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters
and because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately,
would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted U-boat
warfare.

To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates
of the U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory
will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that England
within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will lose ground
in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics than to believe
the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more fatal than the
principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall a prey to Utopian
illusions from which sooner or later a terrible awakening will follow.

England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to
lay down her arms in a few m.onths' time, but perhaps — and here
I concede a Hmited success to the U-boat scheme— perhaps England
in a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to
continue this war d, Voutrance, or whether it would not be more
statesman-like to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central
Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come
for great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers. ^

Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies
to separate us from our allies, in which step I took the responsibility
because your Majesty is incapable of any dishonorable action. But
at the same time, your Majesty instructed me to notify the states-
men of the German Empire that our strength is at an end and that
after the close of the summer Germany must not reckon on us any
longer. I carried out these commands and the German statesmen
left me in no doubt that for Germany, ^:oo, another winter campaign
would be impossible. In this one sentence may be summed up
all that I have to say :

We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility

1 68 IN THE WORLD WAR

of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed, then
we must — and at the right time — play our last card and make the
extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has
proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect
from your German ally sacrifices that your Majesty would not be
ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.

Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples
to make very effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the
Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to
defend those peoples, the dynastic principle, and your throne with
all the means in your power and to your very last breath.

On May nth there came the following ofificial answer
from the Imperial Chancellor, which was sent by the
German Emperor to the Emperor Charles, and then
to me:

In accordance with your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly
to submit the following in answer to the inclosed expose from the
Imperial and Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs of 1 2th ult.

Since the expose was drawn up, the French and English on the
western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a
wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous
quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance
of the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have
every reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the
men and the iron will of their leaders.

Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may
consider the situation of the alHed armies on the Isonzo with the
same confidence.

The eastern front has been greatly reduced, owing to the political
unheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a
large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the situation
would release more men even if it were considered necessary to have
a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to guard against local dis-
turbances owing to the revolutionary movement. With the addi-
tional forces, the conditions in the west would become more favor-
able for us. The withdrawal of men would also provide more troops
for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the successful carrying
out of the fighting on the ItaUan front until the end of the war is
reached.

In both allied monarchies there is an ample supply of raw ma-

•v

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 169

terial for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards
provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out
until the new harvest. The same apphes to Austria-Hungary,
especially if her share of suppHes from Rumania is taken into
consideration.

The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army.
When Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before his
Apostolic Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects
of success for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested
here and the expected military advantages weighed against the
political risk. We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction
of a blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring
about the entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a
falling off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our
enemies would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength,
but we were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the
U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest
share in the world struggle which began in the east has now been
transferred to the west in ever increasing dimensions, where EngHsh
tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the resistance of
our enemies by varied means. A definite and favorable result for
us could be achieved only by a determined attack on the vital spot
in the hostile forces; that is, England.

The success obtained and the effect already produced by the
U-boat warfare exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest
statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing
difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies, as
well as corresponding comments in the press, not only include urgent
appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength, but bear
aho the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the distress that
England is suffering.

The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head
Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed account
of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The review was
pubHshed in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the ist inst.
I beg herewith to refer to the inclosed.^

According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda,
owing to the inadequate supply of com, has been compelled to
specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so restricted
that more room for corn can be secured only by hindering the con-
duct of the war in other ways. Apart from abandoning overseas

* Helfferich's expose is reproduced in the Appendix.

170 IN THE WORLD WAR

traffic, vessels could be released only by cutting down such imports as
absorbed much space. England requires not only great transport
faciHties for provisions, but also for the import of ore to keep up
war industries, and also pit props to enable the coal output to be
kept at a high level. In the case of the ore needed for England
and the wood available in the country, it is not possible to restrict
the cargo space in these two instances. Already, after three months
of the U-boat warfare, it is a fact that the shortage of cargo space
caused by the U-boats reduces the living conditions of the popula-
tion to an unbearable extent, and paralyzes all war industries, so
much so that the hope of defeating Germany by superior stores of
munitions and a greater number of guns has had to be given up.
The lack of transport facilities will also prevent the larger output of
war industries in America making up for the lesser output in Eng-
land. The speed with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed
vessels excludes the possibility of building new vessels to furnish ade-
quate cargo space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month
of U-boat warfare than the EngHsh dockyards have turned out in
the last year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden
vessels, if they were there, would cover the losses of only four
months. But they will not come before it is too late. English
experts on the subject have already said quite openly that there
are only two ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats:
either to build vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or
else to destroy the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build
them. The first has proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses
are far less than the new vessels building.

England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss
of tonnage.

The effects of the U-boat warfare on the peoples' provisions and
on all private and government activities will be felt more and more.

I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare with
the greatest confidence.

According to secret and reliable information, the Prime Minister
Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that France
was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed before the
beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since then, France
has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping up the intensity of
the fighting until the offensive ceased.

The French nation is certainly doing marvelous things in this
war, but the government cannot sustain the enormous burden after
it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France, which
is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 171

As regards our o\\nn internal situation, I do not underestimate
the difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe fight-
ing and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly beUeve that we
shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without permanently
endangering the nation's strength and general welfare, without any
further crises and without menace to government organization.

Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a
favorable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with
Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily
as possible an honorable and, in the interests of the Empire and
of our allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the important
factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and that a
fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a time when
both political and military initiative are still in our hands. Count
Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or three months,
when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a matter of fact,
in view of the French and English expectations of the decisive suc-
cess for their offensive, and the Entente not having lost all hopes of
Russia resuming her activities, any too pronounced preparations
for peace would not only be doomed to failure, but would put new
life into the enemy by revealing the hopeless exhaustion of the
Central Powers' forces. At the present moment a general peace
could be bought only by our submission to the will of the enemy.
A peace of that nature would not be tolerated by the people and
would lead to fatal dangers for the IMonarchy. It appears to me
that quiet, determination, and caution as regards the outer world
are more than ever an imperative necessity. The development of
affairs in Russia has hitherto been favorable for us. Party disputes
are kept more and more within the narrow Hmits of peace and war
questions by political, economic, and social exigencies, and the
impression grows every day that the party which makes for peace
with the Central Powers will be the one to remain in power. It is
our solemn duty carefully to follow and encourage the process of
development and disruption in Russia, and to sound the country,
not with too obvious haste, but yet with sufficient expert skill to
lead to practical peace negotiations. The probabiHty is that Russia
will avoid any appearance of treachery toward her allies, and will
endeavor to find a method which will practically lead to a state of
peace between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will
have the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the
general peace.

As in July, 19 14, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance
with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the World War is at an

172 IN THE WORLD WAR

end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a prosperous
peace to the two closely united monarchies.

This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously
not only based on the idea of infusing more confidence
in the future in us, but was also the true expression
of a more favorable atmosphere prevailing, as Berlin
naturally received the same reports from the enemy
countries as we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which
contained the following passage:

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves
no doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all
essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with
sang-froid. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a love
of humanity in general that our enemies have become more peace-
fully inclined, but because they realize that we cannot be crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your
report of April 12th. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the
leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that
you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both
his Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the
world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they
cease to believe in our powers of resistance — and are not persuaded
that our alliance rests on a soHd foimdation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to
make the supremest efforts at the front and throughout
the country, on the one hand, in order to hold the
situation a little longer, and, on the other, to persuade
the enemy that, in spite of the favorable situation,
we were prepared for peace without conquest. To
appoint Hebel to the German Military Commission to
carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of sense.
Neither did I expect to gain much from recent inter-
vention in the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavored, there-
fore, to put myself in direct touch with the German
Reichstag.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 173

One of my political friends who had numerous and
excellent connections with the German Reichstag put
himself into communication with different leaders in
Berlin and explained to them the situation in the
Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman
was not acting for the Ministry, but presenting his own
impressions and views. He was enjoined to be very
cautious, as any indiscretion might have incalculable
consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that
we were thinking of ending the war, not for love of
peace, but because we simply could not hold out any
longer, all efforts would have been vain. In that
respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore,
absolutely necessar>- that the person to whom this
deHcate mission had been intrusted should act in such
a manner as would keep it a secret from the Entente,
a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence
with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which
would enable the Ministry eventually to disavow the
advances.

My friend undertook the task with just as great
zeal as efficiency, and, in brief, this is what he told the
Berlin leaders, Erzberger^ and Siidekum in particular.
As far as he could judge, we had now reached a turning-
point. The next few weeks would decide whether it
was to be peace or war a Voutrance. France was tired
and not anxious for America's entry into the war if
it was not to be. If Germany forced the Entente to
continue the war the situation would be very grave.
Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey could do more.
Germany by herself could not bring the war to a
successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvi-
ous to the whole world. She was ready to make peace

» At this time T did not know that my secret report to the Emperor
was handed over to Herr Erzberger and not kept secret by him. (Later
it was made public through the revelations of Count Wedel.)

174 IN THE WORLD WAR

without annexations and without war compensation,
and to devote all her energies to preventing the recur-
rence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was
that a universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on
sea and on land offered the only means to restore the
financial situation in Europe after the war.)

Germany must publicly notify her position just as
clearly as Austria-Hungary had done and must declare
the following :

(i) No annexations, no indemnities.

(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release

of Belgium (politically and economically).

(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-

Hungary to be evacuated as soon as both those
states had had their territories restored to
them (including the German colonies).

(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work

for a general disarmament and guaranty that
no further war be possible.

Such declaration to be a joint one from the Ger-
man government and the Reichstag, and to be made
public.

The peace resolution of July 19, 191 7, was the result
of this step. The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was
the first victim. The Supreme Military Command,
by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying
to secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be
unacceptable. When Bethmann had gone and Mi-
chaelis had been appointed, they were satisfied.

Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory,
it had one fault at the start. It was no secret that
every one connected with Pan-Germanism, especially
the German generals, disagreed with the decision,
and would not accept the resolution as an admission
from the entire country. Certainly the great majority
in Germany, counting them per head, supported the

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 175

resolution, but the leading men, together with a con- '
siderable following, were opposed to it. The **Starva- I
tion Peace," the ''Peace of Renunciation," and the ;
*'Scheidemann Peace" were the subjects of articles in
the papers expressing the greatest disapproval of the 1
resolution. Neither did the German government take .
up any decided attitude. On July 19th the Imperial i
Chancellor Michaelis made a speech approving the j
resolution, but adding, ''as I understand it." i
The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in |
August confirming his very optimistic views of the
situation, and defining Germany's views regarding
Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above !
alluded to in his approval of the resolution, was ex-
plained in his letter, at any rate, as to the Belgium j
question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to herself ^
the right to exercise a far-reaching military and eco- I
nomic influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows :

Berlin, August ly, 1917. I

Dear Count Czernxn,— According to our agreement, I take the I

liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of the
14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if your Excel- ]

lency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my activities.
The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies
me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand
a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than i

we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of the |

previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably higher '

yield than in 19 16-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less than I

last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out economic
plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories, including
Rimiania, we shall be in a position to hold out in regard to fodder,
as was also possible in the very dry year 191 5.

There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The i

people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is very ;

great; however, there is no trace of any general and really morbid
exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will be no
worse than it was last year. i

176 IN THE WORLD WAR

This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the
condition of the allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from the
Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change
for the worse for us if our allies or the neutral states, contrary to
our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as
would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is already
the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly prejudice
our economic position and in certain cases endanger it. It must
be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war in general
is more difficult than in the third year. The most earnest endeavors,
therefore, will be made to bring about a peace as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to
come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion,
would be a great tactical error. Our demarche for peace last Decem-
ber found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered by
our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind
would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war;
any peace advances must come now from the enemy.

The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the
watchful care of our alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm
of war has made still stronger, .and a trusting, friendly and loyal
co-operation with the leading men of the allied Monarchy. If the
spirit of the alliance — and in this I know your Excellency agrees —
remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our enemies
would see that it was impossible for one of the allies to agree to
any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he states beforehand
that the discussion would be entered into only if the object were a
general peace. If this were clearly laid down there could be no
reason why one of the allies should not listen to such proposal from
the enemy and with him discuss preparations for peace.

At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a
proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether
the reinstatement of the status quo would be a suitable basis on
which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as
follows : I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is not
striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is ready
to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession of any
German territory; with such a conception of the term ''reinstate-
ment of the status quo,'' that form would be a very suitable basis for
negotiations. This would not exclude the desired possibility of
retaining the present frontiers, and by negotiating bring former
enemy economic territory into close economic and military conjunc-
tion with Germany — this would refer to Courland, Lithuania, and

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 177

Poland — and thus secure Germany's frontiers and give a guaranty
for her vital needs on the continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but
must reserv^e to herself the right, hy means of the peace negotiations ^
to the economic exploitation of the territory of Longwy and Briey,
if not through direct incorporation, by a legal grant to exploit. We
are not in a position to cede to France any noteworthy districts in
Alsace-Lorraine .

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the matter
of connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and economic
sense. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at the Kreuznach
negotiations — the mihtary control of Belgium until the conclusion
of a defensive and offensive alliance with Germany, the acquisition
of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof) — were the maximum claims
of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The Supreme Mili-
tary Command agrees with me that these terms or similar ones can
be secured only if peace can be enforced on England. But we are
of opinion that a vast amount of economic and military influence
must be brought to bear in Belgiiun in the matter of the negotiations
and would perhaps not meet with much resistance, because Belgium,
from economic distress, will come to see that her being joined to
Germany is the best guaranty for a prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from your
Excellency to give up Galicia and enroll it in the new Polish state
is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as out
of the question. The development of Poland as an independent
state must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of No-
vember 5, 1 9 16. Whether this development will prove to be an
actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for
the future will be tested later. There are already many signs of
danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the Austro-
Hungarian government cannot notify us now during the war of her
complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in the
administration of the whole state.

It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger
caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary
through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would
not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the
frontier territory as being necessary for miUtary protection, to grant
to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the possibiHty
of being joined to Russia.

The question of the annexation of Rumania, according to the

178 IN THE WORLD WAR

Kreuznach debate of May ist, must be treated further and solved
in connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany
respecting Courland, Lithuania, and Poland.

It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czemin,
here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the
questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there
may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling
us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full
agreement.

With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very
devoted Michaelis.

I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a
matter of course, the agreement to maintain complete
frankness, but remarked that I could not share his
optimism. I explained that the increasing war- weari-
ness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, ren-
dered it imperative to secure peace in good time, that
is, before any revolutionary signs appeared, for any
beginning of disturbances would spoil the chance of
peace. The German point of view in the case of Bel-
gium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the
Entente nor Belgium would ever consent to the terms.
I could not, therefore, conceal from him that his point
of view was a serious obstacle to peace ; that it was also
in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, and I failed
to understand it.

I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an under-
standing as to the minimum of the war aims in which
an important part is played by the question whether
and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable an-
nexation of Poland and Rumania by the Central Powers.

I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the
views of the German Reichstag as demanding a peace
without annexation or indemnity, and that it would
be out of the question for the German government to
ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It
was not a question of whether we wished to go on

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 179

fighting, but whether we could, and it was my duty
to impress upon him in time that we were bound to
end the war.

Doctor MichaeHs was more given to Pan-Germanism
than his predecessor.

. It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans
misunderstood the situation. They dishked me so
intensely that they avoided me, and I had very few
deaHngs with them. They were not to be converted.
I remember one instance when a representative of that
party called on me in Vienna to explain to me the con-
ditions under which his group was prepared to conclude
peace : the annexation of Belgium, of a part of east
France (Longueville and Briey), of Courland and
Lithuania, the cession of the English fleet to Germany,
and I forget how many milliards in war indemnity, etc.
I received the gentleman in the presence of the Ambas-
sador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was
purely a case for a doctor.

There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chan-
cellor Michaelis's ideas and our own. It was impos-
ible to bridge it over. Soon after he left office to
make way for the statesman-like Count Hertling.

About this time very far-reaching events were being
enacted behind the scenes which had a very pronounced
influence on the course of affairs.

Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred
on the part of persons who, without being in any im-
portant position, had access to diplomatic affairs.
There is no object here in mentioning names, especially
as the responsible political leaders themselves heard
only the details of what happened much later, and then
in a very unsatisfactory way — at a time when the
pacifist tendencies of the Entente were slackening.^

* The disclosures made by Count Wedel and Helfferich concerning
Erzberger are only a link in the chain.

i8o IN THE WORLD WAR

It was impossible then to see clearly in such a
labyrinth of confused and contradictory facts. The
truth is that in the spring or early summer of 191 7
leading statesmen in the countries of the allies and of
the Entente gathered the impression that the existence
of the Quadruple AlHance was at an end. At the very
moment when it was of the utmost importance to main-
tain secrecy concerning the conditions of our alliance
the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente
welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple
Alliance.

I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of
throwing a clear light on all the proceedings of those
days. To explain the further development it will
suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what
happened. In the spring of 191 7 connecting links were
estabhshed between Paris and London. The first
impressions received were that the Western Powers
were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany
and to a general peace. At a somewhat later stage
the wind veered and the Entente endeavored to make
a separate peace with us.

Several important details only came to my knowledge
later, some at the time of my resignation in the spring
of 1918, and some not until the collapse in the winter
of 1919. There was no lack of voices to blame me for a
supposed double policy, which the public also sus-
pected, and to accuse me of having made different
statements to Berlin from those I made in Paris.
These charges were brought by personal enemies who
deliberately slandered me, which tales were repeated
by others who knew nothing about the affair. The
fact is that when I heard of the episode I immediately
possessed myself of documents proving that not only did I
know nothing whatever about the affair, but could not
possibly have known.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE i8i

Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to dis-
turbances in the universe, the reason for which cannot
be understood by the observer. I felt in the same way,
without being able to prove anything definite, from
certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the
other side of the trenches events were happening that
were inexplicable to me. I felt the effect, but could
not discover the cause. In the spirit of the Entente,
now more favorably disposed for peace, an undertone
was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a
greater inclination for peace than formerly, but again
probably only in view of the alleged laxity of our
alliance conditions and the hopes of the downfall of the
Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject to a
neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer
and told me he had heard from a reliable source that
apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they expected the
Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a
matter of course, would alter the entire military
situation.

Soon afterward very secret information was received
from a neutral country that a Bulgarian group was
negotiating with the Entente behind the back and with-
out the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as sus-
picion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in
our allies, the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall
the event. We felt as safe about Radoslawoff as
about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other
forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning
our plans were a further disadvantage, certainly only
of a technical nature, but yet not to be underestimated.
Our various agents worked splendidly, but it lay in the
nature of the case that their dealings were more pro-
tracted than those carried out by the Foreign Minister
himself. According to the course taken by the con-

1 82 IN THE WORLD WAR

versation, they were obliged to seek fresh instructions;
they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a
more halting attitude, than a responsible leader would
have to do. In the summer of 191 7, therefore, I sug-
gested going to Switzerland myself, where negotiations
were proceeding. But my journey could not have been
kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it
would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion,
owing to the mistrust already awakened. But not in
Berlin. I believe I still held the confidence of the lead-
ing men in Berlin sufficiently to avert that. I should
have explained the situation to the Imperial Chancellor,
and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria
the case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favored the Entente. If
Bulgaria was under the impression that our group was
falling asunder she would have staked everything to
try to save herself by a separate peace. In Constan-
tinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and
Enver were as reliable as they were strong. But a
journey undertaken by me to Switzerland in the con-
ditions described might prove to be the alarm signal
for a general sauve qui pent. But the very idea that
the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed
we should do would have sufficed to destroy any
attempt at peace in Paris and London.

The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of
the enemy declined visibly during the summer. It was
evident from many trifling signs, separately of small
import, collectively of much. In the summer of 191 7,
too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to
grow less. It was seen by the enemy that it could not
accomplish what he had first feared, and that again
put life into the desire for a final military victory.

These two facts together probably contributed to
fan back the peace wind blowing from the west.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 183

Among other things, the Armand-Revertera negotia-
tions were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet
the moment to speak of the negotiations which in the
spring of 1918, together with the letters of the Emperor
to Prince Sixtus, created such a sensation. But this
much must be stated: that Revertera in the negotia-
tions proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient
agent who acted exactly according to the instructions
he received from the Ballplatz. Our various attempts
to take up the threads of peace when emanating from
the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire group
of Powers.

Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente
to prevent us from separating from Germany, and when
the impression was produced in London and Paris
unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we our-
selves thus used sabotage in the striving for a gen-
eral peace; for it would, of course, have been pleas-
ing to the Entente to see Germany, her chief enemy,
isolated.

There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus
trifling with the idea of a separate peace. First of all,
it could not release us from the terms of the Treaty of
London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for negoti-
ating a general peace. At the time when these events
were being enacted, I presumed, but only knew for
certain later, that Italy, in any case, would claim the
promises made to her.

In the spring of 191 7 Ribot and Lloyd George con-
ferred with Orlando on the subject, when at St. -Jean
de Maurienne, and endeavored to modify the terms
in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando
refused, and insisted on his view, that, even in the event
of a separate peace, we should still have to yield up
Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass to
Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And

i84 IN THE WORLD WAR

secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our
forces, and had already begun to do so.

When a person starts running away in a fight he but
too easily drags the other with him. I do not doubt
that the Bulgarian negotiations, in order to take sound-
ings, were connected with the above events.

The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilet-
tante policy was that we suggested to the Entente a
willingness to separate from our allies, and lost our
position in the struggle for a separate peace. For we
saw that in separating from Germany we could not
escape being crippled ; that, therefore, a separate peace
was impossible, and that we had dealt a death-blow at
the still intact Quadruple Alliance.

Later I had information from London relating to
the official view of the situation there, which differed
very much from the optimistic confidential reports
and proved that the desire for peace was not so strong.
It will easily be understood that for us the English
policy was always the most interesting. England's
entry into the war had made the situation so dangerous
that an understanding arrived at with her — that is, an
understanding between England and Germany through
our intervention — would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was
less than ever in a position to confer with Germany
until the two cardinal points had been guaranteed —
the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of
German militarism. The former was a French claim,
and England must and would support France in this
to her very utmost; the second claim was necessary
in the interests of the future peace of the world. Ger-
many's military strength was always estimated very
highly in England, but the army's deeds in this war
had surpassed all expectations. The military successes
had encouraged the growth of the military spirit.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 1S5

The peace resolution passed in the Reichstag proved
nothing, or, at any rate, not enough, for the Reichstag
is not the real exponent of the Empire in the outside
world; it became paralyzed through an unofficial col-
lateral government, the generals, who possessed the
greater power. Certain statements made by General
Ludendorff — so the Entente said — proved that Ger-
many did not wish for an honorable peace of under-
standing. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not
associate itself with the majority in the Reichstag.
The war was not being waged against the German
nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude
peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared,
further, that under no circumstances would England
restore Germany's colonies. So far as the Monarchy
was concerned, England appeared to be ready to con-
clude a separate peace with her, though subject to the
promises made to her own allies. According to the
latter there was much territory to be given up to Italy,
Serbia, and Rumania. But in exchange we might
reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states
like Poland.

Although this information left no doubt that England
was not then thinking of making advances to Germany,
still the fear of Prussian militarism was at the bottom
of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that,
through a more favorable continuous development, a
settlement and understanding might be feasible on the
territorial but not on the military questions. But,
on the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power
proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear
that its power of defense was invincible unless it was
broken then.

Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak
of war, but the actual course of the war has been full
of many and disturbing misunderstandings. For long,

1 86 IN THE WORLD WAR

it was not understood here what England meant by
the term mihtarism. It was pointed out that the Eng-
Hsh navy was jealously defending the dominion of the
seas, that France and Russia stood ready armed for
the attack, and that Germany was only in a similar
position to any other state; that every state strength-
ened and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly
as possible.

By the term "Prussian militarism'* England did not
only mean the strength of the German army. She
understood it to be a combination of a warlike spirit
bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best
and strongest army in the world. The first would
have been innocuous without the second; and the
splendid German army was in England's eyes the
instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving
autocrat. According to England's view, Germany was
exactly the counterpart of France under Bonaparte —
if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed being
called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Luden-
dorff " — and just as httle as England would treat with
Napoleon would she have any dealings with the juridi-
cal individual who to her was the personification of the
lust for conquest and the policy of violence.

The notion of the existence of German militarism
seems to be quite justified, although the Emperor and
the Crown Prince played the smallest part in it. But
it seems to me an altogether wrong conception that
mihtarism is a specialty of Germany. The negotia-
tions at Versailles must now have convinced the general
pubHc that it is not only on the banks of the Spree that
militarism reigns.

Germany in former days was never able to under-
stand that on the enemy continent, by the side of
morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety as to Ger-
many's plans practically reigned, and that the talk

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 187

about the "hard'* and ''German" peace, about ''vic-
tory and triumph" was Hke throwing oil on the flames
of their fears, that in England, and France, too, at one
time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace
of settlement, and that such expressions as those above
were highly detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.

In my opinion the air raids on England may be
ranked in the same category as the above expressions.
They were carried out with the greatest heroism by
the German fliers, but no other object was gained
but to irritate and anger England and rouse to the
utmost resistance all who otherwise had pacifist ten-
dencies, I said this to Ludendorfl when he called on
me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 191 7, but it rriade
not the slightest impression on him.

The demarche for peace made by the Pope and our
reply had been published in the European press. We
accepted the noble proposals made by the Holy Father.
I have therefore nothing to add.

In the early part of the summer of 191 7 the Socialist
Conference at Stockholm had become a practical
question. I issued passports to the representatives
of our Social Democrats, and had several difliculties
to overcome in connection therewith. My own stand-
point is made clear by the following letter to Tisza.

(Not dated.)

Dear Friend, — I hear that you do not approve of the delegation
of Socialists for Stockhohn. To begin with, it is not a delegation.
The men came to me of their own accord and applied for the per-
mission to travel, which I granted. Adler, EUenbogen, and Seitz
were there, Renner as well. The first two are capable men, and I
value them in spite of the differences that exist between them.
The last two are not well known to me. But all are genuinely
desirous of peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the down-
fall of the Empire.

If they secure peace it will be a sociaHstic one, and the Emperor
will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear friend,

i88 IN THE WORLD WAR

that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor will have to
pay still more; you may be sure of that.

Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my
prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved
to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service, but
the conditions surrounding it, that must be blamed for the war not
coming to an end.

If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they
would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been
allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.

Every one is indignant with me here, particularly in the Herren-
haus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to "buy "
the Socialists by promising to lower the customs dues if they
returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but
that has no connection with Stockholm, ''Sozie" and peace.

I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the death-
blow to the customs dues — but I felt rather like Daniel in the lions'
den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very indignant.
The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside Trnka is the
Prime Minister Clam.

Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of
the octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more,
but the contention is false.

You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we
shall be forced to have SociaHst policy after the war, whether it is
welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to prepare
the Social Democrats for it. Socialist poHcy is the valve we are
bound to open in order to let off the superfluous steam, otherwise
the boiler will burst. In the second place, none of us ministers
can take upon ourselves the false pretense of using sabotage with
regard to peace. The nations may perhaps tolerate the tortures
of war for a while, but only if they understand and have the con-
viction that it cannot be otherwise — that a vis major predominates ;
in other words, that peace can fail owing to circumstances, but
not owing to the bad will or stupidity of the Ministers.

The German-Bohemian Deputy, K. H. Wolf, made a scene when
the speech from the throne was read to the "Burg"; he declared
that we were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation,
and made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also
come to a wrong conclusion about the customs dues and Stockholm.

You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's
what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the
slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an anti'

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 189

German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favor of the dues, we
are to a certain extent to blame. The BerHn people are always afraid
of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard hehn it means
she turns to the right, and in order to check this movement the
steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only way to keep a
straight coiu-se — he must hold out. Such is the case of statecraft
in Vienna — it is always carried out of the course of the AlUance,

It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought
feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully.
Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not carrying
it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing either in London
or in Paris. But why should I write all this — you share my opinions ;
I do not need to convert you. We will talk about Stockholm again.

In true friendship, your old Czernin.

As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed
himself to be quite converted, and raised no objections
as to the Hungarian Social Democrats. The negative
result of the Stockholm Congress is already known.

As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible
to discuss in detail the various negotiations and at-
tempts at peace. Besides the negotiations between
Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts were
made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to
between the Ambassador Mennsdorff and General
Smuts, which were referred to in the EngHsh Parliament.
I do not consider it right to say more about the matter
here. But I can and will repeat the point of view
which was at the bottom of all our peace efforts since
the summer of 191 7, and which finally wrecked them all.

The last report cited reflected the views of the
Entente quite correctly. With Germany there was at
present no possibility of intercourse. France insisted
on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and the entire
Entente demanded the aboHtlon of German militarism.
Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colo-
nies. But Germany was not yet ' ' ripe ' ' for this demand
to be made. In the opinion of the Entente, therefore,

I90 IN THE WORLD WAR

any debate on the subject would be useless. For us
the case was different. The impression prevailed that
we could conclude a separate peace provided we were
ready to make sacrifices. The London terms had
created a situation which must be accepted. Con-
cessions to Rumania, the cession of Trieste and the
Trentino, as well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy,
and concessions to the Southern Slav state would be
unavoidable, besides reforms in the Monarchy on a
federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided con-
cession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in
that form was, naturally, not possible. But still we
thought that, under certain premises in the territorial
questions, an agreement might perhaps not meet with
insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course,
however, the Entente was not in a position to make
terms such as could only be laid down by the victor
to the vanquished, as we were anything but beaten,
but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the
frontier posts in the Monarchy.

It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente
being willing, a settlement of the various interests
would be possible ; but proposals such as the giving up
of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as was
also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's
back. I referred to the military situation and the
impossibility of any one accepting these views of the
Entente. I was full of confidence in the future, and
even if that were not the case I could not conclude a
peace in the present situation which the Entente could
not dictate in other terms, even if we were beaten.
To lose Trieste and access to the Adriatic was a totally
unacceptable condition, just as much as the uncon-
ditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.

Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the
Entente demands were not couched in the terms of a

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE "191

peace of understanding, but of victory. Opinion in
neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But
in England especially there were various currents of
thought; not every one shared Lloyd George's views.
The main point was, however, to lead up to a debate
which would tend to clear up many matters, and I
seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was
assured by some, lay in the Entente's assertion that
Germany had shown remarkable military strength, but
yet had not been adequately prepared for war ; she had
not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or
provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The
Entente's idea was that if peace were made now, Ger-
many might perhaps accept even unfavorable con-
ditions, but it would be only to gain time and make
use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a
fresh war. She would make up for loss of time and
"hit out again." The Entente, therefore, considered
the preliminary condition of any peace, or even of a
discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition
of German militarism. I replied that nobody wished
for more war, and that I agreed with the Entente that a
guaranty in that connection must be secured, but that
a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by
the Central Powers and Germany was an impossibility.
It might be imagined what it would be like if one fine
day an army, far advanced in the enemy country, full
of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had to
lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept
such a proposal. Meanwhile, a general disarmament
of all the Powers was both possible and necessary.
Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitra-
tion under international control; that, according to
my idea, would present an acceptable basis. I men-
tioned my fears that the Entente rulers in this, as in the
territorial question, would not mete out the same meas-

192 IN THE WORLD WAR

ure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless
I had some guaranty in the matter I should not be in a
position to carry the plan through here and with our
allies ; anyhow, it would be worth a trial.

Long and frequent were the debates on the Central
European question, which was the Entente's terror, as
it implied an unlimited increase in Germany's power.
In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred
that the Monarchy should be made independent of
Germany, and any further advances to Berlin on the
part of Vienna checked. We rejoined that to us this
was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the mutila-
tion caused by the resolutions of the Treaty of London
forced us to investigate the matter. Apart from the
question of honor and duty to the Alliance, as matters
now stood, Germany was fighting almost more for us
than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it,
concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and
her military superiority on land; but we, with our
territory, would have to pay the Italians, Serbians, and
Rumanians for their part in the war.

I heard it said on many sides that there were men
in the Entente who readily understood this point of
view, but that the Entente nations would do what
they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the
war on promises from London. Rumania also had
been given very solid assurances, and heroic Serbia
must be compensated by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situa-
tion that had arisen through the Conference in London,
but a treaty is a treaty, and neither London nor Paris
cotild forsake their allies. Meanwhile, it was thought
likely in Entente circles that both the new Serbian
and Polish states, probably Rumania as well, would
have certain relations with the Monarchy. Further
details respecting such relations were still unknown.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 193

Our reply was we would not give up Galicia to Poland,
Transylvania and the Bukovina to Rumania, and
Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return
for a vague promise of the closer relations of those states
with the pitiful remains left to us of the Monarchy.
We were not impelled thereto by dynastic interests. I
myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice Galicia
to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many
Germans and Magyars who simply could not be made
a present of, and above all the concessions to Italy!
I once asked a neutral statesman if he could under-
stand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily
give up the arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner
Pass. The storm that would be let loose by such a
peace would uproot more than merely the Minister
who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there
were certain sacrifices which on no conditions could be
expected of any living being. I would not give up
German Tyrol, not even though we were still more
unfavorably situated. I reminded him of a picture that
represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the
driver threw out fur, coat, and whatever else he had
to the pack to check them to save himself — but he
could not throw his own child to them; rather would he
suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about
Triest and the German Tyrol. We were not in the
position of the man in the sledge, for, thank God,
we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but
even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept
a peace that deprived us of Bozen and Meran.

My Hstener did not disagree with my argument, but
could see no end to the war in that way. England was
ready to carry on the war for another ten years and,
in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German
people, for whom no hatred was felt — always the same
repetition of that deceptive argument — but German

194 IN THE WORLD WAR

militarism. England was in a condition of constraint.
Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany were not
defeated in this war she would continue with still more
extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in
London; she would then, in a few years, have not one
hundred, but one thousand, U-boats, and then England
would be lost. Then England was also fighting for
her own existence, and her will was iron. She knew
that the task would be a hard one, but it would not
crush her. In London they cite again the example of
the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with, ''What man
has done man can do again.'*

This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all
occasions, and the suggestion constantly was put for-
ward that if we were to declare ourselves satisfied with
a general disarmament, that in itself would be a great
advantage and an important step toward peace.

My speech on October 2, 191 7, at Budapest, on the
necessity of securing a reorganized world was prompted
by the argument that militarism was the greatest ob-
stacle in the wa^'' of any advance in that direction.

At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an
audience of party leaders. I had to take into con-
sideration that too pacifist a tone would have an effect
at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At home
the lesser powers of resistance would be still further
paralyzed, and abroad it would be taken as the end of
our capacity for fighting, and would further check all
friendly intentions.

The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a
new world organization is as follows:

The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to^ have
said words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was
true respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine
a maxim less smted to the present day. The millions who are fight-
ing, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to know why

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 195

and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to know why
peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet been made.

When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly
to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should
tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace negotia-
tions as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of a peace
of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained, though on
broad Hnes only, the peace idea of the Austro-Himgarian Monarchy.
Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have reproached
me for speaking so openly. The argiunents of the said critical
gentlemen have only confirmed my belief of the justness of my
views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am
that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my
attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called
upon to-day to tell the public how the imperial and royal govern-
ment will deal with the further development of the utterly distorted
European conditions.

Our program for the reconstruction of the world organization,
preferably to be called the building of a new world organization, is
given in our answer to the peace note of the Holy Father. It, there-
fore, only remains for me to-day to complete the program and,
above all, to state what were the considerations that decided us to
accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It will
come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear incomprehensible,
that the Central Powers, and especially Austria-Hungary, should
be willing to desist from future military armament, as it is only
their military power that has protected them through these trying
years against vastly superior forces.

Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but
it has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the founda-
tions of former European policy. Among many other political
theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring
state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the
Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and
caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But
having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at
any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on a
proper imderstanding of oiu" vital needs in Europe and that no
hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms. Until
the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could not do
without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to un-
favorable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the
legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have

196 IN THE WORLD WAR

been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down
arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration. This
being recognized by the world affords us the possibility of not only
accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of arbitration, but,
as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with all our energy for its
realization, as we have for some time past.

After this war, Europe must doubtless be placed on a new juridical
basis of which the permanency can be guaranteed. This juridical
basis will, I beHeve, be of a fourfold nature:

In the first place, it must furnish a guaranty that there shall
be no war of revenge on any side ; we must make sure that we can
bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will be
spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have under-
gone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can achieve
that. The only manner by which it can be attained is international
disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of the principle
of arbitration. It is needless to say that these measures for dis-
armament must not be confined to one separate state or to a single
group of Powers, and that they apply equally to land, water, and
air. War as a factor in policy must be combated. A general, uni-
form and progressive disarmament of all the states in the world
must be established on an international basis and under international
control, and the defensive forces limited to the utmost. I am well
aware that this object will be difficult to achieve and that the path
that leads thereto is long and thorny and full of difficulties. And
yet I am firmly convinced it is a path that must be trodden and will
be trodden, no matter whether it is approved of individuals or not.
It is a great mistake to imagine that after such a war the world can
begin from where it left off in 19 14. A catastrophe such as this
war does not pass by and leave no trace, and the most terrible mis-
fortune that could happen to us would be if the race for armaments
were to continue after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean
the economic ruin of all states. Before the war began the military
burdens to be borne were heavy — though we specially note that
Austria-Hungary was far from being on a high level of military
preparedness when we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and
it was only during the war that she resumed her armaments — but
after this war an open competition in armaments would render state
burdens all round simply intolerable. In order to keep a high
standard of armaments in open competition all the states would have
to secure a tenfold supply of everything — ten times the artillery,
munition-factories, vessels, and U-boats of former days, and also
many more soldiers to work the machinery. The annual military

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 197

budget of all the Great Powers would comprise many milliards — it
would be impossible, with all the other burdens which the belligerent
states will have to bear after peace is concluded. This expense,
I repeat, would mean the ruin of the nations. To return, however,
to the relatively limited armaments in existence previous to 19 14
would be quite impossible, for any individual state which would
be so far behind that its military strength would not count. The
expense incurred would be futile. But were it possible to return to
the relatively low level of armaments in 19 14, that in itself would
signify an international lowering of armaments. But then there
would be no sense in not going farther and practically disarming
altogether.

There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute
international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any
object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world guarantee
the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to the lowest
limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the interior. This
will only be possible on an international basis; that is, under inter-
national control. Every state will have to cede some of its indepen-
dence to insure a world peace. The present generation will prob-
ably not live to see this great pacifist movement fully completed.
It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I consider it our duty to put
ourselves at the head of the movement and do all that lies in human
power to hasten its achievement. The conclusion of peace will
establish the fundamental principles.

If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory international
arbitration system as well as general disarmament on land, the
second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas and dis-
armament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not extend
the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that special rules
and regulations must be laid down for the connecting sea routes.
If these two factors have been settled and assured, any reason
for territorial adjustments on the plea of insuring national safety
is done away with, and this forms the third fundamental principle
of the new international juridical basis. This idea is the gist of the
beautiful and sublime note that His Holiness the Pope addressed
to the whole worldo We have not gone to war to make conquests,
and we have no aggressive plans. If the international disarmament
that we so heartily are longing for be adopted by our present enemies
and becomes a fact, then we are in no need of assurances of territorial
safety; in that case, we can give up the idea of expanding the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, provided, of course, that the enemy
has entirely evacuated our own territory.

198 IN THE WORLD WAR

The fourth principle to enforce in order to insure a free and
peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have
experienced is the free economic participation by every one and the
unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature
must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we con-
clude peace we must have the positive assurance that our present
enemies have given up that idea.

Those, my honorable friends, are the principles of the new world
organization as it presents itself to me, and they are all based on
general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the papal note,
has also positively recognized the idea of a general disarmament.
Our present enemies have likewise, partly, at any rate, adopted
these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points,
but agree thoroughly on one — that there nevermore should be a war
of revenge.

The impression made by my speech on the Entente
surpassed the most pessimistic expectations. In order
not to approach too closely the subject of their own
disarmament, my propositions were said to be hypo-
critical and a peace trap. This needs no comment.

Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the sup-
port of and secure a guaranty from Germany that
she would disarm, it would have been an opportu-
nity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise
the greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders.
But the sword was knocked out of my hand by them
themselves, for the retort came from Berlin: Here is
the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of disarma-
ment as they reject everything coming from us. There
is only one way out of it — a fight to the end and then
victory.

Again did the Entente force the peoples of the
Central Powers to side unconditionally with the
generals.

Never in the whole term of my office did I receive
so many letters as after my speech — both for and
against, with both sides equally impetuous. "Death
sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 199

and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and
agreement.

In the autumn of 191 7 the peace movement di-
minished visibly. The U-boat fiasco was very obvious.
England saw that she was able to overcome the dan-
ger. The German military leaders still spoke of the
positively expected successes of their submarines,
but the tenor of their predictions became very different.
There was no longer any talk of the downfall of Eng-
land within a few months. A new winter campaign
was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted
that, though mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this
was not so respecting the effect of the U-boats, and that
England would collapse. The U-boat warfare had
achieved this amount of success, that the western
front remained intact, though it would otherwise have
fallen.

The military situation underwent a change in the
autumn. The end of the war in the east was within
sight, and the possibility of being able to fling the
enormous masses of troops from the east into the line
in the west, and at last break through there, greatly
improved the situation.

It was not the U-boat campaign that brought about
a decision at sea, but it enabled a final decision on land
to be made; such was the new military opinion. Paris
and Calais could not be taken.

In these different phases of military hopes and ex-
pectations we floated like a boat on a stormy sea. In
order to land in the haven of peace we needed a mili-
tary wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only
could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would
help us to reach the saving shores. As long as the
enemy persisted only in dealing with the crushed and
depopulated Central Powers all was in vain.

I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare.

200 IN THE WORLD WAR

I believed in a break-through on the western front,
and during the winter of 191 7-18 Hved in the hope
that by such means we might break the obstinate love
of destruction in our enemies.

As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained
the same peace was impossible, as was also the bringing
of any outside pressure to bear on Germany, for it was
true that "the German army was fighting more to
support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own
existence."

Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions
of the Treaty of London confronted us. They forced
us always to take up arms again, and drove us back
into the field.

• ••••••

At the time of writing these lines, in June, 1919,
Austria has long ceased to exist. There is only left
now a small, impoverished, wretched land called Ger-
man-Austria, a country without army or money; help-
less, starving, and well-nigh in despair. This country-
has been told of the peace terms at St. -Germain. It
has been told it must give up the Tyrol as far as the
Brenner Pass, that Andreas Hofer's mountains are
to be handed over to Italy. And defenseless and
helpless as it is, it sends up a cry of despair and frantic
grief. One voice only is heard — such peace is impos-
sible !

How could an Austrian government accept the
dictates of London at a time when our armies stood
far advanced in enemy country, unvanquished and
unbroken, when we had for ally the strongest land
Power in the world, and when the greatest generals
of the war so firmly beHeved in the break-through and
in final victory?

To demand that in 1917 or 1918 I should have
accepted peace terms which in 1919 were rejected by

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE loi

the whole of the German-Austrian people is sheer
madness. But it may be there is method in such
madness. The method of using every means to dis-
credit the ''old regime."

• ••••••

In the beginning of August, 191 7, an effort was
made at a rapprochement between England and Ger-
many which, unfortunately, almost immediately broke
down.

At the suggestion of England a neutral Power had
sounded Germany with regard to Belgium. Germany
replied that she was ready for direct verbal negotia-
tions with England on the Belgian question. In trans-
mitting this favorable answer, Germany did not intrust
it to the same neutral Power that had brought the
message, but for some unknown reason confided it to a
trusted messenger from another neutral country. This
latter appears to have been guilty of some indiscreet
dealings, and when rumors of the affair reached Paris
it caused some anxiety. It was probably thought
there that England was more interested in the Belgian
than in the Alsace-Lorraine question.

The messenger sent from Berlin thought that his
task had failed, and sent word to Berlin that, owing
to his errand having been made known, the opinion
among the Entente was that every step taken by
Germany was condemned beforehand to failure.

The government which had employed the messenger
took up the case on its own initiative, and transmitted
the German reply to London. No answer was ever
received from England.

This is the account as given to me post festum by
Berlin, and doubtless reflects Berlin's views. Whether
the incident in detail was exactly as described, or
whether many more hitherto unknown events took
place, has not been proved.

202 IN THE WORLD WAR

During the war all happenings on the other side of
the trenches were looked upon with dim and gloomy-
eyes as through a veil, and, according to news received
by me later, it was not clear whether England had
sent an answer. Whether it was despatched and held
up on the way, or what became of it I never knew.
It is said never to have reached Berlin.

A warlike speech by Asquith on September 27 th
appears to be connected with this unsuccessful attempt,
and served to calm the Allies.

It appears extremely doubtful to me, however,
whether this advance would have led to anything,
had the occasion been more favorable. The previously
mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis
dates from those August days, a letter referring to
Belgian projects which were very far removed from the
English ideas on the subject. And even if it had been
possible to settle the Belgian question, there would
have been the Alsace-Lorraine question, which linked
France and England together, and, first and foremost,
the question of disarmament. The chasm that di voided
the two camps would have grown so wide that no
bridge could possibly have spanned it.

Not until January, 191 8, did I learn the English
version. According to that, the Germans are said
to have taken the first steps, and the English were not
disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It
was stated in Vorwdrts that the suggestion was made
at the instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that
subsequently military influence gained the upper hand.
The episode did not tend to improve the frame of
mind of the leading men in England.

• »•••••

In the early summer of 191 7 conditions seemed favor-
able for peace and the hope of arriving at an under-
standing, though still far distant, was not exactly a

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 203

Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our
group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have
contributed to stiffen the desire for war in the Entente
countries cannot definitely be stated. Both factors
had a share in it. Before we came to a deadlock in the
negotiations, the position was such that even in case
of a separate peace we should have been compelled to
accept the terms of the Conference of London. Whether
the Entente would have abandoned that basis if we
had not veered from the straight course, and by un-
official cross-purposes become caught in the toils of
separatist desires, but had quickty and consistently
carried out our task, is not proved, and never will be.
After the debacle in the winter of 191 9 it was intimated
to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power
a peace of understanding with Germany became out
of the question. His standpoint was that Germany
must be definitely vanquished and crushed. Our
negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and
Clemenceau only came into power when the peace
negotiations had become entangled and were beginning
to falter.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and
England would have welcomed a separate peace on
our part, even during Clemenceau's period of office;
but in that case we should have had to accept the terms
of the London Conference.

Such was the peace question then. How it would
have developed if no misleading policy had come into
being naturally cannot be stated.

I am not putting forward suppositions, but confirming
facts. And the fact remains,, that the failure of the
U-boat campaign, on the one hand, and a policy carried
on behind the backs of the responsible men, on the other
hand, were the reasons why the favorable moment
passed and the peace efforts were checked. And I

204 IN THE WORLD WAR

herewith repeat that this fact does not in itself prove
that peace negotiations would not also have failed
later if the two reasons mentioned above had not

existed.

It became quite clear in the autumn that the war
would have to continue. In my speeches to delegations
I endeavored to leave no doubt that we were faithful
to our allies. When I said, ' ' I see no difference between
Strassburg and Trieste," I said it chiefly for Sofia and
Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple
AlHance was the greatest danger. I still hoped to be
able to prop the trembling foundations of the Alliance
policy, and either to secure a general peace in the
east, where the mihtary opposition was giving way,
or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German
break-through on the western front.

Several months after my dismissal in the summer of
1 91 8 I spoke in the Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and
warned every one present against trying to undermine
the Quadruple Alliance. When I declared that "honor,
duty to the AlHance, and the call for self-preservation
compel us to fight by the side of Germany," I was mis-
understood. It did not seem as though the public
reahzed that the moment the Entente thought the
Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that
moment our cause was lost. Had the public no knowl-
edge of the London agreement? Did it not know that
a separate peace would hand us over totally defenseless
to those cruel conditions? Did they not realize that
the German army was the shield that afforded us the
last and only possibility of escaping the fate of being
broken up?

My successor steered the same course as I had done,
doubtless from the same reasons of honor and the call
for self-preservation. I have no particulars as to what
occurred in the summer of 1918.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 205

Afterward events followed in rapid succession. First
came our terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente
break-through on the western front, and finally the
Bulgarian secession, which had gradually been ap-
proaching since the summer of 191 7.

Ill

As is the case in all countries, among the Entente
during the war there were many and varied currents
of thought. When Clemenceau came into office the
definite destruction of Germany was the dominant
war aim.

To those who neither see nor hear the secret informa-
tion which a Foreign Minister naturally has at his dis-
posal, it may appear as though the Entente, in the
question of crushing Germany's military strength,
had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I
think that this may have been the case in the spring
of 191 7, but not later, when any such hope was decep-
tive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote in a
somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the
determining influence in England.

When sounding England on different occasions, I
endeavored to discover by what means the dissolution
of the military power in Germany was to be or could be
guaranteed — and I invariably came to an impasse.
It was never explained how England intended to carry
out the proposal.

The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong
and determined people except by defeating them,
but such an aim was not to ^be openly admitted to us
in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not
suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other
proposals could lead to a decision.

Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would havQ

2o6 IN THE WORLD WAR

been content with a parliamentary regime which would
have deprived the Emperor of power and given it to the
Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not later.
The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A
disarmament treaty with Germany would be a treaty
between a fox and many geese," conveyed what he
really thought.

After my Budapest speech, which was treated with
such scorn and contempt in the press and by public
opinion on the other side of the Channel, word was
sent to me from an English source that it was said the
"Czernin scheme" might settle the question. But
again it was not Lloyd George who said that.

Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the
English Prime Minister, and with them the great
majority in France and England, had of Germany's
intentions, no measure could be devised that would
have given London and Paris a sufficient guaranty for
a future peaceful policy. From the summer of 191 7, no
matter what Germany had proposed, Lloyd George
would always have rejected it as inadequate.

In consequence of this it was quite immaterial later
to the course of the war that Germany not only did
nothing whatever to allay English fears, but, on the
contrary, poured oil in the fire and fanned the flames.

Germany, the leading military Power in the war,
never for one moment thought of agreeing to disarma-
ment under international control. After my speech in
Budapest I was received in Berlin not in an unfriendly
manner, but with a sort of pity, as some poor insane
person might be treated. The subject was avoided
as much as possible. Erzberger alone told me of his
complete agreement with me.

Had Germany been victorious her militarism would
have increased enormously. In the summer of 191 7
I spoke to several generals of high standing on the

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE 207

western front, who unanimously declared that after
the war armaments must be maintained, but on a very
much greater scale. They compared this war with the
first Punic War. It would be continued and its con-
tinuation be prepared for; in short, the tactics of
Versailles. The standard of violence must be planted,
and would be the banner of the generals, the Pan-
Germans, the Fatherland party, etc. They thought
as little about a reconciliation of the nations after the
war as did the Supreme Council of Four at Versailles,
and Emperor, government and Reichstag floundered
helplessly in this torrent of violent purpose.

The military spirit flourished on the Spree as it is
doing now on the Seine and the Thames. Lloyd George
and Clemenceau will find many counterparts of them-
selves at the Unter den Linden in Berlin. The only
difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that the
one is a Frenchman and the other a German; as men
they are as like as two peas.

The Entente is victorious, and many millions are
delighted and declare that the policy of might is justi-
fied. The future only can show whether this is not a
terrible mistake. The lives of hundreds of thousands
of young, hopeful men who have fallen might have been
saved if in 191 7 peace had been made possible for us.
The triumph of victory cannot call them back to life
again. It appears to me that the Entente has con-
quered too much, too thoroughly. The madness of
expiring militarism, in spite of all its orgies, has perhaps
celebrated its last triumph at Versailles.

POSTSCKIPT

Taking it all together, the real historical truth con-
cerning the peace movement is that, in general, neither
the Entente nor the ruling, all-powerful military party

2o8 IN THE WORLD WAR

in Germany wished for a peace of understanding.
They both wished to be victorious and to enforce a
peace of violence on the defeated adversary. The
leading men in Germany — Ludendorff above all — never
had a genuine intention of releasing Belgium in an
economic and political sense ; neither would they agree
to any sacrifices. They wished to conquer in the east
and the west, and their arbitrary tendencies counter-
acted the pacifist leaning of the Entente as soon as
there were the slightest indications of it. On the other
hand, the leading men in the Entente — Clemenceau
from the first and Lloyd George later — were firmly
resolved to crush Germany, and therefore profited by
the continuous German threats to suppress all pacifist
movements in their own countries, always ready to
prove that a peace of understanding with Berlin would
be a ''pact between the fox and the geese."

Thanks to the attitude of the leading Ministers in
Germany, the Entente was fully persuaded that an
understanding with Germany was quite out of the
question, and insisted obstinately on peace terms
which could not be accepted by a Germany still un-
beaten. This closes the circular vitiosus which para-
lyzed all negotiating activities.

We were wedged in between these two movements
and unable to strike out for ourselves, because the
Entente, bound by its promises to its allies, had already
disposed of us by the Treaty of London and the under-
takings to Rumania and Serbia. We therefore could
not exercise extreme pressure on Germany, as we were
unable to effect the annulment of those treaties.

In the early summer of 191 7 the possibiHty of an
understanding seemed to show itself on the horizon, but
it was wrecked by the previously mentioned events.

CHAPTER VII

WILSON

THROUGH the dwindling away of the inclinatior
for peace in the enemy camp we were faced in the
autumn of 191 7 by the prospect either of concluding
separate peace and accepting the many complicatec
consequences of a war with Germany and the ensuing
mutilation of the Monarchy under the terms of the
Treaty of London, or else fighting on and, aided by
our allies, breaking the will for destruction of our
enemies.

If Russia was the one to let loose war, it was Italy
who perpetually stood in the way of a peace of under-
standing, insisting upon obtaining under all circum-
stances the whole of the Austrian territory promised to
her in 191 5. The Entente during the war assigned
the several parts to be enacted. France was to shed
the most blood; England, besides her fabulous military
action, to finance the war, together with America, and
diplomatic affairs to be in Italy's hands. Far too little
is known as yet, and will only later be public knowledge,
as to the extent to which Italian diplomacy dominated
affairs during the war. Our victories in Italy would
only have changed the situation if the defeats that were
suffered had led to an Italian revolution and a complete
overthrow of the regime existing there. In other words,
the royal government would not be infiuenced in its
attitude by our victories. Even had our armies

210 IN THE WORLD WAR

advanced much farther than they did, it would have
held to its standpoint in the expectation that, perhaps
not Italy herself, but her allies, would secure final
victory.

Such was the situation in the autumn of 191 7 when
Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points.

The advantage of the Wilson program in the eyes of
the whole world was its violent contrast to the terms
of the Treaty of London. The right of self-determina-
tion for the nations had been utterly ignored in London
by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy. Wilson
forbade this and declared that nations could not be
treated against their will and moved hither and thither
like the pieces in a game of chess. Wilson said that
every solution of a territorial question arising out of
this war must be arrived at in the interests and in
favor of the peoples concerned, and not as a mere
balancing or compromise of claims from rival sources;
and further, that all clearly stated national claims
would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be
afforded them, without admitting new factors or the
perpetuation of old disputes or oppositions, which in
all probability would soon again disturb the peace of
Europe and the whole world. A general peace, estab-
lished on such a basis, could be discussed — and more
in the same strain.

The publication of this clear and absolutely accept-
able program seemed from day to day to render possible
a peaceful solution of the world conflict. In the eyes
of millions of people this program opened up a world
of hope. A new star had risen on the other side of the
ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction. A
mighty man had come forward and with one powerful
act had upset the London Resolutions and, in so doing,
had reopened the gates for a peace of understanding.

From the first moment the main question was, so it

WILSON 211

seemed, what hopes were there of Wilson's program
being carried out in London, Paris, and, above all, in
Rome?

Secret information sent to me from the Entente
countries seemed to suggest that the Fourteen Points
were decidedly not drawn up in agreement with Eng-
land, France, and Italy. On the other hand, I was,
and still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken
honestly and sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed
that his program could be carried out.

Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken esti-
mate of the actual distribution of power in the Entente,
on the one hand, and his surprising ignorance of na-
tional relationships in Europe, and especially in Austria-
Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly
weaken his position and his influence on his allies.
There would be no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly
introducing Wilson into the international labyrinth
and there bewildering him with wrong directions, so
that he could not find his way out again. To begin
with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step
farther.

The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading Ger-
man-Magyar magnate in Austria-Hungary. Fifty years
ago nationalism was much less developed than it is now.
Nations were still sleeping. The Czechs, Slovaks, and
Southern Slavs, the Rumanians and Ruthenians, had
barely awakened to national Hfe. Fifty years ago it
was possible to distinguish between what was deceptive
and what gave promise of lasting. The union between
Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming
of — or was perhaps the first sign of — the world-move-
ment. At all events, it was ih the second half of the
last century that we came within the radius of inter-
national politics.

The world's racial problems found a center in Austria-

212 IN THE WORLD WAR

Hungary, whose affairs, therefore, became very promi-
nent. A chemist can inclose in his retorts different
substances and observe how, following the eternal laws
of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a
similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved
racial antagonisms might have been studied within
the Hapsburg Monarchy and the inevitable explosion
anticipated, instead of its being allowed to culminate
in the World War.

In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson
obviously felt the necessity of setthng the world prob-
lem of nationality and recognized that the Hapsburg
Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as
a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a
terrifying example. But to begin with, he overlooked
the fact that in the settling of national questions there
must be neither adversary nor ally, as these reflect
passing differences, whereas the problem of nationality
is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that
what applies to the Czechs appHes also to Ireland, that
the Armenians as well as the Ukrainians desire to live
their own national Hfe, and that the colored peoples
of Africa and India are human beings with the same
rights as white people. He also failed to see that
good will and the desire for justice are far from being
sufficient in themselves to solve the problem of nation-
ality. Thus it was that under his patronage, and
presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the
question of nationality was not solved, but simply
turned round where not actually left untouched. If
Germans and Magyars had hitherto been the domi-
nating races they would now become the oppressed.
By the terms settled at Versailles they were to be
handed over to states of other nationality. Ten years
hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as they
exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations

WILSON 213

will have appeared and become dominant. The
explosive power of unsolved questions will continue
to take effect and within a measurable space of time
again blow up the world.

Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the
program of the Treaty of London, though not attaching
sufficient importance to the national difficulties, proba-
bly hoped to be able to effect a compromise between
the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal policy.
In this connection, however, no bridge existed between
Rome and Washington. Conquests are made by right
of the conqueror — such was Clemenceau's and Orlando's
policy — or else the world is ruled on the piinciples of
national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal,
however, will not be attained — no ideal is obtainable;
but it will be brought very much nearer. Might or
right, the one alone can conquer. But Czechs, Poles,
and others cannot be freed while at the same time
Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans, and Transyl-
vanian-Hungarians are handed over to foreign states.
It cannot be done from the point of view of justice or
with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles and
St.-Germain have proved that it can be done by might
and as a temporary measure.

The solution of the question of nationality was the
point round which all Franz Ferdinand's political in-
terests were centered during his lifetime. Whether he
would have succeeded is another question, but he cer-
tainly did try. The Emperor Charles, too, was not
averse to the movement. The Emperor Francis
Joseph was too old and too conservative to make the
experiment. His idea was quieta non mover e. Without
powerful help from outside, any attempt during the
war against the German-Magyar opposition would
not have been feasible. Therefore, when Wilson came
forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the

214 IN THE WORLD WAR

skepticism with which the message from Washington
was received by the German pubHc and here, too, I
at once resolved to take up the thread.

I repeat that I never doubted the honorable and
sincere intentions entertained by Wilson — nor do I
doubt them now — but my doubts as to his powers of
carrying them out were from the first very pronounced.
It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war,
was much stronger than when he took part in the Peace
Conference. As long as fighting proceeded Wilson
was master of the world. He had only to call back his
troops from the European theater of war and the
Entente would be placed in a most difficult position.
It has always been incomprehensible to me why the
President of the United States did not have recourse
to this strong pressure during this time in order to
preserve his own war aims.

The secret information that I received soon after the
publication of the Fourteen Points led me to fear that
Wilson, not understanding the situation, would fail
to take any practical measures to secure respect for the
regulations he had laid down, and that he underesti-
mated France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition.
The logical and practical consequences of the Wilson
program would have been the public annulment of
the Treaty of London; it must have been so for us to
understand the principles on which we could enter
upon peace negotiations. Nothing of that nature
occurred, and the gap between Wilson and Orlando's
ideas of peace remained open.

On January 24, 19 18, in the Committee of the Aus-
trian Delegation, I spoke publicly on the subject of the
Fourteen Points and declared them to be — in so far as
they applied to us and not to our allies — a suitable
basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took
steps to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in

WILSON 215

a practical way the fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson
could be carried out. The negotiations were then by no
means hopeless.

Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding.
Although that episode, which represented a victory for
German militarism, cannot have been very encouraging
for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognize that we
were in an awkward position and that the charge
brought against her that Germany was making hidden
annexations did not apply to Vienna. On February
12th — thus, after the conclusion of the Brest peace —
the President, in his speech to Congress, said:

Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace
foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an
independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish inhabi-
tants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for European
settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium must be
evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions
it may involve; also that national desires must be satisfied,
even in his own Empire, in the common interests of Europe and
humanity.

Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected
with the interests of his allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is
only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances
to refer to Germany and Turkey. Recognizing and agreeing with
the important principles in question and the necessity of converting
them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more
easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed
by the United States. He would probably have gone even further
had he not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian
Alliance and the country's dependence on Germany.

In the same speech the President goes on to say :

Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of Janu-
ary 8th is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements
a stifficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own govern-
ment to justify his belief that they afford a basisjor a thorough
discussion by both governments of the aims.

2i6 IN THE WORLD WAR

And again:

I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most
confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say what
it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone from that
of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very different object
in view.

There can be no doubt that when the head of a state
at war with us speaks in such friendly terms of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs he has the best intentions
of coming to an understanding. My efforts in this
connection were interrupted by my dismissal.

In these last weeks during which I remained in ofiQce
the Emperor had definitely lost faith in me. This was
not due to the Wilson question, nor yet was it the direct
consequence of my general poHcy. A difference of
opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's
entourage and myself was the real reason. The situa-
tion became so strained as to make it unbearable.
The forces that conspired against me convinced me
that it would be impossible for me to gain my objective,
which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be ob-
tained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence.

In spite of all the rumors and stories spread about
me, I do not intend to go into details unless I should be
compelled to do so by accounts derived from reliable
sources. I am still convinced to this day that morally
I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form, because
I was neither clever nor patient enough to bend the
opposition, but would have broken it by reducing the
situation to a case of ''either — or."

CHAPTER VIII

IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

IN the autumn of 191 7 I had a visit from a subject
of a neutral state, who is a pronounced upholder
of general disarmament and world pacifism. We began,
of course, to discuss the theme of free competition in
armaments, of militarism, which in England prevails
on the sea and in Germany on land, and my visitor
entered upon the various possibilities likely to occur
when the w^ar was at an end. He had no faith in the
destruction of England, nor had I; but he thought it
possible that France and Italy might collapse. The
French and Italians could not possibly bear any
heavier burdens than already were laid on them; in
Paris and Rome, he thought, revolution was not far
distant, and a fresh phase of the war would then ensue.
England and America would continue to fight on alone,
for ten, perhaps even twenty, years. England was
not to be considered just a little island, but comprised
Australia, India, Canada, and the sea. "UAngleterre
est imbattable,'' he repeated, and America likewise.
On the other hand, the German army was also invin-
cible. The secession of France and Italy would greatly
hinder the cruel blockade, for the resources of those two
countries — once they were conquered by the Central
Powers — were very vast, and in that case he could not
see any end to the war. Finally, the world would
collapse from the general state of exhaustion. My

2i8 IN THE WORLD WAR

visitor cited the fable in which two goats met on a
narrow bridge; neither would give way to the other,
and they fought until they both fell into the water
and were drowned. The victory of one group, as in
previous wars, he continued, where the conqueror
gleaned a rich harvest of gains and the vanquished
had to bear all the losses, was out of the question in
this present war. Tout le monde perdera, et d la fin il n'y
aura que des vaincus.

I often recalled that interview later. Much that
was false and yet, as it seemed to me, much that was
true, lay in my friend's words. France and Italy did
not break down ; the end of the war came more quickly
than he thought; and the invincible Germany was
defeated. And still I think that the conclusions he
arrived at came very near the truth.

The conquerors' finances are in a very precarious
state, particularly in Italy and France ; unrest prevails ;
wages are exorbitant; discontent is general; the phan-
tom of Bolshevism leers at them; and they live in the
hope that the defeated Central Powers will have to pay,
and they will thus be saved. It was set forth in the
peace terms, but ultra posse nemo tenetur, and the
future will show to what extent the Central Powers can
fulfil the conditions dictated to them.

Since the opening of the Peace Congress at Versailles
continued war in Europe has been declared: Russians
against the whole world, Czechs against Hungarians,
Rumanians against Hungarians, Poles against Ukrain-
ians, Southern Slavs against Germans, communists
against socialists. Three-fourths of Europe is turned
into a witch's caldron where everything is concocted
except work and production, and it is futile to ask
how this self-lacerated Europe will be able to find the
war expenses laid upon her. According to human
reckoning, the conquerors cannot extract even approxi-

IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 219

mate compensation for their losses from the defeated
states, and their victory will terminate with a con-
siderable deficit. If that be the case, then my visitor
will be right — there will only be the vanquished.

If our plan in 191 7, namely, Germany to cede Alsace-
Lorraine to France in exchange for the annexation of
all Poland, together with Galicia, and all states to dis-
arm— if that plan had been accepted in Berlin and
sanctioned by the Entente — unless the non possumus
in Berlin and opposition in Rome to a change in the
Treaty of London had hindered any action — it seems
to me the advantage would not only have been on the
side of the Central Powers.

Pyrrhus also conquered at Asculum.

My visitor was astonished at Vienna. The psy-
chology of no city that he had seen during the war
could compare with that of Vienna. An amazing
apathy prevailed. In Paris there was a passionate
demand for Alsace-Lorraine; in Berlin the contrary
was demanded just as eagerly ; in England the destruc-
tion of Germany was the objective; in Sofia the con-
quest of the Dobrudja; in Rome they clamored for all
possible and impossible things; in Vienna nothing at
all was demanded. In Cracow they called for a Great
Poland; in Budapest for an unmolested Hungary; in
Prague for a united Czech state ; and in Innsbruck the
descendants of Andreas Hofer were fighting as they
did in his day for their sacred land, Tyrol. In Vienna
they asked only for peace and quiet.

Old men and children would fight the arch-enemy in
Tyrol, but if the Italians were to enter Vienna and
bring bread with them they would be received with
shouts of enthusiasm. And yet Berlin and Innsbruck
were just as hungry as Vienna. C 'est une ville sans dme.

My visitor compared the Viennese to a pretty, gay,

220 IN THE WORLD WAR

and frivolous woman, whose aim in life is pleasure
and only pleasure. She must dance, sing, and enjoy
life, and will do so under any circumstances — sans dme.

This pleasure-loving good-nature of the Viennese
has its admirable points. For instance, all enemy aliens
were better treated in Vienna than anywhere else. Not
the slightest trace of enmity was shown to those who
were the first to attack and then starve the town.

Stronger than anything else in Vienna was the desire
for sensation, pleasure, and a gay life. My friend once
saw a piece acted at one of the theaters in Vienna called,
I believe, "Der Junge Medardus." The scene is laid
during the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon. Viennese
citizens condemned to death for intriguing with the
enemy are led away by the French. In a most thrilling
scene weeping women and children bid them farewell.
A vast crowd witnesses the affair. A boy suddenly
rushes in, shouting, ''Napoleon is coming." The
crowd hurries away to see him, and cries of ''Long live
Napoleon" are heard in the distance.

Such was Vienna a hundred years ago, and it is still
the same. Une ville sans dme.

I pass on the criticism without comment.

In different circles which justly and unjustly inter-
vened in politics during my time of office, the plan was
suggested of driving a wedge between North and South
Germany, and converting the latter to the peaceful pol-
icy of Vienna in contradistinction to Prussian militarism.

The plan was a faulty one from the very first. To
begin with, as already stated, the most pronounced
obstacle to peace was not only the Prussian spirit, but
the Entente program for our disruption, which a closer
connection with Bavaria and Saxony would not have
altered. Secondly, Austria-Hungary, obviously falling

IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 221

more and more to pieces, formed no point of attraction
for Munich and Dresden, who, though not Prussian,
yet were German to the very backbone. The vague
and irresponsible plan of returning to the conditions
of the period before 1866 was an anachronism. Thirdly
and chiefly, all experiments were dangerous which
might create the impression in the Entente that the
Quadruple Alliance was about to be dissolved. In a
policy of that nature executive ability was of supreme
importance, and that was exactly what was usually
lacking.

The plan was not without good features. The
appointment of the Bavarian Count Hertling to be
Imperial Chancellor was not due to Viennese influence,
though a source of the greatest pleasure to us, and the
fact of making a choice that satisfied Vienna played a
great part with the Emperor William. Two Bavarians,
Hertling and Kiihlmann, had taken over the leader-
ship of the German Empire, and they, apart from their
great personal qualities, presented a certain natural
counter-balance to Prussian hegemony through their
Bavarian origin ; but only as far as it was still possible
in general administration which then was in a disturbed
state. But farther they could not go without causing
injury.

Count Hertling and I were on very good terms.
This wise and clear-sighted old man, whose only fault
was that he was too old and physically incapable of
offering resistance, would have saved Germany, if she
possibly could have been saved, in 191 7. In the rush-
ing torrent that whirled her away to her fall, he found
no pillar to which he could cling.

Latterly his sight began to fail and give way. He
suffered from fatigue, and the conferences and councils
lasting often for hours and hours were beyond hi?
strength.

CHAPTER IX

POLAND

BY letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Em-
perors declared Poland's existence as a kingdom.

When I came into office, I found the situation to be
that the Poles were annoyed with my predecessor
because, they declared, Germany had wanted to cede
the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and
Count Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there
is some misunderstanding in this version of the case,
as Burian says it is not correctly rendered.

There were three reasons that made the handling
of the Polish question one of the greatest difficulty.
The first was the totally different views of the case
held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favor
of the so-called Austro-PoHsh solution, Count Tisza
was strongly opposed to it. His standpoint was that
the political structure of the Monarchy ought not to
undergo any change through the annexation of Poland,
and that Poland eventually might be joined to the
Monarchy as an Austrian province, but never as a
partner in a tripartite Monarchy.

A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on
February 22, 191 7, was characteristic of his train of
thought. It was as follows :

POLAND 223

Your Excellency, — Far be it from me to raise a discussion on
questions which to-day are without actual value and most probably
will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other hand, I
wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken con-
clusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest certain
statements that appeared in the correspondence of our diplomatic
representatives.

Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the atten-
tion of your Excellency to the fact that the so-called Austro- Polish
solution of the PoHsh question has repeatedly (as in telegram No. 63
from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the "tripartite solution."

With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out
the fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the Austro-
Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent circles in the
Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland to the Mon-
archy must on no account affect its dualistic structure.

This principle was distinctly recognized by the then leaders in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers;
it was also recognized and sanctioned by his late Majesty the
Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this
view is shared by your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid mis-
understanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian government
considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political system,
from which, under no circtunstances, would it be in a position to
deviate.

It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The
uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian state, where the
German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a very
imsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that easily might
gain the upper hand should a relatively small number of the Ger-
mans, whether from social-democratic, political-reactionary, or
doctrinary reasons, separate from the other German parties. The
establishment of the new Polish element as a third factor with
Austria-Hungary in our constitutional organism would represent
an element so unsafe, and would be combined with such risks for the
further development of the poHcy of the Hapsburg Great Power,
that, in view of the position of the Monarchy as such, I should feel
the greatest anxiety lest the new and unreliable Russian-PoHsh
element, so different from us in many respects, should play too
predominating a part.

The firm retention of duajism, according to which half the political
influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and the Hungarian
and German element in common furnish a safe majority in the delega-

224 IN THE WORLD WAR

tion, alone can secure for the dynasty and the two states under its
scepter an adequate guaranty for the future.

There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital
interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the
Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose
clear perception of that fact may have become dulled during the
last peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realization
of it by the present war.

The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and
active Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condi-
tion for the existence of the Hungarian state. It was fatal for all
of us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative
qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all state and national aims,
have for centuries past not been able to devote themselves to the
common cause. The striving for a solution of the world racial
problem and the necessity of combining the responsibilities of a
Great Power with the independence of the Hungarian state have
caused heavy trials and century-long friction and fighting.

Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of
efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for liberty
did not attack the continuance of the Hapsburg Empire as a Great
Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle they never
followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown a guaranty
for their chartered rights.

Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the
scepter of the Hapsburgs; she did not w4sh to come under any
foreign rule, but to be a free nation governed by her own king and
her own laws and not subordinate to any other ruler. This prin-
ciple was repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723
and 1 791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was
found which endowed it with life and insured its being carried
out in a manner favorable for the position of a great nation.

In the period of preparation for the agreement of 1867 Hungary
was a poor and, comparatively speaking, small part of the then
Monarchy, and the great statesmen of Hungary based their admin-
istrative plan on dualism and equality as being the only possible way
for insuring that Hungarian independence, recognized and appealed
to on many occasions, should materiaHze in a framework of modem
constitutional practice.

A political structure for the Monarchy which would make it
possible for Hungary to be outvoted on the most important questions
of state affairs, and therefore subject to a foreign will, would again
have nullified all that had been achieved after so much striving and

POLAND 225

suffering, so much futile waste of strength for the benefit of us all,
which even in this war, too, would have brought its blessings. All
those, therefore, who have already stood up firmly and loyally for
the agreement of 1867 must put their whole strength into resisting
any tripartite experiments.

I would very much regret if, in connection with this question,
differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible
leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it unneces-
sary to give pubHcity to a question that is not pressing. At all
events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be avoided
which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event of a
resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken expecta-
tions in them which could only lead to the most complicated
consequences.

The most moderate Poles had made up their minds that the
dualistic structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact,
and that the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the
Austrian state, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have
to be the consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent
and injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realization of which
seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view, but
from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy.

I beg your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest
esteem. TiszA.

Budapest, February 22, 1917.

The question as to what was to be Poland's future
position with regard to the Monarchy remained still
unsolved. I continued to press the point that Poland
should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza
wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dis-
missed him, although he was favored by the majority
of the Parliament, it did not alter the situation in
regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as in
almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views;
otherwise he would not have been in the minority.

The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the
question of electoral reforms, as his successors could only
act according to Tisza's instructions. For, as leader
of the majority, which he continued to be even after

226 IN THE WORLD WAR

his dismissal, no electoral reforms could be carried
out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the
Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority
against him, which he considered quite logical, though
not agreeable.

The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans
toward Poland. At the occupation of Poland we were
already unfairly treated, and the Germans had appro-
priated the greater part of the country. Always and
ever3rwhere they were the stronger on the battle-field,
and the consequence was that they claimed the lion's
share of all the successes gained. This was in reality
quite natural, but it greatly added to all diplomatic
and political activities, which were invariably prejudiced
and hindered by military facts. When I entered upon
office Germany's standpoint was that she had a far
superior right to Poland, and that the simplest solution
would be for us to evacuate the territory we had
occupied. It was, of course, obvious that I could not
accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the point
that under no circumstances would our troops leave
Lublin. After much controversy the Germans agreed,
tant hien que mat, to this solution. The further develop-
ment of the affair showed that the German standpoint
went through many changes. In general, it fluctuated
between two extremes: either Poland must unite her-
self to Germany — the German-Polish solution — or else
vast portions of her territory must be ceded to Germany
to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained
would be either for us or for Poland herself. Neither
solution could be accepted by us. The first one for this
reason, that the Polish question being in the foreground
made our Galician question very acute, as it would
have been out of the question to retain Galicia in the
Monarchy when separated from the rest of Poland.
We were obliged to oppose the German-Polish solution,

POLAND 227

not from any desire for conquest, but to prevent the
sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose.

The second German suggestion was just as impos-
sible to carry out, because Poland, crippled beyond
recognition by the frontier readjustment, even though
united with Galicia, would have been so unsatisfactory
a factor that there would never have been any prospect
of harmonious dealings with her.

The third difficulty w-as presented by the Poles them-
selves, as they naturally wished to secure the greatest
possible profit out of their release by the Central
Powers, even though it did not contribute much to
their future happiness so far as military support was
concerned. There were many different parties among
them: first of all, one for the Entente; a second, Bilin-
sky's party; above all, one for the Central Powers,
especially when we gained military successes.

On the whole, Polish policy was to show their hand
as little as possible to any particular group, and in
the end range themselves on the side of the con-
querors. It must be admitted that these tactics were
successful.

In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost
always in Polish political circles a certain nervous
excitement, which made it extremely difficult to enter
into any calm and essential negotiations. At the very
beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the
Polish leaders and myself with regard to what I pro-
posed to do; misunderstandings which, toward the
end of my term of office, developed into the most bitter
enmity toward me on the part of the Poles. On
February 10, 191 7, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk,
I received the news from Warsaw that Herr von
Bilinsky, apparently misunderstanding my standpoint,
evolved from the facts, considered that hopes repre-
sented promises, and in so doing raised Polish expecta-

228 IN THE WORLD WAR

tions to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed, there-
upon, to our representative as follows :

February i6, igiy.

I have informed Herr von Bilinsky, as well as different other
Poles, that it is impossible, in the present imsettled European situa-
tion, to make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I
have told them that I sympathize with the Austro-Polish solution
longed for by all Poles, but that I am not in the position to say
whether this position will be attainable, though I am equally unable
to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared that our whole
policy where Poland is concerned can only consist in our leaving a
door open for all future transactions.

I added that our representative must quote my
direct orders in settling the matter.

In January, 191 7, a conference was held respecting
the Polish question ; a conference which aimed at laying
down a broad line of action for the policy to be adopted.
I first of all referred to the circumstances connected
with the previously mentioned German request for us
to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not
agreeing to the demand. I pointed out that it did
not seem probable to me that the war would end with a
dictated peace on our side, and that, with reference to
Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish
question without the co-operation of the Entente, and
that there was not much object as long as the war lasted
in endeavoring to secure fails accomplis. The main
point was that we remain in the country, and on the
conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the
Entente and the Central Powers to secure a solution
of the Austro-Polish question. That should be the
gist of our policy. Count Tisza spoke after me and
agreed with me that we must not yield to the German
demand for our evacuation of Lublin. As regards
the future, the Hungarian Prime Minister stated that
he had always held the view that we should cede to

POLAND 229

Germany our claim to Poland m exchange for economic
and financial compensation; but that, at the present
time, he did not feel so confident about it. The con-
ditions then prevailing were unbearable, chiefly owing
to the variableness of German policy, and he. Count
Tisza, returned to his former, oft-repeated opinion that
we should strive as soon as possible to withdraw with
honor out of the affair; no conditions that would lead
to further friction, but the surrendering to Germany
of our share in Poland in exchange for economic com-
pensation.

The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Clam, opposed
this from the Austrian point of view, which supported
the union of all the Poles under the Hapsburg scepter
as being the one and only desirable solution.

The feeling during the debate was that the door must
be closed against the Austro-Polish proposals, and that,
in view of the impossibility of an immediate definite
solution, we must adhere firmly to the policy that ren-
dered possible the union of all the Poles under the Haps-
burg rule.

After Germany's refusal of the proposal to accept
Galicia as compensation for Alsace-Lorraine, this pro-
gram was adhered to through various phases and vicis-
situdes until the ever-increasing German desire for
frontier readjustment created a situation which made
the achievement of the Austro-Polish project very
doubtful. Unless we could secure a Poland which,
thanks to the unanimity of the great majority of all
Poles, would willingly and cheerfully join the Mon-
archy, the Austro-Polish solution would not have been
a happy one, as in that case we should only have
increased the number of discontented elements in the
Monarchy, already very high, by adding fresh ones
to them. As it proved impossible to break the resist-
ance put up by General Ludendorff, the idea pre-

16 ~

230 IN THE WORLD WAR

sented itself at a later stage to strive for the annexation
of Rumania instead of Poland. It was a return to the
original idea of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the
union of Rumania with Transylvania, closely linked
to the Monarchy. In that case we should have lost
Galicia to Poland, but a certain compensation would
have been conceded to us in Rumania with her corn
and oil springs, and for the Monarchy, as for the Poles,
it appeared better to unite the latter collectively with
Germany rather than to divide them, as suggested in
the Vienna-Berlin dispute.

The plan for the annexation of Rumania presented
well-nigh insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing
to her geographical position, Rumania ought naturally
to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza, who was not in
favor of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to
it if the annexed country had been administered from
Budapest and in the Magyar spirit, which meant that
it would be incorporated in Hungary. This, for
obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the plan,
for the Rumanians would gain no advantage from the
annexation if it was to be at the sacrifice of their
national independence. On the other hand, the
Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable objections
to the suggestion of a future combination that would
add a rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria
would be reduced in proportion, and compensation
in one or other form was demanded. Another, but
transitory, plan was to make over Bosnia and the Herze-
govina definitely by way of compensation to Austria.
All these ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory
nature, evoked by the constantly recurring difficulties
in Berlin and Warsaw, and they invariably fell through
when it was seen that the obstacles arising from dualism
were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish
solution was taken up again, although it was impossible

POLAND 231

to extort from the Germans a definite statement as to
a reasonable western frontier for Poland. In the very
last term of my office the Rumanian plan again came
up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles
on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims
made by Germany, which rendered the Austro-Polish
solution impossible.

Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the
future organization of the Monarchy was being con-
sidered. The Emperor adhered to the correct stand-
point, as I still consider it to be, that the structure
of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the v/ar,
would have to be altered, and reconstruction on a far
more pronounced national basis be necessary. As
appHed to the Poles, this project would entail the
dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent
position for the Ruthenian Poles.

When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the
hunger riots that were beginning, I refused to agree to
the Ukrainian demands, but consented to submit
the question of the division of Galicia to the Austrian
Crown Council. I was impelled thereto by the con-
viction that we were adhering strictly to the program
as it had been planned for the Monarchy.

I will give fuller details respecting this question in
the next chapter, but will merely relate the following
incident as an example to show the degree of hostile
persecution to which I was exposed. The rumor was
spread on all sides that the Emperor had told the Poles
that ''I had concluded peace with the Ukraine without
his knowledge and against his will." It is quite out
of the question that the Emperor can have made such
a statement, as the peace conditions at Kieff were a
result of a council convoked ad hoc, where — as the
protocol proves — the Emperor and Doctor von Seidler
,were responsible for the terms.

232 IN THE WORLD WAR

The great indignation of the Poles at my conduct at
Brest-Litovsk was quite unfounded. I never promised
the Poles that they were to have the Cholm district,
and never alluded to any definite frontiers. Had I
done so the capable political leaders in Poland would
never have listened to me, as they knew very well that
the frontiers, only in a very slight degree, depended
on the decisions at Vienna. If we lost the war we
had nothing more to say in the matter; if a peace of
agreement was concluded, then Berlin would be the
strongest side, having occupied the largest portion of
the country; the question would then have to be
decided at the general Conference.

I always told the Polish leaders that I hoped to
secure a Poland thoroughly satisfied, also with respect
to her frontier claims, and there were times when we
seemed to be very near the accomplishment of such
an aim; but I never concealed the fact that there were
many influences at work restricting my wishes and
keeping them very much subdued.

The partition of Galicia was an internal Austrian
question. Doctor von Seidler took up the matter
most warmly, and at the Council expressed the hope
of being able to carry out these measures by parlia-
mentary procedure and against the opposition of the
Poles.

I will allude to this question also in my next chapter.

Closely connected with the Polish question was the
so-called Central European project.

For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Ger-
many was keenly interested in a scheme for closer union.
I was always full of the idea of turning these important
concessions to account at the right moment as com-
pensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus
promoting a peace of understanding.

During the first period of my official activity, I

POLAND 233

still hoped to secure a revision of the Treaty of
London.

I hoped, as already mentioned, that the Entente
would not keep to the resolution adopted for the
mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore,
approach the Central European question closer; had
I raised it, it would greatly have comphcated our posi-
tion with regard to Paris and London. When I was
compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly
to the decision that we were to be divided in any case,
and that any change in its purpose would only be
effected, if at all, by miHtary force, I endeavored to
work out the Central European plan in detail, and to
reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany
until the right moment had arrived to make the offer.

In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs
Union was unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the
other hand, a new and closer commercial treaty would
be desirable, and a closer union of the armies would
offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them
after the war. I was convinced that a peace of under-
standing would bring about disarmament, and that
the importance of miHtary settlements would be in-
fluenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of peace
would bring with it different relations between all
states, and that, therefore, the political and miHtary
decisions to be determined in the settlement with Ger-
many were not of such importance as those relating
to economic questions.

The drawing up of this program was met, however, by
the most violent opposition on the part of the Emperor.
He was particularly opposed to all miHtary rap-
prochement.

When the attempt to approach the question failed
through the resistance from the crown, I arranged
on my own initiative for a debate on the economic

234 IN THE WORLD WAR

question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in
which he forbade any further deaHngs in the matter.
I answered his letter by a business report, pointing
out the necessity of continuing the negotiations.

The question then became a sore point between the
Emperor and myself. He did not give his permission
for further negotiations, but I continued them notwith-
standing. The Emperor knew of it, but did not make
further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put
forward by the Germans made the negotiations ex-
tremely difficult, and with long intervals and at a very
slow pace they dragged on until I left office.

Afterward the Emperor went with Burian to the
German headquarters. Following that, the Salzburg
negotiations were proceeded with and, apparently, at
greater speed.

CHAPTER X

BREST-LITOVSK

IN the summer of 191 7 we received information which
seemed to suggest a likelihood of reahzing the con-
templated peace with Russia. A report dated June
13, 191 7, which came to me from a neutral country, ran
as follows:

The Russian press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the following
state of affairs :

At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife
as to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the
Allies and now also energetically advocated by Kerensky in speeches
throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists
under the leadership of Lenin, with their press, are taking a definite
stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the Menshe-
viks as well — i.e., Tscheide's party, to which the present Ministers
Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong— is likewise opposed to the offensive,
and the lack of unanimity on this question is threatening the unity
of the party, which has only been maintained with difficulty up to
now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled Internationalists from
their trying to re-establish the old Internationale, also called Zim-
merwalder or Kienthaler, and led by Trotzky, or, more properly,
Bronstein, who has returned from America, with Larin, Martow,
Martynoz, etc., returned from Switzerland, are on this point, as
with regard to the entry of Menshevik Social Democrats into the
Provisional government, decidedly opposed to the majority of the
party. And for this reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of
the Marxian Social Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the
party, as being too little patriotic for his views and not insisting
on final victory. He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief

236 IN THE WORLD WAR

supporters of the Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed,
after their press organ, the Echinstvo group, but is of no importance
either as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that
the official organ of the Mensheviks, the Rahocaja Gazeta, is forced
to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for instance,
frequent articles against the offensive.

There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the
Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is per-
haps the strongest of all the Russian parties, having succeeded
in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its course; at the
Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the peasants' deputies
were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social Democrat was elected to
the executive committee of the Peasants' Deputies' Council. A
section of this party, and, it would seem, the greater and more influ-
ential portion, is definitely opposed to any offensive. This is plainly
stated in the leading organs of the party, Delo Naroda and Zemlja i
Wolja. Only a small and apparently uninfluential portion, grouped
round the organ Volja Naroda, faces the bourgeois press with uncon-
ditional demands for an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the
Plechanow group. Kerensky's party, the Trudoviks, as also the
related People's Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minis-
ter of Food, Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow
Kerensky here or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the
Russian press, as, for instance, the Retsch, assert that Kerensky's
health gives grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time.
The official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council,
the hwestija, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great
emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is
characteristic that a speech made by the IMinister of Agriculture,
Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning
that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to
justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that such
had been his meaning.

While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question
of an offensive, the men at the front appear but Uttle inclined^ to
undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the Russian
press, the symptoms being regarded either with satisfaction or with
regret. The infantry in particular are against the offensive; the
only enthusiasm is to be found among the officers, in the cavabry or
a part of it, and the artillery. It is characteristic also that the
Cossacks are in favor of war. These, at any rate, have an ulterior
motive, in that they hope by success at the front to be able ulti-
mately to overthrow the revolutionary regime. For there is this to

BREST-LITOVSK 237

be borne in mind: that while most of the Russian peasants have no
landed property exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no
land at all, every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction
which is constantly being referred to in all discussions of the land
question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of the
Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also that
they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of

the Tsar.

Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the follow-
ing details:

At the sitting on May 30th of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers'
Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3d Elizabethengrad
Hussars is stated, according to the Retsch of May ist, to have given,
in a speech for the offensive, the following characteristic statement:
"You all know to what extremes the disorder at the front has
reached. The infantry cut the wires connecting them with their
batteries and declare that the soldiers will not remain more than one
month at the front, but will go home."

It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from
the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority
Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the Rabocaja
Gazeta, May i8th and 19th— this is the organ of the Mensheviks
—i.e., that of Tscheide, Tseretelli, and Skobeleff . These Entente
Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness that
the Russian army could not and would not fight for the imperiahstic
aims of England and France. The state of the transport, provisions
and forage supplies, as also the danger to the achievements of the
Revolution by further war, demanded a speedy cessation of hos-
tilities. The EngHsh and French SociaHst delegates were said
to be not altogether pleased at this state of feeling at the front.
And it was further demanded of them that they should undertake
to make known the result of their experience in Russia on the
western front — i.e., in France. There was some very plain speaking,
too, with regard to America: representatives from the Russian front
spoke openly of America's poHcy of exploitation toward Europe
and the Allies. It was urged then that an international Socialist
conference should be convened at the earliest possible moment,
and supported by the English and French majority SociaHsts. At
one of the meetings at the front, the French and English Socialists
were given the following reply:

"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from
your governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities.
We will shed no drop of blood for imperiahsts, whether they be

238 IN THE WORLD WAR

Russians, Germans, or English. We await the speediest agreement
between the workers of all countries for the termination of the war,
which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued, prove
disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude any
separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims as
soon as possible."

According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether
converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case,
from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and
Moutet at the French Socialist Congress, The English, on the other
hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined
somewhat toward the Russian point of view.

Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the Minister
of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at the Russian
front.

The disorganization at the front is described by an officer or
soldier at the front in the same organ, the Rahocaja Gazeta, for
May 26th, as follows:

"The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye,
even a peace costing the loss of ten governments {i.e., districts), is
growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it passionately,
even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and in revolutions,
even though all conscious elements of the army fight against this
party that longs for peace." And to paralyze this, there can be but
one way: let the soldiers see the democracy fighting emphatically
for peace and the end of the war.

The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates'
Councils and the Army Organization at the front in St. Petersburg
June ist to 14th took for its first point in the order of the day the fol-
lowing: "The war, questions of defense and the struggle for peace."
At this time the government v/ould doubtless have to give a declara-
tion with regard to the answer already received at the beginning
of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This congress will also
probably decide definitely upon the nomination for the Stockholm
Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals with the ques-
tion of nationality. An open conflict had broken out between
the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and the
Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of the
formation of a Ukrainian army. The appointment of a "Ukrai-
nian Army General Committee" further aggravated the conflict.

With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing
seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in con-

BREST-LITOVSK 239

nection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed report
dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded later.

At the end of November I wrote to one of my friends
the following letter, which I here give in extenso, as it
shovv^s faithfully my estimate of the situation at the

time:

Vienna, November 77, igi/-

My dear Friend, — After many days, full of trouble, annoyance,
and toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very
noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my
thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at least,
to forget the wretchedness of every day.

You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well •
between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. ^ I am
sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the friction
of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree. As soon
as a thing of this sort leaks out— and it does so fast enough— all
enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed strength, making
for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing my overthrow.
These good people are like carrion vultures — I myself am the carrion
—they can scent from afar that there is something for them to do,
and come flying to the spot. And the lies they invent and the
intrigues they contrive, with a view to increasing existing differences
— really, they are worthy of admiration. You ask, who are these
inveterate enemies of mine?

Well, first of a 1, those whom you yourself conjecture.

And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the nimibers
of those who would fane be in his place. Finally, a crowd of political
mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted because they
had hoped for some personal advantage through my influence, and
I have ignored them. No. i is a comfortingly negligible quantity.
No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 3 are deadly.

In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked,
reHef is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia
quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all round.
All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the govern-
ment there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as possible.
But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can throw
their massed forces against the west, they have no doubt of being
able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly threaten
England. Such a success, however, could only lead to peace if

^40 IN THE WORLD WAR

Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of conquest. I,
at any rate, cannot believe that the Entente, after losing Paris and
Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as inter pares — it would at
least be necessary to make every endeavor in that direction. Up
to now Hindenburg has done all that he promised, so much we
must admit, and the whole of Germany believes in his forthcoming
success in the west — always taking for granted, of course, the
freeing of the eastern front; that is to say, peace with Russia.
The Russian peace, then, may prove the first step on the way to the
peace of the world.

I have during the last few days received reliable information
about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews,
with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country that
is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the most
interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make peace,
and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for they
cannot carry on the war.

In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines
to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage;
the second does not take this view at all, but is, nevertheless, un-
willing to treat with a revolutionary of this sort; and the third
consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I will treat with
him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of his position and the
certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's period of power the
more need to act speedily, for no subsequent Russian government
will recommence the war — and I cannot take a Russian Mettenich
as my partner when there is none to be had.

The Germans are hesitating — they do not altogether like the idea
of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons
already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the case.
The German military party — ^which, as every one knows, holds the
reins of policy in Germany entirely — have, as far as I can see, done
all they could to overthrow Kerensky and set up ''something else"
in his place. Now, the something else is there and is ready to make
peace; obviously, then, one must act, even though the party con-
cerned is not such as one would have chosen for oneself.

It is impossible to get any exact information about these Bolshe-
viks; that is to say, there is plenty of information available, but
it is contradictory. The way they begin is this : everything in the
least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture must be destroyed,
and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and equality seem no
longer to have any place on their program; only a bestial sup-
pression of all but the proletariat itself. The Russian bourgeois

BREST-LITOVSK 241

class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly as our own, and
its members let themselves be slaughtered like sheep.

True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we
had the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to
force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would be
better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to march
on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the
power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our
ov;n salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans
get to Paris— and they cannot get to Paris unless their eastern
front is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German
military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether illogical of
them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal grounds.

I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this
to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter
which you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate
peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it and told him that this
would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could
not take such a step myself, but would be wilHng to resign under
some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to
make the attempt. The Conference of London has determined on a
division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would
avail to alter that. The Rumanians, Serbians, and Italians are to
receive enormous compensations; we are to lose Trieste, and the
remainder is to be broken up into separate states — Czechish, Polish,
Hungarian, and German. There will be very slight contact between
these new states; in other words, a separate peace would mean
that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be
hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result we must
fight on, and that, moreover, against Germany, which will, of course,
make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy. The
German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the Entente
has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to make
Austria itself the theater of war. So that instead of bringing the
war to an end, we should be merely changing one opponent for
another and delivering up provinces hitherto spared — such as
Bohemia and Tyrol— to the fury of battle, only to be wrecked com-
pletely in the end.

On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time,
secure peace all round, with Germany as well — a tolerable peace of
mutual understanding— always provided the German offensive turiis
out successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his
entourage, one pulls this way, another that— and we gain nothing

242 IN THE WORLD WAR

in that manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing
the confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy,
then let him do it — le remede sera pire que le mal — but to be forever
dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the pose without
carrying it out in reality — this I cannot regard as prudent policy.

I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding;
we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain
nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the
entire structure of the Monarchy — after the fashion of the federation
Danubienne proposed to France — and I am certainly rather at a loss
to see how this can be done in face of the Germans and Hungarians.
But I hope we may survive the war, and I hope also that they will
ultimately revise the conditions of the London Conference. Let
but old Hindenburg once make his entry into Paris, and then the
Entente must utter the decisive word that it is willing to treat.
But when that moment comes, I am firmly determined to do the
utmost possible to appeal publicly to the peoples of the Central
Powers and ask them if they prefer to fight on for conquest or if
they will have peace.

To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through
the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to
make peace — even at a loss — that is my plan and the hope for which
I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all ''leading" men
— with the exception of the Emperor Karl — will demand a "good"
peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of having
"spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself.

So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled.
But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in
throes and convulsions. I said so pubHcly some time back, in my
Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically
on all sides.

This has made a long letter, after all, and it is late. Lebe wohl,
and let me hear from you again soon. — In friendship as of old, yours,

[signed] Czernin.

With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-
Litovsk, I will leave my diary to speak for itself.
Despite many erroneous views that may appear in the
following notes and various unimportant details, I
have not abbrev^iated it at all, since it gives, in its
present form, what I believe will be a clear picture of
the development.

BREST-LITOVSK 243

**December iq, IQI7- — Departure from Vienna,
Wednesday 19th.

''Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party
already assembled there : Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo,
Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut. Field-Marshal
Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden.

''I took the opportunity on the journey to give
Csicserics an idea of my intentions and the tactics to
be pursued. I told him that in my opinion Russia
would propose a general peace, and that we must of
course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first
steps for a general peace would be taken at Brest,
and not given up for a long time. Should the Entente
not accept, then at least the way would be open for a
separate peace. After that I had long discussions with
Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the
whole day.

^'December 20, iQi'/. — ^Arrived at Brest a few minutes
past five. At the station were the Chief of Staff, Gen-
eral Hoffmann, with some ten of his suite, also the
emissary Roseberg and Merey with my party. I
greeted them on the platform, and after a few words
Merey went into the train with me to tell me what
had happened during the past few days. On the whole,
Merey takes a not unfavorable view of the situation
and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops
up, we should succeed within a reasonable time in
arranging matters satisfactorily.

''At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General
Hoffmann; he gave me some interesting details as to
the mentality of the Russian delegates, and the nature
of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I
had the impression that the general combined expert
knowledge and energy with a good deal of calm and
ability, but also not a little Prussian brutality, whereby
he had succeeded in persuading the Russians, despite

244 IN THE WORLD WAR

opposition at first, to agree to very favorable terms of
truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of
Bavaria came in, and I had a little talk with him on
matters of no importance.

*'We then went to dinner, all together, including the
whole staff of nearly one hundred persons. The dinner
presented one of the most remarkable pictures ever
seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the
Prince sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew
called Joffe, recently liberated from Siberia; then came
the generals and the other delegates. Apart from
this Joffe, the most striking personality in the delega-
tion is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign
Minister, Trotzky, a man named Kamenew, who,
likewise liberated from prison during the Revolution,
now plays a prominent part. The third delegate is
Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past.
Her husband is a minor official; she herself took an
early part in the revolutionary movement. Twelve
years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor
of some Russian city, who had been condemned to
death by the Socialists for his energy. She appeared
before the general with a petition, holding a revolver
imder her petticoat. When the general began to
read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him
on the spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived
for twelve years, at first in solitary confinement, after-
ward under somewhat easier conditions; she also owes
her freedom to the Revolution. This remarkable
woman learned French and German in Siberia well
enough to read them, though she cannot speak them,
not knowing how the words should be pronounced.
She is the type of the educated Russian proletariat.
Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious deter-
mined set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up pas-
sionately at times. All that is taking place around

BREST-LITOVSK 245

her here she seems to regard with indifference. Only
when mention is made of the great principle of the
International Revolution does she suddenly awake,
her whole expression alters; she reminds one of a
beast of prey seeing its victim at hand and preparing
to fall upon it and rend it.

"After dinner I had my first long conversation with
Hr. Joffe. His whole theory is based on the idea of
establishing the right of self-determination of peoples
on the broadest basis throughout the world, and trusting
to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual love.
Joffe does not deny that the process would involve
civil war throughout the world, to begin with, but
he believes that such a war, as realizing the ideals of
humanity, would be justified, and its end worth all it
would cost. I contented myself with telling him that
he must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was
the way to a happier age; when he had shown this to
be so, the rest of the world would be won over to his
ideals. But until his theory had been proved by
example he would hardly succeed in convincing people
generally to adopt his views. We were ready to
conclude a general peace without indemnities or annexa-
tions, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the develop-
ment of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment
of the Russian government itself. We should also be
willing to learn something from Russia, and if his
revolution succeeded he would force Europe to follow
him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there
was a great deal of skepticism about, and I pointed
out to him that we should not ourselves undertake
any imitation of the Russian methods, and did not wish
for any interference with our own internal affairs ; this
we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavoring
to carry out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on
ourselves, he had better go back home by the next

246 IN THE WORLD WAR

train, for there could be no question of making peace.
Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft
eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost
imploring tone that I shall never forget, he said : ' Still,
I hope we may yet be able to raise the revolution in
your country too.'

"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good
Joffe, I fancy, in bringing about a revolution among
ourselves; the people will manage that, if the Entente
persist in refusing to come to terms.

' ' They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They
talk of freedom and the reconciliation of the peoples
of the world, of peace and unity, and withal they are
said to be the most cruel tyrants history has ever
known. They are simply exterminating the bour-
geoisie, and their arguments are machine-guns and the
gallows. My talk to-day with Joffe has shown me
that these people are not honest, and in falsity surpass
all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to
oppress decent citizens in this fashion and then talk
at the same time of the universal blessing of freedom —
it is sheer lying.

''December 21, 1917. — I went with all my party to
lunch at noon with the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in
a Httle bit of a palace half an hour by car from Brest.
He seems to be much occupied with miUtary matters
and is very busy.

"I spent the first night in the train, and while we
were at breakfast our people moved in with the luggage
to our residence. We are in a small house, where I
Hve with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite close
to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that
could be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at
work with my people, and in the evening there was a
meeting of the delegates of the three Powers. This
evening I had the first talk with Kiihlmann alone, and

BREST-LITOVSK 247

at once declared positively that the Russians would
propose a general peace, and that we must accept it.
Kuhlmann is half disposed to take my view himself;
the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand
annexations or indemnities ' ; then, if the Entente agree,
we shall have an end of all this suffering. But, alas!
it is hardly likely that they will.

''December 22, 1917. — The forenoon was devoted to
the first discussion among the allies, the principles just
referred to as discussed with Kuhlmann being then
academically laid down. In the afternoon the first
plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being opened
by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Doctor Kiihl-
mann. It was decided that the Powers should take
it in turns to preside, in order of the Latin alphabet as
to their names — i.e., Allemagne, Autriche, etc. Doctor
Kuhlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles
on which he considered a future peace should be based,
and the Russian delegate then went through the six
main tenets already familiar from the newspapers.
The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give
a reply as early as possible after having discussed
the matter among ourselves. These, then, were the
proceedings of the first brief sitting of the peace
congress.

'' December 2j, 1917. — Kuhlmann and I prepared our
answer early. It will be generally known from the
newspaper reports. It cost us much heavy work to
get it done. Kuhlmann is personally an advocate of
general peace, but fears the influence of the mihtary
party, who do not wish to make peace until definitely
victorious. But at last it is done. Then there were
further difficulties with the Turks. They declared that
they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian
troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immedi-
ately on the conclusion of peace, a proposal to which

248 IN THE WORLD WAR

the Germans would not agree, as this would obviously
mean that they would have to evacuate Poland, Cour-
land, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany
would never consent. After a hard struggle and re-
peated efforts, we at last succeeded in persuading the
Turks to give up this demand. The second Turkish
objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly
declared its intention of refraining from all interference
in internal affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister
agreed that internal affairs in Austria-Hungary were
an even more perilous sphere for Russian intrigues
than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in
accepting, he also could be content.

**The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the
Minister of Justice, as their chief, and some of whom
cannot speak German at all, some hardly any French,
did not get any proper idea of the whole proceedings
until later on, and postponed their decision until the
24th.

''December 24, 1917. — Morning and afternoon, long
conferences with the Bulgarians, in the course of which
Kuhlmann and I, on the one hand, and the Bulgarian
representatives, on the other, were engaged with con-
siderable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded
that a clause should be inserted exempting Bulgaria
from the no-annexation principle, and providing that
the taking over by Bulgaria of Rumanian and Serbian
territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such
a clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts
null and void, and could not under any circumstances
be agreed to. The discussion was attended with con-
siderable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian
delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we
did not give way. Kuhlmann and my humble self
remained perfectly firm, and told them we had no
objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they

BREST-LiTOVStC Ug

could also, if they pleased, send their own answer
separately to the proposal, but no further alteration
would be made in the draft which we, Kiihlmann and
I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived
at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th
and the Bulgarian delegates wired to Sofia for fresh
instructions.

"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and
presumably the snub we had expected. They were very
dejected, and made no further difficulty about agreeing
to the common action. So the matter is settled as far as
that goes.

"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Ger-
mans. The German military party 'fear' that the
Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to agree to a general
peace, and could not think of ending the war in this
'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to
listen to such twaddle.

"If the great victories which the German generals
are hoping for on the western front should be realized,
there will be no bounds to their demands, and the diffi-
culty of all negotiations will be still further increased.

"December 25, ipi^. — The plenary sitting took place
to-day, when we gave the Russians our. answer to their
peace proposals. I was presiding, and delivered the
answer, and Joffe replied. The general offer of peace is
thus to be made, and we must await the result. In order
to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters
concerning Russia are being continued meanwhile.
We have thus made a good step forward, and perhaps
got over the worst. It is impossible to say whether
yesterday may not have been a decisive turning-point
in the history of the world.

''December 26, 191 7. — The special negotiations began
at 9 A.M. The program drawn up by Kiihlmann,
chiefly questions of economical matters and representa-

250 IN THE WORLD WAR

tion, were dealt with so rapidly and smoothly that by
II o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of further
matter to discuss. This is perhaps a good omen.
Our people are using to-day to enter the results of the
discussion in a report of proceedings, as the sitting is
to be continued to-morrow, when territorial questions
will be brought up.

''December 26, 1917. — I have been out for a long
walk. Alone.

"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting
in the gutter, weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did
not even look at me, only wept and wept, and could
not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me his
story — Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together.

"Well, he had a store — Heaven knows where, but
somewhere in the war zone. First came the Cossacks.
They took all he had — his goats and his clothes and
everything in the place — and then they beat him.
Then the Russians retired, beat him again, en passant
as it were, and then came the Germans. They fired
his house with their guns, pulled off his boots, and beat
him. Then he entered the service of the Germans,
carrying water and wood, and receiving his food and
beatings in return. But to-day he had got into trouble
with them in some incomprehensible fashion; no food
after that, only the beatings ; and was thrown into the
street.

"The beatings he referred to as something altogether
natural. They were to him the natural accompaniment
to any sort of action — but he could not Hve on beatings
alone.

"I gave him what I had on me — money and cigars —
told him the number of my house, and said he could
come to-morrow, when I could get him a pass to go off
somewhere where there were no Germans and no Rus-
sians, and try to get him a place of some sort where he

BREST-LITOVSK 251

would be fed and not beaten. He took the money and
cigars thankfully enough ; the story of the railway pass
and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway
traveling was for soldiers, and an existence without
beatings seemed an incredible idea.

"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight,
waving his hand, and thanking me in his German-
Russian gibberish.

''A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but
worst of all in one's own country. We at home suffer
hunger and cold, but at least we have been spared up
to now the presence of the enemy hordes.

''This is a curious place — melancholy, yet with a
beauty of its own. An endless fiat, with just a slight
swelling of the ground, like an ocean set fast, wave
behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things
gray, dead gray, to where this dead sea meets the gray
horizon. Clouds race across the sky, the wind lashing
them on.

''This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed
the Russians of the German plans with regard to the
outer provinces. The position is this: As long as the
war in the west continues, the Germans cannot evacu-
ate Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact
that they must be held as security for the general peace
negotiations, these countries form part of the German
munition establishment. The railway material, the
factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable
as long as the war lasts. That they cannot now with-
draw from there at once is clear enough. If peace is
signed, then the self-determination of the people in
the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the
great difficulty — how this right of self-determination
is to be exercised.

"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be
taken while the German bayonets are still in the coun-

252 IN THE WORLD WAR

try, and the Germans reply that the unexampled ter-
rorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election
result, since the 'bourgeoisie,' according to Bolshevist
ideas, are not human beings at all. My idea of having
the proceedings controlled by a neutral Power was not
altogether acceptable to any one. During the war
no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the
German occupation could not be allowed to last until
the ultimate end. In point of fact, both sides are
afraid of terrorization by the opposing party, and each
wishes to apply the same itself.

''December 26, 191 7. — There is no hurry, apparently,
in this place. Now it is the Turks who are not ready,
now the Bulgarians, then it is the Russians' turn —
and the sitting is again postponed or broken off almost
as soon as commenced.

* ' I am reading some memoirs from the French Revo-
lution. A most appropriate reading at the present
time, in view of what is happening in Russia and may
perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no
Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannized the world
under the battle-cry of freedom were to be found in
Paris then as well as now in St. Petersburg. Charlotte
Cor day said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast I
killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear,
and who can say if there will be a Corday ready for
Trotzky ?

*'Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and
the state of things said to exist there. He spoke with
great respect of Nicolai Nicolaievitsch as a thorough
man, full of energy and courage, one to be respected
even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he
considered cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a
proof of the incapacity of the bourgeoisie that they
had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all of them
more or less degenerate; he could not understand how

BREST-LITOVSK 253

any one could accept a form of government which
involved the risk of having a degenerate ruler. I
answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first
of all one advantage, that there was at least one place
in the state beyond the sphere of personal ambition
and intrigues, and as to degeneration, that was often
a matter of opinion: there were also degenerates to be
found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe
considered that there would be no such risk when the
people could choose for themselves. I pointed out
that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had not been 'chosen,'
and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial
election would have brought him into power. Possibly
there might be some in Russia who would consider
him also degenerate.

''December 27, IQ17. — ^The Russians are in despair,
and some of them even talked of withdrawing alto-
gether. They had thought the Germans would renounce
all occupied territory without further parley, or hand
it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the
Russians, Kuhlmann, and myself, part of the time with
Hoffmann. I drew up the following:

" I . As long as general peace is not yet declared, we
cannot give up the occupied areas ; they form part of
our great munition works (factories, railways, sites
with buildings, etc.).

''2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland,
Courland, and Lithuania is to decide the fate of the
people there : as to the form in which the vote is to be
taken, this remains to be further discussed, in order that
the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used.
Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much

worse.

'' Afternoon.— Matters still getting worse. Furious
wire from Hindenburg about 'renunciation' of every-
thing; Ludendorff telephoning every minute; more

254 IN THE WORLD WAR

furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kiihlmann
true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians
declare they cannot accept the vague formulas of the
Germans with regard to freedom of choice.

"I told Kiihlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far
as possible with them ; but should their endeavors fail,
then I would enter into separate negotiations with the
Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were really both
opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary,
on the other hand, desired nothing but final peace.
Kiihlmann understands my position, and says he him-
self would rather go than let it fail. Asked me to give
him my point of view in writing, as it 'would strengthen
his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed
it to the Kaiser.

''Evening. — Kiihlmann believes matters will be set-
tled— or broken off altogether — by to-morrow.

''December 28, ipi 7.— General feeling, dull. Fresh
outbursts of violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a
wire from Bussche: Hertling had spoken with the
Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kiihlmann said to
me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole
of Germany.*

"We have at last agreed about the form of the com-
mittee; that is, a committee ad hoc is to be formed in
Brest, to work out a plan for the evacuation and voting
in detail. Tant bien qiie mal, a provisional expedient.
All home to report; next sitting to be held January
5, 1918.

"Russians again somewhat more cheerful.

"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on
the part of the Russians and the four alhes to Prince
Leopold. He answered at once, and very neatly,
but told me immediately afterward that I had taken
him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken
by surprise myself; no notice had been given; it was

BREST-LITOVSK 255

only during the dinner itself that the Germans asked
me to speak.

''Left at 10 P.M. for Vienna.

''From the 29th to the morning of the 3d I was in
Vienna. Two long audiences with the Emperor gave
me the opportunity of telling him what had passed at
Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view
that peace must be made, if at all possible.

' ' I have despatched a trustworthy agent to the outer
provinces in order to ascertain the exact state of feeling
there. He reports that all are against the Bolsheviks
except the Bolsheviks themselves. The entire body of
citizens, peasants — in a word, every one with any pos-
sessions at all — trembles at the thought of these red
robbers, and wishes to go over to Germany. The ter-
rorism of Lenin is said to be indescribable, and in
Petersburg all are absolutely longing for the entry of
the German troops to deliver them.

'January j, igi8. — Return to Brest.

'On the way, at 6 p.m., I received, at a station, the
following telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch,
who had remained at Brest:

< <

li-

Russian delegation received following telegram from Peters-
burg this morning: 'To General Hoffmann. For the representa-
tives of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish
delegations. The government of the Russian Republic considers it
necessary to carry on the further negotiations on neutral groimd,
and proposes removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the
proposals as formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian
delegation in Points i and 2, the government of the Russian Republic
and the Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils
of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire
agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the
proposals are contrary to the principle of national self-determina-
tion, even in the restricted form in which it appears in Point 3
of the reply given by the Four Powers on the 12 th ult. President
of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe. Major Brinkmann has com-
municated this by telephone to the German delegation, already

2s6 IN THE WORLD WAR

on the way here. Herr von Kuhlmann has sent a telephone message
in return that he is continuing the journey and will arrive at Brest
this evening/

"I also went on, of course, considering this maneuver
on the part of the Russians as rather in the nature of
bluffing. If they do not come, then we can treat with
the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now.

"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither,
Hauser, Wekerle, Seidler, and some few others. The
opinion of almost all may be summed up as follows:
Teace must be arranged, but a separate peace without
Germany is impossible,^

*'No one has told me how I am to manage it if
neither Germany nor Russia will listen to reason.

*' January 4, igi8. — Fearful snowstorm in the night;
the heating apparatus in the train was frozen, and the
journey consequently far from pleasant. On awaking
early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians and Turks
were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnif-
icent now: cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went
across to Kuhlmann, had breakfast with him, and talked
over events in Beriin. There seems to have been
desperate excitement there. Kuhlmann suggested to
Ludendorff that he should come to Brest himself and
take part in the negotiations. After long discussion,
however, it appeared that Ludendorff himself was not
quite clear as to what he wanted, and declared spontane-
ously that he considered it superfluous for him to go
to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he
did.' Heaven grant the man such gleams of insight
again and often! It seems as if the whole trouble is
more due to feeHng against Kuhlmann than to anything
in the questions at issue; people do not want the
world to have the impression that the peace was gained
by 'adroit diplomacy,' but by military success alone.
General Hoffmann appears to have been received with

BREST-LITOVSK 257

marked favor by the Kaiser, and both he and Kuhlmann
declare themselves well satisfied with the results of
their journey.

"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg tele-
gram, declining a conference in vStockholm, and further
tactics to be followed in case of need. We agreed that
if the Russians did not come we must declare the
armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers
would say to that. On this point Kuhlmann and I
were entirely agreed. Nevertheless, the feeling, both
in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a
little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break
off negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant
position. The only way to save the situation is by
acting quickly and energetically with the Ukrainian
delegation, and we therefore commenced this work
on the afternoon of the same day. There is thus at
least a hope that we may be able to arrive at positive
results with them within reasonable time.

*'In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from
Petersburg announcing the arrival of the delegation,
including the Foreign Minister, Trotzky. It was
interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at the
news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of
satisfaction was it fully apparent how seriously they
had been affected by the thought that the Russians
would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great step
forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the
way.

''January 5, igi8. — ^At seven this morning a few of
us went out shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria.
We went for a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers by train,
and then in open automobiles^ to a magnificent primeval
forest extending over two to three hundred square
kilometers. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow,
and pleasant company. From the point of view of

2s8 IN THE WORLD WAR

sport, it was poorer than one could have expected.
One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two
hares, and that was all. Back at 6 p.m.

''January 6, igi8. — To-day we had the first dis-
cussions with the Ukrainian delegates, all of whom
were present except the leader. The Ukrainians are
very different from the Russian delegates. Far less
revolutionary, and with far more interest in their own
country, less in the progress of SociaHsm generally.
They do not really care about Russia at all, but think
only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are solely directed
toward attaining their own independence as soon as
possible. Whether that independence is to be com-
plete and international, or only as within the bounds
of a Russian federative state, they do not seem quite
to know themselves. Evidently, the very intelHgent
Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard
from which they themselves could spring upon the
Bolsheviks. Their idea was that we should acknowl-
edge their independence, and then, with this as a Jait
accompli, they could face the Bolsheviks and force them
to recognize their equal standing and treat with them
on that basis. Our line of poHcy, however, must be
either to bring over the Ukrainians to our peace basis,
or else to drive a wedge between them and the Peters-
burgers. As to their desire for independence, we
declared ourselves willing to recognize this, provided
the Ukrainians on their part would agree to the follow-
ing three points : i . The negotiations to be concluded
at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2. Recogni-
tion of the former poHtical frontier between Austria-
Hungary and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any
one state in the internal affairs of another. Char-
acteristically enough, no answer has yet been received
to this proposal !

''January 7, igi8. — This forenoon, all the Russians

BREST-LITOVSK 259

arrived, under the leadership of Trotzky. They at
once sent a message asking to be excused for not appear-
ing at meals with the rest for the future. At other
times we see nothing of them. The wind seems to
be in a very different quarter now from what it was.
The German officer who accompanied the Russian
delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron Lamezan,
gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first
place, he declared that the trenches in front of Duna-
burg are entirely deserted, and save for an outpost
or so there were no Russians there at all; also, that
at many stations delegates were waiting for the deputa-
tion to pass, in order to demand that peace should be
made. Trotzky had throughout answered them with
polite and careful speeches, but grew ever more and
more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the impression
that the Russians were altogether desperate now, hav-
ing no choice save between going back with a bad
peace or with no peace at all; in either case with the
same result — that they would be swept away. Kiihl-
mann said, 'lis n*ont que le choix a quelle sauce ils se
feront manger.' I answered, 'Tout comme chez nous.'

''A wire had just come in reporting demonstrations
in Budapest against Germany. The windows of the
German Consulate were broken, a clear indication of
the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were
to be lost through our demands.

''January 8, 1918. — The Turkish Grand Vizier,
Talaat Pasha, arrived during the night, and has just
been to call on me. He seems emphatically in favor
of making peace; but I fancy he would Hke, in case
of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into
the foreground and keep out of the way himself.
Talaat Pasha is one of the cleverest heads among the
Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of them all.

''Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the

26o IN THE WORLD WAR

telegraph service, and was on the revolutionary com-
mittee. In his official capacity, he got hold of a tele-
gram from the government which showed him that the
revolutionary movement would be discovered and the
game lost unless immediate action were taken. He
suppressed the message, warned the revolutionary com-
mittee, and persuaded them to start their work at once.
The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and
Talaat was made Minister of the Interior. With iron
energy he then turned his attention to the suppression
of the opposing movement. Later he became Grand
Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha,
the will and power of Turkey.

*'This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads
of the allied delegations and the Russian. Afterward,
plenary sitting.

*'The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are
still not ready with their preparations. Late in the
evening I had a conversation with Kiihlmann and
Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics.
I said again that I was ready to stand by them and
hold to their demands as far as ever possible, but in
the event of Germany's breaking off the negotiations
with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a free
hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view,
especially Kiihlmann, who, if he alone should decide,
would certainly not allow the negotiations to prove
fruitless. As to details, we agreed to demand con-
tinuation of the negotiations at Brest- Li tovsk in the
form of an ultimatum.

''January p, igi8. — Acting on the principle that
attack is the best defense, we had determined not to
let the Russian Foreign Minister speak at all, but to
go at him at once with our ultimatum.

"Trotzky had prepared a long speech, and the effect
of our attack was such that he at once appealed for

BREST-LITOVSK 261

adjournment, urging that the altered state of affairs
called for new resolutions. The removal of the con-
ference to Stockholm would have meant the end of
matters for us, for it would have been utterly impos-
sible to keep the Bolsheviks of all countries from
putting in an appearance there, and the very thing we
had endeavored with the utmost of our power to avoid
from the start — to have the reins torn from our hands
and these elements take the lead — would infallibly
have taken place. We must now wait to see what to-
morrow brings : either a victory or the final termination
of the negotiations.

''Adler said to me in Vienna, 'You will certainly get
on all right with Trotzky,' and when I asked him why
he thought so, he answered, 'Well, you and I get on
quite well together, you know.'

"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to
appreciate the situation there. These Bolsheviks have
no longer anything in common with Adler; they are
brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a disgrace
to the name of freedom.

''Trotzky is undoubtedly an interesting, clever
fellow, and a very dangerous adversary. He is quite
exceptionally gifted as a speaker, with a swiftness and
adriotness in retort which I have rarely seen, and has,
moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race.

''January 10, igi8. — The sitting has just taken place.
Trotzky made a great and, in its way, really fine speech,
calculated for the whole of Europe, in which he gave
way entirely. He accepts, he says, the German-
Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk,
as he will not give us the satisfaction of being able to
blame Russia for the continuation of the war.

"Following on Trotzky 's speech, the committee was

at once formed to deal with the difficult questions

of territory. I insisted on being on the committee
18

262 IN THE WORLD WAR

myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of
these important negotiations. This was not an easy
matter really, as the questions involved, strictly speak-
ing, concern only Courland and Lithuania — i.e., they
are not our business, but Germany's alone.

"In the evening I had another long talk with Kiihl-
mann and Hoffmann, in the course of which the general
and the Secretary of State came to high words between
themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our
ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same
fashion and 'give the Russians another touch of the
whip.' Kiihlmann and I took the opposite view, and
insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly,
confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing
up point by point as we went on, and putting all doubt-
ful questions aside. Once we had got so far, in clearing
up things generally, we could then take that which
remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instruc-
tions from the two Emperors for dealing therewith.
This is undoubtedly the surest way to avoid disaster
and a fresh breach.

''A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians.
They now demand recognition of their independence,
and declare they will leave if this is not conceded.

''Adler told me at Vienna that Trotzky had his
library, by which he set great store, somewhere in
Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told Trotzky
that I would arrange to have the books forwarded to
him, if he cared about it. I then recommended to
his consideration certain prisoners of war, as L. K. and
W., all of whom are said to have been very badly
treated. Trotzky noted the point, declared that he
was strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of
war, and promised to look into the matter; he wished
to point out, however, that in so doing he was not in
the least influenced by the thought of his library; he

BREST-LITOVSK 263

would in any case have considered my request. He
would be glad to have the books.

''January 11, igi8. — Forenoon and afternoon, long
sittings of the committee on territorial questions. Our
side is represented by Kiihlmann, Hoffmann, Rosen-
berg, and a secretary, in addition to myself, Csicserics,
Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present,
but without the Ukrainians. I told Kiihlmann that I
only proposed to attend as a second, seeing that the
German interests were incomparably more affected
than our own. I only interpose now and again.

* ' Trotzky made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In
a speech rising to violence he declared that we were
playing false; we aimed at annexations, and were
simply trying to cover them with the cloak of self-
determination. He would never agree to this, and
would rather break off altogether than continue in that
way. If we were honest, we should allow representa-
tives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to come
to Brest, and there express their views without being
influenced in any way by ourselves. Now it should
here be noted that from the commencement of the
negotiations it has been a point of conflict whether the
legislative bodies at present existing in. the occupied
territories are justified in speaking in the name of their
respective peoples, or not. We affirm that they are;
the Russians maintain they are not. We at once
accepted Trotzky's proposal, that representatives of
these countries should be called, but added that, when
we agreed to accept their testimony, then their judg-
ment also in our favor should be taken as valid.

*'It was characteristic to s^e how gladly Trotzky
would have taken back what he had said. But he
kept his countenance, fell in with the new situation at
once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned
for twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-

264 IN THE WORLD WAR

reaching importance that he must confer with his
colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotzky will make
no difhculty now. If the Poles could be called, it would
be an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that
Germany, too, would rather be without them, knowing
the anti-Prussian feeling that exists among the Poles.

'' Jamiary 12, igi8. — Radek has had a scene with the
German chauffeur, which led to something more.
General Hoffmann had placed cars at the disposal of the
Russians in case they cared to drive out. In this case
it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the
proper time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man
and abused him violently. The chauffeur complained,
and Hoffmann took his part. Trotzky seems to con-
sider Hoffmann's action correct, and has forbidden the
entire delegation to go out any more. That settled
them. And serve them right.

"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a
holy fear of Trotzky. At the sittings, too, no one
dares to speak while he is there.

''January 12, IQ18. — Hoffmann has made his unfor-
tunate speech. He has been working at it for days,
and was very proud of the result. Kiihlmann and I
did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it
beyond exciting the people at home against us. This
made a certain impression on him, but it was soon
effaced by Ludendorff 's congratulations, which followed
promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the situation more
difficult, and there was certainly no need for that.

''January ij, 191 8. — I had a letter to-day from one
of our mayors at home, calHng my attention to the fact
that disaster due to lack of foodstuffs is now imminent.

' ' I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows :

"I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which
justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to your Majesty,
and shows that in the question of food-supplies we are on the very

BREST-LITOVSK 265

verge of a catastrophe. The situation arising out of the carelessness
and incapacity of the Ministers is terrible, and I fear it is already
too late to check the total collapse which is to be expected in the
next few weeks. My informant writes: 'Only small quantities are
now being received from Hungary, from Rumania only 10,000
wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease of at least 30,000
wagons of grain, without which we must infallibly perish. On
learning the state of affairs, I went to the Prime Minister to speak
with him about it. I told him, as is the case, that in a few weeks
our war industries, our railway traffic, would be at a standstill, the
provisioning of the army would be impossible, it must break down,
and that would mean the collapse of Austria and therewith also of
Hungary. To each of these points he answered yes, that is so,
and added that all was being done to alter the state of affairs,
especially as regards the Hungarian deliveries. But no one, not
even his Majesty, has been able to get anything done. We can
only hope that some deus ex machhia may intervene to save us from
the worst.'

"To this I added:

" I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude
of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored your
Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and compel Seidler, on the
one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in order.
Even from here I have written entreating your Majesty to act while
there was yet time. But all in vain.

' ' I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the
situation would be to secure temporary assistance from
Germany, and then to requisition by force the stocks
that were doubtless still available in Hungary ; finally,
I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime
Minister of my telegram.

''January 16, igi8. — Despairing appeals from Vienna
for food-supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin
for aid, otherwise disaster imminent. I replied to
General Landwehr as follows:

"Doctor Kiihlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope
of success. The only hope now is for his Majesty to do as I have
advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On

266 IN THE WORLD WAR

my return I propose to put before his Majesty my point of view,
that it is impossible to carry on the foreign poUcy if the food question
at home is allowed to come to such a state as now.

"Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most posi-
tively that we could hold out till the new harvest.

''At the same time I wired the Emperor:

"Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for
us. Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two
conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that
we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food-supply,
which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of the
stocks still existing in Hungary.

"I have just explained the entire situation to Doctor Kiihlmann,
and he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all san-
guine, as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think
the only way to secure any success from this step would be for your
Majesty to send at once, through the military organs, a Hughes
telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to
intervene himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the
outbreak of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I
must, however, emphatically point out that the commencement of
unrest among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of
peace here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian repre-
sentatives perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution,
they will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is
based on this factor.

''January ij^ igi8. — Bad news from Vienna and
environs: serious strike movement, due to the reduc-
tion of the flour rations and the tardy progress of the
Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna
Ministry seems to be past all understanding.

"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time
to secure some suppHes from the Ukraine, if only we
can manage to keep matters quiet at home for the next
few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in question
to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On
the same day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Doctor
von Seidler, the Prime Minister:

BREST-LITOVSK 267

"I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of
all the errors made by those intrusted with the food resources.

"Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us,
having insufficient for itself.

"Had your Excellency or your department called attention to
the state of things in time, it might still have been possible to procure
supplies from Rumania. As things are now, I can see no other
way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian grain
for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the Ru-
manian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come
to hand.

''January 20, igi8. The negotiations have now come
to this: that Trotzky declares his intention of laying
the German proposals before Petersburg, though he
cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in any
case, to return here. As to calling in representatives
from the other provinces, he will only do this provided
he is allowed to choose them. We cannot agree to this.
With the Ukrainians, who, despite their youth, are
showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit
by the situation, negotiations are proceeding but
slowly. First they demanded East Galicia for the new
'Ukrainia.' This could not be entertained for a
moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the
outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they
realized our position and know that we must make
peace in order to get corn. Now they demand a
separate position for East Galicia. The question will
have to be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Minis-
try will have the final word.

*'Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that
without supplies of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe
is imminent. There ar^ supplies in the Ukraine; if we
can get them the worst may be avoided.

"The position now is this: Without help from out-
side, we shall, according to Seidler, have thousands
perishing in a few weeks. Germany and Hungary

268 IN THE WORLD WAR

are no longer sending anything. All messages state
that there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question
is only whether we can get it in time. I hope we may.
But if we do not make peace soon, then the troubles at
home will be repeated, and each demonstration in
Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for
Messrs. Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of
our state of famine at home from these troubles as by
a thermometer. If only the people who create these
disturbances know how they are by that very fact
increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from
Ukraine ! And we were all but finished !

*'The question of East Galicia I will leave to the
Austrian Ministry; it must be decided in Vienna. I
cannot, and dare not, look on and see hundreds of
thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy
of the Poles, as long as there is a possibility of help.

''January 21, IQ18. — Back to Vienna. The impres-
sion of the troubles here is even greater than I thought,
and the effect disastrous. The Ukrainians no longer
treat with us; they dictate!

*'0n the way, reading through old reports, I came
upon the notes relating to the discussions with Michaelis
on August ist. According to these, Under-Secretary
of State von Stumm said at the time :

**'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with
the Ukrainians, and the separatist movement in
Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of their
movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance
that they should be allowed to unite with the govern-
ment of Cholm, and with the areas of East Galicia
occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs
to Austria the demand for East Galicia cannot be con-
ceded. It would be another matter if Galicia were
united with Poland; then a cession of East Galicia
might be possible,'

BREST-LITOVSK 269

"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long
since been prejudged by the Germans.

*'0n January 2 2d the council was held which was to
determine the issue of the Ukrainian question. The
Emperor opened the proceedings, and then called on
me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties
that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which
will be apparent from the foregoing entries in this
diary. I expressed my doubt as to whether our group
would succeed in concluding general peace with Peters-
burg. I then sketched the course of the negotiations
with the Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians
had originally demanded the cession of East Galicia,
but that I had refused this. With regard to the
Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made
demands which had been refused by me. At present
they demanded the division of GaHcia into two parts
and the formation of an independent Austrian province
from East GaHcia and Bukovina. I pointed out the
serious consequences which the acceptance of the
Ukrainian demands would have upon the further
development of the Austro-Polish question. The con-
cessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to
consist in the inclusion in the peace treaty of a com-
mercial agreement which would enable us to cover
our immediate needs in the matter of grain-supplies.
Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full
reciprocity of the Poles resident in Ukraine.

''I pointed out emphatically that I considered it
my duty to state the position of the peace negotiations;
that the decision could not lie with me, but with the
Ministry as a whole, in particular with the Austrian
Prime Minister. The Austrian government would
have to decide whether these sacrifices could be made
or not, and here I could leave them in no doubt that
if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should proba<-

270 IN THE WORLD WAR

bly come to no result with that country, and should
thus be compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk with-
out having achieved any peace settlement at all.

''When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Doctor
von Seidler, rose to speak. He pointed out first of all
the necessity of an immediate peace, and then dis-
cussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian crown
land, especially from the parliamentary point of view.
Seidler believed that, despite the active opposition
which was to be expected from the Poles, he would still
have a majority of two-thirds in the house for the
acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not
blind to the fact that arrangement would give rise to
violent parhamentary. conflicts, but repeated his hope
that a two-thirds majority could be obtained despite
the opposition of the Pohsh delegation. After Seidler
came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Doctor Wekerle.
He was particularly pleased to note that no concessions
had been made to the Ukrainians with regard to the
Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear division of
the nationahties in Hungary was impracticable. The
Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of
culture to enable them to be given national indepen-
dence. Doctor Wekerle also laid stress on the danger,
also in Austria, of allov/ing any interference from with-
out; the risk of any such proceeding would be very
great; we should find ourselves on a downward grade
by so doing, and we must hold firmly to the principle
that no interference in the affair of the Monarchy
from without could be tolerated. In summing up,
however, Wekerle opposed the point of s^iew of the
Austrian Prime Minister.

"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was
perfectly aware of the eminent importance and perilous
aspects of this step:^ It was true that it would bring
us on to a down-grade, but from all appearances we^

BREST-LITOVSK 271

had been in that position already for a long time,
owing to the war, and could not say how far it might
lead us. I put the positive question to Doctor Wekerle,
what was a responsible leader of our foreign policy
to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the
Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hun-
garian supplies would only suffice to help us over the
ne^t two months, after which time a collapse would be
absolutely unavoidable, unless w^e could secure assist-
ance fromx somewhere in the way of com. On being
interrupted here by a dissentient observation from
Doctor Wekerle, I told him that if he, Wekerle, could
bring corn into Austria I should be the first to support
his point of view, and that with pleasure, but as long
as he stood by his categorical denial and insisted on his
inability to help us, we were in the position of a man
on the third floor of a burning house who jumps out of
the window to save himself. A man in such a situation
would not stop to think whether he risked breaking his
legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the
certainty of the same. If the position really were
as stated, that in a couple of months we should be
altogether without food-supplies, then we must take
the consequences of such a position. Doctor von
Seidler here once more took up the discussion, and
declared himself entirely in agreement with my re-
mark.

"During the further course of the debate, the proba-
bility of a definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solu-
tion in connection with the Ukrainian peace was dis-
cussed, and the question was raised as to what new
constellation would arise out of such failure. Sek-
tionschef Doctor Gratz then took up this question.
Doctor Gratz pointed out that the Austro-Polish
solution must fail even without acceptance of the
Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates ren-

272 IN THE WORLD WAR

dered solution impossible. The Germans demanded,
apart from quite enormous territorial reductions of
Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish industry,
part possession of the Polish railways and state domains,
as well as the imposition of part of the costs of war
upon the Poles. We could not attach ourselves to a
Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed, capable of living
at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its posi-
tion. Doctor Gratz maintained that it would be wiser
to come back to the program already discussed in
general form; the project, by which United Poland
should be left to Germany, and the attachment of
Rumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Doctor
Gratz went at length into the details of this point of
view. The Emperor then summed up the essence
of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that
it was primarily necessary to make peace with Peters-
burg and the Ukrainians, and that negotiations should
be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the division of
Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish
solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not
finally settled, but shelved for the time being.

*'In conclusion. Doctor Burian, the Minister of
Finance, rose to speak, and pointed out, as Doctor
Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian stand-
point. Burian declared that, while the war might
doubtless change the internal structure of the Mon-
archy, such alterations must be made from within,
not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the
Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the
Austrian principle of the division of Galicia were to
be carried through, the form of so doing would be of
great importance. Baron Burian advised that a clause
referring to this should be inserted, not in the instru-
ment of peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This
form was, in his, Burian^s, view, the only possible means

BREST-LITOVSK 273

of diminishing the serious consequences of the steps
which the Austrian government wished to take."

Thus the notes of my diary relative to this Council.
The Austrian government was thus not only agreed
as to the proposed arrangement with the Ukraine;
it was indeed at the direct wish of the government, by
its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was
brought about.

''January 28, igi8. — Reached Brest this evening.

''January 2Q, IQ18. — Trotzky arrived.

"January jo, igi8. — The first plenary session has
been held. There is no doubt that the revolutionary
happenings in Austria and in Germany have enor-
mously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a gen-
eral convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of
the question now to come to any peace terms with
the Russians. It is evident among the Russians them-
selves that they positively expect the outbreak of a
world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their
tactics now are simply to gain time and wait for this
to happen. The conference was not marked by any
particular event, only pin-pricks between Kuhlmann
and Trotzky. To-day is the first sitting of the com-
mittee on territorial questions, where I am to preside,
and deal with our territorial affairs.

*'The only interesting point about the new con-
stellation seems to be that the relations between Peters-
burg and Kieff are considerably worse than before,
and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognized at all
by the Bolsheviks as independent.

"February i, igi8. — Sitting of the territorial com-
mittee, I myself presiding, with the Petersburg Rus-
sians. My plan is to play the Petersburgers and the
Ukrainians one against the other and manage at least
to make peace with one of the two parties. I have
still some slight hope that a peace with one may so

274 IN THE WORLD WAR

affect the other that possibly peace with both may be
attained.

**As was to be expected, Trotzky replied to my
question, whether he admitted that the Ukrainians
should treat with us alone on questions dealing with
their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after
some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be
adjourned and a plenary sitting convened, in order
that the matter might be dealt with by the Kieff and
Petersburg parties together.

''February 2, igi8. — I have tried to get the Ukrai-
nians to talk over things openly with the Russians, and
succeeded almost too well. The insults hurled by the
Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were simply
grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between
these two governments and that it is not our fault
that we have not been able to bring them together
under one hat on the question of peace. Trotzky
was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he
stared fixedly before him, drawing nervously on his
blotting-paper. Heavy drops of sweat trickled down
his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the disgrace
of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence
of the enemy.

"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little
while ago. The elder has shot down some sixty, the
younger 'only' some thirty, enemy airmen. The elder's
face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He told
me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only
get as near to the enemy as possible, from behind,
and then keep on shooting, when the other man would
fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over your own
fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your
opponent. Modem heroes.

"Two charming stories were told about these two
brothers. The English had put a price on the head of

BREST-LITOVSK 275

the elder Richthofen. When he learned of this he
sent down broadsheets informing them that, to make
matters easier for them, he would from the following
day have his machine painted bright red. Next morn-
ing, going to the shed, he found all the machines there
painted bright red. One for all and all for one.

''The other story is this: Richthofen and an English
airman were circling round each other and firing furi-
ously. They came closer and closer, and soon they
could distinctly see each other's faces. Suddenly
something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun
and he could not shoot. The Englishman looked across
in surprise and, seeing what was wrong, waved his
hand, turned, and flew off. Fair play! I should like
to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is
greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old.

''February j, igi8. — Started for Berlin. Kuhlmann,
Hoffmann, Colloredo.

''February 4, igi8. — ^Arrived Berlin. Nothing this
afternoon, as the Germans are holding council among
themselves.

"February 5, igi8. — Sitting all day. I had several
violent passages of arms with Ludendorff. Matters
seemed to be clearing up, though this is not yet alto-
gether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for
Brest, we have at last to set down in writing that we
are only obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of
Germany. Ludendorff was violently opposed to this,
and said, 'If Germany makes peace without profit,
then Germany has lost the war.*

"The controversy was growing more and more
heated, when Hertling nudged me and whispered,
'Leave him alone; we two will manage it together
without him.'

"I am now going to work out the draft at once and
send it in to Hertling.

276 IN THE WORLD WAR

"Supper this evening at Hohenlohe.

"February 6, igi8. — ^Arrived Brest this evening.
Wiesner has been at it untiringly and done excellent
work; the situation, too, is easier now. The leader
of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived
yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part
his Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest,
speaks nationally, far more chauvinistically than when I
thought I knew him in Vienna, and we have at last
agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I
gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish
with the Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then
in the name of Germany commence negotiations with
Trotzky, and try if I could not get speech with him
privately, and find out whether any agreement were
possible or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposi-
tion we agreed.

''February 7, IQ18. — My conversation with Trotzky
took place. I took Gratz with me; he has far exceeded
all my expectations of him. I began by telling Trotzky
that a breach of the regulations and a resumption of
hostiHties were imminent, and wished to know if this
could not be avoided before the fatal step were definitely
taken. I therefore begged Herr Trotzky to inform me
openly and without reserve what conditions he would
accept. Trotzky then declared very frankly and clearly
that he was not so simple as we appeared to think,
that he knew well enough force was the strongest of all
arguments, and that the Central Powers were quite
capable of taking away the Russian provinces. He
had several times tried to bridge a way for Kuhhnann
during the conference, telHng him it was not a question
of the right of self-determination of the peoples in the
occupied districts, but of sheer brutal annexation, and
that he must give way to force. He would never
relinquish his principles, and would never give his con-

BREST-LITOVSK 277

sent to this interpretation of the right of self-determina-
tion. The Germans must say straight out what were
the boundaries they demanded, and he would then
make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexa-
tion and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak
to oppose it. Only the Moon Sound Islands seemed
to be more than he could swallow. Secondly, and
this is very characteristic, Trotzky said he could never
agree to our making peace with the Ukraine, since the
Ukraine was no longer in the hands of its Rada, but
in the hands of his troops. It was a part of Russia,
and to make peace with it would be interfering in the
internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter
seems to be that about nineteen days ago the Russian
troops really did enter Kieff, but were subsequently
driven out, the Rada once more coming into power as
before. Whether Trotzky was unaware of this latter
development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot
say for certain, but it seems as if the former were the
case.

''The last hope of coming to an understanding with
Petersburg has vanished. An appeal from the Peters-
burg government to the German soldiers has been
discovered in BerHn, inciting them to revolt, to murder
the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the
Soviets. Following on this came a telegram from
Kaiser Wilhelm to Kuhlmann ordering him to terminate
negotiations at once by demanding, besides Courland
and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of
Livonia and Esthonia — all without regard to the right
of self-determination of the peoples concerned.

''The dastardly behavior of these Bolsheviks renders
negotiations impossible. I cannot blame Germany for
being incensed at such proceedings, but the instructions
from Berlin are hardly likely to be carried out. We
do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia.

278 IN THE WORLD WAR

''February 8, igi8. — This evening the peace with
Ukraine is to be signed. The first peace in this terrible
war. I wonder if the Rada is still really sitting at
Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message dated
6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here,
and Trotzky has declined my suggestion to despatch
an officer of the Austrian General Staff to the spot, in
order to bring back reliable information. Evidently,
then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were already
masters at Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me,
by the way, that Trotzky, with whom he spoke early
this morning, is much depressed at our intention of
concluding peace with Ukraine to-day, after all. This
confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz
has convened a meeting with Petersburgers for to-mor-
row; this will clear matters up and show us whether
any agreement is possible or if we must break off
altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that
the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end."

After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received
the following telegram from the Emperor:

" Court train, February g, igi8.

" Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace
with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for
your persevering and successful endeavors.

*'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto
far from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further
continue to aid you on your difficult path — to the benefit of the
Monarchy and of our peoples. Karl.

''February ii, igiS. — Trotzky declines to sign. The
war is over, but there is no peace.

''The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna
will be seen clearly from the following message from
Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux, February 12,
1 9 18. Skrzynski writes:

BREST-LITOVSK 279

"'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the fol-
lowing notifications: We were already quite disposed to enter
into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether
Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give
her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which
is, perhaps, already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And
Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows:
It has been decided to wait for a while.'"

Our position, then, during the negotiations with
Petersburg was as follows: We could not induce Ger-
many to resign the idea of Courland and Lithuania. We
had not the physical force to do so. The pressure ex-
erted by the supreme army command, on the one hand,
and the shifty tactics of the Russians made this impos-
sible. We had then to choose between leaving Ger-
many to itself and signing a separate peace, or acting
together with our three allies and finishing with a peace
including the covert annexation of the Russian outer
provinces.

The former alternative involved the serious risk
of making a breach in the Quadruple Alliance, where
some dissension was already apparent. The Alliance
could no longer stand such experiments. We were
faced with the final military efforts now, and the unity
of the allies must not in any case be further shaken.
On the other hand, the danger that Wilson, the only
statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of a
peace on mutual understanding, might from the con-
clusion of such a peace obtain an erroneous impression
as to our intentions. I hoped then, and I was not
deceived, that this eminently clever man would see
through the situation and recognize that we were
forced to act under pressure of circumstances. His
speeches delivered to our address after the peace at
Brest confirmed my anticipation.

The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of

280 IN THE WORLD WAR

imminent famine. And it bears the characteristic
marks of such a birth. That is true. But it is no less
true that despite the fact of our having obtained far
less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should,
without these suppHes, have been unable to carry on
at all until the new harvest. Statistics show that
during the spring and summer of 1918, 42,000 wagon-
loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have
been impossible to procure these supplies from any-
where else. Millions of human beings were thus saved
from death by starvation — and let those who sit in
judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind.

It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks
available in Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity
could have been brought into Austria if the collecting
and transport apparatus had worked differently.

The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my
request, in May, 1919, furnished me with the following
statistical data for publication:

Brief survey of the organization of corn imports from Ukraine
(on terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same:

When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived
at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies,
a mission was despatched to Kieff, in which not only government
officials, but also the best qualified and most experienced experts
which the government could procure were represented.

Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being
persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain busi-
ness, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente grain
houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the leading
French com merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss).

The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and
commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to
show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties.

The Ukrainian government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk
that very great quantities, probably about one milHon tons, of
surplus foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the mean time been
replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power evinced

BREST-LITOVSK 281

no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to fulfil obligations
on this scale, but was more disposed to point out that it would be
altogether impossible, for various reasons, to do so.

Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange
system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But
neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in
a position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded)
required in exchange.

We had then to endeavor to obtain the supplies on credit, and
the Ukrainian government agreed, after long and far from easy
negotiations, to provide credit valuta (against vouchers for mark
and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this were
finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all six hundred and
forty-three million karbowanez.

The Ruble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under
the leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest,
was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight
activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of
great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost; and
even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with. Any-
how, it had only procured comparatively small sums of rubles, so
that the purchasing organization in Ukraine, especially at first,
suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment.

But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question
would only have improved matters in a few of the best suppHed
districts, for the principal obstacle was simply the lack of supplies.
The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves continually in
danger of a food crisis is the best indication as to the state of
things.

In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the result-
ing confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the Bolsheviks
(November, 191 7, to March, 1918) were conspicuously apparent:
cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but where
supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly carried
off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the harvest had
given certain stocks available in the country, though these were not
extensive, and the organization of a purchasing system was now
commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and Germany
had originally contemplated could not be carried out, in fact, since
the Ukrainian government declared that it would itself set up this
organization, and maintained this intention with the greatest stub-
bornness. But the authority in the country had been destroyed by
the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion; the peasantry

282 IN THE WORLD WAR

turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by revolutionaries
and cut up. The power of the government, then, in respect of
collecting supplies of grain, was altogether inadequate; on the
other hand, however, it was still sufficient (as some actual instances
proved) to place serious, indeed insuperable, obstacles in our way.
It was necessary, therefore, to co-operate with the government —
that is, to come to a compromise with it. After weeks of negotia-
tion this was at last achieved, by strong diplomatic pressure, and,
accordingly, the agreement of April 23, 191 8, was signed.

This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hun-
garian Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a
great firm of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed
a number of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of
activity in the business, with Russian grain affairs.

But while this establishment was still in progress the people in
Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey
to North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no
longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a civil
commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied
by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a decree from
the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain should be
intrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the districts occupied
by them. To carry out this plan a general, who had up to that
time been occupied in Rumania, was despatched to Odessa and
now commenced independent military proceedings from there. For
payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War Grain
Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial instructions
to the government, to place one hundred million kronen at the
disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set
aside by the finance section of that department.

This mihtary action and its execution very seriously affected the
civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired the
value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to such
an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in cir-
culation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus
into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed
to the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place
there some months later.

The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great
disapproval by the Germans, and when in a time of the greatest
scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Ger-
many for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition
that independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary

BREST-LITOVSK 283

should be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be
intrusted to Germany.

It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured,
especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established
a collecting organization, to the demand of which the Rumanian
government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain,
and in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The
country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies, and
in addition to this the collecting system never really worked prop-
erly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was frequently
upset by overbidding on the part of our own military section.

Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the
harvest of 1918. The collecting organization had become more
firmly established and extended, the necessary personal requirements
were fully complied with, and it would doubtless have been possible to
bring great quantities out of the country. But first of all the demands
of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in many cases
a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian and finally
the very considerable contingents of German and Austro-Hungarian
armies of occupation. Not until supplies for these groups had been
assured would the Ukrainian government allow any export of grain,
and to this we were forced to agree.

It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout
the whole country had seriously declined — owing to the entire
uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution.
The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were little
incHned to agree to export, and it actually came to local embargoes,
one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to any other,
exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.

In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which
had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of the
German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position of
the government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was unusu-
ally weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements through-
out the whole country were now working with increasing success
against our organization. All this rendered the work more difficult
in September and October — and then came the collapse.

The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had
either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube,
or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient
wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition, often
instances of resistance on the part of the local railways, incited by
the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.

284 IN THE WORLD WAR

However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however
much the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have
contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing of
peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being reaUzed, we may never-
theless maintain that all that was humanly possible was done to over-
come the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And in particu-
lar, by calling in the aid of the most capable and experienced firms of
grain merchants, the forces available were utilized to the utmost
degree.

Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import organiza-
tion— apart from the before-mentioned interference of the military
department and consequent fluctuations of the system — was largely
upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on more
particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high
export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian
government were constantly being overbid. This smuggHng was
also in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether
the nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and
frequently criticizing our own organization in public, or upsetting
arrangements before they could come into operation, did a great
deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany like-
wise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted smuggling, with
ill effects on the official import organization, and led to similar
conditions on our own side.

Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen
from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not
inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned,
amounting in all to about forty-two thousand wagons, though,
unfortunately, the quantities delivered did not come up to the
original expectations.

SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCE-
MENT OF IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918

I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Depart-
ment (corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds):

Total imported for the contracting states (Germany,

Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey) ii3j42i tons

Of which Austria-Hungary received 57>382 "

Grain and flour amounting to 46,225 "

n. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Com-
pany:

a
((

BREST-LITOVSK 285

Of Which Austria-
Total Hungary Received:

Butter, fat, bacon 3,329,403 kg. 2,170,437 kg.

Oil, edible oils 1,802,847 " 977,105

Cheese, curds 420,818 " 325,103

Fish, preserved fish, her-
rings 1,213,961 " 473,561 "

Cattle 105,542 head 55,421 head

(36,834,885 kg.) (19,505,760 kg.)

Horses 98,976 head 40,027 head

(31,625,172 kg.) (13,165,725 kg.)

Salted meat 2,927,439 " 1,571,569 "

Eggs 75,200 boxes 32,433 boxes

Sugar 66,809,969 kg. 24,973,443 kg.

Various foodstuffs 27,385,095 " 7,836,287 '*

Total 172,349,556 kg. 61,528,220 kg.

and 75,200 boxes and 32,433 boxes
eggs eggs

(Total, 30,757 wagons) (Total, 13,037 wagons)

The goods imported under II represent a value of roughly 450
million kronen.

The quantities smuggled unofficially into the states concerned are
estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official imports).

So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important
while we were Hving through it, but which was yet
nothing but a phase of no great importance, after all,
since it produced no lasting effect.

The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-
Litovsk, washing it away as completely as a castle of
sand on the shore is destroyed by the incoming tide.

Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in
the Herrenhaus, who asserted that I had proved my
incapability by my own confession that the Peace of
Brest had not withstood the ^test of subsequent events.
But should I have shown more capability by asserting,
after the collapse of the Central Powers^ that the peace
still existed ?

286 IN THE WORLD WAR I

The term "bread peace" {Brotjrieden) was not coined
by me, but by Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the
occasion of my reception by the Gemeinderat of Vienna
at the Nordbahnhof. The milHons whose Hves were
saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat
the words without a sneer.

CHAPTER XI

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST

AT Brest - Litovsk the news began already to be
^ spread that Rumania did not intend to continue
the war. This news assumed a very definite character
after the peace concluded with the Ukraine. That
peace, as well as Trotzky's attitude, left no doubt in
Bukharest that Rumania could no longer reckon on
further co-operation on the part of Russia and gave
rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back.
I say in some circles, for there was one group which, to
the very last moment, was all for war.

While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch
with the leaders of the Hungarian Parliament in order
to come to an agreement on the peace aims relating to
Rumania. It was evident that, as regards Rumania,
a peace without annexations would be more difficult
to bring about than with any other state, because the
treacherous attack by the Rumanians on the whole
of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical
frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent
opposition from Hungary, where, under the name of
strategical frontier rectifications, as a matter of fact,
greater annexations were desired. The first person
with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great
trouble, was brought to modify his original standpoint
and finally was led so far as to admit that the funda-
mental ideas for peace were capable of acceptance.

288 IN THE WORLD WAR

On February 27, 19 18, he handed me a pro-memoria
with the request to show it to the Emperor, in which
he explained his aheady more conciHatory point of
view, though, nevertheless, he very distinctly showed
his disapproval of my intentions. The pro-memoria
reads as follows :

Unfortunately, Rumania can withdraw from the war not as much
exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy
could wish.

The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains
in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us are
out of all proportion with Rumania's guilt and with her military
situation.

Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift
offered to vanquished Rumania and are not at all to be made a
subject for negotiations. In no case are these negotiations to assume
the character of trading or bargaining. If Rumania refuses to
conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only be
a resumption of hostilities.

I consider it highly probable that the Rumanian government
will rim that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western
Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that
after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back
and give way before our superior forces.

At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse
of Rumania.

In all human probability it is almost certain that the development
of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the peace
with northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete success
for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier rectification
as co7iditio sine qua non forms a justifiable measure to protect an
important interest for the Monarchy of a purely defensive nature.
It is energetically demanded by the entire patriotic public opinion of
Himgary. It appears out of the question that a Minister of Foreign
Affairs, had he taken up another attitude in the matter, would have
been able to remain in the Delegation.

And, besides, the procedure — to which the greatest importance
must be attached — is absolutely necessary in order to compromise
the chances of a general peace.

It is obvious from the pubHc statements of leading statesmen of
the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree to

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 289

an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and firm
resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in this
respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only way
to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude that will
lead them to think differently.

This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and imder-
takings. In connection with the Rimianian peace, it is evident that
to yield on the frontier question — even for fear of a breakdown in
the negotiations — must have a deplorable effect on the opinion our
enemies have of us. It would certainly be right not to take advan-
tage of Rumania's desperate situation, but to grant her reasonable
peace terms in accordance with the principles embodied in our
statements. But if we do not act with adequate firmness on that
reasonable basis we shall encourage the Western Powers in the
belief that it is not necessary to conclude a peace with us on the
basis of the integrity of our territory and sovereignty, and fierce
and bitter fighting may be looked for to teach them otherwise.

TiSZA.

February 27, igi8.

Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder
treatment of Rumania, and thus the whole Hungarian
Parliament were of one accord on the question. I am
not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do not
know if at that period the ''tiger soul" which he at
one time displayed to Rumania, or the pacifist soul
which he laid later at the feet of General Franchet
d'Esperey, dominated.

Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Rumanian peace
appeared on the horizon, I took up the standpoint
that the party desirous of peace negotiations must be
supported.

The episode of the Rumanian peace must not be
taken out of the great picture of the war. Like the
Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Rumanian peace was neces-
sary from a military point of view, because it seemed
desirable to release troops in the east as quickly as
possible and transfer them to the western front. It
was urgently desired and repeatedly demanded that

290 IN THE WORLD WAR

we should come to a final settlement with Rumania
as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result
I had already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Em-
peror to send word privately to King Ferdinand that
he could reckon on an honorable peace should he wish
to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my
advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews
with a gentleman sent from the immediate entourage
of the King. But the German opinion was that King
Ferdinand must be ** punished for his treachery" and
no negotiations entered into with him. For this reason,
and to avoid fruitless controversy, I first imparted to
Herr von Kiihlmann the accomplished fact and informed
him that we had put ourselves secretly into communi-
cation with King Ferdinand. This event was quite
in accordance with the standard of equality in our
Federation, by which every member was privileged
to act according to the best of his ability and was
merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the
proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany
for permission to take such a step.

There was a threefold reason why I did not share
Germany's opinion in this question. In the first place,
my point of view was that it was not our duty to mete
out divine justice and to inflict the punishment, but,
on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible.
Therefore my duty was to seize every means possible
to prevent a continuation of the war. I must mention
here that the idea prevailing in many circles that the
Rumanians were quite at the end of their strength,
and were compelled to accept all the conditions, is
entirely false. The Rumanians held very strong posi-
tions, the morale in the army was excellent, and in the
last great attack on Maracesci Mackensen's troops
had suffered very severely. This success turned the
Rumanians' heads, and there were many leading men

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 291

in the ranks of the Rumanian army who sided entirely
with those who wished to carry on the war d Voutrance.
They did not count so much on an actual victory,
but were upheld by the hope that for some time to
come they could maintain the defensive and that,
meanwhile, the decisive successes of their allies on the
west would also bring victory for them. They were
probably afraid, too, that a peace concluded with us
would place them into permanent disgrace with the
Entente — that they would lose the friendship of the
Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between
two stools. The second reason which decided me to
insist on negotiating with the King was that, from a
dynastic point of view, I considered it most unwise
to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a
certain fall in the value of kings on the European
market, and I was afraid it might develop into a panic
if we put more kings on the market. The third reason
was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a
competent representative in Rumania. If we were to
depose the King we should divide Rumania into two
camps and would, at the best, only be able to conclude
an illegitimate peace with that party which accepted
the dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly
secured peace could only be concluded with the^ legit-
imate head in Rumania.

In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa
had on February 4th and 5th with the confidential en-
voy from the King of Rumania, the envoy asked whether
all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the
step in question, and whether the occupied territory in
Rumania would be released. I was notified of this
inquiry of the King, and replied that I was persuaded
that no refusal need be expected from the other Central
Powers should he, with the object of securing an
honorable peace, address them accordingly. As to the

292 IN THE WORLD WAR

question of territorial possessions, I stated that, for the
present, I was not able to express any opinion on the
matter, as it would have to be a subject for the intro-
ductory negotiations.

The view held by the German military leaders in
agreement with Hungarian politicians that Rumania
should be treated differently from, and in a much
sterner manner than, any other state was, if the ques-
tion is considered from the point of view of retribution,
quite justified. Rumania's actions with regard to us
were far more treacherous than those with Italy.
Italy, owing to her geographical position and to the
fact of her being totally dependent on the Western
Powers — a blockade by whom might finally have
forced her to submit to their demands — would have
found it very difficult to remain neutral in this world
war. Rumania was not only perfectly independent,
but was amply provided for through her rich granaries.
Apart from the fact that Rumania alone was to blame
for allowing things to go so far that Russia was en-
abled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force
her into war, it must be admitted that Rumania was
far less likely to be influenced by the Entente than
Italy. But neither would the Russian ultimatum
have taken effect if Rumania had not consciously and
willingly placed herself in a position in regard to mili-
tary and political matters that gave her into Russia's
power. Bratianu said to me in one of our last inter-
views: "Russia is exactly like a black cock dancing
before the hens." In admitting the truth of this
appropriate comparison, it must be added that the
female of the simile, longing to be embraced, directly
provoked violence.

For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion
against us in his own country. Had he not done so,
and had he not finally bared his Russian frontier of all

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 293

troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had no
effect.

In Rumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power.
On February 24th Kiihlmann and I had our first inter-
view alone with Avarescu at the castle of Prince Stirbey,
at Buftia. At this interview, which was very short,
the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The
frontier rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-
Hungarian program, were barely alluded to, and the
economic questions, which later played a rather im-
portant part, were only hinted at. Avarescu's stand-
point was that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an
impossibility, and the interview ended with a non pos-
sumus from the Rumanian general, which was equiv-
alent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the
Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint.
The so-called ''old" Dobrudsha, the portion that
Rumania in 1913 had wrested from Bulgaria, had
been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the
time of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their
co-operation, and the area that lies between that
frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda railway line
was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They
went much farther in their aspirations : they demanded
the whole of the Dobrudsha, including the mouth of
the Danube, and the great and numerous disputes that
occurred later in this connection show how insistently
and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands.
At the same time, as there was a danger that the Bul-
gars, thoroughly disappointed in their aspirations,
might secede from us, it became absolutely impossible
to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Rumanians. All
that could be effected was to secure for the Rumanians
free access to Constanza, and, further, to find a way
out of the difficulty existing between Turkey and
Bulgaria in connection with the Dobrudsha.
20

294 IN THE WORLD WAR

In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I
suggested to Avarescu that he should arrange for his
King to meet me. My plan was to make it clear to
the King that it would be possible for him now to
conclude a peace, though involving certain losses,
but still a peace that would enable him to keep his
crown. On the other hand, by continuing the war he
could not count on forbearance on the part of the Cen-
tral Powers. I trusted that this move on my part
would enable him to continue the peace negotiations.
I met the King on February 27 th at a Httle station
in the occupied district of Moldavia.

We arrived at Foesani at noon and continued by
motor to the lines, where Colonel Ressel and a few
Rumanian ofhcers were waiting to receive me. We
drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German
car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded
as far as the railway station of Padureni. A saloon car-
riage in the train had been reserved for me there, and
we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at five o'clock.

The Rumanian royal train arrived a few minutes
later, and I at once went across to the King.

Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand
lasted twenty minutes.

As the King did not begin the conversation, I had
to do so, and said that I had not come to sue for peace
but purely as the bearer of a message from the Emperor
Charles, who, in spite of Rumania's treachery, would
show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand
would at once conclude peace under the conditions
mutually agreed on by the Quadruple Alliance Powers.
Should the King not consent, then a continuation of
the war would be unavoidable and would put an end
to Rumania and the dynasty. Our mihtary superiority
was already very considerable, and now that our front
would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea,

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 295

it would be an easy matter for us, in a very short space
of time, to increase our strength still more. We were
aware that Rumania would very soon have no more
munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks
the kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist.

The King did not oppose anything, but thought the
conditions terribly hard. Without the Dobrudsha Ru-
mania would hardly be able to draw her breath. At
any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding
' ' old ' ' Dobrudsha again.

I said to the King that if he complained about hard
conditions I could only ask what would his conditions
have been if his troops had reached Budapest ? Mean-
while I was ready to guarantee that Rumania would
not be cut off from the sea, but would have free access
to Constanza.

Here the King again complained of the hard con-
ditions enforced on him, and declared he would never
be able to find a Ministry who would accept them.

I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Ru-
mania's internal business, but my private opinion was
that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in order to save Rumania,
would agree to the conditions laid down. I could only
repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms
laid before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If
the King did not accept them, we should have, in a
month's time, a far better peace than the one which
the Rumanians might consider themselves lucky to
get to-day.

We were ready to give our diplomatic support to
Rumania that she might obtain Bessarabia, and she
would, therefore, gain far more than she would lose.

The King repHed that Bessarabia was nothing to
him, that it was steeped in Bolshevism, and the Do-
brudsha could not be given up; anyhow, it was only
under the very greatest pressure that he had decided

296 IN THE WORLD WAR

to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He
began again, however, to speak of the promised access
to the sea, which apparently made the cession of the
Dobrudsha somewhat easier.

We then entered into details, and I reproached the
King for the dreadful treatment of our people interned
in Rumania, which he said he regretted.

Finally I requested that he would give me a clear
and decided answer within forty-eight hours as to
whether he would negotiate on the basis of our proposals

or not.

The result of the interview was the appointment of
the Marghiloman Ministry and the continuation of the
negotiations.

Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet,
he approached me to learn the exact terms.

He declared himself to be in agreement with the first
and hardest of the conditions — the cession of the Do-
brudsha, because he was quicker than the King in
seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation
to Bulgaria in this connection it could not be otherwise.
As to our territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that
I laid chief stress on entering into friendly and lasting
relations with Rumania after peace was concluded,
and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such
measure as Rumania, on her part, would consider
bearable. On the other hand, he, Marghiloman, must
understand that I was bound to consider the Hungarian
aspirations to a certain degree. Marghiloman, who
was an old friend and tried parhamentarian, fully saw
in what a constrained position I was placed. We
finally agreed that the cession of the populated districts
and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should not
take place, and, altogether, the original claims were
reduced to about the half. Marghiloman said he
accepted the compromise.

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 297

My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with
Rumania played an important part in the negotiations.
It was clear to me that this demand was in Austrian,
but not in Hungarian interests; but I still think that,
even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for
both countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage
of provisions made the opening of the Rumanian
granaries very desirable. As was to be expected, this
clause in the negotiations met with the most violent
opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible
to see a way out of the difficulty. I never took back
my demand, however, and was firmly resolved that
peace should not be signed if my plan was not realized.
I was dismissed from office in the middle of the negotia-
tions, and my successor did not attach the same
importance to that particular item as I did.

On the German side there was at once evidence of
that insatiable appetite which we had already noticed
at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans wished to have a
species of war indemnity by compelling Rumania to
cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbors,
to German companies, and placing the permanent con-
trol of her finances in German hands. I opposed these
demands in the most decided manner from the very
first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude
all possibility of any friendly relations in future. I
went so far as to ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph
direct to the Emperor William in that connection, which
met with a certain amount of success. In the end the
German claims were reduced by about 50 per cent.,
and accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form.
With regard to the petroleum question, a ninety years*
lease was agreed on. In the matter of the corn supply,
Rumania was to bind herself to deliver her agricultural
produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of
years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent

298 IN THE WORLD WAR

control of Rumanian finances was not carried out. In
the question of price, the Rumanian views held good.
The most impossible of the German demands, namely,
the occupation of Rumania for five to six years after
the conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties.
This was the point that was most persistently and
energetically insisted on by the German Supreme Mili-
tary Command, and it was only with great trouble and
after lengthy explanations and discussions that we
settled the matter on the following lines: That on the
conclusion of peace the entire legislative and executive
power of the Rumanian government would be restored
in principle, and that we should content ourselves with
exercising a certain control through a limited number
of agents, this control not to be continued after the
general peace was made. I cannot say positively
whether this standpoint was adhered to by my suc-
cessor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only
undertook office on condition that I give him a guaran-
tee that the plan would be supported by me.

As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha
had prepared great difficulties for us in two respects.
First of all there was the relinquishing of their claim,
which, for the Rumanians, was the hardest term of all
and imparted to the peace the character of a peace of
violence; and, secondly, the matter had precipitated a
dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians' view was that the entire Dobrudsha,
including the mouth of the Danube, must be promised
to them, and they insisted on their point with an
obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come across.
They went so far as to declare that neither the present
government nor any other would be able to return to
Sofia, and allowed it clearly to be seen that by refusing
their claims we could never again count on Bulgaria.
The Turks, on the other hand, protested with equal

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 299

vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered
by two Turkish army corps, that it was a moral injustice
that the gains chiefly won by Turkish forces should be
given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and that they
would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole
of the Dobrudsha unless compensation was given them.
By way of compensation they asked not only for that
stretch of land which they had ceded to Bulgaria on
their entry into the war (Adrianople) , but also a con-
siderable area beyond.

In the numerous conferences at which the question
was discussed, Kuhlmann and I played the part of
honest mediators who were making every effort to
reconcile the two so diverging standpoints. We both
saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks
might be the result if a compromise was not effected.
Finally, after much trouble, we succeeded in drawing
up a program acceptable to both sides. It took this
form: that "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given
back to Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be
handed over as a possession to the combined Central
Powers, and a definite decision agreed upon later.

Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with
the decision, nor yet averse to it; but, under the cir-
cumstances, it was the only possible way of building a
bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.

Just as England and France secured the entry into
the war of Italy through the Treaty of London, so
did the Emperor Francis Joseph and Burian, as well
as the government in Berlin, give binding promises
to the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these
promises proved later to be the greatest obstacles to a
peace of understanding. Nevertheless, no sensible
person can deny that it is natural that a state engaged
in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without
first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will

300 IN THE WORLD WAR

give rise to important or minor difficulties. The fire-
man extinguishing flames in a burning house does not
first ask whether the water he pumps on it has damaged
anything. When Rumania attacked us in the rear
the danger was very great, the house was in flames,
and the first act of my predecessor was naturally,
and properly, to avert the great danger. There was no
lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the
Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks
had a right, through promises, to the territory they,
on their part, had ceded to the Bulgars I do not know.
But they certainly had a moral right to it.

On the occasion of the Rumanian peace in the spring
of 19 1 8, too severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and
Turks to the Alliance was dangerous. For some time
past the former had been dealing in secret with the
Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on
Talaat and Enver. Talaat told me in Bukharest,
however, quite positively that he would be forced to
send in his resignation if he were to return empty-
handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would
be very probable.

We tried then at Bukharest to steer our way through
the many shoals ; not mortally to offend the Rumanians,
to observe as far as possible the character of a peace of
understanding, and yet to keep both Turks and Bul-
gars on our side.

The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard
demand to make on the Rumanians, and was only
rendered bearable for them when Kiihlmann and I,
with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent
opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free
access to the Black Sea.

When, later, in one breath, we were reproached with
having enforced a peace of violence on the Rumanians
and with not having treated the Bulgarian claims and

THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST 301

wishes with sufficient consideration — the answer to the
charge is obvious. Because we were compelled to
consider both Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to
demand the Dobrudsha from the Rumanians and
treat them with greater severity than we should have
done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and
the Bulgars for our negotiation plans. Judged accord-
ing to the Versailles standard, the Peace of Bukharest
would be a peace of understanding, as regards both
form and contents.

The Central Powers' mediators, both at Versailles
and St. -Germain, would have been glad had they been
treated in the same way as the Marghiloman Ministry
w^as treated.

The Rumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired
safe and guaranteed access to the sea; they lost a
district of sparsely populated mountainous country to
us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia.

They gained far more than they lost.

CPIAPTER XII

FINAL REFLECTIONS

THE farther the World War progressed, the more
did it lose the character of the work of individual
men. It assumed rather the character of a cosmic
event, taking more and more from the effectiveness of
the most powerful individuals.

All settlements on which coalitions were based were
connected with certain war aims by the Cabinets,
such as the promises of compensation given to their
own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory.
The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred,
the increasing crude brutality of the world, all tended
to create a situation making each individual like a small
stone, which, breaking away from an avalanche of
stones, hurls itself downward without a leader and
without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided
by any one.

The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time
to make the world believe that they possessed the
power to rebuild Europe according to their own ideas.
According to their own ideas ! That signified, to begin
with, four utterly different ideas, for four different
worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and
Washington. And the four representatives — "the Big
Four," as they were called — were each individually
the slave of his program, his pledges, and his people.
Those responsible for the Paris negotiations in camera^

FINAL REFLECTIONS 303

which lasted for many months, and were a breeding-
ground for European anarchy, had their own good
reasons for secrecy; there was no end to the disputes
for which no outlet could be found.

Here Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because
he deserted his program ; . certainly, there is not the
slightest similarity between the Fourteen Points and
the Peace of Versailles and St.-Germain, but it is for-
gotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to
enforce his will against the three others. We do not
know what occurred behind those closed doors, but
we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought weeks
and months for his program. He could have broken
off proceedings and left ! He certainly could have done
so, but would the chaos have been any less; would
it have been any better for the world if the only one
who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest
had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too,
the direct opposite of Wilson, was not quite open in his
dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, who now at
the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the
Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart
from that, if he had tried to conclude a ''Wilson peace,"
all the private citizens of France, great and small,
would have risen against him, for they had been told
for the last five years, que les hoches payeront tout.
What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to
do it or France would have dismissed him.

And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the
subterraneous rumbHng of approaching revolution;
the only means the government has adopted to check
the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of
national interests. I believe that in 191 7, when the
general discontent was much less and finances were
much better, the Italian government might much more
probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after

304 IN THE WORLD WAR

final victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles
they were the slaves of their promises. And does any
one believe that Lloyd George would have had the
power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of
the right of self-determination to Ireland and the
Dominions? Naturally, he did not wish to do other-
wise than he did; but that is not the question here,
but rather that neither could have acted very differently
even had he wished to do so.

It seems to me that the historical moment is the
year 191 7, when Wilson lost his power, which was
swallowed up in imperiahsm, and when the President
of the United States neglected to force his program
on his allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the
American troops were so eagerly looked for, but later,
when victory came, he no longer held it.

And thus there came about what is now a fact. A
dictated peace of the most terrible nature was con-
cluded and a foundation laid for a continuance of
unimaginable disturbances, compHcations, and wars.

In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies,
in spite of all the claims of the Council of Four, a world
has expired at Versailles — the world of militarism.
Solely bent on exterminating Prussian militarism, the
Entente have gained so complete a victory that all
fences and barriers have been pulled down and they
can give themselves up unchecked to a torrent of
violence, vengeance, and passion. And the Entente
are so swallowed up by their revengeful paroxysm of
destruction that they do not appear to see that, while
they imagine they still rule and command, they are
even now but instruments in a world revolution.

The Entente, who would not allow the war to end
and kept up the blockade for months after the cessation
of hostilities, has made Bolshevism a danger to the
world. War is its father, famine its mother, despair

FINAL REFLECTIONS 305

its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in
the veins of Europe for many a long year.

Versailles is not the end of the war; it is only a phase
of it. The war goes on, though in another form. I
think that the coming generation will not call the great
drama of the last five years the World War, but the
World Revolution, which it will reahze began with the
World War.

Neither at Versailles nor at St. -Germain has any
lasting work been done. The germs of decomposition
and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms that
shattered Europe are not yet over, as, after a terrible
earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be
heard. Again and again we shall see the earth open,
now here, now there, and shoot up flames into the
heavens; again and again there will be expressions of
elementary nature and elementary force that will spread
devastation through the land — until everything has
been swept away that reminds us of the madness of
the war and the French peace.

Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world
will be born. Coming generations will look back to
our times as to a long and very bad dream, but day
follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid
in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to dis-
ease. MilHons, with hatred and murder in their hearts,
have died in their efforts to devastate and destroy.

But other generations will arise and with them a new
spirit. They will rebuild what war and revolution have
pulled down. Spring comes always after winter. Res-
urrection follows after death ; it is the eternal law in life.

Well for those who will be^ called upon to serve as
soldiers in the ranks of whoever comes to build the
new world.

June, 1919.

APPENDIX

RESOLUTIONS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF APRIL 26, 1915*

On February 28, 191 7, the Isvestia published the following text of
this agreement:

The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting
on the instructions of his government, has the honor to convey to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Am-
bassador in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in
London, Count Benkendorff, the following notable points:

§ I. A Military Convention shall be concluded without delay
between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and
Italy. This convention to determine the minimum of forces to be
directed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in case that country
should turn all its forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to
concentrate chiefly against Germany. The Mihtary Convention
referred to shall also settle questions bearing upon an armistice, in so
far as these by their nature come within the scope of the Army
Command.

§ 2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the
means at her disposal, together with France, Great Britain, and
Russia, against all countries at war with them.

§ 3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render
Italy undiminished, active assistance until the destruction oj the
Austrian fleet, or until the moment peace is concluded. A Naval
Convention shall be concluded without delay between France, Great
Britain, and Italy.

§ 4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the
district of the Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its natural

1 Translated from the German text given by Count Czemin, no
English text being available.

3o8 IN THE WORLD WAR

geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the city
and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, the
whole of I stria as far as Quamero, including Voloska and the Istrian
islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of Plavnica,
Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St. Peter de
Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighboring islands.

Note: I. By way of supplement to § 4, the frontier shall be drawn
through the following points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a
northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the
watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the source of the rivers
Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner
and the Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn
southward, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the
present frontier of Grein, drawn toward the Alps; following this
it will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course
along the watershed of the Julian Alps; over the heights of Predil,
Mangart, and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlanes-
kan, and Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-
easterly direction to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River
Save, with its sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory.
From the Schneeberg the frontier proceeds toward the coast, inclos-
ing Castua, Matughe, and Voloska in the Italian possessions.

§ 5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its
present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all
possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca
eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the Italian
possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching at
SebenicOjSuch as Cikola, Kerke, and Budisnica, with all those situate
on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised all the islands
lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast, beginning with the
islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago, and Punta-
dura, etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also
the islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola,
Cazza, and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as
well as Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser
Zirona, Pua, Solta, and Brazza.

The following are to be neutralized: (i) The entire coast from
Cape Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula
of Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the men-
tioned peninsula in the neutralized area; (2) a part of the coast
beginning from a point situate ten versts south of the cape of Alt-
Ragusa, as far as the River Vojusa in the south, so as to include
within the boundaries of the neutralized zone the whole of the Bay

APPENDIX 309

of Cattaro with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua,
and Durazzo; this not to affect the declarations of the contracting
parties in April and May, 1909, as to the rights of Montenegro.

In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only
admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they
shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which
may in the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no
part of the coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject
to future neutralization. The restrictions in the case of the port of
Antivari, agreed by Alontenegro itself in 1909, remain in force.
(3) Finally, the islands not accorded to Italy.

Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded
by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of Croatia,
Serbia, and Montenegro: In the north of the Adriatic, the entire coast,
commencing from the Bay of Volosca on the frontier of Istria as far
as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the whole of the coast-
line now belonging to Htmgary, the entire coast of Croatia, the port
of Fiume and the small harbors of Novi and Carlopago, as also
the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli, and Arbe. In the
south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the
entire coast from Cape Blanca as far as the River Drina, with the
principal ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, a7id
San Giovanni di Medua, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Bua,
Solta, Brazza, Jaklian, and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Moham-
medan State of Albania.

§ 6. Italy to be given full possession of Valona, the Island of
Sasseno, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in military
respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north and east
to the boimdary of the Chimara district in the south.

§ 7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to § 4, Dalmatia and
the islands of the Adriatic according to § 5, as well as Valona, is not
to oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain, and Russia
in case of the establishment of a small autonomous neutraUzed state
in Albania, as to division of the northern and southern frontier belts
of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The southern
strip of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as
far as Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralization.

Italy has the prospect of right to determine the foreign policy of
Albania; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a
siifficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on
the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece
and Serbia.

3IO IN THE WORLD WAR

§ 8. Italy to have full possession of all the islaftds of the Dode-
canessus which it occupies at present.

§ 9. France, Great Britain, and Russia accept in principle the fact
of Italy^s interest in maintaining political equilibrium in the Mediter-
ranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any division oj Turkey, to a
like portion with themselves in the basin of the Mediterranean, and
that in the part adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has
already acquired particular rights and developed particular inter-
ests, to be noted in the Italo-British Convention. The zone then
falling to the possession of Italy will in due time be determined
according to the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Simi-
larly, the interests of Italy are also to be considered in case the
territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should be maintained by the
Powers for a further period, and only a limitation between the
spheres of interest be made. Should, in such case, any areas of
Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain, and Russia
during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to Italy,
and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together with
the right to occupy the same.

§ 10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto
conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne.

§ II. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall
be commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts.

§ 12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, Eng-
land, and Russia whereby Arabia and the holy cities of the Moham-
medans are to be granted to afi independent Mohammedan Power.

§ 13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial
possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great
Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain
compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in Eritrea,
Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to the
colonies of France and England.

§ 14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realization
of a loan of not less than fifty million pounds sterling in the English
market on favorable conditions.

§ 15. France, England, and Russia undertake to support Italy in
preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any diplo-
matic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a peace,
or the regulation of questions connected with the present war.

§ 16. The present treaty to be kept secret. As regards Italy's
agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration
will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against
Italy.

APPENDIX 311

The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective
authorized representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia,
together with the representative of Italy similarly authorized by his
government for this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain,
and Russia declare their full agreement with the foregoing notable
points, as set before them by the ItaHan government. With regard
to §§i, 2, and 3, referring to the agreement upon military and naval
undertakings of all Four Powers, Italy undertakes to commence active
operations at the earliest possible date, and in any case not later than
one month after the signing of the present dociunent by the contract-
ing parties.

The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the

26th April, 191 5, and sealed, by

Sir Edward Grey,
Cambon,

Marchese Imperiali,
Graf Benkendorff.

After the entry of Rumania into the war (September, 19 16) this
program was further extended.

note from count CZERNIN to the AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, DATED

MARCH 5, 191 7

From the aide-mimoire of the American Ambassador in Vienna,
dated February i8th of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry
for Foreign Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet enter-
tains some doubt, in view of the statements issued by the Imperial
and Royal government on February loth and January nth of this
year, as to what attitude Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting
for the future with regard to submarine warfare, and whether the
assurance given by the Austrian government to the Washington
Cabinet in the course of the proceedings with regard to the case of
the vessels Ancona and Persia might not be taken as altered or
withdrawn by the statements mentioned.

The Austrian government is most willing to meet the desire of
the United States government that this doubt should be removed
by a clear and final declaration.

It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on
the methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since

312 IN THE WORLD WAR

these form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare
put into practice by Austria-Hungary and her alHes, besides throw-
ing a clear Ught upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian
government in the questions arising therefrom.

When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central
Powers, but a few years had elapsed since the memorable time when
Great Britain itself, together with the remaining states, had com-
menced at The Hague to lay the foundations of a modern code of law
for marine warfare. Shortly after that the English government had
brought about a meeting of representatives of the principal naval
Powers, assembling in London, in order further to carry forward
the work commenced at The Hague, presumably in a spirit of
reasonable compromise between the interests of belligerents and
those of neutrals. The unexpected success of these endeavors,
which aimed at nothing less than concerted establishment of legal
standards calculated to maintain the freedom of the seas and the
interests of neutrals even in time of war, was not to be long enjoyed
by the peoples concerned.

Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war
than it also began to break through the barriers with which it was
confronted by the standards of international law. While the Cen-
tral Powers immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their
intention of observing the Declaration of London, which also bore
the signature of the British representative, England discarded the
most important points in that Declaration. In the endeavor to cut
off the Central Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually
extended the list of contraband until it included everything now
required by human beings for the maintenance of life. Great Brit-
ain then placed all the coasts of the North Sea — an important
transit-way also for the maritime trade of Austria-Hungary — under
the obstruction of a so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the
entry into Germany of all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband
list, as also to bar all neutral traffic with these coasts, and prevent
any export from the same. That this method of proceeding stands
in the most lurid contradiction to the standards of blockade law
arrived at and established by international congress has already
been admitted by the President of the United States in words which
will live in the history of the law of nations. By thus illegally pre-
venting export of goods from the Central Powers Great Britain
thought to be able to shut down the innumerable factories and
industries which had been set up by industrious and highly
developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and to bring the workers
to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And when Austria-

APPENDIX ^t^ '

Hungary's southern neighbor joined the ranks of the enemies of the
Central Powers her first step was to declare a blockade of all the
coasts of her opponent — following the example, of course, of her
allies — in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy had shortly
before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to point
cw.it to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of all
legal validity.

For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until
then, and after long and mature consideration for and against, did
they proceed to answer in like measure and close with their adver-
saries at sea. As the only belligerents who had done everything
to secure the observance of the agreement which should provide
for freedom of the seas to neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes
to bow to the need of the moment and attack that freedom; but
they took that step in order to fulfil their urgent duty to their peo-
ples and with the conviction that the step in question must lead
toward the freedom of the seas in the end. The declarations made
by the Central Powers on the last day of January of this year are
only apparently directed against the rights of neutrals; as a matter
of fact, they are working toward the restitution of those rights
which the enemy has constantly infringed and would, if victorious,
annihilate forever. The submarines, then, would circle round
England's shores, announce to all peoples using and needing the
sea — and who does not need it? — that the day is not far off when
the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly acquired
freedom.

It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo
wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in par-
ticular by the great people of the United States of America, whose
most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up
with ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all
nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in
mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended
not only to force the Central Powers to submission bystarvation, but
ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and
thereby insure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the
other hand the blockading of England and its allies only serves to
render possible a peace with honor for these Powers and to guarantee
to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritim.e trade,
thus insuring their safe existence, then the question as to which
of the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided.
Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further
allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming

314 IN THE WORLD WAR

that neutrals should appreciate their endeavors to bring to life
again the principles of international law and the equal rights of
nations.

Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memo-
randum of February i8th of this year, already referred to, the Aus-
trian government would first of all remark that in the exchange of
notes in the cases of the A ncona and Persia this government restricted
itself to consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then
arisen, without setting forth the legal position in point of principle.
In the note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the Ancona
case it reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of inter-
national law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion at
a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the
question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum
is concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may
be made clear to the American government that the Austrian
government now as heretofore holds unmovahly by the assurance
already given, and with the endeavor to avoid any misunderstanding
between the Monarchy and the American Union by clearing up the
most important question arising out of the submarine warfare — most
important as it rests on the dictates of humanity.

First and foremost the Austrian government wishes to point out
that the thesis advanced by the American government and adopted
in many learned works — to the effect that enemy merchant- vessels,
save in event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be
destroyed without provision for the safety of those on board — is also,
in the opinion of the Austrian government itself, the kernel, so to
speak, of the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view,
this theory can at any rate be considered in connection with possible
circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the
dictates of humanity, which the Austrian government and the Wash-
ington Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down
the general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy
merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible.
This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before
exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the
method indicated by the theory of the Union government referred to,
according to which the commander of the war-ship himself issues a
warning to the vessel about to be sunk, so that crew and passengers
can be brought into safety at the last moment ; or, on the other hand,
the government of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an
imperative necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect,
before the sailing of the vessel to be sunk; or, finally, such govern-

APPENDIX 315

ment can, when preparing comprehensive measures against the
enemy traffic at sea, have recourse to a general warning applicable
to all enemy vessels concerned.

That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on
board is Hable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union govern-
ment itself. The Austrian government believes, however, that
destruction without warning is not only justifiable in cases of
attempted escape or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance
only, that the character of the vessel itself should be taken into
consideration; thus merchant-ships or other private craft, placed in
the service of war operations, whether as transports or guard-ships,
or with a military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any
kind of hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be
liable to destruction without notice. The Austrian government need
not go into the question of how far a belligerent is released from any
obligation as to provision for safety of human life when his oppo-
nent sinks enemy merchant- vessels without such previous warning,
as in the well-known cases, previously referred to, of the Elektray
Duhrovnik, Zagreb, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident
right, the Austrian government itself has never returned like for
like. Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian
war-ships have not destroyed a single enemy merchant- vessel without
previous warning, though this may have been of a general character.

The theory of the Union government, frequently referred to, also
admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance,
whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance
can be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or
whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for
example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the pas-
sengers into the boats (the case of the Ancona), or when the pas-
sengers themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of
the Austrian government cases such as those last should also justify
destruction of the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those
on board, as otherwise it would be in the power of any one on the
vessel to deprive the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the
rest it should also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of
opinion really as to when the destruction of enemy merchant ton-
nage is justifiable at all.

The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking
a vessel will, in the view of the Austrian government, on the one
hand, involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it
may in certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful
interests of the belligerent. In the first place, it cannot be denied

3i6 IN THE WORLD WAR

that saving lives at sea is nearly always a matter of blind uncertainty,
since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a vessel
exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in small
boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore, far more
in accordance with the dictates of humanity to restrain people from
venturing upon vessels thus ettdangered by warning them beforehand.
For the rest, however, the Austrian government is not convinced,
despite careful consideration of all legal questions concerned,
that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to immunity
when traveling on board enemy ships.

The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the
freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral
persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly
justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their
power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed
necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant-vessels to sail the
sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their
purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral,
are enabled to avoid risking their lives. But even where there is
doubt as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible
reprisals threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain
one to be decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they
being admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field
for their military operations, of suppressing any interruption of
such operations and supremely determining what measures are to
be taken against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case
no legitimate claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be
given them of measures contemplated against the enemy, in order
that they may refrain from intrusting their persons or goods to
enemy vessels.

The Austrian government may presumably take it for granted
that the Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which
the Austrian government is fully convinced are altogether unassail-
able. To deny the correctness of these views would imply — and this
the Union government can hardly intend — that neutrals have the
right of interfering in the military operations of the belligerents;
indeed, ultimately to constitute themselves the judges as to what
methods may or may not be employed against an enemy. It would
also seem a crying injustice for a neutral government, in order
merely to secure for its subjects the right of passage on enemy ships
when they might just as well, or indeed with far greater safety,
travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at the arm of a belligerent Power,
fighting perhaps for its very existence. Not to mention the fact

APPENDIX 317

that it would open the way for all kinds of abuses if a belligerent
were forced to lay down arms at the bidding of any neutral whom
it might please to make use of enemy ships for business or pleasure.
No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact that subjects of neutral
states are themselves responsible for any harm they may incur by
their presence in any territory on land where military operations are
in progress. Obviously, there is no ground for establishing another
standard for naval warfare, particularly since the second Peace Con-
ference expressed the wish that, pending the agreement of rules for
naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare upon land should be
applied as far as possible at sea.

From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being
given to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to
exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for
instance, the cases cited by the Union government of flight and
resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others
warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian
government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with
the Union government as to the protection of neutrals against risk
of life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet
toward some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian
government has not only put into practice throughout the war the
views it holds in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating
its actions with the strictest care according to the theory advanced
by the Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only
stated that it was ''essentially in agreement" with the Union govern-
ment's views. The Austrian government would be extremely satis-
fied if the Washington Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its
endeavors, which are inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity,
to save American citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning
its subjects in this direction.

Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February loth of this
year concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant- vessels, the
Austrian government must in any case declare itself to be, as
indicated in the foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading-
ships, even when only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not
justified in modem international law. The rules provide that a
war-ship is to approach an enemy merchant- vessel in a peaceable
manner; it is required to stop the vessel by means of certain signals,
to interview the captain, examine the ship's papers, enter the par-
ticulars in due form, and, where necessary, make an inventory, etc.
But in order to comply with these requirements it must obviously
be understood that the war-ship has full assurance that the merchant-

3i8 IN THE WORLD WAR

vessel will likewise observe a peaceable demeanor throughout. And
it is clear that no such assurance can exist when the merchant-ves-
sel is so armed as to be capable of offering resistance to a war-ship.
A war-ship can hardly be expected to act in such a manner under the
guns of an enemy, whatever may be the purpose for which the guns
were placed on board. Not to speak of the fact that the merchant-
vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all assurances to the con-
trary, have been proved to be armed for offensive purposes, and
make use of their armament for such purposes. It would also be
to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a war-ship were
expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance
on their own part. No state can regard its duty to humanity as
less valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect
of the subjects of a foreign Power.

The Austrian government is therefore of opinion that its former
assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to
armed merchant-vessels, since these, according to the legal standards
prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organized mihtary
forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable
to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the
general law of nations, merchant-vessels have never been justified in
resisting the exercise by war-ships of the right of taking prizes. But
even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it would
not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves with
guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant-
ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and
that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who
seek to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of
humanity. As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering
was discontinued, until a few years back, no Power has ever thought
of arming merchant-vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of
the second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions
of the laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about
the arming of merchant-ships. Only on one occasion was a casual
observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is
characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of
superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de
guerre se propose d'arreter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le
commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation k la mer, fera tirer
im coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que
Ton puisse donner. Les navir de commerce n^ont pas de canons d
hordy ("When a war-ship intends to stop and board a merchant-
vessel the commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The

APPENDIX 319

firing of a gun is the best guarantee that can be given. Merchant-
vessels do not carry gims.'")

Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by-
its assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were
cautioned beforehand against intrusting their persons or their goods
on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were
not put into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to
enable neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same.
And, finally, the Austro-Hungarian war-ships are instructed, even in
case of encountering armed enemy merchant-vessels, to give warning
and to provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems
possible to do so in the circumstances.

The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the
armed British steamers Secondo and Welsh Prince were sunk without
warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian
government has in the mean time received information that no
Austro-Htmgarian war-ships were at all concerned in the sinking of
these vessels.

The Austrian government has, as in the circular verbal note
already referred to — reverting now to the question of aggravated
submarine warfare referred to in the memorandtun — also in its
declaration of January 31st of this year issued a warning to neutrals
with corresponding time limit; indeed, the whole of the declaration
itself is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the
efect that no merchant-vessel tnay pass the area of sea expressly defined
therein. Nevertheless, the Austrian war-ships have been instructed
as far as possible to warn such merchant -vessels as may be encoun-
tered in the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers
and crew. And the Austrian government is in the possession of
nimierous reports stating that the crews and passengers of vessels
destroyed in these waters have been saved. But the Austrian
government cannot accept any responsibiUty for possible loss of
himian life which may after all occur in connection with the
destruction of armed vessels or vessels encotmtered in prohibited
areas. Also it may be noted that the Austro-Hungarian submarines
operate only in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas, and there is
thus hardly any question as to any action affecting American inter-
ests on the part of Austro-Hungarian war-ships.

After all that has been said in the preamble to this memorandimi,
it need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question
as a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the
destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that
its object — apart from the higher aims of relieving humanity from

320 IN THE WORLD WAR

further suffering by shortening the war, is only to place Great Britain
and its allies, who have — without establishing any legally effective
blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers — hindered traffic by sea
between neutrals and these Powers, in a like position of isolation, and
render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of permanency.
That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of war than
her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human con-
trol. But the Austrian government is conscious of having done all
in its power to avoid loss of human life. The object aimed at in the
blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly
attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those waters.
To sum up, the Austrian government may point out that the
assurance given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the A ficona,
and renewed in the case of the Persia, is neither withdrawn nor
qualified by its statements of February lo, 1916, and January
31, 1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian govern-
ment will, together with its allies, continue its endeavors to secure
to the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in
the pursuit of this aim — which it may take for granted has the full
sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself — it should find itself
compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain
areas, it will not need so much to point to the behavior of its oppo-
nents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to
be followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through
the persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon
its destruction, is brought to a state of self-defense in so desperate
extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian
government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now
being carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the
preservation of its own vital interests, but also toward the realiza-
tion of the idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and
hardest phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on
the part of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to
confirm in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the
laws of humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and
interests of neutral peoples.

SPEECH BY DOCTOR HELFFERICH, SECRETARY OF STATE, ON THE

SUB- MARINE WARFARE

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of May i, 19 17, gives the
following speech by Doctor Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the

APPENDIX 321

economical effects of the submarine warfare, delivered in the prin-
cipal committee of the Reichstag on April 28th. The speech is here
given verbatim, with the exception of portions containing con-
fidential statements:

'' In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the
technical and economical results of the submarine warfare have been
estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed
in estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first
month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half,
the estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may
fairly cherish the best expectations. The technical success guar-
antees the economical success with almost mathematical exactitude.
True, the economical results cannot be so easily expressed numeri-
cally and set down in a few big figures as the technical result in the
amount of tonnage sunk. The economical effects of the submarine
warfare are expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area,
where the enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by
resorting, so to speak, to statistical smoke-screens.

"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might
almost say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The
Secretary of State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly
the pride of the British public had faded. The English are now
suppressing our reports on the successes of our submarines and our
statements as to submarine losses; they dare not make pubHc the
amoimt of tonnage sunk, but mystify the public with shipping statis-
tics which have given rise to general annoyance in the English Press
itself. The EngHsh government lets its people go on calmly trusting
to the myth that instead of six U-boats sunk there are a hundred at
the bottom of the sea. It conceals from the world also the true
course of the entries and departures of tonnage in British ports since
the commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare. And more
than all, the English government has since February suppressed
most strictly all figures tending to throw light on the position of the
grain-market. In the case of the coal exports, the country of
destination is not published. The monthly trade report, which is
usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the next
month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete;
and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted
that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult
for us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there
is a gratifying side to the question, after all. It is not to be supposed
that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid
revealing its strength.

322 IN THE WORLD WAR

"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an
idea.

"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the
first two months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than
1,600,000 tons were sunk, of which probably considerably over
1,000,000 tons sailed under the British flag.

"The estimates as to the quantity of EngUsh tonnage at present
available are somev/hat divergent; in any case, whether we take the
higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two
months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to
replace it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the ques-
tion. In the year 19 14 England's newly built ships gave a tonnage
increment of 1,600,000; in 191 5 it was 650,000 tons, in 19 16, only
580,000, despite all efforts. And the normal loss of the British
merchant fleet in peace-time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,-
000 tons. It is hopeless to think of maintaining equilibriiim by
urging on the building of new vessels.

"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in
British service by a system of rewards and punishments may here
and there, to the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves,
have met with some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider
the need for preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace-time,
so that there is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this man-
ner. Even in January of this year about 30 per cent, of the shipping
entries into British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard
estimates brought up to 80 per cent, in order to terrify the neutrals;
if but 50 per cent, of this be correct it means a decrease in British
shipping traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and
tonnage frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been
reduced, at a low estimate, by one-fovuth, and probably by as much
as one-third, as against January. In January arrivals amounted to
2.2 million net tons. I may supplement the incomplete English
statistics by the information that in March the arrivals were only
1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this.
The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons represent, compared with the average
entries in peace-time, amounting to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per
cent. This low rate will be further progressively reduced. Lloyd
George at the beginning of the war reckoned on the last milliard.
Those days are now past. Then he based his plans on munitions.
England has here, with the aid of America, achieved extraordinary
results. But the Somme and Arras showed that, even with these
enormous resources, England was not able to beat us. Now, in his
greeting to the American allies, Lloyd George cries out: 'Ships,

APPENDIX 323

ships, and more ships yet.' And this time he is on the right tack;
it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will depend.

''The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to
build a thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these
can be brought into action they will, I confidently hope, have
nothing left to save.

**I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible
despite the English policy of suppression and concealment.

''Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still
not yet available, but those for February tell us enough.

"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million
pounds sterHng, in February to only 70 million; the exports have
gone down from 46 to 37 millions sterling — imports and exports
together showing a decline of over 20 per cent, in the first month
of the submarine warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round
has, since the commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a
more rapid rate, so that the decline in the import quantity from one
month to another may fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The
figures for imports and exports, then, confirm my supposition as to
the decrease of tonnage in the traffic with British ports.

"The British government has endeavored, by the strictest meas-
ures rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to
ward off the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported.
The attempt can only partially succeed.

"In 1 9 16, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about
31 millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs
and luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including im-
portant war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum,
cotton and wool, rubber, only 11 milHon tons, or roughly one-fourth.
A decline of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month
of unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect article^ indispensable
to life and to the purposes of war.

"The decline in the imports in February, 191 7, as against Febru-
ary, 1916, appears as follows:

"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp
48 per cent., jute 74 per cent., woolen materials 83 per cent., copper
and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the
imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures :

"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent.,
refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent.,
lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent.

"The only increases worth noting are in the cases of leather,
hides, rubber, and tin.

324 IN THE WORLD WAR

"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the
various sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from
February onward.

''The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives
no complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the
commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time
when the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly
weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judg-
ment will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration
the entire development of the imports during the course of the war.

"I will here give only the most important figures.

"In the case of iron ore England has up to now maintained its
position better than in other respects.

"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons.

"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons.

"January, 19 13, 689,000 tons
"January, 19 16, 526,000 tons
"January, 1917, 512,000 tons

February, 1913, 658,000 tons.
February, 1916, 404,000 tons.
February, 19 17, 508,000 tons.

'Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the
months of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease,
though the imports, especially in February, 191 7, were in excess of
those for the same month in 191 6.

"Timber imports, 1913, lo.i million loads.
" " 1916, 5.9 million loads.

February, 19 13, 406,000 loads.
" 1916, 286,000 loads.

" 191 7, 167,000 loads.

"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell
from 3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here
December, 19 16, and January, 191 7, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads
as the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 19 13; a
statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February.

"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said
as to the export of coal.

"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 miUion tons in
1 9 13 to 46^^ million tons ini9i5; ini9i6 only about 42 million tons
were exported. In December, 19 16, the export quantity fell for the
first time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and
3.9 million tons during the months from January to November, 1916.
In January, 191 7, a figure of 3.5 miUion tons was again reached; it
is the more significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from
the nature of the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month
to month, falls again in February, 191 7, to 2.9 million tons (as

APPENDIX 325

against 3.4 million tons in February of the year before), thus almost
reaching once more to the lowest point hitherto recorded — that of
December, 191 6. And it should be remembered that here, as in the
case of all other exports, sunk transports are included in the English
statistics.

"Details as to the destmation of exported coal have since the
beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desir-
ous of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading
for the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal-
supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of
191 6, may be seen from the following figures:

''England's coal export to France amounted in December, 19 16,
to only 1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the
same year; the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only
to 278,000 tons, as against 431,000 tons in January, and, roughly,
800,000 tons monthly average for the peace year 19 13.

"As to the further development since the end of February, I am
able to give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the
first week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the
previous year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as
against 2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see
how the operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway
and war industries in the countries allied with England

"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 2 2d of this
year, showed the EngHsh how they could protect themselves against
the effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own
country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are
more than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his
allies how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of
the coal-supply.

"I come now to the most important point: the position of England
with regard to its food-supply.

"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to
mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of
foodstuffs from overseas.

"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged
during the last years of peace as follows:

" Bread com, close on 80 per cent.

"Fodder grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilized as
substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread corn, 50 per cent.;
meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar con-
sumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely
covered by imports from abroad.
2'2r

326 IN^THE WORLD WAR

"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as con-
cerns the food situation in England, are operating under quite
exceptionally favorable conditions; the world's record harvest of
191 5 has been followed by the world's worst harvest of 19 16, repre-
senting a loss of 45-50 million tons of bread and fodder grain. The
countries hardest hit are those most favorably situated, from the
English point of view, in North America. The effects are now — the
rich stocks from the former harvest having been consumed — becom-
ing more evident every day and everywhere. The Argentine has
put an embargo on exports of grain. As to the condition of affairs
in the United States, this may be seen from the following figures:

''The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat
still in the hands of the farmer on March i, 1917, at loi million
bushels, or little over 2>^ million tons. The stocks for the previous
year on that date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during
the whole of the time I have followed these figures back have the
stocks been so low or even nearly so. The same appHes to stocks
of maize. Against a supply of 1,138,000 bushels on March i, 1916,
we have for this year only 789,000 bushels.

"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit.
The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fan-
tastic. Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of
January, 191 7, at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents,
and by April 2 5th had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York,
which stood at Sj^i cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917
had already risen to 19 iK cents, rose at the beginning of April to
229 cents, and was noted at no less than 281 on April 2d. This is
three and a half times the peace figure! In German currency at
normal peace-time exchange, these 281 cents represent about 440
marks per ton, or, at present rate of exchange for dollars, about 580
marks per ton.

"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help
England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!

"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and
stocks of grain. I can, however, state as follows:

"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917,
England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters,
as against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years.
From January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline
in the stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these
months do not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 191 5, the
visible stocks amounted only to about 2 million quarters, represent-
ing the requirements for scarcely three weeks.

APPENDIX 327

"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more
favorably during the present year. This is borne out by the import
figures for January — as published. The imports of bread com and
fodder grain — I take them altogether, as in the English regulations
for eking out supplies — amoimted only to 12.6 miUion quarters, as
against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.

''For February the English statistics show an increase in the
import value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent.,
as against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution
among the various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and
reckoning with the rise in prices since, about the same import
quantity as in the previous year. But in view of the great decrease
in American grain shipments and the small quantity which can have
come from India and Australia, the statement is hardly credible.
We may take it that March has brought a further decline, and that
to-day, when we are nearing the time of the three-week stocks, the
English supplies are lower than in the previous years.

"The Enghsh themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George
stated in February that the English grain-supplies were lower than
ever within the memory of man. A high official in the English
Ministry of Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an
agricultural congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare,
which was an extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs
had grown far worse even than then.

"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department
(Kriegsernahrungsamt), stated briefly on April 19th that the then
consumption of breadstuff s was 50 per cent, in excess of the present
and prospective supphes. It would be necessary to reduce the con-
sumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.

"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, the member for Manchester, at a
conference of the Independent Labor Party in Leeds had stated
that, according to his information, England would in six to eight
weeks be in a complete state of famine.

"The crisis in which England is placed — and we can fairly call
it a crisis now — is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies
of other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavorable
turn.

"The import of meat in February, 19 17, shows the lowest figures
for many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.

"The marked falling off in the butter imports— February, 191 7,
showing only half as much as in the previous year — is not nearly
counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every
effort to introduce.

328 IN THE WORLD WAR

"The Import of lard also, most of which comes from the United
States, shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fod-
der-stuffs. The price of lard in Chicago has risen from isH
cents at the beginning of January, 1917, to 2i>^ cents on April
25th, and the price of pigs in the same time from 9.80 to 16.50
dollars.

"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which
at present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst
for a generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant.
Captain Bathurst stated on April 19th that in about four weeks the
supphes of potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.

"The full seriousness of the case now stares English states-
men in the face. Up to now they have beHeved it possible to exor-
cise the danger by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves
compelled to have recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is
too late."

The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the
measures taken up to date in England for dealing with the food
question, and thereafter continues:

" On March 2 2d again the English food dictator. Lord Devonport,
stated in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the constunp-
tion of bread would be necessary, but that it would be a national
disaster if England should have to resort to compulsion.

"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: *We do
not wish to introduce so un-English a system. In the first place,
because we beHeve that the patriotism of the people can be trusted
to assist us in our endeavors toward economy, and, further, because,
as we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system
promises no success ; finally, because such a system would necessitate
a too compHcated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs
of men and women whose services could be better employed else-
where.'

"Meantime the English government has, on receipt of the latest
reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a
failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organization for
the purpose is in readiness.

"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps
now being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture
in the country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as
the measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest-
time, nor can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency
can hardly be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the
spring. Not until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained.

APPENDIX 329

And between then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for
England, and for all countries dependent upon imports for their
food-supply.

"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of
the harvest in 19 16 will be followed by a Hke universal failure in
19 1 7. In the United States the official reports of acreage under
crops are worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous
year. The winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels,
as against 492 million bushels for the previous year and 650 miUion

bushels for 191 5.

"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed,
and offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.

"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present:
short, but safe— for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we
can say that the war of starvation, that crime against humanity,
has turned against those who commenced it. We hold the enemy
in an iron grip. No one can save them from their fate. Not even
the apostles of humanity across the great ocean, who are now
commencing to protect the smaller nations by a blockade of our
neutral neighbors through prohibition of exports, and seeking thus
to drive them, under the lash of starvation, into entering into the
war against us.

"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them
by the neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mis-
tress of the seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her
sons by hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the
England that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were
starved into submission, that could wait till their big brother across
the Atlantic arrived on the scene with ships and million^ armies,
standing fast in crushing superiority until the last annihilating

battle?

"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait.
Time is on our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the
turn of the world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing
to help, what our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all
comparison. But they will attain their end. For us at home, too,
it is hard; not so hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough.
Those at home must do their part as well. If we remain true to
ourselves, keeping our own house in order, maintaining internal
unit} , then we have won existence and the future for our Fatherland.
Everything is at stake. The German people is called upon now, in
these weeks heavy with impending decision, to show that it is worthy
of continued existence."

330 IN THE WORLD WAR

SPEECH BY COUNT CZERNIN TO THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION,

JANUARY 24, I918

''Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace
negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained
up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true,
logical, and justifiable.

"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress
of the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea
of the difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step.
I will in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties,
but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing between
the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which have
ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I
am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open
windows. It would be impossible that negotiations of the depth
and extent of the present could from the start proceed smoothly
and without opposition. We are faced with nothing less than the
task of building up a new world, of restoring all that the most
merciless of all wars has destroyed and cast down. In all the peace
negotiations we know of the various phases have been conducted
more or less behind closed doors, the results being first declared to
the world when the whole was completed. All history books tell
us, and indeed it is obvious enough, that the toilsome path of such
peace negotiations leads constantly over hill and dale, the prospects
appearing often more or less favorable day by day. But when
the separate phases themselves, the details of each day's proceedings,
are telegraphed all over the world at the time, it is again obvious
that nervousness prevailing throughout the world must act like an
electric current and excite public opinion accordingly. We were
fully aware of the disadvantage of this method of proceeding.
Nevertheless, we at once agreed to the wish of the Russian govern-
ment in respect of this publicity, desiring to meet them as far as
possible, and also because we had nothing to conceal on our part,
and because it would have made an unfavorable impression if we
had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of secrecy until
completion. But the complete publicity in the negotiations makes
it insistent that the great public, the country behind, and above all
the leaders, must keep cool. The match must be played out in cold
blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the peoples of the Monarchy
support their representatives at the conference.

APPENDIX 331

*'It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which Austria-
Hungary treats with the various newly constituted Russian states
is that of *no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the pro-
gram which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Mmister,
I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated
to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace.
And I have not deviated from that program. Those who believe
that I am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to
follow are poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the
slightest doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never
allowed myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's-breadth from
that way, either to right or left. And I have since become far from a
favorite of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who
follow the Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted
as an inveterate parti zan of war by those whose program is peace
at any price, as innumerable letters have informed me. Neither
has ever disturbed me; on the contrary, the double insults have
been my only comfort in this serious time. I declare now once
again that I ask not a single kreuzer, not a single square meter of
land from Russia, and that if Russia, as appears to be the case,
takes the same point of view, then peace must result. Those
who wish for peace at any price might entertain some doubt
as to my 'no-annexation' intentions toward Russia if I did not
tell them to their faces with the same complete frankness that
I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going beyond
the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any
surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then
I shall continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious
for peace as they, or I would resign if I could not attain the
end I seek.

"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there Is no
ground for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through,
since the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no
annexations or indemnities — and nothing but new instructions from
the various Russian governments, or their disappearance, could
shift that basis — I then pass to the two great difficulties in which
are contained the reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded
as quickly as we all wished.

"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with a single
Russian peace delegation, but with various newly formed Russian
states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely
fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the
following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St. Peters-

332 IN THE WORLD WAR

burg; secondly, our new neighbor proper, the great State of Ukraine;
thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

"With the first two of these states we are treating directly;
that is to say, face to face; with the other two it was at first in a
more or less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative
to Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four
separate Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the
Caucasus, with which we ourselves have, of course, no direct
questions to settle, but which, on the other hand, is in conflict with
Turkey, will serve to show the extent of the matter to be debated.

"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is
that of the great newly established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine.
In the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead
with this delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis
of no indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived
at settlement on the fact that trade relations are to be re-established
with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this
very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing difficulties.
While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of being entirely
autonomous and justified in treating independently with ourselves,
the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between their
territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed, and
that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking part
in ouf deUberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not admitted
by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This
unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia, how-
ever, gave rise to very serious delays. We got over these diffi-
culties, and I hope that in a few days' time we should be able once
more to resume negotiations.

**As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I
received yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the
following two telegrams :

"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of
the Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations
of the four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to
send two delegates to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part
in the peace negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also
to form a supplementary part of the Russian delegation itself.
Herr Joffe adds with regard to this that the Russian delegation is
prepared to receive these Ukranian representatives among them-
selves. The above statement is supplemented by a copy of a

APPENDIX 333

''declaration" dated from Kharkov, addressed to the president of
the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest, and emanating from the
Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic,
proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kieff only represents the
propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of acting on behalf
of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian Workers' and
Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge any
decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kieff
without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send
representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a supple-
mentary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognize
as the accredited representatives of the Federative government of
Russia.'

''Furthennore: 'The German translation of the Russian original
text of the communication received yesterday evening from Herr
Joffe regarding the delegates of the Ukrainian government at
Kharkov and the two appendices thereto runs as follows:

'"To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.

"'Sir, — In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration
received by me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants'
Government of the Ukrainian Republic, W. M. Schachrai and E. G.
Medwjedew, and their mandates, I have the honor to inform you
that the Russian Delegation, in full agreement with its frequently
repeated acknowledgment of the right of self-determination among
all peoples — including naturally the Ukrainian — sees nothing to
hinder the participation of the representatives of the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic in the peace nego-
tiations, and receives them, according to their wish, among the
personnel of the Russian Peace Delegation, as accredited repre-
sentatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the
Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to your knowledge, I beg
you, sir, to accept the expression of my most sincere respect. — The
President of the Russian Peace Delegation: A. Joffe.'

"'Appendix i. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the
Russian Republic. Declaration.

"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants* Govern-
ment of the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military
Affairs, W. M. Schachrai, and the president of the Pan-Ukrainian
Central Executive Committee of t^e Council of the Workers',
Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputation, E. G. Medwjedew, delegated
to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for the purpose of conducting peace
negotiations with the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, in full agreement with the representative^

334 IN THE WORLD WAR

of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Russian Federa-
tive RepubHc, thereby understood the Council of People's Com-
missaries, hereby declare as follows: The General Secretariat
of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be acknowledged as
representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name of the
Ukrainian workers, soldiers, and peasants, we declare categorically
that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat without our
assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people, cannot be
carried out, and can in no case be realized.

'''In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries,
and thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and
Peasants' Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct
of the peace negotiations with the Delegation of the Four Powers,
together with the Russian Peace Delegation.

"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the president the
following resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee
of the Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants'
Deputies, on the 30th December, I9i7-i2th January, 1918:

'"The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade
Medwjedew, president of the Central Executive Committee, and
People's Secretary Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take
part in the peace negotiations, instructing them at the same time
to declare categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central
Rada to act in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded
as arbitrary steps on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian
population, against the will and interests of the working classes of the
Ukraine, and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will
be acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet government or by
the Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants'
Government regards the Council of People's Commissaries as
representatives of the Pan-Russian Soviet government, and as
accordingly entitled to act on behalf of the entire Russian Federa-
tion; and that the delegation of the Ukrainian Workers' and
Peasants' Government, sent out for the purpose of exposing the
arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada, will act together
with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian Delegation.

'"Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of
the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December,

1917.

"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People,
Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did
not, therefore, arrive with us.

'"January, 19 18.

APPENDIX 335

'''The President of the Central Executive Committee of the
Ukrainian Coimcil of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies,
E. Medwjedew.

"'The People's Commissary for MiHtary Affairs, Schachrai.

***A true copy of the original.

"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'

"Appendix 2.

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the
Council of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina,
the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints,
in the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina,
the president of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim
Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the People's Secretary for Military
Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai, and the People's Secretary
for Enlightenm.ent of the People, Wladimir Petro witch Satonski, in
the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to take part in the
negotiations with the governments of Germany, Austria- Hungary,
Turkey, and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace between the mentioned
states and the Russian Federative Republic. With this end in view
the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, Wasili
Matwjejewitch Schachrai, and Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, are
empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to issue
declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited
representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Govern-
ment are bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions
of the accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants'
Government of the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is under-
stood the Council of People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for Inter-
national Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice,
Works, Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 191 7-1 2th January, 1918.

" ' In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not
interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficul-
ties to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian
Republic, determine that the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary

j;36 IN THE WORLD WAR

and the former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves
and the Ukraine.

POLAND

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have
not yet been exactly determined, we want nothing at all from this
new state. Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall
choose its own fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the
form of the people's vote in this respect; the more surely it expresses
the general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased. For I
desire only the voluntary attachment of Poland ; only in the express
wish of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guaranty for
lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that the Polish
question must not be allowed to delay the signing oj peace by a single
day. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach
us, we will not reject its advances — the Polish question must not
and will not endanger the peace itself.

"I should have been glad if the Polish government had been able
to take part in the negotiations, since in my opinion Poland is an
independent state. The Petersburg government, however, takes
the attitude that the present Polish government is not entitled to
speak in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as
competent to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on
this point in order to avoid possible conflict. The question is
certainly one of importance, but it is more important still in my
opinion to set aside all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations.

GERMAN-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES AS TO THE OCCUPIED AREAS

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has
been most widely echoed in the Press, is the diference of opinion
between our German allies and the Petersburg government anent
the interpretation of the right of self-determination among the Rus-
sian peoples; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German
troops. Germany maintains that it does not aim at any annexation
of territory by force from Russia, but, briefly stated, the ditference
of opinion is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that the numerous
expressions of desire for ituiependence on the part of legislative cor-
porations, communal representations, etc., in the occupied areas
should be taken as the provisional basis for the will of the people,
to be later tested by plebiscite on a broader foundation, a point of

APPENDIX 337

view which the Russian government at first was indisposed to
agree to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in
Courland and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any
more than in the case of Poland.

''In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall
take place after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn
from the occupied provinces, while Germany, in reply to this, points
out that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would
create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a
state of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should
here be noted that everything in these provinces which to-day
renders possible the life of a state at all is German property. Rail-
ways, posts, and telegraphs, the entire industry, and, moreover, the
entire administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in Ger-
man hands. The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would,
in fact, create a condition of things which seems practically impossible
to maintain.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a middle way, which,
moreover, miist he found.

''The diffierences between these two points of view are in my opinion
not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations.

''But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another;
they take time.

"// once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion
the general peace cannot he long delayed, despite all efforts on the
part of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some
are unable to understand why I stated in my first speech after the
resumption of negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest
of a general peace, but of a separate peace with Russia. This was
the necessary recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotzky also
has admitted without reserve, and it was necessary, since the nego-
tiations would have been on a different footing — that is to say, in
a more limited sphere— \i treating with Russia alone than if it were
a case of treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the
fruit of general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless
convinced that the fruit has begun to ripen, and that it is now only
a question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honor-
able peace or not.

Wilson's message

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of
peace put forward by the President of the United States of America

338 IN THE WORLD WAR

to the whole world. This is ait offer of peace, for in fourteen points
Mr. Wilson sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish
a general peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be
expected to furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that
were the case, then negotiations would be superfluous altogether
and peace could be arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single
assent. This, of course, is not so.

"But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals
on the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the
Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that there are among his
proposals some which we can even agree to with great pleasure.

''If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I
must, to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with our allies — mention
is made of the German possession of Belgium and of the Turkish
Empire — I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our allies, I
am firmly determined to hold out in defense of our allies to the very
last. The pre-war possessions of our allies we will defend equally
with our own. This standpoint is that of all four allies in complete
reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must politely
hut definitely decline the method of councils such as we govern by
in our internal affairs. We have in Austria a parliament elected hy
general, equal, direct and secret ballot. There is not a more demo-
cratic parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with
the other constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right
to decide upon matters of internal Austrian affairs. I speak of
Austria only, because I do not speak of Hungarian internal affairs
in the Austrian Delegation. I should not consider it constitutional
to do so. And we do not interfere in American affairs; hut, on the
other hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state
whatever. Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to
the remaining points, to state as follows :

"As to the point deahng with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy'
and the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have
nothing to say. From my point of view I have no objection to
such public negotiations so long as full reciprocity is the basis of
the same, though I do entertain considerable doubt as to whether,
all things considered, it is the quickest and most practical method
of arriving at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter
of business. But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for
instance, of commercial treaties between one country and another
it would not be advisable to publish incomplete results beforehand

APPENDIX 339

to the world. In such negotiations both parties naturally com-
mence by setting their demands as high as possible in order to
climb down gradually, using this or that expressed demand as
matter for compensaimt in other ways until finally an equilibrium
of the opposing interests is arrived at, a point which must necessarily
be reached if agreement is to be come to at all. If such negotiations
were to be carried on with full publicity, nothing could prevent the
general public from passionately defending every separate clause
involved, regarding any concession as a defeat, even when such
clauses had only been advanced for tactical reasons. And when the
public takes up any such point with particular fervor, ultimate
agreement may be thereby rendered impossible or the final agree-
ment may, if arrived at, be regarded as in itself a defeat, possibly
by both sides. And this would not conduce to peaceable relations
thereafter; it would, on the contrary, increase the friction between
the states concerned. And as in the case of commercial treaties,
so also with political negotiations, which deal with political matters.

''If the aboHtion of secret diplomacy is to mean that no secret
compacts are to be made, that no agreements are to be entered upon
without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the
introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realized and
adherence thereto insured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted
that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always
be able to make a secret com.pact without any one being aware of
the fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick
by formalities, and a question of more or less formal nature will
never prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement.
'Point I, then, is one that can be discussed.
Point 2 is concerned with the freedom of the seas. In this
postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can
here fully and completely share America's desire, the more so as
the President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters' — that is
to say, we are to understand the freedom of the open sea, and there
is thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the
sovereign rights of our faithful Turkish alHes. Their standpoint
in this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any future economi-
cal war, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by
ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands general disarmament, sets forth in
particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this
present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient
for the internal security of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly

340 IN THE WORLD WAR

and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ven-
tured to express the same idea; it forms part of my political creed ^
and I am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same
thought.

"As regards the Russian clause, we are already showing in deeds
that we are endeavoring to bring about friendly relations with our
neighbors there.

"With regard to Italy, Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro, I can
only repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures
of our enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our
enemies, who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on
until the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by
such concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advan-
tage of being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk.
[Applause.]

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses
among his allies to persuade them on their part to declare 07t what
conditions they are willing to treat; he will then have rendered the
enormous service of having set on foot the general peace negotia-
tions. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and I
will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for
themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that time, and
the continuation of the war, cannot but afect the situations here
concerned.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example.
Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial
acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into
the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war
expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery
upon its own population, and all this only to lose forever an advantage
which it might have won.

"Finally, as regards point 13, it Is an open secret that we are
adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish state
to include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.'
On this point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson.
And if the President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal
League of Nations he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto
on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those
of Mr. Wilson, we are not only agreed in essentials as to the great
principles for rearrangement of the world after this war, but our

APPENDIX 341

ideas as to several concrete questions hearing on the peace are closely
allied.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but
that a discussion of these points might lead to a clearer under-
standing and bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary, on the
one hand, and the United States of America, on the other, are the
two Great Powers in the hostile "groups of states whose interests
are least opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to
suppose that an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might
form the natural starting-point for a conciliatory discussion between
all those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations.
{Applause.] So much for Wilson's proposals.

PETERSBURG AND THE UKRAINE

"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this con-
clusion is perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am
endeavoring to bring about peace between the Ukraine and Peters-
burg.

"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our
definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed
to the Petersburg government— we have the Ukrainian against us —
and it is impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they
have nothing there themselves but revolution and anarchy, goods
which the Bolshevists, no doubt, woidd be glad to export, but which
I must politely decline to receive.

"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well,
since this, like any other cessation of hostiUties, brings us nearer
to the general peace.

"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of
provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial
terms. The question of food to-day is a matter of anxiety through-
out the world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral
countries, it is a leading question. I wish to profit by the conclusion
of peace with those Russian states which have food to export, in
order to help our own population. We could and would hold out
without this assistance. But I know my duty, and my duty bids me
do all that can be done to lighten the^burden of our suffering people,
and I will not, therefore, from any hysterical nervousness about
getting to final peace a few days or a few weeks earlier, throw away
this possible advantage to our people. Such a peace takes time and
cannot be concluded in a day. For such a peace must definitely

342 IN THE WORLD WAR

state whether, what, and how the Russian party will deliver, for the
reason that the Ukraine on its part wishes to close the business not
after, but at the signing of peace.

"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this
newly established state occasion great difficulty and naturally con-
siderable delay in the negotiations.

APPEAL TO THE COUNTRY

"// you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms
at once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economical advantage
at all, and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation
which they should have gained from the peace.

*'A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind
him standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation
in record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank
him for the manner in which it had been carried out.

''If you give our present opponents the impression that we must
have peace at once, and at any price, we shall not get so much as a
single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic.
It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating
the war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians them-
selves intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the
no-annexation basis. It is a question — I repeat it once again — not
of 'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our
population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and pro-
curing them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our
partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching,
to see whether you are forcing me to act or not.

^^If you wish to ruin the peace, if you are anxious to renounce
the supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my
hand by speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but
not otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that
we are to-day at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace to-day
without economical gain rather than a good peace with economical
advantages to-morrow.

"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely
to lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport, and
organization which are increasing. When you at home get up strikes
you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate
the crises concerned aiui hinder the supplies of food and coal. You
are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that
peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.

APPENDIX 343

"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating
rumors to the effect that the government is instigating the strikes.
I leave to these men themselves to choose whether they are to
appear as criminal slanderers or as fools.

*'If you had a government desirous of concluding a peace dif-
ferent from that desired by the majority of the population, if you
had a government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of con-
quest, one might understand a conflict between the government and
the country. But since the government desires precisely the same
as the majority of the people — that is to say, the speedy settlement of
an honorable peace without annexationist aims — then it is madness
to attack that government from behind, to interfere with its freedom
of action and hamper its movements. Those who do so are fighting,
not against the government; they are fighting blindly against the
people they pretend to serve and against themselves.

"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your
duty, to choose between the following alternatives; either you trust
me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must
help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose
me. I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the
Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a
vote of confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then
the matter is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence
must be brought up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority
against me I shall at once take the consequences. No one of those
who are anxious to secure my removal will be more pleased than
myself; indeed, far less so. Nothing induces me now to retain my
office but the sense of duty, which constrains me to remain as long
as I have the confidence of the Emperor and the majority of the
delegations. A soldier with any sense of decency does not desert.
But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could conduct negotiations of
this importance unless he knows, and all the world as well, that he is
endowed with the confidence of the majority among the constitu-
tional representative bodies. There can be no half measures here.
You have this confidence or you have not. You must assist me or
depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."

V ^

REPORT OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK

The Austro-Hungarian government entered upon the peace nego-
tiations at Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as

344 IN THE WORLD WAR

possible at a peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead
to a general peace, should at least secure order in the east. The
draft of a preUminary peace was sent to Brest containing the
following points:

1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be con-
cluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford any
support to the enemies of the other.

2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Livonia, and Courland
retaining the right of determining their own destiny for the future.

3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military
operations.

4. Cessation of economical war and reparation of damages sus-
tained by private persons through the economical war.

5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provision-
ally on the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years'
preference subject to restriction in respect of any custom^s union
with neighboring countries.

6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.

A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of
the occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed
until after consultation with the German Supreme Military Com-
mand, whose co-operation was here required, owing to the mingling of
German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The
Army Command has indicated a period of at least six months as
necessary for the evacuation.

In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in
particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of
evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically
that no evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until
after conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in
connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied dis-
tricts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it
should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples
within its territory the right of self-determination, and that the
nations in question had already availed themselves of that right.
The plain standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry
through, although it was shared by the other allies. However, in
formulating the answer sent on December 25, 19 16, to the Russian
peace proposals a compromise was, after persistent efforts on our
part, ultimately arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption
of the divergent German point of view on these two points. In the
matter of evacuation the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of
certain bodies of troops before the general peace might be discussed.

Appendix 345

In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating
this was found, making it appHcable only in the event of general
peace. Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace then the
principle of ''no annexations" would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our en-
endeavors to this answer by the Four Powers to the Russian pro-
posals, the German Headquarters evinced extreme indignation.
Several highly outspoken telegrams from the German Supreme
Command to the German delegates prove this. The head of the
German delegation came near to being recalled on this account,
and if this had been done it is likely that German foreign policy
would have been placed in the hands of a firm adherent of the
sternest military views. As this, however, could only have had
an unfavorable effect on the further progress of the negotiations,
we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr Kiihlmann.
With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise Berlin
that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary
would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia.
This declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did
not fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely
responsible for the fact that Kiihlmann was able to remain.

Kiihlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it ren-
dered the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first offi-
cially touched upon on December 27th, but had been already taken
up in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly
awkward matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front
was not to be evacuated until six months after the general peace.
Russia was disposed to agree to this, but demanded, on the other
hand, that the fate of Poland was not to be decided until after
evacuation. Against this the Germans were inclined to give up their
original standpoint to the effect that the populations of occupied
territories had already availed themselves of the right of self-deter-
mination conceded, and allow a new inquiry to be made among the
population, but insisted that this should be done during the occupa-
tion. No solution could be arrived at on this point, though Austria-
Hungary made repeated efforts at mediation. The negotiations
had arrived at this stage when they were first interrupted on
December 29th.

On resuming the negotiations on Jariuary 6th the situation was little
changed. Kiihlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer
than before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the Ger-
man military party. Under these circumstances the negotiations,
in which Trotzky now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led

346 IN THE WORLD WAR

only to altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of
self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the
distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In
order to get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavors
were made on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between
the German and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally,
and especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the terri-
torial question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our
proposals to the German delegates were to the effect that the
Russian standpoint should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite
demanded by the Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans
insisted should be the case, during the German occupation, but with
extensive guaranties for free expression of the will of the people.
On this point we had long discussions with the German delegates,
based on detailed drafts prepared by us.

Our endeavors here, however, were again unsuccessful. Cir-
cumstances arising at the time in our own country were responsible
for this, as also for the result of the negotiations which had in the
mean time been commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These
last had, at the first discussion, declined to treat with any Polish
representatives, and demanded the concession of the entire Cholm
territory, and, in a more guarded fashion, the cession of eastern
Galicia and the Ukrainian part of northeastern Hungary, and in
consequence of which the negotiations were on the point of being
broken off. At this stage a food crisis broke out in Austria to an
extent of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was hitherto una-
ware, threatening Vienna in particular with the danger of being in a
few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost immediately after this
came a strike movement of threatening proportions. These events
at home weakened the position of the Foreign Minister both as
regards his attitude toward the German allies and toward the
opposing parties in the negotiations — with both of which he was
then in conflict — and this, at a most critical moment, to a degree
that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required
to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely
to ask, but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food,
or Vienna would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe.
With the enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the
situation at home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be
favorable to Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation
and our labor troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis
and tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain

APPENDIX 347

the supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish
poHtical pressure on that country; on the other hand he had to
persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally
to arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable con-
ditions possible with the Ukraine, which would, if possible, put an
end to the still serious difficulties of the food situation.

Under these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the
German delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a
separate peace with Russia, as this would have imperiled the chance
of lood-suppHes from Germany — the more so as the representative
of the German Army Command had declared that it was immaterial
whether Austria-Hungary made peace or not. Germany would in
any case march on Pertersburg if the Russian government did not
give way. On the other hand, however, the Foreign Minister pre-
vailed on the leader of the Russian delegation to postpone the
carrying out of the intentions of his government — to the effect
that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on the part
of German- Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation
were continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences
we succeeded in bringing their demands to a footing which might
just possibly be acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause
whereby Ukraine undertook to deliver at least one million tons of
grain by August, 1918. As to the demand for the Cholm territory,
which we had wished to have relegated to the negotiations with
Poland, the Ukrainian delegates refused to give way on this point
and were evidently supported by General Hoffmann. Altogether
the German miUtary party seemed much inclined to support
Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to accede to Polish
claims, so that we were unable to obtain the admission of Polish
representatives to the proceedings, though we had frequently asked
for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was the fact that
Trotzky himself was unwilling to recognize the Pohsh party as hav-
ing equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that the
Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to
those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision
of the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the
finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population — i. e.,
the principle of national boundaries under international protection.
The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the
Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guaranty
as to the autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia.
With regard to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister

348 IN THE WORLD WAR

declared that they could only be granted on the condition that the
Ukraine fulfilled the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of
grain, the deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further
demanded that the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal —
i.e., that the failure of one party to comply therewith should release
the other. The formulation of these points, which met with the
greatest difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a
later date.

At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the
separate delegates time to advise their governments as to the results
hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign
Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotia-
tions to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations
his policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the
basis of the concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question
dealt with at the same time was whether the Monarchy should, in
case of extreme necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if
the negotiations with that state should threaten to come to nothing
on account of Germany's demands. This question was, after full
consideration of all grounds to the contrary, answered in thesi in
the affirmative, as the state of affairs at home apparently left no
alternative.

On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavors
were made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing
out what would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In
the course of the deliberations on this point with Herr Kiihlmann
we succeeded after great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of
the German delegates to a final attempt at compromise, to be under-
taken by the Foreign Minister. The proposals for this compromise
were based on the following considerations:

For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:

1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were
to be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should
be taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be
taken first;

2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a
constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;

3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and

4. In what manner it was to be organized (by general franchise,
by a vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would
also be in accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to
leave the decision on all these points to the people themselves, and
deliver thern over to the "temporary self-administrative body,".

APPENDIX 349

which should, also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff),
be introduced at once. The whole of the peace negotiations could
then be concentrated upon a single point: the question as to the
composition of this temporary body. Here, however, a compromise
could be arrived at, as Russia could agree that the already existent
bodies set in the foreground by Germany should be allowed to
express a part of the will of the people, Germany agreeing that these
bodies should, during the occupation, be supplemented by elements
appointed, according to the Russian principles, by free election.

On February yth, immediately after Herr Kiihlmann had agreed
to mediation on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of
the Russian delegation, Trotzky, and had a series of conversations
with him. The idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was
little to Trotzky's taste, and he declared that he would in any case
protest against the handUng of the self-determination question by
the Four Powers. On the other hand, the discussion did lead to
some result, in that a new basis for disposing of the difficulties
which had arisen was now found. There was to be no further
continuance of the conflict as to whether the territorial alterations
involved by the peace should be termed "annexations," as the
Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of the right of self-determina-
tion," as Germany wished; the territorial alterations were to be
simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes that . . .").
Trotzky, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion of such
a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon
Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the
other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any
separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose govern-
ment was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, accord-
ing to some reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign
Minister was now anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question
also, in which he had to a certain degree the support of Herr von
Kiihlmann, while General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed
any further concessions.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their
end, owing to the fact that Herr Kiihlmann was forced by the
German Supreme Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff
declared that the negotiations with Russia must be concluded within
three days, and when a telegram from Petersburg was picked up
in Berlin calHng on the German army to rise in revolt Herr von
Kiihlmann was strictly ordered not to be content with the cessions
already agreed to, but to demand the further cession of the unoc-
cupied territories of Livonia and Esthonia. Under such pressure

350 IN THE WORLD WAR

the leader of the German delegation had not the power to compro-
mise. We then arrive at the signing of the treaty with Ukraine,
which had, after much trouble, been brought to an end meanwhile.
It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign Minister had proved
fruitless. Nevertheless, he continued his discussions with Trotzky,
but these still led to no result, owing to the fact that Trotzky,
despite repeated questioning, persisted in leaving everything vague
till the last moment as to whether he would, under the present
circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers at all or
not. Not until the plenary session of February loth was this cleared
up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed no
treaty of peace.

The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for
further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since
peace seemed to have come via facH already. At a meeting on
February loth of the diplomatic and miHtary delegates of Germany
and Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to
be done it was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient,
that the situation arising out of Trotzky's declarations must be
accepted. The one dissentient vote — that of General Hoffmann —
was to the effect that Trotzky's declaration should be answered by
declaring the armistice at an end, marching on Petersburg, and
supporting the Ukraine openly against Russia. In the ceremonial
final sitting, on February nth, Herr von Kiihlmann adopted the
attitude expressed by the majority of the peace delegations, and
set forth the same in a most impressive speech. Nevertheless, a
few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany declared
the armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march on
Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the sign-
ing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took
no part in this action.

REPORT OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT BUKHAREST

The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Rumania
was considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations
at Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Rumania
itself from taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the
Rumanian government to understand that it would not treat
with the present King and the present government at all. This
step, however, was only intended to enable separate negotiations
to be entered upon with Rumania, as Germany feared that the

APPENDIX 351

participation of Rumania in the Brest negotiations would imperil
the chances of peace. Rumania's idea seemed then to be to carry
on the war and gain the upper hand. At the end of January,
therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in order to bring
about negotiations with Rumania. The Emperor sent Colonel
Randa, the former Military Attache to the Rumanian government,
to the King of Riunania, assuring him of his willingness to grant
^Rumania honorable terms of peace.

In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised
in Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as
to prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the
invasion by Rumania in 1916 over the Siebenburgen, despite
opposition on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The
strategical frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the
way, was influenced by considerations not conducive to peace,
followed a line involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin,
Sinaia and several valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public
opinion in Hungary voiced even further demands. The Hungarian
government was of opinion that the Parliament would offer the
greatest hindrances to any peace not complying with the general
desire in this respect, and leading Hungarian statesmen, even some
among the Opposition parties, declared the rectification of the
frontier to be a condition of peace sine qua non. Wekerle and
Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this serious difference
of opinion the Foreign Minister, in entire agreement with the
Emperor, even before the commencement of the negotiations in the
middle of February, took up the position that demands connected
with the frontier fine should not offer any obstacle to the conclusion
of peace. The rectification of the frontier should only seriously be
insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of loyal and, for
the future, amicable relations with Rumania. Hungary regarded
this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister with
increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line con-
ceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be unfor-
tunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal
politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would
be thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it
would give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Rumanian fac-
tions; and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it
would mean annexations and the transference of population this
way and that, rendering friendly relations with Rumania an impos-
sibility. Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold
fast by the frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point

552 IN THE WORLD WAR

could be used to bring about the establishment in Rumania of
a regime amicably disposed toward the Central Powers. The
Foreign Minister was particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman
Cabinet formed, inaugurating a policy friendly to ourselves. He
believed that with such a Cabinet it would be easier to arrive at
a peace of mutual understanding, and was also resolved to render
possible such a peace by extensive concessions, especially by giving
his diplomatic support in the Bessarabian question. He informed
Marghiloman also in writing that he would be prepared to grant
important concessions to a Cabinet of which he, Marghiloman, was
the head, in particular as regards the cession of inhabited places
such as Tumu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he was willing to
give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the Austro-
Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would, despite
active opposition on the part of the Hungarian government, be
reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Rumania were par-
ticularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga and
Busteni. On March 24th Count Czemin prepared to terminate these
negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to
Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated
Lotru district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the
frontier question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself
satisfied with this compromise. On the next day, however, it was
nevertheless rejected by the Hungarian government, and not until
after further telegraphic communication with the Emperor and
Wekerle was the assent of all competent authorities obtained. This
had, indeed, been widely considered in Hungarian circles as an
impossibility.

Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in
the Bukharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an
economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania. This
was of especial interest to the Austrian government, whereas the
frontier question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was
a matter of indifference to this government, which, as a matter of
fact, did not sympathize with the demands at all. The plan for an
economical alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary.
Immediately before the commencement of the Bukharest negotia-
tions an attempt was made to overcome this opposition on the part
of the Hungarian government and secure its adherence to the idea of
an economical alliance with Rumania — at any rate, conditionally
upon the conclusion of a customs alliance with Germany as planned.
It proved impossible, however, at the time to obtain this assent.
The Hungarian government reserved the right of considering the

APPENDIX 353

question later on, and on March 8th instructed their representatives
at Bukharest that they must dissent from the plan, as the future
economical alliance with Germany was a matter beyond present
consideration. Consequently this question could play no part at
first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done was to
sound the leading Rumanian personages in a purely private manner
as to the attitude they would adopt toward such a proposal. The
idea was, generally speaking, well received by Rumania, and the
prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly
advisable from Rumania's point of view. A further attempt was
therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the
east, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian government;
these deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister
for Foreign Affairs resigned his office.

Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in
Bukharest, considered the question of imposing on Rumania, when
treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection
with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war
indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of
Wallachia should be maintained for five or six years after the con-
clusion of peace. Rumania should then give up its petroleum
districts, its railways, harbors, and domains to German companies
as their property, and submit itself to a permanent financial control.
Austria-Hungary opposed these demands from the first on the
grounds that no friendly relations could ever be expected to exist
with a Rumania which had been economically plundered to such
a complete extent; and Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain
amicable relations with Rumania.

This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without
some success, on February 5th, at a conference with the Reichs-
kansler. In the middle of February the Emperor sent a personal
message to the German Emperor cautioning him against this plan,
which might prove an obstacle in the way of peace. Rumania was
not advised of these demands until comparatively late in the negotia-
tions, after the appointment of Marghiloman. Until then the
questions involved gave rise to constant discussion between Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout endeavoring
to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to arriving at
a peace of mutual imderstanding, but also because, if Germany
gained a footing in Rumania on the terms originally contemplated,
Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably suffer
thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the
Rumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Ger*

354 IN THE WORLD WAR

many, and the plan of a cession of the Rumanian harbors was altered
so as to amount to the establishment of a Rumanian-German-
Austro-Hungarian harbor company, which, however, eventually
came to nothing. The petroleum question, too, was reduced from
a cession to a ninety years' tenure of the state petroleum districts
and the formation of a monopoly trading company for petroieum
under German management. Finally, an economical arrangement
was prepared which should secure the agricultural products of
Rumania to the Central Powers for a series of years. The idea of a
permanent German control of the Rumanian finances was also
relinquished, owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The negotia-
tions with Ivlarghiloman and his representatives on these questions
made a very lengthy business. In the economical questions especi-
ally there was great difference of opinion on the subject of prices,
which was not disposed of until the last moment before the drawing
up of the treaty on March 28th, and then only by adopting the
Rumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the
differences were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived
at, in the face of the extreme views of the German economical
representative, on the one hand, and the Rumanian Foreign Minister,
Arion, on the other, by a compromise, according to which further
negotiations were to be held in particular with regard to the trade
monopoly for petroleum, and the original draft was only to apply
when such negotiations failed to lead to any result.

The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation
for five or six years after the general peace likewise played a great
part at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first
stoutly opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavored to bring
about an arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace,
Rumania should have all legislative and executive power restored,
being subject only to a certain right of control in respect of a limited
nimiber of points, but not beyond the general peace. In support
of this proposal the Foreign Minister pointed out in particular that
the establishment of a Rumanian Ministry amicably disposed
toward ourselves would be an impossibility (the Averescu Ministry
was then still in power) if we were to hold Rumania permanently
under our yoke. We should far rather use every endeavor to
obtain what could be obtained from Rumania through the mediimi
of such politicians in that country as were disposed to follow a
policy of friendly relations with the Central Powers. The main
object of our policy to get such men into power in Rumania, and
enable them to remain in the government, would be rendered
unattainable, if too severe measures were adopted. We might gain

APPENDIX 355

something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing every-
thing in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the
German Secretary of State, Kiihlmann, of the inadvisability of the
demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by
the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement
of Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make
it impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had
been informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme
Army Command insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a
Cabinet on the assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a
solution of the occupation problem would be found. In this question
also we did ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Rumania.

One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Rumania
was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria
insisted with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it.
The ultimatum which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea
had also to be altered chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria
was already talking of the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of
how Bulgaria had been disillusioned, and of the evil effects this
disillusionment would have on the subsequent conduct of the war.
All that Count Czernin could do was to obtain a guaranty that
Rumania, in case of cession of the Dobrudsha, should at least be
granted a sure way to the harbor of Kustendje. In the main the
Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea. When, later, Bulgaria
expressed a desire to interpret the wording of the preliminary
treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube" was to be
given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the territory
up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the Danube,
this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany
and Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace
treaty that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch
was to be ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bul-
garia, but was unavoidable, as further demands here would probably
have upset the preliminary peace again.

The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin
resigned his office.

VII

Wilson's fourteen points

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there
shall be no private international understanding of any kind, but
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

356 IN THE WORLD WAR

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside terri-
torial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be
closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement
of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the
nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.

IV. Adequate guaranties given and taken that national arma-
ments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic
safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment
of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests
of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settle-
ment of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and
freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining
for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the inde-
pendent determination of her own political development and
national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society
of free nations imder institutions of her own choosing; and more
than a welcome assistance also of every kind that she may need
and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her
sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their
good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from
their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she
enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act
will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations
in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the
government of their relations with one another. Without this
healing act the whole structure and validity of international law
is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded
portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 187 1
in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of
the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace
may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected
along clearly recognizable lines of nationaUty.

APPENDIX 357

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the
nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded
the first opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Monetengro should be evacuated,
occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access
to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one
another determined by friendly counsel along historically estabUshed
lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guaranties of
the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of
the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should
be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are
now imder Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of
life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened
as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations imder
international guaranties.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which
should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish
populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to
the sea, and whose political and economic independence and ter-
ritorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties
of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike.

VIII

OTTOKAR CZERNIN ON AUSTRIA'S POLICY DURING THE WAR

Speech delivered December ii, 1918

Gentlemen, — In rising now to speak of our policy during the
war it is my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to
light. We are Hving in a time of excitement. After four years of
war, the bloodiest and most determined war the world has ever
seen, and in the midst of the greatest revolution ever known, this
excitement is only too easily understood. But the result of this
excitement is that all those nmiors which go flying about mingling
truth and falsehood together, end by misleading the public. It is
imquestionably necessary to arrive at a clear understanding. The

public has a right to know what has really happened, it has the right
24

358 IN THE WORLD WAR

to know why we did not succeed in attaining the peace we had so
longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if so where, any
neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the overwhelming
power of circumstances which had led our policy to take the course
it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves and
Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will
come then, when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will
be made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be
made public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil
to-day from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this
theme I will refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors
which once counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do
so because it seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons
who are now paying heavily for what they may have done and who
are unable to defend themselves. And I must pay this honorable
tribute to the Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole
sought to spare the former Emperor as far as possible. There are,
of course, exceptions — exceptiones firmant regulam. There are in
Vienna, as everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to
attack, the less if those whom they are attacking are able to defend
themselves. But, believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are
not the bravest, not the best, nor the most reliable; and we may
be glad that they form so insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration
of the various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point
out two things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Rumania
into the war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious
peace" on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which,
unfortimately, was throughout cherished by the German military
party; and, secondly, that we have never received any offer of peace
from the Entente. On several occasions peace feelers were put
forward between representatives of the Entente and our own;
unfortunately, however, these never led to any concrete conditions.
We often had the impression that we might conclude a separate
peace without Germany, but we were never told the concrete con-
ditions upon which Germany, on its part, could make peace; and,
in particular, we were never informed that Germany would be
allowed to retain its possessions as before the war, in consequence
of which we were left in the position of having to fight a war of
defense for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to a com-
mon defense of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente
never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished
for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its inten-

APPENDIX 359

tion of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany,
and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult.
We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be
allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire
for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial con-
cessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This,
however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was
primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had
offered Italy concessions, however great, if we had offered all that
Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made
peace, being bound by duty to its allies and by circumstances not
to make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.

When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable,
obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching
that end. One, a general peace — i. e, including Germany— and the
other a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending
the former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the
question of separate peace.

I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never,
not even in the hour of disillusionment — I may say of despair at
my inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels — even
in such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with
the German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as
may be contracted by two emperors or two governments, and can
easily be broken, but an aUiance of blood, a blood-brotherhood
between the ten million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of
the Empire, which could not be broken. And I have never forgotten
that the military party in power at that time in Germany were not
the German people, and that we had allied ourselves with the Ger-
man people, and not with a few leading men. But I will not deny
that in the moments when I saw my policy could not be realized
I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to the Emperor the appoint-
ment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw salvation in a separa-
tion from Germany. But again and again I reUnquished this idea,
being firmly convinced that separate peace was a sheer impossi-
bility. The Monarchy lay like a block between Germany and the
Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from which
it could not be cut off; it was procuring oil and grain from, the Bal-
kans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we
should be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the
Entente would naturally have demanded first of all that we join
in the blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have
Involved also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn,

36o IN THE WORLD WAR

Germany would have been unable to carry on the war. In such
a situation there can be no possibility of doubt but that the German
Army Command would have flung several divisions against Bohemia
and the Tyrol, meting out to us the same fate which had previously
befallen Rumania. The Monarchy, Bohemia in particular, would
at once have become a scene of war. But even this is not all.
Internally, such a step would at once have led to civil war. The
Germans of Austria would never have turned against their brothers,
and the Hungarians — Tisza's Hungarians — would never have lent
their aid to such a policy. We had begun the war in common, afid
we could not end it save in common. For us there was no way out
of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany
against the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany
until Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would
have happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by
Andrassy at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already
annihilated and prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops
toward the Tyrol, and had not the revolution overwhelmed all
Germany like a conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am
not sure but that the Tyrol might at the last moment have been
harried by war. And, gentlemen, I have more to say. The experi-
ment of separate peace would not only have involved us in a civil
war, not only brought the war into our own country, but even then
the final outcome v/ould have been much the same. The dissolu-
tion of the Monarchy into its component national parts was postu-
lated throughout by the Entente. I need only refer to the Con-
ference of London. But whether the state be dissolved by way of
reward to the people or by way of punishment to the state makes
little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a "Ger-
man Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it
would have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take
up an attitude which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my
own case, as Minister of the imperial and royal government,
it Was my duty also to consider dynastic interests, and I never
lost sight of that obligation. But I believe that in this respect
also the end would have been the same. In particular the dis-
solution of the Monarchy into its national elements by legal means,
against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, would have
been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria would
never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with
Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering
the powerful republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would
have been in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the

APPENDIX ' 361'

South-Slav question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente
than the Hapsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never
have forgiven the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive
territories to Bohemia and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then,
that in this confusion the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in
fact. A separate peace was a sheer impossibility. There remained
the second way — to make peace jointly with Germany. Before
going into the difficulties which rendered this way impossible I must
briefly point out wherein lay our great dependence upon Germany.
First of all, in military respect. Again and again we were forced to
rely on aid from Germany. In Rumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and
in Russia we were victorious with the Germans beside us. We
were in the position of a poor relative living by the grace of a rich
kinsman. But it is impossible to play the mendicant and the politi-
cal adviser at the same time, particularly when the other party is a
Prussian officer. In the second place, we were dependent upon
Germany, owing to the state of our food-supply. Again and again
we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany, because
the complete disorganization of our own administration had brought
us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by the
hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on
the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I
remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict
with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from
Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can
imagine, gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must
weaken a Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due
to the state of our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were
drawing a hundred million marks a month from Germany, a sum
which during the course of the war has grown to over four milliards ;
and this money was as urgently needed as were the German divisions
and the German bread. And, despite this position of dependence,
the only way to arrive at peace was by leading Germany into our
own political course; that is to say, persuading Germany to conclude
a peace involving sacrifice. The situation all through was simply
this: that any momentary military success might enable us to propose
terms of peace which, while entailing considerable loss to ourselves,
had just a chance of being accepted by the enemy. The German
military party, on the other hand, Increased their demands with
every victory, and it was more hopeless than ever, after their great
successes, to persuade them to adopt a policy of renunciation. I
think, by the way, that there was a single moment in the history
of this war when such an action would have had some prospect of

362 IN THE WORLD WAR

success. I refer to the famous battle of Gorlitz. Then, with the
Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like houses of cards,
many among our enemies changed their point of view. I was at
that time still our representative in Rumania. Majorescu was then
not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Rumanian army,
moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels
of the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calcula-
tions, have brought about a complete debacle. It is not unlikely
that the collapse which later took place in Russia might have come
about then, and after a success of that nature, with no "America"
as yet on the horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to
an end. Two things, however, were required: in the first place,
the Rumanians demanded, as the price of their co-operation, a
rectification of the Hungarian frontier, and this first condition was
flatly refused by Hungary; the second condition, which naturally
then did not come into question at all, would have been that we
should even then, after such a success, have proved strong enough
to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not called upon to agree
to this, but the second requirement would undoubtedly have been
refused by Germany, just as the first had been by Hungary. I do
not positively assert that it would have been possible in this or any
other case to arrive at, but I do positively maintain that during my
period of office such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost we and Ger-
many could have attained. The future will show what superhuman
efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That all
proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was
it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the
leaders of the German miHtary party, which had attained such
enormous power in the country. Every one in Wilhelmstrasse, from
Bethmann to Kiihlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it
simply because the military party got rid of every one who ventured
to act otherwise than as they wished. This also applies to Beth-
mann and Kiihlmann. The Pan-Germanists, under the leadership
of the military party, could not understand that it was possible to
die through being victorious, that victories are worthless when they
do not lead to peace, that territories held in an iron grasp as "secu-
rity" are valueless securities as long as the opposing party cannot be
forced to redeem them. There were various shades of this Pan-
Germanism. One section demanded the annexation of parts of
Belgium and France, with an indemnity of milliards; others were
less exorbitant, but all were agreed that peace could only be con-
cluded with an extension of German possessions. It was the easiest
thing in the world to get on well with the German mihtary party as

APPENDIX 2^2

long as one believed in their fantastic ideas and took a victorious
peace for granted, dividing up the world thereafter at will. But if
any one attempted to look at things from the point of view of the
real situation, and ventured to reckon with the possibility of a less
satisfactory termination of the war, the obstacles then encountered
were not easily surmounted. We all of us remember those speeches
in which constant reference was always made to a "stem peace,"
a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then, the possi-
biHty of a more favorable peace — I mean a peace based on mutual
understanding — I have never believed in the possibihty of a victori-
ous peace — would only have been acute in the case of Poland and the
Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasize the
fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way
of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea
that Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be
united and attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that
such a step should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or
against the will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked
as if not only Poland, but also certain sections among the Entente,
were not disinclined to agree to such a solution.

But to return to the German military party. This had attained
a degree of power in the state rarely equaled in history, and the
rarity of the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of
its terrible collapse. The most striking personality in this group
was General Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of
genius in conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts.
But this man required a pohtical brake, so to speak, a political
element in the Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence,
and this was never found. It must fairly be admitted that the
German generals achieved the gigantic, and there was a time when
they were looked up to by the people almost as gods. It may be
true that all great strategists are much alike; they look to victory
always and to nothing else. Moltke himself, perhaps, was nothing
more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain equilibrium. We had
no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it was not the
fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for him, that he
was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of Germany,
and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was directed
into military channels. Ludendorff "was a great patriot, desiring
nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his country;
a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless — and for all that
a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam
glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every

364 IN THE WORLD WAR

attempt at peace which was not a peace of victory. Those
very people who worshiped Ludendorff when he spoke of a vic-
torious peace stone him now for that very thing; Ludendorff was
exactly like the statesmen of England and France, who all rejected
compromise and declared for victory alone; in this respect there
was no difference between them. The peace of mutual understand-
ing which I wished for was rejected on the Thames and on -the
Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said this already.
According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to carry on a
defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the integrity
of the state. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could never
publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to
declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were
for Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the
Entente so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself
to such a step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavors
were made in this latter direction. And I may here in parentheses
remark that our military men throughout refrained from committing
the error of the German generals and interfering in politics them-
selves. It is undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that when-
ever any tendency to such interference appeared he quashed it at
once. But in particular I should point out that the Archduke
Frederick confined his activity solely to the task of bringing about
peace. He has rendered most valuable service in this, as also in his
endeavors to arrive at favorable relations with Germany.

Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with
the German government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware
of the serious nature of the situation. In April, 191 7 — eighteen
months ago — I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles,
which he forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that
he was entirely of my opinion:

(Here follows the report in question.)

This led to a reply from the German government, dated May gth,
again expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the sub-
marine campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle
to take steps toward peace, but reprehending any such steps as
might be calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was
not to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine
ourselves to words alone. In 191 7 we declared in Berlin that the
Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with
Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that state to

APPENDIX 36s

Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the
west in order to secure peace. But we were met with a non pos-
sumus and the German answer that territorial concessions to
France were out of the question.

The whole of GaUcia was here involved, but I was firmly assured
that if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the
Ukraine; and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not
have restrained me had it been a question of the highest value — of
peace itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our
views steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The
journey of the Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered.
It is true that the SociaHsts were not ''sent" by me; they went to
Stockholm of their own initiative and on their own responsibility,
but it is none the less true that I could have refused them their
passes if I had shared the views of the Entente governments and
of numerous gentlemen in our own country. Certainly, I was at
the time very skeptical as to the outcome, as I already saw that
the Entente would refuse passes to their Socialists, and consequently
there could be nothing but a "rump" parHament in the end. But
despite all the reproaches which I had to bear, and the argument
that the peace-bringing Socialists would have an enormous power
in the state to the detriment of the monarchical principle itself, I
never for a moment hesitated to take that step, and I have never
regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed. It is encouraging
to me now to read again many of the letters then received criticizing
most brutally my so-called "SociaHstic proceedings" and to find
that the same gentlemen who were theix so incensed at my policy
are now adherents of a line of criticism which rnaintains that I am
too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means toward peace.

It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 191 7, the
majority of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the
numerically weaker but, from their relation to the German 'Army
Command, extremely powerful minority on the question of the reply
to the Papal note. Here again I was no idle spectator. One of
my friends, at my instigation, had several conversations with
Sudekum and Erzberger, and encouraged them, by my description
of our own position, to pass the well-known peace resolution. It
was owing to this description of the state of affairs here that the
two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry the Reichstag's
resolution in favor of a peace by mutual understanding — the
resolution which met with such disdain and scorn from the Pan-
Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment, to have

366 IN THE WORLD WAR

gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag
against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the
subject of that unfortunate submarine campaign which was un-
doubtedly the beginning of the end, and to set forth the reasons
which in this case, as in many other instances, forced us to adopt
tactics not in accordance with our own convictions. Shortly after
my appointment as Minister the idea of unrestricted submarine
warfare began to take form in German minds. The principal
advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of the
former Reichskansler, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was
long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument
to dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the
end he was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians
who came in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral
Hoitzendorff came to us at that time, and the question was debated
from every point of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My
then Ministerial colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself, were
entirely in agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal,
and the only one who then voted unreservedly in favor of it was
Admiral Haus. It should here be noted that the principal German
argument at that time was not the prospect of starving England
into submission, but the suggestion that the western front could not
be held unless the American munition-transports were sunk — that
is to say, the case for the submarine campaign was then based
chiefly on the point of technical military importance and nothing else.
I myself earnestly considered the question then of separating our-
selves from Germany on this point; with the small number of
U-boats at our disposal it would have made but little difference
had we on our part refrained. But another point had here to be
considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the
northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the
Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports
would have been sent via Italy, France, and Dover to England, and
the northern U-boat campaign would have been paralyzed. But
in order to carry on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have
to give the Germans access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro,
and Trieste, and by so doing we were de facto partaking in the
submarine campaign ourselves. If we did not do it, then we were
attacking Germany in the rear by hindering their submarine cam-
paign— that is to say, it would bring us into direct conflict with
Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we agreed, not
convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.

APPENDIX 367

And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few
words to say as to the present. From time to time reports have
appeared in the papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were
preparing disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been
mentioned as one of them. I am doubtful whether there is any
truth at all in these reports; as for myself, I have not been outside
this country for the last nine months. As, however, my contra-
diction on this head itself appears to have given rise to further
misunderstandings, I will give you my point of view here briefly
and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am most strongly opposed to
any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that any such attempt could
only lead to civil war — a thing no one would wish to see. I am,
therefore, of opinion that the republican government must be main-
tained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a whole has
taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the German
people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a dogma
of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as
repubhcan Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so
great freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that
the people itself must determine in what manner it will be governed,
and I therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by
the constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here
entirely at one with the present government. There are two
methods of ascertaining the will of the people; either candidate for
the representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a
republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself
will express the decision; or the question of monarchy or republic
can be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge
that I myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that
any co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No
one can, therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to
revert to the old regime. But I am not or.e to juggle with the
idea of democracy, and its nature demands that the people itself
should decide. I believe that the majority of German-Austria is
against the old regime, and when it has expressed itself to this effect
the furtherance of democracy is sufficiently assured.

And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to
set before you. I vainly endeavored to make peace together with
Germany, but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavors to save
the German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict
with Gerriiany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have
defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and
I do not know what would have happened had I not done so.

368 IN THE WORLD WAR

Andrassy's "extra turn" at the last moment showed the great mass
of the pubUc how present a danger was that of war with Germany.
Had the same experiment been made six months before it would
have been war with Germany; would have made Austria a scene of
war.

There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people
of many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will
come when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and
when that day comes a better future will dawn.

The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria.
They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood
and suffering a better, freer, and nobler world arise, then they will
not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold
alien earth ; they died for the happiness, the peace, and the future
of the generations to come.

INDEX

Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion
with, 31
and the Socialist Congress at

Stockholm, 187
and Trotzky, 260, 261, 262
Adrianople, cession of, 299
Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and,
46
policy on expansion, 5
Air raids on England, cause of, 19

their effect, 187
Albania, and the Peace of Bukha-
rest, 7
Queen Elizabeth of Rumania
and, 105
Albrecht von Wiirttemberg, 45
Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 84
cession of, demanded by En-
tente, 184
conquest of, a curse to Ger-
many, 17
Emperor Charles's offer to

Germany, 85
France insists on restoration of,

189
Germany and, 82, 177
Ambassadors and their duties, no,

125

America and the U-boat cam-
paign, 132, 135
enters the war, 20, 166
rupture with Germany, 143
ship-building program of, 323
un preparedness for war, 138
(C/. United States)
American government, Count Czer-
nin's note to, 311 ei seg_.

Andrassy, Count, and Rumanian
peace negotiations, 289
declares a separate peace, 28, 29
German Nationalist view of his
action, 29
Adrian at Nordbahnhof, 243
Anti-Rumanian party and its

leader, 87
Arbitration, courts of, 191, 196,

197
Arion, Rumanian Foreign Minis-
ter, 354
Armaments, pre-war fever for, 4
Armand-Revertera negotiations,

the, 183, 189
Asquith, a warlike speech by,

202
Austria-Hungary, a rejected pro-
posal decides fate of, 2
and Albania, 7
and cession of Galicia, 163
and question of separate peace,

31, 183, 190
and the U-boat campaign, 140,

141, 167, 366
ceases to exist, 200
consequences of a separate

peace, 28
death-blow to customs dues,

188
declaration on submarine war-
fare, 311
democratic Parliament of, 338
.enemy's secret negotiations for

peace, 158, 181
food troubles and strikes in, 265,

266, 268, 346
her army merged into German
army, 25

370

IN THE WORLD WAR

her position before and after the
ultimatum, 15

heroism of her armies, 368

impossibihty of a separate peace
for, 23, 24 et seq.

maritime trade obstructed by
blockade, 312

mobilization and its difficulties,
10, II

obstinate attitude after Sara-
jevo tragedy, 9

parlous position of, in 191 7, 209

peace negotiations with Ru-
mania, 289, 350

peace terms to, 200

policy during war, Count Czer
nin on, 357

racial problems in, 211, 212

separatist tactics in, 183

Social Democracy in, 25, 35

terms on which she could make
peace, 33

the Archdukes, 26

views on a "tripartite solution"
of Polish question, 223
Austrian delegation. Count Czer-

nin's speech to, 330 et seq.
Austrian government and the
Ukrainian question, 269, 270,

273

Austrian navy, the, Franz Fer-
dinand and, 58
Austrian Ruthenians, leader of,

276, 278
Austro- Hungarian demands at

Bukharest negotiations, 351
Austro-Hungarian army, General
Staff of, 25
inferiority of, 25
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the,
and foreign policy, 150
peace idea of, 195
Austro-Polish question, the, and
the Ukrainian demands, 269
no bar to peace, 363
solution of, 222 et seq.
Avarescu, interview with, 293
retirement of, 355

Baernreither, his views of a
separate peace, 256

Balkan wars, the, 6, 7

Balkans, the, troubles in: atti-
tude of German Emperor, 78

Baralong episode, the, 149

Bathurst, Captain, and consump-
tion of breadstuff s, 327
on an "un-English " system, 328

Bauer, Doctor, German-Austrian
Secretary of State, 2 1

Bauer, Herr, houses Trotzky's
library, 262

Bavarian troops enter into the
Tyrol, 31

Belgian neutrality violated by
Germany, 16

Belgian question, the, Germany
ready for negotiations with
England on, 201

Belgium, England's promise to, 16
German entry into, 16
Germany's views regarding, 175,

176
invasion of, changes England's
poHcy, 3

Benckendorff, Count, at London
Conference, 307

Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's
answer to peace note of, 195
German reply to, 365
proposals for peace by, 187, 197

Berchtold, Count, and Franz Fer-
dinand, 50
and the Rumanian question,

87
criticized by pro-war party at

Vienna, 38

ultimatum to Serbia, 8

vacillation of, 11

Berhn, Byzantine atmosphere of,

72,77
the English Ambassador de-
mands his passport, 16
Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 295
Bethraann-HoUweg, and Austria's

INDEX

371

willingness to cede Galicia,

163

and the Supreme Military Com-
mand, 174
draws up a peace proposal,

156

opposes U-boat warfare, 131,

366
optimistic view of U-boat cam-
paign, 169 et seq.
replies to author's expose, 168
requests Vienna Cabinet to ac-
cept negotiations, 9, 10
visits western front, 84
Bilinski, Herr von, and the future

of Poland, 227
Bismarck, Prince, and the invinci-
bility of the army, 20
and William II, 60
dealings with William I, 75
heritage of, becomes Germany's

curse, 17
his policy of "blood and iron,"

Bizenko, Madame, murders Gen-
eral Sacharow, 244
Blockade, enemies feeling the grip
of, 329
of Germany, 312
why established by Great Brit-
ain, 313
Bohemia as a possible theater of
war: author's reflections on,
28
Bolsheviks and the Kieff Commit-
tee, 273
Bolsheviks, dastardly behavior of,
277
destruction wrought in Ukraine,

281
enter Kieff, 277, 278
Bolshevism, Czernin on, 240, 246
in Bessarabia, 295
in Russia, 235, 240, 255
terrorism of, 252, 255
the Entente and, 304
Bosnia, as compensation to Aus-
tria, 230

Bozen, proposals for cession of,

190, 193
Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by,
128

apprises author of Sarajevo
tragedy, 97

collapse of, 112

Ministry of, 100

on Russia, 292

reproaches author, no
"Bread peace," origin of the term,

286
Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at,
250

a victory for German militar-
ism, 215

answer to Russian peace pro-
posals, 249

arrival of Trotzky at, 259

conflict with Ukrainians at, 262

episode of Rumanian peace, 289

evacuation of occupied areas:
difficulties of, 344

first peace concluded at, 278

frontier question, 232

further Ukrainian representa-
tion at, 332

heated discussions at, 253, 254

object of negotiations at, 337

peace negotiations at, 242 et

seq., 343
Russians threaten to withdraw

from, 253
territorial questions at, 261, 262,

263, 273
Ukrainian delegation and their
claims, 230, 258, 346
Briand, peace negotiations with, 203
Brinkmann, Major, transmits Pe-
tersburg information to Ger-
man delegation, 255
British losses by submarines, 322
trade, and result of submarine
warfare, 323
Bronstein and Bolshevism, 235
Brotfrieden ("Bread peace"), 286
Budapest, author's address to
party leaders at, 194, 195

372

IN THE WORLD WAR

demonstration against Germany
in, 259
Buftea, Treaty of, 355
Bukharest, fall of, 112

Peace of, 7, 92, 113, 242 et seg^.^

301
report of peace negotiations at,

350

Zeppelin attacks on, 114 et seq.
Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey,
298
and the Dobrudsha question,

293, 355
her relations with America, 141

humiliation of, 7

negotiations with the Entente,

181, 182, 299

question of her neutrality, 12

secession of, 205

Bulgarian representatives at Brest,

248

Bulow, Prince, exposes William II,

63
Burian, Count, 121, 222

and the division of Galicia,
272 draws up a peace proposal,

156
his Red Book on Rumania, iii,

129
succeeded by author, 129
visits German headquarters, 234
Busche, von dem, and territorial

concessions, 12 1

Cachin, his attitude at French

Socialist Congress, 238
Cambon, M., attends the London

Conferenc , 307
Capelle and U-boats, 148
Carmen Sylva {see Elizabeth,

Queen of Rumania)
Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy

of, 99
and Serbia, 14
last days of, 102

peculiar policy of government

of, 92
tactfulness of, 90
Tsar's visit to, 99
urges acceptance of ultimatum,

102
visited by Franz Ferdinand, 89
Carp, 93, 99, 107
Catarau, and the crime at Debru-

zin, loi
Central-European question, the,

232
the terror of the Entente, 192
Central Powers, and the Bratianu

Ministry, no
enemy blockade of, 148
favorable news in 191 7, 160
why they adopted submarine

warfare, 313 e/ seq.
Charles VIII, Emperor, and Franz

Ferdinand, 47
and problem of nationality, 213
and the principle of ministerial

responsibility, 64
and the Ukrainian question, 272
apprised by author of critical

condition of food-supply, 264,

266
cautions the Kaiser, 353
communicates with King Ferdi-
nand on Rumanian peace, 288
confers a title on eldest son of

Franz Ferdinand, 52
correspondence with Prince Six-

tus, 183
frequent absences from Vienna,

70
his ever-friendly demeanor, 66,

invites Crown Prince to Vienna,

opposes U-boat warfare, 366

reinstates Archduke Joseph Fer-
dinand, 70

rejoices at peace with Ukraine,
278

submits author's expose to Will-
iam II, 164, 364

INDEX

373

suggests sacrifices for ending

Worid War, 85, 86
visits South Slav provinces, 68
Clam-Martinic, Count, and the

customs question, 188
and U-boat campaign, 136
attends conference on Polish

question, 228
opposes submarine warfare, 366
Clemenceau, M., and Germany,

203
and the Peace of Versailles,

304
dominant war aim of, 205,

208

Colloredo-Mannsfeld, Count, at
Brest- Li to vsk, 263
attends conference on U-boat

question, 137
meets author, 243

Compulsory international arbitra-
tion, 191, 197, 198

Conrad, Chief of the General
Staff, 50

Constantinople, an Entente group
in, 182

Corday, Charlotte, cited, 252

Cossacks, the, 236

Courland demanded by Germany,
277

Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea,
house damaged in Zeppelin
attack on Bukharest, 117

Csatth, Alexander, mortally
woimded, 10 1

Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal,

243

at Brest-Litovsk, 263

Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding

a separate peace, 28
Czemin, Count Ottokar, a candid

chat with Franz Ferdinand,

a hostile Power's desire for

peace, 158
a scene at Konopischt, 45
abused by a braggart and brawl-
er, 94
25

acquaints Emperor of food

shortage, 264, 266
activities for peace with Ru-
mania, 287 et seq.
Ambassador to Rumania, 8
an appeal for confidence, 342
and American intervention,

138

and the reinstatement of Arch-
duke Joseph Ferdinand, 70
and the Ukrainian question (see

Ukrainian)
answers explanation of an Amer-
ican request, 144, 145
appeals to Germany for food,

265, 267, 361
appointed Ambassador to Bu-
kharest, 87
apprises Berchtold of decision of

Cabinet Council, 14
attends conference on U-boat

warfare, 137
avoided by Pan-Germans, 179
becomes Minister of Foreign

Affairs, 129
breakfasts with Kuhlmann, 256
confers with Tisza, 32, 33
conflicts with the Kaiser, 367
conversation with Trotzky, 277
converses with Crown Prince,

85
criticizes Michaelis, 179
decorated by King Carol, 100
disapproves of U-boat warfare,

131

dismissal of, 204, 216, 297
extracts bearing on a trip to

western front, 83, 84
friction with the Emperor, 234,

239

his hopes of a peace of under-
standing, 23 et seq., 195, 232,

^ 241,363,365

imparts peace terms to Mar-
ghiloman, 296

informs Emperor of proceedings
at Brest, 255

interviews King Ferdinand, 294

374

IN THE WORLD WAR

issues passports for Stockholm

Conference, 187, 365
journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 243
learns of the assassination of

Franz Ferdinand, 97
loss of a despatch-case, 1 1 1
loyalty to Germany, 359
lunches with Prince of Bavaria,

246
meets with Emperor William II,

misunderstandings resulting

from a speech by, 22, 26
nominated to the Herrenhaus,

53
note to American government,

311

obtains a direct statement from

William II, 65
on a separate peace, 359
on Austria's policy during war,

357
on Bolshevism, 240, 246

on President Wilson's program,

215

on U-boat warfare, 166, 199,

366

passages of arms with Luden-
dorff, 275

peace program of, 331

persecution of, 232

Polish leaders and, 227

President Wilson on, 215

private talk with the Emperor,
140

sends in his resignation, 27

sets interned prisoners at lib-
erty, 108, 109

speech to Austrian delegation,
330 et seq.

threatens a separate peace with
Russia, 254

unfounded charges against, 180

urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lor-
raine, 82

William IPs gift to, 73

with Emperor Charles visits
eastern front, 65

Danube Monarchy, the, a vital

condition for existence of

Hungarian state, 224

dangers of a political structure

for, 224

Debruzin, sensational crime at,

100
Declaration of London, the, 312
D'Esperey, General Franchet, and

ICarolj^i, 289
Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian

Social Democrats, 235
Devonport, Lord, on the food

question, 328
Disarmament, negotiations re-
specting, 4
international, 191, 197, 206, 340
question of, 202
Divorces in Rumania, 96, 97
Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 92
assigned to Bulgaria, 298, 299
cession of, at peace with Ru-
mania, 355
King Ferdinand and, 295
Marghiloman's view on, 296
question discussed with Ava-

rescu, 293
Turkish attitude concerning,
298, 299
Dualism, the curse of, 154

East Galicia, cession of, de-
manded by Ukrainians, 267
et seq.
"Echinstvo" group, the, 236
Edward VII, King, and Emperor
Francis Joseph, i, 2
and William II, 73
encircling policy of, i , 73
Elizabeth, Queen of Rumania, a
word-picture by, 103
an operation for cataract, 105
her devotion to King Carol, 105

INDEX

37S

EUenbogen, Doctor, and Socialist
Conference at Stockholm, 187
plain speaking by, 30
England, an effort at rapproche-
ment with Germany and its
failure, 201
and dissolution of military

power in Germany, 205
and the elder Richthofen, 274,

275

attitude of, at beginning of
World War, 18, 19

blockade of, by U-boats, 160,
169

bread shortage in, 327

declares war on Germany, 16

discards Declaration of London,
312

distress in, from U-boat war-
fare, 162

distrust of Germany's intentions
in, 206

dread of gigantic growth of
Germany in, i

Flowtow's tribute to, 135

food-supply of, 325

freedom in, 367

her desire to remain neutral at
opening of war, 2

negotiates with Germany on
naval disarmament, 4

pubHc opinion in, after Sarajevo
tragedy, 9

refusal to restore German colo-
nies, 185, 190

shortage of potatoes in, 328

the pacifist party in, 187

"unbending resolve" of, to
shatter Germany, 36, 81
English mentality, a typical in-
stance of, 4

English Socialists, 238
Entente, the, adheres to Pact of
London, 233, 241

and arming of merchant vessels,

318
and Italy, 31
and the trial of William II, 76

answers President Wilson, 133,

136
as instruments in a world rev-
olution, 304
Austria pressed to join, 2
demands abolition of German
militarism, 184, 189, 191, 193,
194
desire of final military victory,

182
exterminates Prussian militar-
ism, 304
impression on, of author's speech

at Budapest, 198
mine-laying by, 146
peace proposals to, 22, 23
rejects first peace offer, 130
suspicious of Germany's plans, 3
their "unbending resolve" to

shatter Germany, 36, 358
views as to peace, 189
Enver Pasha, his influence in

Turkey, 260, 300
Erzberger, Herr, agrees with
"Czemin scheme," 206, 365
and author's secret report to
the Emperor, 173 (note)
Espionage in Rumania, no
Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 153
Esthonia demanded by Germany,

277, 349
Eugen, Archduke, 26

Europe after the war, 196

European tension, beginnings of, i

Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-
Hungarian action in Bel-
grade, 14
Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits suc-
cess of U-boats, 327
Ferdinand, King of Rumania, au-
thor's interview with, 294
German opinion of, 290
Queen Elizabeth's fondness for,

105

376

IN THE WORLD WAR

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-
Serbian policy of, 59
Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by,

Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof,

243
Flotow, Baron, interview with

Hohenlohe, 133

reports on German attitude on

U-boat warfare, 134

Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 210 et

seq., 303, 338, 339, 355 et seq.
France and Austria: effect
Vienna troubles, 278, 279
Bethmann's tribute to, 171
distrust of Germany's inten-
tions in, 206
insists on restoration of Alsace-
Lorraine, 189
opening of war a surprise to, 2
the pacifist party in, 187
Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute
to, 54
advised to accept negotiations,

and Franz Ferdinand, 48, 53
and the principle of ministerial

responsibility, 64
author's audience with, 13
death of, 55, 56
gives audience to author, 54
King Edward VII and, i, 2
on the Peace of Bukharest, 7
opposes Filippescu's scheme,

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a

fortune-teller's prediction
concerning, 51
anti-Magyar point of view, 44,

57
antipathy to Himgary, 41, 43,

as gardener, 40

as husband and father, 51, 52
dislike for the Germans of, 58
false rumors concerning, 49
fearlessness of, 52
friendships of, 45

Goluchowski, Count, and, 42, 43
Great- Austrian program of, 47,

57
his high opinion of Pallavicini, 6
his sense of humor, 47
makes advances to the Kaiser,

49
marriage of, 47, 51

mentality of, 41
personality of, 39
pro-Rumanian proclivities of,

87, 88, 89
tragic end of, 56 {see also Sara-
jevo tragedy)
views on foreign policy of, 59
Freedom of the seas, 197

attacked by Entente, 312, 313
neutrals and, 316
President Wilson on, 313, 339
French Socialistic Congress, 238
Freyburg, Baron von, attends
conference on U-boat ques-
tion, 137
Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to,
26
tact of, 83
Frontier rectifications, Hungary

and, 287, 297, 351, 362
Fiirstenberg, Karl, a request of,
refused at Vienna, 127
report on Rumanian question
by, 87

Galicia, proposed cession of, 22,
86, 163, 177, 193, 364
partition of, 232
Tiszaand, 151
Gas attacks, reason for Germany's

use of, 19
Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram
from, 255
at Nordbahnhof, 243
George, Lloyd, admits grave state
of grain supplies, 327
and the Peace of Versailles, 304
author in agreement with, 198

INDEX

377

confers with Orlando, 183

Doctor Helfferich's allusions to,
322

his desire to crush Germany, 208

influence of, 207

on disarmament, 206
George V, King, his telegram to.

Prince Henry of Prussia, 10
German army, the General Staff, 25
German- Austria, 200

population of, 35
German Empire, the, creation of,

17,76
German government, versus Ger-
man diplomacy, 12
German mentality, a typical in-
stance of, 5
miHtary party refuse peace, 32
German Nationalists and Count

Andrassy, 29, 30
German policy founders on heri-
tage left by Bismarck, 17
German-Russian differences as to

occupied areas, 336
German Supreme Command and

evacuation question, 344
Germans and a friendly attitude
toward America, 138
at Brest conference, 249
attitude of, toward Poland, 226
inferior mentality of, 79
"insatiable appetite" of, 297
Lenin and, 240
oppose peace negotiations with

Rumania, 289
refuse to renounce occupied

territory, 251
the dynastic fidelity of, 61
Germany, a moral coalition
against, 3
advocates unrestricted U-boat

warfare, 130 et seq.
and Alsace-Lorraine, 82
and Austro- Hungarian military

action in Ukraine, 283
answers the papal note, 198
blind faith in invincibility of her
army, 20

blockade of, and her retaliatory

measures, 19
confident of victory, 27, 82
culpability of, in matter of

peace, 206
decides on U-boat campaign,

140
declares armistice with Russia

at an end, 350
disillusionment of, 36
dissatisfaction in, over peace

resolution in Reichstag, 174
England declares war on, 16
evil times in store for, 368
her dream of a victorious peace,

358» 363
her hopes of food shortage in

England, 162

Michaelis on internal economic

and poHtical situation in, 175,

176, 177. 178
military party of, 22, 359, 362,

363
negotiations respecting naval

disarmament, 4
post-war intentions of, 206, 207
restricts building of U-boats,

148
revolution in, 360
rupture with America, 143
unsuccessful effort at rapproche-
ment, 201
violates neutraHty of Belgium,
16
Goluchowski, Count, vacillation

of, 41
Gorlitz, battle of, 109, 122, 361 _
Gratz, Doctor, a good suggestion
by, 276
author's discussion with, 243
on Austro-PoHsh solution of
PoHsh question, 271
^ Great Rumania, question of, 91
Great War, the, psychology of
various cities, 219
(See World War)
Grey, Sir Edward, an interview
with Lichnowsky, 9

378

IN THE WORLD WAR

at London Conference, 307
purposes negotiations, 9

Hadik, apathetic attitude of, 265
Hague Convention, the, 312
Hapsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty
of London and, 24, 33, 34, 38
Haus, Admiral, favors submarine
warfare, 366
in Vienna, 137
Hauser, and the question of sepa-
rate peace, 256
Hebel, appointment for, 172
Helfferich, Doctor, disclosures by,
179 (note)
on attitude of William II during

Balkan troubles, 78
speech on submarine warfare,
169, 320 et seq.
Henry of Prussia, Prince, a tele-
gram from King George to,

ID, II

Hertling, Count, advised to sup-
press "Der Kaiser im Felde,"

73, 74
becomes Imperial Chancellor,

221

President Wilson on, 216
succeeds Michaelis, 1 79
Herzegovina as compensation to

Austria, 230
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, mod-
esty of, 142
popularity of, in Germany, 20
Hoffmann, General, an unfortu-
nate speech by, 264
and plans for outer provinces,

251
high words with Kiihlmann, 262

received by the Kaiser, 256, 257

receives a telegram from Peters-
burg, 255

visited by author, 243
Hohenberg, Duchess of, 47

welcomed in Rumania, 89
Hohendorf, General Conrad von,

and his responsibility for the
war, 2 1 (note)
Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement
of Wedel's request, 143
free speech from William II, 74,

report on U-boat campaign, 131,
132, 142
Holtzendorff, Admiral, and sub-
marine campaign, 166
arrives in Vienna, 136
guarantees results of U-boat
campaign, 138, 366
Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle
on, 270
Social Democrats, 187
Himgary and cession of her terri-
tory, 121
and Rumanian intervention, 87,

120, 121
and the alliance with Rumania,

87 et seq.
demands of, at Bukharest, 351
frontier rectification question,

287, 296, 351, 362
her influence on the war, 154
indignation in, at author's ap-
pointment to Bukharest, 88
"just punishment" of, no
opposes economical alliance with

Rumania, 297, 352
question of a separate peace, 31
repellent attitude of, 122
struggle for Hberty in, 224
why her army was neglected, 25

Imperial, Marchese, points sub-
mitted to London Conference
by, 307

International arbitration {see Ar-
bitration)

International disarmament, 191,
196, 197

International law, Germany's
breach of, in adoption of U-
boat warfare, 312, 313

INDEX

379

Internationalists, Russian, 235
Ischl, an audience with Emperor

Francis Joseph at, 13
Iswolsky, 13
Italy, Allied defeat in, 205

and Albania, 7

and the Peace of Versailles, 304

Czernin on, 340

declares a blockade, 313

points submitted to London
Conference, 307

stands in way of a peace of
understanding, 209

ultimatum to, 14

why she entered the war, 3

Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic

death of, 100, 10 1
Jagow, Herr von, a frank dis-
closure by, 16
Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to
Allies, 332
conversation with, at Brest, 245
criticisms on the Tsar, 252
Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo

tragedy, 98
Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 26
appointed chief of Air Force, 72
reinstatement of, 70
relinquishes his command, 71
the Luck episode, 70

Kameneff at Brest, 244, 349

Karachou, Leo, secretary of peace
^ delegation, 335

Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to
the Entente, 23

Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince,
Franz Ferdinand and, 45, 46

Karolyi and Rumanian peace
negotiations, 289
his attitude before the Ruma-
nian declaration of war, 32

Kerenski and the offensive against
Central Powers, 235
newspaper report of condition of
his health, 236
Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical re-
mark by, 73
Kieff, a mission to, 280

entered by Bolsheviks, 277, 278
in danger of a food crisis, 281
peace conditions at, 231
Kieff Committee and the Bolshe-
viks, 273
Kiel Week, the, 72
Kienthaler (internationalists), 235
Konopischt and its history, 39 et

seq.
Kreuznach, a conference at, 163
KJriegen, Doctor Bogdam, a ful-
some work by, 73
Kiihlmann, Doctor, and the food
shortage, 265, 266
author's talk with, 247
difficult position of, 345
high words with Hoffmann, 262
his influence, 221
informed of Rumanian peace

overtures, 290
on the Kaiser, 254
returns to Brest, 256

Lamezan, Captain Baron, at

Brest-Litovsk, 259
Landwehr, General, and the food

shortage, 265, 267
Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory,

attitude of, 205, 206
Larin and Ivlenshevik Socialists,

235

League of Nations, the, 340

Lenin, author on, 240

opposed to offensive against
Central Powers, 235
Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a
day's shooting with, 257
chats with author, 244
Lewicky, M., 268

38o

IN THE WORLD WAR

Lichnowsky interviews Sir Ed-
ward Grey, 9
Li^ge taken by Ludendorff, 25
Lithuania, Germany and, 277
Livonia demanded by Germany,

277, 349
London, Declaration of, discarded

by England, 312

London, Pact of, 24, 190, 192, 200,

360

desired amendment to, 164

text of, 24, 307 et seq.
Lubin, German demand for evac-
uation of, 226, 227, 228
Luck episode, the, 26, 120

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
and, 70
Ludendorff and Belgium, 208

and the Polish question, 229,
230

candid admission by, 275

compared with enemy states-
men, 22

confident of success of U-boat
warfare, 142

congratulates Hoffmann, 264

displays "a gleam of insight,"
256

dominating influence of, 130,
142, 143

German hero-worship of, 20

his independent nature, 69, 70

how he captured Liege, 25, 26

personality of, 363
Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, 58
Luxemburg, German invasion of,
18

JMackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins
at Bukharest, 114
failure at Maracesci, 290
headquarters at Bukharest, 119
Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdi-
nand, 44, 58
author and, 88
Majorescu and Austria's policy,
362

and territorial concessions, no,

121
forms a Ministry, 91, 93
Mandazescu, arrest and extradi-
tion of, lOI
Maracesci, attack on, 290
Marghiloman and co-operation of
Rumania, 121
forms a Cabinet, 296, 352
Marie, Queen of Rumania, Eng-
lish sympathies of, in, 112
Mame, the, first battle of, 20
Martow and the Menshevik party,

235

Martynoz and the Russian Inter-
nationalists, 235

Medwjedew, J. G., Ukrainian dele-
gate to Brest, 333

Mennsdorff, Ambassador, inter-
views General Smuts, 189

Menshevik party, the, 235

Meran, the Entente's proposals re-
garding, 190, 193

Merchant vessels, arming of, au-
thor on, 317

Merey meets Czernin at Brest, 243

Michaelis, Doctor, appointed Im-
perial Chancellor, 175
defines Germany's views regard-
ing Belgium, 175, 176, 177, 178
on peace proposals, 176
Pan-Germanism of, 179

"Might before Right," Bismarck-
ian principle of , 18

Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, mar-
velous escape of, loi

Militarism, German faith in, 20
England's idea of German, 186

Monarchists V. Republicans, 60, 61

Monarchs, hypnotic complacency
of, 67 et seq.

Moutet, attitude of, at French
Socialist conference, 238

Nationality, problem of, 212
Franz Ferdinand and, 213

INDEX

381

Naval disarmament, negotiations

on, 4
Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the

military party in Russia, 2
Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, 252
North Sea, the, blockade of, 312
Noxious gas, why used by Ger-
many, 19

Odessa, in danger of a food crisis,

281
Orlando confers with Ribot and

Lloyd George, 183
Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz

Ferdinand, 42

Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses
the political situation with
author, 6
Pan-Germans, 362

conditions on which they would
conclude peace, 179
Pan-Russian Congress, the, 236,

237, 238
Papal note, the, 187, 198
Austria's reply to, 195
German reply to, 365
Paris, negotiations in camera at,

302
Peace by sacrifice, 359
Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk,

242 et seq.
Peace movement, real historical

truth concerning, 207
Peace negotiations, Count Czer-
nin on, 330 et seq.
deadlock in, 203
the Pope's proposals, 187, 195,

197,365 ^

Peace resolution, a, and its con-
sequences, 174

Penfield, Mr., American Ambas-
sador to Vienna, 147

People's Socialists, the, 236

Peschechonow, Minister of Food,

236
Petersburg and the Ukraine, 341
Plechanow, Georgei, and the Rus-
sian Social Patriots, 235
Poklewski, Russian Ambassador

to Rumania, 98
Poland, a conference on question
of, 228
becomes a kingdom, 222
conquest of, 120
Count Czemin on, 336
Emperor Charles's offer regard-
ing, 86
future position of, 225
German standpoint on, 226
Michaelis on, 177
reorganization of, 163
the German demands, 272
unrepresented at Brest, and the
reason, 336, 347
Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk ne-
gotiations, 231
party divisions among, 227
Polish question, and the Central-
European project, 232
difficulties of, 222
Popow, Bulgarian Minister of

Justice, 248
Pro-Rumanian party and its head,

87
Prussian militarism, England's
idea of, 186
extermination of, 304
fear of, 194
{See a/jo German military party)

Quadruple Alliance, the, dis-
sension in, 279
Germany as shield of, 204
peace terms in Rumania, 291

Radek, a scene with a chauffeur,
264

382

IN THE WORLD WAR

Radoslawoff^ ignorant of negotia-
tions with Entente, i8i

Randa, Lieut. -Col. Baron, a tell-
ing remark by, ii8
and Rumanian peace overtures,
289, 291, 351

Reichstag, the, a peace resolution
passed in, 174
demands peace without annexa-
tion, 174, 178

Renner and the Stockholm Con-
gress, 187

Republicans i). Monarchists, 60, 61

Ressel, Colonel, 294

Revertera negotiates for peace,
183, 189

Revolution, danger of, 165

Rhondda, Lord, British Food
Controller, 169

Ribot confers with Orlando, 183
statement by, 170

Richthofen brothers, the, 274, 275

Rosenberg meets author at Brest,

243
Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz

Ferdinand, 43

Rumania, 87 et seq.

a change of government in, 91

a land of contrasts, 95

affairs in, after Sarajevo trag-
edy, 98

and the Peace of Bukharest, 7

author's negotiations for peace,
287

between two stools, 291

declares war, 124, 311

espionage in, no

freedom of the press in, 95

Germany and, 292, 297

her treachery to Central Pow-
ers, 292

how news of Sarajevo tragedy
was received in, 98

Marghiloman forms a Cabinet,
296

negotiations for peace, 350

out of action, 27

peace concluded with, 355

question of annexations of, 177,
230

question of neutrality, 14, 107

Russian gold in, 127

social conditions in, 96

ultimatum to, 14, 292

why she entered the war, 3
Rumanian invasion of Transyl-
vania, 123
Riunanians, mistaken views of
strength of, 290

their love of travel, 96
Russia, a contemplated peace
with, 235

abdication of the Tsar, 159

an appeal to German soldiers,
277

begins military operations with-
out a declaration of war, 3

Bolshevism in, 235, 240, 255

declares for cessation of hos-
tilities, 350

difference of opinion in, as to
continuance of war, 235 et seq.

enters the war, 9

Francis Joseph's inquiry as
to a possible revolution in,
120

her responsibility for Great War,
II

incites German army to revolt,

349

negotiations for peace, 330

out of action, 27
peace treaty signed, 350
prepared for war, 127
the military party in, 3, 11
ultimatum to Rumania, 292
Russian Revolution, the, 159, 165,

235 et seq.
Russians, their fear of Trotzky, 264
Ruthenian districts of Hungary,
Ukrainian demands, 269

Sacharow, General, murder of,
244

INDEX

3S3

St.-Mihlel, author at, 84
St.-Privat, reminiscences of, 84
Salzburg negotiations, the, 234
Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 7, 56
sounds death knell of the Mon-
archy, 37
Sassonoff , a momentous statement
by, 100
attitude of, after declaration of

war, 9
visits Bukharest, 128
Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch,

334

Schachrai, W. M., at Brest, 333

Schonburg, Alvis, and the Em-
peror Charles, 71

Schonerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdi-
nand and, 58

Secret diplomacy, abolition of:
author's view, 338, 339

Sedan, a house with a history at,

85
Seidler, Doctor von, a. faux pas by,

and the food shortage, 267

and the partition of Galicia, 232
and the Ukrainian question,

232,270,271
apathetic attitude of, 265, 266
author's meeting with, 256
visits South Slav provinces, 68
Seitz, and the Stockholm Con-
ference, 187
Serbia, arrogance of, 7

ultimatum to, 8
Sewrjuk, M., 268
Sixtus, Prince, letters from Em-
peror Charles to, 183
SkobelefE and the Mensheviks, 235
Skrzynski, Herr von, 278
Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death

of, lOI
Slav provinces, a visit by the

Emperor to, 68
Smuts, General, interview with

Mennsdorff, 189
Social Democrats and the ques-
tion of peace, 30, 35

and the Stockholm Conference,

187,365
Hungarian, 270

opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-
Lorraine, 82

"Social Patriots," Russian, 235

Social Revolutionary party, the,
236

Socialists and offensive against
Central Powers, 235

Spanish reports of war-weariness
in England and France, 160

Stirbey, Prince, 293

Stockholm, a Socialist Conference
at, 187, 365
Russians ask for a conference
at, 255

Stockholm Congress, negative re-
sult of, 189

Strikes and their danger, 342

Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims,
268

Sturdza, Lieutenant-Colonel, ex-
traordinary behavior of, 94

Stiirgkh, Count, 21 (note)
recollections of, 53

Submarine warfare, author's note
to American government on,

311

Czemin on, 366

destruction without warning
justified,- 315

enemy losses in, 322

enemy's "statistical smoke-
screens" as to, 321

question of safety of passengers
and crews, 314

speech by Doctor Helfferich on,
320

why adopted by Central Pow-
ers, 313, etseq.

(See also U-boats)
Sudekum, Herr, and Austria-Hun-
gary's peace proposals, 173,

365
Supreme Military and Naval
Command, conditions of, for
peace negotiations, 177

3^4

IN THE WORLD WAR

Switzerland, reported disturbances

in: author's disclaimer, 367
Sycophancy in high places, 67, 69,

12, 73, 74
Sylvester, Doctor, and the Ger-
man-Austrian National As-
sembly, 30

Talaat Pasha, arrives at Brest,
260
influence of, 161
threatens to resign, 300
Talleyrand, a dictum of, 194
Tamowski, Count, author's opin-
ion of, 125
German Ambassador to Wash-
ington, 143
Thomas, M., war speech on Rus-
sian front, 238
Tisza, Count Stephen, 21 (note)
a characteristic letter from, 223,

224, 225, 226
advocates unrestricted U-boat

warfare, 130, 366
and American intervention, 138
and author's appointment to

Bukharest, 88
and cession of Hungarian ter-
ritory, 151
and control of foreign policy,

150
and the Stockholm Conference,

187,
assassination of, 154

at a U-boat campaign confer-
ence, 137
author's conference with, 31, 32
defends Count Czernin, 123
dismissal of, 152, 225
Franz Ferdinand and, 44
his influence in Hungary, 31
leads anti-Rumanian party, 87
lively correspondence with au-
thor, 144, 145
on dangers of pessimism, 172
on the Treaty of London, 31

opposes annexation of Rumania,

230
opposes the war, 11
opposes U-boat warfare, 147, 366
peace proposals of, 156
pro-memoria of, on Rumanian

peace negotiations, 288
question of frontier rectifica-
tions, 351
refuses cession of Hungarian

territory, 122
speech at conference on Polish

question, 228
tribute to, 154
views regarding Poland, 222
visits the Southern Slavs, 34
Transylvania, 193

opposition to cession of, 122
proposed cession of, 32, 57
Rumanian invasion of, 123
Trentino, the, offered to Italy, 86
Trieste, Entente proposals regard-
ing, 190, 193
"Tripartite solution" of Polish

question, Tisza on, 223
Tmka and the customs dues, 188
Trotzky, a tactical blunder by, 263
accepts the German- Austria

ultimatum, 261
and the Internationalist party,

235
arrives at Brest, 258, 259
declines to sign, 278
his brother-in-law Kameneff,

244
his library, 262
negotiations with, 276
opposed to ill-treatment of war

prisoners, 262
ultimatum to, 260
Trudoviks, the, 236
Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks,

235, 237
Tschemow, speaks at Peasants'

Congress, 236
Tschirsky, Herr von, a momen-
tous communication to Berch-
told, 9

INDEX

38s

and a telegram from King

George, 10
his desire for war, 37
untactful diplomacy of, 12
Tseretelli and the Menshevik

party, 235
Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria,
298
asks for munitions, 108
how the Sultan was deposed, 260
probable secession of, 300
Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at

Brest, 259
Turks, a reported advance by a
hostile Power for a separate
peace, 161
at Brest Conference, 247
Tyrol, the, German troops in, 28

U-BOAT warfare, 129 et seq.
a conference in Vienna on, 137
"a terrible mistake," 141
and America's entry into the

war, 142
and why adopted by Germany,

Czernin on, 166

political arguments against, 132,

133

what it achieved, 199

(See also Submarine warfare)
Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripar-
tite solution" of Polish ques-
tion, 223
Ukraine, and Petersburg, 341
Bolshevik destruction in, 281
food-supplies from, 280 et seq.^

347

military action in, and the con-
sequences, 282

peace concluded with, 278

revolution in, 282

survey of imports from, 284

treaty signed, 349
Ukrainian Army General Com-
mittee appointed, 238

delegates at Brest, 257, 332
Workers' and Peasants' gov-
ernment, a declaration from,

333

Ukrainians and their demands,

231,267,346
dictatorial attitude of, 268
negotiations with, 347
United States, the, scarcity of

supplies in, 326
{See also America)

Versailles, opening of Peace
Congress at, 218

terrible nature of, 304

the Council of Four at, 302

the Peace of, 21, 302

triumph of Entente at, 207
Vienna, a council in, 137

differences of opinion in, 87

disastrous effects of troubles in,
278

disturbances in, 67

food shortage and strikes in,
265, 266, 268, 346

politicians' views on peace pro-
posals, 256

psychology of, 219

warlike demonstrations at, after
Sarajevo tragedy, 37, 38
Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch
Ambassador to Riunania, 118

Wales, Prince of (see Edward
VII, King)

Wallachia, occupation of, 112,
119

Wallhead, Mr., 327

Washington Cabinet, and Austria-
Hungary's attitude to sub-
marine warfare, 311

Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Aus-
trian Ruthenians, 276, 278

386

IN THE WORLD WAR

Wedel, Count, calls on Count
Czernin, 143

disclosures of, 179 (note)

revelations of, 173 (note)
Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins
the term "bread peace," 286
Wekerle, Doctor, and the Polish
question, 225

author and, 153, 256

on the Ukrainian question,
270

standpoint of, on Rumanian
peace negotiations, 289, 351
Western front, an Entente break-
through on, 205
Western Powers, the, and Ger-
many's ambitions, 2
Wiesner, Ambassador von, and a
Pan-German, 179

at Brest-Litovsk, 263

author discusses Russian peace
with, 243
Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz
Ferdinand, 49

anxious for peace, 83

author's conversation with, 85

his quarters at Sedan, 85
William I and Bismarck, 75
William II, Emperor, and Bis-
marck, 60

and Franz Ferdinand, 49

and the German Supreme Mili-
tary Command, 20

as causeur, 76

as the "elect of God," 60, 61

cause of his ruin, 72 et seq.

demonstrations against, in the
Reichstag, 63

desires to help deposed Tsar,
80

difficulties of his political advis-
ers, 69

fails to find favor in England,
72

his projected division of the
world, 78

impending trial of: author's
protest, 76

informed of serious nature of
situation for Allies, 364

instructions to Kuhlmann, 277

long years of peaceful govern-
ment, 78

longs for peace, 81

on food troubles in England,
162

on impending attack on Italian
front, 82

presents author with "Der
Kaiser im Felde," 73

Prince Hohenlohe and, 74

question of his abdication, 85

the press and, 75

warlike speeches of, 79
Wilson, President, advantages of
his "Fourteen Points," 210

as master of the world, 214

author on his Message, 337

Count Andrassy's note to, 29

Count Czernin on, 214

Entente's reply to his peace
proposal, 133, 136, 138

his Fourteen Points and the
Peace of Versailles, 302

on the freedom of the seas,

313

ready to consider peace, 279
reopens hopes of a peace of un-
derstanding, 211
speech to Congress, 215
text of the Fourteen Points,

355
Wolf, K. H., a scene in the

"Burg," 188
World-dominion, Germany 'sdream

of, I, 2
World organization, a new, prin-
ciples of, 195 et seq.
World War, the, an important
phase of, 122
attempts at peace, 150 et seq.
author's impressions and reflec-
tions on, 217 et seq., 302 et
seq.
by whom started, 21 (note)
causes of, 3

INDEX

387

President Wilson and, 210 et

seq.
question of responsibility for

outbreak of, 2
U-boat warfare in, 129 et seq.

{see also Submarine warfare

and U-boat)
violent measures adopted by

Germany in, 18, 19

Zeppelin raids on Bukharest, 1 14
Zimmermann, Herr, and author's
peace proposals, 163
opposes unrestricted U-boat
warfare, 130, 136
Zimmerwalder (Russian Interna-
tionalists), 235

THE END

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In the world war, by Count

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