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V&ha^W

JOURNAL. R&S

Kniieir Serine* fitstitatifltt,

WHITEHALL YARD.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL.
Authors alone are responsible, for the contents of their respective Papers.

VOL. XX.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY W. MITCHELL AND CO.,

39, CHASING CROSS,

NrTAH THE ADMIRALTY 1XD HOEBki ODIRM,

WHITEHALL.

1877.
[Entertd at Statiomm' Hall. All rights wwriwrf. ]

LOKDOH :
HAXBIBOK AND B05B, rBIVTBBS IH OBDXNABY TO HEB MAJESTY, BT. MAKTIN's LANE.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME THE TWENTIETH.

PAOB

Another Warning Voioe from 1805. By Major-General T. B. Collivsok, R.E. 1

If our Merchant Serrioe any longer a Feeder to the Royal Nary ? By Captain
J. C. Wilsok, RN. 61

On Circular Iran-ekdi. By B. J. Rbkd, Esq., C.B., M.P 85

How beat to Improve and keep up the Seamen of the Country. By T.
Bbassst, Esq., M.P., Ac 110

Proposed new Combination of Propellers for Ships of War. By Gbobgb
Quick, Engineer, K.N 157

On the Casing of the Propeller of H.M.S. "Bruiser." By B. Gbiffithb,
Esq.,C.E 171

Cavalry. By Major Frame 8. Russell, 14th Hussars 179

Some Special Features in Large and Small Grain Powders. By Major J. P.
Moboajt, R. A. 195

The Comparative Cost of the Armies of different Nations, and the Loss to a
Country by Conscription. By Captain J. C. Abdagh, R.E., F.R.G.8., Ac. 218

The Naral Priie Essay (1876). On the Best Types of War Vessels for the
British Navy. By Commander Gbbabd H. U. Noel, R.N 253

Discussion on the above 275

The Tactical Power of Modern Field Artillery. By Lieutenant-Colonel C. B.
Bbackbxbuby, R.A., A.A.G., S. O.G.I. •• .•••• 810

On Magneto-Electric Light. By Captain W. Db W. Abnbt, RJ2., School of
Military Engineering, Chatham. .' 332

The Turkish Forces, and the Military Aspects of the Eastern Question. By
C. E. Howard Vnronrr, F.R.G.S., Lieutenant-Colonel, Central London
Rifle Bangers, Ac., Ac., Ac 346

The Italian Army. By Colonel the Lord Wavrhry, F.R.S., A.D.C. to the
Queen, Ac., &c., fto 359

Recent Reforms in the Russian Army. By Captain F. C. H. Clabjde, R.A.,
D.A.Q.M.-0eneral 373

Hugo Helvig's Tactical Examples 389

The New French Rifle. By Captain R. A. E. Ltvrbat, R.E 400

Notes on Naral Matters 413

The Royal Navy of England and the State Navy of France 419

Notice. "Instructions for the Cavalry Regiments about to take part in the
Exercises of the Combined Cavalry Division detailed from Regiments." By
Major-General Voir Schmidt, translated by Major-General Waxrrr, O.B. . 422

HVwtim* Rights. By John Ross-or-Bladrhsbrro, Coldstream Guards. . . . 423

The Maritime Defence of England, including Offensive and Defensive Warfare.
Part I. — The Organization of our Maritime Forces 447

Part H. — Our Ships of War, their Armament, Ac., Ac. By Captain R. A. E.
Scott, R.N., Ac, Ac 467

The Mercantile Marine considered as an Auxiliary to the Royal Navy. By
T. Brarsry, Esq., M.P., Ac., Ac 493

Hie Study of Military History by the Regimental Officers of the Army. By
Major Lohbdalb A. Halb, R.E., Instructor in Military History, Royal
Tttigmj^y Establishment, Chatham 50s

IGfitary Training a Means of Administrative Power and of Political Usefulness.
By Major-General Sir Frrdkbio J. Goldsmid, C.B., K.C.S.L 624

The Austrian Army in 1876. By Colonel Sir Ltolry Graham, Bart, Ac., Ao. 543

389177

IV CONTESTS.

PAGE

The Medical Department of the German Army in Peace and War. By Sur- •
geon-General T. W. Fox, B.E 660

The Military Resources of Holland. By C. E. Howard Vincent, F.R.G.8.,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Central London Rifle Rangers, Barrister-at-Law, late
23rd Fusiliers 675

The New French Infantry Tactics. By Major Lonsdaxb Haxb, R.E., &c., &c. 678

Notes on Field Guns. By Lieutenant W. H. Jakes, F.G-.S., R.E 584

Fortifications on the Russian-German Frontier 689

Hotiee. " Jahresberichte uber die Yeranderungen und Fortsohritte im
Militairwesen." 590

Ancient Naval Tactics. By the Rev. Edx ond Wabbb, M.A., Eton College. . 593

The Convention of Geneva, and National Societies for Aid to Sick and
Wounded Soldiers in War. By John Fublbt, Esq 632

Assistance to the Wounded in time of War. By Surgeon Sandfobd Moobi,
M.B., F.S.S., Instructor, Army Hospital Corps 658

On the Be9t Method of Propelling Steam Ships, so as to give the Greatest
Facility for Manoeuvring in Action, and for Avoiding Collisions at Sea. By
R. Gbipfiths, Esq., C.E 684

A Sketch of the Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828-29, in Europe and Asia.
By Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Wilbbaham, K.C.B., &c., &c 692

An Account of the Chinese Naval Arsenal at Foo-chow: Translated and
abridged from M. Giquel's pamphlet. By Commander Cypbian G. A.
Bridgb, R.N 711

Prussian Drill, 1876. By Colonel E. Nbwdigatb, Commanding Rifle Depot. 719

The German Railway Regiment. By Lieutenant H. E. Rawbon, R.E 738

Notices. Historical Records of the First Regiment of Militia, or Third West
York Light Infantry. By Captain G. A. Raikes, Third West York Light
Infantry Militia, &c 761

" Leitfaden fur den Unterricht in der Dienstkenntniss auf den Kdniglichen
Kriegsschulen." By Captains Schnackexbubg and Babtels 761

Sur la Dispersion Naturelle des Projeotiles et la Loi des Erreurs. Par Aioxs
tan Meydbn, Capt. Artillerie, Lausanne 762

Campaign of 1870-1. The Operations of the Corps of General v. Werder.
Compiled from the Official Documents by Ludwig LOhlbin, late Captain
1st Baden Body Guard Grenadier Regiment 762

For names of Members who joined the Institution between the 1st January and
the 3rd April, see pages 61, 167, 196, 332, and between 2nd May and 19th
June, pages 668 and 684.

Proceedings of the Forty-sixth Anniversary Meeting i

Statement of Changes amongst the Members tu

Tabular Analysis . . , yiii

Award of Referees (Military Prize Essay) and the Presentation of the Gold Medal xii

Memorial to the Right Honourable the Earl of Beaconsfiold, First Lord of
Her Majesty's Treasury. With Appendix xvii

Names of Members who joined the Institution between the 4th April and the
2nd May, and between the 19th June and the 31st December, 1876. . . . xxv, xxvi

Additions to the Library : —

Books presented » xxvii

Books purchased • •• xxxi

Maps, plans, charts, 4c .... xxxvii

Additions to the Museum

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

PATRON.

HER MAJESTY THE QTJEEX.

VICE-PATRONS.

K1BLD-MARSHAL H.B.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K<G., G.C.S.I., A J>.C., Ac, Ao.
CAPTAIN H.B.H. THE DUKE OP EDINBURGH, K.G„ A.D.C., B.N.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H.B.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, K.O., Bine Brigade, AJD.C.
FISLD-MABSHAL H.B.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G., K.P., G.C.M.G., Ac, Afe,

COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF.
MAJOB-GENEBAL H.B.H. THE PRINCE CHRISTIAN OF 8CHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, K.G.
MAJOB-GENEBAL H.S.H. THE PB1NCE W.A.E- OF 8AXE-WEIMAB, OB.

H.S.H. THE DUKE OF TBOK, G.C.B.,

fteaeoosneld. The Bight Hon. The Earl of, Flrit
Lord of the Treasury.

Crone, The Bight Hon. Richard Assheton, Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, If. P.

Derby, Tbe Bight Hon. The Earl of, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

Camaram, The Right Hon. The Earl of, Secretary
of State for the Colonies.

Hardy, Tbe Bight Hon. Gethorne, Secretary of
State for War, M.P.

Satbbnry, the Moat Hon. the Marquis of, Secretary
of State for India.

Hunt, The Bight Hon. G. Ward, First Lord of the
Admiralty, M.P.

Marlborough, His Grace the Duke of, Lord Lieu-
tenant of Ireland, K.O., K.P.

Ljtton, His Excellency the Bt. Hon. Lord, G.C.S.I.,

6c., Ac , Ac., Viceroy and GoYernor-General
of India.
PeeL LieuL-General The Bight Hon. Jonathan.
Beresford, Bight Hon. William.
Sartorlus, Sir George Bo«e, Admiral of the Fleet,

K.C.B.
Napier of Magdala, Lieut-Gen. The Bight Hon.

Lord, G.C.B., G.C.S.L, Ac.
Wallis, Sir Provo Williajn Parry, Admiral of the

Fleet, G.C.B.
Somerset, His Grace the Duke of, K.G.
Codrington, Sir Henry J., Admiral of the Fleet,

Rowan, Sir William, Field-Marshal, Q.C.B.

Torke, Sir Charles, Field-Marshal, G.C.B., Con-
stable of the Tower.

Strathnairn, Field Marshal the Bight Hon. Lord,
G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

PRESIDENT— FIELD-MARSHAL H.B.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, E.G., K.P., G.C.M.G.

Ac., Ac., COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

Stanhope, P. Spencer, General.
Beck, Sfr George, Admiral, D.C.I*, F.B.8., Ac.
Hamilton, Sir Frederick W„ General, K.C.B.
Alexk, T. St. L-, Col. Royal E. Middlesex Militia,
walte, Loraine, Major.
Ffshboerne. E. G., Vice-Admiral, C.B.
Xartaoa, Sir Frederick W. E., Bart., Admiral,
C.B.

Collinson, Sir Richard, Admiral, K.C.B.

Codrington, Sir William J., General, G.C.B.

Hay, The Bight Hon. Sir John C. D., Bart., Vice-
Admiral, C.B., M.P., D.C.L., F.B.8.

Lacon, W. Stirling, Esq., late H.C.S.

Wareney, CoL the Bight Hon. Lord, Commandant
Suffolk Artillery Militia, A.D.G. to the Queen,
FJ8LS.

COUNCIL 1S77— 187S.

CBAiaMAif— Stephenson, F. C. A., MaJor-GeneraU C.B.

Vicn-CBAimMair<-Nicolaon, Sir Frederick W. E., Bart., Admiral, C3.

F. B~, LfvCol., V.€. Commandant Boyal
Mdtaeex MUM*, late Indian Army.
Dentop, Hugh, Vice-Admiral, C.B.

r, Erasmus, Vlee-AdmiraL C.B., F.B.S.
Lieut.-€oL, B.E., C.M.G., Inspector,Sub-
Mintng Defences.
Guford, TheBighs Hon. Lord, Bear-Admiral, C.B.,

Lord of the Admiralty.
WBam, J. C, Captain B.N.
Wales, G. O., Bear-Admiral, C.B., Superintendent,

Dffuuport Dockyard*
too, B. A. K., Captain BJff.
Haaw, H., Col. late Grenadier Guards, C.B.
ftephcuaim. F. C. A., Major-Gene ral, C.B., Com-
manding Home Disbict.
wflsiabaaa, Sir Bicbard, Lieut.-General, K.C.B.
Ho***, Sir Edward, Lieuk-General, K.C.B.
Geoaeaongh, W. H., Ll-Col. B.A., Assist, to the

Director of ArttBery and Stores.
Biker, T. D„ LC-CoL 18th Boyal Irish, Assistant-
Adjutant-General, C.B.

Ewart, C. B., Colonel, C3M B.E., Deputy Director

of Works for Barracks.
CommerelL Sir John Edmund, Bear-AdmiraL V.C^

K.C.B.
Green, Sir W. Henry Bodes, Major-Geneml, CJ*^

fflflr& W< Fm Esq'* u>0 of tha Colonial and War
Codrington, Sir Henry J., Admiral of the Fleet,

K.C.B.

Nicholson, H. F., Captain, BJT.t Captain, Boyal
Narai College, Greenwich.

Fletcher, H. C, Colonel, CM.G., (Commanding 2nd
Bate. Scots Fusilier Gds.

Lyacins, Sir Daniel, Major-General, K.C.B. .Quarter-
master General.

GoMsmid, Sir Frederic J., Malar-GeneraL CJI.,
K.C.S.I

•Biles, W. K., Major 38th Begt. Deputy-Assistant
Quartermaster-General, Intrthgonre Department.

* Nominated by the War Offlee.

SaomaTABT awn CrriAToa— Captain Boughey Burgess.

D, SuDiman, Esq., late Lieutenant

Mth

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS OP COUNCIL:—

Annlstead, The Bev. C. J., M.A.
Balfour, C. James, Captain
Bateman, B. 6., Comr.
Bosanquet O. S„ Capt.
Bowden-Smith, N., Capt.
Bower, Oraham J., Lieut.
Brent, Capt. H. W.
Brooker, G. A. C, Capt.
Bythesea, J. 8. C., U.6.. Capt.
Clanchy, H. F., Comr.
Codrlngton, W., Capt. .
Colomb, P. H., 'Capt., U.M.S.

Audacious.
Comber, H. W., Capt.
Coote, B., Bear-AdmL
Crofton, S. 8, L., Capt.
Cuming, W. H., Capt.
Curtis, Seymour, Comr.
De Honey, A. F. B., Bear-Adml.
DeBobeck, U. St. J., Comr.
Durrant, P., Comr.

BOYAL NAVY.

Egerton, Hon. F.. Bear-Admiral
Egerton, F. W., Comr.
Farqubar, A., Bear-Admiral
Field, E.v Capt.
Fisher, J. A., Capt
Fltsclarence, Hon. G., Commandei
Fitsroy, B O'B., Capt.
Fulford, J* Bear-Admiral
Gibbons, C, Commander
Gilmore, A. H., Commander
GrenfeU, Hubert H., Commander.
Hall, B,, C.B., Bear-Adml.
Hand, G. W., Comr.
Harrey, J. W. F., Comr.
Hayet. J.M., Bear-Adml., C.B.
Hunt, W. G. F., Assist-Paymaster.
Ingles, John, Comr.
Inglis, CD., Comr.
Jones, 0. J., Commodore
Lambert, B-, C.B., Bear- Admiral
Liddell, W. H. Capt.

Martin, F., Captain

Molyneux, W. H. M., Comr. H.M.
Ship Sliius

Napier, G. J., Capt.

Noroock, C. J., Lieut.

Pike, J. W., Captain

Prevost J. C, Bear-Admiral

Randolph. G. G., C.B., Bear-
Admiral

Sandys, H. S., Comr.

Seymour, F. B. P., C.B., Bear-
Admiral

Shortland, P. F., Capt.

Smith, S. S.. Comr.

Southey, J. L., F.B.G.8., Paymr.

Spencer, Hon. J. W. 6., Bear-
Admiral

Spratt T. A. B., C.B., Bear-Adml.

verney, Edmund Hope, Comr.

Ward, Thos. Le H., Captain

BOYAL NAVAL BEBEBVE.
White, David, Lieut., late Indian Nary.

B07AL NAVAL ABTILLERY
VOLUNTEEBS.

'Ashley, Lord, late B.N., Lieutenant Commanding

ROYAL MARINES.

Artillery.
Keedham, J. L., Capt.. Pronator of Fortification,
B.N. College, Greenwich

Light Infantry.
Champion, P. B., Lieut.
Farquharson, M. H., Capt.
Frampton, Cyril, Lieut, and Adjt.
Sandwith, J. H., Lieut.

Molyneux, £., Capt. 7th Dragoon

Guards.
Moore, A. G. M., Col. 4th Hussars
Carmichael, L. MM Captain 5th

Lancers.
Thesiger, Hon. C. W., Colonel 6th

(Inniskilling) Dragoons
BurnelL H. D. AT., Lt-CoL 7th

Harnett, E.,Lt-Col.llth Hussars
Boasell, J. C.« Major 12th Lancers.
■Swindley, J. E., Lt-Col. 15th Hus-

Maillard, B. T., Capt. 16th Lancers
Barrow, P. H. S„ Captain 19th Hus
Montgomerie, A. W. Jn Major

20th Hussars
Crichton, Capt, the Hon. H. G. L.

21st Hussars
Stirling, W., Lt.-Col.BJL
Vesey, G. 11., Major-Genl. B.A.
Wlekham, E H., Capt. B.A-
Pennethorne L. P.Xapt. B.A.
Grant, W. J. E., C.B., Col. BJk.
Gherm&ide, H. L.t CoL, C.B., B.A.
Hope, J. B., Lieut-Col. BJk.
Gockburn, C. F., Major B.A.
Nioolson, F., Lieut. B.A.
McMahon, 0. J., Capt. B.A.
Haggard, T. T., Col. BJk.
Oldfleld, TL. Major B.A.
Hutchinson, A. U., Major B.A.
Wake, A. J.. Major B.A.
Morgan, J. P., Major B.A.
Stubba, F. W.. Major BJk.
Knollya, H„ Capt. BJk.
Owen, C. H., Lieut -Col. B. A.
MUman, G. H. L., MaJ.-Genl. B.A.
Hisoe, H. W. L., Capt. K.A.
De Butts, J. C. B.. Col. B.E.
Drake, J. M. C Major BJ5.
Harrison, B., Lieut.-Col. B.E.
lanes, J. MeLeod, 9.C., Lieut.*

Col/R.1.
Jones, Jenkin, Col. B.E.
Smith, P. G. L., Major B.E.
ototiwrd, B.H., Lt-Col. B.E.
Woodward. C, Capt. B.E.
Gun, H., Capt. B.B.

ABMY.

Earle, W., Col. 1 Batt. Grenadier

Guards
Hinchingbrook, Viscount, Lieut.-
Col. 3 Batt. Gren. Gds.
Barton, B., Capt. 1 Battalion Cold-
stream Gds.
Trefoils, Hon. W. B., Lieutenant-
Colonel 1 Battalion Scots Fusilier

Guards
Moncrieff, G. Hn Lt-Col. 1 Batt.

Soots Fus. Gds.
MocGwire, E. T. St. L., Col. 1st

Batt. The Boyal Scots
Colley, G. Pomeroy, C.B., Lt-Col.,

2nd Batt. 2nd Queen's Rojals
Macklnnon. W. C, Capt 1st Batt.

3rd the Buffs
Pearson, C. K., Lieut.-Col. 2 Batt.

3rd the Buffs
Cameron, W. G., C.B., Col. 1 Batt.

4th K.'s Own
Yorke, P. C, Lt., 2nd Batt. 4th

King's Own
Bigge. T. 8., Lieut.-Col. 1 Batt. 6th

Fusiliers
Boas, A. E., Major, 2nd Batt. 6th

Fusiliers
Gociburn, J. G., Capt 1st Batt.

6th Begt.
Plummer, H., Major 1st Batt. 7th

Boyal Fusiliers
Waller, G. H.. Lt-Col. 1 Batt 7th

Boyal Fusiliers
Daubeny, A. G„ Major, 1 Batt

7th Boyal Fusiliers
Brown, C B„ Capt. 2nd Batt. 8th

King's Own
Glen, A., Lt 2nd Bait. 10th Begt
Hare, E. 1L, Captain 1st Batt. 11 th

Best.
CoMle, C. F., Capt 2d Batt 11th

Begt.
Parr, H. H„ Lieut 1st Batt. 18th

Light Inf.
Hawley, W. H., Lt.-Col. 1st Batt

14th Begt
Leyard,G.E\,Oao. 2 Batt 15th Beat.
Stone, C. P., Capt 1 Batt 15th

Begt.

Bancroft, W. C, Col. 2 Batt. 16th

Begt
Tompton, W. D., Major 1 Batt 17th

Begt
Griffiths, E. St J.. Major 1st Batt.

19th Begt
Knight, H. 8. G. S., Major 2nd

Batt. 19th Begt
Jackson, F. G„ Capt 1st Batt

21st B. N. B. Fus.
Browne. Edm. C. Capt, 2nd Batt.,

21st B.N.B. Fus.
Panter, H. G, Lt-Col. 2 Batt 22nd

Kegt
Creek, E. S., Capt, 1 Batt. 23rd

Boyal Welsh Fusiliers.
Terry, F. S., Major 2nd Batt 26th

Begt.
Hale, M. HM Major 26th Begt
Barton, E., Lieut.. 27th Begt
Brodigan, F., Major 28th Begt.
Spratt E. J. H., Lieut, and Adjt

29th Begt.
Bateman, H. W., Capt. 31st Begt.
Swiney, G. Clayton, Capt. 32nd

Regt.
Lloyd. T.. Capt 36th Begt.
East CecU J., Bt, Major 41st Bt.
Wilson, W. H., Capt. 4crd Regt.
Bawllns, J., Major 48th Regt.
Lock, A. C. K., Lieut-Col. 60th

K«gt
Farrington, M. CMaJor 51 st Begt
Fife, A. G., Lieutenant 63rd Begt
Parker, F. G. S.. Major 64th Begt.
Foster, C. E., Capt. 68th Best.
Frampton, W. J.. Capt. 59th Regt.
Gunter, E. Capt., 69th Begt.
Biddell, U. S. Button, Lt 1st

Battn. 60th Boyal Rifle*
Chalmer, B., Capt. 2nd Batt 60tb

Boyal Rifles
Murray, 0. Wyndham, Lt 61st

Regt
Brown, H. B., Col. 63rd Begt
Barker, G. D., Lieut-Col. 64th

Begt
Blewitt C, Lt-CoL 66th Begt.
, Capt 66th Begt

Cobbbsp okdiho Mxmbbrs — continued.

ToDoch, A. B., Captain 69tb

Gilbert, O. J., Capt 71st Regt.

Fiyn, W„ C.B„ CoL 72nd Regt.

Cornish, 0. 0., Capt. 73rd Beit.

Feflden, 0. R, Major 78th High-
landers

Burroughs, C. A.P., Lt. 82nd Regt

Bsasiey, 6. G., Capt. 83rd Begt.

Wood, H. Evelyn, IJ.C.« C.Bn
Colonel 90th UI.

Kirk, J. BM Major 91st High-
landers

KaoHys, W. W., Major 93rd High-
landers, F.R.G.S.

Malthas, 8., Major 94th Begt.

Petrie, M-, Major h.-p. 97th Begt.

Donne, J. H., Col. 99th Begt.

Cook, H., Lt-Col. 100th Begt.

Boater, 8. JL, Capt. lOltt Boy.
Beag. Fua.

Kogera, J. E. V., Capt 102nd Boy.
Madras Fusiliers

BelL H. J., Major 105th Madras
Light Infantry.

Garttck, J. W., Capt. 106th Bombay
Light Inf.

FtayJair, W. M., Capt 107th Begt.

Fyers, W. A-, C.B., CoL, late Bif.
Brig.

Maclean, H. J„ Lt-Col. 3rd Batt
Bifle Brigade

Wood, H„ Maj. 4th Batt Rifle Brig.

MUdmay, H. A. St J., Capt 3rd
Batt. Bifle Brig.

Brownrigg,H. S., Capt 3rd Batt
Bifle Brigade

Banbury. C. Tn Major 1st Batt.
Bifle Brigade.

Bale, Capt J. E., lit W. I. Regt

Stoker. W. Beauchamp, Capt 2nd
W. I. Begt.

Meaden, J., Major, late Ceylon
Biflet.

Halpin, R, 0„ Key., MA., Chaplain
to the Forces, and to H.R.H.
The Duke of Cambridge, K.G.

Nason. J., Lieut-Col. 32nd Brigade
Depot

Morgan, H., Major, Paym. 70th
Brigade Depot

McDonald, A. M„ Col. late 7th
Dep6t Batt, Winchester

Fonblanqoe, £. B. det Dep. Con-
troller, H.P.

Cox, J. W., C.B., Col. on Staff,
Jamaica

Bolton, F. J., Major Unattached

Pole,C V.N., Lt-Col. Unattached

Davies, O. S., Major Unattached

Stewart, W. L., Col. Unattached

Yonge, G. N. K. A., Colonel Unat.

Layard, B. V., Capt late 3d W.l.
Begt

Walkey, R., Capt. R.A., Instraotor
of Artillery, Royal Mil. Academy

Stoney, F. S., Capt. R.A., Aesist.-
Saperintendent Royal Gun Fac-
tories, Woolwich

Doorly, M., Maj., late 1st W. I.
Regt.

Strange, T. Bland, Lt-Col. B.A.,
Special Doty, Canada

Heathorn, T. B., Capt., late R.A.

Macaulay, G. W.v Lc-Col., late
Comt 1st Scinde Horse

MacGregor,H. G., Capt. 29th Regi-
ment

Garrison Instr., Home District
Robinson, C. W., Major Rifle Brig.,

Major of Brigade, Aldershot
Fawcett R. H., Captain 33rd Foot,

Garrison Instructor, Curragh
Hale. L. A., Major R.E., S.M.E.,

Chatham
Roe, Eugene M.. Captain R. W.

Fusiliers, Garrison Instructor,

Shorncliffe
Savile, A. R., Capt 18th Rl. Irish,

Garrison Instructor, Dover.
Walton, C. E., Dep. Com.
Morton, G. de C, Capt, AJD.C.

to the Lt.-Gor., Punjaub
Hosier, J. W., Capt. Scots Greys,

D.A.Q.M.G., Intelligence Dept
Rogers, E., Capt Staff Officer of

Pensioners, Ch.ster, F.R.G.S.
Wright, A. F. Bingham, Captain,

A.D.C. to Brig. Gen. Coindg.,

Chatham
Willoughby-Osborne,Eric,Lt. h.-p.
RoberUon-Koss, P., C.B., CoL 9lh

Brig. Depot
Thompson, B. T., Capt. 56th Regf .

D.A.A.G., Aldershot
Marsden, W., Capt. 82nd Regt.,

D.A.A.G., Portsmouth
GoWsworthy, W. T., Lt-Col.

A.A.G., Cork
Travers, E. A., Sub-Lieut. Un-
attached R.M.C., Sandhurst
Bulger, G. £., Lieut.-Col. late

10th Begt.
Hardtman, Berkeley J. H., Lieut.,

A.D.C. to the Governor, Queens-
land

HSR MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES-

W. B„ Cant Bengal Staff Corps
Fosbery, G. V., {i.CLtCol. Bengal Staff Corps
Sandfman, J. E., Capt Bengal Staff Corps
Gordon, J.JE, Lt-CoL Commandant 29th Bengal

Native Infantry
Mooat, F. J^ Deputy-Inspector-Gen. Ben. Army,

FJLCL8.
Lloyd, E^ L4emenant4th Punjaub Cavalry
MacGregor. C. M., Lt-CoL C.S.I., Assist Quarter-

Maeter-GeneraJ, Army Head Quarters
Mem, B. S-, Capt 18th Beng. Car.
Grant, J. M-, L.S.-C0I. Madras Staff Corps

BythelL B., Major, Fort Adjutant Asseerghur
Ostrehan, E. S., Major Bom. Staff Corps
Watts, J. G., Major Bombay Staff Corps
Cologan, J. Fitzgerald, Captain Bengal S.C.
Sewell, H. Fane H., Capt. Hyderabad Contingent
Clutterbuck, T. St Q., Capt 29th Punjab Inf.
Prendergast, G. A., Major Comdt. 15th Bengal

Cavalry
Hey land, A. Rowley, Capt. let Bombay lancers
Collen, E. H. H., Capt Bengal S.C., Offlciating

Assistant Sec. to the Govnt of India, Military

Dept

MILITIA.

ENGLAND.

Brereton, Robert Capt. and Adjt Royal Brecon
While, C. H., Capt and Adj. 1st Boy. Cheshire
Ban, G„ Lieut. -CoL Durham (Artillery)
Tompsoa, H. Sceuait, Capt. and Adjt 2nd. Stafford
Digveed, W. BL, Lt-CoL, late Hampshire
Cssspbatt. J. R», Major Hampshire (Artillery)
Bertion, Alderson, Capt Isle of Wight (Arty. Mil.)
Doughty, Cheater, Capt. and Adj. Hereford
Bafley, Vincent Capt Hertford.
Perrott Herbert C, Capt. East Kent
WOson, C. T-, Capt 7th Royal Lancashire
German, J., Major late 3rd Boy. Lancashire
EaflehL Viscount, Honorary Col. 2nd Boy. Rifles
Baylis, T. BrakJne, Capt. Royal Ekhorne L. I.
SewaQ, T. D., Capt R«yal London
Swan, J. P., Capt Roy. Westminster, Middlesex
Parker, C- W., Capt and Adjutant 4th Roy. South

Xerthasaberlaad, His Grace the Duke of, Lieut. -CoL

Northumberland
Adair, A. W., Lieut-Col. Commdt. 2nd Somerset
Kacfiver, D~ late Capt 2nd Somerset

Kingaley O., Capt The (King's Own) 1st

Evelyn, G. P-, Lt-CoL Commandant 1st Roy. Bar.
Dsvnt John, Capt 2nd Royal Surrey
aJttjpB, Jas. J., CoL N. Durham

Flower, L, Capt 3rd Roy. Surrey, I. Musketry
Gage. The Hon. H. E. H.. Lieut-Col. Royal Sussex
Lee, J. W., Captain Queen's Own Light Infantry
Norris, G. G , Citpt. 2nd Warwick
Cockle. G„ M.A*,Cpt Rl. Westmorland, I. Musketry
Fyers, H. T., Lieut-Col. East and North York (Art.)
Wade, H. C, C.B., CoL North Tork Rifles
Raikes, G. A., Capt 3rd West York
Cadman, W. K„ Major 6th West York
Garnham, R. E. W., Major 6th West Tork.

SCOTLAND.

Inverurie, Lord, Capt. Royal Aberdeenshire High-
landers.
Walker. G. G., Lt-Col. Scottish Borderers
Hardie, H. R., Capt Haddington (Artillery)
Halkett J.C. C, Lt-Col., Stirling
Mackenzie, Colin, Capt The Highland Rifle Militia

IRELAND.

StawrU, W. St Leger Alcock, Uaut-Col. North Cork

(Rifles)
Duncan P., Major West Cork (Artillery)
Forbes, Hon. W. F., Lt.-Col. Leitrim Rifles
Goit, Viscoont Hon. Col. Limerick City (Artillery)
Fox, L. Loftus B., Capt Prince of Wales' Royal

Longford Rifles
Canlfleld, J. A., Lt-Col. Royal Tyrone Fus.
Cuffe, 0. W., Capt. and Adjt Waterfoid (Artill e

OoBsnpoia>nro Mnam-Mitiiiwi

YEOMANRY CAVALRY.

Croft, B. B., Cut. Herts, F.L.S., F.B JLS. Hamilton, J. O. C, Major ImmtM&n Q.O.

Tottenham, C. J., Hon. Cot. Denbighshire Portman, Hon. W. H. B., CoL Wesif

Mildmay, Sir H. B. P. St. John, Bart., Lieut -Col. Stanhope, W. T. S., Cape 1st Watt York
Hampshire

HON. ARTILLERY COMPANY.
Field, J. W. P., Cap*. I. Musketry

VOLUNTEER CORPS.

Artillery.
Rutley, J. Lewis, Captain 2nd Middlesex
Innes, Alex., Major Aberdeen and Kincardine
Moore, Geo.. Lieut. Srd Essex
Pooley, II., Captain Cheshire
Haworth-Booth, B. B„ Lieut. -Col. East Yorkshire

Bngiiucr*
Kain, G. J., Capt Middlesex
Bailey, W., Capt. and Adjutant 2nd Tower Hamlets

Riflu.
Acland, Sir Thomas Dyke, Bart., M.P., Lieut. -Col.

Devon
Davidson, D.. Lieut -Col. Edinburgh City
Twyford, H. B., Lieut -CoL Hampshire
Hardinge, Viscount, Lieut. -Col. Kent
Sweny, Eugene, Capt. Kent.
Higgins, P., Major, 6th Lancashire
Hutchinson. J., Hon. Cot. 8th Lancashire

Tbmkins, A. 8., Capt. 1st Middlesex Victorias
Yicken, C.B., Lt.-Col. 2nd London
Page, Sam. Flood, Major late London Scottish
Lombard, O. C. &., Capt. and Adj. 21st Middlesex
Baker, James, Major 22nd (Queen's) Westminster
BoupeH, C. M., Capt. 28rd Inns of Court
Enfield, Viscount, Honorary Col. 29th Nrth. Midlsx.
Baylis, T. Henry, Major S6th Middlesex, Q.C.
Vincent, C. E. Howard, Lieut-Col. 40th Middlesex
Skrine, Harcourt, Capt. 43rd Middlesex
Walker, A., Capt. and Adjt. Northumberland
Wright, C. J., Lieut-Col. Nottingham
Thomas, W. H.t Capt. 1st Surrey
Dartmouth. Earl of. Capt. Stafford
Bouse, Bolla, Major late 2nd Suffolk
Harding Charles, Major 19th Surrey, F.B.6.S.
BatcluT, C. Lieut-Col. 1st Warwickshire
Longstaff, Llewellyn W., Ueut.-Col. 1st East York,
F.B.G.S.

COLONIAL RESERVE FORCES.

Militia.

Gore, Augustas P., Lt-Col., Barbados* '

Brunei, A.. Lt.-Col .. Active Militia, Canada

TurnbulL J. F.t Colonel Canadian Hussars.

Imlack, B. W., Lt.-Col., British Guiana

Osutier, F. E., Caps., A J>.C. to H.E. the Governor of Quebec.

©fa Jmmtal

OF TBS

Jtopl Wwtei ^mm Jnatittttum.

Vol. XX. 1877. Appendix.

PROCEEDINGS of the FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY

MEETING. '

The Forty-sixth Anniversary Meeting of the Members was held
in the Theatre of the Institution, on Saturday, March 3rd, 1877.

The Right Hon. Oathorne Hardy, M.P., Secretary of State for War,

in the Chair.

I. The Secretary read the notice convening the Meeting.

II. The Secretary read the Minutes of the Forty-fifth Anniversary
Meeting.

III. The Forty-sixth Annual Report was read as follows : —

1. The Council have the pleasure of laying before the Members their
Forty-Sixth Annual Report.

Memberc.

2. Thirty-eight Life Members and one hundred and twenty-four
Annual Subscribers, making a total of one hundred and sixty-two new
Members, joined the Institution during the past year. The loss
by death amounted to seventy -two, and forty-two Members with-
drew their names, whilst the names of thirty-six have been struck off
the list in consequence of the non-payment of their subscriptions for
many years, after frequent applications. The increase therefore is
twelve.

A detailed statement of the changes in the List of Members, and a
tabular analysis of the present and past state of the Institution, will
be found on pages 7 and 8.

Finance.

3. The usual Abstract of the Yearly Accounts, as audited on the
7th February, will be found on the following page.

PROCEEDINGS OP THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

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PROCEEDINGS OP THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

Ill

Estimate op Receipts ajtd Expenditure for the Year 1877.

ElPESDITUR*.

Receipts.

«.

£ *. d.

Secretary's Salary and Lodg-

Balance at Bankers, 81st

ing allowance ..

400

—

Dec, 1876

105 - -

Librarian and Accountant's do. 220

—

Annual Subscriptions :

Clerk's do

104

—

£ *. d.

Serrants' Wages

520

—

At 10*. .. 200 - -

Ditto Clothing

—

Abore ..2,510 - -

Insurance

—

2,770 - -

Ground Rent

205

—

Entrance Fees

170 - -

Fuel

—

Dividends

370 - -

Lighting

—

Interest on Exchequer

Assessed and Income Taxes

—

Bills

20 - -

Parish and Water Rates

100

—

Government Grant

600 - -

Artificers, Repairs, Ac. . .

100

—

Sale of Journals ..

100 - -

Museum ..

—

Miscellaneous Receipts . .

40 - -

Gold Medal

—

library and Topographical

Departments ..

250

—

Advertisements . .

100

—

Printing Circulars, & Sta-

tionery . .

200

—

lectures

—

Journals, including Print-

ing Annual Report and

List of Members

1,200

—

Postage of Journals

200

—

£«tage

—

— ■

House Expenses and Sun-

dries . . . .

—

Balance

—

Ill 1 i

Total.. ..£4,175

Total.. ..£4,175 - -

Life Subscriptions.

4. Life Subscriptions to the amount of £583 lis., including £127
not invested in 1875, have been invested in Three per Cent. Consols.

Capital Account.

5. The funded property of the Institution on the 1st January 1877
was £11,304 15*. 3d., as compared with £10,721 1*. 3d., on the
1st January, 1876.

The Future Locality of the Institution.

6. A Memorial, signed by His Royal Highness the Ftosichnt has
teen presented to the Right Hon. The Earl of Beaconsfield, First Lord
of U.M.s Treasury (for Memorial see page xvii), praying that when the
appropriation of the Crown lands m the neighbourhood of the Institution

IV PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

takes place, its claim for a permanent site, may receive due considera-
tion; and a deputation from the Council waited on Mr. W. H. Smith,
M.P., one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, with a similar object.
He assured the deputation that the value of the Institution is fully
recognised by the Government, and that when the proper time arrive**,
the claims of the Institution will be duly considered.

Lectures and Journal.

7. The Council desire to record their best thanks to those Gentle-
men who, during the past year, contributed much valuable information
on professional subjects. Eighteen Lectures were delivered, and fifteen
Papers were read in the Theatre of the Institution.

A portion of the Journal is now reserved for the publication of
articles, original or compiled, on Foreign professional subjects, also
for notices of professional works, either Foreign or English. This
arrangement promises to be very successful in affording much valuable
'information to the Members. The superintendence of this part of the
Journal has been kindly undertaken by Major Lonsdale Hale, R.E.

The Council earnestly invite the co-operation of the Members in
supplying Lectures or other subject-matter for the Journal, and in
otherwise maintaining the high character which it bears both at home
and abroad.

Library.

8. Six hundred and ninety-eight volumes were added to the
Library during the past year ; of these, 140 were purchased and 458
presented. Among the latter, the following are the most note-
worthy : —

By the Austrian Government —

Mittheilungen iiber Gegenstande des Artillerie- und Genie- Wesens.

Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete das See-wesens.

Organ des Wiener Militar-wissenschafllichen Vereins.

Official Account of the Italian War o/*1859, 3 vols.

By the French Government —
Revue Maritime et Coloniale.
„ Militaire de tEtranger.

By the German Government —

Archiv fur die Artillerie- and lngenieur-Oflizieic des Deutsche n

Reichshceres.
Jahrbucher fur die Deutsche Armee and Marine.
Mili tar ische Blatter.
Militar- Literature Zeitung.
Xeue Militdriscfie Blatter.

By the Netherlands Government —

Four Plates 'f " Matt rid de f Artilleries

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. V

By the Russian Government —
Engineering Journal.
Naval Review.

Bv the Spanish Government —
Memorial de Ingenieros.

B? the Swedish Government —

Krigs- Vetens-Kaps Akademiens Handlingar.

By the United States Government —

Fifteen Volumes, on various Naval and Military subjects.

The exchange of Journals with Foreign Governments, and with
various Scientific Societies, in this and other Countries, has been con-
tinued.

The Library now contains upwards of 17,700 volumes.

Of the volumes presented, about one hundred were given, shortly
before his decease, by the late J. W. Fleming, Esq., F.R.C.S., Surgeon-
Major, formerly of the 37th Regiment and 4th Royal Irish Dragoon
Guards. The Council have thanked on several previous occasions that
Officer for gifts of rare works and medals.

The late Capt. Arthur C. Tupper was a frequent contributor to the
Library, and bequeathed to the Institution a collection of Memoranda
on Naval, Military, Antiquarian, and general subjects, carefully in-
dexed. The Council deeply regret the loss the Institution has sustained
by his death. He was a zealous Member of the Council for nearly
twenty years, and gave valuable assistance in organizing and main-
taining the Museum.

Topographical Department.

9. The Secretary of State for War has presented Photographs and
Lithographs of Guns, Casemates, Shields, Targets, &c, and copies of
works published by the War Office.

The Institution has also received from the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty, Charts, Sailing- Directions, and other valuable works.

Museum.

10. The additions to the Museum and to the Library will be found
in the Proceedings of this day's Meeting, and in the Appendix to
ToL XX of the Journal.

Want of space has prevented many other additions being made to
the Collection of Models in the Museum.

The several Foreign Government^ the Secretaries of State for War
and India, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the various
Donors, have been thanked by the Council for their respective presents
to the Library and Museum.

Vice-Patrons.

11. The Council regret to record the death of one of the Vice-
Patrons of the Institution, Field-Marshal the Marquis of Tweeddale,

VI PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY -SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

K.T., G.C.B. The Marquis of Tweeddale became'a Member in 1840,
and was elected a Vice-Patron in 1875, on his promotion to the rank
of Field-Marshal.

The Council have had the pleasure of electing Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Provo W. Parry Wallis, G.C.B., a Vice-Patron of the Institution.

Honorary Members.

12. The Council have had great pleasure in electing Lady Sarah
Lindsay an Honorary Member, in recognition of the long and valuable
services rendered to the Institution by the late Lieut. -Gen. the Hon.
Sir James Lindsay, K.C.M.G., and in acknowledgment of a present
made by her of historical interest, viz., two chairs formerly used by
the Emperor Napoleon the 1st at Malmaison.

Several Foreign Officers have been admitted as Honorary Members
during their stay in this country.

Corresponding Mrmrifrs of Council.

13. On the 1st January, 1877, there were 336 Corresponding
Members of Council ; the Council thank them for their past services,
and trust that they will continue their efforts to make the advantages
of the Institution more widely known.

Gold Medal.

14. At the last Anniversary Meeting, the Gold Medal of the
Institution was awarded to Commander Gerard H. Noel, R.N., for his
Essay on u The Best Types of War- Vessels for the British Navy."

The subject for the year 1876 was announced as follows, viz. :
" On the Causes which have led to the Pre-eminence of Nations in
War." Seventeen Essays have been sent in ; the award by the Officers
who kindly undertook the duties of referees, viz., General J. R. Craufurd,
General Charles Stuart, and Major-General Collinson, R.E., will now be
made known to the Meeting.

The subject for the Essay for the current year is as follows, viz. : —

" Great Britain's Maritime Power ; how best developed as
regards—

1. Fighting Ships.

2. Protection of Commerce.

3. Naval Volunteer or Supplemental Force.

4. Colonial and Home Defence; —

the Classes, Armament, and description of the Vessels needed ; and the
organisation required to secure a Powerful and Economic Imperial
Naval Force"

Conclusion.

In conclusion, tto Council congratulate the Members on the satis-
factory state of the Finances, and on the general efficiency of the
Institution.

PROCBBDIKCH3 OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETIKG. Vll

STATEMENT OF ChAXGES AMONG THE MSHBEKS SINCE

1st January, 1876.

Life. Annual. Total.

Number of Members, 31st December, 1875 . . 1,102 3,206 4,308

„ joined during 1876 . . 38 124 162

1,140 3,330 4,470
Changed from Annual to Life +12 — 12

1,152 3,318 4,470

Life. Annual.
Deduct —Deaths during 1876 . . 16 56
Withdrawals.. .. — 42
Struck off . . — 36

16 134 16 134 150

Number of Members on 1st January, 1*77 1,136 3,184 4,320

via

PROCEEDINGS OF THE F0RTY-3IXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

Tabular Analysis of the State of the Institution

To 31st of December, 1876.

Vmf

Invested

No. of

mil
1st J an.
to 31st

Dec

Annual

Subs.

received.

En-
trance
Fees.

• m

Income
(from all
sources).

Life

Subs.

received.

Amount
of Stock.

in the

purchase

of Books,

Ac.

No. of
Vols, in
Library.

Mem-
bers on
the 31st

Dec.

Number

of
Visitors

1831

£
654

654

1,194

• •

• t

1,437

• •

1832

1,146

• •

1,146

978

• •

• .

• •

2,699

■ •

1833

1,405

• ■

1,450

692

* .

• *

• •

8,341

. •

1834

1,500

• «

1,549

583

1,100

• .

. .

8,748

18,876

1885

1,480

• ■

1,574

366

2,430

• .

4,156

8,537

1836

1,570

* t

1,682

880

8,747

• •

4,069

8,521

1837

1,549

• i

1,747

222

4,747

180

• •

4,164

10,907

1838

1,462

• i

1,634

230

5,500

246

• •

4,175

15,788

1839

1,899

• «

1,565

168

6,500

292

• .

4,186

16,248

1840

1,368

m f

1,525

198

6,500

446

5,500

4,257

17,120

1841

1,450

• <

1,643

186

6,000

243

6,850

4,243

19,421

1842

1,378

• «

1,565

144

6,400

378

6,450

4,127

21,552

1848

1,299

•

1,494

140

6,700

237

7,000

4,078

27,056

1844

1,274

•

1,408

112

8,000

298

7,850

8,968

22,767

1845

1,313

•

1,466

223

1,500

127

8,100

3,988

21,627

1846

1,298

•

1,456

138

1,500

8,410

4,031

32,886

1847

1,314

1,502

132

1,700

• •

4,017

38,699

1848

1,175

1,375

1,700

9,641

3,947

87,140

1849

1,176

1,376

1,150

• •

8,970

83,333

1850

1,141

106

1,294

198

600

• •

3,998

88,778

1851

1,136

181

1,292

eee

10,150

3,188

52,178

1852

1,134

133

1,281

114

200

10,800

3,078

20,609

1858

1,248

819

1,684

264

528

10,420

8,251

25,952

1854

1,200

138

1,368

126

612

10,587

3,171

22,661

1855

1,159

107

1,289

120

653

10,780

3,181

14,778

1856

1,216

197

1,519

156

761

10,832

3,204

16,184

1857

1,258

176

1,987

1,088

10,960

3,168

12,755

1858

1,818

221

2,102

105

488

11,062

8,246

25,747

1859

1,526

195

2,277

512

946

11,820

3,344

28,789

1860

1,961

298

3,577

397

2,178

114

11,517

3,518

28,011

1861

2,122

805

2,899

266

2,846

11,812

3,689

23,296

1862

2,296

242

3,127

289

8,178

109

12,026

8,797

27,215

1868

2,379

218

8,100

405

3,583

143

12,296

8,847

18,150

1864

2,425

215

3,253

222

4,516

116

12,700

8,902

17,276

1865

2,485

154

3,467

235

4,804

137

13,000

3,895

18,253

1866

2,485

157

3,488

299

5,486

150

18,387

3,891

17,067

1867

2,431

141

8,467

208

5,782

140

13,800

8,823

17,211

1868

2,446

184

3,534

297

6,896

119

14,100

3,812

16,417

1869

2,868

165

3,485

238

6,658

282

14,660

3,792

15,947

1870

2,876

178

3,493

383

7,318

140

15,056

8,881

18,654

1871

2,455

237

3,677

538

7,748

202

15,501

3,922

19,420

1872

2,620

336

4,111

713

8,927

192

15,761

4,116

19,773

1S73

2,776

295

4,816

535

9,465

222

16,227

4,276

18,188

1874

2,819

216

4,491

409

10,189

218

16,624

4,830

16,771

1875

2,801

154

4,695

469

10,721

228

17,000

4.308

15,960

1876

2,794

162

4,500

437

11,806

171

17,700

4,320

15,548

PROCEEDINGS UF THE FOKTT -SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. IX

IV. Lord Elcho, M.P. : —

Mr. Hardy and Gentlemen, — When I came down here punctually at twelve
o'clock, I had not the remotest conception that I was to be asked to more the
adoption of a Report which I at that time had not read ; but representing a branch
of die Beserve Forces, and being therefore amenable to military discipline, and many
persons supposing that the "Volunteers are not a really disciplined force, and do not
readily yield to discipline, — which I need not say is a great libel on that force, — I
thought if I declined on this occasion to move a Beport, of which I knew nothing, I
should fall under that censure justly, and therefore I submit, and here I am,
pressed into this service, finding applied to the Reserve part of the Forces that
system which used to be practised in the great war with reference to manning the
5avy. I am suffering from being pressed into the Service, though I must say I am
a very willing pressed man. You nave heard the Beport read, and if I were to speak
here for a week, I do not think I could say more than that the Beport appears to me
thoroughly satisfactory. One of our best soldiers is, I find, to second this motion, I
mean the distinguished officer Sir Lintorn Simmons, and anything, therefore, that is
necessary to be said upon the military or other bearings of the Beport, will no doubt
be moat thoroughly said by him, but as a semi-civilian Member of this Institution,
and a Member of Parliament, one part of the Beport I look upon with great satis-
faction, that part which refers to the locality, the building, and the probable future
of this Institution. It will be in the recollection of Members of the Institution that
at one time this, what I may call very valuable Institution, was put in considerable
peril of being swept away from here, and we wondered where we should pitch our
tent. There was considerable feeling with regard to the matter at one meeting,
when I think the Duke of Cambridge was in the chair. Remonstrances were made,
and the late Government were ready to admit the importance of this Institution.
Well, this question appears by the Beport to be again arising, and it is gratifying to
find that the succeeding Government, of which .Lord Beaconsfield is the head, and
of which I am happy to say we have a distinguished member here in the chair
to-day, the Secretary of State for War, who must naturally take a sort of parental
interest in this Institution, are also favourably disposed to give us a site, if necessary
to take the ground which this building now occupies. I think we may congratulate
the Institution upon that. In connection with that subject, I see there is a paragraph
in the Beport to this effect : — " Want of space has prevented many other additions
being made to the collection of models in the Museum." Now we who know how
valuable and interesting these models are, feel that it is very desirable that additions
to such a Museum should*not be prevented by want of space. That appears to be
another reason why the Government should favourably consider any question of
giving ns a better building or an extension of space whereon to build. Having said
this much, I will leave Sir Lintorn Simmons to say anything that may be desired on
military or other matters. I will only say this, that I am sure every one must feel
the value of this important National Institution ; and feeling that as we all do (or
we should not be here), I may I think ask you heartily to join in the conclusion of
the Beport, which is, that " the Council congratulate the Members on the satisfactory
state of the finances," — for finances are the sinews of an Institution as well as of
war, — " and on the general efficiency of the Institution." As a Member of the
Institution I may be allowed, on behalf of the Members, to do what the Council
cannot do for themselves, congratulate them on the management of the affairs of
the Institution in such a satisfactory manner. I will now, without further preface,
more, " That the Beport now read, be adopted and printed for circulation among the
Members.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir Lintorn Simmons, K.C.B., R.E. : —

After what has fallen from his Lordship, there is very little for me to say as to
the fabric of this Institution. I think we may recall the old saying, that one
volunteer is worth two pressed men. I do not know in what capacity his Lordship
has appeared on this occasion. He certainly appeared as a pressed man, but he

X PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH AKNIVERSARY MEETING.

must be a very valuable volunteer if he is worth twice what he has shown hLn^if
worth on this occasion. I have very few words to say with regard to the Report, but
I think there are one or two facts in it which are of great interest. First of all,
with reference to the state of our Library. When I first entered the Service, nearly
forty years ago, there was scarcely any literature in the English language on military
subjects, and very little discussion on them, and this Institution has taken a very
honourable part in promoting the study of professional subjects throughout the
Army and Navy. So little were books written on professional subjects in former
days, and so little circulation had they, that I may mention a case that came under
my own knowledge of a scientific work written in the English language, which was
translated into French and had an enormous circulation in France, while to my
certain knowledge never more than 200 or 300 copies were disposed of in thia
country. That showB pretty much what the state of study was in former days. Happily
we have come upon Tory different times, and now, if officers either of the Army or
the Navy wish for success, they must study, and I think this Institution has done a
great deal by collecting such a first-rate Library, which affords a mine from which
officers may extract the ore which is afterwards worked up into valuable essays and
discussions' in this room, and which also supplies means of study for all officers
visiting London. The Library has been greatly frequented, and we must congratulate
ourselves on the possession of it. As regards the Lectures, also, I think there has
been very great and valuable progress. I think it was in 1831 or 1862 when the
first discussion took place in the Theatre of this Institution on a military subject,
and I remember taking part in that discussion, and being sent for to the Ordnance
Office and severely wigged ; and I was reminded that there was a station in the
West Indies which I might have to visit for the sake of my health. I think that
that state of things has passed away. The Secretary of State for War would scarcely
send for an officer now-a-days and wigg him if he discussed a subject of general
interest. The subject of that first discussion was a purely scientific one ; it was a
system of fortification proposed by Mr. Ferguson. The Authorities did not wish to
have it discussed, because it interfered with their own prejudices, and that was the
manner in which they attempted to gag officers. I think we have arrived at a
better time than that, and so long as the Council do not admit into the discussions
subjects touching upon discipline, we shall be perfectly safe on the lines on which we
have worked for so many years. I have, therefore, great satisfaction in seconding
this resolution, because the Institution is serving a very useful purpose indeed as
regards the Army. There is one other point. I see in the accounts £1,200 a year
expended in issuing the Journal. This Journal has become a most valuable military
handbook ; it goes to all parts of the world ; it is studied by officers wherever they arc
in distant regions ; it communicates to them knowledge which formerly could only
be obtained by visiting the Metropolis or Woolwich ; and it keeps them ctu eouramt
with whatever is on the tapis in this country with regard to military subjects. I am
happy to see that there is an extension proposed, under the direction of my brother
officer, Major Hale, by which the Journal will contain extracts and precis of foreign
works. I think this will bo of the greatest possible advantage to the Institution, I
have, therefore, much pleasure in seconding this resolution.

The Resolution was put from the Chair, and was carried unani-
mously.

V. Names of the Members who retire from the Council by
rotation : —

Major-Gen. Sir Henry R. Green, C.B., Vice- Admiral Sir J. Walter Table-

K.C.S.I. ton, K.C.B.

W. F. Higgixs, Esq. Bear- Admiral M. S. Nolloth.

Major-Gen. F. M. Eariuby Wiljtot, Brigadier-Gen. the Hon. Fbrdebic

R.A.. F.R.S. _ TnnsiuEit, C.B., A.D.C. to the

Admiral of rv ^ Hjwby J. Con- Queen.

RINOTOK,

j'1^' ■

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING, xi

Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Balfoub, K.C.B., M.P. : —

Mr. Hardy, my Lords, and Gentlemen, — I have also been called upon unexpectedly
to propose a resolution, but I need not nay with, what pleasure I perform toe duty,
because, considering this Institution to be of great national importance not only to the
onmtry bat likewise to the* Army and Navy, I am always prepared to give any assist-
ance in my power to promote the objects which it has in view. I need not say,
Mr. Hardy, that the progress which my noble friend behind me (Lord Elcho) and
my friend General Simmons have shown to have taken place with regard to this
Institution, has been one of continued success. We have never ceased to progress
from tiie time this Institution was established, and we have now arrived at a highly
satisfactory result. Now that progress never could have been secured, had it not
been for good management oat the part of those who conducted its affairs. It is to
those gentlemen, therefore, that I am now called upon to propose a resolution of

thanks, — to those gentlemen who for the past year have managed the affairs of this
Institution, and who now retire by rotation, f am sure that is a duty which etery
Member will readily perform, for we cannot give too much credit to those gentle-
men who devote their time and leisure to the performance of such important
services. Without detaining the Meeting longer, I beg to propose, " That the
thanks of this Meeting be given to the Members of the Council who retire by
rotation." I have also had the duty given to me to propose the following gentlemen
to succeed them : —

Major-General Sir Hbkbt
, C.£., 1L.CS. I.

Captain H. F. Nichoxsov, R.N.
jpor Colonel H. C. Flbtchkb, C.M.G., Com.

W. F. Hioarvs, Esq. ^re-eiection 2nd Bafct* Soot8 Fua* CWs-

Admiral of the Fleet Sir ' Major-General D. Lysonb, C.B.

Hxbtbt J. CoDBnreTOK,J Major-General Sir Fhedbbic J. Gold-

K.C.B. aim), C.B., E.C.S.I.

And " that the following names be adopted from which to select, in the event of
vacancies occurring in^the Council," viz. : —

Colonel the Hon. Pbecy Fktlding, C.B., Colonel Lord Elcho, M.P., Comg. Lon-
Commanding the Coldstream Gds. don Scottish Rifle Volunteers.

Rear- Admiral Jasper H. Sblwyx.

I am sure that the Members of the Institution will be most willing to elect those
distinguished officers whose names I have read out, because they must be quite
confident that those who are now named as worthy of the management of its affairs,
will perform their duty in a manner which will be valuable to the Institution. I
beg, therefore, to propose that resolution.

The Resolution having been seconded by Admiral Sir Claudk
Buckle, K.C.B., was put from the Chair, and was carried unanimously.

VI. Colonel Lord Waveney, F.R.S. :—

The third resolution appears to be merely of a formal character ; still it has its
special recommendation in the nature of the services for which it is given,
it is, " That the thanks of this Meeting be given to the Auditors for their
valuable services." With regard to the services of Auditors, we know how largely
they must enter into a well-arranged scheme of finance, and as a subsidiary matter
of congratulation to the Institution, it appears to me that the accuracy with which
the accounts are made out, and the minuteness of attention which has been paid to
them, are most satisfactory. I, therefore, move, " That the thanks of this Meeting
be given to the Auditors for their valuable services, and that the following gentle-
men be elected for the ensmng year :—

T. €h BxniWAT, Esq., for re-election. El R. Baitt, Esq.

T. £. Dxaprb, Esq. Capt. J. E. A. Dolby.

XII PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

Rev. Mr. Halpin, Chaplain to the Forces : —

In seconding this resolution, perhaps if I were to do it without a word in addition,
It would be better, jet as I feel a deep interest in the Institution, I may be allowed
to make a remark. It is to the growing value of this Institution to which I wi&h
specially to call attention. Thirty years ago I was indirectly connected with it, my
father haying been a Member. Then it was only considered an out-of-the-way
place, not possessing much interest or value, where a few old gentlemen, retired
from the Service, came to read a limited number of newspapers. Now we see the
vast difference. Its scientific interest and value are recognised throughout the
length and breadth of the country, yea, over the face of the world. Now to whom
is this due ? No doubt to the Managers of the Institution ; and when we give
thanks to the Auditors, it is thanking indirectly and through them, the Managers,
the Council, and the Secretaries, who have brought this Institution *to such a state of
advancement, and have made it so valuable in the eyes of the whole Naval and
Military community, and of the community at large. I will not detain the Meet-
ing any longer, but beg leave to have the honour of seconding the resolution.

The Resolution was then put from the Chair, and was carried
unanimously.

VII. The Secretary read the Report of the Referees on the
Military Prize Essay, on " The Causes which have led to the Pre-
eminence of Nations in War," and the Chairman announced the name
of the successful candidate to be John Ross, of Bladensburg, Cold-
stream Guards, and presented him with the Gold Medal.

The Secretary then read the names of the writers of the five
Essays honourably mentioned, viz. :— -Colonel H. C. Fletcher, Scots
Fusilier Guards ; Lieut.-General Sir Richard Wilbraham, K.C.B. ;
Captain De Thoren, h.p. 38th Regiment ; Lieut. H. Elsdale, R.E. ; and
Captain H. W. L. Hime, R.A. (Gold Medallist R.U.S.I., 1875.)

The Chairman announced the following to be the subject for the
Prize Essay for the current year, to be rendered on or before the 1st
November, 1877, viz. : —

" Great Britain's Maritime Power : how best developed as regards —

1st. Fighting Ships.
2nd. Protection of Commerce.
3rd. Naval Volunteers, or Supplemental Force.
4th. Coast and Home Defence ; —
the Classes, Armamont, and description of the Vessels needed ; and
the organization required to secure a Powerful and Economic
Imperial Naval Force."

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Codrington, K.C.B. : —

It is now my pleasure, as well as my duty, to propose a rote of thanks to the
Referees for the trouble they have taken and the decision they have come to. I do
not know that it is easy for us at once to estimate the difficulty of a judgment of
this sort. Perhaps the mere fact that after adjudging the prize to one gentleman,
they hare had to name three or four others whose Essays are most excellent in their
way, and recommend them for publication, will show the difficulty these gentlemen

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. xiii

have had in deciding. There are many points which go to a decision of this sort.
The Beferees hare to consider the style of the Essays, the appropriateness of the
language, the whole treatment of the subject ; in short, to balance one consideration
with another, is a very difficult matter indeed : and where the number of papers is
great, the difficulty is very much increased by the necessity of bearing in mind the
respective excellences of each paper read. In this case, there have been some most
excellent papers, and the Referees have found it their duty to recommend several
for publication. There is no question that we are very much indebted to those
gentlemen who have taken all this trouble, and our best thanks are due to them. I
have great pleasure, therefore, in proposing " A vote of thanks to General J R.
Craufurd, General Charles Stuart, and Major-General Collinson, R.E., for their
valuable services in adjudicating on the Military Prize Essay, for the trouble they
have taken and for the decision they have come to."

The Resolution having been seconded by Major General F. C. A,
Stephenson, C.B., was put from the Chair, and was carried unanimously.

The Chairman having announced that the business of the Meeting
was concluded,

The Chair was taken by Sir Henry Codrington.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Sartorius, K.C.B. : —

Sir, — A very agreeable task has devolved upon me, viz., that of proposing that
the thanks of this Society be given to one who hears a name so well-known and so
highly honoured as yours. It is also a very favourable augury for an important object
we have in view, viz., the obtaining a site for our Institution, that the War Office has
taken so much interest in it; and this is an opportunity I should like to take
advantage of to make a few observations upon the subject of the Memorial. If wo
could have an independent site for our Institution, that would be the most advan-
tageous ; but if that is impossible, in my dreams I have imagined some magnificent
building, upon a very large scale, which should combine all the Scientific Societies of
London under the same roof, so that we might move about conveniently and watch
the proceedings taking place in all these Institutions. That would be of the greatest
service to us individually and nationally. Whether that dream of mine can be
realised or not, depends on a much higher power than myself to say, but in returning
thanks to you, Sir, for the compliment you have paid us and the interest that vou
take in this Society, I must say that that interest gives us great hope that wc shall
not fail to have either my dream accomplished or an independent site.

Major-General Shute, C.B., M.P. : —

I have great pleasure in seconding the resolution. The merits and wants of this
Institution have been so f ullv dilated on by other speakers, that it is quite unneces-
sary for me to trouble you with any remarks upon them. Our great object of course
is, that my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for War, should take the
tame deep interest in this most valuable Institution as he has shown in the British
Army. No doubt there are sundry difficulties to be solved in connection with this
Institution, but he has had greater with regard to the Army, and I have no doubt he
wQl ove come the former in the same able manner as he has overcome the latter.
Now, my Lords and Gentlemen, I know you must feel with me how deeply indebted
the Army is, and all of us are, who are Members of this Institution, to the right
honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for War. It would be in extremely bad
taste were I on this occasion to refer to the various difficulties which he, in coming
into office, has had to solve ; but there are three which I may very shortly allude to,
because every one here present, as I know from the .Lectures I have attended, takes
the deepest interest in them. The first difficulty was to know how we could

XIV PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOETT -SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

possibly hare a moderately strong and fairly good Army with a Reserve ; hew in
order to get greater numbers, we could add to the attractions of the Army. Now,
my Lords and Gentlemen, our Secretary of State for War has solved that difficulty.
We hare found hardly any difficulty in procuring recruits this year, though the
numbers are vastly increased. The other two questions yet to be solved, and which
are also very difficult ones, are, how to make Short Servioe, which, mind you, is
necessary for a Reserve, applicable to India ? and how to secure a flow of promotion
for the officers of the Army while, at the same time, keeping faith with them as
regards the promises of the House of Commons ? My Lords and Gentlemen, if we
ever had a War Department capable of solving those difficulties, I am quite sure
that Department, of which my right honourable friend is at the head, will be able to
do it. I am certain you will most heartily vote him your thanks for the kind
manner in which he has taken the chair on this occasion, and join with me in hoping
that he will take that deep interest in this Institution which he has .shown with
regard to everything connected with the Army.

The Resolution was then put from the chair, and was carried with
acclamation.

Mr. Hardy : —

My Lords and Gentlemen, — When I look at the clock and think of the amount
of business that you have sot through in three-quarters of as hour, it is an example
which I could wish to bee followed in another place. I am quite aware that officers,
whose work is action, are very often men of very few words, indeed, I may say
that almost in all cases those who are the most energetic, are those who express
themselves most briefly. I shall endeavour to emulate the good example which you
have all of yon set, but at the same time I must say a few words with reference to
my position as regards this Institution in connection with the office which I hold.
Far from being like my predecessor, who occupied the building which is now the
War Office in the times which Sir Lintorn Simmons has described, I have looked
upon this Institution as one which is calculated to bring out and develop the talent
of the young and to keep up the interest of the old in the advancing science and art
which are applied now to all Military and Naval purposes. I do not think we
conld have a stronger proof of that than has been afforded by the Essays, for I
find as competitors men so eminent as General Wilbraham and Colonel Fletcher,
contending with anybody who chooses to enter the lists with them, their object
being not to gain the Gold Medal for themselves, but to inform the public upon the
subjects of the Essays. My opinion is very strongly this, that discussion upon these
Military and Naval subjects is calculated to put us m possession of the best means of
proceeding in both cases : you eliminate the weak points, you confirm yourselves in
the strong ones. All Military and Naval subjects, other than those of discipline,
which Sir Lintorn Simmons alluded to, are very fitly discussed, it seems to me, by
those practically acquainted with them, and who bring to the knowledge of us who
are not technically so acquainted with them, an amount of information which in no
other so compendious a form could we obtain. It would be idle to suppose that a
civilian brought into the position I now hold, could be able to acquaint himself with
those works which, it appears from Sir Lintorn Simmon's statement, have only
recently been begun to be studied by officers themselves ; but we can look at the
shorter essays read previously to discussions here, and from them we obtain a
sufficient insight into what is going on, to be able to form our judgments. And let
me say how much I value the assistance which I have received ever since I have
been at the War Office, from officers in the Army. I have never called on any
military officer in any department, whether the Line, the Artillery, or the Engineer*
— and I may sneak especially of them in the presence of Sir Lintorn Simmons —
without receiving an amount of disinterested and valuable assistance which I can
never be sufficiently thankful for. It is indeed impossible for anyone to hold the
office I do without receiving that assistance. I believe it is given with as pure a

PROCEEDINGS OF THK FORTY-SIXTH AKNIVfiRSAJRT MEETING. XV

adc for the Army and Cor the benefit of the public as can possibly be conceived.
• j^re is no decile to koep back anything from anyone who holds the office I do, and
- i« his own fault if he does not obtain the information he needs. A great deal has
■ «eeu said, I think, with respect to the Library and the Journal. The Library, it
»**me to me, is of value not only to you, but, as Sir Lintorn Simmons has said, to the
public at laqge, and it is a scientific library which I hare no doubt finds students
irrespective of the Army and Nary ; because, if erer your services should be required
on a great scale, you will, as far as I can understand, be obliged to call in assistance
from the outside world, in engineering particularly, to develop the great works and
machines which will be put in motion on such an occasion. When I read of a
vessel, like the " Alexandra " going to sea with thirty-five steam-engines on board, it
makes me feel perfectly bewildered. Anybody who goes into a factory for the first
time, and sees the wheels and spinning-machines going round him, supposes that
nobody could ever get into a position to understand them, yet children do it ; but I
am quite sure no man can go in command of a ship like that, without an amount of
scientific knowledge, which cannot be gained only by study of works, but by practical
experience ; and you will have to educate your officers up to the position they have
to occupy in those ships, and not only that, but you will have to educate your
Engineers for works of which you have hitherto had no conception. There is a
development of power every day, which is become so great that you will have to
consider two great questions — first, how to get strength to resist it ; and next, haw
to get it with an amount of expenditure which the country would be justified in
consenting to. One of the points I see in the Essay proposed for next year is,
the economical mode of obtaining sufficient vessels for your purposes. Depend
upon it that at the bottom of half the difficulties that surround you is this ques-
tion of economy. It is the thing to which you must look, because if you do not
do these things economically, there comes upon the nation every now and then a
cold fit, and for the sake of saving money, it undoes that which you have done
probably at an enormous expense. You must endeavour to do these things at a
cheaper rate, and yet do them quite as well, and that is a study to which I would
direct the attention of military officers as' a subject for an essay some time or other —
" How best you can fortify." For instance, whether you can suggest any cheaper mode
of fortification than is adopted at present ; because, if you cannot do that, I am
convinced it will not be without great difficulty that it will be done at all. It is a
question very much studied and very much considered I know, and it is one which
will come to the front, because when you have these enormous ironclads sailing
about the ocean and«able to approach anything like an ordinary fortification without
the slightest risk, you must prepare to meet them at those places which are most
important to yourselves. I may mention, for instance, the coaling stations of the
world, without which our Navy may sometime or other be overcome. I have
ventured to say that much with respect to the question of economy, and I may
carry it now a little further. You want to get into a new building ; so do I. I do
not suppose there is anyone who can speak more feelingly on the subject of being
m unpleasant quarters than I ; not that I complain personally so much, but on
account of my surroundings. I think it a most unreasonable thing to expect to get
a great amount of work out of people who are subject to bad ventilation, unpleasant
rooms, and noises and surroundings which render the place unfit for study and
reflection, where you cannot open the windows without letting in all the dust of Pall
Mall. I think these are things that ought to be considered by the country, not, I
am bound to say, by this Institution. Therefore, I feel as you do* I only know
the War Office seems to me an admirable place for the study of finding your way
under difficulties ; it is a place with an intricacy of passages which I should think
would be study for a military man, almost as much as a difficult country in which
he was for the first time put down. But, however that may be, I am afraid you
wul never get a building before we do. Therefore, you should use all your efforts to
persuade the country to build a War Office first, because I am sure you will
never get out of the building in which you are at present before that is done.
Gentlemen, I will be as good as my word. I thank you very heartily for the

XV1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

kindness with which you have received me. I am very sorry that on a former
occasion I was called away by a Cabinet Council ; I was rery much afraid I should
have been to-day ; but I showed at least the will to come and get the benefit of
what had passed in your Institution, and that I had a deep sense of the advantages
it confers on the country. As far as I am concerned, I think you are in bad
quarters, and you hare rightly not come to me on the subject, but hare gone to the
Treasury, for depend upon it at the bottom of every improvement in the country is
the Treasury, whether that improvement be carried out or not.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY/-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XTl'l

MEMORIAL from the President, Vice-Presidents and Council of
the Royal United Service Institution to the Right Honourable
the Earl of Beaconsfield, First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury.

1. Your Memorialists having understood that application is being made to the
Treasury for the appropriation of a portion of Crown land in this immediate neigh-
bourhood for the purpose of building Museums for India and for the Colonies,
desire to lay before your Lordship the claims which they consider that this
important National Institution has on Her Majesty's Government for favourable
consideration when any appropriation may take place; they therefore beg to
submit a statement of the history of the Institution, and of its present position.

2. The Institution was established in the year 1831, under the immediate
patronage of His late Majesty King William the Fourth, and although then a
mere museum, with a small library, a building rent-free was granted by His
Majesty's Government. In order to adapt this building, and that subsequently
acquired from the Crown at a ground-rent of £205 10s., a sum of upwards of
£10,000 has been expended from the funds of the Institution.

3. The Institution having become in every respect well suited to the advance-
ment of professional knowledge, and the importance of a higher education of
Officers having been fully recognized, it may fairly claim a liberal consideration
from the Government. It contains a Professional Library of over 17,000 vols.,
universally acknowledged as the best of its kind ; a well-arranged Map and Chart
Boom ; a valuable Collection of Models (some of them of great size), of Arms, and
of other Professional Objects. There is also a Lecture Theatre, in use since 1860 ;
all of these afford excellent means for study, and for instruction in Naval and
Military subjects.

4. In the Lecture Theatre, papers of great importance to the Army, the Navy,
and to the Reserve Forces are read and discussed, and are then published in the
Journal, which is not only greatly appreciated by Officers at home and abroad, but
holds a high position in the public estimation ; and the general information supplied
by the Institution has been of great use to Her Majesty's Service, the advantages
afforded, proving it to be an important centre of Naval and Military instruction.

5. Secretaries of State for War, iTirst Lords of the Admiralty, and other
Members of successive Governments, have borne ample testimony to the merits of
the Institution, as given in the Appendix.

6. Encouraged by the favourable opinions thus expressed, your Memorialists
venture to request a continued consideration of the claims which the Institution
has on the Government, for the allotment of a permanent site, inasmuch as the
present tenancy is liable to be terminated at a quarter's notice.

7. The course which your Memorialists hope may be adopted, and the one which
they deem best calculated to secure to the Services and to the Nation the benefits
now afforded by the Institution, would be to appropriate to it either the site on
which it now stands, or one in its immediate neighbourhood ; the first proposal
would allow the present premises to be gradually reconstructed, and the building
to be brought into harmony with any improvements which may be carried out in
this locality.

Your Memorialists trust that this Memorial may receive your Lordship's most
favourable consideration.

(Signed) GEORGE, Pretident
Botal United Service Institution,
Whitehall Yabd,

20/* January, 1877-

XVlli PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from the Speeches made by toe Chairmen at the
Annual General Meetings, from 1860-76.

3rd March, 1860.

The Right Honourable Bakd m Gbvy and Ripon, Under Secretary of Slate

for War:—

" I assure you I entertain the very highest appreciation of the value of the
services rendered by this Institution, especially of late yean, to the United Services
of the Army and Navy.'*

2nd March, 1861.

His Grace the DtTCE of Sovxbsst, First Lord of the Admiralty : —

" I may say it is of the greatest value to have an Institution of this kind, where
lectures on Naval and Military Science are given, because a great deal of infor-
mation might otherwise be lost."

1st March, 1862.

Ihe Right Honourable Sir Geoboi Cornhw all Lbwis, Bart, M.P., Secretary

of State for War:—

"I have great gratification in saying that the benefits of the relations between
this Institution and the Government have not been one-sided ; but that the
Government, on a late occasion, received assistance from this Society, by some
information with respect to a port in North America at a time when we contem-
plated the unhappy event of a rupture with the United States We feel

the advantage which we derived from having access to the well-stored special
library of this Institution, furnishing us with information of which the Govern-
ment may at a moment of emergency not be in possession.''

\Uh March, 1868.

Admiral the Honourable Sir Fbederiok W. Gbey, K.C.B., Lord of the

Admiralty : —

" I quite agree with the remarks of gentlemen who have preceded me, that it is
to the lectures and discussions that most importance should be attached. I think
that the want of some arena in which professional questions can be calmly and dis-
passionately discussed is most strongly felt, particularly since the commencement of
the present session of Parliament.

" The different members of the Government and the heads of the Departments
who are engaged in carrying out these important improvements which the advances
of science render necessary, must have acquired a great deal of information upon
that occasion." (Discussion on the question of Rifled Ordnance.)

5th March, 1864.

General the Honourable Sir Edward Cttat, K.C.H.

" I allude, not only to the facility this Institution gives to the younger members
of the profession to acquaint themselves with the progress in naval and military
science, but more especially to the valuable information which it affords to those
entrusted with the administration of the Army and Navy, information which they
could not otherwise obtain."

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XIX

4M March, 1865.
Hi* Grace theThm op Somebsbt, 4.G., First Lord of the Admiralty.

" I can assure you that in acting with the Secretary of War in the application to
the Treasury, for a joint grant to this Institution, I did nothing more than what I
considered my duty as First Lord of the Admiralty.

" If you look to the present position of the Institution, and to what it has done
during the last three or four years, and see the attention which H has drawn to
matters of science connected with the Army and Navy, you will see the great and
growing value of this Institution. It was in that view that I recommended to the
Treasury that the Admiralty and the War Office should combine to make this grant
of £600 out of the Estimates."

%nd March, 1867.

The Bight Honourable Sir Jonif Someesht PAKtKGTOH, Bart., G.C.B., First

Lord of the Admiralty.

" The extraordinary circumstances which hare marked the progress of every-
thing connected with the Science of War during the last few years, certainly do tend
to give a new and completely additional value to an Institution like this. Whatever
it may have been at first, it is impossible to reflect upon these subjects to which I
am now in these words referring, without feeling that such an Institution is calcu-
lated to promote national objects of the very first importance. I sincerely think
that an Institution of this character is entitled, beyond all question, to the warmest
and most sincere encouragement of the Government. I think the Government of
this country is bound gratefully to acknowledge the services of such an Institution
as thii, and to give it every due and proper encouragement.

" And if its objects could not be satisfactorily carried out without an increase o!
assistance from the public funds, I am quite willing to express my opinion that that
assistance ought to be given."

1th March, 1868.

Major-General the Bight Honourable Sib H. K. Storks, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

Controller-in-Chief.

" I wish to express publicly the great interest which I take in the prosperity and
usefulness of this great Institution. Having been a great deal abroad, and having
been somewhat in communication with foreign armies, I can confirm all that has
been said by the honourable and gallant gentleman who seconded the first resolution
as to the high estimation in which the Journal of the Proceedings of this Institution
is regarded by Officers of those armies. Articles are translated and constant

reference is made to them I can only repeat, which I do most sincerely,

that it will be my endeavour, at all times and .under all circumstances, to assist to
the beat of my ability the interest of this great Institution."

6th March, 1809.

The Bight Honourable H. CuXLnw-EABDXEY Chiidbus, If .P., First Lord of

the Admiralty: —

" The connection between the Government and an Institution of this kind ought
to be of the most friendly, and, I may say, of the most cordial character, and so far
as it in me lies in any way to promote that object, you may on all occasions be quite
certain of my best endeavours to do "bo. Gentlemen, I look upon this Institution, if
I may be allowed to say so, as a sort of neutral ground of professional enquiry,
connected with the two services. We have political enquiries in the two Houses of
Parliament, and we have departmental enquiries at the War Office and Admiralty ;
and yon all know that those enquiries and researches cannot be altogether dls-

tociated from questions of pure politics or questions or administration

5o one who has had an opportunity, as I have, of perusing the most valuable
papers that have been read here, which bear directly upon questions dealt with in
Parliament and in the departments, jean fail to be greatly benefited, and I believe
what is done here influences in a very remarkable degree many things which are
done elsewhere."

XX PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

UK March, 1870.

The Bight Honourable Edward Cardwell, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

"I feel extremely the importance of this Institution, and am very much
impressed with the feeling which has been expressed in some speeches, viz. : — that
the Government derives the greatest advantage from the labours of those gentle*
men who contribute to the literature of this Institution. We live in a time when
pure science, and applied science, and historical investigation, contribute probably
more than at any former period, to the real progress of the military profession.
Many of the most interesting subjects which afterwards occupy practical attention

find the first germs of their existence in the lectures of this Institution

I do not know that I ought to condole with you on the prospect of being disturbed
in your premises, because I sincerely hope that, if, in consequence of any improve-
ments that may take place in this neighbourhood, you are disturbed, the result may
be that I may have the pleasure of seeing you in a more commodious place, and one
in which your abundant treasures may be properly exhibited.1'

4iA March, 1871.

The Right Honourable the Viscount Halifax, G.C.B., Lord Privy Seal.

" I have had a good deal to do during a rather active life, so that I have not had
time to pay much attention to the concerns of this Institution. But since Captain
Burgess was good enough to wait upon me to ask mo to take the Chair on the
present occasion, I have looked through a number of papers which he left with me,
and I must say that reading over tnose papers has impressed me with th^ very
highest opinion of the valuable nature of this Institution. My belief is that the
information which is collected here, and the results of the collision of opinion which
takes place in the discussions in this room, will be of the greatest possible utility to
both the Naval and Military Departments of the Government. We are living in a
period of constant and rapid transitions. Thirty-five years ago I first became con-
nected with the Admiralty. Nothing in the world exists there now which existed
in those days. In thirty-five years everything has changed, from the truck to the
keel, I was going to say ; and it is almost impossible for any one, two, or three men
to keep up with the rapidity of these changes. I see, in looking over the papers
which have been discussed, that a great number of valuable suggestions have been
made by various members, and discussed with great ability, imd the result of those
discussions cannot but be most useful to those who have to administer the Naval
and Military affairs of this country. The Navy is the department with which I was
first connected, and I still continue to take a deep interest in its affairs. 1 am sure
that many of the questions which are discussed now, and which must be discussed
for many years to come in this Institution, will be treated with the greatest con-
sideration by the Government. The same remark will apply to the Army, because
the state of transition there is in many respects quite as rapid as in the Navy. Since
I have known the Army, it has been supplied with four or £^e different weapons, to
say nothing of the field guns. Questions relating to the Army have been submitted
to the experience of Members of this Institution, and the result of that experience
has been brought to a focus within these walls ; and I cannot but think that in that
respect this Institution is of the greatest possible service to those who have to
administer the military resources of the country. Well, in this state of things,
gentlemen are likely to be called upon in one part or another of the country to take

Sart in home defence ; and we must come to learn from professional officers those
uties which we cannot have the opportunity of learning at home, and which we
may learn here with great advantage. I am glad to see that a personal friend of
mine gave a very able lecture on the subject of ' Military Organisation ' a short time
ago. Although we cannot boast the experience of professional officers, I am glad to
see that a country gentleman has read a paper hero on a subject of great interest.
I think those who are called upon to bear arms in defence of their country will learn
a great deal from the lectures that are given here. I am glad to find from the
Report, that you have an increased number of Members, increased efficiency in

PROCEEDINGS OP THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XXI

various ways, in additions made to the library, and in other means of obtaining and
improving information. I do trust, though there is not much chanoe of your being
disturbed this year, that before long you will be put, not into a more convenient
site— for this is a very convenient site — but at any rate into a site at least as con-
venient, and from which you are not likely to be disturbed."

"2nd March, 1872.

field-Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, E.G., &c., Ac., Ac.,
Commanding-in-Chief , President of the Institution : —

11 Gentlemen, — After having had this Report read by the Secretary, I do not
think there is much left for me to say with regard to the present position of the
Institution. I am happy to congratulate you that, upon the present occasion, we
meet under more favourable circumstances than when we last assembled in this
theatre, viz., for the special purpose of considering what was to become of the Insti-
tution. One point was clearly brought out as the result of that meeting ; namely,
that the value of this Institution has been fully appreciated not only by the public,
but especially by the Government, with which we are very essentially concerned,
inasmuch as our tenure of this building, as you have already heard, depends mainly
upon the course Her Majesty's Government may think it right to adopt. On that
occasion I ventured to counsel you — arid I am happy to say that that counsel was
supported by everybody present — that we should accept the * notice to quit ' in any-
thing but an unfriendly spirit ; that we should make our opinions known ; and that
it should be made fully apparent how essential it was to the interests of the Insti-
tution that it should be continued on its present footing. One very important point
should not be overlooked, viz., that it is essential than an Institution of this descrip-
tion should be situated in a locality accessible to every Member. This is a point of
such importance, that I trust it will not be lost sight of in 'any arrangements which
may hereafter be made. Meanwhile, thanks to the good feeling that has been evinced
towards us, we have at least gained this great advantage, that instead of being called
upon to leave on the 5th of April next, a year's grace has been given us, and the
notice has been extended to the 5th of April, 1873. There is no doubt that that
arrangement gives us a great advantage. It gives us time to consider what is best to
be done ; and it gives us the opportunity of intercommunication with the Govern-
ment, and of seeing if our interests and their views cannot be brought in harmony.
I do hope that, between the present date and the period proposed for our departure,
some means will be found for letting us remain where we are, which certainly would
be the most convenient and advantageous course for the Institution ; particularly
considering the amount of money which has been expended in enlarging and improv-
ing the premises ; or, if we should fail in that, I trust that we shall meet with a site
in immediate contiguity to the place in which we are now assembled. The advan-
tage of the meetings which take place in this Institution for the reading of papers
and for discussions has been generally acknowledged, not merely by the official
world, but by those who take, or ought to take, an interest in the objects of the
Institution. * We have a proof of this in the Report which has just been read. You
heard that an addition of ninety-one Members was made last year. I look upon that
as a most interesting fact. It shows that there is a general interest in the subjects
that are discussed here, as being of advantage to the two Services. It shows, too,
that the exchange of thought and opinion which the discussions produce, is of the
greatest ralne. I have no doubt, if we can only retain the present site, or secure one
equally good, that the continued opportunity for the interchange of thought which
takes place here on neutral ground, will be so extended, that, not only the two
Serf ices, but the Government itself, will derive the greatest possible advantage from
it ; because it is here that subjects of great importance can be freely and fairly
discussed ; they can be discussed on a very different basis from what they can be in
an Office. Here everybody is allowed to express his opinions. It is very desirable
that thoee opinions should be expressed with great moderation, great thought, and
great good feeling. I am happy to say that that spirit has always pervaded our
meetings. It does not at all follow, because two people do not think alike that they

(

XXli PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIYEBSABY MKKXUW.

should not be good friends. It would be the greatest possible mistake were it other-
wise, particularly in discussing any merely professional question. There must be a
variety of opinions ; it is desirable that it should be so, and it is quite desirable that
proper rent should be given to those differences of opinion. I used the words
' proper vent,' because there are two ways of expressing opinions. Here opportunity
is given to express the thoughts which every man has a right to entertain, and, as I
have said, the greatest good feeling and moderation prevail. But there is another
way which is not quite so satisfactory, where thoughts are expressed sometimes even
in an offensive manner. That course I greatly deprecate. That is not the system
upon which our deliberations are conducted, and I trust it will never be permitted
to find a place in them. I have a conviction of the vast importance, not only to
the two Services, but to the public generally, of thb Institution. Under these
circumstances, I trust that, between this and next year, some arrangement may
be made to secure, on even a more firm basis than hitherto, the Royal United
Service Institution, which has now existed for a considerable time, and with great
advantage, I think/'

1st March, 1873.

The Most Honourable the Marquis of Lansdowvb, Under Secretary of State

for War :-—

" I esteem it a very great privilege to have been allowed by the Council of this
Institution to take the Chair to-dav. It has often occurred to me that one of the
great advantages of public life — mine has been a very brief experience of such a life,
but still it has convinced me of it none the less — is that it affords you opportunities
of bringing yourself into contact with numbers of men, classes of men, associations of
men, whom you would not otherwise have the privilege of meeting and knowing ;
and I can assure the members present here to-day, that there is no association whose
acquaintance I am more pleased to make, than that of the Royal United Service
Institution. I say this not only as one of the general public who watch with an eye
of approval and interest the energetic endeavours of this Institution, but I say it also
as having the honour of being connected with one of the Public Departments, which
will, I hope, continue always to preserve with this Institution those amicable
relations which I am convinced subsist between them. Added to this, I think I may
congratulate myself upon having been allowed to occupy your Presidential Chair
upon the occasion of certainly one of the most successful meetings — I mean not so
much in point of attendance, but successful in point of tho condition of things which
the Report discloses — that has ever been held. We have not only a very large and
rapid increase in the number of members of the Institution, but we have a very con-
siderable financial increase as well ; and I dwell with greater satisfaction upon this,
because when I see the funded property of tho Institution gradually increasing, it
occurs to me that, should that unfortunate contingency which has been already
referred to to-day ever overtake us, the Institution will find iteelf with funds of its
own whereby to second the effort which I believe will be made by any Government —
whatever party it may belong to — to secure for tho Royal United Service Institution
a firm basis for the futuro. A reference to pledges which have been already given
by persons holding high official positions in the present Government, is certainly
reassuring on this subject ; and I am convinced that those pledges were not only
readily given, but will be honourably redeemed when the day comes.

" Then, Gentlemen, having had the honour of filling the Chair to-day, I feel
tempted to say a few words to you about your Institution itself, and I must confess
that it is with some hesitation that I address myself to the task, because I run no
inconsiderable risk of finding myself talking to you about a subject with regard to
which you are very much better informed than I am. But there are one or two
considerations that force themselves upon my mind, and those considerations I will,
with your permission, very briefly state. We live in an age of great scientific pro-
gress. Inventions and discoveries succeed each other with remarkable rapidity, and
for that reason increased scientific culture has become at once indispensable and
more popular than it ever was before. We see that in every trade, in every pre-

PROCXBDITOS OF THB F0Bn.8IXTH AHKYEBSARY MEETING. XX1U

fession, in every claw of society ; and I think this Institution may not unreasonably
congratulate itself upon having for more than forty years taken the lead in that
movement in the direction of scientific culture, which has added so much to the
resources and strength of our country. .... This Institution has facilities for
promoting scientific culture which perhaps no other Institution in the world has, for
this reason, that we have here a neutral territory between science on the one hand
and professional and practical life upon the other. The merit* of the one frame of
mind dovetail with the merits of the other ; each corrects the fault of the other ; and
I think you get a more practical use of science in an Institution like this, than
perhaps you do under any other conceivable circumstances.

" I will not sit down without referring to the connection which has so long sub-
sisted between the War Department and this Institution. I am happy to say that
that connection is one on which both the War Department and the "United Service
Institution may reflect with pleasure. There has never been any approach to
dependence between the two, but there has always been the utmost goodwill. We
feel that we gain not only by the use made by Officers connected with the War
Department of your valuable premises and of those facilities which you offer to them,
bat we feel that we gain in that wide diffusion of cultivated spirit which no Act of
Parliament and no regulations can produce, but which the spontaneous efforts of this
Institution have succeeded in very firmly establishing. My Lords and Gentlemen,
I have only to thank you for having allowed me to occupy the Chair to-day, and to
assure you it will be a great pleasure to me to look back: upon my introduction to
this Institution."

7th March, 1874.

Admiral Sir Axbxaxdbb Mil* b, G.C.B., Lord of the Admiralty : —

" My Lords and Gentlemen, I beg to thank you for the honour you have done me
in according me a vote of thanks. I can only say that I am exceedingly grateful to
the Council for having done me the honour of asking me to preside on this occasion.
I accepted that invitation with the greatest pleasure ; because, though I have not
heen participating as an active Member of this Institution, yet it is one that I have
for years advocated as one of the most useful and practical for both Services. I have
read with great attention, and with much interest, the valuable Journals which arc
published here. They contain matters of public interest both for the Army and Navy,
as well as for civil life, and I can certainly concur in all that has been said to-day*
about our being under a deep obligation to the authors of those Papers for the
address which they have displayed, and for the ability with which they nave written
them. But the usefulness of this Establishment is not confined to the discussions
which take place hero. I agree in every word which the gallant General said with
regard to free discussion. I think it is for the interest of our professions that those
who come here should clearly and explicitly state their views in that straightforward
manner which cannot be objectionable to any Government. Besides the privilege of
the Lecture*, Members of this Institution have access to what is perhaps the finest
professional library in the country. It is a great credit to the Members of the
Council, and to those who have passed years icrthe discharge of their duties here,
that this Establishment has been raised to the position which it now holds, that it
has the finest library in the country, that it receives from foreign nations their
principal works, and that both the War Office and the Admiralty are ready to come
forward to render such assistance as they can in the way of books and charts. There
ib another way in which this Institution exercises a widespread influence. I
believe that the Papers published here have great influence in our respective

professions I have pleasure in mentioning that, because the Essay

(Junior Naval Professional Association), which is now printed, does him (Lieut.
Xoel, B.N.) great credit ; and I also take the opportunity of referring to the subject
as showing the influence that this Institution has over the professional Officers of
the Navy, and I believe of the Army also. I have to return you thanks for the
compliment paid to me, and to assure you that my desire and my anxiety have been
to forward the interests of our respective professions, and also to do all I could for
this Institution."

XXiv PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

6th March, 1875.

The Bight Hon. the Earl ov Pembroke, Under Secretary of State for War (in the

absence of Mr. Gathobne Hardy) : —

" Before I say anything on the subject of the motion, I wish just to state that no
one I am sure can be more disappointed at his absence to-day than Mr. Hardy him-
self. He was summoned away, as has been said already, at the last moment, and
with great regret that he was not able to attend. I am not as well acquainted with
this Institution as I hope to be in future ; but it does not require. a very deep insight
into its working, or very great experience, to see the very great advantages which it
possesses, and the enormous capabilities it has both for acquiring and diffusing
information. I most thoroughly concur in all that has been said about the very great
service which it has rendered and does render, and I hope always will render, to the
Government. In saying this I wish to call particular attention to one point, viz., that
of the Gold Medal. The amount of help that will be afforded to the Government
by picking the best brains of the whole army upon such subjects as that which has
been chosen for this year cannot, I think, be exaggerated."

Uh March, 1876.

Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, G.O.B., Lord of the Admiralty :—

" Before the business of the meeting commences I think that I should state the
reason why I have the honour of occupying the Chair on this occasion. It was tho
intention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to have been here this afternoon, but in
consequence of a meeting of the Cabinet at 12 o'clock, he is unable to be present.
The Council have been kind enough, therefore, to ask me to preside, and I shall be

very glad if I can be of any service I am quite sure of this, the more

young Officers write upon technical subjects, avoiding all questions of discipline, and
not making use of confidential papers, the more it will be tor the good of the Service
itself, and also of the military profession. I trust you will allow me to add a few
words with regard to the Institution itself. I think nobody can form any other
opinion than that it has been of the greatest professional use both to the Army and
Navy, and that there are matters discussed and papers written in this Institution by
members of both Services which are exceedingly advantageous, and hold forth not
only old but new views upon all these particular questions now arising in our
respective professions. To whom are we indebted for all this ? We are indebted to
the Chairman, the Council, the Secretary, and the other professional Officers of the
United Service Institution. These gentlemen are catering for the public good, and
I think it is due to them that, as the Chairman of this meeting, I should express, as
representing you, our satisfaction at the manner in which the Chairman and the
Council have so kindly undertaken their duties, and have maintained and kept up
this Institution. We have expressed, through a Resolution, a vote of thanks to those
Members who are leaving the Council ; but I think it is due to those who still remain
that their services should not pass unnoticed. I conclude by expressing my own
personal feeling that whatever I can do, or the Admiralty can do, to support this
Institution or increase its usefulness, we shall be very glad to do.'1

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XXT

NAMES OF MEMBERS

WHO JOINED THE INSTITUTION BETWEEN THE 4th APRIL AND

THE 2nd MAY, 1876.

Life.

Ponsonby, J. G-., Lieut. 49th Regiment.
Cleveland, Henry F., Captain R.N.
Canon-Howe, Hon. A. G., Lieutenant
RJ*.

Inverurie, Lord, Captain Rojal Aber-
deenshire Highland Militia.
Wood, Thomas, Lieut. Gren. Guards.
Fife, James G., Colonel R.E.

Annual.

Nettleship, W. F., Captain 9th Surrey «

Rifle Volunteers.
Hume-Spry, G. F., M.D., Surgeon 2nd

Life Guards.
George, O. W., M.D., Surgeon-Major

1st Life Guards.
Clinton, Lord E. W. P., Major Rifle

Brigade.
Wegg-Proeser, J. F., Lieut. Rifle Brigade.

m Carter, Robt. Brudenell, Esq.,| F.R.C.S.,
late Staff Surgeon A.M.D.
Romilly, Frederick W., Lieut. Scots

Fus. Guards.
Prm, Francis, Lieut. 1st Life Guards.
Murray, A. M., Lieut. RJL
Mildmay, H. P. St. J., Lieut. Gren. Gds.
Williams, C. G., Lieut. R.N.

WHO JOINED THE INSTITUTION BETWEEN THE 19th JUNE AND

THE 31st DECEMBER, 1876.

Life.

Bobertaon, Charles G., Lieut. Edin-
burgh Militia.

Birch, Lightwood T.t The King's Own
1st Stafford Militia.

Xoake, Maillard, Major New Zealand
Militia.

Corry, Alrin C, Lieut. R.N.

Newark, C. W. S., Viscount, Lieut.

Gren. Guards.
Warry, A. W., Lieut. R.N.
Branson, C. E. D., Captain H.M.I.M.F.
Pole, Arthur C, Captain 13th Hussars.
Lord, Frank K., Lieut. 55th Regiment.

XXVi PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANMIVBB8ABT MEETING.

Annual.

fowler. C J»Jiieut.-Colonel R.E.

Ey, Charles, Lieut. R.N.
Chambers, Francis, Lieut. -Colonel 1st
• King's Own Stafford Militia.
Madden, Geo. C, Lieut. 1st West India

Regiment.
Parker, R. J. H., Captain R.E.
Smart, Geo. J., Major R.A,
Foster, C. £., Captain 58th Regiment.
Turnbull, C. F. A., Lieut. 32nd Regt.
Johnston, D. A., Lieut. R.E.
Greenhill, B. Cecil, Lieut. Sent Art.

Militia.
Weldon, F., Major Madras Staff Corps.
White, W. L., Captain 4th E. York

Artillery Volunteers.
Elyard, James, Major 2nd Royal Surrey

tiilitia.
Coles, Chas. Horsman, Captain 1st

Surrey Artillery Volunteers
Stoddard, Thomas H., Major-General,

TJnatt.

__ V. IjOjattrCB., Com. R.N.
?ompkins, John, Paymaster R.N.
Rotton, Arthur, Lt.-Colonel, late R.A.
Watson, A. J., Lieut. 12th Regiment.
Main, Robert, Esq., Royal Naval College,

Greenwich.
Toulmin, Alfred H., late Lieut. 65th

Regiment.
Greg, Edward H., Captain, late 4th

Royal Lancashire Militia.

Murray, K. D., Captain 89th Regiment.
Taaffe, C. R., Lieut. 16th Lancers.
Chadwick, Edwd., Lieut. 16th Lancers.
Davis, J. E., Captain R.N.
Eden, M. R., Major, TJnatt.
Baumann, C. E., Lieut. 2nd West India

Regiment.
Messervr, G. T., Captain 21st Middlesex

Rifle Volunteers.
Norman, C. B., Captain Bengal Staff

Corps.
Hoste, Geo. H., Esq., Admiralty.
Clarke, William, Captain, 2nd Middle-
sex Militia.
Boyce, E. J. G., Lieut. R.E.
Bedford, F. G. D., Captain R.N.
Shaw, William, Captain 2nd Stafford

Militia.
Forster, Charles, Captain, 2nd Stafford

Militia.
Hall, Geo. C., Lieut. 2nd Stafford Militia.
Bagnall, T. N., Lieut. 2nd Stafford

Militia.
Heyland, J. R. K. L., Lieut. R.A.
Hamilton, R. V., C.B., Captain R.N.
Ballantyne, J. G., Captain 11th Regt.
James, F. W., Lieut. 9th Regiment.
Pruitt, Percy S., Lieut. 101st Regiment.
Wyndhani,W. G. C, Lieut. 21st Hussars.
Graham, D. A. G. C, Captain 16th

Lancers.

PBooxcDmas or the fobty-mxth AssmmAax meeting. xxvu

ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

DURING 1876.

LIBRARY.

Where London is the place of Publication, the word London is omitted.
Where no size of Volume is mentioned, the Work is in Svo.
Where no date is mentioned, 1876 is the year of publication.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

Albemarle, Tho Earl of, General.
Fifty Tears of my Life. 2 vols.

The Author.

Barlow, H. 0., M.D. Critical, His-
torical and Philosophical Contributions
to the Study of the Divina Commedia.,
1864. The Author.

Battalion Re-organization. By a Field
Officer. Pamph.

Canada. Report, Canada Militia. 1875.
Ottawa. Isaac Brock Stanton, Esq.

China. Translation of the Peking
Gazette. 1874-75. 2 vols.

Capt. Alex. Man.

Db Martens. An Essay on Privateers,
Captures and particularly on Re-
captures. Also a Discourse on the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers.
Translated by T. H. Home. 1801.

Dtlague. Leoons do Navigation.
Rouen, 1791.

Gen. Sir Wm. Codrington, G.C.B.

Dffpla. Medical History of the Ex-
pedition. Fol. 1875.

D. T. Gen. J. T. C. Ross, F.B.C.S.

Ditto Hills. Account of Part of

the. Fol. Calcutta, 1875. Anon.

De FonbIiANQUe, E. B. Political and
Military Episodes in the latter half of
the 18th Century, derived from the
life and Correspondence of the Right
Hon. John Burgoyne, General, States-
man, and Dramatist. The Author.

Dnjxur, The Hon. Arthur. A Winter
in Iceland and Lapland. 2 vols.
1875. The Author.

Dalton, J- 0., Lt. R.H-A. Questions
and Answers for the Use of Non-
commissioned Officers and Gunners
of Batteries of Horse and Field
Artillery armed with the 9 P.R. and
Rifled Gun of 6 cwt. Cork. The Author.

Dixkajuc. Four Sheets Topographical
Atlas. The Danish War Minister.

Examinations. Report, Final Exami-
nation, Staff College, Dec. 1875.

Ditto. Report on the Final Ex-
amination to the Staff College, Dec.
1876. With Copies of the Exami-
nation Papers. The Director- General
of Military Education.
Fbasee, T., Capt. R.E. The Defence of
a Position Selected as a Field of
Battle. Royal Engineer Prize Essay
for 1875. The Writer.

Fawcus, G. Small Pocket Field Draw-
ing Board. The Designer.
FRANCO-Gcrman War. 1st Part, 8th and
9th Sections ; 2nd Part, 10th Section.
The Secretary of State for War.
German Empire. The Armed Strength
of. Part I., Organisation and Ad-
ministration, with Map. By Capt.
F. C. H. Clarke, R.A.

The Secretary of State for War.
Goldsmid, Sir F., Gen. Eastern

Persia. 2 rols.
Gut, Dr. F., R.S. The Crimean War,
or tho Turks avenged. Pamph.

The Author.
Hall, Sir William H.f Admiral, K.C.B.
Our National Defence. Pamph.

The Author.

Harcus, W. South Australia; its

History, Resources and Productions.

F. S. Dutton, Esq., C.M.G.

Hogg, Jabez. Impairment or Loss of

Vision from spinal shock or concussion.

The Author.

House, E. H. The Japanese Expedition

to Formosa. 1875. Capt. Alex. Man.

Inglis, Col. R. E. Notes of Lectures

on Iron Fortification. 1875.

The Commandant S.M.E. Chatham.
Italy. The Armed Strength of. Trans-
lated from the German by Lt. W. A:
H. Hare, R.E.

The Secretary of State for War.

XXViii PR0CEED1KG6 OP THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

. Italy. Der Krieg in Italien, 1869.
Zweiter Band. Wion.

The Austrian War Minister.
Monteibo, J. J. Angola and the River
Congo. 2 toIb. 1875.

The Publishers.

Mounted Rifles. Report of Annual

Meeting of 1st Hants Mounted Rifles.

13th May, 1876. Col. Bower.

Navy. Admiralty Regulations, 1790-

1826 and 1844.

Gen. Sir Win. Codrington, G.C.B.
NAVY: —

Naval Instructions. 1806.
Extract from Marine Treatise. 1758.
Duties of a Deputy Judge- Advocate.

1805.
Essay on Naval Tactics. 1790.
Naval Force of Great Britain. 1791.
Le petit Neptune Francais. 1793.
Pilot Ayroura.
Memoirs of the Royal Navy,

Druck's. 1806.
Naval Courts Martial, M'Arthur's.

1792.
Ship Master's Assistant. 1792.
Mathematical Tables, Sherwin's.

1771.
Thompson on the Scurvy. 1790.
The Seaman's New Vade Mecuni.

1787.
Le petit Flambeau de la Mer.
Recueil des principaux Flans des Ports

et Rades de la Mer Mediterranee.
Account of the Proceedings of the
Squadron effecting the escape of the
Royal Family of Portugal.

Mrs. Brownlow Knox.

Netherlands. 7th vol. Military
Reports.
The War Minister, The Netherlands.

Ditto. The Armed Strength of.
Bv Capt. F. C. H. Clarke, R.A. With
Map. The Secretary of State for War.
Panorama, Military, or Officer's Com-
panion. 3 vols, for 1813-14-15.
General Sir Edward Hodge, K.C.B.
Pbice, Capt. R.N., M.P. Navigation
of Her Majesty's Ships. Pamph.

The Author.

Raikes, G. A., Capt. Historical Records
of the First Regiment of Militia, or
Third West York Light Infantry.

The Compiler.

Records, The Royal North Gloucester
Militia. Capt. Crippe. The Author.

Royal Ekginkers. Professional Papers.
Vol. 23. Cot. Hutchinson, X.E.

Russia. The New Law regulating
Military Service in Russia.

The Secretary of State for War.
St. John op Jerusalem, the Order of.
Report, Roll, and Brief of.

Ditto. The History of Eagle, in
the County of Lincoln, a Commandery
of the Knights Hospitallers. Pamph.
Capt. ferrott, East Kent Militia.
Sprot, J., Col. Standing Ordere of the
91st Highlanders, with Addenda and
detached Appendix of Forms.

The Compiler.

Sweden, Krigs-Vetenskops-Akademiens

Handlinger och Tidscrift. 1875-76.

The Minister of War, Sweden.

The British Army and Miss Nightin-

GALE. Paris. 1874. Dr. Shrimpton.

The Cabinet Council and the impending

War. By an Englishman. Pamph.
_ Anon.

ToRirjrGTOK, H. St., R.H.A- Swim-
ming Drill. Pamph. The Author.
Trinity House Fog Signals. Reports
on a Special Gun, ftun Cotton and
Rockets for Signal Purposes.

Admiral Sir Richard Collinson.
Trotter, H., Capt. R.E. Account of
the Survery Operations in Eastern
Turkestan. 1873-74. Fol. The Author.
United States. Official Army Register,
1876. The Adjutant-General.

Report, Chief of Ordnance, 1875.

The Chief of Ordnance.
Medical Statistics of the Provost*.
Marshal General's Bureau. 2 vols.
Folio. Dr. J. H. Baxter,

War Department, Washington.

United States Geographical Surveys

West of 100th Meridian. Vol. 8,

Geology; 6, Zoology.

Explorations across the Great Basin

in Utah in 1859. Folio.
Exploring Expedition from Santa
F6 to junction of Grand and Green
Rivers. 1859. Folio.
Report of the Chief of Engineers.

3 vols. 1876.
Report of a Reconnaissance from Car-
roll, Montana Territory, on the Upper
Missouri, totheSellowstone National
Park, and Return, made in the
Summer of 1875. By Captain Lud-
low, Engineers.

The Chief of Engineers.
Historical Sketch of the U.S. Naval
Academy. By Professor James
Russell Soley, A.B.
Rules, Register, &c, for tho same.

Admiral Jlodgerr. U.S.X.

PROOKBDIXeS OF THE TOETT-SIXTH ANNTVEB8ABY MEETING. XXIX

Ufited

Sailing Directions—
No. 59. The Coasts of Chile, Bolivia
and Peru.
60. Coast and Ports of the Bay
of Biscay.

Commodore Wvman, U.S.N.
Votlb, Gen. B. A. A Military Dic-
tionary. 3rd edit. The Author,
Wauueb, Beauchamp, General, C.B.
Instructions for Regiments taking
part in the MancsuTres of a Cavalry
Division. The Author.
Wabd, B. A Treatise on the Relative

Bights and Duties of Belligerent and
Neutral Powers in Maritime Affairs.
1875.
John F. Q. Boss, of Bladensburg,

Coldstream Guards.
Websteb, B. G., Capt. The Amalga-
mation of the British Army.

The Author.
Will, Lt. "IThe Artillerist's Hand
D ALTON, Lt. J Book of Reference.

The Authors.

Yonge, W. L., Col., B.A. Chart of

Sunrise and Sunset for every Day and

at every Place. The Author.

The following Works were presented by J. W. Fleming, Esq., F.M.C.S., late
Surgeon- Major 4th Dragoon Guards, since deceased.

Aixnr, John, M.D. Annals of the
Reign of King George the Third, from
its Commencement in the year 1760
to the Death, of His Majesty in the
year 1820. 2 vols. 1825.

Anne, Queen, Life and Beign of. 1738.

ijrsTis, John. Observations Introduc-
tory to an Historical Essay upon the
Knighthood of the Bath. 1725.

Beadfield, Henry J. Waterloo. 1826.

BaoADXUtfBT, Bev. Thomas. Funeral
Orations in Praise of Military Men.
Translated from the Greek of Thuoy-
dides, Plato, and Lysias. Bath. 1811.

Bulstbode, Sir B. Memoirs and Re-
flections upon the Beign and Govern-
ment of King Charles the 1st and
King Charles the 2nd. 1721.

Bubney, W., Master of the Naval
Academy at Gosport. The Naval
Heroes of Great Britain. 1806.

Butleb, Major John. Travels and Ad-
ventures in the Province of Assam
during a residence of fourteen years.
1855.

Cakbubkenneth. Begistrum Monas-
terii S. Marie de Cambuskenneth,
a.d. 1147—1535. Presented to the
Members of the Grampian Club by the
Marquess of Bute. Edinburgh 1872.

Cattbbmole, Bev. Richard. The Great
Ciril War of the Times of Charles 1st
and Cromwell. 4to. 1866.

Chambers, Robert. History of the
Rebellion in Scotland in 1745, 1746.
2 vols. 1830.

Charles, G. History of the Trans-
actions in Scotland in the years 1715-
16 and 1745-46. 2 vols. 1817.

China, Pictorial, Descriptive, and His-
torical, with some Account of Ava
and the Burmese, Siam and Anam.
1853.

Clarendon and Whiteloce Compared.
1727.

Costbllo, Edward. The Adventures of
a Soldier. 1841.

Ceomwell, Oliver. View of the Life
and Actions of, Military and Civil.
1681.

Ditto. History of. ByB. B. 4th
edit. 1706.
Ditto. The Life of. 4th edit. 1741.
Ditto, Thomas. Oliver Cromwell
and his Times. 2nd edit. 1822.

Cuntnghamb, Captain Arthur. An
'Aide-de-Camp's Recollections of Ser-
vice in China. 2 vols. 1844.

Dawson, T., D.D. Memoirs of St.
George, the English Patron, and of
the Most Noble Order of the Garter.
1714.

De Butts, Lt. Rambles in Ceylon. 1841.

Dsiofix, Auguste. Weapons of War,
being a History of Arms and Armour
from the Earliest Period to the Pre-
sent Time. Translated by C. C.
Black, M.A. 1870.

Dixon, Hepworth. Robert Blake, Ad-
miral and General at Sea, based on
Family and State Papers. 1852.

Dohbn?, Michael. The History of the
American Bevolution.

Elizabeth, Queen. History of the
Life and Reign of, from her Birth to
her Death. 1739.

Evans, Maurice. The JEgis of England,
or the Triumphs of the Late War.

XXX PROCEEDINGS OF THE F0BTT-8IXTH AJUUVJUCSABY HBETH9G.

Gibraltar, The Siege of. n.d.

Glbig, The Eev. G. B. The Leipsic
Campaign. 1852.

Gordon, Charles Alexander, M.D., C.B.
Remarks on Army Surgeons and their
Works. 1870.

Gordon, The Iter. James. History of
the Rebellion in Ireland in the year
1798. Dublin, 1801.

Graham, The Ray. John. A History
of the Siege of Londonderry and De-
fence of Enniskillen in 1688-9. 1829.

Green, John, late of the 68th It. I.
The Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life,
or a series of occurrences from 1806 to
1815, with a Concise Account of the
War in the Peninsula. Louth, 1827.

Hall, J. H. W. Scenes in a Soldier's
Life in Scinde, Beloochistan, and
Afghanistan, during 1839-40-41-42-
43. 1848.

Harvard, W. M. A Narrative of the
Establishment and Progress of the
Mission to Ceylon and India. 1823.

Henderson, Andrew. The History of
the Rebellion in 1745-46. 5th edit.
1753.

Ditto. The Life of William Augustus,
Duke of Cumberland. 1766.

History of the Rebellion of 1745-46.
n.d.

Historical Anecdotes of Heraldry and
Chivalry. 1795.

History of all the Real and Threatened
Invasions of England from the Land-
ing of Julius C»sar to the Present
Period, 1797. 1798.

Holmes & Co. The Bengal Obituary,
since the Formation of tne European
Settlement to the Present Time. 1848.

Horne, John. The History of the
Rebellion, in the year 1745. 1802.

Hoofer, Jacob. History of the Rebel-
lion and Civil Wars in England during
the Reign of Charles the First. 1738.

Hughes, Michael. A Plain Narrative
and Authentic Journal of the late
Rebellion, begun in 1745, Describing
its Progress in Scotland and England
till the Full and Glorious Defeat at
Culloden. 2nd edit. 1747.

Hunt, Captain G. H.,78th Highlanders.
Outram and Havelock's Persian Cam-
paign. 1858.

India. Military Sketches of the Goorka
War in the years 1814-15-16. Wood-
bridge, 1822.

Ditto. Recollections of the Deccan. By
ah Officer of Cavalry. Calcutta, 1838.

India. Pictorial, Descriptive and His-
torical, from the Earliest Times to the
Present, 1857.
James the Second, Life of. 1702.
Knighton, William. History of Ceylon
from the Earliest Period to the Pre-
sent Time, 1845.
Lawrence- Archer, J. H. The Orders

of Chivalry. 1871.
Laurie, William F. B. Pegu, being a
Narrative of Events during the Second
Burmese War, from August, 1852, to
its Conclusion in June, 1858. 1864.
Looking*, Henry, M.A. Historical
Gleanings of the Memorable Field of
Naseby. 1830.
Loyalist, The. Addressed to all Pa-
triotic Persons, especially to the
Soldiers, Sailors, and Loyal Volun-
teers throughout England, Wales,
Scotland, and Ireland. Vol. I. 1808.
Macdonald, Roger. The British Mili-
tary Register. 4 vols. 1806.
MacFarlane, C. History of British

India. 1852.

Mackib, William, Major 88th Connaught

Rangers. Britannia Ingrata, a Tribute

to the Peninsular Army. 1837.

MaoNbvin, T. The History of the

Volunteers of 1782. 4th edit. 1845.

Mann, J. H. A History of Gibraltar

and its Sieges. 4to. 1870.
Mastin, Rev. John, Vicar of Naseby.
History and Antiquities of Naseby.
Cambridge, 1792.
Maxwell. Victories of Wellington and
the British Armies. New edit. 1871.
Miles, E. An Epitome, Historical and
Statistical, Descriptive of the Royal
Naval Service of England. 1844.
Nicholson, G. The Cape and its
Colonists, with Ilints to Settlers.
1848.
Palliseb, Mrs. Bury. Historic Devices,

Badges, and War-Cries. 1870.
Parliamentary Officers, Portraits of
the, in the Great Civil War, being the
facsimilies of a rare series published
in 1647. Only 100 copies printed.
1878.
Peck, F., M.A. Memoirs of the Life
and Actions of Oliver Cromwell. 4to.
1740.
Pizzi, P., LL.D. Marengo and its

Monuments. 1856.
Planchk, J. R., Rouge Croix. The
Pursuivant of Arms, or Heraldry
Founded upon Facts. New edit.
1859.

FBOOBlTCNeS OP THB FORTY-BIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XXXI

Pridham, Charles An Historical, Poli-
tical,and Statistical Account of Ceylon
and its Dependencies* 2 vols. 1849.
Ditto. An Historical, Political, and
Statistical Account of Mauritius and
its Dependencies. 1849.

Rat, James, of Whitehaven. A Com-
plete History of the Rebellion from
its First Bise in 1746 to its Total
Suppression at the Glorious Battle of
Culfoden, in April, 1746. 1759.

Beoqluckovb of an Eventful Life,
chiefly passed in the Army. By a
Soldier. }826.

Becobds. Narrative of the Campaigns
of the Twenty-eighth Regiment since
their Eetnrn from Egypt in 1802. By
Lient.-Colonel Charles Cadell. 1835.
Ditto. The North Somerset Regi-
ment of Yeomanry Cavalry. Bath,
1860.

Ruins, D. F., M.D. Peking and the
Pekingese during the first year of- the
British Embassy at Peking. 2 vole.
1865.

BoBKBTSOK, James A. Concise Histori-
cal Proofs respecting the Gael of
Alban, or Highlanders of Scotland.
2nd edit. 1866.

Rook, Sir George, Kt. The Life of.
1707.

Sutdmsoh, C. Battles of England,
showing the Cause, Conduct, and
Issue of every Battle from 1066 to
to the Present Day, 1868.

Shbbkb. Tales of the Wars of Our
Times. 2 toIs. 1829.

Shoes and Battles in the North of
England that happened during the
Civil War in 1642-1643 ; to which is
added the life of Oliver Cromwell,
likewise an Impartial History of the
Rebellions of 1715 and 1745. Bolton,
1786.

St. Jokkt, Horace. History of the

British Conquests in India. 2 vols.
1862.

Skinneh, Thomas, M.D. The Life of
General Monk, Duke of Albemarle.
2nd edit. 1724.

Statutes of the Most Distinguished
Order of Saint Michael and Saint
George. 1832.

Stocquelbb, J. H. Military Encyclo-
pedia. 1853.

Tapbstbt, Hangings of the House of
Lords, representing the several En-
gagements between the English and
Spanish Fleets in the year 1588.
Royal folio. 1789.

Tayixxb, Arthur. The Glory of Re-
gality, and Historical Treatise of the
Anointing and Crowning of the Kings
and Queens of England. 1820.

The War, or Voices from the Banks.
1855.

Ttjppeb, Ferdinand Brock. Family Re-
cords, containing Memoirs of Major-
General Sir Isaac Brock, X.B., Lieu-
tenant E. W. Tupper, R.N., and
Colonel William de Vic Tupper.

Tioabs, John. England's Worthies,
under whom all the Civill and Blondy
Wars since 1642 to 1647 are related.
1846.

Wabwick, Sir Philip, Kt. Memoirs of
the Beigne of King Charles 1st, with
-a Continuation to the Happy Resto-
ration of King Charles 2nd. 1701.

Whitelocke, ft. H. Memoirs of Bul-
strode Whitelocke, Lord Commissioner
of the Great Seal, and Ambassador at
the Court of Sweden at the Period of
the Commonwealth. 1860.

William the Third, late King of
England and Prince of Orange, the
Life of. 2nd edit. 1703.

Weight, G. N., Bev., and Watmts, J.
The Life and Reign of William the
Fourth. 1837.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

AsxtTBOKO, Alex. Observations on
Naval Hygiene and Scurvy. 1858.

Aubtjela. Recueil dee Traites et Con-
ventions oonclus par TAutriche avec
les Puissances Etrangeres depnis 1763
josqu'jfc nofl jours. Tome ler. Vienne.

Baser, Sir SaaraeL Ismailia. A nar-
rative of the Expedition to Central
Africa for the Suppression of the
Slave Trade. 2 toIs. 1874.

Bakxb,Y. Clouds in the East. Travels
and Adventures on the Persc-Turko-
man frontier.

Bax, B. W. The Eastern Seas, being a
Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S.
"Dwarf" in China, Japan, and For-
mosa, with a description of the Coast
ofBussian Tartary and Eastern Siberia,
from the Corea to the Amur. With
Map and Illustrations. 1875.

XXX11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOKTY-S1XTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING.

Belgium. Revue Bolgo d'Art, de
Sciences et da Technologic Militaires.
Vols. I, II, III, IV.

Bbllbw, H. W, Kashmir and Kash-
ghar. A Narrative of the Journey of
the Embassy to Kashghar in 1873-74.
1875.

Beialkont, A. La Defense des Etats et
des Camps Retrenches. Paris.

Bbugh, N. P. Modern Marine Com-
pound Engines, forming a Supplement
to Modern Marine Engineering.
1874.

Bubnaby, F. A Bide to Khiva. Travels
and Adventures in Central Asia.

Btjtlee, John, Major. Travels and
Adventures in the Provinces of Assam.
1856.

Butlbb, W. F., Major. The Wild North
Land. 5th edition. 18741

Ditto. The Great Lone Land. 7th
edition. 1876.

Campbell, Sir George. A Handy-book
of the Eastern Question, being a
recent view of Turkey, With a
Map.

Campbbll - Maclaohlan, A. Niel.
William Augustus, Duke of Cumber-
land, being a Sketch of his Military
Life and Character.

Cayalby. Regulations for the In-
struction and Movements of
Cavalry.

Coby, A. Shadows of Coming Events,
or the Eastern Menace.

Davibs, E. W. L., Rev. Algiers in 1867.

Db Lolxs, J. L. The Constitution of
England ; or an account of the English
Government, in which it is compared
both with the Republican form of
Government and the other Monarchies
in Europe, 1853.

De Valbezen, L. Les Anglais et l'lnde.
2 vols. Paris, 1874.

Db Wobms, H., Baron. The Austro-
Hungarian Empire.

Diblebe, P. La Guerre D'Escadre et
la Guerre de Cotes. (Les nouveaux
Navires de Combat.) Paris.

Du Cassb, R. Etudes, la France Mari-
time et Coloniale (Regne de Louis 14).
Paris.

Duff, M. E. G. Notes of an Indian
Journey.

{Life of Sir Henry
Lawrence. 2
vols. 2nd edi-
tion. 1872.

Foebyth, W. The Slavonic Province*
South of the Danube ; a Sketch of
their History and present State in rela-
tion to the Ottoman Porte, with a
Map.

Freeman, E. A. The History and
Conquests of the Saracens. 3rd
edition.

Gbbmany, Deb Dbutboh. Francd-
sischeKrieg. 1870-71. Hefte7,8,9,
10, 11.

Gordon, C. A. Our Trip to Burmah,
with Notes on that Country.

Gbaham,G., Col., £.$., C. B. Operations
of the German Engineers and Technical
Troops during the Franco-German
War of 1870-71. By Capt. Goetze.
1875.

Gbabeb, B. De Veterum re Navali.
4to. 1864.

Green, J. R. A. Short History of the
Engliah People.

Hanover. For Sceptre and Crown. By
Sumarrow. 2 vols. 1876.

HelviGjH. Exemples Tactiques. 2 vols.
Paris, 1876.

Hope, Thomas. Costume of the Ancients.
1809.

Hopfbaveb, E. Taktik der Feld Artil-
lerie (inter eingehender Berucksich-
tigung der Erfahungen der Kriege
von 1866 und 1870-71, wie des Ge-
fechtes der Infanterie und Oavallerie
fur Officiere aller Waffen. Berlin.

Ditto. Die Deutsche Artillerie in
den Schlacten bei Metz. Berlin.

Ditto. Taktik der Feld Artillerie.
Berlin.

Hume, David. Essays, Literary, Moral,
and Political, n. d.

Invasion. Report on the arrangements
which were made far the internal
Defenceof these Kingdoms/when Spain,
by its Armada, projected the Invasion
and Conquest of England ; and appli-
cation of the wise proceedings of our
Ancestors to the present crisis of public
safety. State Paper Office, 17th May,
1798.

Kate, J. W. A History of the Sepoy
War in India, 1857-58. Vol. III.

Lanfbey, P. Histoire de Napoleon I.
9eme eclit. 5 vols. Paris, 1876.

Levttzey, M. Aperou sur les divers
proctides de Fabrication de% Canons
adoptGs en Russie. Paris.

Longman, F. W. Pocket Dictionary of
the German and English Language.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XXXiii

Hacauxat, Lord. Lays of Ancient
Borne, with Ivy and the Armada.
New edition. 1874.

Markham, Clements B. Narratives of
the Mission of George Boyle to Tibet,
and of the Journey of Thomas Man-
ning to Lhasa.

Martens, F. Beceuil des* TraitSs et
Conventions conclus par la Russieavec
let Puissances Etrangeres. Tome III.
Traites avec rAutriche, 1808—1815.
St. PStersbourg.

Martin, Theodore. The Life of His
Roval Highness the Prince Consort.
Vols. L, II.

Maspero, G. Histoire Ancienne des
Peuples d'Orient. 2nd edition. Paris.

Moresby, J. Discoveries and Surveys
in New Guinea and the d'Entrecasteux
Islands.

MuHBO-Butler-Johnstone. A trip up
the Volga to the Fair of Nijni.
Norogorod. 2nd edition.

MrBBAT, John. Handbook for Travellers
in Russia, Poland, and Finland, in-
cluding the Crimea, Caucasus, Siberia,
and Central Asia. 3rd edition. Re-
vised, with Maps and Plans. 1875. •

Patby, L. Etude d'Ensemble de la
Guerre Franco - Allemande de 1870
-71.

Payer, J. New Lands within the Arctic
Circle. Narrative of the Discoveries of
the Austrian Ship " Tegotthoff " in
the years 1872-74. 2 vols.

Phhxixors, A. The Life of Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Wm. Parker, Bart.,
K.C.B., from 1781 to 1866. Vol. I.

Rr3trcix, W. H. The British Expe-
dition to the Crimea. New and re-
vised edition.

Schuyler, E. Turlristan Notes of a
journey in Russian Turkistan, Kho-
kand, Bukhara, and Kuldja. Three
Maps and numerous Illustrations.
2* vols.

Scott, Sir Sibbald, D., Bart. To
Jamaica and Back.

Schmidt, B. Lea Armes a Feu por-
tatives, leux origine et leur develop-
pement, historique,et technique jusqu a
nos jours. Geneve.

Srdillot, L. A. Histoire General des
Arabes, leur Empire, leur Civilisation,
leurs Ecoles philosophiques, scienti-
fiques et litteraires. 2 vols. Paris.

scbnackenbiteg
Bastels

"Leitfaden fur den
Unterricht in der
K. Kriegsschu-
len. Berlin.
Susanne, Gen. Histoire de rinfanterie*

Franchise. 3 vols. Paris.
Stores. Priced Vocabulary of all Stores

used in Her Majesty's Service, and

provided by the Control Department,

Clothing excepted. 1875.
Todlebbn, E. Defense de S&astopoJ'.

Vol. 2. Appendice.
Trench, F. Chenevtx, Capt. Short

Service and Deferred Pay. 2nd edit.
Ttndall, J. Lessons in Electricity at

the Royal Institution. 1875-76.
Twiss, Sir Travers. The Black Book

of the Admiralty. Vol. III. 1874.
Vial, J. Historic Abregee des Cam-

pagnes Modernes. 2nd edition. 2 vols.

Paris.
Von Arnim, R. Aus dem Tagebuche

eines Eompagnie-Chefs Eliln. 1874.
Von Moltke. Brief e liber Zust&nde

und Begebenheiten in der Turkei aus

den Jahren 1835 bis 1839. Berlin.
Von Schellendobp, B. Der Dienst

Generalstabes. Enter Thiel 1875.
Von Scherff, W. Die Lehre von der

Truppenvervendung als Vorschule fiir

die aer Tnippenfuhrung. I, II Lies-

erung. 1 Band. Berlin.
Von Thielm ann, Baron Max. Journey

in the Caucasus, Persia and Turkey in

Asia. Translated by Charles Heneage.

2 vols. 1875.
Von Weyhern, H. Ansichten uber

ausbildung einer eskadron nach den

Anforderungen der Jetztzeit. Berlin.
Waller, H. The last Journals of

David Livingstone in Central Africa,

from 1865 to his death. 2 vols.

1874.
Waterloo, the Battle of. By a Near

Observer. 4to. 1817.
Watts, H. A Dictionary of Chemistry

and the Allied Branches of other

Sciences. 2nd Supplement. 1875.
Wells, J. C. The Gateway to the

Polynia. A Voyage to Spitsbergen.
Wiceham, E. H. The Influence of

Fire-arms upon Tactics. Historical

and Critical Investigations, by an

Officer of superior Rank. Translation

from the German.

XXXIV PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANKIVEKSAttT MEKTIKO.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORT3, PAPERS, AND PAPERS PRESENTED

BY COMMAND*

RBPOBT8 A»J> PaPBSS.
Army —

24. Purchase Commission — Appropria-
tion Account for 1874-5.
85. Estimates for tbe Year 1876-77
(with Index).

36. Variation of Numbers, &c.— State-

ment and Explanations re-
specting.

37. Colonies— Statement of Amounts

included in the Estimates for.
49. Appropriation Account and State-
ment of Surpluses and Deficits
for 1874r-5.
67. Manufacturing Establishments —

Accounts for 1874-5.
71. Purchase Commission — Estimate

for 1876-7.
93. Ashantee Expedition — Vote of
Credit — Supplementary Estimate,
1875-6.

112. Colonels, &c. — Number of, in cer-
tain Years.

127. Commissions — Returns relating to.

140. Majors, Royal Artillery— Return
of Applications for Arrears of
Pay, by Majors who served in
India.

148. Soldiers in Prisons — Return re-
specting, 1869 to 1875.

166. Fortifications (Defences Loan, 1874
-5) — Account relatire to.

168. Special Allowances — Return of,
for the Foot Guards, included
under Vote 1, Sub-head E, of
Army Estimates.

178. Military Savings Banks — Account
for 1874r-5.

190. Soldiers Pensioned in India — Num-
ber of.

198. Ashantee Expedition (Vote of
Credit) — Appropriation Account
for 1874-5.

200. Purchase Commission — Estimate of
Vote " On Account" for 1876-7.

221. Miscellaneous Expenses — Return
respecting Allowance of £11,079
15*. given to the Guards' Stock
Purse.

286. Furlough and Retiring Regulations
—Returns of, 1796, 1868, and
1874.

Army —

301. Soldiers appointed to Civil Offices
— Return relating to.

329. Soldiers, &c. (Families in Receipt
of Relief) — Abstract Return re-
lative to.

355. Prize Money — Account of, 1809 to
31 March, 1876.

364. Staff Appointments — Return re-
lating to.

387. Charges defrayed by the War

Office on Account of India-
Estimate for 1876-7.

388. Soldiers Tried before Civil Power—

Return of, 1870 to 1874.
407. Fortifications, &c— - Account rela-
tive to, to 31 March, 1876.

413. Arrears of Pay — Return — Appli-

cations for.

414. Chaplains, &c. — Return of Chap-

lains (Episcopalian Protestant)
serving in Ireland, &c.

420. Enlistments — Number of, in each
» Sub-district, from 1 April, 1873,
to 31 March, 1876.

427. Militia and Militia Reserve — Re-
turn showing the Strength of
Particular Regiments at certain
periods.

457. Reserve* — Return showing Strength
of, on 1 July, 1876, with reference
to the Mobilization of Second and
Fifth Army Corps.

iWrry—

1. Merchant Shipping Act, 1875 (In-

spectors)— Papers relative to the
Appointment of.

2. Merchant Shipping — Tables show-

ing the Progress of.

3. Merchant Shipping Act, 1875 (Ves-

sels Detained; — Return of.

4. Ditto-— Papers relative to the Ope-

ration of.

5. Ships Detained as Un seaworthy

(Merchant Shipping Acts Amend-
ment Act, 1871)— Further Cor-
respondence relative to.

25. Greenwich Hospital and School —
Appropriation Account for 1874-5.

44. Appropriation Account and State-
ment of Surpluses and Deficits
for 187-4-5.

* The numbers are identical with those in the Official List of Parliamentary Paper*.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSART MEETING.

XXXV

Aary —

50. H.H.8. " Vanguard M— Papers re-

lative to (with a Plan).

51. Fugitive Slaves — Return of Cases

since 1866 of Applications from
NaTal Officers ibr Instructions in
tegard to*
55. .Estimates for the Year 1876-77.

57. Merchant Shipping Act, 1875 (Load

Line) — Reports relating to.

58. Bole of the Road at Sear— Papers

relative to.
63. Fleetmen on the "Vanguard"—

Return relating to.
77. Suez Canal Tonnage Dues — Return

of, paid by English Ships of War

and Transports, in 1875.
79. Royal Naval Reserve (Scotland)—

Report of the Inspection of.
84. Works, 1876-77 — Memorandum

explanatory of Vote 11 of the

Navy Estimates (with a Plan).
87. " Mistletoe " Inquiry— BaronBram-

well's Letter on the subject

of. J

89. Harbour, Ac., Bills — Reports of the

Board of Trade, viz : —
89-(l). London, Brighton, and South

Coast Railway (Various Powers).
89- (2). Queenborough Harbour.
89-(3). South Eastern Railway.
95. Supplementary Estimate — State-
ment of Excess for 1874-5.
98. Loss of the " Vanguard " — Papers

relating to.
98-1. Ditto — Furthers Papers (with

• Plant).
104. H.M.8. ° Devastation "—Reports

of the behaviour of, on passage

from England to Malta
107. Programme of Works — Return of,

for 1876-7.

117. Merchant 8hipe (Health of Crews)

— Papers relating to recent Cases
of 8curvy.

118. Merchant Shipping Act, 1873

( Compensation ) — Return of

Claims for.
132. Religious Denominations — Return

respecting.
141. " Alberta "sod the " Mistletoe "—

Papers relating to the Collision

between.
147. Screw - casing — Reports showing

results of Trials of {with Plant).
151. lighthouses, Ac. (Local Inspections)

— Reports relative to.
157. Victualling 8avings — Return re-
specting.

Navy*—

159. Retirement of Officers — Return of,

since the Order of February,

1870.
176. Suez Canal (Surtax and Tonnage)

— Return relative to.

180. Victualling Accounts, 1874-5— Re-

turn of.

181. Accounts (Shipbuilding and Dock-

yard Transactions, 1874-5) —
Balance Sheet and Accounts.

182. Ditto (Manufactures and Repairs

in Dockyards, 1874-5) — Balance
Sheet.

183. Surpluses and Deficits, 1874-5—

Retabulation of the Statement of.

187. Merchant Shipping Legislation
(Canada) — Papers relating to.

196. " Britannia" Cadets— Reports rela-
tive to.

201. Crime and Punishment— Returns
of, for 1874.

204. Victualling Savings — Report of the
Admiralty Committee on, 1870.

222. Training Ships — Revised Instruc-
tions for the Entry of Boys.

224. Ironclads — Return relative to.

225. Distribution of Forces — Return

showing, on 1 April and 1 Octo-
ber, 1874 and 1875.
235. Office of Lord High Admiral-
Names of Persons who have held
the Office, from 1660.

238. Unseaworthy Ships (Transfers) —

Papers relating to.

239. Ships Built — Return respecting,

1864-5 to 1875-6.

245. Officers holding Civil Appoint-
ments— Return relative to.

280. Admiralty Trial of Coal— Return
of, recently made.

283. Dockyards (Increase of Establish-
ment)— Circular Letter relative
to.

285. Ship "Star of Peace"— Dates of
Proceedings in the case of The
Queen v. Captain Richard Boa-
den.

297. Vessels completed since 1855 —

Return of.
297-1. Ditto— Index to Return.

298. Corporal Punishment — Return of,

1869 to 1874.
310. Bovs— Return relative to, during
the last Twenty Yean.

315. Royal Naval Reserve— Returns re-

lating to.

316. Ship Surgeons — Return respect-

ing.

XXXVI PROCEEDINGS OF THE fORTY-SIXTH AN5IVEB8ART MEETING.

Navy —

318. Sea Fisheries Act (1868)— Orders

for Fishery Grants, 1876 — Report

by the Board of Trade.
321. Admiralty Courts (Cork and Belfast)

— Paper relating to.
340. Ship " Mary " — Correspondence

relating to.

344. Captain Suli van— Correspondence

relative to the Removal of.

345. Oyster Fisheries — Report from the

Select Committee (with Plans).

347. Tonnage at Ports in Ireland — Re-
turn of, 1862 to 1865, and 1872
to 1875.

350. Captain Sulivan — Return, in con-
tinuation of No. 344.

374. Merchant Ships detained for Un-

seaworthiness— Return respect-
ing.

375. Training Ships — Return relative to.

376. Health — Statistical Report for

1875.
378. Mercantile Marine (Steam Ships) —
Report on the Bursting, by Uy-

Navy —

draulic Pressure, of a Boiler and
Superheater taken out of the
" Ban Righ " {with a Plan) .

381. Naval Prize Money, &c. — Accounts

for, 1875-6.

382. Seamen's Savings Banks and Money

Orders — Accounts relative to.

395. Greenwich Hospital — Accounts for
1875-6.

445. Sale of Stores — Return respecting,
for 1874 and 1875.

447. Naval Savings Banks — Account for
1874-5.

453. Water-tight Compartments — Cor-
respondence relative to.

Presented by —

The Secretaries of Slate for War

and for India.
The Lords Commissioners of the

Admiralty.
The Director- General of Ordnance.
W. F. Higgins, Esq.
W. Stirling Lacon, Esq.

JOURNALS AND TRANSACTIONS EXCHANGED.
Institutions,* Societies, &ca.

Anthropological.

Antiquaries.

Abt Union.

Arts.

Association, British.

Association, East India.

Association, National Artillery.

Association, National Rifle.

Engineers, Civil.

Engineers, Civil, Society of American.

Engineering, Indian.

Engineers, Mechanical, Birmingham.

Great Seal Patent Office.

Meteorological Committee.

National Society for Aid to Sick and
Wounded in War.

Naval Architects.

Ordnance. Department of the Director-
General of.

Quebec, Literary and Historical.

Royal.

Royal Agricultural, of England
Royal Arcileological.
Royal Artillery.
Royal Asiatic.
Royal Astronomical.
Royal Colonial.
Royal Geographical.
Royal National Life Boat.
Royal*, of Edinburgh.
Royal, of Great Britain.
School of Military Engineering.
Shipwrecked Fishermen and Ma-
riners.
Statistical.
United Service, India.
Victoria.

Washington-Smithsonian.
Zoological, of London.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70BTT-8IXTH AKN1TEBSABT MEETIK0. XXXvii

PERIODICALS PURCHASED.

ABC Railway Guide.

Alley's Indian Mail.

Almanacs — British and Companion.

Db Gotha.

O'Bybks's Military .

Olives and Boyd's New
Edinburgh.

Thom's Irish and Of-
ficial Directory.

Whittabeb's.
Annales du Conservatoire. Paris.
Annual Register.

Archly fub Sbbwbsek.
Army and Navy Journal, New York.
Army Lists — Hart's.
Indian.
Monthly.
White's.
Athenxum.
Bookseller.

Bbadshaw — Monthly Railway

Guide.
Route to India, China

and New Zealand.
Continental Railway
Guide.
British Postal Guide.
Broad Arrow.

Bulletin Offictel de la Marine,
Pabis.

„ DB LA REUNION DES OfFICIERS,

Pabis.
Colonial Office List.

Snginbebino.
Foreign Office List.
Gazettes — Army and Naty.

Pall Mall.

United Sebyicb.

Volunteer Seryice.

Wellington.
Jackson's Woolwich Journal.
Kelly's Post Office Directory,
le spectaterr ml lit aire. paris.

Magazines — London, Edinburgh, and

Dublin Philosophical.
Colbubn's United Ser-
vice.
Nautical, and Naval
Chronicle.

Marine Vebordnungsblatt. Berlin

Militab Wochenblatt. Berlin.

Nature.

Navy.

Navy Tiist — Quarterly and Monthly.

Neub MilitVb Zeitung. Wien.

Newspaper Press Director*.

Notes and Queries.

CEsterbeichische Vierteljahres-

8chbift fub militarwi8senschaft.

WlBN.

Quarterly Journal of Science.
Reviews— Edinburgh.
Quarterly.
Westminster.
Revub d'Abtillerie. Paris.
„ db8 deux mondes. paris.
„ Mllitaire Suisse.
Royal Blub Book and Kalendar.
The Statesman's Year-Book.

Clergy List.

Colonies and India.

Daily News.

Daily Telegraph.

Globe.

Lancet.

Morning Post.

Naval Chronicle.

Saturday Review.

Standard.

Times.

Times Index.
Tims' Ybab-Book of Facts.
Yaohbb's Parliamentary Companion.
Walfobd's County Families.

„ House of Commons.

Wab Office List.

>»

MAPS, PLANS, CHARTS, SKETCHES, too.

Presented.

Charts, Ac., published by the Hydro-
graphie Office, Admiralty, from
January 1876 to January 1877.
Section 1.
111. England, east coast: Farn Islands
to Berwick, with plan of Holy
Island Harbour, and views.

2507. Scotland, west coast : — Ardna-
xnurchan Point to Loch Bhreatal,
Skye ; including the Bmall isles
and Slcat Sound.

Section 3.

2138. Baltic : — Approaches to Gron

Sound and the Stor Strom.

XXX. VI 11 PttOC'KtDIKaS Of THB FOBTY -SIXTH ANNIVEB8A.BY MEETING.

Section 5.
170. Sicily, north coast, sheet I. : —
Cefalu to Mazara.

Section 7.
200. Newfoundland : — Plocentia to Bu-
rin Harbour.
375. Labrador : — Sandwich Bay to
Nain.

Section 8.
2485. Barbadoes, with views.
456. Jamaica, south coast : — Port Royal
and Kingston Harbours, with
views.
525. Florida Beefs : — Boca Grande oay
to Tortugas cays, with plan of
Tortugas Harbour.

761. West India Islands and Carib-
bean Sea, sheet I. : — Florida
Strait, Bahama Islands and the
Greater Antilles.

•697. Dominica, with view.
791. St. Vincent, with view.

762. West India Islands and Carib-
bean Sea, sheet II. : — from Lesser
Antilles and Coasts of Venezuela
and New Granada, and Gulf of
Paria to Gulf of Darien.

Section 9.
1290. South America, east coast : —
Nuevo Gulf, with Plans of Port
Madrin and Cracker Bay.

Section 10.
15. South America, west coast : —
Molyneux Sound, Concepcion
Channel.

2324. Cape San Lucas to San Diego
Bay, including the Gulf of Cali-
fornia.

2323. Manzanilla Bay to the Gulf of
California, including the Kcvilla
Gigedo Islands.

Section 11.
•€38. Africa, west coast : — Congo River

and adjacent Creeks.
662. Ditto, cast coast : — Kilwa Point

to Zanzibar Channel.
715. Indian Ocean :— Rodriguez Island

and plans of Mathurin Bay and

Port South-east, with views.
164. Red Sea: — Mussawwa' Channel,

Africa.
658. Africa, east coast :— Ras Pekawi

to Cape Delgado.

Section 12.
824. Bay of Bengal, east coast, sheet
IV. :— White Point to Mergni.
2404. Singapore Main Strait.
819. Ceylon :— Approaches to Point de
Guile Harbour, including the
Gindurah and Bellows Rocks.

Section 13.
951. Japan:— Kii Channel to Owasi

Bay, with plans of Kada, Taize

Ura, and adjacent Bays, south

coast of Nipon.
1255. China, north-east coast: — Kyau-

chau Bay to Miau-tau Strait,

Shantung Promontory.
2347. Japan : — Nipon, iLiusiu, and

Sikok, and part of the Korea.

Section 14.

1058. Western Australia : — Rottnest
Island to Warnbro Sound, show-
ing approaches to Gage Road, &c.

1063. Australia, south coast : — Bass
Strait, western approach to, with
views.

Section 15.
769. Pacific Ocean : — Admiralty and
Hermit Islands, with view ; and
Challenger Cove, Humboldt Bay,
New Guinea.
1366. Easter Island, or Rapa Nui, and
plans of Cook Bay ; and Sala y
Gomez, with views.
786. Pacific Ocean, eastern part : —

Cape Horn to Cape Corrientea.
1757. Fiji Islands : — Nukalau Island to
Namuka Island, including Lau-
thala Suava and Namuka Bays.

Section 16.
China Sea Directory, Vol. I., Sup-
plement.
West India Pilot, Vol. II., 3rd edit.
West Coast of England, 2nd edit.
North Sea Pilot, Part I., 2nd edit.
Australia Directory, Vol. I., 7th ed.
Tide Tables, 1877.
Lights Lists, 1877.
40 Hydrographic Notices.
167 Notices to Mariners.

The Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty.

PURCHASED.

Dr. Smith's Atlas of Ancient Geo- Maps to illustrate Current Events,
graphy. 1874.

PROCEEDINGS OK THE FORTT-TIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING. XXXIX

MUSEUM.

MILITARY.

Presented.

Breech-Loading Rifle and Bayonet, also
a Revolver, with Cartridge and Car-
tridge Cases, Percussion Caps, together
with Brass Plates for stamping Caps
and Cartridges.

The MinUter of War,

The Hague.

Two Arrows from.Muneepore.

Col. Martin Dillon, C.B., C.S.L

Three Spears (Limburg), one Sundang,

and a Golok or Chopping Jungle
Knife, from Laroot, Perak.

Captain Speedy, Assistant
Resident at Perak.
Two War Clubs, used by the Accoway
Indians, and one used by the Cara-
bisce Tribe.

Lt. -Colonel R. W. Itnlach,
Georgetown Militia.
Campbell's Range - Finder for Sea
Batteries.

Major J. R. Campbell,
Hants Art il ten/ Militia -

MISCELLANEOUS.
Presented.

Pink Button, with Jade Stone and
Feathers of the Chinese Mandarin,
»hot in the North Takoo Fort in the
Campaign of 1860, by Major Prynne,

Mrs. Prynne.
The Colours of the 66th Regiment, pre-
sented at Winchester sixty years ago ;
the late General Nicolls commanded
the Regiment.

Miss Louisa Nicolls.
Silver's Patent Anti-Recoil Heel-Plate
and Ebonite Hand-Guard.

Lt.-Col. H. A. Silver.

Russian Order- Book of the Regiment of
Vladimir.

Captain C. Yesey, R.X.
Uniform of an Officer of the Bengal
Irregular Cavalry who was killed
during the Mutiny.

Mrs. Quits-..

An Officer's Field Companion, Designwt

and Presented by Lieut. F. B. Brad-

shaw, 13th Light Infantry.

A Sergeant's Breastplate of the Royal

East Middlesex Militia in 1803.

Mr. G. J. S. Camden*.

NAVAL.— MISCELLANEOUS.

Section Model of Griffiths's Tunnel
Pcrew Ship.

R. Griffiths, Esq., C.JB.

Modfl of Martin's Self-Canting Anchor,

Two Links showing the old form of

weld, and Martin's Patent Zig-Zag

welds for Chain Cables.

S. Martin, Esq.
Model of a Catameran, from the Island
of Formosa.

H. O. Brown, Esq., Commissioner

of the Imperial Customs, Port

Takow, on the Island of

Jformosa.

A Tablet marked Observatory, 1824-

25, and a Cylinder marked His Brit-

taoic Majesty's Ships Hecla and Fury,

Port Bowen. June, 1825, containing

Papers left by Captain Kennedy, R.N.,.
Commanding H.M. Ship Prince Albert
in 1851, at Port Bowen, Prince
Regent's Inlet.

These were brought home by Cap-
tain Suter of the Tay Whale Filling
Company's Ship Intrepid.

Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty.
A Piece of 19-inch Hemp Cable.

The Admiralty..
Two Log-Books of H.M.S. Assistance,
Arctic Expedition, 1854; a Memo.,
from Sir Edward Belcher to Sir John
Frankland, 23rd June, 1853. Printed
on Silk and Despatched by Balloon.

Mr. Brians

LIST OF MEMBERS

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION,

15th MARCH, 1877.

Should there he any error or omission in this List, it is particularly
requested t/iat notice Otereofmay be sent to the Secretary.

WHITEHALL YAKD, LONDON.
MARCH, 1877.

'!•■* "i."

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

• Denotes Corresponding Member of Council.

ABBOTT, <©VrF.,CB. Maj.-Gen. (ret.)Beng.

Engs. (1/.)
Abbott, James, CB. Lt.-Gen. B.A. (II.)

Abbott,8.A. Maj.-Gen. late Bom. Army (12.)
Abinger, Lord W . F. Col. S.F. Gds.

Adand, 0. T. Dyke Capt. 1st Dev. Yeo. (If.)
•Adand, 8irT. Dyke, Har^., MP. Lt.-Col.

ht Dev. Rifle V. (1/.)
'Adair, Alex. W. Lt.-Col. 2nd Somerset

Mfl. (If.)
Adair, A. 8. Oapt. Edmon. R. Rifles, (11.)
•Adams, Cadwallader, CB. Col. late 10th

B<*t. (1L)
Adams, E. Major-Gen. (1/.)

Adderiey, Myites B.B. Capt. (ret.)R.H.Gds.
Addington^ffow.C. J. Col. 100th Regt. (12.)
Aldington, Son. Leon. A. Mai. (ret.) R.A.
•Addiaon,Charles Capt. 2nd Mid. Mil. (II.)
•Addison, T., CB. Maj-aen. (11.)

Adye, Sir John M., ECB. Maj.-Gen.

tUL(ll.)
Aikman, F. R., W-C Lt.-Col. Royal East

Middlesex Mil. (11.)
AilavMAEQUiBof Capt. late Cold.Gds. (11.)
Amslie, C. P. Lt.-Gen.Col. 1st R. Drs. (U)
Awlie, H. F. Col. (ret.) 83rd Regt. (1/. 1«.)
Airrr, Lord, GCB. Gen. Col. 7th R. Fus.(U)
Ajtchison, W. Col. late S. F. Gds.

Atkea, W. D. Maj.-Gen. R.A. (11.)

Aim, C. fi. Col. R.E. (1/.)

A^flnarle, G. T., Eabl of Gen.

A^orth,R. W. Col. (ret.) 7th R. Fus.(U)
Ldworth, Robt. Major N. Cork Rifles (1/.)
A-eiander, Son. Chas. Lt. Rl. Tyrone

fm. a/.)

icxander, Claud, MP. Lieut.-Col. Gren.

Gds. (11.)
lnander,G.G.,CB. Maj.-Gen.R.M. (11.)
•AVtander, H. McClintock Capt. R.N. (11.)
Ajrtaiider, Sir Jas., ECB. Gen. R.A.

inlander, Sir J. E., CB. Maj.-Gen. (11.)
Asunder, Son. W. P. Lieut. 2nd R.N.B.

D*. (II.)

A^lton, Arthur H. Comr. R.N. (11.)

Aiar^ace, G. J. C. Lieut, late 50th Regt. (11.)
Ua. G. Lewin. Capt. 60th R. Rifles

*-*a. Frederic Major Beng. S. Corps (1/.)
Oa. George W. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

Ltl Ralph E. Capt. 15th Regt. (11.)

*i*»n, A C. Capt. 1st W. I. Regt. (1 /.)
•Mjmd.Jm.J. Lt.-Col.N.DurhamMiI.(U)

*«too James H. Lt. late 80th Regt. (1/.)
WLidt, L. N. F. Capt. late Gren. Gds.

Amief, F. J. T. Oapt. late 9th Mon. R. Vols.
(10

Anderson, A. J.
Anderson, B. T. G.

derers Mil. (11.)
Anderson, David
Anderson, Geo.

Hospitals (11.)
Anderson, W. L.

Capt. R. A. (11.)
Capt. Scottish Bor-

Major-Gen. (11.)
Dep.-Insp. Gen. of

late Admiralty (11.)

Anderton, W. J. Maj. Lane. Hus. late 17th

Lancers (11.)
Andrewes, Wm. Geo. Col. R.A. (11.)

Andrews. J. W. Lieut. 11th Regt. (11.)

Ansell, A. F. Maj.-Gen. (11.)

Anson-Cartwright Reg.Capt. 48th Regt. (11.)
Anstey, T. Henry. Capt. R.E. (XL)

Anstruther, A. W. Lieut. R.A. (II.)

Anstruther, Philip, CB. Maj.-Gen. late

Madras Art. (XI.)
Anstruther, Sir Robt. Bart. Lt.-Col. (ret.)

Gren. Gds., MP. (XL)
Antrobus, Edmund Capt. Gr. Guards.

Arbuthnot, Geo. Lt. 2nd R.N.B. Dr*. (XI.)
Arbuthnott, H. T. Col. R.A. (XI.)

Arbuthnott, Son. Hugh late Lt. 81st Regt.

Archdall, Mervyn Edw.

Drs., MP.
Archer, Lawrence J. H.

W. I. Regt.
Archer, R. H.
Archer, W. H.
Ardagh, J. C.
Arkwright, A. P.
Arkwright, F. W.
Arkwright, Ferd. W.

Gds. (XI.)
•Armistead, Rev. C. J., MA. Chap, (ret.)

R.N. (It.)
Armitage, John Scott Capt. late 2nd R

Cheshire Mil. (11.)
Armstrong, C. A. Capt. (ret.) 10th Regt (H.1
Armstrong, J. W., CB. Maj.-Gen. (11.)

Armstrong, Sir W. Geo., CB. late Engineer

War Depart, for Rifled Ordnance (1/.)
Armstrong, W. A. Col. 22nd Regt. (11 )

Arthur, Thos. Lt.-Col. late 8rd Dr. Gds.
Arthur, W. Stevens Capt. R.N. (11)

Arthur, Wm. Capt. R.N. (U.)

Ashburner, F. J. Capt. 2nd Drag. Gds. (11 )
•Ashley, The Right Hon. Lobd Lt. Com
R. N. A. Vols, late R.N. Q.I.)

Askwith, W. Harrison Major-Gen. R.A.

a a

Oapt. late 6th

Capt. (h.p.) 4th

Lieut. R.N. (It.)

Major late 16th Lancers.

Capt. R. E. (11.)

Capt. R.N. MP. (11.)

Lt. Coldm. Gds. (11.)

Capt. late 4th Drag.

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Astley, Sir J. Dugdale, Bart. Lt.-Col. late

S. F. Gds.
Atcherley, W. A. Capt. late 8th King's (11.)
Atchison, T. Lt.-Col. R. Lane. Mil. Art.

late R.A. (11.)
Atkinson, John Capt. late Gr. Gds. (11.)'
Atkinson, R. Col. late G-r. Gds.

Atkinson, R. H. Lieut. 14th Regt. (1/.)

Auchinleck, Wm. L. Capt. 63rd Regt. (11 S
Aufrere, Geo. Capt. late 20th L. Drs. (II.)
Austin, G. L. Capt. late Rifle Brigade (17.)
•A.ylmer, J. E. F. Capt. (ret.) 54th Regt.
Aylmer, H. L. Lieut. 16th Lancers (11.)
Aynsley, C. M., CB. Capt. R.N. (If.)

Aytoun, Andrew Lt.-Col. (h.p.) R.A. (11.)
Aytoun, Jas. Maj. (ret.) 7th Huss. (1/.)

BABINGTON, 0. W. Capt. 9tli Ben.

Cav. (1/.)
Babington, J. M. Lieut. 16th Lancers (1/.)
Back, &V George, DCL.FRS. A dm. (11.)

Bacon, C. B. G. M.-Gen. Ben. Army (11.)
Bacon, H. Capt. R.N. (11.)

Bagnall T. C. Lieut. 2nd Stafford Mil. (1/.)
Bagot, Joceline F. Lieut. Gr. Gds. (1/.)

Baigrie, R., CB. Col. Bom. S. C (1/.)

Bailey, Henry Lt.-Col. G. T. R. Brig. (11.)
Bailey, J. F. Lieut. 18th L. L (1/.)

Bailey, T. J. Lieut. 3rd Sikh Inf. (11.)

Bailey, Vincent Capt. Herts Mil. (11.)

Baillie, Duncan J. Col. late R. H. Gds. (If.)
Baillie, F. H. Capt. late 60th Rifles (11.)
•Baillie, J. Maj.-Gen. (11.)

Baillie, Wm. H. Capt. late 8th King's (11.)
Bain, D. S. E., MB. D. I. Gen. of Hosp. (It.)
Bainbrigge, Arthur Lt.-Col. 13th Regt. (11.)
Baker, Francis B. Surg. Gr. Gds.

Baker, F. M. Lieut. 73rd Regt. (12.)

*Baker,Jas. Lt.-Col. lateCamb.Univ.V. (1 J.)
•Baker, T. D., CB. Lt.-Col 18th R. Irish (11.)
Baker, T. R. Major late 7th Fusiliers (11.)
Baker, Sir W. E.,KCB. Lt.-Gen. R.E. (11.)
Baker, W. T. Major 12th Regt. (If.)

•Bale, John E. Capt. 1st W. I. Regt. (If.)
Baldwin, F. 0. Capt. 88th Regt. (11.)

Balfour, Geo. M. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Balfour, H. L. Lieut.-Col. R.A. (11.)

Balfour, T. G., MD. Surg.-Gen.

Ballantyne J. G. Capt. 11th Regt. (1/.)

Ball, Edward A. Lieut. 6th Regt.

Ballard, John Arch., CB. M.-Gen.R.E. (17.)
Ballin, Geo. Capt. (ret.) n. A. C. (1/.)

•Bancroft, W. C. Col. 16th Regt. (If.)

Banes, Geo. Edw. Maj. 3rd Essex Art. V. (1/.)
Banfield, R. J. F. Lieut. 69th Reg. (11.)
Banks, Chas. late Asst. Sec. R. Hosp.

Kilmainhara (11.)
B irk worth, Thos. Lieut, late 2nd Roy.

Surrey Mil. (1/.)
Baring, Chas. Col. (h.p.) Coldm. Gds. (1/.)
Baring, E.f CSI. Major R.A. (1/.)

Baring, Francis Lt.-Col. (ret.) S. F. Gds.
•Barker, G. D. Lt.-Col. 64th Regt. (11.)
Barker, John Capt. West Essex Mil. (1/.)
Barlow, A. T. Pratt Capt. R. Berks Mil. (1/.)
Barlow, F. W. Capt. late 20th Regt. (1/.)
Barlow, Henry W. _ Capt. late R. E.

Barlow, W. R. Major R. A. (1/.)

Barnard, JohnH.,CMG.Capt.l01stRegt. (1 /.)
Barnard, L.H.J. Lieut, late 68th Regt. (1/.)
Barnard, W.A.M. Col. (ret.) 96th Regt.
Barnett, Henry Lt.-Col. Oxford Yeo. (1/.)
Barnett, H. D. H. Lieut. S. F. Gds. (1/.)
Barnett, J.H.M. Capt. 16th Madras N.I.
(11.)

•Barrett, Saml. Capt. late 14th Hubs. (11.)
Barringer, T. S., MD. 8urg. H.A.C.

Barron, Fen wick Boyce Lt.-Col. (ret.) 3rd

Dr. Gds. (1/.)
Barrow, Charles T., Lieut. 26th Reg. (11.)
Barrow, E. G. Lieut. 89th Regt. (1/.)

Barrow, John, FRS. Capt. 36th London

R. Vols. (11.)
•Barrow, Knapp Capt. late 57th Regt. (1/.)
Barrow, P. H. S. Capt. 19th Hussars (1/.)
Barstow, T. A. A. Lieut. 72nd Highlra. (1 f.)
Bartholomew, Robt. Lieut Wigton Mil.(l/.)
Barton,HughM. Lieut.late 17th Lancers (1/.)
Barton, Robt. Major R.E. (1/.)

Barwell, W. B. B. Major 62nd Lt. I.

Bassano, Philip H. late War Office

Basevi, C. E. Major R.A. (1 /.)

Bastard, Baldwin J.P. Lt. late 9th Regt.(l/ )

Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Lt.-Gen. (1/.)

Col. 1st Life Gds.

Lieut.-Col.(ret.)

Lt.-Col. late S.F. Gds.

Capt. 8th Regt. (1/.)

Col. (1/.)

Capt. 10th Huss. Adj.

•Bateman, Richard S.
Bates, Henry, CB.
Bateson, Rich. H.
Bathurst, F. T. A. H.

Gren. Gds. (1/.)
Bathurst, Henry
Batten, John M.
•Battersby, J. P.
Battine, W. A.

Warwickshire Yeo.
Battye, A. Capt. Beng. Staff Corps (11)
Battye, Montague W. Lieut. 59th Regt. (1/ >
Battye, Wigram Capt. Beng. S. C. (If)
Baumann, C. E. Lieut. 2nd W. I. Regt. (1* )
Bax, W. J. Capt. 11th Beng. Car. (if)

Baynes, Geo. E. Lieut.-Col. (1/.)

Baynes, R. S. Lieut.-Col. (If.)

Baynes, W.W. D. I.-G. of Hosp. and

Fleets (If.) * *

Beames P T Capt. (ret.) 11th Regt. (If.)
Beamish, H. H. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Beasley, J. N., Major 87th Regt. m )

Beauclerk, Ferdinand Lieut. R.E. (1/.)

Beck with, H. J. Capt. late 53rd Regt. (if*)
Beddy, Edwin Capt. Bengal S. Corps (1M
Bedford, F. G. D. F &pt R™(itf

Bedford, G. A. Rear-Adm. (I / )

Bclfield, Edward Col. RE

•Bell, Henry J. Lt.-Col. 105th Regt. (il )
Bell, T. Lynden Lt.-Col. 6th Regt. (If )
Bell, W. M. Major late 3rd Hus. {11. U)
Bennett, Adrian Maj. 7th R. Fus. (If)

Bentinck, A. Cavendish Major-Gen flf \
Bentinck, Sir H. J. W., KCB? Gen" Col
28th Regt. (If.) 01'

Bentinck, H. C. A. F. W. A. Lt.-Col. Cold
Gds. (11.)

Benyon, W. H. Lieut, (ret,) 28rd R. W

Fus. (11.)
Bcresford, Rt. Hon. Lohd Charles W. T>e

** p- Comr. R.N. (if.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Beraford,D.W.Pack-, Capt. late R. A. (II.)
Bererford, E. M. Lt.-Col. S. F. Gds. (II.)
Berwford,G.delaP. Lt. -Col. Mad. S. 0.(1/.)
Bererford, Rt Hon. William Major late

12th Lanoen (1/.)
Berkeley, G. 8. Capt. R.E. (1/.)

Berkeley, Geo.,CMG. Govr. Antigua (1/.)
Berkeley, Robt. Major 29th Regt. (1/.)

Bernard, T. S. W. Lieut. 44th Regt. (1/.)
Berridge, Thos. Probyn Lt-CoL St. Kitts

Mil (1/.)
Berriedale, Lobd Lieut. 4th Caithness Art.

Tok (1/.)
Berry, Geo. F. Lt>Col. 56th Regt. (1 I.)
Bertie, Ron. G. A. Yere Capt. Cold. Gds.

(11.)
Bertram, C. P. Lt,-Col. (ret.) 41st Regt ( 1/.)
•Berthou, Aldenon Capt. I. of W. Art. Mil.

(R)
Beat, Thoe. Capt late Hampshire Mil. (1/.)
Betbell, George B. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Bethune, C. R. Drinkwater, CB. Adm. (1/.)
Bfran, G. B. Capt. 81st Regt. (II.)

firrille, G. F. Major Bomb. S. Corps (12.)
Bering! on, H. G. Capt. 1st Lon. Art. V. (11.)
Benngtoo, Samuel B. Major 10th Surrey

R. V. (1/.)
Bidder, G. P. Lt.-Col. £ng. Railway Vol.

Staff Corps (U)
Biddleeombe, Sir George, Kt, CB. Capt.

RJT. (1/.)
Btddulph, G. H. M. Lieut, late 52nd Lt.

Inf.
Biddolph, M. A. 8., CB. Col. R.A. (1/.)
Biddolph, R. M. Col. Denbigh Militia, late

Lieut. 1st Life Gds. A DC. to the Queen
Biddolph, 8ir T. M., KCB. Lt.-Gen.
•Bige, T. 8. Lieut.-Col. 5th Fus. (1/.)

B*»e, W. M. late Lt-Col. Northumberland

¥0.(11.)
Btai, James Paymaster R.N.

Bilkngton, G. M. Maj. 6th Insk. Drs. (11.)
Bbgrham, Horn. R. Lieut. R.N. (1/.)

Bingham, W. Lieut, (ret.) 5th Fus. (II.)
•Birch, W. B. Capt. B. S. Corps

Bjcham, A. H. Capt. 60th Rifles (1/.)

Bed, Edward J. Adm. (1/.)

Bid, J. W., Oapt. 1st Surrey Art. Vol. (1/.)
BH 8. G. Capt. Victoria R.V. (1/.)

kkbeck, Robt. S. Capt. 6th W.Y. Mil. (II.)
*Hrj, R. K. Major 19th Lane. Art. V. (1/.)
kbop, H. P. Lt.-Col. R.A. (11.)

&*i, WUsone Major 24th Regt. (11.)

z*iett, CB. CoL late Cold. Guards (II.)
Ukrtt, Chas. F. Capt. Rifle Brig. (11.)
=jckett, E. V. Lieut. R.A. (1/.)

^kett, E. W. Lt.-CoL

^kett. H. W. R. Capt. 19th Huss. (1/.)
t*irtt,R.S. late Cornet 6th Dr. Gds. (10
&**, A. M. Lieut. Gren. Gds. (II.)

&**,&. F. Capt. R. M. L. I. (1/.)

;tftt*7,W. A. F. Capt.late 52nd L. 1.(1/.)
*4»1, James Fox Major (1/.)

^.GilbertGordon Capt.late S.F.Gds.(lI.)
=W, 8r 8eymour J. , Bart. , CB. Col. late

We Brig. (11.)
*4*nt,C.W.LoBD Lieut, (ret.) Gren. Gds.

♦Blewitt, Charles Lt.-Col. 65th Regt. (II.)
Blockley, John Capt. late H. A. C. (II.)

Blomfield, R. M. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Blomfield, Thos. E. Lt.-Col. late 26th

Regt. (II.)
Blood, Bindon Capt. R.E. (1/.)

Bloomfield, Sir John, GCB. Gen. CoJ.

Commt. R.A. (II.)
Blowers, W. H. Lt.-Col. Bomb. S. C. (1/.)
Bloxam, Geo. W. Capt.3rd Carm. R. V.(1I.)
Blundell-Hollinshead-Blundell, Richard

Lieut.-Col. 3rd Huss. (II.)
Blythe, J. D. Capt. Paym. (h.p.) 45th Regt.
Boileau, C. H. Capt. 61st Regt. (1/.)

Boileau, G. W. Lt.-Col. 1st City of Nor-
wich Vols. (II.)

Boileau, J. T.
Boileau, W. S.
Boland, R. S.
Boldero, G. N.
Bolitho, £. A.
•Bolton, F. J.
Bomford, S.

Maj.-Gen. R.B. FRS. (1/.)

Capt. (h.p.) R.E. (II)

Capt. late 59th Regt.

Col. late Depot Bat.

Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Major late 12th Regt. (11.)

Major Gloucester Mil. (II.)

Bonney, F., MD., MRCP.Dub., MRCS.Eng.

As*t.-Surg. 1st Royal Surrey Mil. (1/.)
Booth, J. G. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Borough, Sir Edw., Bart. Dep.-Lieut.

Borthwick, Alex. Capt. Rifle Brig. (II.)
Borton A. C. Lieut. 13th Regt. (II.)

Borton, A. J. Capt. 69th Regt. (11.)

•Bosanquet, G. S. Capt. R. N. (II.)

Boscawen, Ron. E.E.T. Capt. Cold. Gds. (II.)
Bostock, J. A., CB. Dep. Surg.-Gen. (II.)
Boswell, Geo. L. H. Capt. Gren. Gds.

Boteler, J. H. Capt. R.N.

Boulderson, S. S. Col. Ben. S. Corps (II.)
Bourchier, Claude T., X8&. Colonel late

Rifle Brigade, ADC. to the Queen.
Bousfield, Henry Surg, (ret.) Beng. Army
Bouverie, H. H. P. Lieut. W. Somerset

Yeo. (1/.)
Bowden, H. G. Major (ret.) 22nd Regt. (II.)
Bowdich, E. H. S. M.-Gen. Bomb. Army

(11.)
Bower, G. J. • Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Bower, J. Lt.-Col. Hants Mounted R.V. (11.)
Bowers, Henry Pep. Com.-General

Bowles, A. M. Lieut. 95th Regt. (1/.)

Bowles, H. C. Lieut. Rifle Brigade (II.)

Bowles, R. F. Capt. late R. Berks Mil. (11.)
Bowly, J. D. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Bowmen, H. S. Major (ret.) 35th Regt.

Bowyer, E. A. Capt. late 1st W. I. Regt

Boxer, C. R. F. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Boxer, E. M. Major-Gen. (ret.) R. A. (II.)
Boyce, E. J. G. Lieut. R.E. (II.)

Boycott, Wm. Major late 29th Regt. (II.)

Capt. late Roy. Can. R. (II.)
Rear-Adm. (II.)
Capt. (ret.) Cold. Gds. (II.)
Boyle, Gerald E. Lieut. Rifle Brig. (11.)
Boyle, Patrick D. Capt. Gr. Gds. (1/.)

Boyle, R. H. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Boyle, Ron. W. G. Lt.-Col. 2nd Somerset

"Militia, late Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds.
Boys, Chas. V., Esq. late 7th Surrey, R.V.
(11.)

Boyd, Jas. P.
Boyle, Alex.
Boyle, E. R.

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

•Boys, Henry Bear-Adm. (12.)

Brabazon, J. P. Capt. (ret.) Ghr. Ods. (12.)
Bracken, R. D. C. Lt.-Col. 2nd Sikh Inf.(12.)
Brackenbury, C. B. Lt.-Col. R.A. (12.)

Brackenbury, Henry Lt.-Col. R.A. (11.)
Brackenbury, H. Maj . late Depot Batt. (I I.)
Braddock, Lionel F. Capt. 1st Surrey Art.

Vols. (1/.)
Bradford, Wilmot H. Colonel

Bradley J. D. Capt. late 14th Regt. (12.)
Bradshaw, F. B. Lieut. 13th Regt. (1/.)
Bradshaw, R. A. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Brady, Maziere K. Lieut. RE. (1/.)

Brain, D. List Lieut. 4th King's Own (12.)
Bramston, Thos. H. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Or. Ods.
Brancker, W. O. Major R.A. (12.)

Brand, H. R. Capt. (ret.) Cold. Ods. (11.)
Brandling, Charles Lieut, late Or. Ods.
Bravo, A. Lt.-Col. late 2nd W. I. Regt.

Braybrooke, S. Lieut. -Gen., Col. 99th Regt.
Brayshaw, Benj. B. Capt. 3rd Essex A.V.

Breen, H. Hagert late Administrator

of the Government St. Lucia (1/.)
•Brent, H. W. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

•Brereton, R. Capt. late 46th Regt. (12.)
Brett, Henry Colonel (12.)

Bridge, Cyprian Col. (ret.) 58th Regt.

Bridge, Cyprian A. O. Comr. R.N (1/.)

Bridgeman, Hon. Francis C. Capt. S. F.

Ods. (12.>
Bridges, E. 8. Lieut -Col. Or. Ods. (12.)
Bridges, Walter B. Comr. R.N. (12.)

Bridport, Viscount Lieut. -Gen.

Brien, C. R., MD. D. I.-Oen. of Hosp. and

Fleets (12. 1*.)
Briggs, David M.-Gen. Beng. Army (12.)
Brine, Lindesay. Capt. R. N. (1/.)

Bringhurst, J. H. Major late 90th Regt.
Brinjes, J. F. Lt.-Col. IstEng. Tower

Hamlets Vols. (12.)
Broadwood, Arthur Cap. S. F. Ods. (12.)

Brodcrip, Edm. Lieut, (ret.) 57th Regt. (12.)
Bromfield, James Lieut. 50th Regt. (12.)
Brooke, E. T. Lt.-Col. R.E. (12.)

Brooke, R. Wilmot Lt.-Col. late 60th Rifles
•Brooker, O. A. C. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Brookfield, A. Montague Lt. 18th Huss.

(12.)
Bros, R. Follett Capt. late 17th Regt. (12.)
Broughton, W. E. D. Lieut.-Oeu. R.E. (12.)
Browell, Langton Capt. R.N.

Brown, A. H. late Comet 5th Dr. Ods.,

Lt.-Col. 1 st Lane. Vols., MP. (12.)

•Brown, C. B. Capt. 8th or King's (12.)

Brown, Fred. Capt. 3rdR. Sur. Mil. (12.)
Brown, F. D. M., tf.C Capt. B. S. C. (12.)
Brown, O. A. Lt.-Col. 1st B. N.I. (12.)

Brown, J. H. Lieut. R.N.R. (12.)

Brown, R. A. O. Capt. R. N.

Browne, Alex. A. P. Col. 109th Regt. (12.)
Browne, C. Orde Capt. late R.A. (12.)

Browne, E. C. Capt. 21st R.N.B. Fus. (12.)
Browne, E. S. Lieut. 24th Regt. (12.)

Browne, H. D. Capt. 60th Rifles (12.)

Browne, J. F. M., CB. Col R.E. (12.)

Browne, W. B. Capt 46th Regt. (11.)

Browne, W. H. Capt. Beng. S. 0. (U)

Browning, M. C. , Capt. (ret.) 87 th R. I. F. (11.)
Brownjohn, Wm.W. Lt. late 64th Begk(12.)
Brownlow, Sir C. H., KCB. Brig. -Gen. (12.)
Brownlow, Hon. Edw. late Capt. S.

F. Ods. Hon. Col. Armagh Mil.
Brownlow, W. A. dc V. Capt. R.N. (11.)
•Brownrigg, Henry S. Lt. Rifle Brig, hi.)
Bro wnrigg, J. St udholme, CB. Lt .-Oen. (11.)
Brownrigg, M. S. Capt. 52nd Light Inf.
Bruce, Edw. J. Col. R.A.

Bruce, Harvey J. L. Capt. Cold. Ods.

Bruce, Michael Maj. -Gen.

Bruce, Robert Maj.-Gen. (LI.)

Bruce, R. C. Dalrymple Maj. (h. p.) 8th Regt.

Brumell, William Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 25th Regt.
Brunei, Alfred Lieut.-CoL Canadian Active

Mil. (12.)
Brunkcr, H. M. B. Lieut. 26th Regt. (XL)
Brydon, L. A. Capt. late 74th Highrs.

Buchanan, D. C. R. Carrick Lt.-Col. 2nd

Royal Lanark Mil. (12.)
Buchanan, J. R. O. Capt. (h.p.) 14th Best

(12.) F' ^

Buckingham and Chandos, Duke of, KO.

Colonel Royal Bucks Yeo. (12.)
Buckland, F. T. late Asst-Surg. 2nd Lift

Ods. (12.)
Buckle, Sir C. H. M., KCB. Vice-Adm.

(12.)
Buckle, C. M. Capt. R.N.

Buller, E. W. Lieut, late R.A. (11.)

Buller, F. C. M. Lt.-Col. Cold. Ods.

Buller, Reginald J. M. Lt.-Col. Gt. Gds.
Bullock, C. J. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Bullock, O. M. Lt. 11th Reg. (12.)

Bulwer, E. O., CB. Col. (ret.) 23rd R. W. P.

(11.)
•Bunbury, Chas. T. Major Rifle Brig. (12.)
Bunyon, C. S. Lieut, (unatt.) (11.)

•Burgess, Ardwick. Maj. Q. O. L. I. Mil. (12.)
Burgess, C. J. Major H. A. a

Burgess, H. M. Capt. R.A. (11.)

Burgovne, R. dhu O. H. Capt. late 93rd

Highlanders (12.)
Burke, H. P. Capt. 8th Hua. (11.1

Burls, E. Grant Capt. 1st Sur. Art. V. (12.)
Burn, David B. Capt. 18th Hussars (11.)
Burn, John M. Major R. A.

Burn, Robt. Lt.-Gen.Gri. Comdt. R.A. (11.)
Buraaby, F. O. Capt. Royal H. Ods. (12.)
Burnaby, R. B. Lieut. 70th Regt. (1L)

Burnand, N. Lieut. -Col. late Cold. Gda.
•Buruell, H. D*A. P. Lt.-Col. 7th Hus. (12.)
Burnell, E. S. P. Lt.-Col. Cold. Ods. (11.)
Burnell, T. Coke Lt. late West Essex

Mil. (12.)
Burney, H. 8. S. Lieut.-Col. (12.)

Burroughs, C. de P. Lieut. 82nd Reg. (11.)
Burroughs, F. W.f CB. Maj.-Oen. (11.)

Burrows, G.R. S. Lt.-Col. 15th Bo. N.I. (12.)
Burr, C. E. O. Capt. 17th Regt. (If.)

Bury, J. T. Lt R.A. (11.)

Bury, W. C. Viscoitnt, KCMG., MP. Lt.-

Col. 21st Civil ServioaNoW
Bushell, John M. Comr. ^B^ . (\l>>

LIST OF ANNUAL 8UB8CBIBEBS.

Admiralty (12.)

BuUsr, Henry

Butler, J. B. Capt. B.N. (12.

Butler, Yens A. Lt. late B.M. L.I. (12.)
Butt, T. Broomhead. Col. (ret) 86th (12.)
Battanafccw, W. H. Capt. Paym. 16th

Lancers (11.) '
Byham, W. B. late War Office (12/

Byng, A. M. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gren. Gds. (12.
Byng, #<m. C. C. G. Capt. 1st Life Gds.(12J
Byng, Mam. H. W. J. Maj. Wilts Yeo.

late Lt.-CoL Colds. Gds.
Byng, Geo. P. F. Capt. 105th Beg. (12.)
Byngt T. B. Capt. Mad. S. C. (12.)

Byrne, T. £. Lieut.-Col. B.A. (12.)

Byrne, Tyrell M. Lt-Col. late 1st Royals

CABELL, A. T. Col. B. H. A. (12.)

Cadell, B., CB. Colonel B.A. '12.)

Cadell, Thoe., W.€. Major Beng. 8. C. (12.)
Cadogan, Htm. Sir Geo., £CB. Lt.-Gen.

(XL)
•Cafe,H*ydanL. Lt.-Col. late94thBegt (12.)
Caffin, Sir James C, KCB. Vice-Adm.(U)
Ctldbeek, Wm. Lt. late Limerick MiL (12.)
Calderon, C. M. Capt. 60th B. Bifles (12.)
C*ldioott,B. Maj. 1st Warwick B. Y. (12.)
Caldwell, W.B. LL-Col. late 76th Begt. (12.)
Calthorpe, Hon, Somerset J.' G. Col. (ret.)

6th Dr. Gds.
CaiaeT0BvAylmer8,9.CMaj.25thBegt(12.)
Cineroo, Sir D. A., GCB. Gen. CoL

42nd Boyal Highlanders (12.)
Cameron, J., CB. Maj. -Gen. B.E. (12.)

Cameron V. Lovett, CB. Comr. R.N. (12.)
*Csjnerom,W. Gordon, CB. Col. 4th Begt. (12. )
Campbell, Arch. C. Capt. Lanark Yeo.

late Lieut. -CoL Soo. Fns. Gds. (12.)
Campbell, A. H. Lt.-CoL late B. S. C. (12.)
Campbell, Duncan Lieut.-CoL

Campbell, F. Lorn Capt. S. F. Gds. (12.)
Campbell, George, CB. Gen. B.A. (12.)
Campbell, Sir Geo., Bart. Capt. late 1st l)rs.
Campbell, Gr. H. F. Col. late Gren. Gds.
CampbeU,JTo».H.W. Lt.-Col.lateCold.Gda.
Campbell-Johnston, A. B., late Governor

Hong Kong (12.)
•C*mpbell,JohnR. Maj. Hants Art. Mil. (12.)
Campbell, P. John Col. B.H.A.

Cunpbell,Z&m.R.G.E. €aat.Oold.Gds.(12.)
Campbell, W. Col. late 100th Beet.

Campbell, W. F., Load Maj. 46th Mid.

B.V. (U)
Campbell, W. M. Capt. B.E. (12.)

Campbell, WelterS. lateLient.Bifle Brig.(12.)
CampbelL W. M. X. Major B.E. (12.)

r U. 60th BL Bifles (12.)

Lieut.-Gen. (12.)
Lt.-Col. 6th Fus. (12.)
Lieut.-Col. (12.
Capt. 82nd Begt. (12.
Card well, Begimald Capt 1st Lano. Mil. (12.
Cswy, Coaataotine P. Major B.E. (12.)

C«ey, X. A- Lt-Col. Beng. 8taff Corps (12.)
Csrfrae, C. W. Lieut. 78th High! (12.)

CaifUl, Sidney Capt. 66th Begt. (12.)

Carmgton, Eton. W. H. P. Lt.-Col. Gr.

8ds. MP. <U)

Campbell, W. P.
Ccaoon, B.
Ctrden, G-
GanUn,F. W.
Csrdew, Fred.

•Carmichael, L. M. Capt. 6th B.I. Lan. (12.)
Carpenter, F. S. late Dep. Controller

Carpenter, G. W. W. Major (12.)

Carr, Fredk. S. Capt. 5th Punjab Cav. (12.)
Carrick, S. A., Eabl of Capt. late Gr. Gds,
Carrington, Chas. W. Major B.M.L.I. (12.)
Carrington, Fred* Lieut. 24th Beg. (12.)
Carson, Jas. S. Capt. Rl. Bucks MU. (12.)
Carter, H. Bonham. Lt-CoL late Cold. Gds.

(12.)
Carter, Jno. M. Lieut.-Col. late Adj. Boy.

Monmouthshire Militia

Bobt. Brudenell, FBCS. late

Staff Surgeon, A.M. j[). (12.;
Cartwright, H. Col. late Qr. Gds. MP. (22.)
Case, John Navy Agent (12.)

Cass, A. H. Lieut.-Col. 10th Hubs. (12.)
Casson, B. T. Capt. 5th W. York Mil. (12.)
Castle, W. McCoy Fitzgerald Lieut.B.fiT.(12.)
•Caulfield, J. A. Major Boyal Tyrone Fus,

late Capt. Cold. Gds.
Cautley, George Major-Gen. (unatt) (12.)
Cautley, Henry Capt. B.E. (12.)

Cavaye, C. W. Lieut. 24th Beg. (12.)

Cavenagh, Orfeur Lieut.-Gen. (12.1

Cavenagh, Gordon M.-Gen.Beng. 8. C. (12.1
Cavendish, Jftm.C.G.W. Lt. 10th Hus.(12.j
Cavendish, Jas. Chas. Capt. (ret.) B.A. (12. J
♦Cavendish, W. H. F. Lieut.-Col. Commt»

2nd Derby Bifles, late 52nd L.I. (12.)
Cawkwell,W. Lieut.-Col. Eng.Railway Vol*

Staff Corps (12.)
Cawston, Geo. lateLt.lst Mid. Art. Yols. (12.}
Cecil, Eustace, Lobj> Lt.-Col. MP. (12.1
Chads, Henry Vice-Adm. (11.)

Chadwiok, Edw. Lieut. 16th Lancers (12. J
♦Cbalmer, B. Capt. 60th Bifles (12.)

Chambers, A. W. Major 26th Mid.B.V. (12,)
Chambers, Ed wd. Lt. London Art. Yols. (12.)
Chambers, Francis CoL 1st King's Own

Stafford Mil. (12.)
Chamberlaine, T. J. Lieut. 80th Beet. (12.)
•Champion, P. B. Lieut. B.M.L J. (12.)
Channer,A.W. Capt. 3rd Middx. Militia,

late Lt. 21st R. N. B. Fus. (12.)
Chaplin, Edw.Lt.-Col.lateCold.Gds.MP, (12.)
•Chapman, A. T. L. Maj. 34th Begt, (12.)
Chapman, J. F. Capt. 7th Dr. Gds, (12.)
Chapman,£»VF.E..KCB. Maj.-Gen.R.E (12.)
*Chapman,W.E. Caut.(h.p.)lstDr.Gds.(l2.)
Chapman, W. H. Maj. late Leicester Mil. (12.)
Charleton, T. H. Capt. late 69th Begt.

Charley, John Capt. 60th B. Bifles (12.)
Chatto, W. J. P. late Ens. 28rd M. B.V.(12.)
Chawner, Harry Lt. Georgetown Mil. (12.)
•Chermside, H. L., CB. Col. B.A. (12.)

Cherry, Apsley Major 90th Begt. (12.)

Chester, C. M. Maj. late B. Sussex Art.

Chetwynd, Eon. C. C. Capt. (ret.) 10th Beg.

(12.)
Chichester, FrancisS. Lt. late 22nd R«g. (12.)
Chichester, H. A. Capt. 25th Begt. (12.)
Childers, E. W. Lieut.-Col. B.A. ?12.)

Childers, J. W. Dep.-Lt. Yorkshire

Chinn, Edw. Capt. late 12th Begt. (12.)
Chisholm, A. B. .Capt. late 26th (12.)

Cholmeley, H. J. Apt. 16th Begt (1

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS-

Cholmondeley, Marquess of

Christian, H.B.H. Pbinob P. C. A. of Schles-

wig-Holstein, KG. Lt.-Gen. (II.)
Christie, Fred. Gordon Lieut.-Col.

Chrystie, W. Major R.E. (1/.)

Churchill, C. H. S. Lt.-Col. (ret.) 60th Rifles
Churchill, Lord Edw. Spencer Lt. Isle of

Wight Mil. (1/.)
•Clanchy, Henry T. Corar. R.N. (1/.)

Clark, A. Lieut.-Gen. (1/.)

Clarke, Sir Andrew, KCB. Col. R.E. (11.)
Clarke, C. Harwood Lieut. 1st Lon. Art. V.

(1/.)
Clarke, C. M Major 57th Regt. (II.)

Clarke, J. G. Maj. late 45th Regt. (11.)

Clarke, J. H. Courtney Lt. 7th Fus. (If.)
Clarke, P. P. D. Capt. (h.p.) 58th Regt. (II.)
Clarke, S. C. Capt, R.E. (1/.)

Clarke, Stanley de A. C. Maj. 4th Hus. (II.)
Clarke, T. S. Lieut. 60th Rl. Rifles (1/.)
Clarke, W. A. Capt. N. Durham Mil. (II.)
Clnrke, William Maj.-Gen. (unatt.) (1/.)
Clarke, William Capt. 2nd Middx. Mil. (II.)
Clay, Wm. Lt.-Col. 8th Lan. Art. Vols. (If.)
Clayton, Emilius Capt. late S. F. Gds. (II.)
Clayton, Emilius Capt. R.A. (1/.)

Clayton, F. A. T. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds.(l/.)
Clayton, Fran. S. Comr. R.N. (1/.)

Clayton, J. W. Capt. late 13th Lt. Drs. (II.)
Clayton, Thomas Paymaster R.N. (1/.)

Clayton, V. G. Major R.E. (1/.)

Clayton, W. L. Nicholl Capt. I. of W.

Art. Mil. (il.)
Cieland, Wm. Capt. 102nd R. Mad. Fus. (II.)
Clements, Hon. C. S. Capt. late 37th Reg. (II.)
Clement*, F. W. R. Major R.E. (1/.)

Clerk, H. Maj.-Gen. R.A. (1/.)

Clerk, John Capt. (ret.) 4th Dr. Gds. (1/.)
Clery, C. F. Capt. 32nd Regt. (II.)

Clifford, R. S. C. Col. late Gr. Gds. (If.)
Clinton, Lord E. W. P. Maj. Rifle Brig.

(1/.)
Clitberow, E. J. Stracey. Lieut. -Col. late

8. F. Gds. (II.)
dive, E. H. Col. Gr. Gds. (1/.)

Cloete, Sir A. Josias, KCB. Gen. Col.

19th Regt. (1/.)
Clonmell, J. H. R. Earl of Cornet Glou.

Yeo. Lieut, (ret.) 1st Life Gds.
Close, Frederick Col. R.A. (11.)

Clothier Robt. F. Lieut. 2nd W. I. Regt.

(11.)
Clowes, G. G. Major late 8th Hussars

Clutton,Owen Maj. Iate7th Surrey R.V.(1I.)
Cochran, Francis Capt. 37th Regt. (If.)

Cochrane, H. S., W-€. Lt.-Col. 7th Fus. (II.)
Cochrane, W. M. Lt,-Col. 2ndSur.R.V.(lI.)
Cockburn, Alex. Col. late Derby Mil.

Cock burn, C. V. Major-Gen. (ret.) R.A.

•Cock bum, James G. Capt. 6th Regt. (1/.)
•Cockle, G. M. A. Capt. Royal Westmore-
land Mil. (1/.)
Cocks, Chas. Lygon Lt.-Col. late Cold. Gds.

(11.)
Cocks, O. Y. Maj. (ret.) 4th Regt. (11.)

Cbdd, ISdwmrd » Vioe-Adm. \

Gtxirmeton Alfred & Lieut. Cold. Gds. (1/.) J

Codrington, Sir H. J., KCB. Admiral of

the Fleet. (1/.)
Codrington, Sir W. J., GCB. Gen. Col

Cold. Gds. (21.)
Codrington, W. Wyndham Lt.late 17th Lane.
Coe, E. O. Lt. late Edmonton R. Rifles (11.)
Cohen, Lionel B. Capt. Tower Hamlets

Engr. Vols. (1/.)
Coke, Hon. E. K. W. Capt, late Cold. Gds.
Coke, Thos. W. Viscount Capt. Scots Fus.

Gds. (1/.)
Coker, Augustus H. Lieut. R.N. (11*)

Coker, E. Rogers Capt. 106th Reg. (II.)
Cole, J. A. Maj.-Gen.

Coleman, W. F. G. Capt. late R. Drag. (1/.)
Coles, Alfred Lt.-Col. 1st Sur. R. V. (H.)
Coles, Chas. H. Capt. 1st Surrey Art. Vols.

(10

•Collen, E. H. H. Capt. Bengal Staff Corps
Colleton, SirTl. A. W., Bt Lt. 23rd Regt. (it)
•Colley, G. P., CB. Col. 2nd Queen's (U)
Collings, G. M. Capt. R.E. (11.)

Collins, Caleb Lieut. 51st Regt (II.)

Collins, F. MD. Surg. -Maj. A.M.D. (U)
Collins, Wm. Louis Capt.lst Exeter R.V.(tt)
Collinson, Sir Richard, ECB. Adm. (1/.)

•Collinson, T. B.
Collyer, G. C.
Colman, G. B. T.
•Colomb, J. R. C.
Colomb, P .H.
Colquhoun, J. A. S.
Colthurst, James N.
•Colvile, Charles F.
Colvile, Henry E.

Maj.-Gen. R.E. (II.)
Col. late RE. (11.)
Lt-Col.
Capt.lateR.M.A. (11.)
Capt. R.N. (11.)
Capt. R.A. (II.)
Major 6th Regt. (II.)
Capt. 11th Regt. (II.)
Capt. Gren. Gds. (II.)
Colvill, Hugh G. Capt. late 29th Regt. (II.)
Colville, Hon. W. J. Col. late R. Brig. (II.
Colvin, W. B. Major 7th Roy. Fus. (II.)
•Comber, H. W. Capt. B.N.

Combermere, Wellington H. S. Viscouht

Col. (1/.)
Commerell,£irJ.E.,||*.CKCB. Rear-AdmL

(II.)
Comerford,Jas.W. Capt. 22nd Mid. R.V. (II.)
Compton, A. F. Lieut. Gren. Gds. (II.)
Coney, Bicknell Major late 17th Lancers
Conolly, Arthur Capt. Bengal S. Corps (II.)
Conolly, Jas., CB Maj -Gen.

Conolly, J. A., t^.C Lieut. -Col. (ret.)

Coldm. Gds. (II.)
Conway, T. S., CB. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

Cook, Henry Lieut.-Col. 100th Regt. (II.)
Cooke, A. C, CB. Col. R.E. (II.)

Cooke, T. C. Capt. R.A. (II.)

Cookesley, E. M. Capt. late 22nd Regt. (II.)
Cooper, Edw. H. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gren. Gds.

MP.
Cooper, Harry Lieut. 47th Regt. (II.)

Cooper, Wm. Col. late 19th Regt. (II.)

Cooper, W. Cooper Maj . late Bedford Mil. (II.)
Cooper, Wm. Lt. late 4th Midx. R.V. (II.)
Cope, Edwd. Lieut. Robin Hood B.V. (II.)
Cope Richd. Capt. late 7th R. Lancashire

Mil. (1/.)
Cope, Sir W. H., Bart. Lieut, late Rifle

Brig. (1I.V
Copeman, C. B. Capt. 1st lj«a©."B.."^ . V\l^

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Coppinger, T. S. Lieut. 11th Regt. (1/.)
Corballis, James A. Capt. 103rd Regt. (II.)
Corbett, W. A. Capt. late 62nd Regt. (11.)
Corkran, C. S. Lt-Col. Gren. Gds. (II. 1*.)
Cornish, Chat. O. Capt. 73rd Regt. (1/.)
Cory, Arthur Col. Bengal S. Corps (11.)
Corry, Hon. Hen. W.L. Capt. Cold. Gds.

(1/.)
Concaden, John F. Capt. late Queen's

Westr. R.V. (11.)
Cosby, T. P. Major 14th Regt.

Costello, T. M. Surgeon R.N. (1/.)

Custin, C. Capt. late 14th Regt (1/.)

Cotes, Charles James Capt. Gren. Gds.

Cotton, A. McClintock Lieut.-Col. 20th

Hussars (11.)
Cotton, Corbet Lt-Gen.

Cotton, Thos. F. Staff Surgeon (h.p.)

Coalson, J. B. B. Capt. (ret.) Rifle Brig.
Courtenay, E. Jas. Lieut. 35th Regt. (1/.)
Courtney, D. C. Lieut. R.E. (II.)

Cbrentry, H. A. F. F. Lt. late 60th Rifles (1/.)
CbwanJPhineas Lt.-Col. SrdLondonR.V. (11.)
Cowell, Sir J. C, KCB. Lieut. -Col. R.£.
Coirper, H. Capt. late King's German Legion
Cox, Francis Edward Lieut. -Col. R.E.

Cot, H. J. W. Capt. 9th Kent Art. Vols.

(K)
Cox, James Ponaonby Lt.-Col. R.E. (1/.)
Cox, R. Sneyd Major Hereford Mil.

Cox, Talbot A. Col. 3rd Buffs (1/.)

Crabbe, Eyre M. S. Lt. Gren. Gds. (12.)
Cmigie, Patrick G. Capt. Roy. Perth Rifles

[IL)
Crarter, G. A. Lieut.-Col. R.E. (11.)

fraufurd, H. R. G. Lieut, late R.A. (11.)
Craurard, J. R. Gen. Col. 91st Regt. (11.)
Cmren, Geo. Sabl of Capt. Warwick Yeo.

W
Cr»Ten,Wm George Lieut. Gloucestershire

Yeo. late Li. 1st Life Gds.
Crawford,Geo.A. Ma}. 4th R. Lane. Mil. (II.)
Crawford, Thos., MB. Surgeon-Gen. (1/.)
(Word, C. W. F. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

Crawford, H. J. Lieut. Gren. Gds. (11.)
Crawford, H. P. R. F. Maj. Mad.S.C. (II.)
Crawley, T. G. Capt. 8th or King's

Crawley, T. R. Col. (11.)

Crcagh, John Major 5th Fus. (1/.)

Cresiock, H. Hope, CB. Col. Unatt. (1/.)
Creed, Henry late Lt.-Col. 1st Middl. Art.

Vols, late Capt. Bombay Army (1/.)
Creek, Edwd. Stanley Capt. 23rd R. W.

Fus. (U)
Cmnorne, Vesey Lord, MP. Lt.-Col. late

Coldm. Gds. (11.)
Crwer, Thomas Comr. R.N. (11.)

Cwrke, A. S. Capt. R.E.

(ink, William, MB. Surg.-Maj R.A. (11.)
Crichton, Hon. C. F. Lieut. -Col. late Gr.

Ods. (1/.)
Cnchton, D. M. M. Lt.-Col. Gren. Gds. (1/.)
Cnchton, Hon, Hen. G. L. Capt. 21st

Hoss. (1/.)
■Ctofton, Stephen S. L. Rear-Adm.

Croggan, J. W. Lt-Gen. Col. Comt.

R.A. (1/.)

Crohan, Herbert Comr. R.N. (1/.)

Crokat, Cbas. F. . War Office (II.)

Croker, Wm. Major (ret.) 27th Regt. (11.)
Croker-King, C. E. Capt. 78th Highlrs. (II.)
Crombie, T. Lieut. -Gen.

Crommelin, W. A. M.-Genl. R.E. (11.)

Crookshank, Alex. Crowder, CB. Dep.

Com. -Gen. (1/.)
Crookshank, Arthur Capt. Ben. S.C. (1/.)
Crosse, Joshua G. Major (ret.) 62nd Regt.

(1/.)
Crossley, L. J. Capt. 8th W.Y. Art. V. (11.)
•Crossman, William, CMG. Lieut.-Col.

R.E. (11.)
Crowe, S. M. Capt. late Kent Art. Mil.

Crozier, H. E. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Crozier, Richard Adm. (II.)

Cruikshank, A. R. Capt. R.A.

•Cuffe, O. W. Capt. (h.p.) R. M. A.

Adj. Waterford Art. Mil. (II.)
Cumberland, C. E. Col. R.E. (II.)

Cumberlege, H. O. Capt. Ben. S. C. (II.)
•Cuming, W. H. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Cumming, Wm. Capt. (ret.) 48th Regt. (II.)
Cundell, J. P. Lieut. R.A. (II.)

Cuninghame, Sir W. J. M., Bart., ©.C.

Major (II.)
Cunningham, J. W. H. Capt. late 2nd Life

Gds.
Cunningham, John D. Lieut. R.A. (II.)
Cunynghame, Henry H. Lieut, late R.E. (II.)
Cuppage, Sir Burke, KCB. Lt.-Gen. Col.

Comt. R.A.
Cureton, E. B. Col. (II.)

Curme, C. T. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Currie, A. D. Capt. 41st Regt. (II.)

Currie, James P. Maj. Civil Ser. Vols. (II.)
Curteis, Edwd. W. Lieut 24th Regt. (LL)
Curtis, A. C. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Curtis, James D. Comr. R.N. (II.)

Curtis, Reginald Col. R.A. (II.)

•Curtis, Seymour Capt. R.N. (II.)

Curzon, Hon. E. G. Col. 52nd L. I.

Curzon, Hon, Montague Lt. Rifle Brig. (II.)
Cust, Henry Francis Capt. North

Salop Yeo. MP.
Cust, John Francis Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds.
Custance, F. H. Lt.-Col.late Gren.Gds. (II.)
Cutler,Fredk. Sub-Lt.latelstW.LRegt(ll.)

DACRES, Sir R. J., GCB. Gen. Col,

Comt. R.A. (II.)
Bale, Chas. L. Lieut. 2nd W. 1. Regt. (II.)
Dalison, M. D. D. Lt. S. F. Gds. (II.)

Dallas, R. C. F. Lieut, late 98th Rest. (II.)
Dalrymple, Sir H., Bart. Lt.-Col.

Dalrymple, J. H. E. Lieut-Gen. (II.)

Dalrymple, Hon. North de C. Lieut. S. F.

Gds. (II.)
Dalrymple, W. R. E. Lieut. Rl. Ayr and

Wigtown Mil. (II.)
D'Aguilar, Chas. L., CB. Maj. -Gen.

R.A. (II.)
Dalton, C. J. Maj. -Gen. R.A. (II.)

Darner, S. L. Dawson Capt. late S. F. Gds.

MP. (II.)
Dames, T. L. Capt. late R.A. (

LI8T OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS

Dangan, Loud Lt.-Col. (ret) Cold .Gds. (1 I.
Daniel, B. H. Lt.-Col. 18th B. Irish (U
Daniell, C. F.T. Lt.-Col. late 28th Begt (If.
Darley, W. S. Lieut. 5th Fusiliers

Darling, Sydney Lieut. -Col. (11,

•Dartmouth, EABLof Capt. Staf. R.V. (11.
Darwin, S. C. Lieut. R.N. (11.

Dashwood, G. J. E. Capt. late S. F. Gds. (1/.
•Daubeny, A. Gh Major 7th Fusiliers (1/.
Daubeny, £. Capt (ret.) 68th Beg. (11.
Daubeny, James, CB. Maj-Gen.

Daubeny, J. F. Capt. late 18th Boy. Irish

(11.)
Daubeny, W. A. Major late 3rd Buffs (11.)
Daunt, Arthur H. Lieut. 7th Royal Fus. (11.)
Daunt, John C. C, ©.C Capt. Beng.

S.C. (U)
Davidson, C. B. T. Capt. B.E. (11.)

•Davidson, D. Lt.-Col. City of Edin.

B. Vols., (ret.) Bom. Army (1J.)
Davie, Sir H. B. Ferguson, Bart. Gen.

Col. 73rd Regt. MP. (11.)
•Davies, Geo. S. Major (11.)

Davies, Henry F. Lt.-Col. Gren. Gds. (11.)
Davis, Hugh Comr. B.N. (11.)

•Davis, John Capt. 2nd Surrey Mil. (11.)
Dawes, Thomas Capt. Ben. S.C. (11.)

Dawaon, D. F. B. Lieut. Cold. Gds. (11.)
Dawson, Son. E. S. Comr. B.N. (1/.)

Dawson, John B. Capt. Haddington Mil.

Art. (11.)
Dawson-Scott, B. N. Major B.E. (11.)

Dawson, Yesey John Lt. Cold. Gds. (U)
Deane, B. M. Lt.-Col. 19th Begt (1/.)

Deane, H. B. Capt. Inns of Court B. V . (11.)
De Bathe, Sir H. P., Bart. Lt-Gen. ( 11.)
•De Butts, J. 0. B. Col. B.E. (11.)

Deering, Chas. L. H. Capt. Dublin Mil.

Lt late 28th Begt (U)
•De Fonblanque, E. B. ret. Controller (11.)
•Degacher, H. J. Major 24th Begt. (II.)
•De Horsey, A. F. B. Bear-Adm. (11.)

De Horsey, W. H. Beaumont Col.

Grr. Gds. (U)
De Kantzow, Herbert P. Gapt B.N. (11.)
De la Poer, B. H. Lt. late 15th Begt. (U)
De la Voye, Alex. M. Lieut. 56th Begt. (11.)
De Moleyns, T. A. Major B.A. (U)

Denison, Henry Lieut. BJ3. (11.)

Penny, Cuthbert 0. Lieut, late 17th

Begt. (1/.)
Dent, Herbert W. 2nd Queen's BL (1/.)
•De Bobeek, Hastings St. J. Comr. B.N. (li.)
De Satge-de Thoren, O. W. Capt late 88th

Begt (1/.)
De Balis, ftodolph, CB. Maj.-Gen. (1/.)

De Sohmid, H. W. F., Capt, South Devon

MiL (U.)
•Desborough, John, CB. Col. B.A. (1/.)
De Teistier, The Babok. Col. Unatt. (11.)
De Vesoi, J. B. W. V»ooukt Lieut-Col.

Cold. Gds. (1/.)
Dewar, J. B. J. Major BJL. (1/.)

De Winton, F. W. Major BJL. (11.)

l>e Winton, Walter Capt. late 1st L. Gds.

(1M
P'fye, W. B. Capt. (ret.) 92nd Begt. (II.)

Dick, Wm., MD. D.-I.-G. Hoapa. (11.)

Dickens, C. H., CSI. Col. B.A. (11)

Dickins,C.S.S. Capt. late B. Sussex L. I. MiL
Dickinson, J. D. late Lieut 24th Begt. (11)
Digby, the Hon. E. C. Capt. Gren. Gds. (1/.)
Digweed,W.H. Lt.-Col. lateHante. Mil.(l/.)
Dillon, Hon. Arthur Dep.-Lieut Co. Mayo

(11.)
Dillon, H. A. Capt. Oxf . Mil., late Lieut.

Bifle Brig. (11.)
*Dillon, Martin, CB. CSI. Col. Bifle Brig.

ADC. to the Queen (11.)
Dillon, B. H. Capt 45th Begt (11.)

Disney, E. J. Capt. Essex Biflea, late 7th

Fus. (11.)
Dixon, Manley C. M. Capt 8th or

King's (1/.)
Dixon, Walter O. Lt. 10th Surrey B. V. (1/.)
Dixon, Wm. Manly Hall, CB. Maj.-Gen. (U)
Dobbs, F. G. Lt. 1st Midx. Art. V. (1/.)
Dobson, G. Adm. (11.)

Docker, E. S. D.-I.-G. of Hospitals

Doherty, Chas. W. O. Lieut 2nd Boyal

N.B. Dragoons (1/.)
Doherty-Waterhouse, D. H. Capt (ret.)

3rd Hubs. (1/.)
Dolby, J. E. A. Capt. late N. Y. Bifles (11.)
Domvile, Sir Charles C. W., Bart. Col. late

Dublin Co. L. L Militia (1/.)
Domvile, W. Major, late 21st B. N. B. Fus.,

(ret.) Worcester Militia (1/.)
Domville, J. W. M.-Genl. B.A. (1/.)

Doncaster, J. B. Capt 73rd Begt. (11.)

•Doorly, M.,Maj. latePaym. IstW.l. Begt
Dorchester, Lord Col. late Cold. Gds.

Dorling, Francis Lieut 96th Begt. (1/.)

Dormer, Lord Capt. late 74th Highlrs., (1/.)
Dorville, John W. Capt B.N. (11. \

Douglas, George M. Capt. 33rd Regt (11.)
Douglas, Sir John, KCB. Lt-Gen.

Douglas, Sir Bob. Percy, Bart. Gen.

Col. 96th Begt. (11.)
Douglas, Sholto Capt. B.N. (XL)

Dowding, Herbert W. Lieut. B.N. (U)
Dowson, C. S. Lt.-CoL late 10th Begt (1/.)
Doyle, Sir 0. Hastings, KCMG.,Major-Gen.

Col. 87th Begt. (1/.)
Doyle, Francis G. Capt. 2nd Dr. Gds. (11.)
Drake, F. G. A. Capt. late B. H. Gds.

•Drake, J. Mervin C. Major B.E. (in

Drake, Thomas George Capt. R.N.

Draper, Edward T. Navy Agent (U)

Drayson, Alfred Wilkes Col. B. A.

Drew, Andrew Adm. (li.)

Drew, F. B. Lt-Col. Sth or King's (II.)
Druitt, Percy S. Lieut 101st Begt. (II.)
Drummond, Archd. S. Lt. S. F. Gds. (II.)
Drummond, A. H. Capt. Bifle Brig. (11.)
Drummond, Edgar A. Lt. B.K. (If.)

Drummond, JohnCapt latelOthHuss.(U.)
Drury, Byron Bear- Adm.

Du Cane, E. F., OB. Lt-Col. B.^. ( 11.)

DuCane, F. Major (ret.) B.E. (1/.)

Ducie, Earl of Lord Lieut. Gloucester (1/.)
Duehett»W.M. Lieut. 2lst B.N.B.Fus.(U)
Duff, A. M. Capt (ret.) 74th Highlrs. (11.)
Duff, James Maj. late 23rd B. W. Fus. (11.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Duff,R.W.
Dugdaie, A. G.
Dunbar, W. M.
Duncan, A. W.
Duncan, Fras.
Duncan, John

Major E.E. (11.)

Lieut. R.A. (12.)

Major 24th Regt

Major R. A. (1/.)

Major R.A. (12.)

Capt. 102nd Regt. (1/.)

•Duncan, P. Oapt. W. Cork Art. Mil. (1/.)
Duncorobe, Hon. A. Adm. (1 I.)

Duncombe, Hon. Cecil Capt. late 1st L. Gds.
Dunoombe, C. W. Capt. 1st Life Gds.

Duncombe, George T. Capt. late 16th Regt.
Dundas, James D. Major 60th Roy. R. (12.)
Dtmdat, Thomas Maj. (ret.) 12th Regt. (12.)
Dunlop, Franklin, OB. Lieut. -Gen. R.A.
•Dunne, J. H. Col. 99th Regt. (12.)

Donne, T. J. JB. Lieut. 2nd Queen's Royal

Regt. (12.)
Dunsany, Right Hon. Edw. Losd Vice-

Adm. (12.)
Durham, P. F. Capt. late 37th Regt. Adj.

Royal Cardigan Rifles
Dune, Charles Lieut.-Col.

Dumford,F. A. Lt.-Col.Sur. Art. Vols. (12.)
Dntton, W. C. Lieut. West. I. Regt. (12.)
Dwyer, L. F. W. Capt. 106th Rest. (12.)

Dyson, Edward Maj. late 3rd Dr. Gds. (12.)

•EAST, Cecil J. Major 41st Regt. (12.)

Saitwick, E. B., CB., Lieut, late

6th Bomb. N.I. MP. (12.)
Eastwick, W. J. Capt. (ret.) Bo. Army (12.)
Eaton, H. F. Capt. Gren. Gds. (12.)

Eden, Sir Charles, KCB. Admiral

Eden, H. H. Capt 30th Regt. (12.)

Eden, J. Capt. late 14th Hussars

Eden, M. R. Major unatt. (12.)

Eden, W. Haesall Gen. Col. 90th L. I. (12.)
Edenborongh, H. - Maj. late W. Essex Mil.
Edgcumbe, Hon. C. E. Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds.

(12.)
Edgcumbe, Piers Lieut. 44th Regt. (12.)
Edmeades, H. Major R.A. (12.)

Edmunds, Charles Vice- Adm.

Edridge, F. L. Lt-Col. 20th Regt. (12.)
Edwards, F. J. Lieut. R.E. (12.)

•Edwards, J. B. Lieut.-Col. R.E. (12.)

Edwards, Nathaniel F. Capt. R.N.

Egerton, Alfred M. Capt. R. H. Gds. (12.)
•Egerton, Hon. Franois, MP. Rear- Adm.

(12.)
Egerton, F. P. Capt. R.N.

•Egerton, F. W. Comr. R.N. (12.)

Egerton, Sir P. de Malpas Grey, Bart., MP.

FRS. Lt-CoL Cheshire Yeomanry (12.)
Egerton, P. de R. Capt. late Cold. Gds. (12.)
tqcrUm. W. W. Capt. 8th or King's (12.)
Elcho, Lord, MP. Col.Lond.8co.R.V.(12.)
Elgee, C. W. Col. R.A. (12.)

Xhaa, Alfred Capt. Royal Edmonton Rifle

Regt. (12.)
Elias, Robert Capt. 59th Regt. (12.)

mot, Hon. C. G. C. Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds.
•EUet, W K. Major 38th Regt. (12.)

Ettice, Sir C. H., KCB. Lieut-Gen. (1/.)
KUbt, A. F., MD. Staff Surgeon (12.)

EBiot,Ao».CharlesG.J.B.,CB. Adm.

KOiot, George Admiral (12.)

Elliot, John Col. R. M.L.I. (12.)

Elliot, W. H. Major-Gen. late R.A. (12.)
Elliott, Wm. Capt. 4th E.Y. Art. V. (12.)
Ellis, C. H. Fairfax Capt. R.A. (12.)

Ellis, Fred. Capt. late 9th Lancers (12.)
Ellis, William Rear- Adm. (12.)

Ellis, W. B. E. Major R.A.

Ellison, R. G. Maj. (ret.) 9th Lancers (12.)
Elliston, E. C. Capt. B.S.C. (12.)

ElmsaU, W. de C. Major late R. £>rs. (12.)
Elphinstone, John Col. Madras S.C. (12.)
Elrington, F. R., CB. Maj.-Gen. late Rifle

Brig. (12.)
Elrington, W. F. Lt-Col. late Soo. Fua,

Gds. (12.)
Elsdale, H. Lieut. R.E. (12.)

Elwes,W.C.C. Capt. (ret.) 71stH. L. I. (12.)
Elwyn, Thomas Lt.-Gen. R.A. (12.)

Elyard, J. Major 2nd RL Sur. MU. (12.)
•Enfield, Viboottnt, MP. Hon. CoL

Royal Edmonton Rifle Regt.
England, F. Herbert Lieut. 61st Regt. (12.)
England, Sir Rich., GCB. KH. Gen. Col.

41st Regt. (12.)
Enniskillen, W. W., Eael of, FRS. Col.

Fermanagh Militia (12.)
Errington, A. 0. Lieut.-Gen. (12.)

Errington, A. J. Comr. R.N. (12.)

Erskine, Geo. Major-Gen. (12.)

Erskine, J. Elphinstone, Adm. (12*)

Estridge,Geo. Lt-Col.lateSt KitsMU. (12.(
Evans, E. T. Lieut. 04th Regt. (12.)

Evans, George Adm. (12.)

Evans, H. D. Capt. R.A. (12.)

Evans, H. Lloyd Lt.-Col. late Indian Army

(12.)
Evans, John Capt. (ret.) 6th Innis. Drs.(12.)
Evans, Saml. T. G. Capt. Eton R. Vols. (12.)
Evelegh, G. C. Capt. (h.p.) R.A.

Evelyn, C. F. Maj. 3rd R. Sur. MU. (12.)

Ewart, Henry P. Lieut-Col. 2nd Life Gds.
E wart, R. W. Capt. Scot. Bordrs. Mil. (12.)
Ewart, W. S. Lt-Col. (ret.) Gren. Gds. (12.)
Exeter, Mabquis of Col. Northampton

Mil., ADC. to the Queen
Eyre, F. V. Major R.A. (12.)

Eyre, Henry Gen. Col. 69th Regt. (12.)

Eyre, Henry R. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds. (12.)
Eyre, Philip H. Major 38th Regt. (12.)

Eyre, Sir Vincent, CB.KCSI. Maj-Gen. (12.)

FABER, W. Raikes, CB. Lt.-Gen. CoL

17th Regt.
Fagan, C. S. F. Lieut. R.M.L.I. (12.)

Fairfax, T. F. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (12.)
Fanshawe, Charles M.-Genl. R.E.

Farewell, W. T. F. Col. Mad. S. C. (12.)
•Farquhar, Arthur Vice- Adm. (12.)

Farquhar, F. G. Capt. 2nd R.N.B. Drs.(l2.)
Farquharson, J. R. Lt.-Col. (ret.) S. F. Gds.
•Farquharson, M. H. Capt. R.M.L.I. (12.)
Farr, William Lieut R.N. (12.)

FarreU, H. C. Major R.A. (12.)

Farrell, J. Sidney Major (ret.) R.A.

FarreU, J. D. C. Maj. 26th Kt R.V. (12.)
FarreU, Sidney B. Lt.-Col. RE.

Farrer, Henry Capt. 94th Regt

LIST OP ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Farrer, W. D. M. C. P. Lt. Gren. Gds. (1/.)
Farrington, ff. D'O. Maj. 73rd Regt. (II.)
•Farrington, M. 0. Maj. 51st K.O.L.I. (II.)
•Fawcett, R. H. Capt. 33rd Regt. (II.)

Fawkes, Wilmot H. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

FeUden, H. M., Capt. late 1st Royal

Lane. Mil. MP.
Feilden, R. J. Col. late 60th Rides (II.)
Fellowes, Edward Col. late 11th Hubs.

Fellowes, P. H. Col. R.M.L.I.

Forming, 8. W. Lieut.-Col. (II.)

Fenwick.N.E deB. Lieut. 60th Rifles (II.)
Ferguson, G. A. Lieut.-Col. (ret.) Gren. Gda.
Festing, Sir Francis W., CB., KCMG. Col.

R.M.A. (II.)
Field, iEsculapius late Hon. Corps

Gen tlemen-at- Arms
Field, G. T. Col. R.A. (II.)

•Field, J. W. P. Caut H.A.C. (II.)

Fife, Aubone G. Lieut 5th Lancers (II.)
Fife, J. Cookson Capt. 65th Regt. (II.)

Filmer, Sir Edm., Bart, late Cornet Royal

East Kent Teo.
Finucane, George Col.

Firebrace, Frederick Capt. R. E. (II.)

Fisher, A. A'Court, CB. Col. R.E. (II.)
Fischer, J. F. Col. R.E. (II.)

Fitzgerald, Charles C. P. Comr. R.N. (II.)
Fitzgerald, P. S. Capt. late 2nd R. Lane. R.
Fitzhugh, H. T. Col. R.A. (II.)

FitzJames, Arthur Chas. Col. Coxnt.

4th R. S.Midx. Mil. late 93rd Highrs.

Fitz-Patrick, Hon. B. E. B. Capt. Rl.

Cork Art. Mil., late Lieut. lstLifeGds.(ll.)

Fitzroy, A. W. M. Lieut. Cold. Gds. (11.1

Fitzroy, Lord A. C. Lennox, CB. Maj.-

Gen. (II.)
Fitzroy, C. C. Maj. (ret.h.p.) 68thL.I. (II.)
Fitzroy, Lobd F. J. Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds. (II.)
Fitzroy, G. R. Lieut.-Col. Cold. Gds. (II.)
Fitzroy, Philip Major 5th Fus. (II.)

•Fitz Roy Robert O'B. Capt. U.N. (II.)
•Fletcher, H. C, CMG. Col. Sco. Fus.

Gds. (II.)
Flood, H. Capt. 2nd Queen's (II.)

Flood, J. C. H. Lieut. 19th Huss. (II.)

•Flower, Lamorock Capt. 3rd R. Sur. M. (II.)
Flower, Stephen Capt. 86th Regt. (II.)
Fludyer, C. Lieut.-Col. late Gren. Gds.
Foley, Hon. A. F. Col. late Gren. Gds.

Foley ,Hon.&t.&eo. Gerald,CB. Maj.Gen.(ll.)
Follett, R. W. Webb Capt. Cold. Gds. (II.)
Forbes, J. Lieut. -Col. late Cold. Gds.

Forbes, John, CB. Maj. -Gen. Bombay

Army (II.)
Forbes-Leslie, Jonathan Lieut.-Col. late

78th Highlanders
Forbes, Stewart Lt.-Col. 1st Roy. Surrey Mil.
Forbes, Sir William, Bt. Lt.-Ool. Aberdeen

R. Vols, late Lieut. Cold. Gds. (II.)
•Forbes,iToii.W.F. Lt.-Col.LeitrimR.(ll.)
Ford, Chas. Erskine Maj. -Gen. R.E.

Ford, Edmund Twisa Major- Gen.

Ford, James E. Lt.-Col. late Sco. Fus. Gds.
Forester, Hon. H. T. Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds.
Forster, B. L. Lt.-Col. R. A.

Forster, Charles Capt. 2nd Stafford Mil.(ll.)

Forster, F. R. Lt.-Col. (h.p.)4thB.I.D.Gds.
Forster, J. F. Capt. 46th Regt. (II.)

Forster, Wm. Capt. 60th Rifles (II.)

Forsyth, Frederick A. Capt. 5th Fus. (II.)
Forsyth, T. H. Capt. 62nd Regt. (II.)

Fortescue, Cyril D. Capt. Cold. Gds. (II.)
Fortescue, E. Francis Capt. 86th Beng.
N.I. (II.) * B

Fortescue, Francis Capt. late Sco. Fua. Gds.
•Fosbery, Geo. V., ©.«£. Lieut.-Col. Bene.

S. Corps. (II.) B

Fosbery, W.T.E. Capt. (h.p.) 77th Regt. (II.)
•Foster, C. E. Capt. 58th Regt. (II.)

•Foster, Kingsley O. Capt. the King's Own

1st Stafford Mil. (II.)
Fowler, Chas. J. Lt.-Col. R.E. (II.)

Fowler, G. C. Capt. E.N.

Fowler, Robert Dashwood Capt. R.N.

Fox, Augustus H. Lane Col. (h.p.) Gren.

Gds. (II.) r '

Fox, Edwin Capt. (ret.) H.A.C.

•Fox, L. Loftus B. Capt. B. Longford Rifle

Mil. (II.)
Fox, J. T. R. Lane Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds. II.)
Fox, Maxwell Comr. R.N. (II.)

•Frampton, W. J. Capt. 59th Regt. (II.)
Frank, P. late Staff-Surgeon (II.)

Frankland, Colyill Major 103rd Regt. (II.)
Franklen, C. R. Major R.A.

Franklyn, Edw. J., MD., FRCS. D. Sure.-

Genl. (II.) B

Franklyn, T. P. Capt. 1st Kent R.V. (II.)
Fraser, Hon. Alex.E. Lt.-Col. lateS.F.GcU.

(II.)
Fraser, A. E. Lieut. R. A. (II.)

Fraser, Charles C, ffr.C. CB. Col. late

11th Hussars (II.)
Fraser, Hon. H. T. Lt.-Col. 8. F. Gds. (II.)
Fraser, J. Keith Lt.-Col. 1st Life Gds. (II.)
Fraser, James, CB. Col. late 72nd Highrs.

(II.) *

Fraser, W. J. late Lieut. 1st Tower Hamlets

Eng. Vols. (II.)
Freeland, Russell G. Ens. (ret.)4th K.O. (II.)
Freer, C. T. Major Leicester Yeo.

Freese, J. N. A., CB. Gen.

Freeth, S. Maj.-Gen. R.E. (1/.)

Fremantle, Fitzroy W. Lt.-Col. C. Gds. (II.)
French, J. D. P. Lieut. 19th Huss. (II.)
French, P. T. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Bomb. Army
Frobisher, W. M. Capt. (ret.) 34th Regt. (II.)
Frome, Edw. Gen. R.E. (II.)

Fugion, Edw. Major (II.)

Fulford, Wm. Major (ret.) R.A.

Fullerton, A. G. Major late 2nd Life Gds.
Furse, P. G. F. Commissary (II.)

•Fyers, Henry Thomas Capt. (h.p.) R.A.

Col. E. and N. York Art. Mil. (it.)
•Fyers, W. A., CB. Col. late R. Brig. (II.)
Fynn, Robt. N. late Lt. 2nd W. York Mil.

(II.)

GAGE, Hon. E. T., CB. Col. R.A. (II.)
Gaisford, Horace C. Capt. Gr. Gds. (II.)
Galloway, Eabl o» Capt. late R.H. Gds.
Galloway, T. J., Lt.-Gen. Col. 49th Begt. (II.)
•Galton, Douglas, CB. FRS. Capt. (ret.) R.E.

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Gamble David Lieut-Col. 47th Lane. R.V.

Gamble, John H. Lieut. 17th Regt. (1/.)
Gamlen,W.B. Ens. late 23rd Mid. R.V.(U.)
Gammell, Major A. late 43rd Regt.

Gammell, J. H. H. Major 54th Regt. (1 I.)
Gandy, F. Lt.-Col. late 8. F. Gds.

Gardiner, A. M. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

Gardiner, Chas. Gk Lieut. R.N. (1/.)

Gardiner, R. M. late Com. Gen. (11.)

Gardiner, W. Comr. R.N.

Gardner, C. H. Capt. 12th Regt. (1/.)

Gardner, G. H. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Gardner, W. B. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) R. A. (11.)
Gardyne, C. Greenhill Lieut. -Col. (ret.)

Cold. Gds. (1/.)
Garforth, fi. St. John Capt. R.N. (11.)

•Garliek, J. W. Capt. 106th Regt. (11.)

•Garnham, R. E. W. Major 6th W. York

Militia (U)
Garnett, A. P. Major 11th Hussars

Garratt, J. A. T. Lt.-Col. Gren. Gd£ (11.)
Garratt, Francis Lieut. Roy. 1st Devon Yeo.

late Capt. 3rd Drag. Gds. (11.)
Garrock, Sir John, GCB. Lieut. -Gen. (11.)
Gascoigne, Chas. Gen. Col. 72nd Regt. (1/.)
Gascoigne, Clifton Lt.-Col. (ret.) G. Gds.
Gatcoigne.W. J. Lt.-Col. Sco. Fus. Gds. (U)
Oatacre, W. F. Capt. 77th Regt. (11.)

Gaussen, Alfred W.G. Lieut. 43rd Regt. (11.)
Gautier, F. E., Capt. ADC. to the Governor

of Quebec (II.)
Gawler, John C. Col. late 73rd Regt. (1/.)
Gearr, H. Capt. R. A. (11.)

Geanr, H.leG. Major R. A. (11.)

Geddes, W. L. Capt. 53rd Regt.

#German, James Major (ret.) 3rd R. Lane.

Mil. (1/.)
Gtrmon, R. C. H. Major 9th Regt. (1/.)
George, O. W., M.D. Surg. -Major 1st Life

Guards (1/.)
Gibbon, Arthur War Office (11.)

•Gibbons, Charles Capt. R.N. (11.)

Gibbons, John Dep. Surg.-Genl.

Gibbs, Charles Major late 2nd Queen's (1/.)
Gibbs, J. R. Lieut. 6th Regt. (11.)

Gibson, Edwd. Lt. late So. Glou. Mil. (1/.)
•Gflbard, Geo. J. Capt. 71st H. L.I. (11.)
Gilford, Yiscouht Rear Adml. (11.)

GOl, F. Capt. 39th Middlesex R.Y. (11.)
GiUespie,R. Rollo Lt.-Col. 106th Bo. L.I.

GOIett, Henrj Major 13th Light Inf. (12.)
Gillett, W. Capt. Uxbridge Yeo. (1/.)

•Gilmore, A. H. Comr. R.N.

Gtmson, Herbert Navigating Lieut. (1/.)
Gflpm,S,VRich.,T., ^.CoLBedford.Mil.MP.
Gipps, H. Capt. (ret.) 9th Regt. (11.)

Gipps, Reginald Col. S. F. Gds.

Gtiirdot, G. C. Capt. 106th Regt. (1/.)

Giasmg, Charles E. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

GUdftone, J. R. Lieut. Cold. Gds. (1/.)

Glaispoole, W. A. Lt.-Col. Bo. S. Corps (1/.)
Gleig. A. C. Col. (h.p.) R.A. (11.)

Gleig, C. E. S. Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 14th Regt.
Gleig, Rev. G. R., MA. late Chaplain-
General to the Forces (1/.)

Glendonwyn, W. R. D. S. Capt. 69th Regt.

Glennie, Farquhar Capt. 24th Regt. (11.)
Gloyer, Sir John H., GCMG. Capt. RN.

(11.)
Glyn, R. T. Col. 24tb Reg. (1/.)

Glyn, Sir Rich. G. Capt. late 1st R. Drags.
Glvn, Bon. Sidney Carr Capt. late R. Brig.

lvn,

)

Godbold, G. A. B. Lieut. 12th Regt. (1/.)
•Godman, A. F. Major late 6th Dragoon

Guards (1/.)
Godsal, P. T. Lieut. 52nd Regt. (1/.)

Godwin, A. A. Major 103rd R. B. Fus. (1 J. )
Godwin- Austen, F. Lt. 2nd W.I. Regt. (1 /.)
Godwin-Austen, H. H. Major B. 8. C. (1/.)
Goff, Robert Charles Maj. Cold. Gds. (1/.)
Golding, Henry Capt. 37th Regt. (1/.)

Goldsmid, Sir Frederic J., CB., KCS1.

Maj.-Gen. late LA. (1/.)
Goldsmith, George, CB. Adm. (1/.)

Goldsworthy, J. W. Lt.late 86thRegt. (1/.)
•Goldsworthy, W. T. Iieut.-Col. late 91st

Highlanders (1/.)
Gonne, T. Major 17th Lancers (11.)

Goodall, George Lieut, late R.E. (If.)

Goodenough, O..H. Major R.A. (1/.)

Ooodenough, W. H. Col. R.A. (11.)

Goodlake, G. L., ©.C. Col. late Cold. Gds.

ADC. to the Queen
Goold-Adams, F. M. Lieut. R.A. (11.)

Goolden, G. B. Comr. R.N. (1/.)

Gordon, Alex. W. M.-GenL (11.)

Gordon, C. 8. S. Evans Col. Gov. R.V.

Hosp. (11.)
Gordon, Cosmo F. M. Lieut. R.N. (If.)

Gordon-Cumming, Sir W. G., Bart. Capt.

S. F. Gds. (II.) F

Gordon, E. C. A. Col. R.E. (1/.)

Gordon, G. Grant Lt.-Col. 8. F. Gds. (11.)
Gordon, Geo. Hamilton Lt.-Col. R.E.(1J.)
Gordon, Henry W., CB. Com.-General

•Gordon, J. J. H. Lt.-Col. Beng. 8. C.

Gordon, John Lt.-Col. late 47th Regt. (1/.)
Gordon, Robert W. T. Maj. 93rd Highl. (11.)
Gordon, W. F. F. Major 63rd Regt. (11.)
Gordon, W. C. Assist. Commissary (11.)

•Gore, Augustus F. Lt.-Col. Barbadoes

Mil. (11.)

Gore-Browne, Harold Lt. 60th Rl. Rifles
(It.)

Gore, G. R. C. Ormsby-, Lt. Cold.-Gds. (1/.)
Gore, W. R. O. Maj. late 13th L. Drs. MP.
•Gort, 8. P., Viacouirr. Hon. Colonel Lim.

Mil.
Gosling, Geo. Lieut. -Col. Sco. F. Gds. (1/.)
Gosling, W. C. F. Col. R.H.A. (11.)

Gosset, W. D. Maj.-Gen. late R.E. (1/.)
Goulbum, Edward Col. late Gr. Gds.

Gould, Henry O. Lt.-Col. late Gr.Gds.(l/.)
Gould, H. C. Maj. Royal Glamorg. Mil.(R)
Gould, R. F. Lieut, late 31st Regt. (11.)
Gower, Erasmus Capt. late 12th R. Lancers
Grace, Sheffield Mai. (h.p.) 68th Regt. (11. )
Graham, Allan Hamilton Major-Gen. (If.)
Graham, D. A. G. C. Capt. 16th Lancers

(1/.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Graham, Donald Duncan Capt. late Ceylon

Rifles (1/.)
Graham, F. W. Capt. 103rd Regt (J I.)

araham, Gerald, ©.C. CB. Col. R.E. (1/.)
Graham, H. A. late Lieut. 7th Fus. (11.)
Graham, Jas. John Col. (11.)

Graham, John Maj. Pemb. Art. Mil. (17.)
Graham, Sir Lumley, Mart. Col. (11.)

Graham, T. P. Lt.-Col. S. F. Gds. (II.)

Grange, Chas. Walter Major

Grant, Arthur H. Lt. late 27th Regt. (11.)
Grant, Edward Fitzherbert Col. (ret.) R.A.
Grant, Henry D., CB. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Grant, John M. Lieut. -Col. R. £. (1/.)

Grant, J. M. Lieut, (ret.) 25th K. O. Bordrs.
♦Grant, J. M. Col. Mad. S. Corps (1/.)

Grant, J. Thornton, CB. Maj.-Gen.

Grant, Robert Major RE. (11.)

Grant, Wilmot Capt. Rifle Brigade (II.)
Grant, W. B. Capt. R.N. (11.)

•Grant, W. J. E., CB. Col. R. A. ADC. to

the Queen (11.)
Grant, W. L. Lieut.-CoL E.O. L. I. Mil.
Grattan, A. O. D. Lt.-Col. late R.E. (11.)
Graves-Sawle F. A. Capt. Cold. Gds. (11.)
Gray, Basil Capt. (unatt.) (11.)

Graj, William Lieut-Col. 27th Lane.

RV., MP. (11.)
Gray, W. J. Lt.-Col. R. A. (11.)

Graydon, Geo. Major-Gen. (II.)

Greathed, Sir E. H., ECB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)
GreaTes, Geo. H. Capt. Adjt. 64th Lane.

R.V. (11.)
Greaves, G.R., CB. Col. (h.p.) 70th Regt.

(1*.)
Green, Andrew Lt.-Col. late Rifle Brigade

Green, G. F. Capt. late 70th Regt. (11.)

Green, M.S., CB. Col. Bomb. 8.C. (11.)

Greener W. H.R., CB.,ECSI. Maj.-Gen.

Bomb. S. C. (11.)
Greenaway, H. C. Capt. lOthBen.Lanc. (11.)
Greenhill,Barclay Maj. late Vic. R.V. (11.)
Greenhill, Barclay C. Lt. Kent Art Mil.

(II.)
Greenwood, Fred. Lt.-Col. 6th W. York

R.V. (tt)
Greer, H. Harpur, CB. Col. (ret.) 68th L. I.
Greg, Edwd. H. Capt. late 4th Rl. Lane.

Mil. (H.)
Gregory, C. H., CMG. Lt.-Col. Eng. and

Rail. Staff Corps (11.)
Gregory, G. B. Capt. late 57th Midlx.

R.V.,MP. (11.)
•Gregson, J. D. Capt. 105th Regt. (II.)
Greig, J. M. Lt.-Colonel R.E. (1/.)

Greville, A. 0. Lieut.-Col. (1/.)

Grey, Ron. Sir Fred. W., GCB. Adm. (11.)
Ore j j Hon. George Adm.

Grier, J. J. Capt and Adjt 1st Renfrew

R.V. Lieut, (ret.) 16th Regt. (1/.)
Grieve, Frank Capt. 46th Regt. (11.)

Griffiths, A. G.F. Maj.late 63th Regt (11.)
•Griffiths, E. St. J. Maj.late 19th Rest. (U)
Griffiths, Leonard Major R.A. (li.)

Grimston,J.W.,Vi80T. LtlstL.Gds.(lf.)
Grimaton, Walter J. Major (ret.) R. A. (1/.)
Grundy, F. Leigh Lieut. 6th Regt.

Gubbins, J. Col. (h.p.) 23rd R. W. F. (11.)
Guest, Robert Capt. 6th Lane. R.V.(1J.)
Guinness, B. Lee Capt (ret.) R.H. Gds. (12.)
Guise, J. C. ©.«£. CB. Col. (ret.) 90th L.I.
Gully, Philip Capt. late 22nd Regt. (U)
•Gun, Henry A. Capt. R.E. (11.)

Gunning, C. G. Capt. Madras S.C. (U)

Gunter, Edwd. Capt. 69th Regt. (II.)

Gunter, H. Capt 73rd Regt. (11.)

Guy, Sir Php. M. Nelson, ECB. Lt-Gen. (11.)
Gybbon-Spflsbury, Albert Capt. 6th West

Yorks. Mil. (11.)
Gye, Lionel late Lt. R.A. (II.)

HADOW, Reginald T. Maj. Georgetown

Mil. (II.)
Haines, B. Gilpin late Lt. 18th R.I. (1/.)
Haines, Sir F. P., ECB. Gen. (11.)

Haldane, G. H. J. Major 64th Regt. (1/.)

•Hale, Lonsdale A.
•Hale, Mathew H.
Hale; Robt
Halkett, F. J. C.

Hamlets Mil. (II.)
Halkett, Peter A.
flail, E. C.

Major R.E. (1/.)

Major 26th Regt. (II.)

Col. 7th Hussars (11.)

Lt.-Col. 2nd Tower

Comr. R.N.
Lieut. R.N. (1/.)
•Hall, Qeo. Lt-Col. Durh. Mil. Art. (II.)
Hall, Geo. C. Lt. 2nd Stafford Mil. (II.)
Hall, Henry Capt. 15th Hussars (II.)

Hall, Julian H. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gde.

Hall, Montagu Major 101st R.B.F. (II.)
•Hall, Robert, CB.. Rear- Adm. (II.)

all, Saml. V£~ Assist. Com-Genl. (II.)
. Jftr WmTH., ECB., FRS. Adm. (II.)
alLflirWm, Eing, ECB. Adm. (II.)

aUett,rf.kHughes Capt. 57th Regt. (II.)

Hallett, J. A.
Hallo wea,

Nayy Agent (II.)
Adm. (II.)

•Halpin, R. C, Rey., MA. Chaplain to the

Forces (II.)
Haly,StrW.O'Grady, ECB. Lt-Gen. (II.)
Hamersley, John H. Capt. 22nd Regt.

Adjt. 24th Lane. R. V. (1L)
Hamilton, A. C. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Hamilton, A. Terriok Capt. (ret) 7lst Highl.

L.I. (II.)
Hamilton, Charles, CB. Lt-Gen. (II.)

Hamilton, C.E. Lt-Col. 80th Lan. R.V. (II.)
Hamilton, Lobs Claud, MP. Lieut. -Col.

late Donegal Mil. (II.)
Hamilton, SirFred. Wm., ECB. Gen. (II.)
Hamilton, Geo. J. Major 26th Regt. (II.)
Hamilton-Gordon, Hon. Sir Alex., ECB.

Lieut-Gen., MP. (II.)
Hamilton, H. B. Capt. 6th Dr. Gds. (U)
Hamilton, I. J. Capt. 8th Eing's Regt (II.)
•Hamilton, J. Glencairn C. Major Lanark

Yeo. late 2nd L. Gds. MP. (II.)
Hamilton, L. H. Lieut -Col. (II.)

Hamilton, Mark, MD„ BA. Surg. R.N. (II.)
Hamilton, Robert George Maj.-Gen. R.E.
Hamilton, R. V., CB. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Hamilton, R. W. Lt-Col. late Gr. Gds. (II.)
Hamilton, T. Bramston Capt. R. A . (II.)

Hamilton, StrWm.,**. Lt-CoLR.H.A.(l/.)
Hamley. E. B.. CB. Col. R.A. (II.)

Hammersley, Chas. Army Agent (II.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Hamnwraley, Fred. Col. (II.)

Hainmiek, St. Y. A. Capt. 4Srd L.I. (1/.)
Hammond, B. H. Comr. R.N. (12.)

Hammond, R. N. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

Hammond, W. O., Ssq.
Hamond, H. E. late Lieut lit L. Gds.

Hampton, Rt. Rom. Lobd, GCB.,6c.&o. (II.)
Hankey.F.A. Capt. late Queen's Westr.R.V.

Banns, H. B. Capt Beng. S.O. (1/.)

Haimen, O. G. Major R. A. (1/.)

Hanson Joseph late Una. 1st Surrey R. V. (1 2.)
Harbord, the Rev. J. B. Chaplain R.N. (12.)
Hareoort,F. VenablesCol.lateCold. Gds. (11.)
•Hardie, H. R. Capt. Haddington Mil. A. (12.)
Harding, Charles, FRGS. Maj. 19th Surrey

RV. (II.)
*Haidmge,C.S.YiS00Trirr Lt.-Col.Kent R.V.

Harding*, Rom. A. E., CB. Maj. -Gen.

•Hardtman-Berkeley, J. H. Lieut. 107th

Regt. (1/.)
HardT, Cbas. <3h Lt.-Col. Gren. Gds. (II.)
Hardy, F. Col. 84th Regt. (II.)

Hardy, John Maj. 9th Royal Lanoers (1/.)
E. H. Capt. 11th Regt (12.)

Hare, M. A. 8. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Hare, Rom. Richard Lt-Col. late 90th Regt.
Hare,«r T.Bart. Captlate2ud Life Gds. (II.)
Hare, W. A. Home Lieut. R.E. (U)

Harford, F. H. Lt.-Col. S. F. Gds. (11.)

Harford, F. Lloyd, Lieut. 36th Regt. (12.)
Haringtou, A. M. Lieut. Rifle Brigade (12.)
Harington. R. E. S., Maj. Lanark R. V., Capt.

late Rifle Brigade (11.)
Hanson, O. Lieut, (ret.) 6th Fus.

Harkness, J. 0. Major 5th Fus. (12.)

Harneat, Sir Hen. Drury, KCB. Maj.-Gen.

BE. (1/.)

Lt.-Col. 7th Royal

Capt. 4th Dr. Gds. (12.)

Purveyor (12.)

Lieut. R.N. (12.)

Harris, Rom. Sir Bdw. A. J., KCB., Vice-

Ada. (11.)

Capt. R.E. (12.)

Lt late 8th Hussars (12.)

late Sur. Hants Mil. Art.

Capt. 19th W. York R.V.

•Harnett, Edward
Dragoon Guards
Harm, Edward
Harrington, 8. C.
Harris, Charles B.

Harris, Geo.
Harrison, Henry
Harrison, W. A.
Harrison, Wm.

(II.)

Hart, John Capt. 100th Regt. (12.)

Hatty, Jos. Mark Col. (12.)

Harrer, Chas. Elwin Major R.E.

Harrcy, E. Capt. R.E. (12/

Harrey, John S. A. Lieut. 42nd Highrs. (II.
aHanrood.Ed. Lt-CoLlate2ndSom.Mil.(l/.'
Harvood, J. A. P. K. Capt. late 13th L.I.
Hulctt, A. K. Capt. R.E. (12.)

Hafl6wood,ClementA.Lt.l2thMidx.R.Y.(12.)
Haiung*, Warren, Lt. 2nd W.I. Regt. (12.)
HatdieU,G<vrg» Major 60th Rl. Rifles (in
Hathtrtoa, Lobd Col. 2nd K.O. Staff. Mil.
Hatton, E. H. F. Capt. late Northampton

H*ttan,VuliBr»L. Lt-Col.lateGr.Gds.(12.)
Hattea, Vaiiera Capt Gr. Gds. (12.)

Haughton, J. Major R. A. (12.)

Haughton,John Lt 72nd Highlanders (12.)
Havelock, 8ir Hen., Bart., CB. 0.C. M.P.

Hawes, A. G. S. Lt. (h.p.) R.M.L.L (12.)
Hawes, G. H. Lieut-Col. 9th Regt (12.)
Hawkes, R. T. Lieut. Beng. S.C. (II.)

Hawkins, Cesar H. Comr. RJf. (12.)

Hawkins, H. C.
Hawkins, R.

Westm. R.V. (12.)
Hawkshai

torps (12.)
, W. H.

Capt R.N.
Major late Queen's

Lt.-Col. Eng. & Rail.

•Hawley, W. H. Major 14th Regt (12.)
Hay, Horn. C. R. Lt-Col. (ret) S. F. Gds.
Hay, H. M. Drummond Lt.-CoL late

Comdt R. Perth Rifles
Hay, Sir Hector M., Bt. late Major Lond.

Rifle Brig. (1/.)
Hay, Bt. Horn, Lobd John, CB. MP. Rear

Adm. (12.)
Hay.J.C. Jtfajor 92nd Highlanders (12.)

liajor late Indian Army (12.)
Haye, J. B. Lieut R.N. (12.)

•Hayes, John Montague,CB. Rear Adm. (U)
Hayne, Arthur N. Lieut. 67th Regt. (12.)
Hayter, A. D. Lt.-Col. London

Rifle Brurada, MP. <12.)
Hayward, H. B. Major 46th Regt. (12.)

Hayward, I. F. Curtis Capt. 26th Regt. (12.)
Healy, R. C. Capt. Assist. Coso-Gen. (II)
Heastey, G.B. Lt.-Col. R. M. L. I. (12.)
Heath, Sir Leopold G., KCB. Yice-Adm.(12.)
Heathcote, C. T. Lt.-Col. Bomb. S.C. (12.)
Heathcote, Eustaoe Major Hants Mil. (12.)
Heathcote, H. F. Lieut. 103rd Regt. (12.)
*Heathorn,T.B. Capt (h.p.) R.A. (12.)
HeUard, SamL B. Comr. late L N. (12.)
Hemans, G. W. Lt-Col. Eng. and Rail.

S.C. (12.)
Henderson, E. Y. W., CB. Col. (12.)

Henderson, J. W. C. Capt. Mad. S. C. (12.)
Henderson, W. M. -General R.A. (12.)

Hennell, S. CoL (ret.) Bombay Army (12.)
Henniker, Major Ron. A. H. Lieut. C.G. (12.)
Henry, G. 0. Col. R. A.

Henry, J. L. V. Iieut 2nd R. N. B.

Drags. (12.)
Hepburn, Henry P., CB. M.-Genl. (12.)

Herbert, Arthur James, CB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)
Herbert, C. J. Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (1Z.)
Herbert, H. A., Capt. (ret) Cold. Gds. (12.)
Herbert, Ron. W. H. Col. late 4th

W. I. Regt. (12.)
Herdman, Alfred Lieut, late 6th Lancers (12.)
Hereford, Chas. Major 19th Regt. (12.)

Hertford, Mabqubsb of Gen. (12.)

Hewett, Edw. O. Lieut-CoL R.E. (12.)

Hewett, Sir-W. N., ©.C, KCB. Capt R.N.

(12.)
•Heyland, A. R. Capt. 1st Bom. Lan. (12.)
Heyland, A. T., CB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)

Heyland, H. K. Lieut. R.N. (12.)

Heyland, J. R. K. L. Lieut. R.A. (12.)

Heywood, J. M. Major R.E. (12.)

Hibbert, J. Nembhard Major late 97th Regt
I Hiohens, Wm. Lt-Col. B.E. (12.)

LIST OP ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Hickman, D. H. Lt.-Col. Ben. S.
Hicks, John Lieut. R.N. (It)

Hicks, W. A. Capt. 3rd Duke of

Lancaater'a Mil. (II.)
Hickeon, R. A. C.ipt. 3rd Buffs (II.)

•Higgina, F. Major 6th Lane E.V. (IV
Higgins, W. F. late Colonial and

War Depte. (II.)
Higginson, C. T. M. Capt. 2nd B.Cav. (II.)
Higginson, G. W. A..CB. Col. Gran. Qda.

(U)
Hight, Edward Lieut. E.N.E. (11.)

HiU, E. Bowie; Lt.- Gen., Col. 5th Fus. (11.)
Hill, Son. Geoffrey R. C. Capt. (pet.) B.H.

Gds.
Hill.Q.H. H. En«. (ret.) 93rd High™. (II.)
Hill, John Tboma* Genera)

Hill, PaacoeG., Rev. late Chaplain B.N. (II.)
Hill, Rowland Cant. 39th Regt. (If.)

Hill, Stephen J., CB. Col.. (1/.)

Hill, Thomas Capt. late 11th Regt. (II.)
HiU, W. Col. (II.)

Hilla, J., B.S., CB. Col. R.H.A. (U.)

Hillyard, G. A. Capt Rifle Brigaded?.)
Hime, Frederick Major R.E.

Himcll.W T„, Capt. R.A. «ott

ifirtrsHtf t, iKflitarn CM'xn, 1875 (if.)
*Hmchingbrook,ViBooVNT Lt.-Col.Gr.Gda.
Hind, Charles Major-Gen.

Hinde, John, CB. Major-Gen. (11.)

Hire, Henry W. Capt. B.N. (11.)

Hint, R. A.B. Major late W. Essoi Mil.

(II. 1».)
Hobaon, Frederick T. Capt. 3rd Buffs {11.)
Hodgson, Geo. E. Capt. (ret.)44th RegUlI.)
Hogarth, Ale 1. Major let Aberdeen R.V. (II. J
Hogg, Adam Capt. 2nd Beloooh Regt. (11.)
Hogg, John R. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Holcombe, F. Major (ret.) R.A. (II.)

Holden, Henry Lient.-Col. late 18th Light

Drs. (II.)
Holdsworth, J. K. Major R. A. (II.)

Holland, A. Ot. Lieut. 16th Husaara (11.)
Holland, Swiuton O. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Hollingsworth, T. S. Burg. 62nd Regt. (II.)
Hulmea,J.K. Oapt.Iate 8th Orkney l.V. (II.)
Holmesdale, Vibcoubt, MP. Capt. late

Cold. Gda. (II.)
Holrorde, J. B. Capt. 8th W. T. AH. V. (II.)
Holt, G. Trefuaia Capt. late Indian Nary

(II.)
Home, Bo*. Cospatnck D. Lieut. Rifle

Brigade (II.)
Home, D. M. Capt. R. H. Gde. (II.)

Homo, Robert, CB. Lt.-Col. R.E. (11.)

Home, Son. W.8.D. Lt.-Col.Gr. Gda. (II.)
II cm o- D rum m on d- Moray, W. A. Lieut.

Scot* Fus. Gda. (1/.)
Hood, F. W. Tibcoukt Ll.-Col. (ret.) Gr.

Gda. (II.)
Hood, W. C. Capt. 2nd Queen's Royals
Hood, W. H. Comr. R.N.

Hooke, H. H. Capt.-« "*

Hoole, James Capt. 5th

Hooper, Fred. Chaa. Capt.
Hope, Charles Lieut.

Hope, Chae. Wm.
Hope.Edwards,H.J.
Hope, G. R.
Hope. H. P.
Hopkins, J. O
Hopkinson, C
Home, Charles J.
Horner, John C
Horaford.«r Alfred*
H5H, Sir J. J.,

Capt. R.N. (II.)

Lt.60thRiflea(li.)

Comr. B.N. (II.)

late Male R.N. (II.)

Capt. R.N. (11.)

Army Agent

Maj. 16th Regt. (II.)

MA late 55th Regt. (II.)

dH.,GCB. Lt.-Gon. (11.)

., CB. Major-Gen. (II.)

Horton,Geo.W. Col. late 7th"Dr. Gda. (II .)
Horton, William Capt. R.N. (II.)

Hoseason, J. C. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Hoste, D. K., CB. Col. R.A. (II.)

Hoste, Geo. H. Eiq. Admiralty (II.)

Hotham, Charles F. Capt. R.N. (11.)

Howard, F. C. Lieut. Rifle Brigade (II.)
Howard, H. R. Capt. 3rd Herta R. V. (If.)
Howe, Eabl, CB. Haj.-Gen.

Howes, Geo. Capt. R.N.

Howell, Sir Thos., Et. Director of Contracts

War Office (II.)
Howitt.M.B. Capt. 3rd R. Surrey Mil. (II.)
•Hoiier, H. M. Capt lateAsaiat. Contr.(lI.)
•Holier, John Wallace Capt. 2nd R.N.B.

Dragoons (II.)
Hubbard, A. G. Lt. 3rd Bucka R.T. (II.)
Hudson, John Lt.-Col. lateBeng.S.C.(lf.)
Huggins, John Capt. late 20th M id, R.T. (II.)
Hughes, C. A. Capt. late 2nd Life Gds.

Bughea, J. W. Lt-Col. 54th Regt. (II.)

Hull, Thos. A. ataffCom. R.N. (II.)

Hume, Francis A. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Hume, Henry, CB. Col. (ret.) Gr. Gda. (II. J
Hume-Spry, G. Fi-edk., MD. Surfr-Major,

2nd Life Gda. (II.)
Humfrey, T. Blake Capt. 8th or King'aflf.)
Humphry, E. W. Capt. (h.p.) R&. (II.)
Hunt, Chas. B. Lieut. 4th Surrey R.T. (II.)
Hunt, J. M. F. Lt. Hant* Art. Mil. (If.)
Hunt.Wm.GF. Asat.Paymr.(ret.)R.N.(lI.)
Hunter, Montgomery Col.Beng.S.C-tll.)
•Hunter, Saml. A. Lt.-CoL.late lOlatR-B.F

(II.)

Hunter. T.. MT>.
HSIer.T.R:
Karat, W. B.
Hutchins, Alfred G.

(II.)

D.I.G. ofHospitaht

Lieut, late I. N. (II.)

Lieut. R.E. (If.)

Capt. 39th Mad. M.I.

Capt. R. L. Mil. (II.)

Hutchinson, C. S.
•H u Ichinso □ , John

R.V. (II.)
•Hutchinson, E.R.
Hutchinson, W.L. Inapec." of Cape Frontier

Police (II.)

utchinaon, W. Nelson Gen. Col

33rd Regt. (11.)
Hutehiaon, H. McL. Capt. 14th Regt. (1 1 )
Hutlon, C. M. Lt. 52nd Regt. (II.)

Hyde, O. Hooton Major-Gen. (ret.) R.A.
Ilyltou, Lobd Capt. late Cold. Gds.

IAGO, Arthur Cant. 2ndMiddi. R.V. (if )
"*. Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 89th Beat.
I. Capt.4thbr.Gda. (11.)

LI8T OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

•InnXL W.J^CB.

Ingiefield, ""

•Indies, John
Ingles, W. L.

a*.)

•Inglis, C. D.
Inglis, R. W.
Inglis Thos.
Inglii, Wm.t CB.
Ingram, Aug. H.

Major-Gen. (1/.)

Lt.-Col. B.A. (11.)

Comr. R.N. (1/.)

Major (h.p.) 16th Regt.

Johnson, H. J. Lt. 80th Regt. (1/.)

Johnson, .LWVD. Lt. late 21st Hussars (U)

Capt. late 90th L.I.

Capt. R.N. (11.)
Capt. Lon. Irish R.V. (11.)
CoL R.E. (II.)
Major-Gen. (II.)
Rear-Adm. (II.)
Injjnm, E. $L. B. Lt. 69th Regt. (II.)

•Innes, Alex. Major Aberdeen Art. V. (II.)
•limes, J. McLeod, 0.€. Lt-Col.R.E.(lf.)
Innes, Peroral R. Lt-CoL late LA. (II.)
Irhj, J. J. C. Capt. Adj. Chelsea Hosp.

(U)
Irrine.MBjaLaCMO. Dep.Com.Gen.(ll.)
&.3tJ. Lt.-Col. R. H. Gds. (II.)
Itw, a. M. Lieut.-Col. 36th Middx.

KY. kte Cold. Gds. (II.)

•JACKSON,F.GkOapt.21stR.N.B.Fus. (II.)
Jftcksoo, H. M. Lieut. R.A. (II.)

Jstkson, J. B. Capt. late 21st R.N.B. Fus.

fl/.)
J*bon, J. M. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Victara, Handle Capt. late 8th Hus. (II.)
Jvob, H. K. Maj.-Gen. Bom. S. C. (II.)
Jicob, Sir George Le Grand, CB. KCSI.

Major-Gen. (II.)
Jicobf, M. H. Capt. H. A. C. (II.)

Junes, Edm. R. Major R.E. (11.)

J*m«s, F. W. Lieut. 9th Regt (II.)

iim«, W. C. Lt. 2nd R.N.B. Drags. (II.)
Junes, W. H. Lt. R.E. (II.)

Juwtt, C. B. Capt (ret.) Gr. ads.

J .rns, 3. P., CMG. CoL late 82nd Rgt. (II.)
Jut, Robt H. Maj. late 12th R. Lane . (II.)
hj, J no. Livingstone late Sec. to

Gorernor, Greenwich Hospital (II.)
•»j, W. C. Capt. H. A. C. (II.)

Jttus, E. Major late Rifle Brigade (II.)
J<&. Fredk. W. Lt.-Col. 67th Regt. (II.)
J«*ip, B. F. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Jrfreyg, EdmcL R., CB. Maj.-Gen.

Jdfcrii, John Major Sussex Art. Volun-

tam, Lt (ret) Madras Art. (II.)
<~rktns, Robt., CB. Rear-Adm. (II.)

J- m*r, Stephen W. Capt. R.E. (II. )

iffam, Alfred Comr. R.N. (II.)

J'ptuon, J. H., MD. late Asst-Surg. 49th

'Vis*. John Lt -Col. 86th Regt. (II.)

^H.J. W., Lieut.-Col. late R.A., MP.
'-tu, Hon, J. E. L. Lt 7th Hussars (II.)
**-TB-White, H. Capt. 77th Regt. (II.)
'-*oU,E.S. Capt (h.p.) 7th R. Fus. (II.)

J^ai* Sh» W V HiTimmnTi^, CB., KCMG.,

-•>L k.JL (1/. Is.)
•>**», H. C. Lt.-Col. late Cold. Gds. (II.)
«*>4>, Thos. Capt. late 2nd R. N. B.

t I>^oons (II.)
*"itu, Horn. J. Strange Lt.-Col. late

< F. Gds. (II.)
: £. Ttxrmas Major 46th Regt. (II.)

- -tioa, Cecil F. W. Comr. R.N. (II.)

Juoo^rE-B^KCB. Maj.-Gen.R.A.(ll.)

Johnson, W. V.
Johnston, D. A.
Johnston, Thos. H.
Johnston, W. F.

Lieut. R. E. (II.)
Gen. Col. 66th Regt.
Col. late Gren. Gds.

Johnstone, Fred. E. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Johnstone, F. F. Lieut. 16th Regt. (II.)
Johnstone, Son. H. Butler Col. Comt

Scottish Borderers Mil. MP. (II.)
Jones, Arthur Paymaster R.N. (II.)

Jones, Chas. Lieut R.A. (II,)

Jones, Chas. Gk Capt. R.N. (II.)

Jones, D. G. Capt. late R.E. (II.)

•Jones, Jenkin Col. R. E. (II.)

Jones, Sir John, KGB. Major-Gen. (II.)
Jones, Sir Lewis T., GCB. Adm. (II.)

Jones, Lewis J. F. Col. late Dep. Batt. (II.)
Jones, Mainwaring Capt. H. A. C.(ll.)

Jones, R. W. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Jones, W. Gore Capt. R.N. (II.)

Jopp, A. A. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Jopp, Keith Lt.-CoL Bom. S. Corps (II.)

•KAIN,Geo. James. Capt. late 1st Middx.

Bug. Vols. (II.)
Keane,G.M. Lt.-Col. (ret.) 2nd Queen> (II.)
Keane, Eon. H. F., CB. Col. R.E. ADO.

to the Queen
Keays- Young, H.W. Capt. 18th R. Ir. (II.)
Kebbel, W. H. Major H.P.

Keirle, R. Capt 1st M. Art. Vols. (II.)

Keith, W. Major R.E. (II.)

Kellie, James Lieut. R.E. (11.)

Kellie, Robt. H., Lieut. 82nd Regt. (II.)
Kelly, J. G. Lieut. Beng. S. C. (II.)

Kelly, J. L. Capt. 62nd Regt. (II.)

Kelly, Sir R. D., KCB. Major-Gen. (II.)

KCSI. Maj.-Gen. (U)
Lieut. R.N. (II.)
Capt. R.N. (II.)
Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 42nd Royal

jLSir

Kemp, F. R. B.
Kennedy, A. J.
Kennedy, J. P.

Highlrs. (II.)
Kennett, V. H. Barrington Lieut. Royal

Elthorne Mil. (II.)
Kensington, Lord Col. late Cold. Gds.

Kenyon-Slaney,W.S. Capt. Gr. Gds. (II.)
Keppel, Hon. Sir H., GCB. Adm. (II.)

Kerans, Percy G. Lieut. 2nd W. I. Regt. (II.)
Kerr, C. R. Lieut. 102nd Regt. (ll'f

Kerr, Henry Major 7th Fusiliers (II.)

Kerr, Herbert Capt. late 17th Regt. (II.)
Kerr, Lobd Mark, CB. Lieut-Gen. (II.)
Kerr Lord Ralph D. Lt.-Col. 10th Huss.

(II.)
Kerr, Robert Dundas

Kerrich, W. D'Oyly N„

Kettlewell, W. W. Lt. late 27th Regt. (II
Key, Geo. Wm. Lt-Gen., Col. 15th Hus.
Keyes,C. P., CB. M.-Genl. Madras S.C. (II.)
Kilcoursie, Vibcottkt late Lieut R.N. (II.)
King, Edw. R. Col. late 96th Regt

King, Eyare late Lieut. 47th Regt

Kinfr Geo. S.. MD. SurgJ

rag, Sir Geo. St. Vincent, KCB. Adm. (1L\
King-Harman, M. J. Capt. B..A

King, John R. Major R..

Col. R.E. (II.)
Lt.-Col. R A. (II.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

King, W. G. N. Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Kingscote, B. N. F., CB. Lt.-Col. late

8. F. Gds. MP.
Kingsford, T. H. Oapt. late 1st Boy. Surrey

Militia (1/.)
Kinloch, Alex. Oapt. late Qren. Gds.

Kinloch, Geo. H. A. Capt. 13th Begt. (12.)
Kirby, W. H. Col. (11.)

•Kirk, James B. Lt.-Col. 91st Highlrs. (12.)
Eirkland, J. A. Vesey Major-Gen. (1/.)

•Knight, H. S. Gh S. Lt.-Col. late 19th Begt.

(1Q
•Knollys, Henry Capt. B.A. (1/.)

Knollys, mgU Hon. Sir W. T.,KCB. Gen.

Col. 62nd Begt. (12.)
Knollys, W.W.,FBGS. Maj.98rdHigh. (11.)
Knowles, C. B. Major 67th Begt. (1 1.)

Knox, G. W. Lt.-Col. 8co.,Fus. Gds.

Knox, T. E., CB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)

♦Knox, Richard Maj . -Gen.

LACON, W. Stirling late H. E.LC.S.S. (12.)
Lacy, T. E. Maj.-General (1/.)

Laing, Joseph Capt. 14th Regt.

Lake, H. Atwell, CB. Col.

L'Aker, J. Capt. 1st Lond. Engr. Vols. (12.)
Lambard, Henry Capt. 46th Begt. (11.)
Lambert, John Arthur Lt.-Gen. (1/.)

Lambert, B. Capt. late 43rd L. I.

•Lambert, Rowley, CB. Bear-Adm. (1/.)
Lambert, Walter M. Capt. B.M.A. (11.)
Lambton, Arthur Lieut.-Col. Cold. Gds.
Lambton, Fran. Lt.-Col. late S. F. Gds.(12.)
Lamont, James Dep. -Lieut. Bute

Lamotte, C. W. Lt.-CoL

♦T^mT)rey> Jones, MB. Surg. Major 67th

L'Amy. J. Bamsax Major late Forfar and

Kincardine ArtTMil. (11.)
Lane, Fred. Wm. Capt. late 67th Begt.

Lane,H.J.BagotLt.-Col.(ret.)Cold.Gds.(12.)
Lane, H. P. Maj. B.A. (11.)

Lane, J. Theophilus, CB. Lt.-Gen.

Langford, Hercules E. Lord Capt. Gr. Gds.
Langhorne,A.B.M. Lt. late 52nd Regt. (1/.)
Lascelles, Son. E. W. Maj. late W. York Mil.
LasceUes,H.n.}ViBCOUVT Capt. late Gr. Gds.
Lascelles, Walter B. Maj. Rifle Brig. (1/.)
La Touche Geo. D. Capt. 2nd W. I.

Begt. (1/.)
Latour, W. Young Lt.-Col. Gt. Gds. (1/.)
Laughton, J. K., Esq., B.N., MA. Naval

Instructor (11.)
Laurie, J. W. Col. D.-A.- Gen.CanadianMil.
Law, E. F. G. late Lieut. B.A. (1/.)

Law, F. T. A. Major B.A. (11.)

Law, Hon. H. S. Capt. late 28th Begt. (11.)
Lawley,IT0». B. N. Capt. late 2nd L.Gds. (1/.)
Lawlor, D. A. 8. Lieut, late 13th L. I. (11.)
Lawrence, H. J. H. Batt. Surg. Gr. Gds.
Lawrence, W. A. Capt. Ben. S. Corps (1/.)
Lawrence, W. W. Lt. 18th B. I. Begt. (12.)
Lawrenson, John Gen. Col. 18th Hubs. (11.)
•Layard, B.V. Capt. 28th Begt.

Layard,W.T. Maj.-Gen. (1/.}

Lazenby, Jamas Major 100th Begt. (1/.)
Leach, Edm. Lieut-Col. 50th Begt. (11.)

Leach, E. P. Lieut. B.E. (11.)

Leahy, Arthur Lt.-Col. B.E. (11.)

Leake, H. Capt. E.Y. Mil. late 70th Begt. (12.)
Leather, John Towlerton Capt. late 2nd

Dorset Art. Vols. (1/.)
Le Blanc, T. E. Capt. late 37th Begt.

Leconfleld,LoBDH. W. Capt. late 1st L. Gds.
Le Cocq, H. Lt.-Col. B. A. (11.)

•Lee, John W. Capt. Q. O. L. I. Mil. (1/.)
~~ arner,C. H. J. B. Capt. late 8. F. Gds.

(11.)

Leeke, Balph Capt. Gr. Gds. (1/.)

Leeman, Joseph Lieut. B. N. B. (11.)

Lees, T. Evans Lt.-Col. 31st Lane. B.V. (12.)
Lefrov,J.H.,CB.FBS. Maj.-Gen. B.A. (12.)
Le Geyt, W. B. Dep.-Com. (II.)

Legge, Compton Lieut, late Oxford Mil. (12.)
Legge,ir<m.E.H. Lt.-Col.lateCold.Gds. (1/.)
Legge, Hon. H. C. Lt. Cold. Gds. (1/.)

Legge, Hon. Heneage Capt. 9th Lane. (1/.)
Legge. W. D. Capt. (h.p.) 6th Fus.

Leggett, B. A. Capt. late 69th Begt. (11.)
Legh, George Cornwall Maj. 2nd B.

Cheshire Mil. MP. (1Z.)
Le Grand, F. G. Capt. B.M.L.L (11.)

Legh, H. M. C. Lt.-Col. lateGren. Gds.

Le Griee, Frederick 8. Capt. R.A.

Leigh, Lord Lord Lieut. Warwickshire
Leighton, F. Major 8th Mid. B.V. (1/.)

Le Mesurier, A. A. Maj. 14th Beet. (1/.)
Lempriere, A. B. Major BJE. (1/.)

Lempriere, Henry Major (ret.) B.A. (If.)
Lennard, T. G. B. Lt. late 5th Dr. Gds. (IV.)
Lennox,LosDA.C.Gordon Capt.Gr.Gds.(12.)
Lennox, Lord C. Francis Gordon Capt.

S. F. Gds. (If.)
Leonard, Peter, MD. Insp.-Gen. of

Hosps. and Fleets (11.)
Le Patourel, H. Capt. E. Y. Mil.

Leslie, George Colonel B.A. (1/.)

Leslie, John H. late Capt. 7lstHigh.L. 1.(12.)
Lethbridge, Sir Wroth Acland, Bart, late

Lt. B. B. (12.)
Leyeson, E. J. Lt. 6th Kent Art. Y. (12.)
Lewes, W. L. Capt. (ret.) 48th Regt.

Lewin, W. H. Com. (ret.) B.N., Sub-Lieut.

Boy. Naval Vols. (12.)
Lewis, Charles Algernon Gen. (12.)

Lewis, H. F. P. Capt. B.A.

Lewis, John Edw. Lt.-CoL (ret.) 68th Begt.
Lewis, J. F. Lieut. B.E. (12.)

Lewis, J. Owen Lt.-Col. late 37th Begt.
Leycester, E..M. Capt. B.N. (11.)

Leyland, T. N. Lt.-Col. Denbigh Yeo. late

Capt. 2nd Life Gds.
Leyland, T. Capt. Denbigh Yeo. late

Lieut. 2nd L. Gds.
Liddell, B. S. Capt. 10th Hussars (1/.)

Liddon, Matthew Capt. 8th or King's (12.)
** iffaatgood. TM MP Surg. B. Hoa-

Sital, Chelsea (ll.)
ie, G. A. H. Lieut, late Ben. S.C. (12.)
Lindoe, F. E. Lieut. 81st Begt. (12.)

Lindsay, Charles Lieut. B.N. (12.)

Lindsay, Hon. C. H., Lieut.-Col. lltli

Middlx. R.V. late Lt.-Col. Gren. Gda. (II.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

♦Lindsay, H. Gore Capt. late R. B.

Lindsay, Lobd James L. Lt. late Gr. Gds.
Lindsay, Robert J. Loyd, ©.C Lt -Col.

HJLC. late Lt.-CoJ. S.F.Gds. MP. {II.)
Linton, J. K Master (ret) I.N.

ListoweU, Kabl of Capt. late S. F. Gds.
Litchfield, E.F. Lt-Col. late Beng. N. I. (12.)
Litchford, £. B. Lieut, late 48th Beng. N.I.
Little, H. A. Major Beng. S. C. (11.)

Ijtt]edale,Bdward Major late 1st Roy. Drs.
Littledale, F. C. H. Lieut 29th Regt, (11.)

Iiojd, Arthur C.
Lloyd, C. W.
Uord, Francia T.
Lioyd, G. M.
Lloyd, Neaham T.
Lbyd, R. O.
Llojd, T. H.
•Lloyd, Thomas

Lieut 45th Regt. (II.)
Major 16th Regt. (12.)
Capt R.A. (12.)
Lieut. R.A. (11.)
Lieut. 82nd Regt. (ID
Lieut. R.E. (12.)
Capt. R. A. (11.)
Capt. 85th Regt.
LWd, Thoa. F. Lieut-Col. 98th Regt. (11.)
LbVd, Rer. W. V., MA. R.N. FRGS. Naval

Inst (1L)
Lloeuyn, W. B. Major R.A. (1/.)

Loco, Geo. Capt. late Duke of Lancas-

ter's Yeo. MP.
Locfa,H.B.,GB, Lt-Col. 2nd Cheshire Mil.

tnd Lieut-Gor. Isle of Man (11.)
Loeh, W. Capt 19th Bengal Cay. (11.)

Loehner,C.P. Maj.late 39th Midx.R.y.(12.)
•L»kt A. C. Knox Lt.-Col. 60th Regt(U)
L,«k, H. Lt-Col. 108th Regt. (11.)

Loclhart, Arch. Inglis, CB. Mai-Gen.

Lxkwood, A. B. M. Capt Cold. Gds.

Ltrock, Herbert Major R.E. (It.)

Lder. F. C. J. Lieut 82nd Regt. (12.)

L<fee, Frank Capt. R.A. (11.)

L*lge, I. W. Lieut. 5th W. Y. Mil. (11.)

Capt (ret.) Indian Army

KCB. MD.

(11.)
«**ie, Cosmo Gordon, MD. Dep. Surg.-Gen,

•1/.)
'Lombard, Gh C. S. Capt and Adj. Civil

farice B. Vols. (12.)
louden, H. Brrington, CB. CSI. Maj.-Gen.

ill)
Infield, F. Major 8th or King's (11.)

>s^brdt The KabloI, KCB. Maj.-Gen. (12/
Uigmore,Tho8w,CB. D.I.G.ofHosp8.(12
'jr-usdale, Eabx of Major Westmoreland

od Cumberland Yeomanrv (12.)
-rag, Sir Wm, KCB. Vice-Adm. (12.)
-rrJi; John Williamson, CB. Col. R.E.(12.)
L w. Alex., CB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)

law, Sir John, KCB. GCSI. Gen. (12.)
u wt, A. "Vice-Adm.

•L^e, E. W. D., CB. Col. (12.)

-*«,W. D. Capt.

ttfET, BW..CB- Col. late 47th Regt. (12.)
^£r, FTw. Comr. R.N. (12.)

-wd, C. B. Capt. R.E. (12.)

-vd. John K., CB. Gen. (12.)

~«d,R.GkA~Col.(h.p.)late62ndRegt (12.)

*Ap, W. B.

«iW.O., CB.

Rear Adm. (12.)

in, G. B. Babl of, GCB. Gen. Col. 1st
LGda.
--t*. I*nia A. Cart, late 6th L. R. V. (1 2.)

Ludlow, John Maj.-Gen. (12.)

Lugard, E. J. Capt 4th King's Own R. (12.)
Lumsden, H. W. LieutCol. late R. A. (12.)
Lushington, Sir Stephen, GCB. Adm. (12.)
Lynch, E. J. Capt 3rd Buffs (12.)

LynchjStaunton, G.S. Capt. (ret.) 14th Hue.

(12.)
Lynch, W.W. Lt.-Col. 10th Regt. (12.)

Lynn, James Lt-Col. (ret.) RE.

Lyon, Francis Major R.A. (12.)

Lyon-Fremantle, A. J. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds.
Lyons, Algernon McL. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Lyons, W. Col. (12.)

Lysons, D., CB. Major-Gen., Quarter-

Master Genl. (12.)
Lyttelton, Hon. C.G. Lt. Worcester Yeo. (12.)
Lyttelton, the Hon. N. G. Lt. R. Bgde. (12.)

MABERLY, W. Leader Lt.-Col.

McBean,W. Lt-Col. (ret) l»tW.I. Regt. (12.)
McCallum, G. K. Capt. 92nd Highs. (12.)
MacCarthy, R. H. Lt 4th K. O. Regt. (12.)
McCausland, M. F. H. Capt. R.A. (12.)

•MccGwire, E. T. St. L. Col. 1st Royal

Scots (12.)
McCleyerty, Wm. A. Gen. Col. 48th Regt.

(12.)
Mc£liitfock, Sir F. Leopold, KT. FRS.

Rear-IahTT (12.)
M'Coy, T. R. Capt. late 65th Regt.

McCoy, Washington J. Lt South Devon.

Mil. (12.)
•M'Crea, J. D. Capt. R.N. (12.)

McCreagh,M. Maj.(ret)4thB.I.Dr.Gds.(12.)
•McDonald, A. M. Col. (tt)

Macdonald, J.H.A. Lt-CoLEdin.City R.V.

(12.)
Macdonald, N. Major 5th Fus. (12.)

Macdonald, Wm. Lieut.-Col. B.S.C. (12.)
MacDonnell, H. J. Capt late 12th Regt. (12.)
MacDonnell, John R. late Maj. 19th Middx.

R.V. (12.)
McDonough, S. Maj. late 3rd W.I. Regt. (12.)
M'Dougall, Patrick L. Maj.-Gen. (12.)

McDougall, Niel, Esq. Controller's Depart-
ment of the Nary (12.)

McDougall, W. B. Lt. 78th Highlrs. (12.)

.(12.)
•Macgregor, H. G. Capt. 29th Regt. (12.)

MacFarlan, D.

Lt-Col. R. H. A.

•MacGregor, Chas. M., CSI. Col. Ben. S.C.

(12.)
M'Gregor, Sir Duncan, KCB. Gen. (12.)
McGregor, Sir Geo., KCB. Major-Gen. (12.)
McGeral-Hogg, Sir J., KCB. Lt-Col. late
1st Life Gds. MP. (12.)

ir Chas. Bart. Army Agent
late Surg.-General (12.)
Tackay, H. A. " Capt R.A. (12.)

Mackay, Henry Fowler Capt.

Mackean, Kenneth Lieut. R.E. (12.)

McKean, A.C. Lieut. 6th Innisk. Drag. (12.)
" - " Maj. (11.)

Major late 75th Regt.

Mackenzie, Hugh
Mackenzie, J. D.

(1*0
Mackenzie, John K. Lt.-Col. (unatt.) (12.)

McKiUop, H. F. Capt R.N. r • *

Mackinnon, D. H. Lieut-Col. S.O.I

B 2

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Mackinnon, GhH., CB.
Mackinnon, L. B.
Mackinnon, L. D.
Mackinnon. W.

Lacxinnon, \v. C.
Mackinnon, W. H.
•Maclean, F. D.
Maclean, P.

Gen. (II)

Oapt. R.N. (12.)

Capt. Cold. Gds. (12.)

Dep. Stfrg.-Gen.

Capt. 3rd Buffs (12.)

Oapt. Ghren. G-ds. (11.)

Lt.-CoL late 13th Hubs.

, _ . Major-Gen.

Maclean, W. C.,MD.CB. Dep.Insp.Gen.(12.)
McLaughlin* Jfidwar Major R.A. (12J

MacLeod, Norman
McLeod, W. C.
McMahon, Alex. R.
•McMahon, C. J.

lateLt. H.A.G.
Lt.-Gen. (1/.)
Lt.-Col. M.S.O. (12.)
Lt.-Col. R.A. (1/.)

M'Murdo, W. M. STI QR. Lieut-Gen. (II.)
HcAiuiiin, J". Oapt. Mad. S. Corps (12.)
McNair, J. A. Fred. Major R.A. (12.)

Macneill, J.G.R.D«v.Capt. Mad. S. C. (12.)
McPherson, Cecil Blajor 17th Regt. (11.)
Mackpherson, J. 0. Oapt. R.E. (U.)

Macpherson, J. F. Oapt. Border Rifles (ll.)
Macqueen, D. R. Oapt. 75th Regt. (ll.)
Madden, Geo. 0. Lieut. 1st W. I. Regt. (ll.)
•Maillard, R. T. Oapt. 16th Lancers (1/.)
Main, Robt., Esq. Royal Naval College (11.)
Mainguy, F. B. Major R.E. (1/.)

Mainwaring, Alfred R. Lieut. R.A. (ll.)
Maitland, C. L. B., CB. Maj.-Gen. (in
Maitland, G. G. W., FRCS. D.S. Gen. (1/.)
Maitland, H. L. Capt. R.N. (11.)

Malet, C. St. Lo.Lt.-Col. late S. F. Gds. (ll.)
Malet, H. C. B. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (ll.)
Malet, Harold E. Capt. 18th Hussars (11.)
Malgarini, F. L. Lt. Forfar and Kincardine

Art. Mil. (11.)
Majendie, V. D. Major R.A. (11.)

Malcolm, G. A., OB. Lieut.-Gen. Col.

105th Madras L. I. (ll.)
Malcolm, G. J. Capt. R.N. (11.)

Maiden, Viscouot Lt.-Col. Herts Yeo. (If.)
Malley, James Lieut, (ret.) 53rd Regt. (11.)
Maltby, J. M. Lieut. 1st W. I. Regt. (12.)
•Malthus, Sydenham Major 94th Regt. (11.)
Malton, W. D. Oapt. late Scottish Borderers

Mil. (1/.)
Manby, Charles, FRS. Lt.-Col. Eng. and

Railway Vol. Staff Corps (11.)
Manderson, G. R. Major R. H. A. (12.)
Mansell, A. B. Lieut. R.N. (11.)

Manson, A. R. Maj.-Gen. (11.)

Manson, Walter Oapt. R.E. (12.)

March, W. H., CB. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) R.M.L.I.
Margesson, W. G. Lt.-Col. (11.)

\f^pndinr H. R. Mai, late 1st Royals (12.)
Marknam, W.T! Capt. late Cold. Gds.

Marquis, Jas. Col. 17th Ben. N. I. (12.)
Marriott, C. F. Capt. 6th Dr. Gds. (12.)
Marriott, H. 0. Maj. (ret.) 60th Rifles (1/.)
Marriott, W.F.,CSI. Maj.-Gen. (unatt.)(U)
Marriott, W. H. Capt. 11th Regt. (12.)
Marry at, J. H. Capt . R.N .

Marsden, Richard Capt. R.N.R. (12.)

•Marsden, William Capt. 82nd Regt. (12.)

Capt. Martin Rifle V.

-Marshall, John, W.

N.Z. (12.)
Marsham, H. S.
Marsh, W. D.

Lieut. 60th Rifles (12.)
Lieut.-Cul. R.E. (12.)

Martin, Edw. Lt. late 28th Mad. N. I. (12.)
•Martin, Francis Oapt. R.N. (12.)

Martin, G. W. T. Lt. late 46th Reg. (12.)
Martin, Jas. Staff-Surg.-Maj. A.M.D. (12.)
Martin, James J. Staff-Surg. R.N. (12.)

Martin, Thos. Lt.-Col. (12.)

Martin, W. L. Comr. R. N. (12.)

Martin, Sir Wm.F., Bart. GOB. Adm. (12.)
Marx, John L. Lt. R.N. (12.)

Massy, H. H., OB. MD. Surg.-Gen.

Matheson, Duncan Lt. 6th Innis. Drs. (12.)
Matthews, F. P. Oapt. late 1st Sussex R. V .

(12.)
Maude, Ron. Francis Oapt. R.N. (12.)

Maude, F. F., ©.C OB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)
Maude, F. N. Lieut. R.E. (12.)

Maude, G. A., OB. Lieut.-Col. (ret.) R.H.A.
Maunsell, D. Chas. Oapt. R. E. Mid. Mil. (12.)
Maunsell, F. R., OB. Col. R.E. (17.)

Maurice, J. F. Capt. R.A. (12.)

Maw, James Capt. 3rd Essex Art. Vols. (12.)
Mawson, W. Willxniott Lt.-Col. 33rd Lane.

R.V. (12.)
Maxse, Fred. A. Rear- Adm.

Maxse, H. F. B. Lt.-Col. late Cold. Gds.
Maxwell, H. H., CB. Maj.-Gen. R.A. (12.)
Maxwell, R. J. Major (h.p.) 80th Regt. (12.)
Maxwell, W. H. Capt. R.N. (12.)

May, John Capt. Hants Militia (12.)

May cock, J. G. Lt.-Col. late 14th Regt. (12.)
Mayers, J. P. Col. late 86th Rest. (12.)

Mayne, J. O. Lieut.-Col. R.E. (12.)

Mayne, J. T. B. Capt. 73rd Regt. (1/.)

Mayo, John H. late Lt. W. Norfolk Mil. (1/.)
Mayo, W. R. Asst. Commissary (1/.)

Meade, H. R. Major R.E. (12.)

Medwin, Frederick late R.N. (11.)

Meehan, Geo. Waller Lieut.-Col.

Melgund, G. J. Vibooukt Lt.(ret)S.F.Gda.

(10
Mellor, A. Lieut, (ret.) 8th or King's (11.}
Melville, P. Lawrenoe Lt. 97th Regt. (1Z.>
Melvill, Teign Lieut. 24th Regt. (1/.)

Mends, Geo. 0. Rear-Adnu

Mends, Herbert Col. (ret.) 2nd W. I. R.
Mends, Sir W. R., KCB. Vice-Adm. (1/.)
Merrewether, Sir W.L.,CB. KCSI. Col. (11.)
Meryon, J. E. Lieut. R.N. (1/.)

Mesham, Arthur Oapt. latelst R. Drs. (1/.)
Messerry, Geo. T. Oapt. 21st Middlesex

R.V. (12.)
Metcalfe, John A. Oapt. 1st Durham Mil. (l/.\
Methuen, F. H. P. Lord Col. R. Wilt*

Mil. ADC. to the Queen
Methuen, Hon. Paul 8. Lt.-Col. S. F. Gds

(12.)
Meurant, Edwd. Lt.-Col. 83rd Regt. (1/.)
Meyrick, Aug. W. H. Col. late Sco. Fus. G ds.
MichqlL Sir Johnr GpR. Lt.-Gen. Col. 86th

Michel, J. Edward, CB. Col. R.H.A. (U.)
Michalowski, F. H. Capt Georgetown Art

Mil. (12.)
Middleton, F.D. Col. (1/.)

Middleton, Sir G. N. Broke. Bart., CB

Vice-Adm. (12.)
Middleton, O. R. Oapt. 4th King's Own (11.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

lfiUmay, H. P. St. J. Lieut. Gren. Guards

(U)
•Mildmay, &r Henry B.P.St John, £art.

Lt.-CoL Hants Teo. (12.)
•Mildmay, H. A. St. J. Capt. Rifle Brigade

ill)
Mile*, H. 8. G. Capt 101 st Begt. (12.)

Mdw, Thoa. G. Major N. Durham Mil. (1/.)
Miller, D. 8. Lt-Col. (11.)

Miller, D. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Muler, G. M, CB. Lt.-Col.79th Highl*.(12.)
MOler, H. M. Capt. R.N. (11.)

MiSer. T. C. Capt. 43rd Begt. 111.)

Miller, Tbos. B. Lieut. B. N. (11:)

Million, Charles Major late 39th Beg. (10
Miliington, Walter Capt. late 3rd Essex

Art. Vols. (II.)
Mule, C. J. C. Maj.-General

•Milam, G. A- Lt-Col. (h.p.) B.A. (12.)
MJne, Sit Alex., <9»r*.,GCB. Admiral (12.)
Milne, H. Maj.-General (12.)

Miber, Joseph Mid. B.N. (1/.)

MiDchinJ.W. Capt Paymstr. 58th Regt(12.)
MidieU, C. B. H. Major B.M.L.f. (11.)
UndieU, C. J. Capt. late Vict. Rifles (U)
Mitchell, Hugh H. Capt. Rifle Brig. (11.)
Mitford, John Lt. Ciril Service R. V. (12.)
Xj&tt, K. M Col. (12.)

K Jooy, C. M. Capt. B.A. (1/.)

IMrneox, W. C. F. Lt. 22nd Begt. (11.)
hssm^AJsx^BS. Biai.Edin.Art.Mil. (1/.)
•ibncnen; Geo. H. jUt-Col. 8. F. Gds.

M<mcrieff, L. N. Comr. B.N. (1/.)

Money, £. C. Capt. 87th Fus. (I/.)

Mduon, Han. D. J. Capt. (ret) 96th Begt
tfmtogu, Andw. Lt. 5th W. York Mil. (1/.)
aWgomerj, G. 8., CSI. Mai .-Gen.

IcBtgomerj, W. E. Capt 8. F. Gds. (11.)
Ijntixambert, C. E. Maj. Canadian Art. (11.)
Kntresor, H. E. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds.
Hxdy, J. L., MA. late Chap, to the Forces

(U)
h/ore, Arthur W. Lieut R.N. (12.)

■M**e, A G. Montgomery Col. 4th Huss.
Muore, H., CB. Lt.-Col.

Moore, H C. Lieut. B.B. (11.)

M we, John C. Capt late Rifle Brigade (12.)
fcore, B. C, CB. Lt-Gen. B.A. (11.)

Mare, Thomas C. C. Maj. -Gen. R.M.L I.
s>wt, W. 8. Capt. late Gr. Gds. (1/.)

KniT, H. E. H. Drummond Capt. S. F. Gds.
Xmj, J. C. D. 8. Major 28th Bo. N.l. (11.)
* **. George Lt 3rd Essex Art. V. (11.)
i rtm,G B. Maj. Town Maj.Gibraltar (12.)
%npaJIoratk> Maj.Paym.l00thReg.(12.
•fcrgm, J. P. Major B.A. (11.

*****, James A. Major (ret.) R.M.LJ. (12.
H^wfl, H. Capt late Essex Rifles fit.

Kfrieaao, J. Lieut-Col. (11.

Hme»tm,B. Col. (12.)

M^ru, Mark Sayal Instructor (11.)

H-mion, W. lu Col. B.B. (12.)

^"•e, H. B. pep. Com.-General (12.)

K.«heid, 4. A. Lieut. 24th Beet. (12.)
**timer, Stanley Capt. late 60th Rifles (11.)
Kitlork, Wn. Ens. Vict. B.V. (1/.)

,MortonvG. de 0. Lieut. 6th Begt.

Mostyn, Ron. M. late Paym. 21st B.N^B. Fus.
Mostyn, Hon. Roger Lt.-Col. (ret.) 8. F. Gds.
Mount-Charles, G. H. Eabl of Col. (h.p.)

1st L. Gds.
Mountsteyen,F.H. Capt. (h.p.) R.M.LJ. (12.)
Moysey, Charles John Capt. B JS. (11.)

Muir, Sir W. Muir, KCB. Director-Gen.

Army Medical Department (11.)
Muncaster,LoBD,Capt. late R. Brig. MP. (1/.)
Mundy, A. M. Capt. late Notts. Mil. (11.)
Mundy, Sir G. Rodney, KCB. Adm. (II.)
Munro, Campbell Capt. late Gren. Gds.

Monro, C. A. Capt Bengal Staff Corps (12.)
Murchison, K. R., formerly of the 13th and

58th Begts. and late Capt Som. Yeo. (12.)
Mure, W.f LtiOoL (ret.) 8. F. Gds. MP. (12.)

Lieut 82nd Begt. (12.

Murphy, J. A.
Murray, A. M.
Murray, John
Murray, J. J.
Murray, K. D.
Murtogh, John
Mussenden, W.

Lieut. R.A. (12.1

Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds. (12.1

Col. Ben. S.C. (12.1

Capt 89th Begt. (11.)

Surg, (h.p.)

Lt-Col. 8th Hussars (12.)

NAGHTEN, A. B. Lt.-Col Hants Art.MiL,

MP. (1/.)
Nangle, W. C. Major B.A. (1 1.)

•Napier, Gerard J. Bear- Adm. (12.1

Sir Geo. 8., ECB. Capt R.N. (12.1
Nares, h.. *T. Lieut 17th Begt. (12.1

#Nason, Jno. Col. (12.1

•Needham, John L. Capt. B.M. Art. (12. j
Neilson,W. M. Lf.-Col.25th Lanark B.V. (12.)
Nelson,Thos.,MD. DJ.G.Hospls.R.N. (12.)
Nelson, T. Lt-Col. E. & N. Y, MU. A. (12.)
Nelson, W. F. Capt. B.A. (12.)

Neaham, T, ?. W- Lieut R.N. (12.)

Nettleship, W. F. Capt 9th Surrey B. V. (12.)
Neville, Edward £t.-Col. (ret.) S. F. Gds.
Newall, D. J. F. Col. B.A. (12.)

Newdigate, Edw. Col. (12.)

Newdigate, H. R. I,. Lt.-Col. Jtifle Brig. (12.)
Newington, Cecil G.H. Lieut. 31st Begt (12.)
Newington, C M. H. Capt. 22nd Regt. (12.)
Newton/YV.E. LtlatelstMid.£ng.V.(12.)
Newton, W. 8. Lieut-Gen.

Nicholetts, G. Lieut-Col 27th Bo. N.I. (12.)
Nicholls, Henry Maj. (ret.) 94th Begt

•Nicholson, Henry F. Capt, JLN. (12.)

Nicholson, Lothian, C$. Col. B.E. (12.)

Nicholson, W. G. Lieut. RE. (12.)

Nicholson, 8. J. Major B.A. (12.)

Nicoll, Chas. B. Surg. -Maj. (ret.) Gr. Gds.
Nicolls, O. H. A- Lt. Col. JtA. (II.)

Nicolson, Sir Fred, W. &> Bart.t CB. Ad-
miral (12.)
•Nicolson, Frederick Lieut. ftH.A, (12.)
Noble, Andrew Capt late R.A. (12.)

Nolan, J. Philp Capt. B.A„ MP. (12.)

Nolloth, Edward, MD. Staff Surg. R.N. (12.)
Norbury T. C. N. Col. late 6th Pr. Gds.
•Norcock, Charles J. Lieut. R.N. (12.)

Norcop, W. J. Lieut B.N. (12.)

Norcott, Wm. S. B., CB. Major-Gen. (12.1
Norman, C. £. Capt late JB. S ^ ^ ' <

Norman, Henry Lieut, late lfr
Norman, Sir H.W.,KCB. Majo
•Norris,G. G. Capt. 2nd Warwic

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

North, J. S. D. Col. late Q.O.L.I. Mil. MP.

(11.)
North, Hon. W. H. J. Lieut. Oxford Yeo.

late 1st L. Gds. (II.)
Northey, E. B. Capt. late 52nd L. I. (II.)
Northey, W. B. Lt.-Col. late Cold. Gds. (12.)
•Northumberland, The Duxe of Lt.-Col.

North. Mil.
Norton, G. C. G. Lieut. 2nd W. I. Bgt. (12.)
Nott, A. H. Capt. late I.N.

Nugent, Andrew Col. 2nd E.N.B. Drs. (U)
Nugent, C. B. P. N. H., CB. Col. B.E. (12.)
Nugent, 0. E. Lieut, late 43rd L.I.

Nugent, Sir G. E., Bart. Lt.-Col. late Gr.

Gds. (12.)
Nugent, St. G. M. Col. (12.)

Nuthall, W.F. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

OBBAED, Harry S. Col. Bene. S. C. (12.)
O'Brien, A. V. Capt. 60th Rifles (11.)

O'Brien, Donatus Capt. late E.S.C.

O'Brien, E. D. C. Capt. B. E. (12.)

O'Brien, J. T. N. Xt.-Col. (12.)

O'Byrne, Robert, FBGR. Nayy Agent (12.)
O'Connell, H. Lt.-Col. Mad. S. C. (12.),
O'Connor, J. J. Inspeo. of Cape Frontier

PoUoe (in
Ogg, G. S. W., MD. Sure. (12.)

OgUyy, Thomas CoL late 2nd L. Gds. (12.)
O'Hea, J. B. Capt. late 25th K. O. Bor. (12.)
Oldfield, Chas. J. Lt.-Col.

Oldfield, Geo. T. Capt. Bl. Lou. Mil. (12.)
•Oldfield, Bichd. Major B.A. (12.)

Oldham, H. H. Capt. 79th Begt. (12.)

Ommanney, F. G. Nayy Agent (12.)

Ommanney, F. M. Conrr. B.N. (12.)

Ommanney, M. F. Lieut. B.E.

O'Neill, Win. late Mil. Store Dept. (12.)

Onslow, A. Edw. Lt.-Col. late S. F. Gds.
Onslow, Geo. M. Capt. 20th Hussars (12.)
Onslow, Sir W. W. B., Bart. Capt. Bl.

Cornwall Bangers, late Lieut. 12th Begt.

(12.)
Ord, Sir H. St. G., Kt.y CB. Maj.-Gen. B.E.
Ormsbr, Geo. F. Capt. late 2nd Dr. Gds. (12.)
O'Borke, Albert J. Lieut. B.N. (12.)

•Osborne,Eric W. Ltlate lstW.I.Beet. (12.)
•Ostrehan, E. S, Major Bomb. S. C.

Otway, Charles Maj.-Gen. B.A. (12.)

Otway, W. M. Capt. late 1st. Dr. Gds. (12.)
Otway, W. P. Capt. Cold. Gds.

Ouchterlony,T. H. Capt. B.A. (12.)

Outram, A. M. Lt. Bl. Sher. For, MU. (12.)
•Owen, C. H. Lieut.-Col. BJL (12.)

Owen, F. H. E. Capt. B.M.A. (12.)

•Owen, G. A. Capt. late 107th Begt. (12.)
Owen, B. E. Lieut. 69th Begt. (12.)

Oxley, J. S. Lt.-CoL 19th Middx. B,V. (12.)

PADDISON,H. Lieut. 48rdMiddx.B.V. (12.)
Page, G. H. Col. 47th Depot Brig. (12.)
•Page, S. F. Major late Lon. Sc. B. V. (12.)
Paget, Lobd Geo. A. F., BOB. Lt.-Gen.

Col. 7th Dr. Gds. (12.)
Palk, Lawrence H. Lieut. 1st Devon Yeo.

late Lieut. S. F. Gds. (12.)
Palliser, Sir Wm., KCB. Maj. (12.)

Palmer, Frederick Lieut.-CoL S. F. Gds.
Palmer, John Capt. B.N. (12.)

Palmer, Sir B, Bt. Col. (ret.) 2nd L. Gds.
Pamphilon.F. W. Lt. 2nd S. Mid. B. V. (12.)
•Panter, H. G. Major 22nd Begt. (12.)

Pardoe, T. F. Capt. 22nd Begt. (12.)

•Parish, H. Woodbine^ CB. Col. late

4bth Begt. (12.)
Parke, Wm., CB. Maj. -General (12. 1#.)

•Parker, C. W. Maj. late 4th B. Middlx.

Mil. and 69th Begt.
•Parker, F.-G. S. Major 54th Beg. (12.)

Parker, Bich. Lt.-Gen. Col. 5th Dr. Gds. (12.)
Parker, B. J. H. Capt. B.E. (12.)

Parkinson, C. F. Lt.-Col. 95th Begt. (12.)
Parkinson, F. F. Lieut. 17th Begt. (12.)
Parlby, Wm. Gen. Col. 21st Hue. (12.)

Parnell, A. Major, B.E. (12.)

Parnell, Hon. H. W. Lt. late B.N. (12.)

Parnell, W. H. Lieut.-Col. Gr. Gds.

Parratt, J. E. T., MD. I. G. of Hosps.

Parsons, Clifford Major 8rd Buffs (12.)

Parsons, Wm. Comr. B.N. (12.)

Pasley, Sir T.Sabine, Bart.,XCB. Adm. (12.)
Patchett, W.Gordon Lt. 2nd W.I. Begt. (12.)
Paterson, H. W. Capt. 2nd W.I. Begt.

(12.)
Patterson, Darid Aikman Major Psrm.

21st Fusiliers (12.)
Patterson, W.T. L. Col. late 88th Begt. (12.)
Pattison, Bowles Capt. late 40th MidcLsex,

B.V. (12.)

.47thHegt.(12.)

Maj.-Gkm. Unatt. (12.)

Capt. (ret.) S. F. Gds,

Master R.N. (12.)

Capt Suffolk Mil.

*ayn, Wm., CB.
Paynter, John
Peacock, Geo.
Pead, Leonard W.

Art. (12.)
Pearce, Fras. G.

Paym.B.N. (12.)

Pearse, Cosmo B. Capt. late Gren. Gds. (1 2. )
Pearse, Geo. G. Lieut. -Col. B.A. (12.)

•Pearson, C. X. Lieut.-Col . 3rd Buffs (12.)
Pearson, M. B. Capt. 2nd Mid. Art. V. (12.)
Pearson, B. L. O. Col. (ret.) &r. Gds.

Peel, Cecil Lennox Lt.-Col. late S.F. Gd*.

(12.)
Peel, Right Hon. Jonathan, MP. Lieut. -Gen.
Peel, J. Floyd Capt. late S. F. Gds.

Pemberton, B. C. B. Major B.E. (12.)

Pennant, Hon. A. H. D. Lt-Col. late Gr. Gds.
Pennefather, B. Don. Lt.-Col. E. Bent Mil.
Pennefather, B. P. Capt. B.E. (ll.j

•Pennethorne, L. P. Capt. B.A. (12.)

Pennington, Edward War Office (12.)

Penny, Stapleton Major R.A. (12.)

Penrhyn, Lobd E. G. D. Col. Comt Royal

Carnarvon Rifle Corps
Peploe, D. Peploe Major 1st Heref.R.V. (12.)
Perceval, Jno. J. Lt. (ret.) 17th Begt. (12.)
Perceval, Spenoer Lieut. -Gen.

Percy, George A. Capt. Gr. Gds. (12.)

Percy, HughM., LORD, ©.C. KCB. Lt-Gen.
Perry, Lionel F. Lieut. B.A. (12.)

Petre, John Barney Capt. late 1st Drs. (12. )
•Petrie, Martin Lt -CoL (h.p.) 97th Begt.

" 0*.)
•Peyton, Francis QqI late 98$ B#gt. (12.)

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Peyton, T. G. Major Heref. Mil. (11.)

Phayre, R., CB. Bng.-Gen. Bom. S. C.

ADC. to ike Q**en (12.)
Philips, Alex. Capt. R.N. (If.)

Philip*, Geo. Major R.B.

•Philips, George Major 4th Hussars (11.)
Phillimore, Wm. Brough Capt. late Gr. Gds.
Phillips, Sir B. T. Maj.-Gen. (1/.)

Phillips, L. Guy Lt.-CoL Gr. Gds. (11.)

Phillips, R. N. Major-Gen.

Phillipps, Paul Winsloe Col. R A..

PhiUpotte, W. C. Lieut-Col. R.E.

•Philp, Francis L. Capt late 2nd R.N.B.

Dra. (1/.)
Philpot, H. J. Late Surg. Brecon Mil. (1/.)
Phippe, C. R. Capt. 18th R. Irish (11.)

Phipps, R. W. Major RJL. (11.)

Pidcock, Henry H. F. Lt. 108rd Regt. (11.)
Pidcock, Thomas Paymaster R.N.

Piers, C. B. Major and Paymaster R.A.

Pierson, W. Henry Capt. R.E. (1/.)

Pigott, H. de R. Col. 70th Regt (12.)

PUffrun, Chas. Capt. Bucks Yeo. (1/.)

Capt. R.E. (12.)

Capt. Ben. S. C. (11.)

Capt. 107th Regt. (12.)

Major 7th R. Fus. (12.)

Lieut. R.A. (11.)

Lieut. 52nd Regt. (11.)

Major-Gen.

Major 5th Fus. (11.)

Puleau, H. G.
Pitcher, Duncan G.
Playfair, W. M.
•Plummer, H.
Plunkett, R. H. W.
Pocklington, £. B.
Pocklington, E. H. F.
Pocklington, F.

•Pocklington, G. H. Lt.-Coi. late 18th R.I.
•Pole, C.V. N. • Lt.-CoL late Cape M.R. (11.)
Pole, Edward Lt.-Gen. Col. 12th Lancers
Polkinghorne, Stewart Lt. R.M.L.I. (12.)
Pollard, Chas. Col. R.E. (11.)

Ponaonby, Man. A.J.G. Capt. late Gr. Gds.
•Jtooley, H. Capt. 3rd Ches. Art. V. (1/.)
Pope, James tf. l*te War Office

Pope, W. Agnew late Lt. 1st Beng. F. (11.)
Popham, Brunswick Adm. (1/.)

Porter, Whitworth Col. R.E. (11.)

Porteoua, Darid Scott Lt. 2nd R.N.B. Drs.

(IL)
Porteoua, F. P. Lieut. 24th Regt. (1/.)

•Portman, Man. W. H. B. Col. late West
Som. Yeo. MP. (1/.)

C. St. Clair Capt. 4th Regt. (11.)

Dep. Controller (11.)
Capt. Beng. S. C. (11.)
Rear-Adm.
Capt. late S. F. Gds.
Pa»er7&>W.T.J.,KCB. Com.G.-in-Chief
Powys, Son. Charles J. Fox Maj. 69th Regt
Powjs-Keck, H. L. Lt. Leicester Yeo. (1/.)
row? s-Keck, T. B. late Lt. 60th Rifles (11.)
Pratt C. Stewart. Capt 34th Ben. N.I. (12.)
Pr»tt, Lobd G. M. Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (11.)
Pntt, Robert, CB. Maj.-Gen. (11.)

Prvt, 8ir T. Simpson, KCB. Gen. Col.

37th Regt.
Patent, F. M. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Prwcott, A- 8. K. Surg. Major R.A. (1/.)
Preston, A. T. Lieut. R.E. (1/.)

rr«<um, B. H. Major M.8.C. (1/.)

Proton, F. W. H. Lt. 49th Middlesex Rifle
Volunteers (1/.)

Fmll, R. A.. CB.
Powell, Thomas H.

Preston, W. H.
Price, Arthur
Price, Edward, CB.
Price, G. E.
Prichard, A.
Prickett, Thos.
Prior, H. W.
Pritchard, G. D.

Lieut. 73rd Regt. (11.)
Paymaster R.N. (1/.)
Maj.-Gen. R.A. (1/.)
Comr. n.8., MP. (12.)
Mai. -Gen. (11.)
Capt. 56th Regt (1/.)
Lieut. 81st Regt. (II.)
Col. R.E. (11.)
Probyn, Sir D. M. Maj.-Gen., WM. KCSl.

CB. (1/.)
Protheroe, M. Capt. M. S. Corps fl 2.)

Prowse, J. F. Comr. R.N. (1/.)

Puckle, Alfred D. Capt. Lon. Sc. R. V. (1/.)
Pugh, Horace, J. M. Lieut. R.N. (12.)

Pullen, W. J. 8. Rear-Adm. (11.)

Purdon, H. G. Lieut. 64th Regt. (11.)

Puriris, J. 0. Capt. R.N. (11.)

Pye, Kellow Chas. Capt. R.E. (1/.)

Pym, Francis late Lieut. 1st Life Guards

(11.)
Pym, Samuel Capt. R.A. (12.)

QUICK, George,

Engineer R.N. (12.)

RADCLIFFE, H. Lt.-Col. 39th Middz.

R.V. (1/.)
Radoliffe, R. P. Col. R.A. (12.)

Raikes, P. B. Major R.A. (12.)

Raitt, E. R. War Office (12.)

Ralston, W. C. , Capt. late 46th Regt.. (12.)
Ramsay, B. D. W. Major (12.)

Ramsbotham, John late Lt. R. Sussex Mil.

(12.)
Ramsden,W. J. F. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds.( 12.)
Randall, Alfred Capt. 13th L.I. (12.)

Randolph, Chas. W. Col. late Gr. Gds. (12.)
Randolph, Edmd. Lieut. 69th Regt. (12.)
•Randolph, G. G., CB. Rear-Adm. (12. 10*,)
Rasoh,F. Came late Lt. 6th Dr. Gds. (12.)
•Ratcliff, C. Lt.-Col. late 1st War. R.V. (12.)
Rawes, W. W. Lieut. R.A. (12.)

•Rawlins, John Major 48th Regt. (12.)

Ray, A. E. Maj. 3rd Mid. Art. V. (12.)

Rayner. W. S. Capt. 5th R. Lane. Mil. (12.)
Read, Constantino Lt-Col.(h.p.)R.S.C. (12.)
Read, 0. 0. Surg. Cold. Gds.

Read, John M. Capt. late 13th L. Inf. (12.)
Read, Philip Capt. 19th Middx. R.Y. (12.)
Reade, C. E. Comr. R.N. (12.)

Ready, C. Lt.-Col. (ret.) 55th Regt. (12.)
•Ready John T. Capt. 66th Regt. (12.)

Reamsbottom, Alfred Capt. 82nd Regt. (12.)
Redmond, J. P., CB. Col. (12.)

Reece, Fredk. L. C. Lieut. R.N. (1/.)

Reed, Sir T., GCB. Gen. Col. 44th Regt.

(1/)
Reeye.EllisP.F. Lt.-Col. late Cold. Gds. (12.)

Reid, A. T Major Bombay 8. C. (12.)

Reid, D Lieut.-Col.

Reid, P. Savile G. Lieut. R.E. (12.)

Reid, Sylvester Lieut. 11th Regt. (12.)

Reid, Wm. W. Capt. St. Kitfs H. Art. (12.)

Reid haven, Vise, late Lieut. 1st Life Gds.

(10
Eeilly, W. E. M., CB. Col. TLA. fin

Rennie,J.,CB. Capt. 1-

Renuy, Henry, CSI.

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Rentssch, G. H. Assist-Surg. 1st Middx.

Art Vols. (12.)
Reynardson, 0. B. Lt.-CoL Ot. Gds. (12.)
Ricardo, Horace Capt. Or. Gds.

Richards, W. H. late Lieut. R N. (1/.)

Richardson, J. S. Lt.-Col. N. S. W. Local

Forces (12.)
Richardson, W., CB. M.-Gen. late Indian

Army (1/.)
Richmond, H. T. Lt.-Col. S. O. P. (II.)
Rickards, A. W. L. Lt. 1st R. Scots Regt.

(II.)
Ricketts, Geo. T. late Lt. 5th Dr. Gds. (12.)
•Riddell, H. S. Hutton Lt. 60th Rifles (11.)
Ridgway, Alex. Maj . late 1st Devon Mil. (11.)
Ridgway, T. Gh Army Agent (1/.)

Ripley, Thoi. G. F. late Ord. Dep. (II.)
Ripon, Marquis of (21.)

Robarts, H. 0. Dep. Lieut.

Roberts, C. P. Major R.A.

Roberts H. B. Col. late R.M.A. (12.)

Roberts, Wm. Col. 5th Fusiliers (11.)

Robertson, Rev. Arch, late 51st Regt. (12.)
Robertson, D. Maj. 44th Mad.N .1 . (1/.)
Robertson, Murray Capt. W. Kent M. (12.)
Robertson, R. S. Capt. Beng. S.C. ill.)

Robertson, W. John Lieut. R.A. (12.)

Robertson, W. Lt-Col. late 1st R. £. Mid.

Mil.
Robertson, W. Maj. Mad. S. C. (12.)

•Robinson, C. W. Major Rifle Brigade (12.)
Robinson, F. C. B. Capt. R.N. (12.)

•Robinson, G, C. Maj. late 17th Lane. (12.)
Robinson, H. A. Capt. 16th Lancers (12.)
Robinson, Sir Heroule* G.R. Kt. (12.)

Robinson, Henry Capt. R. E. (12.)

Rochfort, J. D. Capt. late R. Lane. R. (12.)
Rodd, John R. Capt. R.N. (12.)

•Roe, £. M. Capt 23rd R. W. Fus. (12.)
Roe, Herbert F. Paymaster, R.N. (12.)

Roe, W. C. Staff Surgeon (12.)

•Rogers, B. Capt. S.O.P. (12.)

•Rogers, J. E. V. Capt. 102nd R. M. Fus.
Rokeby, H. Lord, GCB. Gen. Col. 77th

Regt. (12.)
Rollo, Ron. R., CB. Major-Gen. (12.)

Rolls, H. J. Lt 3rd Middlx. Art. V. (12.)
Romer. R. Frank Gen. R.A.

Rbmilly, R W.s Lt. Soots Fus. Gds. (12.)
Romney, EAELof late Lt £. Kent Teo. (12.)
Rooper, C. J. T. Major Flint Mil. (12.)

Rose, Henry Comr. R.N. (12.)

Rose, H. Cooper, MD. Surg. Royal East

Middlesex Militia (12.)
Rose, W. M. Ens. (ret.) 32nd Regt. (12.)
Ross, Albert E. Maj. 5th Fus. (12,)

Ross, J. C. Capt. R.E. (12.)

Ross,John,CB.Brig.-Gen. late Kifle Brig.(12.)
Ross, W. H. Maj. Bombay S. C.

Ross of Bladensburg, J. F. G. Lieut. Cold.

Gds. 6ol* &LttsaXU*U Militaxv GMfttf,

1877 (12.)
Rosser, George Lieut, late 17th Lane. (12.)
Rotton, Arthur Lieut.-Col. late R.A. (12.)
•Roupell, CM. Capt. Inns of Court R.V. (12.)
•Room, Rolla Major late Suffolk R.Y. (12.)
Rowe, Samuel, CMG. MB. Surg.-Maj. (U.)

Rowley, C. J. Capt R.N. (II.)

Rowsell, E. P. late Capt. Lon. R.Y. (12.)
Ruddell J. A. Col. 25th K. O. Bordrs.

Ruddiman, T. Capt. (ret.) M. Army (12.)
Rumley, Randal Lieut. -General (12.)

Rushout, Sir C. F. R., Bart. Capt. (ret.)

R. H. Gds.
Russell, Cecil H. Maj. Inns of Court B.V.

(12.)
Russell, Sir Charles, Sort., &C* Lt-Col.

(ret.) Gr. Gds. MP.
Russell, Loed Chas. Jas. Fox Lt.-CoL late

60th Rifles
Russell, Christopher J. Capt R.E. (12.)
Russell, Charles R. T. Comr. R.N. (12.)
Russell, Sir D., KCB. Lieut-Gen. (1*-)
Russell, Lord Edward, CB. Adm.

Russell, Godfrey Maj. late Shropshire

Mil. (12.)
Russell, Hon. Geo. W. G. late Lt 9th Lan.

•Russell, J. C. Maj. 12th R. Lancers (II.)
•Rutlev, J. L. Capt 2nd Mid. Art. V. (1/.)
Rycroft, C. A. W. Lieut Hants Yeo.

Rycroft, Sir TX.tJBart. Capt Hants Mil. (12.)
Ryder, Alfred P. Vice- Adm. (12.)

Ryley, Frank Lieut. 81st Regt. (12.)

SABINE, Sir Edw., KCB. DCL. FRS.

Gen. Col. Commt. R.A. (12.)
Sadler, S.W. Paymr.-in-Chief R.N. (12.)
SainsburyrC. H. 8. Capt. late 91 st Regt. (12.)

. Clair, J. L. 6. Lieut. 91st Highlra. (12.)
St. George, Sir J., KCB. Lt -Gen. R.A. (12.)
St. John E. B. Capt. (h.p.) 73rd Regt. (12.)
Salis-Schwabe, Geo. Capt. 6th Dr. Gds. (12.)
Salmon, Nowell, W.C. CB. Capt. R.N. (12.)
Salmond, Wm. Capt R.E. (12.)

Saltoun, Alex. Loed Lt.-Col. late Commt

Aberdeen Mil. (12.)
•Salusbury, Fred. O., CB. Maj. -Gen. (12.)
Salwey, Alfred Dep. Com.-General

Samson, A. M, W. Major late 1st W.J.

Regt. (12,)
Sandhurst, W., Logo Lieut. Cold. Gds. (12.)
SandUands, Philip H. Major R. A. (12.)

Sands, W. H. Capt 6th W, Y. MU. (12.)
•Sandwith, J. H. Lt. R.M.L.I. (12.)

Sandys, Edwin W. Capt. R.A., Adjt

Forfar and Kincardine Mil. (12.)
Sankey, M. H. P. R. Lieut. R.E. (12.)

Sankey, Wm., CB. Maj.-Gen. (12.)

Sargent, J. N.,CB. Col. (h.p.) 3rd Buffi (12.)
Sartorius, Sir George Rose, KCB. Ad-

miral of the Fleet (12.)
Sartorius, E. H. Capt. 69th Regt.

Sartorius, G. C. Capt. Ben. S. O.

a^rtnrjii^R yLy.gr. CMG. Maj. 6th

Bengal Car.
Satterthwaite, B. A. Lieut 81st Regt. (12.)
Saunders, Arthur A. Capt R.A. (12.)

Saurin, E. Admiral (12.)

SaTile, Albany R. Capt. 18th R. I. (1/.)
Savory, H. B. . Capt. (h.p.) 78th Highlrs.

Adjt Roy. Lon. MU. (12.)
Sawyer, C. CoL late 6th Dr. Gds. (12.)

Sawyer, G. W. Capt Bomb. 8. C.

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Sue Weimar, &. 8. H. P&ikce Wm. Au-
gusta* Edward of; CB.Major-General(12.)

Sayer, J. R. S., CB. CoL late 3rd Drag.Gds.
<1JL)

Scarlett, Leopold J. Y. C. Capt. S. F. Gds.

(1/-)
Schaw, H. Lt-Col. R.E.

8chomberg, G. A., CB. Lieut-Gen. {II.)

Sconce, G. C. Lieut, late I. N. (12.)

8cot, P. G. Col. 36th Bengal N.I. (11 )

8cott, A. de C. Major R.E. (1/.)

Scott, Horn. Chae. Grantham late Col.

8. F. Gds.
Scott, C. H. S. Major Beng. S.C. (11.)

Scott, Eight Son. Lord Charles T. M. D.

Capt. R.N. (1/-)
Scott-Douglas, J. H. Lt. 21st Royal North

British Fusiliers (11.)
Scott, E. W. S. Major-Gen. R.A. (12.)

Scott, F. D. Sibbald Lieut. R.N. (12.)

Scott, Qeo. T. Capt. 2nd R.N.B.Drs. (12.)
Scott, H. B. late Lt-Col. (h,p.) 9th Regt.

(U)
8cott, Hen. Young D. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) R.E.
Scott, B. A. E. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Scott, Sir Sibbald David, Bart. Capt. late

R. Sussex Mil Art. (12.)
Scott, T. A. Capt. Beng. S.C. (12.)

Scott, William Capt. late 1st R. Drs. (12.)
8cott, W. C. E. Capt. late 100th Regt. (12.)
Scourfield, J. A. P. Capt 12th R. Lan. (12.)
Scorell, E. W. CoL late 96th Regt.

Scriren, A. G. Lieut. 52nd Reg. (12.)

fieri Ten, Horace W, Maj. 4th Middx. MiL,

Capt late 25th E. O. Bordrs.
Seafield, J. C, Eakl of late R.N.

Seaman, W. C, MD. D.I.G. of Hosps.

(12.)
Seecombe, John Rear- Admiral (12.)

Seddon, H. C. Major R.E. (12.)

Sedgwick, Leonard Lt. R. Flint Mil. (1/.)
Sefton, W. P., E abl of late Capt. Gr.Gds. (22.)
Selwyn, Jasper H. Eear-Adm. (12.)

Seton, J. L. Capt. (ret) 102nd L.I. (12.)
8eton, W. C. Capt (ret.) 82nd Regt. (12.)
SeveU, J. H. Lieut 16th Hussars (12.)

•Sewell, T. D. Capt R. Lond. Mil. (12.)

Sexton, M. J. Capt R.A. (12/)

Seymour, Lord A. C. Capt Sc. F. Gds. (12.)
Seymoiir,&fr Francis, Bart., ECB. Lt-Gen.
•Seymour, F. Beauchamp P., CB. Vice-Adm.
Seymour, F. H. A. Major Rifle Brigade
Sejmoqr, Leopold R. Lt-Col. late Gr. Gds.

(U.)
Seymour, Lobd W. F. E. Lieut. -Col.

Cold. Gds. (12.)
Shakerley, Sir Charles W., Bart. Lt.-Col.

6th Batt Cheshire R.V. (12.)
Sharpe, Benjamin Comr. B.N. (12.)

Shaw, William Capt 2nd Stafford Mil.

Sheffield, Sir Bobt, Bart. Major (ret) B.H.

Gds.
Shelley, Charles Col. (ret.) S. F. Gds.

Shenon, Alex. Nowell Capt (12.)

Shervmton, C. B. Lieut.-Col. (12.)

Shirley, James C. Capt 100th Begt (12.)

Shirley, Sir Horatio, ECB. Lieut-Gen. (12.)
Shuckbureh, Sir G. T. Francis, Bart. Maj.

late S. F. Gds.
Shute, C. C, CB. Major-Gen. MP. (12.)
Shute, Neville H. Col. late 64th Regt. (12.)
Siborne,H. T. Lt.-Col. R.E. (12.)

Sibthorp, C. C. W. Capt. late 1st Drs.

Sieh, Arthur J. Capt 2nd Middx. R.V. (12.)
Silk, Geo. C. Lieut late S. Middx. R.Y.( 12.)
Sillery, Charles Col. (ret.) 30th Regt. (12.)
Silver, Hugh A. Lt-CoL 9th Essex R.V. (12.)
Sim, C. A. Capt. R. E. (12.)

Sim, E. C. Major R.E. (12.)

Simkins, J. G. Lt. 2nd Middlx. Mil. (12.)
Simpson, Cortland H. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Simpson, D. Lieut-Gen. Beng. Army (12.)
Simpson, Frank Staff Assist. Surg. (12.)

Simpson, G. W. Y. Maj.-Gen.B.A. (12.)

Simpson, K. Hamilton Major late Paym.

33rd Regt
Sinclair, Clarence G. Sub-Lieut. Unatt (12.)
Sinclair, the Hon. the Master of Col.

late 67th Regt. (12.)
Singer, Morgan Capt. B.N. (1/.)

Singletonj-Trthn Maj. -Gen.

•Sitwell, H. C. Capt. 91st High. (12.)

Sitwell, H. S. Capt. R.E.

Skinner, P. E. M., CB Lieut-Gen. (12.)
Skinner, T. H. Capt. 1st W. York Militia,

Lieut, (ret.) 8th or King's (12.)
Skinner, Thos. Major late Ceylon Rifles (12.)
Skipton, S. S. MD. Surg. 26th Regt

*Skrine, H. Capt. 43rd Middx. R.Y. (12.)
Skrine, H. M. Maj. Som. Rifle Vols. (12.)
Slack, James Lt.- Adj. Sc. of Musk. (12.)
Slade, Charles G. Major Rifle Brig. (12.)
Sladen, Joteph Capt. (12.)

Slingsby, T. Capt (ret.) B. H. Gds. (12.)
Sloggett, W. H. D.I. Gen. of Hospitals and

Fleets (12.)
Smith, Astley C. Major (ret.) 26th KO.

Borderers (12.)
Smith, C. B. Lucie Maj. Mad. S.C. (12.)

Smith, Carlton Maj. 1st B. Surrey Mil. (12.)
Smith, Edwd. Capt.40thMiddx.R.V.(12.)
Smith, Edwd. L. Capt. N.Durham Mil. (12.)
Smith, Felix V. Capt. late 2nd Dr. Gds.
Smith, Gerard Lieut-Col.lateS.F.Gds.(l2.)
Smith, H. Fowle, MD. D. Surg. Gen. (12.)
Smith, Hy. Porter Lt. (hjp.) Rifle Brig. (12.)
Smith, James Webber, CB. Lieut. -Gen.

Smith, Jerroise Major late R. Edmonton

Rifles
Smith, Joshua Simmonds Maj. -Gen. (12.)
Smith, J. H. Col. R.E. (12.)

Smitb,M.W.,CB. Lt-Gen.Col.20thHus.(12.)
•Smith, Percy G. L. Major R.E. (12.)

Smith, P. H. Lieut, 11th Regt. (12.)

Smith, Rob. M. Major R.E. (12.)

Smith, Thomas Charlton Lt-Gen. (12.)

Smith, W. Major R.A. (12.)

Smith, Wm. Lea Lt (h.p.) 18th L.I. (12.)
Smith, W. Sidney Ad"

Smyth, E. G. Selby Lieut. 86th Beg. (i
Smyth, E. Selby Maj.-Gen. f- - "K '
Smyth, G. J. F. Lt-Col. C
1 Smyth,Henry, CB. I

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Smyth, Henry Augustus Col. B.A. (11.)
Smyth, H. F. Capt. B.A. (11.)

Smyth, J. H., CB. Maj.-General B.A. (1/.)
Smyth, James S. Capt. 17th Begt.

Smythe,Wm.Ja8.,B.A. FBS. MBIA. Maj.-

Gen.
Somerset, Edw. A., CB. Col.

Sondes, G.W. Lobd, Lieut.-Col. East Bent

Yeo.
Sothehy, Sir Edwd. S., KCB. V.-Adm. (II.)
Sparks, E. T. B. Lieut. 98th Begt. (11.)
Sparks, B. W. Major 7th B. F. (11.)

Sparshott, A. £. Lieut. B.M.L.I. (11.)

Spearman, H. B. Capt. Beng. S.C. (11.)

•Spencer, Hon. J. W. S. Bear-Adm.

Spencer, Hon. B. C. H. Col. (ret.) B.A.

Spencer, B. H. Lieut. 2nd Drag. Gds. (11.)
Spencer-Stanhope; F. W. Lt. \3th Begt.

(H.)
Spicer, B. W. Capt. late 16th Lancers

Spragge. F. P. Lieut. B.E. (11.)

Sprot, John Col. (h.p.) 91st Highlrs. (1/.)

Stacey, W. J. War Office (1/.)

Stafford, P. P. Leslie Major M. S.C.

Stair, J. Eabl of Capt. late S. F. Gds. (11.)

Stallard, Wm. Major 1st Wore. Art. V. (II.)

Stanhope, Philip S. Gen. Col. 13th L.I. (11.)

•Stanhope, Walter T. S., Capt. 1st W.

York Yeo. MP. (11.)
Stanley, C. E. H. Lt.-Col. Gr. Gds. (11.)
Stanley, Edw. Lieut. 2nd W.I. Begt. (11.)
Stanley, F. S. Lt. Hants Yeo. late B. H.

Gds. (II.)
Stanley, Hon. Fred. A. Lt.-Col. 1st Lane.

Mil., late Capt. Gr. Gds. MP. (11.)
Stanley, Hans Sloane Lt. (ret.) 16th.

Lancers (12.)
Stanley, Hon. J. C. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds.

(II.)
Stapleton, F. G. Capt. (ret.) 33rd Begt.
Stapleton, Hon. Miles Capt. Cold. Gds. (1/.)
Stapylton,G.G. 0. Col.(h.p.) 32nd L.I. (1/.)
Staunton, Geo., CB. Lieut.-Gen. Col.

92nd Highlrs.
Statham, M. Major 33rd Lane. B.Y. (1/.)
Staveley, Edmund Major B. A. (11.)

Stawell, Geo. D. Lieut. 11th Begt. (11.)
•Staweil, W. St. L. Alcock Lt.-Col. N.

Cork Rifles (11.)
Stebbing, F. A. Capt. (h.p.) 8th Begt. (11.)
Steele, Aug. F. Col. (II.)

Steele, Sir T. Montague, KCB. Lt.-Gen. (II.)
Steevens, N. Lieut.-CoJ. (II.)

Stephen J. Grant Major B. Lane. Mil. Art.
Stephens, Cecil J. Lt.(ret.) 12th B. Lane. (II.)
Stephens, Edmund Capt. B. E. (II.)

Stephens, F. S. M. Capt. 2nd B. Middx. Mil.
Stephenson, Chas. Capt. 22nd Mid. B, V. (II.)
Stephenson, F. C. A., CB. Maj.-Gen. (II.)
Stepney, Sir John Cowell, Bart, K.H. Lt.-
Col. late Cold. Gds. MP. (II.)
Bterling, John B. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds. (tt)
irteyens, Stephen J. Lieut. 90th Best. (II.)
Stevens, Wm. Major (h.p.) 2nd or Queen's
Stevenson, B. A. Major B.A. (II.)

Stevenson, W. G. Lieut, late 8. F. Gds.

Stewart, Hon. Alex. Major B. Art. (II.)

Stewart, John D. H. Capt. 11th Hut. (II.)
Stewart, J. H. Col. B.M.L.I. (II.)

Stewart,lfo».B.H.Oapt. (h.p.)42ndHigh. (II.)
Stewart, B. MoG. Capt. B.A. (II.)

Stewart. B. C. Col. (h.p.) 2nd Begt.

Stewart, Hon. Walter J. Capt. 12th K.

Lane. (II.)
Stewart, W. Houston, CB. Bear-Adm.(ll.)
Stirling, Francis Capt. B.N. (II.)

Stirling, J. S. Lieut.-Col. B.A. (II.)

•Stirling, W. Lieut-Col. B.A. (II.)

Stock, H. J. Capt. Bom. S.C. (II.)

•Stocker, M. E. 0. Major B.A. (II.)

Stoddard, Thomas H. M.-General (II.)

Stoker, W. Beauchamp Capt. 2nd W.I.

Begt. (II.)
Stokes, Alfred Capt. late 38th Begt. (lt.)
•Stone, Cecil P. Capt. 16th Begt. (II.)

Stone, George H. Lieut.-Col. B.A . (II.)

•Stoney, F. S. Major B.A.

Stopford, Horace B. Lieut. Cold. Gds. (II.)
Stopford, Bichard H. Vice-Adm. (II.)

Storer, Arthur T. Major B.E. (II.)

Stourton, Marmaduke Capt. 63rd Begt.

Stracey, Henry H. D. Lt.-Col. S. F. Gds.
Strahan, William Major B.A. (II.)

•Strange, Tom Bland Lt.-Col. B.A.

Strangways, W. A. F. Lt.-Col. B.A.

Strathmore, Eabl of Lt. late 2nd L. Gds.
Strickland, Edw., CB. Dep. Com. Gen. (II.)
Stuart, Charles Gen. Col. 46th Begt. (II.)
Stuart, Geo. $., MB. Surg. Army Med.

Dep. (II.)
Stuart, J. F. D. Crichton Lt.-Col. (ret.)

Gr. Gds. MP. (II.)
Stuart, Wm. Jas. Lt.-Col. B.E. (II.)

Stuart, W. T. Capt. Beng. S.C. (II.)

Stucley-Stucley, Sir George, Bart. Lieut.-
Col. late Devon Mil. Art. (II.)
Studd, Edward Major-Gen.

Studdert, B. A. Fitz Gerald Capt. Lond.

Art. V. (II.)
Sturt, C. N. Col. late Gr. Gds. MP. (II.)
Sturt, N. G. Capt B.E. (II.)

8ulivan, G. L. Capt. B.N. (II.)

8uliyan, G. A. F. Col. (ret.) 5th B. I. Lan.
Suttie, James Grant Lt.-Col. Haddington

Mil. Art. (II.) ■
Swaine, L. V. Capt. Bifle Brig. (II.)

Swann, Jno. S. Capt. late 22nd Begt. (II.)
Sweny, G. A. Capt. 7th Fus. (II.)

•8windley, J. E. Lt.-Col. 16th Hussars (II.)
•Swiney, G. Clayton- Capt. 82nd L.I. (II.)
•Swinfen, F. H. Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 5th Dr. Gds.
8ymes, W. Alex. Capt. 71st Highrs. (II.)
Symonds, C. E. H. Lieut, late B.A. (II.)
' Lieut. B. N. (II.)

Symonds, B. J.
Symonds, T. E.

Capt. B.N. (II.)

TAAFFE, C. B. Lieut. 16th Lancers (II.)
Talbot, C. B. M., MP. Dep. Lieut.

Talbot- Harvey, W. Mai. late Suffolk Art.

Mil. (II.)
Talbot, Hon. B. A. J. Capt. 1st L. Gds. (II.)
Talbot, Hon. W.L. Lt.-Col. late 21st Fus. (II.)
Tandy, Paahwood G. Comr. B.N. (II)

Tanner, Edward Major, 8th or King's

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Tangueray,0. Waugh Capt. Lon. Scot. R.Y.

Tito, Jas. Roddam
Tatham, Edward, O.B.
Tatham, W. I.
Tttnall, B. C.
Taylor, Alex., CB.

Paym. B.N. (If.)

Bear-Adm.

Lieut. B.A. (12.)

Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Maj.-Gen. R.E. (1/.)

Taylor, Brook Lt-Gen. Ool. 2nd W. I. Regt
Taylor, The Set, H. A., MA. late Chaplain

to the Forces
Tarler, Sir H. G. A., GOB. Gen. (12.)

Taylor, J. L. da P. Lt-Col. 40th Middx.

BY. (in
TeasdsJe, W. Lt. late 1st W. York Art. Y.
Teek, F., S.8.S. Vxjkr of, GOB. Hon.

Ool. Surrey Art. Y. (12.)
Tempest, Thos. B. P. Ool.

Templer, O. B. Lieut, late I. N. (12.)

Templeton, J. M. Maj. Victoria B.Y. (12.)
Templetown, Viscouwt, KCB. Gen.

OoL Oommt. 60th Rifles (12.)
Tennyson, Julius Capt. late 17th Beg. (12.)
Terry. A. F. Capt. 00th Rifles (12.)

•Terry, Frederick 8. Major Both Begt. (12.)
Terry, H. D. Lieut 9th Begt. (12/

Te8chemaker,T.B. Maj. {ret.) B.A. (12.
Tew, Cyril B. Capt. 16th Regt. (12.

Thackeray, E. T., W.€. Major R.E. (12.
Thelluson, A. G. B. Major late Cold. Gds.
Thelwall, E^ D. Lt-Col. late R.M.A. (12.)
Thesiger, Son. Fred. A., CB. Brig.-Gen.

ADO. to the Qneen (12.)
•Thesiger, Son. C. W. Col. 6th Drs. (12.)
Thomas, C. D. Lt-Col. Cold. Gds. (12.)
Thomas, H. J. OoL<ret.) B.A. (12.)

Thomas, J. W., CB. Col. (12.)

Thomas, Montagu Capt R.N. (12.)

•Thomas, Wm. H. Oapt.lst 8urreyR.V.(12.)
Thompson, C. H. Capt. R.A. (12.)

Thompson, Henry Maj. Ben. S. Corps (12.)
Tbompson,J.C. Capt.26th Middx.R.V.(12.)
Thompson, J. H. Lieut. 2nd W.I. Regt. (12.)
•Thompson,P.S.,CB. Ool. late 14th Hub. (12.)
Thompson, W. H. Capt, 1st King's Drag.

Gds. (12.)
Thomson, C. F.
Thomson, Harry
Thornton, C. E.
Thornton, B.Z.
Thornton* Harry G-

(12.)
Thorold, Cecil late Capt. 1st L. Gds. (12.)
Thuillier, H. L., OSI. Col. R. A. (12.)

Thurlow, B. H. Lieut. 60th Rifles (12.)

Thuriow, H. H. Lt. 13th L.I. (12.)

Urorsby, Jas. L. Mai. (ret.) 17th Rest. (12.)
Thursby, Rich. H. Lt-Col. late Cold. Gds.
Thurston, W. French Hon. Asbt. Surg. 3rd

Middx. Art. Vols. (12.)
Thyme, Alfred W. Lt -Col. late Gr.Gds. (12.)
Thymic, Reginald T. Lt.-Col. Gr. Gds. (12.)
Tipper, H. Roe Capt. 6th T. Ham.B.V.(12.)
Tippotte, A- M. Surg. 5th Fus.

Tipping, Alfred Lt-Col. late Gr. Gds.

Tipping, H. T. G. Lieut. B.N. (1/.)

Todd, 5. A. Lt-Col. late 14th Hus. (12.)
Jodd, T. Fe&iham Capt. 62nd Begt. (12.)

Capt. 7th Hus. (12.)

Gen. (12.)

Major late S.O.P. (12.)

Capt. 4th Begt. (12.)

Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds.

Toke, J. L. Major 1st Berks B.Y. (12.)

Toler, James O. Lieut. 74th Highs. (12.)
Tollemache, W. A. Capt. late 2nd L. Gds.
Tomline, G. Col. N. Lincoln Mil. MP.

Tomline, Wm. Capt. late 10th Huss. (12.)
Tompkins, John Paymaster R.N. (12.)

•Tompson, H.S. Capt. and Adjt. 2nd Stafford

Mil. (12.)
•Tompson, W. D. Major 17th Regt (12.)
Tongue, J. M. Gurnell Capt. 24th Regt. (12.)
Torrens, J. A. W. O. N. Lieut. 2nd BN.B.

Dragoons {12.)
Torriano, C. E. Lt.-Col. R.A. (12.)

•Tottenham, O. J. Hon. Col. Denbigh Yeo.

(12.)
Tottenham, H.L. A. Maj. 38thBeng.N.I. (12.)
Toulxnin, A. late H.E.I.C.S. (12.)

Toulmin, Alfred H. late Lt. 66th Regt. (12.)
Tower, Arthur Lieut. 95th Regt. (12.)

Towneley, Richard H. late Lt. 2nd L. Gds.

(12.)
Townsend, Samuel P. Capt. R.N. (12.)

Townshend, H. D. Gen. Col. 25th Regt (12.)
Tracy, JZoa.C.Hanbury lateLt.R.N.MP.(12.)
Tracey, Harry A. Major B.A. (12.)

Travers, E. A. Sub-Lieut 25th Regt. (12.)
Travers, James,l7«fX*CB. Lient-Gen. 12.)
Treffiry.Fred. Asst. Paymr.Control.Dep. (12.)
•Trefusis, Son. W. B. Lt-Col. S.F.Gds. (12.)
Tremayne4 A. Lt-Col. late 13th Lt. Drs. (12.)
Trench, C. Major B.A. (12.)

Trench, Son. C. G. Capt. late 1st. B. Drs.

(12.)
Trench, Frederick C. Capt. 20th Hus. (12.)
Trench, Son. W. Le Poor Major B.E. (12.)
•Trevelyan, H. A. Col. late 7th Hussars

Trevelyan, H. Lieut. 32nd Regt (12.)

Trevor, E. A. Capt. R.E. (12.)

•Trevor, W. 0., CB. Col. 64th Regt. (12.)
Trevor, W. S., ffr.C. Lt-Col. R.E. (12.)
Trimen, Richard Capt. late 36th Regt. (1 2.)
Trist, Wm. S. G. Lieut. 2nd W. I. Regt. (12.)
Tritton, F. B. Lt-Col. (ret.) 18th Regt.
Tritton, H. J. Capt 25th Surrey R.V. (1/.)
Trivett, J. F. Lieut. R.N.R. (12.)

Trollope,5trC.,ECB. Lt.-Gen.CoL 53rd Regt.
Trotter, H. Lt.-Col. Gr. Gds. (12.)

Trotter, Henry Capt. R.E. (1/.)

Trousdell, W.G., MD. D. I. G. of flosps. (12.)
Trousdeli, W. B. P. Lt. late 7th Hus. (12.)
Troyte,Chas.A.W. Maj.lstDevonR.V.(12.)
Tryon, George, CB, Capt. R.N. (1/.)

Tubby, J. BL. Assist. Com.-Gen. (12.)

Tuite, Hugh Manley Maj. -Gen.

•Tulloch, Alex. B. Capt 69th Regt (12.)
Tulloh, Alex., OB. Gen. (1/.)

Tully* Thos. Capt. 28th Middx. R. V.(12.)
Tupper, M. de Vic Major R.A. (12.)

Tupper, C. W. Capt. late K.O.L.I. Mil.
Tupper,DeVic Lt.-Col. late 8th or King's (12.)
Tupper, G. Le M. Col. R.H.A. (12.)

Turbervill, T. P. Lieut-Col. R.A. (V *

Turnbull, 0. F. A. Lieut 32nd Regt. (
Turnbull, H. J. L. Lieut. R A

Turnbull, J. F. Col. Car
Turnbull, J.R. Lt-Col. If
Turner, A. B. Ca

f 28

LIFT OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Turner, Geo. H. Capt. 17th Eegt.

Turner, T. Capt. 26th Regt. (II.)

Turner, W.Webb Capt8rd8ussexArtV.(lI.)
Turquand,W.M.G. Capt.lateColdGds.(lI.)
Tweeddale, Marquis of Lieut.-Col. late

Gren. Guards.
Twemlow, Edw. D'O. Capt. R.E. (II.)

Twemlow, P. R. Lieut. 3rd Staf. Mil. (1/.)
Twemlow,Geo. Lt-Gen.Col.Comm.R.A. (11.)
Twentyman, A.C. Capt. 4th King's Own

•Twyford, H. R. Lt-Col. Hants B. Vols.

Capt. late 36th Regt. (II.)
Tylee, Alfred Col. (ret.) R.A. (II.)

Tynte, Merryn C. 8. Capt 4th Dr. Gds .

(1/.)

UPTON, Hon. Arthur General (II.)

Underwood, A. G. Capt. 36th Middlesex

R.V. (II.)
Underwood, P. 0. Lieut. R.N. (II.)

Utterson, A. H. Major 17th Regt. (II.)

VACHER, F. S. Lt.-Cpl. (II.)

Tandeleur, C. T. B. Capt. late 12th Lancers

(II.)
Vandeleur, T. B. Capt. 7th R. Fus. (II.)
Yander-Menlen, J.H. Capt. 35th Regt. (II.)
Van-Hcythuysen, G. Capt. 14th Regt. (II.)
Van-Straubeuzee, T. Lt.-Col. R.A. (II.)
Varlo, Henry Capt. (h.p.) R.M. L.I.

Vassall, Rawdon J. P. Lieut. -Gen. (II.)
Yaughan, £. B. Maj. (II.)

Yaughan, J. F. Lt.-Col. B. Mon. L. I. M.
Yaughan, J. L., CB. Maj. -Gen. (II.)

Venner, L. 8. Lt-Col. (II.)

Yereker, T. G. Major

Verity, 0. F. Capt. 2nd Middx. B.Y. (II.)
Verney, Sir Harry, Bart. Major late Gr.

Gds. MP. (II.)
Vernon, G. A. Lieut.-Col. late Cold. Gds.
Vernon, Hon. Geo. W. H. Lieut. Scots

Fus. Gds. (II.)
•Vesey, G. H. Maj.-Gen. late B.A. (II.)
Vickerman, W. J. Capt. Stfth Middx. B.V.

(II.)
•Vickers, CB. Lt-Col. 2nd Middx. R.V. (II.)
Vidal, Chas. J. Capt, R.N. (II.)

Villiers, Hon. G. P. H. Capt Gr. Gds.(ll.)
•Vincent, C. E. H. Lt-Col. 40th

Middlesex R.V., late 23rd R.W. Fus.

Capt late Rl. Berks Mil. (II.)
Voules, W. J. Capt. late 7th Fus. (II.)

Voyle, G. E. Major-Gen. R.A. (II.)

Voyle, F. R. C. Capt. Beng. 8,C. (II.)

Vyner,R. C. deGrey Capt. (ret.) Gr.Gds. (II.)
Vyse, G. Howard CoL (ret) 2nd L. Gds.

WACE, R. Capt. R.A. (II.)

•Wade, Hamlet Coote, CB. Col. (II.)

Wahab, G. D. Capt. 20th Regt.

Wabab, H. J. Maj. Paym. 48th Regt (II.)
•Wake, A. J. Major R.A. (II.)

Wake, R. W. Lt-Col. (h.p.) R. Afr. Corps
Wale, Rev. Henry J. late Lt. 2nd Drs.

Walhouse, Edward Capt. (ret) 12th Regt.
Walker, A. G. Lieut B.A. (II.)

Walker, C.P.Beauohamp,CB. Maj.-G*n.(ll.)
Walker, D. Come ' Major R.E. (II.)
Walker, F. W. E. F. Lt-Col. 8. F. Gds. (II.)
Walker, G. F. Lieut.-Col. 12th Regt. (II.)
•Walker, G. G. Lt-Col. Scottish Bor-

derers Mil. (II.)
Walker, Sir Geo. R., Bart. Capt.

Walker, Henry C. Lieut B.N. (II.)

Walker-Myln, Hercules Lieut-Col.

Walker, John Capt. late 66th Regt. (II.)
Walker, John B. Capt R.A. (II.)

Walker, Robt Capt. Lon. Rifle Brig. (II.)
Walker, 8. Lt.-Col. late Q. O. L. Inf. Mil.
Walker, W. Capt late 69th Regt (II.)

Walker, W.L. Lt-Col. (ret) IndianArmy (II.)
•Walkey, R. Capt. R.A. (II.)

Wallace, Chas. J. 8. Maj.-Gen,

Wallace, James Lt 72nd Highl. (II.)

Wallace, N. W. Capt. 60th Bines (II.)

Wallace, W. A. J. Capt B.E, (II.)

•Waller, Geo.H. Col. 7th B. Fus. (II.)

Waller, S. Lieut BE. (II.)

Walpole, Horatio J. T. Capt. Rifle Brig. (II.)
Walsh, Hon. A., MP. Capt late 1st L. Gds.
•Walton, C. E. Dep. Com. (II.)

Walwyu, Jas. H. Capt. 28rd B. W. Fus.
Wandesfbrd, C.H.B.C. Lt. lateGr.Gds. (II.)
Ward, Edw. Wolstenholme, CMG. CoL

B.E. (II.)
Ward, John Lt.-Col. late 91st Highlrs.

Ward, John Boss Bear-Adm. (II.)

Ward, J. W. Lt 8th or King's (II.)

• Ward, Thos. Le H. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Ward, Hon. W. J. Capt. R.N. (II.)

Warde, C. A. M. Lieut.-Col. late R.A. (II.)
Warde, Sir E. C, KCB. Lieut-Gen. (II.)
Warde, Sir Francis, KCB. Lieut-Gen. Col.

Comm. B.A. (II.)
Warden, Robert, CB. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

Wardlaw,Robt,CB. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

Waring, Walter T. Capt. Kent Art. (II.)
Warner, WynyardH. Capt late 101st Regt.

(II.) ^

Warre, F. Lieut, late E. Kent Militia

Warre, Hy. J., CB. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

Warren, Charles Capt R.E. (II.)

Warren, William Capt. R.A. (II.)

Warton, R. G. Lieut. 10th Regt. (II.)

Watson, A. J. Lieut. 12th Regt. (II.)

Watson, 0. E. Lt-Col. (ret) 18th R.I. (II.)
Watson, C. M. Lieut. R.E. (II.)

Watson, D. Maj.-Gen. (II.)

Watson,F.G.D. Capt. I. of W. Art. MiL (II.)
Watson, G. L. Lt. (ret) IstL. Gds. (II.)

Watson, Henry W. Lieut, late R.E. (II.)
Watson, H. J. Capt 1st King's Dragoon

Guards (II.)
Watson, T. C. Lt late 75th Regt. (1L)

•Watts, J. G. Major Bom. 8. C. (U)

Waugh, Sir A. Scott, JK.,FRS. Major-Gen.

R.K. (II.)
WaveU, A. G. Lieut. 9th Regt (II.)

Wavell, A. H. Maj. 41st Regt. (II.)

•Waveney, Lohd CoL Suffolk 1L% Art.

ADC. to the Queen (11.)
Weatherley, F. A. Capt. (ret.) 6th Dn.

Webb, Francis E. Capt 28th Eegt

LI8T OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Webb, Theodottu* Cant, late R.E.
Webb, W. F. Lt. late 17th Lancers (1/.)

Webber, C. E. Major R.E. (11.)

Webster, G. M., MD. Staff Surg.

Webster, Robt. G. Capt. 4th Royal Lane

Mil. (1/.)

Wegg-Prosser, F. B. Maj. 1st Mid. Art. V.

(A.)
Wegg-Prosser, J. F. Lieut. Ride Brig. (12.)
Welby, A. 0. E. Cant. 2nd R. N. B. Drgs.

(1/.)
Weldon, F. Major Madras Staff Corps (12.)
WeDesley, Arthur C. Capt. Gr. Gds. (11.)
WeUemlej.Hon.Y.A. Lt.-Col.Cold.Gds.(lZ.)
Weflesley, Gr. G., CB. Adm. (11.)

Wellesley, W. H. C. CoL

Wells, Richard Capt. R.N. (1Z.)

Welsh, D. I. Major R. A. (11.)

West, Jamee B. Capt. R.N.

West, Hon. M. S. Capt. late Gren. Gds.
Westbury, B. L. P. Lord Iieut. Scots Fus.

Gds. (11.)
Westby, A. G. Capt. (ret.) 8th or King's
Westby, B. C. Capt. 16th Regt. (11.)

Westby, B. H. Capt. (h.p.) 16th Regt. (1/.)
Westloe, F. H. Lt. 106th Regt. (1Z.)

Westmacott, Spencer Col. R.E.

Wethered, E.B. Major Paym. R. A. (1Z.)

Wetherall, W. A. Lieut. Bo. S. Corps ill.)
Whale?, Hen. Lieut. North York Rifles (1Z.)
Whalley, J. L. Capt. 1st R. Lane. Mil., Maj.

4th Ad. Brigade Lane. Artillery Vols. (U)
Wbarncliffe, E. M. G. Loud Lt-Col. late

1st W. York Yeo. late Lt. Gr. Gds.
Wheatlej, Wm. Lt.-Col. (ret.) S> F. Gds.
Wlieeler, J. Rom Lt.-Col. (ret.) 29th Regt.
Wheeley, J. S. Capt. 8th or King's (1Z.)
Whiffen, H. W. S. late War Office (11.)

Whimper, F. A., CB. Maj. -Gen.

Whinfield, C. W. Capt. R.E. (11.)

Whisb, C. F. D. late Lt. 85th Regt. (11.)
Whitaker, G. T. Capt. 60th Rifles (1Z.)

Whitbread, J. W. Capt. late Suffolk Art.
White, A. Lt. late Queen's West. R.V. (11.)
•White, C.H. Capt and Adj. Cheshire Mil.

White, Cbae. W. Lt. West Kent Mil. (11.)
•White, Darid Lieut. R.N.R. late Indian

Nary (11.)
White, F. B. P. Capt. 1st W.L Regt. (11.)
White, H.D., CB. Major-Gen. (11.)

White, R. H. Col. S. F. Gds. (11.)

White, W. Lambert Capt. 4th E. Y. Art.

Vols. (1/.)
Whitehead, F.G. Col. Com. Essex Rifles (11.)
Whitehorne, A. H. Lieut. R.A. (11.)

Whitehouse, Alfred Paymtr. R.N. (11.)

Whitelocke.G.F. Lt.-Col.lateBen.Army(lZ.)
Whitla, W. Major 10th Regt. (11.)

Whitmore, E. A., CB. Col. (11.)

Whitvell, John Lt.-Col. 1st Westm. R.V.

MP. (If.)
Whyte, W. H. Capt. R.N. (11.)

•Wiekham, E. H. Capt. R.A. (ll.)

Wigraro, J. B. Capt. late Cold. Gds. (11.)
Wilbraham, Sir Rich., KCB. Lt.-Gen. (ll.)
Wudbofe.FrecL Asst.-Surg. late Cold. Gds.

Capt. 87th Regt. (1Z.)

Col. (1Z.)

Iieut. R.N. (1Z.)

Commr. R.N. (11.)

Maj.-Gen. (1Z.)

Wildman, C. W.
Wildman, John
Wilkins, Joseph W.
Wilkinson, E. H.

Wilkinson, F. G. Maj.-Gen. (1Z.)

Wilkinson, G. A. Col R.A. (1Z.)

Wilkinson, H. C. Lt.-Col. 16th Lane. (11.)
Wilkinson, H. G. Lt.-Col. late S. F. Gds.
Wilkinson, Josiah Major 105th Regt. (1Z.)
Willan, L. P. Commr. R.N. (If.)

Willes, Aug. Capt. late 104th Fus.

Willes, Geo O., CB. Rear-Adm. (1Z.)

Williams, D. W. Lt.-CoL Madras Army (1Z.)
Williams, E. A., CB. Col. R.A.

Williams, J. Aubrey late Lt. 60th Rifles (1Z.)
Williams, J. W. C. Col. R.M.A. (1Z.)

Williams, L. Major 5thW. YorkMil. (1Z.)
•Williams, O. L. C. Col. R. H. Gds.

Williams, 8ir Wm. Fenwiok, Bart., of Kars,

GCB. Gen. Col. Commt. R.A. (1Z.)
Williams, W. Major late 103rd Fus. (1Z.)
• Willock, G. W. Capt. 3rd Beng. Cav. (1Z.)
Willock, John H. Capt. B. Lon. Mil. (1Z.)
Wilmot, Francis Capt. 16th Regt. (1Z.)

Wilmot, F. M. Eardley, FRS. Major*

Gen. R.A. (1Z.)
Wilmot, Sir Hen., .Bar Z.. f£.C. Lieut-Col.

Derby R.V.M?. (1Z.)'
Witmot, Sydney, M. E. Lieut., R.N. (1Z.)
Wilmot, W. A. Bardley Capt. 5th Fus. (1Z.)
•Wilson, Charles T. Capt. late 4th King's

Own, Capt. 7th Lane. Mil. (1Z.)
Wilson, C. W., Major R.E. FRS. (1Z.)

Wilson, C. W. H. Capt. 6th R. Regt.

Wilson, Fitz-Roy Capt. Rifle Brigade (1Z.)
Wilson, Fred. W. Capt. R.N. (1Z.)

Wilson, Geo. H. Lieut. 26th Regt. (ll.)
Wilson, H. B. Capt. 7lst L.I. (1Z.)

Wilson, J. C. Capt. R.N. (1Z.)

Wilson, J.J. Lieut.-Col. R.E. (ll.)

•Wilson, John Major late 42nd High. (1Z.)
•Wilson, S.W. F. M. Col. late 18th R.I. (1Z.)
Wilson, T. M. Lt.-Gen. (U)

•Wilson, W. H. Capt. 43rd Regt. (1Z.)

Windsor-Cliye, Hon. G. H. W. Lt.-Col.

(ret.) Cold. Gds. MP. (1Z.)
Wingfield, Digby H. R. Capt. late R. H. Gds.
Wingfield, F. Dep. Asst. Com.-Gen. (1Z.)
Winmarleigh, Right Hon. Lord Col. 3rd

Lane. Mil., ADC. to the Queen
Wirgman, Theodore Col. late 6th Dras. (1Z.)
Wise, Aug. Capt. 2nd Warwick Mil. (1Z.)
Wombweil, A. Lt.-Col.

Wood, Elliott Lt. R.E. (1Z.)

•Wood, Henry Major Rifle Brig.

Wood, H. G. Col. 8th or King's

Wood, H. W. Major R.E. (1Z.)

Wood, J. Andover Major (h.p.) Madras

Army (1Z.)
Wood, Patrick Major 9th Essex R. V. (1 Z.)
Wood, Wm. Mar% Lt.-Gen.

Woodall, J. W. Major late E. and N.

York. Art. Mil. (1Z.)
Woodford, Sir J. G., KCB.KCH. Gen. (
Woodhead, H. v— A

Woodhouse, A. P. Capt. 6°
Woodrow, Alex. K. I

LIST OF ANNUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

Woods, Wm. Fell Capt. late 40thMid.R.V.

Woodward, John Capt.

Woodward, W. W. Maj. R.H.A. (11.)

Woolsey, O'B. B. Col. R.A. (U)

Worcester, H. A. W. F., M abqums of Capt.

R. H. Gds. (II.)
Worsley , Francis Capt. late I. of W. Mil.(H)
Worsley, G. F. Major R.A. (11.)

Wray, Henry Col. R.E. (II.)

•Wright, A. F. B. Capt. 101st Regt. (II.)
Wright, C. J. Lt. -Col. 1st Notts.R. V. MP.

(1/.)
•Wright, D.
Wright, H. O. P.
Wright, William H.
Wrottesley, Son. Geo.
Wyatt, H. F. J.
Wyatt, Sir Matthew

Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms (1/.)
Wygram, Godfrey J. Lt.-Col. Cold. Gds.
Wyndham, W. G. C. Lieut. 21st Hub. (1/.)
Wynne-Finch, C.A. Lt.-Col. S.F. Gds.JlJ.)
Wynne, E, W. L. Col. Gr. Gds.

Wynne, G. Lt.-Gen. R.E. (II.)

Wynyard»E.G. Major-Gen. (11.)

Surg. Ben. S.C. (II.)

Lieut. R.M.L.I. (11.)

Lt. R.A. (1/.)

Col. R.E. (11.)

Lieut. R.N. (1/.)

late Lt. Hon.

XIMENES, W. R.
Ring's (12.)

Capt. (ret.) 8th or

YARBOROTTGH, Easl of late Captain

R. N. Lincoln Mil. (II.)
Yarmouth, Easl of Capt. late Gr. Gds.

(1L)
Yates, H. Peel Col. R.A. (12.)

Yolland, W. Col. fcrte R.E (11.)

•Yonge, G. N. K. A. Col. (II.)

Yonge, W. L. Lieut.-Col. R.A. (If.)

Yorke, Sir Charles, GCB. Gen. CoL

Rifle Brigade {11. 10 s.)
Yorke, J., CB. Lieut. -Gen. (12.)

•Yorke, P. C. Capt. 4th King's Own Regt.

(XL)
Yorke, Philip S. Capt.-Col. 12th Ben. Cav.

(11.)
Young, Chas. Allen * Major

Young, J. S. Dep.-Commissary (11.)

Young Richard R. Lt. 73rd Regt. (1/.)

Young, S. S. Maj. 39th Middx. R.Y. (11.)
Young, Thos. Maj. (ret.) 37th Regt. (II.)
Younghushand, C. W. Col. BA.

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

ACHESON, Hon. E. A. Brahason Lt.-Col.
Cold. Gds. {91.)

Acland-Troyte J. E.

Own Regt (9/.)
Adand, W. A. D.
Adair, H. A. Capt
Adeane, E. S.
Airey, J. M. G.
Airer, J. T., CB.
Aitchison, H. C.

Lieut 4th King's

Lt. R.N. (92.)
(ret.) 52nd L.I. (92.)
Capt. R.N. (9/.)
Comr. R.N.
Major-Gen.
Comr. R.N. (91.)
Abock,T.St.Ii. Hon.Col. R. E.Mid. Mil. (3/.)
Aldham, W. C, CB. Vice-Adm. (91.)

Alexander, R- Lt-Gen. Col. 24th Mad. N.I.

(3/.)
Alexander W. Gordoa Major 93rd Highlrs.

(W.)
Allen, J. L. Dep.-Lt. Perthshire

Alieyne, Douglas Maj. 37th Regt. (91.)

AH, W. J. Capt. 15th Surrey R.V. (91.

Aires, W. L. Lieut. R.A. (9/.

Anderson, A. Dunlop Capt. Beng. S. C. (91.)
Andoe, Hilary G-. Comr. R.N. (91.)

Arbuthnot, C. R. Lieut. R.N. (9/.)

Archer, Clement R. Capt. late 4th Dr. Gds.
Archer, G. W. Capt. R.E. (91.)

Armstrong, Sir Alexander, KCh. LLD.
FBS., Director-General Medical Depart-
ment of the Navy (91.)
Armstrong, T. Maj. late 2nd W. I. Regt.
Arnold, Stanley Capt. Royal Lane. Art.

Mil. (91.)
Arthur, Albert F. Lieut. R.N. (91.)

Ajhmore, Ohas. , Gen. Col. 30th Regt.

Astley, F. D. Lieut. Scots Fus. Gds. (9/.)
Atkinson. T. Capt. (ret.) 1st Royals (10*.)
Austin, Thomas Colonel late 69th Rest.
Ajlmer, F. C. Col. (92.)

Aylmer, H. Major-Gen. R.A. (32.)

BABBAGE, Henry P. M.-Gen. Unatt. (91.)
Bacon, Sir H. B., Bart. Lt. G. Gds. (91.)
Baddeley, F. H. Maj. -Gen. R.E.

Badgley, W. F. Capt. Ben. S. C. (91.)

Bag*, C. Col .3rd K.O. Staff. Mil., late Gr.

Gds.
•Bagot, George Col. late 69th Regt. (91.)
Bafflie, Hugh 8. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Baldock, W. Lt. late Rifle Brigade

•Balfour, O. James Capt. R.N.

Balfour, F. W. Major late Rifle Brig; (92.)
Balfoor,S»rGeo.,KCB.Lt.'Gen.R.A.MP.(3^.)
Balfour, R. F. Lt-Col. Gren. Guards. (91.)
Barclay, A. K. Capt. late Sur. Teo.

Barclay, D. W. Capt. late 90th L.I.

Barlow, Ck Maj. late 4th Royal Lane. Mil.
Bameton, R- H. Dep.-Lt. Cheshire

Barreto, The Baron, FRSL. Capt late 4th

R. S. Middx. Mil. (91.)
Barstow, John A. Maj. late 89th Regt. (91.)

Bartley, J. Cowell
•Barton, Edward
Barton, R. J.
•Bateman, H. W.
Bates, C. Ellison
Bayfield, H. W.

Maj. -Gen.
Capt. 27th Regt.
Capt. Colds. Gds. (91.)
Capt. 31st Regt. (92.)
Capt. Bengal S. C. (92.)
Admiral
Bayley, J. A. Maj late 62nd Regt. (92.)
Baylis, E.W.D. Capt. 86th

Middx. R.V., FRGS. (92.)

•Baylis, T. Henry
R.V. QC. (92.)

•Baylis, T.Erskine
(92.)

Bayly, Geo. Cecil

Bayly, John, CB.

Bayntun,W. H.

Beadon, George

Major 36th Middlx.
Capt R. Elthorne M.

Capt R.A. (92.)
Col. R.E. (10*.)
Capt. late 12th Lancers
Capt. R.N.
Beamish, Cauld. F. Capt. late 46th Regt. (92J
Beauclerk, Rt. Son. Lord Ameliua W.

Capt. R.N.
Beaumont, Lewis A, Comr. R.N. (92.)

Beazley, Geo. G. Major 83rd Regt. (92.)
Bedford, Dukb of Lieut, late S.F. Gds.
Bell, Chas. Wm. late Lt. 16th Hus.

BeU. Mark S., f$.C. Capt. R.E. (92.)

Beresford, C. E. delaP. Lt. 46th Reet. (92.)
Beresford, W. H. Capt. late Rifle Brig.
Best, Hon. Henry late Mid. R.N. (92.)

Best, T. C. H. Major (ret.) 72nd Highls.

Betty, J. F. Major R.A. (92.)

Bewicke, Calverley T. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Biddulph, M. W. Lieut. 6th Fus. (92.J

Bidwell, J., FSA. late Lt Queen's R.V.
Bingham, G.W.P., CB. Major-Gen.

Birch, George F. Major Hants Mil. (92.)
Birch, Lightwood T. Lieut, the King's Own

1st Stafford Mil. (92.)
Black, B. West Major-Gen. R.A. (92.)

Black, James Scott Capt. late 11th Hus. (92.)
Black, William late Mid. R.N.

Black, W.T. [ a™-e,.M»joT (Q/ )

BlackwUUd, Sir JbTancis, fit. ~ Comr. R.N.

(92.)
Blair, W. Fordyce Capt. R.N.

Blake, Wm.G. Capt. 3rd W. York Mil. (92.)
Bland, F. Malthy late Mid. R.N. (9/.)

Blanshard, Rich. late Lieut-GcY.

of Vancouver's Island
Blundell, H. B. H. Lt.-Col. Gr. Gds. (92.)
Boileau,C. L. Major late Rifle Brigade (12.)
Bonamy, John Lt-Col. (ret.) 6th Regt.
Bonhote, John Lieut, late 84th Regt. (9/.)

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Borland, Oswald
Borton, Arthur, CB.

Capt. B.N.
Lieut. -Gen.

Boulderson, Samuel Major 17th Lane. (91.)
Bourbel, Le Marquis de Lt.-Col. B. £. (91.)
Bourchier, Jas. J. Maj. (ret.) 52nd L.I. (9/.)
Bourke, Paget J. Capt. R. Body Guard

Bourne, Jas. Col. Commt. B. Lane. Art. Mil.

MP. (91.)
Bousfield,N. Major 1st Lanc.R.V. MP. (91.)
Boustead, John Army Agent (32.)

•Bowden-Smith, Nath. Capt. K.N. (91.)
Bowker, J. H. Comdt. Cape Mounted

Police (91.)
Boyd, Arch. D. Capt. 1st B.E. Mid. Mil. (9/.)
Braudreth, Thomas Capt. R.N. (91.)

Branfill, B. A. Major late 86th Regt. (9/.)
Branson, C. E. D. Capt. H.M.I.M.F. (9/.)
Brassey, T., Capt. Cinque Ports

Art Mil. MP. (92.)
Bray, G. F. C. Lt.-Col. 96th Regt. (9/.)
Breton, H. W. Gen. Col. 56th Regt. (82.)
Breton, Peter Wright Capt. Hants Mil.

(91.)
Breton, W. H. Comr. R.N. (SI.)

Bright, R. O. B., CB. Maj.-Gen.

Brigstocke, G.C.H.P. Capt. late 4th Dr.Gds.
Brocas, Bernard Lt. late 6th Dr. Gds.

•Brodigan, F. Major 28th Regt. (91.)

Brook, G. S. Ordn. Storekeeper

Brooke, Charles K. Capt. 15th Regt. (91.)
Brooshooft, E. A. D. Lt.-Col. 4th E. York.

Art. y. (91.)
Brown, James Comr. R.N. (91.)

Brown, J. C. Capt. R. Lane. Art. Mil. (91.)
Brown, R., FRS. FLS. late Surgeon

Scotch Fencible Regt.
Brown, Sir W. R., Bart. Col. 1st Lano.

Art. V. (91.)
Brown. W. E. Lieut. 15th Regt. (9/.)

Browne, Augustus Lt. R.A. (91.)

•Browne, H. R. Col. 63rd Regt. (9/.)

Browne, Ten. Archdn. R. W., MA. late

Chaplain to the Forces
Browne, W. B. Ensign late 68th L.I.

Brymer, J. Capt. late 5th Dr. Gds. (32.)
Buccleuch, Walter F.M. Duke of, KG. KT.

FRS., Lord-Lieut. Co. Mid -Lothian
Buckle, Claude E. Capt. R.N. (91.)

Buckle, W. Hill late Lieut. 14th Regt.

Bucknill, J. T. Lieut. R.E. (9/.)

Bulger, G. E. Lt.-Col. late 10th Reg. (9/.)
Buller, Alexander, CB. Capt. R.N. (92.)
Buller.E.M. M. Col. (h.p.) Rifle Brigade

(91.)
Burdett, Francis Lt.-Col. late 17th Lancers
Burdett, Sir Robert, Bt. Col. late 68th L.I.
Burghley,B.H.G.C. Lord Capt.Gr.Gds. (91.)
Burke, W. St. Geo. Capt. R.E. (91.)

Burrard, Sidney Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds.
Burriss, E. N. Lieut, late Ceylon Rifles
Burroughs, F. W., CB. Col. late

93rd Highlrs. (91.)
Burrows, R. E., KH. Col. late 66th Regt.
Burslem, G. J. Capt. late 94th Regt.

Butler, H.T. * (91.)

Buxton, J. W.F. I \)

•Bythell, R.
•Bythesea, J., Q.C.

Major. Bo. S. C. (9/.)
Capt. R.N. (91.)

CAMBRIDGE, H.R.H. GEORGE W.F. C.
DUKE OF, KG. GCB. GCMG. Field-
Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Presi-
dent <xr thb Institution (91.)
*Cadman, W. E. Major 5th W. York Mil.

(9/.)
Caldwell, Charles B. Capt. late 66th Regt.
Caldwell, W. C. Capt. late 47th Regt. (3/.)
Calvert, A. M. Lieut.-Col. R. A. (32.)

Call, C. F. Lieut. R.E. (9/ )

Campbell, A. J. Lt.-Col. late 16th Regt.
Campbell, Archibald Col. late 46th Regt.
Campbell, D. L. Lieut, late 9th Lancera
Campbell, H. J. F. Comr. R.N. (9L)

Campbell, Robert Comr. R.N. (32.)

Cannon, Edward St. Leger Yice-Adm.

Cannon, Frederick Capt. R.N.

Carey,Le Marehant Capt. late 66th Regt.
Carey, W. Major R.A. (92.)

CargOl, John Lt.-Col. Otago V. (92.)

Carington, C. R., Lord Capt. R. H. Gds.

(9*5
Carlyon, T. F. Capt. 76th Regt. (92.)

Carmiehael, G. Lynedoch Lt.-Col. late?

95th Regt.
Carpenter, C. Comr. R.N. (32.)

Carr, Henry J. Comr. R.N. (92.)

Carr, R. E. Major 36th Regt. (92.)

Cavan, P. C. Lt.-Col. late 30th Rest. (92.)
Cave, Lawrence Trent Capt late 54th Regt.

(3/.)
Chadwick, OBbert Lieut, late R.E. (92.)
Chalmers, P. Capt. late 3rd Dr. Gds.

Chaloner, Thomas Vice- A dm. (32.)

Chamberlain, Henry Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Chamberlaine, W. C. Rear-Adm. (92.)

Chambers, Montague late Lieut.

71st High. LX QC. (92.)
Champernowne, Henry Capt. RJ32. (92.)
Charlewood, E. P. Rear-Adm. (92.)

Chichester, Son. Aug. G. C. Col. (92.)

Chichester, Sir Alex. P. B., Bart. Lieut.

Devon. Yeo. (92.)
Christie,S. Hunter,M A. late Prof. R.M. Acad.
Christie, W. J. Capt. late Gren. Gds.

Churchill, Lobd Alfred late Lt. 83rd Regt.
Clarke, Geo. Calvert, CB. Major-Gen.

Clarke, H. W. Capt. R.E. (92.)

Clarke, M. de S. M<K. G. A. Major 50th

Regt. (92.)
Clayton , Matthew Capt. late Nort hum. Yeo.
Clerk, Godfrey Lt.-Ool. Rifle Brigade (92.)
Cleveland, Henry F. Capt. R.N. (92.)

Clinton, H. Col. (ret.) 11th Huss.

Clinton, Hen.R. Lt.-Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (92.)
Close, Geo. C. Major late 45th Regt. (92.)
•Clutterbuek, T. St. Quintin Capt. 29th

Punjab Infantry (92.)
Cochrane, T. B. H. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

•Cockburn, C. F. Lt.-Col. R.A. (92.)

Cockburn, J. P. late Lt. 1st Warwick

Mil. (92.)
Cocks, Philip Reginald Col. late R.A. (32.)
•Codrington, W. Capt. R.N. (92.)

LIST OP UfX MEMBEM.

Comn, J. Townsend Adm.

Cole, Joshua Comr. R.N. (91.)

CoDett, H. Major Beng. 8.C. (92.)

CoDings. J. R, CB. Col. (91.)

Cologan. J. Fitx-G. F. Capt. 18th Bengal
N.I. (92.)

Conroy, H. G.
Conybeare, Fredk.
Cooke, J. G.
Cooke, William
Cookes, George
Cooper, D. 8.
Cooper, Henry
Cooper, J. C.
Cooper, Leon Morse
Coot*, Bobert, OB.

Col. late Gr. Gels.

Major-Gen. R.A. (92.)

dapt. 7th Lane. Mil.

Lt Madras S.C. (92.)

Capt. (82.)

Capt. late 1st Royals

Lt-Gen. Col. 79th Reg.

Capt. (ret.) 8th Regt. (91.)

Col.
Rear- Adm. (3f.)

Corbett. William Major late 52nd L.I.

Carry, Atan C. Lieut. R.N. (91.)

•Cox, J. W., CB. Col. (9/.)

Cntg, John C6LR. N. Down Rifles (91. ,

Cnigie, R. W. -Comp. R.N. (92.)

Crawford, Alex, de C. Lieut. R.N. (91.)
Crawford, C. Capt. R.E. (91)

Crawley, H. Lt. -CoL late 20<fti Regt. (91.)
freak, EttrickW. Staff Comr. R.N. (92.)
Cwsdock, J. North Major 96th Regt. (92.)
•Croft, Richard B. Lieut. R.N. and

Capt. Herts Yeo. FRMS. (92.)
Crofton, John F. Lt.-Gen. Ooi. 6th Regt.
dole, G. S. Major

Cnnkihank, J. D. Capt. R.E. (92.)

Crstehley, Charles Lieut-Gen. (32.)

frmynghame, Sir A. A. T., RGB. Lieut.-

9«l. CoL 36th Regt. (32.)
Cappaidgej Alex. Ctornet late 4th Br. Gds.
Garhng, J. J. Lieut, late R.E. (92.)

Currie, Wm., of LixrtheH Lieut, late

Edinb. Mil. (92.)
CSron-Howe, Hon. A. G. Lieut. R.N. (92.}
Curtis, Herman Lieut. 1st Mid. Art. V . (92.)
Cart, Horn, Sir E., Bart., XOH. EH. Gen.

CoL 10& Lancers (32.)
CiMtance, H. F. CoL 1st Norfolk Mil. (92.)

DAGUILAR, H.T. Lt-Col. late Gr.Gds.
iWy, R. T. A. fct-Col. Georgetown Mil.<92.)
frtbrymple, J. H. N. G. H. Viscount Lt.

R." Horse Gds. (92.)
Dmdo.A-C. Capt. R.N. R. (92.)

Cornell, E. 8. Lt-Col. late HBnd Reet . (92.)
Bwiiell, W. H. M. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Dmrin, Leonard Lt. R.E. (92.)

Dmbeney, Sir H.C.B.,KCB. Maj.-Gtra. (82.)
iKridsoii, J. Master Royal School of Naval

Architect* (92)
Deris, «r John F., Bart., ROB. Deputy-

Iieut. Gloucestershire (92.)
Dtrisom, Thoe. Oapt. 16th Lsneers (92.)
iNvc, Charies Major late Bth or Xing'*
Draay, Ham. Eustace H. Lieut. Cold.

Gds. (ML)

H. C. late Mid. R.N. <9t.)

ffom. B. M. W. Capt. (ret.) 92d

Hichr*. (9/.)
&iw«m,W. Capt. R.N. <92.)

bmon«W.H. Lt. 6thlnniskiluqgDrs.r92.)
, H. O. Lt. (ret.) 17th*egt (92.)

Dennis, James B. Maj.-Gso. R.A.

Dennis, M. S. T. Lt-Col.

Pennistown, R. J. W. Capt. 64th Regt. (02.)
Derby, The Eabl of, CB. (92.)

Derriman, 8. H., CB. Rear- Adm. (92.)

De Winton, C. L. Maj (ret.) 76th E«gt (92.)
Dicken, H. Perry -Comr. R.N.

Diokins, H. F. Qaar.-Mar. Vict. E.V. (92.)
Dickinson, Edwd. Lieut. R.E. (92.)

Digby, Ron. E. H. T. Capt. Cold. Gds. (92.)
Digby, J. A. Lt.-CoL 14* Gtr. Gds.

Dixon, Matthew Capt. R.N.

Domville, W. 0. H. Lieut. R.N. (97.)

Donoyan, E. W. Maj. -Gen. (92.)

•Doughty, Chester Capt. and Adit. Hereford

Mil. (92.)
Doaglas, Charles Col. R.A (92.)

Drax, J. S. W. E. Copt, late R. E««t Mil.

MP. (32.)
Drummond,Alf.M. Capt late Rifle Brig. (92.)
Drummond, C. G. A. Capt late Rule Brig.

(92.)
Drummond, Hon. Sir James Robert, SOB.

Vice-Admiral
Dugmore, W. F. J. Lieut-Col. {ret.)

S. F. Gds.
Dunbar, John G. H. W. Lieut l*t Life

Gds. (91.)
Dundas, P. Col. late 96th Regt

Dunn, R. G. Capt. late 0th Regt. (92:)

Dunlop, Hugh, CB. Vice- Adm. (82.)

Duntze, J. A. , Adm.

•Durrant, Francis (Capt R.N. (92.)

Dutton, Wm. Holmes Col.

Dyer, S. H. Oapt. (rat) 8th or King's (02.)

EDINBURGH, H.R.H., A.E.A., DVKT

OF, EG, KT., GC8X. GCMG., Oapt

R.N. (92.)
•Earle, Wm., 081. Col. Gr. Gds. (82.)

Ebury, Lord Capt. late FJint Yeo,

Sden, A. D. Cajit 26th Kegt (92.)

Edgar, the Rev. J. H. late Lieut. R.A.

Edwards, Sampson Comr. R.N.

Elgee, Charles Lt-Col. 23rd R. W.F. (92.)
Elliot,CharleslCB. Col. late Mad.S.C. (92.)
Elliot, Root. Comr. R.N. (92.)

Elliot, Hon. W. Fitz-William Lieut 9i8rd

Highrs. (92.)
Ellis, Arthur E. A., CSI. Lieut-Col. Gar.

Gds. (92.)

Capt. late H.A.O.

Capt. late 12th Regt

Comr. R.N. (92.)

Capt R.E. (9Q

Capt R.N. (92.)

_ _ Dep. Lieut. Derby (92.)

•Evelyn, G. P. Lt-Ccd. Oomt. liti. Surrey

Mil. (82.)
Erersley, Vhoount Col. Oomt. Hampahiee

Yeo. ADC to tie Qneen (10*.)
Ewart, C. B., CB. Col. RJB.

Ellis, Robert
Elwes,R. H.H.®.
England, W. G.
English, Thomas
Erskine, James E.
Evans, T. W.

Ewart, Darid
Ewart, J. K.

FABER, W.

Fairfax, Henry

Col. J(rot) Bengal Art
Iieut. 78th Highlra. (92.)

Lt. lobe Ufch Lt. Pes.
Capt R.N. (9« v

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Fane, Charles G. Capt. B.N. (91.)

Fanshawe, Edward Gennys, OB. Adm.

Farmer, W. B. G. Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds.
Farquhar, Harry B. Capt. 24th Begt. (92.)
Farquharson, F. Oen.

Farquharson, Gh M'B. Maj.-Oen. Bomb.

Staff Corpg (92.)
Feilden, Henry Capt. late 21st B.N.B.

Fus. (92.)
•Feilden, O. B. Lt.-Col. 78th High. (91.)
FeUding,flb».P.B.B.,CB. Col. Cold. Gds.
Fergusson, B. 0. Lieut. S. F. Gds. (9/.)
Ferris, John Lieut. B.N. (91.)

Feating, E. B. Major B.E. (9/.)

♦Field, E. Capt. B.N.

Fife, James, G. Col. B. E. (9/.)

FiUiter, Clavell F. Lt. 2nd W. I. Begt. (91.)
Fincham, Herbert Geo. Aseist. Corny. (92.)
Fishbourne,E. Gardiner, CB. Vice- Adm. (3 J.)
Fisher, E.B. Capt. (ret.) 4th E.I. Dr. Gds. (SI.)
•Fisher, John A. Capt. B.N. (92.)

*Fitzclarence, Hon. Geo. Comr. B.N. (31.)
FitzGeorge, A. Comr. B.N. (92.)

Fitzgerald, H.C. Lt.-Col. (81.)

Fiteherbert, W. H. M. Capt Bifle Brig. (91.)
Fitzmayer, Sir James W., KCB. Major-
Gen. B.A. (32.)
Fitzwygram, F. W. J. Col. 15th Hubs. (32.)
Fletcher, E. C. Lieut.-Gen. (32.)

Fletcher, Henry M. Capt. B. London

Mil. (92.)
Flood, Warden Capt. late 51st Begt.

Foley, Hen. Fitzalan C. J. Lt. 2nd Derby

Mil. (92.)
Forbes, J. A. Lieut.-Col. late 92nd Highs.
Fordyce, C. F., CB. Maj.-Gen. (91.)

Fortescue, H. G. Capt. late Cold. Gds. (92.)
Fox, W. V. Capt. 1st Cheshire Mil. (92.)
•Frampton, Cyril Lt. B. M. L. I. (92.)

Eraser, Son. A. W.F. Capt. Gr. Gds. <92.)
Eraser, Thomas Capt. B.E. (92.)

Eraser, Sir W. Aug., Bart. Capt. late 1st

Life Gds.
Franklen, Bich. late Lt. 1st L. Gds.

Freeland, H. W. Dep.-Lt. Sussex (32.)

Freeman, T. A. Lieut. 70th Begt. (92.)

Fremantle, Hon. E. B., CB., CMG. Capt.

B.N. (92.)
Frith, Cockayne Capt. late 38th Begt.

•Fulford,John Vice-Adm.

Fuller, T. Capt. (ret.) 18th Huss. (92.

GALBBAITH, W. Capt. 85th Begt. (92.)
Gambier, G. C. Adm.

Gardiner, H. L. Col. B.A.

Gardiner, J. Capt. late 5th Dr. Gds.

Garrett, E. Comr. B.N. (32.)

Gasooigne, Fred. 0. Trench Hon. Col. 2nd

York. Eng.Tols. late Capt. 66th Begt. (32.)
•Gassiot, Sebastian Comr. R.N. (92.)

Geddes, A. D. Major 27th Begt. (92.)

Geddes, J. G. Lieut.-Col.

George, F. D., CB. Major-Gen. (92.)

George, T.Barry late Lt. 13th L.I. (92.)

Gerard, F. Major Lane. Hus.

Gerard, 8ir Bobert T.f Bart. Col. Lane.

Hum. ADC to the Queen

GKbbings, Henry Cornwall C. Lieut. 108th

Begt. (92.)
Gibson, B. Capt. late 28th Begt. •

Gibsone, J. C. H. Lt.-Gen. Col. 8th Has.
Gifford, G. A. Lieut. B.N. (92.)

Gill, W. John. Lieut. B.E. (92.)

Oillum, W. J. Lieut-Col.

Gleichon, Victor F. F. E. G. A. C. F. Cousr

Bear- Adm. (92.)
Glen, Archd. Capt. 10th Begt. (92.)

Glon, Joseph Phys.-Gen. (ret.) Bomb. Army
Gloai, A. B. Col. B.A. (92.)

Goddard, A. Lethbridge Major B.Wilts

Yeo. MP.
Godfrey, Henry J. Lieut. B.N. (92.)

Godman, Ch. B. Lt. B. Sussex L.I. Mil. (92.)
Godman, B. Temple Col. (h.p.) 5th D.G. (92.)
Godwin, John Capt. Mil. Et. of Windsoi

(32.)
Goldie, James Major 16th Lancers (92.)
Gooddy, E. C. Capt. 44th W.Y.B. Vols. (92.)
Goodenough, F. A. Capt. late Calcutta

Vol. Gds. (92.)
Gordon, Lobd Douglas W. C. Lieut.

Colds. Gds. (92.)
Gordon, G. T. Vice-Adm.

Gordon, S. E., CB. Col. R.A.

Gordon, Wm. Lt.-Col. late 25th Regt.

Gordon, Wm. Col. Beng. S. C. (92.)

Gordon, W. E. A., CB. Rear- Adm. (92.)
Gore, James A. Major (h.p.) 71st High. L. I.
Gorman, W. J. Capt. late Ceylon Rifles (9/.)
Gosset, A, Maj. (ret.) R.A.

Gosset, M. W. E. Capt. 54th Regt. (92.)
Graham, Andrew, MD. Fleet-Surgeon (92.)
Graham, C. S. Capt. R.A.

Graham, Cyril late Governor Bed River

Settlements (92.)
Graham, Wm. Capt. B.N. (9/.)

Grant, A. Capt. late 61st Regt.

Gray, Bertie J. Lieut, late Boy. Afr. Corps
Gray, C. G. Lieut.-Col.

•Grenfell, Hubert H. Comr. B.N. (9/.)

Grey, Sir George, KCB. late Capt. 53rd

Begt. (32.)
Grey, H. B. E. Comr. B.N. (9/.)

Griffith, Henry Darby, CB. Lt.-Gen.

Griffith, M. B. M. Comr. B.N. (91.)

Grover, G. E. Capt. B.E. (92.)

Grubb, Alexander Capt. B.A. (92.)

Gunnell, E. H. Capt. B.N. (lO*.)

Gunter, Bobert Lt.-Col. 5th West York

Militia, late Capt. 4th Dr. Gds.
Gurdon T. E. Comr. RN. (91.)

•HAGGARD, T. T. Lt.-CoL B.A. (91.)
Haig, C. T. Capt. B.E. (9/.)

Hales, Arthur Capt. 27th Begt. (9l.\

Halifax, Rt. Hon. Cha. Viscount, GCB. (3/.)
•Halkett, J. C. Craigie Lieut.-Colonel

Stirling Mil. (92.)
Hall, G. B. Lt. late 19th Lt. Dra.

Htdl, Marshall Capt late RE. Middlx

Mil. (92.)
Hall, J. P. Maj. Paym. 94th Beet. (9/.)
Hall, Thofc Lt.-CoL

Hall, W. H. omr. B.N. (9/.)

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

HalloweU, Edw. Dep.-Lieut Middlesex

Hsllyburton, J. F. G., Lord, GCH. Adm.
Halsey, H. W. B. W. Dy-Lt. Sussex (9/.)
Hamilton, A. P. Admiral (32.)

Hamilton, F. Tower Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Hamilton, Sir C. J. J., Bt., CB. Col. late

S. F. Gds. (32.)
Hamilton, Sir Edw. A., Bart, Capt. (ret.)

Cold. Gds. (9/.)
Hamilton, H. G. Capt. R.N. (32.)

Hamilton, Sir J. J., Bart. Lt.-Col.

Hamilton, J. Capt. late Beng. Cav. (92.)
Hammill, Tynte F. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Hand, G. S., CB. Vice-Adm. (32.)

•Hand, G. Weightman Comr. R.N. (32.)
Hankey, H. A. Gen. Col. 1st Dr. Gds. (32.)
Harcourt, E. W. Col. Cinque Ports

Art. (92.)
Hardinge, Edward Capt. R.N. (92.)

Hardinge, Henry Lieut. -Col.

Hare, H. J. Major 4th W. York Mil.

Harris, J. B. Capt. late 24th Regt.

Harrison, Rev. Oct. Swale, MA. Chaplain

K.X. (3/.)
•Harrison, B. Lieut. -CoL R.E. (92.)

Barman, G. B. Col. (unatt.) (92.)

Harmar, C. D'O. Capt. 39th Regt. (92.)

H*r*ton, C. G. Capt late B.M.L.I. (92.)
Hart, A. Fitzroy Capt. 31st Regt. (92.)

Hart, Henry G. Mai. -General (92.)

Hart, Horatio H. Lieut. B.E. (92.)

Hart, Reginald C. Lieut. R.E. (92.)

Hart. Wyndham Lieut. Vict. R.V. (92;)
H&rrey, Gillmore Capt. R.N.

•Harrey, J. W. F. Comr. R.N. (92.)

Harworth-Booth, B B. Lieut. -Col.

22nd E. York Art. V. (92.)
Hamell, W. H. Capt. R.N. (92.)

flawes, A. B. Capt. late Beng. Army

Hawkins, Ethelred Capt. late 22nd Regt.
Hawkins, F. Capt. late 89th Regt.

Hawkins, J. S. Major-Gen. R.E. (32.)

Hay. Edward O. Lieut. E.A. (92.)

Hay, J. Beckford Lewis Adm.

Hit. J. F. Dalryniple Capt. R. Ayr and

Wigtown Mil.
Hay. John Baker Porter Vice- Adm.

HsV, the Right. Hon. Sir John C. D. Bart.,

CB. DCL. FBS. MP. Vice-Adm. (32.)
HaTgarth, F Lt.-Col. (ret.) S. F. Gds.

HsVne, C. 8. Capt. 2nd S. Devon Mil. (92.)
H«*thoote, C. Geo. Lieut. 5th Fus. (92.)
H-athcote, F. A. Lt. 81st Regt. (9/.)

HViton, John R. Lieut. -Col. (92.)

Hrarry, E. # Col. (ret.) R.E. (92.)

E~>der»on,G.W.M. Capt. late S. F.Gds.(92.)
H^irnon, W. H. Lieut. R.N. (92.)

Hn.ning, Shorlock, CB. Col. 38th Regt. (92.)
Herbert, Hon. A. W. E. M. Lieut, (ret.)

7th Hum- (92.)
H*rt>ert, Ivor J. C. Capt Gren. Gds. (92.)
Allen J. Lieut. Queen's Westr.

.P.

Lt.-Col. Bucks Yeo.

L T. Capt. 71st Highlds. (92.)
Capt. late 19th Regt.

•Hincks, A. S. Capt. (ret.) 76th Regt. (92.)
Hobart, Hon. H. M. Major late 103rd Regt.
(92.)

Hodge, Sir E.C., KCB. Lieut.-Gen. Col.

18th Hus. (32.)
Holbrook, E. N. W. Lieut. R.M.L.I. (92.)
Holdich, Sir E. A., KCB. Lieut.-Gen. ( 92.)
Holaaworth, Walter J. Lieut. Lanark Yeo.

Cavalry (92.)
Holford, R. S. Dep.-Lt. Gloucester (82.)
Holland, J. Y. Col. late R.M.L.I. (92.)

llollist, E. O. Capt- R.A. (92.)

Hooper, R. Wheeler Maj.

Hope, H. W. Capt. (ret.) Gr. Gds. (92.)
Hope, J. E. Col. R.A. (92.)

Hope, Sir Jas., GCB. Adm.

Hope, W., CB. Major-Gen. (92.)

Hoskins, A. H. Capt. R.N. (91.)

Houstoun, Geo. L. Lt. Royal Renfrew

Mil. (92.)
Houstoun, Wallace Vice-Adm.

Howes, H. Capt. late King's O.L.I. Mil.

(92.)
Hubbard, Cecil J. Lt.-Col. Gren. Gds. (92.)
Hulse, Sir Edwd., Bart. Lt.-Col. late S.

Hants Mil.
Humbley, W. Wellington Waterloo Lt.-Col.

late 9th Royal Lancers
Hume, J. R. Lt.-Col. 55th Regt. (92.)

Hume, R., CB. Col. 55th Regt. (92.)

Hussey, W. Hayter Capt. late 26th Regt.
•Hutchinson, A. H. Major R.A. (92.)

Hutchinson, W. B. Paymaster R.N.

Hutton, Edwd. T. H. Lt. 60th Rifles (92.)

•IMLACH, R. W. Lt.-Col. Georgetown Mil .

(92.)
Ingilby, Sir W. Bates, KCB. Lt.-Gen.

Col. Comdt. B.A.
♦Inverurie, Lobd Captain B. Aberdeen-
shire Highland MiL (92.)
Irving, Alex., CB. Maj.-Gen. B.A. (32.)

Irving, J. C. S. Capt. 39th Regt. (92.)

Irring, Geo. Clerk Staff Asst. Surg. (92.)
Irving, Lewis Allen Staff Asst. Surg. (92.)

JACOB, S. S. Capt. Bombay Staff Corps (92.)
Jago, John Lt-Col. 74th Highrs. (92.)

James, Chas. D.
James, W.
Janvnn, F.
Jekyll, Herbert
Jervoise, F. J. E.
Jocelyn, W. H.
Johnson, Allen B.
Johnson, G. V.

Capt. 86th Regt. (92.)

Major late 26th Regt.

late Ens. 20th Regt.

Lieut. R.E. (92.)

Dep.-Lt. Hants (32.)

Lt. R.N. (92.)

Col. Ben. S.C. (92.)

Col. R. H. A. (92.)

Johnson, Sir H. F. P., Bart. Col.

Johnson, W. S. Lieut, late 83rd Regt.

Johnston, CurreU H.
Johnstone, J. Julius
Jones, Douglas F.
Jones, H. Helsham
Jones, Loftue F.
•Jones, Oliver J.
Jones, R. Owen
Josselyn, Fred. J.
Justice, Philip

Lieut. R.E. (92.)

Lieut.-Col. Gr. Gds.

Lieut. R.A. (92.J

Major R.E. (92.

Capt. R.N. (92 '

Rear- Adm. (92. j

Major P

Capt. 96th "

Capt. 108th

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

HELL, W. G. Capt. late K.O.L.I. Mil.
Kelso, E. B. P. Comr. R.N. (92.)

Kennedy, A. W. M. Clark, FUGS. FLS . Capt.

late Cold. Gds. (91.)
Kennedy, J. Douglass Capt. 6th E. Lane.

Mil. (92.)
Kenyon-Slaney, W. B. Lt. Rifle Brig. (9/.)
Keppel, Edw. Geo. Capt. 74th High. (9 J.)
Keppel, W. H. A. Lt. Norfolk Mil. Art.
Kerr, Lord F.H. Vioe-Adm.

Kerr, Lord Walter Talbot Capt. R.N. f92.)
Key,5»rA8tle7C.,KCB.FBS. Vioe-Adm. (91.)
Kinahan, Richard G. Comr. R.N. (9/.)

King, Henry Capt. R.N.

King, H. B. Comr. B.N. (91.)

King, T. H. late H.E.I.C. Serv.

Knowles, W. Major (ret.) 50th Begt.

LAMB, Henry late Lieut. I.N. (32.)

Lambert, Thomas Capt. R.A. (10*.)

Lansdowne, Mabqttis of (9/.)

Laroom, the Mi. Son. Sir T. Aiekew, Bart.,

KCB. Maj.-Gen. R.E.
Lardner, Wm. Lt. late 2nd W. I. Begt.
Lardy, Christian F. Lt.-Col. late 53rd Begt.
Lauderdale, Earl of, GCB. Adm. (91.)
Law, E. D. Comr. R.N. (9/.)

Lawrence, J. B. Capt. late I.N.

Lawrence, Sir A. Johnstone, KCB. Lt.-

Gen. Col. 58th Begt. (92.)
Lawrence, Loud, GCB. GCSI. (9/.)

LawsoguJioJ)ariL_Jfa8p.-G6n. Hospitals (32.)
•EFfard, C. E. ^^ttept. 16th Begt. (91.)
Leah, Henry Lt. B.N. (91.)

Leask, William Major 2nd Hertfordshire

B.V. (91.)
Lecky, J. G.
JL/ee, w. H.
Leeds, The Duxb of,

York Mil. (91.)
Lees, E. B. Major 31st Lane. B.V. (91.)

•Le Mesurier, F. A. Capt. B.E. (91.)

Lendy, A. F. Capt. B. S. Middx. Mil. (92.)
Lennox, Lokd J. G. Lieut.-Col. late 6th

Drags.
Lennox, W. O., W.C CB. Col. B.E. (92.)
Lewis, Henry Comr. B.N. (82.)

Ley, J. M. CoL

Liddell, Son. Geo. A. F. Col. (32.)

•Liddell, W. H. Capt. B.N. (92.)

Lindsay, W. J. Lt. Bifle Brigade (92.)

LindseU, John B. Lieut. B.E. (92.)

Litteldale, H. W. A. Lt. R.N. (92.)

Little, B. B. Capt. late Madras Art.

Littleton, Son. Algernon C. Lt. B.N. (92.)
•Lloyd, Edward Lt. 4th Punjab Car. (92.)
"' Capt. B.E. (92.)

Capt. (32.)

Major-Gen. (92.)

Lieut, late Gr. Gds.

Capt. B.A. (92.)

Lt.-Col. late Gr. Gds. (3/.)

Capt. B.N. (92.)

Lt.-CoLlstE.

Lt.-Col.
late Lieut. S. Hants Mil.
Major late North

Lloyd, E. M
Lloyd, Mark
Lodder, W. W.
Loftus, Douglas
Logan, Alfred
Long, Samuel
Long, Samuel
•Longstaff, Lewellyn W.

York. B.V. (9/.)
Loraiue, Sir Lambton,-Bari. Capt. R.N. (92.)
Lorain*, W. C. late I.N. (91.) \

Lowndes, James

Militia (92.)
Low, C. B.
Loyd, Arthur P.
Loyd, Frank K.
Loyd,W. K.
Lucas, H. H.

Major Royal Benfrew

late Lt. I.N. (92.)
Lieut. 21st Huss. (92.)
Lieut 55th Begt. i92.)
Lt.-Col. (ret.) B.A. (32.)
late H.E.I.C.S.
Lugard, Sir Edw., GCB. Lieut.-Gen. CoL

31st Begt. (32.)
Lumsden, Henry Capt. L. Soot. B.V. (91.)
Lumsden, Sir Harry B., KCSI. CB. Gen.

(92.)
Lumsden, P. 8., CB. CSI. Col. Ben.

S. Corps (92.)
Lyons. T. C. CoL (92.)

Ly sley , W. Gerard Lieut, late Inns of Court
B.V. (92.)

•MABEBLY, Eyan, CB. Maj.-Gen. B.A.
•Macaulay, G. W. Lt.-Col. (ret.) 1st

Begt. Soinde Horse (92.)
M'Call, S. Lt. late 6th Dr. Gds.

McOleverty, James Capt. 45th Begt. (92.)
McClintock, William Capt. B.A. (92.)

McDonald, Alex., MD. Surg. (h.p.)

•M'Donnel, Christopher Maj. late 4th R. I.

Dr. Gds.
Macdougall, A. H. late Boy. Archers of

the Queen's Body Guard
McFarlan, J. W. Capt. and Paymaster

9th Iiancers (92.)
M'Hardy, J. B. B. Admiral

M'Hardy, Wallace B. Comr. R.N. (92.)

•Mackenzie,Colin Capt.late78thHighlrs.(92.)
Mackenzie, Keith Stewart, of Seaiorth Lit.

late 90th L. I. (92.)
Mackenzie, B. 8. M. Capt. B.A. (9;.)

Mackeson, E. Dpty.-Lt. Tower Hamlets (92. )
Mackintosh, G. D. late Hon. Corps of

Gentlemen-at-Anns
Mackirdy, D. E. Lieut.- Gen. (9/.)

•Maclean, Hen. John Lieut.-CoL Rif. Brig.

(32.)
Maclean, J. L. Capt. late 69th Begt.

Maclear, J. F. L. P. Capt. B.N. (92.)

•Macliver, David Capt. late 2nd Somerset

Mil. (92.)
McLaughlin, Charles Lieut. B.N. (92.)

McMahon, 3tr Thos. W., Jtort., CB. Maj.-

Gen. (92.)
MoNeile,Alex. Capt. (h.p.) Indian Army (9/. )
McNeill, J. C, fP.C. CB. CMG. CoL

(h.p.) 48th Begt. (92.)
Mahon, D. Major late 96th Begt.

Mahon, H. J. Pakenham Lt. late 8th Huss.
Mainwaring, K. H. A. Capt. B.N. (91.)

Maitland, E. Major B.A. (9/.)

Maitland, Fred. Thos. Col. late B.S. Corps
Malet, Sir A, Bart. Dep. Lt of Wilts (10*.)
Maltby, G. B. Lt. B.N. (92.)

Man, J. Alexander Capt. Boy. Aberdeen

Hiffh. Mil. (92.)
Manchester, W. D. Dotcb of, Lt.-Col. Hunt-
ingdonshire Lt. Horse Vols. (12.)
Mann, Geo. B. Ens. 1st Middx. R. V. (92.)
Mansel, J. C. Capt. late Northum. Mil.

Margary, A. B. Major late 54th Begt. (9/.)

LIST OF LIFE MEMBEK8.

Markham, Edwin Lieut-Col. R.A. (9/.)

Marsh, J. C. Lory, MB. Asst. Surg, late

Notts MQ. (9/.)
Marshall, W. Dep. -Lieut. Cumb. (90

Martland,Wm. E. Lt.-Col. 5th Drag. Gds.

(91.)
Martin, F. S. late Ens. 58th Regt. (9/.)

Martin, James Capt. late Rifle Brigade

Martineau, George Lt. 6th Surrey K.V. {91.)
Mason, Geo. Capt. late 4th Foot

Mamie. Watkin late Lt. Ind. Army (91.)
Massy, W. Q. Dunham Col. 5th RL Irish

Lancers (9/.)
Mat son. Henry Major late 58th Regt.

•Ma?ne, R. C, CB. Capt. R.N. (91 )

Mead, J. A. R. Lt.-Col. R.A. (91.)

•Meaden, James Maj. late Ceylon Rifles

Mease, Edw. Capt. H. A C. (91.)

Meiklam, J. Lieut, late 9th Lancers

•Mein, A. Major late 4th Lanark R.V. (91.)
Mercer, C. H. L. Lieut. R.A. (9/.)

Mercer, Saml. Rear-Adm.

Meroeron, Henry late H.A.C. (9/.)

Mills, Richard Capt. Civil Service R.V.

•Milman, G. H. L. Maj.-Gen. R.A. (3/.)
Milne, Archd. B. Lieut. R.N. (9/.)

Molyneux, A.M. Lt.-Col. late 2nd Mad. L.I.
Molvnrux, A. Mitchell Capt. late 23rd

B*. W. Fus. (3/.)
•Molvneux, E. Capt. 7th Dr. Gds. (3?.)

•Molyneux, W. H.Mitchell Comr.R.N.(9J.)
Monck, Bon. Henry P. C. S. Lieut.

Cold. Gda. (9/.)
Monckton, John H. Lieut. 2nd Stafford

MU. (9L)
Moncrieffe, Sir T., Bart. Col. Roy. Perth

Rifles late Lt. S. F. Gds.
Montagu, Philip Lt. 31st Regt. (91.)

Montefiore, Sir Moses, Bart., FRS. Capt.

late Surrey Local Mil. and Depty. -Lieut.

of Kent
•Montgomerie, A. W. J. Maj. 20th Hus. (9/.)
Montgomerie, C.T.M. late Lt. Gr. Gds. (91.)
Montgomery, A. J. Lieut. R.A. (91.)

Montgomery, R. A. Lieut. R.A. (9/.)

Montresor, Fred. Byng Vice-Adm.

Moody, R. Clement Maj.-Gen. R.E.

Moody, Thoa. B. Lieut. R.N. (9/.)

Moore, J. Capt. late 30th Regt.

Morant, J. L. L. Capt. R.E. (91.)

Moreton, Aug. H.M. Capt. Cold. Gds. (9/.)
Morrah, Jas. A. Capt. late Adj. 7th Depot

Batt.
Morris, E. Lieut, late 54th Regt.

Mortimer, H. M. Jones Lt.-Col. late

73rd Rc$t. (91.)
M'rton, James F. Capt. 55th Regt. (91.)
Mos§e,W. Lt.-Col. (li. p.) 26thCameronians

(9/.)
JMooat, F. J., FRCS. JXLG. of Hosp. (9/.)
Mi.uld, John A. ©^TGenl. of Hosps. and

Fleets (3/.)
Mould, Thos. Rawlings Maior-Gen . R.E.
Mowbray, G. T. Maj. Leicester Mil. (M.)
Moysey, H. G. late Lieut. 11th Lt. Drs.
Murray, C. Wyndham Lt. 61st Regt. (91.)

Murray, Dennis, MD. Staff Sure, (h.p.)
Murray, Freeman Lieut-Gen. (91.)

Murray, John Geo. Lieut. R.A. (91.)

Murray, Sir Patrick Keith Capt. (ret.)

Gr. Gds. (3/.)
Musgrave, Sir 'George, Bart. Depy.-Lieut.

Cumberland and Westmorland
Muttlebury, J. E. Major late 3rd Buffs

NAPIER of Maffdala, Lobd, GCB. GCSI.

Gen. R.E. (9/.)"
Napier, W. C. E. Lt.-Gen. Gov. Royal

Military College (31.)
Naylor, Christopher J. Lt. R.N. (91.)

Neal, Wm. Capt. (ret.) P2nd L.I. (91.)

•Neave, Everard S. Capt. Bene. 8.C. (91.)

late Mate R.N.

Capt. R.N. (91.)

Lieut, late 12th Regt.

Lt.-Col. Hon. Corps

Neele, T. Clarkson
Nelson, Horatio
Netterville, A. J.
Neville, Park Percy

Gentlemen-at-Arms
Newark, W. S., Viscount Lt. Gren. Gds.

(91.)
Newcome, G. Capt. late 47th Regt.

NewBome, W. Major R. E. (91.)

Nicholl, Edward Lt.-CoL

Nicholson, H. Whalley Capt. (ret.) 82nd

Regt. (91.)
Nicholson, J. A. Stewart
Nicoison, C, A.

Nixon, John Major New Zealand Mil. (91.)
Noake, Maillard Maj. New Zealand Mil.

(91.)
Noel, G. H. U. Comr. R.N. 60&r

#UttalUrft, jlafcal e&Map, 1876 (9/.)

Nokes, J. Major late 65th Regt.

jh, Matthew S. Rear-Adm. (3/.)

NoUotnTPeTerTT Tol. (ret.) R.M.L.I.

Northbrook, Right Eon. Lord, GMSI. (9/.)
Northwick, Lobd Col. (ret.) Herefordshire

late Lt. Gr. Gds.
Lt. R.N. (91.)

Mil. (SI.)
Norton, Cecil W.
Norton, R. T. L.
Notman,H.Wilkes

(91.)
Nugent, George

Lt. 5th Lancers (91.)

Capt. late 2nd L. Gds.

Capt. Lond.Scot.R.V.

Maj.(ret.)2ndDr.Gds.

O'CALLAGHAN, G.W.Douglas, CB. Vice-

Admiral
Ogilvy, Wm. Major

OUivant, E. A. Capt. R.A. (9/.)

Oliver, Rd. AJdworth Rear-Adm (3J.)

Olive, Ernest Llewelyn Lt. 38th Regt. (91.)
Olpherts, Richard Cupt. late 1st W. 1. Regt.
Ommanney, Erasmus A. Lieut. R.N.

Ommanney, Erasmus, CB. FRS. Vice-Adm.

(3/.)
Orde.Sir John V.yBart. Depy.-Lieut.Argyle.
i Osborne, J. H. W. Major Bcngul Army (9/.)
I Ossulston, Lobd Lieut. Ritle Brigade (9/.)
Otoav, C. W. late Mat* K.N.

Ou>ry, H. A., CB. Col. (ret.) 9th Un«ri
Owen, .John F. Capt. R A- <?

Oxley, Chas. L. Command'

PAGET, Harold Lieut. 7tT

LIST OP LIFE MEMBERS.

Paget, Joseph Capt. late Derby Mil. (9/.)
Pame/Wm-Dunkley 0apt.6th Sur.R. V. (91.)

Pakenham, Hon. T. A.
Palmella, Dttke of
Papillon, Alex.F.W.
Parker, J.
Parkinson, C. P.
Parkinson, J. B.

Capt. R.N. (SI.)

late R.N. (91.)

Major (ret.) R.A.

Capt. late H.A.C.

Major- Gen. (SI.)

Capt. late 68th L. I.

•Parr, H. Hallam Lieut. 13th Regt. (91.)
Parry, F. J. Major late K.O. L.I. Mil.

Pasley, C. Col. R.E. (91.)

Paterson, W. Capt. late 60th Rifles (SI.)
Patton, Robert Adm.

^Illfl t. T-niWk w™ t a(m Gten. Col.

^68th L.I. (3/.)

Peach, H. P. K. Capt. (ret.) R. H. Gds.

Peacocke, G. J. Col. (h.p.) 16th Regt. (SI.)
Peard, Henry Cornet late 5th Dr. G-ds.

Pearson, Sir Edwin, Kt. late Lt. Yeo. of

the Guard
Pedder, H. N. Capt. late 3rd R. Lane. Mil.
Pelly, Ootavius Lt.-Col. Edin. Mil. Art.

Capt. (h.p.) Madras Lt. Cay. (9/.)
Pemberton, S. E. Capt. R.A. (9/.)

Pendarres, E. W. Wynne, FRS. Lieut-Col.

late R. Cornwall Rangers
Pender, Francis Henry Lt.-Col

Perciyall, Charles late Yet. Surg. R. A .

Percy, Lord Algernon, M.A. Lt. Gren.

Guards (92.)
Perrott, H. C. Capt. East Kent Mil. (91.)

Petit, L. P.
•Fhillimore, Augustus
Phillips, H. C. M.
Pickard, A. P., W.€.
Pigot, J. H. S., PAS.
♦Pike, J. W.
Pilkhurton, H.

jclford C. T.
Pinson, A

late Mid. R.N.

Rear- Adm. (3/.)

Comr. R.N.

Major R.A. (91.)

Dy-Lt. Somerset

Capt. R.N. (9/.)

Lieut. R.E. (91.)

Cnpt. R.N., MP. (9/.)

Col. 37th Madras N.I.

Pixley, Stewart Capt. 1st Victoria V. (91.)
Piper, H. Lt.-Col. late 38th Regt.

Pitman, John C. Capt. R.N.

Poignand, George Capt. 59th Regt. (9/.)
Poland, J. A. Capt. R.N. (9/.)

Pole, Arthur C. Capt. 13th Hussars (91.)
Pollock, Arth. J. O. Lieut. 21st R. N. B.

Fus. (92.)
Ponsonby, H. P. Maj.-Gen. (unatt.)

Private Secretary to Her Majesty (SI.)
Ponsonby, J. G. Lieut. 49th Regt. (9/.)
Poole, Wm. Halsted Capt. (h.p.) R.A.

Poore, Robert Major (ret.) 8th Huss. (91.)
Porcher, E. A. Capt. R.N. (9J.)

Porah, J. R. Lt. 1st Rl. Soots Regt. (91.)
Powell, Scott Capt. late 23rd R.W. F.

Powell, W. T. R. Lt.-Col. late R.

Cardigan Rifle Corps
Powell, W. Wellington Capt. late 86th Regt.
Powis,E.J.EABLof Lt.-Col. SalopYeo. (97.)
Pratt, S. C. Capt. R. A. (91.)

*Prendergast, G. A. Lt.-Col. 15th Ben. Cav.

(91.)
Prendergast,H.N.D.,&.CCB. Col.R.E. (9/.)
Prest ™ A 8. Capt. R.N. (9Z.)

Pw Lt.-Col.

•P Vice-Adm. (31.)

Prevost, Lewis De
Priauhc, Henry St

Stafford Rifles
Price, William
Prinsep, F. B.
Prior, George U.
Prower, J. E. M.

QUICK, Geo.

T. Capt. 93rd Highl. (92.)
Geo. Capt. late K. O.

Army Agent

Capt. 21st Huss. (91.)

Capt. 100th Regt. (9/.)

Capt. late 67th Regt.

Capt. late 1st R.Drs.

RADCLIFFE, W. P., CB. Maj.-Gen. (91.)
•Raikes, G. A. Capt. 3rd W. Y. Mil. (9Z.)
Raines, J. A. R., CB. Major-Gen.

Ramsey, G. A., KH. Major

Ramsay, Geo. Major-Gen. Beng. S.C.

Ramsay, Bt. ZTon.LoED J.W. Comr.R.N. (91.)
Ramsden, Sir John W. Bart., MP. Col.

W. York Art. V.
Rawlinson, Sir Henry C, KCB. FRS.

Rebow, Hector J. Gurdon late Lt. 2nd

L. Gds. (91.)

Reed, Francis
Reeve, Nevill H.
Rendle, Ash ton W.
Rennie, Geo. B.

Capt. late R. Drs.
Capt. 45th Regt. (91.)
Lt. 65th Regt. (91.)
late Mid. R.N. (9/.)

Reynardson , E. Birch, CB. Col. late Gr»Gds.
Reynolds, G. S. % Rear- Adm.

Rhodes, Godfrey * Lt.-Col. (3*.)

iich, G. W. T., CB. Col. (91.)

iicTtaiT^JohnC. Staff Comr. R.N. (91.)
Richardson, J. B. Major R.A. (91.)

Richardson, Thos. Capt. (h.p.) 7th Huss.
Richmond, Duke of, KG. late Lt. R.H.

Gds. (91.)
Riddel], C. J. B., CB. Maj.-Gen. R.A. (SI.)
Rigby, Walter A. Major 1st Lane. Eng.

Vols. (91.)
Roberts, C. J. Cramer Major 9th Regt. (11.)
Roberts, W. E. Capt. 7th Royal Fus. (91.)
♦Robertson, A. C. Col. late 8th or King's (SI.)
Robertson, Chas. G. Lieut. Edinburgh Mil.

(9/.)
Robertson, F. W. Capt. 107th Regt. (91.)
♦Robertson-Ross, P., CB. Col. Brig. Dep.
' Halifax HM.)

Robinson, George Capt. R.N. (91.)

Robinson, Sir Robt. S., KCB. PRS. Ac

(SI.)

Comr.R.N. (3/.)
Capt. late Rifle Brig.
Dep. Lieut, of

Robinson, Walter F.
Rooper, J.
Rosebery, Eabl of

Linlithgow (91.)
Ross, Eglintoun F. late Lt. 1st R. Sur. Mil.
Ross, J. T. C, FRS. D.I. Gen. (91.)

,Ross, George Capt. late R.E. (SI.)

Rous, Hon. H. J. Adm.

Routh, W. R. Lieut. 12th Regt. (9/.)

Rowan.g/rWilliam,GCB. Gen.Col.52ndL.I.
Rudge, John" N Capt. 10th Regt. (91.)

Russell, H. Rose Lt.-Col. (h.p.) 57th Regt.

(9/.)
Russell, Sir William, Bart., CB. Col. (3/.)
Russell, F. S. Major 14th Hussars \9l).

ST. JOHN, O. B. C. Major R.E. (9/.)

St. Quintan, Matt. C. D. Col.

LIST OF

UP ME

MEMBERS.

9alk*ld,T.O. Lt-Col. late Ino^ArmiUtf.)
Salmoud, F. Mackenzie Capt. Sls^Kegt.

(W.) /

Saltmarshe, A. Lt-Col. (h.p.) 70thRegt.(92.)
8andemantAlbertG. CaptC.ServiceR. V.(92.)
Ssndeman,GeorgeG. Capt R. Perth Mil. (92.)
Sanderson, Patrick Gapt. 2nd R.N.B.

Dn. (9/.)
dandOanda, E. N. CoL Beng. 8.0. (91.)

Sandwith, F. B. Major 10th Regt (9/.)
•Sandys, H. Stair Oomr. E.N. (91.)

Sapiens, J. P. A. Prince Lt late 6th Dr.

Gds. (91.) >

Saumarez, St. Vincent J. Lobb de Col.

Saunders, A. W.O. Major 21st Fua. 91)
Saunders, F. W. Lieut 5th Fusiliers (92.)
Sawbridge, S. Comr. R.N.

Sawyer, W. H. Lt 43rd Regt (91.)

8cott, James R. Capt. late 4th Dr. Gds.

Scott, John Binney Capt B.N. (32.

Scott, William Capt. R.A. (9/.

8cott W. H. H. Dep. Comy.-Gen. (91.

Scourneld, Sir Owen H. P. Bart. Capt.

Pembrokeshire Yeo. (9/.)
Scratchley, P. H. Lt-Col. R.E. (92.)

Scrivener, H B. Lt. Queen's Westr.R.V. (91.)
Seale, F. R., FOB. late St. Helena Begt.
Seiby, W. H. C. Comr. R.N. (9/.)

•Sewell, H.Fane H. Capt. Madras S. 0. (91.)
Seymour, H. Maj. late 23rd R. W. F.

Seymour, Sir Michael, GCB. Adm.

Seymour, M. C. Capt. R.N. (91.)

Seymour, W. H., CB. Brig. -Gen. (10*.)
Shadwell, Sir Chas. F. A.t KCB. FRS.

Viec-Adm. (3/.)
Shadwell, Lawrence, CB. Maj.-Gen.

Sharp, BL J. Major

Sharp, W. Granville Capt. M.S.C. (91.)

Sharpe, J. H. Major 55th Regt. (9/.)

Sharpe, Philip R. Capt. R.N. (92.)

Shawe, R. F. Major

Shearman, John Major

Sheffield, J. C. Capt late 21st R. N.B. F. (91.)
Shelly, J. Nicholas Surg, (h.p.) Greek L.I.
Sherrr, Joseph, KH. Vice- Adm.

Shipley, Conway M. late Lt. R.N. (31.)

^hortJand, Peter F. Capt. R.N. (3/.)

Sibthorp, F. R. Waldo Lieut.-Col. (91.)
Sulery, Rob., MD. Staff Surg, (h.p.)

Simmons, Sir J. Lintorn, KCB. Ideut-

Gen- RE. (SI.)
Simmons, T. C. late Hon. Corps of

Geutlemen-at-Arms (SI.)
Sanson*, The Rev. T. F., Canon of York,

late 72nd Highlanders
Sinclair, C. A. late Lt. 56th Regt.

Smith, C H- late of Malta Dockyard

Smith, E. H. Capt. late 76th Regt.

Smith, Sir Henry, KCB. Admiral

Smith, Horace J. Capt. lateS.Herts Yeo. (SI. )
Smith, Philip Col. Gr. Gds. (3/.)

•Smith, Seymour Spencer Comr. R.N. (91.)
Smith^Mdne Maj.late3rdW.YorkR.V.(92.)
Smyth, George Major

Smyth, H. C. W. Maj. (ret.) Bengal Army
Smyth, R. Carmichael Major

Smyth, William Adm.

Sole, H. W. Major late 5th W. Y. MiL (90
Somerset, The Duke of, EG. (91.)

Somerset, L. E. H. Capt. R.N. (9/.)

Somerrail, Alex. Ens. 1st Middx. R. V. (9/.)
•Souther, J. Lowther Paym. R.N,

Sparks, J . B. Capt. Beng. 8. C. (91.)

Sparke, Jas. Pattoun, CB. Lt-Gen. (32.)
Spratt, A. G. Lieut. 1st W. I. Regt. (91.)
•Spratt, E. J. H. Lieut. 29th Regt, (92.)

Spratt, Fredk. T. N. Lieut. RJS. (91.)

♦Spratt, Thos. A. B., CB. FRS. Rear- Adm,

(SI.)
Spring, F. W. M. Capt. R.A, (91.)

Sprot, Alexander Lieut. 6th Dr. Gds. (91.)
Staoe^ Henry Coope CoL (ret.) R.A.

Stanton, E. Lt-Col. (ret) Bom. Art. (SL)
Stanton, Edward, CB. Maj.-Gen. R.£. (10s.)
Stanton, F. R. Capt. late 1st Royals (92.)
Stareley, Sir C. W. D., KCB. Lieut-Gen.
Steward, H.Holden Lt-Col. 2nd Dr. Gds.

(81.)
Steward, E. Harding, Major R.E. (91.)

Stewart, Alex. Ordnance Storekeeper

Stewart, Alex. Dep.-Lieut. Norfolk

Stewart, Duncan Comr. R.N. (91.)

Stewart, H. B. Comr. R.N. (91.)

Stewart, J. Campbell Capt. (ret.) 72nd

Highs. (92.)
Stewart, J. H. M. S.
Stewart, Rich. H.
Stewart, Walter
•Stewart, W. Little
StUweU, J. Gillian
Stirling, M.
Stopford, A. B.

Lt.-Col. R.E.(9J.)

War Office

Comr. R.N, (92.)

Col.

Navy Agent (SI.)

Roy. Archers of Scotland

Lieut R.A. (91.)

Stopford, R. Fanshawe Adm.

Stormont, W. D. Murray, Viscoukt Lieut -

Col. Royal Perth Mil. (91.)
•Stotherd, R. Hugh Lt-Col. R.E. (SI.)

Strange, Charles V. Lieut. R N. (91.)

Stuart, Donald Major late 46th Regt.

Stuart, Herbert Crichton Dy-Lt Bute, MP.
Stuart, Wm. Dy-Lieut. Bedford

Stuart, William Lt-Col. Bed. Mil. (9/.)

•Stubbs, F. W. Lt-Col. R.A. (92.)

Stucley, W. L. Col. (ret.) Gr. Gds.

Styan, Arthur Capt. Queen's W. Vols. (91.)
Suffield, Might Hon. Lord Lieut -Colonel

Norfolk Artillery Mil. (9/.)
Sudeley, S.C.J. Lord late Capt. Gr. Gds.
Sulivan, Sir Bartholomew J., KCB. Vice-

Adm. (SI.)
Sullivan, H. Col.

Sutherland, The Duke of, EG. (92.)

Sweny, Eugene Admiralty (32.)

Symonds, T. P. Lt-Col. late Hereford Mil.
Symonds, T. G. Lt. late 4th Dr. Gds.

Synge, Millington Henry Maj.-Gen. late

R.E. (32.)

TABUTEAU, A. O. Major 93rd Highrs.

(92.)
Tapp, Thos., CB. Lt-Gen. (32.)

Tarleton, Sir J. W., KCB. Vice-/ A~ ;° ^
Taylor, A. H. Capt. 21st r

Taylor, 0. S. S. M

Taylo^PringKKH. jit>GeT

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Taylor, Wilbmham Capt. late Mid. B.V.

(91.)
Teevan, A. Lieut, late 55th Regt. (91.)

Teeran, G. J. Capt. (h.p.) 94th Regt. (9J.)
Temple, C. P. Capt. 49th Regt. (91.)

Tenison, Edward Capt. late 14th Drs.

Thackwell, Jos. Edwin, CB. Maj.-Gen.

Thompson, C. W. Major-Gen. (9/.)

Thompson, E. R. late Lieut. 14th Drs.

• Thompson, R. T. Capt. 56th Regt. (91.)
Thornburgh-Cropper, E. D. Lieut. West

Kent Militia {91.)
Thornton, J. H. Todd Maj. Donegal Mil.
Thresher, Wm. Comr. R.N. (9/.)

Tighe, J. Lowrie Surg, (h.p.) 12th Lancers
•Tomkins, Alfred S. Capt. Vict. Rifles (91.)
Tomkyns, Rev. John late Capt. R. Drs.
Tomlinson, P.P. Lt. Inns of Court R. V. (9/.)
•Torrens, H. D., CB. Col. late 23rd R. W. F.
Townley, George Lt. late Rifle Brig.

Trafford, H. T. Capt. (ret.) 43rd L.I. (91.)
Trevelyan, W. R. Capt. Bom. S.C. (91.)
Tryon, R. Capt. (ret.) Rifle Brigade (91.)
Tryon, Robert Vice-Adm.

Tryon, T. Col. (9J.)

Tubbs, Robert Dop. -Lieut, of Middlesex
Turner, N. O. 8., CB. Col. R. A. (9J.)

Tumor, Christopher Hatton Lt. late Rifle

Brigade (91.)
Tumour, the Hon.Keith Lt.60th Rifles (91.)
Tylden, Sir J. Maxwell Lieut. -Col.

Tyler, C. J. Major R. A. (91.)

Tyler, Sir James Lieut, late of the Hon.

Corps Genk-at-Arms (SI.)
Tyler, H. W. Capt. late R.E. (31.)

Tyrrell, Avery Capt. late 5th West York

Mil. (91.)
Tytler, Wm. Fraser Major (ret.) 9th Beng.

Light Car. (91.)

UTTERSON, Alfred Major Bo. S. C. (9Z.)

VALIANT, Thos. Jas. Major-Gen.

Vandeleur, John Col. late 10th Hussars

Vernon, W. F. Capt. late 68th Regt. (31.)
Verling, Jas., MD. Insp.-Gen. of Hosps.
•Verney, E. Hope Comr. R.N. (9 J.)

Verney, G. Hope Capt. Hants Mil., late

Lieut. 74th Highrs. (91.)
Vernon, Lord Capt. Comt. 2nd Derby R.V.

Vesey, Hon. Eustace Lt. 9th Lancers (9/.)
Vibart, H. M. Major R.E. (9/.)

Vivian, H. H. P. Capt. late 22nd

Regt. (9/.)
Vivian-Hussey, H. Lt.-Col. Swansea R.V.
. MP. (91.)
Vivian, Sir Robt. J. H., GCB. Lt.-Gen.

Col. 102nd R. M. F.
Vyse, E. Howard. Col. 3rd Hussars (9/.)
Vyvyan, Geo. R. Lieut. R.N.R. (9/.)

Vyvyan, Rich. H. S. Lt. late Duke of

Cornwall's Rangers

WALES, H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF, KG.
~ °B. GCSL Field Marshal Col. 10th
irs, Col. in Chief Rifle Brigade (9/.)

Waddilove, C. L. Capt. R.N. (91.)

Wake, Baldwin A. Capt. R.N.

Waldegrave, W. F. Eabl Capt. London

Rifle Brigade (91.)
Walker, A. L. Capt. 99th Regt. (91.)

Walker, C. F. Capt. R.N. (31.)

Walker; Sir E. W. Forester, KCB. Gen.

Col. 50th Regt.
Walker, E. N. Capt. late Georgetn. Mil. (91.)
Walker, H. Chesshyre Lieut. R.A. (91.)
Walker, Mark, CB. Col. 45th Regt. (9/.)
Wallace, Chas. T. Capt. 74th Highs. (91.)
WalUs, Sir P. W. P., GCB. Admiral

of the Fleet
Walter, E. Capt, late 8th Hussars (SI.)

Ward, F. B. Lt.-Col. (ret.) R.A. (10».)

Ward, W. R. Capt. S. Down. Mil.

Warner, J. H. Major Middlx. R.V. (9L)
Warre, The Rev. Edmond Capt. Eton Cadet

R.V. (91.)
Warry, Alfred W. Lieut. R.N. (91.)

Wason, E. S. Capt. 33rd Regt. (91.)

Watherston,E.J.Capt.22nd Midx.R.V. (91.)
Watkin, H. S. Spiller Capt. R.A. (91.)

Watkins, C. F. Lt. 2nd R.N.B. Drs. (9/.)
Watson, John, H?.©. CB. Col. Bo. S.C. (9/.)
Watts, J. S. Staff Comr. R.N. (91.)

Wauchope, A. G. Lieut. 42nd Highlanders

(9/.)
Webb, J. M. Capt. late 4th Dr. Gds.

Webster, Sir Augustus F. , Bart. Comr. R.N.
Welch, J. W. Capt. late H. A.C. (3/.)

Weld, Fred. A., Esq., CMG. Governor

and Coram. -in -Chief of Tasmania (9/.)
Weller, T. M. M. Major W. Kent Mil.

Wellington, Arthur, Duke of, KG. Lt.-Gen.
Wemyss, D. Douglas Capt. late 48th Regt.
Wemyss, W. B. Lieut.-Gen. (9/.)

West, Hon. W. E. Sackville- Lieut.-Col.

(ret.) Gr. Gds. (31.)
Westminster, Duke of, KG. Lt.-Col.

Commt. Queen's Westminster R.V. (91.)
Western, W. T. Navy Agent (91.)

Wharton, W. J. L. Capt. R.N. (91.)

Whichoote, George Gen.

Whish, Claudius B. Lt. late 1 4th Huss. (3/.)
White, Loraine Major, Knight of Wind-
sor, late Barrack Master, London (31.)
Whitter, J. R. late Assist. Paym.-Gen.

Whittingham,Ferdinand,CB. Maj.-Gen. (3Z.)
Wightman, George Lt.-Col.

Wilkie, Hales Col. 29th Regt. (9/.)

Wilkinson, B. E. Lt. late 4th Dr. Gds. (91.)
Williams, T. B. Capt. late 4th Dr. GdB.

Williamson, James Maj. 23rd R.W.F. (91.)
Williamson, J. Lieut, lnte R.N.

Willhik, W. N. Lieut. R.N.(9J.)

Willis, G. H. 8., CB. Maj.-Gen. (9/.)

Wilson, A. K. Comr. R.N (91.)

Wilson, Belford R. Lt. 4th Drag. Gds. (9/.)
Wilson, C. P. Lieut, late I. N. (9/.)

Wilson, George Lieut.-Col. late 65th

Regt.

Col. Mad. S.C. (91.)
Lt.-Col. 1st N. York

Wilson, J.
Wilson, John G.

R.V. (91.)
Wilson, R. B. W. Lt. (ret.) 15thHuee. (91.)

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Wikm, Thomas, CB. Vice-Adm. (10*.)
Wilson, W. T. Lieut, late B.E. and late

Bhenish Cuirassier Begt. (91.)
Wilton, T. Eabl of, GCH. Hon. Col.

Q.O.L.I. Mil.
Winchester, Mabqusss of Col. Hants Mil.
Wing, H. Tryon Lieut. 97th Begt. (91.)
Wingfield, C. G. L. Lieut. 54th Beg. (91)
Wingfield, Geo. T. Lieut. B.N. (91.)

Winter, Chas. Capt. late 66th Begt.

Winterton, E., Eabl of late Capt. Commt.

6th Sussex B. V. (31.)
Wisden, T. F. Maj. Bl. Sussex Mil. (9J.)
Wolseley, G. B. Capt. 65th Begt. (91.)

Wolseley, Sir G. J., KCB. GCMG. Major-
Gen. (91.)
•Wood, H. E., tf.C. CB. Col. 90th Begt.

Wood, James Capt. (h.p.) B.M.L.I

Wood, Thomas Iieut. Gren. (Ms. (9L)

Woodall, J. Dep.-Lieut. Yorkshire

Woodgate, T. Capt. B.N.

Woodgate, W. Lieut, late 25th Begt.

•Woodward, Charles Capt. B.E. (91.)

Woof, Richard late Lieut. 2nd Batt.

Wore. Rifle Vols. FSA. FRSL. (91.)
Wrey, W. Long late Lt. Newf. Corps

Wright, Chas. Jas. Major-Gen B.A.

Wright, S. Capt. late 3rd Buffs

Wylde, W., CB. Gen. Col. -Commt, B.A.

(31.)
Wylie, Henry Capt. B. S. Corps (91.)

YEATMAN, A. G. Capt. B.A. (91.)
Yelrerton, Sir Hastings B., GCB. Adm.

(10s)

Young, Allen W. Lieut. B.N.B. (9J.)

Young, H. B. Vice-Adm.

Young, W. L. M.,CB. Dep.-Controller (31.)

Yule, James Comr. B.N. (31.)

HONORARY MEMBERS.

Bye-La ws. — Section III.

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands

His Maj estVo scab II, Kino of Sweden and Norway.

His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of the Netherlands.

His Royal Highness the Comte de Paris.

The Prince Imperial of Germany.

His Highness Eugene-Loui*-Jean-Joseph-Napol6on, Prince Imperial.

His Highness the Prince Hassan.

The Hon. Lady Grey.
Mrs. Bgerton Hubbard.
Mrs. Alexander.
Mrs. Jackson.

Lady Muncaster.
Miss Martha Somerville.
Lady Gomm.
Lady Taylor.

Mrs. Hayes.

Miss Roberts.

The Lady Sarah E. S. Lindsay.

Abel, F. A., FBS.

Addams, Robert

Anderson, John, C. E., Superintendent of

Machinery, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich
Baker, Sir Samuel White, KL, MA. FBS., Ac.
Baldock, William, Jun.
Bentham, George, FBS. LS. and HS.
Bourne, John, CB.
Cither, B.

Close, Mark C, Captain
Band, J.

Dnunmond, A. Robert
Drummond, Charles
Drummond, George
Dnunmond, John
Pergnsson, James, FBAS.
Faces, Capt, ScincuVs Service
Gabon, Fran., MA. FBS. FBGS.

Gordon, A. F.

Gould, John, FBS., Ac. Ac.

Grey, Eight Son. Sir George, Bart., GCB.
MP.

Harerfield, Bev. T. T., BD.

Hope, Bev. F. W.

Latham, John

Mallet, B.,C£. FRS., Ac.

O'Byrne, W. B., Author of " Naval Bio-
graphy"

Oliphant, Laurence, FBGS.

Smyth, C. Piazzi, Astro. Boy. for Scotland

Stephens, Andrew John, FBS. Standing
Counsel to the Institution

Tobin, Geo. Webb

Wigram, Clifford

Williams, J.

Wyatt, James

CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE.

Austria. — Beust, Count, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
Captain the Baron Spaun, Naval Attache.

Bavaria. —

Belgium. — Solvyna, Henri, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
Van de Velde, A. M., Councillor.

Denmark. — Bulow, de, F., General, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

France. — Harcourt, Marquis d', Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Ferronnays Le Marquis de la, Military Attachl.

Pin de la Tour, du Vicomte, Naval Attache*.
German Empire — Minister, Count, Ambassador Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary.

Yon VietinghoiT, Major, Military Attache.

Italy. — Cadorna, Cavaliere Carlo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
Maffei, Count, First Secretary.

JPertuffal. — Toroato, Le Visoomte de, Military Attache1.

Bussia. — Schouvaloff, Count, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plemipoteniary.

Gorloff, Major-General A., Military Attache.
Spain, —

Sweden and Norway. — Hochschild, Baron Carl, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary.

Turkey. — H. E. Musurus Pacha, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

United States of America. — The Honble. E. Pierrepont, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary.
Moran, Benjamin, Secretary of Legation.
Badeau, A^ General, Consul-General.

FOREIGN OFFICERS.

Bode, Baron de, Major-Gen., Imp. Buss. Ser,
Ceoille, Admiral, French Navy.
Da Cunha, C. P. Capt., Port. Navy.
Graham, J. D. Major, U.S. Topograph. Eng.
Lampo, A. Cavaliere, Capt. Italian Nary.
Pirche, Colonel, the Baron de, French Army.
Roerdansz, R., Lieut.-Col.Imp. German Staff.

Tchitohagoff, Admiral, Imperial Russian
Navy.

Todleben, Lieut.-General E. de Imp. Rus-
sian Service.

Ueedom, Baron Yon.

Wright, Lieut. -Gol. Commanding 6th Prus-
sian Dragoons.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

Novitsky, N. de, Major-General, Aide-de-Camp to H.M. the Emperor of Russia.
Bonnevie, F. Lieut., Norwegian Royal Guard.
Ekeloff, I. A. Lieut. Royal Swedish Navy.

hjlBBIsok ahd sojtb, PitnmwB ur qkdhtakt to bxb «ainsjT¥9«T. KaBxurii Xitio.

• - • •«

E=>i

Pts«

KD'

©Ity <$ranml

or THE

$topl tRnM Jlmfe Jnstitattmr.

Vol. XX. 1876. No. LXXXV.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE PROM 1805.
Jp,r By Major-General T. B. Collinson, B..E.

1793-1801.

The Pith of the Lesson.

In the year 1790, when the great French Be volution was beginning
to look threatening to the peace of Europe, and when most other
States began to get themselves into war condition in anticipation of a
% storm, Great Britain, that country of bold and practical minded
"*t people, disbanded the very respectable Army she then possessed, dis-
mantled her admirable Navy, and sold her naval stores. The lion did
not wait to have his claws cut, bat deliberately cut them himself, and
that without the excuse of one atom of love, nor even of the quiet
reserve of a great heart, but simply from the exigencies of Parlia-
mentary warfare interpreting a selfish policy of isolation. The
balance of political parties in Great Britain at that time prevented
-» tile Government of the day from preparing for war, and the oppo-
. r sition used for their purposes the national ignorance of continental
politics. There were other States in Europe which, for their own
. selfish interests, abstained from joining in the war against French
] dominion long after Great Britain had heartily begun ; but Great
Britain was then especially, as she is now pre-eminently, the one
power, which, by her geographical position, her character and her
resources, could interfere most effectually and with least danger to
herself, in preventing the spread of war in Europe, Hence we must
acknowledge that this laggardness of the people and opposition of the
rulers in preparing to take their part at the beginning of the dis-
turbance, has, from an historical point of view, an aspect of selfish
isolation. They had had many lessons in the course of their history on
evil consequences and uselessness of such a policy of separation, but
they persisted in burying their heads in their island nest in the hope
that the hunters would not see them, and in shutting themselves up
in their stronghold in the hope that the fire raging in the town would
not reach them ; and the result was that they themselves afforded to

VOL. XX. B

2 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

their posterity a stronger example of those consequences than any of
their predecessors. A long drawn war of 20 years, and a debt of
which we seem never to be relieved, was mainly the effect of their
taking the course, in 1790, directly contrary to what appears now to
have been the right one.

This proposition, so difficult to impress on the minds of the English
people, is demonstrated, I think, with sufficient clearness in the his-
tories of those times. From the beginning to the end of that long
war, the speeches, letters, and reports of the statesmen, admirals, and
generals read like one continuous commentary on the mistake of
being unprepared for war at the beginning — a mistake which took
15 years of the war to rectify. The very statesmen who at first
opposed the idea of interfering with the progress of the Revolution,
were at last most energetic in taking those measures against it which,
if addpted at the commencement, might have prevented the desolation
of Europe. It is surely no excuse to say that in this long period of
tribulation, the plants of a better liberty took firm root in every State,
and that Great Britain reaped a harvest of glories that would never
otherwise have flourished : the plain duty of a country placed in the
world in the position of Great Britain, is to preserve the peace ; and
that is the only and sufficient argument for the maintenance of its war
forces.

The form this continuous commentary took, is the best evidence
of the truth of the proposition: like the repeated chorus of some
song of lamentation, comes the cry of one minister after the other —
0 ! for an expeditionary force to send on to the Continent— 0 ! for a
well equipped body of trained troops — 0 ! for 50,000 disciplined
soldiers! But 50,000 disciplined soldiers are not to be bought at
Covent Garden Market every day in the week: such an article
requires some years to grow in ; it is a perennial plant, and the
attempt to substitute for it, annuals trained by forcing to look like
the real thing, may make a flower show, but produces no fruit. And
so the war ministers of the day found it, one after another : for they
all attempted for some years to supply the deficiency, which they all
felt, by making the general Militia act the part of Regulars — an ex-
pedient which gave satisfaction to no parties concerned, except perhaps
to the enemy. It was felt to be an unfair application of this old con-
stitutional force to make it a sort of recruiting depot for the Regulars ;
it was equally unfair to the Militia to expect them to do the work of
regular soldiers in foreign expeditions; and to the commanders of
those expeditions, to expect them to act as if their whole force was
composed of equally trained soldiers. Rut, it will be said, the troops
of the French Revolution were at that time equally untrained ; that
is true, but it is also true, that when there was a fair field, the French
Revolutionary troops at that time were beaten ; and had they been
met by a properly trained force, under a good commander, the French
Revolution would have been considerably curtailed in its proportions.

Tlie first Failure.
The British people were roused from their position as indifferent

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 3

spectators in 1792, and very suddenly. In June of that year, the
King dismissed Parliament without a prospect of having to disturb
that position of economical isolation ; in about a month afterwards,
Royalty in France was put an end to, an event which touched the
feelings of the English greatly, but not enough to disturb their peace.
In another month, however, their pockets were touched by the occu-
pation of Holland : and this was a blow which brought Parliament
together again about six months after their peaceful separation, to re-
establish the dismissed Army, to reconstruct the dismantled Navy, and
to re -purchase the sold stores. The first idea on going to war was quite
Worthy of the bold British race, namely, to attack the enemy at once,
and in the part where he had inflicted the injury on us ; and the first
operation of this long war was the siege of Dunkirk. This expe-
dition is, therefore, highly interesting to us, as a pregnant example of
the first performance when there was so much promise — in spirit.
Time was when an expedition into France would have brought all the
youth of England together as for a holiday excursion, with the
prospect of successful enterprise, and the French would have remained
at home in anxious preparation. In 1793 the British Government,
after three weeks' labour — of which those who have been in our War
Office at the outbreak of a " little war " will be able to form an idea —
got together 35,000 British and Hanoverian troops, and leaving the
Butch and the other opponents of the French to their own devices,
undertook this little independent operation at Dunkirk. The French
already dealing with troops by the 100,000, brought a superior force
upon this isolated expedition, and such was the defective condition of
our Navy, that they attacked the British besieging force by sea as well
as by land ; and this first episode resulted in a failure to the British
arms.

It was a fair example of many other such unsuccessful expeditions
with which the war on land was carried on in a desultory manner for
the next 15 years. All undertaken from the feeling of the necessity
of attacking the enemy on his own weak points, and all failing from
the want of a sufficient strength of properly trained and properly
equipped soldiers. Early in the war, Mr. Pitt pointed out the necessity
of so doing : " The power of Great Britain at sea, however irresistible
" on that element, could not, in the nature of things, make an adequate
" impression upon an enemy whose strength was concentrated on
land."1 But the absence of the only efficient means to produce that
required impression was shown by the successive attempts to modify
the Militia so as to feed the regular Army with the best kind of soldiers
available. They had no others, and what they had of these were so
few and so unfitted for the work, that these little isolated attempts of
a few thousand m?n at one point and another of Europe, this
warfare of pigmies,'' as Napoleon afterwards called it,2 only en-
couraged the enemy and discouraged the people of Great Britain.

The Be8ult.

In 1797, four years of this kind of warfare resulted in Great
1 " Ann. Beg.," 1794. 8 Dumas.

4 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

Britain being shut np in its own islands, with one of them in re*
bellion, and threatened with an invasion. It may be doubted whether
the French at this period contemplated a serious invasion, but the
threatening attitude they assumed had all the effect they intended, of
still more discouraging Great Britain from attempting any exploits
on the Continent. It was, it must be confessed, a humiliating position
for this country to be placed in, and drew from Mr. Burke an eloquent
denunciation of this timid and futile war policy : " Who wonld have
" credited that 200,000 men were kept in England and 80,000 in
" Ireland for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence ; and
" that by its very constitution the greater part of this force was dis-
" abled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke
" of active hostility. And who would have believed that a fleet of
" 500 ships, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the
" sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of ttn-
" enterprising defence. What must be the feelings of those who
" remember the former energy of England, in seeing these two islands
" with their extensive sea coast treated as a garrison — and a garrison
" powerless to sally — allowing itself to be besieged by an inferior
" force and a shattered fleet—-and with merely the menace of an
" attack P"1

At this period* however, the British Fleet, as it had often done
before, came to the rescue of the national honour. The naval
victories of St. Vincent and Caniperdown, in 1797, and of the Nile,
in 1 798, first roused the true war spirit of the people : that spirit had,
however, to fall and rise several times yet before it stood at the level
of steady success. Naval victories do not give permanent power, and
the truth of the above warning of Mr. Pitt was shown in 1799, in a
fresh expedition to Holland, and the defect of our war organisation
was again shown in its failure. Once more the Navy, under Nelson,
at Copenhagen, in 1801, raised the dormant war feeling, and this time
the first success on land by Abercromby, in Egypt, seemed to give a
prospect of a turn in the tide of war : showing that it was defect of
organisation only, and not of spirit in the people, that had hitherto
checked our arms on land. But the nation had not yet learnt the
lesson that no amount of enthusiasm, and no dominion of the sea, will
compensate for the want of deliberate preparation for war on land.
This new war spirit that had arisen in Great Britain, and which in
1790 might have been effectual in preserving peace, was now over-
shadowed by the superior organisation that had arisen in France
under the genius of Napoleon, whose moral power alone, one may say,
forced England to consent to a nominal peace in 1801 .

Its Lesson Lost.

Thus the first part of this great war was nominally brought to a
close by this forced peace of Amiens in 1801 — a peace which was no
peace — a mere armed truce, for the purpose of lulling the people of
Great Britain into a false security, while Napoleon was consolidating

1 Aliwm, toI. iy, p. 181. 1797.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1305. 5

his power in Europe for the more effectual subjugation of England.
For what were the respective positions of the two parties after eight
years of war ? Great Britain was all powerful at sea, and had gained
some colonies, which were highly advantageous for the preservation
of that power, and for the extension of her commerce. In conse-
quence, indeed, of that sea dominion, her commerce had gone on
increasing in a marvellous manner throughout the whole war ; and
she was induced to believe that it only required peace with her one
great enemy to perfect that sea dominion and make her mistress of
the commerce of the ocean. But the great enemy had very different
intentions in his mind. He had never deviated from the ideas he had
confidentially expressed in 1797 : " Let us concentrate all our activity
44 on the marine, and destroy England ; that done, Europe is at our
44 feet."1 The year before he made this hollow peace he said,
4i England must be overturned, war to the death with England "2
And throughout all his proceedings during the peace, for extending
and perfecting his control over the various countries on the Continent
which had been subdued by his arms, he always kept in view the
design, on the first favourable opportunity, of conquering that island-
power which was the great obstacle to his supreme dominion in the
western world.

And yet those same exigencies of Parliamentary warfare, which had
in 1790 diverted the nation from the right view of the state of the
Continent, again interfered to foster their erroneous views of sea
security and unlimited commerce, and with the same result. Such
Army as they had, was disbanded, the fleets were dismantled, and the
ships and stores collected during the last eight years, were sold.

So difficult is it for the British' mind to learn the lesson of its
proper duty in the world. So ready are our people for the sake of
that ocean commerce to rely on our security from the troubles of the
Continent. And if the mistake of that policy were so strongly brought
home to them, by the imminent danger of the next three years, how
much stronger ought it to be impressed upon us in these days, when
we have no longer the same security from invasion, and are infinitely
more dependent on the Continent for existence.

The Preparations in France.

First Conception of Project

It was in 1798 that Napoleon first had his attention turned to the
idea of invading England with a large force from the coast imme-
diately opposite to it. And whatever his real motive may have been
for declining the undertaking at that time, he recorded a professional
reason for doing so, which is of some value to us now ; and that was,
that however practicable it might be to pass over a sufficient body of
men, notwithstanding the superiority of the British at sea, to make
good a footing in England, it would be impossible to reinforce them.3

i " Confid. Corresp. de NapoL," Alison, iv, 212. * Alison, vol. iv, 220. 1800.

8 Thiers, " Consul, et l'Emp.," x, 13.

6 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

So, when he had obtained the supreme power in France, and had no
other enemy to deal with but Great Britain, and he had resolved to
take that opportunity of striking a decisive blow against her, he did
not forget that question of reinforcement; and he swept away the
difficulty with his usual force, by resolving to take over reinforcements
and all at once.

There are some curious points of resemblance between this projected
invasion of Napoleon and that of the Spanish Armada in 1588.
Napoleon had nearly as great power in Europe as Philip II had,
and at the moment England was his only enemy ; he had the resources
of Holland, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland, besides those of France, at
his disposal ; he prepared with great care during two years an enormous
armada of ships and troops, and stores of all kinds ; he had not the
command of the sea as Philip had, but that was more than counter-
balanced by his superior genius ; his favourite Admiral died at the
moment when all was ready, and he had to trust the pith of the expe-
dition to an inferior man. The winds of Heaven were against him as
against the Armada ; but the real cause of failure was the same in
both; the Franco- Spanish navy, enthusiastic and high spirited as the
men were, was not a match at sea for the British sons of Neptune.

There was this further point of resemblance, that both expeditions
were conceived and worked out by one man, and the real scheme of
each was kept secret to the last moment. But the difference of the
two men made a total difference in the character of the two expedi-
tions, and in the two schemes. Napoleon was a soldier and a states-
man of the highest genius, and fully capable of arranging the details
in the most efficient manner, as well as of devising a strategic plot
most calculated to ensure success, military and political. The one
expedition was a "toro" in a bull ring, going at his object by bruto
force, the other was the "toreador," who by skill and intelligence
seeks to overmaster the animal. This was very much the difference
between Napoleon and his present antagonist Great Britain ; to the
ingenious toils of the one were opposed the unskilful courage of the
other.

Napoleon began to think of the subject as soon as ho had made peace
with Austria in 1800, because England was the only power then likely
to oppose him ; and as he was not by any means prepared for such an
undertaking then, he was willing to make peace with her in 1801, for
the very purpose of better completing those preparations. When
Great Britain herself broke the peace in 1803, he was compelled by
the feeling in France to resume the project energetically, although he
himself would have preferred a delay of some years to ensure a prepa-
ration sufficient for the enterprise. And when Pitt returned to office
in 1804, and began to stir up Russia and Austria again to oppose him,
Napoleon found it necessary to act at once, and he put his mighty
shoulder to the wheel accordingly, and the machine moved.

Details of Vessels.

The whole scope of this wonderful contrivance for circumventing
England will come better later on in this account ; at present we shall

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 7

deal with the details of the preparations. As he could not expect to
keep the command over the " narrow seas " for very long, he naturally
selected the shortest passage for his troops across, and consequently he
was limited in the size of the vessels he could use to those which could
conveniently enter the ports in that part of the French coast imme-
diately opposite England ; then it was important that they should be
movable by oars as well as sails, and be flat-bottomed, so as to be
easily beached on the English coast. These were all the conditions
imperative, as far as the transport of the troops was concerned ; it
only required the presence of a protecting fleet to complete the scheme.
Napoleon's genius, as will appear further on, was shown in his plan fof
deceiving the British Government, and indeed everybody else as to his
real plot for ensuring the passage. Instead of confining his vessels to
these conditions for mere transport, he had them constructed capable
of fighting their way across against men of war ; and so completely
did he work out this idea that nobody in England or France, except
the three men in the real secret (and one British Admiral who divined
it) had a notion that he had any other intention of effecting the passage,
and the British Navy were most completely put on the wrong scent,
until the fox was on the point of getting into the hen-roost.

With this view, he had the main body of his transport- vessels con-
structed of three kinds. One, a good sea boat, of as large a size as
practicable, and well armed for fighting and not carrying many troops ;
one both a sea boat and a rowing boat, rather smaller in size, not
carrying so heavy an armament, but more troops ; and to each one of
these two descriptions was to be attached a powerful rowing-boat
also carrying troops, so that the sailing and the rowing boats were to
mutually assist and protect each other. And in the disposition of the
troops in the vessels, his first idea was to have some of each arm in
each pair of vessels. Thus, the large gunboat, with its rowing pinnace,
was to carry a company of infantry and some artillery, and horses ;
the small gunboat, with its pinnace, was to carry a company of
infantry, a field piece with the rest of the gunners, and some cavalry
and horses. Each pair of vessels was to carry a proportion of provi-
sions (for 20 days) and military stores as well. Thus, whatever the
numbers of pairs of vessels that landed on the English coast, they
would find themselves with a proportion of each arm, and with ammu-
nition and provisions.1

This idea was so far modified, that apparently each gunboat was
eventually independent of the rowing boat. According to M. Thiers
(who had access to the official correspondence), the arrangement of
the three kinds was as follows :

The large gunboats, or chaloupes canonnieres, were brigs, with an arma-
ment of four 24- or 36-pounders, a crew of 24, and 100 infantry, besides
ammunition and provisions.

There were about 320 of them.

The small gunboats, or bateaux canonniers, were barks, carrying one
24-pr., and a field-piece and ammunition waggon, all ready for action ;

1 Dumas, xii, 265.

10 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

began with that branch before the others ; a precaution, for the want
of which, we shall find the* English Commander-in-Chief lamenting.
The camps were at Ostend, Dunkirk, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and
Etaples. The troops in the two former were gradually brought to
Ambleteuse, in the flotilla, as it became ready, so that all parties got
bond fide experience in the work they were to do.1 But Napoleon, like
Caesar, wished his soldiers to be capable of turning their hands to
everything ; he not only had them practised at embarking and disem-
barking, but in rowing, and working the vessels, and in using the
cannons.

The fighting flotilla was organised in divisions to suit those of the
Army. A battalion of infantry consisted of 800 men, and 2 batta-
lions, made a demi-brigade; 9 large gunboats were required for a
battalion, with the proportion of artillery and horses ; 18 for a demi-
brigade. The whole flotilla was arranged in divisions of 18 vessels ;
6 such divisions, each commanded by a naval officer, with a proportion
of transport boats for stores attached, formed "an escadrille " under a
Post Captain. The vessels lay in harbour alongside the wharves in
tiers of nine, so that each battalion could march direct to the tier it
belonged to, and on to the nine vessels. And to keep up the connec-
tion between men and vessels, one-fourth of each company were kept
on board their boat for a month at a time, and worked it during that
time. The bulk of the stores were kept always on board ; the whole
force of men could embark in two hours ; the horses in four or five
hours ; they were put in slings, and so transferred from the innermost
vessel to the others.2

Remarks.

Every G-eneral is not a Napoleon; but without any disrespect to
the personal qualities of our Generals, we may ask, how many of them
would take an interest in, or even wish to see, their troops employed
in forming basins for the Navy, or in rowing or working boats, or even
in learning gun drill ? How many would be prepared to make any
proposition about artillery, or to discuss, like Napoleon, surrounded with
scientific men of all kinds, the whole bearings of the project, naval,
military, and civil ? Napoleon said once, that science was superior to
arms ; but we appear to act sometimes in our Army nearly on the
contrary supposition; we seem to think that it is sufficient for a*
General to know his drill, and that the soldier should practiso
nothing else all his life; and the result is, that we have seldom a
General qualified by practice to take in the whole branches of
warfare into his calculations in the way an Admiral has to do with
a Fleet, and that our soldiers at the outset of a campaign are at
a loss to do anything but fall in and march. The care and thought
bestowed by Napoleon himself on these matters gave new feelings to
his troops, and a confidence in the result of their labours they did not

1 It appears by the table from Dumas, at the end of paper, that in July, 1805,
there were still about 400 Teasel a ut Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend : probably store
transports.

3 Dumas, z and xii, 304. Thiers, iv, 486.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 11

feel at first. We are a nation whose whole warfare is made up of snch
expeditions ; how often do our Army and Navy rehearse together the
parts they are to play so often in their lives ? and yet the British
soldier has quite as much time for all these things , as the French
soldier had, and he is better qualified by nature to rise to the occasion.
Our Officers and men have, I believe, higher personal qualifications
for soldiering than any other race ; but these qualities are in great
measure wasted by the system which tends to keep each branch of the
Army within its own little groove ; and we train a portion of our
officers very carefully for war, and then make little or no use of this
expensively educated section during the long years of peace. This
adherence to the purely tactical part of the military profession is a
foreign tradition, quite contrary to the English character, which of
itself naturally takes the more comprehensive spirit of the sailor, and
is not slow to take advantage of the science of the day. We shall
never have a really English army until we enlarge our notions about
the duties of the profession.

British Attack?.

The British cruizers appointed to watch all these proceedings did
not allow them to go on during those two years without many attempts
to stop them. Besides the constant waylaying of the flotilla as they
crept, one detachment after the other, along the French shore to the
rendezvous, there were several direct attacks upon them in harbour by
bombardment or otherwise. Our naval Officers now would no doubt
think, as they did then, that it would not be a difficult matter to
destroy them in that manner, but none of the attempts at that time
succeeded. Even Lord Nelson failed in two attacks on Boulogne in
1801, where there was already a portion of the flotilla collected ; and
the great cause of failure seemed to be the superior size of the French
guns. As the British ships got bolder in their attacks, Napoleon
made larger guns and mortars, and fired the guns at high angles. It is
true that, now-a-days, bombardments look more hopeful with our
powerful and accurate guns; but it must be recollected that the
flotilla presented a fair mark even to the guns of those days ; there
were generally one or two hundred of them moored in the roadstead,
close together, and yet, neither by French nor English account, was
there much injury done to either flotilla or forts, and their close
packing and other precautions saved them from several attempts at
boarding. Our torpedoists will also be disappointed to hear that one
or two attempts with new and ingenious machines of that kind failed
completely, and not so much from any defects in the machines them-
selves, as from accidents of time and place and the precautions of the
flotilla, to which such inventions in all ages are liable.

Upon the whole, indeed, there seems to be no doubt that the
French naval and military forces felt more confidence in the prospect
of success in the flotilla in 1805 than they did in 1803, and really
began to believe in the possibility of forcing their way across the
narrow channel in spite of the British Fleet ; the Minister of Marine
(Admiral Decres) declared at last, that with the loss of about 100

10 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

began with that branch before the others ; a precaution, for the want
of which, we shall find the* English Commander-in-Chief lamenting.
The camps were at Ostend, Dunkirk, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and
Etaples. The troops in tbe two former were gradually brought to
Ambleteuse, in the flotilla, as it became ready, so that all parties got
bond fide experience in the work they were to do.1 But Napoleon, like
Crosar, wished his soldiers to be capable of turning their hands to
everything ; he not only had them practised at embarking and disem-
barking, but in rowing, and working the vessels, and in using the
cannons.

The fighting flotilla was organised in divisions to suit those of the
Army. A battalion of infantry consisted of 800 men, and 2 batta-
lions, made a de mi-brigade ; 9 large gunboats were required for a
battalion, with the proportion of artillery and horses ; 18 for a dcmi-
brigade. The whole flotilla was arranged in divisions of 18 vessels ;
G such divisions, each commanded by a naval officer, with a proportion
of transport boats for stores attached, formed "an escadrUle" under a
Post Captain. Tho vessels lay in harbour alongside the wharves in
tiers of nine, so that each battalion could march direct to the tier it
belonged to, and on to the nine vessels. And to keep up the connec-
tion between men and vessels, one-fourth of each company were kept
on board their boat for a month at a time, and worked it during that
time. The bulk of the stores were kept always on board ; the whole
force of men could embark in two hours ; the horses in four or five
hours ; they were put in slings, and so transferred from the innermost
vessel to the others.*

Remarks.

Every General is not a Napoleon ; but without any disrespect to
the personal qualities of our Generals, we may ask, how many of them
would take an interest in, or even wish to see, their troops employed
in forming basins for the Navy, or in rowing or working boats, or even
in learning gun drill ? How many would be prepared to make any
proposition about artillery, or to discuss, like Napoleon, surrounded with
scientific men of all kinds, the whole bearings of the project, naval,
military, and civil ? Napoleon said once, that science was superior to
arms ; but we appear to act sometimes in our Army nearly on the
contrary supposition; we seem to think that it is sufficient for a
General to know his drill, and that the soldier should practise
nothing else all his life ; and the result is, that we have seldom a
General qualified by practice to take in the whole branches of
warfare into his calculations in the way an Admiral has to do with
a Fleet, and that our soldiers at the outset of a campaign are at
a loss to do anything but fall in and march. The care and thought
bestowed by Napoleon himself on these matters gave new feelings to
his troops, and a confidence in the result of their labours they did not

1 It appears by the table from Dumas, at the end of paper, that in July. 1805,
there were still about 400 vessels at Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend : probably store
transports.

* Dumas, x and xii, 304. Thiers, iv, 486.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 11

feel at first. We are a nation whose whole warfare is made np of such
expeditions ; how often do our Army and Navy rehearse together the
parte they are to play so often in their lives ? and yet the British
soldier has quite as much time for all these things. as the French
soldier had, and he is better qualified by nature to rise to the occasion.
Our Officers and men have, I believe, higher personal qualifications
for soldiering than any other race ; but these qualities are in great
measure wasted by the system which tends to keep each branch of the
Army within its own little groove ; and we train a portion of our
officers very carefully for war, and then make little or no use of this
expensively educated section during the long years of peace. This
adherence to the purely tactical part of the military profession is a
foreign tradition, quite contrary to the English character, which of
itself naturally takes the more comprehensive spirit of the sailor, and
is not slow to take advantage of the science of the day. We shall
never have a really English army until we enlarge our notions about
the duties of the profession.

British Attacks.

The British cruizers appointed to watch all these proceedings did
not allow them to go on during those two years without many attempts
to stop them. Besides the constant waylaying of the flotilla as they
crept, one detachmeut after the other, along the French shore to the
rendezvous, there were several direct attacks upon them in harbour by
bombardment or otherwise. Our naval Officers now would no doubt
think, as they did then, that it would not be a difficult matter to
destroy them in that manner, but none of the attempts at that time
succeeded. Even Lord Nelson failed in two attacks on Boulogne in
1801, where there was already a portion of the flotilla collected ; and
the great cause of failure seemed to be the superior size of the French
guns. As the British ships got bolder in their attacks, Napoleon
made larger guns and mortars, and fired the guns at high angles. It is
true that, now-a-days, bombardments look more hopeful with our
powerful and accurate guns; but it must be recollected that the
flotilla presented a fair mark even to the guns of those days ; there
were generally one or two hundred of them moored in the roadstead,
close together, and yet, neither by French nor English account, was
there much injury done to either flotilla or forts, and their close
packing and other precautions saved them from several attempts at
boarding. Our torpedoists will also bo disappointed to hear that one
or two attempts with new and ingenious machines of that kind failed
completely, and not so much from any defects in the machines them-
selves, as from accidents of time and place and the precautions of the
flotilla, to which such inventions in all ages are liable.

Upon the whole, indeed, there seems to be no doubt that the
French naval and military forces felt more confidence in the prospect
of success in the flotilla in 1805 than they plid in 1803, and really
began to believe in the possibility of forcing their way across the
narrow channel in spite of the British Fleet ; the Minister of Marine
(Admiral Decres) declared at last, that with tho loss of about 100

12 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

vessels and 10,000 men, the flotilla wonld arrive on the English
shores.1 "We must lose some men in every campaign," observed
Napoleon2 upon this ; bnt these two were in the secret.

The Transit.

The arrangements for the actual transit over the strip of sea were
these. On the signal being given by Napoleon, which wonld be
towards high water time, as only half the vessels could get out in one
tide, about half the number of troops would at once embark
in their respective vessels, in each of the three ports of rendezvous,
and lay outside off the ports till the next tide ; in the meantime the
horses would be put on board the transports, and at the next high
water the remainder of the troops would embark, and the whole would
move on at once to the appointed places on the English coast. The
force from each port was to move* in three lines — the large gunboats in
the van line, the small gunboats iu the rear, and the pinnaces in the
centre. The naval Commander-in-Chief of the flotilla (Admiral
Bruix at first, and, on his death, Admiral La Crosse) calculated on
moving in a calm at the rate of three miles an hour, with the help of
their oars ; they anticipated and hoped for a calm, or even for a fog,
so as to escape the British men-of-war ; and they calculated on the
passage, even in a calm, not occupying more than twelve hours. They
were not afraid of night-time, as the troops had been practised in
embarking and disembarking, and moving the vessels during the
night.8

Whether such an expedition would have succeeded in reaching the
English shore in the face of any respectable naval force is a doubtful
question. Admiral Lord Keith, who commanded the British naval
force opposed to it, thought they would never attempt it without
having the command of the Channel ; we know that Napoleon did not
intend them to attempt it, but it seems certain that the French naval
and military commanders, who were not in his secret, had made up
their minds to try it, and that after some experience.

It has indeed sometimes been doubted, whether Napoleon seriously
entertained the idea of invading this country — whether the whole
affair was not a blind to deceive the world, including the French
themselves. But 1 think no one can read his letters on the subject
during those years, showing his earnest attention to every detail
in the affair, and his anxiety when the action of the plot began,
without coming to the conclusion that his mind was really set upon
the attempt. But the strongest evidence of all is, that it was on the
point of being completely successful ; his calculations of the proba-
bilities of success were so carefully made, that the failure was due,
not to fault in the design, but to defect in execution.

Other Preparations.

The consideration of the points of attack on the English coast, and
of the whole scheme, will come better in subsequent parts of the

1 Thiers, iv, 417. ' Dumas. * Dumas, xii, 805, 312.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 13

account ; but we may record in this part the other preparations for
the affair on the French side.

At Texel, Napoleon had compelled the Dutch to provide a war fleet,
and transports and troops, which with a French contingent formed
a separate expedition of about 25,000 men, prepared for long sea
voyage.

At Antwerp, he had commenced the docks and quays, which were
bat the beginning of the great works he contemplated there and at
Flashing ; and no doubt if be could have postponed the attempt on
England, as he wished, till these were finished, the Scheldt would
have been chosen as the point of departure of a large naval and
military force. As it was, the Belgians were occupied in providing
part of the flotilla, which was moved to Ambleteuse when ready.

At Brest, there were 21 French ships of the line and transports
besides, and about 25,000 troops : forming another complete expedition
for long sea voyage.

At Rochefort, there was a small squadron and a few thousand men.

At Toulon, there were 11 ships of the line and 9,000 men ; and
at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, the Spaniards were bound by the
treaty with Napoleon of January, 1805, to have 30 ships of the line
and 5,000 troops.

It must be recollected that all these war squadrons, and their troops
and transports, were blockaded in their respective ports by the British
ships ; and it will be seen, subsequently, that the troops at Rochefort
and Toulon and part of the Spanish forces were employed in the West
Indies ; and that the two great expeditions of Texel and Brest never
moved at all.

At the beginning of 1805, Napoleon had available, towards the
invasion of England, the following land and sea forces. Of these
nearly 200,000 men, about 10,000 must be deducted for the West
India expedition, and 40,000 at Texel and Brest together, for whom
there was not transport; leaving 150,000 who could have been
embarked for the invasion.

French Naval and Military Forces prepared towards the Invasion

op England, 1805.

Place*. Troops. Ships of the Line.

T J French 18,000 Marsh. Marmont Dutch 5 -

rML \ Dutch 12,000'

Bbebt French 25,000 Gcnl. Angereau French 21 Adml. Gantheaumc.

Roc*™*. „ 4,000 ^Id^SS.

_ .» f „ 5 Adml. Gourdon.

^."•.'.WnUh 5,000 SpafhHir.Sra-

ClBTIIAGBHA J 16

Toru,x.... French 9.0C0 Fre»A U { 1dm. vSuve.

1 Dumne, i, DO.

14 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

Bdulognb .. French*

^Ambleteuse 23,727 Marsh. Davoust.

Boulogne 30,627 Marsh. Soult.

Etaples 20,527 Marsh. Ney.

Reserve. 38,801 Gen. Baraguay d'Hilliers.

wStaffand Non-combat. 9,233

Total 122,915*

Horses .... 14,654 «

Totals :— 196,000 troops ; 78 ships of the line.

Officers 1,023

Troops 6,065

Artillery 7,666

The Land Preparations in England.
Unready in 1804 — as in 1588.

If there were some points of resemblance bet ween the preparations
for the invasion of England in 1803 and those in 1588, there are more
between the preparations for resisting it at those two epochs. The
general organization of the forces of the country had been, indeed,
much altered since the days of the Tudors; the permament Royal
Army had been increased, the old constitntional Militia had been put
on a settled footing by Act of Parliament, and a new edition of it in
the shape of Volunteers had been established ; and the whole was
placed much more nnder the central authority of the Government.
But there was just the same blindness to the danger in the Govern-
ment itself, the same mistaken parsimony and the same bewildering
fuss when the supreme moment arrived. There was, indeed, the same
enthusiasm in the country ; at the first sound of the trumpet of victory
the English war-spirit broke forth, as it did in the days of Elizabeth ;
but the very centralising of the anthority, which ought to have led that
enthusiasm, by its own supineness wasted it away. The counties were
ready to act as ever, but they had no longer that spring of local power
to act : the men of Kent had no longer the responsibility of defending
Kent. It was a better system, no doubt, to have a powerful central
authority, but that authority having failed to do its duty, as in 1588,
there was no independent local action tD fill the gap as in those days.

Now this is not merely a question of historical interest ; we have

a much more serious concern in it, for the same defects still exist and

1 Dumas, xii, 33, but an actual " state" of those embarked, at page 304, gives the
following : —

Infantry 76,728

Cavalry 11,640

Artillery . . . . , 7,560

Non-combatants 17,476

114,554

Horses 7,394

M. Thiers, iv, 488, gives the field guns as 400.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 15

will lead to the same imminent danger in the next great* war we are
engaged in. We have gone on improving the condition of the per-
manent Royal Army, and elaborating a system on paper, and at the
same time we have been accumulating more and more power in the
central Government, and more and more sapping that local spirit
which is after all the esseuce of English action. And this lias resulted
from the form of Parliamentary Government now existing in this
country : not indeed directly, because in all civil questions that come
before Parliament, the importance of local government is always
strongly insisted on, but the jealousy of Parliament has prevented
any Government from ever trying to put the system of defence of the
country on a broader, more permament, and more local, and therefore
more national, basis, although a proper system of that kind would on
the whole tend to deprive the central Government of some of the
military power they have now got possession of.

The defensive measures began in England at the same time that the
Revolutionary Government in France began to threaten them with
invasion. Neither side appeared to be very much in earnest in the
matter : the French apparently did not care to do more than make
desultory descents upon Ireland and England, and the English felt
so confident in the naval guard they kept on the narrow seas, that they
did little on land but call out the Militia and arm the old existing
least batteries ; and under the reactionary influence that brought about
-he peace of 1801, even this small expense was economized. The
trained troops were disbanded, the guns and stores sold, and the ships
paid off, which had been slowly accumulated during the eight years
of war, and all in order that the Government of the day should gain
popularity by reducing the estimates. Very heavily we are paying for
that one year's popularity.

Very different was the feeling twelve months after, when the
terrible Napoleon, who now directed the energies of France, and who
had struck down one enemy after the other on the continent, now
turned the undivided forces of his genius and of his kingdom upon what
was known to be his most ardent desire — the crushing of England by
one overwhelming blow. The popular Government of peace was
speedily dismissed to make way for the only man who was felt to be
a match for the dreaded enemy, William Pitt. And in 1803, after a
peace of Great Britain's own making and own breaking, the country
had to begin almost de novo in creating a fleet and an army and de-
fences, with the foe looking in at the gate. That the country escaped
being conquered was no merit of that popular Government, nor of the
Parliament ; it was due under God's Providence to national charac-
teristics, which from time to time save England in spite of Govern-
ments.

The Six War Department*.

I cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness the present Com-
mander-in-Chief. The record of all these struggles to get ready for
the impending blow is contained in the correspondence of the various
departments concerned. I have been allowed to look over some of the

16 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

records left by his illustrious predecessor the Duke of York ; and I
cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness that he has but a Secretary
of State to deal with, and that in peace, instead of the task of his
royal uncle, who had six different independent departments of the
Government to consult, in face of a war a Voutrance. There was the
Colonial Minister, who guided the general operations of the war ; the
Secretary at War, who raised the forces ; the Master-General of the
Ordnance, who provided the war stores and commanded the artillery
and engineers ; the Treasury, who provided the supplies ; the Home
Office, who controlled the reserve forces; and the Admiralty, who
conducted the naval defence. The Commander-in-Chief and his
Generals of districts might propose plans of defence ; but any one of
these political chiefs might upset the whole by putting in or leaving
out his own little independent spoke. If a coast battery was to be
altered, the proposition must be submitted through the General of the
district to the Commander-in-Chief for his general approval ; to the
Master- General for the guns ; to the Secretary at War for the pay of
the gunners ; to the Treasury for their food ; and to the Admiralty
for the coast signal. That any defences were ready by 1805 is in
itself a memorial of the energy of the British character which could
overcome so cumbrous a machine of war.

The machine still exists. It has been put together in a new form,
in one large case, and labelled War Department ; and many people
believe it to be an entirely new engine, capable of being set in motion
by one person. It does very well for show in peace time, but try to
set it to work for any practical purpose, and it will be found that the
old limbs are there still with the rust of ages on them, and particularly
stiff in their connecting joints. And the most curious arrangement
about this old machine for a practical people, as we profess to be, is that
the man who has to work it, is specially selected on account of his total
ignorance of its details, and in order to insure inexperience, he is
changed at uncertain times. I am not thinking of the permament
officials in thus speaking of the War Department, I know well how
hard they work for the nation ; it is the Government and Parliament,
who are to blame, who being responsible to the country for providing
an efficient war machine, allow this overworked old affair to go on.

The Force Available.

Throughout 1803 we find from the records that the Commander-in-
Chief and his Generals were occupied in discussing a scheme of
defence ; about the middle of it, he expressed a confident hope that
there would shortly be devised some means of impeding the enemy
from advancing into the country ; what then wo may ask had the six
independent departments been about, when after eight years of
expectation of invasion, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces, is
still in an attitude of doubt as to the defence ? In October of that
year His Royal Highness made a general report to the Government on
the scheme of defence he proposed: and this document is well
worthy of the attention of all future defenders of the country ; for
though many of the conditions are quite altered, the local peculiarities

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

and the general principles remain the same. He calculated on Having,
in 1803, and he actually had in 1805, at his disposal for the defence of
the United Kingdom, about the following force :*

In Great Britain and the Channel IB-
lands

In Ireland

Total

Regulars.

Militia.

Volunteers.

70,000
25,000

56,000
25,000

330,000

• •

95,000

81,000

330,000

Sea Fencibles.

16,000
10,000

26,000

Total 526,000

There were then in the East Indies and in the Colonies about
50,000 regulars and Colonial corps.

The Commander-in-Chief had, therefore, for the defence of Great
Britain (as the troops in Ireland could not be removed under the
circumstances) about 126,000 of what in the loose military ideas
of that day, they called Regulars, that is to say regular Army and
Militia. He wanted 20,000 more, and 20,000 on the top of that, for
the expeditionary corps which never was ready to start : not a very
extravagant demand considering the character of the troops, and the
character of the 180,000 Napoleon had available to bring against him.
The Militia had been embodied during the previous eight years, and had
been considered as the legitimate reserve and feeder of the permanent
Army ; and there was therefore not much difference between them :
few of them had seen real war, or had any experience out of the
United Kingdom. Hitherto the country had depended mainly for its
land forces on the voluntary recruiting for the regular Army and on
the old constitutional Militia : and the insufficiency of this provision
for the defence of the country, may be judged from these comparative
statements: From 1783 to 1800 the regular British Army had had
about y^ of the whole population of the kingdom per annum .*' during
the same time the French Army had taken about y^ of their popula-
ion per annum,9 or nearly the whole such population of 20 years of
age each year : and at the present day the Prussians take in peace
time per annwn 3^ of their whole population for their regular
army/

But in 1803-4 the Volunteer force, which had hitherto existed rather
on sufferance, took a prominent and permanent position in the de-
fensive elements. Now, the very existence of such a body, rising up

1 At the end of the paper are tables showing the actual strength of the different
forces and their disposition. I have not been able to get that of the Volunteers
later than 1803 ; the number in 1805 was greater. Alison (" Hist. Europe") says
in 1804 there were 190,000 regulars (including those abroad), 110,000 militia, and
400,000 Tolunteen ; the highest numbers of forces of all kinds I find mentioned
daring that war were 800,000.

8 Alison, nr, 212. 8 Alison, i, 856 j vi, 411.

* "The Military Forces of Great Britain," by Major-General Sir L. Simmons, 1871.

VOL. XX. C

8 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

a crew of only 6, and 100 infantry, or artillery or cavalry, and 2 horses,
besides ammunition and provisions.

There were about 550 of these.

The pinnaces, or pemches, were 60 feet long, and had, according to
M. Thiers, 60 oars, but, according to Dumas, 18 banks or thwarts of
oars, which is more likely, and only a few sailors, 60 soldiers, a
howitzer, and a small field-piece.

There were about 320 of these.1

Besides the above, which were considered as the fighting part of the
flotilla, there were nearly 500 vessels for carrying the remainder of the
horses and artillery, including a siege-train, and nearly 500 vessels for
carrying the rest of the provisions (for 3 months for the whole force)
and stores, and non-combatants. There were altogether about 2,300
vessels in the flotilla. Most of the fighting portion of the flotilla were
constructed, the others were purchased from the local fishing trade.
There are two tables from Dumas at the end of this paper, giving the
details of the whole flotilla.

Difficulties of Assemblage.

The construction and assemblage of all these vessels, within a few
months as was intended, was not done by a stroke of a pen like an
English contract now-a-days. Timber had to be felled and converted
ill over France and Belgium, naval stores to be made and purchased,
tnd these materials collected within waterway of the ports. By stir-
ring the old feeling of France against England, Napoleon got many of
•the cities to make vessels at their own expense ; his correspondence at
this period contains an amount of detail on all these matters, that
shows at once what a master mind was guiding the whole, and how
little local independence there was.9

The worst part of the business was moving them when ready to the
appointed places of rendezvous, along the coast infested with those
hornets of British cruisers. These places of rendezvous were Boulogne,
the centre and principal, with Ambleteuse and Vimereux north of it,
and Etaples south of it. They were selected from being the first ports
south of Cape Grisnez, and being opposite the south coast of England
at the narrow part of the Channel. It was indispensable that the
whole flotilla should be assembled so close together as to be certain of
starting simultaneously. The vessels had to come from all the ports
as far as the Scheldt on one side and Brest on the other ; and the
systematic arrangements for their safe conduct deserve our notice, as
examples of coast defence. Besides permanent batteries on all the
headlands of the coast, field batteries of even 16-pounders were
stationed at intervals, which followed the detachments of vessels along
the shore. The French coast generally is favourable for the manoeuvre,
being shallow and sandy ; and the flotilla being of light draught could
keep under the guns on shore, and out of range of the large English
vessels, and even beach if necessary. The attempts of the watchful
British cruisers, under Sir Sydney Smith, to prevent this movement,

1 Thiers, iv, 414. Dumas, xii, 804. 2 Dumas.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 9

formed a series of little sea episodes during those two years; but
though the j also had some vessels of light draught, they did not succeed
in materially interrupting the gradual assemblage of the flotilla ; and
the failure was owing chiefly to the heavier guns of the French,
a point Napoleon had pressed on his own artillery. Heavy guns in
coast batteries is the moral of that story.1

But perhaps the most remarkable part of the whole preparations, to
an English mind, was the enlargement of the several harbours of
rendezvous to hold the flotilla. In England, if such a proposition had
not stopped the scheme altogether, it would certainly have been done
by contract at a huge * expense ; Napoleon made the troops who were
to embark fortn the harbours for the flotilla they were to embark in.
Timber was felled in the neighbouring forests to make quays and
piers, and the excavation was done by relays of soldiers, under the
directions of the scientific engineers of France. The sea defences of
each post were multiplied so as to make an attack from the sea hope-
less, and heavier guns were expressly made by Napoleon's order for
them ; to get range, mortars were laid on the sand between high and
low water, so that they were covered by the tide ; at Boulogne alone
there were 500 guns in sea batteries ; we have few places now with so
many.2

Hie French Troops.

The troops employed by Napoleon on this great enterprise were
selected from those available in France. In 1803, he had altogether an
army of about 480, 000,3 and, as he was at peace with the rest of the
world, he calculated on being able to allot 150,000 altogether to assist
towards the invasion of England ; but with his usual prevision he took
special means to keep up and even increase the strength. His measures
for recruiting his army, and their effect on France, are not encourag-
ing towards compulsory service. The population of France about that
time was nearly 30,000,000/ and by the laws of conscription which then
existed he was at liberty to take 60,000 men of 20 years of age every
year, in war time ;* but, of course, he easily evaded this restriction, and
during his reign he took on the average 200,000 per annum, which was
then the whole number of 20 years of age in each year,6 a drain which
must hare materially assisted in producing the fact that the population
of France has not increased since that time at the rate of the English
population. We pay heavily for our Army, it is true ; but a nation
can recover from a money expenditure much easier than from the loss
of its young men.

Napoleon formed camps near the ports where the flotilla was pre-
paring, for the double object of assisting in the work and re-organising
the French Army, which now for the first time was arranged in permanent
divisions, with a permanent staff over each.1 And knowing from his
own education the necessity of careful training for the artillery, he

1 Dumas. J&mefl. * Thiers, iv. Dumas, xii.

* Thiers, iv. * Statesman's Year Book,

* Thiers, ir. • Alison, v, 411.
7 Dumas.

10 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

began with that branch before the others ; a precaution, for the want
of which, we shall find the* English Commander-in-Chief lamenting.
The camps were at Ostend, Dunkirk, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and
Etaples. The troops in the two former were gradually brought to
Ambleteuse, in the flotilla, as it became ready, so that all parties got
bond fide experience in the work they were to do.1 But Napoleon, like
Caasar, wished his soldiers to be capable of turning their hands to
everything ; he not only had them practised at embarking and disem-
barking, but in rowing, and working the vessels, and in using the
cannons.

The fighting flotilla was organised in divisions to suit those of the
Army. A battalion of infantry consisted of 800 men, and 2 batta-
lions, made a demi-brigade ; 9 large gunboats were required for a
battalion, with the proportion of artillery and horses ; 18 for a demi-
brigade. The whole flotilla was arranged in divisions of 18 vessels ;
G such divisions, each commanded by a naval officer, with a proportion
of transport boats for stores attached, formed " an escadrille " under a
Post Captaiu. The vessels lay in harbour alongside the wharves in
tiers of nine, so that each battalion could march direct to the tier it
belonged to, and on to the nine vessels. And to keep up the connec-
tion between men and vessels, one-fourth of each company were kept
on board their boat for a month at a time, and worked it during that
time. The bulk of the stores were kept always on board ; the whole
force of men could embark in two hours ; the horses in four or five
hours ; they were put in slings, and so transferred from the innermost
vessel to the others.2

Remarks.

Every General is not a Napoleon ; but without any disrespect to
the personal qualities of our Generals, we may ask, how many of them
would take an interest in, or even wish to see, their troops employed
in forming basins for the Navy, or in rowing or working boats, or even
in learning gun drill ? How many would be prepared to make any
proposition about artillery, or to discuss, like Napoleon, surrounded with
scientific men of all kinds, the whole bearings of the project, naval,
military, and civil ? Napoleon said once, that science was superior to
arms ; but we appear to act sometimes in our Army nearly on the
contrary supposition; we seem to think that it is sufficient for a*
General to know his drill, and that the soldier should practise
nothing else all his life; aud the result is, that we have seldom a
General qualified by practice to take in the whole branches of
warfare into his calculations in the way an Admiral has to do with
a Fleet, and that our soldiers at the outset of a campaign are at
a loss to do anything but fall in and march. The care and thought
bestowed by Napoleon himself on these matters gave new feelings to
his troops, and a confidence in the result of their labours they did not

1 It appears by the table from Dumas, at the end of paper, that in July, 1805,
there were still about 400 vessels at Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend : probably store
transports.

3 Dumas, x and xii, 304. Thiers, iv, 486.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 11

feel at first. We are a nation whose whole warfare is made np of such
expeditions ; how often do our Army and Navy rehearse together the
parts they are to play so often in their lives ? and yet the British
soldier has quite as much time for all these things , as the French
soldier had, and he is better qualified by nature to rise to the occasion.
Our Officers and men have, I believe, higher personal qualifications
for soldiering than any other race ; but these qualities are in great
measure wasted by the system which tends to keep each branch of the
Army within its own little groove ; and we train a portion of our
officers very carefully for war, and then make little or no use of this
expensively educated section during the long years of peace. This
adherence to the purely tactical part of the military profession is a
foreign tradition, quite contrary to the English character, which of
itself naturally takes the more comprehensive spirit of the sailor, and
is not slow to take advantage of the science of the day. We shall
never have a really English army until we enlarge our notions about
the duties of the profession.

British Attache.

Upon the whole, indeed, there seems to be no doubt that the
French naval and military forces felt more confidence in the prospect
of success in the flotilla in 1805 than they olid in 1803, and really
began to believe in the possibility of forcing their way across the
narrow channel in spite of the British Fleet ; the Minister of Marine
(Admiral Decres) declared at last, that with the loss of about 100

18 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

spontaneously as it did at the beginning of the war, was a moral force
such as few countries have been fortunate enough to possess. The
mighty Napoleon was trying at this very time, in 1803, to rouse arti-
ficially in France that spirit, which in England was almost over-
powering in its free growth. The Volunteers had as yet been only a
comparatively small supplement to the Militia; but in 1803 the
Government being frightened not out of their wits, but into them,
then commenced that series of experiments, which continued up to
1812, on the raising of a British army, and which will be found a mine
of study to the inventors of such schemes at the present day. It was
the first of these, an attempt to raise a sort of levy en masse of the
country, that drove the whole of those liable to its operations in a body
into the ranks of the Volunteers. Thus these 330,000 recruits, who
had suddenly sprung out of the ground, were, though equally enthu-
siastic, of a different character to those which had gradually grown on
te the Militia, and the Commander-in-Chief very properly did not trust
very much to their assistance in his scheme of defence.

And unless we alter our ideas upon the subject of Great Britain's
war requirements very considerably, this is precisely the general
character of the force which the future Commander-in-Chief will have
to deal with in preparing to defend the country against future in-
vasion. A few Regulars, a partially trained and hurriedly increased
Militia, and a vast crowd of Volunteers. Whether the 150,000
experienced soldiers of JJapoleon would have forced their way through
those spirited defenders of their country up to London, is a problem
we can only approximate to, by considering the advance of the
Prussian Army, in 1870, through the whole French regular army and
over a distance three times that of London from the coast, up to Paris.
As we did in 1588, as we did in 1797, as we did in 1803, so are
we doing now ; we are trusting entirely to that one line of defence,
the guarding of a narrow strait of sea by our ships. We have really
at the present time no arrangement at all for increasing largely and at
once the number of regular troops in the United Kingdom, any more
than we had at any one of the times above mentioned : and yet that
was felt at each of the epochs to be the one effectual security against
such a fearful danger.

The Commander-in-Chiefs Report.

In considering the defence of the Kingdom in 1803, the Com-
mander-in-Chief took the coast between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as
the most vulnerable part — it must be remembered that the threatened
points of departure of the invader extended from Texel to Brest —
and that the kind of vessels constructed for the great French flotilla,
implied a short passage. He then describes the numerous practicable
places for the enemy's landing on that coast: and lays down the
maxim, far more applicable now than then, that "The period of
" the enemy's greatest weakness would be that of his landing : " and in
order to take advantage of this weak moment, he proposes to distri-
bute part of what he calls his regular forces, that is of the 126,000
above, mentioned, in camps along the coast within easy march of

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM' 1805. 19

it; the volunteers of the counties concerned to proceed on the ap-
pearance of the enemy to reinforce these regulars. He then discusses
the possible advance of the enemy from some point of this vul-
nerable coast upon London ; for he assumes, as almost every military
man, either invader or defender of England, has assumed, that
the object of the enemy would be to reach London by the shortest
possible line, without turning aside for any purpose if he could help
it. And he draws attention to the serious danger, which still remains
as a matter of very great concern in our defensive system, that there
are no good natural positions between this vulnerable coast line and
the capital, on which a decisive battle could be fought with advantage :
hence he argues on the necessity of strengthening artificially such
as do exist, in order to gain time for the forces to accumulate to
oppose the enemy's advance. The tremendous difficulty of the
problem was to him, as it is still, in the " dangerous proximity of
" the capital to the coast." And he saw no way of escaping the risk of
losing the capital, but by intrenching and defending it.

Napoleon's Plan of Attack.

The weak part of this system of defence appears to be in scattering
the regulars too much : as the whole defence depended on them. The
general principle was that the regulars were to remain in their dis-
tricts, and the volunteers were to march to reinforce them : the whole
concentrating towards London. But as the volunteers were not to
move until the enemy appeared, the commander must have had little
notion of Napoleon's speed of movement if he expected to have time
to assemble them between the coast and the capital, in a position to
oppose him.1 An inspection of the map accompanying this paper
will show how very much scattered the English land forces were
just before the expected invasion.2 We have no authoritative
account of the lines of attack on which Napoleon proposed to
move: but we know that he asked for the command of the
channel for only six days,* and said that he would be in London
in five days,4 and that his naval officers calculated on performing
the passage by rowing the boats of the flotilla in twelve hours
at the utmost, and that 120,000 men could have been carried in
the flotilla ; hence we may conclude that the mass of his forces were
to be landed on the coasts of Kent and Sussex. This is confirmed by

1 The rate of march for the troops from inland, mounted on waggons, was calculated
at 25 miles a day ; and it was expected that the volunteers who assembled at
Leicester would be in London in seven days from the first alarm of the enemv's
appearance.

* In the scheme for the Mobilisation of the Army, which was published in
the Army List for December, 1875, this defect has been avoided. The bulk of the
Regular forces and of the Militia, are to be concentrated at certain fixed places in
the United Kingdom, in war time, and formed into eight army corps, together con-
stituting the movable army for the internal defence of the kingdom : and the bulk
of the Volunteers are to form the stationary garrisons for the permanent defensive
works.

1 Dumas.

4 Alison, v, 160, quoting Montholon.

C 2

20 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FKOM 1805.

a French map of the channel which I have seen, and which indicates six
places of landing on those coasts, viz., Brighton, Newhaven, Hastings,
Shorncliffe, Dover, and Deal, with routes from each to London.
Other landing places are marked at Swanage (west of the Isle of
Wight), in the Bristol Channel, and at Harwich on the east coast,
with routes also up to London ; hut these would probably be the
feints to be made by detachments from the fleets at Brest and
Texel. If the main body were really to land at these six places, then
following the ideas expressed by Napoleon himself of securing one of
his flanks on the Thames, they would probably have advanced in
echelon from the right, and thus have prevented both their flanks
from being turned. The above map, by the references on it, evidently
was connected with the scheme of invasion at that period.1

Fortifications and Guns.

The fortifications of the south and east parts of England were in a
wretched condition for a country to go to war with. The fortifica-
tions enclosing Portsmouth existed, and those enclosing Portsea were
completed or nearly so ; and Blockhouse Fort, Southsea Castle, and
some coast batteries in Stokes Bay. At Dover the Castle, the citadel
on the western heights, and some sea batteries existed. At Chatham
one or two of the small forts on the lines only existed. At Sheerness
Garrison Point was fortified, and on the Thames, Tilbury Fort and two
or three batteries below it were all the defences. On the coast be-
tween these places and up north to Yarmouth, there were batteries
which had been constructed since 1798 : but these and the whole of
the other works had been partly dismantled during the short lived
peace of 1802. As to the rest of the coast of Great Britain in 1803,
there was not a general from the north of Scotland down to Land's
End who did not write to represent the defenceless state of his
district.

Mr. Pitt, in 1804 (when he returned to office), like Lord Palmerston,
in 1859, gave a new start to the fortifications of the country. About
that period were commenced at Portsmouth the Gosport Lines, the
Hilsea Lines, Fort Monckton, and Fort Cumberland. At Dover the
lines on the western heights were constructed as field works. At
Chatham also the lines were made as field works, and one or two of
the detached forts commenced. And the lines at Sheerness. Along
the coast between Portsmouth and Yarmouth, those extensive series
of Martello towers and coast batteries now existing were begun.
At Plymouth, the lines round the dockyard were made as field works,
and field redoubts constructed on the neighbouring sea heights ; the
citadel and some of the sea batteries existed before.

But not many of these works were ready to resist the attack if it
had been made in 1805 ; indeed, the towers on the east coast were not
begun till 1808 ; and the deficiency of guns was loudly complained of.
The inadequate ideas on this subject might be judged from the total

1 The points of debarkation and the routes to London as shown on that map are
marked on the map accompanying this paper.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 21

number of garrison guns (from 42 to 6 pounders) in fortresses and
batteries between Sheerness and Dangeness, including Dover, in 1803,
being 335, and with only 80 rounds per gun of ammunition : Napoleon
having 500 garrison guns at Boulogne alone. Also that the Com-
mander-in-Chief in 1803 calculated on having 480 field guns available
for the defence of the whole of Great Britain, with 150 rounds per
gun: Napoleon having 400 ready to embark in his flotilla, besides
some 2,000 pieces belonging to the vessels themselves. And the
reserve of small arm ammunition in the fortresses and fixed camps
was at the rate of 60 rounds ahead for about 230,000 men. Lord
Chatham (Master-General of the Ordnance in 1803) ingenuously
remarks that he could supply the guns, but the difficulty was to get
gunners, officers, and horses, and seems to think it a satisfactory
explanation to say that " goodwill and numbers will not supply the
" qualities necessary in artillery : " it would have been rather more so
if that undisputed truth had been taken into account in 1790. And
to the Commander-in-Chief's reiterated representations of the want of
proper fortifications for the arsenals and dockyards, he returns the
regular answer, which has been handed down among other parts of
the old machine, "it has been referred to a committee." One can
fancy the committee sitting steadily through the crisis, and making a
most valuable report when it was all over. As to the entrenchments
for strengthening the various positions between the coast and the
capital, selected for making a stand at, except the two camps now
existing at Colchester and Shorncliffe, and a position at Chelmsford,
1 cannot find that anything was done at all ; except, indeed, a brisk
correspondence as to whether it was the duty of the Commander-in-
Chief or the Master-General of the Ordnance to make them.

We are now in a better condition as regards the defence of our
naval arsenals, thanks to Lord Palmerston ; but the coast line, especially
that " vulnerable coast line " and the mercantile harbours, are not
much better on the whole now than they were then : the batteries and
guns for the most part are almost as obsolete as if those of 1805 still
remained. On the east coast particularly, that coast which was
directly threatened by Napoleon's Texel expedition, and opposite which
a possibly new enemy has sprung up since his day, the towers and
batteries of 1808 are still the main defence, and as regards the
guns of the present day, are almost as they were left in 1812. Re-
member the two morals on this subject, one from England and the
other from France : — u The period of the enemy's greatest weakness
" is that of his landing : " and " les batimens Anglais furent contraints
" de tenir le large — par l'effet des pieces de fort calibre."1

The Defence of London.

The project for defending London included Highgate on the north,
and Sydenham and Woolwich on the south, and had a circuit of 46
miles — a large scheme for that day. But when we learn that 170,000
men were considered as the necessary garrison, that the greater part

1 Dumas, xii, 42.

22 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

of them were to be furnished by London itself, and that the entrench,
ments were to be made in a few days, after the landing of the enemy,
one begins to donbt whether it was seriously intended to carry ont
snch a project, which would hardly have delayed the capture of the
capital for a day. That was all, however, the Commander-in-Chief
could hope to do, — to put as much obstruction as possible in the direct
way of the enemy — between him and the great prize he sought. And
this must be the principle of all projects of defence of the Kingdom :
so that on whatever point of the coast an enemy may land, it will be
certain that he will have to fight his way through a succession of
obstacles up to London, the last and greatest of all being close to the
capital itself. Mr. Pitt saw that. In discussing the defence in Par-
liament at this time, he said : "It is in vain to say you should not
" fortify London because your ancestors did not. If, by the erection
" of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress
" of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between
" the safety or the destruction of the capital. It will not make the
" difference between the conquest and the independence of this
" country ; for that will not depend upon one nor upon ten battles :
" but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives
" and millions of property, and of confounding the efforts and
" causing failure in the enterprise of the enemy."1 Napoleon saw it,
for on the map I have mentioned before, there is an entrenched camp
marked on the north side of London, from which he intended to
defend his prize : and long after, at St. Helena, in discussing the
general question of fortifying capitals, he said : " A great capital is
" the country of the flower of the nation ; it is the centre of opinion,
" the general dep6t : it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a
" point of such importance without means of immediate defence."*
And he enumerates the rapid conquests he made of Austria, Prussia,
and Spain, owing mainly to the defenceless state of their capitals at
the time ; and the loss of his own kingdom, in 1814, from the same
cause ; to which we may now add, its protracted defence in 1870, in
consequence of the deliberate adoption of his advice in time of pro-
found peace.

Other Preparations.

Several other points of great importance in the defence of the
country are discussed in the Commander-in-Chiefs correspondence.
The removal of the inhabitants from the coast, and the removal or
destruction of live and dead stock, is a very serious question : though
full regulations were laid down at the time about it, on the whole it
was left to be carried out too much at the last moment. Some steps
towards it ought to be taken always on declaration of war. Napoleon
trusted much to capturing a large number of horses in England.

The accumulation of provisions at the central points of assembly of
the forces, though much considered, was not sufficiently provided for,
judging by the reports of some generals ; too much dependence was
apparently placed on local resources, especially on village ovens for

1 Alison, y, 160. ' Alison, y, 161.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 23

baking bread. As all property taken for the use of the troops, or
destroyed on advance of the enemy, was to be paid for by the Govern-
ment, at fair rates, it would have been better, on both counts, to have
made depdts of live and dead stock at central points on declaration
of war, and to have fed the forces from them, replenishing them from
the coast. We shall see further on Napoleon's opinion as to false
economy on this head.

Depdts of Military Store*, at the central points, do not appear to
have been sufficiently attended to ; the arsenals and fortresses were
depended ou for these articles. But those places would have quite
enongh to do in issuing stores in bulk, without having to deal with
troops in detail. And if the formation of such temporary depdts is
left to the time of imminent danger, there will be the confusion and
waste, such as has happened on more than one occasion since those
days. The first thing Napoleon began with was the depdts for
artillery and military stores.

Corps of local Pioneers were established all round the coast ; and
the correspondence shows how much impressed the Commander-in-
Chief and his generals were with the importance of such local bodies,
for assisting in forming entrenchments, in making and destroying
roads and bridges, inundating marshes, Ac. The Railway Engineer
Corps was intended partly to supply this want at the present day ;
bat however valuable and indispensable such a corps would be for
special works, it is to the local corps of Volunteer Engineers we must
look for the chief assistance in this respect. But if these corps are
to take the place of those pioneers, who were so much in demand in
1803, they should be practised in their own localities on the description
of work they will have to do, and not treated as ordinary infantry
volunteers.

Remarks.

The whole of this part of the story may be in effect summed up in
these words : (< Great Britain declared war first, and then began to
44 think about preparing for it afterwards" Not the first nor the
last time she has done so; the old story was precisely repeated in
1854. There was plenty of energy in 1803 when they did begin to
prepare, no lack of war enthusiasm everywhere, bat the alarming
feature of it all, the terrible tone that pervaded it throughout, was
that it had to be done as it were under fire, in presence of the enemy.
While Napoleon's single genius was rapidly arranging his forces for
action, the British war authorities were still discussing what system
of defence they should make, and the British Parliament was fighting
about the general principles on which the forces should be recruited.
It was not the want of warlike spirit ; there were 7 or 800,000 men
under arms, almost every man of whom had enlisted of his own free
will; but not one quarter of them knew anything of drill or dis-
cipline. And nothing had been settled as to the positions they were
to occupy or how they were to get there, or how to be provisioned
when they got there; no defences had been prepared, no guns
mounted. When Napoleon calculated on the disaffection of a large

24 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

portion of the English people to their constitution he showed how
little a foreigner, even of the highest intelligence, understands oar
national character ; bnt when he prophesied the indecision and con-
fusion of the British Government, he laid bare the weak point of the
country, of which future enemies may still take advantage.

For the indecision as to our war policy exists still, and therefore the
confusion that will arise on a declaration of war may be confidently
foretold. We have been told lately by a high political authority that
the old maxim, si vis pacem para bellum, is now to be interpreted,
" If you wish for peace, prepare for peace." If that means that yon
are to make no preparation for war whatever, then that was exactly
what happened in 1793 and 1803, with a result each time not en-
couraging to that interpretation. But if it means that you are to
make every requisite preparation to defend yourself when and where-
ever you are attacked, then that is exactly the interpretation I should
wish the British Government to give to the old Latin proverb.

We are not so prepared at present. Our present condition, from a
war point of view, as compared with 1803, may be generally stated
thus : our external cares and liabilities have multiplied manifold ; we
have more dependencies to look after, much more ocean wealth ex-
posed to attack, very much greater dependency on foreign food ; and
we are more liable to invasion. These are all against us. On the other
hand, we have double the population, with probably double the wealth
per head, and improved weapons to defend ourselves with. Upon
the whole, it must be allowed that our general condition is less secure
from vital injury by an enemy than in 1805 ; and an evidence of it
appears in the successive panics that come over the country upon
every threat of war. Well did the Duke of York demonstrate this
when he said of the state of affairs in 1803: "A panic generally
" arises from a danger which has not been foreseen. A high-spirited
" people never despond when they feel themselves possessed of the
" means of resistance." If this view of our position is correct, as I
think it could be shown to be by details, our preparations for
securing our position ought to be so much the more carefully made
beforehand.

Our Present Land Forces.

Now, in the first place, what land forces have we actually available ?
The whole of our peace establishment of all ranks and all kinds, and
to defend all parts of our empire, is, according to the Statesman's
Year Book of 1875, about 500,000. This number, in proportion to
population, is about one-third of the maximum number of all sorts,
raised to defend 'our then empire during the war of the French
Revolution. Where are the other two-thirds to come from in case of
war? Recollect, we are in a worse general position as regards an
enemy than at that time ; we therefore cannot do with less than the
same proportion of land forces in war. Indeed, when we consider the
character of the change in our position, that a material part of it
consists in more distant and extended responsibilities over the world,
we must expect to require a greater proportion to population than was

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 25

required in 1805. Then, again, consider the character of the forces.
About 200,000 out of the 500,000 are regular troops, belonging to
the Queen's permanent Army ; better drilled, better disciplined, and
better conditioned altogether than what were called Regulars in 1805.
We have, therefore, as regards the regular troops, an advantage in
quality, and not so great a disproportion in quantity. But there is
another standard for armies to be considered besides population, and
that is, the force the enemy is likely to bring against yon; and it
will be found, on consideration of the present standing armies of
Europe, as compared with those of the Great Napoleon's days, that
they have not only doubled in strength, and have also improved in
drill and discipline, but that far more effective and sure means are
now taken to increase those numbers of trained troops rapidly and
largely in war.

What measures have we now for increasing rapidly and largely
those 200,000 regulars? I don't think it is putting the case too
strongly to say, that we have absolutely none worth mentioning.
There is a so-called Army Reserve. I wish to speak with respect of
the attempts by Lord Cardwell to improve our Army ; there are two
of his measures which bear upon this part of my subject — the Army
Reserve and the Localisation. But when one hears of 30,000 as a
high result anticipated from the first, one is reminded of a former
Army Reserve in 1803, of which Mr. Windham said, in 1805, that it
was " like a turnpike gate which men were paid to go through, and no
" more made an army than the lobby of the House of Commons made
" the members. . . It was like Harlequin's horse, the only fault of
" which was that he was dead." The same epitaph, 1 fear, would do
for both reserves : " Bequiescit in pace et non in bdlo resurget" Now,
bearing in mind that it was " trained soldiers " that were in demand
in 1803, not recruits, not Militia, not Volunteers ; that the question as
put to Parliament even in 1806, and by a Whig Minister, was:
" How are we to ensure to this country what unquestionably it has
" never had, a never failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers ?"
I think we shall not be going beyond the mark, in 1876, in put*
ting the requisite reserve of the regular army at nearer 300,000
than 30,000. And at the back of these should be the Militia
and the Volunteers; not a militia which has the distinction of
regulars without the training ; not volunteers which, as was said of
those of 1803, " were as much an army as a man's picture is himself ;"
bat which shall both of them together form the old constitutional
force, the armed people of England, prepared, as Pitt said of them,
" to fight on their own soil for everything dear to the individual and
" important to the State." These men would form the garrison of
England, while the regulars formed the moving army. No amount of
ironclads could in these days give the same strength to the defenders,
and hesitation to the enemy, as the knowledge that two such bodies
could be called into existence at a few days' warning.

Preparation for Mobilisation.
Thai is one preparation required. Another which, like the former,

26 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

can only be properly done in time of peace, consists in the arrange-
ments for concentrating all the forces when raised, at suitable places
in the country selected beforehand, for collecting the necessary war
stores and provisions at these places, for constructing field works
in positions carefully planned before, for taking possession of cer-
tain railways and telegraphs and occupying certain lands, so that,
on declaration of war, all these Questions will not have to be
discussed by Committees at the War Office, as in 1803; but that
that declaration, ipso facto, will be the authority for Generals of
districts, in concert with Lords-Lieutenant of counties, to pro-
ceed at once to carry out the plans lying all ready drawn up in
detail in their offices. We know that a great deal has been already
done, and is doing, towards this essential preparation, especially in the
lately created Intelligence Department of the War Office, which has at
once shown its value by commencing to perform that important
service towards the defence of the country, hitherto almost unattended
to, of collecting the necessary information to enable the war autho-
rities of the country to decide upon the above questions ; and the con-
stitution of the different army corps, <fcc., published in the Army List
for December, 1875, shows how carefully and fully that Department
has considered this subject. But after these Officers have completed
their valuable labours, if it is not to be all lost labour and waste
paper, the Government will then have to do its part, in putting
the whole arrangements on such a practical and permanent footing,
that the two local authorities above mentioned — the civil and the
military — will have both the legal power and the practical means
of carrying them out, without further direction from either Parlia-
ment or Government; so that we shall not have, as happened in
1803, to discuss a Defence Act under the excitement of external
war, as well as under the internal disputes of party politics,
and parade, as they did, our family jars before the world at a time
when the thoughts of the whole country should be turned solely
towards its defence. And to satisfy the country of the efficacy of the
arrangements, they should be put to practical proof by making the
Autumn Manoeuvres an opportunity of collecting forces by railway
on different parts of the coast to meetan actual debarkation from our
fleets.

Localisation of Authority,

And yet, notwithstanding Reserves, Defences, and Acts of Parliament,
there will still be confusion and delay, unless a more real localisation
of authority is established than exists at present. Lord CardwelTs
Localisation Act came in with such a flourish of trumpets, that many
people believed that it completely effected this object ; they should be
made aware, therefore, that it merely connected the regular regiments
with the militia regiments, and left the powers of local General Officers
almost as limited as ever, and even reduced that of Lords- Lieutenant
of counties. Now, in 1588, the counties paid for their own troops
and own defences, and hence each county had an interest and a pride

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 27

in making both efficient, and they showed by their acts that they had.
Two centuries after, the system had so completely changed, that
between 1793 and 1814, there must have been about twenty different
individuals, who conducted the whole defences of the kingdom from
London, each coming new to the work, each independent of the other,
each with his own crotchets, which he insisted on having discussed by
Parliament, as the one original and only effectual panacea for security.
And if we have war in 1876, there will be two or three gentlemen in
Pall Mall, who probably began to study military matters for the first
time about twelve months ago, who, with the help of the electric
telegraph, will equally decide on the movements of a General's army,
the issue of an extra ration to Private Smith, the firing of an extra
round of ammunition, and the purchase of a palisade; and these
gentlemen may be changed at any moment for two or three others,
who will have equally to decide these questions with probably equal
knowledge of them. This is not a system suited to the English
character ; that is only brought out into full action by the respon-
sibility of independent power within the range of each man's sphere
of duty. This I believe to be the chief cause of the success of British
seamen, and of the constant vitality of our Navy through all England's
difficulties. The General of a district ought, like the Admiral of a
Fleet, to feel himself responsible for every part of the military matters
in his district ; for the fortifications, the guns, the military stores, the
provisions, and for the efficiency of all the arrangements we have been
talking of, for the defence of the country. At present he is virtually
only responsible for the discipline of the troops and the drill of the
infantry and cavalry ; and it has this doubly injurious effect, that the
Generals cease to take a real interest in the defensive measures of the
country, and it comes to be considered that ability in drilling troops
of the line is the one essential qualification for a General. And there
is the same want of unity of knowledge and power in the War Office
in London. There is no Commander in-Chief of the British forces
really ; he is only the Officer commanding the regular troops in the
United Kingdom. We have little wars going on continually in every
climate on the globe, and we don't know how soon we may nave great
wars going on in parts we are totally ignorant of; and yet we have
only just established an Intelligence Department to collect the indis-
pensable information for such wars ; and we have now no one per-
manent person in a position to combine that information with a know-
ledge of all the war resources of the empire, in such a manner as to
guide the temporary political War Minister in conducting the defence
of it

Naval Preparations in England.

Over-Confidence in our Security.

I am not competent to enter into any detailed discussion of the
lessons to be drawn from the naval preparations in England to oppose
the projected invasion of 1803. I can only state, and that briefly, the

28 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

general character of them, and such points in them as strike me to be
prominent ; leaving it to naval men to extract what moral they can
for the next time.

The general impression made upon me by the records of the naval part
of the defence is, the confidence in the successful result of it that was
felt both on sea and land ; and yet the Navy was in just the same
condition of unreadiness as the Army when the war broke out.
Twice in his career had Mr. Pitt to re-construct the British Navy —
once in 1793, and again in 1804. In 1792 there were only 15
line-of -battle ships in commission and 15,000 seamen; in 1794 there
were 80 liners in commission and 70,000 seamen.1 Here seems an
argument for providing a large reserve for the Navy, of seamen, ships,
and stores ; what expense, what labour, what unjust misery must have
been occasioned by having to purchase, build, and impress to that
extent in a year. The unsatisfactory character of the impress was
shown by Pitt's attempt, in 1794, to raise a reserve, by taking a
tithe of men, out of the Merchant Service, in a systematic way,
according to tonnage, by which, out of a total number of 100,000
merchant seamen, he expected to get 20,000 ; and another 10,000 by
levying one man from every parish. But this rude and unjust method
did not apparently succeed any better than the still ruder and more
unjust impress. In 1802, the number of seamen was allowed to get
down to 30,000, and in 1804 it had to be raised again to 80,000.*
And of the vessels purchased at this time for the Navy, to replace
those sold in 1801, many were lost owing to their unfitness for the
purpose. James says that, in 1804, there were 87 war vessels launched f
the Government, in 1802, had evidently been " preparing for peace,"
according to Mr. Forster's interpretation.4

Notwithstanding this makeshift fleet, there seemed to be no doubt
in anybody's mind that "the narrow seas" were quite securely
guarded. The tone of the Navy is that of men accustomed to victory,
and whether the squadrons were large or small, badly found or not,
there was no hesitation about keeping up the blockade of the enemy's
naval forces. This difference of feeling, as compared with the land
forces, was not due to any difference in the men themselves, for as
soon as England got a really efficient army on to the Continent, under
a really efficient commander like Wellington, we find exactly the same
atmosphere of victory, and feel the same confidence in ultimate success
in all difficulties. In each case the men were confident in their own
strength, only in the Navy that had grown up as a part of their
necessarily self-dependent and responsible existence ; whereas, in the
Army, that state of existence is a war plant not grown in peace
time.

There is, however, I think, a note of warning to us, in that very
confidence of the people of England in the secure guarding of the
narrow seas ; for it was that underlying feeling which caused them to
neglect their defences on land. There was evidently at the bottom

■

1 " Ann. Beg.," 1795. * " Ann. Beg." » James, " NaT. Hist."

4 Mr. W. S. Fonter's address at Edinburgh, Not., 1876.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 29

the unspoken idea that all the preparations on land were very well as
an evidence of the spirit of the people ; bnt that the enemy wonld
never really come, the Fleet wonld take care of that. We shall see
in the next part how very, very nearly the enemy were in coming in
spite of the Fleet.

Naval Forces in 1805.

In 1805, according to James's list, there were altogether in the
British Navy about 800 vessels having a total tonnage of 660,000
tons, including 80 building ;l this list does not appear to include the
special flotilla got up for opposing the French flotilla ; for, in 1804,
the Secretary of the Navy, in the House of Commons, stated that there
were about 600 vessels in the flotilla, in addition to 880 in the main
part of the Navy.1 Of this fleet, 180 were ships of the line, but only
83 of these were commissioned as sea-going. In Steel's Navy List
for April, 1805, the following is the distribution of the ships of the
line ; this month's list fairly represents the general disposition of the
fleet for opposing the scheme of invasion, and before the opening of
the ocean drama of 1805 by Napoleon disturbed the previous general
arrangements.

Distribution of British Liners. — From Steel's Navy List, April, 1805.

1. In the English and Irish Channels . . . . 22

(Rear-Admiral Lord Cornwallis)

2. In the Downs and North Sea . . . . . . 6

(Admiral Lord Keith)

3. In the West Indies and America. . . . . . 8

(Rear- Admiral Lord Cochrane)

4. Coast of Spain and Portugal . . . . . • 14

(Vice- Admiral Collingwood)

5. Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . 12

(Vice- Admiral Lord Nelson)

6. In the East Indies . . . . . . . . 8

(Rear- Admiral Sir E. Pellew)

7. In port, fitting . • . . . . . . 18

8. Guard ships, Hospital and Prison ships . . 16

Total in commission .. .. ..104

9. In ordinary, Ac, and building . . . . . . 78

Total 182

The distribution of the regular war-ships for the special defence of
the narrow seas against the French flotilla, is thus given in the Com-
mander- in-Chief s records, by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the
time. These were all under the command of Admiral Lord Keith.

1 See end of paper for detail of the fleet, from James. * " Ann. Beg."

30 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

June, 1803.
On the French Coast —

From Ushant to Boulogne. . 20 Frigates and others.

From Boulogne to Dunkirk 7 „ „

On the coast of Holland . . . . 9, including 1 liner.
On the English Coast —

From the Start to the Downs . . 12, including 2 liners.

About the Thames . . . . 11, including 2 liners.

Thames to Yarmouth . . . . 10 frigates and others.

The Naze and the Humber . . 3 frigates and others.

Fitting in port . . . • . . 6

Total .. .. 78

In addition to these, there were in the Thames, 10 frigates across the
river, a little below Graveseud, manned by the Trinity House ; and at
the Nore, about 6 gun- boats and at least 40 gun-barges ; and 4 floating
batteries were proposed for the Thames and Medway. In this account
no mentioned is made of any special flotilla, which, by other letters,
appears to have been under the orders of Sir Sidney Smith, for attack-
ing the French flotilla in its course of concentrating at Boulogne.

Seamen, — Marines. — Sea Fencibles.

The personal naval force in 1805 consisted of 90,000 seamen, 30,000
marines,1 and about 26,000 sea fencibles along the coasts of England
and Ireland. It is noteworthy here that, as the naval force increased,
so it was found advantageous, and even necessary, to increase the
marines ; for it is probable that as our more extended empire causes a
much greater demand for over-sea expeditions than in those days, this
necessary body, from its very amphibious nature, will become a far
more important element in such expeditions. It was once, I think,
proposed to increase this force largely, expressly with that view. I
have included the sea fencibles among the naval forces, as well as in
the land forces, because, although they were ordinarily stationed on
shore, under the Generals of districts, they had boats (1,846, in 1805,
in Ireland alone), for assisting in attacking any enemy who appeared
on the coast, and when so afloat they were under the Admiral's orders.
This fencible body is worthy of notice. They were originally recruited
(voluntarily) out of the whole seafaring population along the coast,
but when it was found that it was used as a means of escape from
the Navy impress, it was modified to include only those not liable
to serve elsewhere, either by land or sea. But, with a proper system
of reserve for the Royal Navy, there would be no need for such
restrictions ; they would be the sea Militia of the country, and would
be drawn from the whole seafaring population, excluding only the
Naval Reserve, just as the ordinary Militia are drawn from the rest
of the population. Their organisation is quite a model for any
Militia force. The south and east coast of England, from Cornwall
to Yorkshire, was divided into eleven districts, each under a Post

1 " Ann. Bog."

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 31

Captain ; in Ireland there were twenty-one districts ; they had alarm
posts along the coast, where they kept their arms (only pikes), and
assembled once a week for gun-drill, in such parties and on snch days
as might be most convenient to the men (which, be it remarked, might
be on a Sunday), otherwise they carried on their private business,
unless specially called out. Two permanent men were stationed to
each boat, with 2*. a day pay ; the other men had 1*. a day when
on duty, and naval pay and allowances when away from their own
district. The cost of tbem, including all expenses, appears to have
been about £5 per head per annum. l

Dispersion of the Naval Strength.

Thus the naval forces of the country were chiefly employed in
watching the enemy's coasts. This does not appear to have been con-
sidered, even then, as an altogether satisfactory system of naval war-
fare. It was true it gave a feeling of security to England, but it was
at a great expenditure of men and ships, which kept the sea per-
petually at all seasons, while the enemy's fleet was safe and well in
harbour ; and it scattered the naval strength over a great extent of
ocean, in small squadrons, each employed in blockading an enemy's
port or his colonies, thus giving him the chance, if he could escape
out of one or two ports, of concentrating a sufficient force to defeat
these small squadrons in detail. This was a plan of operation which
suited the ideas of Napoleon, and this dispersion of the British naval
forces suggested to him that tremendous scheme of naval strategy by
which, in 1805, he so very nearly accomplished his purpose. Moreover,
this system of " unenterprising defence," as Burke called the similar
one in 1797, was not at all suited to the adventurous character of the
British seamen. If the land defences and land forces of England and
of her colonies had been better organized, a body of the fleet would
have been available sufficient to have carried the British flag in triumph
through the colonies of the enemy and her allies.

Still less does this system appear advantageous now, when an enemy
has greater facilities of breaking through a blockade, and much
greater certainty of concentrating his squadrons. And to give even
the same feeling of security to the coast would now require such a
naval force as would use up, in a wasteful manner, the maritime
strength of the country. There is one element of naval warfare that
never changes, and that is the distance of the horizon. With in-
creased speed and certainty of movement, the enemy has only got the
same zone of observation to pass over. Napoleon calculated on advanc-
ing over that zone at three miles an hour ; he could now do it at ten.
Napoleon had to construct vessels expressly for the transport, and
collect them by degrees together, to make sure that they would cross
simultaneously ; he would now find, in the ports of the countries he
then controlled, sufficient merchant steamers to carry over the same
force he proposed, and which, leaving each their own separate ports,
might deceive the British Fleet (as he deceived it in 1805), and meet
at a given place at a given time, within a few hours of each other.

1 Principally from Admiralty records.

32 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

And even in 1805 this feeling of security was not felt by the
Admiral himself who had charge of the naval defence. Lord Keith,
in a very remarkable private letter to the Duke of York, in October,
1804, shows that he at least divined that Napoleon would never
attempt to cross with the flotilla alone, but that he would endeavour
to get part of his blockaded squadrons out, so as to assemble a
sufficient force in the channel to cover the passage of the flotilla.
And he goes on to point out that is was quite possible for the French
squadron in Brest (twenty-one sail of the line) to escape in easterly
weather, when the British blockading squadron would be driven off ;
and so to get as much as eight days' start of it. He then considered
it practicable for the flotilla to cross over a sufficient force to secure a
position inland in Kent, and for reinforcements to be brought over in
sufficient strength to get altogether 300,000 men in England ; and
that the covering fleet would still have time to escape to the North
Sea, before the British Fleet from Brest made its appearance.

In the face of these warnings, rendered doubly telling now by the
increased advantages to the invader, I think it would be safer to make
the real defence of .England begin on the coast of England, and con-
tinue, step by step, every foot of the way, between that coast and
London ; and thus to allow the main body of the British Fleet to take
its proper part in war of attacking the enemy, leaving the sea defence
of the coast line to special gun-boats manned by a sea Militia.

Our Present Ncwal Forces.

But there are those who think the naval strength of Great Britain
ought to be equal to playing both parts. I think if they would con-
aider the amount of war-ships of different kinds that will be required
for our various war purposes during the next great contest, they
would be surprised at it. We have now in the Royal Navy, according
to the Navy List for July, 1875, about 400 vessels of all kinds ; this
includes 26 building, but does not include 134 employed in permanent
harbour duty, and not in commission or ever likely to be. The total
tonnage by weight of these 400 vessels is about 900,000 tons ; but to
compare this with the tonnage of 1805, which was no doubt by old
measurement, that number must be reduced to about 600,000, which
is nearly equal to the total tonnage of the Royal Navy in 1805, as
given by James. But our population has doubled since then, and the
people are certainly not poorer ; hence we may assume that, to defend
the same interests, the Royal Navy in time of war will have to be
doubled, and that it will not even then press so heavily on the people
as in 1805. But the interests are not by any means the same ; our
exports and imports, which may be taken as a comparative measure
of our floating commerce, have increased tenfold since 1805, and the
tonnage of our merchant shipping has increased nearly fourfold. We
are dependent on foreign countries for half our annual supply of the
necessaries of life, and we have interests and responsibilities scattered
over the globe in dependencies and colonies, far beyond those which,
in 1805, caused so much anxiety. Our interests, therefore, have

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 33

increased in a greater ratio than our population, and our war Navy
most be in a greater proportion also.

Bui it will be said : the standard of our Fleet, like that of onr
Army, must be determined by that of the Fleets that are likely to be
opposed to u*. We have some measure of comparison on that scale also.
About 1805, Napoleon calculated on being able to raise, out of the
Navies of Europe, 180 line-of-battle ships to oppose England (he had
80 at his disposal in 1805) ; the greatest number of British line-of-
battle ships in commission for sea service during the war was a little
over 100, the greatest number for all purposes was 240. At the
present time, the total tonnage of the British iron- clad fleet is about
350,000 tons, and that of all the rest of the world is about 770,000
tons.1 If, therefore, we may compare iron- cl ads with line-of-battle
ships, our Navy now bears rather less proportion to the Navies of the
world than it did then. But these are only the peace establishments
that are now existing ; in war we must expect that foreign powers
will increase their Navies, not only up to the increased extent of their
own interests in population and commerce, but (in case of war with
England) up to the value of the British interests assailable ; and we
must recollect that to attack sea commerce and most colonies does not
require costly iron-clads of slow growth, but vessels of a class that
most nations can now manufacture quickly for themselves.

On the whole, therefore, it appears probable that there will be
plenty of occupation for the whole of the present British Fleet, and a
good deal more to boot, on the outbreak of serious war, without
including in that duty the guarding of the coasts of the United
Kingdom.

The Drama op 1805.
First Act

The year 1805 was one of the most eventful in the history of
England. Tbe story of it, with its surprising incidents, the great
forces brought into play, the great issue at stake, reads like a grand
epic drama, played upon the ocean for a stage, France and England
for the actors, and all Europe for an audience. For once more in her
history, as in 1588, England was standing up alone to hold mortal
duel with the possessor of half Europe; once more England, the
nominal champion of aristocracy, was in reality upholding the cause
of true liberty ; and once more her opponent, like Philip II, the self-
styled liberator of the world, was the true representative of absolute
despotism.

The drama may be said to open with the coronation of Napoleon,
at the end of 1804. Amid the thundering applause of obsequious
Europe, and with the sanction of the ancient ecclesiastical authority
of the Roman Empire, the young eonqueror at length ascended the
bet step of the ladder which was to put him nearly on an equality
with the Caesars. It is not surprising that he was thought to be the
arbiter of nations — a conqueror, a statesman, a savant, and a genius,

1 Dislero'fr " Marine Ouirauee."
VOL. XX. D

34 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

and, withal, young and noble looking ; he was as successful, as astute,
and as indefatigable as Caasar, as large-minded as Charlemagne, and
as interesting as Alexander. No wonder that wherever he went, the
people believed him when he said he was the giver of enlightenment
and order ; and that from the Baltic to the Adriatic they were ready
to learn that lesson at his feet. His coronation procession may be
said to have extended politically, as it almost did in reality, from
Holland, throughout France, and across the Alps into Italy.

But throughout the whole of the magnificent spectacles that suc-
ceeded each other in these months, his mind was deeply occupied with
the coming struggle between himself and the one European power
which had shown itself determined to resist him. Hitherto, as
M. Thiers points out, the two combatants had been resting as it were
looking at each other, each holding the dominion on his own element,
but neither willing to enter on the other and strike the first blow.
And this careful calculator of chances had no desire to precipitate the
contest, until he had extracted out of his subject kingdoms a naval
force sufficient to make the operation almost a certainty. His early
intentions were to have had 100 line-of -battle ships before he made
the first stroke, even if he waited ten years for it : and all that great
show of preparations at Boulogne in 1803 was partly to occupy the
minds of the French people, and partly to keep England in a state of
alarmed passive defence. The threatening attitude of Russia and
Austria in 1804, brought about mainly by the ability of Pitt, forced
him to act before he otherwise intended ; and at the end of that year
the hostilities commenced by England against Spanish vessels gave
Napoleon an opening for completing a close alliance with that country,
by which he obtained control over their fleet. This power of utilising
towards his great scheme the maritime resources of all the States
subject to his influence, was always made by him a sine qua non in his
treaties, and showed the bent of his real desires. Early in 1805 he
had therefore at his disposal towards the great project about 80 ships
of the line and 180,000 men ; he trusted that his genius and his
prestige would compensate for the deficiency of the former. Here we,
judging after the event, can see a defect in this mighty mind, in
basing his calculations for sea operations on quantity without regard
to quality; he could not appreciate the full effect of individual
character in ocean warfare. It may be doubted whether he did, or
whether any continental nation at the present timo do, fully appreciate
its effect in land warfare. On the Continent, where all armies are
alike drawn by conscription from all ranks and all conditions, numbers
alone may decide the day ; but in England we can afford to pot a
higher value on each individual who voluntarily takes up soldiering
as a profession. Colonel Q. T. Chesney struck a true national chord
when he advocated an army organisation based on this principle at
this Institution in 1874. In ocean warfare it is true that steam has
now done much towards putting seamen of all nations on an equality
— so much the worse for us — nevertheless, it is still to a great extent
true that the real seafaring race cannot be created artificially, they
must grow by nature to be true sons of Neptune.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 35

Now, here is the plot of the drama we are reviving, in the words of
the great author himself, written immediately after its failure confi-
dentially to his Minister of Marine, in September, 1805.

"Chapitre L
" Quel a ete mon but dans la Creation de la Flotille de Boulogne.

" Je voulais rennir quarante ou cinquante vaisseaux de guerre
44 (ships of the line) dans le port de Martinique, par les operations
41 combinees de Toulon, de Cadix, du Ferrol, et de Brest ; les faire
44 revenir tout d'un coup sur Boulogne ; me trouver pendant quinze
44 jours maitre de la mer ; avoir cent cinquante mille homines, et dix
" mille chevaux campes sur cette cdte ; trok ou quatre mille batimens
" de flotille, et aussitot le signal de l'arrivee de mon escadre, d^barquer
44 en Angleterre, m'emparer de Londres et de la Tamise. Ce projet a
44 manque de re'ussir. Si l'Amiral Villeneuve, au lieu d'entrer au
44 Ferrol, se fut contente de rallier l'escadre espagnole, et eut fait
44 voile snr Brest pour s'y reunir avec FAmiral Gantheaume, mon
44 armee debarquait, et e'en etait fait de PAngleterre.

" Pour faire r£ussir ce projet, il fallait reunir cent cinquante mille
" hommes a Boulogne, y avoir quatre mille batimens de flotille, un
" immense materiel, embarquer tout cela, et pourtant empecher
" l'ennemi de se douter de mon projet : cela paraissait impossible.
4k Si j?y ai reussi, e'est en faisant l'inverse de ce qu' il semblait qu'il
44 fallait faire. Si cinquante vaisseaux de ligne devaient venir pro-
'4 teger le passage de Tarmee en Angleterre, il n'y avait besoin d'avoir
44 a Boulogne que de batimens de transport ; et ce luxe de prames, de
44 chaloupes canonnieres, de bateaux plats, de p£niches. &c, tons
'* batimens armes, etait parfaitement inutile. Si j'eusse ainsi reuni
44 quatre mille batimens de transport, nul doute que Tennemi n'eut vu
" que j'attendais la presence de mon escadre pour tenter le passage :
44 mais en construisant des prames et des bateaux canonniers, en
44 armant tous ces batimens, c'£taient des canons opposes a des
4i canons ; des batimens de guerre opposes a des batimens de guerre,
" et l'ennemi a et^ dupe. 11 a era que je me proposais de passer de
4* vive force par la seule force militaire de la flotille. I/idee de mon
" veritable projet ne lui est point venue ; et lorsque les mouvemens de
'* mes escadres ayant manqu6, il s'est aper9u du danger qu'il avait
44 couru, l'effroi a 6te dans les conseils de Londres, et tous les gens
" senses ont avoue que jamais TAngleterre n'avait et^ si pros de sa
** perte.,,,

I have given Napoleon's own words, because they show the true
state of the case, on both sides, in a few lines, better than any other
account I have read, and because it is a game that might be played
again, and with advantages in favour of the assailant.

It was not carried out precisely as Napoleon describes it, but the
idea was sufficiently adhered to as to confirm him, by its success, in
the sagacity of his design. What a wonderfully daring scheme of

1 Dumae, xii, 316.
d2

36 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

naval strategy it was for those days of sailing vessels, requiring four
months of sea voyaging in face of an enemy who had the " dominion
" of the sea " at the time. The alarming point about it to us now
is, that nnder such almost impossible circumstances, it virtually
succeeded; the British Government was fully deceived, and the
French naval force was eventually massed in the Bay of Biscay, in
superior strength to the British force there at the time.

Future naval wars will probably be full of such strategic combina-
tions. With proper pre-arrangements, steam navies can be assembled
from different ports, one or two months' voyage distant, at an
appointed place on an appointed day. Part of Napoleon's scheme,
which he does not allude to in the above memorandum, gives us an
idea as to the advantages steam now affords towards an invasion of
England. He had to give considerable latitude to his naval com-
mander-in-chief, Villeneuve, and in his final instructions he offered
him two or three alternatives, in case of his being unable to carry out
the main proposal. One of these was, to raise the blockade of Brest,
and land the military force there on the north coast of Ireland, and
immediately proceed north of Scotland, raise the blockade of Texel,
and then go on to Boulogne.1 One may presume, from the indications
on the map of the channel I have before mentioned, that part of the
Brest expedition would have landed in the Bristol Channel, and part
of the Texel expedition on the east coast. And if the naval works at
Antwerp had been completed as he propose.!, that would probably
have been the point of departure of a more powerful expedition to the
east coast of England.

He would not require to construct an Antwerp now, nor to build
transports ; there are some half-a-dozen ports in the north of Europe
which would now supply merchant steamers large enough for his
whole Army, and powerful enough to assemble from each port at a
given distant rendezvous, and then move together to any point on the
east coast or west coast of England. Neither would he have to locate
the troops for the expedition at the ports of departure ; if the military
stores and provisions are embarked beforehand, the men, and even the
horses, could be brought by railway from the interior at tbe time for
the departure. A scheme of ocean strategy which, in 1805, required
two years' preparation by Napoleon, could now be arranged in two
months, with less difficulty than one on land. What advantages have
we gained since 1805 to counterbalance these of the enemy r None
on the sea. We cannot expect to have more energetic commanders,
nor, in all probability, shall we be so powerful at sea again ; and we
certainly are not likely to have a more wide-awake Ministry. But we
can do this, which will counterbalance all the enemy has gained, —
we can make his landing on the coast, and his advance from it, as
dangerous an undertaking as the passage over the sea was formerly.

It was quite true, as Napoleon says, Great Britain was congratulat-
ing herself that her enemy's naval forces were securely shut up, and
apparently hors de combat, and was fixing her whole attention on

1 Duma*, xi, 214.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 37

guarding her shores from the immense force and flotilla that had been
gradually assembling immediately opposite to them. The shouts of
that force, on the appearance of their Emperor as if for instant action,
seen and almost heard from the English shores, may be said to close
the first act of the drama of 1805.

The Second Act.

The second act opens with the escape of two French squadrons
from their blockaded ports, one from Rochfort of 6 liners under
Admiral Missiessy in January, and one from Toulon of 11 liners under
Admiral Villeneuve in March. The action of the plot now begins.

Great consternation of English government busily employed watch-
ing Boulogne, at this unexpected flight of 17 French liners into mid
ocean, to reappear nobody knew where. Perhaps at Alexandria, per-
haps in the West Indies, perhaps in the East Indies, perhaps in
Ireland ; certainly not in the Channel : nobody in England apparently
(except Lord Keith) thought of that possibility.

The Rochefort squadron was first heard of in the West Indies ;
Admiral Lord Cochrane with 6 liners was immediately sent in pursuit ;
but the whereabouts of the Toulon squadron was a most alarming
puzzle to the British Government. The natural supposition was that
it had gone to unite with the other squadron ; but with an enemy
like Napoleon anything was possible. Egypt and India beyond it
were known to be still looked at with longing eye. Napoleon took
care to foster the alarm he had calculated on ; he massed an army at
Tarentum in South Italy, and got Spanish vessels moved, as if for a
fresh Egyptian expedition : he published false news of operations by
the French in the East Indies and the Cape ; and part of Villeneuve's
work was to threaten the British colonies in the West Indies, and even
to take St. Helena. So that, as he expressed it himself, Great Britain
would find herself attacked at once in Asia, Africa, and America : and
would thus be compelled to send her fleets from the shores of England
to the rescue.1

It is fearful to think what would have been the British anxieties,
had the Suez Canal been then in existence. The whole land forces of
the country would hardly have been enough to stop the man, who had
already conquered Egypt with 25,000 men, from appearing some day
at Bombay.

Then to add to the general alarm Nelson with his 10 liners, who
had been watching Toulon for two years, disappeared also : this was
perhaps a greater cause of anxiety to Napoleon than to the British
Government; it was bad enough to know that Nelson was off any
port, but not to know where he was at all, moved even the indomitable
Emperor. The Admiralty would doubtless in their distraction have
done exactly what Napoleon wished them to do, dispatch another Fleet
after Villeneuve, if they had not been relieved from their distress, by
news from Nelson himself ; that after a month's fruitless search through
the Mediterranean, he had ascertained that Villeneuve had picked up

1 Dumas, xi, 209.

38 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 180.5.

6 Spanish and 1 French liner at Cadiz, and gone westward ; and that
he was about to follow them. So did our great seaman earn the
Laureate's crown of praise : —

" O shaker of the Baltic and the Nile,
O saviour of the silver coasted isle."

In all his calculations, which were daily written throughout his
coronation tour, Napoleon slighted the notion that even Nelson, with
ten ships worn out with two years' cruising, would follow across the
Atlantic eighteen fresh ones. His daily correspondence with his
Minister of Marine at this time, published by Dumas, his close
calculations of all contingencies, every mile of the way to the West
Indies and back, every day Villeneuve would require, and the close
agreement of them with the result, give one an insight into the
foundation of his power. He had victuals prepared for Villeneuve at
several of the ports where he might touch on his return ; and to the
expostulations of his Minister, he returned an answer, which the
British War Department might take to heart : " This is not a time for
" ridiculous economy — in such a war it is only ignorance, not to have
" plenty of provisions, which keep so well"

The scene now changes to the West Indies. Nelson perceived very
soon after his arrival there, by the action of the French fleet, that their
return to Europe was imminent ; and for the first time the real origin
of all these sea movements occurred to him. Now in this part of the
drama, it must be allowed that the French have some reason to com-
plain, as they have done, of the unhandsome treatment of their cause
by fortune. Villeneuve was 35 days from Spain to the West Indies,
Nelson was only 25 -days; on the return voyage, Villeneuve was
54 days from the West Indies to Spain, Nelson was only 36.1 But the
unkind est cut was the vessel that Nelson sent home to warn the
Admiralty of 'his discovery of the plot; it had apparently been
captured from the French, and was, like many of their vessels, a model
sailer, and therefore selected for this great international race across the
Atlantic. The " Curieux" started 16 days after Villeneuve, and got
to Europe 15 days before him :* it was certainly hard that their own
science of ship building should be made the means of their defeat.
Mars and Minerva had led their favourite Napoleon triumphantly over
the terra firma of Europe, and now Bat on the prows of the French flag-
ship ; Neptune sulking at the general incapacity of the British
Government to rule the surface of his domain, was appeased by the
noble sacrifice of his dear son Nelson, and held on to the stern of the
Spanish liners while he shoved the " Curieux " a head.

The last scene of this act lies in London. The First Lord of the
Admiralty is discovered fast asleep in bed on the morning of the 9th
July, 1805, worn out no doubt with watching Boulogne and wonder-
ing what had become of Villeneuve. He opened his dispatches in bed
with regret at having to begin his official day so early ; and finds one

1 The times of the French fleet are tat en from Dumas ; and of the English fleet
from James. * James.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 39

from Nelson, which had been lying by his side all night, informing
him that by the time he was reading that letter, Villenenve would
probably be entering the Channel with a force sufficient to sweep
Cornwallis and Keith before him, and ferry Napoleon over to Dover.
What an awakening to the real light of the case, for the hitherto
benighted First Lord devoting day and night to watching Boulogne !
With the danger, however, came the pluck to meet it ; lie then and
there, unwashed, unbreakfasted, unshaved, sent off the orders to
Cornwallis to intercept Villeneuve if possible ; and, Neptune relenting
at this reveillee, which Napoleon himself could hardly believe, Sir R.
Calder was at Cape Finisterre, with 15 liners, by the 15th July.1

The Third Act.

Then begins the third and most momentous act of this startling
drama, at which Europe held its breath. On the 22nd July, the fog,
emblem of the impenetrable secrecy that had hitherto enveloped
Napoleon's schemes, lifted for a moment at Cape Finisterre, and
showed to Calder the French and Spanish fleet, now 20 liners strong,
before him : just seven days too late. After two years of careful
maturing in the master mind, and four months of equally careful
execution, so precisely calculated and so precisely carried out, that
this final issue was within a few days of its prediction, it was lost by
only seven days. Well might Napoleon say that his able arrange-
ments and their marvellous accomplishment deserved success: and
well might we too now say, that the absence of arrangement and
haphazard execution by the British Government did not deserve that
they should be saved by the bold devotion of one man.

They were not saved yet though. The climax of the plot was still
to come. The engagement which of course came off between
Villeneuve and Calder, was a drawn battle ; Calder then went north
to join Cornwallis again, thus leaving it open to Villeneuve to pursue
the route which Calder had been sent expressly to intercept. To
take in the proper idea of the extreme peril England was in during
the fortnight after that battle, we must recollect the position of the
respective forces at the time. On the English side, the main body of
the Fleet, 18 liners, was with Cornwallis off Brest,2 with 4 or 5 in
addition off the coast of Ireland, Calder with now only 12 liners
in the Bay of Biscay, Keith with 6 in the North Sea fully
occupied in watching the enemy's coast and guarding his own:
Collingwood off Cadiz with 4, Nelson at Gibraltar with his 11 pretty
nigh exhausted with their late expedition. On the French side,
Villeneuve had still 18 liners ; there were 5 French and 10 Spanish
in Ferrol, and 5 under Admiral Lallemand, cruising off the Bay of
Biscay on the look out for Villeneuve, and 21 shut up in Brest under
Gantheaume : and at least 10 liners at Cadiz. Nelson and Colling-
wood knew nothing of what was going on at Cape Finisterre, and the
former after revictualling in Gibraltar made his way into the
channel, and joined Lord Cornwallis on the 15th of August, from

1 Jame». 2 James, iii, 181.

40 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

whom he first learned the result of his forethought in sending home
the " Curieux."1 Thus between the 22nd July and the 16th August,
daring 24 days, Villeneuve had the opportunity of assembling 38 ships
of the line off Brest, which with the 21 in that harbour, would
certainly have compelled Lord Cornwallis even if he had been joined
by the 5 in the Irish Sea and by Calder's 12, to have retreated before
them, and have given the command in the Channel to the French for
at least 14 days.

One can well imagine the exultation of Napoleon, who was already
at Boulogne, on hearing of the arrival of Yilleneuve at the appointed
rendezvous, and at the appointed time. There is, perhaps, no other
instance in history, where a scheme of war strategy, involving so
many combinations, subject to so many chances of failure, and
extending over such an area, was so completely carried out. The
victorious Emperor stood on the heights of Boulogne, with all that
enthusiastic host of soldiers fully prepared in every way to leave the
French coast within twelve hours after the appearance of the com-
bined fleet, and as certain as ever an army was of at last striking
that overwhelming blow at England for which all Europe had been
waiting for two years. In his feeling of securely grasping success
about this time, he wrote, after discussing various possible moves of
the English Admiralty : " I do not know, indeed, what precaution
" England can now take to shelter herself from the terrible chance
u she is running. That nation is little wise, when, without fortifica-
" tions, without an army, she allows herself to get into the condition
" of seeing 100,000 men land on her shores,"2 One can also well
conceive what must have been, or at least what ought to have been,
the fear and remorse of the British Government, at having so com-
pletely failed in providing any sort of strategic combinations on their
own element equal to the occasion. Sir R. Calder was made the
scapegoat of the national panic, for which the Government and Par-
liament were the real defaulters ; and, as if appeased by this poor
victim, the angry sea-god once more saved his neglectful daughter
Britannia by the glory of his dear child Nelson.

Villeneuve did make an attempt to carry out his mission, the com-
pletion of which Napoleon pressed upon him by daily messages ; but
it was not till the 12th of August that he left Ferrol with 29 liners,
French and Spanish ; and before he had gone far northward he heard
that 25 English liners were before him;3 and believing that his
unceasing pursuer, the terrible Nelson, was with them, he did not
feel his fleet equal to that encounter, and so turned south, and, taking
advantage of part of Napoleon's instructions, he made for Cadiz. It
was true that Calder, reinforced to 20 liners, was in his neigh-
bourhood, and that part of Nelson's squadron was with him ; but as
Napoleon told him afterwards, Nelson's ships without himself were no
more than any other ships. Towards the end of August, the news
arrived in London and Boulogne that Villencuve was in Cadiz, and it
was felt on all sides at once that the game was over for that season.
The turning of Yilleneuve southward about that 14th August, 1805,
1 Jame?. 9 Dumas, xi, 171. a James iii, 255.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 41

was like that day in August, 1588, when the Duke of Medina turned
his head toward the North Sea after the battle of the Godwins ; it
was the day of salvation to England from a crisis such as occurs
seldom in a nation's history, and it was virtually brought about by
the same cause in both cases. The combined Franco- Spanish fleet
was not in a condition to try another battle with the English fleet ;
there is no stigma of want of courage in either the French or Spanish
Admirals ; it was a fleet of two nations, and the Spanish ships were
not in good condition. Thus, Napoleon's long-drawn plot was even-
tually defeated, as the Spanish Armada was defeated — not by the
patriotic unity of the British Parliament, nor by the forethought of
its Government, but by the character of the British fleet.

The Fourth Ad.

If, in the beginning of September, 1805, we suppose the curtain to
rise upon the scene of our drama for the fourth act, the vast legions
assembled on the opposite shores of France for England's destruction
would be found to have disappeared ; of all those 150,000 experienced
soldiers, collected so gradually and with such forethought, not 20,000
remaining ; and that unexampled flotilla, so completely organised, in
rapid progress of being dismantled, and stored away. It required but
a few hours' thought of that extraordinary mind to turn the whole
current of war from west to east. So clear and prescient was his brain,
that on the same day of his receiving the news of Villeneuve's retreat,
he dictated the plan of the campaign that conquered Austria: before
Britain had realised her escape, the great " Army of England," as it
was called, had begun to move towards the Rhine. Within a month of
his watching on the heights of Boulogne for the signal to invade
England, he was at Strasburg, watching the concentration of all his
forces from Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and Boulogne,
upon Bavaria ; and before Britain had recovered her supreme relief at
Trafalgar, he had subdued Austria at Ansterlitz.1

Villeneuve's retreat had not removed all fear of invasion in
England ; though the fleet was shut up in Cadiz, it still existed, and
more powerful than ever, for the Spanish liners it found at Cadiz
brought it np to the strength of 43 ships of the line ; a very powerful
engine of war, and which, in Napoleon's hands, might still some day
repeat the enterprise from which only good fortune and good fleet had
delivered them. And Napoleon fully intended that it should ; and,
moreover, he deliberately made arrangements for the express purpose
of keeping alive in England that alarming possibility, and expressly
in order that she should thereby be prevented from interfering with
his schemes on the Continent. He kept a portion of his army still at
Boulogne, and sufficient of the flotilla to carry 50,000 men ; it was
easy for him to assemble that force ; and hence, if at any time during
the chances of war he could obtain the command of the Channel
again, he could in one tide transport that force into Englnnd. Thus,
at a small expense to the French, Britain would be compelled to keep

1 Dumas, xii.

42 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

up a large force of troops along the southern coast, and a portion of
her fleet constantly in the Channel.1

And those arrangements of his fully answered his purpose; for
Great Britain had not yet awoke to the clear perception that it was
only by interference on the Continent that Napoleon's power could be
really made innocuous; and they would have gone on perhaps for
years content with guarding their own shores, if Nelson, who had so
often checked Napoleon whenever he put his foot upon the ocean, had
not given him a final checkmate at Trafalgar.

The Fifth Act.

The great drama of 1805 closes with this complete settlement of the
question of invasion. Nelson had been sent to watch Villeneuve, and
the latter, in pursuance of Napoleon's plan, was moving into the
Mediterranean to threaten Malta and Egypt ; when Nelson, who felt
that there could be no rest so long as the naval forces of the enemy
were so powerful, at once attacked him, and on the 21st October,
1805, at Trafalgar, Great Britain was finally freed, by the destruction
or capture of the majority of the combined Franco- Spanish fleet,
from all real danger to her own sacred soil during the rest of
Napoleon's career.

The last scene of the last act of this most eventful period may be
said to be the death of the two Englishmen who had been the two
heroes of the drama — the statesman Pitt, who by his powerful spirit
had roused his country at home and the discontented States on the
Continent to vigorous action against the despotic power of Napoleon ;
and the seaman Nelson, whose daring and devotion had compelled the
conqueror of the land to feel himself powerless on the sea. It seemed
as if, when the tide of war was thus turned from the west to the east,
that the work of these two great Englishmen was done ; together they
had worked head and hand to bring about that result, together they
sank, and together they live in Scott's lines : —

" The buried warlike and the wise,

The mind that thought for Britain's weal,
The hand that grasped the victor's steel."

Scott ("Marmion").

Summary.

" If you wish for peace, prepare for peace," said Mr. Forster at
Edinburgh. So say we all : if yon wish for peace, — -prepare — that you
may have peace. Prepare is the watch- word which should be written
over our war departments, naval and military. And if we read the
story of the war of the great French Revolution aright, especially
that episode in 1805, and then consider the present condition of our
war preparations, we shall, I think, all come to the conclusion, that to
avoid the evils of those times, we had better begin as soon as possible
to remedy the following deficiencies in that war apparatus : —

1st. A Reserve of trained men, both for our Regular Array and
Regular Navy : of strengths equal at least to the respective present

1 Dumas, xii, 315.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 43

peace establishments of each: which shall consist of really efficient
soldiers or sailors, and shall be really forthcoming at the time and to
the fall numbers required.

2nd. Reorganisation of the Militia both for land and sea service:
to take them out of that half and half position into which they were
forced during that war, and which failed over and over to produce
the effect desired, and restore them to their proper constitutional
position, of local bodies of the armed people of England : of which
the volunteers would then become the elite. These two bodies together
should be so organised that on declaration of war, in a few days, a
sufficient force would be embodied and armed to line the shores of
Great Britain.

3rd. Tlte Mobilisation scheme for the defence of the country should be
perfected and have given lo it the necessary legal authority; so that
the local commanders will be able to proceed in the assemblage of the
forces, and the military stores, and the provisions, without further
reference to London.

4th. An expeditionary equipment, including all the military stores
required for 50,000 men, should be kept always ready in our arsenals.
And arrangements should be made that certain vessels of the Royal
Navy or merchant vessels shall be available for the transport of men
and stores, so as to ensure that men and stores shall be disposed in the
vessels in a manner suitable and effective for the purpose of the
expedition.

5th. Coal depots in secure harbours should be provided at the strategic
points in the world, best suited for the support of oar naval and
military operations.

The Question of Cost.

But we must cut our coat according to our cloth, says the cautious
public man. Well, it is a good cloth, there is no denying that, and
deserves to be well made : and cut of a fashion that will do credit to
the owner; for, as a good English authority tells us "the apparel oft
** proclaims the man." But however truly we apply that to ourselves
privately, in our military dress we often think our "clothes more
** costly than our parse can buy." It is not by any means certain,
however, that Prussia is not upon the whole paying more heavily for
her military power than Great Britain is at this moment. Military
organisation, like gymnastics, may be carried too far and weaken the
body it was intended to strengthen: and may be drawing on the
strength of a nation more than any mere money payment ever
can do.

In 1793 they had the same cloth that we have now ; they made it up
cheaply, not expecting to have to use it ; and when the war storm
unexpectedly turned upon them, the cheap military coat let it in at the
seams, and, as generally happens with cheap articles, John Ball had to
get a new one sooner than he expected ; and such a creature of habits
of all kinds he is, that the second coat was made up as cheaply as the
first and lasted no longer ; and a third followed in the same course.
About which time he began to see that the quantity of cloth he used

44 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

tip cost more than the making in the most expensive style. By trying
to do it cheaply at first on £7,000,000 a-year for all his war expendi-
ture, instead of blowing the fire out, he blew it up ; then lie thought
he could put it out with £12,000,000 a-year, but it was beyond that
already ; and at last at the end of twenty years he had got up to
£55,000,000 a-year for purely war expenses ; and not only was that
generation burdened with this expenditure, but their posterity have
had to go on paying and will have to go on paying £25,000,000 a-year
for this cheap tailoring. And this was expressly said at the time to
be " preparing for peace," and not preparing for war : if so, preparing
for peace sounds to us very like shoving the expense on future
generations.

It is not certain either whether these proper reorganisations of our
war apparatus will be more expensive than the present one. At least
as regards the Reserves, which is the most expensive part, there have
been schemes proposed and estimates made, notably that by General
Simmons,1 which show an actual decrease of expenditure for an
improved army. It is certain that our present system is an expensive
way of preparing for war ; for by it, during all the years of general
peace, we keep up an army and navy of a costly description, and
larger than we require for our peace garrisons by sea and land. And
this is done, solely because we are afraid as a nation to look war
straight in the face ; we persist in keeping it out of sight and pretend-
ing to ignore its possible existence : and thus Governments, Parlia-
ments, and people are driven to practice the self-deception by which
nobody is deceived, of declaring every year our disbelief in permanent
armies and in war, while all the time we are keeping up a permanent
army and navy, extravagant for peace, because we know we dare not
dispense with one man of it in our present state.

The Question of Safety.

But if we blame that generation for not seeing more clearly the full
extent of the war storm that was coming upon them, when its aspect
was mainly political ; what should we say of them, if their means of
existence had been plainly liable to be cut off at the first burst of war.
If Ifapoleon thought England foolish for allowing herself to fall into
the condition of imminent invasion, what would he have thought of
her, if, in addition to that danger, she had only secured the means of
feeding half her people : if England had allowed herself to be not
only invested, as Burke expressed it, but on half rations ? Such is,
however, our case now. Wo are dependent every year upon foreign
countries for nearly half our supply of bread and meat; of the
foreign meat supply the chief quantity comes from Northern Europe ;
of the foreign bread supply the chief quantity comes from the United
States. Thus, if the ports of one of the great Northern Powers were
closed to us, the price of meat would quickly rise in England ; and if
it was those of the United States, bread would rise ; and a coalition
against us of those States with one of the northern Powers, would

1 " The Military Forces of Great Britain." By General Sir L. Simmons, R.E. 1871.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 45

compel us to fight for life ; and in any case of war, we should start
with this certain disadvantage, a discontented population upon reduced
wages and increased cost of living.

The political economist would immediately say, then form alliances
with the States which supply you with food, and you have the double
security of preserving peace both by political alliance and commercial
intercourse ; but commercial intercourse has not succeeded in former
times in ensuring peace between two nations. In 1588 there was
great commercial intercourse between England and Spain, and yet
that did not stop the Armada from coming. In 1807 there was
great commercial intercourse between England and the whole of Europe,
especially the Northern Ports, but that did not prevent Napoleon from
closing the whole of the ports under his control against the commerce
of England. And the instructive part in this latter instance is that
the first country to complain of the stoppage of trade was England
herself. She felt it more than the continental nations, because she
was not only the producer but the carrier also. In the present day
Great Britain has not only this war disadvantage as compared with
other nations, but she has the additional one, with respect to northern
countries, that the trade is not of equal importance on each side.
Because the produce that those countries get from Great Britain are
chiefly luxuries, whereas those she draws from them are chiefly neces-
saries of life.

The theories of the political economist in this respect appear, there-
fore, to be of an artificial composition, which won't stand the heat of
war. We have, however, means within our power of insuring to a
great extent our supply of food at all times, in our great colonies of
Canada, the Cape, Australia, and New Zealand, which are all
essentially food-producing countries.

The question of the length of voyage is one mainly of price ; and
a case of war would be quite possible, in which the price of meat
in England would well remunerate the importer from any of those
colonies. But if those colonies are to be any advantage to the mother
country in this respect in war time, the food trade with them must
not be left to be produced by the exigencies of war, but must be
fostered during peace by an alliance based on mutual interest.

With respect to the question of commerce generally, it is somewhat
remarkable that the countries from which we draw these necessaries
of life are the northern countries of Europe and America, whereas
the commerce with the southern countries of Europe, Asia, and
America, is chiefly for what we may call the luxuries of life. It has
also so happened, that the general coalitions in war have been between
the northern countries against the southern. If, therefore, in case of
a war with the northern States, we are in danger of losing our food-
smpply, the same measures of security which we shall have to take to
preserve our commerce with southern Europe and with Asia, would
also preserve our food supply from Australia and the Cape.

The Question of Honour.
There is another point of view from which the war aspect has

48 ANOTHER WARNING TOlCE FROM 1805.

transport Fleet. We could no more avoid occupying certain points
on the ocean in strength, than we could hesitate about moving
regiments to their appointed places for the defence of our shores.
Some provision has been made in the mobilisation scheme for the
troops for such an expeditionary force, but the difficulty and the
delay in sending out expeditions from home has not been in the
selection and preparation of the troops, but in their equipment and
transport. The equipment for war of a certain force of troops has
been laid down on paper, but if it is not to be one more record of
official good intentions, it requires to be put into a more practical
form for actual use. It is not enough to have a mass of war stores
stacked in bulk in great storehouses ; there are certain of them, in-
cluding cavalry and artillery equipments, and guns and ammunition,
which any expeditionary force would require to have with them ready
for action on landing ; these should be kept at the places of embarka-
tion, and arranged, not merely for the voyage, but so as to be im-
mediately available for use at the end of it, so that each ship-load of
troops will find themselves landed fully equipped, for a time, with
stores and provisions. We have been too much in the habit of treating
troops and stores as two species of goods, which are to be carried
somewhere somehow, but when and in what order has been thought a
secondary concern — to the shipper, at least. In the Crimean War, the
shipment of guns and artillery stores from England, in this general
cargo fashion, was one of the causes of the confusion and delay that
occurred in that expedition. But if we are really to take full advantage
of the ocean as a base of operations, these points must be considered,
experimented on, and practised just as much as for land transport.

The subject of our sea transport has been ably discussed by Captain
Hoseason, R.N., both in this Institution and out of it. He has shown,
not only the inefficiency of this system of taking up tonnage on
the spur of the moment, and shovelling troops and stores in as they
happened to come, but the extreme extravagance of it. It is like a
man buying up the corn of a province without having any means of
taking it to market ; he is at the mercy of the carriers. We have
now six regular troop ships in the Royal Navy, and five belonging to
the Indian Government ; the total tonnage of these eleven vessels is
about 33,000 tons (old measurement) ; they would, therefore, carry
about 36,000 men, without guns or horses, on a long sea voyage. This
is a poor provision for an empire on which the sun never sets and
wars never cease ; not enough to punish an African Chief with. An
ocean empire, like Great Britain, in which some expedition is going
on every year, and every one of them joint expeditions — naval and
military — should have a regular organisation for the purpose, some-
thing like a " unit of sea transport" such as Napoleon had in his mind
in 1805, only, of course, on a larger scale. This unit, whether of one
vessel or more, would contain a complete section of an Army, of all
branches, with a proportion of stores and provisions ; and the vessels
would be, not merely transports to convey them to a port and have
done with them, but would be attached to that division of the army
during the expedition; they should be felt to be their real base of

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 47

The path seems perilous only because we have not made up our
minds to prepare for it ; we are still striving to manage an empire
after the fashion of a municipality. But if our descendants in the
United States could found an empire capable of indefinite expansion,
surely we could form a confederacy suited to our present position in
the world. These islands are remarkably situated, politically and
geographically, for holding the position we do at present. The con-
tinents of Europe and Asia form a great parallelogram, and all the
continental states upon it, whether in Europe or Asia, have land
frontiers to guard, and almost all their operations with each other,
whether of peaceful commerce or war, have to be carried on by land.
The British Islands, placed in a detached position on the north-west
flank of this parallelogram, are more secure in themselves from attack,
and yet by this position and by the character and habits of the people
they have the means of operating round the whole circumference of
the continental parallelogram, by sea, either for commerce or war.
And this capability of utilizing the sea for these purposes will preserve
an advantage to Great Britain over continental countries as long as
the spirit of the British people remains the same, and as long as sea
transport is so much easier than any kind of land transport, and is at
the same time more harassing to the enemy.

Prom the political point of view, the geographical position of these
islands has further advantages over other States. They are just
opposite the line, on the continent of Europe, which divides the
northern races from the southern ; by descent, by language, by
religion, and by productions, the States on each side of this line are
more allied together than they are with those on the other side of it.
And England, approximately to the main land just at this point, is in
a position to watch, and, if necessary, to control almost the whole of
the sea traffic that passes from North to South Europe.

Thus, by position, by resources, and by character, Great Britain
appears to be marked out by Providence to be, at the present period,
the peace officer of the world.

The Japanese are a race of islanders, similarly situated on the north-
east flank of the continental parallelogram, and if their people had the
same qualities as the British race, they ought to have played a similar
part in the history of the Asiatic continent to that Great Britain has
played in the history of the European continent.

A Marine Army.

But to utilize these advantages which Providence has given us,
for the benefit of our commerce in peace and our security in war, the
last two of the five principal improvements required in our war system
should be taken in hand, and placed on a better footing.

An expeditionary equipment has an aggressive sound, but, in our
present condrt ion, it is really as much a part of our defensive system
as the mobilisation scheme just published. For, in case of any serious
war, our dependencies and military posts all over the world would
require such additions immediately as would use up a considerable
portion of our Regular Army at home, and more than all our present

48 ANOTHER WARNING TOICE FROM 1805.

transport Fleet. We could no more avoid occupying certain points
on the ocean in strength, than we could hesitate about moving
regiments to their appointed places for the defence of out shores.
Some provision has been made in the mobilisation scheme for the
troops for such an expeditionary force, but the difficulty and the
delay in sending out expeditions from home has not been in the
selection and preparation of the troops, but in their equipment and
transport. The equipment for war of a certain force of troops has
been laid down on paper, but if it is not to be one more record of
official good intentions, it requires to be put into a more practical
form for actual use. It is not enough to have a mass of war stores
stacked in bulk in great storehouses ; there are certain of them, in-
cluding cavalry and artillery equipments, and guns and ammunition,
which any expeditionary force would require to have with them ready
for action on landing ; these should be kept at the places of embarka-
tion, and arranged, not merely for the voyage, but so as to be im-
mediately available for use at the end of it, so that each ship-load of
troops will find themselves landed fully equipped, for a time, with
stores and provisions. We have been too much in the habit of treating
troops and stores as two species of goods, which are to be carried
somewhere somehow, but when and in what order has been thought a
secondary concern — to the shipper, at least. In the Crimean War, the
shipment of guns and artillery stores from England, in this general
cargo fashion, was one of the causes of the confusion and delay that
occurred in that expedition. But if we are really to take full advantage
of the ocean as a base of operations, these points must be considered,
experimented on, and practised just as much as for land transport.

The subject of our sea transport has been ably discussed by Captain
Hoseason, R.N., both in this Institution and out of it. He has shown,
not only the inefficiency of this system of taking up tonnage on
the spur of the moment, and shovelling troops and stores in as they
happened to come, but the extreme extravagance of it. It is like a
man buying up the corn of a province without having any means of
taking it to market ; he is at the mercy of the carriers. We have
now six regular troop ships in the Royal Navy, and five belonging to
the Indian Government ; the total tonnage of these eleven vessels is
about 33,000 tons (old measurement) ; they would, therefore, carry
about 16,000 men, without guns or horses, on a long sea voyage. This
is a poor provision for an empire on which the sun never sets and
wars never cease ; not enough to punish an African Chief with. An
ocean empire, like Great Britain, in which some expedition is going
on every year, and every one of them joint expeditions — naval and
military — should have a regular organisation for the purpose, some-
thing like a " unit of sea transport" such as Napoleon had in his mind
in 1805, only, of course, on a larger scale. This unit, whether of one
vessel or more, would contain a complete section of an Army, of all
branches, with a proportion of stores and provisions ; and the vessels
would be, not merely transports to convey them to a port and have
done with them, but would be attached to that division of the army
daring the expedition; they should be felt to be their real base of

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805. 49

operations, their great depot and means of supply : ships and troops
should form one whole machine, fitted to each other for the whole
work to be done. A British Army would then be able to fall back
upon its movable base, and proceed with it to another line of opera-
tions, refreshed and in complete condition ; while the enemy would be
expending time, resources, and the strength of his troops in changing
the seat of war by land : and one such " Marine Army " would be a
match for two on land.

We have no proper place of embarkation for our expeditions at
present. They are dispatched from one of the dockyards or from
Woolwich Arsenal, as it happens to be convenient for the vessels. The
wharf space in any of the dockyards available for this purpose is only
large enough for one or two vessels, and even that would be required
by the Navy in war time, and that at Woolwich Arsenal would be
fully occupied, in any serious war, with the dispatch of the reserve
stores ; and it would not be desirable to enlarge the accommodation
there, with the object of embarking troops also ; for the reserve stores
would be sent in different vessels altogether from those above alluded
to, which would be only for the active force and for the equipment
required for immediate use.

Its Strategic Paints.1

When Napoleon was organising his great scheme of combined naval
and military strategy, one of the most important class of preparations
that he had to make, was to plant depots of provisions for the force
at certain places on the route of operations. If the epoch of the affair
had been seventy years later, he would have substituted coal for
provisions. We can have little doubt, from his great care in providing
those, that one of his first proceedings would have been to plant
depots of coal in numerous and secure places ; he would have con-
sidered economy .in such a matter as still more " ridiculous " and
** ignorant " of war, than he did in provisions.

We have a good many harbours for the refitting and re-coaling of
our naval forces, scattered over our ocean empire, but not enough for
carrying out the defence of that empire on an efficient system of naval
and military strategy ; and in many of those existing, there are not
sufficient means of protection, or for putting the coal on board ex-
peditiously. Our chief lines of strategic operation will probably be
those of our most important sea commerce, because they are also our
lines of communication with our great productive colonies and de-
pencies. One of the greatest of these is the line of commerce to India
and Australia; and, perhaps, at the present period, the two most
important places in the world to Great Britain, outside of her own
islands, are Suez and Singapore. We have lately obtained a legiti-
mate footing of control towards preserving the freedom of the Suez
Canal, both in peace and in war ; and whatever the consequences of
that step may be, commercially or politically, there can be no doubt
that it will be of the highest value towards the naval and military

1 In considering these subjects I have been indebted to an admirable pamphlet by

in J. C. B. Coloxnb, R,M.A., entitled, " Three Smouldering Questions,* 1875.
VOL. XX. E

50 ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM ,1805.

defence of the empire. Singapore must always be the centre of naval
operations for the protection of our immense trade between Great
Britain and India, on one hand, and China and Japan and the Pacific
Islands, on the other, and also as the nearest point in the line of
communication to Australia. It would be a serious danger to our
connection with those countries, if the opposite coast of Sumatra
should ever be occupied by a hostile force.

The extension of our trade to the north of China and to Japan, and
the spread of Russian power on the north-east coast of Asia, and of the
United States on the north-west coast of America, together render
Hong Kong no longer so advantageous to us as a naval and military
station as it was. Some position nearer to the Japanese Islands,
which would also have a climate more favourable to our northern
race, would now be desirable for a strategic harbour to protect oar
trade in those seas. Also some more connecting links between
Singapore and Australia are now required, as that is a line of com-
munication, like a road in a forest country, that offers many advan-
tages to an attacking party.

It is impossible for us to escape from the necessity of securing such
strategic positions on the ocean ; if we do not make them deliberately
in peace we shall have to do so hastily and expensively in war. In
1805, the fear of being attacked in the East Indies, and of losing one
of our West Indian colonies or the Cape of Good Hope, was sufficient
to give great anxiety to the British Government, and to take up the
attention of a large portion of their forces, both naval and military.
It was with them more a question of prestige than commerce ; but
with us now, the commerce with those same countries has become a
question of necessity to provide occupation for our people ; and secure
harbours for coal depdts are far more necessary for the protection of
that commerce than provision dep6ts were in 1805.

To the Unprofessional Reader.

At our public schools we leave the boys to settle their disputes
among themselves, because we think a man should be trained to«
defend himself and defend others in life ; he is not a man else.

That is what we soldiers and sailors want to persuade Great
Britain to do in the world school, to bo trained to defend herself
and to defend others ; Great Britain is not a nation else.

Well, and have we not always defended ourselves ? says the English -
countryman. But you have never trained yourselves, and your back-
wardness has encouraged the enemies of peace to deeds that have
forced you to rush in and lose a deal of blood in your clumsy ignorance ;
if you had shown yourselves prepared, you might have prevented it.

But, says the countryman, why am I to be prepared to defend
others more than anybody else ? Because you are the only nation in
the world in a position to do it. You are safer from attack on your
own land than any other nation; you have resources which draw
wealth from all parts of the world to your shores ; you have responsi-
bilities all over the world. You are, by all these, made the peace
officer of the world, and if you don't take up the duty, some other'

M
CC

ANOTHER WABNING VOICE FEOM 1805. 51

nation will have to be appointed instead, and yon are not at present
prepared to do the work committed to you.

Surely, says the countryman, we are paying more for Army and
Navy than anybody else ; and look what an Army and Navy we have
to what we used to have.

Look what armies and navies they are getting on the continent of
Europe, compared to twenty years ago. When a pugnacious boy
comes into a school, there will be a deal more fighting until he finds
his level ; so when a nation increases its armed strength, other nations
must be prepared for war until it finds its level. Europe has gone
back from peace to war; we may think it a great backsliding, a
grievous waste of the resources of civilisation ; but to sit down, and
cry about it, is not quite manly. If your boy at school was to do so,
you would tell him that he must take the fighting with the bread and
jam, just as they come ; he can't expect a school to be all bread and
jam.

Well, says the countryman, we'll hold our own yet. I don't think,
my friend, you quite know what that means at the present period of
your history. It means a great deal more than sitting still to watch '
the coast of Great Britain. Europe is getting now into the condition
described by Austria in 1804 : " A situation which is not peace, but
more destructive than actual war ; in which a single Power, already
too formidable by its greatness, continues alone armed, and is pre-
vented by no opposition from occupying one independent State
" after another."1 If Great Britain allows herself to be a party in
such a situation, it will not be her own land only that will be
threatened, but her colonies and India ; and " holding our own " will
then mean, that the Government of the day is in a better state of
preparation than it was in 1803, when it was said of them, " they
" were unable to remonstrate in such a manner as became the
" Ministers of a great and powerful nation, or to interfere in such a
manner as to make their interference effective, or to mediate in such
a manner as to aid those in whose favour they mediated."8 If we
to " hold our own " better than that, if we are to prevent the
lapfle of Europe into despotism, whether autocratic or democratic, and
if we are to preserve in our dependencies true liberty, political and
religions, we must take the patriotic advice of Burns, which he gave
to the defenders of 1805, only applying it to the whole Empire of
Great Britain : —

" Be Britain still to Britain true,
Among ourseVs united :
For never but by British hands
Maun British wrangs be righted."

List of Books referred to in this Papbf.

Dctkas: Pricis des Eoenemen8 Milltaires (1822). — Is really not apWci>,
but a precise account, and with all the appearance of careful
accuracy, and is distinguished above others for its copious extracts

1 " Ann. Beg.," 1805. * "Ann. Beg.," Pari. Deb., June, 1803.

IS 2

52 ANOTHKE WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

from original documents. It also has this peculiar double advan-
tage, that the author was present in high official capacity at most
of the scenes he narrates ; and yet, being under the Restoration
when he wrote, his bias, though thoroughly French, of course, is
not Napoleonic ; and, for a Frenchman of that period, he is fair to
England.

Thiers : Sistovre du Consulat et de VEmpire (1845). — From his
position as Minister to Louis Phillippe, M. Thiers had access to
official papers beyond the reach of Dumas ; but he has not used
his advantages in the same conscientious way, and has not given
us the same means of forming our own judgments by extracts.
The tone of the work is not that of a calm historian writing forty
years after the events, but of an advocate supporting a particular
cause, which is that of French glorification, and therefore he is
not so trustworthy as Dumas.

Victoires bt Conquetes des Francais (1817). — These records, though
written by eye-witnesses, comprise so extensive a range of events
for the size of the work, that the accounts of each are brief, and

• there are few, if any, extracts from original documents.

James's Naval History (1823). — This is the only book on the English
side at all corresponding to Dumas ; for, until the Peninsular War,
there was little but naval operations to record, and this is more a
register of the British Navy and its exploits than a history of the
naval warfare of the period ; but, as far as it goes, it has the
advantage of being a conscientious compilation from original
sources, with, of course, a certain prejudice as to the invincibility
of the British Navy on all occasions.

Alison's History of Europe during the French Revolution (1830). —
Perhaps, still, the best and indeed almost the only English account
of the whole transactions of that period. But it was written at
a time when the British feelings against everything Napoleonic
were still strong; and, however well founded, they gave a tone to
the record of all the events on either side. One can, however,
separate the opinions from the record in Alison, which it is more
difficult to do in Thiers, though he wrote fifteen years later.

Tqe Annual Register. — Is chiefly valuable for showing the opinions
prevalent at the time both in Parliament and among the people
generally; the extracts from Parliamentary discussions on im-
portant questions are particularly valuable. The records of par*
ticular events are sometimes very useful, but the details are in
general insufficient for a full account.

Clode's Military Forces of the Grown (1869). — A very full and very
useful compilation of all the legislation with reference to the
British military forces of all kinds; specially advantageous to
refer to alongside of the Parliamentary discussions, during those
years, 1808-13, when so many schemes for recruiting were tried.

I have been much indebted to the assistance I have received from
the Officers in the Intelligence Department of the War Office in
examining the records of the Quartermaster-General's Department.

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FBOM 1805. 53

Considering the rising importance of military affairs, it is much to be
wished that a complete precis of the records both in that office and in
that of the Inspector-General of Fortifications of that period, were
compiled ; it would be of great assistance in the reorganisation of our
forces on a more national basis.

I have also to thank the Officers of the Admiralty and of the
Record Office, and last, but not least, of the Royal United Service
Institution for assistance.

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From records, Quartermasfor-Gen.'s Office.

Distribution of Regular Forces, June, 1805.

District.

North district

York district

East district

South district

South-west district

IaleofWight

West district

Severn district

North-west district

North Inland district ,

South Inland district.

London district

Home district

Channel Islands district

North Britain district

Total

Artillery.

Cavalry.

Regular
Infantry.

Villfrifl.

Totals.

416

Ill

462

4,006

4,996

130

563

631

2,906

4,230

1,086

1,971

8,697

12,615

19,869

2,290

4,835

15,785

16,874

39,784

1,016

2,040

5,943

2,986

11,986

239

653

1,002

382

622

1,250

5,061

7,816

• •

545

1,697

2,248

a .

680

• .

77*

. .

200

669

. .

869'

• •

188

103

• •

291

185

6,143

1,143

7,526

3,670

1,530

• •

2,068

7,268

284

• .

7,426

. .

7,720

194

627

3,533

6,308

10,662

9,622

12,984

47,116

56,316

126,028

ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

From records, Quartermaster-Gen.'s Office.

Disposition of Volunteer Forces, November, 1803.

Counties.

North Britain

Northumberland 1
Cumberland. . . . I North 1
Westmorland .. | district J

Durham J

Yorkshire, Lin- / York \

colnshire . . . . \ district J
Norfolk, Suffolk,")

Essex, Cam- I East 1

bridge, Hunt- | district J

ingdon •*.... J

Hants, Dorset,/ S.W. \
Wilts I district J

Somerset, Devon, / West \
Cornwall ....(. district J

Gloucester, Mon-
mouth, Gla-

noX^^rH|^e™}
Carnarvon, j*1**"* J
Gardigan,Pem-

broke

Chester, Flint,
Denbigh, Me-
rioneth, Mont- I N.W. "I
gomery. Car- "district/
nairon, Angle-

}

Stirrer, Herts •• •••

Middlesex, London

Oxford, Berkshire

Northampton, Bedford,
Bucks

Rutland, Leicester, Warwick

Wast Riding, Yorkshire • .

Iancashire (except Liver-'
pool), Cheshire (except
Chester), Derby, Not-
tingham, Stafford ....

Shropshire, Worcester,
Hereford ,

}

790
210

168

561
1,229
1,602

520

Cavalry.

Infantry.

2,548

44,237

1,851

11,411

1,709

15,305

8,393

18,989

1,940

13,513

2,803

13,649

3,313

26,147

794

15,516

670

9,174

47,570
13,672

17,182

22,466

16,014
17,081
31,562

16,310

10,564

Disposable Force (not explained
what this means).

140

To assemble at

Salisbury..

Bristol.

Chester,

1,715

1,135

11,089

86,888

6,051

12,854

86,880

7,816

2,506

6,694

9,199

1,221
1,494

7,094
14,605

8,315
16,099

2,841

26,462

31,433

1,570
Gene

11,324
ml total

12,894

327,286*

Reading.

Aylesbury.

Northampton.?
Wakefield.

Lichfield.

1 These totals are taken direct from the book.

•58

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Monday, January 17th, 1876.
Rear- Admiral G. 0. WILLES, C.B., in the Chair.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 1st and 17th

January, 1876.

LIFE.

Hamilton, Tynte F., Lieut., R.N.
Chamberlain, Henry Lieut., B.N.
Sharp, W. Granville, Capt., Madras Staff Corps.

ANNUAL.

Walker, A. G., Lieut, R.A. Cuttler, Frederick F., Lieut., late 1st

W. I. Regiment.
Warrj, Alfred W., Lieut, R.N. Germon, R. C. H., Major, 9th Regiment.

IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANY LONGER A FEEDER

TO THE ROYAL NAVY?

By Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N.

To the uninitiated, the title of this paper may appear absurd as, in all
probability, they accept as gospel the statement so often made in
after-dinner speeches, that the greatness of England mainly depends
on an efficient Navy manned by seamen, who can never be wanting so
long as our flag floats on every sea, and our mercantile marine is the
largest and finest in the world. Such statements, made or delivered
fifty years ago, as no doubt they were, may have been perfectly true,
as then the mainstay of the Navy was undoubtedly the merchant
service, and on the Navy, England depended for security at home and
respect abroad, but reliance must no longer be placed on the mercantile
marine as a feeder to the Regular Service, unless some very radical
changes take place, though it still contributes to the Naval Reserve,
a corps which bears the same relation to the Navy, that the Militia
does to the Army, except that it is very inferior in drill and discipline
to that force, and can only be called on to serve during war, but not
in time to prevent a war. Before the Russian War, the Navy was
almost entirely dependent on the merchant service for men, but,
as that source signally failed, continuous service was introduced
into the Navy, with the system of training boys to keep up the supply,
thus superseding the old plan so entirely that, for some years past, the
entry of men from the merchant service, has been considerably under
a hundred per annum. Various reasons are assigned for this falling
off of volunteers for the Navy — for it must be borne in mind that the
door has always been kept open to them — the most common being the
scarcity of men caused by the abolition of apprentices. This, though
no doubt one, is certainly not the only, or even the chief cause.

62 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONGER A

In my opinion, the principal reasons are — first, that as the supply
of seamen has fallen short of the demand, wages in the mer-
chant service have steadily increased, whereas the pay of the Royal
sailor has not kept pace with it, and for the merchant seamen who
may try the Navy, the pay has remained absolutely stationary for the
last seventy years. Again, the Royal Naval Reserve has the effect
of keeping men out of the regular service, for they can hardly be
expected to serve in a man-of-war for £24 a year, when they can get con-
siderably more in a merchant ship, in addition to £10 from Government,
— actually given to men for remaining away. The expense also of an out-
fit on joining, is out of all proportion to the small pay our men receive,
and necessarily places them in debt for at least their first year of service,
whilst the doing away with the two months' advance, formerly given
on joining, renders it often impossible for a man to pay off debts
incurred whilst waiting for a ship, and causes that powerful class of
land-sharks — the crimps — to be dead against us. These, 1 believe,
to be the chief causes operating against men entering the Navy,
though there are many others of minor importance. As I have
shown in a former paper, read in this theatre,1 we have at present,
as the result of our training and continuous service system, bat
12,000 able seamen in the Fleet. Were this the result of the be-
ginning of a system, it might reasonably be supposed that with
time the number of able men would increase, but such must not be
anticipated, for, though the training of boys has been in full force
for the last ten years, we still include amongst our 12,000 AJJ.'s,
many who joined as wen, either prior to, or since the introduction
of, the present system, and we must be prepared, when these are
gone, to see our force of 12,000 dwindle down to probably less than
10,000, which will be about the normal number of able seamen pro-
duced by our training establishments. We see now that 3,000 boys
have annually to be entered to maintain a force of 18,000 or 19,000
blue jackets, of whom only about half are thoroughly qualified seamen,
the remainder being but learners, and in many cases little better than
boys.

But is the Navy as at present maintained able to train as sailors
all the men it requires? Let us see. To keep up the number of
men now voted, 4,000 boys, first-class (viz., boys who have passed
through the training course) are required, but all our ships put
together do not take more than three-fifths of them, the remainder
being cooped up in harbour vessels, learning little but evil. It is thus
clear we have not nearly the requisite tonnage at sea to salt our youths
properly — a state of things most detrimental to them, and the service
at large ; in short, we have to keep more men than the ships of the
Navy can possibly make into sailors, and the sooner the fact is boldly
faced the better, for no half-measures will remedy this most serious
evil. We now come to the question whether, with only sufficient ships
at sea to absorb about 1,800 boys a year, it is advisable, so to ppeak, to
swamp the service with 3,000 P As the Navy is at present worked, it

1 " Seamen of the Fleet, Ac.," see Journal, Vol. six (No. 83) page 604, et seq.

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 63-

is necessary to enter them, because the profession is self-dependent
and with no other source from which men are obtained ; but
is it absolutely unavoidable that such an unsatisfactory state of
things should continue ? and is there no solution to the difficulty ?
There can be no doubt that the Navy should train as many of its-
men from boyhood as possible, but there is a limit to its power of so
doing, and that limit should not be exceeded. Some fifteen hundred
boys per annum can be conveniently and advantageously disposed of
in the ships usually kept at sea, but any excess of that number only
injures the sea training of them all.

flow the remaining 1,200 or 1,500 men needed to keep the Navy
effective are to be found is a question as yet unanswered, and, as usual,
the main difficulty in matters of this sort is money ; so, unless 1 can
suggest a means by which men can be had as good, and as cheaply, as
those manufactured for the Navy, I fear things are likely to be allowed
to remain in their present defective condition; but I am confident
that men can be got who would, on the whole, be quite as good as the
average of our young hands, whilst possessing more nauticcd experience,,
and who would have cost nothing for training. Seamen now, to be of
real value in war, should be (as I have attempted to show in my former
paper) thoroughly drilled and disciplined as fighting men, but this
cannot be done without barracks, I therefore take it for granted that
barracks will ere long be constructed, as they are already recognised
as an imperative necessity, without which the men of the Fleet never
can attain to that high standard of efficiency which the country
has a right to expect, and the present exigencies of the service
require. With barracks, the great difficulty to entering seamen direct
will disappear, for in them the young merchant sailor can be so com-
pletely disciplined and drilled that he would no longer be looked on
as the objectionable character he has hitherto been considered on
board of a man-of-war. In entering such men it would not do to be
too particular in their nautical examination, as many things required
of a sailor in the Royal Navy are not thought necessary in the mer-
chant service ; and it should be borne in mind that there are certain
parts of a seaman's work which can be perfectly well taught on
shore, whilst there are others which must be learned afloat. Two
qualities absolutely necessary, but only to be acquired in youth, and
<*n the salt water, are sea legs and a sea stomach, and a man possessing
these might, in considerably less than a year under careful instruction
in barracks, be transformed into a very fair man-of-war's man. There
are other qualities of course essential to good sailors, such as readiness
of resource, self-reliance, activity, and determination, which are so much
developed in the man, by actual work aloft, that sea training should
always be imperative on candidates for entry. In barracks therefore,
I would drill the additional men necessary to keep our blue jackets
up to their proper strength, and therein qualify them for their
duties as men-of-war's men. I am aware I may be met with the
objection, that seamen cannot be got from the merchant service, but
this difficulty can, I believe, be overcome. In the first place, to do so
we must make the Royal Naval Reserve the link between the Royal,

<64 18 OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONGER k

and merchant navy, not leave it, as it now is, the gulf which separates
them. If we can attract a certain number of men regularly from the
merchant service, we should soon find ourselves in a position to insist
on a qualifying period of service in the Fleet, before they could pass
into the Reserve, thus immensely increasing its value, as those com-
posing it would then be all disciplined, tried men, to whom the duties
of a ship of war, when they were required to join the Navy, would be
neither unusual nor irksome. There should also be easy means of
interchange between the two services, so that a man could serve for a
time in the one, and then pass into the other, three years in the Reserve,
counting as two in the regular service, towards a non- continuous service
pension. At present, if a Naval Reserve man joins the Navy, he is a
positive loser. For instance, in a Frigate I commanded in South
America, I had four Naval Reserve men ; they were all stout good mer-
chant seamen, who soon fell into our ways, and were thought well of,
but in less than a year three out of the four had deserted, simply
because they could not afford any longer to serve Her Majesty on £14
a year, for such was the practical result of giving them £10 whilst
out of the service and only £24 when in it. Had these men been
allowed to draw such portion of their retainer as would have made up
their pay to that of their continuous-service brethren, they, in all pro-
bability, would have remained in the service contentedly until the
ship paid off, when, if they returned to their former calling, aa the
chances are they would, they at any rate might be expected to speak
favourably of their experience in the Royal Service, and have been a
valuable addition, instead of being lost, to the Reserve. I may add
that the fourth man rose to be a leading seaman, and, on paying off, I
asked him whether he intended to rejoin the Navy, he replied, — " I
like the service, but at my age (thirty) it would not pay me to do
so." I hold that nothing short of absolute necessity should induce
Government so completely to alienate the merchant service from the
Navy. At present, in the Reserve, there is a certain proportion of
men who have served in the Fleet for short periods, but unless some
encouragement is offered to the merchant seamen these will soon
disappear, and leave the Reserve entirely composed of men who know
nothing whatever of the routine or duties of a man-of-war. There is
a strong natural antipathy in the merchant sailor to the Navy, which
is only to be removed by serving in it, or modified by hearing it well
spoken of by those who have ; but when the whole body is composed
of men who know nothing of a man-of-war, it can hardly \>e expected
that the Royal Service will become more popular with them than it is
at present. I have heard it said that it is better that the Naval Reserve
men should not serve in the Fleet in peace time, as their doing so
reduces our resources in case of war. If quantity and not quality were
the only consideration, such an argument might hold good ; but
quality is certainly now-a-days of the first importance, and unless
a seaman is thorough in drill and discipline he is not worthy of being
estimated at anything like full value in the fighting power of the
Fleet.

But cutting off the merchant seamen from the Navy is felt in-

FEEDEB TO THE ROTAL NAVY? 65

juriously in other ways; the good -feeling which formerly existed
between the two branches of the profession is fast vanishing, the
man-of-war's man is no longer looked on by the merchant sailor as a
bird of the same feather, bnt as one of a totally different order, and
this feeling extends from them to their Officers, who, in former times,
if not interchangeable like their men, at any rate became familiar with
the Navy from hearing, in their yonth, the experience of the old salts
with whom they sailed, and who had seldom passed a long life at sea
without having spent a considerable portion of it in a ship of war. I
would even go further, and should like to see a qualifying service in the
Navy imperative on all future Naval Reserve Officers, snch service would
be a clear gain to all parties, for the Officer would learn his naval duties,
the Admiralty be able to estimate his suitability, and value as snch, and
thus be in a position safely to reduce the number of Officers in the regular
service, which would both save the country's money, and remove to some
extent that incubus, " Half- pay," which I have no hesitation in saying,
does more harm to the profession, than it is possible to estimate ; but the
greatest of all the advantages to be derived from the connection, would
be the sympathy, and the good understanding engendered by it. At pre-
sent, merchant Officers look on us, I fear, as mere drawing-room sailors
who may possibly know the bow from the stern of a ship, but not much
more This unfavourable opinion would not so much matter were it
not, through them, transferred to their employers, and other mercantile
classes, and thus diffused throughout the country, till, as a result, con-
fidence in the Navy is shaken, as we too often see by the tenor
of the articles, written on naval matters, in the leading journals.
If merchant Officers were brought into contact with those of the
Nary, they would find such opinions, if entertained, to be unjust and
erroneous, and that there are proportionately as many practical sailors
serving the Queen as in their own branch of the profession, for though
the training in the Royal Service may not be so rough as theirs, still
Naval Officers are not only always ready, but quite as able to do any
part of a seaman's work as the most hardy Neptune in the Australian
trade. The time for keeping the Navy a close borough has past ; within
proper limits we should put out our hand to those who, like ourselves,
follow the sea; for the ranks of the merchant service now hold officers of
as good social position as our own, gentlemen both by birth and educa-
tion. What is required for the Navy is more light, nothing should be
kept dark, the more the public and Parliament know of it, the better
for us all. Now we are principally known and judged of by our
shortcomings or unfortunate accidents; but the important services, and
hard work done by the Navy, though of every day occurrence, is
but little heard of or considered : were it otherwise, we should not be
» roundly abused for things which are too often beyond our control.
Bat to return to the seamen.

How are we to induce merchant sailors to join the Navy ? certainly
not by offering them a bounty, for experience has shown that that does
Bot answer. There appears to me, however, to be another way we may
get them to join, viz., by allowing their sea time out of the service to count
towards a non-oontinuous service pension, to be earned by a combination
tol. xx. f

66 18 OUR MERCHANT BE B VICE ANY LONGER' A

of service in and out of the Navy, and Reserve, for a period of 21 yean
or its equivalent, irrespective of age. Thus, I would allow a seaman
under twenty-five years of age to count half his time served at sea;
between that age, and thirty, two-fifths of his sea time, and so on
to an age limit ; but I would allow all time served in the Reserve to
count as two-thirds time. Men entering the Navy with a view of
passing into the Reserve should Also be allowed a free kit credit on the
books, equal to that now given to boys on entry and before passing
into the fleet, viz., £7 10s. for clothes, and £1 for bedding, which
would enable them to commence their service clear of debt, and allow
of their drawing pay from the first.

The above proposal may appear at first sight too liberal, but it must
be remembered that the country woujd have the benefit of all man's
time for the entire period of his service, and have paid nothing
whatever towards his training as a sailor ; in fact we should get a
ready-made article instead of having to manufacture it. The Naval
Reserve men should be encouraged to-come and go as much as possible ;
when in the fleet, they should be paid as continuous service men, the
only difference between the two classes being the pension. Such a system
backed by other minor inducements, such as allowing the men to carry
their conduct and gunnery pay with them, exempting them from the
re- qualifying course excepting once in three, or five years, but allowing
the men to draw their ration money, and considering them eligible for
the coast guard, when their combined service qualified them for it,
would probably induce a number of staid and experienced seamen,
(a class of men the want of whom is much felt in the Fleet) as well as
younger men, to join, "for it often happens that it is convenient for the
Reserve sailor to join our ships abroad, and for us to take him.
Besides, as these men get older they begin to look ahead, and are
then pretty certain to see the advantage of reducing the time between
them and a pension, by putting in a few years in the Navy as oppor-
tunities offer. It would hardly be fair, seeing how short the mer-
cantile marine is of men, to introduce the proposed scheme unless the
Government in some way or other made up for the men which would
be absorbed by the Navy ; but I think we may reasonably anticipate
that the New Merchant Shipping Act will amply provide for this,
probably by furnishing ships in which boys can be prepared for
service in the mercantile marine ; if so, such vessels, — to be thoroughly
efficient, — should be put under one system of instruction, and be
periodically inspected by some competent person, whose report would
enable the Board of Trade, or whatever department they are placed
under, to form a proper estimate of the work they are doing.

It is not my intention here to enlarge on the subject of training-
boys, but there are one or two important points I should like to
touch on in passing in view of the establishment of these nurseries
for seamen. The best age to take a boy for making a sailor is about
I4£, but the most paying age is a year or eighteen months older, that
is to say, the bulk of boys joining at the younger age will stick to the
sea, and become excellent seamen, but the older they are taken the
larger is the proportion of Iobs, until we reach those who enter as

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 67

young men, and who seldom turn oat well, or remain at sea if they can
leave it; but the difference of waste between the boys of 14£, and
15£, is not equal to the additional cost of maintaining the yonnger
class for the extra year. Thus the regulation age should be from 15£,
to 16£ ; over, or under these ages the expense is increased. Seamen,
now that so few are carried in proportion to tonnage, must be both
strong and able, therefore there should be a standard of size, as well as
a physical examination before entry, and as young boys are growing
fast, they should be well and plentifully fed, so as to develop to the
utmost both their bodies and minds. Eighteen months is the maximum
time a boy should be kept in a harbour training ship, after that they
only lose ground, and become discontented. But as lads of between
seventeen and eighteen will often be too light to get berths in merchant
ships easily, they>may have to be sent to sea, rather than be retained
too long in harbour, in carefully selected ships, under humane and ex-
perienced captains, who might receive in remuneration a sum equiva-
lent to the value of their rations. The custom of carrying premium
boys is now becoming so universal, that this course will probably be
found imperative ; but I do not anticipate that there ever will be
any difficulty in competing with them, as they labour under the dis-
advantage of being entirely uninstructed, and therefore very inferior
aa compared to the trained youth. After, say a voyage to India,
viA the Cape, or to Australia, such lads would, as a rale, be quite fit for
an ordinary seamen rate, and be much sought after. By sending boys
thus to sea, no extra expense would be incurred, as it is obvious that
whether retained at home, or sent to sea, they must be fed.

Having roughly sketched out how in my opinion the Navy might
be benefited and placed in more intimate connection with its Reserve,
and through it, with our great mercantile marine, I will proceed to
make a short summary of what I have written : —

1st. The Navy is now self-dependent rearing its blue jackets from
boys, numbering 19,000, of whom but 12,000 are able-bodied seamen.

2nd. As sufficient ships are not kept at sea to carry more than
three-fifths of them, the seamen-like qualities of our sailors are
rapidly deteriorating.

3rd. The sea-going ships of the fleet only carry about three-
fifths the boys required to make good the loss on the blue jackets of
the Fleet.

4th. It is, therefore, desirable to draw seamen from other sources,
rather than swamp the Navy with more boys than it can possibly
instruct.

5th. That the mercantile marine must again become the nursery
from which we should draw a proportion of our seamen, to be disci-
plined, and moulded into men-of-war's men in barracks, before being
embarked.

6th. That for many weighty reasons it is bad policy to alienate the
merchant service entirely from the Navy, and that our present Naval
Reserve system has that injurious effect.

7th. There should be established means of easy interchange be-
tween the Reserve, and the regular Service, three years in the

18 OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANY LONGER

former, to be considered equivalent to two in the latter
fying Bervice in the Fleet required of both officers and ir

8th. That the whole should be linked to a compreherc
training boys for the Merchant Service, under prope*
supervision.

TheBe are the main points put forth in this paper :
the discussion on it to clear up any uncertainty as t<
which from want of detail may not be perfectly clear,
ever I am certain, the Navy, if kept at its present
long continue to make its own sailors without aid fr
attempting to do so will prove most injurious to the s

We cannot tell in a naval war what number o
quired, and therefore if our men were even better, ai
than they are, we should do well not entirely to bi
cantile marine of the country. It must be remem
an in ferior naval power gets the start of us in ^
half a dozen fast cruizers to prey on our trade
which we certainly are not always prepared), our
surely take refuge under neutral flags ; and as all
the men invariably follow the ships, go where V
press-gangs would be equally powerless to ton
was clearly demonstrated during the American C
commerce, second only to our own, passed all)
flags ; their ships-of-war, however, remained t\
though an enormous bounty was offered, and
with foreign merchant sailors, or deserters 'fi
mented by some twenty thousand landsmen, to

It is no new idea to form our Reserve fro-
through the fleet; pamphlets have been w
admirals ; committees, both Parliamentary
sat on the subject ; blue books have been pri
has been made to do so, or even to secure
years' men, who at their prime, and when o
siderable numbers out of the Navy, and ar
steps being taken to secure their services i i
able to judge, consider our Reserve as
from satisfactory, whilst we hear it spokt
u pensive," and doubts expressed as to
" come forward except by compulsion."
fair to add, that many intelligent officers
highest terms as a reliable force. I be]
between these two extremes, and that
good, many bad points. At best it is a
trained to arms, and composed of m<
though undoubtedly good sailors, and
men composing the Reserve had all pas
prospect of war would be inducement e>
to our ships ; but for men of a certa
habits, to take to a new life with eqn
nature we have yet to see, to believe i

«•

' . i-ik

; ■* at

<i the

. £«> on

;•• know

• i rt ment.

» ill always

'indent the

• ut between

•» mercantile

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 69

Can we, or should we, thus rest contented when a doubt on such a vital
question exists ? are we to wait patiently until war solves the problem,
possibly by involving the country in some great calamity ? I do not
doubt the honesty of purpose of our Reserve men, for they probably
are quite sincere in their promise to serve in war ; but after all they
are but human, and are certain to be exposed to great temptations to
break their contract. The link between them and the nag they are
to fight under must therefore be made stronger, let them all be proved
men with something to lose ; self-interest can always be depended on,
honour only at times. I have no wish to see new measures made re-
trospective, indeed there is no reason why, at any rate for a time, old
and new should not be worked together. It would be no hardship,
but much to the advantage of the young men coming on, to pass a
few years under the pendant, before going into the Reserve, and the
same may be said of the young merchant officers. These gentlemen,'
when Sub- Lieutenants in the Reserve, should be required "to serve for
six months in one of our Channel, or Mediterranean ships, before
being qualified for promotion to Lieutenant's rank ; the report from
the Captain they were under to be considered, in combination with
their other services, before they received promotion. We could not
expect great results at first, but I feel confident that if the matter
were taken up with energy, if Naval recruiting parties and rendezvous
were established at our principal sea ports, we should in due time
succeed in entering all the men we require. The continuous ser-
vice -system should be maintained in full force within proper limits,
which I roughly estimate at from 14,000 to 15,000 men, the remaining
three or four thousand to be short service men, qualifying for the
Reserve. As the time required of a Reserve man to entitle him to
a pension is long, 1 would like to see him allowed to earn a 'part of
it, when unable to serve for it all — thus, if a man had, after putting
in ten or fifteen years, to leave from any good reason, I would grant
him a proportionate pension at the age of fifty* The rule about men
following the sea whilst in the Reserve might also, with advantage,
be somewhat relaxed in favour of those who had served ten years in
the Navy, or its equivalent in the Navy, Reserve, and merchant ser-
vice; if such men lose by remaining on shore — which I doubt — for once
a sailor always a sailor, the country would be the gainer, by having
a body of experienced men always ready to hand. I do not place any
great importance on frequent requalification in drills. If the men
have passed through the Navy, and have once been thoroughly trained
to arms, they can at any time be made efficient in a few weeks, so
long as they are physically fit.

If England is really in earnest and jealous of the supremacy of
her flag on the sea, if she really believes that on the Navy, " under
" the good providence of God, the wealth, the safety, and strength of
** the kingdom chiefly depends," she must, through Parliament, look
carefully to it ; it will be useless condemning the officers or even the
Admiralty, if, when the evil day arrives, the arm on which the country
confides be found wanting, the fault will surely lie with the public,
aad not with the profession, for is not vox populi vox Dei ?

70 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONGER A

Captain Wilson : Before commencing the discussion I should like to add to
what I have written a few notes which I made from the report of evidence taken
before a Departmental Committee in 1871, hut which was not published. From
the report itself I take this : — " The total number (Reserve Seamen) removed from
" the register by death, discharge, &c., since the formation of the force amounts
" to upwards of 13,000. It has been given in evidence that most of the able
" seamen of the mercantile marine, who are eligible by the regulations, have
11 joined the Royal Naval Reserve, and this statement has been confirmed by
" the Registrar-General of Seamen." We then go on to evidence given having
reference to the question of men passing out of the Navy into the Merchant
Service, which some people think is so likely to occur if we allow them to go on the
short service pension. Here is the evidence of a Quarter-Master and five seamen
— young men-of-war's men — who had been educated in the Service, and who were of
opinion that young seamen would dislike the idea of leaving the Navy for the
Merchant Service. Individually they had the strongest objection to serving in the
mercantile marine. A captain in the Merchant Service being asked what he thought
of the Reserve men says, " I think they are a very mixed class. I have had them
" myself and I have found that some of them are very good men and others quite the
"reverse." Then in speaking of men-of-war's men passing into the Merchant Service
he says, " You can make man-of-war's men out of merchant seamen, but you cannot
" make merchant seamen out of man-of-war's men as a rule ; of course there are
" exceptions," — in that I quite agree.

I hare also some notes which I am sure will carry very great weight with you
all. The evidence given by our very dear and lamented brother-Officer, Com-
modore Goodenough (and I take the opportunity of offering a humble tribute
to his memory, by saying that the Service could ill afford to lose such an able
and such a good man) he says, "Again, I think that the present system of
" our Reserve is exceedingly expensive, and probably very ineffectual. The real
" Reserve should be composed of men who have been trained in the Service, and
" have gone through their five or six years in the Navy. Instruction and time is
" thrown away in accumulating men on your lists, who are not first rate, in time of
" peace." Then I go on to some evidence given by Captain Gore Jones, who is a good
authority on these subjects. He says, " The great mistake with us has always been
" having no permament establishment like the army. We see from the Acoountaut-
" General's statistics," and this is a part which is very noteworthy, " that in nine yean
" the numbers have decreased from 32,000 pure seamen to 19,000, without any
." apparent cause." I think that is a very strong point. There is another little item
that I draw your particular attention to, evidence given by a very intelligent Officer
with reference to the comparative merits of boys trained in the private training
ships, and those in the Royal Naval training ships. Captain Cuming served as
captain of a Royal Naval training ship, and also as captain of a private training
ship. A question is asked him as to the relative merits of the two classes of boys
(ignoring gunnery altogether) simply as to discipline, clothing, and their abilities as
seamen, and comparing boys of two and half years standing in the private training
ship to one year in the Royal Naval training snip.

Q. " Apart from the knowledge of gunnery drill after two and half years with
" you," — he was then commander of a private training ship, — " and after a year's
" training in one of the Queen's ships, what is the actual difference as far as seaman-
" ship goes between the two classes of boys P " His answer is, " A boy from the
" Queen's training ship would have a much better knowledge of the theory of seaman-
" ship, and certainly of the practice." I want to draw attention to this as I think
there is an idea abroad that because these private training ships keep the boys at
per 19?. to 221. a year% their training is cheap compared with what we give in the
Royal Navy ; this notion I think Captain Cuming's evidence upsets. I will go on
to the evidence given by a very noted sailor in our Service, who ought to know
what men are, Sir William Mends, now at the head of the Transport Department.
He says, in answer to a question about Reserves, " It is certain that you will always
11 have to fall back upon the mercantile marine in time of need. At present the
" mercantile marine and the Royal Navy are quite distinct, the line is cut between
" them.. You have nothing now to associate the Naval Service with the mercantile

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 71

marine. If man-of-war's men, whom we could not find employment for in our
ships of war, went into the mercantile marine, and constantly passed to and fro, so
that a certain link was kept up, the seamen of the mercantile marine would
'' gradually lose their distaste for the system of discipline necessary to the condition
" of the Royal Navy." Then in answer to another question he says, " The merchant
" seamen see nothing now of ships of war except the outside. The men forming the
"* Royal Naval Reserve are drilled in ships specially set apart for the purpose, and
" which form no part of the active Fleet. I think the continuous service system is
41 very good for the Navy in its normal condition, but very disadvantageous to the
" country in time of war." And in speaking of requalif jing drills he says, " Tho**
" men who have had four or five years on board ship are soon brought up to the
" work again." The question is also put to him, " The transition from peace to war
" being momentary, is not that one of the objections, and a serious one to our Royal
" Naval Reserve ? " He answers, " Of the 15,000 men we should not have in the
" summer time more than 4,000 in England : the others would be on the high seas."
Commander W. Dawson, R.N. : There is one great advantage to the country in
•* half-pay " which has been overlooked by Captain Wilson, namely, that we are
indebted to " half -pay " for the very able and interesting paper which we have heard
to-night. Naval Officers when afloat spend a great deal of what is called " sea-
'* time " in, and devote a great deal of exhaustive " sea service " upon, washing
decks and scrubbing hammocks ; but when relieved from those intellectual
labours and allowed a period of learned leisure on half-pay, or of employment
on shore, they can devote their talents to subjects of greater importance to
the country than those not very recondite occupations which go to make up " sea
M time," and I hope that whatever learned leisure Captain Wilson may have whilst
on half-pay, may be devoted to the further development of the principles which he
has enunciated in connection with this most innwrtant subject, for at present he has
but touched the fringe of a very large question, and one which would well repay
the devotion of Captain Wilson's talent and experience to elaborate more fully.

The question which he has put before us is, " Is our Merchant Service any longer
"a feeder to the Royal Navy f"

He appears to restrict this question to peace times and to fixed numbers, and if
we are to confine our attention within such limits our reply must be that, "of
"course it is not a feeder to the Royal Navy; " and I would add, " why should it
** be ? " Why should not rather the Royal Navy be the feeder to the mercantile
marine ? The Merchant Service at this moment cannot raise seamen enough for
itself, and when it has got them it cannot keep them. When they become good
and decent men, the first thing they do is to quit the Merchant Service, which,
speaking roughly, and ignoring some most praiseworthy exceptions, is so badly
managed that no decent man who has any respect for himself can belong to it,
unless he gets into one of the more favoured employs, or is driven by poverty to
put up with bad food, bad housing, and a depressing mode of payment. Conse-
quently there is a very large secession of good and decent men always going on from
the mercantile marine who are taking to employments on shore. There is also another
reason why the mercantile marine wants assistance given to it rather than to give
away its best young men to the Royal Navy, viz., that steamers are greatly increas-
ing in number, and merchant steamers do not train up seamen, although they use
them when trained. On the contrary, large proportions of the crews of a great
number of these steamers are made up of Lascars and of the sweepings of mercantile
sea porta, so that there are not so many persons under early training for British
merchant seamen as we should naturally suppose. If we could in any way persuade
men, who have served in ships of war, subsequently to serve in the mercantile
marine — which I think is very doubtful indeed, so that I am not very hopeful of
the plan proposed in that respect— if we could, however, then I should say the
better plan would be rather to make the Royal Navy one great training establish-
meat for the whole marine of the country. But it is answered, " we have not
" enough ships of war at sea for the purpose of training the boys required for the
** Queen's Service alone." Well, who else is going to train men for the Navy if the
Navy does not do it for itself? and who is best able to pay for Royal Naval training ?
the country with all the taxes at its back, or the private shipowners ? I say at

72 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANY LONGER A

once, if you have not enough vessels at sea to train tout boys, pay off some of the
harbour ships which are constantly merely lying round the coast. It would be a
great advantage to the Service if the number of harbour ships were greatly reduced.
Then as to barraoks, I don't think you will get barracks for the Navy till a batch of
those demoralizing hulks, which destroy discipline and spoil nien-of -war's men, are
burnt. Even then decent barracks will not be given to the Navy. Nobody wants
to have them in the form of disused old storehouses in the dockyards, without any
drill ground or any other decent appliances, such as would enable Officers to dis-
cipline and to drill their men efficiently. The real question coven a much larger
ground than the title of this paper. Peace time is simply a preparation for war,
and the question is not merely how to man the Royal Navy in time of peace, but
how to provide such a greatly expanding force as will be required to defend our
commerce, our colonies, and our homesteads in time of war. When Captain Wilson
asked on a previous occasion, " what are the number of men wanted in time of
" war P " he was answered by a very distinguished Officer that we have now more
seamen than we have ships of war to put them into.

The Chaibman : For the moment !

Commander W. Dawson : For the moment ! But in case of a great maritime
struggle there is hardly a single seaworthy merchant steam-ship into whieh you
could not put one or more 64- pounder guns. The Naval architect would not be
worth hi? salt who could not do it. Surely if a heavy gun can be placed upon a
raft it could be put into any seaworthy merchant steam-ship afloat. If Naval
architects cannot build up a cradle or other framework inside of any gingerbread
merchant ship capable of keeping the seas so as to carry 64- pounder guns, all I can
say is they have no businoss to be called Naval architects. Every merchant steamer
which has a speed of more than six knots could also be employed as a torpedo ship,
therefore every single seaworthy vessel in which there is a steam engine can be used
as a war vessel in any great maritime struggle for national existence. Besides, in
the last war some of the best fighting ships we had were taken from the enemy,
and that is a source to which we must look for setting many of our best fighting
ships in time to come. But we want well-disciplined and well-drilled men to fight
these ships. Mere seamen without discipline and without warlike training in the
arts and arms of war do not form a fighting force, what we want is not mere
sailors, whether amongst Officers or men. It is not so muoh mere seamanship as
intelligence that is wanted on the quarter deck, and skilled fighting men before the
mast. And fighting men who have the skill to fight in bodies, means discipline and
drill. Thus we come round to very much the same conclusion at which Captain
Wilson arrives, though they are reached by a different road. Has not Captain Wilson
been led into a little contradiction in speaking of the qualities of the present Reserve
men ? Captain Wilson speaks in the highest terms of praise of the four Naval
Reserve men serving in the frigate which he commanded ; but since he was afloat
he has evidently been reading some of the late Mr. Reddie's papers, and has taken
up some notions from those who are opposed to that fighting force. All I can say
is, " a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." You have now in the Naval
Reserve, so far as they go, the pick of the mercantile marine. Be they bad or
good, they are the best men in the whole Merchant Service. The mercantile
marine may contain far too many unseaworthy Bailors; but those men in the
Reserve are at any rate the best, or if you choose to put it otherwise the least
worst of those in the Merchant Navy. And having got these Naval Reserve men
drilled, it may be with obsolete guns and with obsolete carriages, still gaining a
modicum of discipline and under a certain degree of control, you have a bird in
the hand which can be depended upon when the country is in an emergency. It is
quite true, that under the conditions made with them the Naval Reserve men cannot
be called out till the emergency arrives ; but get this other Reserve whieh you
speak of if vou can, and do it without breaking faith with the old. We must
recognise this fact that we shall want every man and boy who is serving afloat lor
the defence of the country when the struggle comes for national existence, that death-
struggle which must be fought out not on Dorking heights, but on the high seas ;
and if that be the case, the Government ought to come forward and claim a sort
of oversight over the whole of the personnel of the mercantile marine. A great

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 73

many abuses whioh are now driving from the British Merchant Service its best men,
and which are demoralizing and debauching the rest, could be immediately stopped
as they hare been in the Queen's Service by the regulations of a Government, which
looked upon merchant seamen as persons who are in process of being trained and
qualified now in time of peace for the defence of the country in time of war. In
that way Captain Wilson's system might very well be elaborated and made to work
out. But it would be silly on our part to expect merchant seamen to come into the
Royal Navy unless some very large increase is made to the wages of the men of the
Royal Navy. An A.B. of the Royal Navy is receiving 21. 0*. 6d. per month, while
an A. B. in the mercantile marine is receiving in the port of London at this moment
3/. 10*. per month, and if coming home from Australia he gets SI. per month ; and
although it is quite true that there are only nine or ten months wages in the year
for the merchant seamen, he does not always count up the months : and though
there are no twopenoes or threepences for badges of various kinds to add to it as in
the Royal Navy, still there is the plain naked fact, that he will get 1/. 10*. a month
more by remaining where he is, than by entering the Queen's Service. This question
of the wages of men-of-war's men has always been treated in a very scurvy way.
In the Royal Navy, an ordinary artificer is given 91. a year more than is given to a
first-class seaman Petty Officer, or nearly twice the rate of wages given an able
seaman of the Navy. Surely an able seaman is a skilled workman whi ought to be
paid the wages of a skilled workman. A first-class seaman Petty Officer is a man
who has risen through two or three grades above an able seaman, and that, even
after so rising in trustworthiness and skill, he should be receiving 91. a year less
than a shipboard ordinary mechanic, seems to me one of those things that wants
rectifying. I do not believe myself that there is any very bad feeling between the
Royal Navy and the Merchant Service. The members of the mercantile marine
have had nothing to do with the published attacks lately made upon the Navy.
Those animadversions are a great deal the fruits of what rfaval Officers themselves
have sown ; they have told the world that Naval Officers were nothing but seamen,
mere sailors that knew one end of a ship from the other, and knew nothing more,
and that ignorance is the handmaid of seamanship, and that knowledge of affairs or
of science was inconsistent with the skill to command fleets and fight battles ; and
they have been taken at their word, and have been very naturally treated by successive
Governments and by the public, as men wanting in intelligence, incapable of holding
positions of responsibility, and as, in short, the poor relations of the Army and of
the Civil Service. On the contrary, the Naval Reserve has contributed to the grow-
ing good feeling which obtains between the employes of the merchants and of the
Queen ; they see something of the Navy and of its Officers in the drill ships, and
this contact contributes a good deal towards mutual good feeling. At any rate,
whatever the Naval Reserve are, they are a good bird in the hand, though they are
wholly insufficient in numbers. I would, therefore, welcome any broad compre-
hensive and statesman-like grasp of the question of maritime defence, which would
embrace the whole mercantile marine amongst the defensive forces of the country.
We do need a much greater and more complete link between the Naval and the
mercantile marine than we have at present ; we do not need a more fostering, dis-
criminating, and national Government control of that Service. Merchant seamen
do not stand in the same national relation to the country that cabmen or colliers
stand in, because cabmen and colliers are not men who are placed foremost in the
defence of the country ; but say what you will, in any great maritime struggle,
whenever this country comes to fight for national existence, the Sovereign must
have the aid on the seas of every man who has a sea leg or a sea stomach ; and
every such man should be made competent to give a capable response to the signal,
44 England expects every man to do his duty." If Captain Wilson will, during the
further time he may be on half-pay — though I do not wish him to be on half-pay
longer than he himself wishes, — devote his talents and studies to elaborating a
system such as he has himself sketched, widening his views so as to bring the whole
control of the personnel of the mercantile marine into the hands of the Government
in some form or other — if he would devote his intellect and his labours to the
elaboration of that great subject, it would be a work worthy of his great talents,

74 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANY LONGER A

of his energy, and of his patriotism, and one that would confer great benefit upon
the country.

Rear- Admiral J. H. Sblwtv : I could hare wished, Sir, to have heard tome one
on the other side of the question who might have informed us more of the mercantile
feeling on the subject. I think Captain Wilson's paper mainly brings before us the
question, "Which are the best seamen for the Nary, and how can they be obtained? "
and I think I see a latent idea in his mind, that it would be most desirable to have
our men trained from boys in the duties which they are to perform afterwards ; that
is to say, thoroughly educated in the true sense of the term, which means, a prepara-
tion for the life a person is likely to lead, and not a mere teaching in any formal
subjects which he may or may not follow up afterwards. A seaman should be
educated in those things which he may be required to do at sea during war or
peace, and in such habits as can only be inculcated when they are begun from the
earliest days of his life. Afterwards, it is not so much how long it takes you to
teach, or what you can teach, but it is what you can make the men unlearn — idle,
dirty habits, habits of talking when he should be silent, grumbling, and all those
things which unfortunately are too rife to-day in the undisciplined services, are
much harder to unlearn than the good is hard to be taught. Therefore, I do
think, if it were not for the objection which Captain Wilson has stated, that the
number of our ships is not sufficient to employ more than a very small proportion
of the boys we now train, he would believe, as I do, the best way would be to train
the whole number we require. Captain Dawson has shown that such men so trained
would be much more valuable to the mercantile marine than any one we can ever
expect to receive from them would be to us. They would be men of such orderly
habits as every good shipowner desires to see in his ship ; they would be lees liable
to the seductions of the harbour and of crimps ; they would be less likely to deceive
their owners, and mutiny against their masters, in proportion as you gave them
better training. Many yean ago I drew attention strongly to the fact that, in
France, the Inscription Maritime, together with the law that no person should
command a ship above a certain size in their mercantile marine without having
served a certain period of his youth in the Navy, had had good effects, and might be
very well imitated, if it were not for that popular cry which tells us that the British
nation would never stand it. Now I deny that that cry, in any case in which it is
uttered, is a wise or a true cry. I shall take exception to the maxim with which
Captain Wilson concluded his paper — " Vox populi, vox Dei." I should translate
that in exactly the opposite direction. My own experience in America, as well as
everywhere else, would teach me, if history did not, that it is precisely not what is
the voice of God which is the voice of the people. I have been a great deal lately
in the " Model Republic," and I can only tell you that they do not believe in it.
There is another point which is the inducement to be offered to those boys who become
men after we have trained them, the inducement to those men to remain with us.
There is a very simple and very effectual means of doing that, one which cannot be
too strongly insisted on, as it is the only fair and just way, whioh will not burden
the country too much, and it is, to give to those men who serve their country during
a long period of their lives, the fair share of public employment which they ought to
have, as a refuge for old age. A man is not the worse, he is very much the better,
in a public office for having been trained and disciplined at sea or in the Army.
And I would say that, on this question of the Navy, the promotion of persons who
have not served the ordinary time, which alone qualifies tor such promotion in the
service to which he is supposed to be added, is a fallacy and a mistake. You
may lower the rank, but you cannot raise the men. You may call people,
as tbey do in America, Majors, Generals, and every other grade you please,
by the dozen ; what is the result ? You simply lower the whole title until nobody
cares to bear it That rank which the Navy and the Army is supposed to give,
is almost the only inducement to an Officer and a gentleman to remain in the
Service, for the pay, certainly, would never do it. If you lower the rank, you lower
the inducement to good men *o enter or remain in either Service. I have now
arrived at an age and rank when all these things do not affect me personally in the
slightest degree, therefore I can scarcely be suspected of having a private interest
in the subject, but that will be the inevitable result of going forward with any such

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NATT 75

■ham* as the whole nation has been for the last twenty years past pursuing. And
besides this, little by little we are induced to pay twice as much for a sham as we
need to pay for the real thing. The Reserve was held out a great many years ago
as the great means for allying the merchant marine with the Navy. Now we are
told it is not so, and that it has operated positively in the opposite direction.
There is an old friend of mine here who has been long a distinguished member
of the Naval Reserve, and 1 think he will say that there never has been a feeling
in the mercantile marine against the Navy. They have always worked together
as . brothers whenever they have met ; but, very naturally, a man who has been
brought up in the comparative comfort of a man-of-war — the elegancies of life, I
may almost say, on board a modern man-of-war — is not prepared to engage later
in Ufe in the rough work of the mercantile marine, and you cannot persuade him
to do it. Neither can you make use immediately in war of the mercantile marine
at your disposal. The enactments within the last twenty years have led to a
most lamentable state of things with regard to the flag. You saw in America, the
instant war broke out, one or two fast cruizers were not only able to distress and
harass the commerce of that nation, but so to raise the insurance, that practically
no goods could pass under that flag. So in the French and German war, the
German marine was laid up in port, our harbours were crowded with their
steamers ; I saw them in Kio Janeiro at the same time. The result was, the
whole commerce deserted the flag, left those ships and sailors unemployed, and
went to another nation. Each nation must now be prepared for that state of
things the instant it goes to war; that flag will cease to carry commerce under
it at all, because it cannot do so cheaply with war risk for insurance. (Captain
Wilson : The men will go with it.) They would perhaps go into the Ajnerican
Marine. Now, as to the steamers ; your fast steamers could be made use of in war
as the only ones that can really keep the sea, because they carry ten days' full steam
(I should be very glad to see a man-of-war carrying ten days' full steam) they can
go Cut and far and they can carry heavy guns.

The Chairman : How long would it take to fit a heavy gun in one of those
ships?

Admiral Sklwtn : There is not the smallest difficulty ; they could carry an 80-
ton gun to-morrow if you wish, provided you carry it low enough, provided you
will consent to have the proper carriages to utilise recoil to carry the guns low down
and only bring them up when required to fire, I mean Major Moncrieff's plan.
The pensions for public service have always been a very onerous and disagreeable
payment for the nation to make. Men live too long as pensioners, those who pay
do not like it and murmur at it constantly, but I do think ordinary pay in such
public offices as I have suggested, or in such employment, if it was not in public
offices yet obtained by the recommendation of the Department, as might fitly he
given, would operate as the strongest inducement to good and lasting service.
Why did Captain Wilson's friend of the Reserve refuse to serve any longer in the
Navy at the age of 30 ? Simply because he saw no issue. If he had been told,
•* If you complete your service in the Navy, you will have a good claim on the
" Government for a certain pension or reward which will take the shape of an office
" in which you can serve," I think his objections would have vanished. But, un-
mistakably, we can and ought to train, if we look at it merely as a question of
public policy, and to educate the vagabonds in our streets to be something better than
the sons of crime they now become. It is now allowed that the training given, even
in private ships, is far better than that given by the schools and is not nearly so
expensive. I think, under these circumstances, we may claim that there should be
first the clear and plain recognition of the fact that the training school of the Navy
is not only to be sufficient for itself but also for the mercantile marine, and that if
ships of the Navy are not forthcoming in which to continue training our men after-
wards, there ought to be a wise expenditure during peace for that object in order to
be prepared for war.

Captain Bedford Pnc, R.N., M.P. : How many men do you estimate are
•erring in the mercantile marine ?

Captain Wilson : I can only go from documents I see printed. I estimate there
are about 210,000 teamen (but not necessarily tailors) but from what I have read

56 18 OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONGER A

of the evidence given before different committees, and also in the papers, as well as
from my own observation, I do not suppose we have more than from 20,000 to
25,000 thoroughly competent English able seamen in the mercantile marine.1

Mr. Stirling Lacon : A calculation put out from Liverpool to-day, states that
there are 202,000 men in the mercantile marine, and they bring down their calcula-
tion of able seamen to the figures you now mention, somewhere about 30,000.

Captain Dawson : It does not include foreigners.

Mr. Stirling Lacon : After deducting foreigners. There is one subject I wish
to mention to Captain Wilson, and that is the question of apprentices, for it is quite
evident that we are coming round to it ; and if we do so, it will render the question
very feasible in dealing with the Merchant Service and the Navy. Foreigners are
obliged to ' bring up their own boys in order that they may have sailors, and why
should not we ? but in this great maritime country for the last twenty-five years, the
boys have not been able to get to sea. It is only marvellous to me that we have as
many as 30,000 sailors in the Merchant Service, but they are gradually falling off.
Tou cannot have sailors unless you begin with them when boys. From returns
which I quoted five or six years ago, 60 per cent, of the shipowners of this country
were in favour of returning to the old apprentice system ; and I am told to-day by
the Chairman of Lloyd's Committee, that the mercantile marine are now all but
unanimous in favour of a return thereto : but it must be compulsory ; unless it is
dealt with by the Government as compulsory it is useless, what is obligatory on all
is a hardship to none. Ships in which it may not be convenient to take boys should
contribute an equivalent in money. If the mercantile marine are in favour of
returning to the old apprenticeship system, which I am told is the case, it simplifies
matters very much, if the Government will take the matter in hand, and deal with
it in a comprehensive spirit.

Captain Bedford Pim : You estimate 80,000 as the number of pure blue jackets
in the mercantile marine ?

Captain Wilson : Might I be allowed to read an extract from a letter which
appeared in the Timet, of Friday, the 14th instant, written by Mr. John Williamson,
Honorary Secretary of the Committee of Inquiry into the condition of our mer-
chant seamen. He says, " The total number of hands employed, according to the
" Registrar-General of Seamen's Returns, is about 202,000 ; but an analysis will
" show about the following bond fide seamen of all sorts, including apprentices and
" foreigners, 153,000 ; but of this number the genuine A.B.'s, including foreigners,
" are about 40,000. This amount is arrived at trom the almost universal testimony
" of ship masters, that not more than one-fourth of their forecastle hands know the
" ordinary duties of a seaman. Deduct foreigners, 20,000 ; leaves British able-
" bodied seamen 20,000 ; and as nearly all the foreigners are able-bodied seamen,
" the proportion of the best, or able-bodied seamen in our forecastle, is one-half
" foreign, and one-half British. These are startling figures to ponder in view of a
" war with a Naval Power ; the foreigners would undoubtedly return to their native
" country ; our Navy would require its Reserves out of the above able-bodied
" seamen, the carrying trade would be placed in a serious position. So the sooner
" something be done in the way of ' inaugurating an extensive national system ' of
11 training seamen, and that in connection with the Royal Navy, the better for both
" the material and national interests of our Empire."

That, I think is a very important paragraph.2

1 Experience shows that only about one man in four is a skilled able seaman ; we
may therefore conclude, that out of the 210,000 or 220,000 seamen, not more than
65,000 are really qualified sailors ; but of these we may reckon that from 20,000 to
25,000 are foreigners, for unless they were good seamen they would not be employed
in preference to Englishmen ; the number must again be reduced by some 6,000 or
8,000 negroes, before we come to the total of English skilled sailors, who do not,
I believe, exceed 26,000 in all !— J. C. W.

* If the above be true and the Registrar-General's evidence goes to confirm it, our
shipping interest should take it to heart and observe how it will affect them in war.
In war, out of the 20,000 skilled native seamen, 16,000 the yery cream of them, are

FEEDEtt TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 77

Captain R. A. S. Soott, R.N. : I should like to make one or two remarks with
respect to Captain Wilson's valuable paper, and first as to the means of obtaining
men at the present time. I think, from what he says himself, it is very clear that
what we must look for, is the training of more boys for the Navy. There is a fur-
ther point that has not been touched upon, nor will Captain Wilson perhaps do so,
but haying been very much connected with this part of the Service, I would remark
that except men are trained when boys, I do not think that they ever will become
thorough gunners. As for the great mass of men at sea at the present time, to call
them •• gunners," is absurd. They are badly drilled, they are unable to take true
aim, and hence they miss when they ought to hit the mark ; I am speaking now as an
old seaman gunner, formerly of the " Excellent," and I affirm that what we require
for boys is early and intelligent training, teaching them the reasons why and where-
fore, and giving them to thoroughly understand the machinery with which the guns
are being worked, because all these later ponderous guns must be worked by machinery ;
then, whether they go into the Navy or into the Merchant Service, such boys would
have an interest in the guns, for we know how fond all boys are of mechanism.
Unfortunately our present system of drill, whether in the Royal or in the Mercantile
Navy, does not teach the boys the use of machinery, and does not aim at teaching
machinery to men, until they are too old to learn, but if we at once adopt a wise
national system of training for boys, we shall be in a far better position in case of
war. What Admiral Selwyn has said is quite correct as to the ease with which
very heavy guns may be mounted in merchant ships, and steam tugs also would be
found very valuable for coast defence, supplementing torpedoes with very con-
siderable efficiency. I feel strongly that in order to maintain our naval supremacy
we must have more boys. We have boys in our principal towns, who are now
learning mischief and going into evil, who could instead be very usefully employed ;
they would soon get a liking for the Navy and would also be valuable for the
Merchant Service, and such boys could be utilised in time of war after being trained
to the sea and to the use of machinery ; for whatever their subsequent occupations
were, we should be able to put our hands upon them : in fact a war would at
once bring them to the Navy. It is not sailors only that are wanted in war time,
but we should rather want men who can use the latest improved weapons
thoroughly. We ought, therefore, to hold out much more encouragement than we
do at present. A first-class Petty Officer now fires the guns on board ship. In the
M Inflexible," whera there are only four guns ; fancy a man with 30/. or 4>0l. a-year
firing these guns — firing away more than his annual income at each round ! We
ought at once to give a much higher salary, and secure specially trained marksmen
and skilled Officers to uphold the honour of the country, or else we may find our-
selves distanced by some of our friends over the water whose discipline is better
than our own, and whose intelligent training is superior to ours at the present
time.

Mr. Sttbuxo Lacon : Captain Wilson spoke of naval barracks, I may mention
that I have been round France at L'Orient and at Brest, and I was quite astonished
at what I saw in their naval barracks there. They drill the men at single stick,
and gymnastics, and the use of weapons, but we have nothing of that kind at
present.

Mr. Bullivant : I wish to speak upon one point in Captain Wilson's lecture,
and that was that he rather disparaged the training that is given in our private
training ships as compared with that of the Navy. I do so as having taken a great
interest in these ships, being one of the Committee of the " Chichester " and the
*• Arethusa," and having started the "Worcester," and since acted as Honorary
Secretary to the " Worcester," though I do not wish to make any remarks apply-
ing to the " Worcester " (which is more of a floating training college for gentle-
men's sons, and does not come under the same category as what are usually meant by
training ships) but more particularly to the poor boy ships. The age at which the

to be withdrawn for the Navy, leaving hardly any to manage their trade which must
either be placed in inefficient hands, or under neutral flags, or laid up, or in the
hands of foreign seamen, who may be bribed to carry their valuable vessels into an
roemv's port.---J. C. W.

78 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONGER A

boys are taken into the naval ships is 15^ to 16 ; the age at which we are obliged to
take the poor destitute boys is very often 12, 13, or 14 ; therefore, I hardly think
the comparison is fair when you take the boy's time out of one ship where they
commence training at 154, and then compare it with those we have commenced to
train at 134 and 14. With respect to the training of boys, I can only say that
there is not the slightest difficulty. We only want in our training ships funds
found us ; we are training boys in those ships at the cost of about 221. a-year.
There is not the slightest difficulty in getting them, and the way in which they turn
out is most satisfactory. Taking these boys off the streets of London, we find that
about 75 per cent, turn out really thoroughly good boys, and as to the system of
training, I could give instances in which boys, after having been at sea six years,
trained in these ships, are now serving as chief Officers of ships. Therefore, I do
not think the training that we give on board these private training ships can be at
all disparaged, or that I can grant that the training given in the Navy is better than
we are giving in our private training ships.

Captain Dbnt, R.N. : There is one point I think very necessary to be mentioned
when asking for the mercantile marine as a backbone, and that is, for the Navy to
consider whether it is capable of being so, as it was in former years ; and I say un-
hesitatingly it is not so. I know, from observation of seafaring people that are going
through or detained in the refuge port of Holyhead, and from a yoty large experience
at Liverpool, that whereas, twenty-five years ago, a Captain with fourteen men
thought himself unlucky if he had two men who were not able seamen, he now thinks
himself very lucky if he has two able seamen in the same number ; and the great
problem shipowners want to solve now, is how to be able to get good men. As to the
question of apprentices, there is very great difficulty, for this reason : Many of the
great companies, if they would be perfectly willing to take apprentices, could not train
them. In the line I am conducting, 1 must take a ready-made seaman. I cannot
make them. A boy comes in, I can teach him nothing. I should be willing to
subscribe for training ships, but I could not take compulsory apprentices, because
I could not make sailore of them, our vessels being full-powered steamer*, with only

Sole masts. There is another point I have noticed very much with regard to the
Tavy and the mercantile marine, viz., whenever they are thrown into contact
together, true sailors, whether seamen of the mercantile marine or of the Royal
Navy, are always drawn together and always work well together. But, as at
present constituted, the Navy are under one department and the mercantile marine
under another, and there is a good deal of jealousy between these departments
which tends to keep these people apart, and you find it is very difficult even for
naval Officers who would like to find employment in the merchant service to get
such employment. If they were all thrown under one head that might be done
away with. There are a large number of appointments under the Board of Trade
filled with people picked up in highways and byways which might be filled very
advantageously by naval Officers. There is something to be learned on both sides
of the question, that is to say, speaking generally, the Navy knows as little about
the Merchant Service as that service knows about the Navy. But I say un-
hesitatingly at the present moment, under the present regime, with the Merchant
Service under one authority and the Navy under another, the tendency of the
departments is to keep them apart instead of to amalgamate them. 1 have got iu
my own employ a great many seamen front the Royal Navy who are pensioners, and
are very good men. They are the backbone of the 8ervice when once they have got
thoroughly settled down into it. But there is one thing which has been said
to-night more than once, and which is perfectly true, vii., that in the present state
of things in the Navy, a man-of-war's man is so very well cared for, that it is not
until he has been on shore a little time that he will undergo the hard work in the
Merchant Service. Those men have to work very much harder, and really when it
comes to the question of pay, if a man gets a pension there is not bo very much
difference between the Merchant Service and the man-of-war after all in pay, that
is putting the Navy pension against the sum a merchant sailor would have to put
by to secure a similar provision. I have many men-of-war's men who consider they
were far better off on a man-of-war than in the Merchant Service, and had more
money to spend.

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 79

The Chairman : I see a gallant member of Parliament, who brought forward a
very important Bill last year ; I hope he will give us the benefit of his experience
to-night. I allude to Captain Pirn.

Captain Bedford Pim, R.N., M.P. : I certainly brought forward a Bill, and I
believe a very important one last year. I shall bring it forward again this year, and I
hope and trust it will be the means of giving us plenty of seamen in a few years. At
the present moment I am afraid Captain Wilson's scheme is practically useless,
because we have no merchant seamen to enter the Naval Reserve at all. He him-
self remarks that he was told every really good merchant seaman was now in the
Reserve ; how, therefore, can he hope to Ret any more ? From that source they
are all gone, and, as far as my experience of merchant seamen, as seamen goes, and
I have seen a good deal of them, they are a very different class of men to what
they were, besides you have so many foreigners in the mercantile marine. I have
seen ships coining down the river with certainly 75 per cent, of the crew foreigners,
and in a return I moved for last year it was shown that there were no less than
1,700 foreigners, captains, mates, engineers of English merchant ships, who are
going about the world under the British Flag, at this moment. Nearly 1,000
foreigners in command of our merchant ships ; there is something rotten in that I
think. Of course in the event of war we know what would become of those ships,
and we can from a very shrewd idea where those ships would go to.

With regard to obtaining men, my Bill proposes that the scheme of the industrial
school at Feltham should be extended to every single county in the kingdom, but for
boys who had not come under the law. At Feltham we turn out 100 excellent boys
every year and send them to the mercantile marine. If we could have such a
school in every county in the kingdom, and from the* vast number of letters I
received from all parts of the country I believe the counties would be very glad to
form such schools, we could train every year something like 10,000 boys at least.
I am sure this meeting will be horrified to hear that in England and Wales alone
there are no less than 100,000 pauper boys at this moment under 16 years of age
likely through life to be a burden on the rates, and yet these boys can be made
admirable seamen. Judging by our experience, Captain Dawson knows the Rev.
Mr. Scarth in my borough at Gravesend, he or one of his curates boards every ship
passing through the port at Gravesend, and he says he can put his finger upon
every Feltham boy at once as very far superior to the boy from any training ship.
By our return 90 per cent, of those boys now in the Merchant Service are doing
very welL If we could extend that system through every oounty in the kingdom,
and I believe they would gladly do so, we could turn out more than sufficient boys
to supply both the Navy and the mercantile marine. Another thing which, perhaps,
gentlemen in this room are not aware of is, that the waste of men m the mercantile
asarine per annum is 16,000, and this year we have had more collisions and wrecks,
in spite of Mr. Plimsoll, and last year s legislation than ever before, for up to the
end of September 1,973 ships made up the list of casualties. It is something
horrible when you think of it.

Then as Captain Wilson has pointed out, the seamen are really so very bad, they
are put on board more than half drunk at Gravesend, and they just know one end
of the ship from the other and that is all. If a captain can get a couple of real
A.B.'s with him he is very grateful. I did not intend to address the meeting, but
with you, sir, rests the blame for calling upon me.

Mr. Stsbldco Laoon : Is the support of those schools to be a charge on the
county rate ?

Captain Pnc: Entirely. Our Feltham school is supported by a county rate
in Middlesex, and I want to see every other oounty doing its duty in the same

Admiral Silwth : May I ask Captain Wilson whether he thinks that there is
any objection to the apprentices being taken by way of a reward rather from those
who are trained in the training ships ?

Captain Wimoh : I think I show pretty clearly when apprentices are carried,
if you go back to the apprentice system, there is no use talking about training ships
at all.

Saxvrxw : They object to take apprentices unless they are trained.

80 IS OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANY LONGER A

Captain Wilson : The objection is that they won't take a boy unless he is
physically fit to do a man's work, unless he is a good stout ordinary seaman. I say
if they won't carry boys voluntarily, pay a fee and let them be trained at sea. I do
not approve of sea-going training ships at all so long as you have the real thing
itself. If you can send a boy to sea to make a passage to Australia or India, in a
sailing vessel or an auxiliary screw, he will learn more in that voyage than he would
in ten times the time by reefing topsails in a calm for exercise in a training vessel.
I found, when out with the brigs, if I got one good stiff breeze of wind, if I had
once to take down a couple of reefs in the topsails, it was a bit of a struggle some-
times with the boys, but after having done so the work went as light as a feather,
once having to do a thing from necessity is worth all your reefing topsails inside the
Plymouth breakwater. A stationary training ship, is a good thing and you teach
your boy all he can learn except by experience there. Whenever he has arrived at
that stage that he is fit to go to sea in a sea-going training ship, send him away to
sea in a merchant ship. It is better to pay his fee and let him go through the whole
thing itself than any imitation of it. That is my idea. In the Navy we are obliged
to have training ships simply because we have not the ships at sea to send them
into. We have always 1,500 to 1,800 boys waiting for ships, therefore we must
have training brigs to put them through instead ; if you had the vessels in the fleet
they would go direct from the stationary training ship to the fleet.

Captain Fitz Rot, B.N. : (In answer to the call of the Chairman) said, as yon
have called me on my legs, I should like to ask Captain Wilson if he read a letter
from a well-known shipowner in the Times a few days ago, John Burns of Glasgow.
It appears to me everything he stated in that letter, except perhaps some of the
financial questions, meets the case as nearly as possible. It is a great national
subject, and if it is a national subject it ought to be a national question and a
national system of training for the use both of the Merchant Service and the
Navy.

Mr. Buujvant : There is just one fact I should like to mention. The appren-
ticeship system is certainly now yoij much more on the increase than it has been
for some time.

The Chaibman : I did not know it existed at present.

Mr. Bullitakt : Oh, yes ! I may say three-fourths or seven-eighths of our boys
on the " Worcester," leave and go as apprentices.

Admiral Sir Fbbdebiok Nioolbon : They are trained for Officers.

The Chaibman : There are no legal apprentices at sea.

Mr. Bulxivant : They go as legal apprentices.

Captain Pim : There are certain firms that never send a ship to sea without
apprentices.

Mr. Bullivant : A very small proportion of our boys go as midshipmen ; they
go as apprentices and are bound for three years as apprentices to the sea with
indentures. There is not the slightest difficulty as far as our other boys are con-
cerned.

Captain Dawson : Without paying premiums ?

Mr. Bullivant : They pay premiums too, but still they are bound as apprentices
to the sea and have indentures in the ordinary way. And there is this advantage
in it, a boy if he goes as an apprentice to sea, all his time counts, that is to say, he
goes to sea for six months and' is on shore three months, and if he is apprenticed
all that time counts. They pass after three years' service at sea instead of four aa
second mates, but if they were not bound as apprentices, all the time they are on
shore does not count, it is merely actual sea time, so that it is a great advantage to
the boys going as apprentices and not as midshipmen. Many of our destitute
boys would only be too happy to go as apprentices, but the fact is they cannot
afford it, they have no fund, to fall back upon at home. If by any system our
destitute boys could be supported when on shore, they would far rather serve their
time as apprentices than be changed from ship to ship.

Captain Wilson was then called upon to reply. He Bald: Captain Dawson
began by touching qn half -pay, and was good enough, in passing, to pay me a com-
pliment which I the more appreciate, coming as it does from such a very intelligent
as man himself, especially on a subject on which he has written so ably. I bus-

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVT? 81

petted that if Captain Dawson was here he would touch on the question of half -
pay, is I know his views on the subject. At. the same time, though apparently
there is some difference of opinion between us, I think there is in fact none. I
quite admit that a term on shore for a naval Officer is a first-rate thing — we become
civilised, rub off the whitewash and coal tar — we mix with people on shore, have
oar minds expanded, and we get a little polish put on us of which we had little
More. I know myself from the time I went to sea at 12 years of age, till I was
t post captain, I was but three months on shore, the whole of the rest of that
time wu served on foreign stations ; therefore, not having been on shore, I did not
know much of the manners and customs of people we have to mix with. But
half par does not remedj the evil. Half -pay naval Officers are as a rule poor, our
Toung fellows are thrown on shore as lieutenants, as young commanders, and even as
captains on their half -pay, which is too small to allow them to mix on equal terms
trith those amongst whom they were born, and they are placed at such a dis-
adrantage that instead of being able to go and associate with their friends, live in
country houses, stay with this person and shoot with that, and thus acquire the
manners and the really important part of an English gentleman's education ; they are
amble even to visit our own or foreign dockyards, or to go to a foreign country to
study a language, or indeed do anything towards improving themselves, but are
obliged to be satisfied, unless their friends choose to keep them, with hiding them-
mItcs in a garret, and spending all their time and thought in contriving how they
can make five shillings go as far as ten. That is the objection I have to half-pay,
and jou may say what you like, if you gave Officers a certain amount of full-pay
time on shore, the country and the Service would benefit by it. Do away with
half-pay, bat I do not say do away with shore service. Therefore, I do not think
we differ very much though we differ on the question of half -pay.

Captain Dawson also said I only touched on the fringe of the subject, that
1 am aware of. The subject of manning the Navy, when you come to think what
it mfolves, the number of kindred subjects : — Reserves, training ships, supply of
men and boys, merchant service, &c. — it really ia so boundless that it could not
raetbly put it into a paper, at least I could not even if I had the brains to do so.
L therefore, simply wrote this paper and the one that preceded it as a skeleton, to
•Inch I hoped the discussion would add the flesh and muscle ; I only pretend to
throw out certain suggestions for my brother Officers to discuss.

The number of men for some years considered by Parliament as absolutely
cecessary to be kept up for the Navy is something between 18,000 and 19,000.
A* we are only keeping enough ships at sea to carry from 10,000 to 11,000 out of
thai 19,000, it comes to this, that a man, instead of having a fair amount of sea-
vrrice, has very little indeed. Every man-of-war's man has two phases : when you
divide him he is a sailor first and then a fighting man, the two qualifications making
rh* man-of-war-'a man. I hold that yon must make him a sailor somehow. The
t*«t wsj of doing so for our purposes is to /put him in a man-of-war on a foreign
'Ution and he will in three years become a very fair sailor ; to finish him off,
I **M pot him into barracks. But when you cannot get that sea training, 1 say
£t men that have had some sea training, however rough it has been ; give me a
} sag sailor of 23 or 24 ; he has faced all the contingencies of sea life, he knows what
* :« to reef a topsail on a dark night, how to furl a topgallant sail, he knows what
vnl is and how to be calm in an emergency, he has confidence in himself ; all these
'.abbes are developed in the man by the work he has to do at sea, are the really
important elements in a sailor's character. I do not care how rough he is, how
Hating he is in discipline, give me that man, and I cannot, for the life of me, see
v j? in barracks he should not be made into as good a gunner and as good a
Ufi-of-wmr'i man as a marine artillery man ; why a man who has been five years at
«*» ihould not be made as good a fighting man as a marine artillery man, who has
'»*a made out of a plough boy in a year, I cannot understand. Of course, the
'--2iber of men we require when it comes to war, is a question beyond my
taper On a former occasion it was estimated, I think, that we had somewhere
<*Ht 74,000 seamen, on paper ; that number we never could find in the first
'x* month* of a war. The men we have to depend on are our 3,500 coast-
gH men— I am speaking only of sailors ; add to these a couple of thousand
ful, U. G

82 18 OUR MERCHANT SERVICE ANT LONUER A

naval pensioners, making 5,500 ; and as we Bee by the evidence given before
committee, that we cannot depend, during the first three months of a war, on
getting more than 5,000 naval Reserve men, we make the total. 10, 500, which added
to our fleet men gives us under 30,000 blue jackets all told. As the loss upon these
men would be at the rate of 5,000 a-year, allowing about 15 per cent, which we
find is the average waste in a fleet, the naval Reserve men coming home at the rate
of 500 a month, would only be sufficient to keep your number up to the 30,000.
Therefore, 30,000 sailors are all the men we could ever expect to have available in
case of war for the British Navy.

Sir Frederick Nicolson : As able seamen?

Captain Wilson : I am speaking purely of blue jackets which includes all
clashes of sailors. As has been observed, every ship which could carry a gun would
be commissioned, so the question of the number of ships actually in the Navy is a
matter of no importance. Look at the American Navy ; vessels of all sorts, sailing
vessels not excepted, were pressed into the Service. Therefore, the number of men
we should require for these ships would be enormous, and, as has been said, we
should hope to take some from the enemy's fleet. I may mention a curious fact,
which many of you will remember. During the old war, when one of the George*
went down to Devonport he saw a new dock they had commenced to lengthen, the
work on which was stopped. His Majesty asked the superintendent why they did
not finish it, and he replied : — "Oh, your Majesty! the fact of the matter is, we
" have been waiting for instructions, because the French have just launched a new
" ship, ten feet longer than it was intended to make this dock, and we want to know
" whether it shall be made long enough to hold her ; " and strange to sav, she was
the first ship that went into that dock. That shows our ancestors looked a-head in
these matters.

I wish to dispossess your minds of the idea that I raise any objection to the
Naval Reserve ; and when it is said I rather contradicted myself, because I spoke
highly of the four men with me, it must be remembered I spoke highly of them as
tailors. Sailors are one thing, and men-of-war's men are another, totally distinct ;
these men were excellent sailors, and in a short time they became very good
men-of-war's men, but they were not so when we took them. They knew some-
thing of drill ; but all know that the drill even of men-of-war's men is very in-
different. If so, what must it be in the Naval Reserve P their knowledge is very
crude indeed. I do not wish to depreciate them, but what I wish to point out is, if
we can, with advantage, take 1,500 men who have had an average of four or five
years at sea in the Merchant Service, and put them into barracks and turn them
into men-of-war's men, the five years' sailoring that these men have had would
be so much clear fain to the fleet. We must link ourselves more with the Naval
Reserve, and let the two (Reserve and continuous Service) run together. Captain
Dawson thought I wished to depreciate the Reserve, and said a bird in the hand
was worth two in the bush. I particularly say in my paper let the two run together,
but let the future men for our Reserve, as far as possible, percolate through the
Navy. Let us have our 1,500 men coming in every year ; instead of having 1,500
boys bottled up in hulks about the coast, mere to ripen into what are called " pure
" blue jackets, learning nothing but vice, let us have 1,500 young sailors from 19
to 25 brought from sea placed in barracks, trained there, and passed into the fleet.
These young fellows would in two or three years return to the Naval Reserve, and by
and bye half of it would be composed of such men. You must also remember
we lose an enormous amount of training-power in our foreign ships. The papers
say our ships on the Pacific stations are only half manned; I never was on a
foreign station where my ship was always filled up, therefore, when occasion occurs,
why should not we be able to enter Reserve men when they choose to come, and
why should > not their time count towards a pension? Why should these men if
they choose to come to us be out of pocket by it ? It seems to me to be wrong ;
I know it is Baid the 101. does not keep the men out of the Service, but it certainly
tends to do so ; if you let Reserve men have some equivalent, if, in the first place,
they get the same pay as continuous service men, and a certain amount of time
allowed for the period they are with you towards a pension, then they will be willing
enough to enter when it suits them, and we have vacancies.

FEEDER TO THE ROYAL NAVY? 83

It has been said I wiahed also to depreciate the private training ships. Mr. Bulli-
T&nt very naturally misunderstood me. I was simply drawing a comparison
between them and the Royal ships, because it has been a custom to compare the
expense of the two, and I wished to show that before a committee, a very
experienced Officer, when asked by a gentleman who wished to show that the private
training ships were as good, and very much cheaper, than the Royal Naval training
ship*, if 2| years in a private training ship was equivalent to one in the Royal
training ship (that was because the expense was about the same in the two cases) .
Captain Cuming (then commanding the " Cornwall," and who had also commanded
one of the Royal training ships) said that a boy having had a year in the Royal
training ship was a better theoretical sailor, and certainly a better practical sailor,
in addition to being a gunner. I have gone over some of the private training ships
and hare no objection to them, excepting that I think they are conducted on wrong
principles — I do really; they do an immense amount of good but they are con-
ducted on wrong principles as training ships. If you want these vessels to train
sailors, and our gallant friend here has told us, there are 100,000 boys in England
available for that purpose, then why, when you have a limited number of ships,
should you take a boy of 10 when he is not fit to go to sea till he is 16 ? Why
should you have him there for three, four, or five years uselessly when one year is
sufficient ? The comparison I wished to draw was, that though in the Navy you
pay a larger sum per annum for your boys, you in fact, train them cheaper, you
make the sailor lad cheaper per head than in your private training ship, and
infinitely better.

Mr. Bctllivawt : We never take them at 10.

Captain Wilson : Boys were pointed out to me of 9 years of age. I am putting
an extreme case, you have to say " How quickly can we turn out a " sailor boy ? "
Of course, if you have any amount of money and ships, and it is only a question
of charity, then it does not matter whether you take a boy at 10 or 20, but if
you have only a certain amount of money to expend on a boy you will train him
cheaper and better if you take him at a proper age. The private training ships have
instructors drawn exactly from the same class as those in the Navy, the Officers
who command them are Officers on half -pay from the Royal Navy, therefore these
eoaditions are alike. Then boys are insufficiently fed to develop the bone and
muscle required; a boy in a Royal training ship gets four pounds of food per
diem, and you can take more work out of them in one day than you could out of
yours in a private training ship in a week. I believe it to be true economy, and
you will train boys cheaper if you increase jour staff and take them in at an older
age and only keep them for one year. Of course, I do not in any way refer
to the " Worcester." The " Worcester" is a totally distinct vessel and one that
I think is admirably conducted. I have had the pleasure of going on board several
times, and was very much struck with the instruction and the style of young Officers
brought up there, and it was there the idea entered my mind which I have tried to
bring forth here, that these young Officers ought to be passed through the Navy, say
for six months, to qualify them for the duties which sometime in war they may
hare to perform in the fleet. It would also give them a greater interest in the
Naval Service than they have at present.

The Chaibxak : We have to thank Captain Wilson very much for his valuable
paper. I think I have the right to make a few remarks, but at this period of the
evening I will be as short as possible. The first point is about Officers on half-pay
and there Captain Dawson has rather forestalled me. I quite agree with what he
said, I regret of course very much that the half-pay is so small. (Captain Dawson :
By the term " half -pay," I really meant employment on shore.) Captain Wilson,
to my surprise, suggests reducing the number of Officers in the Navy. I cannot
agree with him. Ido think, looking to our probable requirements in the event of
war, that our active list now is reduced to the very lowest minimum possible.
(Sir Frederick Nicolson : The active list, of course ?) I really believe that if
war broke out to-morrow, we should have to call upon some of my worthy
friends whom I now see to-night, who have been forced by circumstances to
be placed on the retired list. How, then, Captain Wilson can suggest reducing
the number of Officers further, I canno* quite understand. I now turn to

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

circular ironclads of Russia, or Popoffkas, have quite a different form
of section, the bottom of the vessel being an extended plane surface,
which is connected with the edge of the deck by a quadrant of a small
circle. With this form of section great displacement is obtained on
moderate draught of water. The deck of the circular ship is formed
in section with such curvature as to give in a ship of 100 feet in
diameter a round-up of about four feet. There are two Popoffkas
already built, named respectively the " Novgorod," Fig. 1 , and the
" Admiral Popoff," Fig. 2, of which the following are the dimensions
and other particulars : —

" Novgorod."

" Admiral
Popoff."

Ft. ins.

Extreme diameter

101 0

121 O

Diameter of flat bottom

76 0

96 0

Depth in hold at centre, from underside of beam

to top of the frames of the double bottom

13 9

14 0

' J" Forward . .

13 2

12 O

13 2

14 O

1 Mean

13 2

13 0

Height of barbette tower from load water-line . .

12 0

13 3

Diameter of barbette tower, outside

30 0

34 O

Height of upper deck at side, from load water

line amidships

1 6

Displacement, in tons

2,490

3,550

Area of midship section in square feet

1,170

1,416

Engines, nominal horse-power

480

640

Coal supply, in tons

200

250

Propellers, screw, in number

Complement of Officers and men

110

120

Armament, breech-loading guns :

Two in number, each weighing, in tons

Smaller guns in unarmoured breastwork

—

Ft. ins.

Height of armour on side above water

1 6

Depth of ditto below load water line amidships . .

4 6

Thickness of armour on sides (including equivalent
thickness for the hollow iron girders behind

aimour) . . . . . . • . . •

0 11

1 6

ii j^ower siraKe . . « • • . •• • •

0 9

1 4

Ditto on barbette tower

0 11

1 6

Thickness of deck plating . .

0 2}

0 2f

It is hut fair to the distinguished designer of these' vessels, carefully
to hear in mind that, in bo far as the " Novgorod *' and " Admiral
Popoff " are concerned, they have been designed and built purely for
service in shallow waters and near the land. You will all remember
that during our great war with Russia in the Black Sea and Crimea,
the coasts of the Sea of Azof were ravaged by the small and weak
unarmoured vessels of our Navy, and that the defences of Kinburn
were destroyed by English and French floating batteries which were
protected by armour of only four inches thick. The impunity with

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

Extreme diameter

Diameter of flat bottom

Depth in hold at centre, from underside of beam

to top of the frames of the double bottom

' f Forward

Draught of water . . . • . . « Aft

(.Mean
Height of barbette tower from load water-line
Diameter of barbette tower, outside
Height of upper deck at side, from load water

line amidships
Displacement, in tons
Area of midship section in square feet
Engines, nominal horse-power
Coal supply, in tons
Propellers, screw, in number
Complement of Officers and men
Armament, breech-loading guns :

Two in number, each weighing, in tons
Smaller guns in unarmoured breastwork

Height of armour on side above water

Depth of ditto below load water line amidships

Thickness of armour on sides (including equivalent

thickness for the hollow iron girders behind

armour) .. . . .. . .

„ Lower Btrake . .
Ditto on barbette tower
Thickness of deck plating . .

" Novgorod."

Ft. ins.

101 0

76 0

13 9

13 2

12 0

30 0

1 6
2,490
1,170

480

200
6

110

Ft. ins.
1 6
4 6

0 11
0 9
0 11
0 21

" Admiral
Popoff."

Ft. ins.
121 O
96 O

14
12
14
13
13
34

O
0
O
0
3
0

1 6
3,550
1,416

640

250
6

120

40
4
Ft. ins.
1 6
4 6

1 6

1 4

1 6

0 2f

It is but fair to the distinguished designer of these vessels, carefully
to bear in mind that, in so far as the " Novgorod *' and " Admiral
Popoff " are concerned, they have been designed and built purely for
service in shallow waters and near the land. You will all remember
that during our great war with Russia in the Black Sea and Crimea,
the coasts of the Sea of Azof were ravaged by the small and weak
unarmoured vessels of our Navy, and that the defences of Kinburn
were destroyed by English and French floating batteries which were
protected by armour of only four inches thick. The impunity with

oi n twl R frS. Itustitutim

:oj 20.

PI II

Plan, of Upper Deck B\

• • •

Plan of Upper Dea *

T..M*

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 87

which we thus assailed the Russian coasts on the Azof and at the
month of the Dnieper, suggested to the Russian Government the
necessity of providing sufficiently-armoured floating defences for pro-
tection in the future ; and whatever we may think of the suitability
of the circular vessels for sea-going purposes, we shall all, I presume,
agree that in the two ships above described, the Russian Government
has put itself into possession of light draught vessels of unexampled
power, both offensive and defensive, as compared with the armoured
vessels of equally light draught belonging to any and every other
country. In this country it must be acknowledged that the problem
of producing armour-clad vessels, subject only to the conditions of
13 feet draught, 8 knots speed, thick armour, and heavy guns, has
never been put by the administrators of the Navy to the constructors
of the Navy. During the seven years that I filled the office of Chief
Constructor of the Navy, the only light draught armoured vessels that
I was called upon to design were certain very small vessels, the
breadth or beam of which was limited to a comparatively small
amount, to make them fit for service on the inland waters of North
America, and a vessel or two for colonial use, under conditions
imposed by colonial requirements. The administrators of the Navy
have usually considered — and for my part I have concurred with
them — that the necessity for ships capable of performing service
abroad is, in our Navy, so much more urgent than that for purely
coast-defence vessels, that sea-going qualities at least sufficient to
make the ships safe at sea, have been for the most part of primary
importance. It is quite open to me, therefore, and to, every one, to
admit the great qualities of these circular ships, without in any way
depreciating our own work as English constructors ; and it would be
well if those persons who have endeavoured to find in such praise as
I have accorded to the circular ships, a condemnation of English
vessels, would bear this very important consideration carefully in
mind.

With reference to the performance of these circular coast defence
ironclads of Russia, I cannot, I fear, do much more than simply
repeat what I wrote to The Times on the subject. As regards speed,
only a low speed was required for the object in view, and with engines
of 480 nominal horse-power, manufactured in Russia, a speed of
8£ knots has been obtained in the " Novgorod." She has steamed
long distances at an average speed of 7£ knots, and when I was on
board we easily averaged over 6^ knots, although the machinery was
oat of order, and much steam was wasted. I cannot give the indi-
cated power developed, for we had not on board the means of de-
termining it; 2,270 indicated horse-power has subsequently been
given to me as the fullest power developed in this vessel. If we con-
sider only the displacement of the vessel, this will no doubt be thought
a large power to employ in obtaining a speed of only about 8 knots ;
but displacement only is a very delusive standard to judge by ; the
true standard is the offensive and defensive power of the vessel, and I
do not believe any other vessel exists, equal to the ** Novgorod " in
these respects, in which a like speed is obtained with like power. Our

88 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

colonial defence vessels of the " Cerberus " class, of my own design,
come nearest to the " Novgorod " of any vessels I know, and they
certainly steam a knot faster with two- thirds of the power. They
also carry 72 tons weight of guns against the " Novgorod's " 56 tons,
although this discrepancy is partly compensated in the " Novgorod "
by a larger coal supply, after allowing for the increase of fuel required
by the larger power. But the " Cerberus " draws 2 feet more water
than the " Novgorod," and her defensive powers are not nearly so great
as the " Novgorod's," owing to so much of the armour being of less
thickness.

With regard to the behaviour of the " Novgorod " at sea, I must
say that it was remarkably good. We left the roadstead of Theodosia
when a night's gale of wind, blowing across the full extent of the
Black Sea from the S.W., had raised a considerable sea, and when a
strong breeze was still blowing. The motions of the vessel, both
rolling and pitching, were very moderate, never, according to the
best measures I could take, reaching as much as 7 degrees. The
vertical rise and fall of the centre of the vessel seemed absolutely nil,
and the guns could have been fired at any time with excellent aim,
and in any direction whatever, excepting only in the line of the
funnels, and of the steering deck-house aft. I, who seldom escape
some sensation of sickness at sea, felt perfectly at home and com-
fortable in the " Novgorod " throughout the voyage.

It was impossible to avoid observing how much more efficiently a
vessel of this form is protected by her armour than is a vessel of the
usual form. In ordinary ships, as you well know, great exposure
results from pitching, from rolling, and from the alternation of wave
hollows and crests along the ships' sides. No one who has anxiously
considered the circumstances of ironclads in an engagement at sea can
doubt, I think, that with armour stopping as it has hitherto stopped
some five, six, or at the most seven feet under the water — and at much
less than these depths at the bow and stern — much of the bottom of tho
ship below armour is in a sea-way exposed occasionally and repeatedly
to the fire of the enemies guns. From the first day of my connection
with ironclad ships I felt the force of this consideration, and fondly
hoped to carry the armour continually lower upon the sides of our
ironclad frigates as we made progress in other ways. But in a service
like the Royal Navy, and where the constructor is but a humble
servant of the Admiralty in so many things, I never was able, I think,
to get beyond the depth to which the armour of the " Bellerophon "
and the " Hercules " was carried, and undoubtedly the length even of
our shortest ships occasions so great a demand for armour that it has
not been possible, consistently with other conditions which were
thought more important, to carry the armour lower than it was
carried in the vessels just named. For you will see at a glance that
in the case of all vessels where the belt extends from bow to stern an
increased depth of armour if uniformly carried means increased depth
and weight over the whole length of the vessel. The result is, as I
say, that at sea the armour-belt is frequently abandoned by the waves,
and the bottom below armour becomes thus subjected to occasional

Unt or'

— J

■ i-\

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 89

and even frequent exposure. I know that this consideration has
weighed with many naval officers, and it was greatly nrged in the case
of the " Devastation " hy two Officers with whom I do not at all times
agree, viz., Admirals Elliot and Ryder; and some devices were
resorted to in that ship and in similar vessels with the sanction of the
Admiralty for compensating in some degree for the exposure of the
ship at the ends when in a sea-way. It is no doubt true that the
largest part of this exposure is at the ends, and is occasioned by the
ship pitching, and by the hollowing of the sea between the waves.
Bat rolling also is, of course, a great cause of exposure likewise, and 1
have considered that in securing great steadiness for modern ironclads
in comparison with the early ones, by diminishing the stability (even
to the extent of occasionally incurring undue crankness, afterwards
compensated by ballast), we have materially mitigated the danger of
this kind of exposure. But after all is done that can be done to check
rolling, ships will roll at times, and may have to engage enemies when
rolling ; and if it be true that the circular form of vessel involves less
exposure of the hull below water than the ordinary form, there is in that
fact a great and valuable element of increased safety (see Figs. 3, 4
and 5). As regards pitching it will be readily admitted, I presume,
that ships which are no longer than they are broad, will at the bow
and stern be in all probability very much less subjected to exposure
of the kind we have considered than ships of the ordinary form. In
both respects, therefore, and on the whole, we may confidently expect
that circular ships if approximately like the "Novgorod," will be found
to expose the bottom of the vessel below armour very much less than
ordinary vessels. Certainly the tendency to roll in the Black Sea, when
the waves were of ample size to roll an ordinary vessel of her displace-
ment, seemed to me to be singularly small ; and as the circular form
wherever adopted would no doubt be accompanied, as in the
" Novgorod," by low freeboard for at least a considerable part of the
vessel's length, all circular vessels will probably always be found to
possess great advantages in these respects.

Presuming that all circular armour-clads are to resemble the " Nov-
gorod," we may confidently predict for them a second very important ad-
vantage in point of defence. I allude to the fact that in the " Novgorod "
and " Admiral Popoff " the armour is of uniform depth and uniform
thickness at equal depths throughout the whole extent of the vessel's
circumference. Now, in vessels of the ordinary form and- proportions
there is, and I am afraid always will be, a very grave deficiency in this
respect. I believe I may say that every ironclad frigate in existence
is characterised by the fact that the armour is greatly reduced in
thickness as we pass from the midship portion towards the ends ;
and in some ships the reduction towards and at the ends is so great
that the armour there is little more than nominal. We have been
driven, by the length of the ship, to the use of tapering belts —
tapering, not only as regards breadth, but much more as regards thick-
ness. Of course, this subject will bear looking at from the other side,
and it may be said, with truth, that it has been most wise to give to
the engine and boiler spaces and to the magazines a greater measure

90 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLAD8.

of protection than could be allowed to the ends of the vessel, the can-
tents of which were of less vital moment. Still, looking to all the
contingencies and risks of a naval engagement, I think every man
who takes an ironclad ship into action would be glad to know that his
armour tapered neither in breadth nor in thickness, and that a shot
or shell fired squarely at him, wherever it might strike, would be
equally resisted by his armoured defence. Now, when at sea in the
" Novgorod " I felt strongly that this object is attained in her, and I
think the simplicity and efficiency of the defensive armour of such a
vessel will commend itself strongly to most practical naval Officers.

Those who have thought much of the construction of ironclad ships
will have observed that hitherto the decks have been subject to com-
parative weakness, and that, but for the great comparative height of
freeboard which ordinary ships possess, the decks must of necessity
have been made a great deal stronger still. Of course, deck attack
does not play, and probably never will play, a very important part in
naval actions at sea, for obvious reasons ; but, even at sea, there are
times when weakness of the deck might prove very serious, and when-
ever ironclad ships are required to attack or to defy land fortresses,
they are liable to considerable deck attack from elevated guns. I
think I am right in saying that, when a year or two since Admiral
Sir Hastings Yelverton was called upon to take by force two Spanish
frigates from the harbour of Carthagena, he had to perform that
service with the knowledge that there were guns of 12 J tons situated
in elevated batteries commanding his decks, and the risk of having to
withstand the fire of these guns, as well as of many other powerful ones
situated both ashore and afloat, had to be encountered on that occasion
— an occasion which, in my humble opinion, is deservedly considered to
have elicited from the gallant Officer whom I have named a display of
coolness, courage, and determination which effectually proved that we
may, with confidence, look in the future, as in the past, to our naval
Officers for the full possession of these high qualities. Now, as against
deck attack, the " Novgorod " seems very fairly defended, after due
allowance is made for the lowness and the upward slope of the deck.
In so far as I have investigated the subject, I am also led to believe
that on the whole, and speaking generally, the circular ship would have
a decided advantage over others, in lending itself to complete armour
protection, including that of the deck.

It will be seen from the foregoing that I am strongly disposed to
credit circular vessels with great advantages as regards their defensive
capabilities against the fire of guns. They possess further advantages,
in my opinion, in the facility they afford for protection against the
attack of torpedoes. I confess myself much astonished when I found
that a gentleman writing to The Times declared that this form of
vessel was more exposed to the attack of torpedoes than the ordinary
form. I cannot see that this is true, even in case of the attack of fixed
torpedoes in harbour entrances, or other like places, because the area
of the bottom of a circular ship is much smaller than the area of the
bottom of an ordinary ship, even when we make allowances for the
rise of the bottom of an ordinary ship as the sides and ends are

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 91

approached, as compared with the flatness of the bottom of a circular
vessel. In making a comparison of this kind we must adopt some
standard ; I think the standard should be equal power to carry a given
weight of battery armour and of protected guns in the vessels compared.
Let us, then, take the case of two vessels about equal in this respect,
and compare them by simply taking the areas of the load water section
in each case. The " Glatton " and " Novgorod " are sufficiently near
each other for our purpose, and we find that, while the area of the
44 Glatton's " water section is about 11,300 square feet, that of the
44 Novgorod " is about 8,000 square feet, thus showing a difference of
3,300 square feet, or, in other words, the " Glatton's " area of water
section is 41 per cent, greater than that of the circular ship. After
making due allowance . for the greater flatness of the "Novgorod's"
bottom, she would still possess the advantage.

But if we pass from the case of ground or anchored torpedoes to
the case of moving torpedoes, whether of the Harvey or the White-
head types, it will be obvious that the circular vessel has much the
advantage of the other, as regards liability to be struck. 1 think we
may say that as such attacks will usually be directed to the broadside
of the vessel, and will have for their object the destruction of the
engine or boiler-room compartments, the relative exposures of the
vessels will be approximately as are the areas of their longitudinal
sections. Now, taking the two vessels just compared, we find the
area of the " Glatton's " longitudinal vertical section, when at the
ordinary designed load-draught, is 4,579 square feet, and at the
fighting draught, 4,820 square feet, while that of the " Novgorod," at
load draught, is about 1,170 square feet. Thus showing a proportion
of about 4 to 1 in favour of the circular ship. Without dwelling
longer upon the point, I must express my opinion that the advantage
is greatly with the circular vessel as regards the chances of escaping
the blow of the horizontal torpedo.

But the advantage of the circular vessel does not end here. With
such a vessel it is obviously practicable to concentrate your steam
power and your magazines at and near the centre of the ship suffi-
ciently to leave around them all a clear space many feet in width,
which may be divided and sub-divided into very many compartments
so as to limit the extent of the injury when struck by a torpedo, to a
degree that is not possible with a long and narrow vessel (see Fig. 6).
If Admiral Popoff 's system of largely multiplying the propelling engines
and screw propellers be adopted, we may say more, for we may isolate
each set of engines and boilers from the neighbouring set, and thus
largely increase the chances of preserving both the flotation and the
propelling power after a torpedo blow had been struck. While on this
point, I may admit that I consider for sea-going purposes the
arrangement of the screw-propellers, and of the form of the vessel
aft, would require to be modified somewhat from the arrangements
and form of the " Popoffkas," in order to prevent the screws from
protruding largely beyond the circumference of the vessel. As the
44 Novgorod" and the 4< Admiral Popoff" are to fight from shallow
waters, the projection of their screw propellers is of but little moment,

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

but in a sea-going ship it would not do to allow the screws so to pro-
ject that an enemy, by simply steaming past the stern in contact with
it, wonld destroy or injure several of the propellers at once. There
will be no difficulty, however, in making the necessary modifications,
so that I need not here dwell upon the point. I may conclude my
remarks on the defensive powers of circular vessels, by stating that I
am unable to see how vessels of the usual form, can, by possibility, be
made as secure as circular vessels from the blows of torpedoes and
rams,* and from the destructive effects of such blows.

It has been confidently stated that circular ships cannot be efficiently
steered. That they answer their helm with promptness and certainty
is to me, after my experiences in the " Novgorod," absolutely certain.
But, in point of fact, the objection is really based on the circumstance,
that while in a long ship, when she is turning round under her helm,
her length comes athwart her course and takes the momentum out of
her ; a round ship, as she turns, has no such increased surface to oppose,
and will therefore lose momentum less rapidly. This is no doubt per-
fectly true, but surely it is a matter of extremely small importance,
and one entirely unworthy of consideration as a substantial objection
to the employment of circular vessels. In every ship the steam power
which gives onward momentum to her, is always at hand to take it
out of her by the reversal of the engines. This is therefore, merely a
question of manoeuvring, which our naval Officers are fully capable
of solving.

You will expect me to say a few words about the low freeboard of
these vessels. In ships of ordinary form and proportion there are
many objections to low freeboard, but the chief of these is reduced
more and more as the length of the ship is diminished and the breadth
increased, and they become of comparatively small importance in
circular ships, in which the length is of course very short and the
breadth very great. I will here advert only to two of the more
serious objections to low freeboard ships of usual form : they would be
deficient of stability, and the margin of surplus buoyancy which they
would possess would be too small for purposes of safety. A collision,
or an accident much less serious than a collision, would suffice to send
them quickly to the bottom. More than one of the American
" Monitors " were, if I remember rightly, sunk from the mere accident
of a hatch in the deck being left open. But with the circular form of
ship, and with a greatly rounded deck like the decks of Admiral
PopofTs vessels, both these objections are very materially diminished.
In fact it is quite possible in a circular ship to adopt a very low free-
board and yet te have, with a well rounded deck, ample security for all
purposes, and good surplus buoyancy likewise. For example suppose
we take a circular ship of 150 feet in diameter and 12 feet draught,
and therefore with a displacement of about 6,000 tons. With 2 feet
6 inches freeboard, and a good round up of the deck, we can have a
sunplus buoyancy of 3,000 tons. A ship 280 feet long and 54 broad,
with about the same displacement (6,000 tons) would have surplus
buoyancy of about 300 or 320 tons per foot, and therefore, with
the ordinary round up of deck, would require a freeboard of about

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 93

9 feet to bring lier surplus buoyancy up to an equality with that of
the circular vessel with 2| feet of freeboard. It is hardly necessary
to remark upon the relative stabilities of two such vessels, because in
either case it would be ample for all the uses to which the circular
ship could be put. You will observe, therefore, that the circular form
sweeps away some of the gravest objections to low freeboard. With
reference to the sea flooding the low upper deck, much less of this
takes place than would ordinarily be expected, and I am inclined to
believe that the trials of large circular ironclads, even in channel or
Atlantic waves, would develop very unexpected and satisfactory
features.

In this connection I ought, nevertheless, to make it quite clear that
the "Novgorod," and " Admiral Popoff," have, like the " Devastation,"
very extensive unarmoui^ed houses erected above the armoured deck.
The chief of these is a spacious forecastle, which of course adds greatly
to the buoyancy forward when the sea rises there upon the vessel, and
I do not think even circular vessels of very low freeboard could be
steamed against a heavy head sea without such a forecastle, more
especially, as we shall see hereafter, when driven at a high speed.
The forecastle, and other deckhouses, add very greatly to the accommo-
dation and comfort of a circular ironclad.

In coming now to consider more generally the qualities of circular
vessels, and especially of fast sea-going vessels, I think it right to say
most distinctly that the great value which I attach to Admiral PopofFs
labours in this connection, springs from the stimulus they exert in
favour of reduced length and increased breadth in ironclads. The
circular ships exhibit the limit of reduced length and increased
breadth, and it is in this aspect that I wish to discuss the subject. I
do not profess to be able to discuss it at all exhaustively ; my investiga-
tions have not gone nearly far enough for this, and it is upon investi-
gation only that strong opinions in such a matter as this should be
based. To say that circular ships can, or even to suggest that they
possibly may, have high speed given to them is a startling thing, for
we all know that the resistance of such a form of ship must be very
great indeed. We all know that great steam-power must be needed to
overcome that resistance. Still, having come to plate our ships with
very thick armour, and to carry tremendously heavy concentrated arma-
ments, we have now to ask whether the adoption of ordinary forms
and proportions does not entail upon us greater disadvantages than an
increase of steam power ? In order to place the subject into due rela-
tion to the broad question of ironclad construction, I have to ask you
to look at it from this new point of view : Hitherto the problem has
been, how best to armour-plate ships ? The problem to which I now
invite your attention is, how best to adapt armour-plated fortresses for
being sent to sea, and steaming there at sufficient speed ?

This aspect of the subject is for all practical purposes a new one,
and one which the progress of events has first made possible and then
forced upon us. No doubt many persons — myself among the number
— years ago conceived forms of floating fortresses capable of being
sent to sea. But in a country like this there are many checks to rapid

94 ON C1UCULAR IRONCLADS.

progress, and in dealing -with a great service like the Navy it is un-
avoidable that improvement should —

" Slowly broaden down
From precedent to precedent.'

It was most natural, and on the whole I think most proper, that
when the use of shell guns drove the Navy to the use of shell-proof
armour, the application of such armour to something like existing
ships was first resorted to. It must be remembered that steam itself
was only introduced into the Navy as an auxiliary to masts and sails ;
and although it has been continually assuming mora and more import-
ance, it is in extremely few vessels only that the use of canvas has been
dispensed with. If we may believe what we read in the newspapers,
the " Inflexible " herself, with her 2- feet thick armour, her 85-ton
guns, and her twin engines of 8,500 horse-power is to be furnished
with mast and sails. As she is to carry, however, but 18,000 feet of
canvas to 11,000 tons of displacement (or less than one-half the
proportion of the " Hercules"), it is clear that the sail has become
completely subordinated to the steam in this ship, while from the
" Devastation " and some similar ships sail has disappeared altogether.
I think we may safely say that when the steam power comes to be
distributed over a greater number of engines, so that all danger is
removed of the ship becoming disabled by a loss of all her engine-
power at once, masts and sails will finally disappear from heavily-
armoured vessels. We may believe this the more confidently when we
note that Naval Officers themselves, and more especially those who
have commanded ironclads, or squadrons of ironclads, now cease to
demand the use of sail-power in such ships, and consider that very
heavily-armoured vessels should not be allowed in any way to depend
upon sail for safety.

With the abandonment of masts and sails in such vessels disappears
the necessity of adhering in their construction to the ordinary forms
and proportions of ships ; and we are now free, as I say, to consider in
future what is the best form of battery, citadel, or fortress we can
adopt, and what are the best means of sending it to sea under steam.
I expect to have the general concurrence of thoughtful officers in
saying that with armour already 2 feet thick in the " Inflexible," and
a hull to carry it made larger than any previous ship except the
" Great Eastern," it is time that we ceased to armour mere ships, and
set about subordinating ship-shapeness and the use of sails to more
momentous considerations.

Seven years ago I wrote and published a work on " Our Ironclad
Ships," in the Introduction to which I said : — " Our clear duty for
" some time to come will be to avoid alike false analogies and specula-
44 tive forecasts, and to develop as steadily and as rapidly as heretofore
" the power, both of the gun with which we assail the enemy, and of
44 the armour with which we repel his assaults upon us. As an
" encouragement to this course, it may perhaps be not amiss to
" mention that I have myself devised plans for carrying extremely
44 heavy armour, which it has not yet been necessary to divulge, but

ON CIRCULAR IR0NCLAD8. 95

<( which will come into active play when we have attained to the use
" of such thicknesses of armonr as are now deemed too great for even
*4 a moment's consideration by those who think superficially upon this
*• subject"

The basis of that remark was that, I had then foreseen, that as
armonr increased in thickness and guns in weight, their requirements
would more and more overpower the requirements of mere steam and
sailing ships, and that ironclad ships would have to be made first and
foremost armoured and armed sea citadels. Starting with this idea,
and desiring to preserve as many of the qualities of a ship as were
consistent with it, I projected at the Admiralty a number of tentative
designs on the general principle exhibited in the annexed diagram,
Fig. 7, the citadel having sufficient buoyancy and stability to maintain
the vessel afloat at her fighting draught, and with the necessary stability,
even when the ends were filled with water as shown By the desire
of Lord Dufferin, I explained my views on the subject to the Admiralty
Committee of Designs, in April, 1871 ; and, at the request of the Com-
mittee, Mr. Barnaby, the present able Director of Naval Construction,
was good enough, at a later period, to furnish certain additional
observations on the subject. Between ships of this class, and those
subsequently advocated by Admirals Elliot and Ryder, or the "In-
flexible " herself, I cannot discern any difference of principle what-
ever. It has been proposed, I believe, in those cases to place cork,
stow coal, <fcc., in the water spaces, but these are details that do not
affect the general principle. It must be understood, however, that
beyond claiming to have laid down this general principle of the plan I
do not go ; the " Inflexible's " design in all other respects being solely
due, I believe, to the Construction Staff of the Admiralty.

I have dwelt upon this type of design for a reason which you will
now discern. The object in originating it was, as you will see, to
build a very strongly armour-plated citadel carrying very heavy guns,
and to add as little additional armour as possible to that which the
citadel demanded. Ail the armour I proposed to employ apart from
the citadel was, as you will observe, that of an under- water deck 3 or
4 inches thick, and that deck I sought to make very short. Still, in
time of battle, the water must be let in at the ends, and that water
took the place of a belt of armour of about equal weight, and to that
extent the citadel was further encumbered.

Two years after the publication of the book above referred to, I
went to Russia, and there 1 found that Admiral Popoff had designed,
and the Imperial Government had ordered to be built, iron-plated
vessels of circular form for the defence of the Dnieper and of the
Sea of Azof. I saw the keel of the first vessel laid, and during last
autumn I had the privilege of inspecting her at Nicholaieff, and of
steaming in her from Sevastopol to Theodosia and back to Yalta.
I wrote my impressions of the vessel to The Times, and as the editor
has permitted me to republish my letters, what I there said is now
accessible to all.

Now the chief characteristic of these circular ironclads is that they
are purely and simply sea-citadels, propelled by steam, and without

96 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

any attempt whatever to make them conform to the shape of an
ordinary ship.

The question to be determined hereafter is, is this form of vessel,
thus originated for coast defence purposes, and proved eminently
successful for that purpose, available under proper modifications, for
sea-going citadels.

I think we may fairly say that for a sea-citadel, viewed as a citadel
only, apart from other features, the circular form is best, because it
requires a minimum amount of armour to protect a given area or
volume ; or, in other words, with a given amount of armour secures
the greatest amount of buoyancy. For special purposes some modified
form might be preferable, but speaking generally, the circular form is
the best for floating armour to protect an included space, and also for
giving that equal all-round command with your guns which is so
desirable at sea. Starting then with this circular armoured citadel,
and wishing to propel it at speed at sea, there are several ways in
which we can deal with it.

1. We can put engine-power in it just as it stands, without modifi-
cation; or,

2. We can build ends to it like those of an ordinary ship, protect-
ing those ends by a belt of armour, as in the " Bellerophon,"
" Hercules," and many other ships ; or,

3. We can build such ends to it, and protect the lower parts of
them by an under- water deck of armour, as in the "'Inflexible " ; or,

4. We can build around it an outer circle of thin iron, with a mere
narrow belt of * armour, analagous to the belt of ordinary ironclads ;
or,

5. We can build around it such an outer circle of thin iron, with
an under- water deck of armour, analogous to that of the " Inflexible,"
or

6. We can build short ends to it, with either belts or under- water
armour decks, but of greatly reduced length as compared with the
ends of ordinary ships of large beam.

The " Novgorod " is the ouly actual example of the first of these
cases that has yet been tried, and we may state roughly that in her,
750 tons of armour, and 56 tons of guns, are carried on a displacement
of 2,500 tons, and driven at about 8£ knots with 2,270 indicated horse-
power. This confirms what we already knew, viz., that such ships
will require great power in proportion to displacement. But taking
not the false standard of displacement, but the better (although not
perfect) standard of weight of armour and guns as our guide, we
shall find nothing very extraordinary in the power required. In the
" Warrior," our first ironclad, the armour and the guns protected by
it weighed 1,100 tons, and 5,470 indicated horse-power was required
to propel it. In our next ironclad, the " Defence," the armour and
protected guns weighed about 700 tons, and the indicated horse-power
employed at full speed was 2,500. Grouping these figures we have —

ON CIRCULAR IKONCLAD8.

Weight of armour and of guns protected
Indicated hone- power at full speed
Proportion of pow«r to weight driven . .

"Novgorod."

806 tons

2,270
28 to 1

" Warrior."

1,100 tons

5,470

49 to 1

" Defence.

700 tons

2,500
35 to 1

It will of coarse be said that the " Warrior " was driven at 14 knots,
and the " Defence " at nearly 12, " while the " Novgorod's " speed was
only 8£. Bat on the other hand, not only was the steam power re-
quired in the " Warrior " so much greater as we see, but even with this
power an enormously long and costly vessel was constructed solely with
the object of promoting speed ; and when speed was by these means
attained, we still had a ship with only about one-half of her protected,
with exposed steering apparatus, and with other very serious defects
as a fighting engine. In the "Defence" analogous sacrifices were
made, but on a length proportioned, of course, to the reduced speed.

If we take a fully armoured ship, say the "Prince Consort," for
comparison, we shall have the following figures —

Weight of armour and guns protected
Indicated horse-power at full speed . .
Proportion of power to weight driven

" Novgorod."

806 tons

2,270
28 to 1

"Prince Consort."

1,080 tons.

4,234
39 to 1

Here the vessel was f ally armoured, bat the armour was thin, and
could be extended over the whole length of a hull of pretty bluff form
of moderate length. But as armour progressed in thickness, to extend
it over the whole length would have been to increase greatly the size,
power, and cost of the ship, and therefore we were obliged to resort
to central batteries or citadels, the water-line armour alone extending
from stem to stern. This of course involved a still greater proportion
of power to weight of citadel and guns, although it enabled us to
keep down the size, power, and cost.

We may start, therefore, by saying that the circular ironclads have
started with a much less proportion of steam power to citadel armour
and guns than has usually been given to ironclads, and not with an
enormously greater power as many persons have been too ready to
suppose ; and I must say that before resorting to the adoption of
enormous ends, whether armoured or unarmoared, as a means of fining
the lines, it is incumbent upon us to investigate hpw far it is possible, or
otherwise, to get high speed by merely increasing the power. As corn-
fared with ordinary forms the power required to drive at high speed a
circular ship of equal displacement, will probably be from two to three
times that required for an equal displacement obtained on ordinary
lines, or even more ; but then displacement, as we have seen, is no
sufficient basis, and the problem is to find out the true basis, and to
proceed upon that.

I feel persuaded that the circular ship or citadel will hereafter be

VOL. IX.

98 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

taken at least as the point of departure, if I may so speak, of our
investigations. It is idle to say, as has been said, that it is impossible
to put engine-power enough in it to drive it at high speed, because the
engine-carrying and coal-carrying power can be enormously increased,
while preserving the circular form by the plans suggested in cases 4
and 5 before given. We are just as free to extend our unarmoured
hull, or our belt-protected hull, or our under-water-deck-protected
hull all round a circular armoured citadel, as we have been to extend
our rectangular citadel ships to great length by means of long fine
ends protected either as in the " Hercules " or in the " Inflexible ;"
and I can see many advantages in doing so.

But there is one consideration which strongly tends, in my opinion,
to favour the adoption of a short bow and stern in these vessels of
extreme breadth, and that is, that the power of the vessel to steam
against a head-sea would thereby be improved. This opinion is in
some small degree based upon my observations in the " Novgorod,"
but as her speed is so small, no marked features were in this respect
developed. But there are considerations, based upon the relations
between waVe-periods and a ship's period of longitudinal oscillation,
and of the changes in these relations effected by great speed, which
point strongly to the value of some elongation of the form especially
at the bow in order to facilitate steaming against a head sea at speed.
I have had the advantage of a conversation on this subject with that
very eminent investigator of naval science, Mr. Froude, and I think I
may venture to say that he fully concurs with this view, and attaches
to it even more importance than I at first did. The accompanying
diagram, Plate III, fig. 8, shows that, with a comparatively small in-
crease of armour, the circle may be developed into an approximately
ship-shape form of short length and great breadth.

But knowing as I do much of the mind of Admiral Popoff ou this
matter, I think I may safely say that he is quite as ready as you or I
would be to make any modifications of the circular form which either
high speed or any other special object may require. He has, as I have
intimated, added even to his coast defence vessels a protrusion from
the strict circular form at the stern to assist in housing the rudder-
head ; and for sea-going ships, he has before now suggested the pro-
longation of the bow into a ram. He has taken so much pains to
assert and reiterate that his great object is to promote economy and
efficiency by extreme shortening and broadening of ships, and has
achieved, as I believe, so distinguished a success, that although he has
taken the circular form as his emblem and battle-flag, so to speak, his
great object would be accomplished and his victory won — and mine
with his — if the present proportions of heavily-armoured ships were
superseded, even though the circular form were stretched to an oval,
or made pointed at the bow and stern, or even modelled into some-
thing like a ship-shape, provided only that the full benefit of extreme
breadth and shortness are secured. It would be presumptuous in me,
at the present stage of the inquiry, to assign perfection and finality
either to the true circle, or to any one particular modification of
purely circular lines. I repeat now, what I said before in The Times,

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLAP8. 99

that I believe the circular form is itself quite compatible with high
speed, and certainly it possesses very great and numerous advantages
in other respects. I do not, however, refuse to bring it under the
closest scientific scrutiny; I do not say that some modifications of it
may not be beneficial; what I suggest is, that you, and especially
those of you who influence the Admiralty, should secure for the whole
subject impartial and exhaustive investigation. I am glad to say the
Admiralty are having it investigated ; on their behalf Mr. Fronde is
applying his splendid apparatus and his remarkable faculties to the
resistance part of the question. But inquiry must not stop there;
Mr. Fronde himself, and the Construction Staff of the Admiralty, are
well qualified to pursue it much further than that, and I hope they
will pursue it to the end. I have myself thought the matter out suffi-
ciently to be quite sure that many unexpected advantages will be
found to gather around the principle of making even fast sea-going
ironclads extremely broad and extremely short.

The Chairman : We have now had a full description of these vessels, and we find
them favoured, if not backed, by the opinion of Mr. Reed, the originator and con-
structor of that ironclad fleet, of which we are justly proud. Therefore, if any
officer or gentleman has anything to say on this subject, I hope he will be good
enough to favour us with his observations. /

Mr. Scott Russell : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — As no one else rises, perhaps
I may be permitted to offer an observation or two. It so happens that I was one of
the designers of the " Warrior," that I had something to do with the " Great
Eastern, and had also to build one of the first so-called ironclad batteries ; there-
fore I may be said to have even a little personal interest in this matter. But I come
here to-day merely with the feeling that we are very much obliged to Mr. Reed for
having brought this subject so clearly and so thoroughly before us, and for having
added his own observation* and opinions to those of the inventors of this circular
system. Mr. Elder is the gentleman who first developed the great value of circular
vessels for steam purposes. He was an old friend of mine, and I was very much
struck by the great originality of the system, and by the great wisdom with which
Mr. Elder never thought of making it a substitute for ship-shape ships ; but merely
brought it forward as an instrument for accomplishing certain peculiar ends for
which it happened to be peculiarly adapted. For example, he meant it to be, not a
substitute for sea-going sliips, but .to be applied to the purposes of a ferry-boat be-
tween Liverpool and Birkenhead ; and he showed me that as a ferry-boat he could
by this means carry far more in proportion to its mass of weight and given draught
of water than by any other form, and also that it could be propelled at slow velo-
cities with moderate power. Let me say one word on that subject, in order to be
rid of it once for all. At slow velocities allow me to assure you this circular form is
propelled nearly as easily as any other ordinary form, and therefore let us draw a
clear distinction between talking of low velocities, like 6 or 7 miles an hour, and high
velocities, such as we think necessary for our steam navy — namely, 14 knots an hour.
There is no resemblance between them ; and this is an admirable shape for one of the
purposes, and is totally out of question for the other. With regard to the merits
of Admiral Popoff in this matter, allow me to say that I esteem it quite as highly, if
not higher, than that of Mr. Elder. Though Mr. Elder may have adopted the cir-
cular form, we are indebted to Admiral Popoff for having adopted this circular form
and propelled it for the special purpose of naval warfare. Admiral Popoff four or
six vears ago was kind enough to explain to me all his views on that subject I
entirely coincided with those views, and I think this vessel a very admirable thing,
so long as you do not call it a ship. Now this floating battery — for it deserves the
name — o? a circular form is most admirably adapted for carrying the heaviest arma-
ments and the heaviest armour, and for the special purpose of local defence, '.for
which it was designed. Admiral Popoff is entitled not only to our thanks, h<it

H 2

100 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

*o our admiration. Permit me to say here confidentially that it so happened
that I served professionally on. several of the Commissions for Coast Defence.
I had the pleasure of sitting there with some of the most distinguished Admirals
and Generals whom I see here, and we discussed among other things the
whole question of fixed fortresses, of floating fortresses, of self- moving fortresses,
of elongated fortresses, and of circular fortresses, and we arrived at a great
many conclusions which I dare not tell you here. The question which Admiral
PopofFs invention raises is this — "What are the particular places in England
" where you think that floating batteries are wanted as coast defences ? " And if
you know of such places, allow me to say that his experiments show that you can
make excellent vessels for local defence most economically and most conveniently of
the circular form. There is another question which he raises : whether it is more
expedient to propel these vessels by power within themselves, or to anchor them
where they are wanted, or to shift them by tug vessels from the outside ? Tou will
find if you only settle the circumstances in which you want these defences, the cir-
cumstances will settle for you which plan is the best. In the one place you will find
the fixed circular battery is the best ; in another, the anchored circular battery is the
best ; and in another you will find that vessels conveniently moved by other vessels
towing them are the best ; and, finally, you will find that there are other circumstances
in which it is most desirable, at great sacrifice of cost, of machinery, of complication
of construction, and so on, to have steam engines to enable you to transport them
from the place where they are stored to the place where they are required.

I come next to the question whether, according to a suggestion made in the paper,
you ought to consider the sea-going qualities of a ship of war as qualities of the
second or third rank, and whether you should place the armour or the other points
in the ship in the foreground, and leave her seaworthy ship-shapeness as a secondary
point. On that I will endeavour to say all I think in two or three sentences. In the
first place, I call your attention to the fact that in all those qualities and quantities
quoted by Mr. Reed with reference to this subject he has left out of sight the real
question of a sea-going ship — namely, how long a voyage has it got to make, how much
coal has it got to take for that length of voyage, and at what rate is it to steam on
that voyage ? Now those, allow me to tell you, as sea-going qualities and quantities
are elements which, I trust, will rule our future navies, and not the question how the
utmost performance can be got out of a short ship of this or that shape. I think it
is most unwise to set up any theoretical notions of what the best possible shape is,
and it is most necessary that for every ship, when it is about to be constructed, you
should take into consideration the practical purposes for which that particular ship is
wanted. If you do that, you may get a good ship, and if you are only to have a grand
ship in general, without any particular duty, you will get a bad ship. If you settle
what the speed of your ship is to be, that will give you the length of the ship — the
minimum length. If you settle, secondly, what the depth of water is into which she
must go, that settles for you the draught of water of your ship. If you then ask

is the length of the voyage of the ship. A small quantity of coal in a given ship
will certainly let that ship go at a given apeed ; but it will not maintain the speed,
and will not make the voyage. The ship grows in length according to the length of
the voyage she has to make ; therefore, I say, lay down the conditions of your ship
first of all, then make it a principle that above all things she shall be a seaworthy,
sea-going ship. Thirdly, make it a condition that she shall have the power of
remaining long at sea, and that implies her carrying large stores ; and if you will
then add the particular nature of the service she has to perform, you will find all the
rest will settle itself. The last observation I have to make is an observation practi-
cally upon my old pet the " Warrior," and practically on this diagram, which Mr.
Reed has given you, of a vessel with a central fortress. You all know the " Warrior "
was the first vessel of this class. I think you all rather liked the " Warrior,"
as a sea-going, sea-worthy ship. I think also you all remember that the '* Warrior "
Tiad the principle of a central battery, and that that principle of a central battery
lias been followed, and must be followed. Allow me, however, to differ entirely from

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 101

Mr. Reed on a point he has put forward — namely, that you cannot, without this
enormous deck which he has given, and this mode which he has given of filling the
fore and aft part of the ship with water, make that a good, seaworthy ship. Allow
me to say that jou can ; that there are ample means with a central fortress of having
your ship beautifully shaped, perfectly like a seaworthy ship, and with all the
qualities you require of speed, stability, and endurance, without making an ugly
shape of that kind. If you will permit me to entreat you, it is not to give up your
old sea-going prejudices of having a handsome, ship-shape, seaworthy ship. And if
you will take my word for it, neither ugly ships, nor ugly proportions, nor any of
these things you have lately been used to, which have offended the eye, and have dis-
gusted so many sailors with their profession, — I say, if you will only get rid of such
prejudices as these are, you will find that you may to-day have a perfect central fort,
have an unsinkable ship, have the best guns and most powerful armour, have a con-
venient, comfortable, and wholesome dwelling, and still have all the beautiful form
and sea-going qualities which you had before. Only you must first will it, and
then you must give those people to whom you confide its construction jull power to
carry out your purpose in the design and in the execution of the work.

Mr. William Smith, C.S. : I wish to correct an error which Mr. Reed seems to
have fallen into. He speaks of this circular shape as being merely a suggestion of
the late Mr. John Elder's. Now I think the transactions of this Institution will
carry you back to a period when Mr. Elder read a paper here upon the subject of
circular ironclads and other vessels, and you will find he referred not simply to the
ferry-boats, to which Mr. Scott Russell has alluded, but also to circular turret-ships
and floating fortifications, of which he gave a variety of diagrams. There is one
point also to which Mr. Reed has given considerable prominence: he says the
suggestion of Mr. Elder was, that the mid-ship section of the vessel should in every
ease be the arc of a circle. That is a very great error ; and you have only to refer
to the Transactions of this Institution, published some years ago, to find that
it w so. In fact, if I look at the diagrams Mr. Reed has placed upon the wall,
I see there is little or no difference between them and those which Mr. Elder
brought before this Institution. I think it was in I860 or 1861, during the time
the British Association Committee on steam -ship performance were sitting, Mr.
Henry Wright, now Secretary to His Grace the Duke of Sutherland, was then
preparing a collection of facts and materials sent in from time to time to be recorded
in the proceedings of the Association ; and at that time Mr. Elder described to
Mr. Reed, in my presence, the idea he had in his mind, and I advised him to make
a series of experiments, to ascertain the difference of resistance of that particular
form which he described. He had a series of models made and experimented with
them, and the results were recorded. I think he called upon Mr. Reed, who was
not then the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and described his invention to him,
accompanying his description by diagrams. And I am sorry to say that Mr. Reed
did not at that time so fully appreciate the merits and advantages of the form
of vessel then described to him by Mr. Elder as he has since had occasion to do.
Under these circumstances, I think it hardly fair to give Admiral Popoff the fall
credit for this circular design ; and that this occasion ought not to pass without my
putting on record that Mr. Elder certainly was the first designer of these circular
ironclads, not with their mid-ship section, a portion of a sphere, but according to
diagrams exactly identical with those which we see before us.

Major-General Sir John Adyb : Although this question is a naval rather than a
military one, still I hope you will allow me as an artilleryman to make a few remarks,
not upon the general construction of these circular ironclads, but upon the arrange-
ments which have been made for mounting and fighting their guns. According to the
description which Mr. Reed has given us, the circular ironclad has in the centre an
open-topped fixed turret, that is, an iron martello tower on a floating platform,
eapable of moving at slow speed. The guns are en barbette, with a slight command
over the water. Now we all know that the barbette principle affords great lateral
range ; but the disadvantages are, that it leaves the guns and their detachment*
rally exposed. These circular ironclads, therefore, if attacked from more points
than one at the same time, offer no defence at all to lateral fire. And there
» another danger of mounting guns in this way to close to the water, namely,

102 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

that they are liable to be commanded, and the guns and men therefore exposed
to great danger. On shore we rarely, if ever, contemplate mounting guns en bar-
bette near the level of the water, where serious and close action is expected. We
rather seek for a high and a somewhat distant position, where the advantages of an
all-round, lateral, and plunging fire are available, and where the exposure of the
men and the guns is reduced to a minimum. Those are the principles upon which we
construct barbette batteries on shore, and they do not appear to me to be carried out
in the present instance. 1 am quite aware the reply will be, that you may get greater
speed, and you may get the disadvantages of barbette remedied by the disappearing
principle. It is true ; but in the circular ships which have as yet been built that
principle has not been adopted ; therefore, I presume that the distinguished Officer
who designed them did not find his way to mounting guns except en barbette.
Even if that system were established, you wouid still have an open- topped turret,
and therefore, in my opinion, the guns as now mounted, and their detachments,
being fully exposed to flank and plunging fire, are not well adapted for close and
serious action.

Commander W. Dawson, R.N. : In a naval discussion upon circular vessels it does
seem very extraordinary that, surrounded as we are by a great number of most
experienced naval Officers, the whole discussion of such a nautical subject should be
left in the hands of military men and of civil engineers. A great deal that 1 should
have myself said has been anticipated by Mr. Scott Russell, and by what has just
fallen from Sir John Adye. We are invited to consider the use of this vessel,
not in its local and limited application, but as a sea-keeping ship. One point
to which I wish to draw attention as to its sea- keeping qualities is this, that if the
ignorant prejudices of naval Officers against a novel construction of this kind are
to be met, it must be given a special name, and not be called a " ship." The very
first requirement of a ship in a sailor's estimation is, that it should constitute a
comfortable home, a permanent habitation, in which he can spend his life from
boyhood until he leaves the Service. It is quite true that in these saucer-shaped
diving-bells, or whatever you choose to call them, air will be pumped in in very large
quantities ; but I should recommend those who advocate this vessel as a sea-keeping
residence, to ask the manager of the Polytechnic Institution to allow him to go into
the diving-bell there for ten minutes. He would find abundance of air pumped in,
and perhaps for that length of time he would not suffer inconvenience ; but let him
stop there a month, and when he has been in a diving-bell for a month, he would
get a very fair idea of what a life-long residence in a sea-keeping thing of this
kind means. With a very diminutive amount of light, and with air pumped in at
high pressure, he will thus be able to judge of the effect which permanently living
under water will have upon the spirits as well as upon the health of the fighting
men. If it is desired to reconcile sailors to the adoption of a vessel of this kind for
sea- keeping purposes, it must be called by some other name than a " ship." Coming
to the point of the special use of such a semi-submerged residence as a vessel of war
in the Atlantic : This is a point which involves considerations of fleet manoBUvres
whioh many naval Officers present are far more capable of discussing than I am,
and which ought to be discussed from all sides, if vessels of this class are to be
opposed or defended in the open sea. It must be remembered that tliis broad,
exposed, and unprotected deck may be met by high-sided vessels of various classes.
What would be the relative positions of the high-sided " Sultan's " and " Hercules "
and the low and broad-decked vessel when they meet in hostile conflict? In dealing
with such questions, we ought to regard the proposed employment of such a vessel
in open water as critics ; and therefore I am now looking at this vessel solely from
a hostile point of view, and trying to find out its weak points, putting aside for the
moment the many advantages it may have in a large area of shallow water like the
Sea of Azov, and its possible advantages even in the open sea. If a sailor in a high-
sided ship had to attack a broad vessel of that kind with an unprotected wide
expanse of deck,*what would be the natural tactics that he ought to adopt ? Why,
he should try to bring his armoured side as close to the exposed low-lying deck a*

rsible, and to keep his guns depressed as close to that low, wide deck as possible,
might not be safe to lay the high-sided ship actually alongside, because, I
suppose, the enemy would not be so foolish as to trust the defence of his circular

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 103

vessel entirelj to guns and armour, but would have torpedoes bristling round the
circumference as additional means of defence. But supposing he had such other
means of torpedo defence as would make it dangerous to go alongside, the high-
sided ironclad should still keep as close as it was safe to get, and the closer the
better. A very few shells planted through the broad, low decks and bottom of the
circular vessel, would suffice to dispose of it. We must remember that that deck
presents a very large and wide target. It presents exactly what a gunner wants, not
only for close firing, but also for distant tiring. What a gunner likes to aim at in
distant firing is not a target of great breadth, but a target of great depth — depth
being to him akin to height. An ordinary ship is more easily hit when at an un-
known distance, when presented end on to the gunner, than when broadside on,
because a shot may, by a mis-judgment of the distance, go over the ship when
broadside on, which might possibly hit the decks when she is end on. Therefore, a
broad circular vessel would be far more likely to be hit than a narrow vessel. That a
circular vessel would present a much smaller area for the hostile action of torpedoes
is evident. But once struck by a proper torpedo charge, the advantage to be
derived from cellular construction and water-tight compartments is small. A proper
torpedo charge should make a hole through the bottom large enough for a coach
and six to be driven through. I do not think any vessel could float with such a
hole in her bottom even with all the water tight compartments described, and
torpedo charges should be so regulated that the smallest hole they ought to make
would be one of that size. I do not, therefore, attach very much value to the extra
amount of defence against torpedo gained from cellular construction by means of the
circular principle. 1 find also that the armour of the circular vessel does not extend
to the keel, but is the ordinary patch on the side, so that in this respect it is on an
equality with high-sided ships. An artilleryman would not aim at that narrow
patch, but he would try to avoid it, and there would be large deck surfaces above
and bottom spaces below, which it would be quite possible to give a good account of.
I have not spoken of the unquestionable advantages of the circular form, nor have
I entered into the question from the naval architect's point of view ; but, looking
at it simply as a fighting vessel in open water, if I was given the choice of com-
manding either an ordinary high-aided ship with the same armament or this low-
decked circular one, whether I consider the purpose of ramming or the resistance to
torpedoes, or artillery purposes, I confess I should prefer the high-sided ship with
it* superior speed. Whatever advantage the short circular vessel might have in turn-
ing, it would have this disadvantage, that it could not possibly ram the broadside
of any ship unless its own stern was very nearly at ri^ht angles to the side attacked,
because the breadth of its own bow would in any angular approach keep the spear
from touching the enemy, whilst the high-sided enemy aiming at any point what-
ever of the periphery might run at any part of the circular vessel, and would have
only to keep his iron stem in a line with the centre of that saucer, with the certainty
of always striking its side at right angles, so that he would most likely thrust his
oteni right into the heart of the citadel itself. With &U its merits, there is a good
deal to be said from a tactical point of view against the circular form of ironclad
for deep-sea purposes, and I do not know any part of our coast which corresponds
in expanse of shallow water to the Sea of Azov. I do not, therefore, see the necessity
for vessels of that class being introduced for mere defensive purposes into this
country. Even for the defence of the shallow banks winch cover the entrance to
the Thames, 1 would much prefer the same money's worth of Mr. Kendle's small
gunboats to these costly circular ironclads, with very low freeboard, which offer
very large deck targets to the enemy's fire.

Admiral Sir Spbnceb. Roblnson, K.C.B. : The very late hour of the afternoon will
prevent me troubling you with any but a very few remarks ; indeed I should have risen
a little sooner, but I thought there were others better qualified than myself to make
various remarks on the very interesting lecture Mr. Reed has given us.1 My object
is simply this, to bring back, if I could, the discussion to the point from which it
started. The point Mr. Reed has very ably illustrated, and haB given us a most
interesting lecture upon is, whether for certain well defined purposes a circular iron-
clad was well designed, or whether it was not ? A good many of the gentlemen
who have spoken have diverged entirely from that subject. Some have gone into

104 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

©sthetic questions, and discussed with considerable blame, and no approbation
whatever, the ugly ducks that have been launched upon the ocean, and that hare
done, and will do again, the work the country requires. I wish simply to say we
hare had in this lecture of Mr. Reed's a type of ship explained to us— no matter
from what quarter it comes, whether the origin of this admirable ship for coast
defence came from Russia, or came from Glasgow, or came from England — coupled
with the fact that we have had the experience of one himself, a very eminent Naval
architect, who has seen the performance of such a ship at sea, and is able to give
us the whole particulars of her construction, and of the service for which she is
likely to be employed, and apparently to be a master of the work she has to do.
Therefore the question seems to me to be entirely this, is it not worth while for
every person in the Naval profession, and for everybody who can influence the
opinion of those authorities that govern the Navy, is it not worth while to con-
sider every point of this new armoured vessel most carefully, and to see whether it
does or does not contain the elements of that very great success which Mr. Reed
has shown it possibly may contain ? The question is certainly not as some have put it,
whether a circular ship is in all respects the very best possible vessel you could put
upon the ocean to make long voyages, or to fight your actions against other ships of
different classes ; but it is whether this circular ship is not capable of defending
places which no other ship could defend, and not only capable of doing so but
capable of assaulting places that no other ship could assault ? Those are questions
that Mr. Reed, without any dogmatism, has put before you as matters deserving the
investigation the Admiralty is prepared to give it, and X think as matters not
deserving the ridicule of any person connected with Naval architecture and Naval
architects, and certainly not deserving the ridicule of any person who may some day
or other be called upon to fight the battles of this country. Mr. Reed, having put
before us the qualities of this circular ship and its adaptability for certain purposes
of offence and defence, tells you that he sees no limit to its application, and that it is
possible that hereafter the notorious and self-evident want of speed in these circular
vessels might be cured by methods that he has not yet investigated, but that he has
shown to any reasonable mind are capable of being investigated, and so that the
problem may be ultimately solved. These are the points, therefore, which I think
every Naval Officer and all the eminent artillerists and engineers here present should
take into consideration . — Have we or not, a reason to suppose that for certain well
defined purposes, men have in the circular ship the means of carrying out our pur-
poses practically and fully ? And is it not possible by further investigation to find
whether the principle is not applicable still further, and whether that point of Naval
architecture, that point in all ships which I should be the first to uphold, namely,
excessive speed, whether that cannot be obtained in these forms as well as it can
be obtained in the usual forms of ships ? And notwithstanding what we have
heard about their ugliness, notwithstanding that we have heard that sailors are
disgusted with these ships and with recent types of war ships, we may depend upon
this, if the principle is a sound one we shall never find any sailor objecting to go to
sea in a circular ship or even in a square one if he is required to do so.

H. Wbight, Esq. : As my name has be^n mentioned in the course of this dis-
cussion, will you allow me to say that Mr. Elder explained to me that one of the chief
features of his vessel was that high speed would oe most certainly attained. The
diagrams he showed to me years ago before ever the subject was brought before this
Institution, agreed, so far as I can recollect, distinctly with these. I know also that
he considered the revolution of the vessel would be one of the most important
features in an attack upon an enemy's vessel.

Admiral W. Houston Stbwabt, C.R. : I wish to say I had a great deal of con-
versation with Admiral Popoff as to the circular ironclad, and he gave me to under-
stand he originally designed or intended it to protect certain localities in which he
intended to place obstructions against the advance of ships. These obstructions
owing to the draught of water could not be protected by ironclads or by fixed forts,
and therefore could be readily removed by an enemy if unopposed ; and it was for
their protection he designed the circular ironclad. After he had proceeded with
them he found that they were capable of being moved about with much greater
facility, and of giving greater a 1 vantages as to their sea-going qualities, than he had

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 105

originally supposed, therefore the question was opened out to his mind and to many
others in Russia, that this circular form which enabled him to carry very thick
armour with a light draught of water might be used to a much greater extent than
he had originally contemplated, which, as I have said, was to defend obstructed
places where he could not place the usual sort of ironclads, and he could not place
forts. Perhaps Mr. Reed will say if that was the idea that was in Admiral PopoiTs
mind —

Mr. Reed : Quite so.

Admiral Stewart : It may he satisfactory if I mention a report I received the
other day from the Commander-in-Chief in China, who commands one of our iron-
clads designed by Mr. Reed. Mr. Reed has touched on a subject that I am sure is
often present to the minds of Naval Officers — the behaviour of ironclads in a sea-
way. Admiral Ryder writes to me from the " Audacious " saying, " Whatever
44 objections may have been raised to ships of the ' Audacious ' class, the longer
" experience I have of them the more I am struck with their wonderful steadiness.
" I have just lately made (he says) a passage running before a heavy sea and strong
" wind, all my stern ports barred in, and to our great surprise the ship did not roll
4< more than 2° to 1° each way. I half made my mind up to broach her to, to see what
" she would do in such a sea, but the helmsman did it for me. In giving the ship
M a yaw he brought her to the wind, and positively to our great surprise she declined
" to take any notice of the sea at all. An ironclad flag-ship of a first-class naval
" power accompanied me. We were both proceeding before the same sea. My
" flag-ship rolling 2° to 1°, the flag-ship of the other power rolling 20°. I am
" happy to say that we are on the most friendly terms : if the conditions were altered
" I think the steady platform would have decidedly a great advantage."

Admiral Ikglefibld ; The words " ugly, unhealthy, and unwholesome " were
applied just now to one of our principal ironclads. I have just returned from
Malta, and I aaw the " Devastation " having come into port from a long cruize.
She went out with the Mediterranean squadron, and returned a month or six weeks
after their cruize was over ; and the Captain reported to me she had only two small
defects, and those were put to rights in a couple of days. He spoke of the ship as
being perfectly seaworthy, wholesome, and comfortable for the men and Officers,
and everything he could wish. I think it is my duty to bear this testimony to the
qualities of one of our special ironclads of the present day.

Admiral Sklwyn : I think the points raised by Mr. Reed in his paper have
scarcely received the discussion which he might well have expected. I have always
myself been an advocate of Mr. Elder's ideas of marine construction, and I still
hold to the same theory as far as it is a theory ; but I am disappointed to see that
in seeking for a less draught of water Admiral Popoff has thought it necessary to
give a very abrupt turn-up to the side of the ship, and I think in this probably is
to be found the secret ot the extreme power required to drive that particular
circular ship. Mr. Elder's models, although they did preserve a species of spherical
form, yet provided quite sufficient capacity in tonnage to have carried all the pro-
visions, stores, guns, and armour that we could possibly have wished to put into
them ; but he also did not ignore the fact that screws were a very awkward mode
of propulsion in such a vessel, and he provided another form of internal propulsion
which I am persuaded will one day take its place very high among the modes of
propulsion, if indeed it does not supersede all others, namely, that of the hydraulic
propeller, thus obviating the exposed situation of the screws, which is one of the
chief defects of this vessel, and which might probably cause their destruction by
the very smallest unarinoured vessel that could run against them, Mr. Reed says that
by elongating the vessel better lines can be pbtained, and therefore more speed ; and
those gentlemen who remember what the shape of the centreboard yacht is, or the
form of a Chinese junk, would see what might be the elongation preserving the
spherical outline. 1 do not exactly like the form Mr. Reed has shown, and an
approach to the centreboard form would give additional advantages while it might
preserve the sail power. I do not care how much power is put in a vessel, or how
much coal if you tell me I must not use it until I go into action, for under such
circumstances no Officer or crew can be properly trained in the use of their vessel.
If it be necessary to go to sea and carefully preserve a very low rate of speed, and

106 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

to limit the use of the steam till even the engineers get rusty over their furnaces, I
think decidedly sail power should not be ignored. If the centreboard boat with its
single sail, or the Chinese junk with its three sails at the outside can obtain very
high speed, I think there is no earthly reason, if we will consent to abandon all our
traditions about the placing of masts and the description of yards, why we should
not get sail power in these circular vessels quite sufficient to drive them about the
ocean when steam is not allowed or available. But the question of armour carried
on these vessels assumes, a different complexion the instant the spherical outlines are
preserved. It then becomes possible to carry a thickness almost unlimited as well
eight feet as eight inches. I am not one of those who attach any very large importance
to the sawing motion advocated by Mr. Elder, but I think ramming will have a great
offensive efieet in that as in every other ship ; and neither am 1 one of those who
mistake the question as to the surface presented by a circular vessel of this descrip-
tion considered as the area of a target. I think if you show me a target whose
elevation is twenty feet above the water-line and some six hundred feet long, I shall
be more likely to hit that than a circular vessel which exposes no height above the
water-line and only half the length, for she can bo sunk up to the edge of her
armour in action, therefore I do not attach much weight to such objections. To the
question of Artillery en barbette I do attach a certain weight ; but it disappears before
the fact that Admiral Popoff has seen that the barbette battery is not so applicable
as it might be, and that the new ship is expressly designed for carrying disappear-
ing carnag s. My friend, Major Moncrieff, is in Scotland, or I am quite sure he
would show you tliat his principle is particularly applicable to this form of ship. The
question of a steady platform lias been, since I can remember Artillery questions in
this theatre, regarded as of the very highest importance, and considering that more
defence must be given to our shores in the absence of our fleets at sea, it is no answer
to say that a comparison may be drawn between the sightly sea-going ship and the
unsightly sea-going sliip in favour of the sightly ship if it be not proposed to put
forward for that purpose any such ship. This is devised for a special purpose, and
a* it has answered beyond expectation is it not worth while to consider that prin-
ciple as one to bo discussed and provided for iu our own Naval Estimates, instead of
ships which have been said in the Houses of Parliament to be entirely unfit to
defend the coast on account of their draught of water ? I am not one of those who
undervalue the comforts of a sailor's home, but I am one of those who do not fear
to say that there will always be found sailors ready to go to sea in anything thought
to be fit by the powers and authorities that be, for the defence of the nation. I be-
lieve the principle to be good, that it may be successfully developed so as to give
high speed under steam and great carrying power whether of guns or armour, and
that it is not at all impossible so to develop and mast it as to combine with those
qualities great powers under sail and practical unsiukability.

Mr. £. J. Reed : I am very much obliged to the Naval Officers who have spoken
in this debate with the single exception of one, and that is my friend Captain Dawsou,
because I do not understand what object any thoughtful Naval Officer can have in
view in introducing epithets like " diving bell," and phrases of that kind into what
ought to be, and what I, to the best of my humble ability, endeavoured to make, a
simple scientific discussion. I shall not answer Captain Dawson because I think he
has been answered already, and certainly the spirit of his speech has been answered
by other Naval Officers who have spoken. Nor shall I take very much pains to
reply to my esteemed friend Mr. Scott Russell, because he has an advantage over me
at all times, which is a very serious one, and with which I cannot compete, for if
not omniscient he knows everything. And he has done a good deal too, because I
always note in these discussions it is impossible to speak about the " Warrior " in
never so incidental a manner without bringing Mr. Scott Russell to his feet to claim
the design of her. Well, 1 have heard him claim that design a great many tiines,and
I have heard him very justly claim for the design " great merit," and I am sure I
have spoken of the " Warrior " on a thousand occasious with great consideration ;
but we are discussing to-day, Sir, how to send to sea very thick armour and very
heavy guns, and I read in The Ttmes newspnper a few days ago that the Chief Con-
structor of Portsmouth Dockyard had stated that the (i Warrior " was relegated to
harbour service, as a ship unfit to take her part iu the fights of the future of our

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 107

•

>avy. Therefore I do not understand why we are to be debarred by continual

harptngs back upon the design of the " Warrior/' from discussing the new phrases of

the question as they arise. Mr. Scott Russell undertook to tell us all about these

circular ships. At first he refused them the name of ships, as did Captain Dawson ;

and I am sure I refused them the name of ships also. I took very great pains to

make it clear I was asking this Institution to consider not the construction of ordinary

ships, but the construction of engines of war, the primary objects of which were to

take to sea heavy guns protected by thick armour. And that observation, which I

carefully abided by throughout my paper, answers a great deal that has been said

in disparagement. Mr. Scott Russell undertook to tell us all about these circular

vessels, but he seems to have been wrong in what he told us, because he told us they

were introduced by Mr. Elder only for ferry purposes, and he was immediately

succeeded by a gentleman who told us it was distinctly a mistake, that they were

introduced for the kind of purpose we are here considering to-day.

Mr. Scott Russell : I said they were supplied by him to be used for that
purpose.

Mr. K. J. Reed : I accept the correction, but I found Mr. Scott Russell's remarks
went so wide of the various interesting points that I hoped they would be confined
to, that I am obliged to track him into these very desultory observations which he
made. Mr. William Smith remarked that Mr. Elder did design these vessels with
dafc bottoms. I should be sorry to say he did not. Mr. Smith also stated that
Mr. Elder showed me the designs of these vessels. That is certainly most true. It
is equally true Sir Samuel Baker showed me his, but in both cases I have spoken
only from memory, for, as I have said, my object was not to press these views upon
the public, but simply to comply with the request of the Council of the Institution
to explain these vessels. I hope that that fact will be borne in mind, because I have
not appeared here to-day for the purpose of thrusting and forcing circular ships
upon anybody's adoption. 1 concluded my paper, as Sir Spencer Robinson kindly
reminded you, by simply saying the subject seemed to me to be so important as to
require the careful and close attention of the Admiralty, and I expressed my confi-
dent opinion that the Officers of the Admiralty associated with Mr. Froude were
quite capable of working the thing out ; and I am quite sure from the very proper
spirit in which Admiral Stewart was good enough to address the meeting jou will
infer that this subject will receive full consideration.

Admiral Stewabt : I intended to say, though I omitted to do so, that the ques-
tion did deserve and should receive the greatest consideration.

Mr. E. J. Reed : I am much obliged. I am sure that is all that I desire. I
have no object whatever in view except seeing the principle of short lengths and
great breadths made available to our Navy, in so far as it is consistent with other
qualities. I must turn again to Mr. Scott Russell, and distinctly disclaim the
strange imputation that he brought against this paper and myself, when he said I
had asked you to troat as altogether a secondary thing the seaworthiness of the sort
of vessels I was discussing. Why, I took a good deal of pains to explain the grounds
upon which I thought such vessels could be made thoroughly seaworthy. I never put
seaworthiness into any secondary position, because I take it for granted that every
man who undertakes to design a ship in which the British sailor is to be sent to
sea, will make the seaworthiness and safety of that ship his first consideration ; and
I may say more than that ; I may say — and I am sure the distinguished Officer
under whom I served, and who is present, and who has spoken, will bear witness
to the fact — that so far as my humble influence in his office went, it was always
against the adoption of contrivances and schemes for sacrificing the seaworthiness
of British ships. Mr. Scott Russell further said, that the speed of a ship at once
determines its length, and that is a doctrine I have heard him propound many times
before. (Mr. Soott Rubsbll : It is not quite accurate.) Well, perhaps a little in-
sceuracy will be excused in me as well as in others. I understood Mr. Scott Russell
to say, and I have often thought I heard him say the same before, that when yon
hsre determined the speed it will give you the length. (Mr. Scott Russell : I
sdded the word " minimum " length.) If I had heard that word I should have attached
s different value to the observation. I think from Mr. Scott Russell's point of view,
it is reasonable to suppose that the speed of the ship does determine the minimum

108 ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS.

•

length. I do not myself believe it does anything of the kind. I believe, and that
is precisely the point I want brought out in the investigation of this subject, that the
length has so much to do with the quantity of armour you are obliged to carry in
armoured vessels, that you must not make it the first consideration in determining
the dimensions and form of your vessel. He says, and he finished with that, that
you, gentlemen, can have all you want without departing from handsome forms and
thoroughly sea-going ships. 1 do not suppose anyone ever doubted that proposition,
and I should hardly think a meeting of cultivated gentlemen in the centre of
London need to be told that all our plans and discussions are not based upon the
assumption that you cannot have what you want if you choose to spend unlimited
money in obtaining it; but our efforts are always directed to get economically,
cheaply, and in conjunction with a number of other things, what we want. I think
it would be perfect madness for the administrators of the Navy to set up an sssthetic
standard, which, at the beet, changes from day to day ; for people who used to
imagine every ironclad the ugliest thing possible, now consider some of the iron-
clads as amongst the handsomest productions of the modern epoch. I distinctly
remember the Board of Admiralty, consisting of some of the most eminent naval
Officers of the Service, requiring to steam several times round the bow of the
"Hercules," because they thought it was the handsomest and most appropriate
bow for a ship which they had ever seen. With regard to the origin of these
vessels, I do not wish to be understood to have touched upon the respective merits
of Mr. Elder, Sir Samuel Baker, or others in this matter ; in fact, 1 think myself
it argues rather a low standard of feeling, when we find continually in discussions
of this kind, when we are dealing with actual results that have been obtained,
people who proposed them in an abstract and theoretical form spring up and almost
stop the discussions upon tKe essential merits of the thing, to discuss who had the
first finger in it. I do not wish to say anything too immodest, but I must say
1 attend a good many discussions in which, if 1 thought it prudent and proper, I
might say I had thought beforehand of the novelties then being propounded, but
1 do not think that is a subject to engage our attention in matters of this kind.

Sir John Adye made some remarks, which are very true, with regard to the
mounting of guns on the en barbette system ; but I need not point out, because
Admiral Selwyn has stated it, that Admiral Popoff in his second vessel abandoned
the em barbette system, which was quite an incident of the first design, and has
adopted the disappearing principle in the second, and no doubt he is perfectly free
in so far as any limitations of the circular form are involved, to adopt turrets or
any other means of carrying guns that may be desirable. There is nothing in the
circular system at all to interfere with that. Admiral Stewart appealed to me as
to the objects with which these vessels were introduced. A memorandum has been
put into my hand to-day by a friend of Admiral Popoff, as a point for me to fall
back upon, if necessary. " The idea of circular ironclads was originated in a desire
" to strengthen the defences of Kertch Strait and of the Dnieper Liman ; and,
<( therefore, these vessels were built for the special service, viz., the action behind
" certain obstructions, such as, for instance, a row of fixed torpedoes, &c., laid
" down in the narrowest place of these Straits, so that these vessels may choose the
41 distance, behind that line, and on approach of the enemy towards that line, they
44 can retreat, and place themselves at such a position that the men at the gnns
" would be safe from the rifle fire of the enemy. Thus, the open turret and speed of
44 eight knots of the 4 Novgorod ' do not form any deficiency whatever, considering
44 the real purpose for which that first ship was designed." I feel sure that, in the
minds of the bulk of this meeting, the subject has been lifted by my paper off the
narrow basis in which it would naturally be placed by many persons. I view it
only from this point of view. The ** Inflexible " is our latest design. I hope, in
referring to her, I shall not be supposed to view the ship depreciatingly. I think
the vessel is a vessel of remarkably high character, which will be found to express
the power of this country in a most admirable manner ; but, still speaking quite
abstractedly, and with a view to the future progress of design, I' simply say we
must recognize in such a construction the existence of those lengthened ends. I
believe the circular form, or the circular form with a bow, for sea-going purposes,
will be found to give advantages even over this type, and you hare heard from the

ON CIRCULAR IRONCLADS. 109

responsible head of the construction branch of the Nary that the subject is re-
ceiving his consideration : therefore I do feel I have not brought an unworthy sub-
ject before you. I will take the liberty of thanking Admiral Inglefield, as well as
Admiral Stewart, for their kind feeling in choosing this occasion to say a good
word, and a practical word coming from trustworthy sources, respecting the
qualities of certain of Her Majesty s ships. You know here well enough how
anxious a task the construction of those ships is, and you have also heard to-day
how ready some persons are to cast discredit, contumely, and ridicule upon them.
It is a very satisfactory thing to know, when ships get to sea on service, that those

find a f

vessels give satisfaction to their Officers. Here we find a flag-ship in a distant part
of the world, and another after performing a lengthened voyage in the Medi-
terranean, giving a good account of themselves, and it is very gratifying that, in
meetings lice this, Officers should have the generosity and spirit to rise and say
that Her Majesty's ships are not what many persons suppose them to be, but are
efficient and perform their duty well. I thank you, Sir, and the meeting very much
indeed, for the extreme kindness with which you have listened both to my paper
and to my remarks in reply.

The Chajbmax : I am sure every one present will join with me in offering a
hearty and cordial vote of thanks to Mr Reed for his very excellent lecture.

LECTURE.

Friday, February 18th, 1876.
Admiral Sir HASTINGS R. YELVERTON, G.C.B., in tbe Chair.

HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP TIP THE SEAMEN

OF THE COUNTRY.

By T. Brassey, Esq., M.P.

It will be my object in the present paper to be practical. There has
of late been too much vague declamation as to the decay of our British
seamen.

I do not therefore propose to dwell at length on the faults of our
sailors, I shall prefer to occupy your time with proposals for amelio-
rating their condition, their character, and their seamanship.

It will be convenient to clear the difficult path before us by stating
the number of foreigners employed, and the annual waste of seamen in
oar Merchant Service. With regard to the number of foreigners em-
ployed under the British flag, while the proportion is, no doubt, con-
siderable, the number does not increase. The proportion of foreigners
to British seamen, which was 12*6 in 1864, was reduced to 10'87 in 1873.
I may in this place observe, that some of the ablest of our shipowners
have entertained the opinion that foreigners are an indispensable element
in our Merchant Service. To quote only one authority, this opinion was
expressed by Mr. Lamport, in giving evidence before Mr. Lindsay's
Committee in 1860. He was asked, " What, in your opinion, would
" have been the present state of things, had the navigation laws not
44 been repealed ? " He replied, " 1 think there would have been
44 more British tonnage afloat than there is now, but I do not think we
44 should have been able to man our British shiptfwith British sailors."
44 The rate of wages must have been tremendous, in order to bring this
44 about."

It has been computed that, from various causes — death, drowning*,
desertion, the giving up of employment at sea in order to obtain
occnpation on shore — our Mercantile Marine loses every year about
16,000 men. The apprenticeship system supplies about 3,500 men
per annum, and the training-ships probably as many more. The bovs
not apprenticed, and the ordinary seamen, supply the remaining 9,000
men.

As a matter of fact, no great difficulty has been- experienced in
obtaining the number of men required for the Merchant Service.
The quality may have been unsatisfactory ; but the number has been
adequate. Our shipowners have never experienced the difficulty
which has been felt in Germany, where laden ships have been de-
tained for weeks, because a crew could not be obtained.

HOW BE8T TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP, ETC. Ill

In a recent communication to The Times, Mr. Dtmlop, a large ship-
owner, of Glasgow, states that no shipowner finds any difficulty at the
present time in manning his vessel ; and that, if the number of sea-
men were materially increased, it could only produce a redundancy.

Having shown that there is no reasonable ground for a' complaint
of a deficiency in point of number, we have now to consider the
allegations as to the want of discipline and seamanship.

It may be pointed out, in limine, that the same complaints have
been urged before every Royal Commission and Committee of Parlia-
ment which has been appointed, since the termination of the great
Continental War, to inquire into maritime affairs.

As on all similar occasions in the past, so in the latest inquiry by the
Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, witness after witness dilated
on the profligacy, the drunkenness, the physical, the professional, and
the moral deterioration of our seamen. The Mercantile Marine is
acknowledged to be the true backbone of the fighting Navy ; and
those who heard the gloomy story could scarcely suppress a misgiving
that England had forfeited her claim to be the mistress of the seas.

When, however, we turn over the page of history, we find that
the crews even of our fighting vessels have often contained a
large proportion of ill-conducted and unskilful men. Many sea-
men serving in the Royal Navy in the early years of the present
century, unwilling captives of the press-gang, were equally destitute
of patriotism and fidelity. It has been said that, on one occasion,
when the fleet was being paid off at Portsmouth, a large number of
the seamen refused to come on shore, and sailed direct to Brest to
take service in the French Fleet. In the narrative of the capture
of the British frigate " Macedonia " by 'the American frigate " United
States," the historian James gives some details which I shall venture
to quote : —

"The great proportion of British seamen among the crew of the
44 American frigate accounted, it is said, for so many of her guns being
u named after British ships, and some of the most celebrated British
" naval victories. ' Captain Carden,' says Mr. Marshall, l observing
u * ' Victory ' painted on the ship's side over one port, and ' Nelson *
" ' over another, asked Commodore Decatur the reason of so strange
" • an anomaly ; he answered : ' The men belonging to those guns
" * ' served many years with Lord Nelson, and in the ' Victory.'
u * * The crew of the gun named Nelson were once bargemen to that
" ' ' great chief, and they claim the privilege of using his illustrious
" ' 'name in the way you have seen.' The Commodore also publicly
" ' declared to Captain Carden that there was not a seaman in his
" • ship who had not served from five to twelve years in a British
•' 4 man-of-war/ "

Passing on to the inquiries by the Manning Committee in 1853,
the advantages, if any there were, of compulsory apprenticeship
should have been conspicuously shown in the high discipline of
the Mercantile Marine at that period. What, however, was the
language held by the shipowners in regard to their crews? It
was most unfavourable. The Chairman of the London Shipowners,

112 1IOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

Mr. Phillips, went so far as to declare that the seamen were a de-
moralised race, and that the permission to man British ships with
foreign seamen wonld be productive of great good.

I am not attempting to deny that many of onr merchant seamen
are unworthy of the British flag, but when we are told that their
condition is worse than it was, I ask for evidence in support of this
unwelcome assertion. What new circumstances have arisen to injure
the character of our seamen ? Some influences there must have
been working for their good. In part owing to the introduction of a
test examination, our merchant ships are more ably commanded than
they were. Our seamen are acknowledged to be a better educated
body ; the ships in which they sail are greatly improved in comfort, in
safety, and in speed. In the old days there were no ships which could
be compared with the noble iron clippers of the present day. On the
other hand, we cannot fail to recognise the injurious tendency of
some of the modern changes in the constitution of the Merchant
Service. Steamers have drawn away the best men from the foreign-
going sailing ships. A higher rate of wages is paid in steamers, and
they offer the further advantages of a shorter absence from, and a
periodical return to, a home port, with superior provisions, lighter
work, and better accommodation.

In the foreign trade the best men, as a consequence, have been
separated from the mass employed in the sailing ships ; and with a
result analogous to that which followed in the French Army from the
formation of an excessive number of corps d'elite, comprising the
Imperial Guards, cavalry, and artillery. When the best recruits had
been picked out for all those favoured corps, the residuum which re-
mained to form the infantry of the line was destitute alike of physical
vigour and of military ardour.

Again, the growth of the large towns, which are the great entrepots
of our maritime commerce, has tended to the degradation of the sea-
men employed in the foreign trade. The temptations to vice multiply
with the increasing density of the population ; in the smaller towns
the atmosphere is less contaminated.

It is more difficult to draw any general conclusion as to the quality
of seamen than it is to ascertain the proportion which the supply bears
to the demand; but there is one arithmetical test by which the
efficiency of the crews can be partly determined, namely, by noting
the increase or the reduction in the number of men employed to man
a given tonnage. If this test be applied, it will be found that there is
no evidence to show that there has been a deterioration in the quality
of the seamen.

In 1814, the Merchant Service gave employment to 173.000 men, or
about the same number of men as in 1861 ; but in the interval the
tonnage of our shipping had increased from 2,681,000 tons, at the
earlier date, to 5,895,000 tons at the later. The proportion of men to
100 tons in sailing ships was 417 in 1854, 325 in 1869, and 322 in

1873.

On the whole it would appear that, while our seamen have not
deteriorated, yet the character and seamanship of a large number among

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. ll3

them leases much to be desired. In the coasting trade, however,
there are no complaints. The vessels are manned by the owners or
part owners and their families, jnst as they have been for many years
past. Neither are there any general complaints on the part of owners
of steamers. Mr. Mclver, his partner, Mr. Burns, and Mr. Wilson, of
Hull, when examined by the Duke of Somerset, spoke of their men in
terms of commendation ; and their opinion, backed by the officials of
the Board of Trade, presented a cheering contrast to the gloomy
picture drawn by the owners of sailing vessels. On the other hand,
in sailing ships employed in long voyages, the crews are composed of
the residuum of the seamen — men too often without homes, and with-
out characters to lose, careless and reckless as they have ever been,
without the slightest spark of loyalty to their employers, and probably
greatly inferior in all these respects to any class of skilled workmen
on shore.

To what causes are we to ascribe these defects, and how can they be
remedied ? Among the causes I would enumerate : — (1.) The absence
of encouragements or pecuniary reward for good conduct or skilful
seamanship ; (2.) Insufficiency of pay, at least, until a very recent
date, and, in some ships, bad treatment ; (3.) The system of payment
in advance before sailing, and the delay in paying off crews on their
arrival in port; (4.) The want of systematic training for seamen;
(5.) The inadequate professional status of the officers of the Merchant
Service.

Taking these subjects in the order in which they have been enume-
rated, we have first to deal with the question of wages. The owners
of sailing ships stand alone among the employers of this country in
expressing a universal concurrence of opinion that their men are
deteriorating. The explanation is not far to seek.

Until a very recent period, the wages of seamen have been low by
comparison with the reward of any description of labour, requiring
the same skill and experience, ashore.

Looking back to the earlier dates included in the tables, published
by the Board of Trade, we find that the wages of an able sea-
man rarely exceeded 50*. a-month ; and when we take into view the
many privations of a seaman's life, the inferiority of his situation to
that of any other skilled labourer, was such, that, unless there had
been some compensating circumstances, our ships could not have
been manned.

There are two considerations which together have operated to keep
down the wages of the seamen. The apprenticeship to the sea has
been less expensive than the apprenticeship to any other skilled trade.
** The fact," says Mr. Mill, " that a course of instruction is required
" of even a low degree of costliness, or that the labourer must be
44 maintained, for a considerable time, from other sources, suffices
** everywhere to exclude the great body of the labouring people from
44 the possibility of such competition.1'

Boys, from the moment they go afloat, cease to be an expense to
their parents ; hence the poorest among the labouring class, who
alas ! form the majority, are able to bring up their sons to the sea.

VOL. xx. i

114 HOW BBBT TO IMPROVE AHD KEEP UP

Again, the employment of the sailor has been ill-paid, because it
has been invested with, all the charms which belong to an adven-
turous life. " The dangers," says Adam Smith, " and hair-breadth
" escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening young
" people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A tender
" mother among the inferior ranks of the people is often afraid to
" send her son to a school at a seaport town, lest the sight of the
" ships, and the conversation and adventures of the sailors should
" entice him to go to sea. The distant prospect of hazards from which
" we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and address is not
" disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages of labour in any
" employment."

In pointing out that in foreign-going sailing-ships generally, and
especially in those which have been the property of men of limited
capital, the wages have not been sufficient to attract good men into
the employment, I do not imply that there has been a selfish unwil-
lingness on the part of the shipowners to do justice to the seamen. I
am simply pointing out that the conditions offered have been less
attractive than those presented by other employments.

Quite recently the wages of seamen have been advanced, doubtless
in consequence of the competition for labour, caused by the unpre-
cedented activity of . other branches of trade. It cannot now be said
that the seaman is insufficiently rewarded. The rapid advance in tbe
rate of pay, which has lately taken place, will in time produce its effect,
and probably encourage a large number of the youth of this country
to look for employment afloat. Seamen, however, cannot be made
in a day. The benefits to be derived from the increased supply of
trained men will not be realised until the boys, who are now being
attracted to the sea, have had sufficient time to learn their business.

Bad treatment has been assigned as one of the reasons why in some
vessels a difficulty has been experienced in regard to manning. When-
ever it has been alleged that the scale of provisions in any ships
in the merchant service is insufficient, universal indignation has been
expressed by shipowners. In order, therefore, to prove that there is a
foundation for what has been stated, I quote the following passage
from the Report of Dr. Roe, Surgeon to the British Seamen's Hos-
pital at Callao, in answer to a circular issued from the Board of
Trade by Mr. Shaw Lefevre : — " By far the greater number of British
" vessels which visit this port are those which have made long voyages ;
" they have taken cargoes to some port in China, Australia, New
" Zealand, Brazil, the East Indies, or elsewhere, and they have come
" on here to load with guano, having been on the average upwards
u of a year in performing the voyage from England to Callao. Amongst
" the crews of these vessels desertions are very frequent, the principal
44 causes being —

" 1. The physical condition of the seamen.

44 2. The fact that a considerable sum of money is due to each man
44 on his arrival here.

44 3. The system prevailing at this port of paying three months'
44 wages in advance to each man who ships.

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY.

115

" At the British hospital, in the four years commencing 1st October,
*' 1865, and ending 30th September, 1869, 251 cases of scurvy were

received from 57 vessels, 27 ships sending each but a single case,

and 13 ships sending each nine cases and upwards. Official investi-
" gations were instituted into the circumstances attendant on the
" voyages of 13 of the vessels, the crews of which were affected by
" scurvy, and our inquiries have established the inadequacy of this
u diet to maintain the health of seamen, even when supplemented by
" the anti-scorbutics enforced by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1867,
" as scurvy occurred in those vessels only in which the scale was
44 adhered to."

The following scale will show the comparative values of different
articles of food as anti-scorbutics : —

Powerful Anti-scorbutics.

Indifferent Anti-scorbutics.

Powerless as AjUi-scorbuiios.

1. Fresh juicy vegetables,

1. Dried vegetable matter,

Bice, barley, sago, ar-

as raw potatoes, onions,

as preserved potatoes,

rowroot, &c.

Ac.

compressed vegetables,

2. Fresh fruits, as oranges,

Ac.

apples.

2. Fresh or preserved

3. Fruits and vegetables

meats, especially with-

preserved in sugar, or

in the tropics.
3. Vinegar. Lime-juice as

otherwise, with their

juices.

found on board mer-
chant ships after 12
months1 voyage.

ik
it
Ik
ii
Mi
it
ik
ik
ii
U

<(
U
ik

14
ii
ii
i»
ii

" The salt beef and salt pork constitute the main articles of a sea-
man's food, and are supposed to represent an amount of nourish-
ment which they are far from containing. Scurvy is essentially
starvation. The histories of such cases as proved fatal on board
the ships, and they were not a few, showed that those who laboured
longest and hardest were the first to die. Officers and others, who
were not required to use physical exertion, escaped the disease.
One man was a prisoner, and fed on bread and water during a
voyage of upwards of ninety days ; he took scarcely any exercise,
and for a considerable portion of the time never moved from his
cell ; he arrived here in good health and without a trace of scurvy,
whereas all his shipmates were more or less severely affected.
** The great majority of the cases of scurvy recorded above, origi-
nated in vessels, the crews of which were not allowed vegetables
whilst the ships were in port. Let it be assumed that the expense
of providing food better adapted to maintain the health of the men
would be greater than the expense of providing food according to
the scale now in use. The food supplied is but a part of the sea-
men's wages, part of the value paid for their services. If, there-
fore, more value bt given to the seaman in food, less will be
required in money ; and no wages will be better appreciated by the
seaman than good food."

^ i2

116 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

I earnestly hope that all the suggestions contained in the letter of
Dr. Roe may be adopted.

The system of making advances of wages to seamen is a subject
closely connected with the general question of the rate of pay. I
cordially concur with the Royal Commission in their unhesitating'
condemnation of the advance note. Seaman are the only class of
working men who are paid in advance for labour that has not been
performed. It may be urged that it is hard to deny a small sum in
advance to a man who is about to embark on a ten months' voyage.
It may be said that he has an outfit to provide and expenses to pay
for his board on shore while seeking an engagement. The answer is,
that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the money paid in advance
is consumed in debauchery ; that the man comes on board destitute
of clothes, but minus the month's wages. He has discounted his
advance note at a usurious rate of interest, and has probably been
paid not in money, but in the most deleterious liquors. The crimp
alone has derived a profit on the transaction.

Some shipowners have strongly opposed the abolition of the
advance note. They have been accustomed to rely on the co-operation
of the crimp to get their men on board before sailing, and they appre-
hend that the abolition of the advance note will lead to a small rise
of wages.

For the reasons I have stated, I disagree with the objections to the
reform proposed by the Royal Commission. Until a seaman is taught
to depend upon his past earnings, to be sufficiently careful of the
large sums often received on paying off, bo as to be able to provide
therefrom the kit required for the next voyage, you cannot look for
improvement in their moral character.

The delay in paying off is at least as fruitful of evil as the payment
of wages in advance. If a delay of forty-eight hours occurs after
the arrival of a ship in dock, the seamen are necessarily thrown into
the hands of the crimps. True it is that sailors' homes have been
established at the large ports, and they have done great good ; but,
after all, the sailor's home bears a close resemblance to an embellished
prison, and is not the genial and attractive hostel, to which a sailor
would naturally resort, who has been cribbed, cabined, an4 confined
under tight discipline for many months on board ship. Captain
Dawson has enlarged in a recent paper in such sympathetic language
on the necessity for an immediate settlement of wages after the
arrival of a ship, that I need not insist further on this point.

I would offer one more suggestion connected with the question of
wages which ought not to be omitted in a general review of this
subject, although it is not within the province of legislation to remedy
the evil which I seek to point out.

Surely it is a mistake in the Merchant Service to pay every seaman
before the mast at the same rate. By preserving this unbroken
uniformity, you may, it is true, avoid the risk of exciting envy and
jealousy among the crew; but on the other hand, you give no
encouragement under such a system to special exertion and good
conduct. You draw no distinction between efficiency and utter

THE SEAMEN OF THE CO UN THY. 117

inexperience, between the genuine able seaman, and the man who
has no right to claim that rating. Piece-work is impossible on board
ship; at least on board ships engaged in the foreign trade. On
a coasting voyage, as, for example, in the colliers plying between
the north-eastern ports and the Thames, the plan of paying by the
run was universal, but this arrangement is inapplicable to the Indian
or the colonial trade. If, however, payment by results cannot be
introduced ; it becomes the more essential to encourage merit by a
flow of promotion, and by advantages in point of pay. In the
numerous ratings in the Royal Navy, we have an example of what
may be done in this direction. The regulations of the Navy in this
and all other matters are well worthy of study by shipowners. They
represent the traditions of an ancient service, and the thoughts of many
ingenious and capable men, whose business it has been to maintain
the discipline and to animate the exertions of large bodies of men.

There should be a voluntary examination for the rating of A.B.
The examination should be practical and interlocutory, similar to
that which candidates for admission to the Naval Reserve are required
to pass. Shipowners would know that men, who could obtain a cer-
tificate of A.B. by examination, were not impostors; and captains
ought to be allowed by their owners to give higher wages to cer-
tificated men. As soon as it became known that something was to
be gained by passing an examination, every seaman would try to pass.
It might then be expedient to require that a man should have passed
jthe examination, before he was allowed to ship as an able seaman.

I may mention that several Seamen's Associations have petitioned
to Parliament in favour of this proposal. Such a regulation would
involve no hardship on the shipowner. He would be left perfectly
free in the selection of his crew and could ship as large or as small a
proportion of A.B.'s as he thought fit.

Again, an increase of pay should be given for good conduct. This
is done by Mr. Balfour and other shipowners of Liverpool, and
Mr. Balfour, who was specially sent up to give evidence before the
Commission as to the deterioration of seamen, admitted that the com-
plaints, which he poured forth so profusely, did not apply to the men,
who sailed in his ships.

Would it not cost less and would not the merchantmen be more
efficiently manned, if higher wages were paid, fewer hands employed,
and more care taken in the selection of, the crew ? It is a common
practice with shipowners to defer the engagement of the crew, until
a day or two before their ships are ready to sail. The captain is then
instructed to go down to the shipping office, and in an hour to collect
together a crew for a voyage round the world, from among a number
of men, whom he has never seen before. In what other trade can a
parallel be quoted to this haphazard and perilous system P Would it
be reasonable to expect that the skilled labour required for a ship-
builder's yard or an engineering works could be obtained at a
moment's notice by sending out a foreman into the adjacent highway?
In all well-organized industrial establishments it is the custom to keep
together a nucleus of workmen ; and this is done even in bad times,

118 HOW BE8T TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

and when the payment of the men's wages is a heavy loss to the
employer.

Here I would offer a remark on the desirability of more frequent
and direct personal relations between the shipowners and their
seamen.

When shipowners complain that their seamen are not anxious to
promote their employers' interests, that they show no gratitude for the*
care and the money which have been freely lavished, to furnish them
with good provisions, to make their forecastles comfortable, and to>
supply them, it may be, with books and other advantages not included
in the letter of the bond, it must be remembered that mere liberality
will not suffice to arouse the sentiment of personal loyalty. A non-
resident proprietor may let his land at low rents, and be more than
liberal in the repairs of his cottages, and yet, unless he lives among
the people on his estate he will fail to keep up the warm and devoted
attachment, which, in feudal times and since, has so often united
together the owner and the tillers of the soil.

I have dwelt, I fear, too long on the question of wages. Except in
the abolition of the advance note, and perhaps in requiring payment
of a certain rate of interest for e"very day's delay in the settlement of
wages, after the arrival of the ship, the subject is beyond the scope of
legislation. It is for the shipowners to consider the question, and by
a wise generosity to encourage a good class of our working population
to follow the sea.

It is now necessary to refer to the subject of training seamen for
the Merchant Service. The abolition of compulsory apprenticeship
has been deplored by many, and the alleged deterioration of seamen
has been attributed to the relaxation of the laws by which it was
enforced. We have, however, the testimony of the late Mr. Lamport
and others, to show that compulsory apprenticeship led to grave
abuses. There is no reason why an ordinary seaman or boy should
not pick up seamanship, as well, when serving in that capacity afloat
as if he were regularly indentured. It is a fatal objection to the com-
pulsory plan that boys who are worth anything are certain to break
their indentures. Such, at least, has been the experience of the
present training ships. The Managing Committees have, therefore,
determined not to ship any more boys as apprentices.

I now turn to another and a less impracticable plan for increasing
the supply of seamen by the establishment of additional school ships.
I commence by considering the proposal in a politico-economical
aspect.

An artificial training system, must, it if is to produce a radical im-
provement in the pernonnel of our vast Merchant Navy, be carried out
on a very extended scale. Now, if by such an extended training
system you succeed in producing a large additional number of seamen,
you introduce a disturbing element into the maritime labour-market
which must have the effect of depreciating the rate of wages. But
it has been already shown that the wages of seamen have, until a
recent date, been lower than those earned by any other class of skilled
workmen ; and the inference has been drawn that the inferiority in

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTBY. 119

the quality of seamen has been attributable to that cause. If, on the
other hand, you limit the number of boys in training, in strict accord-
ance with the requirements of the Naval Reserve, — and the Liverpool
shipowners, who are the warmest and ablest advocates of the training
system, have never suggested that we should go further, — then you
will fail in producing any appreciable improvement in the efficiency
and supply of seamen for the Merchant Service.

Having given my most careful consideration to this question, and
having studied the various plans proposed from time to time by Sir
Frederick Grey and others, I have arrived at the conclusion that the
scheme projected by the Manning Committee, and approved 'by Sir
Frederick Grey, is the only practicable plan. Any scheme for a partial
contribution by the Govercnerit and the shipowners would break down,
because the majority of the shipowners will not contribute voluntarily,
and you cannot in fairness extort a contribution under the compulsion
of law. The only reliable source to which we can look for pecuniary
aid in support of training ships is the public purse ; and the State can-
not be called upon to expend a sixpence more than it is necessary to lay
out in order to provide for the wants of the public service

The plan of the Manning Commission was, as it is well known, to
establish ten school ships, distributed at the principal ports. Each ship
was to be capable of receiving 200 boys, 100 of whom were to be nomi-
nated by the Admiralty and supported by the State ; the remaining
10O were to be day boarders, who were to be maintained at the expense
of their friends. The ships were to be moored to a quay, so as to give
ready access to the shore. A commencement might be made upon the
plan of the Commission by establishing a ship of the class described at
a few of the principal ports. One or two might be established at
Liverpool, another at Cardiff, another at Cork, another at Glasgow, and
one in the Tyne. In each of these ships 100 boarders should be entered
under an engagement to join the Naval Reserve. They should be
trained, according to the plan of the Commission, for one year, on pre-
cisely the same system now adopted on board the " St. Vincent." At
sixteen they should go to sea in the Merchant Service ; at twenty they
should be required to join the Navy for a year, to be trained in gunnery,
according to the plan sketched out by Captain Wilson in his recent
lecture before this Institution. In each of the school ships there would
be vacancies for 100 additional boys, who might be either boarders or
day boarders. The fees for the day boarders might be paid by the
Education Department. The boarders would be supported by the sub-
scriptions of the merchants and shipowners, or by the contributions of
wealthy and benevolent persons, desirous of availing themselves of the
facilities, afforded by the Government on behalf of poor boys, in whom
they might feel an interest. The number of boys in training in the
school ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth should be reduced, so that
the aggregate number should not be increased by the establishment of
the new training ships at the commercial ports! If the plan succeeded,
the number of naval school ships at the commercial ports might be
gradually increased.

The recent destruction by fire of the " Warspite " and the " Goliath "

120 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

has aroused the public interest in the training ships ; and the gallantry
and discipline exhibited by the youthful crews have been accepted as a
proof that the training they receive is perfect in all respects. The
belief has accordingly been gaining ground that the difficulty of man-
ning the Merchant Service satisfactorily can be met by the multiplica-
tion of training ships of the same class. In my judgment there could
not be a greater mistake, and in that belief I am confirmed by Captain
Wilson, and by many other competent authorities, whose opinions I
might quote if the time at my disposal permitted. Let us acknowledge
with thankfulness the good work that is being done on board theae
charitable, industrial, or reformatory ships. I wish God speed to the
benevolent men, who have sought to rescue hundreds and thousands of
little children from the vile associations, in which they have been born,
and to bring them up to an honest calling. But let us not suppose that
the low morality of our forecastles, which has been so deeply, and, alas!
in too many cases so justly, deplored, can be raised by recruiting the
Merchant Service from the pauper and criminal classes. We want to
draw the great mass of our seamen from pure and untainted sources ;
and if we wish that our honest and self-supporting artisans should send
their sons to sea, we must give them some assurance that they will not
be thrown among boys of another class, with whom they would be
afraid to allow them to associate on shore.

It has been already said that the training of seamen in school ships
is after all an artificial system. The open sea is the only true place for
training seamen. Already the greatest difficulty is experience in the
Navy in finding ships for sending the boys, trained by the Admiralty,
to sea.

I, therefore, venture to suggest a plan for encouraging shipowners
to take apprentices under an engagement, at the end of their apprentice-
ship to serve for a year in the Navy in sea-going ships, according to
the plan of Sir Frederick Grey, or in barracks according to the plan
of Captain Wilson. These Government aided apprentices should not
be entered until the age of 15. At 19 they would be out of their
time, and they would be only 20 at the close of their year of service
in the Navy. The following scale of bounty to shipowners and
apprentices is suggested for discussion. It may be premised that the
ships should be of a class adapted for instructing boys in seamanship,
the number of boys limited in proportion to the tonnage, and the boys
themselves approved by an Officer representing the Admiralty. For
every apprentice so selected the shipowners should receive, at the end
of the first year, a bonus of 15/., and a further bonus might be paid
to the shipowner at the end of. the second year of hi. In the third
year the apprentice should receive a gratuity of 5Z., which would sup-
plement his wages, and be an encouragement to him not to break has
indentures. At the end of the fourth year, on joining the Navy, the
apprentice should receive a further bonus of 10Z. The total amount
of these payments is 35Z., an insignificant sum in comparison with the
cost of training a boy in the Navy from his enrolment until he becomes
an able seaman. The seamen trained under this system would have
been afloat in sea going ships throughout their apprenticeship, and

THE 8EAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 121

would only require drill in gunnery, in order to become valuable
auxiliaries to the Boyal Navy.

The consideration of the condition of our seamen would be imperfect
without some allusion to the necessity of establishing a pension fund.
In all the other leading maritime states, provisions has been made for
the maintenance of seamen in old age and in sickness. The most
complete organization for this purpose. is to be found in France, where
it was established by the great Colbert as a co-ordinate and essential
part of his plan for compulsory service in the Navy. The institution
has been maintained in its integrity to the present time.

The subject received the most ample consideration from Lord Ellen-
borough's commission, who most strongly recommended the establish-
ment of a compulsory self-supporting Seamen's Pension Fund. The
subject has been incidentally examined by the Manning Commission
and Mr. Lindsay's Committee, and the proposals of Lord Ellenborough
have received their warmest approbation. It has been calculated that
a payment of 12., a year, commencing at the age of 14, would
provide a pension of 122., a year at the age of 50, of 152., at the age
of 52, and of 182., a year at the age of 55. In this calculation
allowance is made for a considerable number of seceders. The Govern-
ment possess in the numerous shipping offices the clerical staff necessary
for carrying out tbe recommendations, which have so often been made
in favonr of a Seamen's Pension Fund.

While I trust that some if not all the suggestions contained in this
paper may be approved by the shipowners and the legislature, and pro-
duce their anticipated fruits in the amelioration of the condition of our
seamen, I am well aware that it is in vain to expect, by any plans for
their improvement, that we can neutralize entirely the evil influences
under which our seamen, from the nature of their calling, are com-
pelled to live. The sailor boy must quit his home at a tender age,
and most pass his youth amid the temptations to be found in every
seaport. How much of whatever there is of good in human nature —
frail it must be at the best — is derived from home influences.

" We lore the precepts for the teacher's sake."

In proportion as we value these blessings for ourselves, we shall
sympathise with the sailor in his moral and social privations; and
rejoice that among his class there are to be found so many who have
escaped the contaminating influences to which they are exposed.

Having dealt with the case of seamen, I turn to the Officers of the
Merchant Service. The Duke of Somerset's Commission, following
the unanimous opinion of the witnesses, whom they had examined,
spoke in highly favourable terms of the Officers of the Merchant
Service. They said that, the Board of Trade examinations had
exercised a beneficial influence in raising the standard of education,
and attainment in the art of navigation, and that the improvement
among the Officers offered a bright contrast to the deterioration among

the a«fl3m«nT

None will be found to dispute the general truth of these conclusions.
There is reason, however, to believe that in the nautical profession

122 HOW BEST TO IMFROYB AND KEEP UP

many may yet be found equally unworthy in character and in know-
ledge to occupy the important position of a ship master. Several
members of the Consular Body, in their replies to the letter of inquiry
in 1872, adverted to the deficiencies of the British ship masters, and to
their bad conduct on shore. Mr. Gould, in his Report on the British
Maritime Service in the Baltic, gives some figures, which show that
British shipping is being gradually displaced by the Swedes and
Norwegians, and he attributes their superiority in the race, not as it
might have been expected, from the general tone of the shipowners, to
the faults of the seamen, but rather to the inferiority of our ship-
masters. Mr. Gould specially refers to the utter ignorance of foreign
languages, displayed by the English, in marked contrast with the
German and Scandinavian Officers, all of whom have received a good
commercial education, and speak English and probably other languages
in addition. Several of the Consuls allude to the insufficiency of the
the salaries given to Officers of the Merchant Service. Unquestion-
ably ship-masters are underpaid, as compared with persons of equal
responsibility on shore, but the remedy lies with the parties to the
bargain. The Legislature cannot interfere, and public opinion cannot
do much. It is certain that there is immense competition among the
more educated men before the mast for promotion to the quarter-deck ;
and the shipowner has a perfect right to take advantage of any turn
of the market in his favour, provided always that the Officers employed
are equal to their work. In our own day, as in all former times, the
Officers of the Merchant Service have been a mixed and various body,
including many gentlemen of high bearing and education, and, at the
lower end of the scale, no inconsiderable number, who possess none of
the qualifications necessary, even for the most modest command. It
is indeed unnecessary to insist on the same standard of excellence in
♦all cases. The value of the ship and of the cargo, and the extent and
difficulty of the voyage, must be taken into consideration by the ship-
owner, in determining the amount of salary which he must give, and
the qualifications which he will require in the commander of his ship.
Every commander in the Merchant Service cannot be highly paid,
but many are not so liberally rewarded as they ought to be. The
illiberality of certain ship-owners was severely criticised by Captain
Toynbee, in his speech at the Society of Arts in their last session,
when he referred to ships of 800 tons in the East India trade, where
the masters were receiving only £10 a-month. Even in the best
employment every Officer below the rank of Master is badly paid.
The expectation of promotion is an inducement to subordinates to
serve for years on a small pittance of from £4 to £7 a-month, con-
siderably le»s in short than the wages of the carpenter or the boat-
swain, who are working under their orders.

Allowing that the Government cannot do very much to elevate the
professional status of the Officers of the Merchant Service, and that it
can do nothing to increase their rate of pay, I venture to make one or
two suggestions, which I should be glad to see adopted by the depart-
ments concerned. The Board of Trade may raise the status, and
improve the qualifications of the merchant Officers, by enlarging the

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRT. 123

scope of their examinations, and by giving a certificate of a superior
grade to Officers, who could pass in one or more languages, in which a
certain colloquial facility should be required. To these acquirements,
commercial subjects, including, for example, the theory of foreign
exchanges, and the elements of commercial law, might be added with
advantage. If the good results, which I venture to anticipate, were to
follow from the encouragement, thus afforded, to a wider range of
study, the Board of Trade might be justified in making the higher
certificates, which at first should be the reward of those who passed a
voluntary examination, a necessary qualification for the command of
any ship exceeding a certain tonnage.

The Admiralty might co-operate in this important work, and render
a great service to the country, by requiring all Officers, before they
receive commissions in the Reserve, to serve on probation for a year
in the Royal Navy. Here again I am only repeating a proposal
already made by Captain Wilson. The advantages of such a regula-
tion ought to be mutual. The mercantile Officers would become in
some degree familiar with the duties they would be called upon to
perform in time of war, and the Admiralty would have an opportunity
of testing the qualifications of candidates, before giving them commis-
sions. In future, all Officers before they enter the Reserve, should be
required to go through a three months* course of gunnery at Ports-
mouth ; they should receive adequate pay while so employed ; and if
they failed to make reasonable progress, should be dismissed from the
Reserve.

It would be an encouragement to nautical study, and a graceful
recognition of the Merchant Service, if a few studentships were founded
at the Naval University at Greenwich, which should be opened to com-
petition by all officers, after four years' service at sea as mate or master
of a merchant-ship. They should be tenable for one year, and should
be of sufficient annual value to cover the necessary expenses of the
student, and to give him in addition a sum equivalent to the income,
which he would have earned, if he had been following his profession.
I assume that each of the studentships would cost the Government
about £120 a year. Five might be offered in the first instance, one of
which should be reserved for Scotland, and another for Ireland ; and
the number might be increased if the experiment proved a success.

The good example of the Government might probably find imitators
among the merchant princes and shipowners, who would found nautical
studentships, just as fellowships were founded by pious and benevolent
men in ancient times at Oxford and Cambridge.

It is necessary that I should conclude. Many difficulties in the way
of carrying out my latter suggestions may present themselves to the
minds of Naval Officers, even though they are sincerely disposed to wel-
come as comrades and messmates the representatives of the Mercantile
Marine. Something, however, must be done to make the resources of
our maritime trade in men and ships available for the emergency of
war. The maritime armaments of the great continental powers have
been developed in such vast proportions, that it is only by the develop-
ment of our naval strength, that our country can maintain her claim to

124 HOW BEST TO IMPKOVB AND KEEP UP

rank as a first-rate power. Our fleets cannot, however, be increased
without such additions to the estimates, as the conn try would never
tolerate in time of peace. Naval expenditure may be economized by
keeping a large proportion of your Officers and men on half-pay or
in harbour ships, but a navaj force gives a fallacious appearance of
strength, unless it be kept in full efficiency by frequent employment
afloat. It should, therefore, be the aim of our naval administrators to
create a thoroughly reliable reserve in the Merchant Service. The
officers and the men of the Reserve must be made sailors in the mari-
time trade of the country, and they must be trained to the use of arms
in the Navy. Once more, if it be true that the condition of the
Merchant Service is not in all respects satisfactory ; if you want to
raise the tone and the professional standing of the merchant Officers,
and to improve the seamanship, and to raise the character of their
crews, a closer intercourse with the accomplished and high-spirited
officers and well-disciplined seamen of the sister service will prove the
most effectual means of accomplishing the end in view.

I began with an enumeration of the causes of the alleged deteriora-
tion of seamen ; I conclude with an enumeration of the remedial mea-
sures proposed. They are : —

(1.) The abolition of the advance notes.

(2.) The shipowners to be required to allow interest in case of
unnecessary delay in paying off their crews.

(3.) The Government to give a bonus to shipowners for apprentices,
trained under suitable conditions, and under engagement to serve for a
year in the Navy, and afterwards to join the Reserve.

(4) Training ships under the Admiralty to be established at the
commercial ports, according to the plan of the Manning Commission.

(5.) A compulsory self-supporting Seamen's Pension Fund to be
established under the management of the Board of Trade and the
guarantee of the State.

(6.) Voluntary examinations in modern languages and commercial
subjects to be established for masters and mates ; studentships for the
officers of the Merchant Service to be founded at Greenwich.

(7.) A scale of provisions to be prepared by the. Board of Trade, and
ships bound on long ocean voyages to be required to be provided
accordingly.

The Chairman : Mr. Shaw Lefevre has very kindly offered to give us a few re-
marks on the subject, and I will ask him to begin.

Mr. Shaw Lefevbe, M.P. : I presume it is out of kind consideration to my
Parliamentary duties, which may call me hence in a few minutes, that you
have asked me to lead this discussion. In the presence of so many able and
more distinguished persons, I have considerable hesitation in doing so ; but at
all events, it gives me the opportunity of being the first to thank my friend Mr.
Brassey for his extremely interesting and able paper. It shows, as all his works do,
that deep study, that fairness and moderation of views, and that sense of public duty
which so distinguish him. With most of his premises I most cordially agree. We
have talked over the questions together on many occasions, and I think we have
worked out some of them together. I agree with him in thinking that there has
been great exaggeration in what has been said with rr^nnl to the deterioration of

THB SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 125

our teamen. Mr. Brassey was good enough to quote from the replies to the circulars
which I issued when I was at the Board of Trade five years ago to our Consuls
abroad. Those replies might, with great advantage, be compared to replies made
to a similar circular issued by the Board of Trade twenty-fire years previously, and
if you compare those two sets of replies, you will find that many as are the com*
plaints recently made by our Consuls, they were far greater twenty-five years ago.
1 think without a single exception twenty-five years ago every Consul condemned
nor eailors in every possible way ; but if you look at the replies which have been
published in answer to the circular, which I issued three years ago, you will find
that though a great number of Consuls speak in very unfavourable terms of our
Mamen, yet a good many others speak muoh more favourable. My impression is,
therefore, that the seamen have not deteriorated ; but I believe public attention
has been much more called to the subject, that the seamen have not improved
relatively so much as other classes, so that there is still too much reason to
complain of their general condition. Seamen we must recollect are somewhat of
an international class : they suffer from evils not onlv at home but abroad, and
when we know the condition of things at places like Callao, Quebec, New York, San
Francisco, and many other ports where our seamen are brought into contact with
influences of the worst character, we cannot be altogether surprised that they have
not joined in the general improvement which we see in other classes. Mr. Brassey
hat also referred to the proportion of foreigners, and I think that he has shown
that the relative number of foreigners has not so much increased as people sup-
pose ; in met it has somewhat diminished of late years, and I do not think there
h much ground for complaint on that score. Mr. Brassey then went on to speak
of the timiiiing-ships for boys, and I quite concur in what he has said about the
existing training-ships in our mercantile ports. They were formed generally with
s double object, the main object being to rescue boys from the streets — what are
called the street arabs. Others are reformatory ships, whose object is mainly
to bring boys of that class to a somewhat better course of life. In that they
have been eminently successful, but they have not been so successful in training
boys to the Merchant Service. Captain Wilson has lately pointed out that for the
most part these boys when they leave the training-ships are not physically in a con-
dition fitting them to be entered for the Naval Service ; and as we may presume
that the Merchant Service requires men of equal physical condition to those of the
Xavy, we may conclude that these boys are not fit for the Merchant Service. My
xtroog impression is, that a very large proportion of the boys that now proceed from
these reformatory and training-ships are not really good material for the Merchant
Service. At the same time I have no wish to throw any discredit upon those ships*
I believe they are doing an extremely good work in training and educating boys
from the criminal class to a better state of life, and I wish them every success.
Another defect about them is that the boys leave the ship at too early an age. I
believe for the most part they are sent from these ships at the age of fifteen. Now
■U experience shows that the best period for training boys for the sea, whether for
the Navy or for marine service, is between fifteen and sixteen : therefore I was glad
recently to see in a circular issued by the Admiralty that they make it a condition
of the grant towards such boys as enter the third-class Naval Volunteers, that they
■hall be trained up to the age of sixteen. The period between fifteen and sixteen is
really the important age for training boys for sea service, and unless you can keep
the boys between those two years, I believe very little good is done. At the same
time it must be admitted that there is great difficulty in getting boys between those
ages. For the Navy we enter the boys at fifteen, and they remain a year or a year
sod a quarter on board the training ships, and are then drafted for sea service. But
oty friend Lord Gilford (whom I see here), will, I have no doubt, tell us that there
is no very abundant supply of boys for the Navy. It iaby no means easy to get the
contingent of boys required for the Naval Service. We require every year some,
thing like from 2,500 to 3,000 bova, and I believe at this moment the number is
somewhat less ; and I have a recollection of the difficulty in getting the adequate
number. Then further, these boys who enter at the age of fifteen are paid by the
Xaval Service 9/. a year as wages, besides a free kit ; and my strong impression
is that if we go in for a large system of training boys for the Merchant Service

126 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

it will be found necessary, if you wish to retain them between the ages of fifteen
and sixteen, to pay them wages. I need hardly say that that will add con-
siderably to the expense of the operation. Whether you will get the boys at all at
the late age of fifteen I rather doubt. At that age all the other employments of the
■country are in competition with you ; if you enter at an earlier age you may get
them. At thirteen or fourteen I believe you could get them for two if not for three
years, as proposed by Mr. Brassey. Therefore, really one of the difficulties to be
considered in establishing a system of training boys for the Merchant Service is, what
age arc you to take the boys at ? how long are you to keep them? what conditions are
you to make with regard to their future service ? and what prospects do you hold
out to them of constant and proper employment ? On all these points very much
might be said. All I can say at present is, that though 1 have an inclination towards a
scheme for training boys to the Merchant Service, I have not yet seen any scheme
elaborated which I think will really hold water on those particular points. Mr. Brassey
went on further to say, that in his opinion he thought it would be impossible either to
get contributions from shipowners or to tax shipowners for the purpose of training boys
for the Service, and that the duty and obligation and charge would practically fall on
the State. For my part I cannot agree with him. I do not see any more reason for the
State paying the whole expense of training boys for the Merchant Service than
for paying the expense of training boys for any other trade in the country ; and it
appears to me to be of the first importance that shipowners should understand that
this duty should fall upon them. It may be said that the Naval Service may require
it ; but I think it is very easy to show that the Naval Service is quite sufficiently
provided for irrespective of the boys we may train in this way. I do not intend to
go into the discussion that we had in this very place some time ago in regard to the
entry of boys for seamen in the Navy ; but I showed then that we have in the
Navy sufficient men to send all possible ships that we have to sea on the outbreak
of war without calling on our Reserves. In addition to that, we have the Coast
Guard men, and some four thousand Naval pensioners; but we have also twelve
thousand first class Naval Reserve men, and I think Lord Gilford will say that if these
men can be obtained at the opening of war with such additional training as might
be given in a few weeks or a month, they would be an extremely available class.
But now, what is the possibility of the wants of the Navy at the outbreak of a war ?
I presume nobody supposes that you would hire sailing vessels to send to sea. What
we shall want seamen tor, will be to send them on board steamers. No doubt we shall
have to cover the sea with steamers, carrying one or two guns each ; and I presume the
extreme number would be every steamer in the Merchant Service of this country.
Now, what are the number of able seamen required to man all those steamers ? I
recollect going into the matter with Mr. Mayo, the Registrar of Seamen, and the
4-alculation we made after careful enquiry was that all the steamers of this country
are altogether manned by about 12,000 able seamen. Well, we have 12,000 Naval
Reserve men ('not for fighting"), no doubt, but we have 12,000 Reserve men;
and supposing we hired all these steamers with their crews, we should be able to
place the Naval Reserve men on board, and, as I say, these steamers would not
carry more than one or two guns, and a few trained men would be amply sufficient
for them. Therefore I do not think there is any such claim upon the Government
as would compel us to pay the expense of training boys for the Merchant Service.
For my part, I am ready from a Governmental point of view to contribute towards
the training of boys for the Merchant Service ; but in the main I do think that the
charge should fall upon the shipowners of this country. I have olten heard it *aid
that the shipowners find very great difficulty in getting men at the present day. I
think Mr. Brassey has, to a great extent, shown that that impression has not a true
foundation ; but I would ask this question, " Where do the yachtsmen get their
'' men P * I have often had occasion to ask yachtsmen that question. It is a question
of wages. They draw their men from a somewhat different class, from the fishermen
of this country. The fishermen of this country are rather a higher class of people
than the ordinary seamen. They are for the most part accustomed to fore and aft
vessels, and are extremely useful for such vessels, and probably would be equally so
1 1* steamers; but the owners of yachts induce, bv higher wages, some five or six
.< ldusand men every year to come from their fishing trade to the yachts. Now, I

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 127

would ask whether shipowners, by offering better terms could not get men from the
same class ? For bit part, I believe the question of the supply of the Merchant
Service is in the main a question of wages, and if shipowners give sufficient wages,
the men will not be wanting.

Mr. Edwin Chadwick : I wish to observe upon one point of the very able, and,
on the whole, most important and satisfactory paper that has been read by
Mr. Braasey, the subject of training for the Mercantile Marine. I think, the con-
clusion which he has formed, and which my honourable friend, Mr. Lefevre, lias
formed, on the subject of that training, has been confined to the examination of the
outcome of the training ships. Now there is experience, which, if it be fairly
examined, will be found to be completely conclusive in respect to the outcome of
the training in schools on shore, such as, at the Limehouse School, the Greenwich
School, and a number of other schools where the training has been given with a
mast and a skeleton deck, proving, beyond doubt, that on shore they give them almost
all that is requisite for going on board, except their seu legs, heaving the lead, and
one or two other matters. If you examine ship captains, you will find that there
is very little difference of opinion upon this point. The effect of the training is
marked practically in this way — that it is very common, when one of those boys
comes on board, for the boatswain to say, " My lad, from what ship did you
" come ? " He answers frequently, " I have been in no ship, I came from a school ; "
to which the boatswain's reply is, generally, " You lie ; you are a deserter."
Mr. Brassey, says, that it is very undesirable to train seamen from such polluted
sources as the pauper schools. Now, if I were to select any class at all for a good
outcome, it would be the orphan children brought up in the district half-time
schools, from their infancy, and who have been uncontauiiuated by any association
with adult paupers as in the Union houses, an essential distinction ; and if you
examine the outcome, and take the experience of people who have had experience
of those boys, you will find that they stand in the highest class ; there is nothing
on board any of the training-ships that will exceed them, of this same class of
children. I venture to say that, upon a recent report and examination as to the out-
come on board the " Goliath." It was an enquiry made from every ship and place
where they had gone, and the report was uniformly good, with exceedingly few
exceptions. Now it is exceedingly important to consider these outcomes ; because,
if you can train children on shore, you can provide a mast and skeleton deck for
about £500, and you may train about eight or ten times the number on this method
that you do on board ship. I think if that be fairly examined, it will be found to
be one of the most cheap and economical ways of providing for an addition to the
Mercantile Marine, and you would see in the result that it would be very desirable'
to have masts and these naval exercises extended throughout all the other p^rts and
all the elementary schools that are there. I want it almost exclusively on sanitary
grounds, because it is found that in these schools the naval training is an exceedingly
good addition to the gymnastic training. We got a man from the M Excellent,
who gave the boys naval training and the exercise of the guns, and altogether it is
•o valuable an addition to the gymnastics that we requisite for the bodily treat-
ment of these children, that I would recommend its being imported into schools for
the simple up-bringing of the children of the wage classes without any reference to
any special service ; but for civil manual work, as well as for naval and military
service. But, in respect of their choice, there is this difficulty of bridging over
the time. They usually get them through the training in these shore-schools at
about 13, and there is the difficulty of bridging over the time till the 15th year,
when they are left to choose for themselves ; they are not under obligation to join
the Service, but about 70 per cent, of them have hitherto volunteered for 'the
Navy, and whenever they have the opportunity, they volunteer for the Royal
Marine. On asking the cause of their volunteering for the Royal Marine, the
answer has been almost uniformly : " Because the Mercantile Marine is so dirty and
" so disorderly." The difference between the two services in sanitary condition is
attested by this fact, that the death rate in the Mercantile Marino is about 18 in
1,000, while setting aside accidents in the Royal Marine, exclusive of deaths, in
serviee, and in the home stations, it is not above 6 in 1,000. One great element
has been omitted in the consideration of this question — as to the desire *of the

128 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

shippers themselves to co-operate in this. It is a perfectly notorious fact, that
shippers send out crews which would not be sent out but for full insurance. I
think more might be said upon this ; but I must only challenge the facte as to
the sufficiency of the examination upon which the conclusion is based, that training
and keeping are adequate for securing the necessary discipline, and are not half so
expensive as in the training ships.

Mr. Donald Cubbie : Sir Hastings Yelverton and Gentlemen, — I had not
expected to be called upon to say anything on this subject, although it is one in
which every shipowner should take a very deep interest, but I will say, as briefly
as possible, a word or two respecting the points brought forward by Mr. Brassey .
I do not know any subject which should be more interesting or more easy of settle-
ment to a shipowner than this question of manning the Mercantile Marine ; and
yet I do not think there is any shipowner quite capable of exactly deciding what
ought to be done. It is a very complex question. It has become involved through
late agitation and discussion, and it is not yet ripe for settlement upon a proper
basis. National interests have to be considered in relation to war, and I advocated
last year before the President of the Board of Trade, that our desire was, if possible,
to secure interchangeableness between the Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine.
I think it can be accomplished. I think it ought to be accomplished. The
Mercantile sailor is just as courageous and ready for his work — if he only knew
what to do — as the seaman of the Royal Navy ; but he must be trained for the
qualities required in war, and the question at present is this : how is the interest
of the shipowner since the abolition of the Navigation Laws, and with the com-
petition to which he is exposed, to be brought into harmony with the national
requirements, which should compel from him a ready acquiescence in anything that
is for the national good ? It is said, for example, Why Bhould not the wages of
AJB.'s in the forecastle be paid according to their ability P I think it would be
nearly impossible to settle that, because you have no rule of judging before a man
goes to sea, what his qualities are. The question is, will a man consent to go on the
condition that the captain shall, upon his return, gauge his value ? That will be a
question of contract, and a difficult one. Again, if you carry out the principle
involved in the suggestion of classing men as A.B.'s upon certificates, you virtually
establish a trades union, and ypu play into the hands of those who have advocated
this trades union. At the time certificated engineers were put into ships the great
difficulty pointed out by steam-shipowners to the Board of Trade was this : " We
cannot get qualified men with certificates," but the Board of Trade told us that the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers would get us plenty. At that time we had to
send the worst of engineers, often drunken fellows, on board because they held
certificates; so if you say now : "We will only take four-year A.B.V you will
commence by limiting the already small supply of seamen available for our ships.
This means beginning at the wrong end. I think the great thing is to hold out
inducements to the sailors to behave themselves, and by the encouragement of the
old and friendly relationship between the sailor and the shipowner. That, however,
is a matter not to be settled by legislation, though there are certain legislative means
by which, perhaps, you can help to arrive at that end. I have had Masters of the
Royal Navy and Captains of frigates applying for command of one of our steamers ;
but there is a natural feeling among the Mercantile Marine that they should have
nothing to do with naval men, while naval men do not care to associate with the
Mercantile Marine officers. Hence there is a want of sympathy between the one*
and the other, which I would like to get done away with by making them inter-
changeable in early youth* What is the inducement to a sailor to go into a merchant
ship r Very little as far as I can see. Three days ago I engaged a first-rate chief
officer — as good a man as anybody could find ; and having no immediate place for
him as first officer, I told him I could make him second officer. He agreed to it, but
afterwards he came and told me that, as he lived in Scotland, and had a large family,
he could not afford to live here, and I found that, after twelve years at sea, that man
has scarcely enough to live on. Hence the question arises in my mind, What can
be done to raise the status and the pay of officers, and the status and the pay of
men ? The question is before the Central Committee of Shipowners for con-
sideration. There are six or seven plans, one finds favour very much in the shape

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 129

pot by Mr. Braesey, which will aware the advantage of proper early education
and enlightenment and a proper tone, and which, getting them into the Navy, and
the Mercantile Marine afterwards, wfll provide some resource in their old age ; for
very few sailors go to sea after they are fifty, and I want to know where they go.
The way to do it, perhaps, will be to> airange some system of pension with a proper
early training ; ana that can only be ass if you induce the sailor to see that he can
get something on board the ship. I regretted extremely at the time that you
reduced the Coastguard Service. I do not know anything more deplorable than a
case such as that of the " Deutschland," and other cases where lifeboats, which
might have saved many lives, have not been launched, or have not been established,
when they would have been of great service under the Coastguard'. If we had these
Coastguard men ready for war, they would be useful for times of peace : and it was
false economy which discharged so many. Mr. Shaw-Lefevre asked, Why do
yachtsmen get such good men ? Every one knows thai yachtsmen are drawn from
the fishing vessels when they are idle. Then there ose able steady men who work in
the yachts in the summer, making short voyages in tho spring and autumn in
Canadian and other vessels, which are shut up in the winter. Who was the Captain
of the M Cambria," which won the race across the Atlantic P He was the Captain
of one of the Canadian clippers. I have seen steamers- go to sea with a crew of
ninety men and not a drunken man, and amongst then* there would be perhaps
twenty Naval Reserve men ; when any earnest shipewner tries to retain them, they
do not want it ; they won't be engaged for a second trip. I know men now in
command of ships, who were carpenters seven or eight years ago. There is no
falling-off in the raw material, but there is a lalling-off somehow or another, and I
think it it very much owing to the increase of so many steamers suddenly, and to tbe
competition' throughout tit© whole world. We should deliberately consider what is
best for the national interests and how they can be secured through the Mercantile
Marine, ani we owe much to Mr. Brastey for the care aud judgment he has shown
in the maturing of a plan to secure this development in the best way in the long
run.

Captain Sir QsoBeir Biddlboombb, R.N. : The gentleman on my right made some
observation with reference to the education of boys for the sea by having a vessel
established en shore. Well, I have had a very long turn at sea life, and I do not
know how it is possible to make boys available for sea service by preparing them on
shore. I ana quite sure of that ; and, therefore, I feel confident that no other system,
if we are to introduce boys into the Mercantile Marine, will answer, than that of
establishing vessels at our various ports in England and Ireland. I am very glad to
see that the Government have lately wisely adopted an arrangement by which boys,
who are found competent to join the Royal Navy from such vessels, shall receive a
certain sum of money, that is, the training ships will do so, which will assist in sup*
porting them, because, for a long time past, these Institutions Lave been working with
very great difficulty. I speak of the " Chichester," the " Arethusa " and the vessel
at Liverpool. They have been working with very, great difficulty by getting contri-
butions from their friends to support these vessels, and they have turned out a very
Urge number of boys, some of whom have been proved, on beiug sent to Her
Majesty's ships, to be quite equal to those boys that have been trained on board the
" Implacable,'* and other ships of the Navy. Now if we can train in vessels of the
character that I have described boys who are efficient and can be sent into the
Navy for £25, while we are training them* on boasd our own ships at an expense cf
£40, i.'50, or £60, I think wcought to encourage the establishment of these vessels in
every port in England and Ireland. Some other remarks have been made to-day
which, perhaps, it is unnecessary for me to touch upon. There are so many naval
men here of great experience, that it would be unworthy of me to make any remarks.
Still, I would just touch upon the subject of our British seamen. I see three or
four Officers here (under one or two of whom I had the honour of serving many
years ago), one an Admiral1, who, when he commissioned a frigate, had the greatest
difficulty in getting men. And what were the men we took on board our ship ? I
•m speaking of 1888. Why, two-thirds were useless men, until we took them to
sea and instructed them. Therefore, we must not conceive that in days gone by
we had all these seamen which we now look forward to, and suppose we are to
VOL. XX. K

130 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

get them at once, for in 1840 there was very great difficulty in procuring men for the
Navy, which induced the Government ultimately to train boys, and have continuous
service seamen. I happen myself to have served in the Mercantile Marine of this
country for many years. It is quite true that our mercantile seamen in my early
days were the best seamen in the world, and I believe these Officers will tell you that
the men we received from the Mercantile Marine were the best seamen we got on
board ship, and they did their duty in a most satisfactory manner after being
properly encouraged. But a seaman in the Navy now is a very different man
to what he was forty years ago. In 1834, the late Admiral Smart, commanding the
" Satellite," was the first man who introduced the system of exercising seamen as
small arm men, and the first employment of sailors on shore for soldiers service was
only in 1847 ; and the duties which seamen have now to perform in comparison
with what they were forty years ago are so various that the seamen that we had
in those days from the Mercantile Marine would have been totally useless now
without twelve months' exercise. I therefore think we cannot do better than go on
in the old system of training men, not only for the Mercantile Marine but for the
Navy ; and if we can only arrange in any way to work the two together, so that the
men shall serve a certain period of time in connection with the Navy as well as in
the Mercantile Marine, then I think we shall attain a good object.

Colonel Lord Wavenet : I have neither professional knowledge nor experience,
but I rise to supply a very remarkable omission that I have observed throughout the
whole of this debate, and that is with regard to the supply of seamen for the Marine
Service and for the Royal Navy, from coasts on which, I believe, a sea breaks which
would try the Officers, seamen, and ships of Her Majesty's Service, and therefore,
according to all analogy, is likely to produce seamen. I speak of the supply
that may be expected from Ireland and her ports. It does not appear to have been
present to the recollection of gentlemen that, at this moment, there is a ship, which
has been lying for some time in the Lough of Belfast, which has trained a con-
siderable number of young men drawn from the sources on which, some discredit,
— but I think unreasonable discredit — has been cast, those who have been rescued
from a life of poverty or a life of crime, and also those who have taken shelter in
Union Houses. I think I recollect that there was formerly a saying in the Boyal
Navy, that no Irish seamen were to be found, except between Cork Harbour
and the Old Head of Einsale. I know not how for that may be true, but I think
the establishment of training-ships in the estuary of the Shannon, in the Harbour
of Cork, in Belfast Lough, and other parts of the Irish seas, will be of great
advantage, and I would recommend it to the attention of Mr. Brassey, who has
given us such an excellent exposition of these matters, as a subject well worthy of
consideration. The maritime enterprise of Ireland is not so extensive, but it
reaches as far as the maritime enterprise of other parts of the country, and I
hope that on a future occasion we shall hear, not simply of one training-ship in the
harbours of Ireland, but three, and perhaps four.

Captain Field, R.N. : I should like to offer a remark or two. I have listened with
much pleasure to the lecture given by Mr. Brassey, and we cannot be too thankful
that we have a few civilians in the House of Commons who bring their minds to
bear upon naval questions. This is one worthy of the attention of statesmen ; but
no statesman as yet has attempted to grapple with it. I do not agree with much
that has fallen from him, though there was much also that I was delighted to listen
to. I do not agree that it is the duty of the State to pay one single farthing towards
finding seamen for the Merchant Service, taking it as a question by itself. It can
only be defended on one principle — that it should tend to give a supply of men to
the Navy in times of emergency. On that principle alone it is defensible.

Mr. Bbassbt : I said (p. 119), "The State cannot be called upon to expend a
" sixpence more than it is necessary to lay out in order to provide for the wants of
" the public service." I quite agree with the gallant gentleman.

Captain Field : But you speak of giving the shipowner a bonus to the extent of
j£35 for taking boys out of these training-ships, or as apprentices.

Mr. Bbabset : To serve for a year in the Navy, and be under perpetual obliga-
tion to serve when called upon.

Captain Field : Even that I object to. I think that such payments are unneoes-

THE 6EAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 131

sary and indefensible. If they are unnecessary, they cannot be justified, and I think
I shall be able to show they are unnecessary. I quite agree with the extension of
the training ship system round the coast, and I think it is the only proper system
lor us to foster ; but I see no necessity for the Government to make special grants
for such a purpose. We need but an extension of our present educational system.
We need but to make Government capitation grants, as we do to our ordinary
national schools, and we could also call upon parents to pay ordinary school fees, as
they do now in the national schools. With these fees, and a Government grant, and
voluntary subscriptions, we should be able to have a nautical system of education, as
well as the land system, for the children of this country. I am confident that
hundreds and thousands of parents would be only to glad to send their children to
sueh schools, if they were fostered by the Government. There would be no need
for the Government to pay from time to time the shipowners to take children out of
such schools. The managers of such schools have no difficulty now in placing their
boys in any ships. I do not agree with Mr. Brassey in his qualified approval of
the plan of training ladB by an artificial system. Why, the life at sea is an artificial
life ; and in order to induce persons to lead an artificial life, they require an artificial
training. I do not agree with the remarks depreciatory of taking children from the
pauper class and the criminal class. I hold that children cannot be criminals in
the true sense of the word. I hold that children are pure and untainted as a rule,
and if there is any taint resting upon them, it is in consequence of the surrounding
conditions of their lives ; but if you train them in these ships, they will be trained
as God-fearing citizens, and good seamen for the State. I say with 240,000 pauper
children, such as we have now, we would do well and act wisely to encourage
some of them to enter our training ships ; and I am satisfied that in the pauper
schools of this country we should find hundreds of children who would be only
too anxious to submit to be trained in these training ships preparatory to a sea life.
1 think that if a system of training ships, or training schools, in our various harbours
and ports were established, in return for the Government grant, the State would
have a right to lay down certain conditions just as in the Navy they make the
parents on behalf of the children engage that the child shall serve ten years in the
Navy. Why should not the State make the same rule with regard to training ships,
and take the assent of the child by its signature, and compel the parents to agree
that the child shall serve for ten years from the age of 18 in the Naval Reserve.
I do not care for the one year service in the Navy ; I do not care one straw for that ;
but bind them at eighteen years of age, and let tnem receive some small retainer, —
a matter of detail, easily settled by the authorities. With that provision, and
knowing that the shipowners would only be too anxious to get such lads, there
would be no necessity for paying the shipowners a premium, but vast numbers of
lads would be growing up for the Navy in the Naval Reserve. I do not agree with
Mr. Shaw-Lefevre with regard to the number of men we should require in time of
war. I am confident that ten times the number he stated would be required. It is
absurd to think that 12,000 men would be sufficient to man the steamers and fight
them, and scour the seas in time of war. 12,000 would be of no service whatever
to fight the steamers when armed with guns (Mr. Lefevre said A.B.'s). I was
surprised to find Mr. Brassey state — but I presume he has good foundation for the
statement — that the number of foreign seamen has diminished. I thought that was
one of the evils which led to the diminution of the rate of wages, because there was
such a large element of foreigners in the service ; but I am bound to accept his
statement if he gives it. I can only speak practically. I live where seamen are con-
stantly charged before me, as a magistrate, with mutiny and refusing to do duty
on the high seas. Only last week a whole ship's crew of Greeks were charged before
me with refusing to do duty, and there was not a single Englishman, except th*»
officers, in the ship. It was the most difficult question I ever had to deal with in my
life. There was not one man who could speak proper English, but there was one who
could speak broken English, and that man had committed the greatest offence. If I
bad sent to Oxford to get a professor of Greek, he could not have understood them ;
but before charging the man who could speak the broken English, I spoke to him a few
kind words in order to induce him to fall in with my views. I then swore him in as
an interpreter, and axade him interpret the evidence against the others, and interpret

K 2

132 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KE±P UP

their answers back to me. Then- having heard the minor case, we heard the case
against himself. That is a curious illustration, showing that our ships are often
manned with foreign seamen, and it is a terrible condition for Captains to hare
such orews. However, I am onlj too thankful to Mr. Brassey and others who take
up this question. Unfortunately we have not enough naval men in the House of
Commons to take it up. That is the proper place in which to thrash it out, but
some good may follow from discussions in this theatre, if those in authority will
take notice of them.

Admiral Ommaxney, O.B., F.R.S. : With regard to the employment of foreigners,
I shouU like to mention one glaring instance that came before my obserration last
year. I took passage in a ship of a very influential company, which received a
very large subsidy from the English Government. The crew of the ship, including
stokers, numbered about 60 hands, every one of whom were either Italians or Greeks.
On enquiry as to the reason for not employing British seamen, I was informed that
the foreigners proved to be more sober.

Mr. Gbbates : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — There must be an extraordinary
apathy in the Merchant Service at the present time when year after year meetings
of this sort are held, and but very rarely does a shipmaster from the Mercantile
Marine come forward. I suppose the Mercantile Marine is demoralised by the
presence of foreigners. For years I have been watching these things. Can you sup-
pose there is any honest pride in the young Englishman of the present day in going
into the Mercantile Marine, when they find confronting them in every grade of life a
foreigner who is more often preferred because he will go cheaper, or appears to have
manners less ferocious in independence than the Englishman, and is more suave ?
Do you suppose that boys will be recommended to go to sea by their parents, or
counselled to do so by their friends, when they know this ? No, Sir ; I always say
to boys, " Remember this, that so soon as ever you have made yourself fit and
capable to be brought on to the quarter-deck, and go through your grades, in every
grade that you go through, you will find yourself confronted with a foreigner who is
equally esteemed, and in many cases by a low class of shipowners, much more
esteemed than you are." It is a difficult question, but the difficulty began at the time
that the Merchant Shipping Act of 1864 was brought in. Those who brought in
that Act might have looked down the vista of time and seen the whole of the altera-
tions in the Statute Book as they now stand, as a necessary consequence of their
beginning de novo without knowing what they were going to begin about. I want to
say something about the status of the masters in merchant ships, because at the
conclusion of the session of the House of Commons last year, Mr. Brassey made some
allusion to bringing forward some measure to improve the status of shipmasters.
Now I will ask, how are you going to improve the status of the shipmaster, ab extra
or ab intra ? You cannot do it ab extra, but you can do it ab intra, and almost
by a stroke of the pen. I contend this, that the whole system of the education of
Officers in the Mercantile Marine at the present moment is as thoroughly upside
down as it would be possible for the ingenuity of a fiend to make it. It has been
decided that we shall all pass examinations, but it has never been decided that we
should be educated upon those first principles that make the education almost a
matter of pastime,— of pastime almost to the youth, but certainly a pastime to the
up-grown man. We are examined upon what ? Upon rules ? Do we know the
reason of our rules ? Do we know anything about spherical geometry ? Do we know
anything about plane geometry, or trigonometry p Can we tell the why and thn
wherefore, or the because, that lies at the back of the rule, and makes the rule a
rule ? You shall test it in this way. You shall collect the whole of those in this
country who are engaged in teaching navigation, and you shall take the gentleman
and examine him first, who is the inventor of the sphereograph and ask him how thev
set about the education of men ? Thirty shillings is paid by a smart young fellow who
thinks his arithmetic was pretty good when he was young. He is ground through
the rules for second mate ; he is coached over and over again, and he goes up and
]«sses. For 10*. or 15*. more he can be ground at the end of another voyage for
only mate ; for 10#. or 20*., he can then get all the rules for passing for mate ; and
then, at his leisure, he can go on grinding to pass bis examination for Master ; and,
if you take him the day after he passes his examination for Master, and tell him, " I

•«

<<
it

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 133

M do not want any of these calculations worked oat with those niceties that have
M been impressed upon you, but will you tell me the why and the wherefore that
" lies at the back of the rule, and makes the rule a rule,* he cannot do so. Now
boys learn that at the Blue Coat School. Last year I wae down at the East End of
London with two Officers belonging to one of the oldest and most honoured firms in
this country. Naturally we began to talk on this subject, and we talked much in
this way. The elder, the chief Officer, a splendid fellow, said, " There, if I had
" been educated like that man," pointing to the second Officer, " I should be ten
" times the man I am ;" and he certainly looked all over a man. " But," he said,
" the difference between us is this. He .was educated at the Blue Coat School : he
" chose to go to sea ; he got 25 guineas and a watch ; and only the other day he
went back to that school, after being away five years, and passed his examination
with credit, and got 25 guineas more ; bat I wan weaned upon rules, and brought
up on rules, and now the whole effort of my life is to find out why the rule is a
rule." As Mr. Lindsay says, in the fourth volume of his book, owners are sorely
in want of men who have had their minds opened by education, so as to be fit and
honourable representatives of them in foreign countries, and able to conduct their
buainess properly ; and one of the most difficult things that a shipmaster has to
do in the present day, though he has taken his ship all round the world, is to
pail through the difficulties that beset him. We have initiated training-scho >ls for
the seamen of all the world, and now we are going to initiate training ships for
ourselves. That is upside down, and we say we are going to educate those boys
as a matter of benevolence, when we ought to say, we are doing our duty to our
neighbour as solemnly as we can that we may do our duty to our God. Whether
it is better to have ahips or training establishments on shore is a matter
that will settle itrelf. What we want is- to redeem these poor gutter-snipes
who otherwise must go to prison for things which are regarded as crimes in
them, but which are never mentioned in a well-behaved house. , One half of them
do not know better; but these are God's seedling?, and it is our business
to educate them, and they will go by a natural process into the Mercantile Marine,
or the Navy, or some other industry ; but do you think it is rational to expect them
and their parents to sit down and give a written obligation that at the end of a
certain time they are going to pay you back by a number of years' service ? Do
you think you can ask any boy of 16 or 18 to make an agreement to pay back in
time of service the value of the education he has got ? Why, the very boys whom
we get into the Navv at 18, when they come to man's estate, see perfectly well that ^
the bargain, from their point of view, does not sit fair and square upon their *
shoulders, and they leave. How is the British Merchant Servica going to afford you
anything like a supply of seamen when that service does not rear its own ? How do
you suppose the British Mercantile Marine is going to thrive when there is such a
large body of foreigners of all nations demoralising them ? There was a time when
this was a country ; now it is a shop. Well, if that is the case, then abandon
all these discussions ; do not let us have any more meetings of this sort. Say
what you are going to do, and do it. If the State, as I contend, has a right to the
nervice ot every man in the Merchant Service, let us have some sensible way of
combining the two, no empirical ideas, nothing of that sort ; but you will find that
on board a merchant ship— and I, as a master of a merchant ship, know them fore
and aft^— our men have no sympathy with the Navy, because they are are now a
totally different class of men from those I lived with in the forecastle in 1834 or 1835.
There is no similarity at all. Why, on board the last ship but one I had, we could
talk eight languages among 27 men ; no matter what you said, or what language
you used, so long as you gave the necessary pantomime. We have heard a good deal
about provisions in the Merchant Service being bad, and I have Been a considerable
quantity, and perhaps tasted it. I will ask vou, how is it a thousand barrels of
meat, condemned for the Royal Kaval Service, are passed out through the ship
chandlers, provision merchants, and so on, and find their way on board merchant
ships ? Only the other day, a young fri'vad of mine told me that he was lying in
Buenos Ayres, and, when the chief officer had gone ashore, they look the opportunity
of calling alongside a gunboat there and asking the Commander to send a Lieu-
tenant on board to examine their food, and the Lieutenant came on board and

134 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

condemned the whole of the stores, and it came out of one of Her Majesty's yards.
Now, with regard to the question of apprenticeship, it is said that it is impossible
to re-enact the law making apprenticeship compulsory, as though we could not take
two steps backward with the view of making a bold spring forward. I do not see
why every sailing ship should not be obliged to take a certain number of apprentices
for a certain period, according to her tonnage. The difficulty is nothing if you will
but do it ; but if you go round about and talk all over this country about it, every-
body has a private lion in their path, which they decline to go by on any considera-
tion whatever, though they will go over and look at their neighbour's lion. There is
another reason why foreigners ought not to be placed in command of our ships.
A ship is an integral part of our Empire. The master is a man under authority ;
the Board of Trade sits pretty hard upon him ; but he says to this man, " Go," and
he goeth ; and I say that such a man ought to be a son of the soil. I say that
every foreigner whom you permit to stand under your flag, putting your laws in force
against his ship's company, is occupying the place of a son of the soil ; and in his place
there is a son of the soil walking about who is disaffected by what passes around
liim, and he does not join the Royal Naval Service and make it that bully service
which it ought to be. You have lost all the esprit de corps out of the Service, not
because men are less honourable than they were 45 years ago when we swept the
sea, hut simply because you have done nothing at all to foster it, but everything
deliberately to kill it. At this present moment the two services are separated, and
one difficulty that you have is this : you do not hear the truth. You have Royal
Commissions, and Special Commissions, and Committees, and you get all the most
respectable men from all the great employs to give evidence. Now, you will find
that the men in the American, the Canadian, the West Indian, the Pacific lines,
know nothing about the Merchant Service. I was in command in the West Indian
mail for some years, and in fulfilment of our duties in carrying out our daily walk
in life, we hardly fame in contact with anybody except our brother officers, and a
class of passengers of the highest respectability, from whom we could learn by con-
versation at the table that which -we never learned before. Such men have no
sympathy for the Merchant Service, and they really do look down on the Merchant
Service. I beg their pardon, they do not look down ; they look over it. They do
not. know our wants, our troubles, and the difficulties that exist now between the
master and the owner. We cease now to enjoy the confidence of our owners. The
telegraph does all the work. We are but the bell-wether to take our ship across
the sea and back again ; but if we have to be the lawyer of our ships, to instruct
counsel, and to do the whole thing from beginning to end, so as to be conscientious
and good servants to our owners, there is the position of difficulty, and that is
where we find that we are always behind hand. I do not presume to go into the
question of the proportion of foreigners to Englishmen, but I can say this, that it
is no use to introduce decimals into those proportions. Decimals do not belong to
these things. We are practical men. One more or one less as the years vary
one against the other, is not two chucks of a brass farthing in the argument.
The Englishman is deteriorated ; you cannot find him in the quality, you cannot
find him in the physical stamina, and you cannot find him in the ability. In fact,
what we used to call A.B.'s are gone out of the Merchant Service, because the
Navy Reserve has got the Stite of all the men, and, if you take all the best men out
of all the steamers, who is going to lay out the coal to make all those steamers
useful ? There is a practical way of looking at these things, and, if we are to be
fostered, — grand -mothered, I believe, is the proper phrase now, — pray let it be
done in an out-and-out. practical spirit.1

1 The present system of legislating for the British Merchant Service is the miserable
system of working tide's works without even taking " the young of the Jlood" close
in shore, and then standing boldly out and crossing the body of the flood stream so as
to make " a tide and half tide," and so long as this style of legislating for the greatest
industry in the world obtains, so long will all our difficulties continue to increase.
We are in a most critical position, the eyes of our competitors — of all the world —
are upon us ; and if we are not recalled from our present condition of fatuous and
judicial delusion, the finale must be the entire collapse of this nation. Trade and

TBE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 135

Lord Esukoton, M.P. : I will trespass, for a few moments, on a ground that will
commend itself to the hearts of everybody here. If there is one feeling stronger than
another in the breast of every Englishman, and I hope every Englishwoman also, it
is that of justice, and I wish to be allowed to say one word in justice to foreign
seamen, because I hare this morning had an opportunity of conversing with a man
who probably knows this subject as well as or better than any other man at this
moment in England. I shall not mention any names, but some friends here, who
know the shipping interest, will recognise whom I mean. He has been engaged in
the port of Liverpool — a very good sceue for such labours — upon a close inquiry, for
four years, into the condition of the Merchant Service. Therefore, when I state him
as my authority, it is no mean authority. Now, I am going to state a fact which he
told me, which no doubt will startle a good many gentlemen here present. There
are, making all deductions, not more than 40,000 able seamen in the Merchant
Service of this country. Out of the 160,000 or ] 70.000 British Beamen employed in
ships clearing and entering British ports, there are not more than 40,000 A/B.'s that are
thoroughly able seamen ! And how many of those able seamen does this meeting sup-
pose are foreigners ? Not less than 15,000 ! That is a fact to remarkable that I think
it will startle a great many persons who hear it. But let us follow that out a moment,
and observe our position. First of all let me say, in justice to the foreigner whose
character has been rather lightly spoken of to-day, that I am in a position to state,
without fear of contradiction, that some of the best seamen in the Merchant Service
at this moment — I say it as an Englishman, with sorrow, but with truth — are
foreigners, and those men are drawn from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany.
Now, we know that the character of those men is very like our own, and they improve
upon our character, because they are more docile, and more obedient, and more
loyal to their superiors. That is a remark that I believe is a correct one. But now
look at the position that we should be placed in, supposing a sudden outbreak of war
were to occur, and we have had bitter experience, not in this country, but in Europe,
of what an outbreak of war means. It is a sudden and a sharp blow. Supposing a
war, on any large scale, were to break out, we should probably lose at once something
like 15,000 able seamen, because they are foreigners. Well, then, I come to the
joint my honourable friend has pressed upon us, and it is an official point which I
have often heard in tbe House of Commons pressed, with some power and much
authority, by persons in high official situations. They talk very much, and rather
big, about having 12,000 Naval Reserve. Now, I want to ask any First Lord of the
Admiralty, or anyone connected with the Admiralty, how many of those men do
they suppose they can get on a sudden outbreak of war t I do not believe they
would get more than one-third of those men. They might get 4,000, and think
themselves very lucky if they got them. But then, if we are to lose something near
to 15,000 able seamen — foreigners — and we are only to command, on a sudden out-
break of war, the services of 4,000 Naval Reserve men, why, our position is a very
serious one. Tou have not got, to start with, above 40,000 altogether, and you have
got the whole commerce of this country to carry on, and at the same time you have
to form the first line of defence against any combination of naval power that you
may have to meet. It is an extraordinary thing to me that we are asked to vote
vast sums of money, year by year, and expensive schemes are presented to us of
mobilization of forces, and formation of camps, and fortifications to lock up— God
knows— how many thousands of our troops, but the question of our Naval Militia
seems to me never to enter into the minds of our legislators. We have gone
on, for years, upon Bonaparte's motto, which is the falsest in the world, " Nous
ne faisons rien nous laissons faire." To trust the defence of these islands
to such a maxim as that seems to me the height of folly. We must take

commence are a means to national strength, and by these the nation is to be main-
tained ; but if the nation is to be legislated for, as if our sole ambition is to be a
shop, governed by a sliding and descending scale of conventional honesty, then our
doom is already written. In conclusion, we have had and enjoyed the prestige of
the past solely because we are the trustees of the future and yet unborn generations.
What if we have betrayed this great National Trust ?

136 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

some step for the comprehensive organisation of our Naval Militia. I beliere
that is the first duty of our statesmen, but 1 hare not the freight or authority
to Bay what the exact form that it should take should be. I augur well, how-
ever, from the efforts of such men as my honourable friend, and these public
discussions, which, I trust, will awaken the mind of the country to the vital
importance of this subject. I will only ask leave to say one more word. We
have heard a great deal about the demoralisation of the seamen. I have
attended to this subject a good many years ; I do not pretend to be an authority,
because I have not the means of becoming so, but by constant attention you must
learn something, and I do not believe that, in themselves, the seamen are one bit
worse, but probably rather better, than they were ; Jmt there is a system of engaging
and discharging seamen in this country which has been in practice for a long time,
and which is most detrimental to discipline. I allude to the engagement of the crews
at the shipping office, and I will tell, in two words, what I - believe to be at the
bottom of a good deal of that feeling, not of disloyalty, but of disrespect and dis-
regard for their officers, which is fatal to discipline, and \ihioh is engendered and
fostered by that system. The teamen are not often very highly educated men,
or men of the world, although they travel a good deal, and they have a sort of
idea in their minds that they owe a double allegiance, to the shipowner, in the
first place, and to the shippmg*master, who is a Board of Trade officer, in the
next place. That system of engaging crews under the control and superintendence
of the Board of Trade official, which the shipping-master really is, tends to
produce that feeling, and tends, moreover, to prevent the master having the
opportunity of making the acquaintance of his crew before he goes to sea. I
believe that that is a most mischievous system for the country, because unless
you can bring them into relationship with one another, it is impossible to expect
that those cordial relations which should exist, will exist between them. They
may form themselves in the course of a long voyage, but then there is a system
pursued which is very destructive to discipline, and that is the recording of the
offences and the reading them out from the log to the seamen, however petty the
offentes may be. That causes, in his mind a rankling feeling of antipathy to his
officer, knowing that he will be punished or fined when he gets on nhore. That
is a very bad system. I won't detain you Ionizer, but I think if this question of the
shipping office is really looked into, you will find it was a very great mistake to
sigpersede, even for the convenience afforded by the shipping-office, the old system
of engaging the crews under the responsibility of the master, as he chose, some few
days before the ship sailed.

Mr. Cobbt : I do not intend to make any observations at this late stage of the
proceedings, but 1 wish to propose that this very interesting discussion be adjourned.
I think there are a great many gentlemen who would like to express their views on
the subject. We have heard some very able speeches, and some very different ex-
pressions of opinion, and I think it might perhaps be an advantage u this subject
were still further discussed. If it is the will of the meeting, I should move that
this discussion be adjourned.

The motion having been seconded by Captain Pim, B.N., with Mr. Brassey's
acquiescence, the meeting was adjourned to Thursday, 24th instant, at three o'clock.
The Chairman : Before we separate, I am sure you will join with me in thanking
Mr. Braasey for his very interesting lecture.

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 137

Adjourned Discussion.

Thursday, February 24th, 1876.
Admiral Sir HASTINGS R. YELVERTON, G.C.B., in the Chair.

Mr. Cobby c Sir Hastings Yelverton, Ladies, and Gentlemen : When I moved the
adjournment of this debate, I was scarcely aware of the responsibility it devolved
upon me, but still, as a practical shipowner and as one who has had considerable
experience on the question before us, I may be allowed to make a few remarks.
I have listened with very much pleasure indeed to Mr. Brassey's able, moderate,
and suggestive paper, and with many of his suggestions I most heartily agree, yet
to some I must take exception. Briefly alluding to some of the principal features
of his paper, the first point that struck me was this, he rather doubted whether our
sailors had deteriorated as a body. I think those who have had practical experience
will admit that as a class they have deteriorated. I will not deny that, perhaps at
the present time there are as many good sailors as there were twenty years ago, but
then are certainly twice as many bad ones. Looking at the rapid progress of our
trade, it was scarcely possible that the quality could have been kept up to the
standard. Now, a great many reasons can be urged why sailors have deteriorated ;
one reason is that steamers employ a large number of seamen, but do not make
sailors. Another reason is, our ships are now fitted in a different way to what they
were yean ago, in fact, the whole study of the shipowner is how to dispense with
what we call skilled labour, that is to do as much work on deck as we can, and to
render ourselves as much as possible independent of that skilled labour which we
cannot always obtain. This answers the purpose to a certain extent, but when any
emergency or any accident occurs we find ourselves at a great loss. Mr. Brassey
referred to the fact that a fewer number of men were now employed to man a given
amount of registered tonnage of shipping than formerly, and that this proved that
the quality of the men cannot have deteriorated. This argument, however, falls
through, when we consider that ships are now of a very much larger class than
formerly, and require fewer men comparatively to man them. Apart from this, the
nxperiority in fitting of the modern class of ship would fully account for the
difference he refers to. While claiming that sailors are pretty much as they were
formerly, he thinks, and we all think and hope, that some means may be devised for
improving their condition, and a number of the suggestions he threw out are
deserving of our best attention. He refers to the want of encouragement which
has hitherto existed for any special exertion on the part of the sailor and the in-
»ufficiency of pay. He acknowledges that this last defect has been in a measure
remedied, and that the pay is now as much in proportion as in other trades,
especially taking into account the facilities of learning the trade, if jou may call it
one ; it is scarcely so now, that is, there are so many who go into it, who have not
gone through the preparatory training requisite to make good seamen. Mr. Brassey
also referred to the advance notes. This is a very difficult question, and oue which
has had the careful attention of our General Shipowners' Committee, and is a
subject on which I should like to say a few words. We all deplore the abuses
which he described, but 1 think the remedy might be in many cases worse than the
disease. It was not a shipowner's measure, it was designed purely for the benefit of
the sailor. The shipowner would much prefer to give no advance, and would be
billing to give higher wages to dispense with advance, but we find we cannot obtain
tailors without it. Perhaps the most practical way would be gradually to reduce
the amount from a month to half a month's advance, till the seamen are trained to
more provident habits, as now they must have some tiling to start with. Besides, if

138 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

you do not give an advance, you must introduce a Tory objectionable feature on
board your ships, namely, the truck system, which has a great many abuses con-
nected with it. However, I think the last defect to which Mr. Brassey referred,
was the most important one, that is the want of systematic training for our sailors.
The great bulk of our sailors are not trained, or at least the training is of such a
slight character that you can scarcely call it training at all. After being perhaps a
year and a half in a coaster, they join our ships as A.B.'s. Our captains, of course.
know that these arc not competent A.B.'s, but still they are all so much alike that
it is difficult to discriminate among them, I will give you an instance in point.
I had a ship of 1,800 tons lately arrive at Calcutta, the captain wrote to me with
reference to her, and he said, " With regard to the crew, they are very willing and
" are fairly able to make and take in sail, but I can only find four or five men out
" of the whole crew competent to steer the ship." (She carries a crew of forty men,
all told.) Now this ship is remarkably easily steered and has all the best appliance*
for steering. This will show you that the quality is certainly not what we would
like to see. One of the remedies Mr. Brassey proposes is the classification of sea-
men. This, at first sight, looks very well indeed, but I think, as was pointed out
at the last meeting, it opens up a very dangerous question, that is the question of
Trades' Unions, and all who have had experience of Trades' Unions, would be very
sorry to see anything of the kind introduced at sea. We have enough of dis-
comforts and annoyances without having this system introduced in our ships. We
can very well understand, if the ships were ready for sea, the Trades' Unions might
have it in their power to stop the ship and make their own terms, and therefore,
while it looks well, the dangers are so great that shipowners as a body would fight
shy of it. With regard to discharge, the discharge note should be a certificate of
classification and our captain b are to blame that it is not more so. Of course any
one will toko seamen who have good discharges for a number of years, and some
captains will only take men who have good discharges, and I think this is the right
track to go on. If a man cannot produce a discharge it is a sure sign that there is
something wrong about him. I have a case in point. I had a ship which lately
went down to Oravesend with one of the crew deficient, and I was surprised to find
the captain refusing to Bhip a powerful looking man who presented himself, simply
because he had no discharge. The consequence was he had to take two, because the
men who had discharges were not up to the mark in physique.

A suggestion was thrown out by Mr. Brassey that we should retain picked seamen
while in port. I think that is scarcely practicable, at least in sailing snips after long
voyages. I know that while in port they won't stay with us, and if they join a week
or two before the time, as we sometimes allow them to do, they are comparatively
useless, as the deck men, who are trades unionists, will not work with them. Another

Soint he brought out was the personal intercourse of the owners with the seamen.
off, I cannot see very well how that can be accomplished. We, of course, as he
well knows, do not take cruises with our ships, and the only intercourses we may
have is in occasionally going down to Gravesend, when I do not think, as a rule, the
men are in a fit state for social intercourse. We now come to the important
question of training ships. This is a question occupying a great deal of public
attention and a great deal of shipowners1 attention. It is regarded by many a« a
panacea for all the evils connected with our seamen, and many philanthropists look
upon it as combining two very desirable objects, viz., getting rid of a dangerous
class of our rising population and making them worthy members of society. I do
not altogether agree that it is a panacea for all the evils, but I believe it has many
good features, and therefore should be encouraged. Unfortunately the great bulk of
those who are at present in our training ships, are not the class of boys we would
select as our apprentices to make seamen of. I would much prefer a few lads
brought up on the coast or in the country, to any number of these waifs of society :
in fact you can scarcely expect that they will turn out anything but indifferently.
Their early training and influences have been certainly not of the best character.
If a better class of boys can be induced to join, the result would no doubt be
different. I think, moreover, it is a very artificial system. Comparatively little
training can be done on shore. If you wish to train a boy you must send him to
sea, and I would suggest that proper cruisers should be fitted out merely for the

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 130

purpose of instructing these boys. First they would require a certain amount of
training on shore and then be transferred to these special cruisers, for the purpose
of teaching them something of their duties at sea. I do not think Mr. Brassey's
plan for subsidising owners carrying apprentices would work ; I do not think we
would like to be so subsidized. We do not require this artificial help. We do
carry apprentices, all the large shipowners do carry apprentices, and many not only
carry them without premiums but give premiums instead of receiving them. I may
say, in answ3r to some remarks made by gentlemen who spoke at the last meeting
about foreigners, and especially foreign Officers haying the preference, that four or
fire of our present captains served their time in our employ, and all the others have
been Officers with us, so that we do not forsake those who have served us. We take
apprentices really with the object of making our Officers ; it is not with the idea of
making sailors, they are of too high a class for that. Tou cannot well combine the
two classes, you cannot take apprentices and ordinaries or training-ship boys
together, because, as in our own practice, if we take apprentices we must have all
the rest A.B.'s, as we find when we do ship all A.B.'s, that there are a great many
very ordinary ones among them. With regard to the pension fund for raising the
status of seamen, I think that is a very desirable object, but you will not get Jack
to subscribe to it. If it is done at all, I have no hesitation in saying it will be done
at the expense of the shipowner, that is, whatever is put into the Pension Fund will
be practically a tax on the shipowners over and above the wages. The men will not
be mulcted of their wages for any such object. The foreign element has been
alluded to several times in this debate, and we cannot very well dispense with it.
A great many of these foreigners are the best seamen we can get, all, in fact, from
the northern coasts (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) are the best and the most
trustworthy men. In fact, we make sure that if such men sign articles, they will
come on board sober and fit for their duties, and, therefore, we give them the pre-
ference. We do not care for any southerners, as we find that they are not so trust-
worthy nor such competent seamen. The northern men, as a rule, are steady, sober,
and very attentive to their duties, and are trained seamen ; brought up from boy-
hood along their coasts, they are really our very best men and we would certainly
miss them. Lord Eslington made a very telling remark when he referred to what
would occur if all these 12,000 foreigners had to be dispersed in the event of a war.
Now, I think the practical effect would be, that that would not occur. The sailors
of any particular nation with which we were at war would perhaps leave our
employ, but the bulk would stay where they were. Mr. Brassey referred, with
much feeling, to the dangers and temptations that beset the sailor. We all acknow-
ledge that, and have to make great allowances, and no one can think of these dangers
and temptations to which the sailor is subject, without having his sympathies roused
in his behalf and allowing very large latitude for his misdemeanors.

Mr. Stiblino Lacon : Sir Hastings Yelverton, I rise at this early period of the
discussion to ask your permission to read a statement which appeared in the
Skipping Gazette of last evening. Tou are aware that delegates are now sitting in
London from all the ports of the United Kingdom, I think as many as fifty, and
this statement has been prepared in order that it may be submitted simultaneously
to them and to this meeting. It contains a distinct proposition, because in reading
the paper of the Honourable Member, I am at a loss to know what his proposition
i», or in fact what is at this moment the proposition before this meeting. 1 do not
agree with the Honourable Member with regard to seamen's pensions and seamen's
funds. The thing has been tried over and over again, and what between the mal-
administration of these funds, and a variety of causes, the funds are squandered,
and seldom get into the hands of those for whose benefit the fund was established.
At the latter part of this statement, when I allude to the employment of the young
Officers of the Navy, I believe I shall adduce facts which perhaps will rather sur-
prise you. Since the last meeting I have been among shipowners. They had heard
of our very satisfactory meeting here on Friday, and they asked me, " Who are you,
** and what are you ?" — of course alluding to the Institution. " What is your con-
'• ftxtution, and who are your members ?" But when I told them that the discus-
sions in this theatre were open to all comers, they said that they were very glad to
hear such opinions, and especially were they desirous of hearing the opinions of

140 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

naval Officers ; and even should this discussion involve another adjournment, they
hoped that another adjournment would take place, in order that the subject might
be thoroughly thrashed out. Now, Sir, the course which I wish to pursue is to read
the following communication which I furnished to the Shipping Gazette, and it is
headed " The Supply of Seamen :" —

" When the controversial points in connection with our Mercantile Marine

" are in a fair way of settlement, this subject (the supply of Seamen) will remain,

" and muBt become paramount, for it involves not only the well-being of our Mer-

" cantile Marine, but also the prospective defence of the country. No subject, said

" Lord Eslington, in his speech of this day at the Royal United Service Institution,

" is of more importance to the country, and no subject has been more thoroughly

" neglected. When the deputation ol shipowners waited upon Mr. Disraeli a

" short time ago, if, instead of a series of resolutions, they had come with, say 6rf.

" a ton in their hands, the Premier would probably have said to them, ' Did I not

" ' tell you, gentlemen, that you were masters 01 the position, and now that we

" ' understand each other we can work together, and see whether something cannot

" ' now be done for your benefit as well as for the good of the country, for Parlia-

" ' ment has reported that there ought to bo a greater interchange between the

" ' Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine. But no words of an Act of Purlia-

" ' ment, nor action of the Government, will put things right in ft day. If an evil

" ' has been for years accumulating upon us, it may take years of hearty unanimity

" ' to get things back into a healthy condition. Above all, gentlemen, you must

re-establish the old relation of master and servant, and you must take care

" ' that your servants are not driven into the coal mines and workshops of

" ' England. The days are gone by, let us hope, when they will be sent to gaol

" ' with hard labour for refusing to go to sea in unseaworthy ships at the risk of

" ' their lives ; while others of them have left the sea, and have not waited for such

" ' tender treatment.' Five years ago, by returns from Liverpool, it appeared that

" nearly 70 per cent, of the shipowners were in favour of compulsory apprenticeship ;

" and within the last few days I am informed, upon high authority, that they are now

" all but unanimous on the subject. But compulsory apprenticeship would in these

" days be met by arguments and obstacles which would be fatal when it was brought

" before the Legislature. The problem is this : the boys of the country cannot get

" to sea, and the boy is father of the man, and it is most important in this great

" maritime country that we should have trained men (putting aside in these days of

" steam the old term ' sailor ') with sea legs and sea stomachs, and a readiness

" of resource in moments of emergency and danger, which no landsman can either

" appreciate er understand, and which can only be acquired at sea when young.

" The word ' compulsory ' has, as applied to this question, this meaning — that

" all should be equally weighted, for what is obligatory upon all would be a

" hardship upon none ; and the same argument would apply to our competition with

" foreigners, who, equally, with ourselves, must bring up their own boys. Assuming

" that a tax of 6d. a-ton is imposed, those shipowners who take boys ought to have

" the tax remitted, or be paid an annual sum for each boy from the general fund.

" What that sum shall be must be a matter of detail, but it must be made the interest

" of the shipowner to take boys, or, at leaat, that he shall not be in a worse position

" than his neighbour by so doing ; all such boys at the age of 18 — not obligatory, nor

" unless they shall so elect — to receive 12 or 18 months' training and education at

" the expense of the country, partly in such sea- going training ships as may be avail-

" able, and partly in Naval barracks (great stress has been laid upon this, in order

" that they may receive such training and discipline on shore as is given in France,

" Germany, and Russia, and which cannot be acquired on board-ship) ; at the expira-

" tion of the training, every man to be his own master, and henceforth free to earn

" his own livelihood, some by volunteering for the Navy, and the rest entering the

" Merchant Service ; no future retaining fee, training money, or pension, the accumu-

" lating consequences of which are so serious, that Mr. Goschen said he would take an

" early opportunity of bringing the subject before the House, which he never did. In

" the course of time we should have a large body of trained men in the country, with

" the aforesaid sea legs and sea stomachs, and, in the event of war, the country is

" rich enough to engage them at war wages ; the question of pay during the time of

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY". * 141

14
it

**■
U

training, in order to make the system attractive, being matter of detail ; and such
pa j at the end of the training would form a small fund for each man to begin with,
" when he seta up for himself and enters the labour market. Eventually it might be
" found that we might get rid of the present system of training boys exclusively for
M the Nary at a cost of £60 per boy, as compared with £19 per boy in the ordinary
44 training ships. Moreover, the Navy find great difficulty and inconvenience in em-
" ploying the number of boys they are obliged to rear (3,000 annually) : they are too
" good, said Sir Rodney Mundy, and he would rather have a practical seaman before
" the mast than one who could work a double altitude. I am no advocate for
" pensions for seamen any more than I am for pensions in any other relation of life.
" Bj the scheme now proposed, a man under twenty years of age is enabled to make a
" fair start in life as a skilled labourer, and we want to make him a reasonable being,
" careful and provident, and it must rest with him whether he will provide for him-
" self in his old age or take his chance of the workhouse. Instead of retiring our
" young Officers, even Sub-Lieutenants, wholesale from the Navy, as is now done at
44 great expense to the country, surely means might be devised by which shipowners
" might be induced to employ them during peace, as is done in France, Germany, and
Russia, and thus enable them to acquire and keep up a practical knowledge oi their
profession, and gradually to supplant the 1,630 foreign Officers, 968 of whom are
Captains in command of English ships ! who, according to a Parliamentary return
of last session, are employed and have obtained certificates in the British Mercantile
Marine since 1860. Until recently one Englishman was in command of a Q-erman
ship, but he has been removed by an order of the German Government. In future,
none but Germans are to command German ships. Surely there » something very
** short-sighted in all this — 968 foreign Captains sailing in command of English ships
" under the English flag when our own Officers are seeking employment ! Therj
" have been 4,000 applications for Plimsoll Inspectorships ! Is not an Englishman,
" when freed from Government interference and certificate, as good as any foreigner ?
" Might not foreigners, in the event of war, without waiting for an embargo, quietly
" sail off with their respective charges to seek refuge in their own ports ?"

Science has led us a pretty dance with regard to ironclads and 81-ton guns, but
i* not the improvement of our personnel of more vital importance ? Ships and
guns, wood and iron, won't fight without the gallant hearts to man them.

Captain Bedford Pim, R.N., M.P : The question before us is — " How best to
" improve and keep up the seamen of the country ?" I, for one, feel very strongly
that there is no question at all to compare with this in importance. It is the most
serious question of the day. I take a very great interest indeed in the matter, both
from a national and a personal point of view. In early life I went to sea in the
merchant service, and have been more or less closely in contact with the merchant
service ever since. At this moment I am counsel to a large body of English seamen
at the east end of London. The London Mutual Seamen s Protection Society — the
largest society, I believe, in the kingdom, with a number of men affiliated to it in
the northern ports. I propose, in the first place, to put before the meeting, as
briefly as possible, the state and condition of the Mercantile Marine. The number
of men in the Mercantile Marine at the present moment, according to the Board of
Ttmde returns, is 200,000. Of this, not more than one-third, or 70,000, are blue
jackets ; the rest are all sorts of men, picked up anywhere, stokers, cooks, and the
like. Of these 70,000 more than 50,000 are foreigners. This is a most serious
affair — 60,000 of these 70,000 are foreigners. Now we possess in the Mercantile
Marine at least 22,000 ships, so that if you put on one side the decimals of my
friend, Mr. Brassey, you have about one real English blue jacket to each merchant
ship. When a man comes to a shipping-office, and his name is called over, he may
be registered under any name he likes, there is no necessity for him even to op*n his
mouth, and it is quite impossible for tho shipping-master to know whether he is a
foreigner or an Englishman. On that account the Board of Trade returns ar* per-
fectly valueless in the matter of discriminating between natives and foreigners.
Mr. Brassey told us the proportion of foreigner to British seamen stood at 10*87.
1 am ftrj sorry to be obliged to contradict him, but I know practically from many
ships passing through *my borough, and having a great deal of information about
them, that the crews of British ships are composed on an average of three-fourths

142 HOW 'BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

of foreigners — at least it is so with the ships passing Gravesend. I have known
ships myself going to sea with absolutely every one of the crew on hoard a foreigner,
from the Captain downwards. Why the case of the English ship " Lennie," still
going on, must be familiar to all, the three murdered men were the only English on
hoard. Lost year I obtained a return in ihe House of Commons, and I think the
figures are perfectly dreadful for any Englishman to read, — " Foreign masters, 968 ;
44 foreign mates, 595 ; foreign engineers, 77 ;" total, 1,630 foreigners in the position
of Officers in the British Mercantile Marine, taking ships over the world under the
British flag. I ask, where would ships so commanded and officered go in time of
war ? I do not hesitate to say if, in event of war, we had to collect all the British
seamen in the Mercantile Marine, we could not collect more than 20,000 men. I
am perfectly satisfied you would be unable to get 20,000 real British seamen, and
that would, malgri the decimals of my friend, Mr. Brassey, be rather less than one
for every British ship. With regard to the Mercantile Marine being a feeder of
our Service, the Royal Navy, in the present day, I am afraid that is an idea about
us fallacious as the idea that we have a large supply of seamen. We find, by
a return, that the number of merchant seamen who entered the Royal Navy in
1873 was 382, and that there were more than 800 deserters. Last year we find
that less than 200 seamen entered the Royal Navy, and 1,100 deserted. Mr. Brrssey
is quite right in saying, there are no less than 16,000 men " waste " in the
Mercantile Marine per annum. It w a rery sad thing, but there is no doubt the
calculation has been made most carefully. I see a gentleman here, not far from
me, who is well able to verify this calculation. 16,000 is a frightful waste in this
Mercantile Marine of ours, and how is this to be filled up ? Taking every boy that
you can possibly " scare up " out of the training-ships, you cannot send to sea more
than 1,000 at the very outside. The apprenticeship system yields us about 4,500.
If my memory is right, in 1845 we had about 16,000 apprentices, while last year
there were only 4,500. Adding those to the 1,000 boys from the training-ships,
which is far in excess of the mark, you have 5,500 to fill up a gap of 16,000. How
do you fill up that gap ? Why, with foreigners, or with the outcasts of our own
country. Mr. Corry is not the only owner whose captains write home to complain
that out of their crew they have only four men who can take the helm. I have
known ships of 1,800 tons go to sea with only two men on board who could take
the helm. Altogether there is no doubt the present condition of the Mercantile
Marine, viewed from that aspect, is as deplorable as it is possible to conceive. I
will now touch slightly upon the reasons which, in my humble judgment, have
caused this deplorable condition of the Mercantile Marine. In the first place, we
do not train any boys at all. In this country, we have 100,000 pauper-boys, under
sixteen years of age, more or less on the high road to become criminals, and we
have 100,000 boys, the sons of parents who are so poor that they are next door to
paupers. Now, you could not by any possibility have a finer material to bring up
for seamen. Look at the institution, of which I think the gallant Admiral near me
is one of the visiting justices at Feltham ; look at the way in which the boy« of the
county of Middlesex are there trained. If that sort of institution were established
all over the country, see how easy it would be to turn out 20,000 good boys every
year, to fill up the gap in our Mercantile Marine, if Englishmen would only put
their shoulder to the wheel ! We want at least 20,000 boys, trained for sea everv
year, and it could be done with the greatest possible ease. Another reason for tun
deplorable condition of the Mercantile Marine is the really wretched life that the
men live on board ship. As a rule, I do not consider that the merchant seaman is
at all properly fed. I do not consider that he is well treated, and I should like to
read to you a petition drawn up by the seamen themselves, and presented by me to
Parliament last week. The petition is to this effect : — " That your petitioners,* British
" seamen, employed in the British Mercantile Marine, are subject to great disad-
" vantages, by reason of the extensive employment of unqualified foreigners, and
" other serious drawbacks, which can only be remedied by practical legislation
" administered by a responsible head."

This is a petition drawn up by the seamen themselves, and one almost in iden-
tically the same words was presented by me the session bafore last; so that you
see it is not all a new thing. These men have considered their case very carefully

. THE BE A MEN OF THE COUNTBY. 143

indeed. They have put it down in black and white, and I think it is an admirable
answer to my friend Mr. Brassey's question, as to " How best to improve and keep up
the number of seamen of the country," because the men here speak their own words
on the matter. With respect to the nature of the ships themselves, that also has
been a fruitful source of the men leaving the Mercantile Marine. There is hardly
an employment on shore for which a tailor is not fitted, for we mast all admit
that the sailor is a very handy man. One of the best merchant seamen I ever
met is a man 1 have picked up, and is now my under gardener, and he can do
almost anything. There is no doubt whatever that these men can get employment
on shore, and there is no doubt whatever the reason they leave the Merchant Ser-
vice is because it is in such a condition that a good man won't stop. To my certain
knowledge, in the group of collieries round about Shields, there are no less than
400 EngUsh seamen working under ground at this moment, all ready to answer the
beck and call of the mother institution, the Mutual Seamen's Protection Society in
London. I believe they would come forward in the event of a war directly, but at
the present moment they are earning a living in the bowels of the earth in pre-
ference to going to sea. I have taken the opportunity of bringing down a little
model with me, to show one reason why seamen do not care to go to sea in
the ships of the present day. The new-fashioned ships of the present day are
altogether unlike what we used to know and love so much when I was a young man.
That (taking up the model) is the shape of the ship, three and a -half or four times
her beam, in which we went to sea when we were young. Thirty odd years ago,
when I went to sea, we had more ships than we have at the present moment.
I admit we have more tonnage now, but we have a less number of ships. No doubt
we have a much larger tonnage now, but we had more ships then. And did we ever
hear of collisions coming into court in those days ? Why, I have been amongst
300 ships in the Chops of the Channel, and if we collided with another ship we
swore a little, but the damaged ship was patched up by those on board, and away
we went. We never went into court and made a fuss about it as we do now.
The vice of the matter is simply this : the shipowner who has an old-fashioned
steamer cuts her in half amidships, adds about half her length, and so pro-
duces the ship of the present day (holding up the model), showing 10 times the
beam for length. When you come to look at it, it is really no laughing
matter. That long ship has of course to seek her displacement ; she is 300 feet
long by 30. Suppose she is between two Atlantic waves (illustrated by model), she
haa to seek Her displacement, and down she goes between the waves, the result
being that the sea falls inboard over her stem and her stern at the same time. There
is no doubt the " London " went down through that, and there is no doubt that the
200 odd steamers which have vanished in the last year highly classed — for we lose
four ships a day in this country — of these there is no doubt that at least 200, with
ten times their beam for length, have been lost simply in seeking their displacement,
a big wave coming over the bow and stern at the same moment, or swamping them
amidships. That is one reason why men won't go to sea in a merchant ship. It is
perfectly clear that this ship is built to go through the waves, and not to go over
the waves, and the consequence is the man knows what it is not to have a dry
•bred upon him, or any of hia clothes dry down below. You cannot expect them
to stand that if they can get employment on shore which will give them bread and
cheese. Last year I read a paper on this subject at the Society of Arts, and I will
just read to you the remedy I proposed, because it is no use to enter upon a loud
growl and not to suggest something to be done to remedy these fearful evils. The
remedy I proposed last year was simply this : — First, a responsible head of the Mer-
cantile Marine. Secondly, a maritime Lord Campbell's Act. I am perfectly certain
if the owner of a ship had to see that his ship went to sea perfectly found and fitted,
you would not want Mr. Plimsoll's services any longer. The owner would take pre-
cious good care not to run the risk of an action brought against him for the loss of the
life of any one on board. Thirdly, I propose a Mercantile Marine Medical Service,
not merely for the medical examination of seamen, but a hospital for the men to go
to when they are sick. Go to the United States. Look at their sea-ports, and you
will see magnificent hospital accommodation for the merchant seamen of that
country. We are the only nation of the world where there is no hospital aocommo-

144 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

elation *for our men. There are no less than 40 beds empty at Greenwich, which
cannot be filled. No applicants can go into those beds, and why ? Because they
haye not got money enough to carry it on, and here we have thousands of ship-
owners, immensely wealthy men, merchant princes in this country, who cannot come
down with the necessary sum to provide for the poor wretched seamen who obtain
their wealth for them. Forty beds in the "Dreadnought" Hospital empty for
want of funds!! It is indeed disgraceful. The fourth suggestion was training
schools in every county and training ships attached, boys apprenticed, their liyes
insured, with pensions assured, after a certain number of years' service, by a most
simple process, by insuring their lives or giving them a deferred pension from the
Post Office Savings Bank, so that it would be entirely under Government control, at
once a very different affair to the proposition of my friend Mr. Brassey, and there
would be no fear whatever of it collapsing, as the wretohed fund did that we had
before. I was one of the subscribers in early life, and of course lost my money.
And, lastly, in reference to the ship I have just described to you, I suggest an
honest tonnage law, with taxation removed from the ship to the cargo ; an " honest
tonnage law," I say, because our tonnage law, at the present moment, is simply dis-
' honest.

Captain Pim concluded by introducing his friend Dr. Ward, M.P. for Galway,
who wished to say a few words on the medical aspect of the case.

Dr. Ward, M.P. : I did not intend to address the meeting until Captain Pim
requested me to say a few words. I came rather to hear the views of Naval Officers
on this very important question, for we cannot always depend upon what we hear
in the House of Commons, at least, as far as the sailors are concerned. I think,
however, there are a few remarks which I may make from a medical point of view,
which, if the people interested in this question would take up, might lead to some
useful legislation. Last week I had the opportunity of asking the President of the
Board of Trade in the House a question with reference to scurvy, and his answer
was certainly most remarkable. He stated the great regret he had in saying that
scurvy was on a very considerable increase in the Mercantile Marine in this
country, and, considering the advances that have been made in medical science, and
the great ease of prevention of this terrible scourge to seamen, I think it is a
disgrace* to the country that the President of the Board of Trade had to come
forward with stioh a statement as that. The question comes. How is it to be
avoided ? I believe one of the suggestions of Captain Pim would do a great deal
towards it— the medical inspection of stores, when thinking over this subject
I certainly was most surprised to find that Her Majesty's Navy is engaged in what
I cannot but regard as a disreputable line of conduct. I find it is the habit when
Her Majesty's ships come into port and their beef is not in very good condition,
not to destroy it, nut to sell it to brokers, who re-sell it to the merchant ships. I
understand, indeed, that they take some of the bad pieces out of the barrels, but
we all know when meat is in contact with bad meat, packed up for months, it is in a
very doubtful condition indeed. I understand that this is the case on very fair
evidence, and I believe we Bhall have a return shortly of the amount of this meat
thus sold, and I believe also the name of the principal broker who buys it, which
will be rather useful information. Then there is another point. I quite agree with
my friend Captain Pim that medical inspection of stores ought to be a sine qud «e«,
but there comes the more difficult question of the medical inspection of seamen
themselves. I am not prepared to go the whole way with him, though I think
there is a great deal in what he says ; but I do think it is not at all a creditable
slate of things for this great mercantile country to stand almost alone without
any direct hospital provisions or medical attendance for seamen. I believe if the
friends of seamen would urge this upon the House, — it is not a contested point, and
it is not a question of foreigners or able bodied seamen, — I think no one could
object to medical provision for the sailor, whether he be an able-bodied seaman or a
foreigner, because we at least want him in good health to do his work. I think if
the friends of seamen, and the shipowners themselves, who are very much
interested, would urge these matters in the Bill, which does not make one single
provision for them, they would very easily carry cither the amendments of Captain
Pim, or something equivalent to them.

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 145

Gaptain J. G. Wilson, R.N. : Unfortunately I was not here at the beginning of
this lecture, and I hare only been able to take a cursory glance of the discussion
which took place at the former meeting. I should like to begin by asking the
honourable lecturer a question which will clear away a great deal of difficulty. Can
he tell us how many of the 202,000 merchant seamen are really bond fide blue*
jackets ? because, if we can get at those figures, we shall be in a position to argue
the point clearly and with some benefit. Before I came here, I looked at an old
Nautical Dictionary of 1815, and found the definition of the word " seaman " there
giren, to imply a man who had been brought up to the sea, in contradistinction to a
'"landsman " a man who had not been brought up to service at sea. I fancy a great
number of people included in the appellation " seamen " really are not eren " lands-
** men," but " shore men."

Mr. Brapsby : I think I know a gentleman in this room who can tell me.
Mr. Williamson, can you tell me what was your calculation of the number of fire-
men and stewards P

Mr. Williamson : I had a communication from the Registrar-General of Seamen
on the point, and he gave the following figures : — About 202,000 men, so called, in
the British Mercantile Marine ; the total number, 202,000, embraces stokers, fire-
men, stewards, cooks in steamers, as well as stewards and cooks in steerage. I
deduct 10 per cent, from the number of men in sailing ships, 130,000, that gives
87,000 hands in sailing ships, including ordinaries, A.B.'s, and foreigners. In
steamers there are 71,000 hands ; take 50 per cent, off, that gives you 85,000 sea-
men, making altogether 150,000 in round numbers as the seamen hands.

Captain Wilson : Now we have armed at something definite ; instead of having
202,000 seamen we hare only 150,000 blue jackets, as they are called in Parliamen-
tary phraseology, and out of those 150,000 men we may, I think, taking our naval
experience because we can have nothing better, estimate that about 50,000 of
those are landsmen,1 about 50,000 are ordinaries, and possibly 50,000 are able sea-
men. Now from a conversation I had with Mr. Shaw Lefevre the other day, I
was somewhat shaken in an opinion which I think the honourable lecturer will
remember I conveyed some years ago indirectly to him, that we had then not more
than 25,000 able teamen, which I still maintain is the right class to estimate the
seamen power of your Fleet by, whether merchant or naval. The test is the number
of able-bodied men you have, because you can make a cab-driver, or anyone else into
a bine-jacket to-morrow ; and the term " blue-jackets " is simply an evasion of the
question. We know that First Lords when in difficulties about men enter a number
of novices, or any trash they can get, and go and tell Parliament they have so many
sailors ; " blue jackets " they may be, but they are not seamen. In the Merchant
Service we have, say 50,000 able seamen, and I see Lord Eslington, the other day,
said that out of those at least 15,000 were foreigners, and were prime seamen ; I
think it most natural it should be so because if they were not prime seamen they
would not as it were turn out our own men. Therefore I think it is pretty clear
that in the whole of the British mercantile marine, the first mercantile marine
of the world, monopolising the bulk of the trade of the world, the whole number of
able-bodied skilled sailors, is only about 35,000 ; that is putting it tit the ycrj utmost
we can possibly estimate. Supposing 50,000 able-bodied men are enough to carry
on the trade of this country, we know from the Royal Navy that to keep up the
number of 50,000 able seamen, we should require 15,000 boys a year, and
to keep up 10,000 or 11,000 able seamen in the Royal Navy it at present requires
3.000 boys a year, therefore if we require 50,000 men for the Merchant Service
we may fairly conclude that as the loss in the Navy is not greater than in
the Merchant Service, we should therefore want 15,000 boys annually to make
good the waste on the 50,000 able seamen. Had the apprenticeship system
continued in force, and the apprentices been carried as they were in former
times, according to tonnage, we should have had, at present, about 59,000
apprentices, — an extraordinary large number, — or if calculated according to the

"Landsman" is a rating given to men who are not qualified for that of
'* ordinary." In the Navy the rating has been changed to ordinary second-class.
VOL. XX. L

H6 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

old rule of one apprentice to every four men in a crew, we should require about
50,000 apprentices. This would he in excess, I think, of the numbers we require.1
Then we may go on to the question, — if we aro to train hoys, who is to provide and
pay for them r That part of the question I know nothing about; the shipowners
must settle it, but I think a certain proportion of boys are due by Government, and
I will tell you why. Government draws from the mercantile marine a reserve.
That reserve is estimated at from 14,000 to 15,000 men. The bulk of those men
are able seamen, and, as 1 have shown you before, it takes 3,000 boys to keep up
10,000 or 11,000 able seamen in the Navv, therefore, 1 think Government should
by right, and might be expected by shipowners, to train at least from 3,000 to
3,500 boys a year, or give their equivalent in money. I have no opinion of your
third class reserves, no opinion of your restrictions, and as it were, ticketing
the bovs. One of the few cases where I differ with Mr. Brassey is in his
idea of training. In passing, I ask any practical man, shipowners let them
ask their captains, — captains let them give their opinions, — I am sure ninety-
nine out of one hundred seamen will agree that you cannot train sailor-boys
anywhere except afloat. I have gone into the question and thought it over
carefully ; and know the advantages you derive on shore, and- the time you
gain in different ways, but as Mr. Brassey very properly put it, training
is artificial, so the nearer you can approach the real tbing the better, and the
nearest approach to reality is having training ships afloat. What you teach the
boy of knotting, splicing, reefing, and steering, are matters of small importance com-
pared to the aptitude gained for sea life. He can take care and provide for himself ;
he knows which way to turn when he goes on board a ship ; and, above everything,
he has acquired the language of the sea, and is in every way better fitted for the
rough and tumble of sea life ; the question whether he knows how to haul out an
earring or not, is of secondary importance. I do not think the Commission was
practical in its suggestions about having training ships as Mr. Brassey proposes.
One hundred boys are not enough to have any complete organisation, and organisa-
tion is the root and branch of good discipline. As to the plan of 100 boys going off
to the ships daily to school, you might just as well leave them on shore altogether.
The fewer boys you have on board a ship the greater is the expense. A two-decker,
with 500 boys, is a very good style of training ship, perhaps the best we have in the
Royal Navy. A three-decker (with 700 boys) is more economical per head. I
think Mr. Brassey says that the apprentice system still supplies us, out of these
15,000 boys which are required to keep up a proper number or men in the merchant
service, with 3,500.

Mr. Brassey : 3,500 are supplied every year from that source.

Mr. Williamson : There are over 16,000 in the merchant service.

Mr. Brassey : That is the Liverpool calculation, and it has been endorsed by the
Board of Trade.

Captain Wilson : That question 1 was going to raise, but I think the number
you estimate from the training ships is in excess. I should say you do not get
1,000 ; in fact, when I was in the city the other day, and I had the honour of
speaking before the Lord Mayor, I did not please some gentlemen present, because I
told them what was a fact, that private training ships are not training ships
proper. These vessels were valuable for the purpose, — there were very few of them,
— they were lent for a definite and distinct purpose, but instead of that they are
turned into charitable institutions, which do a great deal of good no doubt, but
such boys as they do train are trained at a very expensive rate, and, collectively, they
only turn out about one-fifth the number they ought, for with all due deference to
my friend, Mr. Stirling Laoon, the bovs in the royal training ships do not cost 60/.
a year, and the boys aro not trained for the Merchant Service for 19Z. each. The
boys sent to sea from most private training ships, cost on an average, 65/. per head,*

1 The number is not so much in excess as at first appears, for supposing the boys
were apprenticed for four years, there would be upwards of 50,000 serving to make
good the waste on 50,000 able seamen.

8 The Marine Society is an exception to the rule ; boys from them are usually

THS SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 14T

and the boys trained in the Royal Nary, including pay, a free kit, and the doxen
and one things we give them, cost somewhat under £40 per year. I made a little*
calculation the other day, and I am perfectly certain of this, — if you can put the
boys into properly organised training ships, with sufficient supervision and
properly conducted, making due allowance for all expenses, you could train them
for from £2& to £30 a year a head, and one year is ample. Allowing for paying a
premium for sending light-made boys to sea, say £10, — from £38 to £40 a head — you
could turn out very good, and well trained boys, boys, the bulk of whom would be
received gladly on board your merchant ships, and who would be from the first able
to earn at any rate their food, if not their wage. These are the style of lads we
ought to turn out; they should be respectable and physically sound, able lads.
None should be taken under fifteen, and none kept more than a year, for there
is a great deal of sentiment about sea service, and if you keep a boy too long in a
training ship you send him to sea with all the spunk gone out of him. He is like
a bottle of champagne that has been uncorked too long, there is no sparkle left, and
the chances are ten to one that he deserts the first opportunity. These are my views
about boys.

I touched upon the question of a third class reserve. It is a very serious thing
for one to differ with his superiors, and perhaps it is a great piece of impertinence
on my part to do so, but I cannot understand their making it a sine qud non> that a
boy should have two years' training, when one is ample, and offering £25 for what
they know must cost at least £50. The third class reserve is a mistake. It is a
matter of no importance to the Admiralty or the country where the men for the
reserve come from. Let us draw our reserve from the best merchant seamen who
present themselves, let us put as it were, into the sea the spawn, and let us draw from
sea the fish, but have nothing to do with them in the meantime. Let the men
come from any source, you know that to keep up the number of men in your
reserve you owe the Merchant Service so many thousands of boys ; put them, there-
fore, into the Merchant Service and draw out your full-grown sailor as you
require or can get him. I can see no better plan than the one I advocated in this
theatre myself for improving the royal seamen and the reserve, whilst at the
tame time linking the Merchant Service with the Royal Navy, which I think, is a
most important matter for the country. I cannot understand how we are to
expect, in time of war, that you are going to utilize your Naval Reserve men, brought
up as at present with totally different ideas, — men who know nothing whatever of
your ships or discipline, who, as was once said by a gallant Admiral, never have
seen anything of a man-of-war but their outside ; how are you going to get these
men to work harmoniously with your continuous service men, a totally different class P
they are perfectly distinct classes ; the merchant seamen will be placed under men-of-
war's men who have different sympathies and ideas, and if they work well together
for the benefit of the service, it will be a perfect miracle. But the case would be
very different if we took steps to link the two together. I want to see class pre-
judice broken down. I think Mr. Donald Currie told us in the last discussion the
Merchant Service objected to Naval Officers, and another gentleman told us that
there was no sympathy between the merchant sailor and the man-of-war's man.
That I have always held to be the case, and I said so in this theatre some time ago.
I knew it to be the case, and I think it is a very great pity it should be so, and the
first way to break down such a dangerous feeling is to carry out the system I pro-
posed before ; that there should be an interchangeableness between the two
services. I do not believe in this tremendous deterioration of merchant seamen, or
the imposibility of getting the small number of men we should require ; I believe
there are as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it, though the number may be
less ; I believe we have a certain per centage of thoroughly able men in the merchant
service, and no person who knows anything about seamen will expect that every man

fine well-trained respectable lads. They are never kept more than a year under
training, or entered under 15 years of age. They cost about £25 each to train. I
am also informed that the " Chichester's " and " Arethusa's " boys are not kept more
than one year under training, but I have seen less of them than the others.

L 2

148 HOW BE8T TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

who goes to sea will torn out a good sailor, to be so, he must hare the natural instincts
and qualities of a sailor, to make him a good one, and these are only developed and
brought forward by the work he has to do, but must be innate in the man, and to
expect that you are going to make an ideal seaman, one of those first-rate fellows
we remember, and who is treasured in our minds as our standard sailor, out of
every lad that joins your ship, is to expect too much, it can never be so : what we
want is a certain number of leading men ; certain men to act as the arrow's point
when it comes to emergency, to lead the others who will when thus headed do the
work ; a few such men are necessary and invaluable everywhere. I would bring
into the Navy a certain number of young sailors from the Merchant Service, passing
them in through barracks. I would reduce the continuous service men and make
up the remainder of our 20,000 seamen with the non-continuous service men.
These men should pass from the Navy into the reserve and returning from time to
time as it suited them to come, and us to receive them. In the reserve their time
should count in certain proportions which I gave before, that is iri the proportion of
three years in the reserve to two in the Navy, and whenever they had made up in
and out of the Navy their twenty-one years service, they should be entitled to a
short service pension.

As to the question of the pay of seamen I do not know what it may be in the
Merchant Service ; but looking into an old book of 1815, I find the pay of pettj
Officers in the Royal Navy was then 46*. a month, while at present it is 58*. ; A.B.'a
36s. 3d. ; it is now 405. Id. Considering that is sixty years ago I do not think the
increase of the pay has kept pace with the times ; and if the same style of thing
obtains in the Merchant Service, I can only say it is no wonder you do not get good
men. We are certainly told that seamen and Officers in the Merchant Service are
not properly paid. The reason of this is insurance. If you had no insurance, both
seamen and Officers would be better remunerated ; as a proof of that it is a well
known fact that in all the large companies where the vessels are not insured, the
Officers and men are of a superior stamp, and are invariably better paid. That is
the root of the whole question.1

Now we come to the last point — the interchange of Officers. I ventured, and I
think I was one of the first to venture upon it, to say it would be a good thing for
the Navy tif we took Naval Reserve Officers for a certain period into the Royal
Service. I want to see a sympathy and interchange between tne two Services. We
have not to look very far to see the advantage of so doing. We know the old fable
of the bundle of sticks, if we are united and hang together we can carry everything
before us ; but why are we so powerless for good in the Royal Navy, and why are
the seamen in the Merchant Service so helpless ? I am putting the shipowners on
one side, and am speaking of the men " who go down to the sea in ships." Simply
and entirely because there is no unity between us. Let us be united by every means
in our power. Why in this great maritime country do we find that twenty-six
millions are spent annually upon the Army in England and India, and only a bare
ten millions on the Navy, and still the Navy is called the first line of defence?
In the first place the Army is a powerful, rich corporation, and is backed up by a
large Militia, and a still larger body of Volunteers. These all sympathise together,
they are all one profession, and they take very good care that the second line of
defence will never be short of funds or allowed to fall much astern, whereas in the
Royal Navy we arc a bundle of loose sticks, nobody cares two straws about us, and
we bungle on as best we can till there is some great war or tremendous disaster,
and then the Admirals are hung to encourage the Fleet. I approve of Mr. Brassey's
proposal that there should be a certain number of scholarships at Greenwich. I
would, indeed, throw Greenwich College open to all Naval Reserve Officers, let
those pass through it who like ; and give a certain number of scholarships for those
who are too poor to pay expenses. I should like also to see the young Naval Reserve

1 Suppose railway trains were insured like ships and cargoes, would not the result
be that the directors would have less interest in their safety, that guards, signal*
men, and other servants would be underpaid and inferior men ? but this is an
analogous case.— J. C. W.

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 149

Officers pass through the Navy and spend nine months or a year in our Service as
Bub-Lieutenants. By that means, as I said the other day, we should be able safely
to reduce our lists of Officers and keep them more auJaU at their work by employ-
ing them more constantly. If I commissioned a ship and there was war to-morrow,
I would be quite willing to take a large number of Naval Reserve Officers and men
and take my chance with them provided they had been previously passed through the
Navy. I think our Naval Reserve is not as efficient as it should be, nor as numerous.
Tou cannot expect a Naval Reserve man to be qualified or disciplined in the time
now allowed. If the men and Officers were passed through the Navy you would
hare a reserve on which you could depend. Mr. Shaw Lefevre said a man in a
month's time properly brought up would be very effective ; but where are you going
to get the month in time of war? In the olden times you had twelve months to
rig your ships and train your crew, but now-a-days you will be sent to sea and fight
jour battles in a week, and there will be no time to make your men ; and when on
ibis subject we must not forget that other countries have much larger reserves of
trained seamen than we have.

I will conclude by saving I think we have every reason to be very grateful to,
Mr. Brassey, that with the great knowledge he has of maritime matters he should*
from an independent stand-point, away both from the Navy or the Merchant
Service, give so carefully and so accurately a digest of facts such as he has
brought before us in his excellent paper, and which has, led to such a very interest-
ing and important discussion.

Mr. Johh Williamson : Sir Hastings Yelrerton, as I hold the position of Hon.
Secretary to the " Liverpool Committee for inquiring into the condition of Seamen,"
I may be able to lay before you some figures that may be of use in this discussion-
I must say how very gratifying it is to myself and to my Committee that so many
Naval men are found taking an interest in this subject, because I believe the solution
of this training question lies in a connection between the Royal Navy and the mer-
cantile marine. I am also very glad to see gentlemen in the position of Mr. Brassey,
who spares neither time nor labour in trying to do something for his country's good,
endeavouring to solve this question. Mr. Shaw Lefevre at your last week's debate
should not I think have made so strong a statement as is reported, that he looked
upon the cry as to the deterioration of our seamen as an exaggeration. If Mr.
Lefevre would show us facts and figures for his statement, I would join issue with him.
In 1869, the Committee of Inquiry took its origin from similar views expressed
by Mr. Lefevre, and a series of questions was issued to men who are capable of
giving information, viz., shipmasters of the best character in Liverpool, London,
and elsewhere j shipowners, once shipmasters, who are capable of expressing a very
good opinion, and others. The result was, 80 per cent, of the replies we received
stated that seamen had deteriorated, and only 2 per cent, that they were improved,
and 3 per cent, that they were as good as before. I think these figures speak for
themselves. I may also just add that the only Government document that has ever
been brought forward, stating any contrary opinion, was a report by Mr. Gray and
Mr. Hamilton, from the Board of Trade, in 1873, which was presented to Parlia-
ment, in which they did not say seamen were as good as before, but that the report
of their deterioration was not quite borne out. Now no town in the country can
express a better opinion on this point than Liverpool, where, at a crowded meeting
to meet Mr. Gray before he issued his report, there was not a single hand held up
against the statement that the sailor had deteriorated. Mr. Gray, at a public
meeting in Liverpool, in the following September, makes remarks of this sort : —
" Unseaworthy sailors would lose the best of ships."

• • • •

" It was now time thev took into consideration the question of unseaworthy

- sailors."

• • • •

" He believed, and those gentlemen who were his colleagues believed, that if it
44 was really wanted to prevent loss of life at sea, they would have to begin with the

- sailors."

• • • •

150 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

" There was also an immense waste in the Mercantile Marine from the oni
" worthiness of seamen, and it was found that men were shipped as seamen

" from their physical condition were utterly unfit to go to sea. *

• • • •

And again, at a meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, held at New-
castle-on-Tyne, on the 21st of September of the same rear, Mr. Gray says : — " The
" question of loss- of life at sea was not a question of unseaworthiness of ships so
" much as of unseaworthiness of seamen."

I consider that report and these statements by Mr. Gray most contradictory.
The evidence of the fact of this deterioration is undoubted: I cannot go back fifty
years and say, the seamen then wore better than they are now. I have to deal
simply with the fact that they are now very bad, and also that there are not 25 per
cent, of forecastle hands that know the ordinary duties of seamen. I take it that
there are 150,000 hands, all told, in the Mercantile Marine, 16,000 of whom are
apprentices. I may mention that these apprentices are generally not in the fore-
castle, they are in the round-house, or in the poop, training to be Officers and
masters, so that I am dealing simply with grown-up hands. Now, if only 26 per
cent, of these forecastle hands are seamen in the proper sense, we have barely
40,000 A.B.'s in the Mercantile Marine of this country. We have 19,000 foreigners,
according to tho Board of Trade returns, of these, a few blacks. Lascars are in
some of the Suez Canal steamers, and a larger number of them in the Peninsular
and Oriental boats— about 5,000. I will mention how this has arisen. The Com-
pany's Superintendent stated at a meeting in London last week, that they were
obliged, from the insubordination of the men, to abolish all the white forecastle
hands, and to replace them with Lascars. These Lascars I do not include in the
number of A.B.'s at all. We have then remaining nearly 15,000 Swedes, Danes, and
other white foreigners, in our Mercantile Marine, and, as Mr. Corry says, any ship-
owner in this country would be delighted to man hie ships with them. All A.B.'s
are paid alike, and not, as has been stated by gentlemen in the House of Commons,
that shipowners take foreigners because they get them at lower wages than British
sailors ; they are all shipped at the same time at the shipping office, and at the same
wages, and these foreigners are the best men in our forecastles — any shipmaster will
tell you this.

Captain Wilson : Are these foreigners plus the 40,000 ?

Mr. Williamson : No ; of the 40,000 A.B.'s, about 15,000 are foreigners ; that

S'ves you 25,000 good English A.B.'s in the Mercantile Marine of this country,
ut of these about 11,000 belong to the flret-class Royal Naval Reserves ; that is
what the Navy has to fall back upon in an emergency. Now I would ask Naval
gentlemen, how many of those will they get in the first five or six months of a
war ? It would not be 3,000 or 4,000 at the outside. Mr. Brassey, in his speech,
has suggested one or two excellent measures for improving the condition of masters.
The whole subject divides itself into two parts, first, the remedial dealing with the
existing state of things ; and second, the question of supplies. In the remedial part
I quite agree with Mr. Brassey, that a compulsory benefit fund for seamen should
be established. Mr. Brassey spoke to a large number of respectable sailors in Liver-
pool last December, and without one dissentient, they agreed to this. He put
before them, that no Government would impose upon them a compulsory pension
fund, — they must do it of their own accord ; and after he had reasoned the thing
out in a most able manner, they all agreed to it ; and I believe if Mr. Brassey were to
stump the country, all the sea-ports would equally agree with the Liverpool men on
this point. Then, as to the second remedy, viz., that before being allowed to rate
as A*B., satisfactory proof of having been four yean at sea should be produced.
You find many A.B. s tell you, that they wish to leave the sea, because they get no
protection at all. They do not like to be in the forecastles with so many in-
competent men ; they say, the duties of the ship are thrown upon a few, while the
others do not do the work, and yet all get the same pay. I may say that all the respect-
able seamen are unanimously in favour of this protection. I do not believe it would
punish the shipowners in any way, the constitution of the forecastles would be im-
proved. The pay all round I do not believe would be greater than it is now,
but you would really improve the condition of the better men ; you would raise

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 151

their statue, and they would occupy a position which they do not occupy at
present.

A* to the advance notes, my friend Mr. Corry and I must differ on this point.
We had a very large meeting of shipowners in Liverpool the other day belonging to
the Association of Sailing Shipowners of the Port, and they almost unanimously
agreed to the abolition of the advance note ; the few who objected did not object on
the principle of the thing, but because they felt it would produce a great deal of
inconvenience to the shipowners in engaging crews. We made this suggestion, that
the law should not come into operation until twelve months after the passing of the
Act, which would give time to inform the seaman that they must take care to have
a few pounds in their pocket, instead of coming on board ship destitute as they do
now ; the abolition of the advance note, I believe would, to a great extent, take the
men out of the hands of crimps and harpies — and I may add, the better class of
sailors wish these advance notes abolished.

Now I come to the question of the supply of good trained men. We have to
deal with a recognised waste of 16,000 a year, which is about 10 per cent, upon the
sailor hands all told — I think it is more, I believe it is fully that. Some people
estimate it at 20,000, however, take it at 16,000. From the apprenticeship system
the annual supply is about 3,500, and the training ships round our coasts supply
something like 700 or 800, it is near a thousand altogether — but some of these ships
supply apprentices, such as the " Conway," in Liverpool, the " Worcester," and one
or two of the better class training ships, and these are included in the supply under
the head of apprentices. Taking it, however, at 1,000 a year, that gives us 4,600 a
year to meet this waste of 16,000 men. A great deal has been said about training
■hips, and the Royal Commission were strong on this point likewise. Our Com-
mittee have taken it up and dealt with it on the recommendation of the Royal
Commission, but we find it very hard indeed to get steam shipowners to agree to a
rating for the supply of trained hands. They do not feel the pinch as the sailing
shipowners do, they get the pick of the men, while the sailing shipowners are those
who alone are training seamen. I may also mention, you could not introduce a law
to compel shipowners to carry apprentices, because steamers cannot take apprentices,
they do not require them and they cannot train them. You would have to fall back
upon sailing shipowners and only those engaged in the foreign trade. Any ship-
owner knows perfectly well, if there was a compulsory law to carry apprentices, no
■hip could be compelled to carry more than four apprentices to every 1,000 tons.
On that basis we have actually more apprentices by about 2,000, than we would be
compelled to carry in our foreign-going ships to-day ; therefore, we must throw on
one aide altogether any attempt to make apprenticeship compulsory; few ship-
owners carry more than that proportion. I know some carry eight or ten, some
four or six, and some none at all, so that the one equalizes the other. There are a
number of sailing ships that cannot carry apprentices, ships engaged only in short
trades or summer trades, and that lay up in the winter months; therefore, you
could not force them to carry apprentices. At the same time I do believe, if you
could induce shipowners to perpetuate the apprenticeship system and also to
increase it a little, it would be a great boon, and I would suggest that might be
done by a rebate to shipowners carrying apprentices out of the light dues. This
m a very large fund and out of it we transfer about £50,000 a year to the Con-
solidated Fund. 1 throw that out as a suggestion. This is the best system of
training and we ought not to neglect but to encourage it. Then as to the training'
•hip question ; after giving every consideration to this subject, the conclusion is
forced upon us, that you cannot ask the country to train seamen for the Mercantile
Marine, any more than you can ask it to train bricklayers or any other tradesmen —
out we aay this- — as the Royal Navy must have Royal Naval Reserves, and they
mast have them from the Mercantile Marine, it is the militia to the Navy, it ia
she duty of the Navy to see these are of the best possible quality, and to be so
they should undergo preliminary training, and we consider, as shipowners are the
int to lose these men in the event of war, the duty of the Government is to train
mp to the requirements of the Navy for Reserves, and to pay the cost of such
teaming. Presuming you must have 20,000 as a first-class reserve, it would take
tern training ships with 800 in each to train up to in thirteen or fourteen years,

152 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

20,000 first-class reserves. Our scheme is this, that the training should only be in
connection with the Royal Naval Reserve, and that the cost of the training should
be borne by the Navy Estimates — £100,000 a year at the very outside ; and such
lads should be taken into those ships at about fifteen or sixteen years of age, lade
educated and of good physique, of the mechanic class, to be kept there one year
and then drafted into sailing ships as ordinary seamen, and then, after three years,
-they would figure as A.B.'s m the Mercantile Marine, and would become first-class
Reserve men in the Royal Navy. That is pretty much a brief outline of our
scheme, and I believe that is the only way in which Government can be asked to do
.anything in the way of training seamen for the Mercantile Marine.

Admiral Selwtn : It is clear that we want a certain manufactured article, and,
in order to its manufacture, it is required that we should have not shore-going
ships but actual sea-going ships. It is also clear that the Navy wants what that
service is likely to provide in no very large measure at present, a place for those
young boys after a year's training in such work as they can learn in training ships.
1 do not think it would be too early to take them into training ships at fourteen
years old. I recollect perfectly well when midshipmen were constantly entered
below that age. They were then perhaps deficient in instruction, but we can giro
our instruction to a boy who comes from his parents or from the streets, which is
most valuable, for a year in a training ship. Then he could be taken and ought to
be taken more largely into the Navy. The present complement of our ships of
war is not half what it was fifty years ago. A 6,000-ton ship does not now carry
more men than a 3,000-ton ship did then. We are relying entirely on what we
want during peace for peace purposes, and we are not allowing for any waste to take
place, either by sending away prize crews or the deaths which would occur in war.
The main point is that we should manufacture an article which is required both by
•ourselves and by the Mercantile Marine. The Government alone can do that in
large measure, and having done that, all the other questions which have been
■argued will settle themselves. If you manufacture any article of any sort, beyond
what the demand may be calling for, you lower the price of that article, and yon.
will no longer have anybody saying in peace that foreign seamen were taken
because they were cheaper ; nor shall we have any tendency on the part of the
Mercantile Marine to take foreigners instead of British seamen if they are both
cheap and well trained. But to be well trained, it is in the early years of a
seaman's life that he must acquire thorough notions of discipline, obedience, and
-morality, and that will never be taught in the forecastles of the Mercantile Marine*
but it can and will be taught in the Navy. Those men will go off under a proper
system to the Mercantile Marine, for no seaman is of any value who is only a man*
of -war's man ; he ought to go all the world over, to see the service of every
country, to pass some of his time in steamers and some in Bailing ships, he should
know everything and go everywhere. Having got those men you need not trouble
yourself about whether they will offer themselves to you or not ; they will be in
existence and you will get your fair share of them, as Captain Wilson says : only
lay down enough of the spawn, you will have plenty of fish. To do this we may
have a much larger number of training ships, but they must be under proper
guidance. We must not confuse training ships which train apprentices for captains
and Officers of merchant ships with those that simply provide seamen, but this has
been done to a considerable extent. Wo must not either confuse the fact of the
apprenticeship system being an eventual advantage to the Mercantile Marine, with
the fact that no owner can afford to carry his goods about the world, unless he can
do it at an equal price with any other man. If you burden him with any expense
which does not repay him, you put a tax on Mb work by which he is prevented from
•competing with others on fair terms, and you encourage by that very act the com-
merce of other nations to supplant your own. You are now training a large number
of foreign Bcamen in your Mercantile Marine for other countries ; they will dis-
appear in the event of war ; you are relying on those men and even getting them
into the Reserve. But you cannot rely on them; notably you cannot rely on
German sailors who are under the same regulations as the rest of their countrymen
for maritime service inrtead of military service, and you would fail, particularly in
.that sudden manning of a fleet which could alone conduce to any useful result.

THE SEAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 153

Yon may get back the men after a time, but you cannot get them back at once
Tour battles in future will be decided in months and not in years. Train them
largely ; make the article everybody requires, and leave the disposition of it, shall
I say to fate or to the inclinations of the seaman ? You will always find him when
he is required, if you giro him enough of that prospect or possibility of prize-
money, that possibility of active service in which the true seaman delights, that
possibility of serving under good Officers of his own choosing which existed for-
merly, not being tied like sheep and sent on board a certain ship on which he neither
knows nor approves of the Officers. The present system does not allow the Officers
to become acquainted with the men or the men with the Officers. You, discharge
the men and turn them adrift in many instances, where you ought to keep them on,
and only those great owners of the Mercantile Marine have succeeded thoroughly
who have adopted the old system of having good men and keeping them at what-
ever price. It is not cheap to have bad men. It is not possible to elevate any one
good man while in contact with a great number of bad men. You cannot raise an
opprentice into the proper condition in which you wish him to exist, of morality,
abedience, and discipline, if you keep him during .his youth largely in contact with
thoso who know neither the one nor the other. The Navy is the place for proper
training, and I am quite sure the Mercantile Marine will be delighted to receive
from us such men as we should, under these conditions, send to them. We have to
unteach so much to the mercantile seaman at present when he comes to us, that it
takes us modi more tlian a year to do that. We find it difficult enough in six years
to teach men all that they are required to do on board men-of-war, and it is not to
be supposed by one year's contact with a man-of-war, that a man would be deprived
of those habits which are most objectionable in that situation of life : still le«s could
we depend upon him for that sotidariM, that feeling of ship-mate-ship which is only
acquired after many years' service together. A man when he goes into action relies
on his right or left hand man in proportion as he knows him, and the way to make
ihem rely on each other is to train them carefully together in a body We shall
never do better than by recurring to many of our old principles, notably that of the
apprenticeship system. I do not regard it as a hardship or objectionable in any
way, that the apprenticeship system should be again enforced, even if there are to
be apprentices on board steamers. If, as seems probable, a large proportion of our
carrying trade should be done in steamers, it is as necessary that there should be
apprentices to steam-work as that there should be others in sailing vessels, and* I
am quite sure the flow from the school ships into the Navy, and thence into the
Mercantile Marine, can be kept up so as to fulfil the most desirable object of com-
bining the two services together, but not by going from the inferior service to the
superior, but from the superior to the inferior, — inferior, that is to say, in habits of
discipline, I do not say in anything else. As regards the Officers, if we had young
Officers fit to put by the side of our sub-lieutenants, to send on board men-of-war
in an emergency, possibly the Naval Reserve Officer might be made equally efficient
in a very short time as the Naval Officer. But we have to deal with a close service,
iu which a man must serve constantly to be efficient, anjd you would scarcely tempt
men at the age of thirty or forty, after long experience in the Mercantile Marine,
to take their place beside sub-lieutenants or lieutenants in a man-of-war. I think
these observations will show that my chief object is to make a proper junction of
the Mercantile Marine and the Navy, but to do it by passing from the Navy to the
Mercantile Marine, by manufacturing the article and then passing it on. I have
also observed in a previous pamphlet of mine, the means by which the men so
acquired, if you desire to have Reserves, can be retained by one ever-lengthening
chain. If you give to the seaman a very small fee per annum, accruing to him only
when he comes back to the Navy, he will come back to the Navy whenever you want
him. If you give to Mercantile Officers the same training in the Navy as they give
in the French Service, that is to say, training in youth from fourteen to sixteen, and
then pass them on to the Mercantile Marine, I think the Mercantile Marine would
not find reason to regret the change.

Admiral Sir William Kino Hall: Captain Wilson having alluded to
training ships not in the service in disparaging terms, I, having been on the
** Chichester " and " Arethusa " Committee for the last ten yean, believe that none

154 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP UP

of Her Majesty's training ships turn out better sailors than the much despised
" Chichester "• and " Arethusa, and that none of Her Majesty's training ships have
been, or are more efficiently commanded and conducted, or boys better trained, or
turned out better sailors. They are not taught rifle, cutlass, or gun drill, certainly ;
but I will give one proof. La«*t month, when the prizes were given by the Lord
Mayor, at the Freemasons' Hall, to the schools and these ships, a fine young
sailor was present who had been 10 months on board the " Chichester," and had
returned from his first voyage to Australia ; had been rated an ordinary seaman ;
very good for ability and very good for conduct ; received £2 10s. a month. A*
for the want of boys to go to sea, why, as a nation, we are all sailors. Wherever
you find a pond, a pool of water, in any part of the country, you will find boys
sculling about in a tub or on a plank, whilst in Franoe they all want to be soldiers,
and strut about in a cocked hat and wooden musket. Boys want to go to sea for the
love of it. I was quite prepared to go into the Merchant Service if I had not got
into the Navy. And how was the seamanship learnt ? Why, the boy commenced
his education by sculling and pulling a boat, and having to furl the royal on their
way out. When we were young men, some of the finest warrant officers that ever
stood on the decks were boys brought in as Officers' servants ; the Officers took
an interest in those boys, and so they pushed on. Some Captain* of our ships in
those days allowed an Officer, if he found a fine suitable boy in the country, who
was anxious to go to sea, to bring him to the ship. My opinion is, there is a great
deal too much of the pupil teacher in all these training ships. Let any man take
the penny steamer in summer and go from London Bridge to Westminster, and he
will see thousands of boys larking on the banks, and if you say, " Will you go to
sea? "they would go at once, but they don't want to go to training ships to be
crammed up with pupil teachers, they want to gain their education at sea. I will
ask Captain Wilson this question, whether the boys have endeavoured to get out of
one of the ships in a very discreditable manner ? In the " Chichester " a boy who
was birched begged to be retained, promised to be a good boy, and has been a
good boy ever since. The plan we adopt is to have a test examination, let the boys
know the first four rules of arithmetic, reading, writing, and as soon as they can do
that, let them learn seamanship. In 1861 1 was called upon by the Admiralty,
when in command of the " Royal Adelaide," to send up a plan for the instruction
of 600 boys. It was not half far enough advanced for them, — the four first rules
of arithmetic, reading, and writing would not do, so I got out of her as quick as 1
could, and somebody else went into her. Let me give you a proof. A little boy
in that ship was brought up to be caned ; they said he waB sulky, that he would
not learn his geography. I said, " Dry your eyes ; what's the matter, boy ? " He
said, " Sir, I came to sea to be a sailor. I have no father ; I can write to my
mother j I can read my Bible — that is education enough." I took him out of the
school j I agreed with the boy. 1 believe there is no difficulty in getting boya u
you do away with these pupil teachers. With regard to novices, we had novice*'
What was the finest frigate action ever performed ? Sir Edward Pellew's. And
what was his crew mainly composed of ? Novices, Cornish miners ; and we had
novices in the " Royal Adelaide," — young fellows who wanted to go to sea, who
came to be sailors, and I met several afterwards petty officers. If a man's heart is
in the sea, and he wants to be a sailor, he will soon make a sailor if it is in hhn.
He wants to go to sea, he does not want to be put in training ships. Now-a-days
they have to go through a medical examination, and a man may be rejected if he has
a hollow tooth, or a boy one-eighth of an inch too short. We are a little too
particular in that style, and we are a little too particular about the education, and
to talk about this country ever wanting seamen when they are all bred seamen ! In
France they are all soldiers, but here every boy wants to be a sailor, and all you
have to do is let him be a sailor.

Captain Wilson : I think Sir William Hall has mistaken what I have said. I
have no wish to undervalue either the " Chichester*' or " Arethusa," but what I
did say was the ships which were lent for private training were not wholly appro-
priated to that work, for we find that there are under 100 trained in vessels which
ought to train 600. I did not speak of the training of the boys themselves.

Mr. Bbabbby : I regret that my duties in another place require me to leave

THE 8EAMEN OF THE COUNTRY. 155

this room, and, therefore, make it necessary that I should, without delay make
a brief reply to some of the observations which hare been addressed to this meet*
ing. Sir Hastings, I am very grateful to the various speakers for the favour-
able terms in which they have been pleased to refer to my paper. I may honestly
say it is the result of days and nights of study of a literature, which, however
important it may be, is certainly not particularly attractive. I refer to the
Blue Book literature under which the shelves of my library have long groaned.
The volumes of Parliamentary literature upon maritime subjects during the last
quarter of a century, are something quite amazing. I hope that now the public
attention is at last rivetted upon this great question of the safety of life at sea, and
the condition of our maritime population, some good fruit will be gathered from the
abundant literary seed which has been sown in previous years by Parliament. We
have heard deplorable statements with reference to the deficiency and the ineffi-
ciency of seamen, and we are all met together here to make suggestions, with a view
to remedy these very serious evils. I have said in my paper that which I must now
repeat, that in the first place it is a question of wages, including in that term not
merely the money paid to the man but the conditions of life which are offered to
him, the accommodation on board ship, fair and just treatment by bis Officers, and
a fair and reasonable amount of labour to perform. Those are various elements
which may be grouped together under the head of wages, and I say, unless the ship-
owner offers to those whom he employs, terms and conditions which will compare
favourably with the terms and conditions offered by other employers to the same
class of men, he cannot expect to obtain their services. Indeed, unless the terms
and conditions offered are adequate, it is perfectly idle to undertake any artificial or
other system of training, with a view to produce the men that are required.
Having trained men for the sea, and made them handy men for almost any purpose
on shore, the shipowner must necessarily lose the services of the men thus placed in
his hand. We have heard to-day of 400 trained seamen being employed in the
collieries of the north, and we know that there is an annual loss of seamen, from
the fact that men seek shore employment in preference to the sea. Then you have
another competitor in this matter, I mean shipowners of the United States. I do
not know how the wages compare at this moment, but I believe, until a very recent
date, it was the case that the wages in American ships were somewhat higher than
those in English ships, and as a consequence, the American Merchant Navy was
largely manned by men who had left the British Service to sail under the American
flag. Therefore 1 say, unless the wages are adequate, it is idle to expect our mer-
chant vessels shall be properly manned. The question of wages I need not refer to
at greater length, it being especially a question with which the shipowner has to
deal. The other point to which I should like to refer is the question of training.
The question is whether the Government can assist the shipowner in this important
work. We are all agreed that the Government cannot interfere simply to enable
the shipowner to obtain labour on cheap terms. The action of the Navy must be
limited, with a strict reference to our naval requirements, and having regard to the
essential importance of creating a sufficient reserve of well- trait ed seamen to man
the Navy in case of the omergency of a great naval war ; the question is whether it
might not be a national duty, which devolves upon our p'atesmen to consider, how
best the Government may combine with the private shipowners in order to provide
this Naval Reserve. At the present time I believe tlie Naval Reserve is up to the
strength laid down by the Admiralty Regulations, but the strength required under
the present Admiralty Regulations is considerably less than the strength recom-
mended by the Manning Commission of 1859 ; and it is a debateable point whether
the Admiralty have been well advised in reducing the strength of the Naval Reserve
to the standard at present adopted. I think that if the Government is to assist in
training seamen with the view to providing an adequate Naval Reserve, of all plans
which I have ever seen, the best and the most practicable appears to be the plan
recommended by the last Manning Commission. As I skeicned out the details of
that pUn in my paper, I do not think I shall be occupying your time satisfactorily
if 1 go over the ground again. It does certainly suggest itself to me, that it would
be a great advantage to the shipowners and to the Mercantile Marine generally, if
there was established in every great port a thoroughly efficient training vessel, con-

156 HOW BEST TO IMPROVE AND KEEP, ETC.

ducted by Naval Officers, upon the principles which have been followed with so
much success in the ships already established at Portsmouth and Plymouth.
Captain Wilson, who speaks with very great authority and experience on this
subject, says the kind of training vessels proposed by the Manning Commission
are not so satisfactory as larger ships, that it is an extravagant thing to train
only 100 boys in a ship, that you nave a larger staff in proportion, and other
expenses are increased in proportion to the number trained. I suppose that the
Manning Commission intended, by 'limiting the number to 100, to afford the
means of training a number of other boys side by side with the boys whose expenses
were defrayed by the Admiralty, and thus they suggested the plan of day boarder*.
I think they also suggested that if you provided a ship, which was capable of
taking 300 boys for training, and you only filled up 100 of those places by boys
paid for by the State, it would afford an opportunity to the shipowner, or to
benevolent persons and people interested in boys, to send them to these ships to
be trained on the Admiralty system, and to be paid for from private resources.
So many points have been raised, that it would be impossible to deal with them
all. Something was said about Officers, and I certainly myself should welcome any
practicable proposal for giving to the Officers to whom you give commissions in
your Naval Reserve, the immense advantages of some experience in the Navy. No
doubt there might occasionally be difficulties, but when we take into view the class
of youths who are now g"ing to pea in the Merchant Service, and who are now
being brought up in the " Conway " and the " Worcester," I cannot see that there
should be any practicable difficulty in selecting for the distinction of a commission
in the Naval Reserve only such Officers in the Naval Service as you would be very
glad to associate with Naval Officers in the Royal Service. Mr. Lindsay years ago
pointed out in his very able separate Report on the Manning of the Navy, that
there were in the Merchant Service ample materials for such selection, and what
Mr. Lindsay said in 1859 I believe iB far more true at the present time. If the
Navy would associate itself more intimately than hitherto with the cream and
flower of the Merchant Service, they would do a great deal both to strengthen the
Navy, by providing reserves of Officers as well as reserves of men, to whom we
should look with confidence in time of war, and also by adding materially to the
professional status and efficiency of the Officers of the Merchant Service. You
want to make the command of one of our noble merchantmen a recognised and
an honourable professional career. At the present time, in our over- peopled
country, the difficulty for hundreds and thousands of young men, well educated
and well born, is to find an opening. I venture to say the command of a fine
merchant ship is a career at least as honourable and as attractive as a good many
of the very miscellaneous employments to which young men are now looking ; and
I do not know that there would be any means so likely to make a career of the kind
that I am describing, attractive, and to give it a professional tone and professional
recognition, as the association of these Officers, at an early stage of their career,
with the Royal Navy. I have spoken of this recognition and association of the
merchant Officers with the Navy in a Naval Reserve point of view. I believe that
if you could by this means elevate the status of the Officers of the Merchant Ser-
vice, and give them that independence which I should like to see them possess, yon
would most materially contribute to promote the greater security of life at sea.
There are, no doubt, cases in which Officers in command of merchant ships do not
speak their minds as freely to their owners as they should ; they are afraid to do it.
I have known instances in which it has been the case. I say if you could, by the
means I have proposed, and by other means, put the Officers of your Merchant
Service in a position of the same professional independence, with regard to profes-
sional matters, which a barrister enjoys when he u consulted by a client upon a
question of law, you would have provided one of the most effectual guarantee you
could possibly provide for preventing the sending forth to sea of ships which were
unseaworthy from any cans/ whatever.

I will not trouble the meet it -g further. I have listened to what has been said by
various speakers with profound interest. I can only hope that 1 may be able in
another place to turn to account what I have learned from this discussion.

9to Jmmtitl

or THE

pi United $mkt JmtfrMim.

Vol. XX. 1876. No. LXXXVI.

(Aliening Hating.

Monday, 31st January, 1876.
Admuul SIR HENRY CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 18th and 31st

January, 1876.

LIFE.
Montgomery, A. J., Lieut. BJL

ANNUAL.

Thompson, W. H., Capt. lit King's Hastings, Warren, Lieut. 2nd W. I. Rcgt.

Dragoon Guards. Fatchett, W. Gordon, Lieut. 2nd W. I.

Rose, Henry, Commander B.N. Begt.

A?hner, H. L., Lieut. 16th Lancere. Murphy, J. A., Lieut. 2nd W. I. Begt.

Hammond, B. H., Commander B.N. Godwin- Austen, Fredk.} Lieut. 2nd W.

Walker, Robert, Capt. Lon, Rifle Brigade. I. Begt.

Jones, B. W.} Lieut. B.N. Stanley, Edward, Lieut. 2nd W. I. Begt.

Andrews, J. W., Lieut. 11th Begt. Thompson, J. H., Lieut. 2nd W. I. Begt.

PBOPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF PROPELLERS FOR

SHIPS OF WAR.

By George Quick, Engineer, J&.N., H.M.S. "Tenedos."

(Read by Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N.)

As the cost of each individual vessel of war is now much greater than
formerly, so also is the individual importance of each vessel greater as
it bears a larger proportion to the total naval strength of the empire.
Thus, a modern ironclad costing £400,000, may be considered equal in
importance in every respect (except number of crew) to a squadron
of four or five of the line-of -battle ships of thirty years ago costing
the same sum of money. Now, whilst it is hard to conceive any com-
vol. $x. M

158 PR0P08ED NEW COMBINATION OF

bination of circumstances which would disable simultaneously a
squadron of the old vessels, it is too well known that an ironclad of
the same money and fighting value may be, and often is, disabled by a
slight accident to her machinery. How much more frequently such
accidents will happen, and how much more serious the injuries will be
in war time, it is difficult to say, but that they will be more frequent
and serious then than in time of peace, is, I think, to be fairly pre-
sumed. It is generally admitted, that in future naval actions the
failure of the propelling power will place a vessel completely at the
mercy of her antagonist, hence the safety of the ship depends entirely
upon the retention of her motive power. Considering this, and the
many sources of danger arising from torpedoes, ramming, Ac., I
cannot concede that even twin-screw propellers afford that security
from total disablement which modern naval warfare requires. Being
thus impressed with the necessity of greater security for the propelling-
power of war vessels, I have been induced to forward a certain proposal
to the Admiralty for the purpose of providing it, an account of which
I beg to submit to the consideration of the members of the Royal
United Service Institution, in the hope of its receiving that free
criticism which is always required for proposed innovations, and with
the view of eliciting the opinions of those Officers who may have
the great responsibility of commanding vessels in action.

Description of proposed new arrangement of Propelling Power for Ships

of War.

The objects sought to be attained are, (1st.) Greater security for
the propelling power and for the ship when in action. (2nd.) Greater
economy of fuel at low speed with less wear and tear of engines and
boilers than at present. (3rd.) To turn vessels quickly and in a very
small circle, as well when they have no progressive motion as when
moving at a high speed.

To attain these objects, I propose to supply additional engines for
driving a turbine, or one or more centrifugal pumps for hydraulic pro-
pulsion, in such manner that when only a small speed is required — say
•under nine knots per hour — these engines can be used alone for pro-
pelling, and when higher speeds are required they can be used in con-
junction with the screw engines. The discharge nozzles should be fitted
with valves so as to allow the propelling streams from the turbine or
pumps to be quickly diverted from going astern to a line at right
angles to the keel, or right ahead, whenever it may be required either
to turn quickly or to go astern, and the orifices for supplying the turbine
with water to be fitted with valves that could be closed when required,
so that in the event of injury to the ship's bottom from torpedoes or
any other cause, the turbine would be able to draw its supply of water
from the leakage, and by this means keep the ship afloat. Safety
would be attained for the propelling power by thus dividing it into
independent sections located in different parts of the ship; the
different sections being used for different speeds ; thus, the turbine
could be used alone for speeds under seven or eight knots, the screw
or screws being hoisted or placed vertically ; for intermediate speeds —

PB0PELLBB8 FOB SHIPS OF WAB. 159

over eight and under twelve knots — the screw could be used alone ;
whilst for speeds oyer twelve knots, both screw and turbine could be
used together.

Now, it is evident that for the same maximum speed to be attained
in a given ship, at least the same total amount of steam must be
supplied by the boilers, and that the power of the screw engines may
be reduced in proportion to the power of the additional engines
supplied for hydraulic propulsion. As an illustration of the applica-
tion of this principle, I give the following: — Suppose a vessel is
intended to have a speed of fourteen knots per hour, her nominal
horse-power to be 1,200, and to indicate 7,200 horsepower. I propose
to divide the boilers into three independent and isolated sections, one
of 600 nominal horse-power, and two sections of 300 nominal horse-
power each ; with valves so arranged that all the boilers could be, if
required, connected together, or any one section of boilers connected
with any one pair of engines. By this division, the efficiency of a
portion of the boiler-power is rendered more secure. As regards the
engines, 900 nominal horse-power, equal to 5,400 indicated, would be
appropriated for the screw-propeller or propellers, and 300 nominal,
equal to 1,800 indicated, horse-power for the hydraulic propelling
engines. Now, if a similar ship fitted only with the screw in the
usual manner, has been propelled 14 knots per hour with 7,200 in-
dicated horse-power, the speed of the proposed ship with screw-
engines indicating 5,400 horse-power, will be 12*6 knots per hour,
that is calculating according to the approximate rule that the speed
varies as the cube root of the power : —

__ _ 8vTHPT1 x S V5400 X 14 -0fi, .
Thus Si = , . ^ = ■ = 12*6 knots.

With the hydraulic engines alone working at 1,600 indicated horse-
power, the speed of the vessel will be 8*8 knots per hour : —

„ a visit; x s vi§ooxi4 007 x

For Si, = « ,— ■ = T , = 8*8 knots.

u VI.H.P. B-/7200

Or if these hydraulic engines are used at half-power, = 900
indicated horse-power, the speed will be 6*9 knots, say 7 knots per
hour.

It is evident that as hydraulic propulsion hitherto has not proved
quite so efficient as screw propulsion, the extreme maximum speed
attained by using the two together at the same time may not be quite
so great as by the single screw using the same amount of power, but
the enormous advantage of security to the propelling power and the
ship, with rapidity of turning in action, especially for ramming, far
outweighs a slight loss of extreme maximum speed, if any such loss
should be experienced. In short, by the proposed combination of
hydraulic and screw propulsion, all the advantages of both systems
may be obtained in one vessel without the disadvantages attending on
the use of either separately.

In proposing the preceding division of steam power between the

m 2

160

PROPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF

turbine and screw, I have considered that the former engines should
be sufficiently powerful to enable the vessel to remain in action, by
being capable of moving at an -effective fighting speed, even if the
screw engines should be entirely disabled ; and I have estimated that
8£ knots per -hour would be sufficient for that purpose.

But the proportion of turbine to screw-power may be very different
from the foregoing, so as to suit the construction of the vessel or the
service for which she may be specially designed. It is obvious that
we cannot demand unlimited space and choice of location for our
engines, but must make the best use of that which is assigned us.
The following Table shows approximately the results which would be
obtained by various proportions of turbine to screw-power, when the
total steam power remained the same : —

Division of Power.
Total 1,200 N.H.P.

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 1-600 N.H.P. to 600

N.H.P :

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 2 - 400 N.H.P. to 800

N.H.P

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 8 - 800 N.H.P. to 900

N.H.P

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 5-200 N.H.P. to 1,000

N H P
Hydraulic 1 to Screw' 7 « lib N.H.P. to 1,060

N.H.P

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 9-120 N.H.P. to 1,080

N.H.P

Hydraulic 1 to Screw 11 - 100 N.H.P. to

1,100 N.H.P

Maximum speed iu knots per hour.

Turbine
alone.

Screw
alone.

Both 1
combined.

11 1

11-1

9-71

12 25

8-8

12 6

7-7

18-15

6-9

18-8

6 47

13*48

6 1

13-56

The foregoing Table is calculated on the assumption that engines
of 1,200 nominal horse-power would propel a similar vessel, fitted
with the screw alone, at a speed of 14 knots per hour.

Applying this principle to a well-known vessel, Her Majesty's ship
" Devastation," of 800 nominal horse- power, and taking the results
of her trial trip as data, namely, speed 13*8 knots per hour, indicated
horse-power 6,630, the following speeds would be attained by the
turbine and screw respectively : — Turbine engines 200 nominal horse-
power, speed by ditto, 8*6 knots per hour. Screw engines 600
nominal horse-power, speed by ditto, 12*55 knots per hour. If, how-
ever, the hydraulic propelling engines be of 100 nominal horse-power
only, the screw engines being of 700 nominal horse-power, we get a
speed of 6*9 knots by the turbine, and 1321 knots per hour by the
screw engines alone. The speed in each case with the combined pro-
pellers being 13*8 knots per hour nearly.

But if the screw engines remained as at present and room could be
found for a pair of engines and turbine of only 50 nominal horse-

PROPELLERS FOB SHIPS OF WAR. 161

power, the speed by these small engines alone would be 5*47 knots per
hoar; whilst the efficiency and safety of this vessel as a fighting
machine would be much increased by the facility afforded for turning
in ramming and torpedo attacks.

In lieu of one pair of engines working a single turbine of great
capacity, it would be possible, and in some cases desirable, to use two
or more sets of independent engines and turbines of small power, and
separated by Water-tight bulkheads. But this is a matter which would
be determined by the proportions and nature of the ship. Again, by
the adoption of the auxiliary hydraulic propeller, a single screw may,
in some cases, be used advantageously in lieu of twin-screws, by which
considerable economy of space would be effected, and the coal-bunker
capacity increased.

I have given no drawings to illustrate the application of this system,
as the detail depends so much upon the nature bf the vessel to which
it may be applied.

From the foregoing it may be seen that the turbine may be applied
as an auxiliary propeller in three different ways: — (1st) as a
powerful auxiliary to the screw, eapable of maintaining a ship in
action after the screw engines are disabled; (2nd) as a feeble
auxiliary, occupying little space, but sufficiently powerful to drive a
mastless or other vessel for very long distances at low speed, which
speed would not be sufficient for fleet actions or for heading against a
gale of wind ; (3rd) in very large vessels of the " Inflexible " type,
whilst considerable turbine power may be supplied for propulsion, and
located so as to exert its maximum efficiency for that duty, a small
turbine may be supplied and placed in the best position to Enable it to
perform the special duty of quickly turning the vessel, and also for
acting as a bilge pump and fire engine.

I anticipate great economy of fuel to arise from the use of the
turbine engines alone, when a low speed only is "required; the economy
resulting from the use of small engines working at nearly full power,
instead of using screw engines of great weight, frictional resistance,
and large heat radiating surfaces at very low power. Having had
occasion to study the effect of the reaction of streams of fluid for a
special purpose, I have arrived at the conclusion, that for vessels of
very fine lines, the turbine may be used for the sole propeller as
efficiently as the screw, provided it be properly proportioned and con-
structed to suit the vessel and speed for which it is intended. The
great point to be considered with regard to full powered turbine-pro-
pulsion is this, whether with a given cubic capacity, weight of
machinery, and coal consumption, the turbine can propel a vessel at as
great a maximum speed as the screw propeller can. If it can, then
the turbine will rival the screw as a sole propeller. If, on the other
hand, the turbine could be made, with the same bulk and weight of
machinery, to give a greater Tnn-Timnnri speed with the same economy
of fuel as the screw, then it would totally eclipse the latter. On this
question it is well to observe, that whereas thousands of screw-pro-
pellers have been made and tried, and are now fitted so as to be
capable of being altered in pitch to suit the vessels to which they

162 PROPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF

belong, only a very few experiments have been made with hydraulic
propulsion, and none at all, that I am aware of, of an exhaustive
nature, involving alterations of the machinery.

But if we can only make the turbine within certain limits to
approach the screw for speed arid economy, then it may be used with
advantage as an auxiliary propeller, in consequence of rte capability of
performing most important duties, other than propelling, which the
screw cannot be made to do.

I have thus briefly stated my proposal for your consideration as
Combatant Officers, for I venture to look upon it as your province to
say whether auxiliary hydraulic propulsion should be used ; and if so,
in what proportion to the screw, and for what purpose; and the
Engineer Officer's duty to be to design the most powerful and com-
pact machinery to occupy the space and location the Naval Constructor
may provide for it.

In conclusion I may state that I have designed means to obviate
certain defects and difficulties which have been hitherto experienced in
the application of hydraulic propulsion, and which have retarded its
extension.

These means being, however, a matter of mere mechanical detail,
I do not ask you to condescend to consider them, but to consider the
important general question as to the desirability, or otherwise, of using
hydraulic propulsion as an auxiliary to the screw in large vessels of war.

Addendum.

Since writing the preceding, news has reached me of the sinking
of Her Majesty's ship, "Vanguard," of 5,312 indicated horse-power,
by the " Iron Duke." This event must, I think, bring into promi-
nence the question of the amount of pumping power required on
board the fighting ships of the future ; for the effect the sinking of
only a single ship in action would have on the rest of the fleet to
which she may belong, is a matter for serious consideration now.
That the present pumping arangements on board ship are utterly
inadequate to deal with such leaks as are likely to occur in action,
and to steam vessels generally, is proved not only by the loss of the
" Vanguard," but by the sinking of the " Re* d'ltalia," "Flamstead,"
and "Ville de Havre," all of which were full- powered steamers.
Other examples may be named, such as the screw sloop " Amazon,"
and many others. These cases show that the " bilge injection valves,"
so much relied on by marine engineers and shipbuilders generally,
are totally insufficient to cope with the flood of water arising from
collisions, and which will arise from injuries by torpedoes and pro-
jectiles. Now it being impossible to construct vessels which shall be
invulnerable in all parts, it is necessary to consider these three
questions : — (1st), the probable size of the breach, or orifice, which
will be made by rams or torpedoes ; (2nd), the amount of pumping,
power requisite to prevent a leak of a given size from gaining on a
ship ; (3rd), the means to be employed for temporarily checking the
rush of water into the vessel when the breach is very large indeed.

PROPELLERS TOR SHIPS OF WAR, 163

The first question cannot be definitely answered at present ; as the
exact size of apertures in the vessels sank is unknown ; and there is
sufficient experience of the extent of the injuries which may be
inflicted on iron vessels by torpedoes exploded in actual contact.
The second question, however, can be easily solved for any particular
case ; and to afford a ready method of approximately estimating the
power required for general cases, the following example is calculated
for the particular case in which the breach is exactly one square foot
in area, is at the mean hydraulic depth of eighteen feet below the water
line, and the height of lift twenty -five feet; being the difference be-
tween the level of the water in the ship, and the surface of that out-
side. The assumed depth of the breach, and height to which the
water must be lifted by the pumps, may be, I think, considered fair
averages for a number of cases ; but these two quantities may differ
considerably from the above named values without greatly affecting the
accuracy of estimates formed on those values — every foot of difference
of level between the water inside and outside the ship affecting it to
the extent of about four per cent ; and every foot of difference in tho
mean hydraulic depth of the breach, from that assumed, to the extent
of three per cent. The following is the calculation : —

Let A = Area* of the breach = 1 square foot.

h = Hydraulic mean depth of breach below water line
= 18 feet.

V = Velocity of flow of water through breach in feet per

second = 8-025 Sh = 8 025 </l~8 = 34 feet.

K = Coefficient of contraction of orifice due to friction of its
edges, &c. = 0*8. (This value allows a fair margin
for safety — the value derived from experiment on
orifices in thin plates being about 0*6).

Q = Volume of water, in cubic feet, entering ship per second
== A. V. K. = 1 X 34 x 0-8 = 27-2 cubic feet.

d = Weight of cubic foot of sea water = 64 lbs.

W = Weight of the water must be lifted per second to pre-
vent the leak gaining on the ship = Qd = 27 '2 X 64
= 1740-8 lbs.

H = Height which the water must be lifted to be discharged
= 25 feet.

WH = Work in foot pounds to be performed per second
= 1740-8 X 25 = 43520 foot lbs.

Let x = Gross indicated horse-power of pumping engine to
perform the work.

E = Net energy in foot lbs. = W X H.
k = Co-efficient of efficiency of steam engine = 0'8.
&, =r Co-efficient of efficiency of centrifugal, or turbine-
pump = 0*75.
fcn = Co- efficient of efliciencv of engine and pump combined
= fcxJfc, = 0'8x 075 = 06.

164 PROPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF

■■•■b"^""^ 18,;re IH p

Say, 130 I.H.P. required to keep leak from gaining on a ship when

the breach is one square foot in area, eighteen feet below water-line,

and height of lift twenty -five feet, whence we can estimate the area

of breach aperture that any given steam pumping-power is sufficient

to contend with ; or the pumping-power required for any given area

of breach. This in the case of the " Vanguard " if one-third of the

5312
engine power, that is —5— = 1770 I.H.P. had been applied to

hydraulic propulsion, the area of the breach which could have been

successfully contended with, by using the turbine as a pump, would

1770
have been = 13*6 square feet. Or the amount of indicated

horse-power requisite for a given area of breach is found by multiply-
ing the number of square feet by 130, which gives the answer.

It may not be amiss perhaps to state the number of men which
would be required to work the pumps continuously to prevent a leak
through a breach of one foot square and 18 feet below the water
line from gaining on the ship, as such a statement may dispel some
vague notions on the subject. On the authority of Poncelet and
others, Professor Rankine states that the work of an average man
turning a crank, as in pumping, is 1,296,000 foot lbs., operating only

eight hours a day. The work per minute would be -^ -r-r- = 2650

.... • 2650 ft. lbs. A AQ ,
foot lbs., and OOAft. , ■ ., = 008 horse power.

ooOOO ft. lbs. r

Now we have seen that 130 gross indicated horse-power = 79 net

horse-power, would be required to perform the work to be done,

79
hence ^r— ^ = 987, is the number of «men required at the pumps con-
tinuously ; and of course double that number for spell and spell. By
this we see the small utility of manual-power- pumps in contending
with leaks or large fires.

To give a more popular illustration of the question, the weight of
water entering a ship per minute through an orifice one square foot
in area, and eighteen feet below water line, may be stated. As
1740*8 lbs. enter per second, 46*6 tons will enter per minute, and
2,796 tons per hour. This plainly shows the immense use watertight
compartments have been in recent disasters in effecting a saving of
life by giving time for escape; when, but for them, owing to the
immense size of the breaches, the vessels injured must have been sunk
almost instantaneously and all lives lost. I have no knowledge of
the actual area of the breach in the " Vanguard," but taking into con-
sideration the fact that it was nearly an hour after being struck before
she sank, it may be safely concluded, I think, that if engines of
1,000 l.H.P. = say 160 nominal, had been applied in that ship to
hydraulic propulsion, and the turbine had been used as a pump after
the accident, that vessel would now be safely in dock undergoing

PROPELLERS FOB SHIPS OF WAR, 165

repairs. For we have seen from a foregoing calculation that whilst a
hole a foot square will admit 2,796 tons of water per hour (quite
enough to sink the " Vanguard "), yet we have also seen that an engine
of only 130 indicated horse-power would discharge the same, lifting it
a height of twenty-five feet. I have specially mentioned centrifugal
and turbine pumps as no other kind is anything like so efficient for the
power applied.

We now come to the third question : the means to be employed for
temporarily checking the rush of water into the vessel when the
breach is very large. It is unnecessary to say that a breach may be
so large that if all the engine power in the snip were applied to the
pumps, the leak could not be kept under for any great length of time,
unless the rush of water could be reduced. But with the knowledge
that there is very large pumping power on board, efforts could and
would be made, not actually to stop the leak — that may be impossible
— but to check it, so as to bring it within the power of the pumps.
And as the pumps would prolong the time between the injury of the
vessel and the complete drowning out of the fires, it is easy to conceive
that time may be found to diminish the leak (by means of bags of
oakum, large sails, awnings, Ac., drawn over the apertures on the out-
side of the ship) to such an extent that the pumps may at last equal,
or even master, the leak before the fires were extinguished. If they
could not, it would be useless wasting time by attempting to work the
hand pumps. But I think the time has arrived for special appliances
for covering orifices and checking leaks to be supplied to fighting
vessels. Such appliances could be made of large size, yet occupying
little storage room on board, moderate price, capable of adapting
themselves to any form or part of the vessel, strong enough to resist
the pressure of the water on the back, and capable, by means of that
pressure and its own elasticity, of forming a moderately good joint
even in the case of the most ragged hole that a torpedo explosion
could produce ; and combining with these qualities the most important
one of being quickly applicable to any part required under all
circumstances, as well by night as by day. Such an appliance I can-
not at present submit to your notice, but I may have, possibly, an
opportunity of doing so at some future time, when I hope it may be
found a satisfactory solution to the question suggested many years
ago by the eminent engineer, Mr. Nasmyth, viz., can " a hole as big as
o church door in a ship's bottom " be stopped ?

I have to apologise for dwelling so long on so simple a matter of
mere detail, but I have done so because I do not think it receives
quite so much attention as it deserves, and also because I do not con-
rider thai the giant steam power of our ships should be only available for
mere propulsion and nothing else, when it is capable of a far greater
range of usefulness.

In conclusion I beg to state my opinion that, however perfect and
powerful the machinery, pumps, and other appliances on board may
be, the engineer officers must have very high moral qualifications —
and I use the word moral in its widest sense — as well as first class
mathematical acquirements, to make effective use of them, and to

166 PROPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF

develop their capabilities to the utmost limit in the moment of
urgent need and danger. But to successfully cope with such exi-
gencies and accidents as may and will arise in action, Engineer
Officers should have more authority- over the materiel and all the
mechanical labourers afloat than at present, as well as a higher
position as Officers to maintain that authority.

Admiral Sklwyn : — I think we may congratulate the Navy on the possession of
an Officer who can write such a paper, and who can entertain such views while he is
still afloat, showing such little prejudice in favour of that to which he is accus-
tomed, and which he has been principally working, for it is the one indication of
progress when those who are actually working, not alone those who have worked
in the past, or may work in the future, begin to consider what can be done to im-
prove, and as boldly to state it. I have for a great many years in this Institution,
strongly advocated going much farther with the hydraulic propeller, which I believe
is possible, but I will confine my remarks to the view which Mr. Quick takes of its
utility, first, as an adjunct to the screw, and secondly, in its character as a pump.
There is no doubt, first of all, that our experiments with the hydraulic propeller
have hitherto been of the most unsatisfactory character as regards the records made
of them, the opportunities given for studying them, and the attention paid to them.
Had the screw been treated with as great a neglect as the hydraulic propeller has
been, had it been so little backed up by capitalists and others, I doubt whether we
should have had the screw to-day, but I am quite prepared to think not so great
an improvement was made by the substitution of the screw for the paddle, as will
eventually be made by the substitution of the hydraulic propeller for the screw. I
remember perfectly well those who advocated the use of the screw were met with
the statement, that it could never be used except as an auxiliary, but that idea has
of course been given up long ago. I think, however prudent it may be to put one
foot forward at a time, and to introduce the hydraulic propeller as an auxiliary, we
shall yet very soon after we begin to understand its uses and its efficiency, regret
that we ever took it as an auxiliary only. The great point which Mr. Quick has not
adverted to in his estimate of its efficiency is this, that whereas in the paddle and
screw we are dependent on the immersion of the ship for the power which may be
developed by any amount of engine-power you put on board that ship, the
hydraulic propeller has no such limit, as it derives its effect from reactive efforts
alone. Any amount of power that can reasonably be put into -the ship and for
which fuel can be found may be usefully exerted at all times by the hydraulic pro-
peller, while with the paddle in rolling, or the screw in pitching, a very large propor-
tion of the power is lost. I think in cases where a vessel is fitted as he propose*
with a combination of these two propellers, the screw and the hydraulic, and in a
heavy following sea, with the screw doing nothing but attempting to break the
engines down, slowly propelling the ship ahead, but causing everybody the greatest
anxiety lest the engines should be broken down by the racing they are subjected to,
— here I believe the screw might be let alone altogether, and the small hydraulic
auxiliary power would do quite as much duty without any waste whatever ; that is
to say, the ship would go ahead as fast with a very small auxiliary hydraulic pro-
peller as if you were using the large effort of the screw only partially effective ; and
that would be a very great advantage. There is no doubt also that the screw is
subject to many exterior accidents to which the hydraulic propeller is not liable,
and that in action these would be multiplied not only by the efforts of the enemy
to ram the ship, or from any accident occurring from torpedoes, but also from the
unavoidable fouling in a sea which would probably have floating wreck in it, for as
you go about in a heavy smoke, not able to see and to steer clear of floating wreck,
you must necessarily expect occasionally to foul the screw. This would reduce the
ship to a condition of absolute helplessness, and in such a case the hydranlie pro-
peller would have a very great advantage. I think there must have been some error
in Mr. Quick's calculation with regard to the manual power required in lifting-water.
I am glad to say it is all on his side ; he has made a very wise error if it is an error,
but I do not think even Ponoelet and Rankine would ever tell us the efficiency of

PROPELLERS *OR SHIPS OF WAR. 167

one man is one ton a minute, one foot high of -water lifted. There is some mistake
which very often occurs in these cases, — that is all in his favour ; it would show that
the 190 horse-power would do more than he states.

Captain Wilson : Mr. Quick states that a man is capable of raising 2,660 foot
pounds per minute, equal to 0*06 horse-power.

Admiral Sbiwtb : We all know what a Terr wearing-out business pumping is if
you come to put men at it ; they rarely do their work quite as an engineer would
desire to see them do it. Mr. Quick gives us some very useful figures if we apply
them generally. I see he says this must be a function of the immersion of the ship,
and a ship at sea is always varying her immersion at any one point. She may be
roffing. She may roll the leak higher up, or she may be subjected to such a swell
as leaves the leak occasionally almost bare. Supposing she has a leak in the fore
compartment, and is running at high speed ; it is dear the water will enter with a
greater velocity; so that his figures will require revision before we accept them as
anything on which we can put a fair estimate of what may be done. I think we
must recognise the fact that the hydraulic propeller does present to us for the first
time the means of utilising a very large proportion of engine-power on board a ship
to encounter those enemies which seem most likely to be formidable in modern
warfare, the ram and torpedo, and those which most seamen will view with the
greatest dismay, simply because they are not to be guarded against as we can guard
against many other things of the kind. Call it a great pump, rendered necessary by
modern conditions, and 1 think even on that view of the question we shall be pre-
pared to accept such an auxiliary power for this purpose ; hut if we can get by any
process whatever a series of experiments tried with the inefficient application of the
hydraulic propeller we have got at present, — fairly tried to the bitter end, giving
the actual results tabulated in such a way as that the whole profession can avau
themselves of them, then we shall be able to go ahead ; we shall be able to detect
the points in which the hydraulic propeller has not proved thoroughly satisfactory.
It may, however, be claimed that a very large amount of satisfaction has really
arisen, and that from, the first application of it, it has not proved inefficient, — the
ship is still going about, — I say by this means we should be able to make progress
in a direction which will have, I am sure, very great value. There is another point
about the hydraulic propeller which is one of its great excellencies, that rf we
choose, and it seems likely we shall have to choose, to mast our ships again properly,
and to give them efficient sail powers^ it does not offer any of those obstacles to rapid
motion under sail which the screw must necessarily do, still less does it make a great
difficulty in the steerage which the screw always must do. You cannot with
impunity have a large vacancy elose in front of the rudder if you desire to have a
ship that will steer well as we used to consider ships ought to steer, and the
hydraulic propeller will give us a machine which will not have that disadvantage.
Also on the question of grounding, it is well known in a late case off the coast of
England, the very first attempt to back the ship astern after grounding resulted in
the breaking of the propeller. The hydraulic propeller is subject to no such contin-
gency, if the points at which the water is taken in and given out are properly
chosen. A ship may get on shore, and lie on sand without any danger to the
machinery outside the vessel, and that is to be reckoned as one of its advantages.
In all these things I think Mr. Quick is taking a line which will, I hope, lead him
to a thorough study of the question of stopping leaks. We have done that very
efficiently at sea formerly, when we did not expect any such large holes in the ship s
bottom, but there may be no doubt means devised for making canvas more water-
tight than it is under such pressure as that. Although canvas answers absolutely
well up to a certain pressure, there is a pressure beyond which the water is forced
through the canvas, and that would be speedily reached with such depths of leak
and such weights to support as might now occur. Some people think that the use of
india-rubber may be possible, but I distrust it very much where it is alternately wet
and dry. Vulcanized rubber is subject to decay, to slow oxygenation of the sulphur
used which decays the whole rubber, and you cannot preserve diving dresses in hot
climates unless you keep them always under water. And then they are subject to
another slow decay, which is the combination with hydrogen, but it is slower than
the oxidization. I can only express my high appreciation of Mr. Quick's paper, and

170 PROPOSED HEW COMBINATION OF PROPELLERS, ETC-

service at the present time, giving his thoughts such a practical direction as
• Mr. Quick appears to have done. I wish him every success.

Captain Burgess : If you look at the proceedings of Lord Dufferin's
on " Designs for Ships of War," you will see that that Committee strongly
mended that further trials should he made with the turbine propeller, and
Elliot and Ryder in their Report did the same.1

The Chairman : I am sure that I feel very much, as all of us do, indebted to
Mr. Quick for having brought the subject so well before us. That the turbine
principle has not been properly tried, I am convinced. I hare only seen one rosed,
and from what she did, or rather what she did not do, I had my doubte ae to
whether she was in that condition in which she might have been. We find
that a better arrangement might be made, and I think there is a great deal that
be done with the turbine ; but it is all in the working out of the principle. I do
think the " Waterwitch " was sufficiently fitted, and therefore it was not a verj fair
trial, on the whole. I very much regret that the system has not been tried more,
and more with the view Mr. Quick now advocates, because there are many other
ways, as gentlemen have stated this evening, in which it may be most useful. I earn
conceive, in action, it is less liable, by far, to be disturbed by the accidents inevitable
in a naval fight. Though it may not possibly (I am not quite certain it would not)
give the same speed under the varying circumstances of wind and weather, apart
from other considerations, as other methods of propulsion, yet if it will give ua that
speed, or something like it, under the circumstances in which these other means of
propulsion will be liable to be disabled, then it will certainly be a very valuable
thing. With respect to pumping, I do not see its application quite to extinguishing
fire, but for pumping out from a leak, I see very great possibilities indeed, provided
we have an instantaneous means of efficiently shutting off the supply to the turbine,
and of taking that supply from the leak. These are questions of fitting, and it
-is, after all, on the accuracy of these fittings that all these new inventions depend.
A new invention which is not well looked after, and which is not very well fitted,
has very little chance, I won't say merely with the Admiralty, because, after all, the
Admiralty are only representatives of public opinion in the Navy, and in general X
may say this for the Admiralty, though I am not in any way connected with it. that
they have rather a bard task sometimes to fulfil, with respect to inventions, and first
of all, to see that they are likely to answer. Everybody who knows anything of
Admiralty business knows that there is far more business than any number of men
can do efficiently in that building, and a great number of inventions are brought
before them, and they have a T&rf difficult part to play to know what to do with
those inventions. It is not every man that can immediately see, in the midst of his
many official duties, how a certain invention may turn out, particularly when it has
not been very effectively brought before him; so that we must not be too hard
upon the gentlemen sitting there, whose time is very much occupied in the public
service of the country, and who have scarcely time to attend to the wonderful and
numerous inventions that are cropping up every day before ns. In short, not being
an office man myself, I can quite feel for them, and we must not deal too hardly
with them. I do sincerely hope, after this paper and the renewed attention that
has been given to the subject, they may be induced to take the question up again,
and give it a chance of developing itself and showing what may be made of it. I
feel convinced myself much more may be made of it than has yet been done by the
" Waterwitch," and I only wish it may be tried.

1 It appears pretty clear that had the " Vanguard " been constructed on the
elaborated cellular system, so strongly recommended by the above Officers, and had
she had in addition a turbine propeller, she would have been afloat now.

170 PROPOSED NEW COMBINATION OF PROPELLERS, ETC.

service at the present time, giving his thoughts such a practical direction as
Mr. Quick appears to have done. I wish him every success.

Captain Burgess : If you look at the proceedings of Lord Dufferin's

on " Designs for Ships of War," you will see that that Committee strongly
mended that further trials should be made with the turbine propeller, and Admirals
Elliot and Ryder in their Report did the same.1

The Chaibman : I am sure that I feel very much, as all of us do, indebted to
Mr. Quick for having brought the subject so well before us. That the twbme
principle has not been properly tried, I am convinced. I have only seen one vessel,
and from what she did, or rather what she did not do, I had my doubts as to
whether she was in that condition in which she might have been. We find now
that a better arrangement might be made, and I think there is a great deal that can
be done with the turbine ; but it is all in the working out of the principle. I do not
think the " Waterwitch " was sufficiently fitted, and therefore it was not a very but
trial, on the whole. I very much regret that the system has not been tried more,
and more with the view Mr. Quick now advocates, because there are many other
ways, as gentlemen have stated this evening, in which it may be most usefuL I can
conceive, in action, it is less liable, by far, to be disturbed by the accidents inevitable
in a naval fight. Though it may not possibly (I am not quite certain it would not)
five the same speed under the varying eueumstances of wind and weather, apart
from other considerations, as other methods of propulsion, yet if it will give as that
speed, or something like it, under the circumstances in which these other means of
propulsion will be liable to be disabled, then it will certainly be a very valuable
thing. With respect to pumping, I do not see its application quite to extinguishing
fire, but for pumping out from a leak, I see very great possibilities indeed, provided
we have an instantaneous means of efficiently shutting off the supply to the ten-bine,
and of taking that supply from the leak. These are questions ox fitting, and it
is, after all, on the accuracy of these fittings that all these new inventions depend.
A new invention which is not well looked after, and which is not rerj well fitted,
has very little chance, I won't say merely with the Admiralty, because, after all, the
Admiralty are only representatives of public opinion in the Navy, and in general I
may say this for the Admiralty, though I am not in any way connected with it, that
they have rather a bard task sometimes to fulfil, with respect to inventions, and first
of all, to see that they are likely to answer. Everybody who knows anything of
Admiralty business knows that there is far more business than any number of men
can do efficiently in that building, and a great number of inventions are brought
before them, and they have a T&tj difficult part to play to know what to do with
those inventions. It is not every man that can immediately see, in the midst of his
many official duties, how a certain invention may turn out, particularly when it has
not been very effectively brought before him; so that we must not be too hard
upon the gentlemen sitting there, whose time is very much occupied in the public
servioe of the country, ana who have scarcely time to attend to the wonderful and
numerous inventions that are cropping up every day before us. In short, not being
an office man myself, I can quite feel for them, and we must not deal too hardly
with them. I do sincerely hope, after this paper and the renewed attention that
has been given to the subject, they may be induced to take the question up again,
and give it a chance of developing itself and showing what may be made of it. I
feel convinced myself much more may be made of it than has yet been done by the
" Waterwitch," and I only wish it may be tried.

1 It appears pretty clear that had the "Vanguard" been constructed on the
elaborated cellular system, so strongly recommended by the above Officers, and had
she had in addition a turbine propeller, she would have been afloat now.

Journal Jt US InatLtutCorv
VOL 20 .

PI JY

lift.

Curve of requisite Supply of Water
far Screws in Cobsinge.

Fi#S.

I 4 6 8 K> ft 14
I HJ> per Sq Foot of the So*ewb Dvsc.

JJortia

ON THE CASING OF THE PROPELLER OP H.M.S.

" BRUISER."

By R. Griffiths, Esq., C.E.1]

The plan of casing -the screw propeller has often been proposed and
practically tried by several inventors, bat caused in every case a loss
of speed, which could not be accounted for at the time ; in some
of the experiments the casing was attached to the periphery of the
screw, and revolved with it ; and, in the others, the casing was fixed
to the ship, and the screw revolved in it ; but in each case I found, by
experiments I made, that the loss of speed was due to the screw being
short of water, when the casing was only made the length of the screw,
for a considerable portion of the water that the screw-propeller forces
through its disc is drawn into it from around its periphery ; so that
when the screw had a casing over.it, it was deprived of all its supply,
except that which entered on the face of its disc.

There has been — I may say universally — an opinion, that whatever

the distance gone by the ship, was short of the distance the screw

would have gone if it had been working through a solid, which is

termed the slip of the screw, was a loss of power ; and there have

been several papers read at different Scientific Institutions to attempt

to prove this theory. I have always opposed this theory, for I saw

in 1849, when I made my experiments on screw-propulsion, that the

water was forced back from the screw at nearly twice the speed the

model was moving, and that the model would not move forward unless

the water was forced backwards from the screw's disc. In order to

give the screw of the " Bruiser " its full supply of water, I had the

casing made of boiler plate of 7 feet diameter where the screw worked,

and tapered to 6 feet 2 inches diameter at the after end ; it was lined

inside with wood, making it parallel where the screw worked, and

tapered from the forward edge of the screw to form a funnel mouth,

which gave about 35 per cent, more entrance for the water to get to the

screw ; when finished it did not appear to allow as much extra

entrance for the water as I imagined to have given the best results in

my model trials ; I therefore had a lip of plate iron attached below the

casing, allowing about 5 per cent, more, making altogether about

40 p«r cent, more entrance for the water to supply the screw than

the area of the screw's disc. This I found -since to be little more

1 Bead at the Evening Meeting on Monday, 31st January, 1876. Admiral Sir
Henry J. Codrington, K.C.B., in the Chair.

172 ON THE CASING OF THE PROPELLER

than is required for a screw that has only 7 I.H.P. per square foot
of the screw's disc, which was the proportion in the " Bruiser ; M
for the supply of water requires to be in proportion to the power
exerted on the propeller, as shown by the diagram, Fig. 3 ; hence a
small screw can be made as effective in propelling as a large one within
certain limits, if it can obtain a sufficient supply of water. A screw
propeller is simply a rotary pump, when in a casing, and is governed
by the same laws, viz., that the power varies as the square of the
velocity, so that to double the velocity of the water you drive through
a pipe, or through the casing of a propeller, you require four times die
power, and four times the thrust is given to propel the ship.

Diagram No. 2 is that of a steam launch with which I tried some
experiments at Devonport, with a view to ascertain the quantity of
water the screw required. These experiments showed that when the
launch was moored, and the engines worked up to the same speed as
when she was going— viz., 240 revolutions per minute — the force of
the water which came from the screw, gave about one-half the pres-
sure upon the gauge-plate as it did when the launch was going at the
full speed of six knots, with 240 revolutions per minute. This shows
clearly the mistake of the theory of engineers that when the screw
was placed where the water had free access to it, the quantity driven
back would be a column the same diameter as the screw at the speed
the launch went ; for these experiments show it to be about 50 per
cent. more.

One of the most important pointe in screw-propulsion is to get a
sufficient supply of water to feed the screw in proportion to the power
that is exerted upon it. On the present system this is all taken from
the stern of the ship in front of the screw, and as the ship moves for-
ward, the water must close in behind her in order to fill up the space
she occupied, and the screw is drawing away the water from where
it is most required, and thus causes much greater resistance to her
than if she were propelled by sails or paddles ; and this resistance in-
creases in proportion to the power and speed of the ship. It is well
known that out of the power exerted to propel a ship by the screw,
there is about 60 per cent, loss, so that 40 per cent, of the power,
if exerted to tow her, would give the same speed to the vessel. I have
tried the model which I use for my experiments, and with the spring
which took one minute to propel it 60 feet, with 600 revolutions by
the screw, it was towed the 60 feet in 33 seconds, with 600 revolu-
tions, by a string wound on a drum, the friction being the same in
each case except the friction of the screw in the water, which must be
considerable.

In order to reduce this enormous waste of power in propelling by the
screw, I have devoted a considerable amount of time and money, and the
conclusion I have arrived at is that, unless the screw gets fully supplied
with the water it requires to drive through in proportion to the power
exerted by the engine to work it, it will not give a relative thrust to
the screw-shaft for propelling the ship ; and, in order to obtain it, I
have been able to discover no better way than to enclose the screw in a
casing made with a funnel-mouth at the entrance, of such proportions

OP H.M.S. "BRUISER." 173

as will admit the quantity of water which will be required, according
to the amount of power that is to be exerted upon it.

There is another important feature in connection with the supply
of water to the screw, — viz., the use made of it after it has passed
through the screw, as well as where it obtains its supply from ; for I
have already observed that the screw in drawing the water from
the stern of a ship causes much greater resistance to her ; and I
find the water should be supplied to the tunnels from underneath the
vessel, as far forward as not to take it from or stop the supply that is
required to fill the space that has been occupied by the ship, and deli-
vered from the screws into the space left by the stern of the vessel ;
and as I have already shown that the screw delivers from 30 to 100
per cent, more water than is due to the speed of the ship, according to
the power exerted to work it, so must her stern be made full to leave
room for it as it leaves the casing and propellers, and in that case 1
find there will be very little disturbance caused by the screw in the
water behind the stern of the ship when under way.

The speed of the "Bruiser" when tried before the casing was
applied, was 8*016 knots, and with the casing 8*280 knots ; and 1 find
from experiments that 1 have made since, that if the casing had been
made to come down level with the keel, and the stern made full as
shown on this model, 1 have no doubt the speed would have been at
least one knot more.

The advantage of casing over the screw as a protection to it, will be
generally admitted both for ships of war and for merchant vessels. I
do not think that screws in general get injured or broken unless they
come in contact with some foreign substance, or the ship is pitching
in a heavy sea ; and no doubt many of the ships that have been lost
and never heard of, as well as those that were known to be wrecked
through the breaking of their propellers, would have been saved had
their propellers been protected ; and I have no doubt that the day will
come when the Legislature will not allow ships to carry passengers
unless they are propelled by two or more protected screws and separate
engines.

Another great advantage which was observed in the " Bruiser " was
the entire removal of the disagreeable vibration, as well as the saving
of much wear and tear, caused by it to the ship and machinery. The
application of the casing over the screw of the "Bruiser" entirely
prevented the racing of the engines when in a heavy sea, the trouble
and anxiety caused by which is known to every marine engineer, as
well as the loss of speed from the screw losing its hold on the water.

In conclusion I would remark that any improvements that were to
be made in screw-propulsion, were expected by engineers and ship-
builders to be made in the screw itself. A greater mistake could not
have been made, for there has been no real improvement made in the
screw when worked in open water since the alteration made twenty-five
years ago in its form in contradistinction to the system of making the
centre or boss as small as consistent with strength, and the blades
narrower towards the root than at the extremity. The placing of the
screw in a tunnel I find requires it to be made nearer to the old form

yol. xx. N

174

ON THE CASING OF THE PROPELLER

of a small boss, and blades wide at the extremities. The screw of the
" Bruiser " had a large boss and blades narrow at the extremities, and
a little more speed would have been obtained if the screw had been
altered, but if this had been done in the u Bruiser " it could not have
been proved whether the improvements were due to the alteration of
the screw or to the casing.

There is one remarkable fact, that Mr. Watdbn, the chief engineer
of the " Bruiser," noticed that when the ship was at sea in clear water,
the water was forced back in a column from the casing for a consider-
able distance without any perceptible increase in its diameter. The
same thing occurs with my models when the screw is only enclosed
in a metal casing ; but in the model with a full stern, which gives the
best results by far, this does not occur, as the water delivered from the
screw stops at the stern, merely agitating the water there ; neither
does the stern drop when going at full speed, which is the case in fine-
sterned launches, which is entirely due to the screw drawing the water
from under the stern.

2 am now engaged in making some interesting experiments upon
some improvements in screw-propulsion, and the proportions, Ac, of
screw ships. When they are completed, I shall feel great pleasure in
communicating the results to this Institution, should the Committee
desire it.

Diagram No. 1. — Represents the stern of Her Majesty's ship
" Bruiser," as fitted with the casing over the propeller.

Diagram No. 2. — Shows the stern of Her Majesty's steam-pinnace,
No. 22, with a casing over the screw, and fitted with apparatus for
showing the pressure of water at different places behind the screw,
and over the boat's side, which consisted of a 3-inch square plate
attached to the lever as shown ; the pressure was taken by a Salter's
balance attached to the arm over the boat. The following table
gives some of the results : —

Pressure on plate, 9 square-inch area at A

!»

W
99

99
99
99

»i n ii

Revolutions of screw ■

Speed of boat about 6 hnots in each case.

.... 67 lbs.
.... 77 „

Screw disconnected,
Screw working. Boat towed.

9 lbs.
18
18
16-5
240

ii
»»
•i

99
99

99
99
99
9>

D
E
F

99
II
19
99

7 lbs.
75

9
120

19
99
99

Revolutions,

D
B

Launch moored. Screw working.

5 lbs.
6

240

About 70 per cent, more water passed through the casing when the
launch was going, than when moored and the screw working.
Diagram No, 3.— Is a curve, showing the requisite supply of water

OP H.M.8. "BRUISER." 175

for screw-propeller and in casings, with various proportions of power,
the extra supply being obtained by means of a funnel-mouth attached
to the casing. j

The branch (fig. 2) had a speed of six knots, at 240 revolutions a minute. When i

the screw was working, and the boat under way, the pressure at G was 9 lbs., at ,

£ and D 18 lbs., and at F 16*5 lbs. When the launch was towed at that same speed
by another ship, the pressure at G was 7 lbs., at E 7*5 lbs., at D 5£ lbs., at F 9 lbs.
In each case the revolutions made with the screw disconnected were 120, exactly
one half what it did when it was driven by the engines. I think that is a point that ,

has never been studied in the screw propeller before, nor given to the public in any
case. When the launch was moored and screw working, the pressure at D was 5 lbs.,
and at £ 6 lbs. The engines were going at the speed of 240 revolutions. (The
Chairman : Moored by the stern P) Moored by the stern. In trying my models,
I made a valve to shut up the aperture that admitted the water to the screw
entirely, and opened a valve to admit the water that was inside the ship, the water •
then went in here (pointing), and the screws going drew all the water out of the
ship directly, propelling the ship just the same.
Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N. : Very much the turbine principle, applied direct.
Mr. Griffiths : The screw is nothing but a rotary pump, when enclosed in a %

casing.

Mr. William Smith, C.E. : I should like to ask Mr. Griffiths how the results to
which he referred square with those made by Mr. Froude ? Mr. Froude had made
a number of experiments on the difference of the strain on a supposed block by the
power transmitted through the screw, propelling the vessel at a given speed, and
ner being towed, and also from her being moored astern. I think ho made a very
exhaustive series of experiments — the first of the kind ever made.

Mr. Griffiths : In those experiments, the object was to ascertain the quantity of
water the screw required to work it, with the object of gaining the best results.

Admiral Selwyn : I think if Mr. Quick 1 had been here, we ought all have con-
gratulated him on the fact that has come before us, that one of the oldest experi-
menters on the screw has very nearly arrived at the conclusion that, to make a
thoroughly efficient screw, it is requisite to bring it almost into the condition of a
turbine, and, if that be so, it will aid us very much in considering the whole
question. It is quito possible we might find the turbine placed in some way
as Mr. Griffiths has got it, more effective in some ways than discharging at the side
of the ship. It will certainly take less room. The point to which attention ought
to be called, is that the experiments Mr. Griffiths has given us, seem, as yet, to be
nther begun than finished. I think you promised us more experiments, and you
supposed the best results would be attained from a still greater prolongation of the
cuing.

Mr. Griffiths : I proved that the casing ought to be brought down so that no
water goes in from the side ; if the water goes in from the side, it is sucked away
from the stern of the ship.

Admiral Sklwtn : I have often had reason to remember the trials made, many
years ago, in the thickening of the run of a vessel, which bore very much on the
question of bringing ,the greatest quantity of water possible to the screw. The
14 Teaser," and one or two other vessels, were doubled under the run with planking,
and it produced a most remarkable decrease. Every inch of planking put on to the
ran of the vessel decreased nearly a knot an hour of the useful result. It was
equivalent to just what we had in some of the early armoured vessels. The
"Meteor," and others, were square vessels, like square boxes, an imitation of the
Emperor Louis Napoleon's first armour clad. The run did not exist at all. The
three small screws with which they were propelled were stuck practically behind
a square box, and, under these circumstances, it will not surprise engineers to
hear that they showed very little efficiency indeed. Here there is a very great
sdraatagc also to be found in the fact that the screw will derive great protection

1 Engineer, B.N., a paper by whom, " On a proposed Combination of Propellers
for Ships of War," liad been read previously.

N 2

176 ON THE CASING OF THE PBOPELLER

from floating wreckage, which is one of the objections we have to it, looking forward
to naval combats. Although I am an advocato of the most advanced means of pro-
pulsion, I do not neglect any means which will make those which we have either
more efficient or less liable to damage. I am quite sure Mr. Griffiths' experiments,
in this direction, will have a legitimate result. I am afraid the Legislature is scarcely
likely to interfere so rapidly as he thinks ; they have so much to do one way and
another that they are very little likely to take so much care of passengers as
Mr. Plimsoll would desire. I have often noticed, in those large ships of the Inman
and Cunard lines, that there is a remarkable driving of the water away from the
stern, and a disturbance of the water which ought not to take place, if the screw
was thoroughly and efficiently doing its work. If Mr. Griffiths can do away with I

that in any manner, and give us less racing in any manner, I am quite sure' every '

naval engineer will give him a cordial vote of thanks. \

Mr. H. Bowlbt Wilson : I have recently made a voyage in a ship that has a i

screw made to drop below the keel of the vessel — the ship " Britannia. The screw j

was working 16 feet below the bottom of the keel, and we made an exceedingly fine
voyage ; she performed remarkably well. But the ship has been taken off and some-
thing has been done to the screw, which seems to suggest that there must be some
practical difficulty to be overcome. Perhaps Mr. Griffiths can throw a little light upon
it. I should just like to sustain the observation made by Admiral Selwyn that the
fineness of the run of a ship is just as important in the replacement of the water as.
the fine lines are in its displacement. I have taken considerable part in the discussions
that have taken place in America on questions of this kind, and I have invariably
found that my own experience and observations on the performance of vessels carries
out exactly the fact as stated by Admiral Selwyn, — that in order that the screw shall
work efficiently, it is necessary for the lines of the run to be equally fine with those
of the entrance. I would remark in respect to the performance of the screw in the
" Britannia," that I experienced a slight tremor all the time, which I imputed to the
circumstance that it was not working in a horizontal position with the keel. There
was a slight lifting motion. I went repeatedly to the extreme stern of the ship, and
felt the shaking motion continually. We made one of the quickest voyages on record ;
our average speed was 16 knots per hour till we arrived at Queenstown, but we had
this continual motion. I discussed the question with Captain Thompson, who declined
to explain what his ideas were in respect to the difficulties, but he said they would be
cured, and I hope they will be.

Captain Wii^on : I think the gentleman who has just spoken has rather strength-
ened Mr. Griffiths' hands by what he has said. I think Mr. Griffiths does not pro-
pose to make any particular alteration in the run of the ship.

Mr. Griffiths : Oh, decidedly : making it full. I come to the old style of ship.

Captain Wilson : Tou draw your water from underneath, and I suppose the effect
is very much the same. You simply confine the water by taking it from underneath the
casing ; therefore I suppose the results are very much the same, excepting that you
give the ship more buoyancy about the stern by drawing the water from underneath,
instead of taking it away from under the counter.

Mr. Griffiths : There is another point. If you do not make her with a big stern,
the water is forced away from the screwB in a line, and draws tho other water with
it ; whereas, if the stern is full enough to take all the water that comes from the
screw, it does not force tho water back at all — it merely fills the place as fast as the
ship goes along.

Captain Wilson : The weak point in all our armour-plated ships at present is that
the screw is insufficiently protected, and in anything like a heavy sea they would be
liable to damage from shot, even in engaging a wooden ship at long range. It would
be a great advantage to be able to case in your screw, not only for speed, but for
security. (Mr. Griffiths : It is perfectly secure.) It would not be so vulnerable in
case of an attack, and would not be so hable in action to become fouled by floating
wreck. You may remember that very curious little incident (I do not know whether
it has ever been noticed in this Institution) which occurred in the German and French
war, where we saw the advantages and disadvantages of masts and sails in war. In
a little action which occurred off Havanna between a German and a French gunboat,
the German gunboat lost her miien-mast j the consequence was the wreckage foaled

OF H.M.S. "BRUISER." 177

"her screw, and the screw was disabled. The Frenchman tried to run her on board,
and as she came up close to her adversary she received a broadside, which cut her
steam- pipe in two, and so was disabled. She immediately made sail, and escaped
into neutral waters before the German had cleared her screw. If the German screw
had been cased, she would have been able to have taken the Frenchman. We know
that screws are very easily disabled, and we know the case of the " Alabama," where
the " Kearsage " was successful in sinking her ; that it was a mere chance that the
" Kearsage" was not herself taken instead, as a shell from the "Alabama" was im-
bedded in her stern-post, and had it exploded it would have smashed her screw to
pieces. If a shell can lodge in the stern-post of a ship, it might strike the screw and
knock it to pieces too. Therefore I think it is of importance that the screws should
be cased, in looking at it even from that point of view. As to whether it would add
very much to the speed of a ship, Mr. Griffiths is a much better judge than most of
us here present.

Commander C. F. W. Johnson, R.N. : Mr. Griffiths has claimed one advantage
for his invention upon which I should like to ask him a question. He says, if he
closes the aperture in the fore end of his casing in the event of a leak (provided, of
course, there is some means of allowing the leakage to come to his screw), the water
would be taken out of the ship by the screw, and the ship still propelled. Might
not that advantage be influenced to a certain extent by the position of the leak ?
Take, the case of the "Royal Albert," in the Mediterranean, during the Crimean
War. The packing in her stern tube came loose, and she had to be run on shore to
save the ship. Supposing such an accident as that to occur in a ship fitted with
Mr. Griffiths' invention, would the advantage hold good ; would the screw, under
those circumstances, keep the water out of the ship ? *

Mr. Griffith a : I only tried it on the small model, which worked the water out
and propelled the ship just the same ; if there is depth enough of water in the ship
to cover the aperture it will go right out directly, It must go out. It is notning
but a centrifugal pump when in a case, and it cannot help but take it out.

Commander Johnson : That would be a very valuable advantage ; it is an acci-
dent which has frequently happened to screw ships, the packing of the stern tubing
coming loose. In such a case the invention in itself would be a very great
advantage.

Mr. Griffiths : I think it is worth trying in some of our ships, since they run
the risk of being run down. I think if the hole is only just the diameter of the
screw, the screw would take off all the water working at full power ; you have the full
power of your engines pulling at it, and the speed of the ship keeps on all the same.
It does not matter at all where the water comes from if you have an opening for it to
go to the screw, — shut one opening and open the other.

Mr. Smith : To do that I think you must be provided with another invention,
that of shutters.

The Chairman: I think with respect to the "Royal Albert" nothing of the
screw propeller's action would have answered in the absence of shutters. In fact,
after the accident, she did steam as hard as she could into a little nook in the
Archipelago, in the island of Zea, I think, and ran on shore on the beach, but even
then the water had risen in spite of this supposed action of the screw, up to such a
height, that it was quite time she was on shore to be safe. I can perfectly see that
the collecting of water for the screw from beneath the bottom of a ship in motion is
a very efficient way of getting more speed. Anybody who has looked over the stern
of a ship merely passing through the water will see that things of medium weight

1 This question I asked, because it appeared to me that the force of the screw thus
directed in the case of the "Royal Albert," and of the " Ajax" (of Holt's line) in
the Shanghai river (and other cases similar to these) would only keep the water out ;
and failing a supply from forward, would not propel the ship. In the other case of
a leak forward of the screw, the same force which would be pumping the water out
of, would also appear to be pumping it into the ship.

It is also a grave question, whether the fires could be kept in under such circum-
stances, to move the engines. — C. J.

178 ON THE CASING OF THE PROPELLER, ETO.

thrown overboard from the head, will invariably rise to the surface of the water at
the rudder. The water to fill up the vacuum made by the ship while moving
ahead, mostly comes from the bottom and not from the sides ; on account of the
increased pressure of the water from that depth it is more easy for it to rise up than
to come from the sides. Therefore it is merely facilitating a good supply to tale it
by that casing. In this as in all things we must look at practical results. How is
this casing to be secured to the ship's bottom so as to be free from accident and
not be a source of danger in itself ? It may involve difficulties which perhaps Mr. Grif-
fiths has not contemplated, and which would be found in use, which we must make
our minds up to, if we are to take up the invention. 'Whether we believe in
all the details given by Mr. Griffiths or not, we must be very much obliged to him
for the paper he has given us, and for the new ideas he has brought forward. There is
a great deal of what is good in it, but I should hope to see it freed from the
danger there might be in it. At any rate we all thank Mr. Griffiths for his paper.
Mr. Griffiths : There is no occasion for casing at all ; the ship can be built in
an ordinary way with a hole underneath for the water to come in at. The casing is
merely a temporary arrangement for ships now built. It does not follow that we
want any casing whatever m new ships, but we should have the tunnel constructed
within the ship, and nothing would oe seen outside except the aperture for the dis-
charged water from the screw.

LECTURE.

Friday, March 3rd, 1876.

Field Marshal H.B.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., K.T., Ac., Ac.,
Ac., Ac., Commanding in Chief, President of the Institution, in the
Chair.

CAVALRY.
By Major Frank S. Russell, 14th Hussars.

Tons Royal Highness and Gentlemen,
I hate been asked by the Council of this Institution, to give a lecture
on " cavalry tactic*," a subject which, however interesting to cavalry
soldiers, would at first sight appear to be somewhat dry and un-
interesting to the other arms of the profession and to the general
public.

I think, Sir, however, that when we enter into the subject and
analyse it, we shall find it of great importance and of special interest,
more especially as up to the present tune it has failed to receive that
amount of attention which I feel it deserves.

From the date of the first improvements in rifled firearms down to
the French and German war, there was an universal tendency through-
out Europe, to decry cavalry and to declare that the time was gone for
it again to play an important part in war. Strange to say this
tendency to depreciate the arm, which above all others requires the
most care and labour to bring it to perfection, has reappeared from
time to time ever since armies first came into existence and has in-
variably been accompanied by a general decadence or falling off in
the science of war. If we study the history of cavalry from its
earliest days, we shall find that at every period of the world's history,
when military art has attained any pitch of excellence, cavalry has
invariably been much developed and has been most sedulously
cultivated.

The history of the world is marked out in periods or eras, with each
of which is associated the name of some chief or conqueror, who by
superior ability, organization, or opportunities has handed down to
posterity a great military reputation. Strange to say, the name of
each one of those, almost without exception, is also associated with the
special excellence of the cavalry he commanded. To begin from the

180 CAVALRY.

earliest times, Sesostris, the first great Egyptian monarch of whom we
have any authentic record, who lived many ages before the Trojan
war, and who may be said to have been at that period the greatest
ruler of his day, is stated by all contemporary writers, both sacred
and profane, to have been the founder of regular cavalry; and the
prophet Isaiah mentions that the Egyptians were the best horsemen
of the world. It is a curious circumstance that the first time light-
cavalry is spoken of, it is with reference to a corps of Amazons men-
tioned by Herodotus, and of whom Hippocrates also speaks, explain-
ing how he performed an operation on their breasts in order to enable
them to use the bow and javelin.

After the decline of the Egyptian power, Philip and Alexander of
Macedon may next be said to have been the most renowned conquerors
who have left their mark on history, and both have been specially
noted for the perfection to which they brought their cavalry, to whose
excellence indeed they owed most of their victories. The exploits of
Alexander's horsemen, more especially at the battle of Arbela (b.c.
331), may well serve as an example to us at the present day. Not
only did they defeat their /enemy on the battle-field, by brilliant
flanking movements combined with sudden deployment, but they
pursued him after defeat, 75 miles in 24 hours.

I fear, however, that my allotted time and your patience would alike
fail me were I to enumerate the various great conquerors in history,
who have also been distinguished cavalry leaders. It is, however,
impossible to omit Hannibal in ancient, and Frederick the Great, in
more modern times. Hannibal entirely owed his successes over the
Romans to his cavalry ; and of twenty-two pitched babbles fought by
Frederick and his generals, fifteen were decided by cavalry. Our own
General Marlborough won his two greatest victories, Blenheim and
Ramillies, by the timely and efficient action of his horsemen.

After the invention of gunpowder, there was the same tendency to
decry cavalry as existed when the latest improvements were introduced
into rifled fire-arms. I remember, when I first joined the army, an
enthusiastic instructor of musketry proving to me, a* he thought, con-
clusively, that if I ever attempted to attack infantry, I must inevitably
be killed at least four times over before I could hope to reach them ;
and he explained that hence I had better exchange into some other
more useful and less dangerous arm of the service. I have no doubt that
the enthusiastic muskeeter of the 16th century used the same arguments
to the ponderous and slowly moving horseman of his time. Charles the
Twelfth of Sweden, however, and Gustavus Adolphus soon demon-
strated that the days of cavalry, so far from having gone, had scarcely
arrived, and that then, as now, although their tactics must be altered
to suit the requirements of the time, the importance of their mission
remains the same. But as remarked by Captain Nolan, great and suc-
cessful as were the achievements of the Swedish and French cavalry in
the 17th century, they could in no way compare with the Turks who
first showed Europe what might be done by cold steel, coupled with
extraordinary rapidity of movement. It is a remarkable fact that the
Turks obtained a more complete mastery over infantry than any other

CAVALRY. 181

cavalry have ever done. In fact the Russians habitually made use of
chevaitx-de-frise to protect themselves, and each battalion had two light
carts attached to it in order to carry these obstacles. It was mainly the
example of the Turks that first led European Commanders, and notably
Frederick the Great, to adopt the only system of training and tactics
that- can ever render cavalry formidable in war. They shewed that the
first requisite is to make a horseman master of his horse, and that
unless cavalry are accustomed to move rapidly, they surrender all the
advantages of being on horseback without having any of the benefits of
being on foot.

After the death of Frederick the Great, it may be said that the
sun of the cavalry service set and only rose for a short time and with
diminished brightness in the days of Napoleon. That great conqueror,
like every other great conqueror, owed many of his victories to the
action of his cavalry both off and on the battle-field ; he also, like
Caesar and Alexander, was checked in his career of victory by the
want of cavalry ; as he, himself, said at St. Helena, had he possessed
cavalry after Lutzen and Bautzen, the 1813 campaign would then
have been ended, neither Leipsic nor Waterloo would ever have been
fought. Of the many losses that the Russian war entailed on him,
the annihilation of his cavalry was the most serious. He appeared at
the head of another army by next spring, but he could not re-create a
force of cavalry in a few months, and to this may be traced all his
subsequent misfortunes.

From the fall of Napoleon down to the present day, cavalry has in
no way had that relative importance, or received that attention which
it deserves. In the long peace this was not astonishing, and the wars
that followed, from their character did not illustrate the mission of
cavalry. The Crimean war was a siege, the Italian campaign of 1850
took place in a country peculiarly unsuited to mounted arms. We next
come to the war of 1866, and here for the first time we find the cavalry-
arm regaining that importance which it once possessed ; but even then
it cannot be said to have been used with full effect or brilliancy. As
remarked by the author of the Tactical Retrospect, the Prussian cavalry
was notoriously mismanaged. The Austrians were far more efficient
both on the battle-field and off it. It is now proved that General
Benedek had full information as to the movements of his enemies, and
the way in which the Austrian retreat was covered after Koniggratz
may well serve as a model for all cavalry leaders to the end of
time.

The events of the late war are so recent that it seems unnecessary
even to allude to them. We all know that the lessons learnt by the
Prussians in 1866 were not thrown away. We all know that the
admirable manner in which the duties of outposts and reconnoitring
were performed, conduced more than any other cause to the success of
the campaign. It seems that but little additional can now be learnt as
to the employment of cavalry off the field of battle. All that is required
is, to put in practice the rules and principles of bygone days, practised
in the days of Frederick the Great; by our own cavalry in the Peninsula ;
by Napoleon in his earlier wars, as long as he had any cavalry worthy

182 CAVALBY.

the name, and now again revived, it is hoped never again to be
forgotten. t

It cannot, however, be said that we have in any way got to the
bottom of the problem as to how cavalry may be best employed in
action, or that the last war has done much to enlighten ns. The
history of the French cavalry in that campaign has proved to ns now
more than ever, that there is no quality in a cavalry Officer so fatal as
bravery, nnless it is tempered with discretion. We know how the
magnificent regiments that in former days we used so justly to admire
in Paris were absolutely annihilated within a few weeks of the decla-
ration of war — not only annihilated but needlessly sacrificed — fruit-
lessly thrown away. Nothing could exceed the bravery of Bonne*
main's Cuirassiers, who charged through the vineyards at Worth, or
of those Lancers, who being kept all day under fire, lost nearly half
their Officers and men without even themselves coming into action.
The charges of the Chasseurs d'Afrique down the slopes of Sedan,
like our light cavalry charge at Balaclava, were lamentable examples
of what brave men will do, but what they should never be asked to
attempt.

I think no one can read the history of the French cavalry during
the late war without feeling that ignorance, dangerous at all times, is
doubly so in a cavalry leader. The responsibility of an infantry
General is great when he comes into action, but of a cavalry General
how much more ! There is no time to correct an error, no time to
consult or advise; in one short moment the training and study of
years must be turned to account; in one short moment victory may be
lost or won. And yet, Sir, I believe it has been said, that study
of cavalry tactics is a waste of time, and labour thrown away. But
although prudence and knowledge are, if possible, even more necessary
in a cavalry leader than in any other, there must be also that dash
and daring, which, although sometimes the accompaniment of age, is
usually the attribute of youth. Seidlitz was made General of the
Russian cavalry at the age of thirty. Lord Uxbridge was little over
forty when he lost his leg at Waterloo. It has been remarked, and I
think with great truth, that all the qualities which make a good man
to hounds are those which are most valuable in a cavalry Officer. He
must ride well ; he must be bold and fearless ; he must have a good
eye and quick decision ; but these qualities are even dangerous unless
he also has discretion and knowledge, otherwise, like any one riding
across country, he must sooner or later come to desperate grief.

It may be said, however, that we have complete examples how
cavalry should not be used on the field of battle in the presence of
breech-loaders, but have we learnt how it can be used ? or whether it
can be used at all ? I think that in the next great European war we
shall see a new phase of cavalry warfare. I dare say we all remember
that last August some alarm was created throughout Europe by a report
that Russia was mobilising her cavalry. It turned out that mobilizing
was the wrong word, it should have been re-organising, and that Russia
was only following the example of the other great Powers, and was
forming her cavalry into independent divisions along her frontier, so

CAVALRY. 183

that it might be able to take the field within a few days of the decla-
ration of war.

I venture, therefore, to make a prediction, of the truth of which I
am fully satisfied, although I have not seen it suggested elsewhere, I
say, that within a few days after the next European war is declared,
we shall hear of a great cavalry battle, which will exercise not only a
great moral, but also a great material influence on the ultimate fate of
the campaign. The cavalry of each combatant will press on that of
the other, each will attempt at one point to tear aside the curtain
before it, and the result will be a great cavalry action. The General,
whose horsemen prove victorious, will not only have the prestige of
an early success, but will also have the inestimable advantage, by the
acknowledged superiority of his cavalry, of being able to screen his
own movements, and to penetrate those of his adversary. The same
ifl true in the caU of an English army-in any expedition that we are
forced to send on the continent of Europe, our independent cavalry
division would inevitably bear the first brunt of battle. Here some
one may remark, that in our new mobilization-scheme no provi-
sion ia made for independent cavalry divisions; to this it may be
replied, that the scheme, as it stands, is intended for defensive pur-
poses, but that if an English army ever took the field, cavalry divisions
would be at once organised with transport and hospital service,
entirely independent of the rest of the army.

It is now therefore more than ever necessary to study and practise
handling masses of cavalry in combined action. Reconnoitring and
outpost duty are important—more important than ever, but they are
not everything, as some time since there was a tendency to ima-
gine. Now more than ever must cavalry be practised in combined
manoeuvres — now more than ever must its leaders be accustomed to
handle rapidly and efficiently large bodies united under their command.
In England we labour under special disadvantages, whereas on the
Continent there are many large spaces of ground where masses of
cavalry can be manoeuvred without difficulty; in this country we
have no such facilities, except perhaps on the Wiltshire Downs, and
there they can only be used occasionally. However, as we all know,
Aldershot and the Gurragh, every year during the drill season, tho
advantages we possess are turned to the fullest account.

It was my good fortune last year, after the conclusion of our
manoeuvres, to see the Prussian cavalry manoeuvres at Walsrode, in
Hanover, where three brigades were exercised in a united division. At
these drills there was much that was interesting, but nothing re-
markably new or original. A flank was invariably combined with a
front attack ; three lines were habitually used, sometimes there were
more, but under no circumstances was any attack made with less than
three lines. I need not remark that although for some time discon-
tinued, this habit of manoeuvring with three lines is of ancient date.
The Duke of Wellington wrote a letter to Lord W. Russell, in 1833, in
which he remarks that cavalry, " being only useful or even safe by the
" employment of large reserves, it should never be manoeuvred in
" fewer than three lines." He also makes some observations as to the

184

CAVALRY.

use of the rank entire, to which I shall presently refer. This diagram
shows the normal formations in which a German cavalry division of

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three brigades, each brigade of two regiments, advances to the attack.
It is the same as that in the last section of the German cavalry

CAVALRY. 185

regulations, translated by Captain Trench, 20th Hussars, and is also
in General Walker's pamphlet, just published, on the " Tactics and
Organization of Cavalry." The first line, as you see, is deployed and
is usually composed of heavy cavalry, the theory being, that they will
be most effective for the first shock, whereas the medium and light
cavalry can move more quickly and hence are better for flank attacks.
I think it unnecessary for me to go into the details of this formation
or of its advantages, these are very fully laid down in the Prussian
cavalry regulations referred to, and are ably discussed at considerable
length in General Walker's pamphlet. I will only remark on one or
two points, which seemed to me worthy of attention. The formation in
columns of division is, I venture to think, an excellent one, less un-
wieldy than line and capable of being immediately converted into line,
it affords peculiar facilities for advances over rough ground, and is I
may say alike handy, compact, flexible. It can be wheeled to either
flank without difficulty, and appears to admit of more uniform rapidity
of movement when an oblique direction is required than is possible
when formations in line or in broader columns are adhered to.

The introduction of division drill into our service, perhaps might
be inexpedient, as it would necessitate an entire change in the organi-
zation of our regiments and in the strength of our squadrons, but from
what I saw of its practical working, I cannot speak too highly of it,
and the best proof of its usefulness is the uniform rapidity with
which regiments moved ; and this, although the German cavalry
soldiers, as regards riding, cannot be compared with our own. The
horses, although of excellent quality and well bred, appear much over-
worked and all are very low in condition. There is certainly one most
important point, on which I think English Cavalry Officers may most
justly congratulate themselves, and that is on the admirable stable
management, on the care taken by the men of their horses throughout
our entire service. In Germany, although no young or unseasoned
horses are ever admitted into the ranks, as unfortunately is the case in
our Army, and with squadrons usually above 130 and never less than
120 strong, I never saw more than 100 horses turned out, and very
often far fewer. At the same time I cannot help expressing my regret,
first, that our regiments and squadrons are so absurdly weak as com-
pared to those of foreign Armies ; and secondly, that the nominal
strength, weak as it is, is practically far more than their effective
strength. I cannot help regretting that we have not, like other nations,
remount depots, where our young horses can be trained and seasoned
until they are fit to be placed in the ranks, and to take part in a cam-
paign. Until this is done, the nominal strength of cavalry regiments
is entirely a fictitious one. I venture also to think that it is neither
fair to the horses themselves or to the men who ride them, to expect
four-year-olds to gallop with 17 stone on their backs, or to do the
work of aged horses.

Before quitting the subject of the German cavalry, I would wish to*
mention their very excellent system of practising the melee or the
disorder, which inevitably occurs in every regiment after almost every
advance. Men, as it were, fall out, go through the motion of sword

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CAVALBY. 187

who were already engaged in front, from extinguishing their* move-
ments. The Russian cavalry had already been nearly destroyed, and
those that remained did not await the attack of SeicQitz's squadrons.
The infantry, however, who were formed twelve deep and supported
by 100 guns, remained steady and received the charge which utterly
annihilated them, and from that moment the battle was won.

There are many points deserving of special remark connected with
this battle were there time to notice them, which I fear there is
not. I must, however, point out the great freedom of action which on
this occasion was left to the cavalry commander ; in point of fact, in
the latter part of the day, Frederick the Great conformed the move-
ments of his army to those of his cavalry leader. Seidlitz's success
was entirely owing to his extraordinary quickness of perception, and
to the great care with which he had reconnoitred the ground between
him and the enemy. Zorndorff was one of the most deadly battles that
has ever been fought. Of 32,000 men, the Prussians lost about 12,000
killed and wounded; of about 60,000, the Russians about 21,000.
Probably cavalry will never again play so important a part in any
general action.

We now come to the battle of Waterloo, to illustrate, as I said
before, the fatal consequences of neglecting the use of reserves. At a
very critical period of the action, the Earl of "Oxbridge, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the British Cavalry, with the true inspiration of
a cavalry leader, perceived that an opportunity had arrived for strik-
ing a decisive blow, so he ordered Lord Edward Somerset on the right,
to charge with the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and King's Dragoon
Guards, keeping the Blues in reserve, while Ponsonby was to charge
on the left with the Royals and Enniskillen Dragoons, having the
Grey* in reserve. He had previously told the Officers commanding the
other cavalry brigades not to wait for orders, but to use their own dis-
cretion and to support any attack that might be made. The charge of
both the heavy brigades was most marvellously successful. Somerset
overthrew the cuirassiers opposed to him, while Ponsonby attacked
a column of French infantry and annihilated it, then galloped on,
attacked and captured forty guns. As Alison remarks, the achieve-
ment was unparalleled, two French columns 5,000 strong were com-
pletely destroyed, forty gnns were rendered useless. But unhappily
the light brigades had not supported, and the supporting regiments
of the brigades themselves, carried away by their enthusiasm, had
come into first line, when in the moment of victory, with their
horses blown, they were attacked on the flank by French Lancers.
The Union Brigade which had gone into action 1,100 strong was
reduced to a single squadron, and the two brigades who had num-
bered 2,300 sabres could scarcely muster 200.

I have already spoken of the employment of cavalry when opposed to
other cavalry, or when used on the flanks of an army ; and I have
endeavoured to shew that we cannot afford now, any more than in
former days, to neglect the training of either Officers or men to act in
large bodies. Cavalry manoeuvres on an extended scale are now more
than ever necessary. Great, however, as the mission of cavalry still

188 CAVALRY.

is, I think we must all acknowledge that it is no longer possible to use
it in the manner of the first; Napoleon.

Huge masses of cuirassiers can no longer hope to break through
the centre of an army, or to have any success against unbroken or
undemoralized infantry. It seems to me that the failure of the French
cavalry leaders to recognise this axiom, was the cause of the disas-
trous mistakes they committed in the late war. I am, however, never-
theless, fully convinced that moments must come, and always will
come in every great battle, when comparatively small bodies of horse-
men may still be used decisively and effectually against both infantry
and guns. The tendency of all troops armed with the breech-loader,
and trained according to the newest methods of tactics, is to waste their
ammunition, to scatter and to disperse. Almost inevitably, times must
occur at the end of an action when bodies of infantry, fighting in loose
order in the confusion and smoke of an action, wander away from sup-
ports, when ammunition is exhausted, when gaps occur in the line of
battle, when guns find themselves unprotected, when in fact a charge
of cavalry, if quick and decided, must produce a crushing effect. But
as the opportunities for its action are now far fewer, as the conse-
quences of a mistake are now far more disastrous than in former days,
now more than ever does success depend on the ability of a leader.

I think I cannot do better than illustrate wfcat I mean by the battle
of Marengo, which is an admirable example of the manner in which
the tide of victory may be turned by a small body of cavalry properly
led. This action was fought on the 14th June, 1800, between about
28,000 French under Napoleon, then General Bonaparte, and about
30,000 Austrians under Melas. Of these respective forces, the French
had about 3,000 and the Austrians about 7,000 cavalry. I will not
attempt to give an account of the battle, but suffice it to say that at
about two o'clock in the afternoon, the Austrians had obtained so
decided a success, while the French were in such complete and dis-
ordered retreat, that General Melas with his staff thought the battle
won and retired to Alexandria, the Quartermaster- General Zach
being directed to carry out the pursuit. The French retreated in
the direction of San Guiliano, and were pursued along that road by
the Austrian infantry in column of route, while flanking parties were
sent out on both sides, the main body of the Austrian cavalry being
on the right. A last attempt, however, was made by Bonaparte to
retrieve the fortunes of the day. He brought up Dessaix's infantry
division, placed it across the road, and then directed Kellerman with a
portion of his cavalry to pass from the left to the right flank between
the two lines of infantry, and to attack the left of the Austrian
columns as they were on the line of march. The manoeuvre was per-
fectly successful. Kellerman first overthrew a regiment of dragoons
that opposed him, then fell on and destroyed the Austrian's columns,
one after another as they were attempting to deploy. A complete route
was thus suddenly converted into a victory, and on the following day
the twelve principal fortresses were handed over to Bonaparte, and he
became master of Italy. In fact, less than 700 horsemen changed the
map of Europe.

VOL

'""v/>/,//W

>-
<

-j,

CAVALRY. 189

I think that it would be impossible to find a more striking example
of the effect that may be produced by a timely charge of a very small
body of cavalry on surprised and unprepared infantry. Timely, I may
say it was, since Marmont, who witnessed it, declared that had it
been delivered five minutes sooner or five minutes later it would have
proved unavailing.

There are connected with the cavalry service one or two abstract ques-
tions to which, Sir, I should wish, if possible, to refer. A short time
since the formation of a corps of mo anted riflemen was strongly urged
by some great and experienced military authorities. I may remark
that the idea is not new, nor has the experiment been untried. So
long ago as the Seven Years' War the Hungarians organized several
corps of mounted infantry ; as we all know, in the American Civil
War, the so-called cavalry were as a rule little more than infantry on
horseback, partly because the nature of the country was wholly un-
suited for cavalry proper, and partly because there was neither the
time nor the opportunity to give men that training which true cavalry
soldiers require. Great, however, as the advantages undoubtedly are
of being able to move riflemen rapidly from point to point, I cannot
but think it would be most undesirable either to convert any portion
of our small and insufficient body of cavalry into the hybrid animals
described, or to create any new arm answering to that description. It
would seem that every sixpence, which the country will consent to
spend on our cavalry, should be devoted to increasing the strength of our
skeleton regiments, to making them truly effective, and to creating re-
serves. I also see no reason whatever why cavalry soldiers proper should
not be drilled and accustomed to perform all the manoeuvres of infantry,
nor can I conceive why their power to manoeuvre on foot should in any
way impair their efficiency on horseback. The cavalry of Seidlitz,
which achieved so many and such great successes, was habitually and
most carefully trained to act on foot ; and in the late war, there are
many instances when dismounted cavalry performed excellent service.

There is, however, one thing specially necessary if horsemen are to
be thus employed, that is, that they should be armed with a weapon
equal in every respect to that which they will meet. It is scarcely
fair to ask cavalry armed with carbines that shoot indifferently at 500
yards to engage infantry armed with rifles that shoot well at 1,500. I
may mention that the Prussian cavalry are armed with adapted Chasse-
pdts and the Mauser cartridge. The arm is sighted up to 1,200 metres,
and shoots admirably up to 800. I also venture to think that it is a
subject worthy of consideration whether we should not follow the
example of the Germans, and arm with rifles a certain proportion in
every squadron of Lancers.

There is another point, also, to which I should wish to call attention.
The invention of gunpowder and the improvement in fire-arms have
caused a diminution in the depth of formations. Formerly infantry,
and even cavalry, fought six deep. This formation was reduced to
two deep, some nations, notoriously the Prussians, adhering until
quite recently to their three deep formation. The British infantry
were almost the first to fight two deep, being from their quality able

VOL. XX. 0

190 CAVALRY,

•

to maintain a shallower formation, than, other nation*. Now practically
tike infantry of all European nations fight in single rank, with wide
intervals, I am unable to understand why the sane principle, in m
modified form, has not been applied to cavalry. II appears tome the*
the only use of the rear rank is, first, to fill up gaps, in the frost rank;
secondly, to tumble over the front rank, and, lastly, to receive the benefit
of all the shot and shell intended for the front rank. Why, therefore,
not reduce the strength of the rear rank to one»thixd or cm-fourth,
which. would suffice to fill up gapa without entailing unnecessary loss?
I have now before me letters from, the late Duke of Wellington and from
Sir Hussey Vivian, expressing opinions more or less favourable to tin
use of rank-entire. General Bacon, who commanded the cavalry e£
tike English Legion in Spain, habitually practised it, and found it
answer so well, that he was the principal advocate for ite adoption.
The arguments thai have been used for and against tfeb rank-entire
are numerous and varied ;. but into these; I fear, there is now scaareerjr
time to enter. I can only say that as the use of rank-entire is habitu-
ally practised in the Prussian and in other foreign armies, it woeM
seem not unadvisable to nraetise it in ours, more especially as thereby
division-drill might be toed without introducing a change in argamv
zatiasu

I would, lastly, wish to speak of cavalry pioneers. This subject
has, I behove, already received attention, and I hear that the Com-
mittee appointed to report on it, have strongly recemamended their
adoption. I have lately seen a most interesting account* of the orga-
nization of cavalry pioneers in the Austrian Army, and the argument*
which may bo used for their introduction into oar service are, I
think* most strong and convincing. The earvabry in advance of an
army will at ail times have u> perform duties where pwntwna or
engineers are required They will have to destroy and repair rail-
roads, to blow up bridge sy» to erect and remove ©©stacks, to create
drinking-placea for the horses* and* in fact, to perform varices worke
of that description too numerous to mention. I may notice that, in
this particular, as well as in some others, the Austrian seems to be>
considerably in advance of the Prussian cavalry. In the latter service,
there are no cavalry pioneers, but all the nea-eemnrissioaed office**
and older soldiers are practised in the destruction and repair of rail-
roads. They also carry a dynamite cartridge, which destroys a rail is
three minutes ; each squadron also- carries an apparatus for *Kwfc™g UB,
the telegraph posts and cutting the wires* also a silver thread for
joining them. At the present time, it is the custom in oex Army to
attach mounted engineers to cavalry with a view to their carrying oat
these duties. It would seem, however, that the objections to this;
system are self-evident* and that it is desirable in vwerj way to have the
cavalry in advance of an army, dependent only on its own resources, in
fact, able to move at the shortest notice wherever it may be required.

As my limits of time are already nearly exceeded, I must only venture
to say a very few words in conclusion. I am far from being one of
those who pretend to think, the British Army is going to the dogs,
or that it would fight a bit less brilliantly now than it always

CAVALRY. 191

has done; but I most Bay that there is one point on which I, in
company, I am sure, with every other cavalry Officer, feel great
disquietude. We regret to see the small force of cavalry we possess,
but we regret still more the impossibility of replacing it, and not only
of replacing it, but even of filling up the gaps which the first fortnight
of a campaign would cause in the ranks. Half -drilled men, if their
heart is in the right place, are valuable when incorporated with
drilled and experienced soldiers of an infantry battalion. But in
cavalry it is very different. So far from being useful, nntraiued men
and horses are absolutely dangerous. They throw everything into
disorder, and, like Von Hake's Hussars at Waterloo, are worse than

Nevertheless, although more than five years have now passed away
since the re-organization of the English Army was commenced, we
have not yet seen any signs of cavalry reserves either of men or of
horses. Our small force of cavalry once gone, disabled, or decimated,
could not be replaced. Our armies might win brilliant victories, but
their fruits could not be gathered. I am sure that all here present
will join with me in expressing an earnest hope that the day may not
be far distant when this omission may be repaired.

The Cbxtrmax : Gentlemen, I am rare that we ore much indebted to the lecturer
for calling our attention to this important subject. Of course, I am perfectly aware
that in the opinion of the many cavalry Officers who are sitting around me, there is
no subject that can require more consideration at this moment than that of the
cavalry service. But circumstances have so changed that what might have been very
well in former daya, I do not think would be quite so suited to the present day. As
regards mounted cavalry in our service, that of course is a matter of £ s. d. ; but
1 am afraid it would require a good deal to induce the public to think it absolutely
necessary largely to increase the Estimates in order to hate a much larger body of
cavalry. All I can say is, if it is thought necessary, I for one should be very giad to know
that we had a larger body, but it must be perfectly understood that it is a very expen-
sive element, and will largely increase the War Estimates. Then as to the difficulty about
hones : no one objects so much as I do, to see young horses too early backed, bat as
a matter of expenditure, if you hare large depots, you must pay for them, and » we
have very small establishments, it is essential that every available horse should be in
the ranks. There can be no two opinions that it is a better thing to back a horsey
sod get out of him what you. can, than to keep him idle, and add to the expenses
during the time he is so kept. That is the great difficulty we have to contend with.
As regards the question of three lines, I cannot suppose thai there can be two
opinions upon that subject. All cavalry, like every other form of arm, must be well
supported. The great fault has been of late years that we have extended our lines
a great deal more than has been prudent. It is the natural impulse to extend,
wherever there is a great latitude for action ; but I think there can be no doubt that
unless it be an extended line, well supported by reserves, either of infantry or of
cavalry, but particularly of cavalry, it is a very unfavourable formation. I remember
well frequently talking this question over with my late gallant friend, Sir Hope
Grant, and Sir Hope Grant said to me over and over again that even a squadron of
cavalry ought always to be divided, and to have a support ; no portion of a squadron
should be sent to the front without a support. If you adopt that principle, you ex-
tend it according to the numbers you have in command. There is a peculiarity about
the Prussian system, which no doubt is also very valuable. I do not think it was
alluded to to-day. I believe that in all these three-line formations care is always
taken that the second line is thrown forward, or that whatever flank it is on, it
always throws that flank forward, so that you make the flank-movement immediately
upon the front attack ; and that, of course, is a very important thing, because if the

0 2

192 CAVALBY.

front attack has taken effect, a certain amount of disorganization results, and a flank
movement on a disorganized body is, of course, of the greatest possible importance.
And that, I believe, is> one of the new features, and one of the most important fea-
tures of the present system in the Prussian service.

As regards the question of cavalry never manoeuvring together in large bodies, I
think that is doubtful. I apprehend that there are many occasions when you must
sacrifice troops for the good of the whole, and on those occasions I have no doubt
the cavalry must take its share of being sacrificed as well as any other branch of the
service ; but beyond that, I do not think any large body of cavalry would ever be
sent to the front against the fire-arms of the present day, because they are so destruc-
tive that really at the end of any distance it is impossible to assume that many men
or horses would be in a condition fairly and strongly to carry out a direct charge.
But, that being so, I do not think it at all militates against the necessity for cavalry ;
on the contrary, I think it is one of the greatest mistakes — though I am happy to
say it is now becoming exploded — to say that the day of cavalry has gone by. I
think the day of cavalry has not at all gone by ; on the contrary, an army without
cavalry would do nothing at all now. Everything must be done so quickly, —
advances, flank movements, and every other movement are made so quickly that
unless you have large bodies of cavalry well to the front, at considerable distances,
and almost unsupported by infantry, you do not know what is going on ; the great
object, therefore, nowadays must be to pay the greatest personal attention to recon-
noitring and outpost duty. On those points I think we, perhaps, have been hitherto
rather backward, but it is very natural. It is impossible to study a subject of that
sort unless you have the opportunity of doing so at manoeuvres. The difficulty that
we have to contend with m manoeuvres in this country is something very great.
There is no doubt that of late we have had greater facilities than we had formerly ;
at the same time we have our country so intersected, and there is so much real damage
done (unless the greatest care is taken) that we cannot expect to be able to go over
private property without great objections being raised. I must say that the
greatest liberality has been shown us upon the various occasions on which we have
had manoeuvres, but still there is always a great indisposition to make use of private
property, and that makes all our movements extremely difficult. We must, therefore,
imagine a great deal, and theorise a great deal more than is good on these occasions,
because, depend upon it, theory is all very well, but practice is a great deal better.
To show the value of cavalry on these occasions, I need only point out that it is not
only the superior Officers who ought to show great ability, but the youngest Officer
may be Bent to the front with a few men, and any information he may gain, or any
intelligence he may show, may save a whole army, or may be the means of gaining
a great victory. Therefore it depends upon the individual Officer, from the highest
to the lowest ; and I really believe whilst every Officer should be well instructed, no
portion of the service should have a quicker apprehension and appreciation of country
than the cavalry officer. I believe, so far from looking down in any way on the
cavalry, the cavalry soldier — and Officer especially — should have the greatest possible
military acquirements. Amongst other things, sketching is of the greatest import-
ance. 1 do not believe that any of our Officers ever dreamt of such a thing formerly,
not because they would not have done it if called upon, but because they were not
called upon. Now we have changed all that, and great attention is paid to the sub-
ject of sketching, and I am satisfied that the more those subjects are attended to, the
better will be the position of our cavalry. I have ventured to throw out these few
observations on this occasion because I do not like to leave this Institution without
showing that I have taken some interest in the invaluable remarks made here on the
part of the lecturer, and in the subject with which we had to deal. On this occasion
we have to thank him for having brought the subject so prominently and ably before
us. I understand it is wished that there should be some discussion about it. You
will perceive in my position it would be better I should retire and leave the discus-
sion free and unbiassed by not being present, and I therefore hope my leaving you
now will not be considered as at all an indication that I do not take the greatest
interest in hearing what may be said ; but I think, under the circumstances, it
would ba more acceptable to you that you should have perfect freedom of discussion.
Under these circumstances I believe General Shute will take the chair.

CAVALRT. 193

Hia Royal Highness haying retired, General Shute, C.B., M.P., took the chair.
No Officer rising to commence the discussion, General Shute said : lam sorry that
no Officer seems inclined to rise to make any observations on the lecture we have just
heard. Perhaps if I venture to make a few remarks myself it may start a discussion
on this important subject. First, then, with reference to the proposed re-mount
depots, I confess, from a considerable experience in India, and from what I have seen
of the cavalry of other nations, as well as our own, I am inclined to think the prac-
tice of Commanding Officers buying the young horses for their regiments, as they do
in England, and being responsible not only for their purchase but for their after
improvement, has very great merits. I am sure the gallant lecturer will agree with
me that there is no cavalry so mounted as the English, except perhaps cavalry of the
Russian guard, which consists only of about ten thousand, which, as compared with
their army, is small ; and with regard to the instruction of the cavalry soldier, I am
no great advocate for mounted rifles, because I am perfectly certain £hat cavalry sol-
diers should be so thoroughly instructed in dismounted service and the use of their
rifles as to render such a force unnecessary. With reference to a cavalry reserve, I
myself suggested last year to the Secretary of State for War — partly with a view to a
aught increase of the cavalry, but still more in order that cavalry regiments might
be less inconvenienced and delayed when a complete corps, squadron, or troop is sud-
denly ordered out in aid of the civil power, or any other emergency, by having to make
arrangements for mounting old soldiers employed to break young horses, or formed
troopers, handing over four-year-olds to the temporary care of recruits, making
arrangements for drill sergeants, drill corporals, rough-riders, &c.f to be left in the
barracks — that there should be in every regiment a ninth troop, to be what the French
would call an " out of the rank troop," containing all drill and riding instructors,
young horses, with a proportion of competent though old or married soldiers who
have nearly completed their services, to break them, and a proportion of old horses
considered fit for little more than riding-school work for drilling recruits. The band
and tradesmen should also be attached to this troop.

From this reserve troop, as I should call it, young soldiers and young horses would
be drafted into the service squadrons as they were fit for regimental field days or
general duty.

But some cavalry subalterns said : " Well, but General, but supposing I were pro-
" moted to a captaincy, do you think I should like to have this troop ? " Of course
not, but what I proposed was this : that it should be specially kept under a business
man, say, receiving 2*. 6d. a-dav extra, and that the subaltern in the same way
should be paid extra. And I think it would be an admirable opportunity in these
days, when purchase is gone and there is nothing for a man to look to who is pro-
moted from the ranks, that he should have an opportunity of having the command
of that troop, and bringing it on, understanding that he was rarely to leave barracks
or go on leave. My idea was, that having that troop, it would form a depot on all
occasions. On this system your four squadrons could be ready, whether to go to a
European war, to march to a manoeuvre, or to aid the civil power, without any hin-
drance. That would be done with little expense, I hold with economy to the
country, and would in some way fall in with the lecturer's idea of a depdt, because I
maintain that our cavalry should always be prepared for war. What do we do now ?
We send three squadrons into the field instead of four, which is the proper organiza-
tion, and form one squadron into a depot, whereas a troop answers every purpose.
And I maintain that for war, three squadrons is a false organization, because a cavalry
regiment should be divisible, and a wing (two squadrons) under a field officer should
be as effective as a weak regiment. As regards mounted rifles, the difficulty is this :
1 am perfectly certain that all who have had experience in the Crimea know, that the
greatest essential is a knowledge of, and care of horses. The mounted soldier should
feel that his primary arm and first care must be his horse. Tou cannot, therefore,
give the horses too much care, and mounted infantry would not feel this ; and I
think if you had what you call mounted rifles, they would rather consider their
horses of secondary consequence, and the result would be that after a few weeks of a
campaign they would be dismounted. The cavalry soldier ought to have a good rifle.
Length of barrel is not necessary to length of range, and there is no reason, on earth
why the cavalry soldier should not have a rifle ranging up to 1,000 yards, and I

194 CAVALRY.

think many infantry Officers' present -will agree with me ; you do not often want-
more than that. I was on the Yeomanry Committee last year, and we strongly
recommended that the Yeomanry should he practised in dismounted service. We
know there is no sort of difficulty in training men to dismounted service. With
regard to the Lancers, I am very prone to think that with our very weak proportion
of cavalry, our Lancer regiments would he more valuable with rifles than with lances.

With regard to telegraphs, I have suggested lone ago that every cavalry non-com-
missioned Officer shoula be taught to use the electric telegraph. There was, of
course, a difficulty when the telegraphs were not in the hands of the Government,
but now you may in every out-post and out-quarter, where the cavalry soldier haa inns
to do than at head-quarters, get permission to have some of your non-commissioned
Officers taught. So with regard to the destruction of railways, though I should
hardly go in for the destruction of stone bridges, still they should be able to destroy
the line and render roads and fords impassable, though I do not say they should go
so far as to be instructed to make bridges for the passage of other troops following
them, as some have suggested, because cavalry have other duties to perform that will
not admit of such delays.

With regard to attack by cavalry, I am perfectly certain that we all admit that it
is an arm of opportunity, and that the greater the extension of the troops, the more
frequently will opportunities be found by a dashing good cavalry officer. In fact, I
think we have opportunities now in warfare which cavalry never had before.

In the Prussian system, as the lecturer says, no opportunity is lost by cavalry of
flank attack. No front attack should ever be made without an oblique attack on the
enemy's flank if possible. Even the first line should have a squadron in rear of each
of its flanks to protect its flank from a similar rear attack, and to dash forward and
take the enemy in flank. I am only sorry I have not been able to take notes of the
very valuable remarks of the gallant lecturer, every one of which I should most
heartily endorse. I only hope I may yet have an opportunity in the House of
Commons of pressing an augmentation of the cavalry. My own idea would be to
have double the number of men in every cavalry regiment that there are horses. You
may buy horses in case of sudden war, but you cannot buy ready-made dragoons.
There are horses enough in every regiment to instruct double the number of men,
and an inspecting General should see one-half mounted on one field-day and the
other half on the next. I do not think this would necessarily entail any great expense.

Major Russell : It appears to me that the great argument in favour of having
re- mount depots for young horses is the fact that thereby the nominal strength of our
cavalry regiments would nearly coincide with their effective strength. At the present
time, cavalry regiments at home, on what is called the foreign establishment, have a
nominal strength of 606 men and 384 troop horses, and yet I discovered yesterday at
Aldershot that the greatest strength on record ever turned out by any regiment was
318 troop horses, and this on the occasion of tho review before the Emperor of
Russia, when many horses were placed in the ranks that were unfit to take the field.
The average strength of a strong regiment is from 290 to 300, and weak regiments,
which have a nominal strength of 302 troop horses, rarely can turn out more than
230, if so many. As a point of fact we have now in England a very much smaller
force of cavalry than appears on paper, as ev^ry regiment has 60 or 70 young horses
that are quite unfit to undergo the fatigues of a week's campaign. In Germany no
young horses appear on the establishment of a regiment until they are fit to take the
field.

General Shuts : I am really extremely sorry that we have not had the advantage
of further observations, but the real fact is, all that has been discussed by the able
lecturer is so utterly impossible of contradiction that there is no room for discussion.
I now beg on your behalf to present our cordial thanks to Major Russell for his
most instructive and interesting lecture.

d^trnrntg llbrifoigf*

Monday, March SOtti, 1876.

CoLassL LORD EUSTACE B. K GASCOYNE-CECIL, MLP.
Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, in the Chair.

OF MSKBEBS mho joined the Instfeafuiom between the Slit January

and 20th Macon, 1876.

MFE.

Montgomery, B. A, Lieut. R.A.

PiTHXMtn, xtoputnt dr., Assist. Gutusmsaary.

Wikan, J., Colonel Madras Staff Oeffw.

BanieU, W. H. M., Liont. E.N.

Godfrey, Henry J., Lieut. S.N.

Woof; Richard, FJ3,A., F.B.S.L., Lieut, late Worcestershire B.T.

Oxiey, Charles L., Commander R.N.

Ronnie, Geo. B., late Midshipman R.N.

McNeill, J. C, t*4k. G.B., C JLG., Colonel h.p. 47th Begt.

ANNUAL.

Brackenbury, H., Major late Depot Batt.
Burroughs, C. de P., Lieut. 82nd Regt.
Arbuthnot, George, Lieut. 2nd R.N.B.

Dragoons.
Hmtnifcer- Major, Hon. A. H., Lieut.

Golds. Guards.
Golding, Henry, Captain h.p. 69th Regt.
Torrens, J. A. W. O. N., Lieut. 2nd

R.N.B. Dragoons,
fester, Kingeley O., Capt. The Sing's

Own 1st Stafford MiL
Biddleoombe, Sir George, Kt^ C.B.,

Captain R.N.
Willan, L. P., Commander R.N.
Courtney, D. C, Lieut. B.E.
Twemlow, Fran. B., Liemt. Ml Stafford

Mil.
Pardee, T. P., Captain 22nd Regiment.
Noroock, W. J., Lieut B.N.
Crosier, H. £., Captain B.N.
Hamilton, I. J., Capt. 8th King's Begt.

Broome, C. S., Lieut. B.N.

Butler, J. B., Captain B.N.

Maude, P. N., Lieut. B.E.

Onslow, Geo. M., Captain 20th Hussars.

Baddiffe, B. P., Colonel B.A.

Sparks, E. T. B., Lieut. 98th Regiment.

Wise, Augt., Captain 2nd Warwick Mil.

Scott-Douglas, J, H., Lieut. 21st Bl.

N.B. Pusiliers.
Young, S. S, Major 89th Middx. Safe

Volunteers.
NewaU, D. J. F„ Colonel B.A.
Bartholomew, Bobt., Lieut. Wigton Mil.
Plunkett, R. H. W., Lieut. B.H.A.
Smith, Edward, Oapt. 40th Middx.

Rifle Volunteer*.
Newington, Ceoil G. EL, Lieut. Uat

Regiment.
Thompson, J. C, Capt. 26th Middx.

Rifle Volunteers.
Gibbs, J. R., Lieut. 6th Regiment.

SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IN LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN

POWDERS.

By Major J. P. Morgan, R. A., Assistant-Superintendent Royal Gun-
powder Factory, Waltham Abbey.

This is now the seventh time that I have had the honour of reading
a paper in the theatre of this Institution ; but I have never before
received such distinguished encouragement as on this occasion. I trust
my perseverance will induce some others to bring forward tbe results
of their special studies for the general benefit of the Services. It is

196

SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IN

also the third time that I have read a paper on the subject of gun-
powder. The first was on the determination of its explosive force,
without an accurate knowledge of which no scientific progress can be
made in its manufacture. The second showed the difficulties which
had been encountered, and the success which had been achieved in the
manufacture of pebble powder. In the present paper, assuming the
conditions on which the thorough ignition of a charge mainly depends,
I intend to show how great an approximation there is to these con-
ditions in the special features which regulate the burning of the
individual grains of powder themselves, and how this depends not
only on the size of the grains, but also on the facility with which the
flame can penetrate towards the centre of the grain, and on the rate
of burning of the particles of charcoal of which it is partly composed.

It is not many years since two sorts of powder only were sufficient
for nearly every requirement of the Service, viz., Large Grain or L.G.,
for guns, and Fine Grain or F.G., for small arms. Both of these
powders were manufactured in the same manner from the same
description of charcoal, viz., alder or willow, differing from each other
only in the sizes of the grain, L.G. being sifted between meshes of 8
and 16 to the inch, and F.G. between those of 16 and 36.

On the introduction of rifled small arms, F.G. was found unsuitable,
and the first and most important alteration was the substitution of
dogwood for alder, or willow charcoal. This necessitated the entire
separation of the manufacture of small arm powder from that of
powder for guns. The first powder of this description was made in
1859, and was of a size 16- to 24-mesh. It was known as Enfield
Rifle, or E.R. powder. In 1860, the size of grain was increased to a
12- to 20-mesh, and the powder was called J. 2 until 1865, when the
name was changed to Rifle Fine Grain or R.F.G. These dogwood
powders can be distinguished from the old F.G., not only by the size
of the grain, but more readily by the charcoal being browner and the
grain being rounder and not so flakey. The inner portion of dogwood
is of a reddish brown colour, and this colour is imparted to the char-
coal and thus to the powder. The roundness of the grain is due to
the soft friable nature of the charcoal, dogwood being a small soft
wood and easily charred.

It has always been found that powders made from dogwood are
more violent than those made from alder or willow. Some have
thought that this is due to the larger proportion of gaseous matter in
the constitution of dogwood charcoal, as exemplified in the following
analyses, taken from the late Captain Smith's " Handbook of the
Manufacture and Proof of Gunpowder."

Ash.

Carbon.

Hydrogen.

Oxygen and
trace of
nitrogen.

Alder

1 24

2 02
1-71

87 0

85 82

83-80

2 97
2-88

3 28

8*78

Willow

9*28

11*21

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS. 197

Dr. Percy, however, justly observes, I think, with regard to the
presence of gaseous matter in charcoal as fuel, that, inasmuch as there
is always an excess of hydrogen, over what is required to burn up all
the oxygen, the latter must be regarded not oniy as water, but as
water in the solid state or most disadvantageous condition, and its
presence is therefore detrimental.

Dogwood being, as I have said, very readily charred, the process of
charring is usually conducted at a low temperature; and wood
charred at a low temperature always contains more oxygen and
hydrogen in its constitution than more highly burnt charcoal. But it
by no means follows that the greater violence of explosion of the
powder is due to the greater amount of gas in the charcoal. No
doubt the gas in the charcoal aids the imflammability ; but I think
that the main reason is to be found in the fact that charcoal " burnt "
at a high temperature is always harder, denser, and a better conductor
of heat than when burnt at a low temperature. The conductivity of
heat makes it withstand the action of the heated gases, I imagine,
just in the same way as the well-known conductivity of heat in copper
makes it the best material for resisting the action of fired gunpowder
in the bore of a gun ; and its hardness prevents it from being reduced
to an impalpable dust so readily as slack-burnt or under-burnt char-
coal. If the latter be crushed between the fingers it is easily reduced
to a fine soft dust, while the former is hard and gritty. It is there-
fore, I think, because the particles of charcoal are smaller and more
readily inflammable that dogwood powders, more especially when the
charcoal has been burnt at a low temperature, are quicker than other
powders. What appears to be required, therefore, iu the manufacture
of fine grain powders, is that the particles shall be as fine and as close
together as possible, so that the combustion may proceed with suffi-
cient rapidity.

The question, however, may be asked, cannot the slower burning of
the alder or willow charcoal be compensated for by making the grains
of powder finer ? I shall answer this question by a short statement
of the experience of Waltham Abbey on the point. I have already
referred to the change from F.G. to E.R. powder, in which dogwood
was introduced, and to the change from E.R. to J. 2 or R.F.G., in
which the size of grain was increased ; and I may add that in the
most recent manufacture of this powder, the grain is somewhat larger
than in the original manufacture, while in addition the density has
been increased, a quality which has the same effects to a great extent
as size of grain. And now, as far as we know, no powder excels
R.F.G. in shooting qualities in the Enfield rifle.

When the Martini- Henry rifle was introduced, it was found that
R.F.G. could not be used, because it fouled the rifle. What was the
cause of the fouling it is difficult to say, unless it be that the density
of the powder was too low and its action too quick, which would also
account for the inferior shooting, if we suppose that the great pressure
would crush up the bullet and thus interfere with its concentricity of
spin and accuracy of flight. It is to be borne in mind that the bore
of the M.H. rifle is small and the bullet long, which not only very

198 SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IK

much increases its inertia, but also gives less space for the powder to
expand. Hardening the bullet has better enabled it to resist the
greater strain which is thus produced, bat the action I have described
is occasionally to be observed in the drop shots which sometimes occur
with this rifle, which probably are the resnlt of the bullets being
exceptionally soft. The fouling might, therefore, be dne to the great
length of the cartridge interfering with its thorough ignition with so
qaiek a powder, in the same way as wave action exists in guns, when
the powder is not suitable. I can see no reason why this action should
not take plaoe with small arms as well as with large guns, and so part
of the charge remain unconsumed : and this, I thank, is no doubt
one cause of fouling, though it is not the only one. The want of
proper lubrication by the non-expansion of the beeswax wad, and
consequent escape of gas over the base of the bullet is another.
Exceeding dryness of the air and want of softening of some of the
products of combustion from deficiency of moisture is a third.

In support of the notion that wave action is a cause of fouling, I
may mention that a sportsman lately told me, that when he washed
out the piece after firing a very fine powder, the water became as
black as ink, but that this did not occur when a coarser powder was
used.

Shortening the charge by chambering has simplified the problem of
finding a suitable powder, but still it has been found that it is only by
increasing the charge from 70 to 85 grains, and using a very slow
burning powder, that satisfactory results are to be obtained.

The Committee on Breech-loading Small Arms, in their investiga-
tions as to the most suitable powder for the M.H. rifle, found that
Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 powder gave the * best results. They
naturally wished to obtain a similar powder from the Royal Gun-
powder Factory.

In the opinion of the Superintendent at Waltham Abbey, such a
powder could be produced by making the following alterations in the
manufacture of R.F.G. : —

1st. Charcoal burnt at a lower temperature ;

2nd. The charge taken off the mill* bed in a moister condition ;

3rd. Pressed to a higher density ;

4th. More highly glazed and sifted to a more uniform size of
grain.

A sample was sent from Waltham Abbey to the Committee, January 6,
1869, designated W.A. special No. 6, and also another R.F.G. No. 6,
to compare with Curtis and Harvey's No. 6. These powders were all
of the same size of grain, viz., 14- to 17-mesh. I give the dates as it
is important to bear in mind the season of the year.

The Committee reported, February 6, 1869, that on the whole Curtis
and Harvey's No. 6 shot best, but suggested improvements might be
made in the manufacture of the W.A. powder.

March 20, 1869. — Another Bample of W. A. Special No. 6 was sent ;
and, April 2, 1869, the Committee reported that the results were so
satisfactory — 15 targets giving a mean figure of merit at 500 yards of
1*08 feet compared with Curtis and Harvey's No. 6, V12 feet— as, in

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS.

199

their opinion, to warrant a more extended series of experiments.
What the densities and velocities of these powders were I am unable
to trace.

Soon afterwards, April 19, 1869, some further specimens were for-
warded, with a view to get a higher velocity.

The following table gives a description of these powders, with the
results obtained by the Committee : —

No.

C. & H. No. 6
BJF.O

Mesh.

Muzzle

14 to 17
17 to 20
14 to 20
14 to 17
17 to 20
14 to 20
14 to 17
17 to 20
14 to 20
14 to 17
12 to 20

Velocity.

f. s.
1,316
1,329
1,320
1,326
1,331
1,335
1,287
1,293
1,287
1,294

Mean
drff.

f. 8.
10

8
10
14

9
10

}
}

3
1
8
6
8
6
8

Percentage of
moittuxe
absorbed.

In 24

hours.

1-6
1-8

2-0
1-8

In 96

hours.

5-0
5-5

6 9
6*6

Density.

1-63
1-60

1C7

1-71
1-55

Figure of

merit,

500 yards,

feet.

{

{
f

•77
•98
•83
•78
111
•80
•99
•95
•83

April 30, 1869. — The Committee reported that the three samples
of powder, Nos. 3, 4, and 5, gave very good and nearly equal results,
superior to those obtained with the Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 ; that
there was no fouling with any of the powders, and that 14- to 20-znesh
seemed to give the most uniform results.

The differences in manufacture of each kind were as follows : —

No. 3. — Charcoal not so much burnt as for R.F.G. ; worked as
R.F.G. ; pressed 13£ inches ; glazed 12 hours.

No. 4.— Charcoal same as for B.F.G. ; worked with rather more
moisture than R.F.G. ; pressed 11 inches ; glazed 5£ hours.

No. 5. — Charcoal same as for R.F.G. ; worked with rather more
moisture than No. 4 ; pressed 10£ inches ; glazed 5£ hours.

R.F.G. — Pressed 104 inches and glazed 5| hours.

Seeing that No. 4, 14 to 20, gave a good range of grain, and there-
tore was economical to manufacture, and also gave a high 'velocity and
good shooting, Colonel Younghusband, then Superintendent at Wal-
tham Abbey, gave it the preference.

124 barrels of this powder were made accordingly, and named
Rifle Martini-Henry, or R.M.H. powder.

December 7, 1869. — Captain Majcndie, Assistant- Superintendent
Royal Laboratory, thought this powder fouled the long chamber rifle.
Colonel Dixon, January 5, 1870, also was of opinion that this powder
was not suitable for either the long or short chambered rifles. And
General Lefroy summed up the facts briefly thus : that, at a tern-

200

SOME 8PECIAL FEATURES IN

perature below or near the freezing point, the small-bore cartridges
fouled the rifle, whether made up with Curtis and Harvey's or W.A
powders, and whether fired with long or short chamber rifles ; and that,
at moderately low temperatures, even up to 50 degrees, tbey foaled
with W.A. powder, but not with Curtis and Harvey's, even in long
chambers.

A Sub-Committee, under Lieut. -Colonel Fletcher, was appointed to
investigate this matter, and the question of powder was again re-
opened.

It will be observed that the density of B.M.H. powder was low,
the same as that for R.F.G. as now manufactured. In the next
samples forwarded, this defect seems to have been guarded against.

The following powders were sent for trial : —

Date of sending.

Density.

Size of grain.

Distinguishing mark.

1-67

14 to 20

>»

12 to 16

,, 25,1870

176

14 to 20

>»

12 to 20

1-74

14 to 20

»»

12 to 20

1-718

14 to 20

12 to 20

February 14, 1870. — Colonel Fletcher's Committee reported that B
and G powders were most suitable, and gave the best results. The
velocities of these two powders taken in the Martini-Henry rifle at
W. A. were B, 1,296 f.s. ; G, 1,301 f.s.

There appears something very definite in these results, the com-
bination of density and size of grain producing almost identical
velocities corresponding with that of Curtis and Harvey's No. 6.

Two more powders were forwarded, viz. : —

Date of sending.

Density.

Size of grain.

Distinguishing mark.

February 24, 1870 ....

1-68
*»

20 to 28
14 to 20

K
K

The former was intended to obtain a higher velocity in the Martini-
Henry rifle, and the latter was for the Snider with an increased
charge, and was the large grains obtained in the manufacture of
K powder.

March 14, 1870. — The Committee decided to recommend K for the

Martini-Henry, and -= for the Snider.

March 19, 1870. — Specifications were made out, and -; was called L,
for the convenience of Store ledgers.

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS.

201

The specifications were as follows : —

Both powders to he manufactured as R.F.G. Density 1*67 to 1*69 ;
but K to have a size of grain of 20- to 28-mesh, and to give a velocity
with 85 grains in the Martini-Henry rifle of 1,330 to 1,370 feet ; and
L to have a size of grain of 14- to 28-mesh, and with 70 grains to give
a velocity of 1,145 to 1,185 feet in the Snider rifle.

April 23, 1870. — K was ordered to he manufactured.

July 4th, 1870. — The Superintendent Royal Laboratory and the
Superintendent Royal Small Arms Factory stated, that the shooting
in the short action Martini-Henry rifle was indifferent, and they
strongly recommended Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 to be used in the
Wimbledon competition for that year.

Colonel Fletcher's Committee naturally imagined that this result
was due to the manufacture at W. A. not having been kept up to the
standard they recommended. But, on comparing a sample with that
originally manufactured, the following results were obtained, 12th
July: —

K Supplied to the Committee
February 23

Muzzle Telocity.

f. 8.
1,374

1,358

Mean difference
of velocity.

Density.

f. 8.
4 6

7 9

1-685
1681

which showed no greater difference than might be accounted for by
the ages of the powders.
It was also fired against Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 : —

Powder.

Date of firing.

Muzzle velocity.

Mean difference
of velocity.

July 21.

• • . . • •

July 23.

f. 8.

1,386
1,379
1,392
1,339

8 3

Curtis and Harvey's ....
K

10 3
5 0

Curtis and Harvey's

4*4

which shows a remarkable amount of uniformity in the two powders
as regards velocity. The high velocities in both cases were due to the
extreme heat of the weather.

Colonel Dixon, the Superintendent Royal Small Arms Factory, still
farther reported, July 7, 1870, against the shooting of this powder in
the Martini-Henry rifle, and suggested that it was due to the powder
being too quick, his experience going to prove that a quick powder
will not give accurate shooting.

This appears to be the true explanation ; and no doubt the inferior
shooting was caused by the combined action of small grain and the
heat of the weather. What suited the rifle in February was too quick
in July.

202

BOMB SPECIAL FEATURES IN

An attempt was made to remedy this defect by increasing the
density; and samples of E^ and Li were made August 8, 1870, of a
density 1718. It was found, however, in the Royal Laboratory, that
thris diminished the velocity very considerably hi the Snider rifle,
giving- only 1,187 feet, against that of L, 1,232 feet ; while R.F.G.
gives 1,260 feet. And, though the charge was increased to 75 grains,
the shooting was affected by fouling, as follows : —

Bounds.

figure of merit.

Benares.

Ito20
21 to 40
41 to 61
61 to 80

inches.
13 *16
19 20
22 35
26*8

Fouling.

The Committee also t reported, Dctober 17, 1870, to January 26,
1871, on the shooting of K in tjie Martini-Henry rifle, showing a
figure of merit of 14 inches against 10*8 with Curtis and Harvey's
No. 6.

It was a favourite idea, with many, that the excellence of Curtis
and Harvey's No. 6 depended on the uniformity of the size of its
grain, and some Li powder was sifted between 14- and 17-mesh, and
called I/. The result obtained by tbe Committee, March 2, 1871, was
favourably ike target* "

I/.

Curtis and Harvey, Ho. 6

Inches.

13-1

13 3.

11-8

13 8

Fresh samples of this powder were made, March 6, 1871, and April
16, 1871, the former of a density of 1639, and the latter 1,747, which
was called M.

The Committee reported, June, 5, 1871, that the results were satis-
factory, the targets being : —

Curtis and Harvey, No. 6.

Inches.

12*4

12 7

Further trial, however, proved M to be inferior to No. 6.

The following diagram was made out by myself to see whether any
general principles could be obtained from previous experience to serve
as a guide as to how the best results could be obtained.

I have drawn lines of velocities of the various sizes of grain, and it
will be observed that Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 ranks very high in
proportion to its size of grain and density, and shows that there must
be something in its manufacture which produces this result.

The following particulars will help to explain the natures of the
powders which are designated by letters in the diagram. The dates
of manufacture and of firing are given, as it is necessary to allow for
the age of the powder and the season of the year.

LARGE- AICD 8KALL GRAIN POWDERS.

203

Fro. 1*

i+o»

►Tt

Date of manufacture;

*i
In
Ll

M
K

K I

January, 1870

»
it
>»

February, 1870

19
W

August, 1870

Density.

April 21, 1871

June, July, and August,
1870.

My and August, 1871

{

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

687
667
764
764
747
747
718
718
667
1-667
1-681
1 681
1-718
1-718
1-718
1-747
1-67

1 69
1-66
1-7

Siae of graini

14 to 20
12 to 16
14to20
12 to 20
14fe>20
12 to 20
14 to 20
12 to 20
12 to 20
Paw20
20 to 28
14 to 20
20 to 28
14 to 20
14 to 17
14 to 17
20 to 28

14 to 17
12 to 28
14 to 28

Date of firing.

}

Januaiy, 1870*

n
a

if
February,

»
it

a
ir

-tt

August,
February, 1871.
May,

tt
it

June, July, and
August, 1871.

May and August,
1871.

What appeared to be required was a velocity of about 1,300 to
1,320 feet. This could not be obtained with the same size of grain
and density as Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 ; but it was anticipated that

204 SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IN

by giving a little less density, while maintaining the same size of
grain, equally good results would be obtained. Three samples of
powder were accordingly made of densities 1*66, 1*68, and 1*7, and
they were sifted between 14- and 17-mesh, called M, as before. At the
same time two other samples were prepared by sifting some of the
powder, 12 to 28, called N, and 14 to 28, called O, so as to get
powders a little quicker and a little slower, while giving a greater
range of grain.

These samples were forwarded for trial, bnt the results wore not
- quite so good as Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 ; and, as the Committee
had recommended that no powder which gave results inferior in
shooting to Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 should be accepted, the idea of
matching Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 by powder made according to
W.A. manufacture was abandoned.

I may here notice more particularly the differences between the
manufacture of Curtis and Harvey's No. 6, and W.A. R.F.G., to
which I have already referred.

(1.) With Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 the charcoal is burned for a
much longer time at a lower temperature. This improves the rapidity
of burning of the powder, as has already been stated, but at the same
time it renders it more hygroscopic, and it is a matter for serious con-
sideration whether a powder, if made on this principle, wotild retain its
keeping qualities if stored for many years. It has always been con-
sidered at W.A. a matter of first importance that the charcoal should
be thoroughly burned.

(2.) Long milling, in the experience of W.A., had not been found
necessary with R.F.G. powder, and much less with R.L.G., and, if
carried out at W.A., wonld seriously diminish the amount of powder
that could be turned out.

(3.) Uniform grain would have the same effect in diminishing the
out-turn, as the percentage obtained would be only 17 against 40 when
the range of grain was greater, as 12 to 20. This does not hurt the
private manufacturer, because he has plenty of call for the other sizes,
but at a Government factory, where only one sort of powder is reqnired,
and nothing is sold, it would be a serious disadvantage.

(4.) Long glazing would also have a similar effect, though in a lesser
degree.

A serious attempt, however, was now made to produce a powder
which should be in all respects similar to Curtis and Harvey's No. 6,
except uniformity of grain. The 12- to 20-mesh was chosen, as it was
that of R.F.G., and would give on the average the same size of grain.
And, as Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 was now being supplied by con-
tract, the results of the samples sent to the R.L. for target proof were
carefully noted. It was observed that within certain limits the
higher densities and lower velocities of No. 6 made the best targets.

The first sample was pade April 15th, 1872. The density was
1*784, and velocity 1,226 f.s. This was manifestly too slow a
powder.

The next sample, April 23rd, 1872, had a density of 1759, and
velocity of 1,300 f.s. The density was still too high, and the shoot-

LABGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS.

205

Ing was not good. The mean figure of merit obtained at the Royal
Laboratory, compared with Curtis and Harvey's No. 6, was as
follows : —

Date of firing.

WJL

Curtis and Harrey.

Inches.
IS -77

Inches.
10-67

With 90 grains, however, excellent shooting could be obtained.

The next attempt, May 28th, 1872, was quite successful, the density
being 1'745, and velocity 1,328 f.s., and it was found to give results
traperior to Curtis and Harvey's No. 6. The shooting, compared with
Curtis and Harvey's No. 6, was as follows : —

Date of firing.

W.A.

Curtis and Harvey.

June 17, 1872 .......

July 19, 1872

July 23, 1872

September 20, 1872 .

Inches.
9-66
9-08
9 48
8'83

Inches.

10*16

11 11

9*96

9-55

9*26

10*44

This powder, at first called Q, and afterwards R.F.G*, has con-
tinued to give results superior to Curtis and Harvey's No. 6, the
reason being that the average size of the grain is a little larger.
Curtis and Harvey's No. 6 is all between a 14- and 17-mesh in size;
but, of &.F.G.*, one half is between a 12- and 14-mesh, one quarter
between a 14- and 17-mesh, and the remainder between a 17- and 20-
mesh. The greater range of grain makes little or no difference.

The charcoal is burned for 8 hours at a low temperature, and the
milling is continued for 8 hours. The effects of slack burning the
charcoal and long milling 1 have already explained. The glazing is
for 12 hours, and seems to be a refinement by which the density of the
exterior of the grain is increased, and thus more time is given for
thorough and complete ignition.

Care has been taken to watch the keeping qualities of the powder,
lest the effects of the low burning of the charcoal should become
apparent, and samples have been preserved and fired from time to time,
in some cases as long as three years. There is no doubt that powder
made with slack burnt charcoal absorbs more moisture than that with
more highly burnt charcoal. The greater density, however, of R.F.G.*
powder helps to mitigate this tendency, and the samples which have
been fired show no undue loss of velocity which could be attributed to
an extreme absorption of moisture. The moistures, also, have been
carefully taken from time to time.

The following are some of the results which have been obtained :—

VOL.

206

SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IN

New.

One year old.

Two years old.

Date of storing.

Moisture

Velocity.

Moisture

Velocity.

Moisture

Velocity.

per qent.

f. s.

percent.

f. s.

per cent.

f. 8.

September 12,

1872 ....

•44

1,311

1*73

1,279

• . . .

1,298

October 2,

ii • • • •

•49

1,385

1-81

1,294

1-77

1,280

November 2,

ii • • • •

1-1

1,311

1-85

1,284

1-66

1,269

December 3,

„ • • ••

1-12

1,327

1*77

1,284

1-65

1,290

January 2,

1873 ....

•89

1,313

1-77

1,281

1-9

1,273

February 3,

„ ....

•60

1,332

1-80

1,274

1-67

1,265

March 3,

„ • • • •

•64

1,808

1-65

1,258

1-72

1,260

April 3,
May 6,

ii • • • •

•51

1,336

1-37

1,264

1-77

1,276

>i • • • •

•9

1,343

1-45

1,266

1-6

1,274

June 2,

ii • • • •

1*1

1,327

1-72

1,274

July3,

ii • • • •

•82

1,837

1-3

1,267

1-52

1,269

August 4,

>i • • • •

•96

1,330

1-3

1,279

October 4,

„ ....

115

1,814

1-4

1,275

1*7

1,282

•82

1,825

1-61

1,275

1*68

1,276

The average moisture of the samples when six months old was
1*55, and the average velocity 1,294 f.s., so that we may conclude
that it takes one year before the powder attains to its normal con-
dition, after which it remains stable, subject, of course, to the natural
fluctuations of the season of the year, and the conditions under which
the cartridges are made up and fired. As the samples of powder here
under consideration were kept in small open kegs exposed to the air, it is
probable that the absorption of moisture and loss of velocity were much
greater than will be experienced with powder kept in dry store maga-
zines, or safely sealed up in air-tight cartridges. There appears, there-
fore, to be no fear of the permanent keeping qualities of R.F.G.* powder.

The following will give some idea of the relative effects of density in
materials, and manufacture. E. means powder the same as R.F.G.j
in every respect except density. A. is the same as R.F.G., excepting
density. A.E. is powder having the same materials as R.F.G.8, but
manufactured as R.F.G.

In the Martini-Henry rifle the charge is 85 grains, and bullet
480 grains. In the Snider the charge is 70 grains and bullet 480.

Density.

Date of firing.

Muzzle velocity.

Powder.

In Martini-
Henry rifle.

In Snider
rifle.

E March 8, 1875

A „ „ „ • • . •
A.E. „ 11 ,,....

#1 II II !!••••

II II »» \
»» >i 22 J "
xl.r .(r.2 „ 8 „ • • • •

II • • • •

1-654
1-653
1-677
1-697

1-650

1-729
1-726
1-62
1-611

March 15, 1876

„ ......

ii ......

April 13, 1875

March 15, 1876

April 13, 1876

i* • •••«•
u 21, „

f. 8.

1,370
1,338
1,340
1,338

1,340

1,843
1,321

. . a .
• . « »

f . 8.

1,299
1,222
1,241
1,230

1,262

1,264
1,231

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS.

207

It will be observed that both the slack burning of the charcoal and
the long milling have considerable effect in quickening the powder.
Between E. and A. of the same density there is a difference of
32 f .8. in the Martini-Henry, and 77 in the Snider. And, allowing for
density and greater age of powder when fired, A.E. excels A. in both
rifles. These experimental powders were made when it was con-
templated to have one powder for both Martini- Henry and Snider
rifles. This could only be done by shortening the Martini-Henry
ballot. The powder A. was rejected as unsuitable. The following are
the comparative results with the other powders in the Martini-Henry
rifle with 80 grains charge and 410 grains bullet.

Powder.

Density.

Date of firing.

Muzzle
velocity.

E March 8, 1875

1-654
1-677

it •• ••

1,392
1,862

A.E. 11, „

It was not, however, deemed advisable to lighten the bullet, but
the question became, could not E. powder be used with 80 grains with
the 480 grains bullet. The velocity obtained, 12th May, 1875, was
1,315 f.s., almost identical with that of R.F.G.,, with 85 grains. It
was found, however, to be too violent and split the cartridges.

In order to show how the same question is affected by. an increase
in the size of grain, with larger charges, I may give the firing of the
following samples of field gun powders in the 9 -pounder and 16-
pounder guns.

Size of
grain.

Density.

9-pounder gun.

16-pounder gun.

Powder.

Muzzle
velocity.

Pressure.

Muzzle
velocity.

Pressure.

P. and W.R.L.O.

Lot 747

W. A. Experimental,

R.F.GK dust.

October 3, 1873

WJL Experimental,

common charcoal,

Jan. 10, 1871 ....

1 4to8 1
J mesh. J

> f " cube

J
* it

1-672
1-674

1.679

f . 8.

1,395
1,440

1,228

Tons.
10-7

It -2
5-2

f. 8.

1,869
1,436

1,283

Tons.
13-8

15-8
8 0

The densities being nearly alike show that the dogwood powder,
though its grain is very much larger than the service R.L.G., Pigou
and Wilks, lot 747, is a quicker powder ; and this fact becomes still
more apparent when contrasted with the January 10, 1874 powder of
the same size of grain, and nearly same density, but made with alder
and willow charcoal. The dogwood powder has been fired in a
chambered 9-pounder gun with 3 lbs. of powder and 12|lb. shot,
giving a velocity of 1,700 f .s , with a very high recorded pressure
of nearly 40 tons, showing that it is a violent powder.

208

SOME SPECIAL FEATURES Iff

I am able to pursue this investigation still further by contrasting
the effects of dogwood and common powders in the 8-inch grain.

Powder.

Density.

Size of
grain.

Muzzle
velooity.

Pressure.

t
i

f. s.

Tons.

Hall and Sons . . "|

Dogwood powder >
Milled two hours J

1*82

r'cube

1,476

12*5

13 6

14*0

» >»

1,447

20-6

20*4

19-4

Hall and Sons. • • • *|

Dogwood powder V
Milled eight hours J

1,516

12-0

12*4

12-2

»> »»

1,506

20*2

20*3

18-7

W.A. December, 1

1873, common I

750

O'O

o-o

0^0

M »

»» n

730

0 0

O'O

0 0

These powders were almost identical as regards density, having
been subjected to an extreme pressure of nearly 30 cwts. to the square
inch. We have, therefore, a strong contrast of the differences caused
by the nature of the charcoal, and also by the milling and size of grain.

Comparing Hall's dogwood inch cubes with the Waltham Abbey
cubes made with common charcoal, we observe that the velocity with
the latter is only about one-half of that with the former, and the
pressure was not sufficient to crush the copper crusher gauges. In
both cases, also, with the dogwood powders, the inch cubes give
higher velocity than the five-eighths cubes, while the pressure is not
much more than one-half.

With both sizes of grain in the dogwood powders the longer milling
has proved beneficial in increasing the velocity and reducing the pres-
sure. The date of firing of Hall's samples was September 19th, 1873.

They were fired again, November 14th, 1873, after being exposed
night and day in open barrels to the weather since the first proof,
with the following results : —

Milled 2 hours
Milled 8 hours -

1" cube
f cube
1" cube
\" cube

Muzzle
velocity.

f . s.
1,306
1,233
1,401
1,399

Pressure.

Tons.

7*3

6*0

10*5

11-0

Tons.

6-9

5*9

10-8

10-6

Tons.

6 9

5-8

10-6

10-8

This shows that the longer milled powder is very much the best able
to resist the action of the weather. Of course no powder will ever be
called upon to stand so severe a test of its keeping qualities as this
powder was subjected to. My object, however, is to bring out the
special features of the various powders.

LARGE jUED SHALL GKAUff POWDERS.

209

X am able to go another step in the same direction. In itmlrfng
experimental powders for the 80-ton gun, powder from new materials
and reworked from Merchant's L.G. have been used. It so happens
that the L.G. powder used showed evident signs of the charcoal
being slack burned, probably with the view of passing the old mortar
proof successfully by giving a good range. It also, of course, received
the extra milling necessary to convert it into the new powder. The
contrast, however, is not nearly so strong as between dogwood and
common charcoal, and the difference in milling is not great. The
following are the results of two sets of samples fired preliminarily in
the 38-ton gnn.

Powder.

•

Sixe of
grains.

Bate of
firing.

Muzzle
velocity.

Pressure.

lnr*A* rework •• •■
Dec 2, 1875 ..../
WJL newpowder \

1-82

181
1-74
1-76

V cubes
1'7* cubes

2" cubes
1 *7" cubes

4/12/75
16/2/76

f . s.

1,360

r 1,380

1,375

1,387

Tons.
15 -0
17-6
25 0
22-3

Tons.
13-7
17-0
26 5
22 2

Tons*
15-2

17 -a

22*9
22-5

Now what conclusion are we to draw from these apparently steadily
consistent results. It would appear that the way to make the best
powder is to prepare the materials with a view to make the powder as
rapidly burning as possible, and then to moderate the combustion by
density and size of grain. If the powder be not quick burning the
density very much affects its rate of burning, and, as was seen with
W.A. inch cubes of high density, the powder becomes much too slow
for any gnn. Now it will occur to most that, as soon as the prupsuro
rises in the bore of the gun, the density of powder remaining to be
burnt becomes very much increased ; and, though the powder used be
et low density and consequently quick burning' on that account, it will
soon become a slow-burning powder. This is the condition we most
wish to avoid ; and, therefore, it is better to start with as high a
density as possible and have it naturally-quick burning, and thus the
late of combustion will be less affected when the pressure rises in the
bore of the gun.

These conditions would, I believe, hold absolutely true were it not
for another feature in the burning of grains of powder which accelerates
the combustion of powders of lower density, though otherwise slower
burning. I refer to the porosity of the grains, on which I more par>
ticnlarly dwelt in a previous paper read here. With the same density
el grain, powders made with hard burnt charcoal are more porous than
those made with slack burnt charcoal, because, the particles of charcoal
being coarser, the spaces between will be proportionately larger ; and
also the particles of charcoal, being denser, will occupy less space, and
so leave more room for interstices. The crushing pressure of these
particles also we may suppose to be higher than with soft charcoal,
which will enable them to build themselves up in accidental positions*

210 SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IK

and thus give rise to uneven densities in different portions of the grain
itself. Under the intense pressure in the bore of the gun the flamo
becomes forced into these spaces, and the less dense portions of the
grain burn more rapidly than the harder portions, and thus give rise
to that particular pitted and burrowed appearance of unconsumed
grains of powder which are picked up after the discharge of the gun,
with which we are all familiar. It is difficult to saj how far the name
becomes forced into these channels, but the effect must be that from
each small centre of penetration the combustion proceeds more rapidly
as larger and larger surfaces come under ignition, and so an increased
amount of gas is generated. It is a great mistake to assume that
under all circumstances the combustion proceeds in regular successive
lamina? from the surface to the centre of a grain of powder. With
very high densities 1*82 to I '84, when the powder probably has been
subjected to a pressure equal to the crushing strain of the particles, I
believe no appreciable interstices exist, and then the grain does burn
regularly from surface to centre. The rate of burning then depends on
the fineness of the particles of charcoal, each particle requiring to be con-
sumed before the flame can reach the next to ignite it ; and this no doabt
accounts for the very marked difference in burning of W.A. 1" cubes
of ordinary charcoal, and Hall and Sons 1" cubes of dogwood charcoal.
With lower densities, however, the conditions are different, and, though
the slack burnt charcoal still retains its greater rate of combustion, yet
the greater certainty of porous channels, or unequal densities in the
grains .with harder charcoal enable it with more certainty to take
advantage of the accelerated rate of combustion I have noted, and so
tend to a great extent to reduce the difference in ultimate effect. It is
mainly, in my opinion, due to this fact, that our cubical powder is able
to match to so great an extent the prismatic powder used by some
foreign governments. In the prismatic powders the channels are in-
troduced into the grains of powder intentionally, so that there may
be an accelerated rate of burning from them as centres as the combus-
tion proceeds. The manner in which these holes are made, however,
renders it uncertain whether their whole surfaces are ignited, as we
find with pressed surfaces that they are generally only ignited from
points ; and, in fact, portions of grains of powder are often picked up
of which the surface never appears to have been ignited. If the holes
could be bored so as to give more readily ignitable surfaces, it is
probable that the combustion would be much improved. Prismatic
powder has to be made of much lower density than granulated or
broken powder, in order to compensate for the greater difficulty of
ignition.

It will be observed with prismatic powder that the sizes of the
prisms are of no consequence provided that the channels are propor-
tionately numerous and suitably placed. And in support of this
notion I have advanced that our powders are porous, I will give the
following results obtained by experiment with powders of different
sizes of grain with the same density. The powders were pressed in
the same press-box at the same time, so it is tolerably certain that
their densities were identical. ,

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS.

211

Powder.

W.A., Sept. 30, 1875. Eework

1 '5 inch cubes

1*7
2*0

In 8-in. gun, 35 lbs. charge, 180 lbs.
projectile.

Density.

1-76

Muzzle
velocity.

f . s.

1,471
1,471
1,452

Pressure.

Tons.

16-2
16-8
15-7

Tons.

15 5
16-1
15*2

Tons.

15 1
14 1
15-2

Length
of cart-
ridges.

20*"
20*"
21"

If we make allowance for difference in lengths of cartridge, these
three samples give almost identical results in the 8-inch gun; and
when we come to the 38-ton gun the larger cubes by no means show
to advantage : —

In 38-ton gun, charge 130 lbs.,
projectile 800 lbs.

Powder.

Density.

Muzzle
velocity.

Pressure.

W.A. Sept. 30, 1875. Rework

1-76

f. s.

1,460
1,440
3,409

Tons.

26-1
27-3

28-7

Tons.

27*7
26-5
24*5

Tons.
19'7

1-7 „ „

24-5

2 '0 „ „

22-5

Take, however, the following samples of powders of equal but
higher densities, and the effect of size of grain is very marked.

Density.

38-Ton gun.

Description.

Muzzle
velocity.

Pressure.

W.A. December 2, 1875. Rework

1-81

f. s.

1,396
1,380
1.350

Tons.

22*2
17*6
15-0

Tons.

22 2
17 0
13-7

Tons.
212

17 „ „

17*2

2*0 „ ,.

15*2

» —

Both of these sets of samples were made from rework L.G., with
the same description of slack burnt charcoal. I have already com-
pared the latter 1*7 and 2-inch specimens with those of W. A., February
5th, 1876, of lower density made from new materials where the char-
coal is more burnt. It will be observed that, with the February 5th,
1876, specimens, the pressures do not go by size of grain, showing that

212 BOMB SPECIAL FEATUBES IN

the powder is porous owing to the low density ; and, as already stated,
though the velocities are about the same as in the last samples given,
the pressures are higher, which bears out my theory about the higher
densities and quicker burning materials giving the best results.

Of course I do not give these samples as proving the question, but
merely as illustrations of the features I wish to bring before you. We
have had samples, especially those made by Messrs. Hall and Sons, of
Faversham, of powders of low densities and hard burnt charcoal which
have given the very best results. They have been tried, however,
with powders only 1" cubes, and density 1*75, giving results too quick
for the 38-ton gun with large charges.

This leads me to the consideration of the third and last feature
I wish to lay before you. I believe the action in that case to be modi-
fied by the slow burning of the particles of charcoal themselves, these
particles being so large and dense that, if we suppose an extreme case,
all the particles may be ignited very rapidly, but the mean time of
burning of the charge depends on the burning of a single particle.
Charcoal has never been burnt at Waltham Abbey to an extent so as
to produce this result, so that I am unable to give any accurate data as
to how far this method may be carried out on a large scale. But
I think it is worth investigation.

I may now sum the different features in powders for large guns, by
which the rate of burning may be modified.

1. A quick burning powder, with a high density, and no appreciable
porosity. *

2. A moderate burning powder, with a moderate density, leaving
moderate porosity.

3. A very slow burning powder, with very large porosity.
Powder may be produced to give very good, and possibly equally

good, results, by any of these methods, but, I think, probably it can
be produced best and with greatest certainty by the first method. It
is, however, by far the most expensive, owing to the greater time
required to manufacture.

The second method, with a slight tendency towards the first, is
that by which powders have hitherto been made at Waltham Abbey.
It is the cheapest, but it depends to a great extent on the most un-
certain of ail the qualities, viz., porosity. The only means by which
this uncertainty can be neutralised is by systematic proof and careful
mixing. When this is properly carried out, the results can be relied
on with perfect certainty.

In all cases size of grain is a most important element which can
never be dispensed with, owing to the facility which it gives for the
complete ignition of the charge, and the total elimination of wave
lction, which is so very destructive to the bore of the gun. From
•bservation of the good results which were obtained by Hall's inch
cubes in the 8-inch gun, I was led to suggest the trial of 2-inch
cubes for the biggest guns, for, if we double the diameter of the
bore of the gun, we ought also to double the length of the side of the
cube of powder required for it. With such large grains no wave
action is now to be observed even if the charge be ignited in rear. It

LARGE AID SHALL GRAIN POWDER?. 218

is, therefore, a safe and Bound principle to keep the grains as large
aa possible, provided other qualifications are not unnecessarily sacri-
• ficed. Were, however, onr heavy guns breech-loading, the result of
my observations lead roe to believe that, if the cartridge were ignited
along the whole centre from the rear, smaller grain and denser powder
could be safely used, and greater efficiency thus obtained.

I may mention a difficulty which has been encountered in the manu-
facture of these large cubes. In glazing in the ordinary manner,
it hae been found that the amount of heat generated is not sufficient
to make the powder sweat in the glazing barrels. The portions thus
rubbed off are not pasty enough to adhere to the aides of the barrel,
bnt remain in a state of dust, which adheres to the cubes, and requires
to be removed before the powder is finished and black-leaded. It
is anticipated that, by using one large instead of four small glazing
barrels, not only will this objection be removed, bat larger units will
be obtained for the after process of mixing. The system of mixing,
and proof of pebble-powder, I have explained in a previous paper.
It is obvious that if a sample of 130 lbs. of cubical powder be fired
from each batch, the batches must be large to prevent an unnecessary
expenditure of powder. By adopting a nnit of 1,600 lbs. instead
of 400, as in the case of pebble-powder, a batch of 16 times 1,600 lbs.
can be obtained if four ordinary stovings be reserved before the powder
is finished. For this purpose a finishing reel, to contain 1,600 lbs.,
has also been made. Cubical powder will not pass through a hopper
in the same way as pebble-powder, because the grains are so large,
but, by means of this mixer, it is anticipated that, if required, as
many as 16 different batches can be made uniform, by taking a barrel
from each for a run. The following diagrams will give an idea of the
sizes of the glazing barrel and mixer as compared with an ordinary
glazing barrel.

Fie. 2.
large glaring band. Mixer.

Ordinary glaring barreli.

214 SOME SPECIAL FEATURES IN

These large cubes afford special facilities for taking densities, and
an instrument was designed by me for this purpose. Where the grain
of the powder is small, and the surfaces touch each other, the air has
to be exhausted -before the mercury is allowed to enter the globe in
the ordinary densimeter ; but in this new design, the cube is simply
immersed, and it is found the air does not adhere to the surface when
it is held by three small sharp points. Fig. 3 shows the design of the
instrument. Fig. 4, the method by which the cube is held in its
place, only one point being shown. The bulbs B give buoyancy when
no powder is immersed, so that the point E just touches the surface
of the mercury. When the powder is immersed, weights are added till
the point E again touches the surface, and thus the density can be
calculated. It has been found in taking the density in this manner
that the cubes vary very considerably, and a large number have to be
tried before an average result can be obtained. The cubes, however,
after being operated on, can be returned again whole by simply brush-
ing off any mercury which adheres to them.

Fig. 3. Fig. 4.

— f— —— -y' -vr V

I trust that the remarks I have made will show how deeply in-
teresting and important this subject is, and how steadily and surely
light has dawned on us, with the aid of the proof tests, which were
inaugurated and carried out by the Committee on Explosives. I have
had the opportunity of studying the matter for now nearly five years,
during perhaps the most interesting period ; and I hope it may not
be considered inappropriate to have laid the results of my observations
before you. Though many of the deductions I have drawn are merely
my own theories, they are the fruit of long and careful study, and they

LARGE AND SHALL GRAIN POWDERS. 215

will not, I feel confident, be lost sight of by those who have to do with
powder at Waltham Abbey, or elsewhere.

The Chairman : I think it only remains for me to express what I am sure is the
feeling of the meeting generally, the very great interest with which they have
listened to the lecture, showing, as it does, an immense deal of research upon a
very difficult, and if I may add, a somewhat dry subject. That dry subject has
certainly been given to us mixed up with a great deal of interesting matter. In
saying so, I should not lose sight of its great importance. For years past the whole
of the military institutions of our country have been more or less under review, and
we may add to that, that our ordnance, our rifles, and our powder have also been under
review ; and next to keeping our powder dry, which I look upon as most essential
under the present circumstances of the world, the most important thing connected
with this subject is, that we should have the best possible powder that we can
possess. I believe Major Morgan has, I won't say actually solved the question,
because I do not believe in finality in anything, and I think that it is quite possible,
considering the great march we have made in the science of explosives as well as in
the science of big guns and rifles, that some day or other an explosive superior to
gunpowder may be discovered, but pending that time, I may say I believe we have
arrived at almost as perfect a solution of the powder-question as can be attained
under the present circumstances and with our present lights. I was pleased to
observe that the lecturer divided his subject into two parts. He took first of all the
small arms powder, and he brought us by gradual stages up to the latter, which he
showed us was the best possible powder that could be produced under the circum-
stances, showing us that this was only done by long and patient perseverance,
because as I understood, from 1869 to 1872, various experiments were made, and it
was eventually proved that the best powder could only be produced by long milling
and by slack burning of the charcoal. I observe our lecturer is in favour of breech-
loading guns. He says, " I should prefer, however, to see our heavy guns breech-
" loading, and the cartridge ignited along the whole centre from the rear, when
" smaller grain powder could be safely used and greater efficiency thus obtained."
I have always supposed that in any breech-loading guns of heavy calibre, the
explosion of a great mass of powder is an operation that would require a great deal
of forethought to be carried out with safety. Certainly I do not suppose for a
moment that which was called the poudre brutale could be used with any great
safety. It may be quite possible, as our lecturer observes, that the small grain
powder might be rightly or safely used, but there may be other reasons which I
think I am hardly competent to go into, as to the gradual ignition of the powder,
which I believe is an essential of the large grain powder in the guns, which might
not make a small grain powder so useful for the purpose. On all these matters I
speak with a great deal of humility. Though I am here in a particular position,
presiding over a meeting which has listened with a great deal of attention to all that
has fallen from our lecturer this evening, I do not think it is necessary and I cer-
tainly should be the last, to wish to go into a controversy on these matters. I had
rather hoped that some gentleman in the meeting would have given us a few
observations upon this most interesting lecture, and that the meeting generally
should have been able to come to some conclusion after a discussion which would
have been more or less favourable. It now, I think, only remains for me to express
again the very great pleasure with which I have listened to a lecture most interesting
as I have said, and most important ; and I think there is an additional matter of
interest pertaining to it, that it comes from a gentleman who has served at Waltham
for the last five years with very great credit to himself and with very great advantage
to the public ; and when a gentleman like Major Morgan comes to an Institution
like this, and is good enough to give us a highly scientific lecture, from which all of
ns can draw more or less profit, I am sure he is entitled to our very best thanks.

Bear- Admiral Selwtn : I should like, my Lord, with your permission, to ask
the lecturer one or two questions. Perhaps Major Morgan would inform us first
what the cost of dogwood is compared with the other charcoal, and also the increased
cost due to the longer time required in working. Also what is the size of the
cartridge made with a prismatic powder as compared with the cubic. I am asking,

816 80MB SPECIAL FBATUBES IS

in fact, very nearly, what is the specific gravity, bat "size of cartridge," would
convey a better idea, to most of my brother Officers ; if he would give ns any idea of
how much additional space is required by reason of the prismatic powder being (I
•appose 1 must not call it less dense) but more porous, and the difierenoe also
between those two and the R.L.G-. There is another question as to the ware-action
of which Major Morgan spoke. Whether that wave-action is not more probably due
to the slow starting and the continued push, as compared with the sadden action of
the quicker powder than to any other peculiarity of the powder. And I should like
also to observe on the question of hydrogen and oxygen contained in these powders
Professor Macquorne Rankin's statement in this theatre some years ago (which is a
perfectly sound authority upon the subject) was, that for every unit of oxygen present}
eight units of hydrogen will be rendered nugatory, and as the total heat of com-
bustion represented by the burning powder must also be the total effect of gaseous
nasssure, it is clear that not only is the whole of the hydrogen absorbed, but them
is an excess of oxygen in a peculiar state which may possibly combine with the
carbon, as I have had reason to see in other experiments connected with fuel, and
produce a more vivid and intense combustion. It is under pressure and it combines
with the carbon. One would say at first sight that the lower quantities of oxygen
and nitrogen ought to give the better effect because less hydrogen would be rendered
nugatory. As to the presence of gaseous matter, we must consider that powder, if
it be properly burnf, all becomes gaseous, but the quantities of oxygen, hydrogen and
nitrogen contained, besides the carbon, do affect the total heat of combustion in every
ease were combustion takes place, and very notably so. I think I might ask
also whether there has been any change for the better in the velocities obtained
over those obtained by the old powder. It was called poudre brutale. It wee
poudre brutaXe if fired under certain conditions and in certain guns, but the question
will arise necessarily whether in- seeking after a good gun, first we did not make a
weak gun ; secondly, whether in seeking after a powder to fit that gun, we have not
made weak powder ; and thirdly, whether in making that weak powder slow-burning
powder, we nave not necessitated much longer guns, which guns, I am sorry to say,
seem likely to surpass very much the limits that can be afforded to them of space in
casemates. I ask these question simply to recall attention to the fact that we do not
do wisely to overlay differences or conceal difficulties as they arise, instead of
candidly and openly acknowledging them. The probability is that as soon as we
have a powder to suit the Martini-Henry, we shall have to get some other form of
jifle to suit the powder. It seems very doubtful whether this question ought not to
have been gone into as the very first consideration in making artillery of whatever
sue— the powder first, the projectile second; the cartridge, if there be a cartridge,
third, and last of all the arm.

Captain BuBOBaa : I should like to ask Major Morgan whether his attention has
been drawn to a cartridge for heavy ordnanee proposed by Mr. Scott Russell last
year, in which he intended that the powder should be built up in the cartridge in
nollow cylinders of powder, the centre being filled with condensed powder, so that
combustion should take place from the centre, and that the cartridge case should
be made of metal?

Major Moboak : In the first place I am very much indebted to your Lordship far
Che kind way in which you have spoken of the paper I have read, and for the
interest which you have shown on the subject. And, indeed, I may say I am most
indebted for the accuracy with which your Lordship found out a flaw in this paper.
X am aware I had no right to go into the subject of guns at all in reference to the
matter in hand, and it was merely incidentally that I did so. I have a specimen
of powder here, made by the Italian Government, three-eighths of an inch cubes;
and it is a slower burning powder than the Waltham Abbey two-inch cubes. It can
never be used, however, m large charges, becauseyou could not get the whole charge
ignited ; and the difficulty is the wave-action. The ignition takes place in one part
ef the cartridge, and unless it can be distributed through the whole charge, you get
wave-action, which spoils the efficiency of the charge. The only way out of that
difficulty with such a powder would be to ignite the cartridge up the middle and
make radial channels, so as to communicate the flame to the whole cartridge as
quickly as possible. I may say I am not in favour of breech-loaders to the extant

LARGE AND SMALL GRAIN POWDERS. 217

which has been supposed ; and in the last paper that I read before this Institution
X showed as far as I could, that our Woolwich guns are better than any continental
guns. However, I have had the honour to propose a breech-loader, which I think is
better even than them, and it is only with reference to that gun that I mention the
subject. With regard to the cost of powder, I should think if you accept the salt-
petre and sulphur, the cost of powder made as R.L.G-. 2 powder would be about
double that of ordinary powder, the cost of every operation in working with the dog*
•wood powder being about doubled. If we can obtain the same results, as I believe
we can, with careful mixing and careful proof, I think we shall have no cause to
change our present manufacture. But I am not here simply to advocate or praise
up any one system; I am here to bring forward, after the experience I have
had, the special features of the manufacture, not with a view to the solution of
the question, but simply to lay all the features before those who may have to do with
powder at this or some future day. There are a great many questions that I do not
xeel justified in going into, and do not come to meddle with on the present occasion.
It is quite sufficient to hare brought the special features of the powder made, before
this meeting without ranging to other subjects which, to a great extent lie beyond
my province. The sice of the cartridge for prismatic powder I should think would
be less than that for pebble or R.L.G-. It would be packed closer together, and
would go in a smaller space. I agree with Admiral Selwyn that there is always a
little excess of hydrogen to oxygen, but according to Dr. Persy, one of the best
authorities we have on the subject, all the oxygen is positively detrimental and might
as well be water in the Bhape of ice, so that it is not the quantity of gas that makes
the rapidity of burning of the powder, but, as I have said, it is the fineness of the
particles of the charcoal. With regard to what Captain Burgess said as to Mr. Scott
Russell's cartridge, I was here and heard that lecture, which was most interesting in
theory. His suggestion was similar to one that I entertained twelve years ago for
my own gun, but whether it would succeed or not I could not venture to say until I
had seen it tried. I do not believe in any theory that is not founded upon facts, for
I hare found in gunpowder-making that practice has led to entirely different results
to those which were supposed would have followed on theoretical grounds. With
regard to differences in powder, you can account for them all in this way — that we
are all learning, and what we knew last year, we must alter our opinion about this
year. At this time last year I could not have drawn the conclusions I draw now, and
of course next year I may have to change my mind again. At the same time there
is no reason why I should not lay the grounds of my present conclusions before those
who are able perhaps to improve upon them, and to form an opinion and estimate
at their value.

Colonel Lord Wayenby : I may notice a remarkable confirmation of what has
been stated in reference to the powder adopted by the Italian Government. The
only Italian gun which I hare seen was rather less than the equivalent of our six-
pounder, the calibre being 2*950, against 3*668 (six-pounder). It was a much longer
gun than ours, which, as has been said, gives more complete combustion, and that is
what we desire in this particular description of powder. I saw* this gun fired with
blank. It is a gun which may be very effectively used for the purposes of auxiliary
forces. They have also guns equivalent to our sixteen-pounders, used for breaching
service in the field. I did not see them employed. It is clear that an additional
length would help the combustion of this more perfectly polished powder. I am
glad to be able to give this confirmation of the theory laid down with regard to the
additional length of guns requisite for the development of a thorough combustion.

LECTURE.

Friday, March 31st, 1876.

Lieut-Geneeal Sir LINTORN SIMMONS, K.C.B., R.E., <fcc, &c,

in the Chair.

THE COMPARATIVE COST OF THE ARMIES OF DIFFERENT
NATIONS, AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CON-
SCRIPTION.

By Captain J. C. Abdaoh, R.E., F.R.G.S., <fcc.

Pabt I.

The subject which I have been asked to investigate depends mainly
upon financial statistics, and is consequently dry, but in laying the
results before you I shall endeavour, as far as possible, to dispense with
superfluous figures, and to confine the numerical statements within
narrow limits. Yet, as money questions are inseparable from figures,
I must ask you to tolerate the inevitable.

In considering the comparative cost of different armies, the first
question to decide, as a preliminary step to the investigation, is — the
standard of comparison ; and here, at the very outset, there is an
extensive field for difference of opinion, apart altogether from the
difficulties to be subsequently encountered in obtaining statistics and
manipulating them.

A description of some of the more rough methods occasionally
employed will somewhat clear the ground.

A favourite plan in England is to divide the amount of the Army
Estimates by the number of soldiers on the establishment. It used to
be said that our Army cost £100 per head per annum. The home
and colonial establishment for this year numbers 127,562, and the
Estimates amount to 14 millions. Dividing one by the other will give
about £110 per head. From this it would appear that we do not now
get as good value for our money as we formerly did ; but, notwith-
standing the increased cost of articles of consumption, or, what is the
same thing, the diminished value of money, this is a transparent fallacy,
for we really get so much more for our £110 now, than we did for
our £100 fifteen pr twenty years ago, when the Militia and Volunteers
had not reached their present efficient state, that we have every reason
to be gratified. The fallacy lies in this — that the peace establishment of
the regular forces is a most inaccurate standard whereby to measure
the military strength of the country. The Reserves, the Militia, and

COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS. 219

the Volunteers are altogether omitted, and yet they constitute
numerically far the more considerable portion of our forces. If we
deal with Army Estimates " en gros," there seem to be only two modes
which can give reliable results, each in its particular way.

The first is to take the average number of men kept continually
under arms as a divisor; this will give a tolerably fair financial
result. The second is to take the number of efficiently trained soldiers
who could be produced on a sudden mobilisation — the ultimate war
strength, in fact ; which is the aim and end of our expenditure.

By the average number of men continually under arms is to be
understood —

a. All the Regular forces.

b. A fraction of the Reserves, dependent on the number of days'
training which they are to receive, which is at present somewhat un-
certain. Twelve days was spoken of, and on that assumption one-
thirtieth of the number may be included.

c. Under heading c come a fraction of the Militia, whq are under arms
for a month in the year, and their recruits, something over one-fourth
of the total number, for two months. One-eighth of the number
attending training may be taken as an average constantly under
arms.

d. A fraction of the Yeomanry and Volunteers, more difficult to
estimate from the peculiarity of their training, but one-thirtieth of
the efficients may be assumed as a liberal average.

The numbers will then stand as follows —

a. All the Regular forces. . . . , , 127,562

b. Reserves, ^th of 31,000 . . • . 1,033

c. Militia, £th of 118,000 14,750

d. Volunteers, V&th of 180,750 . . . . 6,025

Total average under arms . . . . 149,370

Dividing the 14 millions of the Estimates by this number, we
arrive at the cost per man under arms as £93. It is hardly necessary
to remind you that this includes great guns, small arms, military
stores, fortifications, barracks, pensions, and everything else apper-
taining to the maintenance of the Army.

The other basis of calculation suggested, was the war strength of
the Army — the number of efficiently trained soldiers who could be
produced on sudden mobilisation.

This may be said to comprise, nominally —

a. The Regular Army 127,562

b. The Reserves . . . . . . . . 31,000

c. The Militia 118,000

d. The Yeomanry 12,000

e. The Volunteers, 168,750 (one-fourth) 42,188

Total war strength .. .. 330,750

220 COMPARATIVE COST OF ABMIEB OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

It is scarcely necessary to point out that this is a TmnrmrnTw limit,
and that the numbers actually forthcoming, would be below it.
The same is true, but in a less degree, for other countries than
England.

Dividing our fourteen millions by three hundred and thirty thousand ,
we hare the cost per head of war strength £42 per annum.

If the Imperial troops on the Indian establishment and their cost,
together with the whole of the Volunteers be added, the war strength
would be raised to 520,000, and the cost per bead diminished to about
£36 per Mmmw ; but this is mentioned merely incidentally, and is not
intended as a comparative statement. The introduction of the native
forces in India, numbering 440,000 men, or of the Canadian Militia,
whose active strength is 80,000, would only confuse matters still
further.

In going so far, the military establishments of this country only
have been dealt with, and purposely bo, for a single example in*
dicates the process followed in other cases.

The mode in which these figures have been arrived at is altogether
empirical, and most of the details involved are matters of opinion.
In the case of England, for instance, one critic may consider that the
militia should be excluded from our war strength, while another may
ask why only one-fourth of the Volunteers have been included, or why
the Irish Constabulary are left out, and so forth.

In dealing with the statistics of foreign armies, the same class of
difficulties arises. It is true that we possess the most complicated
military system in the world : — we have a Home Army, a Colonial
Army, and an Indian Army, all more or less interwoven; and we have
Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, and native troops, with various terms
and systems of enlistment. In other countries there is, in those
respects, far more simplicity ; but great latitude exists for difference
of opinion. Is the French reserviste, who has only served six months
in the ranks, to be reckoned as a trained soldier P Are the hundred
and forty thousand Cossacks of Russia to be counted as cavalry?
No rigid rule can be laid down; the decision must be left to the
discretion of the computer in each case; and it may be broadly
assumed that, where the calculations have all been made by the same
hand, the results are capable of comparison, which is the ultimate
aim of the investigation.

What has been said regarding numbers, applies with still more
force to money.

No two countries keep their budget accounts on the same system,
and none give complete information regarding the cost of their troops
in an accessible form. In the French budget, military pensions are
borne on the Finance Estimates; while, in America, a very large
Survey and Meteorological Department is charged in the Army Esti-
mates. Russia maintains, perhaps, a judicious reticence. Austria
gives most detail. France nearly as much. Germany less. England,
America, and Italy, supply a very great number of figures, and a
very small amount of information.
I have gone into them all except Russia, and I may say that

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION. 221

America gives no information at all, and in the very wide gap between
America and the great Continental Powers, our budget comes in as a
link — containing very much more than the one, and very much less
than the others.

Before going further into details, it will be interesting to consider
some other general relations between military expenditure in various
countries. Table I has been prepared with a view of illustrating the
incidence of the military burden on the purse and person of the in-
habitants ; and here it must be pointed out that, in different countries,
the extent to which expenditure from general revenue reaches in
local, county, or provincial matters, varies very widely. The county
police in England, for instance, are paid from local rates ; while the
Italian carabineers, who are, in fact, a gendarmerie, are really the
elite of the regular army, and are of course paid by the State. The
railways are, in some cases, in the hands of the state, and, in others,
of private companies.

A great number of the roads and canals, and public works, in
France, involving an annual expenditure of above six millions of
pounds sterling, are administered by the State ; while, with us, these
are all matters of private enterprise. And to complicate affairs still
further, the amount or proportion of the National Debt, and its
charge on revenue, in various States, differs very widely.

The result is that the annual budget is not a very good comparative
standard of the cost of government and administration. This, how-
ever, is not the place to remodel the financial systems of the world ;
and the discrepancies are only alluded to in order to avoid miscon-
ception.

Turning to the tabular statement of statistics, on line 3 will be
found the amount of annual taxation per head of population obtained
by dividing the budget by the population. The figures are tolerably
uniform, with the exception of Russia and America. The propor-
tionately small amount of taxation in Russia, 18a. per head, is
accounted for by the fact, that there are several local governments
within the Empire, which administer their own finances. The Grand-
Duchy of Finland, the Kingdom of Poland, the Province of Courland,
and others, have special local administrations and taxation apart from
that of the Empire.

In America, as is well known, each State of the Union provides for
its own internal administration, and the amounts voted by Congress
are therefore correspondingly diminished.

France also labours at the present moment under the pressure of
her new and enormous debt and the re- organisation of her Army ;
while, as already mentioned, the ordinary budget is swelled by Algeria
and the Public Works sections.

The average taxation per head in the principal European States is
about forty-five shillings per annum. England and France are above.
Germany, Austria, and Russia, are below this average.

Passing to the amounts in line 5, obtained by dividing the Army
Estimates by the population, the cost of the Army per head of popu-
lation is arrived at.

VOL.

222 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OP DIFFERENT NATIONS,

The small sum of four shillings per head in America is very simply
accounted for by the very insignificant force maintained. Russia,
Austria, and Italy, stand at six shillings per head; England and
Germany at nine shillings per head ; and France at the top of the
list with eleven shillings, mainly due to re-organisation.

The proportion of revenue spent on the Army varies from 13 per
cent, in Italy, to 21 per cent, in Germany.

The next group of figures relates to the peace strength of the
Armies. The average number under arms, computed in the manner
already mentioned, varies between exceedingly wide limits. America
has only 28,000, while Russia has 675,000.

The incidence of personal military service on the population in time
of peace is illustrated by the next line of figures : —

In France, there is one man under arms for every 82 persons of the
population. In Germany, 1 in 98. Then follow Italy, 1 in 124;
Russia, 1 in 127; and Austria, 1 in 150. England follows with 1 in
212 ; but if the 63,000 regular troops employed in India be reckoned,
we have one man under arms 'for 148 persons of population, or much
the same as Austria, where strict economy is necessarily observed.

In America, finally, the proportion is only 1 in 1,500.

The next figure has already been mentioned. It represents the cost
per head of the average force under arms in time of peace. The
lowest cost appears in Russia and Italy, at £37 and £38 per man ;
then come three great European Powers, at substantially the same
amount, viz., France, £43, and Germany and Austria, £45, per head
under arms.

In England, the amount is more than double these last, viz., £93 ;
and in America it rises to the enormous figure of £278 per man per
annum. It is strikingly apparent that, even when every allowance is
made for the costliness of the necessaries and luxuries of life in
England and in the United States, the forces raised in those countries
by voluntary enlistment are more expensive by far, if we are to judge
by the estimates, than the armies of conscripts raised by the great
European Powers : and we must conclude that, if the remuneration
offered to the Anglo-Saxon soldier in the open labour market be fair,
that which the conscripts are compelled to accept, is inadequate ; and
the balance which is withheld from them, although it does not appear
on the face of any budget or estimate, is a virtual tax on the country ;
— but that bearing of the calculations will be discussed in the second
portion of this paper.

The next group of figures gives the corresponding statistics for the
war-strength of the various countries, the final line giving the cost in
expectation or anticipation, not that of the war strength when fully
embodied. These figures are very instructive. The war-strengths
show the relative military power of the nations. The number of
population per head of war-strength is an index of the pressure of
conscription on the population.

In Austria 1 in 30 of the whole population can be placed under
arms on mobilisation. France and Germany can produce 1 in 31,
Italy 1 in 34, Russia at present is content with 1 in 50, while we have

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION. 223

in England and the colonies, except India, 331,000 available men, or
1 in 96 of the population of the United Kingdom.

It would appear from this that about one-thirtieth of the popula-
tion is about the maximum force which the great military Powers
can place under arms in time of war. If, however, America be an
exception under ordinary circumstances, it must be recollected that
during the war of secession there were above three and a half millions
of men recruited or drafted into the armies on both sides, or one-
ninth of the entire population.

The next lines — giving the cost per man in time of peace, of the
war-strength; and the ratio which the war-strength bears to the
peace-strength — afford a general idea of the economy and efficiency of
the military administration.

At this point I have introduced statistics relative to the cost of a
private soldier, but the consideration of them will be treated subse-
quently.

Another group of statistics relative to recruiting is subjoined,
giving — The number of males annually attaining the age for military
service, which, roughly speaking, is about one-hundreth part of the
population, of whom it may be added but one-half are generally found
available, the rest being unfit or exempted from one reason or
another : —

The number of recruits taken and trained annually, divided into
first and second portions of the contingent, the latter receiving only
partial training : —

The proportion which the annual contingent bears to the whole
population ; and the percentage of those who come to the military age,
who are trained.

And here some explanation is necessary. In England it is assumed
that the recruits for the regular Army constitute the first portion of
the contingent, and the Militia recruits the second. The volunteer-
recruits have not been accounted for, nor is the number annually
entering the Royal Navy and Marines included. The recruits requisite
to maintain the regular forces in India are, however, comprised as a
set off. It must alBO be borne in mind that the recruits passed from
the Militia into the line ; 4,000 to 5,000 are counted twice.

In other countries the naval contingent has been excluded.

The number of recruits taken in the annual contingent is one of the
best standards whereby to gauge the military training of a country,
bearing in mind that the first portion are efficiently trained, and the*
second inefficiently; for the real military strength depends on the
number of persons trained, however they may be classified, and by
whatever name they may be called. Once a man is made a soldier of,
he forms a unit in the military strength of his country as long as he
can handle a musket, even though he may be temporarily lost sight
of in the civil population. For if an emergency arises, that man can be
induced to come forward again, and if the country be in danger there
should be means, and there always have been means on such occasions
to compel him.

We enlist annually 20,000 men for the Army (a number which

Q 2

224 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATION8,

must be augmented annually in proportion as the new short-service
men are passed into the Reserve, and which must ultimately exceed
30,000). The Militia takes 30,000 recruits, of whom 3,000 re-enrol,
and 5,000 pass on into the regular Army. There is further a regular
loss throughout from desertion, amounting to 15 per cent, in the
regular service, or 3,000 per annum, but this is quite certain to
diminish from the effect of short service and deferred pay.

It may be assumed that of the whole 50,000 recruits, at least
35,000 may be considered new and reliable, and if we can reckon on
the services of those men, whether in the ranks or in the Reserve, for
twelve years (Militia as well as regulars) we ought to be in a position
to lay our hands on 400,000 trained soldiers in case of emergency,
independent of the Volunteers. Those fish exist — what we want is a
net to catch them.

The Militia*

In the tables which I have prepared, the Militia men are not
especially dealt with, inasmuch as they have no complete analogy
in any foreign State. The cost of a Militia man is easy to arrive
at from the data already before us.

The total strength — Officers and men — cost, on the average, £10
per annum, as you may see from the Army Estimates. The private is,
perhaps, not so well off as a Line soldier during the period of embodi-
ment : but you must recollect that, under ordinary circumstances, he
is far less subject practically to military law and to petty restraints
than the Line soldier : he is among his friends and in his own county,
and, on the whole, he regards his month's training in the light of an
outing.

He is in these respects better off, but it is hardly necessary to say
more ; as, if the Militia is embodied for any long period, its conditions
of service become almost identical with those of the Regulars.

The £10 per head, which has been mentioned as the cost of a
Militia soldier, is merely a net sum from the Estimates, and will not
•compara with the £93 in line 9, Table I. It includes no share of
administrative or non-effective services.

There is, however, a financial question regarding the Militia which
I shall bring to your notice.

It has sometimes been said, that the same money which is now
spont on the Militia would give better results if applied to increase
the regular Army and Reserves ; and I shall endeavour to show what
you can have for your money in other ways. I shall assume that the
substitutes are to be bona fide short service regiments, consisting of a
cadre of old soldiers, and the rest enlisted for three years with the
colours and nine years in the Reserve, forming four-fifths of the
-whole.

The cadre of an infantry regiment might consist of 26 Officers,
58 non-commissioned Officers, 40 corporals, and 80 long-service pri-
vates— in all 204 — with 400 short-service men, coming in at the rate
of 133 per annum, and being passed into the Reserve at something

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION. 225

less than that rate, and forming, with their nine contingents, about
1,000 men, when the system was fully at work.

I will not trouble you with calculations, but simply say that, for the
£1,200,000 which we pay for 118,000 Militia, you could have 31 such
regiments of 600 strong, or 18,600 men and 31,000 reserves, makirg
in all 50,000.

This force of 18,600 men could not, of course, be sent abroad.

Now how does the comparison stand ?

You could not have more than 30 or 40 cadres of regiments, whereas
now you have 160 in the Militia, and that is a very serious drawback.
Would your 50,000 men, of whom three-fifths would be reserves, be so
much better than 118,000 Militia ? Would they, in short, be more
than twice as good ?

I believe you will agree with me in voting for the old constitutional
force, with the power of the ballot (unfair as it is) behind it.

And here it is well to draw attention to the division of all armies
into two classes : — 1st. The cadre, formed of the administrative,
executive, and instructional portion, and the old soldiers ; and, 2nd.
The contingent — the recruits — or the rank and file, who are drilled,
instructed, and moulded into soldiers by the others ; and as soon as-
they are so trained, they ought at once to be passed into the Reserve.
You can have a large cadre and a small contingent of recruits, or a
small cadre and a large contingent, for the same strength, and about
the same money. In the former case, you h&ve a large number of
trained reserves, and in the latter, you may have none at all.

An example will show how this bears on the cost and efficiency of
an army.

In France, after the Crimean war, there was a nominal contingent
of 100,000 men, which, however, was reduced to 79,000, by those
taken for the Navy, those unfit for service, Ac, before they became*
disposable. There were in force all kinds of ingenious systems for
evading conscription, by purchase, substitution, replacement, <fec.
The nation would rot submit to the improvements proposed by their
rulers. The system of replacement or exoneration was profoundly
rooted in the custoiris of the people. The first portion, 43,000 of the
contingent, served for seven years, and the second portion, 36,000r
for five months. Of the 43,000 taken annually to keep up the Army,
at a nominal strength of 400,000, no fewer than 20,000 at one time-
used to obtain exonerations, most of them being replaced by the
re-enlistment of old soldiers, who received a considerable bounty.
The price of a substitute rose in fact to over £80. The consequence-
was, that the Army was really kept up by only 23,000 conscript*
annually at one time, most of whom re-enlisted for term after term,
becoming veritable " vieux grognards," while there was no reserve at all.

It may be mentioned in comparison, that the number of recruits
which we have taken in England for the regular Army has often
surpassed that figure, and that too without a bounty.

They had then in France no reserve whatsver of trained troops,
and the result was — the disaster of 1870.

Now, instead of taking 23,000 only into the regular Army, they take

226 COMPARATIVE COST OP AKMIES OP DIFFERENT NATIONS,

108,000, nearly five times as many, to keep up a strength of 440,000,
or about 10 per cent, more than in the time alluded to.

That, it must be allowed, is a forcible example of how the number
of recruits trained annually indicates the true strength of a nation,
and will make it clear how desirable it is to have small cadres
and large reserves, instead of old soldiers and nothing behind them.

Yet another instance of the applicability of the same principle of
small cadres and large reserves will not be out of place.

The peace establishment of a battery of field artillery in most con-
tinental countries consists of 4 guns to a war strength of 6 or 8.
When mobilisation is ordered the reserves come in, horses are requisi-
tioned, and the reserve guns and waggons are paraded with the bat-
tery. The number of cadres is the same, but the number of guns is
increased by half, or even doubled.

Now turn to our own Royal Artillery. They have an establishment
in peace and in war of 6 guns, and the number of guns which we can
put into the field oan only be increased by increasing the number of
batteries — by creating fresh cadres in fact. These new cadres can only
be obtained by subtracting men and Officers from the existing batteries.
If this must be done in war, it ought to be done in peace. A battery
with a peace establishment of 3 or 4 guns may be raised to 6 or 8, and
filled up with trained reserves, withont losing its efficiency ; but if you
take one of the 6-gun batteries, split it in two, and make each half up
to full strength with recruits, can you expect these new and unorganised
cadres, and these untrained men to drop into their places at once, and
be equal to batteries raised on the other system ?

It all points to the moral, that to combine economy and efficiency
you must have Small Cadres and Large Reserves, and this has a most
material effect both on the apparent and on the real cost of an armed
force.

The Cost of an Infantry Soldier in different Countries.

Hitherto only general figures have been dealt with ; direct and in-
direct charges accounted for in the Army Estimates have all been massed
together ; and no distinction is drawn between Officers and men. I
have endeavoured to work out the cost of an army in different countries,
and I shall now try to lay before you the cost of a soldier. Vide
Tables II— VIII.

As it would have been extremely complex to form an average
including all ranks below Officers, and all branches of the service, the
infantry of the line has been selected as being the backbone and
numerical majority of all armies, and I have tried to put a monetary
value on the advantages and inducements held out to the recruit on
joining. (Table II.) These advantages are of a various character,
and may be classed under three heads : —

1st. Immediate and direct advantages.

2nd. Prospective advantages.

3rd. Indirect considerations.

The immediate and direct advantages comprise : —

1. Pay, ordinary extra pay, and marching money.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION, 227

2. Food, including rations of bread, meat, groceries, liquors, &c, and
allowances in lieu thereof.

3. Clothing, including uniform, necessaries, boots, &c., and allow-
ances for that purpose.

4. Barrack accommodation, and lodging allowances.

5. Bedding, furniture and utensils.

6. Fuel, for warming and cooking.

7. Lighting — candles, oil, or gas.
The prospective advantages include : —

8. Good conduct pay.

•*9. Prospect of increased pay on promotion.
10. Gratuities and presents.
*11. Prospect of deferred pay.

12. Prospect of pension.

13. Hospital and medical attendance.

14. Education.

The indirect considerations are : —

15. Opportunity of earning in private employment while serving.

16. Diminished cost of amusement and travelling.

17. Alteration in social status of the Army.

18. Attractions and drawbacks incidental to military service, espe-
cially abroad, including loss of civil freedom, subjection to military
law, and restrictions on marriage.

19. Prospect of obtaining a civil appointment on leaving the Army.

20. Bisk and mortality in the Army, from war and bad climates.
It is at once apparent that many of these items are of such a nature

as to render a monetary appreciation of their value impossible, and yet
they cannot be omitted from consideration. The direct and prospective
advantages can be calculated, and I have given the results in the table
(II) appended to this paper, but only propose to call your attention to
the general figures, and these amounts are, I beg you to observe, absolute
and not comparative. It would be absurd, for instance, to conclude
that, as a Russian soldier gets £10 per annum, and an American sol-
dier £100, the latter is therefore ten tames better off. In order to arrive
at a comparative result, the condition of the soldier must be contrasted
with that of the class from which he is drawn in his own country.

And here again there is wide scope for differences of opinion. What
grades of the social scale are to be included ? What are their earnings ?
Do they pay for their medical attendance and education, and provide
for their poor, aged, and infirm ? How are they affected by taxation ?
Are the necessaries of life cheap or dear P Is the climate hot or cold,
equable or extreme ? What do the inhabitants eat and drink ? Are
they frugal or luxurious in their mode of living ? Is the population
engaged mainly in agriculture or in manufactures ? What is the value
of money ? — and a hundred other questions which are quite as difficult
to answer as it is to discount the prospective advantage of getting into
a theatre at half-price, or deciding whether that privilege is a fair set-
off, against the chance of having to wear a wooden leg.

1 I have taken into account the additional inducements brought forward by the-
Secretary of State for War, when introducing the Army Estimates this year.

228 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

It is impossible to integrate all these considerations, many of them
trifling in themselves, jet forming an important whole. You can only
draw broad comparisons.

The principal is, that voluntary recruiting is apparently expensive*
America and England pay respectively more than twice and four
times as much for their rank and file as the countries where universal
liability to military service is in force. In Russia, a soldier is fed,
clothed, and housed, but his pay is so small — about a farthing a-day —
that it is hardly worth taking into consideration. He has to serve
simply for the necessaries of life. And this is the case to a great
degree in the other continental countries — it takes a man his whole
pay merely to live ; and he is dependent on extra employment, in a
civil capacity, on assistance from his family, or on the bounty of his
friends, for anything he may have in the way of comfort and luxury.

These contributions form in many countries no inconsiderable part
of the income of the soldier.

But the most important point to observe is — that the economy of
conscription is not real. If a soldier is worth £40 per annum in the
open market, and you only give him £20, you are robbing him of his
time and labour to the extent of the £20 you withhold, and you thus
impose an additional tax on the State by exacting that sum annually
from every soldier you employ, instead of distributing it over the
population generally, by an equitable system of taxation.

Part II.

Loss to a country by Conscription.

I shall now proceed to the second portion of the subject, viz., the
loss to a country by conscription. It may be urged that there is no
loss ; but that objection will be incidentally disposed of in endeavour-
ing to assess it. The question is one of evidence, and much of the
evidence is based on opinion or even on prejudice. The general effect
of conscription is so well described in a memorandum handed in to
the Recruiting Commission of 1861, by Mr. Godley, then Assistant
Under Secretary of State for War, a gentleman who was well known
and highly esteemed by many now in this room, that an extract from
that document requires no apology. Mr. Godley says : —

Mr. Godley' 8 Memorandum on the Means of Recruiting the Army.

(Royal Commission on Recruiting, 1861, par. 1796).

" Conscription, which is at first sight and superficially a cheap
" mode of recruiting armies, is, in reality, the most expensive that can
44 be adopted. It is a tax by lot, confessedly the very worst tax that
" a Government can impose. Where substitutes are allowed and pro-
" vided, the tax is paid in money, and consists of the price paid for
" the substitute, the only difference between such substitutes and
" recruits, provided as ours are, being that in the former case the

AND THE LOS8 TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION. 229

" bounty is paid by the unfortunate individual on whom the lot has
" fallen, in the latter case by the public.

" The case is still harder with those who cannot afford to purchase
" substitutes ; on them the conscription is a tax which takes at one
swoop their whole capital, i.e., their labour and their time. It
matters not what the value of that capital may be — whether they
" be skilled or unskilled, educated or ignorant, earning high or low
" wages, producing largely or producing nothing, down comes the
" relentless conscription, takes possession of them for the best part of
" their lives, and gives them in return hardly more than clothing and
" food. In these cases the pecuniary amount of the tax is represented
" by the difference between the value of the conscript's labour at his
" own calling and his pay as a soldier. But no pecuniary expression
44 can represent the full amount of individual suffering and public
" inconvenience which must be the result of so extensive and violent
" a dislocation of labour. Compulsory service of any kind would be
" peculiarly injurious to a country inhabited by an enterprising and
" colonising people like the English. Such a people always sits'
" loosely to the soil, and the prospect of a conscription would
" infallibly lead to a regular and large emigration of our best work-
" men, a class of whom we already lose too many. Of course if
" there is no other way of getting an army, we must have a conscrip-
" tion ; but surely everything else ought to be tried before we have
" recourse to it."

This is the general view, and a very sound one ; but it deals only
with the hardships of the system of substitutes on the poor — the
system of substitutes, an iniquitous injustice, devised to relieve the
rich of their share of the burden.

A substitute is a voluntary recruit, whose bounty, as Mr. Godley
points out, is paid — not by the State — but by the unlucky individual
who is drawn in the ballot. The fine is the same, whether it be paid
by a prosperous millionaire or a struggling artisan. The general
practice has been an uniform rate of exemption, based on supply and
demand. £40 was not an uncommon price for a substitute for the
Militia in the beginning of this century. In France, it ranged up to
£150, and the regulation price fixed by the Government was £80. In
America, during the late war, the cost of a substitute rose as high as
£100 or £200 above the £100 paid as bounty by the State ; and if f*
ballot, with substitution, were resorted to in this country for the
Army, it is certain that even these high figures would be exceeded.
Now can anything be more unjust than this lottery of fines ?

The system admits, it is true, of being improved, by introducing a
sliding scale, based, for instance, on income, but the administration of
such a method presents immense difficulty, and what after all is the
difference between a system of graduated fines, and an item in the
budget, for the provision of the sums required, in the annual Estimates ?
Substitution, then, at its best, is only equivalent to recruiting by
large State bounties, a mode universally recognised as vicious.

Let the system of conscription witnout substitution, be now con-
sidered— universal personal service. There is a kind of abstract ideal

230 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIE8 OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

justice in it, but in practice it is a mere chimera. No nation ever
has, or ever will arrive at the point of insisting on personal service to
the last bitter drop.

The law of conscription in these countries which we refer to, in-
variably begins by declaring universal liability in the most emphatic
way, and immediately proceeds to enumerate exceptions, giving privi-
leges or immunities on one pretext or another, to at least half the
people who are liable.

The exemptions are grounded on : —

1. Physical causes — as insufficient height or chest measurement,
deformity or disease. These are inevitable.

2. Family reasons — as being the support of the family, an only
son, having a brother already in the ranks, Ac. These are also un-
objectionable.

3. Social reasons — as being a minister of religion, a student in
specified establishments, a doctor, or professor, Ac. This is where
the stumbling-blocks commence, I will give you an example. It
would be impolitic to draft a Cabinet Minister, and it would be
abswrd to impress a bishop. Yet the extension of immunities to such
classes as these distinguished persons may be the exponents of — when
pushed to the other extreme — is equally ridiculous, for you come
down to the postman and the parish-clerk, who, although their
absence might be more felt in their respective spheres than that of
the higher functionaries in their offices, could bring no equitable or
valid reason for exemption on the ground of the duties performed.

These are types of the difficulties which have occurred. I believe
the postman, or even any one whom he might employ to carry a
letter, evaded the draft in the United States, on the ground of his
being a Government servant; and certainly in Italy the embryo
ecclesiastics managed to escape until within the last few years.

4. Voluntary service, combined with an educational test.

In Germany, a volunteer for one year passes a high test examina-
tion, the number of volunteers being limited ; and the system has a
most beneficial effect in stimulating advancement in education. In
France, however, the spirit of the law regarding one year volunteers
has been most disgracefully evaded. The Civil Commissions charged
with the examinations, have admitted boys who could do little more
than read and write ; but this can, of course', be remedied.

In Russia, there is a system which, at first sight, is rather attrac-
tive. Those who have received certificates from a first class educa-
tional establishment only serve three months. Those with a certi-
ficate of the second class serve for six months ; and those who can
pass a special examination serve for two years. This applies to
volunteers only, but conscripts have similar, though not so extensive
privileges. The volunteers generally support themselves. Now, this
admission of volunteers on an educational test, and on condition of
self-support, is really, in a country like Russia, simply in favour of
the rich and well to do, and consequently against the poor, who have
to make up the numbers.

In Russia, only one-tenth of the contingent can read and write;

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CON8CBIPTION. 231

so the educated few practically get off altogether, or are made non-
commissioned officers after a few months. In Italy, 43 per cent, can
read and write ; but education there is advancing with rapid strides.
Austria is about the same. In France, 60 per cent, can read and
write. In England, about 90 ; but we, too, are improving. Germany
is at the head of Europe, with 96 per cent.

Then it must be considered that a great number of the men who
are liable for conscription do not put in an appearance, and cannot be
found; and of those who are mustered, many are put back tempo-
rarily for immaturity, or other reasons ; so that the number dwindles
down to something very far below what may be expected. In Germany
about one-third are found available, in Italy nearly one-half. As an
instance of how conscription affects the upper classes, about one-
eleventh of the total contingent in Italy were proprietors, merchants,
professional men, and students, whose enrolment must be considered
as a very large pecuniary loss both to themselves and their country.
In Austria, the persons exempted, from whatever cause, pay a fine
instead of serving. In Italy, the one year volunteer pays £31 to
receive the pay and rations of the soldier. In France, the volunteer
pays £36, and the total amount paid by them to the State is 18
millions of francs, or £720,000 in the Estimates for 1876. That gives
an idea of the value attached to a reduction of service to one year.

But the real way of ascertaining the cost of conscription is to
calculate what recruits could be obtained for in the open market, as
volunteers, and to consider the difference between this sum and what
they actually receive as the indirect taxation representing what the
nation pays in this unjust and unequal manner for submitting to
conscription. In France a labourer earns about £29 per annum, and
an artisan £37 and upwards. Taking £33 as an average rate to
compare with the soldier's £20, we find that the State appropriates
£13 from the earning power of each private soldier, and a higher
sum from the non-commissioned officers. But it is enough to take
the smaller sum.

368,000 men1 at £13 each, make £4,784,000 ; and I have already
told you that a fine of £720,000 is exacted from the volunteers ; so
the lowest estimate of the cost of conscription in France, regarded in
this point of view, is £5£ millions, or 22 per cent, of the Army Esti-
mates. Let us look at it from another point of view. A substitute
used to cost 2,000 francs, or £80, that was the regulation price before
the war, but it has often been higher. There were 164,789 recruits
to be incorporated in 1876, of whom only 108,000 are to be taken as
first portion. Suppose that one-third of these were voluntary recruits,
the remaining two-thirds — 72,000 men — were fined £80 a head by the

1 Total 440,000

Gendarmerie 27,000

Officers 19,000

Staff 26,000

Permanent... 72,000 72,000

Leaves rank and file 368,000

232 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATION 8,

State, or something about £5f millions, materially the same figure as
the last, or about one-quarter of the whole cost of the army.

In these two calculations you will observe that only the labouring
classes have been taken into account ; and that the losses suffered by
men of business, merchants, manufacturers, and persons of large
property, have not been considered at all.

. This limitation has been adhered to, mainly because the one-year
volunteer system affords to those classes a loophole of escape. Yet the
damage done to them and to the material prosperity of the country is
far greater than is shown in the not inconsiderable sum I have men-
tioned.

But I must observe that universal liability has undoubtedly an
excellent effect on the Officers, for it drives into the Army a number of
young men of fortune and high position, who would otherwise perhaps
do nothing, but who are glad to become Officers in order to avoid being
conscripts. This inducement has hitherto been sadly wanting in
France, but I venture to predict that thirty years hence the social
status of the French Officer will have materially altered. In Germany
the effect has long since been produced. To return, however, to the
cost of conscription, I trust that I have made it clear that this 5£ or 5}
millions in France is not the value of a mere sentimental grievance, but
an actual taxation by lot, and a sum which ought to appear on the
estimates, which, instead of being as they are 20 millions, should be 26
millions or more, the balance being made up by compelling men to
work for three-quarter wages, the State appropriating the remaining
quarter.

It is unnecessary to go through the same process for other States ;
suffice to say that France pays the best, and Russia the worst, that is
to say that France appropriates the smallest percentage of the fair
earnings of the soldier, and Russia the greatest.

It is a broad fact that all these nations pay their conscripts vastly
less than the market rate of their service, and that the difference is
made up by indirect means which equally bear upon the country, and
are capable to a certain extent of evaluation.

It is urged by the advocates of conscription that it is a cheaper
system than voluntary enlistment. Nothing can be more fallacious
than to suppose so. If we adopted conscription to-morrow, and only
paid men a farthing a day (as Is done id Russia), giving them,
besides, the mere necessaries of life, there would be an apparent
saving of £15 to £20 per man per annum ; but that apparent saving
is no real gain to the country, it is only a capitation tax on the con-
scripts which ought to be levied on the country in general. But they
say : " You get better men." Undoubtedly you do, but at a loss to
the community at large. You take a man who is earning a pound
a day, and you give him a shilling or a farthing, and the gross earn-
ings of the country are decreased by the difference between what
pittance you choose to accord to him, and the fair remuneration of his
skill or talent. There is no economy in robbing Peter to pay Paul,
and there is no justice in compelling .Paul to work for one-twentieth
part of the wages he can obtain in the open market.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BT CONSCRIPTION. 233

Conscription is only justifiable when the necessities of the country
compel its Government to develope its military resources to the fullest
extent — when it becomes necessary to train the great bulk of the able-
bodied population to arms — as is now the case with most of the great
Powers. If every available man is taken at a certain age, there is at
least no injustice to individuals, although the higher classes suffer far
more than the lower.

If even a moiety of the available men are taken, there is but small
ground for complaint. But it is entirely different when you only
want, as we do, a very small proportion of them, and that small por-
tion for exceptionally arduous duties, which they are quite ready to
insure themselves against if the premium is small, as it would be in
England.

I am sure that the notion of sending a conscript to the West Coast
of Africa, or even to India, can never be seriously entertained. In
short, we never ought, and never will, apply conscription to recruit-
ing except for the Militia, and then only as a dernier ressort.

The question of economy in military administration, as a conse-
quence of conscription, can never come into operation in this country.
We must raise the wages and inducements to enlist voluntarily, pari
passu with the cost of living and the demand for labour ; and when
the moment comes for enforcing conscription, it will be impossible to
turn round and say to your conscripts — we do not intend to pay you as
much as a volunteer, although we admit you are worth more. There
can be no saving then in that way.

On the contrary, it is most probable that every reasonable addition
will have been made to the inducements to enlist, previous to con-
scription, and these cannot be immediately withdrawn.

As the question of conscription for our own Army has been already
ventilated within these walls, I shall only remind you that, in addition
to the objections and injustices which surround it in other countries,
we should have to superadd our Indian and Colonial service — banish-
ment, most likely to an unhealthy climate. That single condition is
sufficient to render conscription for the regular Army, as now consti-
tuted, impossible. No minister could venture to propose a measure
which would render the population liable to exile as well as to com-
pulsory service, for it is beyond a doubt that we have never had a diffi-
culty in obtaining men for those arduous duties, which could not
have been avoided by some foresight and a little money ; and which
was in fact got over, without even the suggestion of resorting to such
an iniquitous injustice as conscription for Indian and Colonial service
would be.

I must remind you, moreover, that during the struggle for existence
in America, during which 3,700,000 men were under arms on both sides
(about one-ninth of the entire population), there was no time that a
substitute could not be procured, although the price sometimes ran
very high. It was enthusiasm and patriotism which brought the best
men in America into the army, and not the compulsion of the draft :
and I venture to say that those motives are by no means extinct in this
country.

234 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

Conscription may in some cases be an inevitable necessity, but
viewed in any aspect is a costly injustice, and the fewer the men
required in proportion to those liable, the greater is the unfairness to
the unfortunates who are drawn. As we have no intention of training
the whole population to arms, the necessity for resorting to conscrip-
tion for the Army seems remote ; but our previous experience of the
working of the existing law for militia-ballot ought to be a warning
to us to advocate such alterations in the Act as will make it really
efficient if it ever has to be put into operation, for it is now lamentably
out of date, and is universally admitted to be unsuitable.

I shall only add a hope that the system of small cadres and large
reserves may render a resort to conscription unnecessary. There are
plenty of men to be had at the market price, and if John Bull wants
more, it will be cheaper for him to put nis hand in his pocket in time
of peace and maintain a reserve, than to resort to a levy of raw recruits
on the outbreak of a war.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTET BY CONSCRIPTION.

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COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

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AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCIUPTION,

Table III.

England.
Cost of an Infantry Soldier
Army Estimates, 1876-7.

Tot© 1. Pay

,» Additional pay (future)

»»

Good conduct pay and skill at arms

»»

10. Provisions

»»

Paillasse, straw

»i

Fuel and light, half of

Lodging or barracks

„ 11. Clothing, rank and file

Great coat, leggings, gloves, and neces-
saries

J 97,0001

' ' 1 70,287 J

r 1,368,000"|

1 122,500 J

J 14,7301

1 122,500 J

f 233,130]

" I 122,500 J

Per diem.

Share of free kit on joining

r 131,0001

1 195,000]

Vote 4. Hospital and medical attendance and medicines . .
£262,000 total vote.

195,000 Army and Militia.
Education

FT 61,4001
Hi 122,000 J

Chelsea and JCUmainham ,

Out-pensions

f 26,0001
1 122,000 J

{1,220,0001
185,000 J

i. d.
1 0
0 2

0-8

• • « «

• • • 4

i • • •

Per annum.

£ «. d.

18 5 0

3 0 10

14 9

11 3 2

o %

1 0

2 12

3 1

0
5

0 14

0 7

1 7

0 10

0 4

7 0

50 11

VOL. XX.

23S COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

Table IV.

France.

Cost of an Infantry Soldier from French Army Estimates, 1876.

Pay

Wine, beer, spirit
Marching money .
Necessaries' fund
Supplement

Francs.

150 38

4 70

36 50

29 20

Gross pay

Deduct hospital or furlough

Net pay

Clothing

Provisions (see below),

Lighting

Hospitals

Bedding

Maintenance of arms

Fuel — warming and cooking

Pensions borne by finance estimate and mainly caused by the
war 66,000,000 x £430,000

Ecoles regimentaires -^ — >•

Invalides
Secours . .

696,000

J 1,388,0001
1 430,000 J

{

J 3,332,
1 500,

000
000

1 62
6 66

£ #. d.
6 0 4

0 4 O

o oia

19 2

1 3 &

8 17 G
0 17 11

0 14.

0 5$

France, 1876, p. 7*A9 cost of Rations to State.

750 grin, bread *22 T oa . , , . , .

300im.meat -39 L ^- « Quoted from pay,

Sugi, coffee 11 7 J leaTing extra cost 13c.

Per annum.

£ *. d.

V'}

6 19 O

Extraordinary or field rations.

Rice and salt '02 1

Brandy every three days '07 J

One year Volunteer pay 900 francs.

}

1 7 D

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BT COX8CRIPT10N. 239

Table V.

Germany.

Cost of an Infantry Soldier from Estimates, 1876.

Pay of a private

Allowances in garrison

Bread ration

Clothing and equipment . . .
Barracks, fire, and light . . .

Additional ditto
Hospitals and medical staff.

Education of privates, Ac.

Invalid houses.

Pensions not in Army Estimates.
Mean prospect of increased pay on promotion.

689,000

811,000
425,

Marks.
Lowest pay 10*60 per month
Mean pay 12*7 „

Marks.
125 0
152 4

The daily bread portion is 750 gr. 1*5 pence is deducted daily from the soldier's
pay for his mid-day meal. If this is insufficient a supplement is issued calculated
on the cost of provisions.

Ration — Small.

150 gr. raw meat
92 rice

Large.
250
118

or certain equivalents in meal, vegetables, potatoes, Jbo*

A fuel ration is for a room holding from 4 to 8 men. A room for 12 men receives
L| rations. A ration is yfjjth part about of a klafter of wood.

Oil is issued to rooms for the winter months, 12 loth in all per annum.

Privates have 40 lbs. hay or 65 lbs. straw per annum for bedding.

R 2

240 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OP DIFFERENT NATIONS,

Table VI.

Austria.

Estimated Cost of Infantry Soldier.

Estimates 1871.

Menage * . . . .
Brot

Kasern-Seryis
Betten Stroh .

Zusammen

Betten Nachschaffung

„ Ausbesserung u. Reinigung
Montur und Rustungs-Gebuhr . . .

Lfthnung

Feuer-Gewehr-Reparatur

According to Estimates
Sanitatswesen

[3,137,1061
1 224,000 J

(There are 5 per cent, in hospital at a cost of 123 g. per
head.)

Versorgungsiresen

J" 10,623,183 1
1 224,000 J

Inralid Hospitals and Pensions.
Unterricht — Ausbildung

Unteroffiziers-Dienstes-Pr&mien
Prospect of increased pay ....

Gulden.

44*2

2221

4*37

•73

71*51

211

1-50

1940

21*90

•53

11695
14

47*4

•33

£ t. d.

4 8 4

2 4 5

0 8 8

0 15

7 3 2
0 4 2

0 3 0

1 18 10

2 a 10
0 17

11 13 11
18 0

4 14 9

0 0 8

178-68

17 17

8-4

0 16

12-

1 2

Bread rations — black bread — 875 grammes, costs 1*6 pence.
Meat ration 185 grammes.
Tobacco at reduced price.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CON8CR1PTION,

241

Table VII.

Italy.

Cost of am, Infantry Soldier.

Estimates 1874.

Daily pay (soldo)

Bread money

Service allowance {assegno individuate) ,
Deeonto (includes clothing, boots, &c.).

Corpo Teterani ed invalidi
Servizio sanitario

f 1 251 0001
i. . . . < >

Pane e viveri (included in pay)

195 000
1 907 3001

1 95 000
22 713 000

Lire.

350 40
6 43

9 77

Letti,legna,lumi,casermaggio <

95 000J
4 247 000

Transporti materiali, &c. . . . i

195 000
f 1 919 000

Immobili

Pensions. . .

t 195 000 J
f 575 0001

195 000
195 000 000

195 000

....

Arms Accoutrements
Cost of Levy ......

21 70
9 80
3
100

501 10

£ 8. d.

14 0 0
0 5 4

0 8 2

0 18

0 8

0 2

4 0

20 2 8
0 10 0

A one year Volunteer Infantry pays 620 lire and receives pay, clothing, &c, as a

soldier.

The Estimates calculate the average cost per man under arms (not including

works and buildings, &c.)> at 700 to 900 lire per annum.

Bread ration 941 grammes. Costs 2*2 to 2*4 pence. Meat ration 200 grs.

Tobacco at reduced price.

Levy of 1873, 65,000 (1st.) 35,000 (2nd.)

Total number dealt with 273,751

Rejected under 5' 1" 21,6031

Deformed or diseased 49,979 V 141,350

Only male, eldest son of widow, and other family reasons .... 69,768 J

Remaining to be drawn from. « 132,401

242 COMPARATIVE COST OT ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

Table VIII.

America.

Cost of an Infantry Soldier.

Money pay — average •

Additional pay $2 per month after 5 years.

Bread, meat, and groceries • . .

Clothing

Lodging, fuel, and light — Est

Bedding

Hospitals free — Est

Medical attendance, say

Education, say

Asylums — Pension, say

Dollars.

£ *.

180

36 0

168

37 15

12 0

13 0

• • • •

1 0

8*40

0 13

1 0

. . « •

0 10

• • . •

1 0

102 18

Heputed cost of a soldier £200 or 1,000 dollars per annum.

One dollar per month is kept back as reserved pay and handed over in a lump at
the end of 5 years. 60 dollars = £12. The effect has been to diminish desertion.

No Pensions allowed, except in cases of disabilities from wounds and other
causes incurred on duty.

Commodious asylums provided for old and disabled soldiers.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BT CONSCRIPTION, 243

Colonel Loid Wavevxt, A.D.C., F.R.S. : I am quite sure, Sir, that you will
not think I am anticipating a very pleasant duty that falls upon you when I
4UA.pi ess the satisfaction with which we must all hare received the statements made
by the lecturer on this occasion, and if I take exception to some few of his
inferences and permit myself to supplement some of his statistics, he will, I am
sore, believe I do it in an earnest desire to co-operate with him. In the first place
as a Militia Officer myself, I thank him for asserting the principle of small cadres
and larg» reserves, as compared with the system of a small concentrated force as
alternative to a large expensive body. There are some points of consideration also
with regard to that service. The service is capable of much larger expansion than
«a '•natty understood, even with the present disqualification of the high price of
laboor vhich necessarily draws away so many. Having commanded a Militia-
regiment far many years, I have had an opportunity of testing the material*
from wfcich we draw our recruits, and I find thai in the agricultural districts, to
which alone you can look for a permanent supply, the rural population is dimi-
nishing to a certain extent* and only that portion who cannot obtain engagements
for the whole of the vear, ootne to us in the Militia. There is no doubt an
anangpnent by whichit is possible to have the three months' training of the
reernit in the winter months instead of his being called up, as was originally the
case, wlen the men were under arms for training. This Expedient was adopted in
the brigade I have under my command, and as to the result, it was taken advantage
of by a fine body of young men, — the finest I have seen since entering the service—
comprising those who could not find subsistence during the whole of the year, and
who tlerefore were presumably more likely, this being an agricultural district,
to be oat of employment in the winter than in the summer. Those three-month men
will b» dismissed to-morrow. During the winter, we employ them in drill and m
gymnastic exercises, and I must say, after twenty years' service, I never saw a body
of uldiers of three months in better trim. There is another point with regard to
reerurtbig for the Militia and the ballot. It is not generally known that in remodel-
ing the Militia Acts of 1853, a power was reserved in supplement of the voluntary
enlistment — that is to say, the Militia service is told olf for recruiting into divi-
sions and districts in each respective county, and a certain number of recruits is
alloted to each. But if this number be not obtained by voluntary enlistment, there
is a power to ballot under the Act to raise the determinate number of Militia
soldiers. At the present time it is unnecessary that wo should revert to that course.
Very fortunately the principle of small cadres, well carried out in the Militia-
service, is amply sufficient, and indeed I am inclined to think if we came to verify
the particular proportions of men enrolled in each Militia regiment, we should find
the cadre system was practically and fairly and absolutely adopted. If it be well
developed, 1 will answer, from my own experience, for making up the full strength
*id establishment of the regiment, so soon as there is prospect of so much of
g**oson and foreign service as we were permitted to undertake during the Crimean
wfc and the Indian Mutiny. And now I would go to the point of conscription tor
ttarmy in the country which has carried it, as I think, most beneficially into
«n*ot. i hare returned recently from Italy. The conditions of Italy are peculiar.
f^ne JT^y i& * necessity of constitutional existence, and to maintaining a place in
the Eursean gT8tem for the Italian people, so much so, that it has become with
them a V»TerDj " The Army made Italy by its battles ; the Army will make the
** Italians y ^ education." The conscription in Italy,— and here to a certain
extent 1 ▼*>-ur0 to differ with the lecturer — is carried out absolutely without
exemption, e^ Qf course gucn M ftre necessary and consistent, that is to say,
not to ^° *"£adow's son, or the support of the family, or professional men. A
very *^wkft*%scurrence has recently taken place. The Italian government has
met with e^ceer- obloquy because it insisted that the pupils at the universities
er seminaries I juge^ional purposes should not be exempt from service in the
ranks. It was ™?PC4 that this was evaded, and that Italians passed off into
the foreign w*™"^ without serving. At last it was decided that what we should

«*U Bn U? H^miM V* fcBke hia fcum of BerT^ce in fche rankB» but thoro WM tha
Deans of BhoW~~*V period by joining the one-year engaged soldiers. There-
fore they are as mucu ^ ^ oonifffiptjonf only &oy have to learn their duty in

244 COMPARATIVE COST OP ARMIES OP DIFFERENT NATIONS,

a shorter time, saving the money of the State, but in a term which probably, con-
sidering their superior education, will be quite sufficient to enable them to acquire' '
the habits of the soldier, amongst whom they lire in barracks, whether in separate
" chambres " I do not know, but they do duty as private sentinels. With regard to*
figures, I am not inclined quite to agree with the lecturer, either as regards America
or Italy. The most clear, definite and accurate detail of the operations of any
army that I have the good fortune to know, was that which was presented by the
War Minister for America — I think Secretary Stanton — the year after tie close
of the great struggle. It has also this advantage, that it was not a collection of
estimates and figures, but of results, and of expenditure. With regard U Italy r
through the kindness of the Parliamentary authorities, I obtained a larger unount
of Parliamentary information presented on the part of the War Minister to the
Committees of Parliament, and from Committees sent back to the Chamber of
Deputies than those of any country, not excepting the English Blue Books which
have puzzled so many of us. The Italian has a natural genius for analyas ; he
has a power of diving to the very bottom of a subject, which is perfectly marvellous ;.
and inasmuch as the great question for Italy is for the present her army, the govern-
ment has gone deep in research into military subjects ; they have accumulatedevery
historical Fact that can bear upon the question, and have thrown light on a great many
points of which we were ignorant. For instance, is any student of German listory
acquainted with the principle. on which the great Frederick paid his officers2 He
sought them far and wide in whatever country, and for their speciality ; he em>loyed
and paid them highly, and this is exceedingly remarkable, — he seems to hav< made
separate payments to the individual, and in cases of artillery and cavalry officrs he
gave pay in those days to the troop officer in those arms equivalent to the couble
pay of a captain in the British service in India at the present moment. A remark
has been-made as regards the proportion of revenue expended on the army, varyng
from 13 per cent, in Italy to 20 per cent, in Germany. In these cases I think tie
revenue should be set against expenditure generally and subdivided afterwarts,
attributing so much to the different arms, so much to fortification, so much t>
office expenses, and so on. I have tables on these matters in my hand, and they
are quite at the command of the lecturer in case of discrepancy.

Now with regard to the conscription itself. An army is a constitutional necessity
in Italy, because Italy says thus : — " We will have no invasion on our frontiers ; we
" will invade none ; we will be drawn into no entangling alliances. Italy for the
<f Italians ! The Army made Italy ; the Army will make the Italians." The Army-
has thus become a necessity, and the most permanent arrangements have been made
for the purpose of giving Italy an Army such as she desires. And here is the fair-
side of conscription. When I discussed conscription with the highest military
officer in the country and those nearest the throne, the remark made was, " A
" conscription is possible for us, but it would be unfair for you, because with your
" Indian and Colonial service you could not send a conscript out of the country
That shows the principle on which conscription is understood in Italy. The cour^y
is divided into districts so that the soldier is as it were amongst his fellow .jro*
vincials, and is not harshly thrust amongst those with whom he may hr* no>
affinities ; but the regiments are kept separate in the districts, and when the ~pr
is once placed in the regiment he is sent to any part that may be necessa* ■*"e'
soldier is taken as a youth, and this is the difference between the conse***Jon °f
this Italian country and others, that he is taken as a youth, he is w ^* ** a
youth, he is sent back immediately his work is over to his parish (1 an^*7m5 ^
the infantry soldier) , and is not then drawn upon for the period durin ?lc" **e lav
liable to conscription, unless in case of war. What is that period *i nWeiTe ?****+
during which he is liable to conscription, and three years, or, pract* J' ° ^ears
and eight months, during which he is with the colours, and he is ^*. ^ U.2* to
his own home. Being taken as a very young soldier indeed, he c* ..n tne con-
dition of my militiaman of whom I spoke, who has not obtained^081 *Jn ln ,tr? e
or business, from which being displaced, he encounters a seriog to'iooe808^ £*
been made for the force that can be calculated upon from , i . . —J*' , ^a*°
three decennial periods, and I find 90,000 men ; 65,000 immc_ * Jom ™ colours,
25,000 are sent home and drawn upou during the three ***** the l08»

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION". 215

which is rather under 10 per cent. j consequently, at the end of three years the
90,000 are exhausted, and this is the result : — in 1872, 381,300 with the colours, and
250,960 at home, and in 1884, 576,000 with the colours and 191,000 at home,
making 767,000, which is to be the normal state of the future available army of
Italy, and which may be mobilized in a fortnight.

Colonel Robertson, lato 8th King's Begt. : I never heard read in this Hall, I have
never saw reported in the Journal of this Institution a more able and instructive
paper than that which we have just had the pleasure of hearing Captain Ardagh
read to us. The facts he has collected are most valuable; I may say they are
indispensable for any one who wishes to investigate thoroughly the problems of
military organization. Very few Officers wishing to obtain such information as is
contained in Captain Ardagh's paper, would know where to find it, still fewer, if
they knew where to search for it, would have the perseverance and the analytical
skill to extract from voluminous official documents, the data required for such
exhaustive summaries of results as Captain Ardagh has not only tabulated for us,
but which he has also commented upon with a masterly clearness of statement which
could not bo surpassed. For in the long paper with which he has favoured us, I
do not think there is a single ambiguous sentence which requires explanation, or
a single obscurely stated fact, respecting the significance of which, any gentleman
present will feel it necessary to ask a question.

As regards the conclusions of Captain Ardagh, I regret very much to find that an
Officer whose opinions are certain to be regarded as authoritative, is an opponent of
the policy of exacting military training, and the liability to military service as a
duty.

I entirely differ from Captain Ardagh, and from all those who think that com-
pulsory military training would be hurtful either to the private interests of the
individual citizens of this country, or to the political and industrial interests of the
state. I say compulsory military training, not compulsory service, because the effect
on individual and political interest of exacting the performance of military duties for
a short period is totally different from the effect of exacting this duty for a long
period. I regard military duty exacted for a short period (say one year) as a highly
beneficial educational training, but if exacted for a long period (say five or even three
years), I regard it as a most onerous and pernicious servitude.1 In considering the
question, — is, or is not compulsory military service beneficial? the answer altogether
depends on the length of the period for which the recruit is required to serve. If for
a short period, it will be beneficial, if for a long period it will be injurious both to
the interests of the recruit and of the State. Conscription, that is military servi-
tude for a long term of years, may, perhaps, without much exaggeration with
reference to individual interests, be described, as it is described;in the words of the
late Mr. Godley, quoted by Captain Ardagh, — " A tax by lot, which takes from the
" conscript at one fell swoop his whole capital, i.e., his labour and his time."

But a short term of compulsory training has a very different effect. A law
imposing such a duty so far from diminishing the capital of a labourer would
increase it, for, although during the year of training the pay he would receive from
the State would be less than the wages he might have earned, I do not consider it
correct to describe this difference between the recruit's pay and the labourer's
earnings as a pecuniary loss and an unjust tax imposed on the recruit. On the
contrary, I look upon the sum representing this difference as capital very profitably
invested, as money laid out in an educational training, the equivalent and much
more than the equivalent of which will be increased vigour both of body and

1 I regret that Captain Ardagh did not include in his paper some statistics
respecting the military organization of Switzerland. Should the Government of
that country ever consider it expedient or necessary to render compulsory the per-
formance or some part of the military duties required for national defence, I am
inclined to think that some modification of the military institutions of Switzerland
would be found better suited to the social and political condition of England, and
therefore better adapted to serve as our model, than the military institutions of
Germany, France, or Italy. — A. C. R.

246 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFEtCEST NATIONS,

mind, increase of money-earning power, increased chance* of obtaining froiltsiue
employment.

This view of the effect of a short term of military service is in accordance
the views of General Trochu,1 and of Sir Charles Trevelyan.

Sir Charles considers that to a young labourer military training is as
oven a greater advantage than university training to a young man intended for a
professional or political career. If this be so then, that statesmen who shall pass a
law exacting from every Englishman the duty of one year's military framing, so far
from imposing an unjust tax or an intolerable burden on the people, will confer on
every labouring man in England a most valuable boon, a benefit of very real and
practical kind. Time will not permit me to say more respecting the manner in
which a law rendering military training compulsory would affect the social and
individual interests of the community, but I shall endeavour to indicate in a very
few words what I think would be the effect of such a law on the political interests
of the State.

Boring long periods of peace, influences are at work which give an undue pre-
dominance to the special selfish interests of individuals, and which are often adverse
to the general interests of the community.

These influences liave a disintegrating effect on that combination of political
forces, which constitutes a vigorous national life. They are inimical to all
institutions and organisations requiring the sacrifice of private interests for the
public good ; and having for their object to render the individual will and all the
abilities of every citizen subservient to the purposes of the State, and instrumental
in carrying out its policy. As an extreme and almost ludicrous instance of the
sacrifice of the interests of the public (or at least what the Government believe to
be the interests of the public) to the selfish interests of a few individuals, I maw
mention the successful resistance of the insignificant section of the community
engaged in the manufacture of lucifer matches to the financial schemes of a minister
remarkable for the determination of his character, and belonging to a Government
which commanded a large Parliamentary majority and the confidence and support
of a powerful party in the State. Another striking instance of great political
power, entirely under the control of individual interests, is afforded by the very
effective, though not entirely successful, resistance of the publicans and brewers to
the recent legislation for regulating the liquor traffic. The political effect of a
measure rendering military service compulsory would be antagonistic to the pre*
dominance of selfish feelings and interests as motives of action, and to those
tendencies of the existing condition of political forces in England, whioh are
opposed to national organisation, to the centralisation of the powers of Govern-
ment, and in general to the attainment of all objects which require unity of purpose
and combined action.

I have to apologise for the length of these observations, but I trust they will not
be considered as either superfluous or irrelevant. The considerations I have
endeavoured to present have not been discussed by Captain Ardagh ; perhaps the
scope of his paper did not require him to notice them. It might, however, have
been expected that either the author of the admirable essay on " recruiting,'' to
which the prize medal of the Institution was awarded, or else some of the Officers
who took part in the discussion which followed, would have pointed out that the in-
stitution of a system of compulsory military training would be attended with great
social and political, as well as with very great military advantages. As, however,
this was not done either by Captain Hime or by any of the speakers, whose
observations are reported in the Journal of this Institution, I have availed myself of
this opportunity to endeavour to direct attention to those considerations, which, if
ably advocated and thoroughly discussed, will, I feel convinced, lead to the con-
clusion, not merely that we must be prepared to accept as an inevitable military
necessity, a measure rendering compulsory a universal training to arms j but much
more than this, that we should recommend and endeavour to promote by every
means in our power its voluntary adoption, because we confidently believe that with

1 Vide the chapter headed " Jeunes at Vieux Soldats " in l'Armee Franoaise en
1867.

AND THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY ST CONSCRIPTION. 247

to the civil and political, ae well as to the military interests of the nation,
such a measure is in all respects expedient and very desirable to establish this
conclusion, and if possible to render it popularly acceptable. This is a task which I
hope will be undertaken by some member of this Institution who has more
authority to command attention, and more ability to convince and persuade than
I have. Captain Hime is reported to have said, " I am not in favour of con*
"scription, I only point out that whether we like it or not, it is inevitable." I am
by no means sure that conscription is inevitable, but I am quite sure that con-
scription, if adopted, whether from necessity or from choice, will certainly be very
beneficial ; that if once established among us, it will be cherished as one of the
most valuable of our national institutions.

Captain Fkathebstokbhaugh, B.E. : I only wish to say two words. There ap-
peared to me to be an inconsistency in Captain Ardagh's argument. He says, " if
" you have voluntary enlistment you have to pay the market price ; if you hare
" compulsory enlistment you do not actually pay to the man, but the State loses it
" in another way, so that it is six of one and half a dozen of the other." I do not
see that the argument has any weight. I do not agree with the second conclusion
that the State has to pay that difference between the market value and the wages of
the soldier indirectly. It is often said there is nothing so fallacious as figures.
I believe that is true. The real question is, can the State afford to have 100,000
man idlo every year ? and if you look at it in that point of view I think it can.
The labour market is over-stocked; men are emigrating; if there were 100,000
soldiers idle every year besides those who go abroad, wages would only rise slightly,
and I consider a thickly populated country like England can afford to have a
number of men idle every year. 1 shall be glad *to hear any more explanation of
Captain Ardagh's theory, because it is to me a stumbling-block I cannot get over.

Mr. .Ralph Knox, War Office : I do not wish to enter upon a discussion as to
whether conscription is the best course for this country to adopt, but rather to con*
gratulate the lecturer upon the delivery of this most important and interesting
lecture. I do not think he has really raised the question as to whether conscription
is advisable or not. He has wished to inform this Institution, and through this
Institution the public, for which I feel certain that this Institution and the public
will feel very grateful, what he has found after most elaborate inquiry and study, to
be the relative cost in money of the soldier in the various countries of Europe, and
what he considers to be in money the cost of conscription to the individuals who
are conscribed. I think he has stated with remarkable clearness in his lecture, and
with even more clearness in the Tables attached to it, the facts as to these matters,
and I can only say that I thank him very much for the information which he has
prepared. The department to which he belongs may congratulate itself as bringing
forth this very excellent fruit as one of the results of its institution. The lecturer
has been enabled from the position which he holds, to analyse many facts and
figures, which, until very recent years, were hardly accessible to one individual ; he
has studied them thoroughly and has laid them most clearly before us. He has, in
the course of his lecture, criticised in a very small degree, and therefore I am not
inclined to join issue with him, the way in which some statements are made in the
statistics which are laid before the House of Commons in this country. But I may
say in explanation, that these departments are not able to do as they like in laying
figures before Parliament ; there are rules that guide them, rules that restrict them,
which they in many cases would be willing to cut through. This is not possible, as
the rules in many oases are of great value to secure the objects in view. The
figures in the estimates state in the most clear and accurate manner ail that can be
stated as a forecast of the expenditure to be incurred for the Army in this country.
It is quite true other nations go into more elaborate details in their figures, but those
figures are by no means exact. What we do want, however, in this country is a
dear and exact return of past mots. We want clear and exact statements as to
what has been done with our money. We do not seem to take an interest in these
things, but such statements are really at the root of all true economy. Very few
people know it but nevertheless it is the fact, and if more care were taken in laying
the monetary facts of the past before the country, I am sure it would tend to vast
saving of military expenditure. I do not wish to occupy your time any further, but

248 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OP DIFFERENT NATION8,

conclude by thanking Captain Ardagh very much indeed for the very elaborate
and clear statement of the cost of the armies of Europe which he has laid
before us.

General Sir William Codbingtow, G.C.B. : Every nation has its own character-
istics, and one of the characteristics of the English nation is a desire for the absence
of compulsion. With regard to conscription, it is my impression that it is the
most expensive, the most tyrannical proceeding with regard to families and to
individuals, that can be adopted by any nation. Look at the extreme detail of
supervision that goes on — I do not know whether in France it is to the same
extent — but which is enforced in Prussia ; not only is the individual taken, but I
think I am right in my impression, that the family is made answerable for the man
being forthcoming in his village when he is wanted. I ask you to carry that into
the detail of English life and judge what it would include. There is another con-
sequence in Prussia which shows the extent to which it is necessary to go in this
extreme of compulsion, viz., that if a man is lame and not fit for service, they make
him pay in money as they naturally say " It is not the fault of the State that you
" are lame, we cannot admit that you should be freed from the necessities of con-
" Bcription except by paying." That is another result of rigorous conscription.
My general impression certainly is, that unless you are under the pressure of in-
vasion, or of such an attack elsewhere that your last defence would be by fighting
abroad, you will never get conscription in England ; I believe it would bo better
worth while paying to the utmost, than it would be to take every individual of every
class to do that, for which I believe you will get men better suited to your purpose
by volunteering. With regard to a proposal for conscription in England, it was
said by a Secretary of State for War, " that the Government preferred paying for
" the labour they required." If we really did so pay for the labour we required,
we certainly should get the men. It might be a very costly business, but I believe
in the end it would be more economical to the nation generally than that extreme
compulsion which would be necessary for conscription.

E. B. De Fonblanque, Esq. : I entirely agree with the last speaker, that the
English instinct is so completely against conscription that it would be almost impos-
sible to introduce it in this country. The tendency of the Essay has been to esta-
blish that, upon financial as well as upon political grounds ; but I think Captain
Ardagh has rather lost sight of the differences in the institutions of other States,
owing to which the system which is not admissible by us, is perfectly admissible in
other countries.

Captain Ardagh : I only spoke of England as regards conscription ; I offered no
opinion whatever about conscription in other countries.

Mr. De Fonblanque : You gave illustrations on the subject.
The Ch A IBM an : Illustrations as to cost — as to the working of it.
Mr. Db Fonblajj que : Well, as to the working of it. The lecturer spoke of the
exemptions under the law of prescription as being very unfair. Now, in some
countries these exemptions are next to nothing. In Switzerland, for instance, there
are hardly any exemptions whatever. Then, by way of contrasting the advantages
of voluntary enlistment with conscription, he has quoted the civil war in America,
and has alluded to the patriotic feelings that induced tbetn to come forward, until
almost the whole population may be said to have been absorbed into the Army. But
the fact is, nearly one-half of those Armies consisted of foreigners, principally of
Germans. (Captain Abdagh : No, no.) Probably I exaggerate when I say one-
half, but I do not think I am very far wrong. As I said before, however, I entirely
agree with the lecturer, so far as the question is confined to England, and as to
conscription not being capable of defence on financial grounds, which the lecturer
has fully and ably established.

Captain Gurdon, R.N. : I just wish to speak a few words to confirm the last
speaker. Fully one-third of the mon in the Northern Army were foreigners — either
Germans or Irish, and if the Southern States had been able to have blockaded the
North, the North would not have been able to have kept up the war the length of
time they did. One whole division of General Sherman's Army were Germans, and
so far Germans that they could not even speak one word of English. About one-
third of the Army of the Potomac were Irish and Germans. I beg to state, I have

AND THE L09S TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION. 249

got my information in the United States itself, where I was travelling and residing
for two yean and a-half ; and I got my information, not only from Southerners,
but from United States Officers as well.

The Chairman : Were they naturalised Germans ?

Captain Gubdon: They were not; they were men who came over during the
war. There were special agents from the United States in Germany, and also in
Ireland, and these men were ostensibly sent over for railway works, but, in reality,
they were all, when they arrived at New York, enlisted, given large bountie?, and
took the place of Northerners who ought to have served in the Northern Army, but
could not be got to serve. I would also beg to state, with reference to Captain
Ardagh's statement that the cost of the American Army is so enormous and its pay
so large, is perfectly correct, and, notwithstanding that very high pay, it is not
possible to find sufficient native-born Americans to enter the ranks ; nearly one-half
(which you will admit is a very large proportion for the Army of any country)
consists of foreigners, German and Irish chiefly, at the present moment.1 I think
that fact will dispose of one of the subsequent speaker's remarks that, if you pay
your men very highly you would always get them, because in this case the American
Government cannot get a sufficient number of their own citizens to serve in the
ranks of the Army. That depends, indeed, on what opening there is for the civil
population. If the civil population can make a great deal more money by civilian
pursuits than they can in the Army, and there are greater openings, of course
naturally, in countries like America or England, you cannot get your men. The
same thing was apparent here during the Crimean War, when we could not get
sufficient recruits, although we were offering high bounties, and we had to raise a
German legion, an Italian legion, and a Swiss legion,' and, if the war had gone on
two years longer, half our actual Army in the field would have been foreigners. My
remarks were caused by Captain Ardagh's statement that, in his opinion, both this
country and the United States could rely on voluntary enlistment to sustain the
strain of a serious war ; I do not think that actual facts tend to confirm that state-
ment.

Captain Abdagh : I expected to have thrown an apple of discord among the
audience in raising this question of conscription, and am very much obliged for the
remarks which have been made on the paper, and in particular for the statistics
which Lord Waveney has given with regard to the Italian Army. But I must say,
with reference to his remarks, that he drew his statistics from a prospective table,
whereas I took mine from actual facts and returns, wluch the Italian Government
gave. There is really no material difference. As regards exemption on educational
grounds in Italy, the principle on which it is carried put is very little different from
that which is enforced in Germany; the test is somewhat more severe than in
France, but the principle is much the same in all. Colonel Robertson has called
attention to the advantage of military training as compared with an university
education, for which, he suggests (it may be considered) a fair equivalent.

Colonel Robebtson : It was Sir Charles Trevelyan's opinion.

Captain Abdagh : I think Sir Charles Trevelyan has rather over-estimated the
advantage of a year's training in the ranks.

Colonel Robebtbok : I quite agree with him, but I quoted him.

Captain Abdagh : One might set-off against that advantage, supposing it is an
advantage, the great loss which persons who earn large sums in private employment
would be subjected to in being withdrawn from their occupation for a year : and I
really think if you appeal to the country, that any notions entertained as regards the
advantage which the youth of the nation might derive from compulsory military
training would never meet with the slightest response from the great bulk of the
population, and it is quite useless to propose such a thing. The objections that Cap*
tain Featherstonehaugh has raised with regard to conscription have been virtually

1 This is excluding the negro troops, my observations only applying to whites
throughout. There were about 60,000 negroes during the war in the Northern
Army ; at the present moment, I believe, there are about 4,000 in the United States
Army.

* Not to mention the Turkish contingent.

250 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS,

answered in the paper. I do not allege conscription is not cheap ; if you judge by the
annual Estimates, it is cheap according to this standard. You hive in France 20
millions as the nominal cost of the army, but I hare shown you it costs that country
at least 26 millions, and I believe it costs otot SO millions. It is unreasonable to say-
that because they only pay 20 millions for what costs the country 90 millions, they
are gainers thereby. I am deeply obliged for the compliment which Mr. Knox has
paid to these statistics. No one is better able to offer an opinion on that subject than
he is ; but I must beg him to consider that in criticising the form in which the British
Army Estimates are presented to the country, I only intended to impugn them in so
far as that they make it impossible for any one to discover, except by the most minute
investigation, what a soldier really does cost ; and if I were to ask Mr. Knox now
what would be the cost of adding a new division to the British Army, I Ten*
tore to say he would find it almost impossible to procure data to answer the
question. Sir William Codrington, I am glad to hear, adds the weight of his autho-
rity in opposing conscription. As regards Mr. De Fonblanque's observation with
reference to service in Switzerland, I venture to submit that it can hardly be brought
in as an example. Military service in Switzerland is merely an amusement : the
Mat bulk of people who go out for their short annual training in Switzerland regard
it much in the light of a picnic. There is hardly such a thing as military law in
Switzerland; they are subject to but slight restraints and no hardships. With regard
to A*"**ffW, it has been asserted that one-third of the whole armies in America were
not naturalised American citizens. From the returns that are published, it appears
that one-ninth of the population of America were under arms during that war, and
I ask you if it is possible that one-third of that one-ninth could have been
foreigners ? It » simply preposterous ; the thing is disposed of by the mere fact
that one-ninth of the whole population were under arms. To tell me that 3,700,000
men were one-third composed of foreigners in America during the war is to make an
assertion that won't bear any inquiry at ail.1

In conclusion, I beg to thank the meeting for the interest with which this com-
paratively dry subject has been received.

The Chaibma* : Gentlemen, I think you will ail agree with me that we are
greatly indebted to Captain Ardagh for this most valuable contribution to the
records of this Institution. It is by papers such as these that the character of the
Institution stands, and will rise. Before sitting down, I would venture to make a
few observations, as the subject of the paper is one which, as Captain Ardagh has
said, I have studied a great deal, and it is one also concerning which I have before
spoken in this room. I quite agree with Sir William Codrington, that you must
take into consideration, in debating this question, the circumstances of the country
to which it refers. What is a necessity — an absolute necessity— on the Continent,
is happily for us not a necessity. Foreign Governments have to deal with the
the necessity whieh has been imposed upon them, and they deal with it according
to their respective lights, and in that way in which they consider it will be least
onerous upon the populations they govern. The latest law, at any rate, the last
that has come to my knowledge, with regard to conscription, is the new law of
service in Russia. It is based on the same principles as the German law — that all
the population, including now the nobles who were formerly exempt, are liable to

1 The annual number of able-bodied male emigrants (about one-fifth of the entire
number) was, during the period 1860-70, 90,000. If every available man of these
had been drafted into the army on landing in the country, the four years of the
war could, as a maximum, have only produced 360,000, or one-tenth of the number
mentioned, instead of one-third as alleged. The estimated number of naturalised
citizens residing in the United States is 4,136,000, of whom 8,100,000 are Irish or
Germans, the total population being 88,558,871. The number of able-bodied men would
amount to about one-eighth of the whole, or 500,000, so that both sources of supply
would fail to make up one-third of the whole. As a matter of fact, the largest pro-
portion of recruits was furnished by the Western States, which had no means of pro-
curing immigrants as substitutes. Kansas sent 36 per cent, of her men to the field,
Iowa 30 per cent., Indiana and Illinois over 25 per cent. The Confederate States
had, of course, no means of recruiting by immigration, in consequence of the blockade.

AXD THE LOSS TO A COUNTRY BY CONSCRIPTION- 251

mUitarv service, and therefore to conscription. The Emperor, in the Bdkt in
winch ne publishes this law to the country, congratulate* himself and the country
on the readiness with which those classes who were previously exempt from con-
scription have fallen into his views, and accepted this law ; hot when yon. come to
look into the operation of the law, you find exemptions of the most marvellous
character ; all people who have properties to manage are exempted ; all people who
are in the Government service, and not only those in Government service, but those
even who are in the service of any corporation are exempt, and have their names
registered as such. In fact, the exemptions are countless ; and as if they were not
sufficient to accommodate the favoured classes, there is a clause under which the
military authorities may give to every man who has. not acquired the honourable
position of a non-commissioned Officer a furlough, or, in other words, may place
him at once in the Reserve, which, is tantamount to exemption. Having lived
in Russia for some years, I conceive the practical working of this law will not tend
to promote high morality in the country. With regard to conscription, notwith-
standing the many objections attending it, one cannot help admitting it has some
great advantages. Germany has reaped the benefit of those advantages to the full
extent, because it has been in operation for many years: and amongst them,
perhaps, the greatest benefit that has accrued to Germany is that of having pro-
moted education. I have myself seen on the frontier, as you. cross from the German
provinces into the Russian, the most marked difference between the state of the
people on different sides of the conventional line which divides these provinces, for
in. many places it is merely a line, and not a river nor a geographical boundary ; on
one side you will find people in the grossest ignorance, and on the other side they
have already arrived at a fairly high state of education ; you see it in the better
cultivation of farms, and in the manufactures which are to be found along the
frontier. I have heard intelligent people in that country attribute this difference to
the effects of conscription ; the population — labourers, artisans, and poor farmers,
and that class of people— know, on being drawn into the Army, that they have to
come back to cultivate their farms, and earn their livelihoods in their own country,
after their three years' service in the ranks. They therefore use their wits, and,
acquiring enlightened ideas among a much more civilixed people than themselves,
bring the knowledge they have attained in those provinces where they have served,
chiefly the Rhine provinces, to their own. And so, I conceive, practical education
has been equalized to a very great extent over Germany ; that is one advantage
mined by conscription, as it nas been worked in Germany, and as has been proved
by the figures adduced by Captain Ardagh, who stated that 96 per cent, of the
population read and write, whereas we stand next on the list of educated people at
90 per cent.

1 think we are greatly indebted to Captain Ardagh for a point which he has

proved most convincingly in this paper, that the cost of an army to a country is not

to be estimated by the pay that is given to the soldier, but by the value of

the labour that is lost to the country. This being the case, if your army is 200,000

strong, it matters not whether you give the men a farthing a day, as the Russians

do, or a shilling a day, as we do, the cost to the country is the same ; it is the

labour of 200,000 pairs of hands lost to the productive energies of the country.

The 200,000 men may be labourers or artisans, the only difference is, that the

higher you go in the social scale, the greater the cost to the country. I think we are

greatly indebted to Captain Ardagh for having brought this fact out so strongly

and convincingly. But while the cost of conscription is the same to the country, it

is very different to the individuals who bear that cost. Instead of conscription

being an equal tax — I coincide with every word of that valuable extract from

a report by Mr. Godley, which was read bv the lecturer— it is, I believe, the most

iniquitous tax that can be in its working ana in its incidence upon individuals ; and

although on the Continent it is a necessity, I should be exceedingly sorry to see it

introduced into this country. I also think the ballot for the Militia very nearly as

objectionable as it would be for the Army. For what is the ballot ? It means

conscription ; it is merely the method of selection by which the conscript is drawn

into the Militia. If, as would be necessary if the ballot were to to enforced, the

Government of this country were to attempt to pass a law by which the infant

252 COMPARATIVE COST OF ARMIES OF DIFFERENT NATIONS.

would be watched from the cradle up to manhood, and never lost sight of, there is
not a mother in England who would stand it. Then you have the total denial of all
liberty to transfer oneself from one place to another, or to travel abroad. For the last
year before the age of conscription arrived, you would almost want to place a sentry-
over every man who had to be conscribed ; that is my belief. Such being the case,
I should like to make an observation upon a remark that dropped from Colonel
Robertson, and I allude to it because it contains a fallacy which is very common in
this country on the part of those who admire compulsory service, who say, " Why
" not take a man for a year." Colonel Robertson said, he should like to see all the
able-bodied men in England under arms for one year. Of course, that would involve
our keeping up a separate standing Army for the Colonics and India. The number
of males attaining military age each year upon whom this duty would fall, is
280,000 ; now if you make a liberal deduction, say 30,000, there would remain a
standing Army — mind, it would be a standing Army, because they would be so for
each year in succession — of 250,000, in addition to our Colonial and Indian Armies.

Coionei Robertson : — I think the lecturer estimated the number actually avail-
able at about one-half.

The Chairman : That is available after exemption as practised on the Continent,
but of course if you call men for a year and keep them at home, you will have to get
rid of the law of exemption, and I think if you had the power and were to apply the
law of exemption in this country, with all our liberal ideas and inconvenient ques-
tionings in our Houses of Parliament, you would never be able to carry it into effect.
The law of exemption very often degenerates into a means of getting exemption by
interest, or possibly some other means, not only most objectionable, but most demo-
ralizing. I think it is a point which some people often lose eight of. that short ser-
vice for everybody involves a very large standing Army ; and, as the lecturer has
shown, 250,000 men, whatever their pay might be, would cause an equal deduction
from the productive labour of the country. There is only one other point upon
which I wish to make some observation, because I do not quite coincide with the
.lecturer, and that is his calculations and deductions as to the effect of men being
drafted from the Army into the Militia, from which he infers that it woidd be neces-
sary to reduce our cadres. I do not think that is at all necessary. My idea is that
men should be drafted from the regular service into the reserves, and after keeping
in those reserves enough men to fiu up your service battalions, the balance, as well
as those who have served their full time in the reserves, may be drafted into the
Militia. The result would be that, instead of having partly and imperfectly trained
soldiers in the Militia, you would still have the same number of cadres, but composed
of men who had passed through the regular Army and been trained for a certain
period, had acquired habits of discipline, and been instructed in their duties.

It only remains for me to ask you to give your thanks to Captain Ardagh for his
very valuable and interesting Lecture.

THE NAVAL PRIZE ESSAY,

1876.

ON THE BEST TYPES OF WAR-VESSELS FOB THE

BRITISH NAVY,

Istly. For Combined Action;

2ndly. Fob Single Cruizers op Great Speed ;

3rdlt. For Coast Defence.

By Commander Gerard H. U. Noel, R.N.,

Prizeman, Junior Naval Professional Association, 1873.
" SEGJTITAXDO 81 GITJNGE."

Introduction.

The difficulty of the subject of this essay is such, that the most
scientific men in the country have failed to arrive at any unanimous
conclusion as to what are to be the types of the men-of-war of the
future.

The individual opinions already collected are most valuable, but the.
desirable number of such opinions is unlimited, and all opportunities?
for giving them publicity, such as essays of this kind, are exceedingly
useful in opening up the subject.

Designers and shipbuilders, among whom we find many most able
and scientific men, have had in the last few years a difficult task to
perform in order to satisfy the requirements of the nation and to
keep pace with the enormous and rapid changes in the construction of
vessels and in the manufacture of machinery.

The building of vessels-of-war is an art, in which perfection cannot
be attained without great and varied experience, and consequently
without vast financial expenditure.

Hitherto, the construction of ironclads has not been altogether
satisfactory. After all the experience of the last fifteen years, during
which time ironclad after ironclad has been built, we still find our-
selves unable to arrive at a conclusion as to which is the most satis-
factory type.

The Committee on Naval Designs of 1871, were in favour of the
" Devastation M class, and also advocated vessels of the "Hercules"
and " Vanguard " classes, though opinions were divided as to which
of these two types should bo followed. Many members, no doubt,
foresaw that the days of all these ships were numbered, but the time
was not ripe for the great changes I now advocate.

VOL. xx. s

254 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

Reviewing our present Navy, we cannot but feel proud of its great
strength, and of its undoubted superiority over that of any nation, or even
of any other two nations. Our ships are not only numerous but well-
built, powerfully armed, and admirably equipped. But, grand as our
fleet is collectively, it is not satisfactory to observe, that of all the
types represented therein, few can be truly called the recognised types
of the future, and these few are types of minor importance.

Still, little advanced as we are in the construction of ironclads,
other nations are far behind us.

The French, who are noted for their skill in shipbuilding, would
probably have kept pace with us (under the guidance of such an able
man as M. Dislere) but for the Franco- German war. Next to our
Navy, theirs is the most numerous, but their new ships are compara-
tively few.

The Germans are steadily advancing : they have an ironclad fleet
in process of construction consisting of eleven ships, viz., two heavy
frigates of the "Hercules" type; the " Kdnig Wilhelm" (5,900
tons) ; two smaller vessels of an older type ; three turret vessels (4,118
tons) ; and three corvettes and sloops. We can, however, learn nothing
from these types.

The Russians have one turret vessel (9,662 tons) "Peter the
Great," built after the plan of the " Devastation ; " one large frigate
the " Sevastopol;" one moderate-sized frigate, and six small frigates ;
three corvettes; and ten gunboats; besides these, three floating
batteries, two of which, circular in form, I estimate highly, and men-
tion in Part III.

The Turkish ironclad Navy consists of two 9,000-ton frigates, very
powerful vessels (with 12-inch armour at the water line, and 10-inch
plating elsewhere) ; four moderate-sized frigates ; eight corvettes ; and
five gun-boats.

In these various Navies , we find some exceedingly powerful ships,
most of which are English built ; we cannot, therefore, hope to learn
as much from the experience of foreign nations as from our own.
Englishmen are, and I trust ever will be, pioneers of the scienoe of
shipbuilding.

While completing this essay, a catastrophe occurred, which has
caused a great controversy on our subject, and has given rise to many
opinions as to the necessity for a change in the construction of our
ironclads, I allude to the sinking of Her Majesty's ship " Vanguard "
by the ram of her sister ship the " Iron Duke."

This accident, while proving the awful power of the ram,
strengthens my arguments in this essay, and points to the inex-
pediency of building such costly vessels, so wanting in floating power
as to sink when casually wounded.

Part I.

On Ships required for Combined Action.

For the convenience of discussion, I will divide the sea-going iron-
clads of the present into seven classes, and for this purpose shall

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 255

follow the plan suggested in an admirable article on the " British
Navy," which appeared in Blackwood's Magazine, of March, 1871.

It is an open question whether the ships of the "Devastation"
class are to be included under the heading of " ships required for
combined action," or under that of " ships required for coast defence ;"
until more thoroughly tested as to their sea-going qualities, I should
prefer giving them a place in a future chapter.

The first class as represented in Blackwood, consisted of the " Her-
cules '* and " Sultan." To these will be added, as they are com-
pleted, the "Alexandra," " Temenure," "Nelson," and "North-
ampton." Undoubtedly these are the most formidable ships-of-the-
line now in existence. The "Hercules" and "Sultan" have been
thoroughly tested and are found efficient as sea-going ships. They
combine fairly protected water-line and battery, heavy guns delivering
their fire in all directions, with great speed and handiness, which
carries with it a most terrible power of ramming.

The drawback to this class of vessels is their enormous cost ; and
when we consider that the explosion of one skilfully-directed torpedo
would sink the largest of them, and that the thickness of their water-
line armour is insufficient to resist a 9-inoh chilled shell (thereby
exposing their most vital parts to danger), we cannot bring ourselves
to believe that the expenditure of over half a million sterling for each
vessel, has brought its adequate return. Besides this, the " Sultan "
has the defect of excessive top- weight (to counterbalance which, 600
tons of extra ballast have already been put into her) : and, indeed, in
all these vessels, the fact of protecting their batteries with heavy
armour, is, in my opinion, a questionable principle, for by so doing,
the size of the battery is curtailed, and the ship is rendered crank ;
whereas the same weight of armour judiciously placed elsewhere,
would make the ship less crank and unsinkable by artillery.

The second class, represented in the above-mentioned article, includes
the " Audacious " and her five sister-ships, and the " Monarch," as a
sea- going turret ship. The first six of these, though powerful vessels,
are generally considered failures. Insufficiently plated at the water-
line, overburdened with heavily armoured box-batteries above the-
upper deck, their first trial proved them so excessively crank as to be
wholly unseaworthy. This last evil has been rectified by an increase
of about 400 tons of ballast. They are now efficient ships of war,
but not of a type likely to be increased in number. The "Monarch,"
in her peculiar province, is a magnificent vessel. As a ship-of-the-
line she is only a few degrees less valuable than the " Hercules," and
would be subject to the same objections. But this is not the
" peculiar province " referred to. Where she would excel, is in heavy
weather, under circumstances where ramming power would be of
least advantage, and that of working guns easily in a sea-way, in-
valuable. The height of her turrets above Jbhe water, though a dis-
advantage in a smooth sea, is an immeasurable gain in a gale of wind
— as she is wonderfully steady in a sea-way.

The third class includes but one sea-going ship of deserved repute,
the " Bellerophon." She was the first of that type which may be

256 ON THE BEST TYPE8 OP

considered as the most successful, and which is now represented by
the larger vessels described as Class I.

The remaining ships of this, and those of the four subsequent
classes, are so far out of date that no reference need be made to them
in this essay. It may be observed that there is one vessel (on the
stocks) to which I have not referred. That vessel is the " Shannon,'*
now being constructed at Pembroke on an entirely new principle.

" The " Shannon " is to be a vessel of 5,000 tons, with a belt of
9-inch armour 9 feet wide at her water-line, extending from the
stern to 60 feet from her bow ; across the ship at this place a 9-inch
armoured bulkhead is constructed, 25 feet wide, reaching above the
upper deck. On each side of the ship this extra width of armour
extends 26 feet from the bulkhead aft, thus forming a citadel in the
fore part of the ship well protected against fire from ahead, and which
affords protection to the Officers directing the ship. Above the
water-line armour-belt, and aft the bulkhead, a 1^-inch plated deck is
constructed. Before the bulkhead, the armoured deck is 5 feet below
the water, and slopes down to 10 feet at the stem. I will not say I
wholly coincide with the principle on which this ship is built ; but it
is the only approach to what I deem necessary for ironclads or ships-
of-the-line.

We require for "combined action" moderately heavy ships-of-the-
line, able to hold the sea in any weather and for any length of time,
possessing heavy batteries of at least 16 guns, ram- bows, a speed of
14 knots, the most efficient turning-gear, and the water-line thoroughly
protected with armour, especially from before the boilers to the stern.

For the leading ships of divisions, it might be advisable to add a
protected conning-tower, so that the important duty of conducting,
or leading portions of the fleet could be carried on with greater
f acility. From an offensive point of view the ram is an indispensable
arm ; and for its full utilization, as well as for defensive purposes, the
thorough protection of the motive and directing power of the ship is
an imperative necessity.

The first consideration for vessels of this class is, that they be tho-
roughly "seaworthy.79 I do not mean " seaworthy " in the ordinary
acceptance of the term, but that a man-of-war should be possessed of a
reserve of "floating power " that would enable her to be still seaworthy
in a crippled state, or after rough handling in action. To effect this,
excessive top-weight must be avoided; and I am convinced that the only
course is, to abolish the armour-plating for the protection of the battery.

To render an armoured man-of-war efficient as a floating body, it is
imperative that she be as unsinkable as possible by artillery ; and that
her engines and steering gear (motive and directing power) be pre-
served so intact during an engagement, that the power to evade all
attacks of ram and torpedo is secured. To attain these objects, an
impenetrable system of armour at the water-line is necessary.

To provide against possible injuries by ram or torpedo, the ship
must be divided into water-tight compartments, a few of which may
be filled without danger of her foundering. Great difficulty is ex.
perienced in arranging these water-tight compartments satisfactorily,

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVV. 257

owing to the immense space required in the body of the ship (her
most vital part), for the engines and boilers.

Fore and aft, as well as athwart-ship bulkheads, should be placed
where it is possible, so that a wound caused by a ram or torpedo
would only till a comparatively small space, and the floating power of
the ship would, though reduced, be able to keep her from sinking.

In addition, I would suggest that all these ships be built on the
cellular system "with double bottoms;,, and that if some method
were adopted in the construction of the bottom, by which the shock of
a torpedo's explosion would be cushioned, an immense advantage
would be gained. This might be effected by the outside skin of the
.ship being covered with layers of india-rubber, or some elastic sub-
stance, the outside of which would be covered with a thin iron sheath-
ing so fixed as to give to an increased or sudden pressure. Another
help in the floating power of a wounded ship, would be to use cork for
filling the double bottom ; this would cause the inner skin to be of
some support to the outside of all, when under extra pressure ; and if
the outer skin were pierced, the cork would still supply its full floating
power.

The second consideration is the " motive and directing power."

I would make it compulsory that all ships-of-the-line should be
capable of attaining a speed of 14 knots on the measured mile ; an
•excess of this I deem unnecessary. But as the speed of a squadron,
or of any number of ships manoeuvring together must bo regulated
by that of the slowest ship, nothing could be more detrimental to
their evolutionary power than to have a laggard amongst them.

It is to be questioned whether in vessels for this service double-
screw propellers are desirable. The advantages of this method of
propulsion are more apparent in large coasting vessels requiring small
draught. The benefit of two separate sets of engines wherewith to
propel the ship is universal ; but in a sea-way the double-screws often
prove dangerous, for by the sudden immersion of the weather-screw
by a heavy roll to windward, a ship is liable to be thrown off into the
trough of the sea. It is quite possible that this was an element in
the causes which combined to bring about the awful disaster of the
loss of H.M.S. " Captain."

As regards the influence of this system on the turning-power of
ships, the pros and cons are fairly balanced in the smaller vessels
required for coasting; but in larger ironclads the advantages are
reduced.

With a ship-of-the-line turning at the high speed necessary for
manoeuvring, the fact of stopping or backing one propeller checks her
way ; a loss not counterbalanced by the slight extra assistance in
the movement of turning.

In considering the turning-power of these ships, we must bear in
mind that we are dealing, as Jurien de la Graviere so truly says,
44 with masses of six or seven thousand tons, which cannot come in
44 contact without mutual destruction." Now in vessels constructed
with single propellers, the rudder is the sole instrument for turning,
and it can be thoroughly relied upon ; but with double engines the

258 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

slightest want of exactitude in the change of speed might lead to
serious results, and any sudden accident to one engine would, in a
squadron, probably entail some fatal catastrophe.

The " Hecate/ ' or one of her sister-ships, when coming from Ply-
mouth to Portsmouth, for the " Shah " review in 1873 (in company
with two or three other vessels of her class), was observed to run off
in a direction at a great angle with her course. This was afterwards
found out to have been caused by some slight error in the management
of her engines.

H.M.S. ** Captain" also on one occasion, when cruizing with the
squadron, unexpectedly left her station abeam of the flag-ship and
charged through the fleet, narrowly escaping a collision with the
Admiral, which would probably have been attended with fatal results.

Against these objections m/st be set two reasons, which strong
weigh in favour of double screws. One is, that there being no screw-
aperture the rudder-head can be made to enter the ship below the
water-line, thus admitting of the steering gear being worked out of
the reach of shot. The second is, that a greater speed than that
estimated has been got out of well-immersed double screws, the
" Devastation " attaining one and half knots more than was expected
of her. My personal opinion is in favour of single propellers, but
these two advantages go a long way to shake my prejudice against
double screws. Some trials have been lately made in the gunboat
" Bruiser " of a casing round the screw, which proves a useful protec-
tion for fixed single propellers. It not only reduces the vibration, but
prevents the screw from being so easily fouled ; and at the same time
has no detrimental effect on the speed of the ship.

All ironclads of this type should be full rigged ships, and should be
capable of using sail under ordinary circumstances. In war-time all
upper spars and spare gear should be landed.

I must now refer to the turning and directing power of ships-of-the-
line.

It appears to me that for ships with single screws, the balance-rudder
of Her Majesty's ship " Sultan," fulfils nearly all the requirements so
far as power is concerned, and that in this ship (owing to her draw-
ing several inches more water than was originally intended), the
rudder is fairly protected. This is not the case in most of our ships,
for not only is the armour round the stern at the water-line inade-
quate protection, but in many cases the upper part of the rudder is
actually visible in smooth water. This is a great weakness, as the
importance of the rudder is such, that its destruction in an engage-
ment would entail the destruction of the ship.

It is my impression that if it is practicable to place both the rudder,
and the steering gear to be used in action, entirely below water, the
safety of the ship would be doubly secured.

I would suggest that it is possible, in ships with single screws, to
support the upper part of a rudder by means of a horizontal iron
strap secured to the ship's counter, and passing round the aperture of
the screw (leaving room for its revolving), and that the whole of this

'• .*

Journal RU 8. Fn/ttitutinn
VOL '10

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WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 259

structure might be at least six feet below water. Then comes the
difficulty of steering gear. I cannot see why the rudder should not
be moved from its lower end with perfect ease and with the utmost secu-
rity. Imagine a cog wheel at the lower extremity of the rudder, just above
its pivot, and an endless chain round that, and round another cog-wheel
of the same dimensions : this latter cog* wheel would form the lower
end of a perpendicular spindle passing up into the ship 20 or 30 feet
before the body-post. I have endeavoured to show this in Plate I,
figs. 2 and 3. For ships propelled by double screws, the protection
of the rudder is much more easily arranged. Nothing could be more
perfect than the construction of the rudder and steering gear of Her
Majesty's ship " Inflexible." The rudder- head enters the ship about
10 feet below the water-line, and the yoke and steering gear are
worked entirely below the protection of an armoured deck. I would
suggest this system for all vessels propelled by double screws.

The third consideration is the " armament." The ram-bow is an arm
which influences the whole method of building the ship to a very
great extent. Numerous as are the ships with ram-bows, it is
astonishing how they differ in shape. I have no doubt that the next
naval action will prove which is the most formidable. It appears to
me that the ram of the "Minotaur " class is too round (or there would
probably have been a fatal accident in Belfast Lough, when she
touched the " Bellerophon,") whereas the rams of the " Bellerophon,"
and " Lord Clyde," also those of the " Devastation " class, (although
these latter are well supported by the additional beam of the ship, and
consequent thickness of their root) are too long, and are liable to be
strained or even broken, in striking a heavy vessel that is crossing
their bow at any speed. I would, therefore, content myself with the
formidable and beautiful curves now seen in the bows of the newer
ships, and first adopted in the building of Her Majesty's ship
•• Hercules."

The new idea being carried out in the bows of the " Shannon," and of
the " Inflexible," of having a movable snout supported on each side by a
fore-and-aft web, I cannot think will answer ; such extreme sharpness
is not required, and a comparatively slight pressure on one side would
break the movable part off. It is true the bow is still left intact,
though were the ship to ram again, she would greatly damage herself
and do comparatively little harm to the enemy.

To many, no doubt, it may appear that I attach too little importance
to the value of guns. My opinion of the present ironclads is, that they
are so built that they cannot be sufficiently armed ; and, indeed, many
of our other vessels might carry a greater weight of armour than they
do at present. I would have vessels constructed on the principle
alluded to, of "unarm&wred batteries" to carry half as many guns
again (of the same calibre), as ships of their own displacement carry
now. This would combine' a powerful though unprotected battery,
with a perfectly sea- worthy vessel possessed of great speed and turn-
ing power, thoroughly efficient under the most aggravated circum-
stances. The idea of plating the whole of the upper works has long

260 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

•

been abandoned as impracticable, and in the latter ships a confined
place in the centre has been moderately armoured for the protection
of a, battery of guns. By dispensing with this battery armour, the
size of the ship is the only limit of the place for guns. This is an
undoubted advantage ; and when we consider that the whole weight
of the battery of Her Majesty's ship "Hercules," including the
allowance of ammunition and projectiles, <fcc, does not exceed 640 tons,
about -jig- of her displacement, I am sure that the feasibility of in-
creasing the weight to 1,000 tons would be entertained, if the space
was not limited, and the armour of the battery could be dispensed
with. My plan then is to increase the armament and thus make it of
more importance, arming vessels of 5,000 tons displacement with ten
9-inch 12- ton guns, and seven 8-inch 9-ton guns, or a total weight,
with ammunition, of about 600 tons of armament ; and arming vessels
of 7,500 tons with ten 10-inch 18-ton guns and seven 9-inch 12-ton
guns, making the total weight of armament about 880 tons. This
last armament would be the heaviest carried by any sea-going iron-
clads.

In these ships all the heavier, and four of the lighter, would be
broadside guns, two of the lighter would protect the bow and also
fight on the beam when necessary, and the remaining one would de-
fend the stern.

The manner of placing the guns is arranged no doubt with a view
to their use in action, under the probable system of attack to be
adopted : it is my impression that too great a value was attached by
some of the authorities, two or three years ago, to bow-fire ; and that
the manoeuvring of a fleet in action, will be more for the purpose of
using the ram effectually, and the guns in broadsides on passing the
enemy. The battery will thus have the greatest opportunity of being
effective in a general action. This is explained in a chapter on guns,
in a Prize Essay written on naval tactics in 1873. Such was the high
estimate entertained of bow-fire that in several of our ships the bow-
armament has been made heavier. The Italians have gone to the
length of reversing the order of things, in the " Palestro," (their last
ironclad), and instead of a centre, they have a bow- and stern-
armoured battery, the centre of the ship remaining unarmoured. I
believe this will prove a mistaken or false principle.

In dividing the guns along the whole length of the deck (besides
giving more room for working), there would be the additional ad-
vantage of decreasing the evil of the moral effect produced by the
bursting of a heavy shell in the battery ; which if in a confined space
would not only be more fatal, but would possibly create a panic, and
certainly great confusion ; besides placing the whole of the guns hors*
de-combat.

Ships of 5,000 tons armed in this manner, whose probable length
would be 270 feet, would have the guns placed as follows : — On each
broadside, seven guns ; the after gun being 68 feet from the stern,
the remainder 22 feet apart, so that the formost gun would be 200
feet from the stern and 70 from the bow. Of these guns the five
after ones would be of the heavier nature. Bow-guns would be on

WAR VE88ELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY/. 261

the deck above, working in an embrasure-port, one on each side about
30 feet from the stem ; this port admitting of their firing direct ahead,
and about 10 degrees abaft the beam, and being so placed as not to
weaken the resisting power of the bow, to the enemy's fire from ahead.

The fourth consideration is the system of armour. The public
usually entertain most erroneous ideas of what the armour of an iron-
clad really consists, and the truth is so difficult to obtain, that even
the officers serving on board our ships find the greatest difficulty in
making themselves acquainted with the exact position of the different
thicknesses of armour. The fact of Her Majesty's ship u Hercules "
carrying a few hundred square feet of 9-inch plating, is often con-
strued into her being covered with armour of that thickness. It is
not to be wondered at that under the belief that her battery is effi-
ently protected, we find so many advocates for the " Hercules " class,
and such opposition to the system of unarmoured batteries. The
article referred to in Blackwood's Magazine, March, 1871, speaking of
the armouring of another class says, " The ' Audacious,' when broad-
' 'side on, presents an a*ea of 6,670 superficial feet, of these only
" 3,277, or less than half, are plated at all. There is a patch of
" 100 feet by 3, at the water-line, of 8-inch armour, which tapers
" down to 4£ inches at the bow and stern, and the rest of the ship
" has nowhere any thicker armour than 6 inches ; the ends of the
" main-deck battery having only 4 inch, and 5 inch armour, while
" the ends of the upper-deck battery are unprotected against a raking
" fire, and more than half the ship's side is in the same unprotected
" state."

This shows how slightly protected an ironclad really is.

I maintain that by arming a battery you not only limit it in size,
but you give the ship too much top- weight, and, after all, it is not
possible to render it proof against any of the heavier descriptions of
guns. I would, therefore, in our sea-going ships, give up the idea of
protecting anything but the water-line (and perhaps in the larger
ships a conning- tower), with armour.

A vessel of 5,000 tons would be able to carry 440 tons of armour,
or a belt 10 feet wide, —4 feet above the water-line, and 6 feet below
it, — of from 10 inches thickness at the immediate water-line, to
8 inches above and below, and backed with wood. Besides this, an
arrangement of coal bunkers (only to be opened from above, except
when the coal was actually required for use), which would be an
additional support to the backing, sufficient to cushion and prevent
the further penetration of a projectile which may have already pierced
the plating. I endeavour to explain this in an accompanying diagram,
plate I, fig. 4. The water-line armour I propose to reduce from its
full thickness at 100 feet from the bow, to half its full thickness at the
bow. This would admit of the bow being further protected by light
armour as high as the upper deck, 15 feet from the stem on each side.
The stern-armour I would raise 6 or 8 feet, and would reduce the
thickness of that at the water-line under the counter by 12 inches.

Ships of 7,500 tons would carry an armour-belt on the same
principle ; but the iron plating at the water-line would consist of two

260 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

been abandoned as impracticable, and in the latter snips a confined
place in the centre has been moderately armoured for the protection
of a, battery of guns. By dispensing with this battery armour, the
size of the ship is the only limit of the place for guns. This is an
undoubted advantage ; and when we consider that the whole weight
of the battery of Her Majesty's ship "Hercules," including the
allowance of ammunition and projectiles, <fcc., does not exceed 640 tons,
about -^ of her displacement, I am sure that the feasibility of in-
creasing the weight to 1,000 tons would be entertained, if the space
was not limited, and the armour of the battery could be dispensed
with. My plan then is to increase the armament and thus make it of
more importance, arming vessels of 5,000 tons displacement with ten
9-inch 12-ton guns, and seven 8-inch 9-ton guns, or a total weight,
with ammunition, of about 600 tons of armament ; and arming vessels
of 7,500 tons with ten 10-inch 18-ton guns and seven 9-inch 12-ton
guns, making the total weight of armament about 880 tons. This
last armament would be the heaviest carried by any sea-going iron-
clads.

WAB VESSELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 263

(though personally I prefer a single engine, farther
kJ with doable engines may prove their superiority); and

.ir and rudder of the greatest efficiency, both being placed
* t reach of the enemy's guns.

hat the ship have a ram-bow resembling that of Her Majesty's
, Hercules," and carry a battery of 17 heavy guns, 14 of which

* oe broadside guns, the remainder for bow and stern defence,
ih. That a system of armour 10 feet wide surround the ship at the

ater-line, sufficient to protect her from the fire of heavy artillery ;
that the bow be lightly armoured as high as the upper deck, and the
stern to a height of about 10 feet above water.

I would suggest two classes of line-of-battle ships of this type.
The first class to consist of about ten vessels of 7,500 tons, with
armoured conning-towers ; these ships would be used as leaders of
divisions, sub-divisions, or groups. The second class to consist of
about twenty vessels of 5,000 tons, ordinary ships of the line. I have
named 14 knots as the full speed, because I consider a reserve of 4
knots necessary for a fleet of heavy ironclad rams when manoeuvring
at 10 knots, and this is the highest speed that human power is capable
of directing safely under such circumstances.

Before concluding this part of the subject, I must make a few remarks
on the steam launches I should like the larger vessels to be supplied with,
if the fleet is to be employed for blockading purposes. Each large ship
should carry a boat, built of steel, 50 feet in length, of the greatest
possible speed, fitted with torpedoes that work either on bow or beam,
the place for working which, and the boat, being protected with mant-
lets of steel. These boats would be found invaluable for reconnoitring
the enemy's coast, for destroying their torpedo defences, and for spying
the movements of their fleet. At the same time, their own great
speed would bo a protection against surprise, and their torpedp-
armament, if so arranged as to be worked at full speed when passing
a vessel, would render them most formidable.

Part II.
On Single Cruizers, of great speed.

This second part of the Essay presents a wide and varied field for
the consideration of our ship-builders. The individual construction
of cruizers is not so important a question as that of the individual
construction of ships-of-the-line ; but the vast number necessary for
the protection of our colonies, and of our enormous maritime com-
merce, gives these ships, as a portion of our naval power, a value
equivalent to that of the ironclad fleet.

Our present fleet of cruizers is equal, both in number and quality,
to the duties required of it. Many of the older ships are doubtless of
insufficient speed, and, in case of war, could not be employed where
they would meet with the enemy's swifter vessels. But of late years
there has been a revolution in the build of cruizers. Iron has to a
great extent been substituted for wood; and, in order to admit of

262 ON THE BEST TYPE8 OF

layers, which together would make a thickness of 14 inches at the
immediate water-line, and 12 inches above and below, the whole belt
being 10 feet wide and 700 tons in weight ; in fact, constructed on the
same principle as the 5,000-ton ships just described.

The fifth consideration, is the cost.

This, thongh the last, is not by any means the least in many ways.
It does not become a nation rolling in wealth to quibble over the sum
to be expended on the protection of that wealth. Bat in this, as in all
other outlays, the country looks to receive the value of its money. A
certain sum is yearly voted to furnish England with an efficient Navy,
and if this is not wisely expended, the country becomes dissatisfied.
But should it at any time be necessary, that sum, great as it is, would
be doubled. What we want, then, is not to lavish, but to be prudent
in our expenditure, and to use such foresight in building our ships as
will ensure our always holding the proud position of " Queen of the Secut"

The cost of our present sea-going ironclads is so vast, that of
necessity it greatly limits their number. By a reduction in their size
and in the complications of their build, we should soon find ourselves
possessed of a considerably larger number of really efficient ships for
the same sum now expended on a few monsters !

In the question of guns versus armour, as heavier artillery was con-
structed, so larger ships were built, in order that they might carry a
greater weight and thickness of armour. Now that it has been
universally decided that the guns have won in the competition, and
that no sea- going ship can be made proof against the later artillery, it
is time to think how the maximum of efficiency in other respects, as
well as in the protection against guns, may be attained. Dispensing with
part of the immense weight of armour, ships constructed after the
plan suggested above, need not be built of such enormous dimen-
sions, and would still be able to carry an equally heavy battery, being
at the same time sufficiently powerful as rams to sink with ease any
ship aflotft. We should then have (for a very considerably reduced
cost) ships equal in many respects, and superior in some, to those of
the " Hercules " class, though with unprotected batteries.

At present, if one of our most expensive ships is promiscuously
sent to the bottom by a ram (friendly or otherwise), or by one explo-
sion of' a well-directed torpedo, the country loses a large fraction of
its naval strength, amounting perhaps to -^. Reducing that expense
would admit of an increase in the number, and consequently render
the loss of one ship comparatively trifling.

I will conclude this part with a summary of the principles I
advocate.

1st. In order to render the ship as unsmkable as possible by artillery
(at the expense of her battery being unarmoured), she must have a thick
layer of iron-plating at the water-line, and a well-devised arrangement
of backing to support it, which will furnish complete protection to her
engines and steering gear. In order to render her as unsinkable as
possible by ram or torpedo, she must have a complete and perfect
system of water-tight compartments.

2nd. That the ship be provided with engines capable of propelling

WAR VESSELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 263

her 14 knots (though personally I prefer a single engine, further
experiments with double engines may prove their superiority) ; and
steering-gear and rudder of the greatest efficiency, both being placed
well out of reach of the enemy's guns.

3rd. That the ship have a ram-bow resembling that of Her Majesty's
ship " Hercules," and carry a battery of 17 heavy guns, 14 of which
shall be broadside guns, the remainder for bow and stern defence

4th. That a system of armour 10 feet wide surround the ship at the
water-line, sufficient to protect her from the fire of heavy artillery ;
that the bow be lightly armoured as high as the upper deck, and the
stern to a height of about 10 feet above water.

Before concluding this part of the subject, I must make a few remarks
on the steam launches 1 should like the larger vessels to be supplied with,
if the fleet is to be employed for blockading purposes. Each large ship
should carry a boat, built of steel, 50 feet in length, of the greatest
possible speed, fitted with torpedoes that work either on bow or beam,
the place for working which, and the boat, being protected with mant-
lets of steel. These boats would be found invaluable for reconnoitring
the enemy's coast, for destroying their torpedo defences, and for spying
the movements of their fleet. At the same time, their own great
speed would be a protection against surprise, and their torpedo-
armament, if so arranged as to be worked at full speed when passing
a vessel, would render them most formidable.

Part II.
On Single Crmzers, of great speed.

Our present fleet of cruisers is equal, both in number and quality,
to the duties required of it. Many of the older ships are doubtless of
insufficient speed, and, in case of war, could not be employed where
they would meet with the enemy's swifter vessels. But of late years
there has been a revolution in the build of cruizers. Iron has to a
great extent been substituted for wood; and, in order to admit of

}

} 3

266 ON THE BEST TTPES OF

Corvettes.

" Challenger " class . . . . 3 ships

" Cadmus " „ . . . . 6 „

Sloops.
" Gannett " „ . . . . 1 ship

Paddle-frigates.

" Terrible " „ 1 ship

" Valorous " „ . . . . . . 2 ships

Paddle-sloops.
" Basilisk " „ . . . . 8 ships . . 8

This division contains the oldest crnizers in our Navy. The frigates
and corvettes are still used, and many of them are fairly efficient ; but
all the ships are above eighteen years of age, and belong so entirely to
the past that we need not take them into consideration.

It is apparent, from the above lists, that the first division alone
contains anything approaching the types that can be advocated for the
future cruizer. Doubtless there are some most admirable types in its
numbers; but I find two principles omitted in the construction of
them, one partially, the other entirely. The principle partially
omitted is, the great importance of the power of the ram. Why
should not all men-of-war, whether cruizers or ironclads, bo capable
of sinking an enemy by ramming her ? It is true that some of the
last built cruizers have bows strengthened for ramming, bat there is
no sharp point, or spur, in the form of their bow, and the shock of
an up-and-down bow striking the upright side of an ironclad would be
terrible to the rammer, even if fatal to the ship rammed. Whereas
a point would enter, and cushion the blow on the bow, at the same
time sinking the enemy. In fact, an up-and-down bow strengthened
for ramming is the only substitute possible (in vessels built for
immense speed), for a more formidable ram, to support which, the
extreme fineness of the ship's lines would, to a certain extent, have to
be sacrificed. I would suggest a bow of mnch the same shape as that
of Her Majesty's ship "Hercules,*' though not so projecting, but
certainly coming to a point at about six or eight feet below water.
The principle referred to as " wholly omitted M is " any system of pro-
" tection to prevent the ship being sunk, or her machinery damaged or
" destroyed by artillery" My opinion is, that by a slight reduction in
the length of the ship, and a slight increase of her beam, sufficient
floating power would be obtained to enable a 5,000-ton ship to carry
a light belt of armour at the water-line, which would materially
strengthen her bow for ramming. This belt would be of the follow-
ing dimensions : — 8 feet wide (i.e., 4£ feet below, and 3£ feet above,
water), 5 inches thick from before the boilers to the stern, and 4 inches
forward. The increase of beam would allow space for larger, and
consequently more powerful engines, and would give more room on
the gun-deck.

WAR VE8SEL8 FOR THE BRTTISH NAVY.

267

The belt of armour plating at the water-line should be supported by
a system of coal-bunkers, similar to those I advocate for ships-of-the
line. This armour may be calculated to resist all fire from light guns,
and oblique fire from heavy artillery. The chain cables, hung round
the United States steamer " Kearsage " during her engagement with
the " Alabama/' are an illustration of how efficient even the slightest
protection of this sort is. The vital parts of the ship are well pro*
tected, and she is rendered comparatively unsinkable. My ideas,
then, for the future typeB of cruizers are as follow : —

Full-rigged ships, constructed with ram dowb, and lightly armoured
at the water-line, in the manner I have described. Ships of 1,000
tons and upward, I divide into five classes, and give their approxi-
mate dimensions, in the following table : —

•

Armour-belt at water-line.

Classes.

Tonnage of
Displacement

Approximate
Dimensions.

Thickness.

Width.

Approximate weight.

Aft and
amid-
ships.

Forward

Armour.

Length.

Beam.

Draught

Fastenings and

Frigates,
1st chn.

}

6,000

800

Ft.
8

Tons.
»2>

-43 «M
A O

Spar-decked
Corvettes,
2nd class.
Corvettes,

}

3,800

270

4j"

8*"

143

'*1 8:

3rd class.

2,500

236

■SB

4th class.

1,800

200

34"

2*"

Sloops,
6th class.

}

1,000

180

The first and second classes would carry 21 guns, of 4| and 3£ tons
respectively ; the third,' fourth, and fifth classes would carry 17 guns,
of from 3 to l£ tons weight. The frigates and spar-decked corvettes
must possess a speed of not less than 15 knots ; the third and fourth
classes, 14i knots ; and the fifth class, 13£ knots.

The rudder and steering-gear for these ships should be worked as
much as possible under the protection of the armour.

Water-tight compartments of the same description as those recom-
mended for the ironclads, will be necessary. In fact, there will be a
great similitude in the internal arrangements of all ships, whether
ironclads or cruizers.

Gunboats, of less than 1,000 tons, are too small either to carry
heavy armour or to have any considerable speed, but all should be
capable of attaining from 11 to 12 knots. Vessels of the latest build,
such as the "Albatross/* "Frolic," and "Mallard" classes, are all
that can be required for this type.

1 It appears that this amount should be doubled (vide discussion on the Essay).
—En.

268 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

It will be observed, that the speed of this description of armour-
belted cruizer does not, in some cases, equal that of our present
vessels. For instance, Her Majesty's ship " Inconstant," on her trial,
made good over 16 knots, which exceeds by 1£ knots the speed I have
laid down for my quickest "belted cruizers." But, taking into con-
sideration their slightly enlarged mid-ship section, and their fuller
bow, supporting the ram, we cannot expect for them, nor do we
require, the enormous speed of the " Inconstant." It may happen
that some enterprising nation, determined, in case of war, to cut up our
commerce, should for this purpose build some extremely fast cruizers.
To frustrate any attempt of this sort, I would add another class of
vessels to the above list, and give them the name of " special cruizers."

These ships should be corvettes of 3,500 tons displacement, with
up and down bows, strengthened for ramming, and every other con-
sideration made subordinate to speed ; no armour, and not over-
weighted with a heavy battery. The " Rover" is a good type of this
class.

Mr. Thomas Brassey, M.P., in his very able and reliable pamphlet
on " unarmoured ships," explains and comments on several points of
interest. Among these, he wisely condemns the excessive expendi-
ture on individual ships, and, whilst declaring it will be necessary to
build ships for special purposes, brings into prominent notice that
" for the tremendous exigencies of war, the fleet might be supple-
" men ted and expanded so as to acquire undisputed ascendancy, by
" equipping and arming our ocean mail-steamers."

His opinion on this subject I believe to be sound, though per-
sonally I am inclined to attach more value than Mr. Brassey does to
the importance of actual men-of-war cruizers.

The cost of cruizers has been well argued out in this pamphlet ;
and, on referring to it, it will be seen that Mr. Brassey strongly
urges, " building ships of the smallest dimensions consistent with
" the attainment of the requisite speed." I agree with him in this to
a certain extent, and would therefore limit the number of ships above
2,500 tons, and increase that of those below it. The number and
duties of the cruizers I propose should be somewhat as follows : —

6 "Belted cruizers" of the 1st class (5,000 tons) ; of these three would

be flagships on the China, Pacific, and East India Stations ;

the remaining three for special service as flag-ships of detached

squadrons.
12 "Belted cruizers91 of the 2nd class (3,800 tons), half of which

would be employed as Commodores' ships, and as supplements

to squadrons abroad ; the other six reserved for special service

in detached squadrons.
6 "Special un-armoured cruizers" of great speed, which would be

sent where most required if war were imminent.

The actual number of the smaller classes would not be limited, but
the proportion would be about twelve of the 3rd class (2,500 tons) ;
twenty-four of the 4th class (1,800 tons) — N.B. This is the most
useful class for service on foreign stations ; — eighteen of the 5th class

WAB VESSELS FOB THE. BRITISH NAVY. 269

(1,000 tons) ; and smaller sloops, despatch vessels, and gun-boats, to
the number we possess at present. Ten or twelve, extremely fast,
small steamers protected by bullet-proof steel mantlets, and fitted to
tow a Harvey torpedo (from their foremast) on each side, would
greatly augment the strength of an ironclad fleet in a general action ;
I would, thereforey recommend their being added to our list of smaller
vessels.

With some remarks on two or three questions of minor importance,
I will finish this part of the essay.

The first , is the ability to hoist the screw — this I consider indispens-
able for all cruizers. As they are required to traverse the ocean, and
go in and out of harbour under sail, it is most important to have
thorough command of the ship under canvas, which cannot be attained
with the screw in its position for propelling.

The second, is the casing for the screw referred to in Part I. I do
not think it will be of service for cruizers, as it must materially
diminish the power of the rudder when the screw is not working.
This would have the same evil effect as a non-protected fixed screw.
But, perhaps, when this new apparatus has been more thoroughly
tested, an improvement may be added, by which the ship can be
steered under sail with a covered screw in position.

Pabt III.

Of Ships required for Coast Defence.

I do not know whether it is prejudice on my part or not, but I have
never been able to place faith in the " Devastation " class. From the time
of the laying of the so-called keel of this ship, I have had an utter distrust
of her — there seemed too much likeness to those unfortunate American
monitors, so many of which were lost in moving from one port to
another during the war. At first, I did not think she would stand
the trials necessary to prove her sea- worthiness, but no one reading
the satisfactory results of those trials can have a doubt of it. Besides
this, I have the testimony of one of our ablest naval men, that she is
the most buoyant vessel in a sea-way he had ever been on board of.
But a question of more vital importance is, what would her behaviour
be in an action, or after it, should she be injured, if a long way from
port and experiencing rough weather? I consider this ship so
admirably balanced that she is perfectly safe so long as she is intact.
But I should like to see her tried, with all her light ironwork (which
in action would be pierced by the smallest projectile), open to the
wash of the sea. In the first place, the mere fact of steaming at a
high speed, under these circumstances, would fill the men's compart-
ment, the armoured deck on which this stands being only one foot
above the water-line. This would be done by the bow-wave, which at
her full speed reaches the top of the compartment mentioned. Thus-
an enormous body of water would be lodged on the upper part of the
ship forward, reducing her speed considerably and rendering her un-
safe as a floating body in* a sea-way, in fact, in all probability,

VOL. XX. T

270 OK THE SEfiT VTP9& O*

destroying her balance. Confident as I «m in h&t safety in peace-time,
I cannot but -condemn her as an instrument of -war.

The ><(InlLexible,,Y now building at Portsmouth, is supposed to 1m
an improvement on the ** Derastation." She is to carry 20- *and %±»
inch armour, and an armament of fbur 81-ton guns. From this c&so&i
description, one is led to believe that the " Inflexible "is a moot fort,
midable monster. But when we come to enquire into particular*, ir&
are astoniefhed at her want •of efficiency as a figfctxng skip. The
armour, impenetrable as it no doubt is, only protects a part, amount-
ing to about one-third of the ship's tipper works. 'This protected
part is in the form of a citadel 110 feet long, by 74> feet wide (or the
whole beam of the fibip), and the armour-placing is in two layers <rf
10-inch thickness, 1*6 feet wide (ti*e outer plates at the immediate
water-line being 14 inches tifc&ok instead of 10 inches). On the top of
this breastwork, which rises to a height of 10 feet above the water-
line, -are the two turrets, so placed at opposite corners of the citadel,
that the fire of all four guns can be delivered direct ahead, astern,
and on either beam. This battery of lour 81-ton gums will be, both
in form and dimensions, the most powerful afloat. And yet the safety
of this formidable structure depends on a balance, more delicate and
more easily disarranged than that of Her Majesty's ship " Derat*>
tion," for, the remainder of the ship's side, a length of 200 feet, is
totally devoid of outside armour, and the only protection is in the
3-inch armoured deck, 6 feet below the water-line, connected with the
lower ends of the athwart-ship breastworks. Thus we see that nearly
two-thirds of the upper- works down to 6 feet below the water-line are
as easily damaged as the light ironwork of ihe " Devastation,'*' and
in action would be knocked away by the smallest artillery; and so, to
the floating power of the comparatively small space below the 3-inch
armoured deck, is left the mighty task of keeping 4his so heavily
weighted ship from sinking, and this only on the condition tfiat the
armoured deck remained water-tight. The Bhip's great beam wouM,
however, certainly be of great assistance in preveiiiang her capsizing.
There is one point of great value to be observed in the construction of
the " Inflexible," viz., the admirable plan of bringing the rudder-head
into the ship below the water-line, and working the steering-gear
below and under the protection of the armoured deck.

The "Rupert," ^Glatton," "Hotspur," and "Cyclops" classes
are, in my opinion, even less valuable as types of fighting ships.
It is true that they are not intended for sea-going purposes, but to my
mind, all ships-of-war, whether for ocean-warfare, or for coast-defence,
must be constructed with a reserve of floating power, which would
enable them to be seaworthy when seriously injured. This is certainly
not the case with these ships.

Our vessels for coast defence at present number in their ranks : —

1st. The "Inflexible" (11,165 tons) ;

2nd. The " Dreadnought " (10,950 tons) ; •* Devastation w and
" Thunderer " (both 9,190 tons) ;

3rd. The " Rupert " (5,444 tons) " Glatton » (4,912 tons) ; * Hot-
spur" (4,010);

WAR VESSELS TOR THE BBKTfSfl NAVY. 371

4*h. Tfca "Cytsfo^ "Hecate," *Hyd»/' and "Gorgon," <3>430

tons);
5tiL "Boyal Sovereign" <5/080toas)^ and " Primes Albert n (3,905

tons);

the first turret ships constructed. From what I haveaaid before, it
may be perceived that I do not «gvoe with the priacinilM on which
these drips are built.

There is a type of -vessel, -so novel in its -cettstmctkm, so •opposed in
its fennto all that has gone before, tfuat<ew!iiawL:aiBhitoetB faamenot,
as yet, undertaken the responsibility of firing it a triaL I refer to
Ate circular ironclads, the type of which was nrst designed by the
late Mr. John Elder, and on the subject of which he lectured it the
fceyal United Service Institution in May, 1868.

The Russian shipbuilders, more adventuresome than 'ourselves, have
taken the lead and have already -constructed two circular ironclads,
the "Novgorod," which is completed and has been, tried, and the
•BepolEka," now nearly <3onrpleted, which is building at Nicholaeff,
entirely from Russian resources, under the direction of Admiral
PepofF. These vessels are poor specimens of a "type, which I believe
will prove, when developed and men thoroughly tried, the moat per-
fect for coast defence.

The " Novgorod " is a circular monitor of 2,490 tons displacement,
and of 480 horse-power. Her diameter is 101 English feet, and she
draws 13 feet 2 inches with all stoves on board, filer armoured breast-
work is (with the backing) 11 inches of iron. . The deck, outside the
breastwork, is plated with 2f inches of iron. She carries two 28-ton
steel 'guns, working inside the breastwork. She is propelled by sic
screws, and on her trial she attained a speed of between 7 and 8
knote. Her cost was about £330,000. To my mind, vessels of thm
eUans would be of more value if of greater sise, and the cost of the
larger vessels would be in proportion ^considerably less.

I would invite attention to the late Mr* John Elder's able paper an
this subject, published in the Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution, No. 52, though in many points I do mot quite aguee with it.
I think Mr. Elder overrates the power of this type when he says,
" that there is no reason why a vessel of the same displacement as one
"of our best ironclads, but circular in form, may not be propelled at
"an equally high rate of speed," Ac. My opinion is, that a speed of
from 8 to 10 knots is quite sufficient lor coast defence vessels such as
these, whose motive power is only required in moving them from one
part of the coast to another, where they would act as floating .and
movable forts, for its protection against an invading force.

1 should be inclined to adopt a system of propulsion, by means of
three, or six screws after the Russian plan, in preference to the
arrangement of hydraulic propelling apparatus, which Mr. Elder
recommends, until we know more of water-power as a propeller iar
ships.

On the question of ramming also, I do not hold Mr. Elder's
opinion. For, in my belief, a circular vessel is not competent, neither
is she required to be used as a ram. In fact, this type of vessel is

272 ON THE BE8T TYPES OF

exactly what we want, without either great speed or the power of
ramming. Her invaluable qualities are, undoubted floating power,
comparatively small draught of water, impenetrability by artillery,
power to resist the attack of rams, and ability to carry the heaviest
possible ordnance.

I see in this form of vessel the only floating body that can possibly
combine these all-important qualities. Great value may be attached to
the arguments that the reading of Mr. Elder's paper gave rise to, and
it will be observed that the admirable qualities of this circular ironclad
were recognised by all the scientific men present ; and that the only
two questions not agreed upon were — first, as to the possibility of
steering her on a straight course ; and secondly, of her attaining the
extreme speed hoped for by the author. The first of these questions
has been satisfactorily solved by the trials of the Russian " Novgorod ;"
and the second, by the fact that such extreme speed is not necessary
for coast defence.

Mastless circular vessels for coast defence would be, I propose, of
two classes:

The type of the first class would be a vessel of about 8,500 tons,
210 feet in diameter, carrying batteries of twelve 12-inch 35-ton gnus,
mounted on an improved Moncreiff system, behind a breastwork of
14-inch armour, 6 feet high, and circular in form, with a diameter of
1 00 feet. The deck outside this breastwork to curve downward towards
its outer edge, and to be plated with 3£-inch iron. The under surface
nearest the edge would also be plated with 3^-inch armour. The edge
itself would be protected by a steel rim of immense strength, sharpened
so as to cut the bow of a vessel ramming her. This circular vessel
would be propelled by three screws, and engines sufficiently powerful
to give her a speed of 10 knots. In order to ensure her having a
good grip of the water, I propose constructing four keels, in the same
direction as, and between which, the screw shafts will work. The
lower surface of these keels will form a flat bottom, so that the vessel
can be, without danger, landed on a gridiron. (Plate TIT, fig. 1.)

In the after ends of the centre keels would be two powerful rudders,
which would give the ship efficient turning power. Approximate
weight of armour of this first class : breastwork, — 500 tons ; upper
surface of armoured deck, 1,700 tons ; under surface, 450 tons ; the
total weight being about the same as that of Her Majesty's ship
" Devastation." The construction of this vessel is less complicated
than that of ordinary iron ships, the difference being (as Mr. Elder
says) " that the frames and floors, instead of extending from keel to gun-
" wale athwart ships, radiate from the centre to gunwale at the outer
" edge ; every frame and floor being the same length and form."
Nothing is simpler than the division of the interior of this form of
ship into water-tight compartments. When afloat, her edge would be
three feet above water, the principal horizontal deck being on this
level, and all the space below divided into small cells by bulkheads
radiating from the centre, intersected by others, following the circular
form of the ship. All the bulkheads, from the outside edge to 35 feet
towards the centre, would be continued upwards beyond this prin-

?T':

? -

I.:--

lAffdftt/ gtttt i.a posit

'TS^-^a

•Journal R.T.S Insbduiimv
VOL 'JO.

Pl.X

Fig ;.
Zo%ver Surface

Scale . 3$1/s feet to an Irish

Plate 3

J Jobnr.s

WAK VESSELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 273

cipal horizontal deck, and join the curved armoured deck above.
(Plate II, fig. 1, and Plate HE, fig. 1.)

The twelve guns will be arranged at equal intervals on the hori-
zontal deck, within the circular breastwork, and their carriages would
be made to revolve on a pivot in their centre (which will be about
six feet from the breastwork towards the centre of the ship), so as to
enable the guns to range over an arc of 120°. The guns, when in
position for firing, would be seen from outside "en barbette" (Plate^
II, fig. 3), the recoil would bring them into position for loading
(Plate II, fig. 2), from under the armoured deck. The degree of
training provided for, would admit of five of these monster guns being
pointed in the same direction. When fired from the position of their
extreme training, it would probably be found that the concussion of
the explosion would be very much felt in-board. In order to rectify
this, I would suggest, that horizontal platforms be arranged between
the guns, on a level with the top of the breastwork, and extending
about five feet in-board. In the centre of the ship there must be a
conning- tower, provided with a rifle-proof cover, from under which
the captain can look over the breastwork, and direct his ship in
action.

The type of the second class would be a vessel of about 5,000 tons
displacement, 150 'feet in diameter, carrying a battery of twelve
10-inch 18-ton guns, mounted behind a circular breastwork of 12-inch
armour, 5 feet high, the diameter of which circle would be 80 feet ;
the plating of the outside deck 3 inches thick. The approximate
weight of armour for this vessel would be : — breastwork, 270 tons ;
upper surface of armoured deck, 700 tons ; under surface of edge,
230 tons; total weight about 1,200 tons. The whole vessel is con-
structed on the same principle as that of the first class. In all pro-
bability, there will be at first great opposition to this innovation ; but
I am positive that, once tried, this type will be universally adopted
for coast defence.

In addition to these floating forts, we require, for the protection of
our coasts, small torpedo vessels and gunboats.

The Americans have recently launched a torpedo vessel, by name
the " Alarm," which was described in The Army and Navy Journal
a short time ago. She is 100 feet long, 28 feet beam, 10 feet draught,
has a ram-bow, and carries one heavy gun and eight Gainings, in
addition to her torpedo-gear, which is reported to be very perfect.
This class of vessel is of undoubted value as a coast-defence, which
we should probably realize to our cost, in the event of war with the
United States. But the handling of such dangerous instruments
as torpedoes on board ship, is so apt to prove as fatal to the workers
of them as to the enemy, that they would be a questionable advantage
to this nation, whose coasts are so admirably defended in other ways.

Gunboats of the " Comet " class, carrying one gun of great weight,
will be found an exceedingly useful addition to the defences of the
coast, and the fact of our possessing twenty-four of them already, is
very satisfactory.

In order to have an efficient coast-defence fleet, we ought, in my

£74 ON THE BEST CTFSft OT

©pinion, to possess four circular ironclads of the first class (abort
8,500 tons), for the Thames and south coast ports; six ewcnlar irotb-
cladB of the seeond olass (about 5,000 tons), to be stationed at other
ports in the United Kingdom; and thirty gunboats of the "Comet"
class divided along the coast, where most required. To those, tor-
pedo vessels may be added, when a really valuable type has been
introduced.

WAR VE88EIA FOR THE BeUXIftH NAVY. $75

Monday, March 23ih, 187&
Arana*L StB HEETRY J. CODMNOTON, K.C.B., in tin? Chair.

Disrauos on this Naval Prizb Essay, on " Tri Best Tymo of Wab

Vessels k)r the Bkitish NayyJ*

Adjoirai Sir Sekbtcxb. BoBUCSOff : Sir Henry Codrington* whoa I was invited to
come hem and discuss, thia subject I satairdUj felt some tittle doubt ae to the
nature o£ the discussion, because I did not quite understand whether the. prise
tad already been awarded or whether we were called upon to discuss the merits
of the essay itself aa deserving the prize. We bow understand that the medal
ha* been awarded tQ the author of this Essay* and, therefore, that the* discussion
that we have- to enter upon, ia a discussion aa to whether thia Institution can
saocmmend the new type of ship which Captain Noel has so cleverty and so in-
anuouaty advocated, and which nas received the approbation, of the referees. In
discuaiing thia subject I must ask the Chairman and everybody here to allow me)
what I am not only most willing, hut moat anxioue always to concede to everyone
with whom I may he Drought into discission, I mean perfect liberty of speech* that
I may ho allowed to say what I think upon, each topic as it arisee, and that no one —
neither the talented author,, nor his friends, nor the* referees who have awarded him
thia medal—will consider that in. anything I say, I base the smallest desire personalty
to ha offensive, or disagreeable to them ; but thai I simply stand forward to advocate
anch principles aa I believe to he ri^ht and perfectly legitimate principles to hold;
andaa to any part I may take in this discussion* and any language X may use* I beg
leave at once beforehand if anything looks personal, or might be construed into
giving offence, to apologise for using such language. All I wish, is to have a diaoue-
aioA on a subject of vital importance to the British. Ravj, perfectly unfettered in the
line of argument that any gentleman or myself may thank fit to adopt.

Baring cleared the way, I should like juet to say one or two things before I realty-
go into the subject of the merits or demerits of the Prize-essay. I think it would
be extremely unfair, and I should feel that I waa doing wrong if I put the weight
of my years or authority in any way to override the opinions of a young commander
who has written upon subjects, of the greatest possible importance. I think that
every one in our profession, and probably every one of those who axe out of it, will
consider that the trouble, the time, the ingenuity and talent that that gentleman has
displayed in writing the Essay, ie worthy of all commendation ; and that, even when
we moat differ from him» we ought to treat the opinions he has been kind enough to
lay before us, with every possible conridejetion* tenderness, and regard. I find it
necessary* aa I am sure the author of thia Essay found it necessary, to clear the road
before considering that type of ship which he considers best adapted for our ironclad
navy* and to do so by observing that all the types, of the ironclad navy now in
egiatonee are seriatim and unreservedly condemned by the author of that esaaw.
Kay, more, it appears to me that if he had not completely and unreservedly con-
demned those types he would not have had a, face* elands for introducing to our
consideration a type of warship — a type of ironclad as ha calls it— so entirely
different from anything that has gone before it fie pro-sappoaes,— *nd I follow him
in hia presupposition,— that the whole of these types being extremely defective1 it is

1 Page 1. " We find ourselves unable to arrive at a conclusion aa to which ia the
" most satisfactory type."
Page 2. " But grand as our fleet is collectively, it is not satisfactory to ohsexee

276 ON THE BEST TTPE8 OF

absolutely necessary without delay to produce a norel type, and that this type with
all the disadvantages that may attend upon it, is better and more fit for the purpose
of an ironclad navy than the types that have gone before it. It is necessary, there-
fore, to examine why he finds fault with the types of ironclads that have gone before,
to see whether his reasons are such as the facts of the case will bear out.

I should like to begin with what he said about the " Iron Duke " class. He said
of the " Iron Duke's class that they were generally considered as failures j and he
has described the class by a quotation from Blackwood? s Magazine} In that quota-
tion there are two rather important errors. He has, however, declared the " Iron
Duke's " class to be a failure. Now I should like to ask every gentleman in the
room what he means by the word " failure." If you design a tool to perform
certain work and it performs that work, is it a failure ? If you aim at a given
object, and you hit that object, is that a failure P If the " Iron Duke " was designed
to do certain work, and she does that work, is she a failure ? Is a ship a failure
because you haying aimed at one object, have realised that object, but have not
aimed at another object, and have not realised that other object ? I should say
certainly not. What is an ironclad, I may ask, designed for? An ironclad is
designed to fight such battles on the seas as we may he compelled to fight with
weapons equal or superior to those that are brought against us. I should like to
compare for a moment an ironclad of the second class, such as the " Defence," with
the " Audacious ;" comparing the latter first of all with the ironclads designed
in earlier days by naval constructors in England, and secondly with the second class
ironclad of any foreign power with which she might be called on to cope. Allow
me first of all to take you to the " Defence," which was the first of the second
class ironclads designed in England, and show you the difference between the
M Defence" and the "Iron Duke." The length of the "Defence" is 280 feet,
breadth 64 feet, mean draught of water 25 feet 1 inch, height of ports out of
water 6 feet 6 inches. She was 6,070 tons displacement, carried 607 tons of 4£-
inch armour, mounted two 8-inch and eight 7-inch guns. Her speed was 11*6
knots, and her powers of action limited by 460 tons [of coal. The " Iron Duke,"
designed as a second-class ironclad, was 280 feet long, 45 feet wide, her mean
draught of water 22 feet, height of ports 8 feet 1 inch, displacement 6,034 ; she

" that of all the types represented therein few can truly be called the recognised
" types of the future, and these few are of minor importance."

Page 8. " Besides this (the enormous cost) the ' Sultan ' has the defect of excessive
" top weight, to counterbalance which, 600 tons of ballast have already been put into
" her, and, indeed, in all these vessels the fact of protecting their batteries with
" heavy armour is, in my opinion, a questionable principle, for by so doing, the size
" of the battery is curtailed, and the ship is rendered crank. The ' Monarch '
"would be subject to the same objections as the 'Hercules.' The second class
" includes the ' Audacious ' and her five sister ships. These, though powerful
" vessels, are generally considered failures. Insufficiently plated at the water-line,
" overburdened with heavily armoured box-batteries above the upper decks, their
" fint trial proved them so excessively crank as to be wholly unseaworthy."

Page 18. " Confident as I am of her safety [the ' Devastation '] in peace-time, I
" cannot but condemn her as an instrument of war."

Page 18. " But when we come to inquire into particulars, we are astonished at her
u want of efficiency as a fighting ship " [the " Inflexible."]

Page 19. " From what I have said before, it may be perceived that I do not agree
" with the principles on which these ships are built — viz., all the turret-armed ships
" in the navy."

1 " The ' Audacious/ when broadside on, presents an area of 6,670 superficial
" feet ; of these only 8,277, or less than half, are plated at all. There is a patch
" of 100 feet by 8 at the water-line, of 8 inches armour, which tapers down
" to 4$ inches at the bow and stern, and the rest of the ship has nowhere any
" thioker armour than 6 inches, the ends of the main-deck battery having only 4
" or 6 inches armour, while the ends of the upper-deck battery are unprotected
" against a raking fire ; and more than half the snip's side is in the same unpro-
" tected state."

WAS VESSELS FOR THE BRITI8H NAVY. 277

carried 924 tons of 8-inch, 6-inch, and 4i-inoh armour, ten 9-inch guns ; her speed
was 18}, and she carried 540 tons of coal. And now that I am on the subject of
the armour plating of the " Iron Duke," I may as well refer to that description in
Blackwood which says that the ship had only got a very limited portion of 8-inch
armour, and the rest was entirely built up of smaller armour, and that there was,
with the exception of its belt on the water line of 8 inches, nowhere any other
thicker armour than 6 inches, and also to the statement that the armour-plated
upper-deck battery was undefended against raking fire. All these facts are liable
to very great correction, which I proceed to give. Not only is there an 8-inch
armour-plate streak above the water-line of the " Iron Duke," class,1 but in the
wake of the ports, that is, in the important place where the pivoting of the guns
is secured, on which the whole efficiency of the battery depends, there is a strip of
8-inch armour. The armour at the corners of the upper deck battery is 6 i -inch
thick s and there are two thwart-ship bulkheads protecting it against raking fire,
reduced to 4} inches in thickness only where no man would be stationed in
action ; and any direct shot coming upon one of those bulkheads must have passed
through the ship's Bide or extremities before it could get there. If it came in a
straight line it would walk out interfering probably with nobody. Of course it
might be perverse and do other mischief, which I cannot describe at this moment,
but at any rate, the badly defended state of the " Iron Duke's" class, about which
the author of this pamphlet seems to have been seriously concerned, and which
tempted the writer in Blackwood to say how little the iron-clad ships were defended,
does not seem to me to stand on very serious ground. Having shown you the
difference between the second-class armour-plated ship, the type of which is so
unreservedly condemned, and the former second-class ironclad, allow me to proceed
to show you the comparison between this second-class ironclad and the French
ships. The French, at the time this ship was built, had two classes of ships afloat
— trie one represented by the "Flandre," of which type there were ten — the
" Surveillante, " Valeureuse," and a number whose names I do not recollect at this
moment. They were first-class French ships ; and bearing in mind what I have
told you about the dimensions and thickness of the armour plating and the arma-
ment of the second-class English ship, allow me to read you the dimensions, thick-
ness of armour plating, Ac., of the French first-class armoured ship. The French
first-class armoured ship of that day, as represented by the " Flandre," was 262 feet
long, 55 feet 9 inches beam, draught of water, 25 feet 8 inches, height of port 7 feet
8 inches, displacement 5,711, carrying 980 tons of armour, 4^ inches thick, mount-
ing 8 guns of 9*44 calibre, speed 14 knots. I ought to have said before, in statins
the armament of these ships, that I only gave their protected guns, because all of
them, both in our own and the French navy, have guns which are not under armour
plating, and these I have omitted for obvious reasons. There was a second-class
French ship at that date. The ships I have described are first-class, and if you
compare the power of the first-class French ship with the second-class English snip,
I think nobody will sav that there was any very great disadvantage in the English
second-class ship if it had to encounter a French first-class ship. The second-class
French ship was 290 feet long, beam 45 feet 9 inches, mean draught of water 19 feet
6 inches, height of port 6 feet 6 inches, displacement 3,400 tons ; she carried 750
tons of armour-plate varying from 58 inches to 4 inches in thickness, and carried
four 7-inch guns : speed was 12 knots. With these figures before us, I am at a loss
to find in what respects the " Iron Duke " failed in the object for which she was
constructed. What was that object ? It was to fight on the sea any ship she might
meet of her own size and construction, and to give the 460 men who embarked in
that ship the means of fighting such an enemy as it might be their duty to engage,
on fair and equal terms. I ask whether it is not evident that the " Iron Duke's" class
would have fulfilled the purpose for which she was designed, and whether that type
can reasonably or truthfully be set down as a failure. The officer who has written
this essay founds, as he well may, the whole of his desire for a new type of ship upon

•

1 This statement is erroneous — there is not any 8-inch armour above the belt in
these ships — the mistake arose from my reading the figures I had taken out for
the " Sultan " instead of those I had extracted for the " Iron Duke's " class.— E. S. R.

278 ON THB BEST TYPES OV

the supposed fiwlure of the old type*. I say there iano evidence of failure whotcvog»
and thai, their unproved failure does not coastituie- a. necessity for a new class
of ship. Something move- may be said. It is true that this second ntann ironelad in
not impeaietraWe to shot. But what naval architect in this world ewer designed a
ship that should be impenetrable to all and every shot node* all cireumstanoesw
Uo> greater oner could possibry be committed than to- believe that, such a thing wna
0*0* possible! or contemplated. Ko> monitor, no eirjenterconsfcrueted ironclad* no
atop ever put together by human hands could* voder certain gives. etmirinntaaoe»
ronwt the power of modern artillery. But ia that a reason that partial and relative
protection should not be given ? Partial and relative proteetifin against such nttaehs
as it. was probable could he mode. Partial and relafcfre protection* woo aimed at in
thin saeon^laa* ship. I. have shown you that partial and relative paeteetiott has
been given to those ships when compared with those of any foreign power thai they
oould have been brought into oontaot with* because, I need not tall you that at the
time when these ships were designed, powerful artillery, and the Tory powerful ships
■Jons' boilt to resist that artillery were not in existence. There ia one thing more
I wish to say above this- shipv The author of tfaao work has been very severe
upon the ballast thai waa put into those ships. One of his objections to then* is
than they were tophoaniy. The mots of the case lie in a very smatt compass* and
perhaps I may be allowed to allude to them. These ships were built as lightly in
tho lower part* as waa consistent with sufficient strength, with an express view and
intension that they should bo lighter than the strict following out of the design
would have, made them* in faet, weight was spared below so fax as it oould ho spared
to introduce it elsewhere. It was known that the work had been carried out with
that effect, but how far than work had proceeded oould only ho known precisely by
the trials of the ships. They were tried light ; they wore not at their load lino at
thoi time of trial, and they showed very considerable cranknoss under such cirounv
stance** Bat what did this prove? It proved what, the constructors of the Navy
knew perfectly well, that if their instructions had been carried out in various details,
not quite easy to calculate, bnlinat would probably bo necessary, and 360 not 409
tone of ballast was pat into them. Vow 360 tons of ballast on a displacemeat of
«VKX> tone is not a very great deal. I resnember, when I waa a young man, I used
to see line-of -battle ships going about with 600 and 700 tons of ballast in thorn
Out oM wooden ships, displacing about 4*600 tons, bad an establishment of fram
S00 to 400 tons of ballast. I remember meeting a very magnificent French ship at
Lisbon, when your Chairman and myself were in command of frigates there : this
hne-of-battl» ship, with a displacement of 5,000 tons, carried 800 tons of ballast.
Xhenvfere, although I am perfectly willing to admit that a slight error was con>
initted, I do not think the adding of 360 tons of ballast to the " Iron Duke'a"
class- at all justifies any condomnatien of the type. I admit the necessity for doing
so ia an error, but it is one of detail in construction, not affecting the type or
dsserrmg the word failure as applied to the design. The result of putting xn this
ballast was to make a difference of about 5 inches in the height of the mid-ship
port. It was to have boon 8 feet 6 inches out of the water and waa reduced to
& feet I inch, and even then the height of the port-sill was more than in the French
firtt-ckas ship and very much more than in the French second-class ship. The
stability of the ship and her sea-going qualities proved perfectly satisfactory. The
carve of stability was taken r the ship could be heeled over to 44$ degrees before
one began to lose her stability in the amalleat degree, and the stability did not vanish
tan she was laid over to upwards of 86 degrees. I fancy no one would have the
least doubt of the perfect seaworthiness of such, a ship, even if the class had not
been, at sea ia every part of the world. The next type is the " Hercules" typo,
vehich also has been condemned by the author of this Assay, and if he had not eon-
dernned it, ho could not have advocated the now typo ho has brought forward. I
should like to compare this type also with the first first-class ship of our own iron-
clad Vary, and with the French first-class amp, to see whether there ia really in her,
any doftcioaoy m armament or tea- going qualities, or if the " Hercules," as com-
panad with any sea-going ship whatever she can possibly most upon die ocean, is
wader any disadvantage* The first type of onr first-lass ironclad will bo admitted
by entry one to ha** boon the "Achillea.'' I put the "Warrior" and "Baauk

WAR VESflBM FOB XHB BB2TJ3H NAVY. 229

Prince " entirely on* of the ouestion as first-class ironelade j. hut the first first-else*

ironclad this country did possess was a very beautiful and powerful shipy the

"Achillea." Let 11a orapara the "Achates" with the "Hereof." The

"-Achilles" haa & length of 880 feet, beam 58 feet 3* inches ;. draught of water

36 feet 10 inches, heigjtn* oi port & feet & inches, displacement 9,094 tone. She

carried 1,250 tone of 4*-inch armour plating, and under that proteetion in h«i

battery, 18 7-inch and 4 8-inch guns. Her speed is 14&. The " Hercules" haa a length

of 325 feet, beam 59y feet, mean draught 25 feet 4 inches, height of port 9 feet

8 inches, displacement 8,840 tons-. She carried 1,299 tons of 9-, 8-, and 6-inch

armour, and mounted on her protected battery* 8 10-inch guns and 2 9-inch guns,

and this ship's speed was 14^ knots. You cannot doubt that the " Hercules ' was

av very superior ship to the other. The object of designing the " Hercules " was to

hare a very great improvement over the first-alass English ironclad previously

designed, and at any rate in this sense the " Hercules " may be said to have been a

nuerejis But 1st us compare the " Hercules " with a fimt-cl&as French ship. The

Vieneh first-class irenolad of that date is represented by the " Friedland," the

"Mansngo/ and others. The " Friedland " is 287 feet long, with a beam of 57 feat

3 inches, mean draught, 2fi feet 6 inches, height of pert 9 iset, displacement 7,180*

weight of amour 1*390 tons of 7~> 8-, 6-, 2-, and 4»iaeh aanoav. She carries in he*

protected battery 4 gone of 106-inch calibre, and 4,9±-inch calibre guns in towers

en barbette. Her speed is 14 knots* X do not hesitate- to say that there ia no cent*

paiiaon possible except an advantageous one to the Engjssh type between the power

ol tihertwe ships ; that the " Hercules," or that type of ship, could with gnmt mm*

tahility of success, and with aa much eonfidenea as attend* anything human* engage

8j firstHslass French- ironclad, and engage her with every prospect of being victorious-.

The " Saltan " is a little mere powerful than the " Hercules," and there ia another
French ship, at sea, the " Kiehalieu," a little more powerful than the " FriedlanaYu
But in point of iaet those ships are on the same principles, and an enlargement of
type does not mean- an alteration of type. Changes in the details of variona fitting*)
and ia the constructive- arrangement in a ship, de net mean a new type of vessel. It
ia impossible to suppose that we shall not day by day find out detail* that may he
advantageously applied to our new ships, but because a detail ean he better eonnv
dared now, and be better earned into operation in thia day than it could have bean
five yearn ago> iathat any reason for resorting altogether to another type of war-thint
I any this because in part of the very interesting extracts from the essay which our
Chairman gave us, descriptions of additional coenpartments, an additional number of
bulkheads were strongly insisted upon. As to that, every one who has considered
the subject for a moment wooM agree. The more you could divide a shis> into
water-tight compartments the better; the more yon could make her a con-
aeries ol cells the better ; but it is not necessary by any means to resort to a new
type of ship in order to divide hejr into a great many more water-tight compart*
menta than haa been done hitherto, ia order to adopt the cellular system as
far as possible, and to take the precaution of having all your ses^connectione at
hand, visible and more perfectly available than in some resent cases they appear to
have been. But not only does my comparison of the type of the " Heroules " apply
to the sea-going ships of France ; my comparison applies also to the seargoing ships
of every other country. The type of the " Hercules " and " Sultan " enabks us to
he perfectly sure that we send our sailors to sea to fight any enemy that they might
meet on the open sea with a well-founded confidence of vietory before them. The
Russians, the Germans, and* strange as it may seem, the Turks have, it is true, one
or two ships— that is to say that eaeh of them has got one ship of rather more
power than the " Herewles." But there is everywhere the same type, and that type
ia this, — you protect the water-line of your ship by a belt ; you protest the battery
and the vital parts of the engines and boilers by armour -y yon protect your men ana
gjane over a limited space* because you. cannot have sea-going qualities rf yon protest
them over an unlimited apace. And that is the type of ship represented in small
ships by the " Iron Duke's " class, and in large ships by the " Heroules " class, and
that w the type of first-class irenolad which thssughonA the world at this day we
shall meet, if ever we meet in hostility at sea.

There is one mere class I must any a word or two- about, before I refer to the ship

280 ON THE BE8T TYPES OP

that is proposed to sweep away all that we have done, to take a place for herself, and
a victorious place, oyer such vessels as it has been my pleasure to see at sea, and to
know something of their qualities. This ship is the " Devastation." The " Devas-
tation " is certainly in some respects peculiar, and I should have expected rather to
have heard a word or two in commendation of the " Devastation " from the talented
author of this Essay. But no! he dislikes the "Devastation." He reminds me
of the old saying applied to Mr. Addington, one of our Prime Ministers : —

" I do not like thee, Dr. Pell,
The reason why I cannot tell,
But still I feel to know full well
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell."

That is all I can find as a reason for condemning the " Devastation." Well,
" kissing goes by favour," and it is very possible that a gallant Officer, who does not
like the " Devastation " now, may yet live to see that the " Devastation " has got
some very powerful qualities, and is not, after all, to be summarily condemned as an
instrument of war. I may say, the " Devastation " takes to sea four of the heaviest
rifled guns yet constructed in this country. She takes those guns to sea at a height
of fourteen feet above the water. She takes them in two turrets, protected by
14-inch armour. The hull of the ship that bears those turrets is protected by 12 ana
10-inch armour. There are bulkheads, which cut off all access of dropping shot
from the vital parts of the ship. She has a speed of 13*8 knots ; she can reverse her
powerful qualities as a ram in two minutes and two seconds — that is, she could be
charging in one direction at the rate of 16 statute miles an hour, and in two minutes
she could be charging in the opposite direction at the same rate of speed. She has
been in gales of wind on the Atlantic ; she has been exposed to such weather as she
could find on the coast of Ireland ; she has crossed the Bay of Biscay ; she has done
good service in the Mediterranean, with eminent satisfaction to everybody on board.
She carries 1,200 or 1,400 tons of coal, and the radius of her operation is only
measured by the distance that coal will carry her. At ten knots an hour, she will go
upwards of 3,000 miles without exhausting her fuel. I am unwilling, therefore,
that so valuable a type of British ironclad should pass under, what I consider, the
^discriminating and undeserved censure of the gallant Officer who has written this
Essay ; because, as a British sailor and a British Admiral, I feel convinced, if it ever
should come to pass that our fleet should be tested, the account that the " Devasta-
tion " will give of herself on the day of battle will dispel a cloud of, what I venture to
call, prejudice, which still hangs over her.

Now, I have described the three types of ships which have been absolutely con-
demned by the author of this Essay, and on which condemnation he has founded
the only type of battle-ship he has proposed to use ; and I am about to make some
few observations on the type he has advocated. First of all, I may say, if he was
right in his condemnation of these old types, I consider he was perfectly right in
proposing a new type. It is for that reason I have dwelt so long upon the valuable
qualities of the old types, because I think, if my position were entirely wrong, if it
were true that these types were not at all valuable, and deserved what he has said of
them, it would be absolutely necessary, without delay, to invent a new type ; and
that many disadvantages that we might otherwise find in his proposed type ought to
have little weight in our judgment, seeing the pressing and urgent necessity of
adopting a new principle. Now I have got an observation to make upon this new
type of ship. The author has not given us many details, but we all know that, to
jmdge of the qualities of a ship proposed to us, a great many calculations must be
entered into, a great many statements must be made, before we can simply adopt or
reject the idea of the ship presented to us. The details that he has put forward as
to the rudder, and various things of that kind, are all exceedingly good in their
way, and, no doubt, perfectly applicable to old types as well as to new. His prin-
ciple, as far as it is developed, is this : He Bays, speaking of the old types, " The
" ship is only partially and imperfectly defended, and the partial and imperfect
" defence of the battery and of the guns has led you to cover the vital parts of
" a ship with an imperfect protection also. I will do away with that ; I will remove
" the imperfect protection you have given to your gun and armament, and I will

WAR VE88ELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 281

" apply it to your water-lino." What do we find ? The first thing I find that the
Essayist proposes to do, is the very thing that he has found fault with as exemplified
in the old types, namely, " imperfect protection." I will show you at once how it
is. He takes two classes of his proposed ships, and he gives you a belt of 14-inch
armour for the first-class ship, and for the second-class ship 10-inch armour ; and,
to my surprise, it is to taper, 100 feet from the stern of the ship, to one-half its
entire thickness. Thus, this 10-inch armour is to taper to five inches at the bow,
and at the stern it is diminished by twelve inches, so that under the counter he has
only two inches of armour. Now, it is undeniable, that tapered armour plating is,
in a certain sense, a defect ; for a ship is not so strong with armour tapered as she
■would be with armour of the same thickness all over the ship. But it is an in-
evitable necessity, and we all lament the necessity which prevents us from pro-
tecting the extremities or any part of a ship with 10 and 12-inch armour, while we
can defend her sides with 12 and 14rinch plates, but it is an inevitable law of
nature, of universal application. Well, in this Essay we find ourselTSs condemned
for having tapered the armour plating in the old ships because of its imperfect pro-
tection, and here is the new ship with a greater taper than we ever ventured on in
the old ships. Therefore, the imperfect protection, instead of being cured in this
new type, remains an imperfect protection still, and liable to be pierced and to be
destroyed at that very water-line, to defend which, he is so ready to make sacrifices.
But let us see what tnese sacrifices are. We have sacrificed the imperfect, though
Tery considerable, protection that we gave to our artillery and to the men who
work the guns. The Essayist takes away the whole of the armour from the guns
and from the men. Now, as has been said at the beginning of this discussion, the
whole object of an ironclad is to contend on equal, or even on better, terms with
another ironclad. If nobody in the world had ever built an ironclad, I do not
know that we should have done so ; but what we did feel was, that as long as any-
body else had got such a weapon, imperfect as it was, full of faults as it was, still
such a weapon was so powerful, that a similar weapon must be provided to contend
against it on, at any rate, not unequal terms. We ask no more. We do not ask,
because it is not possible, to go about in impenetrable ships, free from all hurt to our-
selves while dealing destruction around us ; but we ask that we shall not be caught
at a disadvantage, that we shall have a ship as good as anybody has, and then we,
under Providence, will answer for ourselves. But here the Essayist, in order to
procure this very imperfect protection at the water-line, takes away the whole
protection from the men and from the guns. I ask any one for one moment to
consider what the effect of a broadside of the " Sultan s " 10-inch guns would be
upon that war-ship which he has described, a ship which will carry, I admit, one-third
more guns than the " Hercules " does, because the " Hercules' " battery is limited to
the protection we can afford to give it by armour, and the battery of the new ship is
entirely unprotected, and, therefore, might oppose fifteen guns to the " Hercules' " ten.
But what would be the result at 1,200 yards of shot from the 10-inch guns of the
" Hercules " striking against the battery of a ship built, as the Essayist proposes, of
thin iron. Has any gentleman ever seen a target representing the unarmoured side
of an iron ship, and noticed the effect of the shell striking that target ? If he has,
he will say with me, that the ravage it commits is fearful to look at. And then, as
there is no limitation, no concentration of the armament of such a ship, but as the
guns are spread pretty nearly from one end of the ship to' the other, the aim of the
opposing gunner will be very much easier ; he has a much larger object to fire at ;
he is not bound exactly to fire at the centre of the protected part of the ship. To
do any damage to the protected battery, the fire must be directed to that spot
where the space is limited and the execution uncertain ; but against the unprotected
battery he has only to hit the ship somewhere above the water-line, and he kill*
men by scores, sweeps the decks, destroys the guns, and ruins the structure. I
confess to have very great regard for the gallant Officer who has written this admi-
rable Essay, I hope that his talents may be profitably employed for the benefit of his
country, I wish that every good may befall him in his profession, and that he may
rapidly rise to hold high command in Her Majesty's ships ; but this I should regret ;
I should regret nothing so much as to see him in command of a British war-ship,
manned with 600 men, defended in the manner he has described here, and of the

182 COT THE BEST TYPES OF

tyue just Toferrod to. If fee went into action, I should tfoake hands wina hnn,
knowing the unavailing gallantry he would certainly display, but I -tern pottectly
certain that I should never see him again.

Although I aim very far from having exhausted the observation* I might make
upon this type of ship, I must draw to a conclusion? and although one of the
sery etrangest points of my objeotion to the type which he has so ably advocated is
tins, I can only just hint at it; supposing that the armonr-plafced belt rises $
feet above the water-line, there ate the uptakes, tirowns of the boilers, the whole
motive-power of the ship absolutely undefended either from direct or indirect tiro.
The whip is defended in the most inoonsiBtent way possible, and one might almost
smile if such * subject as this oould be treated m any way except seriously. She is
almost undefended from raking fire ; for strange to say, after all the objection the
Essayist has made to the partial protection afforded by her armour-plating, he has
himself, in this •very mew type that he introduces to our notice, put up what he cafls
a thin bit of armour at the bow and stern. What effect can a thin bit of armour
hare in resisting such shot as those of the 12-inoh guns of the " Devastation " and of
the MMnoh guns of the " Hercules ? " A shot fired witti any sort of command of
height abore whore the amour plating stops in the ship, travels where it pleases,
does what it bkes ; and I urn sorry to say, as effectually condemns that type, and more
dearly than any words I can produce. One would have thought Captain Noel would
have had a word or two to say in favour of the " Inflexible " type, but no : he has
studied the "Inflexible "type, and he finds that her "balance" — a term which,
without meaning any disoourtesy to the gallant officer, I have in Tain endeavoured
to understand is such that on the water being admitted where it may be admitted
if the ship is penetrated by shot, the result will be very unfavourable. Accordingly,
he dislikes her exceedingly. Now I am not competent to stand up and speak of the
qualities of the " Inflexible." She has been designed by those gentlemen whoso
application to this subject, and whose excellent mode of studying those questions in
every way, I hove long known and appreciated, and uherefore I think I may say
with weil-founded oonndence that f have the feifjhest and strongest belief that the
" Inflexible " has been wiandered in every point, that this "balance," which is to
worry thorn a groat deal, has been properly •considered, and the "Inflexible" wS
turn out in ovory respect one of the most ■formidable instruments of war -ever seen
upon an ocean. I see one or two gentlemen connected with naval construction in
this room, and it rasher prevents me from saying a word or two which I should
very much libs to say as to their talent and power to advise and design all that is
wanted tor the British navy. I know this well, having received many proofs of H,
and can speak with perfect impartiality in that matter. But they are present, and
I do not like to praise thorn very much to their faces. So about that I shaH<taT no
more. One or two of them no doubt wul take up the subject of the " Inflexible,**
and say* what I am not able to say from wont of proper acquaintance with the
principles of her design. Hie antJior of this Essay may perhaps endeavour to
jufltsfv in some msasuio the new type of ship by an allusion to the " Shannon,"
therefore I wish to 'make the whole of my observations complete by referring myself
to that ship. The " Shannon " partakes in many respects of the type of vessel ho
has proposed for an ironclad warship. Those gentlemen who are responsible for
our Navy, and the present Controller of the Navy, one of the most practical and
thoroughly esg^eneed seamen in our profession, will tell you that the ship was not
designed as an ironclad at all, that she is a special vessel of war for cruising in dis-
tant regions, protected at the water-line and other places ; never intended to be
reckoned as an ironolad, but intended to protect our commerce wherever that com-
merce may be, and to meet any unarmoured vessel not only on equal terms, but on
terms that will ensure victory. The "Shannon," with her co-mates, was not
designed as an ironolad, and does not rank as an ironclad at all, because they are
cruisers with an armoured belt at the water-line. That does not show that they are
in the least intended to take the place of an ironolad warship ; nor can such a type
of vessel, in ray opinion, ever by any means take the place of an ironclad on equal
terms when she has to engage another. The various remarks that the Essayist
has made about circular ships I must leave others to deal with. Of this I am
perfectly sure, die circular ship presents very remarkable features for special and

WAR VESSELS FOR THB BRITISH NAVY. £83

limited purposes. The csroular ehinis being studied by those naval -architects and
constructors wko are perfectly capable of dealing with the question in every way,
both in its practical construction end as to the scientific retirements which every
vessel that floats on the sea ought to have. Therefore, as I am not in a position
to go into these details, having occupied tout attention far too long, I shall say no
mono o|x>n that subject. I will net alhnis further to the -sailing and unarmoured
cruisers, for it does not appear to me, on reading the Essay carefully, that there is
suggested anything remarkably new. fie has cot -suggested any new type ; and with,
the exception of oertein details which ase extremely well thought out, and which
after all see being carried out more or lose successfully in every new shin, the
whole marrow, pith, and kernel of this essay is the new type of ironclad to engage
the enemy's ironclads. I think I have given this meeting sufficient reasons for not
believing -that that new type ought to be adopted. However great the merit, and
however much we may he indebted to the gallant officer for his production, I behove
that we cannot be wrong in decidedly (as I have done) oondemndcg the new type as
an ironclad vessel of war atte to contend with other ironclad types. I hope in the
mrnarks I have made that I have strictly guarded myself from eaying anything which
might appear offensive, or calculated to give pain to any one, but if I should have
done so, as I said at the beginning, I should wish to -apologise for it, and to say again
that nothing oould be further from my wishes or intentions. I beg to thank you for
the attention with which you have listened to me, and now being my -remarks so an

Mr. Sajbkaby, Director of Naval Construction-: The matter discussed in the
paper is so extremely important that I trust you will not he tired if I speak for
ten minutes or a quarter of An hour on the subject. I find that the ships which
have been put forward of new types by Captain iJoel would cost -about 21 millions
of money, and I suppose, ti&ereibre, we ought to be prepared to discuss pretty
fully has plans before we .go so far as to condemn that which we have already,
and agree to enter upon so lange an expenditure of public money. The ten
first-etas ironclads which he proposes would oost about «i millions, the twenty
ewxmeV-elasB would east about 6 Bullions, and the (four ooast defiance ships would
oost about 3 millions. The six of the second class of ooast defence would coat
about 8 millions more, making altogether forty ironclad ships, at a total of
ySk millions; and then there are besides twenty-four cruising ships, costing
44 mflHonB, making altogether 21 millions. Sir Spencer Robinson has said alreab^y
enough about the " Devastation " to justify me» I think, in saying nothing -about her,
although I proposed to commence my observations by some vemarks about what
Captain Noel calls " coast defence sups." I must confess I was astonished beyond
measure to find reckoned with those coast defence ships not only the " Thunderer"*
and " Devastation," hut also the " Dreadnought" and the " Inflexible." The " Dread-
nought " is a ship with a belt of armour rising everywhere 4 feet out of the water*
withe, deck running right fere and aft 11 feet out of the water, with 14 inches of
sssnour and 14 -knots speed, and with a draught of water that puts her altogether •out
of the list of coast defence ships. Why she should be reckoned among coast defence
nhipti and considered not to be a first-class fighting ship, I cannot imagine. I can
understand why he excludes the " Inflexible "— >he does net believe in her. If you
would give me a minute or two, I think I can show you what it is he fails to under*
stand, because it is realty very easy to be understood. I cannot conceive exactly what
his language is meant to imply any more than Sir Spencer Robinson can, but I think
I see enough of what he -means to show you where his error lies. Suppose this central
part of a ship (Fig. 1) is an armoured part, and these two ends are not armoured,
but that underneath these two ends— that is, under the Water-line— there is* shot-
Fig. 1. Pig. 2.

proof deck. 5ow look at her the other way (Fig. 2). Taking the upper deok of the

284 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

ship 20 feet out of the water, and the fighting-deck 10 feet out of the water, the
armour goes up to the fighting-deck and comes down under the water ; and there is
a shot-proof deck continued under the water in both directions towards the stern,
a a, and towards the bow, b b. If she were light and had not her proper allowance
of coal, this shot-proof deck would be 4 feet under the water, and the fighting-deck
would be 12 feet out of the water. You will see that the areas of these two parts are
together nearly the same as the area of the centre part. Imagine now that you hare

Serforated this thin plating, and filled the two ends of the ship between the shot-proof
ecks and the water-line with water. Suppose, in other words, that these spaces are
quite empty, and that when you let the shot come in they get filled with water. Now,
says Captain Noel, there is nothing to hold the ship up, except the part under the
shot-proof decks. What he means by that I do not know. What is obvious is this:
inasmuch as you have lost the buoyancy which is due to a body of a certain area, 4 feet
thick, you may take this central body, which is armour-plated, of the same area, and if
you take a layer of that 4 feet thick, it is quite obvious if that 4 feet goes down into the
water you have done all that nature asks you to do. The buoyancy has been lost of
the 4 feet abaft the citadel and the 4 feet before the citadel, and she asks you to give
up 4 feet more, i.e., an equivalent bulk of the unpierced part of the ship not pre-
viouslv immersed, and what you will hare now is a ship with a fighting-deck 8 feet
out of the water, and with a shot-proof deck 8 feet under the water, instead of that
which you started with, viz., a light ship with the fighting-deck 12 feet out of the
water, and a shot-proof deck 4 feet under water. But this is not the actual ship. The
ship is this. Let me ask you to imagine now that she is, as she might be, loaded with her
stores ; the fighting deck would then be 10 feet out of the water; she has been pushed
down 2 feet, and the shot-proof deck is 6 feet under the water. Suppose, first, that this
6 feet under the water had been filled in solid with timber. Now will you tell me what
will happen when I shoot into it? Why should the ship sink? All that will happen will
be that so far as the shot ploughs a hole into the solid timber so far a small quantity
of water will go in, but only to fill up the hole actually made by the shot. But you
say, " The ' Inflexible ' has not got a bow filled in with timber like that." No, but
she is filled in with something which excludes water three-fourths as well as timber
does ; she is filled with fuel there, and if the ship is filled with fuel, in sea-going
trim she is brought down in the condition you see, and she excludes water, even
although you punch shot through her from one end to the other of those two places.
Or suppose, on the other hand, she were perfectly light and there were no divisions— I
need hardly tell you the whole of the unarmoured part is divided into numerous
compartments at both ends — but even supposing the ship were light, and there were
no ruel and no divisions, then after perforation of both ends, instead of having a
ship with 10 feet height of battery out of water, you would still have your ship at the
very least with 8 feet out of water. What is there incomprehensible in that ? What
can Captain Noel mean by saying that the ship's safety depends on the part under the
shot-proof decks keeping out the water ? It is the armoured citadel that keeps her (£a
up to the surface, and the fact that the unarmoured ends of the ship are filled in
with fuel, and exclude the water.

Now one word about cruising ships. Some tables are given about the exact
weight of the armour of the belted cruising ships. Perhaps you will take my word
for what I am going to say — I can prove it if it is necessary — it is that Captain
Noel has made a curious error. I do not know precisely whether it is that he has
omitted to multiply by two, but I think that is what it is ; at any rate the weights
of armour he has given here are, taking the least estimate you can, half what they
ought to be. Take page 15. Any one who will multiply 800 feet by 2 for the two
sides of the ship, and will multiply that by 8 for the width of the belt, and will
multiply then by 4} , that being the average thickness of the armour, then by 40,
that being the weight of a square foot of 1-inch plate iron, and will then divide
by 2,240, will discover that instead of having 202 tons, he has about 410 tons. I do
not think it quite fair to us to give us, as the design for a ship, no other particulars as
to weight than these. I am therefore obliged to pass from his belted cruisers with
this remark, that I think Admiral Stewart would call that (pointing to a model of
the " Nelson " and " Northampton ") our belted cruiser. We have not used the
name, but Sir Spencer Bobinson has already said the " Nelson " and " Northamp-

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ton," which is in fact very much the same as was described in this room three years
ago, and of which there is a drawing furnished by me in the XVIIth Volume of the
-Journal for 1873, agrees pretty nearly with the ship proposed by Captain Noel for his
first-class battle ship. Those ships (" Nelson " and " Northampton/') are in fact
Tery much the same sue as what he calls his first-class battle ship, but they hare only
9 inches of armour, whereas for his first-class battle ship he proposes to put 14
inches. They differ from his ship in that they hare no belt armour at the ends.
He proposes, as Sir Spencer Robinson has told you, to make his belt armour at the
stern only 2 inches thick. We do not like 2-inch armour at the ends if we can get
rid of it, and so what wo hare done is to put at the two ends of the ship stores
and fuel, which will exclude water, even if perforated ; but in the " Nelson " and
" Northampton " you find at the stern you get 9 inches of armour, at the bow 9
inches, and anywhere along the belt the same thing. They differ from his ship also
in this, that the guns are protected from bow fire by 9 inches of armour across the
bow. The belt is one foot narrower than his belt ; the armour 9 inches thick instead
of 14 ; the displacement of the ship 7,300 tons, whereas the displacement which he
puts down for his is 7,500 tons ; the ships are therefore about the same size. But
he says he only wants 700 tons of armour for his ship, which is for the line-of-
battle: the "Nelson" and/' Northampton' ' carry 1,700 tons, and they arc only
belted cruisers.

Sir Spbncbb Robinson : Is there side armour ?

Mr. Babnaby : Side armour to the bow guns and to the stern guns. The arma-
ment is two 18-ton guns firing astern and on the broadside, and two firing ahead
and on the broadside. There is therefore a broadside battery of two 18-ton guns,
protected by 9 inches of armour on each side, and the intermediate guns are 12£
tons. The midship part is unarmoured, and I am in the unfortunate position that
I am committed to some extent to the same idea as that of Captain Noel, which has
been handled so roughly by Sir Spencer Robinson. All I say is, whatever can be
said for Captain Noel's ship may be said much more strongly for the " Nelson " and
" Northampton." His second-class ironclad is only to have about the same thick-
ness of armour as these ships have, but what I have told you about the armour
will be sufficient to show you that you cannot place any reliance upon the figures
you find there. It is my duty to say that, and I say it, but you will understand
that an officer in Captain Noel's position cannot be where he would have an oppor-
tunity of going as carefully into a matter of this kind as we should have in Lon-
don. It takes all my time, by night and by day, to make myself master of the
details of my profession, and I am not in the least surprised that he, clever sailor
as he is, trips sometimes when he comes upon our ground.

Sir Spencbb Robinson : Are the broadside guns to be on turntables ?

Mr. Babnaby : No ; the idea is that the only protected guns are to be these four
18-ton guns. If this ship is engaged in close action with an ironclad, which she may
have to be, although she is not designed as a battle-ship, then naval officers know
how these guns may be laid and fired in a broadside without exposing all the

finners necessarily, either on one side or the other, to the enemy in passing,
here is a magnificent bow-fire from behind 9 inches of armour ; there is also a
magnificent stern fire, and you will see Captain Noel gives no protection whatever
against stern fire. And if it should happen that this ship has to engage an ironclad,
these four midship unarmoured guns can be laid, and you can place yourselves in a
position where your enemy cannot get at you, and fire them in a broadside. You
get therefore the advantage of a large number of guns for which he contends ;
you get your isolated batteries which, though Sir Spencer Robinson does not seem
to approve of, is to my mind undoubtedly an advantage. Inasmuch as the burst-
ing of a shell in a single battery may be serious, the splitting up of the guns into
several batteries commends itself certainly to my judgment. The cost of the
hull and engines of one of these ships is £330,000 ; and I should like to say
in that connection another word about coast-defence ships. £330,000 is the
sum of money which it appears from Captain Noel the Russians have paid
for the "Novgorod," and he seems to consider the "Novgorod," which
mounts two 28-ton guns, is a ship to be commended, having cost £330,000,
and he comes here to say that he thinks we should build ships, not of 2,500 tons,
TOL. XX. U

286 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

but of 8,500 tons of the same kind. These ships would cost three-quarters of a
million of money each. I would say with regard to the " Novgorod," which he says
cost £390,000, you shall hare twenty gunboats going nine knots an hour, carrying a
25-ton gun, for the same money. Which will you hare ? But Captain Noel does
not contend for a " Novgorod " in the Russian style ; he contends for it in Bf r.
Elder's form. But in Mr. Elder's form he introduces a difficulty which Admiral
Popoff has avoided to a great extent. For if the things are slow, and they will be,
and if they are attacked by boats that are fast, and they may be, and these bottle
have torpedoes, which they will have, there is a nice little shelf there under which
you can put the torpedoes. With regard to the battle-ships, I only remind you that
this ship, which wo call a belted cruiser, makes up her 7,800 tons in this manner—
2,800 tons weight of hull, 2,800 tons of engines, guns, stores, coals, 1,700 tons of
armour (vertical and horixontal), and that will make 7,800 tons. Now Captain Noel
tells us that this ship, with 14 inches of armour, is going to be built with about that
total weight ; and he is going to do it with 700 tons of armour. He is going, more-
over, to put a vastly heavier armament in the ship. I think I have said enough to
show that I do not altogether agree with Captain Noel.

Sir Sfbnceb Robin sou : I think Mr. Barnaby misunderstood me when he said I
disliked separate batteries j1 it is the very thing of all others I like most. What I
do object to is an unarmoured battery for an ironclad.

Lieutenant Mbbrton, R.N. : May I be allowed to say a few words, after Captain
Noel has been so roughly handled, on his behalf? I quite agree with what Sir
Spencer Robinson said about the success of the " Audacious " and her class, in answer
to Captain Noel's expressed opinion of them as failures. But Sir Spencer Robinson
and Mr. Barnaby did not allude at all to one point in Captain Noel's Essay that I
think is a very notable one, and that is, Captain Noel points out the very great
inutility of bow-fire, to which so much importance has been given in most of our
ironclads, at the expense of considerable loss of armour in the foremost angles of their
batteries. When you consider two hostile fleets approaching each other at great
■speed, with the captain of each ship's nerves fully stretched to keep his station, and
watching his compasses, if he is a leader of a division, to keep his course exact, so as
to bring his division into contact with the enemy in as perfect a formation as possible,
what would be his irritation to find a gun going off right under his nose when he
least expected it, setting all his compasses swinging, and obscuring the enemy for a
few most valuable moments ; and, finally, the system of attack not likely to be doing
any harm to the enemy at all, as the shot would be striking on, or glancing off, the
thickest defended part of the enemy's ship, that is, the bow ! I think too much value
has been placed on this bow-fire ; it is practically useless, except in the case where
any of our ships might take the ground when in action with shore batteries.

Captain Bedford Pih, R.N., M.P : I should like to move the adjournment of the
discussion. The subject is a very important one, and the hour is now getting rather
late. I beg to give notice that at the adjourned discussion I shall move the follow-
ing resolution : " That this meeting is of opinion that the Essay of Commander
" Gerard Noel, R.N., for which the Medal of this Institution has been awarded this
" year (1876) bears the impress of hasty and ill-considered compilation, and does
41 not point out the best type of war-vessels for the British Navy ; lstly, for oom-
" bined action ; 2ndly, for single cruisers of great speed ; thirdly, for coast defence."

The Chairman : I must beg to inform you that it is not competent for you to
bring forward such a motion in the theatre.

Captain Scott, R.N. : The subject before us is a very important one, and I feel
strongly that we have only touched the edge of it. I think that more extended
diagrams should be brought here, and that what we should discuss is the gradual
development of our fleet, how it may be improved, and the direction that improve-

1 The separation of the guns in the batteries by the traverses he has described.
On the contrary, it meets my entire approbation. Something not unlike this
arrangement, was made in the " Bellerophon," under Mr. Barnabv's directions.
What I objected to, is classing ships with unprotected batteries as ironclad ship*
of the line— U.S. R.

WAR VESSELS FOIL THE BRITISH XAVI\ 287

ment ought to take. I look upon those as points so very important that they cannot
be too much ventilated. I will, therefore, second the adjournment.

Sir Spbnobb Robinson : If the debate is adjourned, it must be upon the Prize
Essay.

The Ohaibman : I quite agree. We must stick to our subject. There are plenty
of opportunities of going into the other questions. We must understand that the
adjournment is for this, and we must endeavour to keep and speak to this as much at
we possibly can.

(Adjourned to the 30th inst.)

Adjourned Discussion.

Thursday, March 30th, 187G.
Admiral Sib HENRY J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

The ChaIBICAN: Before re-opening the discussion I wish to say a few words
on two or three points. The first is the necessity of confining the discussion to the
purpose for which the meeting was summoned, viz., the Prise Essay. It is the only
way in which we can make our proceedings keep within bounds. The next is that
there has been some expression about the province of those gentlemen who have
been kind enough to undertake the laborious and difficult duty of umpires in
deciding on the Essays of candidates for the medal. It should be well understood
that those gentlemen hare undertaken a certain duty, namely, to decide, out of the
various Bssays which have been brought before them, which is the one that they
consider on the whole, after duly weighing the various merits of all, is worthy of the
Oold Medal of the year. It does not at all follow that the umpires advocate any
particular points in that Essay ; they are merely deciding on that which they consider
the beet essay, in order that the Council may give the medal to its author ; but
they are not responsible, of course, for the particular opinions given in those essays.
However, we may rely upon one thing, that the high character and long professional
experience of those Officers, who have been kind enough to undertake that very
difficult duty both in the case of the Army, and of the Navy medal, is sufficient
warrant for us to feel well assured that they have adjudged rightly on the point on
which they did judge.

The next point I wished to mention was, that an idea has been put forward
by a gallant Officer about moving a resolution. Wc should well understand that
there is no power to do anything of the sort at these meetings. We meet here —
the members of this Institution, and their friends, and any gentlemen whom they
invite, anybody who can give us information on the military or naval questions
under discussion — and there is a free course for discussion on all these points. But
we are not a general meeting of the members, nor are we in any way authorised to
pass resolutions ; in fact it would be illegal if any meeting of this sort were to
attempt to pass resolutions.

8ir Spbncbr Robinson : Before the discussion commences I beg leave to ask one
question. You have stated, — and I am sure I am extremely obliged to you, and I
should think every member present is extremely obliged to vou, — the part the referees

U 2

288 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

had to take, and how far our discussion was limited by the manner in which they
had discharged the function they were called upon to perform. May I ask was any
naval architect consulted in awarding the merit of this essay ?

The Chairman : I do not know that I am in a position to answer that question
in any way. The Council invite three members, either of the Army or Nary,
as the case may be, to undertake this duty, and I can assure you it is a very
difficult duty indeed. In the case of the military medal there were seventy-nine
Essays, and the referees with many other occupations, some official and many
private, had to read those seventy-nine Essays thoroughly well through, then they
had to meet and give their opinions. The naval Essays were not nearly so numerous,
from whatever cause it might be, but I apprehend it is entirely in the breast of those
gentlemen whether they did or did not consult any other persons. At any rate, X
am not able to say.

Sir Spenceb Robinson : If you could have told me that a naval architect was*
consulted, I should have been very glad to hear it.

General Schombbbo, R.M.A. : I hope I shall not be considered presumptuous in
venturing to speak on this subject not being a sailor, but the Officers of my branch —
I won't say my brother Officers, because we either are, or ought to be, all brother
Officers — may have to fight in those ships, and I naturally feel and always have felt
a very great interest in their construction.

"We cannot put an iron case on our own feelings and everybody who has been in
office, I suppose (as I have), wishes very much he could; but however difficult it
may be, I think as little personal feeling as possible should be shown in considering
this very grave subject. We live in a time when there are changes almost daily in
artillery. The whole system of warfare is revolutionised. Therefore, I think when
a new class of ship is proposed this should not be construed into an attack on by-
gone ships, which have been, perhaps, perfectly suited to by-gone times. We are
proud of our mechanical powers, but I do not think we have any so perfect piece of
mechanism as the old line -of -battle-ship was, to do what she had to do before the
days of shell-guns and steam. We are now trying hard to get something which
will do as well, and it is a very difficult task. I think, therefore, it should be a
subject of gratification to the Naval Service that a young Officer in its ranks has
brought forward his views on this subject with so much modesty and intelligence ad-
Captain Noel has done.

The expressions " success " and " failure " have been used very often. We ought
to qualify them with the adjective " probable," because none of the iron ships that
have been yet constructed have gone through the fiery ordeal of action, and until
that takes place I do not think we can talk of " success " or " failure." We can only
guess, and he will be a very clever officer indeed who will prophesy what the out-
come of a naval engagement will be.

I will now come to Captain Noel's proposed ship for combined action. I perfectly
agree with the main principle he starts with, that looking at the great changes which
have taken place in artillery, the first object to be sought for is that a man-of-war
should bo unsinkable, if possible. I think this is the first desideratum ; and even
protection to the gunners, speed, and coal-carrying power are minor points compared
with it. I feel the greatest satisfaction in seeing the drawing of the " Nelson " and
" Northampton," which very nearly carries out his views. I, for my part, would much
rather go into action in a ship of that sort than anything we have constructed yet. I
think we would all rather run the chance of being smashed than the almost certainty
of being drowned like rats.

I agree with Captain Noel's opinion that the value of bow-fire has perhaps been
rather over-estimated. I think when two fleets are closing (of course this is all
conjecture), probably very few guns will be fired, and the fewer the better. But I also
think he has disregarded protection to the bow and stern ; and I would rather sacrifice
some of his increased armament to get what in fortresses are called " traverses," and
in ships " bulkheads," which would give a certain amount of cover from the raking
fire to which ships may be exposed.

The next subject is the guns themselves. I think all those guns should be on turn-
tables, and if they were placed on turntables I believe you need expose very few men
on the gun-deck ; all the traversing, and running-in and running-out, might be done

WAR VESSELS FOE THE BRITISH NAVr. 289

on the deck below. So that the only men who would be exposed would be No. 1 and
perhaps four or five men to load, who might also be under cover when not actually
engaged in serving the guns. There is also one other point Captain Noel has rather
overlooked, and that is strengthening the deck that covers the boilers, powder maga-
zine, and the men.

The proposed steering apparatus (I speak with great hesitation) seems to me rather
weak.

As to the cruisers of great speed, the subject is rather off my line, but I submit
that the proposed belt might probably diminish the speed under sail ; in war there
must be great difficulty in getting coals, and everything that takes away sailing
power must be a disadvantage to a cruizer.

As to coast defence, I will not enter into the point whether the " Devastation " is
more calculated for coast defence than for cruizing : she is the only one of her class
that has been afloat, and I think the main point of Captain Noel's objection is correct
— that she seems to have too small a margin of flotation. She is perfect if she has
not a hole in her skin, but what will happen if her skin be pierced no one can say.

Then I come to circular ironclads — I should be very sorry to call them " ships "—
I think if you call them " circular batteries " such movable batteries might be of
immense use for the defence of the Thames, Mersey, and our other rivers.

If we do not organise the defence of these rivers and hives of industry before war
comes, it can nover be organised when war does come, and Liverpool and other ports
will be burned to a certainty.

My idea of a gunboat for the defence of the coast of England is a vessel that can
take the sea in any weather and carry the heaviest guns — I do not mean the monstro-
sities in the way of guns we are now trying, but 85-ton guns. Such vessels as could
also keep the sea and rendezvous off Beachy Head or the coast of Ireland in any
weather are what we require.

There is one kind of vessel that has been entirely forgotten, and I am afraid the
piece of ordnance she has to carry is also forgotten ; that is, the mortar-boat. We
Lave no 13-inch rifled mortars, and I think it is a pity that we have not, because
England's power of defence rests in her power of offence, and with 13-inch rifled
mortars I believe we could burn a good many arsenals and dockyards which are con-
sidered unapproachable.

Captain Noel has made a comparison of our fleet with that of other nations. Now
I won't say whether such a comparison is judicious, but when a comparison is made,
I think the conclusions drawn from it should be correct. In the old days of line-of -
battle ships if we had 100, France 50, and Germany 30, we could attempt to draw
comparisons of naval strength. A line-of -battle-ship was a unit of strength that we
could perfectly understand. We knew she could only be sunk (barring the force of
the elements) by a line-of-battle ship. We cannot say that now with regard to tho
new ironclads, which a gunboat might sink ; therefore such comparisons are not
correct. For this reason it is imperative that we should have a very, very large
reserve of ships. In looking at Schomberg's " Chronology " before the commencement
of the war of 1793, 1 find that, roughly, we had 129 line-of-battle ships, 129 frigates,
and about 100 smaller vessels. That force was a much greater naval force than we
have now. This Bubject, reserve of ships, is one that requires Terr grave conside-
ration.

Captain R. A. E. Scott, R.N. : General Schomberg has just spoken of comparisons,
but it is exceedingly difficult to institute any satisfactory comparison.

Unless England can maintain her maritime superiority she must cease to be a great
power amongst nations ; therefore, what she wants is, first, the maximum of efficiency
in her armaments, and, secondly, the minimum of cost.

I find at page 16 of Captain Noel's pamphlet, great prominence is given to the
arming of ocean mail steamers as a sort of supplement to our naval force in time of
war. I think any such expedient would come too late ; it would be a similar mis-
take to that made at the commencement of the Crimean War, when, instead of
-utilising the steam tugs by at once preparing them as gunboats, it was unfortunately
decided to build gunboats, and we all know with what result. Now thingB march on
a great deal faster than at that time, and unless we are thoroughly ready when war
breaks out, we could not afterwards recover the lost ground.

290 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

England, as a first necessity, must be prepared to maintain her lines of traffic with
India and her colonies unbroken, and this can only be done, not, as some have sup*
posed, by removing our merchant steamers from their legitimate trade, but by pre-
serving this trade by rendering our merchant navy which carries it, a navy militant,
by giving them a thorough and intelligent training in times of peace.

It is necessary I should refer to this matter, because when one speaks as to what
class of cruizer is the most needed, one has to bear in mind what cruizers have to do,
or rather, as I hold, what our war cruizers must supplement, which is our armed
Mercantile Marine.

This force, kept fully manned by its own crews, is essential to preserve our com-
merce, which must furnish the sinews of war.

Once interrupt our trade by taking away from the merchant steamers their able-
seamen who are now the Royal Navy Reserve men, and you would destroy your own.
resources.1

The Reserve men must be retained in our merchant vessels, their (Reserve) Cap-
tains commanding them, and thus keep their own ships really prepared at all time*
to meet an enemy's flying cruizers or privateers.

Remember what Raleigh, Drake, and others did of old. How they in poor vessels
were a terror to Spain. Look at what our sailors did in many a cutting-out exploit,
and are not our British seamen able to do the same now ? Let every passenger ship,
then, be prepared to defend herself, her passengers being armed with Snider musket*
and the sailors provided with light guns, torpedoes, and Gatlings, and thus you have
at once your first line of defence — a lino which must be maintained at all hazards-
unbroken. If our foreign trade were to be interrupted, England would soon be
left without commerce.

A great deal has been said about the desirability for the multiplication of lightly
armed British cruizers, but our cruizers must constitute a strong sea police, and be
prepared efficiently to support and protect our Mercantile Marine against capture by
real war ships.

We may talk of fighting in squadrons, or in any other settled manner, but that
would probably not be the way in which an enemy would attack us. For instance,
if we were prepared with very heavy vessels to fight only in the Mediterranean, that
is not where the enemy would go, but he would instead send his powerful ships to-
distant seas, and attack us there. In that case if our cruizers were weakly armed
vessels s of what use would they be ? Are they to run awav from every small or
seeming ironclad ? Certainly not. They must remain and fight to protect our mer-
cantile lines of traffic, keeping up constant communication with each other, so that
if any point in these lines is menaced, it may be made known and defended by a
sufficient force.

Captain Noel speaks of having the cruizers, proposed in his Essay, belted. The-
" Nelson " and " Northampton " are belted ironclad cruizers. The question now in
dispute seems to be, whether our cruizers are to be really efficient for fighting pur-
poses, or to carry small guns only at a high speed. I think a lightly armed cruizer
would be of little use in warfare, for our merchant vessels could give a good account
of privateers v. ho would find they had caught tartars if these were handled as they
ought to, and I expect would be, by well trained Reserve seamen, commanded by
well trained Reserve merchant captains.

Granted this, and it will then be only necessary for our cruizers to be equipped to-
fight with actual men-of-war ; hence we should build cruizers of sufficient size and
power to be useful in all seas and under all circumstances. The question therefore
arises as to what, on the whole, will be the most efficient and economical vessels for
such services.

The " Nelson" and " Northampton " in some respects meet our naval require-

1 On the declaration of war it would, I believe, be necessary for Government to
give a guarantee for the payment of the excess of insurance caused by hostilities, so>
as to prevent English goods from being carried by neutrals. — R. A. E S.

9 The " Iris " and " Mercury," of large size and enormous speed, will only carry
64-poundcrs into action. — R. A. E. S.

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 291

mentfl. They are belted cruizers, and men's minds are going in the direction of
putting some armour on cruizers.

Sir Spencer Robinson told you at the last meeting in this theatre how the thin
aides of an unarmoured vessel built of iron would be driven in by shot, and be
cleared after a few rounds with shell, leaving her a mere wreck. I think therefore
that this serious disadvantage should be well weighed, for England's cruisers should
be ready to fight any foes they might chance to meet. Much difficulty is neces-
sarily experienced by our constructors in trying to keep in advance of the times, and
to make their ships so perfect as to meet every possible requirement of present or of
future warfare.

What at present is required for naval warfare is an important problem. Com-
mencing with weapons of offence, we doubtless want the ram, the torpedo, and the
guns. Every cruizer should, as Captain Noel proposes, be a ram, and should carry
torpedoes ; then as to guns, it is of no use to provide her with guns that won't
penetrate anything and everything she is likely to engage in distant seas ; and there-
lore I take as the smallest gun which would be really effective against the present
thicknesses of armour to be a gun of 18 tons.

The " Nelson" and " Northampton " are to mount four unprotected 12-ton suns
and 2 protected 18-ton guns on each broadside. I think if the armour had been
shortened they might have carried, in lieu of the four unprotected 12-ton guns, two
protected 18-ton guns, and then if wished they could have also mounted two more
18-ton guns outside the shelter of the armour. To give a better idea of what I
think a cruiser's armament should be, 1 will take one of the existing types, viz., the
" Raleigh," a vessel of about the right size for a cruizer, but which is now armed
with shell guns on the broadside, without a single plate-piercing gun amongst them.
These weapons consist of 64-pounden, and what were efficient 6}-ton guns, but are
now turned down to 4}-tons. The " Raleigh " has also one 12-ton revolving gun
forward, and one 12-ton revolving gun aft. The weight of her guns is, 1 believe,
181 tons, and of her powder and shot, 255 tons, giving a total of 436 tons. Now
the " Raleigh " could have mounted two 18-ton revolving guns on the upper deck,,
one forward and one aft, and used the same small rear turn-tables as those
by which her two present 12-ton guns are worked. She could have had two 18-ton
guns upon each broadside worked rapidly by means of similar small turntables, and
have also carried a useful proportion of lighter guns. 1 hold that no ship should
be armed with only heavy ordnance, for without a proportion of light and quick
working guns she is liable to be destroyed by kthe attack of torpedo boats. The
" Raleigh " could have mounted, in addition to six 18-ton guns, four powerful 64-
pounder breech-loading guns — firing large charges of powder with steel shell (which
would pierce ordinary armour), and also with the destructive double shell In
addition to these guns, she could have mounted four breech-loading anti-torpedo
20-pounders (giving very great elevation and depression), which would altogether
make about 180 tons, instead of the 181 tons of her present guns. The supply of
powder and projectiles would weigh about 218 ton% giving a total of 898 tons, so
that the "Raleigh" could have been locally strengthened, and been then given a
most powerful armament well adapted for all the purposes of warfare, in lieu of the
inefficient armament she now carries, and without any increase of weight.

I think it is a great mistake to say, as some have recently done, that effective fire
can only be delivered on the broadside.1 A war vessel should be prepared to fight
an enemy ahead, or to fight an enemy astern ; in fact, the man-of-war should be
prepared to fight at any and at all points ; and she should be so armed as in any
position to be able to bring the greater number of her guns to bear in every direc-
tion. Take the " Raleigh " as I have proposed, she should be armed as an example
of what might bo done ; she would have been able to fire three of the six 18-ton guns
from ahead to 15° abaft the beam, and the other three from astern to 15° before
the beam, the bow guns and the stern guns crossing each other's fire.
~ — ~ ■ p-— ^^~ ^"-™ ^^^^~^^

1 The service ogival-headed projectiles will not bite in armour beyond about 33°
from the perpendicular : flat-headed projectiles will bite at nearly double that
angle. The former being of cast-iron, are liable to break up ; the latter being of
steel are much tougher. — R. A. E. 8.

292 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

On the broadside she could have discharged four 18-ton guns — the two broadside
guns commanding a range from across the bow and stern respectively to 75° training
in the opposite direction, or a total range of 167* for each gun ; so that, excluding
the lighter guns, which hare wide arcs of training, the " Raleigh " would have been
able to fire a broadside from four 18-ton guns, at any enemy, from 15° before to
15° abaft the beam ; and to fire three 18-ton guns in any other direction, either
ahead or astern. I think, however, that our future cruizers of the " Raleigh " class
— but with more beam and a flatter floor, must be armour-plated. A proposal was
made by an admiral to put on an inch of plating, but an inch of plating would be
useless ; it might break up our own weak cast-iron shell, but it would not break up
the steel shell that Brazil and other naval powers are giving their vessels. I think
there is no doubt but that all projectiles used in naval warfare will hereafter be steel
shell, whether intended to be fired against armour-plated ships or for any other
service, because such projectiles would be efficient under all the conditions of
warfare.

The " Northampton " and " Nelson," with their rudders well under water, and
their many water-tight compartments, have great advantages as cruizers ; they have
also two inches of iron deck to protect their boilers, and likewise traverses on the
gun-deck to separate the guns. These ought always to be shut off one from the
other, so that a shell bursting over one gun would not thereby disable the adjoin-
ing gun. There is a further consideration, namely, that when you come to armour-
plate cruizers, whether such vessels will be able to move quickly and to tack under
canvas. My own belief is that they will not ; and 1 look forward to the time when
the present heavy masts and sails will be done away with.1

The weight of the " Nelson " and " Northampton's " three masts, gear, and sails
will probably be between 200 and 300 tons ; take these away and throw their weight
into coals, and see what an advantage you would gain. You would remove the top
hamper, and give far greater speed going head to wind.

It would be a most interesting experiment to take a ship of the " Audacious "
class, with a single lifting screw and sail power, and to keep her out for a certain
time, trying her in every possible way against another vessel of the same class, but
fitted with double screws, and having her masts taken away, and their weight added
in coals.

The mistake often made is to suppose that cruizers are constantly to be steam-
ing at great speed, whereas the fact is that these watchers over our commerce in
time of war would usually be going at a very slow speed, and burning very little
coal. If sailing power be dispensed with, the important question of coaling at sea
becomes prominent. I believe it could be done, but numerous coaling stations and
other needful arrangements should be at once prepared, and not left until we come
to actual warfare.

I will now leave the question as to the best description of cruizer, for I think I
have shown that the future British cruizer should be an ironclad, in fact, all our
future powerful foreign service- vessels should, in my opinion, be armour-plated ;
and I think if we were to thoroughly re-arrange the armaments of our present
ironclads, and to utilise them as cruizers, we should have a very formidable navy
for ocean warfare.

Lately one of the " Minotaur " class had her main deck broadside ports enlarged
at great expense merely to put 12-ton guns in them. For the same cost four 38-
ton guns could have been mounted upon her upper deck, and thus have made her an
efficient war vessel.

Here is a large ironclad that cannot turn quickly, and therefore the very vessel
that ought not to be re-armed merely for broadside fighting ; and yet the ports of
this vessel were enlarged to mount comparatively inefficient guns, which can only be
trained to fire on the broadside, instead: of putting very much more powerful guns
upon the upper deck, where they (the 38-ton guns) could have been mounted so as
to have commanded the whole circle of the horizon.

1 Short masts to carry trysails to steady the ships in a gale, and to give a better
draught to the engines in warm weather, and also to carry square sails when run-
ning free, are desirable.— R. A. E. S.

WAR VESSELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 293

I do not, however, mean to compare this vessel with our modern ironclads, but I
am showing how ships of this type oould be rendered efficient.

During the time I was at the Admiralty, these matters were continually debated ;
and Sir Spencer Robinson and the Constructors, who always supported a policy of
progress, and pushed forward the development of our armaments, know the very
great difficulties that there are in the way of carrying out all such improvements.

The only other vessels I wish to advert to are coast defence vessels.

I think it is the greatest possible mistake for England to possess ironclads that
are not sea-going. I know the contrary has been and is still insisted upon, and that
small ironclads have been consequently built for coast defence.1 I believe that
what we want for coast defence are vessels of as shallow a draught as possible ;
and experience has shown us that we should build our vessels with a flatter floor
and greater beam, which would give more floating power with little loss of speed.

General Schomberg has said, and you will doubtless concur in his view, that our
gunboats should be vessels capable of mounting 85 or 88-ton guns, and be able
to go anywhere round our coasts in order to assemble at any required point.

1 would supplement these powerful gunboats by taking the river and coasting
steamers and making them torpedo vessels.

Then in time of war, look what a numerous musquito fleet you would have,
and how valuable such a fast fleet would be ! Enter their captains and crews now
as Reserve Seamen, and do not waste the present time in inaction, but use it in
judicious preparation. Instead of keeping the captains of merchant steamers in
the grade of Lieutenants of Reserve, let them rise to be Captains of our Reserve
forces.

I must not here refer at length to the merchant seamen who form so important
an element of our maritime strength. We have recently had discussions in this
theatre as to maintaining a sufficient supply of British seamen, but it seems to me
that in the plans of taking seamen from the mercantile marine in war time to
supply the Navy, and in the other proposals made, we are merely groping on the
threshold of the matter, at which lies the root* of England's maritime strength.
To maintain this intact, we must first of all have a very large Reserve ; at the
present time we have none, and there are no arrangements yet made as to how to
man and to maintain the large force of drilled men which will be required for our
ships during war.

Until these arrangements are laid down we cannot proceed satisfactorily in ship-
building ; for different guns and simpler means for working them will be required
with unskilled seamen. With such crews we certainly could not attain to those
results which England must achieve if she wants to keep at the head of nations, and
to maintain intact her maritime superiority, and with it her enormous commercial
wealth.

Captain J. C. Wilsoh , R.N. : It was not my intention originally to have spoken
on this subject at all, but during the last discussion it struck me that the set of
criticism was rather going against the gallant young officer who wrote this very
excellent Essay, and who has received from this Institution its Gold Medal. I am one
of those who think that his essay is excellent in itself, that the principles he has laid
down are clear and distinct, and that whatever its merits or demerits may be, he has
chalked out for us what was in itself a very difficult thing to do ; he has tracked out
for us a line where there was no track before, and one which we can now follow. I
think anyone who writes on this subject hereafter, may possibly improve upon the
essay, because they will have something to guide them, but we must remember when
Captain Noel wrote this Essay, he had nothing whatever to guide him, he had to chalk
out his own line, and I think he has done so very ably. We must remember that
this subject is not dealing with the type of ships that we have in the Navy at the
present time, not with what we are to do with the ships that we have, but the
question is the u best type of war vessels for the British Navy," and I think I may
add without being wrong, " for the future," not for the past. Now, the most telling
criticism on this paper has undoubtedly been that of Sir Spencer Robinson.
8ir Spencer Robinson, wo all know, is on this question perhaps not only the first

1 These might be converted into sea-keeping ships at small expense.— R. A. E. S.

294 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

man in England, but the first man in the world, and therefore I think it Mja a great
deal for Captain Noel's paper, that it should have drawn such a very valuable critic
as the late Controller: butt think Sir Spencer Robinson's criticisms are more confined
to a defence of the ships which he had himself something to do with designing, than
to the suggestions which are brought forward by Captain Noel. Sir Spencer
Robinson evidently was much offended because this young officer spoke of certain
types of ships now in the Navy as being " failures."

Sir Sfsnceb Robiv son : Upon my word and honour, that is the last and most
impossible thing that could have crossed my mind, to take offence at anything that
is written there.

Captain W ilson : If I have said anytlung that is too strong, I regret it ; what I
mean to fay, you criticised very strongly the statement that these ship* were
" failures " ; indeed I think you had very good reason, because I do not think the
bulk of officers of the Navy would venture to call such magnificent ships as we now
have in the fleet, " failures."
Sir Spexcbb Robinson : I found that in the pamphlet.

Captain Wilson : Will you allow me to correct you. I think you have made a
slight error. You gave us to understand that Captain Noel condemned, not only
vessels of the " Audacious" class, but the " Sultan " and other vessels of her class,
which he does not do, with all due deference to you. He says : — " The second class
" represented in the above mentioned article, includes the ' Audacious,' and her five
" sister ships, and the ( Monarch ' as a sea-going turret-ship. The first six of those,
" though powerful vessels, are generally considered failures. That is to say, the first
six ships, meaning the ships of the " Audacious" type. I do not think the bulk of
my brother officers would venture to call even these ships failures ; but Sir Spencer
Robinson told us here that a mistake had been made in these vessels — he called it a
slight mistake. The slight mistake of course is gaged exactly by the amount of iron
concrete ballast which had been put into their double bottoms, and the amount of
sail-power which had to be reduced, and that there is still a tendency to reduce the
sail-power in these ships, and other ships, of a superior type, we see from time
to time ; only two days ago I observed in the Times that the " Sultan" was to have
her mizen-mast taken out of her, the upper spars reduced, and to be rigged as *
barque ; I think that shews conclusively there was a mistake, and although Captain
Noel had hardly reason for his statement that they wero "failures" still there was
at least a slight mistake in them ; they did not come up to the standard which they
were intended to reach when designed. I wish to say, I, for one, entirely approve
of the great principle which underlies the whole of this Essay. That principle is
this, and it was very ably put by my friend General Schomberg, the vitals of
a ship ought to bo protected as much as possible, and that it is a secondary con*
sideration altogether whether the battery is covered or not ; that after the vitals of
the ship, the water-line, the magazines, the engines and the steering gear have been
thoroughly protected, the next consideration is the amount of gun-power you are
to carry on your decks, and in that I quite agree. I would rather go into action
with another ship, ton for ton the same size as my own, my ship made as far a*
possible unsinkablc, but with extra guns on mv decks rather than have the weight in
comparatively thin plates on my sides. Such is my view of the question, and I
think Captain Noel is right in the great principle which underlies the whole of hie
Essay. I think his proposed ship fails in matters of detail. I do not think his
details are as good aa they might be. I quite agree with Mr. Barnaby, and believe
that he is right, and that Captain Noel's calculations are wrong. I also go with
Mr. Barnaby in preferring his ship, the " Northampton," or the " Nelson,' to the
ship proposed by Captain Noel ; but the principle is the same in both oases. I do
not think Captain Noel claims any originality of design. The object of the Essay
was not originality particularly, but to write the best Essay upon the style of ships
that were thought best, and I think he has done good service in drawing attention
to the advantages of these ships. Sir Spencer Robinson in vindicating his own style
of ships, what we may call the " covered bottery ships," described a very harrowing
scene as likely to occur when the uncovered battery ship went into action ana
received a broadside from an enemy with a covered battery at 1,200 yards, — how the
main-deck would become a shambles, how the guns would be dismounted, and the

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 295

•hip have to run away. We all know the inaccuracy of fire at sea, and we also know
that not 50 per cent, of the shot fired from a ship, even in fine weather, would strike
at 1,200 yards. Now take into consideration that the men who are firing the guns
have nerves, in addition, the motion of the ship, and I do not think there is any
great chance of more than 25 per cent., that is to say, one out of four or five shots
striking the ship at all , and as to striking the battery it is a great chance if any
does. Therefore, I think the damage anticipated in that way was much exaggerated.
Now I take the case of the uncovered-battery ship. She has passed inside this
magic circle — she lias run through the 1,200 yards, has got inside of a 1,000, and
opened fire upon her enemy with a covered battery, the ship with the uncovered
battery carrying at least two or four guns more than the one with the covered battery.
I say, whenever she gets within the magio circle, the number of her guns will tell,
and not only will they tell, but they will tell most destructively against the thin
armour which covers the battery of her opponent, and in less than half an hour
she will knock her into a cocked-hat. As to the cruizers I again think Captain Noel
is right. I will not enter into the details. The details in these questions are matter*
for the naval architects ; but I think the principle is correct — protect the vitals of
the ship, give her as much gun-power as you can, as much sail-power as you can,
and then you have a good cruizing ship. I disagree with Captain Scott about the
weight of metal she should carry. I do not think it is a good thing to have no
large guns ; I think he puts the size of his largo guns too high ; but I speak with
all due deference to him. I would rather have more 12-ton, or even smaller guns,
than have a very few 18-ton guns. I prefer number to calibre if of sufficient
power. I also disagree with him in that he prefers a ship being mastless. Where
are you going to get your coals ? Where are your coal depots ? When your coal
is consumed, how are you going to replenish ? Why, it would take half the Fleet to
convoy your colliers alone. No, you must be dependent upon something which will
never be used up, you must be dependent upon your sail-power. Now we go on to
the " Devastation " class, and here also I would like to say one word. Captain
Noel says he does not like the " Devastation'" class of vessel, but he also raises
certain objections to them. Sir Spencer Robinson, however, gave us a very interest-
ing little nursery rhyme the other day about "the reason why I cannot tell,
and Dr. Fell," &c., but X might also quote very much the same sort of thing about
" doctors differing," &c.t I think we certainly see there is a good deal of difference
of opinion between Sir Spencer Robinson and Mr. Barnaby, on this very question of
covered and uncovered batteries.

Sir Spenceb Robinson : I beg leave to say you must have misunderstood me.
I hare no difference of opinion whatever. On the opinion expressed by Mr. Barnaby
as to the uncovered battery of that ship, the " Northampton," I agree with him
entirely.

Captain Wixbon : I was certainly under the impression that you were not quite
unanimous in your opinions.

Sir Spenceb Robinson : Perhaps, if you will allow me to Bay so, I think the way
you have fallen into jour mistake is this. I do not think the " Northampton " is
to be classed as an ironclad fighting ship, but as a belted cruizer she is exactly the
class of ship that I think ought to exist.

Admiral Houston Stbwabt.- The "Nelson" and "Northampton" were not
designed as line-of -battle ships ; exactly the contrary, and they appear in the
Parliamentary programme as protected cruisers. It was never intended that they
should appear in the line-of -battle in any way.

Captain Wilson : I am speaking of them as recommended by Captain Noel.
I only referred to the " Northampton " class as ships I prefer to those he suggested.
With regard to vessels of the " Devastation " class, I think they are very formid-
able ships, but I do not think when the question was brought up here, and they
were referred to by the Constructor of the Navy, that he explained away the
objections which Captain Noel advanced to the " Devastation." If his objections
are explained away, I think there can be little said which is not in favour of such
ships for special purposes. The only thing I have not touched on now are the coast
defence vessels. I here, 1 think, in principle, he is again right, though his details may
be wrong. Mr. Barnaby very clearly showed us the other day, that circular ships of

296 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

the dimensions proposed would be too expensive, and his argument that you could
get a very large number of gunboats for the same money was conclusive against
them, still I think there are circumstances in which such circular vessels would be
useful and even necessary, such as at the mouth of the Thames, the Mersey, and
other places, where they would be infinitely preferable to stationary forts. For
coast defence generally, I do not think they would be so good as thoroughly efficient
gunboats. I will conclude by observing that I consider this Institution is really
very much indebted to Captain Noel for his Essay, which I think is worthy of him ;
still I hope he may yet, after this discussion and the hints which he may gain from
it, look over his paper and re-write it for our general benefit, and thus produce
something even better than the original for which the Gold Medal was awarded.

Captain Bedford Pim, R.N., M.P. : When the meeting was adjourned last Mon-
day, I thought it my duty to give notice that I should move on this occasion, a certain
resolution to the effect " that this meeting is of opinion that the Essay of Commander
" Gerard H. U. Noel, R.N., for which the medal of this Institution lias been awarded
" this year (1876) bears the impress of hasty and ill-considered compilation, and does
" not point out the best type of war-veasel for the British Navy, 1st, for combined
" action ; 2nd, for single cruizers of great speed ; 3rd, for coast defence." At the
time I gave notice I was not aware that Captain Noel was out of the country, and
to press such a resolution would be extremely ungenerous in his absence. I simply
wish to make the explanation why I do not now bring forward my motion.

Captain WliaoK : It would not have been allowed even if Captain Noel had
been present.

The Chairman : Captain Pim did not hear tho observations I made at the com-
mencement of the meeting as he was not then present, therefore, he is not aware
that we are not here in a position to pass resolutions. We are simply here to
discuss certain naval or military questions which are brought before us, and it would
bo positively illegal to move or carry a resolution.

Captain Pim : I suppose it is quite competent for me to say, as a life member in
this society, that I entirely demur to the ruling of the Chairman.

General Sir William CoDBnfGTON : I think I may rise to a question of order : it
is not only the ruling of the Chairman, it is the ruling of the Council.

Captain Pim : I am a life member of the Institution and flatter myself I know
something about the rules and regulations, and still, although it may be the ruling
of the Council, I feel exactly the same, because we are met here on this occasion to
discuss an Essay upon a subject, which, as I consider, is of vital importance to this
country. I look upon this Institution as the first of its sort in the whole world, and
this Prize Essay will go out to the whole world and it will be taken in all parts of the
world as the opinion of the finest — I hope I may say — sailors in the world. Under
these circumstances, when we come here to discuss it, surely a Naval Officer may
express an opinion, and, consequently, move a resolution. I know I heard opinions
expressed \ery strongly indeed, by a naval architect against Captain Noel, in this
room last meeting —very strong opinions indeed were expressed. I am sorry to Bay,
in my opinion, the gallant Officer who has written this Essay, has entirely failed in
carrying out the object which this Institution had in offering a prize. He starts by
telling us " Reviewing our present Navy, we cannot but feel proud of its great
" strength and of its undoubted superiority over that of any nation, or even of any
" other two nations. Our ships are not only numerous, but well-built, powerfully
" armed, and admirably equipped." I beg to join issue at once with the gallant
author of this paper. I feel very strongly indeed, that our ships are not only not
numerous, not only not well built, not only not powerfully armed, but they are not
admirably equipped. I must confess I look with the greatest possible fear and
dread upon the state and condition of our Navy at the present moment. I am not

foinp to place merely my own opinions before this meeting of brother Officers, but
will prove my position by the opinions of the best Officers that ever trod upon a
plank or sailed under a pennant. Captain Noel tells us that the " Hercules and
" Sultan " have been thoroughly tested and found efficient as sea-going ships. He
also tells us that the "Audacious," and her five Bister ships, I suppose he
means her four sister ships — perhaps he did not remember that the " Van-
guard " had sunk — and the " Monarch " are now efficient ships of war, but not of

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 297

a type likely to be increased in number ; and in bis third class be says the
" BeHeropbon " is a typo of that class, and that she is a sea-going ship of deserved
repute. Now, what do we flu d given in evidence before the Committee of Designs,
by, as I said just now, some of the first Officers of this country, prime seamen, and
as good officers as ever stood upon a plank ? I will not, for a moment, venture to

give my own opinion on the matter, but I will take, in the first instance, the present
ontroller of the Navy, Admiral Stuart. I have had the honour of knowing
Admiral Stuart for somo years, and I do not think you will find his superior, as a
sailor, in Her Majesty's Navy. He says : —

"Question 4142. Mr. Reed designed the 'Monarch,' 'Hercules,' 'Belle-
" rophon,1 and ' Audacious ' class to sail as well as sailing ships, and I expected
" that the ' Monarch ' and ' Hercules ' would sail well ; but they do not do so,
" nor do the ' Audacious ' and ' Vanguard.' "

Again, what does Admiral Sir Thomas Symonds say — I suppose he is an undoubted
authority with every one present in this theatre and in the whole of England I should
imagine — he says : —

" Question 1064. When the ' Hercules ' pitches you will see her spur right out
" of the water, and it is the same with any one of them. They jump out of the
" water in a way that you would hardly believe possible. I have known the ' Her-
" ' cules ' when the Channel Fleet was exercising steam tactics, report, in answer to
" signal, February 5, 1870, off Lisbon, a roll of 27° to starboard, and 25° to port.
" Where would be the water-line heavy armour plating ? "

" Question 1084. I have seen the ' Hercules ' running with everything furled
" upon the mizenmast, and chiefly upon the mainmast with her sail all forward,
" broach to, carry away the wheel ropes, and become perfectly unmanageable without
" steam, and with a nice steady breeze running before the wind at 10 knots."

With regard to the " Audacious " class, the scientific principles upon which they
were built, that of throwing the centre of gravity up high, is one of the most
astounding I have ever heard of in my experience at sea, and I am quite certain the
Honourable Member for Derby would bo horrified at the idea, that because you put
on a heavy deck-load, so long as you make that deck -load sufficiently cumbersome,
the ship becomes more seaworthy — but, however, that was the scientific principle
upon which tbe " Invincible " class was built. This is the report at a trial trip of
the "Invincible," in October, 1870, of which I will read the account to the
meeting : —

" The ' Invincible,' Captain Lambert, in charge of Captain C. Fellowes and
" staff of the Steam Reserve, left Plymouth Sound for the six hours' official steam
" trial. At the time of the ' Invincible's ' leaving the Sound, she was at a draught
" of 21 feet 8 inches aft, and 20 feet 6 inches forward, her double bottom not being
" filled with water, and having no ammunition on board, the object of this trial
" being to test her new screws at a six hours' run of uninterrupted steaming. At
" starting the weather was quite calm, but prior to her return a strong breeze set in
" from the westward with proportionate sea. The ship during the trial was kept
" with the wind abeam, and when she first hove in sight on her return, steaming in
" from the southward, she had the appearance of being almost on her beam ends ;
" and as she approached the Sound it became evident that she was heeling over 17°
" to 18°, and the greatest anxiety prevailed on shore for the safety of the ship.
" Although the ' Invincible ' heeled to this extent, she had not a stitch of canvas
" set, and her topgallant masts were on deck."

And in evidence what is said in answer to—

" Question 3713. Lord Dufferin (Chairman). I never heard any captain con-
" demn his ship more completely than Captain Lambert did, and I have never read
" a report so fatal to a ship as the report of Captain Fellowes, especially as the
" captain of a ship generally (perhaps in a praiseworthy manner on the part of the
" Officer) sounds the praises of his own ship."

As ships they are nearly useless and as fighting machines worse than worthless,
as shown in the evidence of Mr. Wm. Pearse, of the firm of John Elder & Co. He
says in reply to —

" Question 2079. The bottom is generally weak and should be strengthened.

" Question 2080. In fitting the machinery, if we had any doubt of the vessol

298 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

4f
41

*' grounding, we boomed the vessel off from the quay into mid- stream to prevent it,
" knowing that if she touched the bottom even with the water only leaving her
" 10 inches, something would break, either a frame or a bracket plate."

"Question 2085. The 'Audacious ' is very weak, so far as her defensive power
" is concerned. In the first place, the main deck forward and aft of the battery is
" only about 4 feet above the water line. This deck is of 3i-inch fir, and V^th-

inch steel plates, the top side above the main deck is of f th-inch steel plating ;

this is the only protection to prevent a shell going below the main deck to the
" boilers and engines — it would get to the boilers and engines, and also, in my
41 opinion, get to the magazine, seeing that the magazine bulkheads are only of
4t i-inch plating, with two thicknesses of inch teak.

" There are four large ports in the battery having an area of 15 square feet each.
41 1 think rather than make a pretence of protecting guns in that way, that it would
' be better to give them no protection at all."

"Question 2215. When I said that one of these ships would not stand that
" (bumping), I was speaking of circumstances under which an ordinary merchant
4t vessel heavily loaded would stand such bumping."

" Question 2232. Under circumstances in which the ' Audacious ' would in*
" evitably be destroyed, an iron merchant ship might not be damaged."

The other ships now left to us are the "Audacious" the "Triumph," the
" Swifture," and the " Iron Duke," and in my humble opinion they are all equally
bad. I should say that more wretched ships it would be hard to find floating on
the ocean. These ships have been heavily ballasted. I moved for a return in the
House of Commons last year, and I find that has been the case with a great number
of Her Majesty's ships. I heard Sir Spencer Robinson say at the last meeting,
what, of course, we all know perfectly well, that in olden days ships had a certain
establishment of balla«rt. Of course they had ; they were sailing ships ; it was
necessary to put ballast into those ships, because they had their centre of gravity
thrown up high by their batteries ; but I must confess I never heard of putting
ballast in a steamer ; I can hardly conceive such a thing possible as a man sitting
down in his office and designing a ship with tremendous boilers and engines, and no
end of cool on board, and then sending her out to sea and finding that on her trial-
trip she heels over 17° or 18° under bare poles, quietly saying that there was some
alight mistake and then having to put 600 tons of ballast on board that ship.

Sir Sfenceb Robinson : I beg your pardon. The " Sultan " has only 460 tons by
your own returns.

Captain Pim : 400 tons of scrap iron and cement. You are quite right. I beg
your pardon. But ' even if she had 400, or even 4 tons of ballast on board, it
would be equally disgraceful to those who designed her. Now, with regard to the
" Bellerophon," this vessel was pronounced to be the very acme of naval scienoe.
There was no impediment thrown in the way, and she was to be a most perfect
ship. What do we find in the evidence before the Committee on Designs ? Mr. Reed
said, " I freely stake my reputation on the fact that the ' Bellerophon ' cannot mil
*' to steam over 14 knots." Admiral Yelverton reports (Channel Fleet, 1866), " I
" think the ' Bellerophon ' ranks below the ' Lord Clyde/ and on a par with the
" ' Ocean ' and ' Caledonia.' In this respect I was disappointed, for I expected
" much greater speed. In steaming full speed, the ' Bellerophon,' ' Ocean,' and
" ' Caledonia ' were nearly alike."

Everyone knows that the " Caledonia " and " Ocean " are wooden line-of -battle
ships, converted into ironclads to meet an emergency, and their full speed at sea
was 11 knots.

Then Admiral Warden (in 1868) shows that the old ironclad "Achilles," of the
" Warrior " class, averaged a speed of a little under 18 knots, while the " Beller-
" ophon " could only do a fraction over 11 knots an hour. But the most con-
vincing testimony to the inefficiency of the " Bellerophon " was given before the
Admiralty Court, in the case of the steamship " Flamsteed " verrus Her Majesty's
ship " Bellerophon," Captain Richard Wells, of Her Majesty's ship " Bellerophon "
stating, that this ship "lay like a log upon the water when hove to ; that, it there
" was plenty of wind and the sea suited her, she could be kept on her course ; but
" it wa* difficult to keep her off the wind, if the sea did not euit her ; her after

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WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVr. 299

" tails were of no use in keeping her to the wind ; but, on the contrary, had to be
" set to wear the ship j " [a startling novelty] " under sail alone she was unmanage-
*' able/' and " more unmanageable in strong than light winds."

The " Bellerophon " was designed to compete with the " Warrior/* and entirely to
distance her m every respect. " The ' Warrior' was first, and the ' Bellerophon '
last," and further on Admiral Warden says, " Here again we have the ' Achilles/
one of the first ironclads built, distancing, in a run of 100 miles, occupying eight
hours, some of the latest constructed ships, containing generally the most recent

improvements, condenser, Ac., in a very remarkable manner It is to

" be borne in mind that, while the engines of the 'Achilles' develop 5,700 horse-
power, to drive 6,000 tons, those of the 'Bellerophon/ 'Lord Warden/ and
* Lord Clyde/ develop about 6,000, to drive 4,000 tons.' It is a result, I think,
" calculated, to give rise to very serious reflections."

The Chairman : May I ask you to keep as closely as you can to the subject of
our discussion, which is the Prize Essay, and not the conduct — present, future, or
past — of th* Board of Admiralty ?

Captain Pim : If it is not the wish of the meeting that there should be free dis-
cussion on this matter, I really must decline to go on. Sir Spencer Robinson had
an hour and a-half , in which he showed the admirable qualities of his own ships.

The Chaibxak : He very properly criticised the remarks of the Prize Essay, and
did so without one word that would, in any way, hurt anybody else. We want
freely to discuss the Essay, and all the points bearing upon it ; but we do not want
to go into all the details that are not mentioned in it; and we do not want one word
said which could give anybody pain.

Captain Pim : I am sure anyone who knows me would be perfectly certain that
I have no wish to hurt the feelings of anybody. I consider it most painful, but, at
the same time, it is a duty that I have to perform, to show this meeting that we
have about as unreliable a Fleet at this moment as it is possible to have. And you
must bear in mind, I am not saying this for the first time, as something new ; it
was amply discussed in the House of Commons. I wish to show this meeting that
we have about as unreliable a Fleet as it is possible for any nation to have. I am
simply enlarging upon a sentence in this Essay, upon which the Essayist's con-
clusions are based ; and I take it I have a perfect right to do so ; but, if I am not
allowed to give free expression of my views, as an English sailor, all I have to say
is, if there is any responsibility in the matter, you may take it, for I certainly
decline to go on.

Admiral Stuabt : I would ask your permission, as a gallant and distinguished
member of the Legislature has paid me such a high compliment, and one which I
do not deserve, by acknowledging me as an excellent judge of the qualities of
seamen, to explain, with reference to the part of my evidence before the Committee
of Designs, which Captain Pim has selected with reference to sailing armourclad
ships, that the question I was asked was, whether I thought ironclad ships could be
designed to sail well, and that part of my answer on the subject, is picked out. I
merely said that it would appear by the past history of ironclads, in our own Navy and
others, that they could not be designed to sail well, but that did not in any way trench
upon their qualities as ironclads ; it was simply as to whether I thought an ironclad
could be designed to sail as well as ordinary ships ; and I think, in the same
evidence, Mr. Reed gave a very clear explanation of why it was found necessary to
put ballast into these ships, and in that evidence he stated, in designing the
ships, he always contemplated to develop the extraordinary qualities of steadiness
which he wished to arrive at in ships of an entirely new type or design, that it
might be necessary to place some ballast. I do not enter into the question of the
value of that answer, but I think, if certain evidence given before the Committee is
quoted, it would be much fairer to give the whole of the answers that bear upon
the question.

Major MoxesTET?, F.R.S. : Sir Henry Codrington and Gentlemen, I have very
few remarks to make, and I shall endeavour to restrict what I say to the subject
under discussion, especially to that part of it with which I am most familiar. Both
the author of the Essay and its critics agree, and all that ha* been advanced leads
to the conclusion that it will be a very difficult task indeed to meet, in the designs

300 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

of war-ships, the new requirements which recent improvements in artillery hare
rendered necessary ; while, unfortunately, it has also been demonstrated that the*
necessity for meeting them is much greater than it was, and becomes more and
more pressing with each improvement in artillery. I do not intend to offer any
opinion as to the types of vessels which have been recommended, or to criticise
those existing ; but I should wish to remind the meeting that on all hands it haa
been agreed that the defensive power of an armoured vessel, or, in other words, her
armour, must now be confined almost entirely to her vitals — unless that armour is
made thinner and lighter than what is pronounced to be requisite. In these vessel*
(the " Nelson " and " Northampton ") a most ingenious and, what appears to be
an effective plan, explained by Mr. Barnaby, has been adopted for dispensing with
armour in the bow and stern parts of the ship, but in the central part strong
armour is placed, so as to protect the water-line and the machinery. Sir Spencer
Robinson and the Chief Constructor explained that the armament of these vessels is,
in fact, the men and the guns, which are also protected by armour, to a certain extent,
but not so much as they could wish. The Prize Essayist, recognising the great sacrifice
at which even this slight extra protection to the men is obtained, actually recom-
mends, as a better alternative, that the armament and men should be left entirely
unprotected, so as to obtain the maximum offensive power compatible with the
safety of the ship. The discussion has brought out strong arguments in favour of
this alternative.

In these circumstances, I submit that any other alternative that is reasonable
and practicable, which would obviate that sacrifice on the one hand, or that ex-
posure on the other, ought at present to have attentive consideration. I beg to say
that such an alternative existB, viz., the disappearing, or Moncrieff principle, carried
out by hydraulics. It has been submitted in more than one form. On the 1st of
February, 1870, it received very favourable opinions from the Lords Commissioners,
of the Admiralty, but the proposal (which, I dare say, has not been considered in
all its bearings) came from myself — while I was in the employment of the War
Office, applying the disappearing principle to land service — and was therefore
probably considered as a subject which should be first tested by the War Depart-
ment, before any serious application of it was made by the Admiralty. Accordingly,
this course was suggested to the War Office by the Admiralty at the time. At
that date, viz., February, 1870, 1 had not a design for a land service carriage of this
kind prepared, and I regret extremely, both on personal and national grounds, that
the recommendation of the Admiralty did not lead to a trial with such heavy guns
as are required on board ship. The War Office, notwithstanding my earnest
solicitations at subsequent dates, still restrict the application of the disappearing
principle to counterweight carriages, which are not applicable to the Navy, nor so
good for heavy guns on land. The consequence is, that at the present moment we
are discussing the armaments of vessels and their designs, and admitting great and
inevitable difficulties, some of which might have been absent, had that principle
been developed by practical trial. I confidently assert that such trials will at once
remove all hesitation to use it in those ships for which it is adapted. I think most
sailors allow at the present time, that the disappearing principle would be of the
greatest use, if successfully applied. To explain my meaning tako, for example,
this vessel, which has a strong iron deck, 4 feet above the water-line, at the level of
the top of the armour. It stands to reason if you can afford to have the ports 2 or 3
feet above the deck, that is 6 or 7 feet above the water-line, and if you can deliver
fire through these porta as effectually as at present, which I guarantee to do, that a
result of some importance is within reach. The guns can thus be loaded and worked
underneath the armoured deck, where the men and the machinery are entirely pro*
tected by sufficient iron plating or by the water itself. You thereby at once get one
advantage of Captain Noel's proposed vessel, viz., the absence of extra armour,
while at the same time you escape from a disadvantage of this belted cruizer (the
"Nelson"), which Captain Noel endeavours to avoid at the expense of great
exposure. In other words, you obtain the means of carrying a much larger arma-
ment, without loading the vessel with high and extra armour, expressly to protect
the men at the guns j while the protection you do obtain for them, around any of
the guns thus mounted, is not of doubtful strength, but is complete, being the same

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVV. 301

which is provided for the ship itself. As yet I hare only been speaking of the
Application of this principle to broadside guns. That, however, is not the only, or,
in my opinion, the best application of this principle. I think its best and most com-
plete application is to deck guns, for all round fire. The guns in the barbette
towers of the " T6me*raire " are mounted on this principle ; at any rate, I submitted
designs, on the 30th September, 1873, at the request of the Admiralty, for that
Teasel, which I understand hare been carried out by a great engineering firm, with
-some modifications. These guns, however, would have been mounted on this
principle, to much greater advantage, could the towers have been dispensed with.
They very much hamper the service of the gun, and thus cripple its efficiency. The
barbette towers were decided on for the particular -requirements of this vessel
before the disappearing carriages for them were designed. When the armoured
deck has sufficient height to dispense with such towers, great advantages can be
obtained.

The ordinary revolving turret will, I presume, now weigh 350 tons. If so, four
guns could be mounted, with all the advantages of lateral range and protection
afforded by these turrets, with a saving of at least 580 tons top weight. Now, it
lias been explained to us what increase of armament can be substituted for 580
tons ; seeing this, and seeing that the ordinary turret requires at least as high an
armoured deck as is required for my principle, it surprises me, in view of the value
of this large saving in weight, that no attempt has been made in England to apply
that principle in its integrity — that is, in the manner it can be most advantageously
used. At this critical and transition stage in naval design, I hope it may be re-
cognized to be the interest of the State to develop the principle I advocate, along
with other alternatives, so that it may be proved and ready for application by the
naval architect, in any case in which he can use it with advantage and economy.

I should have offered some remarks upon the application of the " Moncrieff "
principle to circular vessels, recommended by Captain Noel in the Prize Essay,
but as this would lead me into details which, I think, are better avoided in this
important discussion, I shall not further occupy your time.

Commander W. Dawson, R.N. : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, the Prize Essay
which we have met together to deliberate upon, and which has met with the approval
of three of our most eminent Admirals, has been spoken of by Sir Spencer Robinson
in a way which shews that the essay is one of very considerable importance, other-
wise it would not have received the marked attention which he has given it. In
his remarks Sir Spencer spoke of the essay, as we should expect a person in his high
position and of his great authority, with great dignity, forbearance, and judgment,
and what he said received very great attention from us all. Nevertheless, I am placed
rather in a difficulty in following Sir Spencor Robinson and commenting upon this
<issay in consequence of the impression which he conveyed, that any suggestion as
to the improvement of former designs, or as to the adoption of new types of ships,
was a reflection upon the designers of the older vessels. But if there be any truth
in such an idea, then the persons who originated those everlasting improvements in
our fleet, are the real authors of these reflections upon the older classes of ships ;
and as the same naval architects described both the older and the newer vessels, they
have been denouncing themselves by these changes. Though it is many years since
the "Vanguard" and her sisters were built, they have not been repeated. Many
other descriptions of broadside ships, and many other types of vessels have been
subsequently built not only under Sir Spencer Robinson's administration, but under
the administration of the present Controller ; and not many weeks ago we were
engaged in this theatre in discussing an altogether novel class of ship, brought
forward by whom ? not by Captain Noel, not by any stranger or outsider, but by
Mr. Reed himself. So that if proposing improvements in the ships previously
built is to be looked upon as an attack on the architects who designed them, then
it is those architects themselves who have attacked themselves. Let us rather cast
aside all feeling of personality, for if personalities are to be brought into this dis-
cussion I should feel extremely awkward in discussing a scientific Essay. Captain
Noel is not an architect, but as an Officer of common sense he has read the writings
of eminent men, he has gone to the works of naval architects, and he has borrowed
ideas from naval architects. The very ship he puts forword in this essay is practically to
VOL. XX. X

302 OX THE BEST TITES OF

all intents and purposes the ship brought forward in this Institution by Mr. Barnaby,.
and discussed by us some three or four years ago. Captain Noel has had the temerity
to offer a few suggestions for altering some of the details of the " Nelson," and those
alterations, it is agreed on all hands, are not improvements, but substantially the
principle which Captain Noel goes upon is the principle recommended in this Insti-
tution by Mr. Barnaby throe years ago, and now embodied in the " Nelson." What
was that principle ? Simply this, that it was far more important forthe purposes of
her own defence that the ship should be able to throw a heavy fire than that her top-
sides should be able to resist a heavy fire. Mr. Barnaby asked, three years ago,
" Are you prepared to throw off so many hundred ton a of armour in order that you
" may obtain so many hundred tons extra of armament?" and the general reply
was, •' Yes, giro us plenty of big guns that we may hit many heavy blows.""
What has been the rule with reference to armament ? Why in all the later iron-
clads there has been a continual diminution in the offensive power of the armament.
We hare an instance in the " Devastation," a ship of 9,000 tons, carrying only 140
tons of ordnance. That is a very limited offensive power for any first-class iron-
clad. A vessel of 9,000 tons displacement required to carry 140 tons of ordnance,
and that 140 tons is necessarily divided into only four untried pieces. If anything
happens to one of these four untried pieces, one-fourth of the armament will be
lost. Besides that, the chances of hitting are very much smaller than Captain
Wilson put it, for I believe that under the best circumstances of firing at a target
it is somewhere about one hit in ten shots ; and it would be much less in firing h>
a naval engagement. The general principle of heavy armament and unprotected
batteries which Captain Noel advocates is really the same as that adopted in the-
" Nelson." It is quite a new idea which Sir Spencer Robinson has brought forward,
and which I am sorry to hear supported by the present Controller, that a ship of this
class is to run away from every hostile vessel that it meets on the high seas if that
hostile ship has a strip of armour over her guns.

Sir Spenceh Robfnson : I beg leave to state that it not my meaning.

Commander Dawsox : She is not to fight a vessel which has armour-proteetioii
to her guns ?

Sir Spbhcrr Bobiksok : She will not fight on equal terms a vessel with armour
protected guns. I said nothing about running away.

Commander Dawson : There are only two ways of dealing with a hostile
vessel at sea. You must cither run away or fight. What is the principle kept in
view in the construction of our ships ? The principle laid down by Sir Spencer
Robinson here. I should not take it up as a mere catch-word if it was not con-
stantly dinned into our cars in the public press from time to time that a special
ship is built to fight another special ship of the same class. That is quite an
absurdity. A special ship is most unlikely ever to meet in hostile encounter a
vessel of the same class. If there were an European war to-morrow, what are the
chances that the " Nelson " would fight a vessel of her exact type ? The chances
are one hundred to one against it. Indeed, she could not find a foreign ship of
the same type, because there is not another such ship in existence, so that she would
not fight at all. Any British ship, large or small, armoured or unarm oured, driven
into a corner — nnd remember British ships have not always got the best legs, and
cannot always run away — should be able to avail herself of a certain amount of
the chances of war, whatever the thickness of their respective hides, the British
ships should have teeth wherewith to attack the enemy and give him a bite.
Bn£ if you take away from British ships their armour- piercing guns, so that thev
cannot pierce hostile armour, if yon do not arm them with projecting sterna, if
you do not provide them with torpedoes, then those unarmoured ships when
attacked by a Japanese, a South American, or a Turkish ironclad, or by a weak
ironclad oi a stronger nation, have no chance for life. Such British ships must
run, and when they cannot run, they must strike the British flag, simply because
they have no teeth to bite with. The teeth (guns, prows, and torpedoes) put into
them is regulated by the thickness of their own hides instead of by that of the'
hides of possible opponent?.

The salient, point which Captain Noel puts forward, has been very wisely fought
shy of in lhi* discussion, namely, the einknbility of ironclads*. The '* Vanpunr.kv

* WAU VESSELS FOB THE BRITISH NAVY. 303

are told, was built to fulfil a certain object ; and wc must not qnestian her
design, because she has fulfilled that object. What object has the " Vanguard "
fulfilled ? She is at the bottom of the Irish Sea. This is the vessel, the design of
which Captain Noel (not knowing she was about to descend to the bottom of the
Irish Sea) ventured to question. But the " Vanguard " is not the only ironclad by
some half dozen that went to the bottom of the sea, without injury to their armour-
plating. Other ironclads have had awkward premonitory abrasions of the skin
tending towards " taking soundings." I am speaking in the presence of many naral
men, wbo will remember various scratches which the skins of iron ships have had
within the last fifteen years. Do not you remember how the " Defence," lying at
Spithead, had a nasty scratch made in her skin by her own anchor ? and how the
"Warrior" had an awkward scratch made in her skhi by some gunboat? The
" Northumberland," too, had a nasty premonitory scratch. And do not you re-
member, Sir Henry (Codrtngton), when you commanded at Devonport, how one of
your ironclads had a very awkward scratch ? Who gave that invulnerable armoured
ship that scratch ? Not another ironclad. No ; a small Irish passenger steamer.
It was in smooth water, and at slow speed. I venture to say, that as Commander-
in-Chief of that Fleet, Sir Henry Codrtngton must have had curious speculations
as to what might have been, had that ironclad been in the open sea in rough water,
and that Irish passenger steamer, going a little faster, had struck that armoured
Teasel a little harder. The consequence might have been that we should have had
as ironclad at the bottom of the English Channel, as well as one at the bottom of
the Irish Channel. What the Essayist has placed in the fore front of requirements.
is the unsinkability of ironclads. He has not given us a complete core for it ; but
he has pointed out a very important defect, which ought to be considered, not only
in the construction of ironclads, but also for the destruction of hostile ships in
battle. If there is anything in this Essay about which I feel sore, it is, that the
writer has unfortunately taken to pieces our own ships. I have long wished to see
all foreign navies taken to pieces in this way; so that every English Officer,
knowing where are the soft points in each foreign ironclad, might know what could
he done for its destruction by his own vessel, however small, in case he were obliged
to contend with a hostile vessel, however large. In this question of doing injury to
the bottoms of ships, the small ship will hare an advantage in the fight over the
longer ship. I mean that an ordinary small, somewhat short and handy, un-
axmoured ship, may not altogether despair, if attacked by a vessel trusting m her
armour alone. I do not mean a ram specially built for the purpose ; but that
those frigates, corvettes, and sloops-of-war, now traversing the seas, if properly
armed at the stem, and protected by armour-piercing guns, would, if driven into a.
corner, have some chance in a fight with long armoured vessels, say like the
" Northumberland." These unarrooured ships and thinner plated ironclads would
have' so fair a chance in the fight with thickly armoured long ships, that the
Captain who attempted to haul down the British flag without trying the fortunes
of war, would deserve to be hung, drawn, and quartered.

There is a chapter in this Essay, the heading of which I do seriously object to,
and that is the chapter headed " Coast Defence Ships." But the existence of that
chapter is not Captain Noel's fault. It was the fault of the Council of this Insti-
tution, with all due deference to you, Sir Henry, for giving him such a title to
write upon. But having such a chapter given, I do not know that Captain Noel
could have treated it better than he has done. I object to that term "coast
defence ships." " Coast defence ships," as applied to the British Islands — what
does it mean ? It means this — sending a certain number of ships to blockade
hostile ports in all weathers. That is England's coast defence ; it is the only float-
ing coast-defence England has ever had. There never has been a ship built in this
country to this day — and this is an historical point — there never has been a ship
built within the memory of any man living for the purpose of the coast defence of
England. Certain ships were built for sea-going purposes, and those ships failed.
I do not blame the naval architects who thus failed, because naval architecture is
an inexact science, in which progress is made by guesswork. I have great respect
for naval architects, but I do not look upon them as people who cannot make
mistakes. These failures were designed by most able men, and science his learned

IT o

304 ON THE BEST TYPES OP

a great deal from these mistakes. So far from blaming those designers! I give them
great credit for their courageous ventures ; for if there had not been such bold
ventures, England's Navy would never have been in the proud position it now
occupies. Do not mistake me, then, when I reflect upon some of the ships of
England. The war ships of England are the pride of England. The whole of
Europe and the whole of America look to the constructive department of the
English Admiralty for examples for the construction of ships of war. Therefore,
it does not at all follow, because we point out the errors of the past, that we are at
all blaming the courageous and talented administrators and designers who have
fallen into those errors. For my part, I do not blame them at all. But what are
these " coast defence ships ? " Vessels built for sea-going purposes, and to blockade
hostile ports. But they were found not to be sea-keeping, or not to be seaworthy.
These unseaworthy or unseakeeping ships were therefore placed in the list of
" ineflectives," but we do not manufacture " ineff ectives " purposely, merely to put
them on the " retired list." These so-called coast defence ships are simply " in-
effectives " placed or the " retired list," some hidden away at Bermuda, others up
the Tamar, and so on — " out of sight, out of mind " — with the hope that they will
pass out of existence as quietly and as soon as possible, seeing that their main-
tenance on the retired list is an expense to the country. Moreover, I do object to
unseaworthy vessels being called English " coast defence ships." A ship which
can manage to weather a gale in the Atlantic might not be able to weather a gale
on the coast of England. For this reason : a Captain of a ship in the middle of the
Atlantic has only to think of the winds and the waves, and he manages the ship
with respect to the winds and the waves ; but a ship caught in Cardigan Bay, with
rocks under her lee, cannot be navigated with reference to the winds or the waves ;
she must be navigated with reference to the rocks under her lee, and, consequently,
the vessel is far more tried as to seaworthiness than she would be if in the middle of
the Atlantic. A ship for the coast defence of England must be far more seaworthy
than if she had to go abroad. Therefore, the greater number of vessels now classed
as coast defence vessels are not properly so colled, in consequence of some being
unseaworthy. The others, which are unseakeeping, cannot be properly so classed,
for they are not designed specially for shallow waters. None of them have the
special requirements wanted in vessels designed for shoal water and stormy seas.
The term " coast defence ships " might be correctly applied to circular vessels,
because they are designed for shallow waters and for the special purposes of inland
waters. In designing a circular vessel for the special purpose of defending the
Thames or the Mersey, a real coast defence vessel might be obtained. I think I
called the circular vessel for sea-going purposes a saucer-shaped diving-bell, but it
might bo made at least a floating structure which would float a battery in inland
waters for special coast defence. What we want, however, is not a special class of
vessel for inland waters, that is to cost £300,000 a-piece — it is not a single costly
vessel of limited usefulness at the mouth of the Thames. What we want, is a
multitude of sea-going and sea-keeping gun -vessels ; the smaller the better ; the
heavier their guns the better ; but they should be vessels which can go anywhere,
and in any weather, and not be caught, as one of our so-called coast defence ships
was, in going from Plymouth to Cork, when the barometer got too low, and the sea
too high, and the Captain put back to Plymouth, reporting that it was a merciful
interposition of Providence that this ironclad vessel got back to harbour at all. That
would not happen to a broad-beamed seaworthy gunboat. Having very shallow
draught of water, such vessels could go over the banks into shoal water, where they
they could not be run down by deep draught ships which could not go there. Shoal
water would, therefore, be a place of safety to vessels of this class. I will only, in
conclusion, say, that so far from looking upon Sir Spencer Robinson's remarks as
being in any way adverse to the ability with which this Prize Essay has been
written by Captain Noel, I look upon Sir Spencer's remarks as the highest compliment
which could have been paid to the judgment of the Referees in selecting this Essay.
With all its faults of detail — and one can see at a glance that some of the figures
arc wrong— still, in its general principles, the Essay recommends itself to me as
worthy of careful consideration ; but I do not say necessarily that in every case
Captain Noel's suggestions oic worthy of adoption.

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 305

Admiral Selwyn : I wish to go a little more into the discussion of the paper, and
lees into the discussion of what has preceded the paper, than many other speakers
hare done. I think if Captain Noel's pamphlet had only been written to draw our
attention to the fact that we have good reason to be dissatisfied with the resisting
powers of our present armour, it would hare had a very valuable effect. I wish to
lay down as an axiom, and I think it will be generally adopted, what all our trials
against armour hare shown us, that wherever armour can be pierced by such guns as
are ordinarily carried at sea, it ought not to be carried at all ; that so far from being
a defence to any battery which it surrounds, it is the very greatest danger, for the
portions of the armour driven in by the shot, far exceed in number the splinters that
would be made, and any damage that oould be done, by shell. Therefore, when we
draw attention to the necessity of armouring only in one part, and not in two or
more widely separated places, making both by that process inefficient, the armour
devoted to keeping the ship above water is decidedly the most important, since it is
very little use to keep your battery intact if your ship won't stay afloat. But now
that armour being incapable of resisting many of the modern guns, and the armour
abovo being positively a danger, both are equally thrown away. He has brought for-
ward, I think, a principle which ought to receive the closest consideration from the
authorities — that it would be wise to limit the application of armour entirely to the
protection of the ship's buoyaucy, unless it can be given (which we have not as yet
dreamt to be possible) in such measure as to entirely protect the battery, after the
primary want has been satisfied. Major Moncrieff has brought forward a plan which
I for one very highly appreciate : it is that of thickening the armour at the water
line, possibly extending it both in height and depth, and fighting the guns below
that armour and below water, bringing them up only to fire, letting them recoil
under cover. With those conditions we can get as well a protected battery as a pro-
tected ship. But there is unfortunately another element of consideration, which is
that the torpedo renders it impossible, where it is employed scientifically, ever to
fight actions abeam at all, at least within its range. It' a torpedo can be launched
from the side of a vessel, and strike the bottom of her enemy lying abeam, I do not
think there is at present any possibility of preventing the destruction which would
ensue resulting in the sinking the vessel, unless by one or both of two methods. One-
is that cellular bottom which I have always advocated. This is said to be impracti-
cable, because the engines must be all in one part, the coal-bunkers must be in one
part, and the vessel cannot be cut up in sufficiently small portions on account of the
large space occupied by the engines and boilers. The second method, which also
commends itself very strongly to my appreciation, is the use of the turbine. The
turbine-propeller can be separated into any number of small machines you please, and
will be equally efficient with the largest propeller going. It is true the increased
engine friction will come in to some extent and diminish its value, but it may be in
the different compartments of the ship, and will draw out the water from any por-
tion of that ship, whereas the screw must necessarily be applied at the end of the
ship, and the friction lost by the long shafting will be probably found very nearly
equal to that lost by the division of the turbine power. But there is this great
advantage in the turbine, that the whole engine-power of the vessel in case of neces-
sity can be devoted to pumping out that vessel as well as propelling. Therefore I
say no future type of ship ought to be considered without reference to those points-
of cellular bottom and devoting the whole engine power to pumping out the vessel.
I know engineers are not in favour of casting away a whole mould-loft of patterns,
and until necessity arises they do not like to adopt new designs. If by these methods
you can havfe a battery protected by the same armour which protects the ship ; if
you can have machinery which can propel the ship and pump her out ; I think you
will do unwisely to deny practically that Commander Noel has given you a useful
basis of thought for the future. It is in that view I think the pamphlet is most
valuable. As regards his proposals for a rudder, I think the time has not arrived
when we can safely put a rudder where he proposes, or move it by the method he has
shown, since the chain would he liable to damage, and the whole steering power
would be gone. I will say further sail power is to my mind an absolute essential of
all sea-keeping ships, and that sail power must be put into ships, not as we have
hitherto put it in, apparently in utter carelessness of whether the ship will stay or

306 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

not, and with an unfortunate result that m moat instances she won t stay at all. It is
clear we must consider the placing of our masts more closely than we haw hitherto
done. Then comes the question of amount of sail, and whether an ironclad can be
propelled at the same rate as any other vessel. I deny that there is anything in the
shape, flotation, weights, or any other eiroasstaaee why the ironclad, with the mag-
nificent models we see here constantly repeated* cannot be propelled by sail-power aa
fast as any Teasel has ever been of that tonnage with proper sail-power. If you amy
the vessels are so built that they cannot by any possibility support sail-power, that
their inclination will be too great under it to be safe, then I say that is a mere fault
of construction, which I think anv engineer would be ashamed to repeat twice. A
person who puts ballast into a ship goes back to thai time which we all recollect
when our line-of -battle ships did carry about ballast with them, because their builder*
did not know how to thicken the bottom ; and Sir William Symonds did away with
it all by putting more oak into the bottom. The " Albion " and many other of his
Tesseis went to sea without one ounce of ballast, and any engineer would hare no
difficulty in so disposing his weights as to keep an iron ship upright without resorting
to brick and cement. The question as to stability is one which I must beg the
members of this Institution to recollect in naval action*, as they will be at present
fought, under steam, is very much less important than it used to be. If you prevent
your ship from rolling, which you do by abandoning that extravagant idea of the
steady platform which gunners have so much insisted on, and which yet has not
enabled them to obtain a very great improvement in fire,— if you consent to come
within a distance within which your shot won't miss, then I think you will find the
stability, or rather the inclination the ship is likely to take during the action, is not
such an element of importance as has been generally supposed ; that is to say , we
•could carry our guns provided they be protected guns, as low as Major Moncrieff
wishes them to be, without any danger of water entering the ports, and with sufficient
•command. The advantages gained are so rtry great over any system which puts the
guns and the weights protecting them on the deck of the ship, that I do not think
many men would choose the other alternative. As to vessels of the " Devastation "
type, I think if designed as sea-going ships we ought to inquire very closely indeed
what amount of coal they can really carry at full power. It has been said over and
over again, if you consent to go at a certain speed you can go a great distance, but
our enemies won't always consent to go at that speed, and if we cannot always equal
them in steaming power without fear of expending all the coals on board wo cannot
•call ours a sea-going vessel at all. Wo must either carry more fuel or carry condensed
fuel. With regard to mastless ships, are they sea-going ships in any true sense of
the term ? Are they such ships as we could blockade a port with ? My experience
has been that it is almost impossible, what with fogs and steamers, to blockade any
port effectually. I should like to see the time come back again when you knew where
jour enemy was going, when you had studied the wind and tide ; but that is to-day
impossible, and it is no use to talk about blockading a port unless you can do better
than the Americans did at Charlestown ; they could not do it — it was utterly impos-
sible to prevent the blockade runnem doing as they pleased. If you, however, rely
on blockading ships you must have sea-going ships. Are you prepared to do that ?
Will a mastless vessel carry to sea sufficient coal to enable her to chase any vessel for
a day or two, and come up with her if possible, and fight her, and then come back to
her station perfectly prepared to perform her duties ? If not, she is not a ** sea-
" keeping " t»hip. Circular ironclads have this to recommend them : that they arc
unmistakcebly, as compared with all mastless chips of deep draught of water, of
enormous advantage. It has been objected that they will not go as fast as ships of
an ordinary type. If any gentleman consults Beaufoy's experiments, he will find that
whereas the resistance of a square plate to forward progress at the rate of 8 knots is
221 lbs. per square foot, the resistance of a sphere of absolutely the same sectional
area is only 64 lb?. Mr. Elder did not propose vessels as built in Russia, but the
lower segments of large spheres of 16,00) tons capacity, and with fine water-lines, aud
the fair way is to compare them for speed when so built with their equals in tonnage.
Their sizo has been objected to because they would not go into docks. What is the
use of putting them into docks ? They might go aground, have their repairs made,
and go off again as soon as required. What they can do, is to carry to sea an enor-

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 307

amount of cool to go across the Atlantic and back at their full speed. What
the/ eaa do, is to carry enormous gun-power : what they can do, is to carry unheard*
of armour) and Major MonerieJf has shown how the guns can be placed below the
decks altogether, can come up to fire, do their work, and disappear. I repeat the first
consideration is the life of the ship — that is to be protected before and exclusive of
the battery altogether, and I think naval architects must look to that. I have often
heard my friend, Mr. Scott Russell ask naval men to express some opinion. He says,
44 If yon only tell us what you want, we will do what you want." I think we do want
that ; and, secondly, that they should be sea-going ships, with such masts, sails,
Mores, and crew as may enable them to keep the sea when they are there.

(Sir £prnck» Koblnson : Would you allow me just two words of personal expla-
nation. I observe two naval Officers, for whom £ have the highest respect, have
certainly misunderstood the object of what I said in respect to this Essay ; both
eeem to think L have rather attacked Captain Noel, and that I have not felt, as they
strongly feel, how extremely indebted we all are, every one in this meeting, every
•one in and out of the Service, to Captain Noel, for the pains he has taken in pro*
<thicing this Essay. Now, I am sure that I used the expression, as often as it occurred
to me to refer to Captain Noel's work, " this very valuable Essay," and I spoke of
him always as its "very talented author;" therefore, I think people who have
censured me for the supposed attack I made upon Captain Noel have entirely mis-
understood what I meant. I did not attack Captain Noel the least in the world,
but I thought his principle, as to tho war-ship required, wrong, and one which it
was the bounden duty of any one who thought it wrong, to oppose. My idea being
not that a ship should not be constructed on the principles laid down by Captain
Noel for some particular service, but that for the particular service for which he
suggests his type, namely, a first class ironclad ship-of-war, to fight another first
class ironclad ship-of-war, it was, I thought, entirely unsuitable, and I said so ; but
my difference with Captain Noel was that and no other, and it was a very lawful
smd legitimate difference of opinion, strongly felt, founded on sufficient reason,
and perfectly legitimate for me or any one else to hold and to express.

Mr. Scott Russell : I have read the paper with extreme interest, and was charmed
to find that such a class of youug men as the one who wrote this paper, is being
brought up to the service of the Navy, which we all know requires a great deal more
of education than the service of past times. As to agreeing with him in everything, I
think it is more the naval Officers' business to criticise his work than mine. I come
here as one of those naval architects and ship-builders in whom a gallant Officer
says he has no implicit confidence. But I beg to say, I came here for quite another
purpose, which has been amply fulfilled. I came here hoping to hear a number of
experienced naval Officers say distinctly, once for all, what 1 have asked them again
and again to do. Now, I have heard more from naval Officers to-day of what they want
their ships to do, than I ever succeeded in heariug beforo ; thorefore I go home a
wiser and I hope a much better man. Now, then, in reply, I will say something
which I hope will gratify you, the naval Officers who have instructed me, and I beg
to say, as distinctly as I can say, that if you will please to lay down as a principle
that you wish everything called a ship-of-war to be a good seaworthy ship, with
good sea-going qualities, I give you my word of honour, as a professional man, that
there is no difficulty in doing so consistently with all the practical purposes you
want ; but I must insist on your first deciding by saying, that you wish every one
of your ships to be a good sea-going, sea-keeping, seaworthy snip, and therefore I
am delighted with the courage some of you have had to say, that you want that.
Now I say I want it most strongly, only 1 am not a sailor. 1 want it most strongly
for this reason. I have been three days and three nights in the Bay of Biscay with
<*normous power trying to carry me ahead, and I have been fifty miles further astern
.at the end of the three days and three nights' work than I was when I began. Now
I ask yon, do you mean to say you will dare to call any ship a decent ship-of-war
that cannot hold her own, and that cannot go ahead against any wind that is blow-
ing? I do not. And as I know that no ship can hold her own in a decent storm,
each as I am familiar with, which cannot go an honest nine knots an hour, so to say,
that any one who will permit a ship-of-war to be built of any sort that goes less
than nine knots an hour, is doing a thing which I, as a ship-builder, would entreat

308 ON THE BEST TYPES OF

you not to do. Therefore, pray do keep to it, that every ship shall be a good
going, sea-worthy ship, and that she shall have such speed and such power at to
enable her to keep the sea in all the probable circumstances which may occur
to her. You say next, she shall be an unsinkable ship. Allow me to say, that you
have only to have the courage to demand it, and take a little trouble to look into it,
and try to find out how it can be so contrived that it shall do what you want, and
have the least practical inconvenience, and I tell you again, upon the word of a pro-
fessional man, there is no difficulty whatever in building you not only a seaworthy
and sea-going ship, but a perfectly unsinkablo man-of-war ; and the -reason I say so
is this, that 1 have built ships again and again intended to be unsinkable ships, and
I tell you that. again and again these have been run down, and ripped open, and
have never once gone to the bottom, or showed the least desire to go to the bottom ;
I then go to the next point, and I say to you, with regard to your ships, allow
me also to say all you have heard about the difficulties of closing doors, and
all those things, and the dangers of this, that, and the other communication and
separation, these are all. nonsense, because if you make up your mind that you
will have it, all the means of doing it are entirely at our fingers' ends : only you
won't say you want it.

The next point I bee to state is this. A great deal has been said of the bad
manoeuvring of .fast ships. Now, allow mo to say to you, that it is perfectly
easy, if you wish it, to make all your ships much more handy than they now
are ; only again I say, go to the Admiralty, and say you must have it, and you
will have it ; and you will have this ship able to turn in a given circle, with a
given length, and a given speed, and I tell you we know the means of getting
it. The next point in the structure of those ships, for which you may throw the
blame upon us, is this, our liability to have to carry ballast and useless weight.
Now, allow me to say, that an infinite deal of nonsense has been talked on the
subject of loading ships in order to make them stable. It is not necessary
in a steam ship, — mind I am talking of a steam ship, and I am not talking of
* a sailing ship, — it is not necessary in a steam ship even to carry one single
pound of ballast for any purpose whatsoever, except to conceal some blunder that
may have been made ; and allow me to tell you why I make so dogmatic and
unlimited an assertion. I do so for this reason. I will suppose your ship has 1,000
horse-propelling power. May I ask you what that propelling power is? That
propelling power is ballast. How many tons do you carry in the shape of water
ballast in the boiler, in the shape of iron ballast, called boiler and engines, and
where is all that ? All that is just where you want to put the ballast. What do
you want then with other ballast ? It is perfectly unnecessary. Allow me also to
say to you, that there is not one single calculation in the stability of a ship which
(in any ships I have ever seen constructed by competent men in my profession) had
the least doubt about it, and that it is as easy to measure before you build the
ship the exact amount of stability she is to havo as it is after. Therefore, suppose
you gentlemen of the Navy say beforehand exactly what top weight you want your
ship to carry, and what amount of sail you want her to carry, and what the condi-
tions are you want to have that ship in when she is put into your hands, and I tell
you it is not the fault of these poor shipbuilders and these poor engineers if there ia
not every quality you desire. I shall conclude by asking you to believe that I do
not talk nonsense when I say this one word. I only ask you to believe what I say
upon my professional experience, and therefore I beg to tell you a secret. Almost
all the ships I have built in my life (and I think I have built perhaps 150) I did not
build as common shipbuilders build them. I did not build them on so much money
for so much a ton of ship, — I did quite another thing. I always made the man
who wanted the ship tell me how much he wanted her to carry ; what voyages he
wanted her to go ; what work he wanted her to do ; what speed she was to hare ;
what, in short, it was his purpose to do. And I never made a contract with him as
to how it was to be done, but I simply said, " Well, if }ou give me so much money
I will put a ship into your hands which does all you want." That is the way in
which I built every successful ship I ever built in my life ; and I say, in |HJff
manner, if you, instead of gettixg out specifications of this, that, and the other
details of construction, will only come together, and write do wn on a piece of paper

WAR VESSELS FOR THE BRITISH NAVY. 309

what you want the ships to do that you are to command when Ton go to sea, I
guarantee that I know plenty of men who would give you exactly the ships you
want.

The Chaibicak : I think that we hare now gone through the subject pretty fully,
and I am sure we shall all agree to thank the Essayist. Whether we do or do
not agree with the details, we must all be gratified that an Officer, and one so
young, has devoted so much of his time and talents, and has done it so successfully
as Commander Noel has done in this Essay. I am sure it is extremely creditable to
him, and we owe him our best thanks.

LECTUKE.

Friday, April 28th, 1876.

Major-General Sir GARNET WOLSELEY, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

&c, &c, in the Chair.

THE TACTICAL POWER OP MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

By Lieut.-Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R.A., A.A.G., S.O.G.I.

According to a fashionable theory of philosophers, the life of a nation
is an exact copy of that of an individual, and passes through the
various stages of candid but credulous childhood, poetical and studious
youth, vigorous manhood and grasping but feeble age. We were
told by "the greatest, wisest, meanest of mankind," that "in the
" youth of a state, arms do flourish ; in the middle age of a state,
" learning; and then both of them together for a time; in the declining
" age of a state, mechanical arts and merchandize." According to
this saying we English, nay, we Europeans, ought to be in a condition
of decrepitude. But, for my part I can see no signs of it at present.
The roads that run from town to town and village to village favour
the march of armies ; the railways that render our trade easy and the
existence of such cities as London possible, serve to collect and feed
monstrous bodies of troops ; the telegraphs carry the orders of com-
manders as well as the messages of traders ; if the sea is covered with
steam merchant ships, it bears up also heavily armed ironclads ; and,
while the present perfection of mechanical art produces a thousand
luxuries hitherto undreamt of, it has also rendered possible the de-
velopment of artillery.

I do not propose to inflict on you even a sketch of the history of
field artillery, but it is necessary for the understanding of our subject
that we should bear in mind how modern anything like a manoeuvring
field battery is. As late as 1799, the artillery train dispatched with the
expedition to the Low Countries had to be improvised for the occasion.
The guns, attached in pairs to battalions, were drawn by heavy horses
driven by Dutch waggoners who walked beside their teams with long
whips. Though Napoleon the First improved his artillery so that he
and his Generals won great battles by its daring employment in
masses, we English entered on the Peninsular war with our field
artillery in a very poor condition. Shortly after the commencement
of the Peninsular war, Wellington wrote : " I shall be obliged to
" leave Spenser's guns behind for want of means of moving them,
41 and I should have been obliged to leave my own if it were not for
" the horses of the Irish Commissariat." A little later, before the
battle of Vimiera (1808) he said : "Our artillery horses are not what

TUB TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD AKTILLEKY. 311

" we ought to Lave ; they have great merit iu their way as cart-horses
*' of dragoons and Irish cart-horses, bought for £12 each! but axe
" mot fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a
" high hand, ought to be able to move." The carriages were in no
better condition. Napier says that the pursuit of the enemy after
Vimiera had to be stopped because " the artillery carriages were so
" shaken as to be scarcely fit for service."

Even so late as the battle of the Alma the guns sent over the river
at a critical period had to be worked partly by officers because the
gunners toiling on foot could not keep pace with them.

la the present day even field batteries can move for short distances
at a gallop, carrying the ganners requisite for the service of the
pieces, while the fire of the guns has increased to an extent which
would then have been considered impossible.

Therefore, in trying to estimate the modern place of field artillery,
we need not study old wars, but may confine ourselves to examples
taken from the last war between France and Germany. The battles
round Metz are especially interesting both because the Germans there
met the flower of the French Army, and because a German artillery
officer, Captain HofEbauer, has given us a most careful and instruc-
tive account of the work of his own arm in those engagements. The
instances we are about to examine are not all set before you as
examples to be followed ; some of them only show what is possible, not
what is to be recommended.

Borny. — Few battle-fields could be more unfavourable than that of
Borny for the action of artillery. It was intersected by ravines, water-
courses, enclosed villages, vineyards, walls, plantations, and hedges;
in fact it is one of those battle-fields where artillery can, as a rule,
move only on the roads. The action commenced by a most plucky
attack made by the advance guard of the 7th corps, the object of the
corps Commander being to grip the enemy and force him to suspend
liia retreat from the right bank of the Moselle, and so give more time
for the turning movement of Prince Frederick Charles.

The French were very superior in numbers at first, and remained
more numerous to the end of the day even when all the available
Prussian troops had come up. Moreover, they were fresh troops and
fought with the knowledge that they could, at the worst, take shelter
under the guns of Metz and her forts, even if forced to give up their
strong defensive position.

Yet, in spite of all disadvantages, we find the artillery pushed well
forward at first, and reinforced as soon as possible by the batteries of
the I. Corps sent on at a rapid trot far in advance of their infantry.
We find the batteries falling naturally into groups or masses whenever
it was possible, and holding their own against both infantry and
artillery fire. We find one of the masses limbering up under fire
and moving to the right flank, which was threatened by the extension
of the French left. An episode is well worth remembering. The right
wing of Vonder Goltz's brigade had dashed into a small pine wood, but
found itself attacked and surrounded by heavy forces of the French.
Hofibauer's battery moved at once to a position about 800 yards from

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THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 313

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several horses being killed or wounded. " Swarms of skirmishers again
" rushed out from Vionville, and the moment became critical. The
" battery had recourse to case, and succeeded in driving the enemy back
" into the village ; but as the close and biting musketry fire continued
" to make many casualties, it retired some 300 or 400 paces and took
" up a fresh position." So here we have an example of batteries
quite unsupported by infantry, yet holding: back large forces of the
enemy's infantry. However, the French continued to gather in swarms,
and the artillery had to fight a delaying action, retreating here, advanc-
ing there, till the Prussian infantry came up.

After this, and throughout the battle, the guns continually checked
the advance of French bodies of troops, while on the other hand it is
remarkable that they often suffered greatly from the fire of infantry
at 1,200 to 1,600 paces.

It is sometimes said that the fire of artillery has little physical, but
only moral effect. Let me quote a paragraph from Hoffbauer's
account, later on in this battle : — " Two dense columns of infantry,
" issuing suddenly from buildings to the north-east and south-east
** (of Flavigny), were shelled by the whole of the batteries at a range
" of 1,500 or 1,600 paces, and retreated to Bezonville, leaving the
*' ground literally covered with corpses, while strong French columns,
" which advanced from the hill to re-occupy the village, shared the
" same fate." Next day the neighbourhood of Flavigny was strewn
with bodies of men, and of a large herd of cattle, which had fled from
the farms, torn and mangled by shells.

It is not my business to describe this or any battle, only to give you
a few suggestive incidents. We find Captain Miiller withdrawing his
battery some 200 paces, so as to bring it into line with the skirmishers
of infantry, which had already retired. Again and again we find
Artillery pushed forward within short distance of the enemy to dis-
engage exhausted or overwhelmed infantry. We find a battery coming
successfully out of a struggle in which it lost so much from the fire
of mitrailleurs that " two guns were rendered temporarily useless by
" want of gunners, and three guns lost so many horses that they
" could not be moved." When WedelTs Infantry Brigade advanced
from Mars la Tour, and lost 65 officers and 2,600 men out of 85
officers and 4,500 men — more than half its strength, being utterly
overwhelmed by numbers — the three supporting batteries had to risk
everything to extricate the infantry. Two of them held their ground
till the enemy's infantry were actually close to the muzzles of the
guns. They were saved in their turn by gallant charges of cavalry.
Bat they were saved !

During the latter portion of the battle, nineteen batteries (114 guns)
held the line between the Bois de Vionville and the high road beyond
Flavigny, supported attacks, and always checked pursuit, because so
long a line can play at once on the front and flanks of the advancing
enemy. Remembering how overmatched the Germans were in
numbers, it is not surprising to find that the casualties were so
numerous that " drivers, and even officers, had to work the guns, some
" of which had temporarily to cease firing for want of gunners."

312 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY,

the enemy, and opened fire to extricate the infantry. The result is
thus stated in his own words : —

" The enemy's columns suddenly disappeared, and their place was
" taken by long lines of skirmishers, one behind another; mitrailleurs
" and guns also opened fire. For a few minutes the battery was
" exposed to a heavy fire from skirmishers in the vineyards of La
" Planchette, adjoining the defile of Montoy, but opening fire with
lk case at 400 paces, it cleared the ground."

The losses of the battery were considerable. Three Officers were
wounded, and all the Officer's horses but one killed or wounded ; but
the desired effect was produced and the battery continued in action
throughout the day. Its losses in this action in killed and wounded
were 29 Officers and men, and 28 horses. The total combatant force
of a Prussian battery is, or was then, 6G Officers and men, and 48
horses.

The total artillery losses in the battle were 138 Officers and men,
and 158 horses. The damages to material were only one gun-carriage,
one limber, and three wheels broken, though the ground was often
dangerous to travel over.

You will find the scanty losses of material compared with men and
horses a very marked feature of artillery combats, quite sufficiently
marked to base tactical reasoning upon as I shall do hereafter.

Mars la Tour, Vionville. — The battle of Mars la Tour or Vionville
on the 16th August was, like that of Borny, undertaken to check
the supposed retreat of Bazaine's army from Metz to Verdun. The
Germans were not aware that the French had four Corps close at hand,
though we cannot be sure that such knowledge, if obtained, would have
materially altered their tactics. Their faith in attack is profound, and
the French army had to be held fast at all hazards to prevent its junc-
tion with MacMahon's retreating columns, and the troops assembled at
Chalons.

The battle commenced by the arrival of the advanced guard of the
5th cavalry division near Tronville. Its battery immediately opened
fire on hostile cavalry near Vionville. Some of the French cavalry
were watering their horses, and the streets of the town were fall of
baggage. The result was a panic. A French battery presently replied.
The three Prussian batteries with the main body rushed on to range
themselves beside their comrades of the advanced guard, and drove
back the enemy. Meanwhile, as usual, the artillery of the nearest
Infantry division was ordered forward by the Corps Commander, and
the battery of its advanced guard soon occupied the position near
Tronville, taking the place of part of the Horse Artillery which was
pushed on to the hill at Vionville. After a few rounds they again
pressed on close to Vionville ; but the French now advanced with
swarms of skirmishers, reoccupied Vionville, and pushed through the
village against the guns. The two batteries closest to the village
having no friendly infantry near them, were ordered to draw back
under cover of the hill ; but Muller's battery — one of those which had
come forward from the infantry division, and was now not far off-
moved up close to the village and came into action under a heavy fire,

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 313

several horses being killed or wounded. " Swarms of skirmishers again
" rushed out from Vionville, and the moment became critical. The
" battery had recourse to case, and succeeded in driving the enemy back
" into the village ; but as the close and biting musketry fire continued
" to make many casualties, it retired some 300 or 400 paces and took
" up a fresh position." So here we have an example of batteries
quite unsupported by infantry, yet holding" back large forces of the
enemy's infantry. However, the French continued to gather in swarms,
and the artillery had to fight a delaying action, retreating here, advanc-
ing there, till the Prussian infantry came up.

(of Flavigny), were shelled by the whole of the batteries at a range

of 1,500 or 1,600 paces, and retreated to Bezonville, leaving the
41 ground literally covered with corpses, while strong French columns,
" which advanced from the hill to re-occupy the village, shared the
" same fate." Next day the neighbourhood of Flavigny was strewn
with bodies of men, and of a large herd of cattle, which had fled from
the farms, torn and mangled by shells.

It is not my business to describe this or any battle, only to give you
a few suggestive incidents. We find Captain Miiller withdratmng his
battery some 200 paces, so as to bring it into line with the skirmishers
of infantry, which had already retired. Again and again we find
artillery pushed forward within short distance of the enemy to dis-
engage exhausted or overwhelmed infantry. We find a battery coming
successfully out of a struggle in which it lost so much from the fire
of mitrailleurs that " two guns were rendered temporarily useless by
44 want of gunners, and three guns lost so many horses that they
" could not be moved." When WedelTs Infantry Brigade advanced
from Mars la Tour, and lost 65 officers and 2,600 men out of 85
officers and 4,500 men — more than half its strength, being utterly
overwhelmed by numbers — the three supporting batteries had to risk
everything to extricate the infantry. Two of them held their ground
till the enemy's infantry were actually close to the mnzzles of the
guns. They were saved in their turn by gallant charges of cavalry.
But they were saved !

314 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

Most of the teams were reduced to two horses. Yet they were not
driven back, and in the evening some of these batteries were actually
sent forward to attack. It was so dusk that at 100 paces enemies
could not be distinguished from friends. More than once they
blundered into the presence of the enemy, and saved themselves by
shell or case.

At the close of the battle the artillerymen were for the most part
exhausted,, many of the men being almost blind and deaf. Most of
the guns were very foul, and several instances of shells jamming in
the bore had occurred in consequence.

The losses in killed and wounded were 42 Officers, 685 men,
1009 horses,1 an average of one Officer, 18 men, and 38 hones per
battery — that is to say, more than one-fourth of the men and more
than three-fourths of the horses. One battery lost 4 Officers, 42 men,
and 50 horses, or about three-quarters of its Officers and men, and
more than its complement of horses.

The losses in material were quite insignificant — one gun carriage,
5 limbers, 8 wheels, a pole, and an axletree seat damaged. They had
fired about 20,000 rounds, of which 19 were case. Want of ammuni-
tion was often experienced.

The ranges were various, from more than 4,000 paces to 800
frequently, and more than once 300 or 400 paces. The enemy often
advanced under fire to within 800 or 900 paces, say, 700 yards, but
were almost always checked at about that range. And the instances
of short ranges generally occurred at decisive moments, when no
attention could be paid to cover.

Oravdoite.

The battle was commenced by the IX Corps sending on through
Verneville the artillery of the 18th Division and the Corps Artillery,
escorted by two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons, to the hill beyond the
valley N.E. of Verneville, within effective range of the enemy, who
were near Amanvillers. The battery of the advanced guard pushed on
and opened fire from near the road N. of Verneville, but shortly after
the Divisional Artillery came up at a trot (not Horse Artillery, mind,)
and, crossing a rather difficult ditch at a gallop, came into action 1,000
paces further forward, and fired at hostile batteries to the west and
south of Montigny la Grange. Presently the Corps Artillery came up
at a trot, and ranged itself on the left of the Divisional Artillery,
along the hill between Verneville and Amanvillers. The enemy
replied from batteries under cover, mitrailleurs, and infantry fire, at
1,000 paces, pushing forward skirmishers even closer. The fire was
so hot that the escorting two squadrons of dragoons were sent back to
Verneville. Many Officers and men fell, but the guns retained their
position, and drove back the French infantry.

Now, the left of the line had been pushed so far forward, acting on
the supposition that they had only the right wing of the French Army
to deal with, that it soon found itself under fire from French Artillery

1 Fighting ttrength, 06 officers and men, 48 hones.

THE TACTICAL FOWEU OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 315

and mitraillenrs on the left and in rear. The left battery, Werner's,
retired a few paces, wheeled outwards, advanced 200 paces, and
opened fire in reply. Bnt in less than half an honr it lost two Officers,
three-fourths of the men, and all the horses except eight. It had,
however, silenced the enemy's mitraillenrs at a range of 900 yards,
when Bnddenly a French battalion, which had been concealed in a near
hollow, appeared close to the battery, "like figures on a stage."
There was no time to fire even with case. Only eight horses were
nnwonnded, yet Captain Werner saved two of his guns. The French
battalion pressed on to the flank of the next battery, whose com-
mander, occupied with his own struggle, had not perceived the fate
of Captain Werner's battery. As soon as he felt the fire of the
chassep6ts, he turned his guns upon the French battalion and dis-
engaged himself, by firing shell at close quarters. Deciding on in-
stantaneous retreat, he saved all his guns and left only one limber on
the field, all its team having been killed. Of course he suffered
severely, " unexampled loss," Hoffbauer calls it.

Now, Gentlemen, here are two batteries surprised by infantry at
close quarters. They are entirely without support. In one case all
the hones but eight and three-fourths of the men are already killed or
wounded. This battery carries off two guns. The other battery
suffers great losses but carries off all its guns.

Then ■ German infantry arrived and the rest of the batteries were
ordered to withdraw one by one to make good their losses. This they
did " with reluctance." Two went and the next one was attacked by
French infantry at 400 paces. It fired case, checked the enemy, and
under command of a lieutenant, followed the rest. Horses had to be
sent for from waggons for the next battery, and infantry fired on it
in flank and rear, the German infantry — a battalion pushed forward
after a time to help the guns — having retired through it. Two of the
guns sustained such losses in limbering up that they could not move
with the others. A lieutenant remained with them and brought them
off after some further loss. Twenty-seven Artillery Officers had been
killed or wounded in this affair, others had lost horses, one limber was
blown up. Remember, this line of guns had been pushed right into
the midst of the enemy. French infantry and mitraillenrs were in
front, on both flanks and in left rear. It was'a Balaklava Charge,
with artillery instead of cavalry, yet all the guns were carried off*
except four from the left battery, which were actually among the
enemy, and only two were permanently retained by the French. But
for lack of horses at a critical moment, not a gun would have been
lost. To show the severity of the French fire at this time, it may be
sufficient to say, that the German fusilier battalion, sent to extricate
the left wing of the artillery, lost in twenty minutes more than half
its numbers and had to retire.

On the other hand we read that when the Saxon corps were
advancing, after the storming of St. Marie aux Ch&nes, two batteries
which were pushed forward, " sustained considerable losses from the
*' enemy's artillery, and especially from swarms of skirmishers which
" had ensconced tliemselves in the folds of tlie ground towards Ran-

316 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN .FIELD ARTILLERY.

** court." Two Officers were wounded, two guns very soon lost all
their horses and nearly all their gunners. The batteries retired but
came into action a little further back.

After all the Saxon artillery were in position, the enemy made
repeated attempts to dislodge them as well as other portions of the
German artillery, which were now massed in the neighbourhood, but
the value of large masses of guns now became apparent. Whatever
point the French selected to attack, their way to it was not only
covered by the direct fire of the guns against which their assault was
directed, but also by the flanking fire of other parts of the great
artillery line. Hoffbauer says, "as a rule the ranges varied from
41 1,800 to 3,200 paces, but they were often much shorter, as for
u example, when the enemy's skirmishers, advancing against our
" front to within 800 paces, were completely stopped by the German
" shells."

Speaking generally of the artillery pushed on in the early part of
the battle, Hoffbauer tells us, that " the principal losses were caused
44 by the chassep6ts of skirmishers, who lay under cover in the
*' furrows, as well as in the ditches of the high road."

Towards the right of the German position the first Army massed
156 Runs, with the fire of which it completely crushed all efforts of
the French to advance, and became so emboldened that it attempted
to push both infantry, cavalry, and artillery through the -defile of
Gravelotte, not understanding that immense masses of the enemy
commanded by their fire both the defile itself and the exit from it.
Some batteries got through with loss, but found themselves in a
perfect hornet's nest of Frenchmen. I cannot forbear giving you a
rather long extract, relating the fortunes of one of these batteries.
The order for it to advance was a mistake, but the conduct of the
battery is worthy of immortal honour. Three Officers had been
wounded, all the Officers' horses had been killed, and the battery had
suffered enormous losses.

" But in spite of the losses both in men and horses, which increased
" from moment to moment, the battery not only bravely held its
*' ground, but also maintained its fire with great effect. Shells were
*' thrown at from 700 to 900 paces, against hostile skirmishers in the
t# hollow road, and at 1,100 paces against Moscou, as well as at shelter
4i trenches and mitrailleurs east and west of that farm.

t; Perceiving the desperate situation of the battery, Lieut.-General
'* Von Schwarz sent his Adjutant through the storm of bullets with an
4* order for it to withdraw across the defile. But so many horses had
** already been disabled that the battery could not be moved, and
u Captain Hasse affirmed that death was preferable to leaving the
*' position unnecessarily. The firing was therefore continued, till at
ki length but one gun could be served, and that by four men only; for
*' all the gunners of the other detachments were either killed or
*■ wounded. The ammunition of its own gun-limbers, as well as thai
4- of a limber of the fourth light battery, was exhausted, and there
** was no more at hand, the lines of waggons not having been able to
" pass the defile."

THE TACTICAL POWER OP MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 317

At this moment the Divisional Commander arrived with three
waggon teams, and repeated the order to retire.

""xlaving refitted nnder fire, as far as was absolutely necessary, the
" battery then retired through the defile, its limbers riddled by
" bullets, the drivers on foot, the guns drawn by two or fonr horses,
" and closely packed with the severely wounded. The movement was
44 made at a walk, and further losses were sustained. Major Coester
" (the Divisional Commander) had a horse killed under him ; the last
" gun was suddenly reduced to one horse, and, heavily laden with.
" wounded men, was obliged to halt for assistance. The battery
" was received at Gravelotte with a loud hurrah, and General Von
" Schwarz embraced the Commander with emotion in the presence of
" the troops. The retreat of this heroic battery was a triumphant
" march, in the real sense of the word."

Another of the batteries which had crossed, though suffering heavy
losses, was partially protected by a low wall, and was able to hold its
ground. Its only supports at first were some weak detachments of
Infantry, and though further reinforcements were sent, they were
invariably cut to pieces as soon as they reached the dangerous point,
by the tremendous fire to which they were exposed !

After a time the French advanced in force, driving before them
hundreds of stragglers from different German battalions, who had-
been in or about Saint Hubert. These runaways rushed through the
battery crushing men and horses together, and obscuring everything -
by clouds of dust. " Captain Gniigge, utterly powerless, saw part of
" his battery swept away in the general confusion ; and when the
" turmoil was over, three guns without limbers, and another unhorsed.
44 limber, were all that remained of the battery in its original posi-
" tion. Collecting, however, a few gunners and infantry men, about
44 thirty in number, he opened fire with case at a distance of from 3C0
44 to 500 paces on the pursuing skirmishers, and repulsed them."
This battery remained in its position until darkness made it impossible
to lay the guns.

During the first attack of the Guard upon St. Privat, the Germans
succeeded in seizing a part of the hill with a detachment of the-
4th Brigade, which was presently attacked by strong columns from
Amanvillers. The important point was in danger of being lost, ancf
there was a great longing for the support of artillery. 44 But the cry
" from the hill for support had already reached the 2nd Batter/ of
" the Guard. Without waiting for orders it advanced up the slope,
44 and coming into action near the hard-pressed infantry, maintained
44 the important point against all attacks. In its advance three guns
" were temporarily left behind, one of them having lost all its
44 drivers. In this position the battery fired on the hostile columna
41 and skirmishers at a range of 800 paces with such effect that they
44 were compelled to halt." But time would fail us were I to attempt
to describe all the striking incidents of the action of artillery in this
remarkable battle. We can only notice further two or three important
facts.

The artillery was as usual employed with great boldness and in

VOL. XX. T

318 THE TACTICAL POWER OP MODEKN HELD ARTILLEKY.

masses. The First Army had at one time 28 batteries — 168 guns
under the same command, and in the same position. The final assault
on St. Privat was prepared by the fire of an encircling mass of 186
guns, to which four batteries were added at the commencement of
the assault, so that there were at that moment 210 guns concen-
trating their fire on the devoted position.

After the capture of St. Privat, the artillery pushed on to hold the
advantage gained. Thus was formed by degrees the last great
artillery mass extending from the Forest de Jaumont by St. Privat to
the Bois de la Cusse, in which mass, finally, 38 batteries (228 guns)
were crowded together. The right wing of this force — about half the
batteries — by its flanking fire, without any infantry attack, con-
strained the 4th French corps first to change front, and then to
retreat.

The ranges in this battle varied between 4,000 paces (in one case
5,000) and 800 paces, for we may consider as exceptional the few
rounds of case occasionally fired at close ranges.

The losses of the artillery amounted to 988 Officers and men killed
and wounded, and 1,563 horses.

They had fired 34,680 rounds, of which 20 were case.

The casualties to material — besides the 2 guns taken by the French
— were:

2 gun carriages, 5 limbers, 2 limber boxes, 16 wheels, 3 breech
pieces, and 1 elevating screw.

Such a list appears ridiculous, but losses of material are always
trifling compared with the number of men and horses killed and
wounded.

Sedan.

Near the beginning of the battle, the German official account
says : —

" The artillery had taken part in the engagement side by side with
" the foremost detachments of infantry"

Here we have the usual pushing on of the artillery at first; but
listen to what comes later : —

" The artillery position of the 2nd Bavarian Corps at Frenois had
" been reinforced by the Crown Prince's order, at 1 o'clock, * * * so
44 that 71 German batteries — 426 guns in all — combined their fire from

three different sides upon the French Army, which was now crowded

together in a confined space. (In the north, 14 batteries of the 11th,
" 12 of the 5th Corps ; in the eaBt, 15 batteries of the Guard Corps; 7
" Saxon and 2 Bavarian on the left bank of the Gironne ; 4 batteries of
" the 8th Division and 6 Bavarian batteries west of La Moncelle ; in the
" south, 1 1 batteries of the 2nd Bavarian Corps in the ground between
" Wadelincourt and Villette). Not only their batteries and foremost
" lines of infantry, bnt also their reserves moving backwards and
" forwards, and the masses of cavalry vainly seeking cover, were
" overwhelmed with such en iron hail, that they fell more and more
" into disorder, and found their power of resistance well nigh broken
" before they were even able to engage in the struggle. The fate of

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 319

" the battle was already, to a certain extent, decided by this deploy-
" meat en masse of the German artillery, even without the farther
*' advance of the infantry."

A little later, the official account says : —

" And so annihilating was the fire of the artillery, that the French
" were scarcely capable of any organized resistance, when the German
" infantry, towards 3 p.m., moved forward from all sides against the
" wood."

Again: —

" But before these measures could come into operation, the already
" enfeebled strength of the enemy was utterly broken by the annihi-
" lating fire of the German artillery. The French Commander-in-
" Chief, from his position at Balan Church, saw the troops which he
" had brought forward gradually melting away."

In the general retrospect of the battle, the official account speaks
thus of the artillery work : —

" The German artillery, in the battle of Sedan, produces an espe-
" cially grand and decisive effect. Only the surprise, undertaken
" daring the morning- mist towards Bazeilles, as demanded by this
" sort of attack, is made by the infantry alone ; but at all parts of
" the extensive battle-field the whole strength of the batteries was
" from the first brought into play. Inserting themselves in the
" columns of route in a position favourable to early deployment, they
" hastened forward to the battle-field with the advanced parties of the
" infantry. The batteries of the 11th and 5th Army Corps, which
" have to traverse the difficult road defile at the Bois de la Falizette,
" deploy, trusting mainly to their own strength, in one long line,
" though opposed to the hostile masses of horse threatening them, and
" with their backs to the Belgian frontier. As a general rule, the
" attack of the infantry is deferred until the artillery has produced its
" full effect. From the Calvaire d'llly, the enemy is almost exclu-
" sively driven off by the fire of the guns, whereupon a few companies
" take possession of this important height without a struggle. The
" shells bursting thickly in the Bois de la Garenne prepare the
" attack of the battalions of the Guard, and spare the tremendous
" losses with which previous victories had been purchased."

Pray remember, that this is not written by an artillery officer. It
is the voice of Yon Moltke, speaking through the historical section of
the General Staff.

Let us now try to gather together the main lessons to be learned
from these battles.

The artillery was as a rule pushed forward in advance of the infantry,
with the object of gaining time and establishing a superiority of fire
early in the battle, so that the infantry should suffer as few losses as
possible, and not be delayed longer than necessary before attacking.
This was done in every case, whether the enemy were superior or inferior
in strength.

We find the artillery always able to hold its ground when attacked
by infantry in front in any formation, even as skirmishers, but suffer-
ing terribly, and sometimes obliged to retreat from infantry lying down

t 2

320 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

behind cover, or in folds of the ground. In such cases there was
always felt the want of some troops fitted to dislodge the annoying1
skirmishers.

Good work was done at both very long and very short ranges, from
4,000 paces (about 3,200 yards), down to 300 or 400 paces. When-
ever it was possible, the batteries closed to 1,000 or 1,500 yards, but
frequently the nature of the ground, or their position on the flanks of
long lines, prevented anything like near approach to the enemy.

The shortest ranges for offensive purposes varied between 1,200
and 800 paces.

The artillery on several occasions broke off from the fight in which
it was immediately engaged and made flank marches in presence of
thte enemy. But here we must remember that the French artillery
was decidedly inferior.

Whenever it could be done, the batteries were massed in long lines,
under the fire of which nothing could continue to exist iu formation,
and this habit became more fixed as the Germans gained experience.

The losses were almost entirely in men and horses ; the batteries
continued in action at the same place after extremely heavy losses,
and, if too hard pressed, succeeded in carrying off their guns.

Guns sometimes held their ground when infantry had to retire.
We shall come to the reasons for this hereafter.

There are no means of ascertaining the actual losses of the enemy
by artillery fire. If we could know them, they would be found trifling
compared with what they will be in the next war, for the Prussians had
no shrapnel, only common shells, and no range-finders. Their guns
were not so powerful as ours, or as theirs are now.

Since the war of 1870, artillery has made certain definite advances.
We shall see the effect of them the next time two great nations take
up arms. Meanwhile, for want of actual war, we must get what light
we can from the experimental practice carried out from time to time.
We have gained some valuable facts from the practice at Oliehampton.
Let us examine them for a few moments.

Experiments at Okehampton.

We need not spend much time over these experiments, but we shall
never understand each other unless we agree, or nearly so, as to tho
amount of practical decisions we have the right to deduce from such
trials. And first we must clearly separate the work on Dartmoor from
that usually carried out at the Shoeburyness experiments, about
which we sometimes read in the papers. The experiments I am
speaking of at Shoeburyness are undertaken to try the actual power
of a gun or a projectile under certain definite conditions. They are
purely scientific, and as the astronomer must have his instruments
marked and moved with the extremest accuracy, as the chemist must
weigh his simple or compound materials to the thousandth part of a
grain, so must the scientific gunner spend much time and trouble in
obtaining accurate results on which to base his calculations.

At Okehampton, on the contrary, every endeavour was made to
bring the conditions as nearly as possible like those of war, always

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 321

remembering that the fire of the enemy cannot be imitated. The
ranges were not measured by any other means than those which will,
I am glad to say, soon be in the possession of every battery.

The fire was sometimes rapid, sometimes slow and deliberate, as it
wonld be in war. The ground was very rough. The batteries came
into position at all sorts of paces, and sometimes the targets were so
placed as to be all but invisible ; or, what is worse, they stood out
against the sky-line in such positions that shells passing over them
burst at unknown distances. The batteries were not selected nor
specially trained for the purpose. Do not imagine that there was any
desire to make the best of the occasion for magnifying the power of
artillery. Snrh an attempt would have been as unworthy as it would
have been f ntile under the experienced eyes of many critics. And, in
the details I am about to bring before you, trifling hits are not counted
as disabling men. We will only take a few examples to illustrate the
power of guns at different ranges. To compare them mentally with
the ranges of the German guns in actual battle, we need only re-
member that the length of paces to yards is about as 4 to 5, so that
4,000 yards and 5,000 paces are nearly equal. I take the 16-pounders
in all cases, because the 9-pounders of the Horse Artillery were new
guns which had not yet received their proper tangent-scales.

At 4,000 yards against a small cavalry column (represented by
targets) 53 yards deep, using percussion shells in all cases : —

6 water-shells fired as a salvo gave 48 hits.

6 shrapnel 140 „

12 water-shells fired independently 165 „

12 shrapnel 189 ,,

Total 36 rounds and 542 „

At 3,000 yards against a body of infantry, about 400 hundred men,
supposed to be in reserve, and represented by the famous dummies,
18 shrapnel with time-fuzes disabled 109 men.

So far the dummies were standing. Now for a crucial test.

At about 2,000 yards (1,950), the dummies being so placed as
to represent a half battalion of infantry in two lines, the first line
kneeling and making every use of cover, some of the men hidden by
rocks, the second line lying down 50 yards behind the first : —

36 shrapnel with time fuzes disabled 44 out of 103 in the first line,
and 6 of the second line lying down.

At 2,000 yards against targets representing 288 mounted cavalry
soldiers in column of squadrons, the frontage being 36 yards and the
depth 53 :—

In nine minutes 36 water-shells gave 3,892 hits.

In five „ 36 shrapnel „ 1,574 „

disabling in the first case 186, and in the second 131 men.

Many of the hits were not deadly ; but, on the other hand, many
of the men were killed over and over again by different shells.
Each of the squadrons was severely hit, and at all heights from the
ground, so that a column of infantry would have Buffered equally.

322 THE TACTICAL POWEE OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

I need not trouble you with the effect at the ranges generally' sup-
posed to be best for artillery — namely, between 2,000 and 1,000 yards
— but come at once to short distances.

A battery under some cover was supposed to be attacked by infantry
advancing from 1,000 yards to 100. At 1,000 yards only the first line
of 100 men in open order and supports about the same number, came
under the fire of the battery, and were allowed four minutes to advance
400 yards. They could not have moved faster, for, in the four minutes,
the range being always 1,000 yards, the projectiles, shrapnel with
time-fuzes : —

71 men out of 100 were disabled in 1st line
24 „ „ 2nd „

It may be said that men moving would hove been more difficult to
hit. But this is not the case, because shrapnel at short ranges covers
with its shower of bullets a large depth— 400 or 500 yards, so that
to have the true range is of very minor importance so long as it is not
taken too long.

The infantry were then supposed to be at 600 yards, and in two
lines, about 150 to 160 in each line, always with open files, rank
entire ; and the artillery detachments were reduced by 3 men each to
represent losses — a liberal reduction. Shrapnel was again fired : —

In two minutes 98 were disabled in 1st line.
» 36 „ 2nd „

Again the range was shortened to 400 yards, and there was a further
reduction of 2 gunners per detachment. Shrapnel were fired : —

In two minutes 117 men were disabled in 1st line

39 „ 2nd „

The infantry had now lost 385 men out of 400 in eight minutes.

At 200 yards only one line was supposed to exist, additional men
having come up from some other force. The battery fired case—
another gunner having been removed from each detachment : —

In one minute 81 men were disabled out of 156.

The range was then reduced to 100 yards. Shrapnel were used,
but put into the gun reversed, so that their percussion fuzes were next
the cartridge : —

In one minute 113 men were disabled out of 156.

Thus, at short ranges from 1,000 yards to 100, the infantry never
showing more than from 200 to 300 men in open order, and latterly
much less : —

In ten minutes firing 579 men were killed or severely wounded,
many of them struck over and over again at the same range.

Taking into consideration the whole of the experiments I have put
before you, is it too much to say that the fire of an English battery of
the present day (and we hope soon to outdo all this) begins to be
effective at about 4,000 yards, is very powerful at 2,000 yards, and may
be said to be annihilating to troops in any formation at 1,000 yards
and under. The ground must of course be supposed to be moderately
open.

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 323

The question then arises, what would the infantry have done against
the guns ? Well, Gentlemen, we are not left entirely without know-
ledge on this point also. Last year (1875) certain experiments were
conducted in India, among which not the least interesting were the
attacks of infantry against guns in shelter-pits, and I will give you the
results. But let us bear in mind that the infantry also had no enemy
firing at them.

On the 25th of February, 40 men of the 48th Regiment were placed
at 800 yards from two gun-pits, containing imitations of guns and
dummy gunners, all posted as serving their guns, whereas in reality
the men would have been more than half the time under cover, to say
nothing of the cover afforded by smoke. The infantry fired for five
minutes : —

Result. — Three men hit in each gun-pit.

On the 13th of March, 40 picked marksmen from the 76th and 107th
Regiments fired for five minutes at two guns in pits. The men selected
their own positions, about 750 yards from the guns : —

Result. — 5 men hit in one pit, 0 in the other.

On the 25th of June, 40 men of the 45th Regiment fired at two guns
in pits for five minutes. Range unknown, afterwards ascertained to
be 770 yards :—

Result. — 1 man hit in one pit, and 0 in the other.

On the same day the experiment was repeated, the 40 men being in
skirmishing order. The range is not given in the official report, but I
suppose it was the same as before — 770 yards : —

Result. — 3 men hit in one pit, 2 in the other.

These results give us an average loss of 2 men per gun in five
minutes, and show that the reduction of 3 men per gun made in the
Okehampton experiments to represent the effect of fire from infantry
advancing from 1,000 yards range to 600 in four minutes, was rather
over than under estimated, especially as the first line would have lost
three-fourths of its strength. Remember that not more than a few
men at a time can see the gunners if they have any cover.

Here we have to face the great question of the comparative physical
and moral power of infantry and artillery, and the moral effect pro-
duced upon one or the other arm by equal losses.

Before attacking this subject, permit me to say that, in my humble
opinion, the principal arm, the mainstay of an army, is, as it has been
and must be long after our time, the Infantry. It is the easiest
trained, the cheapest to place in the field and to keep there, the only arm
which is equally powerful at rest or in motion, the most easily con-
cealed, the simplest in its armament and use. Only infantry can decide
battles and secure the ground won. Whatever may be the increasing
value of artillery, it can never supply the place of a single infantry
soldier. But, on the other hand, the value of artillery has grown
greatly of late years.

If the guns are of no use when in motion, their long range renders
the necessity for their moving much less', and their mobility shortens
the period of weakness. To get the full benefit of that range we need
two additions. The first is the range-finder, which is at last adopted

324 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

in the service ; the second is the telescopic-sight, a specimen of which
has been brought forward by Lieutenant Scott, of the Engineers, to
whom we should all wish good speed in his endeavours to introduce
it. The regularity of range noticed at Okehampton was secured by a
very simple arrangement, which there is no need to publish to all the
world, and we have reason to believe that the flatness of trajectory, and
therefore the effect at all ranges, is in a fair way towards makiug
another considerable step in advance.

We may, therefore, take 4,000 yards as a practicable range for field-
artillery. This means that a gun in action under favourable circum-
stances covers with its fire about 7 square miles of country, and can
change its object from one point to another more than 4 miles distant
from the first, by a simple movement of its trail. In other words, a
column of the enemy on the right flank may be hit, and within a
minute another column on the left flank, more than 4 miles distant
from that at which it originally fired. Such opportunities are, of
course, exceptional. No other kind of mobility can approach this. If
the guns cannot fight in motion, there seems little need for them to
do so.

Since 300 or 400 yards difference in range now matters little to
artillery, the guns have a larger choice of positions than infantry in
ordinary cases, so that they can generally find fair cover. Moreover,
because they need not move much, they can make more use of artificial
shelter. From such shelter they can act either offensively or defen-
sively ; whereas infantry must move out of its cover to attack, and
cavalry can only attack by exposing itself completely.

This quietude of artillery enables it to find the range of its mark
accurately and to fire steadily. The place where its shells burst can be
seen, and the range corrected accordingly if necessary. No infantry
soldier can tell whether his bullet has gone over or under the enemy, or
struck the mark.

The fire of infantry is the collective fire of individual men, and de-
pends for its steadiness on the nerve of individuals. Hands will
tremble and bullets go astray after a rapid movement, even if the
soldiers are not under fire. When to this is added the nervous excite-
ment caused by the bursting of shells in front or in the ranks, and the
sight of huge gaps made in the line or column, there cannot be much
doubt that the average steadiness of nerve, and, therefore, the average
firing must be very small compared with the steadiness of the same
men on the practice-ground during peace.

The fire of artillery is not governed by the average steadiness, bat
by that of officers and serereants, and less steadiness is required to lay a
gun than to hold a rifle straight with its sight properly raised. How
often, think you, would a man look to his sight when advancing under
such fire as guns can now produce? Guns have no nerves to be
shaken, and, the proper orders being given, aiming and firing is as
much a matter of routine as marching. Fifty shells bursting in a
battery will not shake the accuracy of a single gun, if once properly
laid.

I hope you noticed how in the battles before Metz the artillery held

TIIE TACTICAL POWER OP MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 325

its ground sometimes when the infantry had to retire. Yon know
the rule that the loss of one-third is supposed to be abont as much as
infantry can bear without retiring. Some of the German batteries lost
three-fourths of their men, and yet held on and fought their guns.
There was no difference in the men themselves. What was the reason ?
Simply this, that the guns did, as they always will if we let them, act
as anchors to the gunners. Think how much trouble is necessary
before a battery can retire. Somebody must take the initiative of giving
the order, which must be repeated from mouth to mouth. Then the
drivers have to perform a complicated movement, if indeed they are
not under stress of difficulties because they have horses falling
wounded in the midst of the teams. Next, the gunners must attach
the gun to the limber — limber up, as we call it. Only then is the
battery as well able to retire as infantry always is. The gun is, there-
fore, a moral anchor to the gunners.

But it is more than this. Each gun is the rival of its companions in
the battery. In peace its gunners have cherished it. They have, in
good-natured rivalry, struggled to make it first in beauty of polish and
paint for itself and its carriage. They have striven to hide its defects
and glorify its virtues. Gentlemen, they have called it she — need I say
more ?

Well, then, this " she " is not easily deserted, and as a gunner has no
other arms, he fights his gun to the last moment. Without her, he is
disarmed and helpless ; with her, no matter how many of his com-
rades are disabled, the power of fire is almost as great as ever. And
she remains there as steady as a rock, always throwing defiance in the
enemy's face. Surely it is not difficult to see why a battery should
hold its ground, if we will only let it, if we don't teach the gunners to
count the preservation of their guns as an end instead of a means.

But the guns possess a qualify which Nature has mercifully denied
to female creatures generally — that of increasing their individual
strength by combination. The effect of the guns is srreatly increased
by their employment in masses.

Take, for instance, the cavalry experiment at OKehampton, the
model of which is before you. The effect was produced by 36 round*
of water- shell in nine minutes. Meanwhile, after the first six shells
the troopers might have dispersed or galloped under cover. Had six
batteries been there, the same or greater physical effect would have
been produced in an instant of time, and the moral effect would have
been overwhelming.

A battery of 100 guns would, roughly speaking, occupy about a
mile, and in former days a mile was a long range for guns. But now
a line two miles long might fire easily at the same object, and the guns
at one end could protect those at the other by flanking fire. There-
fore every increase of range lends a new argument to the advocates of
massing tactics.

But I cannot find, either in reason or experience, any proof of a
proposition which has lately been brought forward by an able. writer
on defensive tactics — namely, that the guns should be placed some 400
yards behind the infantry. If all the experience of the last war will

326 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODEBN FIELD ARTILLEBY.

not suffice to dispel the idea, neither will Napoleon's maxims, which,
however, may come to our aid. He lavs down the role that artillery
can defend its own front in these words : —

"No infantry, however brave, can with impunity march 1,000 or
" 1,200 yards against a strong battery of artillery well placed and

well served ; before they could accomplish two-thirds the distance,

these men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed."

And again: —

" Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous posi-
" tions, and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as is
" possible without compromising the safety of the guns."

All my pains will have been in vain if the impression remains in
your minds that artillery is a thing to be protected and kept out of
reach of harm. If you treat it so, it will be nothing but an incum-
brance to you. Like the queen at chess, it is either a source of great
strength or weakness, according to the way we use it.

Let us now try to gather our floating ideas into a few definite prin-
ciples. As for details, they must vary according to circumstances.

1st Principle.

Since field artillery can move at a trot, and its fire is of great value
at all stages of a battle and at all ranges, a general should endeavour
to obtain a superiority of artillery as early as possible. To gain this,
his whole or nearly his whole force of guns should be pushed well
forward and massed at the beginning of a combat, so that it may
crush the enemy's artillery in detail as the latter comes into position.

2nd Principle,

Whether acting offensively or defensively, artillery can protect its
own front in ordinary open country, and should not retire before
infantry unless the whole force is retreating.

3rd Principle.

But artillery can be sorely annoyed, or even caused to retire, by the
fire of infantry skirmishers, well concealed in folds of ground or be-
hind walls and trees. Therefore infantry should not attack in any
formation, but, so to say, stalk the guns. And, this being granted,
infantry should always attack guns ; who knows but that they may be
unsupported ?

4dh Principle.

The only reply to such hidden attacks, early in the battle before the
friendly infantry has come up, is by the use of dismounted cavalry ;
or, better still, by mounted men trained to work on foot either as rifle-
men or gunners, and permanently attached to the batteries.

hth Principle.-

Since artillery can take care of itself, provided its flanks are pro-
tected, a line of guns may be deployed, and behind it the infantry may
effect turning movements to act on the enemy's, flank. When such a
flank attack is ready to be delivered, the mass of guns should concen-

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODEBX FIELD ARTILLERY. 327

trate their fire on that part of the enemy's line about to be assailed,
till it is shaken.

6th Principle.

A system of signals should be devised and used, so as to enable a
large number of guns to act simultaneously against the same point.

7th Principle.

When the infantry combat has commenced, as many gnus as pos-
sible should be pushed close up to the enemy, say within 1,000 yards,
or to that distance where they will find the best and nearest positions
to the enemy.

Sth Principle.

When artillery advances to close combat, a considerable number of
men and horses should follow the batteries as near as they can con-
sistently with keeping under cover. If this be done, there is no fear
of leaving the guns in the hands of the enemy. At such moments,
cover becomes a secondary consideration. Artillery, like infantry or
cavalry, in close combat must count on heavy losses in men and horses,
but they must determine to crush the enemy in that part of the fielc),
remembering that u omelettes are not made without breaking of eggs."

9th Principle.

Since a frontal attack can be beaten off at any range, artillery, if it
has a clear space of 1,000 yards in front of it and scouts on flanks,
should not allow itself to be turned from its immediate purpose by the
reported approach of large bodies of infantry. Such attacks may be
neglected till the enemy comes within 1,000 yards.

10th Principle.

Range- finders, telescopes, and scouts are indispensable to the develop-
ment of the full power of artillery ; the same may be said of spare
men, horses, and ammunition. The front line of the battery should
have as few men and horses as possible, and should be fed from the
rear, two or three times over if necessary.

But the great principle of all, and that which must underlie all
minor ones, is that artillery has issued from its childhood and is as
well able to shift for itself as any other arm. This does not mean that
it is independent of the others, but that it is only dependent on them
in the same sense that they are dependent on it. Cavalry should feel
the way, and be ready afterwards to support the guns with the dashing
self-devotion characteristic of its nature and history. The infantry
should never forget that the guns in front may be sorely in need of the
arm which can do everything but move quickly. Artillery is, after all,
only preparing the way for the glorious strife of the foot-soldiers. The
gunners are dying that the infantry may live and win the day. On the
field of battle we are all brothers, and our only rivalry should be to try
which can, at any sacrifice, do most for the common good.

328 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

The Chairman : Gentlemen, I think a discussion upon this very interesting
subject would be of great use to the Army, who will read this lecture in various
parts of the world. We have now heard the subject dealt with from an artillery
point of view, and I have no doubt there are some infantry or cavalry officers present
who would like to discuss Colonel Brackenbury's paper. I would especially call
attention to the fact, that in the illustration Colonel Brackenbury has used with
respect to firing at batteries, the guns were in gun-pits and it would not be always
possible in action for artillery to construct these pits. I think it would be very
advantageous if some cavalry or infantry officer present would be good enough to
give us their opinions on the subject.

Major J. North Creaxock, 95th Regiment : I am not prepared to join issue
in any manner with what Colonel Brackenbury has so ably told us, and I have
great diffidence in offering any opinion. It seems to me, however, there is one
little point Colonel Brackenbury has omitted to state with regard to the experi-
ments at Okehampton, namely, how the guns were attacked by the dummy half
battalion. Did the guns advance, or was the half battalion advanced? I am
inclined to think the battery advanced. He told us that the front of the
dummies representing mounted cavalry in column of squadrons was 36 yards,
but what was the front of the half battalion of infantry? I do not think he
stated that, because it makes a considerable difference if you box up a battalion of
infantry into a compact formation. For it is evident, I think, that the losses
which the infantry would experience under a more lateral formation would be con-
siderably less. Although it is possible to move the guns, I doubt if you could the
dummies, and I am inclined to think, if the batteries advanced and the dummies
were halted, that a considerable difference would be the result. After listening to
Colonel Brackenbury, I must say that I feel that I am rather sorry I am an infantry
soldier, because I do not know what our rdle is to be in the future. He did, however,
leave us one small loop-hole, for he said that although the front of the artillery is
safe, the flank is not equally safe, and the only word of comfort is, that he admits in
the battles he describes, there was sometimes a biting fire from infantry concealed
in furrows and behind trees, so that, to use his own argument, I think there is still
a future left for the infantry soldier. I think everything he laid down was done
in a most fair way, and the result will be, I hope, that it will make us infantry
officers a little more anxious to see what we can do to develop the usefulness of our
branch of the service. It is quite true that, as he expressed it, the guns are a
*' moral " anchor to the gunners ; but I go further and would add they are a
" physical " anchor simply because they cannot run away, as it seems the horses
are always shot. Speaking as a so-called " mounted officer," I suppose I may say
our horses are likelv to be shot also, and therefore we shall not be able to run away.
I think on the whole, then, we are not in such a bad way as might be supposed, and
that the future, for us, above all others, lies in Colonel Brackenbury's remark that
" Infantrv should always attack guns."1

Colonel Lord Wavbkey : I have not the advantage of being either an infantry or
a cavalry officer, neither have I the advantage of the general practice in field
artillery which has been developed so clearly by Colonel Brackenbury on this
occasion, but it seems to me there is one point which might be considered. I
observe as regards the experiments at Okehampton against cavalry and infantry,
the frontal attack which the Colonel has developed is the only attack supposed. I
do not remember that he speaks to any extent of the infantry flank attack, except to
disregard it ; nor is any mention made of a combination whioh I cannot but think
may be effectively formed of light cavalry and horse artillery. Reference has been
made by Colonel Brackenbury to the use of cavalry on one occasion, where he
speaks of the Germans remaining quiet under the observation of masses of the

1 It may be questioned, perhaps, if the lecturer could have drawn the same con-
clusion, viz., advising boldness in pushing on artillery, had the French attacked in
place of remaining on the defensive — when they did attack — the German artillery
would appear to have been greatly compromised and had the fortune of a day's
fight been in the favour of the French, it is difficult to see how the Gorman guns
could have ever been withdrawn.— J. N. C.

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 329

French hone. These troops were almost in line, and their morement could only be
that of a frontal attack. I remember some years since reading a very clever work,
written, I think, by General Smith, of Her Majesty's light cavalry, and edited, as
I now learn, by an officer of the Royal Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry
Brackenbury, in which he lays down as the principle of his operations the combina-
tion of the advance of horse artillery with light cavalry. The matter was reduced
to a mathematical proportion, as indeed all these details should be, and it was there
shown how in successive movements of artillery and cavalry, important ground
might be won and maintained. I cannot but think it would be perfectly possible
to develop Colonel Brackenbury's principle as to the use of dismounted cavalry by
an application of mounted cavalry also. I suppose the application of a corps of
cavalry trained something after the Cossack fashion. The peculiarity of the
Cossack attack is this : that although the soldiers are disciplined and trained to act
together, they work in " schwarm ; " that is to say, in clumps of horsemen, with
whom it is exceedingly difficult to deal in detail. They advance in masses and
retreat in masses ; and if this be borne in mind that it would be perfectly possible
with light guns to make a flank attack on guns on a line of a mile long to envelope
them by swarms of theie light horsemen, and that it would be exceedingly difficult
to disperse these horsemen, who would furnish the means of accumulating an over-
whelming force of fire on the flank of this long line, it will be seen that if the guns
were shaken in this way it would possibly effect a very serious loss on the flanks of
the line of artillery. I may ask how long it would take to wheel up to a flank so
as to resist a flank attack on so long a line? There is another point which struck
me particularly in Colonel Brackenbury's remarks on the concentration of guns.
He says, in the last great attack in the battle of Gravelotte after the capture of
St- Privat, an artillery line was formed extending from the Foret de Jaumont, to
the Bois de la Cusse, in which 228 guns were crowded together. Now, I submit
this to his consideration : whether, assuming the existence of a school of officers
who were trained to this massing of guns and light cavalry, not light cavalry of the
regulation class, but light cavalry trained to act in the Cossack fashion — whether
guns accumulated in such masses would not be deprived of their usefulness by the
very accumulation to which they are indebted for their great strength in resisting a
frontal attack. This is a point which has occurred to me. I derived my idea from
the work that I have referred to, and it has seemed to me that very possibly such a
combination as was suggested in that work which I venture to introduce to your
notice, might increase the very great power that has been so satisfactorily shown to
be developed in our modern field artillery by Colonel Brackenbury, by enabling a
power of attack in movement and resistance combined to be developed, of which, at
present, we have not seen any examples.

Colonel Bbaokbnburt : I do not find much to reply to, as I am not aware that
any strong criticism has been made upon what I have had the pleasure of bringing
before you. There is, however, one point on which I am afraid I may have been a
little misunderstood, although I tried to guard myself against misunderstanding. I
by no means say that the power of infantry is any less than it has been. Nor do I wish,
as I think I remarked, that one single infantry man should be taken away. I merely
olaim for guns that their power has been developed of late years, and that they can
do certain things which they could not formerly do. But I should be the last man
in the world to attempt to decry that splendid infantry which has over and over
again in the fields where England has been victorious carried off most gloriously the
honours of the day. I deprecate any attack on the value of infantry, or attempt to
depreciate it in any way whatever.

With regard to the practical questions which have been asked, I would reply to
Major Crealock that the formations of infantry at Okehampton were in every case
taken as exactly as possible from the model which has been laid down for the future
of the British Army, and is now carried out generally at Aldershot. The front of
the half-battalion can, therefore, be easily discovered by referring to the book ; but
he must not forget that special occasion when the infantry was formed with front
rank kneeling and behind cover, and rear rank lying down. Major Crealock also
remarks that his horse, as a staff officer, and those of artillery officers, are very likely to
suffer considerably. Certainly the horses do get killed, but the guns do not, and

380 THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY.

therefore a great part of my argument went to show how there must he a front line
consisting of guns, with just so many men as are necessary to work them, and as few
horses as possible, with a reserve behind of men and horses, kept under cover, but
always ready to supply losses in the battery, and to carry off the guns, if necessary.
As for cover, it was one of the arguments of my Lecture that artillery have generally
greater choice of covered positions than any other arm. Lord Waveney's suggestion
of employing the cavalry like Cossacks seems to be an excellent one. I do not insist
on the particular nature of the troops which should be employed, whether they
should be cavalry or mounted infantry, or artillerymen, who can work both as
cavalry, mounted infantry, and gunners, though I should prefer the latter. But they
must be able to accompany the batteries at any pace, and to keep down the fire of
such infantry as may be lying in the furrows and depressions of the ground, annoy-
ing the artillery, and even sometimes obliging it to retire when no frontal attack of
infantry in formation could do so.

Lord Waveney also spoke of the weakness of the flanks of artillery. Undoubtedly
they are weak, but I have yet to learn that the flanks of any arm are strong. Flanks
always must be weak, and whether we have a line of guns or a line of infantry, both
flanks must in some way or other be protected, or at least guarded, from unexpected
attack, by having troops pushed out to give warning of the approach of the enemy.
I do not think there is any very great difference between the flanks of an artillery
line and those of any other line. With regard to massing guns, I think that a mis-
take is occasionally made in asking Officers whether they advocate the massing of guns,
or the separation of guns and concentration of their fire. It comes to this, that you
cannot help massing the guns ; if you only push your batteries forward, they will
naturally find for themselves places on the surface of the country where they can
act best, and they will therefore come together by a sort of natural law.

The Chairman : The subject which has been so ably dealt with this afternoon in such
a very interesting and careful manner by Colonel Brackenbury is one that I am sure
you will all agree with me in thinking of the deepest interest to students of military
history, and treats of a most important subject for the consideration of every soldier
and Officer who aspires to any command in war. Until recently it has been cus-
tomary in our service to leave the discussion and consideration of artillery subjects
almost exclusively to artillery Officers ; the great bulk of our Officers contenting
themselves with the study of the drill, organization, and tactical requirements of
their own branch of the service. In fact, until the recent great wan drew attention
generally to this subject, we were contented, as an army and as a people, to consider that
the question of artillery tactics had been effectively disposed of by the regulations
in our drill-books, which laid down that batteries were to conform in action to the
movements of the infantry or cavalry to which they were attached. You will find
in the accounts of some of the most remarkable battles fought by the greatest commander
in the world some extraordinary examples of a great concentration of guns. But, curious
to say, from these examples we, as an army, learned but very little, although they may
have been of use to a few military students, who may have deduced from them very
useful conclusions for their own future guidance ; but as an army we were contented
with the rule in the drill-books to which I have referred. When an army was to be
organised for active service in any part of the world, our Generals seemed to content
themselves with attaching to each brigade and each division of the army a certain
number of field batteries, which when used were brought into action, according to
our regulations, with the muzzles of their guns beautifully dressed in a line upon the
adjoining infantry or cavalry. This had no doubt a very striking and theatrical
effect in sham fights, and was looked upon by a great number of old sergeant-majors
with the greatest possible delight, but it was an ignorant use of artillery ; in fact, it
was' not only a ridiculous and ludicrous display, but it was positively injurious to the
interests of the Army, because it conveyed to the minds of young soldiers and
Officers, who would look at these sham fights as a means of learning what real war
was, the idea that if they went into action in command of artillery, the proper dis-
position of it was to have the batteries in line with the neighbouring cavalry and
infantry. I am glad to say that this has now been changed. Very early in our
manoeuvres, when H.R.II. the Commander-in-Chief directed the general operations,
he saw how inapplicable such an arrangement was to real war, and I am glad to say

THE TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 331

he emancipated the artillery from that ludicrous obligation to which they had been
tied down in former days. But although we all feel that it is as necessary as ever it
has been in past times that all three arms of the service should combine together in
action, it is still necessary to give to both the cavalry commander and the infantry com-
mander a great deal of latitude of movement, if yon wish to obtain from both these arms
of the service all that they arc capable of affording you. There is one point to which I
would especially direct your attention, and that is a point I originally intended to
ask you to think of when I rose, and it is a point of far greater importance. It is
this : that before any Officer can really be fit to command troops in action, it is abso-
lutely necessary that he should have thought out for himself this artillery question
as thoroughly as any artillery Officer can have done so. Until he has done so, I
believe it will be impossible for him efficiently, or with due regard to the interests of
the country, to command Her Majesty's troops in action. As I have already said,
we are, as an army, too much inclined to devote our attention to the special branch of ■
the service in which we have been brought up. The education and training given to
artillery Officers is eminently calculated to direct their attention to the solution of
this problem ; but there cannot be any greater error than to imagine that special
training is necessary in order to solve it. I feel convinced that, as regards the tactical
use and movements of artillery in action, there is no mystery whatever, and that " he
" who runs may read." Any man who will bring a mind of ordinary ability to study
the subject can master it, by carefully studying the history of recent wars, and by
bringing his mind to bear upon the subject. He will find it to be one as easy of
solution as any of the other problems in war. I think the information which has
been given us upon this subject by Colonel Brackenbury is very important. Thanks
to the rules of this Institution, the lectures delivered here are published, so as to be
read in every garrison where British troops are quartered all over the world. I
therefore feel justified, not only on the part of those I see here, but of all military
students in remote parts of Her Majesty's dominions, in conveying to Colonel
Brackenbury our very best and sincere thanks for the interesting and delightful
Lecture he has given ns.

(Stoning J&tteting.

Monday, April 3rd, 1876.
Admiral Sir HENRY J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

NAMES of MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 21«t March

and 3rd April, 1876.

LIFE.

Balfour, R. F., Captain Gren. Guards.

Dalrymple, J. H. N. G. H., Viscount, Lieut. Royal Horse Guards.

Elliot, Charles, C.B., Colonel late Madras Staff Corps.

Bacon, Sir H. B., Bart., Lieut. Gren. Guards.

ANNUAL.

Holmes, J. R., Captain 8th Orkney Art. Bagot, Joceline F., Lieut. Gren. Guards.

Volunteers. Mansfield, Hon. W., Lt. Colds. Guards.

Alington, Arthur H., Commander R.N. Thornton, Harry G., Lt.-Col. Gren. Gds.

Homc-Drummond- Moray, W. A., Lieut. Fitzroy, G. R.t Lt.-Col. Colds. Guards.

Scots Fus. Guards. Fortescue, Cyril D., Capt. Colds. Gds.

Coke, T. W., Viscount, Captain Scots Bell, Mark S., 9.C., Captain R.E.

Fus. Guards. Compton, A. F., Lieut. Gren. Guards.
Freeth, Sampson, Major-General R.E.

ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT.

By Captain W. de W. Abnet, R.E., F.R.S., School of Military

Engineering, Chatham.

I must apologise for having undertaken to introduce the subject of
the Magneto-Electric Light, as I do not believe myself entitled to
speak with more authority on the subject than those Officers who
have closely studied the means of utilizing it for military or naval
purposes. My acquaintance with it has been chiefly in what I may
term its scientific aspect ; and I have, therefore, proposed in a great
measure to devote this evening to those points in regard to it, which
may be less generally known. The aspect in which it will be con-
sidered is capable of creating great interest if rightly demonstrated ;
but I fear that with my limited practice, of public lecturing I shall
fail to succeed in doing justice to it. The excuse I must plead for
being here to-night at all is, that I was asked by the Council of this
Institution to read a paper on the subject, and I consented to do so,
though with much hesitancy, as they can testify.

The ordinary sources of illumination such as oil lamps, or the oxy-
hydrogen light, from their small amount of power are manifestly quite
inapplicable for naval, or military purposes, when it is desired to
illuminate land or water from any but close proximity. To light an
enemy's lines, to discover his working parties, or to sweep an area of
sea in order to search for hostile boats which might be sent at night
to grope for torpedoes, requires a much more powerful light than
either of the two foregoing, even when concentrated by a lantern.
The light emitted by incandescent particles of carbon previous to
their oxidation are utilized in the ordinary candle flame, but when the
heat is increased to an extent verging on the absolute vaporisation of
these particles, the light must of necessity be much more intense.
This intense heat can be attained by passing the electric current be-

ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT. 333

tween two carbon points, the electricity being generated in one of two
ways, 1st by a voltaic battery composed of Groves's or Bunsen's cells ;
or 2ndly, by magneto-electric induction, when the electrical intensity
can be enormously increased. The first mode of creating the necessary
current is by the rapid consumption of zinc by an acid. We know
from every day experience that when coal is burnt, the carbon of it is
oxidised, and the act of the combination of the carbon with the oxygen
causes the generation of heat waves. Similarly, when zinc is con-
sumed at a rapid rate by an acid in the presence of a less readily
oxidizable metal, electricity is generated, causing a disturbance in
the medium permeating the conducting wires ; and when the dis-
turbance meets with opposition, the electricity is converted into heat,
and this again when sufficiently intense, into light.

In order to understand the action of the electric light, it must be
borne in mind that heat, light, electricity, and magnetism are each of
them the effects of vibrations executed in the ethereal medium which
pervades all space ; that they are of the same character and nature,
being only distinguishable one from the other by our senses, and that
they are convertible one into another. In the case before us at present,
the light is caused by the conversion of electricity into heat, and thence
from heat into the sensation we call light. To obtain sufficient inten-
sity and quantity of electricity, 40 or 50 Bunsen's cells are coupled up
together ; and the current is allowed to find its way along the con-
ducting wires to two graphite rods of small section, held in position in
the lamp before you. The rods are now separated by about half an
inch, and the quiescent state of the battery tells us that there is no
fresh generation of electricity. The ends of the rods are now, however,
brought together, and, as can be seen on the screen, at the point of
contact they begin to glow with a red heat. The battery is evidently
at work, and the heat is due to the resistance the current meets where
the contact is made. The graphite rods can now be separated gently
till they are more than half an inch apart, but the conditions are
changed. The air between their points is now intensely heated and
rarefied, and is consequently a better conductor. The current still
passes, carrying with it, from one of the points to the other, carbon in a
partially volatilized state. The heat is so intense that a brilliant light
is produced, equal to at least 1,000 candles. A Groves's cell consists of
a plate of platinum immersed in nitric acid contained in a porous cell,
and a zinc plate surrounding this porous cell, both being immersed in
dilute sulphuric acid. The last acid has a strong affinity for zinc, and
dissolves it with the liberation of hydrogen, which is collected on the
platinum plate when the zinc is connected with it by any conducting
substance externally to the battery, and decomposes the nitric acid in
the porous cell into nitrous acid and water. This action was shown
by the nitrous fumes evolved. I now wish to demonstrate the heating of
platinum wire by the voltaic current, as it is analogous to that which
will be shown with a small magneto-electric machine. Two yards of
the wire are taken and the current passed through it with no visible
effect. The length is gradually diminished, and the wire becomes
red-hot, then white-hot, and it finally fuzes. Could an equally fine

vol. xx. 2

334 OW SFAIGNBTO-EEBCT&IO U&HT.

section of graphite be obtained, the rraronwouKE not hawtaken place.
The practical: impossibility of fkztay graphite ha* led to* i*8 adoption
m tike* production of the electric Iigfel I may fare mention that a
lamp hair been constructed heldfirg* very fine rods' o£ earfcon, through
which a current is passed in a manner naaSkr to that which has just
heen demonstrated.

There ir a certain amount of manna? labour^ necessary to put the
battery together, and unless renewed, the Bght hr only good for about
three lours- at a time, which is ahnos* too short for actual work in war*
time, though sumVrientiry lorn?' for carrying out experiments'. Fifty
Groves'B eells require half a galfon of nitric acid, and about a quarter
of a gaHon- ot sulphuric acid ; and after the sine plates are amalga-
mated, to ensure a constant current, hV takes about three-quarters of
an bourte fifl them. The Kght should be used immediately after the
battery is* matte up, or a useless waste ci sine ensues, and a consequent
deterioration of the light.

The second mode of production of the -electric fight is by the action
of magnetism. If a magnet be slowly introduced into a hefts of iron
wire which is- connected by wires with a galvanometer (an instru-
ment which tells when electricity is passing- in any circuit), the needle
of the instrument wtR be found to be at rest. When, however, the
magnet is quickly withdrawn, there will be a slight deflection of the
needle for an instant, showing that a current of electricity is passing.
Oh again suddenly inserting the magnet into the hefix it will be ob-
served that the needle shghtly moves in a contrary direction, showing
that an electrical current is passing in the opposite direction. It is
the fact that small momentary currents are thus induced in a helix, on
which the generation of the magneto-electric light is based. With a
properly constructed helix and with a very rapidly withdrawn magnet,
currents of a most intense character can be created.

Another experiment which I wish to show is the magnetism that is
induced in soft iron when a current is passed through a helix sur-
rounding it. This rod of soft iron has no attraction for these iron
nails, but when inserted in this helix, through which a current of
electricity circulates, it shows magnetism by picking a bunch of them
from the table. In the magneto-electric machine a portion of the
current is utilized to produce this electro-magnetism, and the strength
of the light-giving current depends much upon it.

Perhaps the construction of a Gramme machine may now be under-
stood.

Let NDS, Fig. 1, be a horse-shoe magnet with its north and- south
poles at N and S respectively, and let ABO be a soft iron ring with a
helix of insulated wire wrapped round it, and the ends in connection
with a galvanometer, G-. Wherever N and S are opposite the iron ring,
there it will become magnetized by inductive action. Thus, in the
position shown, B will be a south pole and C a north pole, whilst A
and B will be points of no magnetism. Suppose the magnet to rotate
round the ring, ABEC, in the plane of the paper as it moves the mag*
netism in the ring will shift, and the same action takes place as in the
foregoing experiment : the magnet will be perpetually moving inside the

oh wuBVuro-Tummmo mght. 339

helix, con9B$o»atly- » ffurreBt wil] be excited1 which will Be shown by
the defi*ct«>a.af &»■ needle in one direction or the other in the galvano-

meter, Q, excepting only if
the same result would ea

e either U or S is opposite A. Manifestly
> were the ring rotated instead of the

magnet, and this procedure is adopted in the Gramme machine. In-
stead ot the wires being connected with the galvanometer, as shown
z 2

336 ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT.

in the diagram, the helices are laid bare at parts, and copper brashes,
placed at the neutral points A and £, take away the electricity as
they come opposite those points. By employing a brush at each point
instead of only one at A, both the negative and positive currents are
utilized, and being led to the galvanometer (or through the lamp) in
different directions, a greater intensity is obtained. The artifice of
using the brush collectors causes the current to be continuous, though
it rises and falls in intensity within certain limits.

The construction of the ring armature is shown in Fig. 2.1 We have
at A, » section of the iron ring itself formed of a bundle of soft iron
wires. At B B are the helices, one in section and one detached. At
B R the form is shown of one of the copper conductors to which the
ends of the helices are attached and from which the current is drawn
off by means of copper brushes at A and E' (Fig. 1.) I may here
state that if the brashes were placed in any other position than A and
£, the current would be largely diminished, and if at B and C there
would be no current at all, for then the current travelling one way
would meet the other travelling the other and they would neutralise
each other. By means of the great depth and closeness of the spirals
a very intense current is set up when the armature revolves.

Fig. 8.

Fig. 3 gives the complete Gramme machine : — The circular ring
armature is shown and it will be noticed that the magnets take the form

I1 Figs. 2 and S We been token from Breguet'i pamphlet on the Gramme Machine

ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT. 337

of electro-magnets, thus increasing the power in a wonderful degree.
The armature and these act and react on one another by induction and
produce a current so powerful that it is sufficient to produce the most
intense light when passed between carbon points. The motive power is
generally steam, and from theoretical considerations, it seems hopeless
to expect to produce a useful light by the direct application of human
muscle. The fuel necessarily consumed in causing the armatures of
any machines to rotate, with sufficient rapidity, for its production, is
much greater than is to be found in man, even were his muscular power
equal to it. Perhaps the day may come when we can accumulate the
energy or work of man, as we do when we wind up a watch, but even
then the labour of one man for a week will be expended in a couple of
hours. On economic grounds, therefore, steam or water power must
be resorted to.

It would, at first sight, seem that by indefinitely increasing the
number of revolutions, that is, by indefinitely increasing the amount
of coal burnt in the furnace of the engine driving the machine, we
might attain an infinitely intense light. Here, however, we are
brought face to face with two facts which must cause a limitation ;
firstly, the intensity of the light must be dependent on the amount
of magnetism of which the coils are capable of holding ; and secondly,
it is limited by a physical principle which has hitherto, perhaps,
not been sufficiently recognised, viz., that a great portion of the in-
creased power given by increased consumption of fuel, goes to perform
a different kind of work. It must be remembered that white light,
as it is called, is merely a name expressing the combination of many
coloured rays, some visible and a still greater proportion invisible,
each of which is caused by its own distinctive tremor in the ethereal
medium, and the waves of which have a fixed distance from crest
to crest, lengths so small as to be measured only by the most delicate
methods.

Taking the example of a magneto-electric machine that we have
here, if the armature is caused to rotate at a comparatively low speed,
the graphite, or metallic wire (which latter we have here) will remain
black, though to the hand there will be a perception of heat. By
causing the armature to rotate more rapidly, we get a red heat,
and by exercising still greater power we get a white heat or white
light, which at last is so intense that we fuse the platinum wire.
Now, if force were still further brought to bear, and we had used
a graphite rod of small section, the light emitted would have a
decided violet tinge. From this point a very large proportion of
the extra work the engine might be called upon to perform would
go to produce the shortest waves of light which are imperceptible
to the eye, excepting by an artifice; hence the extra expenditure
of fuel is to a certain extent unproductive for the purpose re-
quired. In other words, more fuel is required to produce the
ultra-violet rays than to produce the violet, and the violet than
the blue, and the blue than the green, and so on. It must also be
recollected that the coils of wire round the machine are really part of
the lamp, and that work is expended in heating them by magnetisa-

338

got juairamvg&BCTBic: I4&BT*

tion and -demagnetisation in the some way as it «ms expended in
ibeating the platinum wire. In one case, of which I «on cogaisanfc,
a magneto-electric machine wae worked at such an immenae speed,
that on dismantling it the wires were found {wboaxuseA, and con-
sequently it was spoilt, though the light produced was no better than
when a less speed was adopted. It may them be taken as a fact that
the brilliancy of light a machine is capable of producing, is dependant
on the weight of judiciously-placed iron. From some recent experi-
ments which I was -called npon to undertake, abundant proof was
fnrnjahed -that the violet and ultra-violet rays of the spectrum wece
largely increased compared to the other rays, when a machine wae
driven at a high speed. It is doubtless well known to all, that
chloride of silver is sensitive te certain coloured rays (shown by a
darkening action), but that by the rays extending from the green to
the red it remains unchanged. If then the .optical and also the
photographic values of the light be measured and it he found -that
with increased speed the photographic value increases at a higher
rate than the optical, we should be certain that the higher rays had
increased proportionally more than the lower ones. The instrument,
which I have called a diaphanometer, employed in thesB experi-
ments for finding the optical value of the light is that shown* The
light to he measured is reduced to the same intensity as a standard
wax candle, burning 130 grains per hour, by means of a black
wedge. The amount of light out off at each part of the wedge
is calculated, and from a formula, the intensify of the filhuninating
power of the electric light is known. The photographic value of the
light was obtained by placing strips of uniformly sensitive paper, at a.

Kg.*.

F&*.

7000

CANDLES

9G00 9
8
7
6
5
4
3
£
I

5000
4000

2000

HORSE
POWCB

■■ 9
8

■ 7

■6

■■4
3
■2
I

400

MHGMUmON***

.AWTURE,PER MINUTE.

aoo

SOB

9%. 4 thews (he relative Yahiei +btam«d'bjr phetognphy and that by the ere.
lig. 6 ehonm (he faorao-por eaMumed in orasmg the different neonberj+f «vr«ta>
tms of the amatol* ner niante.

ON MiAlGNEIT^IXlJaTEIC LIGHT. 886

constant distance from ihepoints, beneath a thin graduated wedge (to-
gether with others unshaded), and allowing them to be aoted upon by
the bight fer a fixed period. A comparison with a tint piwiuoed 4by
sun-Jight as a standard, enabled a comparative photographic value et
the light to <be formed lor each number of revolutions of me annate!*.
The curves shown, give -the photographic and the apfcieai » values <ef a
machine driven at varying speeds. As before asmcunfied, the eeiiefa*
num. to he deduced from these curves is, 'that for eaeh ttaehiae throe is
a oertaiiL hmit to the useful work that cant be drawn mom an engine.
With an average machine, it seems that whan wockmg to th» limit,
one-horse power is equivalent to about 800 ^candies, an equation
which ean be turned into the amount of coal necessary to be cen-
snmed per hour for the production of a certain intensity ef light.

Here we have. an. example of a comparatively large quantity of tow
boat produced beneath the boiler of the engine ^converted into a
small quantity of intensB heat {sufieiesit to melt platinum, the most
infusible of metals X with the accompaniment of an intense light. In
both cases, the heart; taken up by a theoretically perfect engine, and
the amount it givsB out, are equal, though the quality and intensity
of the heats vary.

military purposes, weighs about 17 owt^ and requires an engine <of
about 6-horse power to drive it. No doubt the apparatus for gene-
rating light by voltaic electricity ib the more portable, but it gives
less brilliancy and is mora easily put out off order-: 12 hours' work
can easily be got out ef the former, -whilst it is deuhtftul if <ewen a
fair light would be kept up continuously far three heum with tihe
latter.

We now come to the vurae of "the tight for tnuminsifamg purposes.
It has been calculated that each mile of dry air abstracts by dispersion
(caused by the reflection of particles heM in suspension) about 5 per
cent, of -the brightness of the light.

In general, the formula expressing -this absorption is,

B, = B0E ~ mx.

When Bj is the brightness to be found, B0 the initial brightness, m the
co-efficient of absorption, and x the distance through which the Tight
travels.
Thus at the end of one mile, with 5 per cent, absorption,

B, = -95 Bo,
at the end of two miles,

Bl m («) 'Bo,
and -so on.

The brightness, however, is eniya factor of the illuminating power,
though for signalling .purposes it is the principal effective.

Suppose we call this last I. Then I, diminishes as the square ef
fiie distance, because the same light has to iUuminate a larger area.

The formula is,

J. 55*. t» nniiiwn
it"

840 ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT.

From the foregoing figures it may be believed that the brightness
diminishes very slowly, and that for military or for naval purposes,
the diminution need not be taken into account. This is, however,
not the case, for when the atmosphere is hazy a very much larger
percentage than 5 is cut off, and as a rule, amongst the parts chiefly
absorbed are the most luminous rays, viz., the yellow and green. In
moderately foggy weather the brightness of the light at half a mile
is often reduced 90 per cent., whilst at a mile it would then only
have y&^th of its original value, and the light absolutely reaching the
spot would be of a decidedly red tint ; an ordinary example of the
absorption of the rays of white light is the light of the sun's disc seen
through a London fog. Aqueous vapour absorbs nearly all the ultra
violet rays, diminishes the blue rays, but leaves certain of the red
rays nearly intact ; from this we may deduce that a red light can be
seen farther in misty weather than a yellow, green, or blue light.
If possible, then, it should be arranged that the light should be of
as red a character as possible, not by the interposition of red glasses,
or other red media, for they only accomplish what a fog itself would
do, viz., cut off the most luminous rays ; but the absolute light itself
should be reddish, that is its component rays should have as longwave-
lengths as possible. Now there are two ways of accomplishing this ;
1st, instead of having one lamp giving a very intense light composed
of rays of a proportionably high number of short wave-lengths, we
may use the same power and produce two or more lights, which taken
together, are richer in the longer wave-lengths than in the smaller.
A glance at Fig. 4 will show that this is possible. 2ndly, in-
stead of pure carbon points, we may use a combination of carbon
with metals which, when volatilized, shall produce a red light.
Amongst these metals are calcium, strontium, and lithium. They
are very expensive as metals, but in combination with non-metals,
such as chlorine, they are cheaply procurable in commerce. Some
experiments undertaken at Chatham have been of such an encourag-
ing nature that I hope this method of attaining the desired end may
be practicable.

On the screen is now thrown the light produced by incandescent
carbon and volatilized calcium. The tint is of a red colour, and when
a ray is passed through a prism and allowed again to fall on the screen,
the spectrum is at once seen to be richer in red rays than in the more
refrangible. A similar effect is produced when we employ strontium
or lithium with the carbons.

The illuminating power of the most powerful magneto-electric
machine that I have seen is equal to about 11,000 candles. Sunlight
itself is equal to about 5,000 candles, concentrated at a distance of
3 feet from the object. At the sun's distance, to give the same light
as he does, would require 130 x 10** candles, supposing no atmosphere
intervened between us and him.

On the supposition that no brightness of the light were lost through
impurities existing in the air, at a distance of half a mile a machine
giving a light equal to 5,000 candles, could have an illuminating
power equal to ttt^ °* a candle held a yard off an object. If,

ON MAGNETO-ELECTRIC LIGHT. 341

however, only half the sphere of the light could be condensed into
a beam having angular dimensions of 15° X 5°, the light would be
intensified 100 times, or would be about equal to a candle shining on
an object at a distance of four feet, a light evidently quite strong
enough to be of use. At a mile, the light would be equal to one
candle at 16 feet distance, which would be still fairly efficient,
particularly when an observer collects greater intensity by using field
glasses.

Perhaps I ought to explain why it is suggested to condense the
beam into 15° x 5° ; 5° is quite sufficient depth of beam to illuminate
any depth of area from a moderate height — that is, in a direction
away from the light, whilst it seems insufficient to illuminate a
proper width of area. Some lanterns are constructed to throw a beam
of only 2^° in width. There is more concentration of light, but the
smallness of the angle subtended at the eye by the illuminated portion
prevents a certain requisite distinctness. Also in sweeping an area
to discover an attacking force or boats, the chances are that with a
15° light they will be more readily picked up than with a 2^° light, as
the time which it would rest on any one spot, would be nearly six times
with the former as compared with the latter.

A larger angle than 15° is not advisable, as then the effective light
rapidly diminishes in intensity. I may also remark that the beam of
light is always more intense at the centre than at the margins, which
seems advantageous in some respects.

I have already referred to red light as being the most penetrative in
hazy weather. It has also another advantage, which strikes me of
importance. Form can be more readily distinguished by a red or a blue
light than by white. This is not an observation which is a merely
personal one ; on one occasion a large number of gentlemen attended
an exhibitipn of the powers of a machine, and all noticed the same
fact. It admits, I think, of explanation in this way : supposing an
object illuminated with 64 units of white light, and another next to it
with only 1 unit.; this latter will not find a place on the retina, but
will appear dark. Now, with the electric light those objects which
happen to be in the direct path of the beam only receive illumination
by reflection from adjacent objects ; or if at a very obtuse angle with
the beam, receive only a very limited portion of light. It can rarely
happen that the reflected light is equal to -g^th of the direct light;
therefore, these reflecting objects remain unseen. With red light,
experiment has convinced me, that a much larger difference in intensi-
ties can be appreciated ; hence with it the form of an object can be
more readily grasped.

Whether the similar effect produced by blue rays can be explained
in the same manner I do not know, as no experiments have been under-
taken to ascertain it.

The fact remains, and whether the explanation be satisfactory or not,
it may be worthy of consideration when the light is employed for
naval or military purposes. A piece of blue or red glass placed in the
path of the rays will be effectual, if it does not cut off too much light.

It may be useful to point out the conditions under which an illumi-

842 ON MAGM1TO-ELECIBJC U0HC*

anted area of land or sea can be most favourably watdhed. It is a
matter o£ remark that most people naturally ohoose a position elses to
the source of light, imagining that somehow they thereby observe with
an increased intensity of beam. This is a serious •error, and one to be
Avoided. An observer (excepting in an unusual state of the Atmo-
sphere), should always stand away from the source of light. The most
favourable position is naturally as close to the area as possible, but also
nearly at an angle of 60° with the axis of the beam. An elevation of
position is also a desideratum, for then fall advantage of its depth as
well as its breadth is obtained. The reason why a position at an angle
with the axis of the beam is desirable is tins, that where light is
.emitted from a point, the whole of the small particles of dust and
vapour existing in the air (and which lie in its path) are strongly illu-
minated and reflect back light to the eye. The mistier the weather,
the stronger the reflection will be. Throwing the beam of the electric
light in the air of this room, its track is very perceptible to all. When
iwe allow a little smoke to ascend through the rays the refleotion be-
comes much strengthened. The particles of a mitt, or of steam will
evidently refleet much of the light, and there will be a consequent
absorption and diminution of intensity after passing through, am
atmosphere charged with either. When standing near the lamp, the
eye has to receive the iUnminations of all those particles between it and
the object, and if the latter be half a mile off, it can well be conceived
that the effect is dazzling. Besides whieh^ the eye cannot distinguish
an intensity differing less than ^th part. It might, therefore, happen
that the light from the object and the particles would oomo within
that limit.

When, however, the observer occupies the position indicated, it will be
found that by taking the value of the light thrown hack from the object
and that from the reflecting particles, he obtains the maximum of d»*
tuuotness of view. Thongh having a general knowledge of the effect ef
particles in the air when in the path of a beam, my attention was not
particularly called to tfaetsubjeet till lately, when I attended some trials of
different lights at Portsmouth. Boats were sent out whose supposed
mission it was to grope for tonped© cables, and to out them, in order to
render submarine mines ineffective. On shove and in gusjtL-boatB
observers were Btationed to discover their approach. It was needy
invariably the case, I believe, that parties who occupied positions well
out of the path of the light were the first to distinguish them, and
generally it was some considerable time after, before those who wane
near the lamp could discern therm.

As regards the attack on torpedo positions from the sea, it would
be almost impossible to employ steam launches, as the white steam
is Always lighted up at very long distances, leading to the discovery
of their whereabouts at once. Vessels may be constructed in which
any escape of steam or smoke may be prevented, but at present such
«re rare. As a rule, I take it that ordinary boats, propelled by oaia,
will be employed.

From a position near the light, a black boat would naturally escape
detection, but the faces of the rowers and the eplash of the eirarited

.ON KlOXROHELBOniO LIGHT. 843

water thrown up by the oars would be very readily
Probably a crew with blackened faces and hands, using nitrified iblack
oars, might hope to approach unobserved from each a position, hat
from a point nearly at tight angles to the beam, tbeitinminaticmof the
water would cause even a black object to stand out, particularly as a
dark shadow must be cast by it. There are, doubtless, some present
here to-night who can speak more authoritatively on this point than I
can.

Another question arises wbicb is Oris: supposing a boat to be
observed, could guns be fevengnt to bear upon it with any chance of
success ? It seems prohaMe that they could. With a proper adjust-
ment in the centre of the lens, there could be placed a small diaphragm,
cutting off a small central portion of the beam. When this was caused
to fall on the boat, its horizontal angular position with some fixed
point and its angle of depression could be given by graduated arcs, and
the sighting necessary to give the guns could be ascertained from a
previously constructed table. The lamp itself under these circum-
stances would become a range-finder when its height above the level of
the water is known. Whether this would answer better than ordinary
methods is open to doubt; bat I believe it weald, as the object seen
through an ordinary telescope would be not so easily found as when it
can be found by the lamp itself.

As to the safety of the light when used to illuminate the sea* there
is not much to be dreaded from enemy's guns. It wonM nequdre am
uncommonly good judge of brightness to distinguish the difference be-
tween the elaefric aro half >a mile or a anile off, even when the nonaed
value is known. As the intensity m variable, the chance x>f jndging tfce
distance is very amalL If an enemy should be aware of the exact spot
on which the light would be erected, he might have data on which to
fix his measurements, bat if the light could be moved only 200 or 300
yards, the ahance of has dirtetiy striking the apparatus may bedie-
jniased. The possibility of inreparable damage from shells might be
avoided by the ase of a couple of plane mirrors, with which to (reflect
the light from a»safe position.

As to the shape the lamp ohouM take, thane are, I believe, .djrcsv-
eities of opinion; but oertaialy, on theoretical grounds, the eata*
dioptric form ought to be better than either rbbe dioptric or catoptric

iln the dioptric -system, when no redactors are employed, a large
quantity of side and hack light is lost.

In the catoptric system, where reflectors are used, it has beam
calculated that two-thirds or three*f ourths ef the light is wasted,
being dispersedm directions (not required, unless a complicated system
of auxiliary . mirrors be adopted. Again, metal, of whioh inost para-
bolic reflectors rare made, also causes .a great loss of light, due to the
hammering which it undexgoea.

Iu theearadioptricfsystem, both Deflection and refraction are ntihEed;
and when the reflectom are formed of glass, the waste of light «
minimised. Fig. VI uepresentB a lantern which has bean aotaafly
employed iu military experiments- The catadioptric system is also
now feasible; as by the method, introduced, I believe, byGhaooe

344 ON HAGHETO-ELECTB1C LIGHT.

Brothers, of Birmingham, glass rings of accurate section, both for lens
and reflector, can be made of the most effective nature. It will be
noticed, that the principle of total reflection would be adopted in the
reflector ; and unless the angle of reflection be much greater than a

Fig. 8. Fig. 7.

Fig. 6 shorn the sett Ion of the spherical reflector, the centre of the electric ere being

the centre of the sphere.
Fig. 7 shows the Ions of the lantern in perspective,

right angle, there will be no appreciable loss by prismatic dispersion.
In every case, whatever may be the form adopted, the lamp should
be capable of revolving round a vertical axis, and also of depressing
or elevating the beam.

To test a lamp, the eye should be placed where the electric arc will
be produced, and every point of the area should be distinct through
the lens, showing that the rays converge properly from the position
on which the light will be cast. The lamp, in fact, becomes a camera-
obscura, with one huge objective. This mode of testing was first
suggested by the Astronomer Royal, whose theoretical researches on
light have gone far towards causing the present improvements in all
kinds of optical instruments.

Wo, of the Services, are morally bound to employ any agency which
will be effective in prolonging a defence or in shortening an attack;
and it seems to me, that in the magneto-electric light we have a
weapon placed in our hands which we shall eventually be compelled to
adopt. The time when night attacks are to be dreaded as much as
they are to be now, most pass away with the introduction of a means of
illuminating an area round a fortress or an entrenchment. The value
of a gun must be much enhanced when it can be rendered nearly always
effective ; and I look upon it, that the time is not far distant when
an armament will not be complete unless it has a means of being em-
ployed with advantage at night. I do not believe that we have at
present the very best form of light, any more than I believe that we
have a perfect gun ; but it strikes me that the former is so far advanced

■

ON MAGNETO-ELECTBIO LIGHT. 345

in effectiveness that it should be rendered a necessary adjunct to any
fortress and force.

In our telegraph train, the army has naturalized one form of elec-
tricity, and before many years have passed, I believe, it must adopt
that form which I have endeavoured to demonstrate to yon to-night.

The day has passed when the Services can afford to put inventions
under their pillowa, and sleep upon them ; they must be always awake
to the progress that science makes, and be ready to adopt and adapt
any discovery which will help them onwards towards perfection.

The CHATRBfAK : I must say that we are all very much indebted to you for the
information you have given us on this subject. Of course, we understand that there
are points which you cannot go into, namely, such matters as have been under your
consideration on behalf of the Government ; but I am happy that you have oeen
able to give us so much information which does not in any way trench upon your
position with the Government, and we are very much gratified by it, and thank you
sincerely for it.

SPECIAL LECTURE*

MM*M*fc«H

Monday February 14, 16761
Gboteai; Low* SAKDHtJBST; 6LCIF,, in iKe Chair.

"THE TURKISH FORCES," AND "THE MILITARY
"ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION."

By C. E. Howard Vincent, Esq., F.R.G.S., Lieutenant-Colonel Central
London Rifle Rangers, and of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law
(late 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers).

Yon have come here, Gentlemen, this afternoon to hear a lecture on a
most interesting and important matter. It would be scarcely too much
to designate it as the most prominent subject of the hour. For twenty
years it has slept upon the blood and treasure expended in its solution,
but to-day it is here presenting greater difficulty, greater confusion, a
more dismal future than ever. After what has fallen from the Chair-
man I make no apology for having responded to the wish that I should
summarise for the members of this Institution my recent studies in the
Ottoman dominions and the neighbouring countries. I would, how-
ever, crave again that indulgence which thrice before in this theatre
you have been pleased to extend to me. I would seek it by reason of
my own infirmity, by reason of the special difficulty of the task that
lies before me. This, as you know, is no political arena, but rather a
forum, to advance the knowledge of those sciences which pertain to
the united services. Therefore have I to perform the somewhat
delicate operation of dividing one portion of my researches from the
other, of severing the military crust from the political substratum.
I shall strive to keep wholly within the wise rules laid down by
the Council ; yet, lest I should even by insinuation overstep the line,
I would observe that I alone am responsible for every word that I
utter.

Gentlemen, I propose, as you will perceive, to divide my matter into
two sections.

I. The Turkish Forces.

II. The Military Aspects of the Eastern Question.

I trust I shall not so weary you with the first as to lose your earnest
attention for the second. But it appears to me that a mature exami-

" THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THM EASTERN QUESTION. 347

nation of the Turkish forces most needs precede* any accurate cencep*
tion of the " The Military Aspects of the Eastern Question."

Without further prelude, then, I will past in- review before you the
Army and the Navy of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the
Ottomans. In doing so it behoves me before all to say, that whatever
to the errors into which a defective education has led a strong amtl
capable mind, however great the difficulties besetting eastern sovereign
life, ho weror fabulous, however true the personal narratives that pene-
trate the veil of its mystery, one thing is certain* that Abdul Azia II,
Sultan of Turkey, ia an advanced and intribgent military reformer.

Into 120 military conscriptions are the Ottoman; dominions divided*
and nearly evenly among them are looated the seven corps of which*
the Imperial Army is composed. Following exactly the northern
model four units' make up the total of national datannev vis*. .—

(1.) The- Standing Army, or Nissan*-

(&) The Reserve, ot ikdiati

(8.) The Militia, Landwehr, or Rectif.

£4) The National Guard, Lan&tara, or-Mustafei, —
representing, without the aid of the tatter f aree*. a paper strength o£
• 750,000 men. Make no note, however} of these figures, nor of any
indeed taken from Turkish source? whash I may aduace* I frame my
data- from the concurrence of testimony, but cannot even thus hope ta
be near the mark. There is no doubt tint it wooki be impossible)
to pat more than half a million of Turks into the neldL

(».) The standing' Army is recruited by conscription from the*
Mahommedan population of the Empire. Six times does the faithful
Mussulman dive into the ballot-box. If m these six years the Nizam
does not. secure a recruit, the lucky one passes at once into the Redif.
Such, though, cannot be the good fortune of the majority, and the
conscript thus spells out his 20 years of service :—

4 years in the standing Army.

2 „ in the Reserve.

3 „ in the Redif (1st ban).
3 n in the Redif (2nd ban).
8 „ in the Mustanz.

The four years in the standing Army are usually reduced to three, or.
even two — a measure reducing battalion strength) but prudent alike
on social and economical grounds.

Of the seven corps d'armee that I mentioned, three are stationed in
Europe, at : —

(1.) Constantinople. (2.) Shumla*
(3.) Monastir.
and four ia* Asia, at : —

(4?.) Erzeroum- (&) Damascus.

(6.) Bagdad. (7.) Sanala.

Each corps consists of : —

7 regiments (28 battalions) of In&ntry.
5 „ (30 squadrons) of Cavalry.
1 (84 guns) of Artillery,.

348 " THE TURKISH FOHCE8," AND

with a theoretical strength of 27,000 men, which in war is supposed
to be supplemented by 34 battalions of Redifs.

The first corps is frequently termed The Imperial Guard, and
Yousouff Effendi, the eldest son of His Majesty, is the titular Com-
mander. The men composing it are in a great measure selected from
the whole Empire, for the inhabitants of the capital are exempted from
service.

The Turkish infantry may be said to be without its superior in
Europe as regards material. It consists of 49 regiments with four
battalions of eight companies. The system of drill was devised by
Hussein Avni Pasha, now Governor of Broussa, but under whose
Grand Vizierate and Presidency at the Seraskeriat, the flood-gates of
improvement opened on the country and the army. The rapidity with

which the Osmanli soldiery move is extraordinary and unparalleled

compact independence, to which the neat yet easy uniform conduces.
A fez, blue jacket and waistcoat trimmed with red, scarlet sash around
the waist, trousers ample to the middle of the calf, then tight as a
gaiter, and running into a soft boot of untanned leather. Such is the
dress of gunner, trooper, and linesman.

The infantry is completely armed with breech-loading rifles — long*
Sniders, short Sniders, original, converted, of Tower pattern, of
American make, Winchester's, Remington's, Peabody's — every system,
I believe, that inventive genius has devised. Rifles, though, are not
of themselves engines of destruction. They resent neglect and hard
usage. Without cartridges they avail but little, and there is no
machinery for issuing the complex ammunition required. In time the
Henry-Martini rifles ordered from the Providence Tool Company will
be supplied, and more uniformity insured.

The Ottoman cavalry consists of 35 regiments of six squadrons each,
with a supposed complement of 100 men, armed for the most part
with Winchester repeating carbine, sword, and pistol. At best, the
cavalry partakes considerably of an irregular character. The men are
good Oriental horsemen, but the Officers are no less untrained for
field service than they are by nature unendowed with dash, energy,
and spirit. The country is full of smart little horses, but there is no
remounting system, and not unfrequently a fourth of the regiment
is on foot, another fourth on worn-out screws ere a remount grant
can be obtained. Of one regiment it is narrated that, reduced to a
few score mounted men, the Colonel, after long solicitation, obtained
the required sum. The season was winter. He thought that the
fund placed at interest till the spring would then enable him to buy
more animals. The Koran forbade such a scheme. In the regimental
chest the sum was locked. There were long arrears of pay owing to
the men, and an order came that the remount grant should be applied
to defray them. The regiment of horse became a regiment of foot.

The Imperial artillery boasts of seven regiments and one in
reserve. Each regiment is composed of three horse and nine field
batteries of six guns. The former have four-poanders, the latter
six. The whole of the guns are on Krupp's system and of his manu-
facture, with the exception of the six mountain guns made by Sir

" THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION ." 349

Joseph Whitworth's firm, and the six mitrailleuses attached to each
regiment. Not only has the whole of the artillery been provided with
breech-loading cannon, but there are sufficient in store to re-arm every
battery. As with the rifles, though, the feeding machinery has been
neglected. The guns are there, but ammunition- waggons are to a
great extent wanting.

The chief deficiency of the Turkish artillery lies, however, in the
horses. The native animals are not adapted to the work, and the
entire supply has to be drawn from Hungary. An annual commission
ia sent, and some good animals obtained at prices varying from £25 to
i>40. But it is on all sides agreed that the Hungarian horse is deficient
in stamina, and in many eventualities it is obvious that even this market
would be closed. The scarcity of draught horses becomes a more
serious thing when the total absence of a transport corps is considered
— in a country, moreover, where no levy on the inhabitants could pro-
duce any result. It is much to be hoped that some War Minister,
remaining sufficiently long in office, will foresee the straits to
which any serious campaign must reduce the Government, and take
measures accordingly by founding breeding establishments for draught
horses. Any surplus stock would meet with a ready sale.

There is likewise no regular engineer corps, as the state of the
defences throughout the Empire only too clearly shows, and of course
both pontoon and telegraph trains are wanting.

The Medical Department of the Army, on the other hand, is well
organised. The School of Medicine at Pera is turning out excellent
graduates — not enough, truly, at present for the requirements of the
service, but in time the German surgeons now in the temporary em-
ploy of the Porte will be supplanted by Turkish practitioners. One
alien alone will then remain, Dr. Temple, formerly of the 18th Royal
Irish, attached to the 1st Regiment of Artillery, and Surgeon Extra-
ordinary to his Majesty, exempt by Imperial mandate from the dis-
qualifications of foreigners.

The military hospitals are numerous, well arranged, and beautifully
kept. Close to the principal one at Scutari is the British cemetery, the
resting-place of many a gallant soldier of the Queen. The care
bestowed upon it by the guardian, Sergeant Lyne, late of the Royal
Engineers, is beyond all praise. Strange is the contrast with the ruined
graveyards of the Turks hard by.

The Officers of the Ottoman service now demand consideration. They
form, with the exception of the surgeons, the weakest portion of the
entire system. Ill trained from cradle to school, ill regulated from
school to life's close, they possess, though perhaps not by their fault,
few physical or moral virtues. Forced to discount their pay at ruinous
rates, the majority live from hand to mouth, and military proficiency
meets with but scant reward. The Staff hardly deserves the name,
although some of its members receive a kind of special training, so
small is it numerically ; so weak, for the most part, intellectually ; so
indolent physically. With all this, it would be unbecoming in me not
to make a grateful acknowledgment for the kindness with which, from
tlje Minister downwards, I was treated. Without any official character

vol. xx. 2 a.

350 "THE TURKISH FOROE8," AND

or recommendation, every consideration was shown me as an English
traveller. Every Turk looks npon the Englishman as his natural ally.
With Major Osman Bey, Aide-de-Camp to the Seraskier, and formerly
Military Attache* at St. Petersburg, I visited every barrack, hospital, and
military institution within reach of the capital ; and everywhere, as
previously on the Danube, I met with the same cordiality, the same
friendly greeting, the same desire to show everything — to conceal
nothing.

Nor must I omit to pay a just token to the Military Schools of the
Empire. There are many exceedingly well regulated, and they form
the peculiar pleasure of the Sultan. The shortcomings of Turkish
officers are in no way traceable to any deficiency in the means of educa-
tion. The schools are of two categories — primary, giving a general
education, and receiving boys for four years between the ages of twelve
and eighteen; secondary, receiving students under sixteen years of
age, and after a four years course drafting them into the army. I
visited a school of each character in detail, and many as now are the
military colleges in Europe that I have visited, I never found a better
system in any country.

The Auxiliary Forces are divided, as I said before, into three
categories : —

(a.) The Reserve, or Ikdiat.

(6.) The Militia, or Bedif.

(c.) The National Guard, or Mustafiz.

The Reserve is formed : —

(1.) Of those who have served four years in the standing Army.

(2.) Of those who have been released before the full period of their
active service has expired : —

They belong to it until the completion of the sixth year of their
enrolment under the Crescent. Arms for the Reserve of each battalion
are kept at head-quarters ; clothing and accoutrements likewise. In
theory the reserve men on the outbreak of war revert to their original
corps. But, owing partly to the absence of all methodical civil admi-
nistration, partly to the imperfect means of communication, there is no
possibility of the principle being enforced. Last autumn showed the
truth of this statement. The reserve men are seised by the first regi-
ment they meet. Were it otherwise, in the words of Colonel ZeHnoi,
the able and indefatigable Military Attache to the Russian Embassy,
they would never reach the theatre of operations. It is obvious that
such a system is in the highest degree injurious to sound organisation.
One battalion takes the field 300 strong, another with more than double
the number.

The Militia, or Redif, consists of :—

(1.) Those who have escaped the conscription.

(2.) Those who have completed their term of service in the Nisam
and the Reserve : —

The period of service is twelve years — the first three, theoretically, in
the senior battalion, the second three in the junior battalion. But, with
very few exceptions, this second battalion has no real existence. The
officers of the Redif form a permanent institution in the proportion of

" THE MILITARY ASPECTS OP THE EASTERN QUESTION." 351

two to each company, and one field officer per battalion. They should
receive the same pay as those of the standing Army, and cannot be much
inferior to them in intelligence !

For a month in each year the Bedif is called out for training. Not
the whole battalion — the six contingents in the absence of the second
forming bat one — only four-sixths thereof. The Militiaman conse-
quently in the course of his six years' service in the force goes through
four trainings.

I wa3 afforded the opportunity in the vioinity of Constantinople of
closely inspecting a Bedif brigade. It consisted of two battalions,
come the previous day from Asia Minor, leaving that evening for the
Herzegovina — eight companies of 100 men, splendid fellows. Called
out in mid- harvest from a district depopulated by famine, for a cause
in which they took no interest, discontent might well be expected to
prevail. Never, though, was the Padishah more enthusiastically
saluted than by those 1,600 voices. One could bnt feel that with such
men any difficulty might be surmounted. But who was. to lead the
way ? One officer, of wretched mien, to each of those strong com-
panies. What mechanical force was there to support the physical ?
Long rifles and scabbardless bayonets in the case of one battalion, short
rifles and swords in the case of the other. Uniformity alone in the.
dirty, utterly unserviceable state of the weapons.

As to the last unit in the auxiliary forces — the National Guard or
Mustafiz — it is the very embodiment of theory. It boasts neither
organization nor arms, nor officers, nor cadres save in misrepresenta-
tions to the greatest autocrat, the most deluded monarch of the
civilized world.

Now as to the Imperial Navy — it consists of twenty-six ironclads,
embracing every description of battery, but with, I understand, too
thin plating for these days. The Officers are an cample t. The men
about half. How far either the former or the latter are fit for sea, I
will not presume to opine. Practice in navigation they certainly
never have. All the year round this glorious fleet lies in idle state in
front of the imperial palace. The Sultan gazes thereon from the
presence-room of Dolma Bagtshe, and believes when he is told that
he rules the world. There are none in " his " service who will
undeceive him. He knows no foreign language, and the Turkish
prints are under the censor. Financial difficulties are unknown :
dreams of troubles to come do not disturb the Imperial slumber.

The men of the Army and Navy now have to be considered. Of
them as individuals it is difficult to speak in exaggerated terms.
Whether of the standing Army, of the auxiliary forces, or of the Navy %
whether of the capital or in the provinces ; whether in garrison or in
the field, these tall, robust men have no thought save that of duty and
implicit obedience. Wretched, deplorably wretched, as is the con-
trolling force, crime is so rare that there k no regular scale of
punishment. Every order is executed to the very letter. Long
arrears of pay produce no grumbling. Drunkenness, absence, de-
sertion, are well nigh unknown. In short, to quote that distinguished
officer, Admiral Hobart Pasha, Inspector-General of the Imperial

2 a 2

352 €i THE TURKISH FORCES," AND

Navy, they are the finest men in the world — hardy, brave, active, in-
telligent, patient, enduring, submissive, obedient, beyond comparison.
Thus do I complete my review of the Turkish forces. I presume
to hope that I have succeeded in showing what splendid material
they contain. Nor have I sought to gloss over their numerous
shortcomings. The men are admirable, but the officers very im-
perfect. The guns are numerous, but there are no horses to drag
them. The rifles are of the best type, and enough of them to give one
to each Mussulman in Stamboul, but there are no cartridges. Truly
the engines are ready but there is no motive power. The ally of
Turkey will have to supply it. Officers, horses, waggons, ammunition,
method must be provided before the Turkish forces are really fitted
for European service. The proof of this is, I fear, to be seen in the
operations still pending in the Herzegovina. Not one of the defects
which I have enumerated but is there felt, and none more so than the
continual change in the chief command, and consequent reversal of
plans. Yet it is also positive that the moral support afforded to the
insurgents by the three Emperors, and probably the pecuniary aid
furnished by one of them, has a very great deal to do with the pro-
tracted nature of the struggle. It cannot, however, long continue,
and it is much to be hoped that so soon as peace has been restored,
some energetic Pasha (and none better than the deservedly popular
Hussein Avni, the soldier- vizier) will be placed and maintained at the
head of the Army, and energetically complete the building, of which
so fine a foundation exists. The carrying out of the 23rd Article of
the celebrated Khaththy Humaioun, by the admission of Christians
into the Army on the principle of general equality, would facilitate the
all-important infusion of foreign superior element, would free the
country from much of the burden and depopulating consequences of
the conscription, and then the Turks will take a high place in the
European military family.

The Military aspects of the Eastern Question.

Now, Gentlemen, I solicit your most earnest attention. We have
done with statistics, and it remains for us to consider what military
changes twenty years have wrought in the bete noire of modern
politics. First of all, what is the Eastern Question? There are
probably none here, but there are many outside who totally mis-
apprehend it. To some it imports the maintenance of British
Empire in the east. In the minds of some it is vaguely connected
with religious questions — the tyranny of Mahommedan over Christian,
the ownership of a silver cross at Jerusalem. Not a few either are
there to whom it has no meaning, who have never sought to present it
to their minds in a clear and definite form. Before them I would thus
put the Eastern Question, " Whether Turkey in Europe must be main-
tained intact ?" It is positively this, nothing more and nothing less.
You well know that I am not here to uphold the merits of the affirmative,
or the negative answer. But it is obvious that if all the European
Powers interested therein were agreed upon the point, there would be
no Eastern Question at all. Therefore it is clear that as there is a

" THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION." 353

decided Eastern Question, the interests of some States point to one
solution, of other States to another. Without defendants there could
be no litigation, without aggressors there could be no war. It will
not consequently be foreign to my role to inquire without prejudice, first,
what Powers are interested in the Eastern Question P and, secondly,
how do they severally view it ?

Historical recollection and geographical knowledge will lead you to a
ready answer. The greatest statesmen of times gone by, the eminent
names in British story, regarded it in a positive light. Frederick the
Great, Napoleon, Talleyrand, and Metternich ; Chatham, Pitt, Wel-
lington, Canning, and Palmerston were all agreed upon the subject.
During the present reign we have undertaken a long, a costly, and a
sanguinary war to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Is
that integrity still of interest to us ? Nothing has to my knowledge
occurred to render it otherwise. In it we still, with Turkey, Austria,
and France, are primarily interested. In it Germany, Italy, Greece,
and Spain are much, though perhaps secondarily, concerned.

But have I not omitted from this enumeration of nations one great
state — the mighty empire which stretches from Vistula to Volga, and
even further into Asiatic desert, from White Sea to Black — Holy
Russia ? Can this be on account of her indifference ? No. The
Eastern Question is of greater importance to Russia than to all the other
countries put together. Is it viewed at St. Petersburg according to
what I may call the aggressive and expulsive, or the defensive and
retentive theory ? I will not here presume to say. Vast as is the area
over which the commands of the Romanoff are obeyed, it is clear on
the face of things that the material welfare of the Empire requires a
surer, a safer, a more accessible maritime exit than is at present pos-
sessed. More than once, in this theatre and elsewhere, have I dwelt
upon this cardinal point in the faith of every Russian. More than
once have I craved observation for the question we are this afternoon
considering — have thrust forward its claims to attention in preference
to that most mythical, that most unfounded, yet, for some, that most
absorbing belief in Russian designs upon India. Her traditional ambi-
tion, her obligatory ambition, her true ambition is wholly and solely
directed to securing a passage, safe in peace, safe in war, from the
Euxine to the Mediterranean. So let it be, and a new rival enters upon
those waters. Judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, what existing interests
will be thereby endangered or promoted.

But let us see how in a military sense — and I will take that adjective-
to comprise naval — the Powers named are situated as regards a definite
solution of the Eastern Question.

First of all, as to Turkey herself. You have had her land and sea
forces arrayed, feebly though it may be, before you. I concerned my-
self solely with the fez-bearing, but add thereto now the armies of
Roumania and Servia. Both are vassal by name, vassal by tribute,
to an indulgent, never interfering Suzerain. Roumania, with a Teuton
Prince at the head of affairs, has a Prussianized army. Every day adds
to its efficiency. Sixty thousand men, or thereabouts, it numbers, and
these, if set in motion by the national feeling, alone are ready to main-

354 " THE TUKivISII FORCES," AND

tain the secure and guaranteed position, the practical independence
and prosperity the Principalities now enjoy. I do not say that the
Porte can absolutely count npon this armed assistance. The favour
lately shown to prominent Roumanians by a neighbouring sovereign,
the fluctuations of power, may endanger it; but certain it is, that the
match that fires the smouldering flame will with its first spark change
the military tenure of the territory lying between the Prufch and the
Danube.

Servia we must regard with different eyes. The ruined battle-
ments of Belgrade perpetually remind the otherwise unemployed inha-
bitants of the late Moslem occupation ; yet Turkish rule is no more
actively felt than in Roumania. It is only the capital, not the ignorant,
thrifty population of the interior, that seeks to break asunder from the
light Osmanli yoke. Nor is the enmity unallied with Sclavonic sym-
pathy ; yet there exists but a sorry army, large on paper — 90,000, I
believe — but of little real value. It possesses few officers, few rifles,
fewer gnus, and less organization. But over a restless people, Prince
Milan Obrenowics anxiously holds his sceptre, while the rival Kara-
georgevics awaits, five leagues distant, for a change in the halting and
whimsical affection of Belgrade and the Skuptschina.

Now it is apparent that, if in that, let us hope, remote contingency,
Russia seeks to move by land, on the Ottoman Dominions, the first
step must be the occupation of the flat 'Roumanian lands. Such
might not be difficult, but beyond there lies the broad and rapid
stream, des Schonen blauen Donau. West to east it runs ; northern
bank flat, open, and well adapted for armed manoeuvre, commanded,
though, by position succeeding position on the southern shore. An
able Captain, with an active, intelligent force of cavalry, who chose his
positions carefully, would long defend the fluvial passage. His centre
would rest on Rustchuk, and either wing on Widdin and Silistria. Cf
them, though, anon. When at length the passage was forced, the
Turkish troops would fall back by Shumla, on the Balkan range. The
position of Shumla alone would not be overcome without difficulty, and
then the invaders, weakened by their Army of occupation in Roumania,
by the crossing of the Danube, by the corps detached to mask Widdin,
Rustchuk, Silistria, and Varna, would find a very serious barrier in
the passes and defiles of the Balkan.

But if the double-headed Eagle elect to make a feint only on the
northern frontier, and to leave for subsequent subjugation the fortresses
on that quarter, choosing rather for the real attack to make a sudden
dash on the capital by sea and land, there would be much to recom-
mend such a course. Disembarking fifty thousand men in the unde-
fended Gulf of Bourgas, the fate of Stamboul might be a question
of days. Do you know the Bosphorus, that narrow passage, with
swift and treacherous current possibly, but yet with water so deep,
that a vessel of the largest draught may anchor almost within a
stone's throw of the shore ? On either side crest succeeds crest.
Each offers an artillery position. Fortified and defended, a forced
passage would be almost impossible, but what is the state of the
case ? An indifferent work is to be seen on the Asiatic coast,

T7=TT

" THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION ." 35

nothing besides. The depth is too great for torpedoes. How it is
that the Turkish Chief of the Staff derates his talents, his energies,
his resources to the erection of barrack and store house upon barrack
and store house, while the heights of the Bosphorus, the only land-
ing place on the Black Sea coast, are undefended, while Varna is
ill-guarded, Silistria is left in its ruined state, while Rustohuk falls
into disrepair, while Widdin and Nisch. am scarcely worthy of the
name of fortresses, is for him. to explain.

The Russian Fleet would co-operate to some extent with the land
forces. I take it to be very uncertain how much work is going on in
the dockyards of NicolaiefE ; but from such sources of information as
are at my command, I am justified in assuming that the Black Sea
Fleet is sufficiently strong to protect an embarkation at the point
I have indicated. Whether it be absolutely a match for the Turkish
ironclads is very doubtful ; but yon will perceive that I consider this
plan in the light of a*ooup de main, rather than in that of a campaign of
which the defenders and their allies have had long warning. Russia
possesses such extraordinary facilities for concentrating troops and
material of war without attracting attention, that she would probably
find it easy to drop upon the Turk unawares. I doubt even if three
ironclads could leave their moorings in the Bosphorus for a few days'
cruize without a month of preparation.

Let us now see what light Great Britain could shed upon the
matter. Recent events have not materially altered the position of
affairs. The Eastern Question is indeed connected with our road to
India. But think not that this road is solely one for the conveyance
of our troops, for the passage of our ships. The road to India
means, indeed, one for the transit of men and merchandize, and also
one to the hearts, to the loyalty, to the submission of the vast
Mahommedan population to the Supreme Power, This loyalty, this
submission, depends much — those who have been in India know how
much — on the alliance of the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty with the
Caliph of the Prophet, the Sultan of Turkey. I have before shown
you how obedient to rulers of this creed is the Mahommedan soldier,
and even so is the Mahommedan layman. The infringement of
religious precept could alone break through this rule.

Nor are the new rights so patriotically acquired over the Sues
Canal, any positive assurance that the material road to India will be
for ever secure. So narrow, so shifting, so difficult is the passage that
even in time of peace the speed of four knots an hour must not
be exceeded. Often and often a vessel runs a-ground. The treacher-
ous sand is here to-day and there to-morrow. The buoys which
yesterday marked the course have now to be moved. I am informed,
credibly informed, that a single boat in a single night is capable of
stopping all safe navigation through the Canal ; and will not the able
and renowned Officer, who, if report runs aright, is entrusted by
leave of his Tsar, with the portfolio of war at Cairo, see that
land defences guard the waterway ? In short, be not surprised, if,
on some future day, the existence of a Treaty, that yon now little
dream o£ is brought to light.

356 "THE TUBKISH FORCES, AND

Do yon, then, go with me in the theory that Great Britain is pre-
eminently interested in the great qnestion before ns ? The preservation
of Turkey is closely connected with our own highest interests. How
do we, then, stand as regards the qnestion in a military aspect ? As
matters are, 1 very much doubt if any active interference would have
snch a reasonable chance of success as to justify its being attempted.
The Army which is available for continental operations is too small to
render any vast assistance, unless everything be prepared, everything
favourable, to the execution of a fixed and definite plan. It might be
otherwise, were the Militia liable for foreign service in time of war ; a
practicable scheme I mentioned here last summer. But we can only
take things as they exist. On any attempted rupture of the present
status quo, it is probable that our Mediterranean Fleet would be des-
patched to the Dardanelles. A large portion of the garrisons of Malta
and Gibraltar would be moved at once eastwards. Within ten days
forty thousand regular troops would be despatched from our shores,
and ten days later might disembark on Turkish soil, i.e., at least three
weeks after the declaration of war. Remember that, until that declara-
tion, we could not move a man, for such movement would assuredly
constitute a casus belli of itself. Three weeks in this age is a ?ong time,
and, as you will have gathered, my deliberate opinion is that the Turks
do not at this hour possess the means of resisting any skillfully planned
and energetically conducted invasion. They wiD not submit quietly, —
a St. Bartholomew's day might recur, — but I do not think that any
firm stand could be made, reasonable chances favouring both sides.
Nor is this all. Any British Army sent to assist Turkey, to uphold
our policy of ages, and from which it would be fatal to depart, would
meet with every obstacle long before it came face to face with the
aggressor. Nearly everything would have to be furnished from the
Fleet, for in such a state is the country that it is almost deprived
of the usual means of sustenance. The entire transport would have to
be provided. At home, even the service is defective. How, then,
would it be possible for us to establish it, within the required time,
ready for an arduous campaign, thousands of miles away ? Horses,
again, we should have to send. Have we them here ? Can we have
them there P Then, also, engineer and pontoon trains, to say nothing
of ammunition.

This is now the state of affairs. But let us hope it will improve.
If, say a million sterling were spent now in fortifying the Bosphorus,
Bourgas, Varna, and the line of the Danube ; in organising transport ;
in providing horses; it might save many millions to the British
taxpayer hereafter. If Officers be sent, or at least encouraged, to go
and learn Turkish, to instruct the troops, to stimulate the Navy, then
British arms will be able successfully to co-operate with Turkish
battalions. One other matter, too, is all important, whether with or
without English interference, viz., the completion of the strategical
railway from Adrianople to Shumla. Three years ago was the con-
tract signed by Baron Hirsch, on the one part, and the Turkish
Government on the other, but intrigue has successfully postponed the
carrying out of the work. Without that line, I do not see how troops

^rvT^

" THE MILITARY A8PECTS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION." 35

could be moved np to the Danube — how they could be supplied with
field equipment. It would bear, too, with the utmost importance on
any assistance we or any State gave to the Sultan. Its immediate
construction ought therefore, I submit, to be insisted upon coute que
coute.

The position of Austria, as regards the Eastern Question, now
demands consideration. Any encroachment of Sclavonic power
might inconvenience her in the highest degree. Despite the recent
Note, despite any temporary uncertainty in her views, I cannot but
think that my query must be answered in the affirmative at Vienna.
Already overburdened with heterogeneous races, it cannot be that the
House of Hapsburg seeks to bring more turbulent tribes and greater
discordance into its midst. I refer to the acquisition of sovereign
rights over the Ottoman Provinces now the subject of so much con-
cern. Everything points to a firm accord between the Cabinets of
St. James and Vienna, on Eastern Affairs, and this has an important
bearing on the military aspects of the question. Even without Great
Britain, any active support afforded by Austria to Turkey must
materially change the plans of attack. Moving,*as her troops would
do, on the invader's flank, the northern Army of offence would have
to be one of surpassing magnitude, for I entertain doubts as to tho
reception that the Muscovite would meet with in Roumania, if that
excitable population was influenced by the approach of Austrian
succour. In a very few days, 300,000 Austrians might man the
Danube. To Bazias there is perfect railway communication, and the
vast fleet of river steamers is entirely in the hands of the Viennese
Government. Austria is consequently able to send the maximum aid
to the declining Ottoman, and if co-operating with England, as I trust
she would, any attempt to dismember the Turkish Empire would meet
with summary punishment.

Time was, and a very short time back, that another State would
have claimed a positive right to be consulted on any reappearance of
the question of to-day. But for the present, that time has gone. The
influence which, not long ago, was paramount at the Sublime Porte
has completely faded. There are many present who well remember
how gallantly tho French fought side by side with them on this very
matter. How the Anglo-Franco Turkish alliance silenced the questioner
i& matter of history. But now, France will assuredly not interfere
actively in any solution of the Eastern problem that may arise. The
Russian alliance is the first consideration. It may cost much, but to
Gaul it is worth anything, and of that every Frenchman is convinced.
France, then, has ceased to influence the military aspect of the question.

Even so with Germany. On the other side of Whitehall, it was
authoritatively said, I believe, and not so very long ago, " The Eastern
Questern is for Germany a matter of purely secondary interest." This
too is obvious. The German interests in Turkey are very small.
Those in Russian friendship enormous, no less so than to France.
Teuton intervention in any Russian mode of breaking in upon tho
situation, means for Germany a double war, each requiring all the
force, military and civil, of the nation ; for France rehabilitation, and

358 " THE TURKISH FOBCM," ETC.

victory. Close by me, though, is an Officer who, the other day, toli
me with serious face that all had been prepared in that terrible
" general stab " for the invasion of Britain, the annihilation of
France, the subjugation of Russia, all at one and the same time. I
trust my friend will survive so appalling an idea, and live to see that
the new Empire is and must be peace, until the inevitable war of
revenge has been reckoned among the horrors of the past.

I need not detain yon with any analysis of the aid Italy, Greece, or
Spain might bring to the question. Highly improbable is it, indeed,
that they would do aught in a military war, but to each of them the
present condition of things is most favourable to their prosperity.
To Greece, through which I have lately travelled, is this especially
the case. So is it viewed by every Athenian of intelligence. But,
mentioning Greece, I cannot refrain from inviting attention to a
scheme projected by the ancients, but, owing to scarcity of funds and
local disturbances, never carried out — the piercing of the narrow
Isthmus of Corinth, the junction of classic JEgean with Ionian Sea.
To Austria, to Italy, it would be of vast benefit. The dangerous
doubling of Cape Matapan would be avoided ; and, in a military sense
as regards the Eastern question, and in a commercial sense, such an
undertaking recommends itself to politicians and financiers.

Gentlemen, I have done. I trust I have not over-taxed your
patience, nor said aught upon which any erroneous construction could
be placed. I am grateful for your attention. But, in conclusion, let
me beseech you not to let your investigations end at the point to
which I have presumed to carry them. Consider the Eastern Ques-
tion well in its magnitude, in its importance to our beloved country.
Consider it well, not in any sophistical aspect, but in its true bear-
ing to British interests. The solution will then be left to time, and
even, I may say, to another generation.

LECTURE.

Friday, May 12, 1876.

Majob-Genebal Sib GARNET J. WOLSELEY, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

<fcc, Ac., Ac., in the Chair.

THE ITALIAN ARMY.

By Colonel the Right Honourable Lord Watbnbt, F.R.S., A.D.C.

to the Queen.

Ik the address that I shall have the honour to give you this day, I am
perfectly aware there exist very considerable difficulties, that the task
is a very heavy one, but it is so intimately connected with the subject
that closely engages our attention at present, namely, the re-organiza-
tion of the Armies of Europe, and also is so conjoined with the
fortunes of that great country, the Peninsula of Italy, over the pro-
gress of which we have watched with much anxiety, that even at the
risk of giving a very incommensurate and insufficient idea of the cir-
cumstances which may be more plain to me in my imagination than I
may be fortunate enough to make clear, I am still disposed to undertake
the task. I had hoped, indeed, that on this occasion one of the old
soldiers of the long series of successful and unwearied struggles which
I shall now have to relate to you might have been present. His
Excellency the Italian Ambassador, had he not felt the paramount
duty of attending the Court of Her Most Gracious Majesty, would
have been present on this odbasion, and thus I should have had the
advantage of that enlightened and personal criticism which would have
corrected the errors that I must needs, I fear, fall into.

The subject we treat this day is not one of the mere organization of
the military force, but is so interwoven with the history of the country
generally, with its improvement and defence, that you will permit me,
I trust, to refer to some historical points before I proceed to the ques-
tion of military organization. After the close of the Napoleonic
struggle, one dead level of repose settled down upon Italy, made
heavier and more grievous to her people by the political incapacities
that restrained the exercise of constitutional rights. With the ex-
ception of one small State in which free action, both as regards the

360 THE ITALIAN ARMY.

people and as regards their government, was kept alive ; with that
exception, all the rest were held in a bondage the more hateful, that
it was maintained by foreign bayonets. It is difficult to procure any
map of Italy which sets forth very clearly the position which the small
Duchy of Savoy, afterwards called the kingdom of Sardinia, occupied
with regard to the rest of the Peninsula. But in the colours of that
map you will see the proportion in the north-west corner which
that kingdom occupied. So situated and so circumscribed, it is a
matter of marvel that it should become at last the governing and
motive power of Italy. As I have said, a repose which is not peace,
rested upon Italy, until at last the dry bones began to move, and a
new spirit was breathed into them. The proclamation of the Spanish
Constitution at Naples, in 1822, gave the first evidence of reviving1
power and sentiment in any Italian country, too soon,, unfortunately,
to be quenched in defeat, for the progress of the Neapolitan Govern-
ment was checked by the disastrous affair at Benevento, and then,
for long years, there was no more speech of war. But the spirit was
alive, and as time rolled on the Piedmontese Government more and
more developed constitutional action, and began to prepare for the
contest which it was seen was inevitable. I remember, in 1836, as I
have mentioned before from this place, Field Marshal Radetzky pre-
pared two alternative lines of defence in the valley of the Po. The
attack was expected by him from the west, and from the west it came,
but not in the shape which he anticipated. He believed that the
French would exercise their newly developed power in attack, pro-
bably with the alliance of the Sardinian kingdom, but he little
expected that Sardinia would confront Austria single-handed. We
know the result of that bold and resolute movement — armies broken,
the Sovereign an exile, and dying of a broken heart in Lisbon. But
not, therefore, did the kingdom of Savoy abandon its true and noble
confidence in the regeneration of Italy. Years passed on, and again
the arbitrament of battle was appealed to by the sub- Alpine kingdom,
and with a result which, as we know, gradually brought country after
country into that mass of power which is now reigned over by Victor
Emanuel, the King of united Italy. In the circumstances of those
wars there were some curious and remarkable results. From the
beginning the Sardinian kingdom had to rest exclusively on its own
strength ; the fighting power was gradually developed into a greater
efficiency, step by step, as each successive government declared its
adhesion, because this must be borne in mind, that no portion of
Italy was conquered, so to speak, but that, being set free from the
rule of its native government, it voluntarily joined itself to the Sar-
dinian State. There were, besides, some conflicts fought single-
handed — some disastrous — none dishonourable. There were battles
fought in concert with the French Army, and in result of these,
though falling short at the time of what might have been anticipated,
though Italy was not conquered, as the French Emperor had promised,
" from the Alps to the sea," yet progress was attained ; it was evident
that some future day would give to Italy all that she could desire, just
as previously the protracted resistance, made both at Borne and at

THE ITALIAN ARMY. 361

Venice, gave promise of what might be hereafter the lot of that
country in a better day. And so at last Italy, with the exception of
Borne, was won. " From the Alps to the sea," no foreign soldier rode
or mounted guard on her soil, and the question then was, how, from
the discordant materials of the Italian forces, a national Army could
be constructed which should be sufficient to hold the country, first
against invaders, and then against powers that might seek to enforce
compromising alliances. Now, ib will be observed that the different
districts of Italy are separated from each other, not merely by
natural bounds and limits, but also by the diverse genius and fashions
of their people. The Northern Italy of Savoy has more of the feeling
of the races beyond the Alps ; the Lombard and the men of Venice
are of one mode of thought, and those of the States of the Church
and the Emilian Legations of another ; and so of Tuscany, of Naples,
and of Sicily, and the problem was, how to mould these into one
homogeneous mass.

But, before I proceed further to show you how worthy the Sar-
dinian Army was of the great task that lay before it, let me, from
the simple records of its Army List, mention some facts which are
well worthy of remembrance. Sardinia, or the new kingdom of the
Savoy Duchy, has been known in the successful scientific wars of
Europe since successful scientific wars began. We remember that the
feuds and wars of the middle ages eminently brought to the surface the
great Italian qualities of fiery courage, of resistance, of endurance, and
of scientific application of mechanical means, so far as they were un-
derstood, in engineering and artillery, but it is not remembered,
probably, that amongst the regimented forces of Europe few or none
are older than the Italian. I find, in the Army List in which an
account of the different regiments is given, that the third regiment,
called that of Piedmont, dates from 1637. I believe that is older than
any regimented corps in our country, and older, I think, than any
borne on the rolls of France, or Austria, or Spain, or of any military
power except that of Russia. These regiments distinguished them-
selves in many battles of the latter part of the 17th century and the
whole of the 18th century. It is scarcely necessary for me to read
to you the long roll of their distinctions, but those who remember
the wars that have occurred in the last thirty years, and especially
some to whom I now speak, who were companions of the small Sar-
dinian Army by the waters of the Tchernaya, well know that they
were soldiers, and have been soldiers at all times, with whom the
English soldier might well be proud to bear privation and to mingle
his blood. As of the infantry, so of the cavalry and so of the artillery
and engineers. In this Army List you will find that gradually the
Armies of the different countries that joined themselves to the sub-
Alpine kingdom were absorbed and are borne on their rolls ; but here
was an enormous difficulty. Austria, with her repressive policy, had
forbidden the youth of the Milanese, of Lombardy, and venetia to
cultivate their natural genius for arms and warlike science. The troops
of Tuscany were trained on the Austrian system, but were compara-
tively small in number : the Neapolitan Army was trained and drilled

362 THE ITALIAN ARMY.

under the last King and his predecessors to an extent which gave
them an admirable appearance under arms, and the thorough " allure
militaire " which is so desirable ; and yet, such was the fault of the
Government, that this Army melted away before Garibaldi's red
u camisade " as the snow before the sun, but has since re-entered in
the persons of its Officers into the service of the King of Italy. I
say in the persons of its Officers, because this is a point to which I
shall direct attention. The men of the Italian Army undergo a more
constant and searching change than those of any Army raised by con-
scription. How is this effected ? In the administrative system of the
Italian Government the principle is that a Minister of War shall lay
what is called a "project of law," specifying whatever alterations he
may desire to propose, first before the Chamber, and 'then before a
Committee to be appointed by the Chamber. There is no examination
of witnesses or appointing Committees in our sense, but » the Com-
mittee, generally some sixteen or seventeen Deputies, examine the
project themselves, and require such explanation from the Minister as
may be necessary to satisfy themselves of the feasibility of his plans.
These are very elaborate, and are carried out with a care and atten-
tion which is very remarkable. The volume before us comprehends
the three projects of law on which the organization of the Army is
now carried out, and it is exhaustive, as may be supposed, from the
searching qualities of Italian genius. It goes into every question that
can possibly concern the soldier, from the chief of the Army to the
youngest recruit in the ranks ; and some of the conclusions are exceed-
ingly noteworthy, being drawn, not only from the personal experience
of the Committee, but also from the incorporation of that which
appears to be advantageous in the practice of foreign Armies. For
instance, to commence with the main point of the recruiting, with
regard to the exhaustive principle on which it should proceed, there
was a very long series of discussions as to the nature of the service in
the first instance, and that was decided to be personal conscription for
every male subject in Italy, not disqualified by physical incapacities
or exempted by certain family circumstances from service. Then
came the question, what manner of Army there should be. And it
was decided that there should be first an Army which could take
the field, with a reserve, an Army answering to the Landwehr or
the Militia of our country, and then a communal Militia, resembling
the local corps which obtained in this country during the great
French war; and, finally, Alpine corps, which are regarded as ex-
clusively designed for the defence of the mountains. Then came the
consideration as to whether there should be any exemption, or what
provision should be made for those brought into the ranks. The
principle is at present to raise the trcops, 90,000 men, in what are
called two categories. The first category consists of 65,000 men, who
are raised according to proportions determined on a fixed system,
throughout the military districts of the country ; and this proportion
joins the colours and remains with them, three years for the infantry
and six for the cavalry; and the 25,000 remaining in the second
category arc taken to maintain the original strength of the Army in

THE ITALIAN ABUT. 363

line daring the years of their service, that is to say, at the rate of
about 10 per cent. And it is expressly laid down that those who
happen to be placed hi the second category, that is the category of
temporary exemption, or deferred time of service, have no right, on
that account, to be placed in the third category, that is to say, the
Militia of the provinces or communal, bnt shall continue to form the
second category. And I may mention this, in order to show how
thoroughly a fair and true spirit pervades the whole of the Italian
system. It was laid down expressly in the deliberations of this Com-
mittee, that there is only one hardship in forced service, and that is
inequality.

Then with regard to the command of the Army. In the Italian
service there is no permanent rank above that of Lieutenant- General.
For the great commands, an officer styled " Army- General " is selected,
equivalent to the temporary rank of General Commanding in Chief.
And this question is also argued out with a greater closeness and at
greater length than I care to detain you upon at present ; but in this
argument, and this shows you how thoroughly they have investigated
every question, the Committee remark particularly upon the singular
felicity with which H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief in
this country has managed so to perform and carry forward our military
institutions that he has made the armed soldier acceptable to hia
countrymen in a free state.

Then in this further analysis that I am speaking of, with the close
prevision that is applied to all these subjects, I find in the distribution
of an army of 100,000 men the proportion of infantry of the line to be
66,740, of bersaglieri 11,032, cavalry 4,849, field artillery 6,810, garrison
artillery 4,086 pontoon train 572, engineers 2,179— a large proportion,
— and transport 3,732. And the remark on the cavalry is this : that
whereas cavalry is an arm difficult to maintain, and expensive also, and
on these accounts to be adopted with much circumspection ; that though
certainly cavalry regiments may make a more brilliant campaign, yet>
for a country provided with sufficient fortifications, with an infantry it
can trust, and with arms of defence, and with determination, as we
say, to expend the last man and the last shilling, a brilliancy is not
required which is in excess of what is necessary for the defence of the
country.

The proportions of the conscription, «f which I have spoken are
somewhat remarkable. I have before me a table giving the estimated
proportion of troops from 1872 to 1885. To avoid confusion, I have
taken three periods — 1872, 1878, and 1885. The annual contingent
of 1872, permanent and in reserve, was 632,700 men ; in 1878 it will
he 736,700 ; and in 1885, 767,600. Under the first system, the troops
were four years with the colours and twelve yean liable to service ;
under the second system, which now prevails, they are three years with
the colours and twelve years liable to service.

Having thus obtained their war numbers, the War Office proceeds
to complete establishments with wonderful accuracy and minuteness.
The artillery are to be provided with 1,000 field guns, of a description
of which I shall have to speak, and with 800 stoel B.L. field guns,

364 THE ITALIAN ARMY.

equivalent to our 16-pounders. The fortresses are adequately provided
with artillery, and, as will appear farther on, arrangements are made for
the maintenance of the fortresses in an efficient state. I will now
remark the care that has been taken with regard to the comfort of the
soldier. The recruit is brought from hill or plain, as the case may be,
but at all events, generally speaking in Italy, from secluded districts, at
once into the Army, and is passed through the ranks. The system of
military conscription is here carried out, I believe, to the most efficient
and least hurtful extent in respect of the industry of the country. The
principle is, that each Italian regiment shall have a certain proportion
of recruits from different military districts, determined before-hand,
that is, one- fifth from each of five different districts. Thus, though the
soldier is not entirely separated from his friends and comrades of the
district from which he was recruited, he is not only passed into a
foreign garrison, so to speak, where he learns much of his countrymen
that he has never known before, but he also learns it in the comrade-
ship of those whom he thereby learns to respect and to appreciate.
Thus, for instance, in recruiting for the infantry, I take the case of one
particular corps ; the first infantry regiment receives its recruits from
five districts, from Alessandria, from Bergamo, from Sienna, from
Naples, and from Palermo. I shall have, further on, to mention the
circumstances under which these recruits are personally brought into
the service.

I might detain you for some time on the general subject of establish,
ments, but the work which has been published by our Topographical
Department, " The Armed Strength of Italy," translated from the
German by Lieutenant Hare, R.E., gives so clear an account, that I
would refer you to its pages. There the general arrangements ap-
peared to be very much as they are now carried out, though from time
to time there must be, of course, considerable alterations. Permit me,
then, for a 'moment, in the absence of detail, which time does not permit
me to give, to ask credit for the military establishments being complete.
I shall shortly proceed to give you some details as to some of the special
establishments, but we are now arrived at the point that we have an
army, we have the principle of appointing Officers, and the mode in
which the soldier is brought into the ranks. When the soldier is in
the ranks the question is, how he is dealt with. He is kept for three
years nominally in the infantry, but for two years and eight months
practically with the colours ; he is then returned to his district, and is
not allowed to remain, except under special circumstances and as a
volunteer. It will be asked how are the non-commissioned officers to
be obtained P Non-commissioned officers are obtained for the perma-
nent service from battalions of instruction, which are organised very
highly for their instruction on an uniform system; and amongst
other points of interest to the Army, the question of how the non-
commissioned officer is to be retained in the ranks is very minutely
discussed. How to retain non-commissioned officers in the service is
the question, and the answer is double, first in the negative and then
iu the positive direction. It appears that the hope or expectation of
wearing the epaulette as commissioned Officers, will not retain the non-

THE ITALIAN ABMY. 365

commissioned officer in the service. For this reasons may be easily
supposed. Then with regard to re-engagement, that does not appear
to have been very successful, since if continued service does not deci-
sively secure the future, no one will choose to expend in the service of
the State the best years of his life, that is, those years which alone can.
create a sufficient provision for after-life.

But there are two special recommendations, one to recognise the
right to employment, both staff and civil for long service ; and the
second is, and this a very remarkable one, and as far as I know
novel, to create an intermediate grade between the Italian non-com-
missioned officer and the commissioned Officer. The Italians believe
that these provisions will succeed very well, and this is one of the
points [on which we should have derived so much advantage from the
opinion of the distinguished General, had he been present. I mention
these things to show you the care and attention which are paid to regi-
mental and other matters. Now I will take the case of the various
duties and points of interest which come under the notice of the com-
mittees on military matters. Of the recruiting I have spoken. Then
before these committees such matters are discussed as extraordinary
expenses for the defence of the country, for the organization and
materiel of artillery, for heavy field guns, for firelocks, for mobilisa-
tion of the Army, and for the defence of the sea-coasts. Another
matter -that has very much occupied the attention of the Italian
Government in these references, has been the position of the Topo-
graphical Corps in the Italian Army. And this is remarkable; the
Italian staff has been but twelve years in Sicily, and in that twelve
years, with no very great amount of help, a map has been completed
of contours, in beauty of execution in no way inferior to any that I
have seen. In the report of this department a highly important
scientific question is discussed, which I recommend to your notice, and
which no doubt has attracted the attention of our Survey department.
The question is not only the scale on which military plans should be
drawn, but whether every section of a military map should be a precise
portion of the great system comprehending the kingdom, or whatever
other district may be selected, just as it is in actual fact on the ground.
And here discussion arises as to the variable and comparative difficulty
of forming such maps as shall be absolutely and positively true in
reference to all points, if they be countries running north or south,
or east or west. All scientific Officers present will at once see the
difficulty arising from the different parallels, and this is what the
Italian topographical staff have addressed themselves to obviate. The
system adopted is called the polycentric system ; that is to say, each
separate sheet, instead of having an assumed uniform reference at all
points to all other sheets, is taken in reference to the particular selected
district, so that the whole of this district, though it does not absolutely
and perfectly correspond with the entire surface of the larger and outer
districts, is complete in itself, and one centre of proportional reference
is taken in each sheet or district, and is therefore called the polycentric
system, which now attains, I believe, most successful results in Italy.

Before I pass on, let me speak of the purpose for which alone this

vol. xx. 2 b

366 THE ITALIAN ABMT.

Army is intended, and that is, of national defence. There is a proverb
now, derived from one of these reports, which says " L'esercito che
ha fatto l'ltalia fara anche gli Italiani." The Army which has made
Italy a State is making the Italians step by step, in bringing all
classes of men of all her provinces together, to honour and respect
each other, through mutual knowledge, and is prepared especially in
the person of its officers for sacrifices of any extent, for the advance-
ment and for the defence of their country, as appeared in these
reports.

With regard to the purposes of defence, there may be said to be five
classes of war in Italy — the war of the Alps, the war of the Apen-
nines, the war of the river system, the war of the coasts, and the
war of fortresses. For the war of the Alps, the passes are being
strongly fortified with small forts and heavy guns, and garrisoned by
the Alpine corps. For the war of the Apennines the light field
guns are designed, because, as the Italian Minister of War said to
me, " What could we do in our mountains with your great and heavy
artillery ? " For the war of the plains, there are troops fitted for close
battles. For the war of the fortresses, there are the old works, reHcs
of Austrian rule, which have been placed or retained in a con-
dition of service, and there is no spot of possible offence to the country,
I firmly believe, — from the returns I have now lying before me, — for
which absolute provision for defence iB not made or projected. And
there is this remarkable in the calm courage and foresight of the
Italian Government, that they never hesitate to declare what the
objects of their defence are. In what we should call our estimates,
they set forth that Rome is to be fortified by an entrenched camp, to
secure the capital from sudden attack, and to guarantee it from the
risk of bombardment with an ordinary siege-train. That Capua is to
be fortified as a depot for stores, and of " appui " for the defence of
Naples, and would make her independent of the chances of Upper
Italy, to protect the capital against attack from the south, and to
cover the retreat on Naples of an Army which might be obliged to
abandon Rome. And a nation who are so determined to sacrifice the
brilliant in favour of the useful, who do not hesitate to declare, in the
face of day, what their intentions are, must needs cause themselves
to be respected, even in this first flush and youth of their union.
Again must be noticed the war of the coast, and it is here that Italy
has so great an advantage. Italy has the same advantage, from her
long sea coast and her growing maritime power, that makes England,
for imperial purposes, the strongest military power in the world, that
is, in the possession of sea-bases from which expeditions can be
launched against the most remote of her enemies.

Now, having given very briefly and very imperfectly a general
outline of the Italian Army, let us see its application.

First, as to the recruits. The levies of the military district of
Rome were, on the first of January in this year, taken for the first
time. It was a matter of some little anxiety, for Rome had been
accustomed to no soldiers but mercenaries, and I, with some curiosity,
watched the recruits. Nearly 1,700 men walked into Rome, in the

,«.J . w

THE ITALIAN ARMY. 367

earl j days of winter," from, their mountain and village parishes. They
came clad in goat-skins and shod with sandals, and such equipments
as befit the mountaineer, but with small thought of wearing a shoe,
or putting on a uniform or a shako. H.R.H. Prince Humbert did the
British Officers the honour to request their attendance at the inspec-
tion of these levies. 1,672 were due upon the list, and 1,625 were
in rank. Although only ten days together, the teachable and docile
Qualities of those young recruits, shown in steadiness and aptitude
for service, reminded me of the race from which they sprang. It
was a remarkable sight. Those of my hearers who have been at
Borne will remember that the great parade-ground is formed of the
camp of the Pratorian Guard, the famous, though turbulent soldiers
of the Empire. The parade stretches below the city walls ; beyond are
the magnificent hills of the Sabines, the Samnites, and the Marsi, those
men who kept republican Borne at bay for hundreds of years, and at
last were only conquered into allies. These very men were the
ancestors of the recruits who were now to form a portion of the Army
of Italy. I may be permitted to refer to a quotation which then flashed
across my mind. Horace, in speaking of the Rome in his time, and
how the youth had degenerated from their fathers, says : —

" Non his juventus orta parentibus
Infeeit aequor sanguine Pimioo,

Pyrrhumque et ingentem cecidit
, Antiochum Hannibalemque dirum ;
Sod rusticorum mascula militum
Proles, Sabellifl docta ligonibus

Venare glebas et severs

Mains ad arbitrium reoisos
Portare fustes, sol ubi montium
Mutaret umbras et juga demeret

Bobus fatigatis a mi cum

Tempus agens abeunte curru."

My rough English for this seems to be thoroughly realised : —

" And yet in sooth 'twas no such youth from parents such as these
Who dyed in Carthaginian gore the level of the seas ;

Smote Pyrrhus of the ruddy looks, and stout of lith and limb
The stalwart chief Antiochus, and Hannibal the grim ;
But manly seed of rustic breed, themselves old soldiers made
In youth to turn the stubborn clod, with Sabine pick and spade ;
And homeward bear the billets hewn as thrifty mother bade ;
What time the sun o'er mountain ridge was flinging

Swift shifting shadows over fell and scaur ;
lofting the yoke from wearied oxen, bringing
A pleasant hour with his departing car."

The equipment of the infantry is useful and serviceable in a great
degree ; and they have a most ingenious manner of carrying their
spare ammunition. The Italian soldier fights bat with one pouch;
and for a long time I was puzzled to know how the ammunition was
to be carried unless with the trouble of drawing every spare cartridge
from the pack. But I observed in the upper part of the pack a
packet which I thought contained the spare shoes. I asked what it

2 B 2

368 THE ITALIAN ARMY.

was. " Oh ! it is the spare ammunition." The spare ammunition is
placed in a ticking cover in this packet, and if the soldier requires
fresh ammunition, he undoes the button, raises the left shoulder, and
out falls the cartridge whether he be fighting in line or skirmishing.
Then with regard to the Bersaglieri, those wonderful troops. They
are picked men, the minimum chest measure is 33 inches, and they
answer in a general way in appearance to our stout drivers. Their
Dace, and that of the Italian infantry generally, is rapid and some-
tvhat exhausting. The pace was originally 160, now increased to 170
gymnastic paces, which are 39 inches, the ordinary pace of 30 inches.
116, and the double is 136, of 32 inches. I do not know how long
they can keep up this pace, but still it is very formidable, and in the
case of the Bersaglieri is shown to be very effective.

With regard to the cavalry, two innovations have been introduced,
dne, as it appears to me, of undoubted merit, and the other somewhat
doubtful The Italian cavalry, the light cavalry especially, skirmish
extensively, but the skirmishers leave the sword on the saddle when
they dismount for the purpose of fighting with a carbine armed with
a bayonet. The valise is suppressed in the service, and its place is
taken by two saddle bags of sheep-skin, which have a very soldierlike
and neat effect. The saddle is so stuffed that there is always a current
of air passing over the back bone of the horse, and yet apparently does
not shift ; the saddle itself rests on a blanket folded in four.

With regard to the artillery, there is a special gun which I shall
now have the pleasure of mentioning. It is a gun of very light
draught, and I will ask the meeting to understand that those sketches
represent actually and accurately the field-day, to which the War
Minister kindly invited British officers. The gun itself is 2*953 inches
calibre. The velocity given the shell is 1,312 feet per second, and
with 12° 6' of elevation it ranges 3,828 yards. The elevation for
shrapnel is one-fifth greater, and it is used up to 2,515 yards range.

The maximum elevation given the gun in the carriage is 22°.

The lightness of the gun-carriage and limber, the high initial
velocity given to its projectile, and the consequent long range, place
the Italian field artillery in the foremost rank as to efficiency.

Sir William Codbinqton : Is it 22° ?

Lord Wavbket : The common shell at 12° 6" gives a range of 3,828.
The other tables are not given. This gun is most effective with four
horses and five men to a gun detachment. Two men sit with the gun,
two on the limber, and one on the waggon* In case the waggons are
not up, a non-commissioned officer is dismounted. This gun is the
subject of a paper, well deserving reference, in the Transactions of
the B.A. Institution, by Colonel Maxwell, B.A.

The diagram represents the country to the southward of Borne, and
the Tiber below Borne. The idea of the manoeuvre was that this body of
troops was to hold their ground against a force advancing on Borne, for
two hours, at the end of which time reinforcements would arrive.
This stream, La Magliana, runs into the Tiber; and the lower part
of this ground, with the exception of the road, was neutralized for the
purpose of manoeuvre. The troops left their barracks about 8.30 A.M.,

THE ITALIAN AEMT. 369

the nearest point of ground was about five miles : the farthest about
six-and-a-half. They began manoeuvring at twelve, manoeuvred in
earnest for two hours, marched back again, and there were only three
men in the ambulance. The force was composed of five battalions,
throe of Bersaglieri and two of infantry of the line, with ten guns, six

THE MANQSUVBEfl OF THE MAGLIAN A, J Air. 28, 1867.

A. Centre of defence. Q|l. Bight flank of attack. □ 2. Left flank of attack,

for the attack and four for the defence, and a squadron and a half of
cavalry, equally distributed. The cavalry came very little into action,
as you will suppose, through not seeing them included in the sketches
which represent three separate periods of the manoeuvre. The custom
of the judges is to take two halts during the manoeuvre for the pur-
pose of, as it were, taking count, and thus according the value of the

3?0 THE ITALIAN ARMY.

points verified at these periods of halt, the decision is regulated. Hfy
impression is, the condition on which the manoeuvre was undertaken
was thoroughly carried out, and that the ground was held for two
hours.

The first movement was by massing the attacking force on that
point, D 1 (Diagram). The troops then moved athwart the crest of these
hills till they reached the furthest point of formation, D 2. The proper
right of attack of the assaulting force was from the buildings, near
the confluence of the Magliana and Tiber; the proper left of the
attack from these buildings, a mile and a half to the westward. This
central point was the point of defence, at whioh the head -quarter staff
was posted. On the development of the Bersaglieri attack from the right,
a portion of the troops were thrown into an oak wood in column of
companies, and a portion were retained in hand. Four guns were
brought up to the salient of the point A to bear on the Bersaglieri if
they should make a flank-attack from their left or westward. This
ground is exceedingly steep, and was therefore considered to be very
favourable for defence. The action was commenced by heavy firing from
the central point of the enemy's alignments upon our position, which
was very much exposed. I have mentioned that the ground below was
neutralised for the purposes of the manoeuvres, and indeed it would
have been very difficult to have carried troops or guns across. There
is a road leading to Rome through the flat with a bridge, of which the
Bersaglieri availed themselves to make a false attack in the first
instance over the ground ; and immediately below the central position
of defence in the centre is a nullah, about wide enough to jump a gun
across ; but the Bersaglieri hid themselves so completely in it as in a
shelter trench that from this high ground but little or nothing of the
troops below could be seen.

Having made this false attack from their left, another attack was
precipitated from the right which brought the defence out of the wood
and left them prepared to deploy as soon as the attack from the right
should attain sufficient importance. This was the closing scene of the
manoeuvre. The guns were withdrawn from the centre of defence
towards the left flank, and then opened on the advancing troops.
The skirmishing which was to protect our right was carried on to the
rear, and the men were formed facing the left or false attack.

The light guns were most effectively and efficiently worked with
their four men per gun detachment, and non-commissioned officers;
and I saw the guns of the attacking force brought up a very steep
incline in perfect order, and simply by four horses. It gave us all an
impression of the hardihood of the Italian soldier, and there were
. officers present well acquainted with the power of infantry movement
who were struck with what they call the "gliding" pace of the
Bersaglieri.

My time has now come to an end. I am exceedingly sorry I have

not the opportunity of impressing more strongly what I have to say ;

but if I could only show you the accumulation of papers and memoirs

' which I have had to consult, and to consult always with advantage,

yon would nay that the difficulty of choice was very great indeed.

THE ITALIAN ABMT. 371

The chief consideration is this : The strength of armed Italy is in
the system which has formed the veterans of her Army. They have
done work which few other soldiers could have done under the circum-
stances. They have set themselves thoroughly to do their duty to their
country. They are by degrees indoctrinating the whole of the Service
with the stern, fixed principle of the northern military spirit. Those
who have been their companions in camp and garrison will know how
to value these gallant men. For readiness, for steadiness, for good
conduct, the troops are to be most highly commended, even in such a
difficult capital as Borne. Orderly and quiet, with the best qualities of
the unspoiled soldier, they have learned that the profession of arms is
an honourable one ; and that though it may be difficult to maintain it
in its integrity, and though the pains and troubles that wait upon it
sometimes appear excessive, yet the Italians, who had little thought
twenty years ago of what the merit and honour of the military service
was, have now been converted into an army and a country of con-
stitutional soldiers.

Let me now show to the ladies present how noble a share their
sisters of Italy took in the war of liberation.

I read a poem of Mrs. Browning's entitled : —

aA Cotjet Lady."

" Her hair was tawny with gold, her eyes with purple were dark,

Her cheeks pale opal burned with a red and restless spark.

Never was lady or Milan nobler in name, and in race ;

Never was lady of Italy fairer to see in the face.

Never was lady on earth more true as woman and wife ;

Larger in judgment and instinct, prouder in manners and life.

She stood in the early morning, and said to her maidens, ' Bring

( That silken robe made ready to wear at the Court of the King.

( Bring me the clasps of diamond, lucid, clear of the mote,

' Clasp me the large at the waist, and clasp me the small at the throat.

( Diamonds to fasten the hair, and diamonds to fasten the sleeves,

' Laces to drop from their rays like a powder of snow from the eaves.'

Gorgeous she entered, the sunlight which gather' d her up in a flame,

While straight in her open carriage, she to the Hospital came.

In she went at the door, and gazing from end to end ;

' Many and low are the pallets, but each is the place of a friend.'

Up she pass'd through the wards, and stood at a young man's bed,

Bloody the band on his brow, and livid the droop of his head.

* Art thou a Lombard, my brother ? Happy art thou,' she cried,

And smil'd like Italy on him ; he dreamed in her face and died.

Pale with his passing soul, she went on still to a second ;

He was a grave hard man, whose years by dungeons were reckoned.

Wounds in his body were sore, wounds in his life were sorer ;

' Art thou a Bomagnole ? ' Her eyes drove lightnings before her.

' Austrian and Priest had joined to double and tighten the cord,

' Able to bind thee, O strong one — free by the stroke of a sword.'

• •••••

Down she stooped to a pallet where lay a face like a girl's,

Toung and pathetic with dying — a deep black hole in the curls.

' Art thou from Tuscany, brother ? and seest thou dreaming in pain ;

' Thy mother stand in the piazza, searching the list of the slain.

Kind as a mother herself, she touched his cheek with her hands,

' Blessed is she who has borne thee, although she should weep as she stands.'

372 THE ITALIAN AKMT.

' On she passed to a Frenchman, his arm carried off by a ball ;
Kneeling ' O more than my brother ! how shall I thank thee for all ?
' Each of the heroes around us has fought for his land and line,
' But thou hast fought for a stranger, in hate of a wrong not thine*
' Happy are all free peoples too strong to be dispossessed,
' But blessed are those among nations who dare to be strong for the rest.*
Ever she passed on her way, and came to a couch where pined
One with a face from Venetia, white with a hope out of mind ;
long she stood and gazed, and twice she tried at the name,
But two great crystal tears were all that faltered and came.
Only a tear for Venice? she turned as in passion and loss,
And stooped to his forehead, and kissed it, as if she were kissing the cross.
Faint witn that strain of heart, she moved on then to another,
Stern and strong in his death — ' And dost thou suffer, my brother ? '
Holding his hands in ben — ' Out of the Piedmont lion,
' Cometh the sweetness of freedom ! sweetest to live, or to die on.'
Holding his cold rough hands, * Well, oh well, have ye done
' In noble, noble Piedmont, who would not be noble alone.'
Back he fell while she spoke, she rose to her feet with a spring,
' That was a Piedmontese ! and this is the Court of the Sing.' "

To H.B.H. Prince Humbert the respectful thanks of the British
Officers present at Rome are eminently and in the first place due.

And I avail myself of this opportunity to express our sense of the
constant courtesy shown to us by Lieut.-General Ricotti, then Minister
of War ; by Lieut.-General Cosenz, Commanding Military Division ;
and by the Staff and Officers in garrison at Borne.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, NOTES, AND NOTICES

OF BOOKS.

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
By Captain F. C. H. Clabke, R.A., D.A.Q.M.G.

In the following pages it is proposed to present to the reader a short
outline of the chief reforms which have been introduced of late years
into the Russian Army, more especially during the last two years, 1874-
1875 : an epoch which cannot fail to be characterised in the future as
one of great military activity, not only for Russia, but generally for
the whole continent of Europe.

The reform which first attracts our attention is, naturally, that
fundamental one which affects the whole fabric of the commonwealth :
the introduction of general obligatory service for all classes of the
community. Its main object, as is also the case with the other
reforms, is to increase the numerical strength of the army.

The great development of the armed forces of the European
Powers during and after the war of 1870, had caused Russia to recede
into the background when estimated from a numerical point of view,
whereas eight years previously she had held the foremost place in this
respect among her immediate neighbours. Thus, in 1862, Prussia
had an army of 775,000 men, Austria of 700,000, and Russia of
1,300,000 men. In 1870, Germany had increased her effective to
1,310,000 men, Austria to 1,000,000, while the forces of Russia had
undergone no augmentation. This was considered an unsatisfactory
position for the nation, and a commission was appointed to consider
the whole question of recruitment and reserves. After mature de-
liberation, extending over a period of two years, during which the
subject was ventilated from every point of view, and the opinions and
interests of all classes were consulted and weighed, the commission
ultimately submitted, for the approval of the Emperor, the project of
a new law for regulating military service. This project, after being
altered somewhat in its details, but not in its general principles, by
the Emperor's immediate advisers, became law on the 1st January,
1874.

Although the introduction of general obligatory service must be
regarded as the first radical reform to which the army has been sub-
jected of late years, it would be incorrect to suppose that it broke
suddenly upon a rdgime existing from the time of the Crimean war,
and that the experience of that campaign had been lost upon the
nation. On the contrary, immediately after the peace of Paris, we

374 RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

find the Russians examining their military system and remedying the
more prominent shortcomings and defects under which it was labour-
ing. But the hand using the pruning-knife, instead of proceeding to
the root, touched only the more prominent excrescences on the
branches. The ground for any fundamental change was not yet
ready.

The path of progress in army-reform was so hampered by con-
flicting interests that no changes of a radical character were possible,
until the impediments which beset it could be removed. At length
the day dawned when the onward progress was to be freed from, the
trammels restraining it. The emancipation of the serfs by the
present Emperor in 1861, cleared the way for reform in the military
system, as it did for those numerous other amendments in the con-
stitution, which, in process of time, if as steadily followed as com-
menced, will serve to raise Russia to the level of other European
nations.

So long as the serfs constituted the great source from which recruits
for the army were derived, any augmentation of the yearly contin-
gent, with a view to passing a greater number, of men through the
ranks into the reserve, was so very unwelcome a measure to the pro-
prietors as to be well nigh impossible. In order to avoid interfering
with the rights of the latter, so time-honoured as almost to be sacred,
the Government was obliged to forego any increase to the reserve, and
as compensation, to retain the men present with the colours as long as
possible. Another evil was that the ranks became the receptacle of
all the dross of the community, the proprietors and communes being
openly invited to make use of this means for relieving themselves of their
bad characters. Service in the army, instead of being regarded in the
light of an honourable duty, became a reproach and was looked upon as
a stroke of misfortune not less intolerable than deportation to Siberia.
So repugnant to men of self-respect was the profession of arms, that
the Government was forced to allow every possible outlet for escaping
service. Not only were exemptions accorded to those with rights
appertaining to birth, to those exercising useful professions, and to
those possessing certain educational qualifications, but also to those
who had sufficient means to purchase membership of a guild. Failing
the foregoing qualifications, any person drawn for the army could
purchase exemption, or provide a substitute to take his place in the
ranks.

Exemptions in the regular army had increased to such an extent
by the year 1873, that of a male population of thirty millions in
European Russia, exclusive of Poland and Finland, only about twenty-
four millions were liable to military service. And if we further
deduct from that number those who purchased exemption, it will be
found that about one-fourth of the population was free from service
in the army.

Again the system adopted in levying the contingent of recruits opened
"the door to many abuses. It was entirely in the hands of the communal
authorities, and, as might be expected in a comparatively rude state of
society, the latter were not inaccessible to influence in making up the

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 375

contingent of recruits. The communes had also to provide certain
articles of clothing, food for three months, and pay for the recruits.

Consequently, the burthen of military service fell with its entire
-weight upon the citizen who was too poor to purchase exemption, and
npon the serf class, while the expenses of furnishing and equipping
the contingent formed a heavy charge on the commune funds.

The year succeeding the emancipation of the serfs was marked by
the commencement of some important army reforms, which, however
inceptive and incomplete in their character, must be looked upon as
strides in the right direction. These reforms were the following;
the various units of troops were to be increased to such an extent,
that, with a small establishment in time of peace, they would provide
sufficient cadres for the army whenever the time should come to raise
it to the war footing ; the men requisite for augmenting the army to
the war establishment were to be sent on furlough, ready to be
called up if required. Certain changes were introduced with a view
to the more efficient training of recruits, the local troops were re-
organised and the number of non-combatants was considerably reduced.

But scarcely had these changes time to bear fruit when the two
great wars of 1866 and 1870, sudden in their outbreak, and rapid in
their course and result, shewed that victory attaches itself to that
army, which, in time of peace, has the different parts of its complex
machinery so perfect and arranged, that it can be set in motion in any
direction without friction or delay ; and, when set in motion, is able to
strike a blow of superior weight, and has the means for sustaining its
continuous action.

In order to understand how far from satisfying these requirements
was the Russian Army of the time of the Franco- German War, and to
appreciate the reforms since introduced for its amelioration, we must
further glance at the general principles of the organization which
obtained previously to the recent changes.

The Russian Army consisted then, as now, of the regular army,
the irregular troops, and the militia.

The yearly contingent of recruits for the regular army was divided
into field and local troops ; the former were intended for operations
in the field, the latter for home defence', training recruits, defence of
fortresses, and the performance of local duties in general.

The irregular troops consisted of the Cossack contingents, and the
militia of the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. The service of these
troops was subject to special provisions.

The militia, analogous to the German landsturm, could only be
called out under special circumstances of danger threatening the
mother country.

Up to the spring of 1874 the regular army was recruited from those
liable to service and by volunteers. Those coming under the first
classification were such as paid a capitation or equivalent tax, former
crown, or appanage peasants and original serfs. The nobility, mer-
chants, parish authorities, colonists with certain privileges, inhabitants
of certain districts, and many others were exempt. The intellectual
class of the community, therefore, was not represented in the army.

376 BECENT REFORMS IN THE BUS6IAK ARMY.

Recruits were not to be less than twenty-one nor more than thirty
years of age. It by no means followed that a man passed over at one
of the levies would not be drawn in some subsequent year. He could
not, therefore, feel himself free to enter upon other pursuits until he
had passed the limit of age. The duration of service was twenty
years for those enlisted prior to September, 1859, and fifteen years for
those entering the Army subsequent to that date. After thirteen
years, those under the former rule could be granted indefinite furlough,
and those under the latter, after ten years. Lastly, the authorities
had the power to send men of good character on furlough after eight
years' service, provided the effective was above its normal strength.
Men on furlough, whether for an indefinite or for a fixed period, were
included in the reserve, and could be called up to serve if required.

Volunteering for the army, for periods of fifteen, ten, or even five
years, was open to every Russian subject.

From the foregoing brief sketch it will have been seen of what
faulty elements the Russian Army had been composed previous to the
introduction of the new law, and how unequally the burthen of
military service weighed upon the population. Let us now see what
important changes the new law has inaugurated.

New Law regulating obligatory Military Service (January, 1874).

The main features are, that the enrolment of criminals and of
persons of ill-repute has been abolished ; the term of service has been
reduced to fifteen years, of which six years are passed in the active
army, and nine years in the reserve ; the number of exemptions has
been curtailed as much as possible ; many impediments and conditions
have been set aside in the admission of recruits ; the system of paying •

money to provide a substitute is no longer permitted.

These reforms, trenchant as they were in curtailing the freedom of
a section of society, which up to that time had looked upon immunity
from military service as its prerogative, were accepted generally in a
cheerful spirit throughout the empire. This circumstance must be
the more satisfactory to the Emperor and his advisers, as the feeling of
the people in favour of the change was not born of disaster as are so
many radical reforms, but was the offspring, of serious meditation in
time of peace.

The new law divides the armed forces into, active army, in; which
the period of service in European Russia is six years,1 the re&erve, to
which men who have passed through the army, belong for the next
nine years,* and the militia or general levy, in which all are included

1 Although the term of service in the active army in European Russia is Wix
years, the War Minister has the power to grant furloughs to men before the eV?
piration of that period. Furloughs, not exceeding a year, may also be allowed v
at any time during the term of service.

In Turkestan and Asia the term of service is seven yean in the active army, and ~~~~
three years in the reserve.

9 During his nine years' service in the reserve a man is on permanent furlough,
is placed under the civil law, and may pursue any calling or occupation. He is »

liable, however, to be called out twice for drill during these nine yean, each time
for six weeks. ,a|

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 377

who are capable of bearing arms, from the age at which they are
liable to service to the completion of their fortieth year. This law is
applicable to the whole empire and to Poland, bat not to Finland.

The number of men necessary to complete the army is decided each
year by law. The distribution of the yearly contingent among the
Governments and districts is made by the War Ministry proportionately
to the number of persons in each who are liable to service. A more
detailed distribution is afterwards drawn up by the Government and
district commanders. The actual levy, the lot-drawing and examina-
tion of the conscripts devolves upon the Circle Commissions. Those
persons liable to be drawn are such as have completed their twentieth
year in that year in which the levy takes place.

Besides, the men entering the army by lot-drawing, every Russian
has the right to enlist as a volunteer, under certain conditions as to
age, state of health, and educational qualifications. The degree of
the latter determines his period of service, whether for three, six, or
twenty-four months, at the expiration of which the enlisted volunteer
passes to the reserve for nine years. Volunteers are allowed, as a
rule, to select the regiment in which they are desirous of serving.
Those entering the Guard must maintain themselves at their own cost,
others may be allowed to do the same and to live in private quarters.
All enter as privates, and, according to their educational qualifications,
may be promoted to the grade of non-commissioned Officer after two,
four, or twelve months' service, and to that of Officer after three, six,
and thirty-six months' service in the non-commissioned ranks. No
commission can, however, be conferred unless the applicant has served
in camp during one period of exercise.

There is also another class of volunteer soldier called " amateur,"
who serves under analogous conditions to the three-years' volunteer of
the German Army. This class is composed exclusively* of men not
liable to military service, and those belonging to the militia, provided
they do not exceed thirty years of age. Their period of active and
reserve service in peace is precisely similar to that for ordinary recruits.
In time of war they are obliged to serve so long as it lasts, but are not
afterwards included in the reserve except of their own choice.

The militia consists of all men not forming part of the standing
army who are capable of bearing arms, and whose ages are between
twenty and forty years inclusive. It also comprises all men released
from the reserve. The men belonging to the militia are divided into
two categories ; the first consists of the four youngest classes, and is
intended to form either distinct regiments of militia or to augment
the ranks of the standing army in the event of the reserve being
insufficient ; the second category includes all the remaining classes,
and is solely used for forming a distinct militia force.

The shortening of the term of service introduced by the new law,
and the obligation for all classes to serve, will place in the course of a
few years a very large force of trained reserves at the disposal of the
Government. In fact, so vast are the resources of the empire, some
700,000 men annually attaining the age of liability, that it would be
possible and may appear advisable to shorten the period of service, by

378 RECENT EEFORMS IN THE BtTBSIAM ABMT.

which a still larger number of men will be passed through the ranks
into the reserve. Let us explain by figures. The present peace
establishment of the regular troops in European Russia is 760,000 men,
to maintain which an annual contingent of 140,000 recruits would
approximately be necessary. The actual number to be levied has been
raised this year to 180,000, and even with this large contingent about
three-fouths of those liable escape military service.

A comparison of the relative proportion of those levied to those
liable in other countries, where conscription is in force, will show
that the burdens of military service press least heavily in Russia. ' In
fact, advantage is taken of the circumstance that there is so large
an excess of available personnel to soften the measure of uni-
versal liability by granting postponements of entry, and numerous
exemptions altogether from service when the grounds are good and
sufficient. No other State accords such privileges to education. Not
only is the term of service abridged for young men of culture who
enter as volunteers, but for those also who take part in the lot-drawing.
Even the most elementary instruction, that of the primary schools,
confers the right of a reduction of two years (four instead of six) in
the active service.

Again the exemptions on family grounds are most numerous. In
other countries, these privileges are only granted, as a rule, to those
who are the means of support of necessitous families; for an only
son to obtain exemption, ms parents must not only be sixty years of
age, but must also have no means of existence. In Russia, the age of
the parents is fixed at fifty-five ; and not merely is the only son of aged
parents exempt from service, but also the son of parents capable of
looking after themselves.

Lastly, with respect to property, the law allows of postponement in
the case of those persons whose presence at home is urgently demanded
by their private affairs, whether such business be connected with
landed property, commerce, or trade. In order not to throw any
impediment in the way of exercising such professions as are necessary
and useful to the State, exemptions and postponements are allowed in
favour of the clergy of all Christian denominations, doctors, pharma-
ceutists, veterinary surgeons, artists, professors, tutors, captains of the
mercantile marine, pilots, their apprentices, and others.

With regard to the rights accorded to soldiers, those in active ser-
vice retain all their rights, personal or other, are exempt from all
personal tax, and after discharge to the reserve, may proceed where
they will. During their first year of reserve service, they are also free
from taxes.

The military law of 1st January, 1874, affects only the standing
army, the reserve, and the militia. In addition to these there exist
the different Cossack contingents and some native irregulars, which are
provided for by regulations of later date. The Cossacks retain their
former institutions, which make every man a soldier and a colonist at
the same time ; the native population of the Caucasus and Siberia is
expressly exempt from the new law, special regulations having been
issued for these various tribes.

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN" ARMT. 379

We will now proceed to mention the changes which have taken
place in the organisation of the regular troops.

Army of the Caucasus.

The regiments of all the Infantry Divisions in the Caucasus military
district have been increased by an additional battalion. Each regi-
ment now consists of four battalions, of which three are line and the
fourth a rifle battalion ; each battalion consists of four companies. At
the same time, in lieu of the four establishments x previously existing,
only two are maintained : the peace establishment, of 24 flies per divi-
sion (half company), and the war establishment, of 54 flies. In con-
sequence of this arrangement, a battalion of a regiment on the war-
establishment has very nearly the same strength as heretofore, because
although the number of companies is diminished by one, the number
of men in the company is increased by some fifty (54, instead of 42
files per division). In the general result, therefore, a Division on the
new establishment has sixteen battalions instead of twelve.

The number of Infantry Divisions has been increased from six to
seven by the addition of the 41st Infantry Division.2 The 41st field
artillery brigade, of six batteries, has also been newly created.

The nucleus for the formation of the 41st Division was given
by the already existing fourth battalions of the Grenadier, 19th,
20th, and 21st Divisions ; the remainder of the men were newly raised.
The fourth battalions, given up by the Grenadier, 19th, 20th, and
21st Infantry Divisions, for the aforesaid purpose, were replaced by the
men from the supernumerary fifth companies. To form the fourth
battalions of the regiments of the 38th and 39th Infantry Divisions,
were employed 6 line, 1 local, and 1 fortress battalion.

The general scope of the re-organization of the army of the Caucasus
has been to augment the infantry of the field-army by 28 battalions,
or in round numbers, by 280,000 men.

Abolition of the Cadre Establishment of Infantry throughout Empire.

All the regiments of those Infantry Divisions which were on the
cadre establishment have had their effective raised from 16 files per
division (half company) to 24 files, i.e., to the ordinary peace establish-
ment. This measure, while augmenting in a large degree the effective,
and, in consequence, enhancing the state of preparedness for war,
removed many disadvantages arising from the small numerical effec-
tive of troops on the cadre establishment.

There were 22 Infantry Divisions on the cadre establishment. By
giving these Divisions an increase of 8 files per division (half com-
pany), the result has been to augment the army by about 43,000 men
in time of peace.

1 War, increased peace, peace and cadre establishments.

9 The infantry of the Caucasus now consists of the Grenadier, the 19th, 20th,
21st, 38th, 39th, and 41st Infantry Divisions.

380 RECENT REFORM8 IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Re-organization of the Cavalry,

The seven Cavalry' Divisions of the line l previously existing have
been split into halves, and formed into fourteen Divisions, to each of
which has been added a regiment of Cossacks of the Don. Thus, each
Cavalry Division of the line, formed in two brigades, now consists of
four regiments ; one of dragoons, one of lancers, another of hussars,
and the fourth of Cossacks, all bearing the same number as the
Division to which they belong.

All regiments of cavalry are to have the full war establishment in
time of peace, that is to say, 16 files per division (quarter-squadron).

In addition to the above, a separate Cossack Division has been
formed of four regiments of Cossacks of the Don, also divided into two
brigades.

Thus after the transformation, instead of ten Divisions of cavalry
(including the Guard), as heretofore, there are eighteen, of which two
belong to the Guard, one Caucasian Division of dragoons, fourteen
Divisions of the line, and one Divison of Don Cossacks.

In time of war, it is further proposed to form three Divisions of
cavalry of the Guard, and to split up the Caucasian Division into two,
adding to both regiments of Cossacks. In this way the total number
of Cavalry Divisions will be twenty.

Be-organization of the Horse Artillery.

This measure, rendered necessary by the new organization of the
cavalry, consisted in augmenting the number of regular batteries of
horse artillery from 18 to 26, but at the same time reducing the num-
ber of guns in a battery from 8 to 6. The number of Don Cossack
batteries was also increased from 16 to 22, of which number 8 are
permanently maintained in time of peace. This arrangement allows
of each Cavalry Division being assigned two batteries of horse
artillery.

Five regular batteries and one irregular (Don Cossack) bat-
tery of the Guard form the horse artillery brigade of the Guard,
which is attached to the 1st and 2nd Guard Cavalry Divisions.
The other batteries of horse artillery, not formed into brigades, are
attached to the fourteen Cavalry Divisions of the line as follows : 2
regular batteries to the first 7 Divisions, and 1 regular and 1 irregular
battery to the remaining 7 Divisions.

Changes in the Field Artillery.

The 41st Brigade has been newly created.

The greater proportion (44) of the brigades of field artillery sta-
tioned in European Russia now consist of three 9-pounder, two 4-
pounder, and one mitrailleuse battery. The remaining four brigades
have a mountain battery in lieu of the battery of mitrailleuses.

1 Each Division consisted of six regiments of cavalry, ris., two dragoon, two
lancer, and two hussar regiments.

REGENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMT. 381

Seven of the brigades are on the increased peace establishment, the
remaining forty-one on the ordinary peace establishment.1

The war establishment of the artillery in European Russia, will,
therefore, consist of 48 brigades of field artillery, with 288 batteries,
or 2,304 guns, 26 batteries of regular and 22 batteries of irregular
horse artillery, with 288 guns. Total 2,592 guns.

Reorganization of the Local and Fortress Troops.

The organization of the local troops has been completely modified,
the first step to this being the final abolition (commenced in 1870)
of the so-called reserve troops, upon which devolved formerly the
training of the recruits. The recruits are now trained with the field
troops.

The reorganization of the local and fortress troops, in conjunction
with the issue of regulations for the formation in time of war of
reserve and depot troops, forms part of the great scheme of army
reform, and is intended to relieve the field or active army from all
secondary operations in time of war. The reserve troops, now so-
called, furnish the men necessary to complete the army to the war
establishment on mobilization. The local troops in time of war will
perform all the home duties, and if necessary, supply men to form
depdt and reserve battalions.

This reorganization has now been carried into effect. The local
troops are now divided into two categories : — (1) local battalions and
local detachments, of the same establishment in peace as in war, and
(2) local battalions and local detachments, with a cadre establishment.
The distinction is merely a matter of convenience. When there are
regular troops stationed in the same garrison with local troops, the
latter do not require so large an effective as in garrisons where they
have to perform all the local duties.

Local battalions on the full effective vary in strength from 600 to
1,000 men, according to the extent of the duties in the garrison where
they are quartered. Local battalions on the cadre establishment
(400 men) are transformed in time of war into regiments of four
battalions.

Local detachments on the full effective consist of 250 men. Those
on the cadre establishment, varying in strength from 64 to 250 men,
are transformed in time of war into battalions of 400 to 800 men.

The organization of the fortress infantry is also en train. In time
of peace the fortress infantry consists of separate battalions, each of
4 companies, and each division (half -company) of 24 files. But iu
time of war the battalions are broken up, each company being then
converted into a battalion of 4 companies, of 54 files per division.
Thus each battalion will be transformed into a regiment of 4
battalions, each of 900 men.

The number of fortress battalions is given as 29 in time of peace.
In time of war this number would give 116 battalions, or about

1 On the increased peace establishment all eight guns are horsed, on the ordinary
peace establishment only four.

VOL. XX. 2 C

382 RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

120,000 men. These may be combined into Brigades and Divisions if
necessary.

Snch a large augmentation in the numbers of the fortress infantry
on mobilization — more than eight times the peace effective— demands
very large reserves both of men and material, and can only be carried
into effect gradually. According to a recent order, measures have
been adopted for getting the material in readiness for forming at
first, in the event of mobilization, each fortress battalion into a
fortress regiment of two battalions.

Organization of the Reserve and Depot Troops.

By the issue of the regulations for the reserve and depSt troops,
entirely new classes of troops have come into existence in the Russian
Army. The . former are intended for secondary military operations
and for duties on the communications of an army, while the latter
are charged with the timely preparation, training, and despatch to the
theatre of war of the reinforcements necessary to replace casualties
among the field and reserve troops of all arms. As their designation
indicates, these two categories of troops are only formed in time of
"war.1

Each regiment of infantry and each rifle brigade (except those in
Turkestan) is to have a depot battalion ; consequently, in all, there
will be 12 guard, 16 grenadier, and 164 infantry depot battalions,
besides 1 guard and 6 rifle depot battalions. These depot battalions,
however, do not appear to be in close connection with the field troops
as is the case in Prussia, where each corps gives up on mobilization
a portion of its effective to form the depdt (Ersatz) troops.

The organization of the depot battalions of the guard, grenadiers,
rifles and infantry of the line is identical. Each depdt battalion has
four companies, and consists of a cadre and a variable establishment;
the former includes the training staff, the latter furnishes the escorts
for the convoys of reinforcements for the field troops, as well as the
reinforcements themselves. There are no cadres in time of peace,
but, on the outbreak of hostilities, the battalion is formed partly of
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men from the nearest field and
local troops and partly of reservists and militia of the 1st class. In
order to accelerate mobilization the battalions are formed by com-
panies, as far as possible at points selected for their central position
with regard to the rayon of recruitment, and also with reference to
convenience of communication. The clothing, arms, and equipments
are stored in time of peace at these company centres, from whence,
fully equipped, the companies proceed to the head-quarters of the
depot battalion.

The total number of depot battalions — 199 — will give a force of
about 260,000 officers and men, of whom 220,000 will be immediately
available to replace casualties.

With regard to the reserve troops, this new creation is analogous to
the Landwehr troops of Prussia; they are intended to reinforce or

1 Except the cadres of the depdt troops for the special arms, which are also main-
tained in time of peace.

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 383

replace the active troops on the theatre of war. There are no per-
manent cadres in time of peace, bat, on the declaration of war, the
reserve battalions are formed, partly of officers and men from the
field or local troops and partly of reservists. Their organisation is
precisely similar to that of the active troops; complete stores of
clothing, equipment, Ac., are maintained in time of peace. For the
present, until there are sufficient reserves at disposal for forming the
164 battalions contemplated, the number of reserve battalions will
depend upon the reservists available after the active and depot
battalions have been completed to their war establishment. The
reserve battalions will be combined, if necessary, into Brigades and
Divisions.

When the whole number of reserve battalions is formed, the
number of troops in this category would be upwards of 180,000
men.

Clianges in the Conditions of Service of (he Don Cossacks*

We now come to the changes in the organisation of the irregular
troops. The new regulations differ for the separate Cossack con-
tingents. As a type we will take the Cossacks of the Don as being
the most numerous and as being the force which it has been decided to
employ in European fields of warfare.

According to the regulations previously in force, the regiments of
Cossacks of the Don had no permanent organization. On the out-
break of hostilities, regiments were formed of the men in the military
district, while the officers and non-commissioned officers were ap-
pointed from the whole contingent. Thus the regiments were a mass
of men without any intimate cohesion. On the termination of the
campaign, the men were dismissed to their homes, and every trace
of the regiment disappeared. This system prevented the formation
of the administrative and other services, and at the same time mili-
tated against all esprit de corps. The greatest defects would appear
at mobilisation, which would be exceedingly slow, and would not
correspond to the requirements of the time, when it is proposed to
make use of these troops at the outset of the campaign.

The new regulations for the service of the Don Cossacks, which
came into force on the 1st of January, 1875, took into account, on
the one hand the new organization of the armed forces of the empire,
and, on the other, the defects which experience had shown to exiBt in
the previous constitution of the Cossack contingents. The Cossack
force thenceforward received a permanent organization, which guaran-
teed a rapid mobilization in tune of war, and permitted of the Don
Cossack regiments being embodied in the Cavalry Divisions.

By the terms of the new regulations, the Don Contingent consists
of the active troops and the militia. The latter is only called to
arms under exceptional circumstances. The active class is divided
into three categories : (1) The preparatory, (2) the field, and (3) the
reserve. The preparatory class includes all young CoBsacks between
the ages of 18 and 21. During their first year in this class they per-
form no military duty, but are merely required to provide them-

2 c 2

384 RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

selves with the necessary equipment. Their training does not begin
until the autumn of the second year at their respective stanitsas,1 and
is continued through the third year. After three years passed in this
category, the Cossacks pass to the field class for twelve years. From
this class are drawn the men required for completing the detachments
maintained in time of peace, and for filling up the entire contingent
placed in the field in time of war. In time of peace, the actual
period of service is never more than four years, and, as a general rule,
will not exceed three, after which the Cossack will not be liable to be
called up except for manoeuvres or for war. For the remaining eight
years of the service in the field class, the Cossack is granted furlough.
After completing his full period in the field class, he passes into the
reserve class for five years, during which time he is entirely free from
service in time of peace, but in time of war would be liable to be called
up to replace casualties.

From the [year 1868 until the issue of the present regulations the
term of service of Cossacks in the field category, that is to say, the
time during which they were liable to be called up for service was
15 years, commencing with their 20th year. In addition to this, they
were liable to interior service for 7 years. By the new law, the Cos-
sack in time of peace would be free from military service after com-
pleting his 24th year at the latest.

According to the new regulations, the Don Cossack Contingent is
bound to furnish, in time of war, 62 regiments of cavalry (including
2 Guard) and 22 batteries of horse artillery. Of this force, the fol-
lowing are to be maintained in time of peace : — The Body Guard Cos-
sack regiment, 20 regiments of the line, 1 guard battery, and 7 line
batteries of horse artillery. The line Cossack regiments consist of
6 sotnia8, of 14 files per division (quarter squadron).

The Don Cossack territory is divided into five districts, and, as far
as possible, each district furnishes the recruits for its respective regi-
ments. For the artillery, the territory is divided into two sections.
The distribution of the quotum of recruits among the districts is in
the hands of the Ataman.

The 60 regiments are divided into 3 divisions of 20 regiments each ;
the first division is on duty in time of peace, the other two are on
furlough. The men in the first division, after serving their time, are
replaced by young Cossacks ; those belonging to the second division
have to keep their horses and equipment always available for instant
service, those of the third division only their equipment.

As regards the horse artillery, the men belonging to those batteries
which are to be mobilized in time of war are bound to have their
equipment, clothing, arms, and riding horses in constant readiness.
The guns, carriages, waggons, Ac., are all kept in store ready for issue
when required.

A proportion of Cossack troops are trained in railway duties by
being attached for 2 years to certain lines of rail.

When the new regulations come to maturity, the Don Cossacks

1 Ootsaok village.

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 385

will contribute to the active army a force of upwards of 50,000
completely equipped cavalry and 22 horse artillery batteries, with 132
guns. Besides these, to replace casualties, there will be a reserve of
20,000 to 25,000 men, the oldest class of the preparatory category,
5,000 to 7,000 men, and the militia, consisting of 25,000 to 30,000
Cossacks.

Formation of the Crimean and Bashkir Divisions.

The object of these new formations is to have a small permanent
establishment for training recruits, the Crimean division for the
Tartars of the Crimea, the Bashkir division for the Bashkirs (Tartars)
who live within the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Government.

At first only squadrons were formed, but the contingent was after-
wards increased to a division of two squadrons.

The Bashkirs had at one time a regular force, which was afterwards
disbanded. By the present arrangement, instead of being subject to
the new military law, they satisfy their obligation to military service
by forming a separate contingent, very much in the same way as the
Cossacks. They provide their own horses and equipments.

Additional Formations in Turkestan.

In consequence of the recent operations undertaken against Kokan,
and the resistance which was experienced, it has been found necessary
to form two new line battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery
in the Turkestan military district.

We now come to the more important reforms which have taken
place in the administrative branches of the army.

Reforms in the Administrative Branches.

The change of the greatest moment is the reorganisation of the
local military administration in the Governments and Circles (Vyezd),1
viz., those local authorities charged with the recruitment of the army
in time of peace, the accounts and control of the recruits, and more
especially, the mobilisation of the army in time of war.

The control, of the reservists in time of peace devolved formerly
upon administrative authorities of two instances. The highest
instance for each Government was the bureau of the military chiefs
of Governments, the lower instance, for each town or Circle, was the
town and Circle police administrations. The control of the first
instance was merely nominal. The real work fell upon the shoulders
of the authorities of the lower instance, consequently upon civil admi-
nistrations which were already overburdened with their own busi-
ness, and therefore inclined to look upon the duties connected with the
reservists as of secondary importance. The military chiefs of Govern-
ments kept up registers of the reservists based on the information
furnished by the police, but without any knowledge how far the infor-
mation thus supplied was in agreement with the true position of

1 In Russia the empire is divided for administration purposes into Governments,
and these into Vymd*% or Circles.

386 RECENT REFORMS IN THE RU ASIAN ARMY.

affairs. At the same time, when the number- of reservists was com*
paratively small, there was less necessity for a specially constituted
administration, but of late, when the number of men on furlough is
said to exceed 700,000, the old arrangement was no longer sufficient.
With the introduction of obligatory service, when the number of
reservists will, in course of time, be still further augmented, it would
have been utterly beyond the power of the old administration to carry
out the duties.

Again, all the arrangements for calling out the reservists in the event
of mobilisation were too much centralised, being centred in seventy
Government administrations. The former military chiefs of Circles
formed merely a superfluous channel between the police and Govern-
ment administrations, and, consequently, rather retarded than accele-
rated mobilisation.

In the present day a military official has been introduced under the
Government Military Commander, as a lower instance, called the Circle
Commander, who is the real executive authority in regard to recruit-
ment and the control of the reserves.

The duties of this officer are as follows : — He exercises direct com-
mand over the local troops in the garrison where his head-quarters are
established and has the general control of all the other local troops
within the circle. He is a member of the Circle Recruiting Commission,
and as such is personally responsible for the selection of the recruits
for the various arms. The duty of keeping the registers of the
reservists and of the militia of the 1st class, as well as of the reserve
officers and men intended to be assigned to form the cadres of the
reserve and depdt battalions devolves upon him. On the basis of the
lists furnished by the general staff he apportions the reservists to the
troops and prepares beforehand their joining orders, so that no time
may be lost on the mobilisation of the army. He is responsible for
the stores at the dep6ts being provided with the clothing, equipment,
Ac, necessary for the reserve and dep6t battalions to be formed in his
Circle. It is his duty also to collect such information and statistical
data as bear upon a rapid mobilisation in the Circle, so far as they
affect the distribution, supply the roads of communication, and the
means of transport. In time of war he calls up the reservists to the
colours, dispatches them to the field army and fills up the local troops
under his command. He forms the reserve and depdt companies and
issues orders for them to join their respective battalions. He makes
arrangements for transport of the sick and wounded, and for putting
in execution, within the Circle, the law with regard to the compulsory
supply of horses on mobilization.

Whilst the Circle Commander is the executive authority, the Govern-
ment Commander exercises general supervision over the Circle Com-
manders. Superior to him again is the Commander of the Local
Troops of the Military District.

This augmentation of the administrative authorities who have the
important duties of controlling a number of men, who after passing
through the the Army are living in the mass of the population, and
have to make such arrangements as will ensure their timely assembly

RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 387

on the receipt of the orders for mobilization, is of great moment. In
a vast empire like Russia, it would have been impossible to do this
effectively with the seventy Government administrations, the Govern-
ments often embracing an area of hundreds of square miles. The dis-
tribution of work requires to be on a much larger scale. Hence the
introduction of the Circle Commander as the executive authority.

It seems that even this distribution is hardly sufficient, and that it
requires still greater extension. For instance, in North Germany, the
same duties devolve upon 70 commanders of brigade districts, 296
commanders of landwehr battalion districts and 1,300 company
district sergeants-major. The Russian circle commander corre-
sponds to the commander of the landwehr battalion district in
Prussia, so that the further link of the company district serjeant-
major is wanting in the former country — and we know the value
attached by the Germans to these officials in the control of the
reservists in time of peace. It appears to us, that within certain
limits, the more this nature of work is divided, the more effective
the control over the reservists in time of peace, and the more speedy
the mobilisation in time of war.

Another important reform was the issue of the regulations for the
formation of army corps.

Formation of Army Corps.

Up to recent times the Division of infantry has been the largest unit
of troops, one or more Divisions being quartered in each military dis-
trict. In addition to the Divisions of infantry, there were Cavalry
Divisions and Brigades of artillery in each district, but there was no
intimate grouping of the different arms such as we understand by the
army corps, which consists of a due proportion of the three arms
accustomed to work together.

The question of the formation of army corps was discussed as long
back as 1870, by the commission appointed to consider the re-organiza-
tion of the army, but the opinions were so divided that no conclusion
was arrived at, and the question was left for the final decision of a
special commission. The res a It of their labours was to recommend
the partial introduction among the regular troops of army corps,
regulations for which were confirmed by the Emperor in August,
1874.

In these regulations it is laid down that in those military districts
in which the troops are to be grouped in army corps, the officer in
chief command of the troops in the district has the right of inspecting
the corps personally or through the chief of his staff. It is also his
province to see that the service duties are carried on in a proper
manner, that the troops are well and duly supplied, and that all the
material required on mobilization is held in constant readiness for use.
In those districts where the formation by army corps does not obtain,
the duties ordinarily devolving upon corps commanders fall upon
the officer in chief command of the troops in the military district.

The duties of the corps commander comprise the command of thu
personnel and the military training of the Corps. He is under the

388 RECENT REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

immediate orders of the officer commanding the troops in the military
district. Upon him devolves the duty of deciding as to the manoeuvres
of the year, and exercising general control over them, determining
what troops are to be encamped and so forth. He makes an annual
inspection of the troops at the time he thinks fit to appoint, rendering
to the officer commanding the district a report of their state and more
especially with regard to those matters which affect mobilization, for
the rapidity of which in time of war he is personally responsible.

Up to the present time the administration by army corps has only
been applied to the Guard Corps, which has been formed under the
command of His Imperial Highness the Tsarevitch.

From the preceding brief sketch of the various reforms which have
been introduced in the military system of Russia, it will have been
seen that the chief objects sought to be attained are a sufficient reserve
of men on furlough to fill up the peace cadres, an intimate connection
between these men and the regiments they are designed to complete,
and the adoption of such arrangements as will tend to their rapid
assembly round the standards, in other words the mobilisation of the
army for war.

No nation which respects its independence, be its geographical situa-
tion what it may, but must attentively consider these matters beforehand
in peace, and work out and mature the scheme of mobilisation best
suited to its peculiar requirements, no matter at what cost. The
sound of the war-tocsin — the day of the declaration of hostilities — is
no time for considering in what way the various units shall be
grouped, but must merely be the signal for setting in motion those
agencies, carefully pre-considered and rehearsed in time of peace, by
which the army is placed in the field as a perfect weapon for offence.

HUGO HELVIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES.1

The late campaign in France has caused a very carious change
in the general impression concerning German intellect. Formerly,
they were considered to be a slow and plodding people ; now men
speak with respect of their dash in war, and argue that such brilliant
strategists, tacticians, and leaders of troops, cannot be deficient in
brightness of intellect. A little examination of the subject, however,
soon shows that the facts are as were first supposed, only the infer-
ences drawn were erroneous. We may look through the whole war in
vain for examples of the inspiration plainly displayed by Napoleon I.
In 1870 was shown the power, not of genius, but of sober systematic
organisation and training joined to a stern discipline. The only bril-
liant idea struck out of German solidity of character was the pamphlet
written after 1866, and attributed to Prince Frederick Charles, in
which the author pointed out that to be successful against the French
it would be necessary to meet them with their own tactics, not to wait
for their rush, but to attack boldly. Yet even this idea, fertile
in success as it turned out to be, may have been elaborately thought
out. Who knows how many months the author may have pondered,
how many hours he may have spent with his leaden battalions and
Kriegsspiel maps before the pamphlet was published P Prince Frede-
rick Charles himself once told the present writer that he attributed
the great success of the Prussians, even against superior forces and
equal bravery of the French, to that admirable system of instruction
which enabled generals to trust absolutely in junior officers, knowing
that the shortest and simplest orders would be enough for them, and
that wherever an officer was present, the troops he led would be
handled on certain definite and well understood principles. Though
the German drill-book was in its regulations behind the age, the Ger-
man Officers were able to direct their men to victory while breaking the
rules every day and every hour. Since the war, there have been
serious controversies little heard of in England. The drill book has
been altered, but is still, in the opinion of a large school of tacticians,
quite unable to meet the requirements of modern war. The author of
Tactical Examples writes in the spirit of the new school. He will not
allow his book to be considered as an addition to the regulations,
though his examples are worked out in conformity with the present

1 Tactische Beispiele Ton H. v. Helvig (Major) : Mittler, Berlin. 9s.

" Exemples Tacuques." Par H. t. Helvig, Major de l'Etat, Major-General Bava-
rois, de'tache' au Grand Etat Major-General Prussian. Traduction de M. le Lieut-
Colonel Lectere. Paris, 5#. 6d.

390 HUGO helyig's tactical examples.

formations. On the contrary, he insists that " it is not with, but in
" spite of the regulations, that good instruction and solid preparation
" for war, as the author understands them, are possible in time of
" peace." His teaching is based on the venerable principle, " The
" letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." True, he could not have
worked out these examples in their present form if the drill book had
not been altered, but he holds that the regulations alone would not
only be insufficient, but positively detrimental. He insists with much
truth that there is no formation which will meet all cases, that officers
must be trained to act according to circumstances, and that as the
necessities of modern fighting inevitably cause more confusion than
occurred of old, the highest wisdom now is to practise that very con-
fusion, and the means for extrication from it, rather than to insist on
a steadiness in peace manoeuvres which must break down in war.
Let not the lover of steadiness and discipline start back in surprise
and condemn the book unread. Its object is to reduce to a minimum
the real confusion in war by familiarising officers and men with the
difficult situations likely to arise until confusion is no longer real, but
only apparent.

Von Verdy du Vernois, in his " Studies on Troop Leading," gave
the world admirable examples of the movements of divisions and
brigades under circumstances supposed to be those of war itself.
Major Helvig undertakes the more modest, but not less useful, task of
working out in detail the manoeuvres of smaller bodies, companies,
battalions, and at last brigades, under different given conditions ; and
he recommends strongly that all commanding officers should train
their commands by exercising them in the examples he gives, or
in others devised by themselves. So anxious is he to imitate closely
the difficulties of war, that he even proposes that, at various stages of
the fight, leaders of different bodies, battalions, companies, <fcc., shall
be caused to step oat of their places as if wounded, and resign the
command to subordinates. By such arts as these will he have war
simulated, and officers trained in the new tactics now accepted by all
the world, so that the praise of Prince Frederick Charles shall still be
deserved, and Generals be able to count on the cool action of their
juniors, even when all seems to be a mass of confusion.

The first volume contains thirty examples, the highest of which
shows only a force of one battalion, two squadrons, and a few guns.
The second volume begins with a battalion and a-half, and ends with a
brigade of seven battalions, together with three batteries and four
squadrons, forming the rear guard of a large body of troops, and
ordered to defend the passage of a defile. His method may perhaps be
best described by taking one of his simplest examples, and working it
out with him. For this purpose nothing can be simpler than one
battalion on either side, and we will take Major Helvig's first example.
The real student of tactics will not despise even first lessons. We can
assure him that he will find further on in the book examples of a much
more complicated character.

Our example, then, is the attack of one battalion against another,
each consisting of four companies.

HUGO HELVIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES. 391

The author begins by laying down certain tactical considerations for
each example ; and the " considerations " with regard to the one we
Iiave chosen are that, with equal forces on both sides the enemy should
be " contained " in front, whilst the principal attack is directed against
one of the flanks. Premature and insufficiently prepared attacks from
the enemy are to be repulsed by as rapid a fire as possible, whilst the
reserve, held in readiness, endeavours to profit by seizing such moments
for counter-attack.

The battalion is advancing in company columns at deploying
intervals.

Major Helvig gives the condition of the fight at twelve different
phases, which he calls first, second, third, Ac., moments. A diagram is
given tor each moment.

First moment

No information as to the position or strength of the enemy has yet
been received ; he shows only some infantry patrols. The battalion is
to advance, and throws forward the 4th company as advance guard.

The diagram shows how the company advances, half in skirmishing
groups, half in support.

Second moment*

The point of the advance guard comes in contact with the enemy's
skirmishers ; in rear of them are seen subdivisions in formation.

The 4th company deploys its remaining two sections, and drives in
the skirmishers by a vigorous attack ; left flank advanced, in order to
discover the position and strength of the adversary.

3rd company doubles forward, to act as reserve to the line of
skirmishers.

1st and 2nd companies follow as main body.

Here we are struck at once by the regularity with which all such
manoeuvres are carried out in Germany. In them, as in battles, there
is no such thing as the advance of a long thin line, whether skirmishers
or otherwise, without supports. A force, however small, retains depth
as well as breadth, until actually in contact with the enemy, and then,
in almost every instance retains a reserve. We shall have to speak of
this question farther on.

Third moment.

The enemy checks the march of the 4th company, by a superior fire
of skirmishers, and taking the offensive against the left flank, repulses
the 4th company.

The left flank of the 4th company is thrown back so as to form a
defensive angle with a section in formation close to the point;
skirmishers on the left.

The 3rd company 200 paces behind the left wing faces the oat*
flanking enemy as a support.

Fourth moment.
The enemy continues to press the left flank and, at the same time,

392 HUGO helvig's tactical examples.

advances against the front. His strength is now known; he has two
companies attacking in front and two attacking the left flank.

The 3rd company moves up to the left flank, not prolonging the
wing as thrown back, but inclined at an angle to it, so as to threaten
the flank of the enemy's advance. One section is deployed as
skirmishers, the other two remain in formation to fire volleys.

The 1st and 2nd companies move tip rapidly.

Fifth moment.

The fire of the left wing has checked the enemy ; but, meanwhile,
he has pushed forward in front with one company in skirmishing order
and one in formation.

Hereupon the 1st company moves to the front in skirmishing
order :

Hereupon the 2nd company halts and forms line as support.

Rapid fire is ordered.

Sixth moment.

The enemy slowly draws back his right wing which he had ad-
vanced, and takes up a position in front with two companies in
skirmishing order and the companies in formation.

The 4th company advances from the left wing, group by group, up to
the line occupied by the 1st company. Each of them have two sec-
tions in front skirmishing, and one in support.

The 2nd and 3rd companies form company columns as a reserve.

There is no need to follow the author through the next four move-
ments during which the enemy makes a front attack, and is beaten by
the employment of the 2nd and 3rd companies in a flank counter-
attack. Sufficient has been given to show the style and scope of the
book. But we may examine with profit some of the maxims laid down
by the author and the methods of handling troops proposed by him.
It is often justly said that the science of tactics is only that of common
sense. But how long has the world required to arrive at such growth
of common sense as now seems simple to some people ? Not even yet
for all. So is it with the tactical considerations laid down by Major
Helvig. They are based on common sense, yet without help any
Officer would spend a campaign in working them out for himself. No
amount of ordinary drill even when combined with general maxims can
teach the handling of troops in answer to the movements of an enemy.
For instance, common sense and all the books teach that infantry
should keep a reserve ready for emergencies. Yet there are times
when the whole force must be sent in to win, every man being pushed
forward into the attacking line. Here is a question which neither
drills nor books can answer. It must be settled on the spur of the
moment, and the only good preparation for the time of decision is the
habit of handling troops in the field under conditions approaching as
nearly as possibly those of war. But, to take an officer fresh from
common drill and place him suddenly in charge of a body of men
manoeuvring against another force is to task his resources unfairly and
probably to injure his style of tactics. Some intermediate steps are

HUQO HELVIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES. 393

required similar to the exercises which a fencing master gives his pupils
between the teaching of thrusts and parries, and the final loose practice.
Moreover, the maitre d'armes brings his pupil back again and again
from loose practice to steady lunging and parrying by order, to
strengthen his wrist and steady his eye. These examples of Major
Helvig are just the intermediate practice required in tactics, and we
have no hesitation in saying that the book supplies a very pressing
want. With Major Helvig's examples in his hands, no commanding
officer can now have any difficulty in teaching his subordinates the
science of tactics.

The first point that fixes the attention, among a multitude of details,
is the method of handling infantry for attack and defence, so as to
develop the full power of breech-loaders. Major Helvig makes rail
use of the swarm formation, which, after much controversy, has been
admitted as the latest method of infantry fighting, and he shows how
adaptable it is to circumstances. For we are not to imagine that
infantry so broken up into skirmishers are always to remain so. On
the contrary, one of the most valuable features of the new formation is
that the fighting line admits of contraction as well as expansion, and
can be reinforced, from supports and reserves, without in any way
altering its character or deranging its action. In looking through
Major Helvig's diagrams, we find his battalions invariably kept in
hand at first, then follows the fan-like spread, including first skirmish-
ing line, supports, and reserves ; then occasionally, at critical moments,
a pushing of the supports, or even reserves, into the front line, some-
times in skirmishing order, sometimes with serried ranks to fire
volleys. We find the front line itself changing its character from
moment to moment. Now it consists of skirmishers only, anon,
threatened by cavalry, it collects in groups or rallying squares ; again,
it dissolves when the cavalry are repulsed, and is presently reinforced
by the coming up of all supports and reserves, some of them extending
or thickening the chain, others strengthening its powers of cohesion
by more solid links. But, in all cases, as soon as the action is decided,
even for a time, the moment of relief from the enemy's pressure is
seized to re-establish order and re-form the battalion. This practice
of pulling the troops together as often as possible is highly necessary
as an antidote to the natural tendency to disorder, which is the one
weak point of the new tactics. If it is not taught and insisted on,
from day to day, nothing will save infantry from confusion, and we
may come to see battles lost by reckless charges and pursuits pushed
beyond reasonable limits, like the famous charge of Prince Rupert's
cavalry. By such practice will also be corrected the inclination of the
skirmishing line to disappear in the centre and stream round both
flanks of the enemy, and another tendency, almost equally injurious,
to occupy too much space of frontage without supports or reserves.
No soldier who has seen the swarm system of tactics carried out, either
abroad or at home, can- doubt the reality of these dangerous tenden-
cies or deny that they must be provided against by careful instruction,
just as the soldier, armed with a breech-loader, must be taught not to
waste his ammunition.

394 HUGO helvig's tactical examples.

The next important feature of Major Helvig's teaching is the fre-
quent and bold use of cavalry, and the success he allowB them — not a
success, so far as to inflict positive defeat on infantry, but to waste the
time of an enemy, and oblige him to desist from prosecuting his
present purpose. The chief value of the book is its evident imparti-
ality. Each arm plays a part in his examples, fairly proportioned to
its power under the circumstances, and there are no exaggerated view*
as to the action of infantry, cavalry, or artillery. If the balance in*
clines at all, it is to the side of the infantry, and this is no fault.
Without question no encouragement given to another arm could com-
pensate for the discouragement of infantry if it were taught that it
must constantly yield to the fire of artillery or the charges of cavalry,
and we hold it advisable during peace manoeuvres to give less than the
true value to the power of artillery fire, while encouraging batteries
to act with bold decision. But in these days cavalry also requires
some encouragement and should be caused to execute charges against
infantry more frequently than is now the custom. For, in truth, in-
fantry fire is not the deadly thing on a battle-field that it appears to
be on the practice ground, and a plucky charge of cavalry will often
turn the scale if balanced or even inclining the other way. Take Major
Helvig's twenty-seventh example at the seventh moment. Our force
is one battalion and a squadron against one battalion and a-half of the
enemy, who have deployed a chain of skirmishers which is already
superior to ours in number and seems about to envelope our left flank.
Our squadron charges his left, and under cover of the confusion so
established, we push forward two companies hitherto in reserve and so
outflank the enemy's left, forcing it back with ease, because we caught
it prepared for cavalry, not ready to combat the fire of a line of
skirmishers. Everybody acknowledges that a first-rate cavalry leader
is very hard to find, seeing that he must possess certain natural quali-
fications not often found united. But every cavalry Officer might be
brought up to a moderately satisfactory mark by such practice as these
examples of Major Helvig, not reading them merely in his pages but
working them out on the ground with a marked enemy, as steadily as
he would execute parade movements. We would insist strongly upon
the fact that the " tactical examples " are not to be treated as com-
petitions between one Officer and another, but as a higher and more
practical kind of drill than that, the sole end of which is attained
when the men are sufficiently in hand, and the Officers expert enough
to perform a few simple movements in preparation for tactical practice.
The " examples " can be worked out even in a barrack square when
no other drill ground is available, but we would advise the use of drill
fields whenever they are available. No accidents of ground are
necessary, for such as are spoken of in the " examples " may be
marked in the same way as the enemy is to be marked, and the same
example may be worked out two or three times in succession with
such modifications as occur to the minds of the Officers. And another
valuable point about Major Helvig's book is that it will afford to
teachers of trctics (and all commanding Officers even of companies
should be teachers), a large stock of questions to be put to those

HUGO HELVIQ'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES, 395

whom they are bound to train. A general and well-founded complaint
daring autumn manoeuvres, or the manoeuvres of small bodies, as now
practised with so much success at Aldershot, is that the fire of
artillery cannot be truly estimated, because no one can toll what the
guns a mile away are covering with their fire at any particular
moment. In Major Helvig's examples there is no such difficulty.
Yon are told that the artillery is firing heavily at such and such a
mark, and you can decide on the coarse to be pursued, jnat as you
would if your men were actually falling and becoming demoralized.

To attempt an examination of all Major Helvig's examples would
be to write an essay on modern tactics, but we may, by analysing two
of them — an attack and defence — get fair hold of the author's main
ideas on the handling of the three arms in concert. For this purpose
we will select Nob. 52 and 53 from the latter part of the second
volume. No. 52 is the action of a brigade composed of 4 battalions,
with a battery and 2 sqnadrons attached to it, the whole forming part
of a division in an offensive action.

The "tactical considerations" supplied by the author, lay down
certain rules, the first of which appears to us somewhat self-evident.
It is that when detachments of cavalry and artillery are attached to 'a
brigade of infantry for certain momenta of a battle, they ought to be
employed exclusively to attain the object set before the brigade ; bnt
the rules for such employment are practical and worthy of notice.
Major Helvig says that a battery attached to a brigade to eupport the
execution of an attack shonld exert all its power to facilitate the
mission. It shonld direct its fire solely on the point which is to be
pierced, that point being distinctly indicated to it. It must never
answer the fire of the enemy's artillery. Just before the assault it
must advance — at its own initiative — -to whatever distance may be
best for tbe efficacy of its fire. When the position is taken and the
enemy retreats, the battery must push on without hesitation in pursuit.
If the attack fails, the guns must hold their ground to the last
extremity, in order to assist the defeated infantry to halt speedily and
the enemy.

a distance the flanks of tbe attacking
ipose without orders or hesitation every
u order to utilize success, attack also
part of the enemy which seems to be
ifantry to continue its fire from the
ssible, and help the companies or bat-
e have text enough for a long tactical
rs to ponder over the matter for them*

vision engaged in fierce fight with the
ic the brunt of the action. The com-
i attack the enemy's right wing, and
ttery and two squadrons. His orders
. have information that the enemy's

our left wing. The second brigade
lemy at the point A (farm, local posi-

394 HUGO helvig'b tactical examples.

The next important feature of Major Helvig's teaching is the £re-
qnent and bold use of cavalry, and the success he allowB them — not a
success, bo far as to inflict positive defeat on infantry, but to waste the
time of an enemy, and oblige him to desist from prosecuting his
present purpose. The chief value of the book is its evident imparti-
ality. Each arm plays a part in his examples, fairly proportioned to
its power under the circumstances, and there are no exaggerated viewi
as to the action of infantry, cavalry, or artillery. If the balance in*
clines at all, it is to the side of the infantry, and this ib no fault.
Without question no encouragement given to another arm could com*
pensate for the discouragement of infantry if it were taught that it
must constantly yield to the fire of artillery or the charges of cavalry,
and we hold it advisable during peace manoeuvres to give less than the
true value to the power of artillery fire, while encouraging batteries
to act with bold decision. But in these days cavalry also requires
some encouragement and should be caused to execute charges against
infantry more frequently than is now the custom. For, in truth, in*
fantry fire is not the deadly thing on a battle-field that it appears to
be on the practice ground, and a plucky charge of cavalry will often
turn the scale if balanced or even inclining the other way. Take Major
Helvig's twenty-seventh example at the seventh moment. Our force
is one battalion and a squadron against one battalion and a-half of the
enemy, who have deployed a chain of skirmishers which is already
superior to ours in number and seems about to envelope our left flank.
Our squadron charges his left, and under cover of the confusion so
established, we push forward two companies hitherto in reserve and so
outflank the enemy's left, forcing it back with ease, because we caught
it prepared for cavalry, not ready to combat the fire of a line of
skirmishers. Everybody acknowledges that a first-rate cavalry leader
is very hard to find, seeing that he must possess certain natural quali-
fications not often found united. But every cavalry Officer might be
brought up to a moderately satisfactory mark by such practice as these
examples of Major Helvig, not reading them merely in his pages but
working them out on the ground with a marked enemy, as steadily as
he would execute parade movements. We would insist strongly upon
the fact that the " tactical examples " are not to be treated as com-
petitions between one Officer and another, but as a higher and more
practical kind of drill than that, the sole end of which is attained
when the men are sufficiently in hand, and the Officers expert enough
to perform a few simple movements in preparation for tactical practice.
The " examples " can be worked out even in a barrack square when
no other drill ground is available, but we would advise the use of drill
fields whenever they are available. No accidents of ground are
necessary, for such as are spoken of in the " examples " may be
marked in the same way as the enemy is to be marked, and the same
example may be worked out two or three times in succession with
such modifications as occur to the minds of the Officers. And another
valuable point about Major Helvig's book is that it will afford to
teachers of tactics (and all commanding Officers even of companies
should be teachers), a large stock of questions to be put to those

HUGO HELYIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES. 395

-whom they are bound to train. A general and well-founded complaint
during autumn manoeuvres, or the manoeuvres of small bodies, as now
practised with so much, success at Aldershot, is that the fire of
artillery cannot be truly estimated, because no one can tell what the
guns a mile away are covering with their fire at any particular
moment. In Major Helvig's examples there is no such difficulty.
You are told that the artillery is firing heavily at such and such a
mark, and you can decide on the course to be pursued, just as you
would if your men were actually falling and becoming demoralized.

To attempt an examination of all Major Helvig's examples would
be to write an essay on modern tactics, but we may, by analysing two
of them — an attack and defence — get fair hold of the author's main
ideas on the handling of the three arms in concert. For this purpose
we will select Nos, 52 and 53 from the latter part of the second
volume. No. 52 is the action of a brigade composed of 4 battalions,
with a battery and 2 squadrons attached to it, the whole forming part
of a division in an offensive action.

The " tactical considerations" supplied by the author, lay down
certain rules, the first of which appears to us somewhat self-evident.
It is that when detachments of cavalry and artillery are attached to 'a
brigade of infantry for certain moments of a battle, they ought to be
employed exclusively to attain the object set before the brigade ; but
the rules for such employment are practical and worthy of notice.
Major Helvig says that a battery attached to a brigade to support the
execution of an attack should exert all its power to facilitate the
mission. It should direct its fire solely on the point which is to be
pierced, that point being distinctly indicated to it. It must never
answer the fire of the enemy's artillery. Just before the assault it
must advance — at its own initiative — to whatever distance may be
best for the efficacy of its fire. When the position is taken and the
enemy retreats, the battery must push on without hesitation in pursuit.
If the attack fails, the guns must hold their ground to the last
extremity, in order to assist the defeated infantry to halt speedily and
re-form to repulse the pursuit of the enemy.

The cavalry must watch from a distance the flanks of the attacking
force which might be menaced, oppose without orders or hesitation every
attempt at counter-attack, and, in order to utilize success, attack also
without orders or hesitation any part of the enemy which seems to be
wavering, so as to enable the infantry to continue its fire front the
conquered position as long as possible, and help the companies or bat-
talions sent in pursuit. Here we have text enough for a long tactical
sermon, but must leave our readers to ponder over the matter for them-
selves.

The brigade forms part of a division engaged in fierce fight with the
enemy, but has not hitherto borne the brunt of the action. The com-
mander of the division decides to attack the enemy's right wing, and
reinforces the brigade with a battery and two squadrons. His orders
are given in these words : " I have information that the enemy's
" reserves are marching against our left wing. The second brigade
" will attack the right of the enemy at the point A (farm, local posi-

396 HUGO HELVIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES.

tion, wood, Ac.), retaining a regiment as a general reserve behind hi»
left wing. The two squadrons, which are observing the left flank,
" and the battery which has just arrived, are placed under the orders
" of the brigade. Hasten the attack."

This is a thoroughly typical example of the orders given by German
Generals of Division, who would as soon think of directing how the
brigade was to advance as they would of saying to the Brigadier, " It
" is going to rain, turn up the collar of your great-coat."

The General of Brigade hereupon sends the following order to
Officers commanding regiments and battalions, as well as to his new
adjuncts, the battery and detachment of cavalry.

" Reinforcements of the enemy are marching against our left wing -
" the brigade is to carry the point A."
" Regiment No. 2 will execute the attack."

" Regiment No. 1 will remain provisionally in general reserve, and
" follow, extending beyond the left wing."

4< The cavalry will watch with its scouts the approach of the enemy,
" will hold him back if possible, and charge as soon as the attack of
" regiment No. 2 has succeeded."

" The battery will prepare the attack energetically, taking' up a posi-
" tion to the left front." r ^

" I am to be found with the principal line (regiment No. 2.)"
We commend these orders to the attention of our military readers as
containing everything necessary, yet leaving room for plenty of initia-
tive on the part of the various commanders, who must, however be
well trained men to be so trusted.

The enemy observes the advance of the brigade, and immediately
directs upon it a heavy fire of artillery. Regiment No. 2 has disposed
its first and second battalions as first and second lines, the first being
skirmishers with supports and reserves, the second company columns.
Regiment No. 1 advances with its two battalions in echelon from the
right, both in company columns.

The enemy's right wing appears to be reinforced and a hot fire issues
from it. Regiment No. 2 sends up the reserves of the first battalion
to the fighting line in prolongation of the left, and supplies their place
with half the 2nd battalion. Regiment No. 1 sends up its 1st bat-
talian at a double beside the second half of the 2nd battalion. Two
columns are now seen advancing in the distance, one to join the right
wing of the enemy, the other to attack our left flank. Thereupon
Regiment No. 1 occupies with its 2nd battalion a position on the left
flank, while the rest of the brigade push on towards A. The attacking
line, reinforced by half of the 2nd battalion, which moves up in pro-
longation of the left wing, and at 400 paces from A, begins to envelope
the enemy's right. The battery pushes on to within 1,000 paces (800
yards) of the enemy's position A. The cavalry detaches half a squadron,
to assist the part of the first regiment occupying the position in flank
the rest of the horsemen continue their forward movement with the
attack.

The enemy accelerates the march of his right column and deploys in
skirmishing line all the troops in the position A. Regiment No. 1

HUGO HELVIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES. 397

sends forward part of each company of its 1st battalion as skirmishers.
These and the 2nd regiment advance against A. Our cavalry charges
the enemy's advancing right column, which is stopped by the charge.
The other column of the enemy also hesitates and appears inclined to
retreat. The whole of onr forces advance rapidly, and the position is
carried, but the column of the enemy which was checked by the
cavalry again advances with clouds of skirmishers towards our left
flank.

At this stage Major Helvig sends to the rear as wounded, two batta-
lion commanders, six company leaders, and six subalterns. Regiment
No. 2 occupies the captured position and regiment No. 1 sends both its
battalions against the flanking column, upon which the battery opens
fire. The cavalry concentrates near the battery. The column retires,
but the enemy has gained time to retire in good order.

The brigade is ordered to occupy the position and defend it to the
last extremity. It forms in good order with the battery on the left of
the skirmishing line. The cavalry press on to the front to reconnoitre.

In this example we see employed in the fighting line of skirmishers
at the critical moment the whole of the 2nd regiment, except two
companies, and a section of each company of the 1st battalion, 1st
regiment. We see the cavalry delaying the advance of the enemy's
re-inforcements by charging them boldly, and the battery pushing on
to within 800 yards of the enemy's position, the whole force being
used with decision and energy. Delay might have been fatal to
success, for the re-inforcements might have joined the enemy and made
him too strong to be resisted.

In the 53rd example a similar force, namely, four battalions, one
battery, and two squadrons, form part of a division in a defensive
action. The author again insists that the artillery and cavalry are to
act solely with regard to the present emergency. The artillery is to
fire at the advancing infantry of the enemy, and on no account allow
itself to be turned from this object whatever it may suffer from the
enemy's artillery. It must endeavour to cover the hostile infantry
with projectiles, flanking it, if possible, and especially that flank which
is likely to be the objective of a counter-attack. If the orders are to
hold the position at all cost, or if the general situation demands, the
battery must on no account seek safety in retreat, but continue its fire
even if the enemy are at the very muzzles of the guns. Major Helvig
says with great justice, " The abandonment of the defensive position
" by artillery is from a moral point of view the first half of defeat for
" the infantry, and half a victory for the assailant."

The cavalry must be constantly watching and gaining information,
and then assist and render more energetic the counter-attack. It may
possibly have opportunities for short counter-attacks even while the
brigade is still on the pare defensive, but must beware of prematurely
expending its material and moral strength, lest it should not be avail-
able for the counter-attack. Above all, it must bring to an end, as
quickly as possible, ail uncertainty as to the disposition and force
made by the attacking enemy ; by that means it will fulfil the im-
portant mission of enabling. the General of brigade to decide where

VOL. xx. 2 I)

398 huqo hblvig's tactical examples.

and how his counter-attack ought to be made. The brigade is in
order of march with the usual advance guard, consisting of one
squadron, one battalion, and two guns. We may observe here in pass-
ing, that the Germans hold fast to the idea of very strong advanced
guards, in this case nearly a third of the whole force. The point of
the advanced guard sends back word that a strong column of the
enemy, composed of all arms, apparently about a brigade, is approach*
ing. At the same time, the Commander of the division sends orders
for the brigade to occupy as quickly as possible the position A B, and
hold it until the second brigade has passed a defile, and is able to take
the defensive. The brigade Commander halts the advance guard, and
tells it to occupy the left of the position with its squadron and two
guns outside the left flank. The first battalion of the main body
places itself on the right of the battalion of the advanced guard. The
rear regiment is ordered to occupy the right of the position, but this
disposition is shortly afterwards changed. The four guns of the main
body are pushed rapidly to the right front of the position; the
cavalry of the main body outside the battery. Thus, in fact, each
body of troops is sent to occupy the part of the position nearest to it.
But the enemy now opens fire from a battery against the left wing of
position, and seems to be re-inf orcing his right wing. The brigade
Commander evidently thinks that his left is threatened. He halts one
of the battalions of the rear regiment, holding it ready until he is
certain, and sends two guns from the right to the left flank. The
cavalry dashes out to get information, with orders not to attack. It
brings back word, that the enemy, who is now deployed, shows four
battalions on his right wing. Upon this the 2nd regiment, which is in
front, brings up its reserves into the fighting line. The first battalion
of the 1st or rear regiment sends three of its companies to act as
reserve for the 2nd regiment, and throws one company into skirmish-
ing order on the left to guard the flank of the guns. The other
battalion is brought up to act as general reserve, 300 paces behind the
reserves of the fighting line and near the left flank.

We have now arrived at the 4th moment when the enemy begins
to envelope the left wing. The 2nd regiment which is in the first
line throws back its left flank, and the guns are withdrawn gradually,
without limbering up, into line with the infantry. The general re-
serve battalion wheels a little to its left, and moves up so as to be 300
paces behind the left flank of the front line. The enemy continues to
develope his attack against the left wing, and the brigade Commander
orders his general reserve to make a counter-attack breaking out from
the left flank. The cavalry is ordered to attack also, the rest stand
fast. The enemy's attack is checked, but so is the counter-attack and
the battalion which made it, has to fall back again with serious losses.
At this stage Major Helvig sends to the rear two battalion Commanders,
four company leaders, ten subalterns. The battalion which has made
the counter-attack is sent rapidly to the rear to rally behind the left
flank. The cavalry rallies behind the batter}-.

By this time the 2nd brigade of the division has passed the defile
and begins to make its presence felt by the enemy, who retires slowly

HUGO HELYIG'S TACTICAL EXAMPLES. 399

without giving opportunity for another serious action. Our left flank
which had been thrown back is advanced again, the battery also moves
forward and plies the retiring enemy with its fire. The infantry is
assembled, one regiment occupies the position, the other in reserve.
The second brigade pushes on, and the one whose movements we have
followed, is ordered to rest for a while in the position it has defended.

Now, if all this is not actual war, it is at least as clear an imitation
of it as is possible during peace, and familiarity with such exercises
may, with great advantage, be made to precede and alternate with
manoeuvres against actual troops with opposing Commanders ; at least
no one can say that practice so systematically conducted can lead to
unsteadiness in the field.

We hope we have said enough to show the thoroughly practical
character of Major Helvig's book and its value, not only to professed
students of the military art, but to all Officers as a means of self -instruc-
tion and a hand-book from which to instruct others. We have now
to draw attention to the fact that the volumes were written by a
Bavarian Officer attached to the great general staff at Berlin, and trans-
lated or at least published by a similar organisation in Paris whence
issue continually excellent works, translated or original, and published
at very moderate prices. Some of the best intellects in the German
and French Armies are employed on such duties, for it is recognised
that the distribution of information is one of the legitimate and most
valuable functions of a general staff. May the day soon come when
Officers of the English Army will not have to hunt through foreign
catalogues for such books as this, nor be left in doubt as to the value
of them since their names alone can be taken as an index of their
contents. An Intelligence Branch has been added to the office of the
Quartermaster-General as a sort of nucleus for that General Staff, which
is at least as necessary for England as for foreign countries. Is the
establishment always to remain at its present inadequate strength,
and are students to be thrown back upon private enterprise for all hope
of reading in their own language, books of the greatest importance,
but not likely to bring in a profit to any firm of publishers ? In say-
ing this, we do not undervalue the excellent work which has already
been achieved by the Intelligence Branch. We ask for more of it,
and more officers to execute it. The fact that it has done so much is
the best argument for asking that it may be given power to fulfil the
duties entrusted to it. Among those duties none is more pressing
than the diffusion of military information by means of the printing
press.

2 D 2

THE NEW FRENCH R FLE.

(Condensed from the Revue cVArtillerie, Feb., April, 1876. By Captain

R. A. E. Livesay, R.E.)

The Chassepot, nnder the official designation of rifle o /pattern 1866,
was, as is well known, introduced into the French service in that year.
Its manufacture was then actively proceeded with ; and on the out-
break of the war in August, 1870, about 1,200,000 had been finished.
The French fought the campaign of 1870 and 1871 chiefly with it,
when its good and bad qualities were thoroughly recognised.

At the close of the campaign, the French Minister of War ordered
an inquiry to be held as to the manner in which the Chassepot of 1866,
as well as its cartridge, had acted during the time they had been in the
hands of the troops. This inquiry was made, and brought to light the
necessity of making certain improvements in the arm, and more parti-
cularly in the cartridge.

The cartridges, like those of the Dreyse rifle, are self-consuming,
and as such, their advantages are (1) simplicity in the breech-me-
chanism of the rifle, a cartridge extractor not being necessary ; (2),
small relative weight of cartridge-case. These great advantages are,
however, accompanied by serious defects in reference to transport and
self-consuming power ; the cartridges ought to be sufficiently durable
not to deteriorate when transported, either in large or small quanti-
ties, and burn away completely when the rifle is fired. These condi-
tions are to a certain extent contradictory, and up to this time have
not been completely fulfilled; and consequently the disadvantages
inherent in the cartridge showed themselves quickly on service. The
cartridges were not sufficiently durable, and particularly those carried
by the soldier soon deteriorated ; also the residue in the chamber after
each discharge accumulated to such an extent as to lead to difficulties
in the way of charging the rifle after a number of rounds had been
fired. Besides these great disadvantages, there were other minor ones,
and it was with a view to do away with or minimize them all, if it were
possible, that the Yincennes Commission of the 3rd Sept., 1872, with
General Douay as president, was formed.

The attention of this Commission was at first directed to certain
proposals brought forward with a view to improving the self-consum-
ing cartridge of the Chassepot rifle, 1866 pattern ; but the Commission
soon recognised the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility of pro-
ducing, within a reasonable time, a self-consuming cartridge which

THE NEW FfiEKCH RIFLE. 401

would not necessitate changes in the rifle, and they expressed their
opinion that the best plan would be to substitute, for the self-consum-
ing cartridge, a metallic one.

With a view to this substitution, many propositions had been made
since 1866 ; but there were practical difficulties ; as in the Chassepot
the cartridge was placed at a considerable distance (1*4 inch) from
the end of the chamber, it would be most difficult to adapt to
the breech-mechanism an extractor which would easily remove a
metallic cartridge occupying a position so far in as the self -consuming
cartridge did ; there would not be, it is true, much difficulty in the
case of those rifles still in the workshops, in which the cartridge- cham-
ber had not been as yet formed, and the rifles in hand could be provided
with new barrels, but such a substitution, in the latter case, would
be a heavy business ; it was then proposed to try and effect the neces-
sary modifications by boring out the old chamber and inserting a new
tube adapted to the metallic cartridge. A number of trials as to the
best practical method of re-tubing the old rifles were then carried out ;
many gave satisfactory results, and the Commission arrived at the
conclusion that the re-tubing could be successfully adapted to a
metallic cartridge ; many proposed methods of firing the cartridge
were also considered, which were more or less good, according to the
cost of transformation.

It was next considered necessary to examine into the question
whether the manufacture of new rifles should be carried out according
to the plan adopted for the alterations of the old rifle, or whether a
rifle, original in all its parts, should not be adopted, the old rifle being
altered according to a simple and expeditious plan. This double ques-
tion was carefully and laboriously gone into, and it was decided that
if a method of conversion sufficiently good for a new rifle was hit upon,
new arms should be manufactured according to the plan adopted.
Although by this decision the difficulties of the problem were some-
what increased, the question of unity of armament had such weight
with the Committee that it mainly influenced their decision. In spite
of the practical difficulties of the question, this decision of the Com-
mittee must be looked upon as a happy one, as in consequence the re-
armament of the troops can be proceeded with rapidly, and the delay
consequent on the introduction of an entirely new pattern riflo avoided,
during which delay, the manufacture of rifles of the old pattern would
have to be proceeded with, and these would have, later on, to be altered.
The Commission then continued its inquiries ; it examined into the
shape of the ball, the manufacture of the cartridges, and experimented
on several descriptions, and finally adopted a cartridge of diameter at
base of case = 13*8mm. = 55 inches, and containing 5*25 grammes
= 81 grs. powder.

Several descriptions of rifles were submitted to the Committee, but
after the preliminary trials, two were chosen as fulfilling more nearly
than the others the conditions laid down by the Committee, and in
order to decide between these latter, an exhaustive system of trials
was forthwith instituted.

These selected systems were 1st, the Beaumont, already in use in

402 THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

Holland ; 2ndly, that proposed by Mons. Gras, Chef d'Escadron in the
French artillery.

The Beaumont system is sufficiently well known not to need a
description here ; and it would have to be modified for cavalry and
artillery purposes ; hence unity of armament would not be secured.

System Gras. — This system consists in re-tubing the barrel, re-plac-
ing the breech block by a new arrangement, allowing of the employ*
ment of a metallic cartridge. The spiral spring is, as in the Chassepot,
the basis of the striking arrangement. By the system Gras, unity in
the armament of the cavalry and infantry is obtained.

From the above it will be seen that the two proposed systems lead
to a change in the breech-mechanism of the old pattern rule, further,
that the breech-arrangement of the Chassepot could be altered so as to
be used in connection with a metallic cartridge, but it was not con-
sidered possible to utilize it by any transformation which would . have
been sufficiently satisfactory to be adopted as the model of the new
rifle. This is mainly due to the fact that the metallic cartridge
necessitates a considerable striking power, and in consequence a more
powerful spiral spring, which cannot be manipulated directly^ but
requires a self-cocking or automatic arrangement; and finally the
mechanism of the 1866 pattern was not adapted to limiting the projec-
tion of the striker beyond the extremity of the breech-block by an
invariable quantity.

The two inventors having adapted their systems to the cartridge
proposed by the Commission, the trials were proceeded with on a large
scale in several corps.

Regulations were drawn up and approved of by the War Minister in
November, .1873, to the effect that the trials were to be conducted by
three regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one of artil-
lery ; each regiment of infantry to receive 100 rifles (50 new and 50
converted), the cavalry and artillery, each 90 rifles (45 new and
45 altered). Each infantry rifle was supplied with 1,000, and each
cavalry and artillery rifle with 500 cartridges.

These rifles were manufactured at St. Etienne. The new ones were
provided with a sword bayonet (epee bayonet) having a leathern
scabbard, the converted ones retaining the old pattern sword bayonet
(jsabre bayonet).

The arms thus provided were submitted to various tests equivalent
to several years' continuous service, and corresponding as nearly as
possible to the actual exigencies of a campaign.

With each rifle supplied to the infantry : —

(1.) 30 rounds were fired each day ;

(2.) 500 rounds of snapping ;

(3.) 130 rounds continuously without cleaning ;

The object of the snapping being to test the breech-mechanism.

At the end of the thirty days' trial each rifle had fired 1,000 rounds
of ball cartridge. The rifle was snapped 15,000 times. These figures
represent approximately the number of shots, Ac, fired by a rifle in
five years.

In the artillery and cavalry each rifle fired : —

•cadre:

)f to ?
canir

serai
tpIk
he °r
("is?*

.1 »«• -

rk :*

31-

r. •

ft"-

THE NEW FliEXCH RIFLE. 403

(1.) 15 ball cartridges daily ;

(2.) Was snapped 500 times ;

(3.) And fired 75 rounds continuously without being cleaned.

Finally, during the last fifteen days of the trials, in each regiment,
fire rifles of each system were exposed night and day in the open air,
and were employed in the trials without being taken to pieces or
cleaned. In addition to the firing tests, the cartridges were specially
tested in reference to durability, when carried in ammunition- waggons
and in the men's knapsacks.

At the end of the trials, a report was made from each corps, and was
forwarded to the Minister of War, who transmitted them, with his
observations, to the Committee of Artillery, and finally to a Commission
presided over by* Marshal Canrobert. The conclusions of this Com-
mittee, which were as follows, were adopted by the President of the
Republic, in an Order, dated 7th July, 1874.

The Commission recommended : —

(1.) The Gras system.

(2.) The new pattern sword-bnyonet for the infantry (epee
bayonet).

(3.) The modification of certain parts of the mechanism.

(4.) That the sword-bayonet (epee bayonet) bo provided with a
steel scabbard.

(5.) That the new arms on the Gras system bo officially designated
rifles, carbines, <fec, 1874 pattern, and the converted ones on the same
system, rifles, carbines, &c, pattern 186G-1874.

Infantry Rijle, 1874 Pattern. — The new rifle is like the Chassepot in
appearance, but differs from it in the principle of the cartridge, as
well as in the breech-mechanism. The rifle is provided with an epee
bayonet, and its general dimensions, &c, in English measures, are as
follows : —

Length of rifle 4*2804 feet

Length of sword blade T7121

Total 5-9925 = 6feet.

Weight of sword bayonet 17632 lbs.'

Ditto, without scabbard 1*2342

Weight of rifle 9-25G8

Total weight of rifle and bayonet . . 104910 = 10 lbs. 8 oz.

The principal parts of the rifle are as follows : —

The barrel of the rifle is of cast steel, of the same shape and dimen-

inches deep, nearly ; the area of the lands = that of the grooves, and
the two are connected by arcs of circles of -J- of an inch radius, the
twist is right handed, and makes one complete revolution in 21*6
inches. The dimensions of the chamber of the barrel correspond with

404 THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

those of the cartridge, so that when the latter is home, the point
of the bullet is just at the entrance of the rifled portion. It is
provided with a fore-sight similar to that of the old rifle, and the
bayonet is attached to the barrel in the same manner. The barrel
is screwed on to the breech, and a portion of its upper edge is cham-
fered off so as to allow the claw of the extractor to slip over it and
catch behind the projecting edge of the base of the cartridge-case,,
when the breech-block is pushed home.

The Chamber (Figs. 1 and 2). — The breech-chamber does not differ
much from that of the Chassepot. The general dimensions are pretty
much the same with a view to uniformity of the new and converted
rifle. The rear of the chamber has, however, been slightly modified, so
as to maintain the anterior part of the breech-block firmly in the
direction of the axis when it is drawn back or pushed forward. At
the other end of the breech-chamber a small portion has been chamfered
away so as to contain the extractor when it is pushed forward.

A projection or re-inforce above the upper surface, on the right hand
side of the chamber, gives a firm bearing fco the base of the lever,
when the latter is turned down. Its anterior extremity is formed into
a screw surface, so that while being turned to the right, the base
of the lever slides on this screw surface, drives forward the breech-
block, and locks tightly its movable head against the base of the-
cartridge, and brings the spiral-spring into its greatest state of com-
pression. The breech-block is stopped when drawn back to its proper
extent, by means of a stop-stud passing through the side of the
chamber, and it acts in the same way as in the old pattern rifle. At
the bottom of the chamber, near its posterior end, the head of the-
cartridge-ejector projects above the lower surface of the chamber,
and tips up the end of the cartridge-case when the base of the latter-
strikes against it as the breech-block is drawn back. The main*
spring for discharging the rifle by pulling the trigger is fixed to tho
under exterior surface of the chamber, in the same way as in tho
Chasscpot.

Th<: breech-Mock (Figs. 1 and 2) is composed of seven pieces, as
follows : —

(1.) The cylinder.

(2.) Moveable head.

(3.) Cartridge-extractor.

(4.) Striker or needle.

(5.) Spiral spring.

((>.) The hammer-button (manchoii).

(7.) The hammer. \

The cylinder (Fig. 3) serves to close the breech, its axis is hollotv, and
contains the spiral-spring which is wound round the striker or needle.
The lever of the cylinder is attached to its upper surface. The base of
lever fits exactly between the projections on the chamber, and so *
guides the cylinder when it is drawn back or pushed forward. When
the lever is turned down to the right and the breech chamber closed^
its end abuts firmly against the projection on the breech, to which,
according v, the recoil is transmitted. In front of the lever and on

THE NEW FRENCH BIFLE. 405

the side of the cylinder, is a projecting stud made to fit a corresponding'
groove in the movable head-piece (tete mobile) when the lever is
vertical, so that the two pieces then become connected, and are moved
backward and forward together. The exterior surface of the cylinder
has two grooves cut on it ; in the lower, the tip of the mainspring and
the ejector-stud are contained when the lever is vertical, and the
cylinder drawn back or pushed forward ; the side one, in the same
position, contains the stop-stud, and is curved off at its end at right
angles, the rear curved portion is a screw surface similar to that at the
end of the re-inforce on the chamber ; these two grooves are connected
by a transverse one, into which the ejector-stud passes when the
lever is turned down and the breech closed.

At the base of the cylinder is a mortise (Fig. 3), the right hand side
of which is formed into a screw surface ; connected with the hammer is
a projection similarly formed. When the rifle has been fired, these
two surfaces are in juxtaposition, touching ; the effect of turning the
lever to the left is to make the screw surface of the cylinder slide on
that of the projection on the hammer, and as this latter cannot rotate,
the curvilinear motion of the cylinder produces a rectilinear motion
of the hammer, which draws back with it the striker, thus compress-
ing the mainspring, and so cocking the arm automatically. When
the cylinder has been sufficiently rotated to the left, a small projecting
stop- wedge attached to the hammer passes into a corresponding notch
in the base of the cylinder, and the two are then connected. The
cylinder is the only piece of the breech-mechanism which is capable
of receiving a rotatory motion.

Moveable Head-piece (Figs. 1 and2). — The object of this portion of the
breech-block is to obtain a firm pressure against the base of the cartridge
(for which purpose a recess in its fore part is made to fit exactly the
base of the cartridge), and to contain the extractor. The front portion
is cylindrical, and of the same diameter as the exterior diameter of
the cylinder of the breech-piece; the hind part is also cylindrical
and fits the hollow axis of the cylinder. Its axis is pierced to allow
the striker to pass through, the fore part being circular and the hind
part elliptical in section. The corresponding length of the striker is
similarly formed, so that when the striker has acted, the moveable
cap and striker do not move round with the cylinder when the
latter rotates. On the outside are three grooves, the lower one to
allow the ejector- stud to pass along, the lateral one, which in a certain
position is in prolongation of the lateral groove of the cylinder,
allows of the stop-stud passing freely, and finally a trans verso one,
which acts as a gas escape in case of the breaking of the base of a
cartridge. On the upper surface of the moveable head-piece is a
re-inforce or projection, the interior of which is hollowed out so as to
contain the cartridge-extractor ; on the right side of it is a mortise,
fitted so as to receive the stud on the cylinder when the lever is turned
to the left ; then the cylinder and the head become connected, and when
the cylinder is drawn back, the head follows.

Extractor, — The extractor is a spring composed of two arms with a
stud on the upper, which connects it to the moveable head-piece. T],°

406 THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

lower arm is provided with a claw at its extremity, which is intended
to grip on the base of the cartridge. The extremity of the upper
arm is sloped off so as to form an inclined plane, so that when the
breech-block is pushed forward it slides freely into the cavity prepared
to receive it at the top of the breech-chamber, at the same time that
the claw of the lower arm passes over the base of the cartridge and
grips it. By this forward motion the spring is compressed, and the
moveable head piece is firmly fixed transversely.

Striker (Fig. 1) is a steel needle of 7 mm. = '25 inch diameter,
provided with a shoulder near its point, against which one extremity
of the spiral spring abuts. The point is cylindro-conical, the portion of
the striker between it and the shoulder of the striker being oval in
section ; in consequence of this particular form, when the striker has
acted, it fits the corresponding cavity in the axis of the head, and when
the lever of the breech-block is turned to the left, the striker is unable
to turn with it. The other extremity of the striker is T shaped,
and is fitted on to the button (manchon) that connects it with the
cock.

The Spiral Spring (Fig. 1) is of steel spiral wire 1*5 mm. = '059-inch
diameter, making twenty turns in '38 inches. One end of it bears on
the shoulder of the striker, and the other against the opposite extremity
of the hollow axis of the cylinder. When the rifle is cocked the com-
pression of the spring = 29*6 lbs.

Button (Fig 4). — The button connects the striker with the hammer ;
it is a hollow T corresponding to that of the T on the striker, and is
fixed to it in the same manner as in the Chassepot.

Hammer (Figs. 1 and 4). — The hammer is shaped like that of the old
rifle, it is hollow and allows the end of the striker to pass through it,
and to be made fast to it by means of the button (manchon), which fits
into a cylindrical cavity at its end. The button passes freely in the
direction of the axis, and is made fast to the hammer by giving it a
quarter turn. Above the cylindrical portion,' is the swell of the
hammer, which projects in front of the cylinder containing the button,
and guides the cock in the motions of loading. At the junction of
the projecting and cylindrical portions, is a screw-surface correspond-
ing to that in the notch in the cylinder, so that after firing, when the
lever is turned to the left, the screw-surface of the notch presses on
that of the hammer, and so pushes the hammer back and cocks the
rifle. On the under surface of the cock there are two safety notches
for the purpose of allowing the rifle to put on half-cock.

Action of the Lock Mechanism. — The stiffness of the spiral spring
not allowing of the rifle being cocked by the thumb, the action of
loading and firing is executed in four motions, as follows : —

1. Opening of the breech.

2. Introduction of the cartridge.

3. Shutting of the breech.

4. Pulling the trigger.

1. To open the breech, turn the lever from right to left, and draw
back the breech-block until its motion is arrested by the stop-stud ;
during the first part of this operation several mechanical effects are

THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE. 407

produced, firstly : the rifle is cocked, for when the lever is turned from
right to left, the screw surface of the notch of the cylinder acts on
that of the cock, and as this latter cannot turn, it is forced back, carry-
ing with it the striker and compressing the spiral spring, by a quantity
equal to the projection of the screw-surface on the cock ; this motion
is complete when the stop-wedge on the cock enters the notch made
to fit it on the cylinder — this is known by the click which occurs.
The stop-stud presses against the hollow screw-surface of the groove
on the cylinder, which latter is forced back, drawing with it the
moveable cap and extractor, so starting the empty cartridge-case.
From the above it is seen that the hammer receives two retrograde
motions, one produced by the action of the notch in the cylinder on
the screw-surface attached to the cock, the other from the pressure of
the stop-stud on the screw-surface of the groove "on the cylinder. By this
double effect the rifle is cocked, the cartridge started, and the under
groove of the cylinder is brought into its proper position, and the
handle now being vertical, the entire breech-piece can be drawn back
until arrested by the stop-stud, carrying with it the cartridge-case or
cartridge, as the case may be ; as the base of the latter strikes the
bottom stud in the chamber, the upper extremity being held fast by
the claw of the extractor ; the effect of these pressures on the cartridge-
case is to eject it forcibly.

2. The cartridge is put in in the usual way, and pressed home as
tightly as possible.

3. The entire breech-piece is now pushed forward, and the lever
turned from left to right, until down in its place. The rifle is then
ready to be fired.

The effects produced by these motions are as follows : —
As the lever is pushed forward, the claw of the extractor slips over
the base of the cartridge, and lays hold of it. The forward motion
continues until the stop-stud abuts against the slope of the side groove,
after which the lever can only be turned from left to right, which
being done, the screw-surface on the base of the lever-handle slides on
the corresponding screw-surface on fore part of the re-inforce of the
breech chamber ; by this means the moveable head is driven forward,
and the cartridge firmly pressed into its place; the notch in the
cylinder is disengaged from the stop- wedge attached to the cock, after
which the cylinder turns freely until home, the forward motion of the
hammer being prevented by the nose of the mainspring.

4. The trigger being pulled, the nose of the mainspring is depressed
downwards, clears tho hammer, and the latter being acted on by the
spiral spring is carried forward, and with it the striker, and the charge
is fired.

Safety Notch (Fig.l). — In the experimental fire-arms supplied, a safety
apparatus was used to prevent the rifles going off accidentally, but at
the end of the experiments, and on the recommendation of the Commis-
sion such an apparatus was not considered necessary, and was con-
sequently abandoned ; it was, however, subsequently considered advan-
tageous to be able to have the rifle loaded without being obliged to
keep it on full cock. This was easily carried out by means of a notch

408 THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

in a suitable position on the hammer, presenting also the advantage of
relieving the pressure on the mainspring.

To put the rifle on half-cock, turn the lever partly to the left, the
forefinger pressing the trigger, the thumb on the hammer, and allow
the latter to slide forward until the click of the nose of the mainspring
falling into the notch, is heard. The rifle is then half-cocked. To
place the rifle on full- cock it is only then necessary to press the lever
from right to left and then back into its proper place. The position
of the safety-notch is determined in such a manner, that if the
hammer does now go off, the striker has such a small space to go
through, 1 mm. 5 = *02 of an inch, and the pressure of the spiral
spring is so weakened, that the striker has no longer sufficient force to
explode the detonator.

Sights (Fig. 5). — The back sight is composed of two pieces, one fixed,,
the other sliding on it, and also of a base ; the latter contains a spring,
and is soldered on to the barrel. The sight revolves on the extremity
of the base as an axis, and can be turned down to the front or rear, or
can be maintained in a vertical position. The left side of the fixed
part is graduated for every 25 metres, from 400 metres up to 1,20ft
metres ; the right side is graduated from 1,400 to 1,800 metres. The
sliding part is provided with a notch at each extremity.

In firing at 200 metres, the sight is turned down to the front, and
the notch at the base of the sight is used. For 300 metres, the sight
is turned down to the rear, and the notch at the lower end of the
sliding part is used. For 350 metres, the sight is vertical, and the
notch at the base of the fixed part is used, the sliding part being
pulled up out of the way. For 1,300 metres, the same as for 350, but
the line of sight passes through the notch at the top of the fixed part.
For 400 metres, the sight is vertical, the sliding part is pushed down,
and the line taken through the lower notch on the latter. For 1,400'
metres, the slide is down, and the line of sight passes through its upper
notch. For 1,800 metres, the slide is up, and the linejjf sight passes
through its upper notch.

In some rifles the notches are on the right or on the left of the
plane of fire, in order to correct the lateral deviation of the rifle.

The mountings of the rifle are very similar to those of the Chassepot ;
the ramrod is different, and is secured in its place by means of a screw
at its end.

Sword-Bayonet. — The sword (ept>e) bayonet, with bronzed steel
scabbard, was adopted, instead of the sabre bayonet, to lessen the
soldier's load, and also to facilitate firing when the bayonet is fixed.

Cartridge. — The metallic cartridge adopted by the Commission is
composed of four principal parts : —

1. Powder case.

2. The detonator.

3. The lubricator.

4. The ball.

The powder case is of brass-foil and contains 5*25 gr. = 81 grs. of
powder. The base is of iron, and contains the detonating arrangement,
which communicates with the powder by means of small holes.

THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE. 409

The detonator is composed of the copper cap, containing the usual
detonating composition, and a detonator-cover, to keep the cap in its
place.

The lubricator is placed in the cartridge-case, between the powder
and the bullet, and is composed of a disc of greased felt, between two
cardboard discs.

The bullet is of pure compressed lead, and is surrounded with a
paper covering.

Manufacture. — The date of issue, Ac, of the cartridge is stamped on
the base, and the cartridges are made up in paper packets of six each,
the cartridges being separated by means of a strip of paper passing
between them.

Dimensions of the different parts of the Cartridge.

Thickness of base 2*15 m.m.

Length of case -. . 37*30 m.m.

Total length of case 39*45 m.m. = 2*2 inches.

Projection of ball beyond case = 16*55 m.m.

Total length of cartridge = 76 m.m. = 3 inches.
Greatest diameter of base of cart-
ridge 16*8 m.m.

Least ditto ditto 13*5 m.m.

Greatest diameter of cartridge case 13*75 m.m.

Least ditto ditto 11*75 m.m.

Weight of case = 12*9 gr. = 198 grs.

Diameter of bullet at the base = 11 m.m.

Length 27 m.m.

Weight 25 gr. = 886 grs.

Total weight of cartridge. ... = 43*8 gr. = 676 grs.

Weight of 10 cartridges .... = 15f oz.

Ballistic Qualities. — The following table shows the initial velocities
of the new pattern rifle compared with those of the '66 pattern : —

Arms.

Pattern '66.

Pattern 74.

Transformed rifle ....

m.
420
405
390

m.
450
435

415

There results from this augmentation of velocity an increase in range
and a flatter trajectory, without a corresponding increase in recoil.
Rapidity of fire is also increased, due to the automatic action of the
lock. Accuracy of fire is also increased.

The following tables show the trajectories of the new rifle, for
different ranges : —

410

THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

«
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THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

411

Table III.

Distances
in metres.

Angles of
Eleration
in degrees.

Angles of

Descent in

degrees.

Dangerous
space for
Infantrj.

H. 1*70 m.

Dangerous
space for
CaTaliy.

H.250m.

Time of
Flight.

Final
Velocities
in metres.

0° & 0"

0° C 0"

t •

• •

460

100

0° lO' 56"

0° 11' 40"

• •

024

391

200

0° 23' 24"

0° 26' 34"

• •

051

346

300

0° 37' 33"

0*45' 6"

130

190

0*81

310

400

0° 63' 31"

1° 7' 37"

127

115

281

500

1° 11' 25"

1° 34' 29"

152

267

600

lb 31' 33"

2° 6' 4"

1-92

237

700

1° 53' 32"

2° 42' 46"

2-36

220

800

2° 18' 1"

3° 24' 51"

283

205

900

2° 44' 56"

4° 12' 38"

3*33

192

1,000

3° 14' 26"

5° 6' 24"

387

181

1,100

3° 46' 37"

6° 6' 6"

4*44

171

1,200

4° 21' 35"

7° 12' 3"

504

162

1,300

5° 59' 28"

8° 24* 17"

568

154

1,400

5° 40* 22"

9° 42' 40"

635

147

1,500

6° 24' 23"

11° 7' 2"

705

141

1,600

7° 11' 37"

12° 36' 44"

779

136

1,700

8o g/ 7//

14° 11' 24"

8-56

131

1,800

8° 55' 59"

15° 5(y 32"

936

126

The times of flight were determined as follows : two obserrers, each provided with
a stop chronometer, placed themselyes mid- way between the target and the firer, and
noted, one the report of the rifle, and the other the sound of the impact of the
bullet on the target. The difference between the two times gave the time of flight .

Table shotting comparative Ballistic Properties of the different Rifles now in use in

the Armies in Europe.

Pattern.

France{l876 \\\\\\\\\\\\\\

Germany, 1871, Mauser

England, 1871, Martini- Henry.

Italy, 1870, Vetterli

Russia, 1871, Bcrdan

Calibre.

Inch.
•433
'433
•433
•46
•421
•421
•433
■433

421

Weight of
Bullet.

Grains.
385
385
385
480
310
370
340
385
308
370

Initial Velocities.

Feet.

1,476

1,378

1,469

1,312

1,400

1,476 with new cartridge

1,444

1,460 with German do.

1,397

1,420

The examination of the last table shows that, with the exception of
Italy and England, all the European powers have adopted, as did
France in 1866, a small-bore rifle, varying in calibre from *421 to *433
inches, firing a bullet of between 370 and 385 grains, with an initial

412 THE NEW FRENCH RIFLE.

velocity of from 1,476 to 1,400 feet per second. The results obtained
by these rifles axe, moreover, so nearly equal, in regard to rapidity of
Are and ballistic qualities, that it may be said now, as in the days of
the old smooth-bore, that European armies are almost equally well
armed, and that hereafter, as in the past, success will depend above
all on the use made of the rifle provided, and hence that all our efforts
should be directed towards teaching the soldier to make the best
possible use of it. It is necessary to bear in mind, in practising with
any rifle, that the initial velocity of the bullet, the trajectory described,
and, in consequence, the elevation of the rifle, are not constant
quantities. According to season, temperature, barometer, <fec„ these
quantities are subject to considerable variation, and a change of tem-
perature equal to 20° C, often causes the bullet to strike 16 ' above or
below the mark aimed at, at a range of 200 metres.

NOTES ON NAVAL MATTERS.

The Projection of Gun-muzzles beyond the Sides of Ships.

Now that the number of gnus with which the most powerful ships
are armed is being usually reduced to about four in turret ships, and
half-a-dozen in broadside ships, and all of them, in both cases, are
being mounted upon more or less delicate machinery, the question of
the degree to which their muzzles project from the ship's side is
becoming one of importance. In our " Inflexible " the guns, when
run out, will project several feet beyond the side, owing to the turrets
being placed near to the side, in order to facilitate bow and stern fire.
It is obvious that an enemy, by simply steaming past her while the guns
are run out,. might inflict great injury upon the machinery of both
guns and turrets ; and although it may be said that the turret and
guns can be turned away, or that an enemy would expose herself to
great danger by attempting this manoeuvre, still it is not by any means
impossible that a skilful and daring enemy might contrive in this way
during an action, to cripple the great ship, and even to put her turrets
and guns hors de combats Even a vessel of extremely inferior power,
if well handled, might accomplish this if no provision were made
against it. The Admiralty and its advisers have recognised the force
of these considerations by providing for the " Inflexible " being fitted
with fixed external sweep-pieces, or curved fenders, in wake of the
turret, on either side, for glancing or turning aside an enemy's blow ;
and although the efficacy of this remedy may, in some easily-conjec-
tured cases, be doubted, the adoption of the device shows that the
Government are sensible of the risk involved, and have taken the best
available means of diminishing it. It is curious to note how differ-
ently this practical source of danger has been dealt with in the Italian
and in the Austrian Navies, which shared in the only practical experi-
ence of ironclad warfare that Europe has afforded. In the Italian
turret ships " Duilio " and " Dandolo " the turrets are placed ex-

1 In a discussion on Naval Tactics, at this Institution, on the 81st Hay, 1875
(Vide Journal, Vol. IX, No. 82, page 516, et seq.)t Admiral Sir Henry Codrington
mentioned the account given him by the Commander of a German gunboat, of
the action between his ressel and a French gunboat, off the Havannah, when he
described the effect of the stem of the Frenchman raking along his ship's side, and
not only carrying away the channels, so that his rigging was cut away and his
masts came down and muled his screw, but also struck, capsized, or turned round
his three guns, which he was ready to fire into the Frenchman. — Ed.

YOL. XX. 2 B

414 NOTES ON NAVAL MATTERS.

tremely near to the side, and the guns being very long, their projec-
tion beyond the side will be very great, — we have heard it said that it
will be as much as 11 feet, with the guns run out. We cannot vouch
for this, nor do we think the projection can well be so great, even with
the 100-ton guns, but it will be so great as to make it exceedingly
difficult to fully remedy the defect by permanent projecting sponsons
like the sweep-pieces of the " Inflexible.' * In the Austrian navy, on
the other hand, which is presided over by an officer, Admiral Pockh,
who highly distinguished himself at Lissa, and in which we observe
many evidences of practical improvement, the very opposite remedy is
resorted to. In the design of the new and powerful ironclad " Teget-
hoff" now building at Trieste, the side with its armour is indented
curvilinearly to a sufficient depth to provide for the gun muzzles
being always within the general line of the ship's side, even when the
guns are run out. It has been suggested that the real object of this
was that for which a similar arrangement has before now been pro-
posed in this country, viz., that of giving great lateral training to
the gun with a comparatively small port. That this object also is
furthered by the plan we do not deny ; but it was not for this pur-
pose that the recession of the side was actually resorted to. This fact
has been decisively established, and the true object of the Austrian
authorities clearly affirmed by the designer of the ship, Chief Con-
structor Herr Romako, who, in a letter addressed to Mr. Reed (and
cited by him at the Institution of Naval Architects), said, " The ship
" ' Tegethoff ' is in many regards a novelty, its casemate allowing an
** all-round fire, avoiding, at the same time, by its particular form, the
u dangerous projection of the muzzles of the midship guns, in consequence
" of experience acquired in the battle of JAssa, bid which are very little
" known, even in our own navy*9 These words are as decisive as they
are important, and show that we have actual experience in war to
confirm the views above expressed. It may be inferred from the
difference of procedure in the two navies, in respect of this matter, that
the battle of Inssa did not convey the same lessons to both of the
combatants.

The New Austrian Ibonclad " Tegethoff."

A brief summary of the characteristics of this important ship, now
under construction at Trieste, as the latest embodiment of Austrian
.naval opinion, will be interesting to our readers. We may mention
that she is, in a peculiar degree, the embodiment of naval opinion in
Austria, inasmuch as her design is the consequence of the prolonged
inquiries and deliberations of a very carefully selected Committee which
sat for several months at Trieste, although Herr Romako, the Chief
Constructor of the Vienna Admiralty, is no doubt personally respon-
sible for the technical details, and for the calculations of the ship.
In a paper presented to the Institution of Naval Architects a few
weeks ago, Mr. Reed gave the following general dimensions and parti-
culars of her : " Length between the perpendiculars, 286ft. ll£in. ; length,
" total, 303ft. l|in. ; breadth on the water-line, 62ft. 9in. ; extreme

u
It

NOTB0 ON NAVAL MATTEBS. 415

" breadth io outside of armour, 71ft. l^in. ; depth of hold, 34fo9 in. ;
" draught of water, aft, 26ft. 7£in. ; draught of water, forward, 23ft.
" lin. ; displacement with the half of provisions, 7,390 tons ; area of
" the midship section, 1,301 square feet ; area of the load water-line,
" 14,308 square feet ; height of metacentre above centre of gravity of
" displacement, 14* 623ft ; height of metacentre above water, 4770ft. ;
a distance of the centre of gravity of displacement before the midship
" section, 0'356f t ; depth of the centre of gravity of displacement
below water, 9*853ft ; co-efficient of displacement, 0" 582ft. ; 00-eflw
cient of water-line, 0* 782ft. ; co-efficient of midship section, 0'82ft. ;
displacement of an inch immersion at the load water-line, 34*47 tons ;
weight of armour and backing, 2,160 tons ; the armament consists
" of six llin. Krupp (pins. Area of sails, 12,165 square feet ; cost of
" hull, estimated, 172,790/. ; cost of engines and boilers, estimated,
" 8 1,7 15 J. ; nominal horse-power, 1,200; number of cylinders, 2 ; dia-
" meter of cylinder effective, 125in. ; length of stroke, 4ft. 3in. ;
" Griffith's propeller, diameter, 23ft. Gin. ; pitch, 24ft. ; number of
" blades, 2 ; revolutions per minute, 70 ; number of boilers, 4 ; area of
" fire-grate, 850 square feet ; heating surface, 25,500 square feet ;
" superheating surface, 1,800 square feet ; pressure of steam, 30 lb. ;
" number of furnaces, 36 ; mean, indicated horse-power, 8,000 ; speed,
" estimated, 14 knots. From these figures it will be seen that
" although we are not dealing with a skip of the ' Inflexible ' (Eng-
" lish) or of the ' Dandolo ' (Italian) type, in which armour of exces-
" sive thickness is placed over a central citadel of extremely limited
" extent, we nevertheless have a very powerful ship indeed, with
" armour of apparently about 13in. to 14in. thick, and with a concen-
" trated battery of six llin. Krupp guns, each weighing, I presume,
" about 27 tons. The ship has a belt of armour extending from the
" stern to within abeut 30ft. of the foremost perpendicular, where it
terminates in a transverse armoured bulkhead, and a stout iron deck
going forward to the stem at about 7 feet below water." The
TegethofE " has a long projecting under-water spur — it projects 9 feet
from the stem at the load water-line, and 19 feet from the stem-head.
Nearly all double curvature is excluded from the armour plates. The
battery is of the projecting type adopted by Mr. Reed in the upper
decks of the " Audacious" class, and on the main decks of the Over-
man and Chilian ironclads designed by him. The battery is traversed
by a bulkhead which cuts off the two foremost battery guns from the
remainder, after the plan adopted by Mr. Barnaby in the " Alex-
andra." The ports are thrown back from the outside of the side, as
explained in a previous paragraph.

The Powr and Docktasd of Venice.

Considerable expense is being incurred by the Italian Government
in the improvement of the Dockyard at Venice, and in the port and its
approaches. When there last year, we had an opportunity of inspecting
the new graving docks, one of which was being constructed of con-
crete in a novel manner. The use of concrete itself is not, of course,

2 e 2

416 NOTES ON NATAL MATTERS.

any longer a novelty in dock construction, but in this case the floor of
the dock was being formed of concrete in the water. The bottom was
excavated to a sufficient depth (much exceeding the required depth of
the dock), and then concrete, in a wet state as mixed, was being
deposited over the whole floor. A descending hopper, which opened
only when the bottom was nearly reached, was employed for the pur-
pose, and was made to deposit successive charges side by side by
means of an overhead crane, which travelled across the dock, floated
upon pontoons, which were moved along the dock longitudinally as
required. We were informed at the time that the new docks, although
of no great depth, were considerably deeper than the approaches ; and
great differences of opinion appear to exist among Italian engineers
as to the practicability of improving, and as to the means of improv-
ing, the Venetian channels. Professor G. Lanon has published in the
Bevista Maritima an interesting discussion upon the dockyard
approaches, and upon schemes for improving them, a summary of
which is translated and printed in the newly issued volume of the
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers (vol. 43, p. 363).
The wonder is, that in a place like Venice, the Government does not
have recourse to the system of hydraulic lift with pontoons, such as is
in use in this country and at Malta an# Bombay ; or else of the tubular
hydraulic dock of Messrs. Clark and Stansfield. By this means they
would be able to place their ships upon pontoons in the deep water
near the sea, and then transport them to the dockyard establishment,
and back again, with the greatest ease.

Imperial German Frigates.

The two principal ironclads in the Imperial German squadron, now
in the Mediterranean, are the " Kaiser " and " Deutschland." These
are sister ships, built in England, and completed in March and August
respectively last year. Their principal dimensions are — length between
perpendiculars, 280 feet ; breadth, extreme, 62 feet 8 inches ; depth in
hold, 37 feet 6 inches ; displacement, 7,300 tons ; extreme draught of
water, 24 feet. The engines, by Messrs. John Perm and Sons, of Green*
wich, are horizontal trunk surface condensing, fitted with superheaters,
steam starting gear, &c., with a boiler pressure of 30 lbs., and are capable
of developing 8,000 indicated horse-power. The mean speed at full
power, when tried at the Maplin Sands, was 14£ knots, and at half-
boiler power 13£ knots. In these vessels Mr. Reed has introduced an
arrangement by which when the screw is disconnected for sailing, the
weight of the screw and after-piece of shaft may be taken on friction
rollers, and it is hoped that this arrangement may considerably reduce
the dragging power of the screw when the ships are under sail alone.
The armament is of Krupp's guns and consists of eight 26 cm. (10£-
inch) 22-ton guns in the midship battery, and one 21 cm. (8£-incb)
9£-ton gun in the stern battery. These guns are on the main deck, a
few small guns for saluting purposes being carried on the upper deck
in addition. The midship battery overhangs the side, and is so arranged
that the foremost gun on either side is capable of firing 2° across the

NOTES OK NAVAL MATTERS. 417

keel, the fire from the two guns converging about three ships' lengths
ahead. The aftermost gun on either side of the battery can be trained
to within 15° of the keel, from which point the fire is taken up by the
stern gun, so that the advantage of an all-round fire is secured. The
thickness of armour at the water-line in wake of engines, boilers, and
magazines is 10 in., elsewhere amidships 8 in., tapering to 5 in. at the
stem and stern on the belt. The armour on the midship battery is
10 in. at the port sills and 8 in. elsewhere, and on the stern battery
8 in. The vessels are ship-rigged, the area of plain sail being 29,000
square feet. They are equipped with steam steering-gear, steam cap-
stan, auxiliary fire-engine, and very efficient pumping and ventilating
arrangements. Mr. Reed has carried his principle of broadening, and
shortening ships farther in these vessels than in any of his previous
designs, the proportions of length to breadth being 4J to 1, and they
must certainly be classed among the most successful of his ships, the
designed speed of 14 knots having been exceeded by half a knot, and
the steering powers proving, as might be expected, extremely good.

The Chilian Ironclads " Almirante Cochrane " and " Valparaiso."

The Chilian ironclads, " Almirante Cochrane " and " Valparaiso," are
sister ships, built from Mr. Reed's designs by Earle's Shipbuilding-
and Engineering Company, Hull. They were completed last year.
The principal dimensions are — length between perpendiculars, 210
feet; breadth, extreme, 45 feet 9 inches; depth in hold, 28 feet
10 inches ; displacement, 3,400 tons. The engines are by Messrs. John
Perm and Sons, of Greenwich, and are twin screw on the compound
principle, with horizontal cylinders and surface condensers. They
develop collectively 3,000 indicated horse-power, giving a mean speed
of 13 knots. The armament consists of six 12|-ton guns by Sir W.
Armstrong and Co., in a midship battery. The battery is arranged
with embrasures, so that the foremost gun on either side can fire right
ahead, and the aftermost gun on either side right astern, with sufficient
training to enable them to fire slightly abaft and before the beam
respectively. The midship gun on either side also fires from an embra-
sure port which gives it a training of from 20° abaft the beam to 70°
before it. The armour on sides is 9 inches at the water-line and 6
inches elsewhere amidships, tapering forward and aft. On the battery
the armour is 8 inches at the port-sills and 6 inches elsewhere. Pro-
tective deck plating f inch thick is fitted before and abaft the battery
on the main deck. These ships are barque rigged, and carry 12,000
square feet of plain sail.

The Imperial Brazilian Ironclad " Independencu."

The Imperial Brazilian turret-ship " Independencia " was ordered in
1873, the contract for building her being given to Messrs. J. and W.
Dudgeon, of Poplar, the duty of inspecting the building being under-
taken by Brazilian officers. Owing to an unfortunate failure at the
first and second attempts to launch her, by which she was very much

418 NOTES ON NATAL MATTERS.

injured, and the subsequent failure commercially of Messrs. Dudgeon's
firm, she is still in a very unfinished state, in the large dock at
Woolwich Dockyard. The necessary repairs and the work of com-
pleting her are now, however, being carried on, and it is hoped that
she will be completed in about a year's time. The principal dimensions
are — length between perpendiculars, 300 feet ; breadth, extreme, 63
feet ; depth in hold, 28 feet 10 inches ; displacement, 9.000 tons ;
extreme draught of water, 25 feet. The engines are by Messrs. John
Perm and Sons, of Greenwich, similar to those in the " Kaiser," and
(<Deutschland," but to develop 8,500 indicated horse-power. The
armament is four 35-ton guns, carried in two turrets, and two 8-ton
guns on the upper deck forward. The guns are made by Sir Joseph
Whitworth of steel. One of the 35-ton guns has been tried in France
by the French Government officials, and the publication of their
report is awaited with much interest. The armour on sides amidships
is 12 inches and 10 inches ; on battery, 9 inches and 8 inches ; on the
bow battery, 8 inches and 6 inches ; and on the pilot tower, 8 inches
and 6 inches. Protective deck plating is fitted on the main deck
before and abaft the battery, the thickness being 3 inches amidships
and 2 inches forward and aft. The " Independencia " is to have large
sail-power, and be in every respect a sea-going turret-ship. She is
designed to have a freeboard of 11 feet to the upper deck, and will be
fitted with falling-down topsides. A poop and forcastle are to be
fitted, and the ropes are to be worked on a flying deck entirely over
the turrets. Steam steering and capstan gear will be provided, also
steam and hand turning gear for the turrets, and the turret guns are
to be loaded by Sir W. Armstrong's hydraulic machinery.

Japanese War Ships.

The Imperial Japanese Government is having an ironclad corvette
built in this country. She is of 3,700 tons displacement, 220 feet
length between perpendiculars, 48 feet breadth, extreme, and 28 feet
8 inches depth in hold. Her engines are to be on the compound prin-
ciple, twin screws, with horizontal cylinder and surface condensers.
They are to develop 3,500 indicated horse-power, and are estimated to
drive the ship at 13 knots. The armament is to be supplied by Krupp,
and will comprise four 24 cm. (9j-inch) 15-ton guns, to be carried in
a midship battery on the main deck, and two 17 cm. (6f inches) 5^-ton
guns on the upper deck. The upper deck guns are carried amidships
and are arranged to fire right ahead, on the broadside, and right astern.
They are unprotected. The battery guns are placed at the four corners
of tne battery, and have very considerable fore and aft training in
addition to the broadside fire. The armour on sides is 9 inches at the
water-line and 7 inches elsewhere amidships ; on the battery 8 inches
at the port sills and 7 inches elsewhere. The vessel is to be barque-
rigged, with about 12,000 square feet of plain sail. The same Govern-
ment is also having built here two composite corvettes, which are to
have a thin strake of armour (4} inches) at the water-line in wake of
engines.

THE ROYAL NAVY OF ENGLAND AND THE STATE NAVY

OF FBANOE.

The following important communication on this Bubject has been
contributed by a distinguished Naval Officer, who derived the informa-
tion from a highly-placed foreign Official. — L. A. H.

1. An admirable article in the Quarterly Review (January, 1876),
on British Shipping and Seamen, may perhaps be usefully supple-
mented by a statement showing how the French Government, by their
system of War Reserves established by the great Colbert, not only
provides, first, for an expansion in time of war, which will include, if
necessary, nearly the whole of their merchant seamen and fishermen, but
also, secondly ', that during the process of drilling each man for three
years at least, in a man-of-war, the whole body of French merchant
seamen and their Officers shall be raised to a level much higher than
that occupied by most of our merchant seamen as to intelligence and
steadiness, which means safety, economical management, Ac. We will
first compare the ship's companies of an English and a French iron-
clad, and then the Naval Reserves of the two countries.

I. — The Ship's Companies,

2. There are remarkable differences in the composition of the ships'
companies in French men-of-war and English men-of-war ; the pro-
portion of combatants in the former is much larger than in the latter,
viz., 95 per cent, of the whole ship's company, whereas in the English
ship-of-war only 75 per cent, are combatants, and of these, 9 per cent,
are marines and 10 per cent, are boys.

3. An English ironclad of the "Vanguard" class has a complement
of about 41 Officers, 60 marines, 46 boys, and 314 seamen, domestics,
artificers, stokers, &c, but of the latter only about 197 are drilled to
the use of weapons, leaving 117 artificers, stokers, domestics, &c,
undrilled, or 25 per cent, of the whole crew of 461 ; whereas a French
ironclad, of about the same class, will have only 5 per cent, non-com-
batants ; and of the English Officers, none of the non-executives are
taught, or expected to know, how to use the sword they carry. With
a crew of 461, the French will have only 23 non-combatants, and 438
combatants, opposed to 344 English combatants, and nearly all the
French combatants will be seamen ; instead of marines, they have
matelots fusiliers, and no boys ; of the stokers even, a large proportion
are seamen.

4. There can be no doubt, therefore, that (leaving out the question,

420 THE ROYAL NAVY OF ENGLAND •

for the moment, the disputed point whether it is better to have
4t marines " or " matelots fusiliers ") a French ship's company, as far
as its composition is concerned, is much more efficient for general war
purposes than, cceteris paribus, one of our own.

5. The above system, which provides for so very large a proportion
of the ship's company being seamen, facilitates the drilling of the
reserves, and enables the French nation to present her " outer line "
of defence in a state of preparation, which is at once their boast
and pride, and ought to be our envy, but I do not believe one English-
man out of ten thousand, or more than one member of the House of
Commons, is really aware of what the French Reserve of seamen con-
sists. It is well they should know it, in view of future probabilities.

II. — The Reserves.

6. The number of Officers and seamen afloat in the active service
of France, together with those seamen whose names are on the list of
the Inscription Maritime, and who are between the ages of twenty and
forty, and have been for between three and five years on board a man-
of-war, carefully instructed and drilled, is over 68,000 ! These seamen
can at any time be recalled for further service, in case of war. The
large majority of them are in France, in the coasting trade, fisheries,
&c. The French merchant service is small, and, I believe, nearly
stationary in numbers, but from it and from other seafaring classes,
7,000 men pass annually into the French Navy, and are retained for
from three to five years ; they join French men-of-war abroad. For
this purpose, the legal claim on them commences at twenty and ends,
at forty-five ; but as a matter of fact they are not retained after
forty.

In the Crimean war, the number of Officers and men on active
service was over 63,000.

In the German war, the number was 67,786. Of this number 28,740
were at Paris.

There were also at Paris 28,507 marins, or colonial soldiers (infantry
and artillery), not including 13,000 left in the colonies.

The marins, most of whom have made long voyages, could be
embarked as are our marines, for service on board ship, if necessary,
swelling the number of Officers and men available for service in the
fleet at the commencement of the German war to 96,283, without
withdrawing the marins in the colonies.

It is evident that a large reserve of Officers would be required ; this
is amply provided for. More than 2,000 capitaines de long cours (mer-
chant captains) and 3,000 captains of coasters, all of whom have
passed from three to five years in the State Navy, and the former of
whom (the capitaines de long cours) have had to pass a stiff examina-
tion— form the Reserve of Officers.

Note. — The contrast in acquirements, manners, and habits between
a French capitaine de long cours and the ordinary master of an English
merchant vessel is most unfavourable to the latter, and it can, there-
fore, be no matter of surprise that the crew of the English ship is, as a

AND THE STATE NAVY OF FRANCE. 421

general role, in all but the first class " employs/' thoroughly unsatis-
factory, although there are other causes at work to bring about this
most undesirable result.

7. The English Reserves consist of in round numbers —

4,000 Coast Guard men, chiefly petty officers, good seamen, well

drilled.
15,000 Royal Naval Reserve men, and 2,000 Coast Volunteers ; the

former fair seamen, of whom perhaps about 9,000 are always in

England ; the latter fishermen.
1,000 Royal naval Artillery Volunteers.
6,000 Marines in barracks.

The seamen and marine pensioners available on account of age
would probably be disposed of, as in our war with Russia, in replacing
the Coast Guard men at their stations, manning harbour ships, and as
riggers in dockyards.

Reserves of Officers : —

102 Lieutenants, Royal Naval Reserve, "1 . «. xl
91 Sub-Lieutenants; f m|S£f 7

74 Midshipmen, J

and about 200 chief Officers of Coast Guard, who have risen from
the seamen class.

Retired Naval Officers.

8. There can be no doubt that, as regards Reserves of disciplined
seamen drilled to the use of arms, the French are very much better off
than we are, probably at least 100 per cent, better, especially when we
consider that in time of war with a European power, or the United
States, we should have to send numerous men-of-war to all quarters
of the world, and provide for the manning of fast hired steamers,
carrying a considerable stock of coal, armed for the occasion to act as
convoy to our fleets of merchant vessels. As regards Reserves of
Officers, the French are immeasurably better supplied ; there is no
comparison between us.

9. It may be said that large Reserves of seamen and of Officers are
useless, if there are no ships to place them in, and that as our ironclad
fleet is equal in number to that of the French, and superior in in-
dividual strength, We may content ourselves if we can man and officer
our fleet ; but ironclads can be sold, bought, borrowed, stolen ! The
ironclad fleet of Turkey, said to be the third in strength in Europe,
and designed, I believe, by English Admiralty Constructors, might
change owners as promptly and unexpectedly as the Khedive's shares
of the Suez Canal, and the number of French ironclads be doubled in
a few minutes, by the transmission of a few words by the electric
telegraph to Constantinople from Paris.

10. It may be said that France is now, from interested and, there-
fore, from the most weighty motives, our most devoted ally, and must,
of political necessity, remain so for many years. This is begging the
question, but certainly Germany is not so situated, and if hard pressed
by us, we being in alliance, say with Russia, Germany could easily

422 HOTICE OF BOOKS.

bait a hook, which would draw France to her side with unfailing cer-
tainty, viz., by offering to resign some of her late acquisitions.

11. There is growing and deepening conviction that obligatory
military service, in some shape or other, modified probably when com-
pared with the Prussian and French system, will be enforced on
Englishmen on shore. This may or may not be practicable, and if
practical, it may or may not be a wise step ; but if it is attempted,
seafaring men of every description will have to take their share of the
infliction, and, of course, their service must be afloat. In that case
our Reserves of seamen from the merchant service, coasting trade, and
off-shore fishermen, if disciplined and drilled as are the French
Reserves, will far outnumber them, and the marines might then be
absorbed or become colonial corps for the Crown colonies.

12. When this question of obligatory military service is under the
consideration of the Government, and the Naval portion of it is being
discussed, the above information may, perhaps, be found useful.

NOTICE OF BOOKS.

Instructions for the Cavalry Regiments about to take part in the Exercises
of the Combined Cavalry Division detailed from Regiments. By Major-
General Voir Schmidt. Translated by Major- General Walkeb, C.B. :
Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London.

" I have nowhere but in Verdy's ' Studien,* in section 5, and in these
" Instructions of General Von Schmidt, found what I have long sought
".for, namely, a clear definition, not only of the duties of cavalry in
" large bodies, but also of the ways and means by which these large

" bodies can be practically utilised I am of opinion that since

"the day 8 of the great Frederick no such master of the art of lead-
" ing cavalry has appeared as the late General von Schmidt."

Such is the high praise accorded to this distinguished cavalry
Officer by General Walker in the short preface to this pamphlet. The
Instructions were intended for the use of the Division which General
von Schmidt was to have commanded in the autumn of last year, had
he not been prematurely removed by death.

By the courtesy of the editor and publisher at Berlin, the Instruc-
tions were placed at the disposal of General Walker, who has done
the British cavalry good service by translating them and making them
public. We -commend them to the close attention of all cavalry
Officers. We hope to be able to notice them at greater length on a
future occasion.

|topt ItoM Jlmittt Jratitofum.

Vol. XX. 1876. No. LXXXVII.

LECTURE.

Wednesday, 7th June, 1876.

Genebal Sib WILLIAM J. CODRINGTON, G.C.B., Colonel Cold-

stream Guards, <fec, <fec, &c., in the Chair.

MARITIME RIGHTS.

By John Ross-of-Bladbnsbebo, Coldstream Guards.

I have been invited to draw your attention to the question of " Mari-
time Rights," a subject which has unfortunately been but too much
neglected of late. An examination will, however, show that the
exercise of these most important rights is necessary to our Power,
and that, therefore, our existence as a nation is dependent on the
restoration of our time-honoured customs of naval warfare. Much
attention has been naturally given to the recruiting question. We
must keep pace with the armaments which are being organized
around us. It would, however, be fatal, if all our present efforts
have not developed the natural forces of the country, but instead,
have only copied the institutions of foreigners, who differ from us in
national characteristics. Great Britain is essentially naval and com-
mercial ; it would be suicidal if we have inadvertently agreed to a rule,
by which maritime action is paralysed in a war with a military power,
and by which our mercantile shipping — the nursery of the Royal
Fleets — would be lost to us, when the enemy is himself a naval power.
Yet such is the case ; a Declaration (of Paris), which was promul-
gated some twenty years ago, has crippled our national strength in
this way. It is to this subject that I am to draw your attention.

In a pamphlet which I wrote, I attempted to describe the old law
of maritime capture to be : — " That a belligerent had a right to seize
" the goods of its enemy. Thus, if England and France were at war,
" an English ship bearing the commission of the Sovereign, if it met a
" French merchantman with French cargo on board, could capture both
" ship and cargo. Again, if the English cruizer sighted a neutral —
" Dutch, suppose — the former could stop the latter, examine her
" papers, and if she were found to contain a French cargo, the cruizer
" could compel the neutral to take the cargo to a place of safety,
" where it could be made a prize (by order of the Admiralty Court),
" while the neutral ship, and neutral goods which might be on board,

VOL. xx. 2 F

424 MABITIME SIGHTS.

" went free, the neutral carrier being paid by the captor the freight
" she would have received for the hostile cargo, had she performed her
" journey in safety. No injury whatever is intended to the neutral ship ;
" her presence only cannot protect the property of the enemy. Again,
" as war opens up a market for articles useless in peace, the belligerent
" can stop and confiscate such articles, when destined for the enemy's
" ports, no matter who the owner may be. These rules must be
" carefully distinguished from the illegal orders that have been fre-
" quently given with respect to capture, and from the old and equally
" illegal custom of forbidding neutrals all trade with the enemy.
" These have unhappily been too frequent ; they have done a great
" deal of harm, because they have confused the minds of men as to
" what were the legal maritime rights ; it having been often due to
" these improper rules that wars occurred. Let ub, therefore, observe
" the difference between the maritime rights, as above shown — re-
" corded in the Gonsolato del Mare, the oldest code of maritime laws
" known since Europe emerged from the dark ages, after the over-
" throw of the Roman Empire — and the unfair ordinances of France
" — which declared not only the enemy's cargo a prize, but also the
" neutral carrier — as well as the atrocious Berlin and Milan decrees,
" and the equally unjust Orders in Council which followed."

All jurists, men of different nationalities, up to the middle of the
last century, have considered that the Consolato del Mare expressed
the just law, and they confirmed it. Our own statesmen were most
particular on the subject ; and Lord Stowell, the celebrated Judge in
the Prize Court during the beginning of this century, showed that
the law was not made or enforced for England's own benefit, but that
it was her due according to natural right. Further, it was incor-
porated into the municipal laws of both England and France, and
thus it became part and parcel of their state organization.

But England had other reasons to bind her to her old naval tra-
ditions. Our statesmen did not only argue on their justice, their
actions also showed that the existence of the nation would be im-
perilled by their abolition.

In 1780, Great Britain was in great difficulties — at war with her
revolted American colonies, harassed by discontents in Ireland, and
attacked by France, Spain, and Holland, we were passing through
a terrible conjuncture. This was the moment that Russia, sup-
ported by a league of several nations, chose to assert, by force
of arms, that enemies' goods should go safe in neutral ships, except
contraband of war. England, although she had no force to oppose
the league, did not give in to their pretensions. In 1800, when again
entangled in a war, Paul I., of Russia, revived the Armed Neutrality
of 1780; but this time we were more free to act, and Pitt and Gran-
ville were at the head of affairs; a fleet was sent to the Sound,
the battle of Copenhagen, and the defeat of the Danes, was the result,
and the victorious fleet sailed to crush the other members of the
League, Sweden and Russia. But a revolution had occurred. Paul
was murdered, and his son Alexander changed the policy of the
Empire, which was unable to withstand the action of England against

MARITIME BIGHTS. 423

her trade. Peace was made, and the Armed Neutrality dissolved.
Many of tho speeches of public men of the time, show how the states-
men of the day valued our maritime rights. I would refer you to the
speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, 1801, and the
debate thereon, especially L6rd Eldon's speech. In 1807, Russia left
our Alliance, a declaration as if of war was directed against her, and
in it these important words, so full of significance, occur : — " Those
principles," namely, of maritime law, " it is the right and duty of
His Majesty to maintain; and against every confederacy His
Majesty is determined, under the blessing of Divine Providence, to
maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to
the support of the maritime power of Great Britain ; but they are
become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when
the maritime power of Great Britain constitutes the sole remaining
bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France ; the only
refuge to which other nations may yet resort in happier times, for
assistance and protection." This was written after Austerlitz,
Jena, Eylau, and Friedland.

But in 1854 all was changed ; on the eve of the Crimean war we
waived our maritime rights — those which were founded on justice, and
custom immemorial, which were supported by all independent jurists
for centuries, and which were defended by every British statesman,
and by all our traditions. And at the negotiations of the Peace in
1856, a declaration was issued confirming the above renunciation, in
the following terms : —

1st. Privateering is and remains abolished ;

2nd. The Neutral Flag covers enemy's goods, except contraband of
war.

Now this event created no noise, no astonishment, no consternation.
No one protested that a mistaken policy had cut away from us one of
our most time-honoured rights, and no one complained that traditions
— nay, the laws of the land — were abolished without formality and
without discussion. This, in a nation like our own, could only have
become possible when a veil of forgetfulness and ignorance had
dimmed the vision of the real cause of our former success. It must
be remembered that naval power exercised by capture, is not so readily
perceived as military strength — conspicuous in reviews and organiza-
tion— and it is easy to forget the hidden causes of our greatness,
when there is nothing to remind us of them. But observe the result.
England's maritime rights, held in such estimation, have been
abolished without trial ; and instead of its being necessary for those
who wished their destruction to prove that our old customs were
barbarous and dangerous, the burden of the proof has now been
shifted, and it remains for others to prove thai our policy for centu-
ries was not mistaken, and that the importance attached to a particular
law by our greatest statesmen, was not absurd !

The only whisper — for no real accusation was ever brought against
our old maritime rights, was (1) that neutrals would not permit us to
exercise them, and (2) that they were antiquated and barbarous.
If our rights are just, it is not according to the British character

2 f 2

426 MARITIME RIGHTS.

to give them up. Had England or Russia forbidden Prussia to use
her artillery daring the late war, would she have obeyed ? And yet
we gave up more, far more, than our artillery in the Declaration of
Paris. But who were the powers that constrained us to yield our
rights ? It was not France, for her laws of capture were even more
stringent than our own, as may be seen by those who follow out the
French marine ordinances, many of which are detailed in Mr.
Lawrence's note in Wheaton's International Law. Neither was it
the United States, for that power has always maintained that, by
right, enemy's goods may be seized in neutral vessels (v. negotia-
tions between France and United States, 1797-98).

The injustice or barbarity of the old maritime law has equally never
been shown.

1st. Privateers have been much abused; but as a great deal of
piracy has gone on under that name, it is not, perhaps, extraordinary
that a fierce cry should be raised against their employment. When
we come, however, to examine what they really are, when performing
their legitimate duty, it becomes apparent that they constitute — for
England — a very strong and proper force. Privateers are private
ships which obtain commissions from the sovereign to fight for their
country. They are bound by very strict rules, and they cannot com-
plete a capture, until the vessel taken is adjudged a good prize, in
due course of law, in an Admiralty Court. After condemnation the
capture, subject to certain reservations, becomes the property of the
captors. Privateers receive no pay, they cost the country nothing.
The legitimate employment of privateers has nothing to say to the
grave irregularities which have occurred at different times, in which
neutral vessels often took out letters of marque from a belligerent
sovereign, to prey upon the trade of the other ; this is naturally
nothing but murder and piracy, and cannot be defended for a moment.
Military nations organize into armies all their population capable of
bearing arms, and naval nations are equally entitled to utilize their
resources which consist in shipping; the masses of men which
Germany can produce in her armies are a strength to her; the
crowds of armed cruizers which England can send into every sea, and
which would pay themselves on the commerce of the enemy, are an
enormous strength to us; and why should we be deprived of that
force ? Up to a recent date in the world's history, there were no
State Navies (if we except the Fleets of ancient Rome) ; maritime
nations depended upon their private ships of war. Themistocles won
the battle of Salamis, and freed Greece from the Persians, with the
merchant shipping of Athens and the Islands : the Carthaginians used
their mercantile fleets in their wars ; and the Invincible Armada was
put off a year owing to the Spanish commercial losses, caused by
British privateers, and in 1588 was opposed by the English Fleet,
in which there were only 34 ships belonging to the Royal Navy. An
alliance of maritime nations might destroy Great Britain's superiority
in some seas, if men of war — properly so called— were only employed ;
but no coalition could ever succeed in doing so, if England will only
restore to herself the power she has of covering every corner of the

MARITIME KIGHTS. 427

ocean with volunteer crnizers, and of sweeping any enemy off the
sea.

2ndly. Neutral Flag covers enemy's goods except Contraband. The
only argument that can be urged on apparently legal grounds to
support this doctrine, is that the neutral merchantman is a continua-
tion of the territory of the nation whose flag it carries, that this
territory cannot be violated, and that therefore goods, even if belong,
ing to an enemy, cannot be touched when on board. It is, however,
always conceded that these vessels may still be searched, to prove
their right to the flag they have hoisted, and to see whether there is
any contraband of war among the cargo. But this search is not per-
mitted when the merchantman is in neutral waters, under the real
territorial protection of a neutral government, which clearly proves
that when search is allowed on the high seas, there is no violation of
neutral rights, and that, even on their own showing, their theory is
without foundation. The capture of contraband of war is founded
upon the truth, that neutral colours on the ocean do not indicate a
portion of neutral territory, the capture of enemy's goods is founded
on precisely the same principle ; how then can anyone allow the first,
and disallow the second ?

The controversy is, however, easily set at rest, when we consider
the acts of those nations who professed to believe in the sanctity of
the neutral flag. Those who, in 1780 (during the first Armed Neutra-
lity), were loudest in denouncing Great Britain's tyranny at sea, and
in declaring that their sole desire was to securo the liberty of com-
merce ; those very powers, when it suited them, turned round and
vigorously enforced the old maritime law ! Sweden did so in 1787,
Russia also, in her war against the Porte, the same year; in 1793 she
entered into a Maritime Convention with Great Britain, in which she
engaged to use her influence to prevent neutrals from protecting the
commerce of the French on the high seas ; and in 1 799 the Emperor
Paul threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities on account " of
" their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France,
" under the neutral colours of the Danish flag." France also went to
greater lengths ; in 1798 she declared that all vessels found on the high
seas with any English goods whatever on board, to whomsoever
belonging, shall be good prize ; that neutral sailors found on board
English vessels shall be put to death}

The doctrine " free ships, free goods " is one which cannot be
Substantiated in justice, and the coalitions which tried to force it
upon us were merely attempts to deprive us of a natural supremacy
which they feared ; at other times they have all shown that it is right
to seize enemy's goods in neutral vessels. And this cannot be con-
tested by anyone, if they will only consider that as it is lawful to shed
blood in war, it is also admissible to capture hostile property ; and if
so, who can believe that a neutral is discharging his duties of neutrality
in protecting a belligerent by covering his trade ? No land force
would allow non-combatants to shield the enemy from a blow, why
should sea forces permit them to do so ? Before leaving this part of
the subject, I would refer you to Ward's " Treatise on Maritime Law,"
1 Alton's " Hist, of Europe," chap, xxnii, § 3 and 11.

428 MARITIME RIGHTS.

published in 1801, and reprinted in 1875 ; this short work embraces
all that can be said on the legal side of the question.

It is very obvious that when nations go to war, their armies meet
each other in order to invade or to protect territory. Land has a
real value, and therefore its possession is a gain to an invader.
Armies do not meet as champions to fight out the differences of their
countries, but one belligerent seeks an objective and aims at a point
least difficult to seize, and most inconvenient for the enemy to lose ;
thus are provinces overrun and capitals taken, the physical and
political powers of the enemy are attacked, and the land forces
manoeuvre against each other in the field to accomplish or to thwart
these ends. Frederick the Great, in 1756, occupied Saxony, and held
it during the remainder of the Seven Years' War. Every one knows
the advantage he derived from its resources, in fact, it gave him all
the strength of a province of whose future welfare he was not so
careful as of his own kingdom.

The ocean, on the other hand, is a barren waste, it cannot be
occupied, and fleets do not meet each other for its possession. It is,
however, a great highway, and across it, commerce and men are
transported ; naval wars are undertaken for the attack and defence
of foreign trade. The wealth of a nation which goes by sea is
immensely important to it ; without it, Adam Smith has shown that
it is impossible to carry on a foreign war. The supremacy of the
sea, therefore, which enables a belligerent to destroy tne commerce of
his adversary, gives him power which far exceeds, in coercive force,
military strength. I have not been able to ascertain the exact amount
of German produce which left the country during the late war with
France, but according to statistical returns, I see 52,000,0001. as the
value of the imports into Hamburg during 1870. Taking, then, the
exports of that town as 40,000,000Z. (the ships that cleared were less
than those that entered with cargoes), it is easy to see what a loss the
French could have brought upon their adversaries, had they seized
German produce ; for had they been able to destroy the commercial
prosperity of the merchants, the Government of Berlin would have
found it difficult to support the waste of war in men, supplies,
ammunition, and money in the heart of the invaded country. The
maritime nation, then, that can capture the property of its enemy by
sea — be that property much or little — must paralyse his military
efforts, sever the sinews of his power, and bring bankruptcy upon the
very resources which enable him to be aggressive.

A few incidents in some of the naval wars which have taken place,
will bear out what has been here advanced.

The Illyrians were a restless and piratical people in ancient times,
and they made great depredations on the commerce of Rome and
Greece. The Senate having failed to obtain redress, prepared for war
by sea and land (b.c. 219). The Romans were victorious, granting
peace to the enemy under the terms that they should pay a tribute,
abandon IUyria, a few places only excepted, and that they should never
saf1 u~— J t^«bu8 with more than two frigates, and those unarmed.
T ^ncipally by sea. and the Admiral alone received a

MARITIME BIGHTS. 429

triumph. ; it gave great prestige to the Romans, and particularly in
the eyes of the Greeks, who had been unable to check the seourge of
the pirates. From this time also the Romans were admitted to the
Isthmian games, and considered as part of the Grecian civilised world.

Later, pirates from Gilicia infested the Mediterranean Sea to such
an extent that Rome, powerful as she was, found her trade and navi-
gation nearly cut off, and thus a famine was apprehended in the
capital of the World, caused by the action of a few corsairs. Many
distinguished persons, Plutarch informs us, cast in their lot with these
pirates, and their prosperity was very great. The people of Rome
were, however, so affected by scarcity, that they invested Pompey with
almost regal powers over the whole empire; he collected a large
armament of 500 galleys, 120,000 foot, and 5,000 horse ; he swept
the seas, capturing a great many of the enemy, and defeated them in
the naval engagement of Goracesium, where they had collected their
fleets to oppose him. Plenty was immediately restored in Rome.

In 1527 the French, under Lautrec, invaded Italy. They were very
successful, and early next year they nearly took Naples by a strict
blockade by sea and land. Andrea Doria and the fleets of the Italian
commercial republics were allied to the French, but Francis I. threw
away all this advantage and success by folly. He attempted to injure
the Genoese trade, and being opposed by Doria, he sought to arrest
him. The Italian Admiral revolted to Charles V., restored plenty in
Naples, and the French, having now lost their superiority at sea, were
soon reduced to great straits for want of provisions. The French
raised the siege, leaving their guns behind them ; and after losing
many of their men the small remains surrendered at Aversa. Doria
now succeeded in liberating his own town, Genoa, from the yoke of
Francis ; these reverses enabled Charles to force upon his adversary
the humiliating treaty of Cambray.1

In 1535, also, Charles collected the maritime power of the Medi-
terranean, and defeated the famous pirate Barbarossa, the scourge of
all Christian merchants in that sea. Six years later his expedition to
Algiers to destroy another nest of pirates was not so fortunate, it was
badly timed, and his ships were nearly all sunk in the storms which
arose. The Emperor and the survivors escaped with difficulty.

The maritime power of the Turks was very great in the middle of the
16th century, and their fleets swept over the Mediterranean unopposed,
notwithstanding the efforts of Spain and Italy. In 1565, however, they
failed to capture Malta, only owing to the brave defence of the Knights
of St. John, but in 1570 they took the Island of Cyprus. Philip II.
made another attempt to check their victorious career, the navies of
the Christian part of the Mediterranean were united under Don John
of Austria, and the Turks were defeated at the great battle of Lepanto*
(1571). This decisive engagement destroyed the Ottoman power in
the Mediterranean, and from this moment may be dated the com-
mencement of Turkish decline, for although their course of victory

1 " Hist, of Charles V.," by Robertson, book 5. Dyer's " Hist, of Modern Europe,*
vol. i, p. 488, &c.
3 Dyer's " Hist, of Mod. Europe," book iii, chap. ti.

432 MARITIME IUGH'IS.

made ourselves formidable to our enemies by the victories of Rodney
and Howe.

The wars of the French Revolution, which lasted with little inter-
mission for twenty-two years, began in 1793; during this period the
continental nations were all in torn subject to Napoleon. England
alone stood as his nnconquered opponent, and as the rival which
checked all his attempts at universal empire. A careful study of
events will show that is was our power which ruined Bonaparte,
and that his great object was to defeat Great Britain ; he understood
perfectly that with the world in his possession, he was still insecure
and vulnerable if we held the sea, but that if the naval strength of
England were destroyed, he at once would become universal Sovereign.
At Ulm, in October, 1805, as the Austrians, who had capitulated, were
paraded before him, he gave expression to this truth : "I desire no*
"thing," he said to General Mack, "on the Continent. France wants
" only ships, colonies, and commerce ; and it is as much your interest
" as mine that I should have them.1'1 But these he did not get. The
victories of Howe, St. Vincent, and Duncan had laid bare the com-
merce of the enemy, and established anew our superiority over the
fleets of France, Spain, and Holland. As a Bet-off, the genius of
Bonaparte acquired conquest after conquest in Italy (1796-1797),
which culminated in a naval expedition, the seizure of Malta, and the
descent on Egypt. Nelson, who had been foiled in his endeavours to
meet the French armament in its passage, came upon the fleet lying in
the Bay of Aboukir, after the troops had landed. He immediately
engaged and defeated it. The results of this splendid victory were
very important; a third part of the naval force of France was
destroyed, Great Britain obtained an irresistible superiority in the
Mediterranean, the French commerce in the Levant was annihilated,
all hope of conquest in Egypt was dissipated, and Napoleon's expedi-
tion was reduced to a mere military descent, without hope of reinforce-
ment or retreat, in which the invading army must perish by its own
triumphs.2 These brilliant successes caused much discontent among
the Allies, owing to the supreme power they gave us. Russia feared
England's maritime strength far more than France's military pre-
eminence ; she proclaimed us the tyrants of the sea, and revived the
attempt to rob Us of our naval strength, by the second Armed
Neutrality. The results of this have been already traced.

The next phase of the war was Napoleon's attempt to invade
England. Admiral Villeneuve, although ne evaded the fleets sent to
pursue him, was unable to join the French armament at Boulogne, owing
to the partial victory of Sir Robert Calder off the coast of Finisterre.
Napoleon, seeing he could not even obtain a temporary command of the
Channel (fifteen days was all he required, v. Note written at his dicta-
tion, September, 1805, "Correspondence de Napoleon avec le Mimstre
" de la Marine"), changed his direction, marched into Germany, and
after the capitulation of Ulm, and the victory of Austerlitz, subjugated
Austria, and forced on her the Peace of Pressburg. By sea, however,

1 Bain's " Wan of the French Reyolution," toI. i, p. 487.
a Dyer's " Hiflt. of Mod. Europe," vol iv. d. 356.

MARITIME RIGHTS. 433

the French and Spanish fleets were still watched, while their commerce
was exposed. Admiral Villeneuve, in trying to escape, was defeated
in the great battle of Trafalgar, and the naval power of Bonaparte
was reduced to a mere phantom, while our flag floated everywhere
without a rival. An attempt to make peace proved abortive, and the
French military operations still pursued a triumphant career ; Prussia
was overwhelmed at Jena ; and Russia, defeated at Eylau and Fried-
land, made peace at Tilsit, in 1807. The French Emperor, now master
of Europe, was unable to injure England, but the latter was able to
harass him very considerably. Had Great Britain exercised justly her
maritime rights, it is probable that France would have been bankrupt
before this period. It appears, however, that, owing to certain enact-
ments, a great deal of bond fide French produce was allowed to escape.
A pamphlet, entitled " War in Disguise ; or, the Frauds of Neutral
" Flags," published 1805, drew attention to this fact; and the annual
expose of the state of France laid before the Legislative Assembly,
16th January, 1804, declares that out of 200,000,000 livres which might
have been captured by England, more than two-thirds of that amount
had been saved.1

After 1806 the course of the war was unfortunate. Napoleon tried
to close the ports of the Continent, and thundered out his Berlin and
Milan decrees, wild threats against all trade, which he could not carry
into effect. Great Britain answered by the famous Orders in Council,
illegally creating paper blockades. We had the power, and did carry
out these orders, but we only succeeded in oppressing ourselves and
our friends. They were called retaliative, but they were not so, they
overstepped the law ; they did France no more harm than the legiti-
mate exercise of maritime rights would have done, and they alienated
the United States from us, producing, in 1812, the war which followed.

Russia, at the peace of Tilsit, had bound herself to observe the French
Commercial Decrees, but she was unable to do so. She supports her
Government by a foreign trade, and a non-intercourse with England
means bankruptcy for her. The French invasion (1812) was produced
mainly by the inability of Alexander to keep to these engagements.
Yet Russia was not too desirous of destroying Napoleon until the
moment had arrived when she should be able to push troops into
Europe and assert her claims. Marshal Kutusoff, the Russian Com-
mander-in-Chief, accordingly protected the French Emperor (notably
at Krasnoi), during his disastrous retreat across the snows of Russia.
The reason was, that the Government of St. Petersburg feared
England's maritime power, or, as Kutusoff put it, " 1 am by no means
" sure that the total destruction of the Emperor Napoleon and his
" army would be such a benefit to the world. His succession would
" not fall to Russia, or any other Continental power, but to that which
" already commands the sea, and whose dominion would then be
" intolerable." *

The final overthrow of Napoleon, in 1815, was effected by the
steady advance of the Continent on France, wasted by so many wars,

1 Bain's " Wan of the French Revolution," yoL i, p. 465.

' " The French Invasion of Bussia." by Sir Bobert Wilson, pp. 284. 271. Ac.

434 MARITIME RIGHTS.

and enfeebled by commercial losses ; and, in 1815, the Congress of
Vienna finally closed the long period of hostility.

The naval strength of Great Britain had then exhibited itself by
attacks on the commerce of the enemy, which forced the inferior
fleets of the enemy out of their harbours to protect their convoys ;
and the general action of England by sea seems to have been, that
crowds of privateers and other ships opposed the hostile cruisers, and
cut off the enemy's trade in every corner of the globe, while the larger
ships of war blockaded the enemy's fleets, and attacked them as they
sought to escape, in order to protect and escort their harassed com-
merce. This naval strength was England's chief power ; for her armies,
good as they have always been, have seldom been numerous enough to
effect very decisive military operations properly so called. The mari-
time preponderance which we still have—-did we only restore our rights
by sea — is now even more than it was, when Talleyrand said to the
English Ambassador, in 1806, "You are the rulers of the ocean; your
" naval forces are equal to those of all the Sovereigns of the world
" united. We are a great Continental Power, but there are many
" who equal our power by land, and your marine preponderance will
" always place our commerce at the mercy of your Bquadrons imme-
" diately after your declaring war." In fact, no nation has any
weapon long enough to reach us, but we can destroy in our enemy
the means of making war, and can paralyse his Government by ruin.

In 1854 we were again at war; but this time, having waived our
maritime rights, the war bore quite another character. In 1812, we
declared that the maxim, "free ships, free goods," would make Great
Britain " surrender all the advantages of her naval superiority," and
this prediction was fully verified ; for, having given this immunity to
the neutral flag, there was little or no naval warfare. It cannot be
said that the ships of England could not have harmed Russia, since
she is a military power, and her fleets are weak; for had the rights
been maintained, her commerce would have been exposed, and as this
is of the most vital consequence to her, her men of war would have
been forced out of their harbours to its protection. Had she then
determined to resist, which is unlikely, a maritime war, defrayed by
Russia, would have decided the quarrel, without expense, and without
the loss of so many gallant men who fell before Sevastopol. A state-
ment was made in the House of Commons (February 20th, 1855),
which shows the importance of her foreign commerce to Russia, and
the ease with which we might have coerced her by attacking it : —
" At the outbreak of the war, the rouble fell from par, 38 pence, to
" 32 pence, and it was confidently anticipated that before the war had
" lasted many months, it would fall much lower ; that a serious
*• financial crisis would overtake the Emperor ; that ruin and poverty
" would fall upon the landowners, and that national bankruptcy

" must ensue That our efforts have not met with the

" desired result is certain, but indeed the reverse. So far from our
" having blockaded the principal ports, the exports from that empire
" have been greater than ever. The whole case may be summed up
" in the statement that Russian commerce has not been injured, that

MARITIME BIGHTS. 435

" 10,000,000/. of English money, instead of 11,000,000*., the ordinary.
" amount, has been paid to her, and that the rouble, which had de-
" clined to 32 pence, has risen to par."

Again, of what service was the French Navy to her when struggling
for existence with Germany in 1870-71 ? France had spent millions
on her fleets, and much enemy's wealth was within her reach, yet,
owing to the Declaration of Paris, she was unable to use her marine —
German property going safe under a Neutral Flag, — and was debarred
from capturing that wealth, which permitted her rival to overrun
one-third of her territory, and afterwards to extract from her
200,000,0001. of her money.

The Declaration of Pans has, therefore, destroyed naval action when
war is being carried on against a purely military power. It would
also make us lose our important carrying trade should we go to war,
under its provisions, with a maritime country. This last proposition
is so plain, that it is unnecessary to go into it here ; but I would
remind you that the loss of shipping is not an ordinary commercial
loss ; should our vessels leave us, our sailors would accompany them,
and England would entirely lose her maritime character.

A very important question now presents itself. If Great Britain
has yielded up her naval rights, on what else does she depend for
defence ? The whole of the Continent is armed to the teeth, England,
the possessor of India, has vital interests which cannot permit her to
separate herself from the struggles which are preparing, and which
now seem to be reaching a crisis. The question is rising daily in
importance ; many things have been suggested, much has been tried,
but have we succeeded? Do not let us delude ourselves into the
notion, that we have not yet seriously tried to make ourselves a
military people ; for many years we have neglected naval weapons, we
have forced ourselves to believe that national strength only consists in
organized armies, we have seen and anxiously marked the processes
by which Russia, Germany, Austria, and France have converted
their huge masses of men into well-equipped forces, we have re-
cognised the danger of our defenceless position, we have struggled
hard to copy the Continent, and to provide ourselves with like armies,
and yet, notwithstanding all our efforts, we are totally unable to com-
pete with them, or to raise anything that would sufficiently vindicate
our interests. The reason of this failure is simple ; military power
does not constitute the only defence of a nation, and it is an impossi-
bility to draw the same resources out of Great Britain as those that
can be drawn out of Germany or Russia, for the latter are essentially
military states, the former is not.

To see this, it is only necessary to consider the habits and the
employments of the people who compose different countries. Shep-
herd and agricultural races can devote more attention to military
pursuits, than a commercial and manufacturing people ; 1st, because
they are more easily localized, and 2ndly, because their time is
not so valuable. The former live scattered over the country, they
are easily united in districts, for training or mobilisation ; the latter
huddle together in large towns, they continually shift their residence,

436 MARITIME RIGHTS.

and it is very difficult to collect them for military purposes. The
splendid organization of Germany, which arms at a moment the
whole youth of the empire, from whose villages issue fractions of
companies, and in whose provinces are assembled the perfectly
equipped Army Corps, is quite inapplicable to this nation, where
country labour only draws just sufficient workmen for its own
necessities, and where the remainder crowd into manufacturing'
districts, and become lost in the circles of commercial enterprise.
Again, the time of those who compose shepherd and agricultural
races is not so much employed, as that of men engaged in trade as
artisans ; and the difficulties of forming the inhabitants into soldiers
are far greater in the latter case than in the former. I would refer
you to the very lucid explanations on this head given by Adam Smith,
in his "Wealth of Nations" (Book 5, Chap. I, Part I). The time
of English workmen is most valuable and expensive, and hard as it is
for us to show on paper a force of under half a million, as our war
strength, against the continental nations who each can show over a
million, we should find it yet harder to use half so large a proportion
of our estimated figures, as they could of theirs. It is our national
characteristics which prevent us from being a military state (except,
of course, as far as the excellence goes, which our troops have always
exhibited), and to seek for the origin of our strength, we must not
look to the masses of disciplined men which modern warfare requires,
but to maritime power, as has been already indicated.

The Central Asian question gives great anxiety, yet when we
understand our strength, the difficulty disappears. Sir John McNeill
said that " the right of search which constitutes the maritime power
" of England, was a prudential weapon placed in the hand of England
" for the coercion of Russia." Mr. Cobden also said, " It is clear that

nature itself has doomed Russia to a condition of abject and pros*

trate subjection to the will of the maritime powers.' ' Both these
statesmen here show that the exercise of naval rights is the way to
check Russia. All danger fades away in India, from a Muscovite
invasion, if England will only restore her power and re-establish her
cruizers ; the threat of war will then be quite sufficient to make the
Government of St. Petersburgh think seriously of the risk which it
would run, by provoking our hostility.

There are some who, while they perceive the danger we are in,
owing to the Declaration of Paris, console themselves with the idea
that we shall tear it up the very moment we go to war. This
I believe to be neither jost, wise, nor likely. England has been at
peace in Europe since 1856, and, therefore, during all the wars which
have occurred since then, she has been a neutral; as such she has
carried the goods of those belligerents who had not sufficient maritime
power to defend their own trade, and consequently she has hitherto
seen nothing but the sweets of the Declaration of Paris, and to the
cost of those naval belligerents who found their enemy's goods thus
protected. Is it right or honest that she should connive at this
injustice, while she reaps advantage therefrom, and propose to upset it,
directly it begins to hurt her P

cc
u

MARITIME BIGHTS. 437

But again, the military preponderance of Europe is not now — as it
was in the beginning of the century — in the possession of one empire ;
it is shared by several powers, and is therefore divided. Yet, not-
withstanding, England has not the influence she used to exercise, and
our interests are suffering thereby ; the reason is plain, having done
away with our principal national weapon, we have not the strength to
assert the independent policy which is best suited to our national
welfare. Is it, then, wise to neglect this weapon (and to be powerless)
in peace time ? Is it wise to drift into whatever the military
despotism of Europe may wish to impose upon us ? How different is
this supposition, — of thinking that we shall, on the eve of a war,
abolish the Declaration of Paris,— from that true wisdom which is
contained in the dispatch from Lord Heytesbury to Lord Cornwallis,
British Plenipotentiary at Amiens, 1st January, 1802 : " His
" Majesty will never consent to place out of his hands, in a Treaty of
" Peace, those means which may be necessary for the security of his
" dominions in time of war." And lastly, it is very apparent that the
only reason why we have yielded our maritime rights, has been that
the country has not examined the question at all ; our long cherished
traditions could never have been discarded under any other conditions.
Who, then, will affirm that if we hesitate and neglect the subject
now} we shall be able to abolish the Declaration of Paris when the
confusion of a war overtakes us ? We should then be seeking for
allies, and those nations whose interests are opposed to ours, would
engage neutrals to make us hold to what they would pretend to con-
sider our engagements. Threatened by foes, threatened by neutrals,
and opposed by a country who is ignorant of the value of its rights,
what Government could carry out this change on the brink of a war ?
The Crimean War was conducted without naval rights ; the Danes
were dismembered in 1864, yet they did not tear up the Declaration
of Paris, nor bring their strength by sea to help them in the war
which mutilated their national power; and in 1870-71 the French
held themselves bound to it. In fact, every war since 1854 has been
fought without maritime rights, notwithstanding the fearful disasters
which have befallen nations who neglected them ; whoever, then, sees
that the Declaration of Paris is not binding on us, and that it is
dangerous to the country, cannot for a moment quiet himself with
the supposition, that we should abolish it in the event of a war ; the
testimony of the history of the last twenty-two years entirely annihi-
lates that illusion.

Now, in full peace, is the only moment ; we have every right to
break through the Declaration of Paris, as it is illegal and hostile to
our natural rights, which no compact— even were this a compact,
which is not the case — can destroy. By doing so now, we should
show that we were influenced by principles of international justice,
and not by feelings of self-interest, and as such, should receive the
co-operation and applause of all honest men. If we do so we shall
restore our vast power, and re-establish the influence we seem to have
lost, and thus give the best interpretation to the saying : —

" If you wish for peace, be ready for war."

438 MARITIME RIGHTS.

The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen. I need not tell you that this subject
is one of very great interest, not only in a naval but in a national point of view, and
we may also say in a military point of view. I am very glad that one of my profes-
sion has taken up the sister profession, and shown the interest he takes in it. I am
sure there are a great many here who will be very glad to enter to a certain extent
into the discussion, and we shall bo very glad to hear them.

7 The Eabl op Denbigh : I have some hesitation in speaking on this occasion, when
there are so many Officers present who would speak to so much more purpose than I
could upon this most important question ; but as it is one in which I hare taken rwy
great interest, and on which I hare on two occasions spoken in my place in Parlia-
ment, I cannot refrain from expressing my appreciation of the admirable way in
which Mr. Boss has brought this subject forward. His treatment of it has been so
exhaustive that it leaves scarcely anything to be said. He has particularly touched
upon one question which I think has not been touched upon before. When I asked
the question in the House of lords whether the Declaration had ever been ratified
by Her Majesty, I drew from the Government that there was no ratification of any
sort or kind by Parliament or by the Crown ; but I have been met by the answer
that as we have been silent now for twenty years, we have, as it were, condoned it,
and that we are in that awkward position that we could not withdraw from it with-
out dishonour. It has also been urged that as there is a great deal of loose gun-
powder lying about in the world just now, this is not exactly the moment when we
ought to take the initiative and withdraw from this position. I cannot say that I
concur in this view* I think it is precisely because there is so much gunpowder
lying about in the world that we ought to do so. We have already taken one step
which has shown that we are not afraid of standing by ourselves, and we have there-
fore received the approbation, I believe, of the rest of Europe. We are, therefore,
in the position at this moment of being able to say, " We have taken a false step,
" we admit the falseness of the step. We have forfeited thereby in a thoughtless
" moment our natural rights, of which no one could deprive us, and of which we had
" no right to deprive ourselves by any act whatever ; and therefore, as an honourable
" nation, we desire in this time of peace, when we cannot be accused of any wish of
" aggrandisement, to withdraw from our false position." I believe that this would
put us in a position in which we could hold oui own, and I might even say dictate
to the worla. There was a clap-trap sort of answer offered to me, which

The Chairman : I hope we may a little avoid anything that tends to clash with
the proceedings of Parliament. We are a military and a naval assembly.

The Eabl of Denbigh : This touches the question as to the humanitarian prin-
ciple. One reply made to me was that as we had given up attacking private pro-
perty on land, we were therefore not to attack private property on sea. That has
been touched upon most admirably by Mr. Boss, and it is one which naturally strikes
people on the first consideration of the matter. The other is the humanitarian
question as to whether it is right to impoverish so many people at once, as would be
the case if we stopped the whole commerce of a nation. That is taking a very im-
proper view of the question, because surely it is much more humane to take a per-
son's money than his life ; to impoverish some thousands of people than to blow
them into space by all these diabolical engines that we have now prepared for that
purpose. I am very loth to take up your time, but I cannot help thanking Mr. Boss
for having brought forward these two points which were given as answers to me
when I dealt with the question. I hope they will be thoroughly ventilated in the
further consideration of this question.

Mr. Stirling Lacon : I, following the noble Lord, may say, that although this
question has not received the ratification of Her Majesty, I believe the declaration
of Paris was signed in Paris by our Ambassador, and has also received the sanction
of both Houses of Parliament. (No, no.) I may be wrong, but my reason for
asserting this is, in order that we may put the fullest information upon this subject
before our members who will read this discussion. I have been informed it has
received the sanction of both Houses of Parliament, although it has not received the
ratification of Her Majesty.1

1 " The Treaty of Paris was approved by the House of Commons without a

MARITIME BIGHTS. 439

Mr. Botlxb-Johvstonb, M.P. : If I may be allowed to answer the question,
'the Declaration of Paris has never received ratification. First of all, it was never
signed by the command or mandate of the Crown. It has never been ratified by
the Sovereign, and it has never been approved by either House of Parliament.
From the very nature of the case it could not receive the ratification of the Crown,
nor the approval of either House of Parliament ; and for this reason : — It is not a
treaty, but a simple declaration ; a declaration indeed far more sweeping than a
treaty, because a treaty is a compact between different nations, whereas this is a
declaration, which is to bind the country in future wars with all nations, and with
reference to all neutral nations. The object of the Declaration of Paris, as stated
in the 23rd Protocol of the Conference, was to attain uniformity of maritime law,
whereas formerly there was a difference of opinion and of practice between nations.
Therefore, until all the nations of Europe, and also of the other continent, had
.agreed to this Declaration of Paris, it was premature at any rate for any of the
nations who bad signed that declaration to ratify it either through the Sovereign or
through Parliament. When that declaration became known in this country, there
was such an indignation among those who knew what the meaning of it was, that
motions were made in both Houses of Parliament, by Lord Colchester in the House
•of Lords, and by several members, especially Mr. Phillimore in the House of Com-
mons. Lord Colchester was supported by Lord Derby, Lord Carnavon, Lord Hard-
wicke, Lord Albermarle, and several other members ; in fact, by the general feeling
of independent members on both sides of the House. But Lord Palmerston was the
triumphant Minister of a triumphant country, at the head of an overwhelming
majority, and it was impossible, in the teeth of that majority, and in the teeth of
the general jubilation which took place upon peace being made, to carry motions
condemnatory of the Government. Therefore Parliament has not actually con-
demned it, but no English minister has ever dared to come forward, and ask the
ratification of Parliament for this declaration. Lord Denbigh has said, that there
has been silence on the part of Parliament and of the Government since the Declara-

4t
«

division, and on the 22nd of May following, a motion was brought forward by
Lord Colchester in the House of Lords condemning the code of maritime law con-
tained in the declaration appended to the treaty, and especially that article which
exempted enemies' goods from capture, while under a neutral flag. The motion
" of Lord Colchester was rejected by a majority of 54."

When the treaty was laid before Parliament, it gave rise to animated debates in
both Houses. On the 6th of May, Mr. Robert Phillimore, in the House of Com-
mons, called attention to the subject in an able and exhaustive speech, in the course
of which he expressed his " irrepressible conviction of the great sacrifice of maritime
41 rights which Great Britain had already made, and was still further making by the
" declaration contained in this Treaty." He further said, " that it was because he
" thought that the abandonment of that right would prolong and not diminish the
" horrors of war, that he was opposed to it ;" and he concluded in these words :—
He could not help thinking that a right had been parted with, of the value and
importance of which the country was not aware, and that we were now under ar
obligation to admit, in the face of the whole world, a principle which it was most
inexpedient to part with, but which we had no longer the right to enforce ;" and in
the House of Lords, on the 22nd of May, the Earl of Derby, after a masterly review
of the arguments adduced on either side, concluded as follows : — " Suppose, which
God forbid ! that a war should arise between this country and France, what means
have you of opposing her, except by closing her up hermetically, and stopping her
commerce ? Well, what are you to do ? You cannot blockade the whole coast of
France ; but you can practically prevent her from sending out one single bale of
" merchandise — your new law permitting French goods to go with impunity on
u board neutral vessels comes into operation ; you have no blockade. France gives
" up her whole commercial marine ; she makes her vessels into vessels of war ; she
" has seamen to man them, and before tout very face she carries on her whole com-
" merce under the Prussian or American flag. Tour power is gone ; your right
" arm is cut off ; your only means of defence are abandoned, and abandoned too at
" the suggestion of France. If I stood alone I would support the resolution of my

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VOL. XX. - G

440 MARITIME BIGHTS.

tion of Paris. If there had been silence we should have been in a far better -
position than we are now ; but in consequence of the declaration, and the protocol
wbioh preceded it, there have been negotiations with something like thirty or fortj
nations asking them to sign the declaration. Fortunate it is indeed for us that
among the nations to whom we went cringing and begging to join with us in sign-
ing away our natural weapons, and our supremacy at sea, and the defences of our
country, two important naval nations, viz., Spain and the United States, haye, as a
matter of fact, refused to do so. In the face of Spain and the United States, what
does the recognition given to it by nations like Switzerland or Bavaria signify ?
The fact is, Spain and the United States haye saved us, and now we are able to say,
" as uniformity, which was your object, has never been obtained, we will recede from
" this one-sided declaration, which is aimed simply and solely at maritime nations,
" and especially at the maritime superiority of England.' Other nations who
signed it say this, — " We will consent not to make war upon sea where we are weak,
" but only upon land, where we are strong," whereas the meaning of England sign-
ing it was, — " We will consent to make war upon land, where we are weak, and not
" upon the sea, where we are strong, and where hitherto we haye been supreme."
A declaration more fatal, because it was absolutely destructive, even of the existence
of this country, I do not believe it is possible to conceive. There are one or two
points in this lecture which I wish to mention. Certainly, as Sir William Codrington
has said, I do not know any augury so happy as that it should not have been a naval
Officer coming forward, who might be open to the suspicion of asking for prise
money, and protesting against prize money being taken from the navy ; but that it
is a military man, who knows the defence of the country means war equally upon
land and sea, who comes forward and points out in detail where this miserable
declaration cuts the ground from under our feet. In 1856, we had been attempting
to transform ourselves from a naval into a military nation, and from a naval nation
of the first strength into a military nation of third or fourth-rate strength. They
talk of standing armieB — why, there is no such thing as a standing army now in the

" noble friend. I would divide the House upon the question. I would give to
" every one of your Lordships the power of recording your opinion as to the-
" wisdom and the safety of these proceedings. But, for my part, I solemnly protest,
" as derogatory to the country, as inconsistent with its dearest interests, as fraught
" with danger to its future greatness and power, aye, to its future safety ; I protest
" against the abandonment of rights involved in that which, with all respect for hi*
" personal qualities, I cannot but characterise as the miserable Clarendon capitula-
" tion of Paris."

And the writer of the pamphlet from which the above quotations are made, says,
" The practical question then remains, what is to be done in the event of our being
" engaged in a war with any great naval Power ? Are we to adhere to the Paris
" declaration, or are we to resort, in spite of all the consequences, to the practice of
" former times ? We believe we may venture, without presumption, to answer
" this important question. We believe that on the very first occasion in which we are
" involved in a serious naval war, the Paris declaration will be cast aside, as other
" declarations of a similar kind have been before it. We shall be compelled, from
" sheer necessity, to resume that legitimate weapon of offence which we have so
" recklessly thrown away. It may be said that we did not resort to it during the
" Russian war. But that is not an example in point, for there was then no naval
" contest, the sea from first to last being in possession of the Allies." " Of the
" perilous character of such a step it is almost superfluous to speak. It might
" involve us in hostilities with every one of the Powers that were parties to
" the Paris declaration. It might lead to the formation of a third armed neutrality
" more formidable than either of its predecessors. Even if it did not lead to active
" measures of resistance, it would certainly excite against us the cordial ill-will of
" every naval Power in Europe. We should, at the very least, be charged with a
" a most flagrant breach of faith. But in the cane supposed, we should have no*
" alternative but to encounter all these perils, and brave all accusations, or to resign
" without a struggle, our maritime ascendancy." — " Our Maritime Rights," 1860r
by John Hosack, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. — W. S. L.

MARITIME RIGHTS. 441

old sense of the term ; there are nations standing in arms with their whole man-
hood enlisted in their army and reserves, and what of England ? England, with
her little brave army, that has in history done such marvellous acts, ready to a man
to sacrifice their lives, what can a corps d'armee, like the English army, do against
the military standing nations of the world ? Why the thing is impossible, and for
this reason. We are a commercial and manufacturing nation, instead of an
agricultural nation like others ; and what is the meaning of being a commercial and
a manufacturing nation ? It is that our skilled workmen, earning five shillings to ten
shillings a-day, cannot afford to go and fight in the ranks of an army where they are
only paid one shilling. Our state of civilization makes it impossible to have
recourse to conscription without something like a revolution in this country, and a
nation having an army without conscription cannot by any possibility hold its own
against nations having recourse to conscription. The consequence is, we are left
essentially a naval nation, the army of course co-operating in its own sphere with
the navy, and this Declaration of Paris absolutely destroys that naval superiority.
If the country will only comprehend it, and nothing can make the country com-
prehend it so well as lectures like this — if once the nation comprehends this, I
make no doubt that it will take the matter into its own hands, and will, in time of
peace, which is the only honourable time to do it — (it would be perfectly dishonour-
able to do it in time of war) — now in time of peace, the nation will insist upon the
abrogation of that declaration.

My friend, Lord Stanley, reminds me there is a point about privateering. The
fact is, we were unfortunately led, during the American struggle, to look upon a
pirate, like the " Alabama " was, as a privateer, and consequently we are led to
took upon privateers as pirates. Now, what is war ? War is a declaration of death
against your enemy for doing you injustice. Other nations hare no right to send
their sons to fight in a quarrel which is not their own. If you go and send men to
fight for another nation, that is piracy. The "Alabama" was purely and simply a
pirate; she was fitted out and equipped in English ports in a quarrel which was
not England's. But the question of privateers is very different ; it is a mere means
of warfare. Whether you send commissioned Officers in vessels that you hire,
belonging to the merchant service, or whether you give letters of marque to private
individuals, is a mere matter of detail. But the question of privateers has little to
do with the Declaration of Paris. The question of the flag covering the cargo is a
question of the object of war itself. What the Declaration of Paris did, was to
allow neutral bottoms to carry enemy's goods, and neutral bottoms carrying
enemy's goods means that England has no power of compulsion over her enemy's
commerce, which is the natural weapon of England. Go to war with any nation
you choose — France— you are liable to invasion from her. What compulsion can
you put upon France r Stopping her commerce. Go to war with America. She
can invade Canada with overwhelming forces. What compulsion have you, except
by putting compulsion upon her commerce ? Tou guaranteed Belgium. I do not
know anything so monstrously presumptuous as that guarantee, if you do away
with the single force by which you can compel your enemy to do justice, viz., com-
pelling him on the sea, where your strength lies, and in the commerce which you
can take away from him. This cannot but be a very important subject to English-
men, and the one thing necessary is to enlighten them upon the subject, and
nothing can do that better than lectures, such as that which Captain Ross has given
us to-day.

Mr. Masx : I should like to draw attention to the power given to a ship-of-war
and that given to a privateer. A ship-of-war has a commission to " sink, burn, and
" destroy ; " a privateer has no such commission. I am speaking in reference to the
" Alabama " claims, and also to do away, in some measure, with some of the objec-
tions and prejudices against privateers. Their commission is to capture and bring
into port, tor adjudication : they have no right to sink, or burn, or destroy.

Commander Cheyne, R.N. : Having listened with attention to the lecture, I venture
to suggest, if agreeable to Lord Denbigh and the Committee and Lieutenant Boss,
that Lieutenant Ross's lecture should be placed at the disposal of the Council of the
Lecturers' Association. Lord William Lennox is Vice-President of that association.
I am on the Council myself, and I think, if it is not objectionable, I might lay

2q3

442 MARITIME RIGHTS.

copies of Lieutenant Boss's lecture before the association. I think it would then
be taken up by the lecturers throughout the country, and when the constituencies
throughout the country get hold of the main points of the lecture, it might be
made a crucial question at every election, so that we might be able to extract sv
pledge — =

The Chairman : We will not go into the political part, if you please.

Captain Cheyne : I will drop that point. At all events, I think it would be sv
means of spreading it universally throughout the country, and I am certain the
Council of the Lecturers' Association would take it up. I have already sent the
programme of the Committee to the organ of that association, called the Lecturer**
Institute, a newspaper published monthly, and I am sure it will be well received.
And; if I am authorised to do what I now suggest, I think it would be the means of
enlightening the country on this important, nay, perhaps vital subject.

The Chairman : It is the rule of the Institution that the lecture becomes the
property of the Institution, and as we are here, not as a Council, but merely as a
general meeting, we cannot deal with this matter. I will take care that the proposal
shall be put before the Council, in order that it may be considered.

Lord Stanley of Alderley : I desire to congratulate the Institution upon the
lecture that has just been read ; and, as a sign of the progress made in this direction,
it is very remarkable that no objection has been made to any of the statements con*
tained in the lecture.

General Cavanagh : I should like to refer to one remark which was made by the
lecturer, namely, as to the effect that the loss of shipping caused by the superiority
of a nation with which another nation may be at war, has upon the future pros-
perity of the weaker power, owing to the seamen manning the ships. The
"Alabama" happened to be in the Eastern Seas during the time I was Governor of
the Straits Settlements, and the consequence was, the whole of the American com-
merce was completely paralysed. Several American vessels were lying in the harbour
of Singapore, unable to leave. The Americans, as a nation, were perhaps too proud
to try and get by a side-wind what they could not secure by their naval superiority.
Hence, they did not attempt to nominally transfer their vessels to the British flag,
and the result was, they were obliged to sell them on unfavourable terms. From
that date, I believe, we may trace the decline of American commerce and of its com-
mercial marine. Subsequently, when a war was supposed likely to break out between
France and Germany, the Germans adopted another course. They immediately
applied for letters of naturalization. Had these been issued, they would have sailed
under British colours, and their commerce would have been saved. I cannot say
that I agreed to the arrangement. I considered that, as they had not in time of
}>eace expressed any intention of applying for letters of naturalization, I was not
justified in giving them in time of war, and I consequently felt myself compelled to
refuse their request. I think this shows the effect that the Declaration of Paris has
upon commerce in time of war. Had I granted these letters of naturalization, the
German commerce would have been carried on, in their own vessels, perfectly un-
interrupted, and without Germany suffering, in the slightest degree, from the
superiority of the French Navy.

Major Poobe, late 8th Hussars : The American mercantile marine has not yet
recovered from the effects of the " Alabama." America also furnishes, with another
episode, an example of naval action. Paul Jones, with a few ships (three, I believe)
spread a panic over the whole of this country, coming suddenly and acting on the
coast and shipping.

As we stand, unless we make the sea our defence, we become powerless, as the
sea, unless used as a defence, becomes an easy high road for any nation to attack us.
Again, the sea, from the nature of our possessions, holding as we do nearly all
the best harbours in all quarters of the globe, gives us a base of operations in every
part of the world simultaneously.

This matter of the possession of harbours is one of the distinguishing points
between the action of lawful cruize rs or privateers and the "Alabama.11 The
Southern States, having free possession of no port, had nowhere whence they
could lawfully equip a cruizer or run prizes to, and though the " Alabama," Ac, is
illustrative of part of the subject, the Southern States were not in the position that

MARITIME RIGHTS. 443

we should be, possessing, as we do, ports in all parts of the world, which gives us the
advantage of short and convenient distances to run our prizes to, in comparison to
other nations under similar circumstances, giving us, in time of war, a base of naval
operations in every quarter of the globe, which powerful position, if understood and
properly acted on, can hardly be overrated.

Captain Cabmichabl, 5th Lancers : We ought to be much obliged to Mr. Ross-
of-Bladensberg for bringing forward this question ; and I agree with what previous
speakers have said, that such a lecture as this comes more gracefully from a soldier
than from a naval Officer. We have latterly, and especially at this Institution, been
inclined to aggrandize the Army, trying to make it popular, and, to a certain extent,
overshadow the Navy. I, as a soldier, wish to point out why we can never be a great
military nation in Europe. In Asia we may be, but in Europe we never can. The
area of England is so small as compared with other countries, that, as population
increases, they daily become, as military nations, more powerful in proportion to us.
But the naval power of a nation is dependent on the extent of its coast — a fixed
quantity, which cannot alter — and, since we have a longer coast line than other
continental powers, we must ever remain superior as a maritime nation. I think,
also, our people — accustomed to free institutions — will never endure that internal
interference, by which alone the enormous Armies on the continent are kept up.
But, although our patience is short, we have a very long purse, and I believe we
could endure an amount of taxation that would drive, even the conscript nations
of the continent, into rebellion; and the way in which we can best spend our money
is on the Navy, in those monster guns, and those ironclad ships, whose enormous
cost other nations are less able to afford.

Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N. : I should like to say a few words on this very in-
teresting lecture by Lieut. Ross. I will repeat almost what Captain Carmichael
has already said. It has come much more gracefully from a military Officer than
it would from a naval Officer, because we might be accused of pleading for our-
selves. Self-interest might have induced many men to work up this subject,
whereas he and also several military Officers who have spoken, particularly Captain
Carmichael, on principle advocated our maritime rights, besides referring to the
profession to which I have the honour to belong in the most generous terms, show-
ing that they are quite as ready to advocate anything connected with it as readily
as thev would matters more immediately belonging to their own profession. How-
ever, this is really and truly not primarily a professional, but a national question, a
question of such vital importance that no one can speak too strongly upon it. And
perhaps, in passing, I may say the only objection I have to Mr. Ross s admirable
paper is, that it has been too exhaustive. It has left nothing for any one else to
say. He has so gone into the question, and given us the history of everything
touching it so thoroughly, that he has really left nothing unsaid. That his paper
has been very conclusive I think we may almost at this early stage of the discussion
take for granted, from the fact that we have not yet heard one dissenting voice.
Every one has been in favour of his views. I only regret that wo have not had
some person here (though possibly some one may yet rise) who will take up the
opposite side, and advocate the ratification of the Declaration of Paris. What
Mr. Ross has most clearly laid before us is, that the trade of a country is the sinews of
war, and that without trade, war cannot be prosecuted, and if it is entered into, and
the trade of the country is cut off, in a very short space of time it must succumb.
I think no more telling paragraph is to be found in his paper than that in which he
quotes from a speech made in Parliament, and where he shows that the rouble in
Russia fell 20 per cent, at the declaration of war, but immediately rose again to par
when it was discovered that their trade was to pass undisturbed under neutral flags.
We say the Funds are the pulse of the country ; if so, it shows that the Russians
very soon recovered from what they felt to be a severe shock. If the Funds of this
country fell 20 per cent., most Englishmen would consider we were in a very
critical condition. Both Captain Carmichael and the gallant lecturer pointed out
that a great deal more attention has been lately given in this country to military
matters than to navaL There can be no doubt that such has been the case. I am
not going to enlarge upon the drawbacks of the Navy at the present time, but I may
say the same attention has not been given to the Navy which ought to have been,

444 MARITIME RI6HT8.

and that it even now, at this critical time in the history of England, is not in the
state it should be. Everything they can send out of the dockyards has been
commissioned for the Mediterranean, and to save the country from annihilation, an-
other ship could not be ready under three months. I ask you all whether such
is a state for the country to be in with an Eastern Question qn us ? It is not, as
a rule, in the material of war we shall ever fail, with our enormous factories, our
iron works, and our coal, we can never run short of material. Besides, our coal
mines, our iron shipping, and other interests are so well represented in the Houae of
Commons that the matiriel will never be neglected ; but in the personnel of the
Navy we are always far below par. On the Merchant Service of this country we
must rely for our men ; sooner or later we must fall back upon it. We hare got
now a system of rearing our own men which does very well for peace, but for war
purposes it cannot stand. We have a small reserve, which at the best has never
been tried, but if what we read every day, and what we have heard in this theatre
lately, be true, we have been living ever since the abolition of apprentices upon
capital, using up men without taking the trouble to rear others in their place.

The Chairman : You are getting a little beyond the point.

Captain Wilson : It is simply touching on what the gallant lecturer says. I say
we have no resources to fall back upon in time of war. Our maritime forces hare
been steadily neglected. That is what I wish to enforce.

The question of the flag covering goods in neutrals has been so clearly put by
others that I will only touch upon it in the way it appears to myself. The men
will follow the ships, as all history shows, especially the late American war, where
the commerce of that country disappeared, and with it the seamen, so that they
eould not man their ships of war. Their navy was increased from some 50 ships
to 600, but they had no men, no native sailors, because they had followed their
ships. If our commerce is transferred to neutrals, the men will surely go with the
ships, and we shall not get seamen when we require them for war. There is another
view to be taken of it. Napoleon said he only required the command of the
Channel fifteen days to invade England. If he could do it in fifteen days with
sailing vessels, I suppose forty -eight hours would be enough for one of the great
military powers to do so now, if they only had command of the Channel. But the
thing they have always been wanting in, is transport ; but if the bulk of our ships
are transferred to neutrals, surely it is but a step from them to our enemies. From
a neutral it would be a very easy thing to get ships, and you might be invaded by
means of your own vessels. The idea may be far-fetched, but it is quite possible.
As has been shown, the stoppage of the export of raw material from Russia would
probably have brought the Crimean war to an end much quicker than it was, and
so long as we hare the command of the sea, and can use our rights on it, we can
always keep her aggressive policy in check. There is just one point in which I may
say I do not quite go with the lecturer, and that is on the question of privateers,
although I have heard a good deal said to-day in favour of them. I do not think
that war is a thing into which private speculation should be allowed to enter. I,
think all cruisers, like other machines of war should be under Government, and Aw
the Government flag. I do not mean to say by that I would not utilise the MercbqK
Navy, and I also think it would be a very good thing to utilise private enterprises©
a considerable extent, for it would be quite possible to do so without recurring again
to privateers. For, instance, on shore, if you use volunteers, you would place tnem
under military law and discipline ; in the same way every vessel that calls herself
a ship of war should be under Government. You might treat ships very much in
the same way as in the Russian war you treated regiments. You give certain
Officers the power to raise regiments and command them ; in the same way you
might take picked Officers from the Merchant Service or Royal Navy, and give them
the command of ships they could fit out and man, but I object to privateers in the
ordinary sense of the term. Besides which, I almost doubt whether as a great com*
mercial nation, we should gain at all by employing privateers. I observed in the
Contemporary Review of last April, in an admirable article, written by Mr. Braesey,
a curious fact, viz., that between the 1st February, 1793, and the Slst December,
1795, the French took from us 2,096 merchantmen, whilst in the same time we only
took 319 vessels, therefore privateering appears to have been rather against us than

MARITIME BIGHTS. 445

an our favour. However, this does not alter the main question at all, it is merely a

matter of detail. I will not say any more, excepting to express the very great obliga-
tion we are under to Mr. Boss for having taken up a question which is so deeply

r interesting to all Englishmen, but especially so to us belonging to the Navy.

Captain Soott, R.N. : I think the Army men, as a rule, push the naval men forward,
and if the naval men do not go forward fast enough, it is their own fault. In a

recent paper by Mr. Brassey, he mentions that Admiral Porter states that in a war
with England the United States in the course of a very few months would drive the
English trade off the seas, so that it is very evident that they have no intention of

& agreeing to the Declaration of Paris. The United States might possibly hereafter

.join in alliance with one of our present friends with whom we had been, say, some
months at war. Our friend, like ourselves, agreed to the Declaration of Paris, but
the United States did not, and hence we should be put in a very awkward position,
and might suffer serious injury before being prepared for the new combination.
There is no doubt that our mercantile marine is a very great source of strength,
though I am sorry to say that latterly measures have been taken which* would not
make it so, and we have no organization for developing its power ; but as I am going
to enter into the whole question shortly in a paper I am preparing to read at this
Institution, I will say no more about it at present. When we see so many members
of Parliament take up the matter, I have no doubt it will be brought before it

. and taken up by the country. Lord Denbigh has on several occasions assisted naval
men and measures, and I hope he will not fail to bring this matter forward again,
and no doubt it will be then successfully carried through the Legislature.

Mr. C. D. Collet: With regard to the question of privateering, I beg to
call Captain Wilson's attention to one point, that in war there is always a
difficulty. Even in such a war as the old French war, when the Govern-
ment and people were together, there is always a difficulty from the routine
which the Government exercises, and for that purpose it is absolutely necessary
that the old system of privateering, by which private individuals should not be
debarred from exercising their patriotic inclinations, should be continued. The
regulations on that subject are very strict. Every, privateer has to give security
in a large sum of money that he will conform to the law of nations, and if he vio-
lates it — if, for instance, he ill-uses a neutral, that neutral has the opportunity of
suing him in a court of law. The thing has been done, and the privateer has had
to give damages. But the question is altogether separate from that of the flag
covering the cargo, and so much so that Lord Clarendon himself inspired an article,
in which he showed that if we were at war with America, the Declaration of Paris
would not prevent us from using privateers. The point of difference is this : the
neutral really does get a benefit from carrying on the trade of the enemy, and there-
fore, if we did really make a treaty with a neutral to permit him to do so, we should
be bound in honour to carry it out. But it makes no difference whatever to the
neutral whether the goods of the enemy are taken by a privateer or by a Queen's
ship, and therefore that portion of the Declaration of Paris falls through for want
of meaning. In the war with Russia our enemy was allowed to have many advan-
tages. Every sailor in that war was under a distinct Government Officer, and of
course could only do that which he was ordered to do. Of course, a privateer must
. act independently, and that independence is quite necessary if we are to continue
the patriotic exertions of our own people.

The Chairman : There is no doubt the discussion that has taken place has shown
• the very great interest that every one, both from a naval, military, and national
point of view, takes in this important question. One thing I may say as a military
man : it was remarked that we can never be a great military power on the Continent.
That is rather a strong expression to let pass without comment when we know that
Marlborough fought his battles upon the Continent, and Wellington did the same.
I think those are rather strong cases against the positive statement which has been
made.

Mr. Boss : I am deeply sensible of all the kind things which have been said
of me to-day, a great deal more than I deserve. I think the discussion lias been
so one-sided, we may say, that I really have very little to add to what has been
already remarked. I have only a few words to observe upon what Captain Wilson

446 MARITIME BIGHTS.

said about privateers. I think the great objection raised against privateers has-
been more on account of their name than anything else. People dislike the
word. The Germans during the late war wished to institute privateers, and they
called it the " Voluntary Marine/' but it was exactly the same thing.1 The Officer
in command of the ship was to be a Crown Officer, in exactly the same way as the
Officer in command of a privateer is — for the time being — a Grown Officer ; that is,
during the war he has a commission from the Sovereign, constituting his ship for the
time being a legitimate cruizer. The difference is only in the name. The great abuse
that privateers have had, dates principally from the time when England and Spain, in
the beginning of the last century, were engaged in a sort of chronic war in America,
and in which a great deal of buccaneering went on under the name of privateers ; but
I do not think, in the legitimate employment of privateers we can find any fault.
Then, with regard to what has been said that we should lose by restoring privateers,
I think it is the other way. I saw Mr. Brassey's paper, and, if I remember rightly,
his numbers were something like 2,000, instead of 1,000 ; that is, that we lost
2,000 ships, while the French only lost 300, up to December, 1795. The losing of
merchantmen, however, does not altogether measure the loss of property. A great
deal of French property at that time went under other flags, which was captured,
although during the first part of the war, the English, on account of some Orders in
Council, allowed neutrals to carry a great deal of enemy's property, whioh was there-
fore not confiscated. This, I think, quite shows how it was that we lost so many
merchantmen in comparison with the enemy ; but as far as the loss of property went,
it was quite the other way : the French were entirely crippled in the first part of the
war by their losses in actual money.

Captain Wilson : So long as the privateers are under the Crown, I have no objec-
tion to them at all.

Admiral Sir Brooke Middleton : Privateers, always during any war I have ever
heard of carried a pennant showing that they were under the Crown.
^ Mr. Boas : As Mr. Collet has also remarked, privateers are always obliged to

S've security, and they are national ships. The " Sumter " was merely a New
rleans steam-ship. Two or three guns were put on board, and during its-
short cruize, seventeen of the northern merchantmen were taken, which shows
that we could do the same thing. I have only one more thing to say — I hope
that this subject will not be allowed to rest here, and that every one who has
attended this meeting to-day, and who has been convinced that wo made a mistake
in 1856, and that it is necessary for us at once to resume our maritime rights, will,
according to their several ability, do the utmost they can to impress it upon • all.
whom they meet to try and get the fatal Declaration of Paris abrogated.

The Chairman : I am quite sure I may ask your thanks to the lecturer for his
very able and interesting lecture.

1 Vide " Further Correspondence respecting the War between France and Ger~-
u many, 1870-71," (No. 1) page 20, where the German Docrce is to be seen,

447

LECTURE.

Friday, June 16, 1876.
Admiral Sir HENRY J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

"THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND, INCLUDING
"OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE."

Part I. — The Organization of our Maritime Forces.

By Captain R. A. E. Scott, R.N.

In the short space which has elapsed since I commenced the paper
now in your hands, the manly and vigorous policy of our Ministry
following up their purchase of a vested right in the great highway to
India and the East, has for the moment vindicated our national posi-
tion. The rapid changes, however, which have been truly marked by
the money-market barometer, show what is still in the air, and prove
the wisdom of the proverb, " If you wish for peace, be prepared for
" war."

If my paper should call greater attention to this necessity in a
country the wealth of which is mainly a floating capital — our mari-
time trade, according to the Morning Advertiser, amounting annually to
the enormous sum of 700,000,0002. sterling — I shall be amply repaid
for the time spent in its preparation.

Before commencing from the stand-point of a few days since, I wish-
to remind you that the Mutiny in India happily found us with the
veteran soldiers of the Crimea ready to our hands, and that on the
other hand, the French, proud of their laurels there, and at Solf erino,
were never more confident of success than when they marched towards
the German frontier.

We at the commencement of many a former war, have paid dearly
for our own over-confidence, and have had to sacrifice not only vast
sums of money, but also the far higher treasures of human life, before
the pluck and dash of our soldiers and sailors, backed by the energy of
our people at home, enabled us to pull through all obstacles with
ultimate success.

The present time is ours ; and I venture to think that at a very small
outlay, we may at once make our preparations so complete, as not only
to place our country in security, but also to make her so strong (by
uniting her vast resources) as to preclude attack.

44S " THE MABITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

Were this done, our country would be enabled to maintain Her posi-
tion as the arbiter of Europe, and to use manfully the strength with
which the " Giver of all " has so richly endowed us for the benefit of
weaker nationalities.

I find that it is impossible in one lecture to go fully into the ques-
tion of naval attack and defence, and to show the improvements which
•could be easily effected, and might be quickly carried out so as to
double the fighting capabilities of our existing ships. I also wish to
indicate the requirements of future war vessels from a sailor's point
of view, having due regard to the fall utilization of our present iron-
clads and unarmoured cruizers. I therefore trust, that the Council of
this Institution will permit me to bring these matters before you
within a few days, and thus enable you to judge as to the necessity
for initiating in the work-shop and drill-shed, and in carrying out
•other needful preparations, the vigour just shown in handling that
national weapon, the British fleet.

In stating that we are a maritime people, and that we cannot
maintain our position among nations if we suffer onr naval force to
decline, I lay myself open to the charge of uttering truisms, but they
are truisms of such vital importance to us, and their truth is so con-
stantly ignored in our measures, that I believe they cannot be too con-
stantly dinned into our ears.

It will appear incredible to our descendants that it was left to a
young Officer of the Guards publicly to point out to the English
people that some twenty years previously we had voluntarily waived
those maritime rights which constituted our only real defence in time
of war. As Mr. Ross-of-Bladensberg states, " This, in a nation like
" our own, could only have become possible when a veil of forgetfulness
" and ignorance had dimmed the vision of the real cause of our former
Ai success ; " but how are we to account for the fact that whilst acknow-
ledging as truisms the statements with which I have commenced my
paper, we have done our best, and still strive after the unattainable
position, of vieing with continental powers in maintaining large mili-
tary forces ? If anything could convince the nation of its folly, it
would be the lecture of the young Officer who called our attention in
this room last week to our u neglected maritime rights ; " and I am
glad to follow up that interesting lecture with a few words of caution
on our " maritime defences."

Such words were never more needed than at the present moment.
The political position of affairs is becoming more complicated, and an
explosion may at any moment be looked for when all the conditions
for a discharge of war-tension are so favourable as at present. Ger-
many already possesses an active army of 1,200,000 men, and has,
according to Count Moltke, an additional territorial force of 1,000,000
■soldiers as a reserve. Russia has a force which, as Lord Derby tells
us, " could be made up to exceed those numbers," governed by "the
" most peaceful of monarchs " (see the Times of 28th January last), and
yet " as great a conqueror as Alexander, Caesar, or Napoleon . . .
" forced by an instinct stronger than his will, which drives his people
"" southward and eastward to take possession of a territory three times

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 449

" the size of Germany." France is already repossessed of immense
wealth, and is eager to recover her lost prestige, and these and other
nations are all anxiously looking to what recent events in Tnrkey may
force upon them.

How unreasoning we are ! We admit all these elements of danger ;
we admit that oar " very existence " as a nation depends upon our
Navy; whilst urging the superiority of our fleet to that of other
nations, we are obliged to confess that a reverse on the seas is possible,
and that if a continental army once landed on our shores, we should
run a chance of being blotted out from amongst the great powers.
When we know on good authority that we are dependent even for the
food of half our people upon a maritime trade passing over sea, and
therefore particularly exposed to destruction in war time, we at once
feel the truth of the observation, and yet we fail to make our ships,
including their armament, as efficient as they may be made, or their
number as great : we neglect to use the means which offer themselves
for manning and maintaining them efficiently ; we voluntarily give up
our powers of destroying the commerce of our enemies ; and we con-
tent ourselves with protecting our coasts with torpedoes which are
almost as dangerous to ourselves as to our enemies.

Let us look at the first point I mention for a moment — the efficiency
or inefficiency of our ships. I do not here propose to examine this
critically. I wish merely to call your attention to one or two national
characteristics, pluck and dash, which indicate the nature of the
armament most suitable for us.

Before, however, entering upon these points, I must allude to one
requisite in a good ship of war with which we cannot dispense, viz.,
44 unsinkability." Unless a vessel can be kept afloat, of what use can
be the finest crew, the most powerful weapons, and the highest speed ?
The " Captain " was a capital fighting machine as long as she could be
kept afloat; and both the " R6 d'ltalia" and the " Vanguard " were
powerful engines of war, but what did this avail them in the hour of
trial ? I would therefore premise that this all-important requisite is a
point in which some of our present ships would appear to be deficient,
and that in my opinion the under-water deck, excellent as an addi-
tional means of defence, is not calculated to remove the defect. I
hope, however, to be allowed to go into detail on this and other
important questions in a future lecture.

The next point is that her weapons of offence should be such as our
men would be likely to wield with success. Amongst such weapons I
would almost, if not quite, give the first place to the ram. The nerve,
coolness, and resolution of our seamen is proverbial among nations,
and the ram is a weapon which could only be used with advantage
where pluck and coolness go hand in hand, and where the resolution
is well supported by the skill to direct the blow — yet several of our
vessels are not armed with it, and of those which have it, some are too
weak in the bottom to support the shock of impact with an opposing
vessel of heavy weight. If, again, we look to the guns, we are not
quite in such a position as J should like to see us.

We have at this moment only four 35-ton guns at sea in one ship,

450 " THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

•

the " Devastation," and two 38-ton guns nearly ready, with two more*
35-ton guns, the sole armament of her sister ship, the " Thunderer ;,r
but before we have at all assured ourselves that we have obtained from
them the greatest results of which they are capable, we jump at once
to 80-ton guns for no other reason apparently than to outdo the
Italians, who first talked of 60-ton guns, and then to outstrip our 80-
ton guns in size went to 100-ton guns. Will it not surprise some at
least of my hearers, to be told that no 38-ton gun has yet been tested
up to 100 rounds, or even a third of that number in quick firing ;
and that, so far as our experience goes with guns of heavy calibre,
the metal of which the projectiles are composed, will not bear the
pressure which it is necessary to put behind them in order to get up a
moderate velocity. The shot of the 80-ton gun show a sensible
enlargement of diameter, arising from the compression in the direction
of the shot's length.

Whilst, however, we have waded into unknown depths in the direc-
tion of big guns, we perpetuate known defects in respect of those of
smaller calibre. We know that an 18-ton gun will pierce the thickest
armour-plating afloat, we equally well know that a 12-ton gun will not
do so, and yet the " Sultan " and " Hercules " are the only two broad-
side ships aflbat which carry guns of the former size.

We adhere to cast iron for our projectiles. We found chilled shot
the best thing known at one time, and we adhere to them, regardless of
the superiority of steel. The result of this is, that the round form of
front has to be adhered to ; for, were the front flat, the projectile
would break up on impact. But, as the flat-headed shot will bite at
about 66? from the perpendicular, whereas the round-headed shot fails
to do so above about 33° from it, the loss we may suffer from our
backwardness in introducing improvements is only too evident. The
Germans, however, as usual, being more apt than ourselves in
" appropriating new forces " (to use the expression of the Chief Con-
structor), have manufactured flat-fronted steel projectiles for their
56£-ton gun. Even the Brazilians, with their little experience in
naval warfare, are ahead of us in this. In the matter of gun-carriages,
by dint of constant pressure, I succeeded, some few years since, in
introducing improvements which met with the hearty approval of the
Service ; but these have never been fully completed. Without dwell-
ing upon the sad end of the inventors of many of the improvements
recently utilized for our naval armaments, viz., Norton, Lawrence,
Chalmers, and Snider, I will refer only to the inventor of the Harvey
torpedo (the very weapon for our sailors), and himself, the man of
all others qualified to teach them to use it, who had to appeal to
foreign countries to recoup the expenses he had been put to. With
such an instance as this of our backwardness in using the mechanical
skill of our people, we cannot feel surprised at the statements in the
public prints, that inventive talent is languishing, to the great detri-
ment of our national wealth.

When we turn from the weapons to those who are to direct and
wield them, we find our preparations equally backward. This great
country possesses rather less than 20,000 naval seamen; it has no

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 451

reserve, except old Pensioners, and no plan for supplying the large
number of men that would be needed in a prolonged struggle. The
so-called Naval Reserve force, expected to number 20,000 enrolled men
this summer, could not be removed from the Mercantile Navy without
destroying our trade ; and the number of Coast-guard men who could
be advantageously sent from their stations on shore, is much too small
to supply the gaps in our trained men in time of peace, and would
prove but a drop in the ocean in time of war.

The Royal Marine force has been reduced to the number which
is sufficient only for ships in commission, and very recently it was
proposed to abolish it altogether. Really the lessons of former wars
appear to be wholly thrown away upon us ! Here is a force to which
we ought to look for keeping up the supply of trained gunners, with
" sea-legs and sea-stomachs " (as Captain Wilson expresses it), a force
•of infinitely more importance to us than troops of the line, consisting,
as it does, not only of soldiers but of skilled naval artillerymen, and
we quietly contemplate supplying their places with raw recruits
obtained at enormous cost in times of danger, and. when obtained,
likely to require nurses to look after them, until the time of sea-
sickness is got over. Marines, on the other hand, on being embarked,
Are at once at home, adding to the power and discipline of our
ships while they remain on board, and ready at a moment's notice
to land and show themselves, as they have ever done, enduring,
reliable, and loyal soldiers, and hold tenaciously such of our depen-
dencies or coaling stations, as it might be of vital importance to us
to keep fast hold of during a European struggle. We have not, how-
ever, vet made as much out of them as can be made. In the commence-
ment of our Peninsular war, the Duke was constantly thwarted by the
want of trained artificers to carry on the operations of a siege, and the
«orps of Royal Engineers was created — a corps which has since been as
eminently useful to us in peace as it proved itself able in war. Our
future naval operations will require mechanical skill, and a readiness of
-expedient, to repair our gun-carriages and other weapons, such as can
be obtained only from early training. On talking over this matter lately
with Captain Wilson, he suggested the question : Why not create from
our Marines a corps of Royal Naval Engineers ? The idea appears to
me well worthy of our earnest consideration. We have had, only re-
cently, too many costly instances of the want of mechanical knowledge.
To look to the Merchant Service to replace our valuable trained
men is, I repeat, a serious mistake. To attempt to remove the so-
called Royal Naval Reserve men, who are the backbone of the Mer-
chant Navy, would entirely upset its discipline. We should have in-
numerable repetitions of such massacres as those which have recently
startled us, and our commercial lines of traffic would be thrown into
hopeless confusion. The maintenance of our foreign trade is a first
necessity, and to touch its personnel would quickly bring about that
which Admiral Porter points to in case of war with the United States
— the destruction of our commerce.

The rising sailor boys, as I have repeatedly pointed out for several
jears past, instead of being trained in the use of machinery and in

452 " THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

that practical gunnery which they will hereafter be called upon to
employ, are still drilled to ran about with handspikes and tackles
and, by-and-bye, when past the age at which the eye and hand can be-
taught to act in unison, will be required to exhibit the thoughtful and
steady precision needed for working guns by steam-power. This is
not the way to ensure that each of our costly bullets shall reach its
billet, and do its full work upon an enemy.

This leads me naturally to the next point of our mistaken policy.
We are not only prepared to risk the destruction of our own com-
merce, but have voluntarily given up the power of destroying that
of our enemies. " His Majesty," writes Lord Heytesbury, in 1802,
" will never consent to place out of his hands, in a treaty of peace,
" those means which may be necessary for the security of his domi-
" nions in time of war." We have since been fatuous enough to do-
so, and the possible consequences have been so clearly pointed out in
Mr. Boss's able paper, to which I have already alluded, that I need say
no more on this point.

Finally, no steps have yet been taken to unite and organize the
large forces of which we could make available in time of war for the
defence of our coasts. Thus, with a numerous sea-coast population,
possessed of every attribute necessary for waging successful warfare
against all comers, with maritime resources far superior to those of any
other nation, we may, by some unfortunate combination of circum-
stances in these days of rapid movement by steam — when invasions, to*
quote Lord Mansfield, are always ready organized, — find the command
of the seas about England in the hands of our enemies, and our country
at their mercy.

At the present moment our first line of defence consists of a few
small turret-ships and gun-boats, which would be unable to keep the
sea in heavy weather. It will take months to fit out another sea-
keeping ironclad squadron, and long before the fleet on which we pride
ourselves could be brought from the Mediterranean, a combination
of two or more hostile powers might send to our shores a fleet and an
army which by a sudden and unexpected blow would do us incalculable
damage.

And now for the remedies I would propose. I will commence with
the last defect I commented upon — the absence of an organization of
the personnel of our maritime resources. This is perhaps the most
important point, and it is the one which should be first attended
to. We have in our veteran coast-guard men the best possible nucleus
for a defensive coast force. These men have been trained as gnnnersr
have been long accustomed to judge distances at sea, and are familiar
with the powers of their guns.

Next there are our yachtsmen, consisting of the pick of English
sailors and fishermen, and numbering not far short of 5,000 men, who*
might all be trained with advantage to themselves as well as to the
country to the use of guns and the working of gun-carriages of the
newest type.

Then again we have at all our sea-ports, numbers of fishermen and
boatmen, as intrepid and bold as heart could desire, who would by

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE.1' 453*

trifling encouragement be made to swell this reserve force, and to find
pleasure in learning to fire well.

The dockyard men, or some of them, could be trained to be stokers,
so as to be available as a reserve of stokers in time of war ; their
places being supplied by naval pensioners, who should, as far as
possible, be employed when extra hands are required at our dockyards
and arsenals, so as to know this work when called upon to perform it.

Lastly, there is our large body of Volunteer artillery and infantry,
who have already made themselves skilled marksmen, either with
large guns or rifles, and whose natural aptitude for shooting might be-
kept up and increased by periodical competitions and drills under the
direction of our Admiralty and Naval Commanders-in-Chief.

Wherever, therefore, landing-places exist on our coasts, and at all
these, coast-guard stations are to be found, I would have stations to
which the above-mentioned forces should be told off, and these stations
should be provided with suitable guns, and be connected with London
by telegraph, and with each other by good roads and railways, as well
as by telegraph wires and other modes of signalling.

These forces should be practised as far as possible afloat as well as
on shore ; and both for purposes of drill and defence, gun-boats mount-
ing plate-piercing guns should be stationed at all our sea-ports and off
our principal landing-places.

The fast river steamers should, in time of war, supplement these
gun-boats by acting as torpedo-craft, whilst our steam-tugs, acting as
rocket- vessels, should be in readiness to ram and run down the enemy's
transports and boats. If the whole of our available craft of these
descriptions were told off to the stations nearest the places where they
ply, they would easily, under the skilful commanders of these river
vessels, and united under the flag of a dashing Commodore, throw a
hostile force into confusion and render a landing impossible. The
addition of a fire-ship, or an explosive vessel or two, would complete
their work upon the fleet which brought over the forces intended for
our destruction, and the result would be such as to leave us in security
from a similar attempt for many years to come.

I have thus briefly indicated how England's defence can be insured
by local means, and that the requisite forces could be provided from
local sources without materially interfering with our manufacturing
people, which is a point of the utmost importance to us ; without draw-
ing upon the seamen of our Mercantile Marine, which is of still more
vital importance to us ; and without detaining on our coasts the war-
ships needed for their protection, and for destroying the fighting ships
and ruining the commerce of the enemy.

I will now proceed to show how the last can be supplemented with
other forces at our disposal, and enable our trade to be successfully
carried on by our merchant navy.

The Mercantile Marine comprises numerous swift ocean-keeping
passenger steamers,1 which in war-time would doubtless become the
carriers of a large part of the most valuable portions of our merchan-

1 Efficient despatch Teasels could always be selected from these.

454 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND,

dise, as well as of the munitions of war required at our more distant
naval stations. Such vessels would, if war were now to break out,
owing to the absence of organization, be dependent for safety on speed
alone, and become a source of weakness rather than of strength to our
fighting ships. What seems to me to be required is, to arm them with
light guns, torpedoes, and Congreve or Hale rockets, and to enrol the
men who will have to handle these weapons as part of the Royal
Naval Reserve, and by appropriate rewards to induce them to take an
interest in their drills, which should be taught them at the expense of
the nation. Provision should be made by the arrangements at all our
ports as already indicated for imparting the necessary instruction and
for exciting interest in the work without interference with their
ordinary duties, and the effect on their morale would be very great.
Whilst waiting for another engagement, the better class of our sea-
men would hail any employment of this kind with satisfaction, and
their feelings would influence others.

These drilled men should be divided, first, into two classes or more, the
lower to be called gunners, and the higher class marksmen, both classes
to be given suitable badges and also a small retainer in the shape of
pay, and pensions when wounded in action. The badge would be a
public recognition of their skill, and show them to be militant, and
this honourable mark of England's appreciation would render them
more patriotic and more eager to perfect themselves in the use of the
weapons they would have to handle should war (as it undoubtedly
will) come upon us.

Vessels manned in part by such men would soon become per-
meated by law-abiding principles, and being provided with proper
arrangements at the, Government expense, and with a subsidy to cover
the increased insurance in war, would become a very cheap and
efficient force, fully making up by speed and numbers for the lightness
of their armament, and rendering the farther addition of lightly
gunned royal cruizers " needless."

Secondly, with regard to foreign seamen in oar Mercantile
Marine. The Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians are of the same stock
as that whence we sprang, and have so nearly the same sympathies
and interests as ourselves, that I believe we should do right in giving
them all the privileges of English citizenship, so as to bring them
into closer relationship with our own sailors, who would, I believe,
benefit by their temperate habits as much as they are now deterio-
rated by companionship with the sailors from the mixed seafaring
populations of the Mediterranean. Were this to be done, and the
chance of prize-money or bonus superadded, I think the necessary
supply of reliable merchant seamen could, if wished, be readily ob-
tained from our natural allies.

The Mercantile Marine would by these means strengthen the Royal
Navy, and could continue to do its work of providing supplies during
war, for its personnel would be kept up to a thoroughly effective
strength.

I have only to add that the merchant navy, thus organized and
commanded by its own officers, duly trained for such work and

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 455

rewarded by honorary rank as lieutenants and captains, would when
moving within certain pre-arranged parallels, be enabled to defend
itself against privateers, and would likewise be enabled to act as a
medium of communication or connecting link between our war cruizers,
stationed to protect them against ironclads or heavy war vessels.

This protection against the enemy's war ships can only be secured
by powerful cruizers ; and, looking at the vast water frontier and the
extended possessions which England has to protect, with a naval force
of under 20,000 trained sailors, the question as to what class of vessel
will be most useful, i.e., good at all points, becomes very important.
The strength of the metals of which she would be built is measured by
their tenacity at the weakest part, and this simple rule is not in*
applicable to so vital a matter as England's maritime defence. She
cannot afford to run the risk of a serious wound to her commerce,
even at her most distant possessions ; and, therefore, every individual-
ship built'for fighting should contain within herself every element of
offence and defence. The size of this vessel must be greatly in*
fiuenced by cost, for there is a necessity for the employment of a large
number of such ships, for, as the Times informs us, and I think it
wise to repeat the statement, " that the most powerful of ships could
" only be at one place at a time," and that, allow me to add, would be
just the place a wary adversary would steer clear of.

As already stated, the immediate duty of fighting cruizers would be
the protection of our commerce against the enemy's war ships, and
therefore they would be spread out along the lines of traffic, keeping,
up communication one with the other by means of electric lights at
night, fog horns of great power, and other pre-arranged signals ; and
gathering intelligence from the merchantmen passing them. It
appears to me that these war ships could be coaled and provisioned at
sea by means of suitable extemporised rafts, which their crews should
be practised in putting together and in using for landing their men ;
and I think these cruizers or sea- watchers might be often anchored in
mid-ocean. Very light telegraphic lines could perhaps, in many
cases, be laid down, with buoys and flags to mark anchoring stations ;
a plan which, if as successful as similar devices in the Crimea were,
would place England, the flag-ships of her Commanders-in-Chief at
the principal foreign stations, and the sea-keepers in mid-ocean, in
close communication. Should such an arrangement be found too
difficult for achievement at the present time, a telegraph ship or two
and a station on shore might be provided for the more important
points.

Before concluding my paper, I desire again to urge the necessity
which exists for the better organization and teaching of our crews*
and for giving every facility, both to Officers and men, of acquainting
themselves thoroughly with the handling of our newest weapons*
under all the varied conditions of maritime warfare.

Our ships now abound in engines for destroying life, which require
long and careful training to use with that steady coolness and precision
which lead to victory.

Nelson, Cochrane, and others, like Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon*

VOL. II. 2 H

456 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

were themselves masters of the art of war, and hence could inspire
their followers with confidence ; bat what commander could inspire
an untrained crew with the knowledge and skill needed to manage the
machinery of a ship, and to work her 80-ton or other guns by steam
machinery ?

The devotion of German Officers and men to mastering their duties
is now proverbial, but it is not so well known that the French Gtrttern-
ment has recently published plans of all foreign ironclads, for the
instruction of its Naval Officers. May we soon follow the example
thus set us, and stir up such of our Officers — as have the requisite
mechanical knowledge and are able to impart it — to teach our Navy
the relative values of the different guns and armour used by &&
maritime powers.

If the preparations which I have mentioned as essential to our
maritime supremacy be postponed, owing to our self-gratulatioiis at
the immediate results of our recent unexpectedly vigorous policy, it is
to be feared that our pre-eminent pluck and dash may not prevent
our being landed in disaster, when opposed to the better disciplined
skill of more painstaking nations.

If, however, the organization of our maritime forces be at once
undertaken, and the strength and nerve of our seamen be utilized as
they should be ; and if full advantage be taken of our mechanical skill
in improving our armaments ; I, for one, should have no fear that we
should lose that empire of the sea which we have so long and so
gloriously maintained.

The Chaibmak : If any gentleman feels inclined to give lis farther information,
we shall be very glad to hear him. I hope there will, by permission of the Council, be
a further opportunity of hearing the second part of the subject from Captain Scott.
I should like to remark that the question of laying down telegraphic lines in mid-ocean
has been tried, but hitherto unsuccessfully. I have a recollection of a floating yessel,
tbe " Brink/1 being moored in the chops of the Channel for that purpose, and it was
found rather an impracticable thing, not merely as a mercantile speculation, but
also as to certain mechanical difficulties. I do not say these difficulties cannot be
got over, but we should like a little more information with regard to the mechanical
part before we can agree as to its feasibility. I did not quite understand how the
extemporaneous rafts for coaling are to be used at sea, and I should like to know
that from Captain Scott. Many years ago, the idea was advanced of utilising large
merchant steamers for carrying naval artillery, that is to say, preparing them so as
to put heavy guns into them if we should roquire their services in war. I rather
think a certain number were thus fitted, but the plan came to nothing nationally,
because it was found that the alterations requisite for converting them into vessels
capable of carrying what were the heavy guns of that day (though their weight
would be trifling as compared with the ordnance of the present day) were so great
as to materially interfere with their passenger capabilities.

The Eabl op Denbigh : I wish to ask Captain Scott if he has heard of a plan
which I met with not long ago. A gentleman who has given a great deal of time
and consideration to the defences of our country, told me that he had made draw-
ings of a plan, which had much interested Sir William Wiseman, for utilising the
merchant vessels, or rafts, or any floating craft which you might be able to lay hold
of, at a few hours' notice in case of invasion. He would have a sort of built
breast- work, shot proof, something on the circular principle, like the "Popoff,"
which should surround any such craft. A temporary deck might then be thrown
across of sufficient power to bear the guns. He would also have a built domo that
vould work in sections oyer this, sufficient to turn ordinary shot The advantage

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 457

that he would be able to get a steady deck to fire from. I only beard of tms
in conversation, but when be told me be bad submitted it to Siv William Wiseman,
who thought highly of it, and that it might be worked out, I was anxious to take
this opportunity of asking Captain Scott, or anybody else present, if they had heard
anything about it.

Mr. Soott Russell, F.R.S. : I feel it to be my duty as a shipbuilder to say that I
feel highly gratified at Captain Scott having put to us a problem, which I am anxious
sailors should put to us, as to whether we can do what they want. He says that he
distinctly wants to have unsiukable ships. Now, I venture to answer him in one
word that it only needs that sailors should wish to have unsinkable ships, and they
can get them, not only without practical inconvenience in the use of them, but with
great practical convenience in the use of them, and with great addition to the secu-
rity of the ship, and the manageability of the ship and the gun batteries. • I hope,
therefore, that in the next paper he will give us, not only his views as to the extent
to which he desires to have these unsinkable ships, but will also go further, and let
us shipbuilders know what are each and all of the other qualities he desires, to make
his war-ship fit for his sailor's purpose. May I just make one suggestion to him
for the next paper ? I should like him to say the degree to which he desires his
ships to be handy and clever at backing, manoeuvring, stopping, and turning,
because I can tell him that ships far more handy than those we nave now in the
Navy have been made already for other purposes, and might most easily be adapted
to the Navy, if the sailora wished ; but if they won't say what they want, how
can they expect us to force them upon them ? On one point I hope the author
of this paper will dwell in his next paper, for I have been much delighted with
his allusion to the subject. As I am not a sailor, I only speak to you from the
engine-room ; that is my department. Now, speaking to you from the engine-room,
I venture to make a suggestion to the members of the profession, which my expe-
rience in the engine-room makes me think of great value. I think that all the
Officers on board ship should, as much as possible, be trained to the knowledge of
the others' business, in order that they may know how to co-operate. For example,
I think a sailor should know as much as possible of the engines, of the engine-
room, and of the boilers ; for I think without that knowledge, the captain on the
upper deck, steering his vessel, may make very great blunders. I have often myself
steered vessels. It was my good luck as a boy to be trained to the sea before I was
trained to the engine-room, and to get sea legs, and all that sort of thing, before
I took to shipbuilding, and I have always been grateful for it. But I have seen
from the Captain's signal-room most erroneous and most injurious signals sent down
into the engine-room ; signals that could not only not be fulfilled, but if they had
been at the time, and in the succession, and in the way in which the Captain gave
the orders, they would have destroyed the engine. And why was that ? Because
the Captain on the deck knew nothing whatever of the engine-room to which he was
speaking, and he therefore gave orders which were contradictory, impossible, and
most dangerous if attempted to be carried out. I would insist on all engineers
being good, well-trained seamen, who would not be unwell, nor have bad sea-legs, nor
anything of that kind when they went to sea ; and I would insist on all command-
ing Officers knowing thoroughly everything that would bo going on in the engine-
room after they had given a certain order. Now I carry this a great deal further.
I would like you to train sailors to be good stokers when they are wanted ; I would
like you to train sailors to do everything to help us in the engine-room when we
are in a difficulty, and we are often in a difficulty ; and I should wish in like manner
that sailors should know everything about our pumps, and our pipes, and all the
communications that run out from the engine-room, in order that when mischief
happens, they should each of them know what to do to help us, instead of going and
doing what hinders us. They should know how to keep water out of our engine-room,
instead of going and sending the water into the engine-room, which they often do
with the best possible intentions. I therefore have to entreat you, as gentlemen of
your profession, to try and extend the education of all men who serve on board a
ship to a knowledge of the work of others to a certain extent. I hope you will not
think me impertinent if I Bay, for example, that I think there are occasions when a
great gun or a gun-carriage has suffered a little from shot, when it may be useful

2 H 2

458 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND,

for you to call the engineers and fitters out of the engine-room to help to make good
your gun-carriage, and to help to put it in order again. I think it would be well
that you should before-hand take these men and drill them to know what a gun
was, and what a gun-carriage was, and how to be able to come to your assistance
when you want them. In short, G-entlemen, I have hitherto looked upon a British
sailor as the most capable of mechanics, as the most admirable of labourers, and as
the most capable of workers when I wanted one. When I wanted land-work
cleverly done with a few hands, I hare been in the habit of employing, not lands-
men, but retired Bailors to do my land-work, and I found them do it much more
cleverly than landlubbers. Therefore, I entreat you to consider all the inmates of a
ship as one great family of clever fellows, each with a speciality of his own, and try
and drill them, and train them, and educate them, so that every one of them should
be able to give help to the other when there is a difficulty.

Captain J. C. WiXfiOK, R.N. : Being a sailor, I must answer what Mr. Scott Russell
has said, because it might lead to a wrong interpretation of what our duties are. The
duties of those in a man-of-war may be compared to those which have to be performed
in a town of considerable size. Now, I would like to ask whether it is practicable or
possible that every person in a small township could be able to do his neighbour's
work ? With all due deference to Mr. Scott Russell, a little knowledge is dangerous,
and every man should stick to his own work. Let every sailor know his duties as a
sailor, every stoker know his as a stoker, and let engineers do their duty, and
I have no doubt the executive part of the Navy will not be found wanting. It is a
piece of impertinence for me to question what such an authority says, but such are
my views, rightly or wrongly. To fall back to the very instructive and interesting
paper which the gallant lecturer has read, as he has been good enough to refer to
me by name once or twice, I should like to answer a few of his remarks. In the
first place, I will say the root, the kernel, of the whole question is, " The Declaration
" of Paris," as was so clearly shown in the lecture read on it in this theatre by that
very talented young Officer, Mr. Boss. Without that lecture it would have been non-
sense to have discussed the paper before us. I am speaking, of course, with refe-
rence to that part touching the question of the protection of trade. If " The Declara-
" tion of Paris " is allowed to remain as it is, it presents to us one phase of the question ;
if it is done away with, which the bulk of us hope it will be, it brings the question
before us in a totally different light. With " The Declaration of Paris " in existence,
the bulk of the trade of England must pass to neutral flags whenever war is declared.
We should, therefore, not then require such a number of cruizers, nor such an
extensive system as we should otherwise do. I do not say our trade would pass to
neutral flags from want of proper protection, for no doubt they would be as well
cared for as possible, but, as was shown in a letter in the Standard the other day,
the war premiums on insurance must drive the bulk of our commerce to neutral
flags. I will divide our commerce under two heads : the ships that are insured would
pass to neutrals, and those uninsured, which will probably remain under our own
flag so long as they receive tolerable protection. These latter vessels I will again
divide into two classes. But before wo proceed, let us for convenience suppose that
" The Declaration of Paris " is done awav with. We should then, I think, divide our
trade into two classes, viz., ships of 12 knots and upwards, and ships of less speed.
The ships of 12 knots and upwards would probably rely on their heels, and be
lightly armed, as suggested by the gallant lecturer, to defend themselves, and to
fight their way if need be. They should bo protected by cruizers, stationed, say, at
24 hours' intervals from each other on the principal lines, such as between England
and America or the brazils. We should, besides, require squadrons to protect our
coaling depots and narrow channels, such as the chops of the Channel, the Gut of
Gibraltar, the Straits of Magellan, the Straits of Malacca, Hong Kong, &c., Ac.
Then we come to convoying. Convoys, I should say, would include all our coal and
grain-carrying vessels, our timber trade, and generally vessels of about 8 knots
speed, carrying on the heavy trade of the country. These vessels would have to be
convoyed by very strong squadrons, probably with an ironclad at the head of each,
and a certain number oi frigates and armed merchant ships, as auxiliaries.

To man all these ships would require a very large number of seamen. And now
we come to another point, which I purpose touching on very lightly — the personnel

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 459

not only of the Navy but of the Merchant Service. We have had papers read in this
theatre, and some of the most intelligent members of Parliament, shipowners and
others, have spoken on this rital subject, and the conclusion come to is, that the
Merchant Service is now in the most lamentable state, and that England does not
possess more than 20,000 or 25,000 skilled British merchant seamen. That certainly
is a very small number. We require 50,000 skilled seamen to carry on our trade,
besides others who are not skilled, that is to say, ordinary seamen and boys, stewards,
cooks, and all the numerous callings which now form a ship's crew. But we require
60,000 able-bodied, skilled seamen. Out of these we have little more than 20,000
who are English ; the remainder are made up of foreigners, 15,000, Indians, 7,000,
and about 5,000 negroes, and every year the number of English is getting smaller
and smaller. When it comes to the tug of war, and we take the skilled seamen who
belong to the Naval Reserve, from the Merchant Service, how are we to man our
merchant ships ? It is all very well to talk of our magnificent ships trusting to their
heels, and, where compelled, fighting, but who is to fight them ? You cannot do on
board a ship without a certain percentage of sailors. Those who have been in an
emergency know what a good seaman is. A good seaman is a good man anywhere,
but a good sailor on board ship is better than any other man, however good he may
be. You may possibly do with a smaller proportion of good seamen now than for-
merly, but you still require a certain proportion, and without that proportion you
will never get on safely. Taking all the best men from the Merchant Service, we
shall then only have enough men to man our war fleet, without the auxiliary vessels
which we should have to call in from the Merchant Service. There is one point
which Mr. Scott Russell did not touch on, though I hoped he would, and that is
the fitting of merchant ships to carry guns in time of war. I beard from very good
authority — an authority which I am not at liberty to name, though you would all
respect it — that when building these large ships of 12 and 13 knots speed, if
Government chose to subsidise them by paying 3 or 4 per cent, on the value of the
hull, the shipbuilders are prepared to build them of such a scantling that they will
be able to bear a good armament, a chase gun beside broadside guns, and thus be
available in time of war to be turned into cruizers. The sum would not be very
large, as the engines would not be included in the cost.

As to the organization and training of the Navy, that is a subject upon which I
have already read a paper, and I think our men in the Navy are about as badly
trained and as unfitted for their work, taking them all round, as any first-class
naval power would dare to have its seamen. The men themselves are fine fellows,
physically fine, with some education and a considerable amount of discipline, as
compared with olden times, but they are imperfectly instructed as fighting men,
and very inferior as sailors. Whenever they reach a certain age, they desert if
possible.1 The average age of the men in the Navy now is very young ; they are
mere boys. I remember going with a French captain to see the ironclad ship
" Ocean," and when we came away he said to me, " why, Wilson, that ship is not
" manned at all, she is only boyed." And sure enough she was ; and I ask any
gentleman here in connection with the Navy to go on board any of our ships and
look at the seamen. Three-fourths are boys, or youngsters under 20 years of age.
I say this is unsatisfactory, and every year it is getting so. We have no reserve to
fell back upon, because the merchant seamen, however good they are as such, are
unskilled in the use of arms, or so partially so that they are unworthy of being
classed as a reserve of fighting men. They are also undisciplined, and what is more,
their career in life is such as to make them more undisciplined than ordinary lands-
men. Another point that the gallant lecturer spoke of was the number of non-

1 It was stated by the First Lord in a recent debate that the desertions were so
few, being only 4 per cent., as to show no discontent on the part of the seamen in
the fleet ; but he did not explain that but a very small proportion of the men are
so placed that it is possible for them to desert, for, of course, they cannot do so in
the Persian Gulf, China, South Seas, African station, or North Pole, and, in fact,
only in England to a limited extent, Australia, California, and the south-east coast
of America. But where they can escape they go, not in the proportion of 4 per
cent, but more nearly in thai of 20 per cent— J. C. W.

460 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

combatants, only partially disciplined, if at all, and untrained to the nae of
arm on board a man-of-war. This is a most serious matter, and I cannot understand
how members of Parliament, knowing such a state of things to exist, can listen to
people who say the Navy is as it should be. At this present time, when there is the
prospeot of a war in the East, there is a ship fitting out, the " Hotspur," at Fly-
mouth, to join the Mediterranean squadron, with 57 per cent, of her crew non-com-
batants ! "Sow, I ask soldiers, civilians, or anybody else, can any one believe that the
Navy in such a state is satisfactory F The number of non-combatants varies from 30
per cent, in vessels of the " Sultan " class to 57 per cent, in the " Hotspur " class.
With her crew of 200 odd men she will go out say to Salonica, with but 43 per cent,
of men used to arms. If there is an outbreak, and she is required to land 50 men, a
valuable ship will be left in the hands of those who are wholly untrained to the use
of arms, and who do not know whether shot or powder goes in first ? And, mark
me, such is the case in time of peace, but what state would she be in in time of war ?
In war-time she will not have 43 per cent, of fighting men on board, because she will
be filled up with a certain proportion of Naval .Reserve men and others, trained only
partially to arms. Now, I cannot for the life of me understand why all our crewa
should not be as well trained as fighting men, and disciplined as marine artillerymen ;
nor can I understand why our stokers, carpenters, cooks, stewards, all the present
non-combatants on board a man-of-war, should not be as much fighting men, and ae
highly disciplined, as those of the Royal Engineers. The number of men we have in
the Navy is, as far as I can see, ample, and the number of our reserves would be so>
too if they reached a proper standard of excellence, and had passed through a man-
of-war. But they do not reach that standard, nor are they men-of-war's men in any
sense of the word ; they are inferior in training to men in foreign navies, and cer-
tainly in time of need we should find ourselves placed at great disadvantage. Mate-
rial we have lots of, qualified men-of-war's men we have not in any numbers.

Lord Ranelagh : When answering the questions, will you have the goodness to
gratify my curiosity, and give some information as to that curious-looking thing
before us, which I understand from you is Hale's rocket, and has a very considerable
penetration under water, and will you have the kindness to tell us what that penetra-
tion is?

Admiral Selwtk : I rise to give a very cordial and almost entire approval to
Captain Scott's paper, read with his accustomed clearness and perspicacity. There
are, perhaps, a few points in which I may strengthen his argument ; but very few
indeed in which I can say anything to contradict him. The question of the food
supply which this country would have to face in the event of war is pressing more
Btrongly than ever before, in consequence of the efforts of Captain Ead's to open up
the Mississippi mouths. This, when effected, to Europe gives the command of the
whole of the corn of western America by water carriage capable therefore of
being transferred at a price one-third of that which is now paid for the transport
of corn coming from that country.

It is perfectly clear that the longer war is continued, the lesB probability there ia
of any great food supply being found in this country. The more easily corn can be
brought from America, the more we shall rely upon external supplies, and the more
our farmers will devote themselves to the raising of meat-food instead of corn.
The supply from the east might become precarious, because the commerce of the
Mediterranean, which would enable us to rely on the production from the Danube,
might at any time be interrupted. With regard to fast river boats, I presume for
torpedo-work principally, to which Captain Scott has referred, I have just seen with
the greatest pleasure in Mr. Thornicroft's yard, a torpedo boat at last made for the
English Government. The Austrian Government had two of 18 knots an hour,
and the French Government one. We are now having one built, but at the same
time there is a statement in a morning paper that other firms are running boats of
24 miles an hour, and will engage to make a contract for 30 miles. With regard
• to the organization at each port, whioh I have always strongly supported as the
best means of guarding our coasts, I disagree with Captain Scott just to this extent,
that I think the present state of the Navy may lead us to expect enough active
young Officers, thoroughly trained and disciplined, to do all the teaching required.
These men would be fit to teach a considerable number of untrained levies, and it

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WAEFABE " 461

would be Tain to expect the Officers of the Mercantile Marine, however zealous, to
have the modern knowledge and practical experience which could alone make them
fit to train these men. I therefore think I might ask Captain Scott to reconsider
hie views on that point. As to the coastguard's men being relied on in war, I can
only say if they have deserved their name, not being now much employed in pro-
tecting our shores from illicit commerce, their chief value would be as a nucleus of
organization, round which all the coast levies might be accumulated in the case of
war on the ocean, and of the abolition of that extraordinary Declaration, the wisdom,
of which has been so ably confuted in this theatre by Mr. Ross-of -Bladenaburg. I
quite see with Captain Wilson that we should have to divide our merchant ships
into classes, of which some would necessarily be convoyed, and others would trust
to their heels for safety. But what is the use of attempting to convoy when your
carrying vessels carry ten days' coal, and your convoy only three ? Can you expect
to diminish your dangers by enlarging the time during which the danger lasts ?
Would it not be better to consider the manner of enlarging our fuel-supply by
some reoent inventions ? We have done a great deal of late years by the intro-
duction of high pressure into the Navy, but we are a very long way from having
considered the importance of the economy of fuel, and that is the life of a warship
to-day. Sea telegraphs were observed upon as being difficult, but they have only
failed because a vessel which was fit to ride under sail or steam at sea was put to
do the duty of alight ship. Mr. Scott Russell's observations were so ably combated
by Captain Wilson that I have very little to say on the subject, except that I do
not think that you can ask or expect men to be thoroughly trained in every pursuit*
It is utterly out of the question. A thoroughly good stoker may not make a good
man to go aloft. Even our marines, zealous as they are, object occasionally to go
as high as the mainvard, and they are better trained than we could hope our stokers.
to be. But there is more than.that. As long as I was serving actively, I never
knew a case in which an appeal from the engine-room was not met with a ready
response by the Officer of the watch ; and, indeed, in many cases additional pay
has been given to induce the men to do the stoking work. I should be very much
astonished to hear that the knowledge of steam machinery has fallen off among our
Officers since my day. I could myself go through an engine-room with any
engineer, and should be sorry to know that with the increased facilities for instruc-
tion, our Officers are less acquainted with that subject than they were. But I do-
not think it advisable that the Captain should be boatswain, gunner, carpenter, and
engineer. He must rely on that due subordination which has been the essence of
our success, viz., every man knowing his own duty and doing it thoroughly, and then,
whether it is the Captain doing the duty of the head, or the men doing the duty of
the hands, the work will be thoroughly well done. Only one word more with
regard to the possibility of arming merchant ships ; I have passed over the Atlantic
during the last few years, backwards and forwards, in the largest and best ocean
steamers. There is no difficulty whatever in those ships carrying guns if you con-
sent to let them carry them as they can. If you insist on broadside ports they
cannot do it. If you give them centrally disposed guns with proper carriages,,
calculated not to strain their frames, they can carry them with very little prepara-
tion. It is a question of a comparatively small weight, and I am quite sure that a>
very little solicitation on the part of the Government, a very little attention paid
to the question, a little patriotism appealed to, would induce provision to be made
for such a purpose in the event of war breaking out. I do not think that the
nation could fairly be called upon to pay an armed subsidy during peace, either for
guns or for fighting. Our merchant ships in the old wars put their very highest

Sride in being able to beat off the enemy's men-of-war, and I do not think Britons,
ave do degenerated that the Mercantile Marine would fail in this work in any
future war.

Mr. Scott Russell : One word in explanation. I did not mean that one man
was to meddle with another man's trade. What I meant was, that each man should
thoroughly master his own trade, and then know enough of the duties of ev&ry
man about him to be able to give him thorough, cordial, intelligent help. More than
that I should be very sorry to say.
Mr. Pawkgb : I think I have overcome those difficulties that have been spoken of

462 " THE. MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

toy my patent for unsinkable ships, patented in 1874, No. 1174. It consists of i
double ship, and the inner ship is capable of supporting the outer ship if she b
(penetrated in any part whatever. My unsuitable ship is constructed in longitudinal
as well as transverse sections, so that if a shot penetrated one section, and had da
force enough to reach the inner ship, she would not sink. Had the ** Vanguard"
been built in that way, she would never have sunk. I have also a patent fir
armour, No. 4030.

Captain Pbice, R.N., M.F. : There is one topic which has not been touched upca
ftxore this afternoon, but it is one which I think any naval Officer, and I am suit
.both the gallant lecturer and yourself, Sir, will expect us to give some coxiaideration
to, namely, the question of the guns. Naturally when we are considering the
. strength of our Navy, and of the ships which compose it, we must go Tery consider- J J
ably into the question of the armament of those ships. I won't say that Gaptsis
c Scott has given us alarming information, because I do not think he has com© hoe
with any pessimist views, but amongst other incidental points to which he hat
called attention, he has made this remark : " It will be astonishing to my hearts
•" perhaps to be told that no 38-ton gun has yet been tested up to 10O rounds, nor
t( even to one-third of that in quick firing." I am sure that remark was not intro-
duced without having the object of implying to a certain extent a doubt as to the
power of these guns. He naturally meant, I take it, that if these guns had best
tested to such an extent very likely they might not have been found capable d
- enduring that test. Well, as I have myself thrown doubts on this subject, I should
like to say one or two words about it. From returns which have been presented to
us of the different tests to which these guns have been subjected, I have found not
•only that no large gun of this kind, 35 tons or 38 tons, has been subjected to such s
•test as 100 rounds fired in such a way as they would naturally have to be in an
action, but in the tests that they have been subjected to, I have found that no gun
of such a weight has fired as many as sixty rounds without requiring repairs. I
do not mean to say that the gun has shown signs of bursting, or that it has become
entirely disabled, but the gun has been rendered hors de combat for the time being.
It has been said that such repairs as were necessitated by this amount of firing
might be performed on board ship. Well, no doubt if the implements and artificers
were supplied, they might be under certain circumstances, but I confess I am very
much inclined to doubt that they could be carried out in the face of an enemy, or
whilst the operation of blockading an enemy's port was going on. I have taken the
■opinion of naval officers, gunnery officers, who are capable of giving an opinion on
the subject, and they certainly tell me that such repairs could not be carried out
But whether thev could or not there is this to be said, that the necessary implements
have not been supplied to those ships which carry these large guns, so that on the
principle that the strength of a chain must be tested by the strength of its weakest
fink, we may say that the strength of Her Majesty's ships "Devastation" or
" Thunderer,'1 apart from her ramming powers or the torpedoes which she may
«arry, must, among other things, bo calculated by the strength of the vents in their
guns. On one occasion, in another place, I was answered by a very high authority,
one to whom the nation looks for an opinion upon points of this kind, that even
admitting, for the sake of argument, that these large guns might not be capable of
firing more than fifty or sixty rounds without being obliged to be sent home to
England for repairs, really, as a matter of fact, that ought to be considered quite
sufficient. The actual words, I think, were, " People might think it necessary that
" the guns should be revented after every fifty rounds ; but if they fired fifty
" rounds in action, there would probably be very little left for them to fire at." I
am rather inclined to doubt that. At all eventB I should like to see the thing tried.
It is all very well for us to brag about our maritime forces ; it always calls up a
cheer ; but I think we ought to look steadily into the facts of the case, and with
that idea I have always advocated, and shall continue to advocate, a really practical
test of our guns. I want to see these large guns of ours tested exactly under the
same conditions as they would have in an action at sea. It is very difficult really to
say how many rounds we might expect the "Devastation" to be obliged to fire in
action at an enemy of similar build, and of course we must always pit our best ships
against the best ships of the enemy. The only really practical test which we have

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 463

ever seen our large guns submitted to was one in the year 1870, when our three
largest ships, the " Captain/1 the " Monarch/' and the " Hercules," were sent out
from Vigo Bay to fire at a large mark. I have the numbers here in a lecture given
in this theatre by Captain Colomb, and I am taking the figures from his lecture.
The ships were sent out to fire at a rock distant about 1,000 yards. I was in Vigo
Bay at the time, and saw the experiments. The day was almost absolutely calm ;
at all events there was not the slightest motion I think on board any of the ships.
The rock was 600 feet long and 60 feet high ; that is to say, twice as long, and
four times as high as a ship. That is the chief point to which I would call the
attention of naval gunners, — that the rock was four times as high as a ship, because
that is where the accuracy of firing at sea is more particularly required. The
"Hercules" fired seventeen shots, of which ten hit; she was armed with 18-ton
guns. The " Captain/' armed with 25-ton guns, fired eleven shots, and made four
hits. The " Monarch," also armed with 25-ton guns, fired twelve shots, and made
nine hits. I won't follow out the argument which Captain Colomb so ably brought
before us, but I will just go to the results that he gives. By a simple argument
he reduces those results to the results that would naturally be obtained had the
vessels been firing at a target representing the side of a ship, and, putting it into an
interrogative form, he asks, " Is it really then the case that at a moderate range of
" 1,000 yards under the most favourable circumstances a 'Monarch' can only
" expect to hit a sister vessel from twice to fifteen times out of every 100 shots P"
that is to say, from one to seven and a half times out of the fifty shots that we are
told would be quite sufficient to smash all our enemies. He also says, " In six
" minutes from the opening of her fire on the sister ship at 1,000 yards, she will
" have fired 12 shot. There is another thing that we have to consider besides the
accuracy of our guns. I have no wish of course to detract from the capabilities of
our seamen gunners; the fault does not lie with them: it lies partly with our
artillery, and partly with the elements which we have not as yet been able to over-
come. We have this to look at, that as the size of our gun increases, so we must
expect the accuracy of the gun to decrease. If the " Monarch," carrying 25-ton
guns, can only make this amount of accuracy in firing, we must of course expect
our 38-ton gun and our 81-ton gun to be even less accurate in firing at sea. Then
comes the point, supposing that this single shot, or these half-dozen shots, if you
please, out of the fifty fired before the vent becomes disabled, strike, we have to
consider where they would strike, and what damage would be done to the ship that
was struck. To say that those half-dozen shots would be quite sufficient to sink our
enemy, I think is going a very long way towards saying that all the ships that we
have been building hitherto are really so much money thrown away. We have
been endeavouring to build our ships, if not absolutely unsinkable, at all events in
watertight compartments, and with appliances and means for keeping them afloat.
Mr. Scott Russell has told us, that if we only say we want it, he will build vessels
for us actually unsinkable, and I believe that is perfectly within his powers ; un-
sinkable I take it, he means, not only from the shot of an enemy, but from the blow
of a torpedo or the ram of a vessel of similar size. Therefore, I am at a loss to
conceive how we are to satisfy ourselves that we shall be able to do the necessary
amount of damage to the enemy with the half-a-dozen shots with our big guns
before they are disabled. I do not wish to take any alarmist view of this matter,
but so far as I can see, I am really within the mark when I say, that after a very
small number of rounds from one of our big guns, the possibility is that the gun
may become for the time disabled ; and that for the time is everything, because if
we have to send our "Devastations" home from Sebastopol, or whatever other
fortress they may be next employed against, to this country, or to Malta, or some
other arsenal, to replace their guns, or even to revent them, which amounts to the
same thing, I think we shall be in a very awkward position indeed. I have made these
few remarks, because I think this question of the guns has been put Tory prominently
before us, and is not by any means the least important feature of the lecture.

Mr. Roebuck, M.P. : I came here entirely ignorant of anything you (Captain
Scott) were going to say. I came for the purpose of instruction, and I must
say, I have been instructed to this extent, that I have been much alarmed. The
gallant gentleman has proved to me by his lecture, as far as in a short time could

464 "the maritime defence of England,

be proved, that we are in an utterly indefensible position, and one thing of all
others which has struck me most, has been that the Nary which we have now, w
not fully nor properly manned, and that it cannot be manned. Now what I should
wish to learn in a succeeding lecture from the gallant gentleman is this. He points
out certain defects in our Navy arising from want of men. Now has he any means
to propose by which men could be obtained, because Government ought to be
instructed by professional men upon professional subjects, and sailors, conversant
with these matters, as the gallant gentleman is, are just those to whom we should
look for instruction ? Now I, as a legislator, should be very glad to learn what he
would propose as to the means of manning our Navy, and rendering our men
efficient for the purposes for which men are selected to be sailors ; and teaching
them what ought to be taught to each particular class of men, and how that par-
ticular class of men ought to be raised. If he would take that into consideration in
his next lecture, and tell us what we ought to do for the purpose of manning the
English Navy, I should be very much obliged to him.

Captain Wilson : I have read two papers on the subject in this theatre, which, if
you will allow me the honour, I shall be very glad to send you ; they will answer
the question you'have been good enough to raise. I know that it is out of order, but I
omitted to touch on one point of the lecture which I hope I may be allowed to refer
to now. I wish to say that I think Captain Scott did not give sufficient credit to
the usefulness of young marines, and places too much importance on the old
marines. Young marines are as good for fighting purposes as older men, in my
humble opinion. In the old wars it must be remembered we had often soldiers on
board our ships, who proved quite as good in every way as our marines. Sir
William Napier states in his " life," that he was embarked for some years on board
the " Bellerophon " with his men as marines, and at the battle of St. Vincent, Lord
Nelson, when Commodore in command of the " Captain," was helped on board the
" San Joseph " by one of the soldiers of the 68th Regiment, who was one of the '
boarders. In those olden times, if we read naval history, we find soldiers spoken of
in as high terms as the marines of the present day.

The Chaibman : With regard to what has been said about the Officers knowing the
duties of all the men on board, the idea always has been in our service that the
Captain and superior Officers, although they may not be personally practised in the
particular duties of the engineers and of the stokers below, would be worth nothing
in their positions, if they did not know all about the duties of those over whom they
have the charge. A Captain, I conceive, is no serviceable Captain in a ship if he is
not himself personally able to judge of the duties of every man under his command,
be those duties what they may. I may give one instance in support of the
necessity in superior Officers of a practical knowledge of certain details. We may
all recollect the Niger Expedition, which was an expedition up those rivers in
Africa in a very bad, unhealthy climate. The loss of life from illness was very
great indeed ; so much so in the case of the engineers of one, if not of both of the
Bteamships, that in order to get the vessels down the riven, the surgeons (from
the want of engineers) had to start and work the engines, in order to get the
steamers out to sea.

Captain Scott : Commencing at the remarks made by Captain Wilson, I beg to
say that I have not gone into the question of the relative values of young and old
marines, because I have only dealt with general principles ; but I shall be glad to go
more into details on another occasion. Next time, and in continuation of the
paper I have just read, I hope to put before you our war-ships, their needs, and
the means of supplying them : I am quite sure that if we could stir up a little
national enthusiasm, we should have a different feeling at our seaports from what
now exists. We have already most valuable nuclei in Sailors' Homes for bringing
together our seamen and coast volunteers. These Homes, which many now present
have helped to establish, have been the means by which the morale of our men has
been much improved, and their sobriety greatly encouraged ; if we were to extend
the use of those places, and to draw men together, giving them occasional papers
and suitable readings, I think we might in a very short time provide our naval and
mercantile seamen and our coast population with a strong patriotic feeling.
Unless we, at a nation, are all firmly united with our seafaring coast population, we

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WABFABB." 465

should do little in war. Look at the Army, how very united it is on every essential
point. We are proud of our Army, and one always finds that Army men are the
very first to forward the best interests of the Navy } really, without such aid we
should be nowhere. As to our defences, Captain Wilson has told us that when,
soldiers, in times past, have been embarked in our war-ships they have made very
useful men, but the duties of sailors now are very unlike what they were then.
Formerly the work greatly depended upon muscular strength; now it depends
more upon skill, and therefore we must have well instructed men. We must not
run the hazard of having to fight our battles with undrilled men. Remember, in
the American War, how our vessels were sent off with untrained men, and were
captured by the Americans. When and how was the tide turned ? When the
" Shannon," commanded by Captain P. Broke, and manned with a disciplined orew,
who thoroughly understood their work, and would have followed their Captain
anywhere, appeared off the Chesapeake Biver, then the " Shannon" took the frigate
" Chesapeake in a very short time. Happily, that war ended, as we all know, by our
American cousins gaining their independence, and well it is for the freedom of
the world that it was so. I only allude to this to show the mistakes we have made
through want of preparation for war. I think that the Honourable Member of
Parliament, who asked for information, will find in Captain Wilson's and Mr. Bras-
Bey's pamphlets, and in the discussion on Captain Noel's and other papers in this
theatre, ail the information he requires ; but, with ref erenoe to his further remarks,
I am going to show the insufficiency of our naval armaments, and how these arma-
ments can be greatly improved, and I also hope to indicate the qualities required in
our future fighting ships. At the present time we hear much about the need for
building light, unarmoured vessels ; but of what use will they be to oppose heavy
war-ships, for our enemies will send their heavy war-ships to attack our
commerce? Not long since, some of the most influential Frenchmen, speak-
ing of what they would do in case of war with England, said that (despite
the Declaration of Paris) they would leave our war-ships alone, and send
their war-ships to destroy our commerce. I now beg to turn to Lord Denbigh's

auestion, as to arming our merchant vessels. I think it of importance that we
bould utilise all the resources we have, but we should not attempt to put in the
merchant vessels, guns which are so large that they cannot be carried without con-
siderable alterations. I believe officers were sent round to ascertain whether our
merchant steamers could carry heavy ordnance, but I do not think they were
instructed to find out what extent of light armament such vessels could easily carry,
and consequently they came back with the report that the vessels were unsuitable
for carrying guns. As to making the necessary preparations for utilising our
Mercantile Navy in time of war, there are very few men who have the technical
knowledge of gun-mounting, and of the other appliances for warfare, to be able to
grasp the subject, — to do so, and to efficiently carry out such preparations, you must
have specially qualified persons. As respects the proposal to build circular super-
structures, for the purpose of protecting heavy guns, I fear they would prove cum-
bersome, and would not keep out shot, because if the shot struck at even a
very small angle, they would go right through. As to the question of uhsink-
ability, there is no doubt but that it could be secured by means of cellular sub-
division ; and as to the value of the fish torpedo, the Austrians, who were the first
to buy it, now consider that the ram is a far more efficient weapon. This seems the
opinion of their Naval Constructor and their Minister of War, and I mention it by
way of throwing light upon what we and other nations are doing. Lord Ranelagh
asked about this sub-marine rocket. At the time that Mr. Hale brought it forward,
the explosive effects of gun-cotton were unknown ; but now we have every day fresh
improvements in the manufacture of gun-cotton. The advantage of the Hale rocket
is that whereas the fish torpedo requires careful launching, and the charge is
exploded on impact about four feet away from the vessel struck by it, you may in
Hale's rocket put gun-cotton or the strongest explosives in its front. (Lord Kajte-
LAGH : What distance would it go P) That depends on the size and weight. [The
rocket was here let down its tube, and struck a shelf piece some feet off with great
force.]
Captain Bubgbbs : You light the fuse in the rocket at first merely to start it.

466 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND/' ETC.

Captain Scott : So you do in the case of the fish torpedo, and a very delicate
operation it is.

With respect to the guns, Captain Price is perfectly right as to their insufficient
endurance, and we have been continuously making alterations in them for some
time past, and were an inquiry to take place, I am quite sure it would greatly
benefit England by leading to the improvement of her war material. I hare heard
it said that the Committee of the House of Commons that sat on the guns have not
done any good. We were, however, going on in a wrong groove, but, owing to
that Committee, there was a complete change, and what progress we have made, is
owing to their inquiries. The Committee that sat on the construction of ships have
also done great good. Such inquiries awaken deeper interest in naval matters, and
by bringing to light errors, enable us to go on in a sounder groove. Captain Price
has done a great deal of good by bringing naval questions before the House, and not
being a gunmaker, or having any personal interest in the mattem he is endeavour-
ing to push forward, his opinions are entitled to and do receive much respect. I
venture to add that when I was employed by the Admiralty it was a pleasure to see
the trouble that he took in instructing the guns' crews to use their new weapons.
It has been asked elsewhere, Where are you to get thoroughly instructed Officers
from ? I do not think there are sufficient inducements to cause them to devote
their time to professional work. If their time were thus spent, it would be much
better for the interests of the Service. Our present system is to teach a few only of
our Officers in the " Excellent," and the men are drilled to use the weapons in her ;
but they may have a weapon given them that they have not seen before. In times
past, I have known loss of life to occur owing to being new to their weapons, and
consequently uninstructed in their use. In one case a man took off the break, not
knowing that it was intended to control the gun in a seaway. At night quarters
another man was actually attempting to run the gun out while the Captain fired it.
Were greater inducements held out, I feel sure a sufficient number of Officers would
Boon get the requisite instruction, and would come forward to teach all the men,
including reserves and volunteers, thoroughly. I do not think that seamen, who
are necessarily imperfectly educated, can ever teach modern gunnery properly.
The work of gunnery teaching, combined with that of First Lieutenant, would give
an Officer confidence when commanding his crew in action. To prepare for this he
should always drill the crew at quarters, and not allow another voice to be heard,
unless he gave a special order for some separate work. Every manoeuvre should be
performed under his direction alone ; to do this well requires a Captain who knows
precisely what the power of his guns and other weapons is, and what his vessel
really can do under steam. To command and fight a vessel efficiently in these
times requires a special and very high class of practical education ; and we can only
hope that our Officers and seamen will hereafter be as much distinguished by their
superior skill as they have been in times past for their dash and seamanship.

The Chaibman : I think we need not wait till bis next lecture to thank Captain
Scott for the very instructive paper he has given us. He has given us something to
think about. Some of us may think that everything is not quite so black as has
been represented, and may not despair of the present ; but, at all events, nothing
can be better for us than to know the very worst that can be thought of us so that
we may think the remedies out, and be perfectly well aware of our difficulties, and
thus learn the best means of overcoming them.

467

LECTURE.

Friday, 30th June, 1876.
Admiral Sir HENRY J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

"THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND, INCLUDING
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE."

Pabt IL — Our Ships of War, their Armament, &c., &c.

By Captain R. A. E. Scott, R.N.

Introduction.

On commencing this second part of my paper, I wish to disclaim
everything of a personal nature, and though I have in some instances
particularized, it has been, and will be, should I again have occasion
to do so, with the object of bringing before you more clearly the defects
of a system which has acted injuriously upon the materiel as well as
upon the personnel of our Naval and of our Mercantile Marine.

The state of the personnel has been so clearly brought before you by
the valuable papers of Mr. Brassey, Captain Wilson, and others,
following the lucid statements of General Collinson as to our un-

Ereparedness, that I need only call attention to the fact, that while we
ave been slumbering, France has been nursing her marine, which con-
tains nearly 70,000 well-disciplined seamen between the ages of
twenty and forty, who either have passed or are passing through from
three to five years' service in her war-ships. This force is double that
of all our seamen and marines put together.

In Officers, France is equally well provided, having 5,000 captains of
merchant vessels, who also have passed, or are passing, from three to
five years' service in her Navy, and are therefore thoroughly efficient
commanders, ready whenever their services are required by their
country.

Our own reserve force comprises but few Officers, and those few in-
sufficiently instructed in the art of war. Even the " Rainbow," com-
manded by Thomas Brassey, Esq., M.P., is indifferently armed, but is
well supplied, however, with handspikes and tackles, with which guns
cannot be accurately pointed, nor the crew trained to use the newer
weapons.

468 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND,

I believe however, from the attention the nation is now bestowing
upon maritime matters, a better day is dawning, and that our national
armaments will soon be placed upon so sound a basis that the qnestion
asked in the very able leading article of the Pall Mall Gazette of the
11th February, 1871, viz., " What guararitee have we that under similar
" circumstances we should not fail in a way similar to that of
" France ? " may be satisfactorily answered.

My own desire is to direct attention to what is capable of improve-
ment ; and as 1 feel sure that foreigners are well aware of our short-
comings, which are perhaps unknown to those who would gladly in-
augurate a healthier state of things, I do not hesitate to mention what
1 think to be faulty, pointing out at the same time how it may be
amended.

Permit me here to say a word on a point which is connected with
the subject I am treating of, and which is of some importance to us, viz.,
the facilities given to foreigners to view our yards. This is desirable,
otherwise England cannot continue to be the mart of the world ; but
while doing this, let a£ least equal facilities be given to our own Officers,
and then 1 should have no doubt as to the result. We must remember
also that our great engineering firms, who contribute so largely to the
country's greatness and wealth, manufacture for peaceable as well as
for warlike purposes, and that in case of war, we have the willing aid
of these powerful companies. Besides, we have the advantage — a very
great one if intelligently used — of knowing through them what pro-
gress other countries are making.

I now pass to the consideration of our naval power, its present
improvement and its future development : —
1st. As regards new ships ; and
2ndly. As regards the improvement of our present ships.

New Ships.

The smaller vessels should be sufficiently numerous for the varied
duties which our wide extent of territory necessitates, viz., for putting
down piracy and the slave trade, and for the protection of British
subjects in all parts of the globe; such vessels, if not found suffi-
ciently numerous in war time, might, as Mr. Brassey recently pointed
out in this theatre, be easily supplemented by hired vessels. Hence
we may safely devote all our energies to the improvement and com-
pletion of ships now building, and to the bringing up our present
armaments to the requirements of modern warfare.

Our fighting cruisers— ships equally well adapted for single combat
or for combined action in line-of-battle, and able to maintain the
honour of the British flag at all times and upon all occasions— should
consist, I think, of two classes: the smaller of between 5,000 and
6,000 tons displacement, and the larger of from 7,000 to 8,000 tons,
or about the tonnage of the new cruisers " Nelson " and " North-
ampton," which vessels differ from both the classes I propose, in not
being designed to fight with ironclad ships.

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFAKE." 469

These two classes of ironclads, being largely built of steel, a metal
which has recently been so greatly improved in strength and tenacity,
wonld be of moderate draught of water and manageable size, would be
fast, and take a powerful armament into action. Their cost in pro-
portion to armament would be small, and, as the most efficient ship is
the one which combines in the best proportions the needful qualities
for warfare, I have thought it best to place my views — the result of
careful comparison and long experience as to the relative importance
of these qualities — before you, viz : —

1st. TJnsinkability.

2nd. Bamming power.

3rd. Gun and torpedo power.

4th. Armour protection.

5th. Speed.

6th. Coal capacity or steaming power.

" Sea-keeping " I have not named, as all England's war-ships
should be able to keep the seas in all weathers ; coast defence ironclads
seem to me to be an anomaly.

lstly. Unsinlc ability.

This should be the chief consideration of the Constructor ; and I
feel sure that my brother Officers go with me in thinking, that half or
more of the modern thickness of armour on the topside* should be
given up, and the larger portion of the weight of iron saved, be
employed to strengthen the bottom of the ship, and to render her
cellular subdivision more complete. The Navy will, I think, be glad
to hear that Admiral Elliot's advocacy of the turbine has borne fruit;
for even should the results of the experiments not lead to its intro-
duction as a principal motor, they may call attention to the great
importance of rapidity of turning (especially when an enemy may be
charging), and thus lead to the engine for weighing the anchor being
also utilized for the purpose of turning the ship.

In case of damage to the rudder by torpedoes or torpedo-boats,
some appliance to take its place is needed for the safety of the ship
against rams, <fec., and a powerful means of clearing the vessel of
water, is equally needed to secure the ship from sinking. The views
which Mr. Griffiths has put forth of the capability of his cased screws for
very rapidly discharging the water received through a leak (caused by
the blow of a ram or otherwise), as well as other similarly promising
plans, should be at once and very fully inquired into. The difficulties of

Preventing serious damage by torpedoes have been much over-estimated,
n the experiments carried out at Portsmouth, the weak superstructure
and bottom of the " Oberon " received, on every occasion but the last,
less injury than was anticipated ; and I think these experiments tend
to show that a more subdivided and a stranger bottom would have pre-
cluded serious damage by ordinary torpedo-attacks. Further strength
and resistance would be obtained by making every store-room and tank
a water-tight compartment, and the increase of structural strength thus
gained would materially add to a vessel's security against the blow

470 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND,

of a hostile ram. Looking at the long period the " Vanguard " was
kept afloat after her thin side had been ripped by the " Iron Duke's "
spur, the conclusion that unsinkahility may be secured, seems fully
justified.

Strength of bottom, would likewise prove a safeguard against
serious damage from grounding, when perhaps pursuing (not flying"
from) an enemy's war-ship right under her own batteries. One of
our ships, with a strong wooden bottom, went over a ledge of rocks
in pursuit, and was safely bumped back again over it. Strength of
bottom would also prevent the injury that might otherwise accrue
from plunging fire, or from projectiles, or portions of them, striking'
a bulkhead, and being deflected downwards against the bottom.

2ndly. The Bam.

This has been aptly termed "the naval bayonet," and is a weapon
which, if handled with skill and pluck, will prove invincible. Its
special fitness for British sailors was referred to in my last lecture,
and the Chief of the Naval Constructive Department of the nation,
which used it with such effect off Lissa, says of this weapon, when speak-
ing in regard to the re-construction of three vessels of the Austrian
Navy at the cost of one ironclad — that we, as the result of this cheap
conversion, " now possess three rams, the most dangerous and secure
" weapons, I consider, and compared with which, the action and
" effect of the aggressive torpedo is, in my opinion, doubtful and
" insecure, and may easily endanger the ships of its own fleet."

Such then is Herr Romako's opinion of the relative values of the
ram, and of the fish-torpedo which the Austrians were the first to
purchase and experiment with.

Srdly. The Torpedo and Gun.

1. The fish-torpedo requires careful manipulation, and the danger-
ously high force which is essential to compress the air for working its
motive power, has very recently resulted in one or perhaps two deaths
of the skilled instructors teaching its manipulation on board the
" Vesuvius"; the compressed air burst a torpedo in the Royal Arsenal,
and occasioned a serious accident, and is, I fear, likely to cause still
more serious results when handled by the less practised crews of
the Royal Navy. This torpedo explodes by detonation, the bulk of
the charge being at perhaps 4 feet distance from the object struck,
hence the greater portion of the effect is expended in throwing up a
column of water instead of cutting through the object aimed at.
Until therefore the delicacy of this weapon, and the dangers
and drawbacks attendant upon handling it, be removed, I cannot but
concur with the opinion of Herr Romako as to its inferior value
as compared with the " Ram."

The Harvey towing torpedo is simple and efficient, and far more
easily and safely handled ; it is exploded in actual contact with the
object, the centre of the charge being within half the distance of that

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 471

at which the fish-torpedo explodes. Its range, however, is more
limited.

I believe the fast steel torpedo-boat is destined to play an im-
portant part in future naval warfare, by dashing out from under the
shelter of its protector and destroying the rudder, screws, &c., of the
enemy; I think that a more simple machine than the fish-torpedo
would be offered to our Government, if the certainty of a fair reward
were to be held out.

The Gun.

In the early days of armour-plating, Colonel Inglis, R.E., con-
clusively established that one 68-pounder smooth-bore did as much
damage as five 32-pounders, and I think that nearly similar results are
obtainable from rifled guns ; for instance, one 18-ton gun will produce
an effect beyond that which can be obtained by the firing from three
12-ton guns.

The power of the 18-ton gun is sufficient for the penetration of the
armour of any ironclad afloat within certain limits of range, but
the 12-ton gun will not penetrate the armour of thickly plated
vessels. Its shell also is weaker.

• The superior value of a powerful gun which will not fail to damage
the adversary against whom it is discharged, is obvious, and even
those in favour of light guns, arrange for such guns being fired
together by means of electricity, so as to endeavour, I suppose, to
attain the same result as that which could be obtained with certainty
by the more powerful weapon: this leads me to the important
point of a high velocity as an essential for striking a hard blow. The
blow struck by any projectile is proportional to its velocity squared,
multiplied into its weight, and, consequently, if one gun discharged its
missile with a velocity of 1,000 feet per second, and another gun a
projectile of similar weight with a velocity of 2,000 feet per second,
the blow given by the latter would be four times the force of that
given by the former gun; hence we may deduce how the higher
velocity of the German breech-loading 56i-ton gun enabled it to give a
greater result than that which had been obtained from our 81-ton
gun, notwithstanding the excellent construction of the latter.

This higher result seems to be due to the enlarged powder- chamber,
and I believe that it is now contemplated to chamber our 81-ton gun
to 18 inches, and to make the bore 16 inches diameter. Were the
18-ton gun to be somewhat similarly treated, namely, chambered to 12
or 13 inches, and its bore kept to its present size of 10 inches, its
power would, I believe, be nearly doubled, and a like result would
attend the chambering of the 35-, the 12-ton, and the smaller guns.

"Armed science," however, as represented by the artillery, who
seem far more apt than the Navy in the appropriation of new forces,
has already had a field-piece designed to attain the same advantage in
velocity, as that given by the German breech-loaders. But for the
Navy, in which it is doubly important to strike hard, little appears to
have been done.
This leads me to the projectile. The present war weapon, or tool
vol, xx. 2 I

472 "the maritime defence op England,

with which our sailors will have to crack the side of an enemy,
is made of cast-iron, and this brittle metal is pierced somewhat after
the pattern of a sheet of postage stamps, in order to receive the studs,
by which rotation is given and the projectile kept point foremost.

These stnds are swedged in by powerful hydraulic pressure, and
hence necessarily act as wedges to split open the projectile on impact.

The reason given for the introduction of the gaining twist was to
reduce the strain on the gun on the shots starting, but the adoption
of a slower-burning powder has now caused the greatest strain to be
thrown upon the £un when the shot is nearer its muzzle, and thus has
reversed the conditions, which caused the gaining twist to be adopted.

There is now no advantage, but the contrary, in continuing to rifle
guns with the increasing spiral or gaining twist which necessitates
studs, in fact, the supposed advantage was always infinitesimal.

Plate XIII, fig 4, S. a. A, represents the course taken by the stud
projectile on first starting, through the bore of the gun rifled with the
increasing spiral ; the curved line shows the actual path of the iron-
ribbed projectile in rising and centring itself easily in the bore of the
gun, rifled with the uniform spiral, fig. 6, S. b. B.

The difference in strength of the service stud-projectiles between
those of iron only is best shown in figs. I and 2 (0. S. C. Report).

The unfortunate result of the adoption of the gaining twist in
causing loss of velocity, and consequently of penetrative power, is
apparent from the accompanying table compiled from official reports.
This loss of projectile energy, all the skill of Shoeburyness and the
factories has been unable to restore. (See table A in Appendix.)

The Metal of the Service Projectiles.

As the Germans and the Brazilians are manufacturing steel pro-
jectiles for war-purposes, retaining cast-iron for ordinary practice in
peace, I can scarcely imagine the cost of such superior weapons to be
an insuperable bar to their introduction into the English Navy.

The poorest workman deems it the cheapest plan to provide himself
with the best tools, and therefore buys those with a steel-cutting edge,
for he finds he can perform much more work and with less toil, than
if he were to use the poor cutting edge of cast-iron.

The projectile itself is merely a punching tool driven at a very high
speed, and to manufacture it of a brittle material, is not the way to
enable our sailors to retain their superiority in warfare. The tough-
ness and strength which are found in steel, are needed to enable the
shell to punch an enemy's armour and then to burst explosively,
after penetration.

The charge placed inside plate-piercing shells is exploded by the
heat evolved by impact. This effect can be delayed by wrapping the
charge in flannel. Cast-iron shells usually crack on oblique impact.

Judging from the results of firing with our guns, I believe that
if we were to avail ourselves of the fortuitous change brought about
by the adoption of a slow burning powder, which has left our naval
guns, from 35 tons downwards, with a very large excess of strength
in the inner tube and ia the thickness of breech, and we were, as already

*- rf

-■3

5 ; >

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE.* 473

indicated, to increase the size of the powder-chamber and its charge
as far as practicable — the power of our naval guns would be so greatly
increased, as to enable them to drive projectiles against armour-plates
with nearly double their present force.

One of the most scientific of our artillerists has estimated that the
studs of projectiles fired from our 25-ton guns have commonly to bear
a strain of no less than 20 tons to the square inch, so that the -fact of
the studs being over- weighted and the studs themselves overstrained,
admits of little doubt, even were the evidence of the fact not legibly
written upon the studs and stud-holes, and proved by the compression
of recovered projectiles, and the dropping of their studs on discharge.

The heavy copper wad, recently applied to prevent erosion or
scoring of the bore of the gun, would be unnecessary with a better
system of rifling : this wad must greatly tend to break up the projectile
which, considering the brittleness of the metal of which it is manu-
factured, is a marvel of strength.

The recent firing of fifty rounds, at Shoeburyness, in one day, and
then re-venting the gun, is set down as a great success ; but as various
delays occurred during the series of rounds fired, causing a mean
interval of 4£ minutes between them, and a wet sponge was employed,
excessive heating of the gun was prevented.

I think the result rather tended to show the advantage of the naval
pattern of gun-carriages, and the quickness and accuracy of pointing
with the simple rack-training gear; though it likewise showed the
danger of being dependent upon hydraulic gear alone, for both the
hydraulic for lifting the carriage upon its rollers, and that for checking
and controlling the recoil of the gun, were damaged, requiring in the
one case 12£ minutes, and in the other, 63 minutes to replace them in
working order.

In the " Hotspur's " 25-ton, and other similar purely naval gun-
carriages, preventer-gear is fitted, which can be at once resorted to,
and these carriages have each two compressors, either of which is
sufficiently powerful to hold the gun and control its recoil in any sea.

The rapid wear of the vent, to which this recent Shoeburyness
experiment calls attention, is a serious evil, for it causes but a short
' life in action for the 38-ton gun, and a safe endurance of only 50
rounds under the most favourable circumstances ; but what would be
its endurance should the copper wads become displaced, or the gun
have to be fired rapidly in cold weather ?

I venture, however, to suggest whether such a gun could not be
fired by means of a very strong electrical current passing through its
closed breech-piece, or from a vent underneath the gun, either of
which plans would probably stop erosion.

I now come to another important point, vis., the nature of the
filling, called the burstmg-ch&rgQ of the projectile.

Experiments have conclusively proved the most effective bursting-
charge to be gun-cotton, but the gaining twist gives its stud projec-
tile an unsteady course through the gun, and hence gun-cotton cannot
be safely used in our large guns as now rifled.

2 i 2

474 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

The action of gun-cotton is, however, being daily increased in
intensity, and there seems little reason to doubt, that if it could be
carried inside a shell through an armour-plate, it would, on bursting",
shiver the ship's side or deck. '

I will now call your attention to the effect which would be produced,
by special projectiles filled with gun-cotton.

Here is the model of a short mortar from which flat shells filled
with 2 cwt. or. more of gun-cotton, could be projected through the
nnarmoured sides of an enemy's ship-— or this shell, a flying-torpedo
as we may term it, could be projected so as to explode on falling upon
the deck after passing through the unarmoured ends of modern iron-
clads. (See General Hutchinson's Paper, vol. xi, page 40, Journal
E. U. S. I.)

Mhly. — Armour Protection.

Beck-armour offers many advantages, such as ease of repair, and
being placed at an angle not readily penetrable, but the cumbrous
side-armour which will be so difficult to repair if displaced, or even
if much damaged, cannot yet be dispensed with.

The great point to be secured, is to reduce the length of the side-
armour as far as possible, by judiciously lessening the number and
increasing the size of the guns, to be protected by it ; but this should
be done so as not to impair, but rather to improve the ordnance-power
of the ship. The inner circle, or citadel of armoured protection
should be afforded by an armoured deck rising from some point at
from. 5 to 6 feet below the water to 3 or 4 feet above it. This would
be in lieu of the under- water deck now in favour, and its comparative
advantage is that " the cork of the bottle," as Gapt. Wilmhurst aptly
termed it, would be above instead of below the water-line. With an
under- water deck, on the contrary, the shutters round the hatchways
Are liable to be shot through, and then the water passing through the
ports or wounded side of the ship, would pour down these openings,
hindering the working of her engines, and perhaps destroying her
motive power by extinguishing the fires. Upright aide-armour bracing
the cross-armoured bulkheads firmly together and forming an enclosed
Armoured structure, will protect the guns and their crews, and during
the operations of loading and pointing will afford security to the
getting up powder and shell from below, and whilst passing these
Along to the guns ; but this same armour should likewise be the outer,
the armoured deck being the inner line of defence to the motive-power.
A further protection will be afforded to her boilers, magazines, Ac., by
the coals and stores. And here I would advert to the dangerous fallacy
advanced as to withdrawing the crews of the guns outside the armour
to within it on passing an enemy. Such a course would most injuri-
ously affect their " morale " in leading them to cower behind bul-
warks, which after all, might tend to their more complete destruction
in case of penetration of the armour. The huddling of the men
together would prevent the working of the guns within the armour,
•and tend to create confusion, if not a panic ; besides, the true prin-
ciple of saving the lives of one's own crew and of enabling them to fire

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 47&

steadity and accurately, is to separate the guns widely apart, and to
put bulkheads between them, to limit the destructive effect of splinters.

Bthly. — Speed.

I need only say that a high rate of speed will enable the ship*
possessing it to overtake her enemy, and to place" herself in the best-
position for continuing the action with the ram, and with guns dis-
charging the flying-torpedo.

6thly. — Coal capacity.

This also is a very important element for securing success in warfare,
for it enables a high speed to be maintained for a lengthened period,
and provides for that quality which Admiral Selwyn has so happily
termed, " sea-keeping."

In Part I of my paper I dwelt upon the general principles involved
in England's Maritime defence, more especially as regards the personnel,
and defensive warfare ; I now propose to deal with the development of
the offensive power of our fleet and the other points which are in-
timately connected with its efficiency.

Having described the weapons of offence and defence needed by av
modern war-ship, I proceed to point out, firstly, the type of a ship
in which these qualities can be, I think, best obtained.

First 0la88 Ironclad Oruiaer.

The first class ironclad cruizer would be of about the length of
the " Nelson " and " Northampton," and by giving her a little more
beam, keeping her floor flatter, and using steel largely, she could be built
more completely cellular, have a stronger bottom and carry a heavier
armament. The improved armoured deck I have already described,
as starting from the lower edge of the armour, and running above the
water-line, the space underneath being filled with the reserve supply
of coals. This deck would be carried forward to support the ram, and.
aft to strengthen the stern. (See Plate XIV, Fig. 5.)

Referring to the diagram of the " Nelson" and " Northampton fr
(now building), so as more clearly to indicate the method which
would, I think, largely increase the offensive and defensive power of
future cruizers, and render them more than a match for any war vessel
afloat, I wish to point out that the aforesaid vessels are to mount four
unprotected 12-ton guns, and two partly protected 18-ton guns on
each broadside. The improvements I propose are, first to exchange
these eight 12-ton guns for two 25-ton guns, which, according to the-
proportions of relative power, would be of equal force to the guns,
removed; to exchange the four 18-ton guns for four 25-ton guns,
and to bring the armoured bulkheads much nearer, and join them
in one solid structure with the cross bulkheads. I would then place-
one 25-ton gun forward and one aft, outside the armour, which would*
give a total of eight 25-ton guns, six of them fully covered by the
same armour as that which forms a first line of protection to the

476 "the maritime defence op England,

engines and boilers, tbe armoured deck being their inner defence.
This arrangement would enable the proposed ships to fire five 25-ton
guns on either broadside ; three 25-ton guns ahead, and three 25- ton
guns astern. The broadside of one of these cruizers, which I name
the " Collingwood," would consequently be of more than double the
power of that fixed for the " Nelson " and " Northampton ; her bow
and stern-fire more than treble ; and the whole area covered by the
" Collingwood's " fire more than twice that of these ships. This
result is obtained by using the same small rear turn-tables as those by
which the 18-ton guns in the " Sultan " and " Hercules," and the
12-ton guns in the " Shah," <fcc, are turned from port to port.1

Second Glass Ironclad.

The second class ironclad would be about the length of the
" Raleigh," but with more beam and a flatter floor, and would carry
four 18-ton guns under armour on the main-deck, and two outside on
the upper- deck. If unarmoured, a similar armament to that described
could be carried on precisely the same lines as those of the " Raleigh,"
but I should still prefer an increase in breadth, and greater flatness of
floor, as more strength could then be given to the bottom, and a larger
coal-supply carried. By this alteration, also, the 200 tons or there-
abouts of ballast which are carried in the " Raleigh " could be advan-
tageously dispensed with.

The plan of " projecting-side " was the result of my experience gained
in the Channel Squadron in command of the " Research." It was laid
before the Admiralty in January, 1867, and subsequently published in
the Engineer. The projecting-side was devised in conjunction with
the small turn-table already mentioned, as a means of developing to its
full extent, the plan of mounting guns on the broadside, so as to
bring up the power of our heavy broadside cruizers to at least that of
turret-ships, which have the serious disadvantage of too few guns.

I notice that the Austrians have availed themselves of a similar
plan for the " Tegethoff," which Mr. Reed described at the last meet-
ing of naval architects as the newest and most important of the
Austrian ironclads; and in speaking of the projecting main -deck
battery, he says, " that in adopting the system I consider that the
" Austrian Admiralty have acted wisely, for it has many very great
" advantages, and no disadvantage of any moment that I have been
" able to discover even in a seaway." Those accustomed to watch the
rolling of ships at sea will endorse this opinion, but will not I think
prefer the angular shape of the battery of the Austrian to the original
curvature of side which tends to lessen a roll and also to prevent a hard
blow from the sea such as would strike against any angular projection

1 The least number to secure fighting efficiency is about one plate-piercing gun to
every thousand tons of the ship's displacement, the gnns to be ox the following
relative sizes, namely :—

4 18-ton guns for 4,000 to 6,000 tons.

6 25-ton „ „ 6,000 to 7,000 „

8 35-ton or 88-ton „ „ 8,000 to 9,000 „ B. A. E. S.

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WABFARE." 477

<Plate XIV, fig. 7.) The "Tegethoff" is one of the most powerful
broadside-ships afloat,' if her guns be, as Mr. Reed says, of 27 tons
weight. She partakes, however, of the disadvantages common to all
broadside-ships, viz., of having a very confined arc of training for her
guns, only one heavy gun bearing through an arc of 100° ahead, and
only one gun through 100° astern. In the general arrangement of
guns and armour, the " Tegethoff " is very similar to the " Temeraire,"
but the latter mounts, in addition, one 18-ton and one 25-ton gun,
each in a fixed turret on the upper deck. (See Plate XV, vol. 17,
Journal R. TJ. S. I.)

Before endeavouring to give you a glance at a naval action, I will
briefly describe the differences between a broadside- and a turret- ship.
The guns of the broadside-ship are always ready for action, and can
be fired without danger of blowing away your own men, or any
portion of your own ship. Heavy broadside guns are mounted so as
to be pointed with the greatest nicety by hand-power on motions or
signs from the captain of the gun, who, keeping his eye fixed upon
the object he is aiming at, can fire the instant the enemy rolls,
and exposes her unprotected bottom. Shot may then succeed shot
with great rapidity and accuracy. Nor is one gun hindered by the
loading or firing of another, except as regards " smoke." This draw-
back of smoke indicates the necessity for giving up the continuous
popping from small guns, and for increasing the power, and lessening
the number of the guns. It also indicates the value of a smokeless
powder especially for non-piercing-plate guns, so as not to hinder
the firing of the heavier ordnance.

But here let me add, that no large ship can be properly armed unless
she has a suitable proportion, relative to her size, of light, quick-
shooting, and accurate guns for specific purposes, viz., to ward off
torpedo-boats, and to do the work of counter-mining with flat-fronted
shells filled with gun-cotton ; also to clear the decks of an enemy,
and to destroy a mosquito fleet whether intending to attack with tor-
pedoes, or by boarding, or by both combined. (See Appendix, table B.)
A well-arranged broadside-ship of the type proposed would secure
what Admiral Selwyn advocates, viz., " Having a gun battery pro-
" tected by the same armour which protects the ship ; " and likewise
what Sir Spencer Robinson truly deems most essential, viz., "the
" protection of the uptakes and crowns of the boilers, and of the
44 motive-power." (Plate XIV, figs. 3, 4 and 5.)

The turret-ship, on the contrary, carries a massive weight of
turrets to protect her guns, communicating by armoured trunks with
the under-water and other decks. It, however, affords a better
protection to the guns, gun-carriages, and gunners than any other
adopted plan. It also possesses the advantage of central position, and
of carrying the heaviest ordnance at a great height above the water*
This is undoubtedly a great point, especially in rough weather.

On the other hand, the enormous weight of the turret and its guns
cannot be pointed upon an object by hand-power, and, consequently,
requires steam to intervene between the hand and the pointing-gear of
4he gun. The result is, that an interval of time elapses and a consequent

478 "the maritime defence of England,

loss of accuracy, and this is further increased by the sights being placed
upon the top of the turret some feet above the level of the gun. This,
perhaps, is what Captain Price recently referred to in speaking of the
anticipated inaccuracy of the 81 -ton and other large turret guns, and
not to any gun when mounted on the broadside carriage on which the
38-ton gun was fired on the practice ground at Shoeburyness. There
is the further disadvantage and danger of having to fire over the deck
without any guide for laying the guns even by day — so that a hasty
shot may cut away a mast, rigging, and boats, or be sent through the
deck, should the gun be fired ahead or astern with depression.

The " Monarch " has two 12- ton guns under her forecastle, the
crews of which are, in my opinion, exposed to nearly as much danger
from their own guns as from those of an enemy — an opinion in
which our Constructors seem to share, for no guns are placed on the
decks of the later turret-ships.

In a former commission of the " Monarch," a shot was fired, which,
just passing over the Captain's head, sent the wire shrouds of the
mizen-mast flying in innumerable splinters. This leads me to doubt
whether wire rigging may not prove as prolific a source of danger in
action as the firing of studded shell across the deck.

Lastly, there is the want of light guns, which is a very great draw-
back to the efficiency of a fighting-ship, and one which might lead to
the prevention of accuracy of aim, if not to the silencing of her heavy-
guns by the maintenance of a continuous fire upon the sighting, ports,
and the loading arrangements of the turrets.

The smaller vessel drawn here (see Plate XIII, fig. 5), which I call
the " Victory," may be taken to represent a second-class armour-clad,
carrying six 18- ton guns. In single combat, her broadside power
would equal that of the " Sultan " through an arc of 130°, but for
the remaining 230° it would exceed it twofold. Supposing that the
" Victory " had forged ahead or dropped astern, and were to fire flat,
headed steel shell, which are not deflected like round-headed shot on
touching the water, and would penetrate at an angle of 66° from the
perpendicular, she would be pouring in three 18- ton gun shell and
receiving the fire of only one 18- ton gun, which, if the angle were 40°
from the perpendicular, would fall harmlessly from her side and from
her armoured cross-bulkhead.

Should the " Victory's " shell not explode on striking the " North-
umbrians " side, it would certainly sweep her decks, and if it did little
previous damage, it would probably bring up against the armoured
bulkhead and explode, or be deflected downwards through the crowns
of her boilers or through her engine-room.

Tired of this unequal combat, the " Northumbria " puts her helm
down so as to bring her broadside to bear ; but before she has steadied
herself by reversing her helm to stop the swing which would be fatal
to accuracy of fire, the " Victory," which has also put her helm down,,
comes flying onwards and rams her well forward to escape the danger
of any towing-torpedo.

I think that I have now conclusively shown —

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WABFABE." 479

Istly. Tliat tlie broadside ships I have proposed, viz., the " Colling-
" wood " and " Victory," by the use of the same means as those em-
ployed to work the heavy guns of our present broadside armour-clads,
can be placed upon more than an equality with turret ships.
^ 2ndly. That armoured bulkheads, to protect from raking fire, are of
little value, unless the armour is joined at the two other sides so as to
complete the enclosure, as already shown in the " Gollingwood " and
"Victory."

3rdly. The inefficient protection of plated decks wholly under water,

I need scarcely enlarge further upon the disadvantages attendant
upon the present type of broadside ship. Those who have commanded
such ships in the Channel squadron are aware of these disadvantages
and the difficulty of keeping their guns bearing upon any object, owing
to the present restricted arc of training. This restriction is very
damaging to efficiency, as broadside guns can so seldom be fired when
steaming in a squadron. Even in single actions, when a ship can
manoeuvre with freedom, and fire without fear of striking a friend, to
be forced by the confined arc of training to fight abeam or nearly
so, and perhaps rolling heavily in the trough of the sea, is not the
way to secure victory.1

The having fewer and larger ports has been urged as an advantage,
but in single combat, an enemy would only be opposite one port of
each projection at a time ; were the action a combined one, the great
importance of being able to bring one broadside to support a hard-
pressed consort, whilst engaging an enemy with the other, or to fire
past a friendly ship, must be apparent to all naval men. The ports
in the projecting rounded battery would also enable the captains of the
guns to obtain a wide field of view, and hence to keep their guns
bearing upon any enemies round the whole sweep of the horizon.
(Plate XIH, fig. 7.)

Improvement of our present Ironclads.

Permit me here to mention what Austria is now doing, viz.,
replacing the wooden sides of three of her ironclads with iron sides
and adding additional armour in vital places — a conversion which
Herr Romako states — "will not cost more than the building of
" one ironclad." I venture also to quote from The Navy of May
13th, 1876, Mr. Reed's words : " The authority of the naval architect
" comes in, 1 apprehend," in stating what qualities are, and what
qualities are not, procurable in a ship, and that their opinion as "to
" the value of ships for sea-going and fighting purposes are quite
" subordinate to the opinions of Naval Officers."

1st— The Sultan.

This ironclad, at the time she was equipped, was considered as
one of the finest, and is certainly one of the best-built vessels in the
world. Commencing with her bottom, the 600 tons of scrap-iron and

1 The adherence to the old style of sailing-ship broadside-battery sacrifices more
than half of the gun-power. Broadside suns are only effeeti?e through an arc of
from 66° to 76°, leaving upwards of 100° of total inefficiency.

480 "the maritime defence of England,

cement placed there, is now so much dead weight, and therefore a
source of weakness, and must tend to strain the structure where it is
comparatively light, viz., between the armour and the bottom, on the
vessel's receiving any shock from ramming, or being rammed. This
dead weight, which if the vessel took the ground would risk her
destruction, could be advantageously replaced by a cellular arrange-
ment, carried out somewhat as Mr. Boolds suggests. The cost of
putting in 500 tons of such strengthening, he estimated at £20,000,
but our own highly skilled Constructors would, I believe, give equal
strength by putting in less material, and at less than half this cost.

To balance the removal of the dead- weight from the bottom, and the
carrying up of the cellular structure above the water-line, the cumber-
some top-armoured structure, weighing, if I mistake not, 300 tons,
should be removed, so as to leave a clear deck and an open view fore
and aft for efficiently handling the ship.

With this structure I would sweep away its two 12-ton guns and
turn-tables, which would be in the way of working the sails, and utilize
the turn-tables for the two 12-ton bow guns (which are now arranged
to fire ahead only), so that they would each work two ports, and thus
command a fire from ahead to abaft the beam. In the stern, abaft the
armour, another 18-ton gun, sweeping round the stern and crossing
fire with the bow- guns, could be easily mounted on the main deck on
each side. This with the necessary strengthening would weigh upwards
of 80 tons. The result of the change would be a saving of nearly 500
tons in weight and a much stronger and better arranged ship, together
with a fifth 18-ton gun for broadside-fire.

The five ships of the " Audacious" class could be somewhat similarly
improved, viz., they could mount six 18-ton guns, with shortened slides
in their main- deck batteries, instead of six 12- ton guns, and be pro-
vided with two other 18- ton guns outside their armour, viz., one at the
bow and the other at the stern, their upper decks being locally
strengthened ; the ships would thus discharge five 18- ton guns on the
broadside, and the danger of the bursting of a single shell, or of the
vessel's catching fire, in the central battery, and thus stopping the
firing of all her guns, be prevented.

The armoured structure upon the upper deck, weighing about as
much as that of the " Sultan," could then be swept away and the
ballast replaced by cellular strengthening. This alteration would
remove a weak superstructure, would save nearly 300 tons in weight,
and would enable a much larger coal-supply to be carried.

Both the " Sultan " and the " Audacious " class should be provided
with suitable light upper-deck guns, mounted upon slides, 2 feet
shorter than those now adopted. See Plate XIII, fig. 6.

The " Bellerophon " is deficient in bow-fire, and should be supplied
with two 18-ton guns, mounted in indented ports, outside the armour
of her main deck, and at least two more 18-ton guns to replace 12- ton
guns in her main-deck battery within the armour. The two 6^-ton
guns on the broadside of the upper deck should be done away with.

This vessel, from her fino armoured tower, would make a capital
flag-ship from which to direct a squadron.

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 481

The " Minotaur " class are well built vessels, strong in the bottom,
and showing, I believe, no signs of incipient decay. Their upper
decks are firmly braced, and with local strengthening could easily
carry four 38-ton guns, mounted on the same plan as the gun
at Shoeburyness. On the main deck, so as not to add greatly to
the total weight, a few powerful breech-loading 80-pounders, capable
of piercing the thinner armour-plates, might be mounted. These, with
some anti-torpedo 12- or 20-pounders, would render the " Minotaur "
class, powerful ocean- cruizers. As their proposed main batteries would
be on the upper deck, they might take in a very large supply of coal
below. In war-time, the spacious decks of these vessels would be
valuable for housing and lowering torpedo-launches for an attack ; and
this room would be equally valuable for working the Harvey and
other torpedoes.

The " Minotaur " class would prove most serviceable for laying out
light telegraph-lines ; and for making the electric and sound-signals
already suggested as a> means of communication between our cruizers,
mentioned in Part I. As first-class troop ships, they would be un-
matched, and just the vessels to fight their way with the troops which
the author of " The Army Question, 1876," considers might be used
"in support of an ally with extraordinary effect by striking at the
" communications of an enemy so directly as to give it the effect of
" a much greater force."

I will only refer to one unarmoured vessel, the " Inconstant," as her
12-ton gun-carriages are placed upon slides which are too long and
two feet too far in-board ; this consequently interferes with the passing
of powder and shot behind them. On the other hand, from her guns
being so far in-board, the sights for pointing them are blocked by a
slight roll, and the fire and smoke from the discharge are not carried
sufficiently far from the ship's side. This vessel is also deficient in
bow and stern-fire, which might easily be given.

I need not go further in enumerating the improvements which
could so easily be made in our existing ships ; but I do wish to urge
that our coast-defence armour-clad ships should be made efficient
" sea-keeping " vessels.

What is now wanted, however, to carry out improvement, is the
vigour which Captain Coles threw into the advocacy of the turret, and
like him, for us to throw aside old forms of construction which
modern warfare has rendered obsolete. Mechanical and technical
knowledge is wanted ; the younger Officers might therefore at once,
while in the full vigour of their activity, pass through the Shoebury-
ness course side by side with "armed science." They would thus
gain a far better knowledge, both theoretically and practically, of the
relative values of armour and guns, than is now possible for them to do.

Foreign military governments pay the expenses of their Officers,
and secure admission for them at our various trials of ordnance and
armour. The British Government places the naval Officer on half-
pay, puts few facilities in the way of (lis acquiring information, and
allows him to go at his own cost to these experiments. Besides the
advantage of working side by side with a Corps necessarily better

482 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

educated than his own, the naval Officer would learn at Shoeburyn
what cannot be learnt on a movable platform in harbour, viz., how
to lay a gnn with exactitude, for he would be enabled to observe the
result of his own firing day by day, as the precise spot where each.
shot struck is measured and marked down ; his errors would thus be
corrected, and steady improvement be made.

To give a more perfect knowledge of their weapons to the whole
Navy, as well as to instruct the untaught masses of our coast popula-
tion, a larger establishment than that at Shoeburyness would be
needed ; no better place could be found than the Crosby Sands off Liver-
pool, adjoining which a dep6t for the marines could be advantageously
formed, and this corps, now 500 or more below its nominal strength,
and having only a sufficient number in barracks to keep up the
supplies to the ships in commission and to discipline recruits, could be
rapidly augmented from the neighbouring counties and from the north
of Ireland. Seamen, fishermen, and boatmen also, would be attracted
to such an establishment, and, were due encouragement held out,
would quickly take an interest in and learn their duties, and being
then passed into the drilled Reserve, would be ready for embarkation
on board our war-ships.

I have now endeavoured to show how thorough instruction could
be imparted to our naval Officers and seamen, before being embarked
in war-cruizers for more practical work, and I have indicated the
qualities which are, at the present day, needed in our war-ships.

Permit me now to express a hope, that more attention may be here-
after directed to those improvements, which though costing little, as
Mr. Brassey recently remarked, while the vessel is under construction,
would add greatly to her efficiency when built. I have likewise endea-
voured to show how the vessels which are built might, together with
their armaments, be improved, so as more fully to meet the require-
ments of modern warfare.

In my first lecture I pointed out the necessity for embodying in one
comprehensive Reserve-force the whole of our able-bodied seafaring
population, and I indicated the means by which this could be effected ;
and I also showed how our vast mosquito fleet of river steamers, steam-
tugs, &c., could be utilized for coast defence. I likewise indicated how
our war-cruizers and merchant-steamers could act together for the
preservation of our commerce, and for destroying the foes of our
country, and I showed the advantages of more extended telegraphic
communication.

In the discussion which followed, the growing influence of sailors*
homes upon the morale and patriotism of our seamen was adverted to
by me. May I now add that these sailors' homes would prove valuable
nuclei for the diffusion of that public spirit which it is necessary to
awaken, so as to stir up the slumbering enthusiasm and the great
energy of our hardy maritime population ; thus moved, it would find
a pleasure in being intelligently taught to handle the latest weapons of
war, and perhaps a still keener pleasure in using them in its country's
Bervice.

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WABFAEE." 483

The little cloud in the east is extending, but we may trust that the
time for action will find us not unprepared for the high destiny
assigned us in " the Book," which our gracious Queen acknowledged
to be the foundation of our national prosperity, and wisely use at once
the ample means with which the Giver of All has so richly endowed us.

Then, whatever empires have passed away, or may be overturned in
the coming struggle, we shall be found still occupying the high posi-
tion of " Queen of the Ocean," and using our power, not only for the
benefit of our own people, but also for the maintenance of right
throughout the world.

APPENDIX

>•

Table A. — 7-inch gun competition. Projectiles with hemispherical ends.
Committee pattern. Mean of all rounds fired. Shot.

3 "3

«5|
6 3

•

d
.2

Means.

Weights.

Guns.

•

c3 bo
O g

is1
« e

P o

1-2
§"8

•s

Iron ribbed shot (long bear-

Feet.

1,594
1,529

1,610

« •

• •

■ •

• •

* •

Yards.

1,585
1,473
1,446
1,399

Yards.

17 7
62-2
19 9
29 6

Yards.

1-1
1-9
2-0
1-0

Lbs.

• •

Lbs.
110

French (Falliser studs) ....
Shunt

100
110

A>AV/

Table B.

The complete armaments of the " Victory" and " CoHingwood" (im-
proved broadside ships) would be as follows : —

" Victory" 2nd Class Cruizer.

No.

6
4

Description.

18-ton guns
64-pounders
12-ponnders

Ship's displacement.

Tons.
6,000 to 6,000

CoUingwood" 1st Class Cruizer.

8
6
8

25-ton guns

4-ton guns

12-pounders

- 200

- 24
= 4

228

}

7,000 to 8,000

484

" THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

Table G.

In the following table I have endeavoured to show the sizes and
numbers of guns which would be suitable for each size of vessel.

No.

Description.

Weight.

Ship's Displacement.

Tons.
72

6k
8

Tons.
1

2
6

S^-ton 64-pounders B.L. ....
i-ton 12-pounden B.L* • . . .

V 4*000 to 6,000

12
6

81*

160

4
6

*4-ton plate-piercers B.L

i-ton 12-pounders B.L

V 6,000 to 7,000

16
6

169

210
76
24

38-ton ., U.D

> 8,000 to 9,000

i-ton „ 12-pounders B.L.

314

1 A 4-ton gun was manufactured for India in lieu of the 64-pounder.

The last armament would be for special fighting ships, and could be
well carried on the 8,490 tons displacement assigned to the " Ajax ''
and "Agamemnon," in lieu of the four guns which are intended to
constitute the armament of these vessels.

The Chaibmak : The subjects that have been brought before us to-day by
Captain Scott are very extensive and require a great deal of thought. I hope, and
think that we shall find some gentlemen present who are willing, as well as we know
they are able, to make remarks upon them, and to enlighten us still further with
regard to some of the details which have been brought before us.

Commander W. Dawson, R.N. : The paper, as you, Sir, have already remarked,
extends over a great variety of subjects, so various and so large, that it would be
improper for any one in my position to occupy the time required for an attempt to
discuss them all. I have known Captain Scott's ideas for a great number of years
on the question of ships' armaments. I have very often differed from him very
widely indeed, but I have generally found that when I have subsequently taken the
trouble to study more attentively the particular question on which we differed that
Captain Scott was generally right, and I was generally wrong. Under those circum-
stances I feel rather a difficulty in rising to discuss a paper, the criticism of which
must be to find out the faults, and not to eulogise the good points. It is full of
good points — full of instructive matter for deep thought, which will profit us all
not only in the hearing now, but in thinking them over quietly at home. I will
deal simply with the question of the offensive powers of ships, leaving the other
very tempting questions to be found in this paper. Any one who studies the
relative armaments of our ironclads will find that from the first introduction of
ironclads to this day, there has been a constant diminution in the gross tonnage of
the ordnance carried, and therefore of the offensive power ; it becomes therefore
an important question to decide in what way this diminished weight of armament
ought beat to be distributed. The 18-ton gun is a very serviceable weight, and I

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 485

think it is capable of haying its perforating power largely augmented, without any
material addition to its eighteen tons of metal I take that gun as a standard of
weight to start from, and I would suggest to Captain Scott that his advocacy of the
26-ton gun is, in my judgment, not a good one, inasmuch as the 25-ton gun is
generally looked upon as one of the least effectual guns for its weight that we have.
I am speaking, of course, of its power in reference to its weight. Are there no
means of increasing the perforating value of the 18-ton gun except by doubling its
weight ? When engineers wanted to double the power of the steam-engine, what
did they do? Did they take the weight of the original engine and shafts and
boilers, and multiply them by two, and then build an engine of double the original
weight in order to produce double the power P Is not that something of the war
m which ordnance nmnufaotuvere proceed P An 18-ton gun, throwing a shot with
" decidedly the lowest velocities," is found incapable of doing the required work.
We take that 18-ton gun, and multiply by two, and turn out a 86-ton gun. We
then find that a 86-ton gun, with " decidedly the lowest velocities/' is incapable of
doing the work, and we multiply that weight by two, and we have an 81-ton gun.
Why is that 81-ton gun wanted P Because a " low velocity " 86-ton gun won't do
a given work. Why is the 86-ton gun wanted P Because a " low velocity" 18-ton
gun won't do the work. The work to be done by the shot is to perforate a given
thickness of armour. What are the properties required in a perforating shot ? A
sufficient weight and velocity. Why then may not sufficient weight and velocity of
shot be projected from the smaller gun by some ingenious arrangement, just as
the engineer has got increased work out of the same gross weight of steam engine P
That is a question which I think ought fairly to be faced. It seems a very unintel-
ligible brute force sort of way, that of simply multiplying the weight of the gun by
two, when you want to get more work done by the shot. There must be, and ought
to be, some way devised by whioh more work might be got out of shot projected
from guns of the existing weight* I* it that the bore of the gun is not large
enough or small enough P Then why not make it a little larger or a little
smaller P Why cannot heavier and longer shot be got out of itP or why can-
not the shot be driven out of the gun faster P What obstructs the egress ? There
are several causes of obstruction. Some years ago, some competitive guns were
compared, and it was discovered that when shot of the same diameter and weight
were driven from guns with different rifling appendage, one particular rifling gave
" decidedly the lowest velocities." The rifling appendages which were upon that
"slowest velocity" shot are precisely the appendages which we now have on the
Bhot, which fails to perforate when discharged from our present 18*ton gun. Why
should you deliberately stick to a shot which the late Ordnance Select Committee
reported to have " decidedly the lowest velocities," when you want increased per-
forating power ; why, again, should you not increase the weight of the shot in the
18-ton gun ? It is only 400 lbs. weight ; why not make it 800 11)8. weight, if
required ? Because the shot must be so much longer P What is the harm of length P
The shot will require more spin. If it requires more spin, there must be a sharper
twist in the gun. If there is a sharper twist, you must have stronger rifling
appendages, or a longer bearing and greater grip in each groove; but the grip in the
groove is only one inch ; if the shot be ten feet long or two feet long, it has still but
one inch grip in the groove. If the shot be 100 lbs. weight, or one ton weight, it
has still but one inch grip in each groove. That is quite contrary to all mechanical
science. In proportion as the work to be done by the rifling appendage is greater,
there ought to be a loriger bearing to perform that work. Supposing that instead
of one inch stud in each groove doing the rotating work of the 400 lbs. shot, you
could put in fifty studs, you would get a fifty inoh bearing— the whole length of the
cylindrical parts of the shot. By dispersing the effort of rotation over the whole
length of the shot, you would be enabled to give the grooves a sharper twist, so as to
rotate a much longer shot, and to fire a much heavier projectile with greater spaee for
a much larger bursting charge, and with much more perforating force. There is one
direction in which it might be possible to make improvement. But there is another
advantage in a longer shot, which is this :— that the longer the shot the more regular
is the combustion of the powder in the rear. The longer shot seems to come out of
the gun m a steadier way, so that the combustion of similar oharges of powder is

486 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

more nearly similar. It is quite true that the powder-pressure goes up higher, but
there are not those oscillations of pressure which hare been so very disturbing to the
minds of all artillerists. That is an obrious advantage in increasing the length and
weight of the shot. Then we may increase the size 01 the chamber. In our younger
days, the chamber used to be made smaller than the rest of the gun ; but now it has
been discovered that by making the chamber larger and the cartridge shorter, a
better combustion of the powder is obtained. There are, no doubt, other ways and
means which might be devised by which guns of given weight might be made to do
more work, so as to perforate greater thicknesses of armour. As individual guns
are doubled in weight, there must be a corresponding reduction of the number of
guns carried by each ship. Four 18-ton guns are roughly equal to one 81-ton gun.
Now, supposing the shot from both guns alike capable ox perforating the ironclad
attacked, then I would say that the four guns with the four pair of eyes aiming were
far more likely to make hits than the one pair of eyes with the one 81-ton gun. I
wish to bring this very prominently before your minds, that firing a gun in a sea-
way, and hitting the object with the shot, are two different things, and that it is a
very small proportion of the shot which are fired, that do hit ; therefore, to put an
81-ton gun in place of four 18-ton guns is simply to reduce your chances of hitting
four times. It is a question of common sense ; but, at the same time, of nautical
experience. It is one thing to fire from a moving platform at a moving object at an
unknown distance, and quite another thing to hit it. There is no look-out man at
right angles to the range, and whilst those in rear of the gun are thinking that the
shot is falling short, it is perhaps passing over the object, and while those in the
line of fire think that it is going over, it may really be falling short. These things
must be regulated by a certain degree of attention to the doctrine of chances. If
we are only to have a given weight of armament, it would be preferable to have four
18-ton guns rather tban one 81-ton gun, always supposing, of course, that perfora-
tion is secured. Therefore, I say, attention ought to do more decidedly directed to
improving the perforating force of the smaller gun so as to get more effective work
out of a gun of a given weight. There appears to have been a recent experiment at
Shoeburyness, during which a 35-ton gun was fired at intervals one hundred times.
I do not wish to make any imputation upon any one ; but, as a matter of human
nature, I venture to suggest that a gun-manumcturer who is testing his own gun
will naturally endeavour to show off its special merits. An independent authority,
testing that gun, would, on the contrary, endeavour to find out its demerits. Now,
you have the gun-manufacturers trying the suns they have already made, and try-
ing them under the equivocal circumstances that those guns are doubted by the sea-
artillerymen who have got to fight with them. It would be far more oonsonant with
human nature, and more satisfactory to the Navy, if a doubtful gun was tested by
independent persons, instead of being tried by the gunmakers, who send down to
Shoeburyness a squad of very experienced and rery careful nurses, who have had
great experience in nursing doubtful guns in all sort of ways — so much so, that the
gun itself is popularly called an " infant ! " It requires a certain amount of
nautical experience to ascertain what would be the consequence of 2-inch cubes
of hard gravel being fired out of a 35-ton gun over the decks of friendly ships
and open gun-boats; and as to what would happen if the wrong powder was
employed. These are matters of experiment upon naval guns of which naval men
are the proper judges ; and I would suggest that experiments of that kind to
be at all relied upon, ought to have been done something in this way: — to
telegraph to the Admiral in command of the fleet in the Mediterranean to order the
" Devastation" to fire a hundred rounds from one gun in such a manner as would
simulate to the best advantage the conditions of a naval action; and that a com-
mittee of naval Officers from that fleet, taken as they are without any direct com-
munication at all with the War Department or Admiralty, should devise and carry
out a scheme for firing one hundred rounds as in a supposititious naval action, and
for observing very carefully the effects on vessels in the line of fire and upon the
gun. Supposing the results to be what they ought to be— perfectly good— I am
quite sure all naval men would be thoroughly satisfied with such a report ; but I do
confess from my information as to other experiments tried in the same way, that I
do not think an experiment tried by a gun-manufacturer upon his own gun, and

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 487

carried out by experienced ordnance nurses, does produce the same amount of con-
fidence amongst seamen as if the experiment on a naval gun were conducted by some-
body else.

General Colliptson, R.E. : I think we may congratulate the Institution and the
country on the general tone of these discussions, going, as they have been going, in
the direction of showing the advantage of being prepared for offensive as well as for
defensive warfare. We seem to have begun to acknowledge that the real problem
put before the Army and Navy in war-time, is not so much the defence of England
only, or the fighting of a naval battle only, as to bring the war to a satisfactory
conclusion in some way or other. I think also that English people are beginning to
understand a little more clearly that these islands are the citadel of our Empire,
and that our best policy in warfare is to put that citadel in an efficient state of
defence, so that all our active offensive weapons can be employed against the enemy.
I heard an expression used by a brother Officer of mine the other day, which, I
think, is a very happy one, — that the marine forces are the right arm of England
and the land forces are the left arm of England. We know a man generally uses his
right arm to strike out ; and therefore I think it is a satisfaction to feel that the
Navy are taking up their part in warfare more with that view of their work. We
also know that a man generally uses his left arm for defence, but also that he
is quite prepared to Btrike out with it when necessary ; and I may say I think the
Army is considering its duty in that respect also. Viewing, therefore, the Navy in
the light chiefly of a great offensive weapon, I venture to suggest to Captain Scott
that there are two points in his classification of the power of a war-ship in which he
might add to them with advantage. One is—the power of manoeuvring — the power
of turning the ship ; I presume that would be most clearly expressed by the
diameter of the circle in which a vessel can turn. The second element in the
strength of the ship, which I think all naval men ought to include in their calcula-
tions, is the crew, not only as to numbers but as to efficiency; and I think from what
we have heard of the power of rams, and guns, and ships to-day, we shall feel that after
all, a great deal depends upon the efficiency of the crew, and that it will always be a great
satisfaction to the British nation to feel that it is so. Now I venture to make a sugges-
tion to the naval men present in considering the subject more particularly of defensive
warfare. It is not often that the Army can make suggestions to the Navy, or that
the Army considers itself a little better prepared for war than the Navy ; but I do
think the War Department has made a very great stride in this last year, in their mobi-
lisation scheme, by which, on any declaration of serious war, the whole of the land-
forces of the country will be assembled in different positions in the country most
suitable for its defence ; and also that some, if not all, of the army corps will be
quite prepared in their equipment of men, horses, guns, and stores, to proceed on
any expedition. But the part of the scheme to which I wish to draw the attention
of naval men is, that the coast-line of England is intended to be divided into
districts, and that in the mobilisation-scheme, certain Staff Officers and certain
troops will bo appointed to each district, who will be responsible for all the defensive
elements in that district. I will suggest, in taking up the question of the naval
defence of these islands, that that idea should be carried out as to the coast-defence ;
that it should also be divided into naval districts, which may very properly correspond
with the military districts, and that an idea should be formed of the number of
coast vessels armoured and unarmoured whioh would be necessary for the defence of
each district, and where the armoured vessels are to be obtained, and where the un-
armoured vessels are to be obtained ; that is to say, where you can put your hand
upon merchant steamers, river steamers, and coasting steamers, suitable as an
auxiliary defence, and how many would be wanted, and where these vessels could be
stationed at once in time of war as the centres of the naval defence of the coast ;
and, more especially, what number of men you would require for the working of these
vessels, and how you will be able to get them out of the fishermen and seafaring
men on the coast of England. I think if we could get that further step in the naval
defence more clearly laid down, as it has been in the military defence, we should put
this citadel of our Empire in a more secure state, and leave the active fleet and the
active army more ready for offensive operations. One other point I wish to allude
to with reference to something said upon the subject of testing the guns at Shoe-

VOL. XX. 2 K

488 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND,

buryness. I do not think it is right to say that the manufacturer of the gun testa
his own gun j because really the Officers working at Shoeburyness in all the experi-
ments there, hare nothing whatever to do with making the guns, and sometimes the
guns come from private manufacturers. They are, I have no doubt, as perfectly
willing to criticise any gun that comes to them and to find fault with it, as any naval
man would be ; and I feel quite certain — that as far as such a trial can be made in
a place like Shoeburyness — it is a fair trial. At the same time I quite allow that a
more satisfactory trial would be one more nearly assimilated to the actual conditions
of war.

Major Monobeefp, F.R.S. : The great importance is evident in the present transi-
tional state of naval architecture of such lectures as the one we have listened to, and
they give rise to discussions on methods of treatment likely to be of advantage to the
Service. I have some delicacy at present in making remarks with regard to that
part of the question on which, of course, I am expected to speak. In dealing with
this subject, on this occasion, the broadside, the turret, ana other methods, have
been brought before the meeting, but I did not observe that Captain Scott referred
at all to one method which is calculated to give all the advantages of the " turret-
" system " without its defects. That method, namely, " the disappearing system/1 also
bears upon another part of the subject of the lecture, namely, the exposure of the
men and of the armaments to the enemies' fire. It stands to reason that the appli-
cation of the disappearing principle, properly carried out, enables the men to work
the guns under cover of iron armour, which is considerably below the port through
which the fire is delivered ; it thus does away with the necessity of that weighty
belt of armour required to protect the men in the other systems of mounting the
artillery on board ship. While making these remarks I am not the least surprised,
nor do I complain that my subject should have been omitted from this lecture. It
unfortunately rested upon two stools,' one at the Admiralty, and one at the War
Office, and it has fallen down between them ; it is not, therefore, in so prominent
a position as it might have been, had I been more fortunate. I hope before long,
however, that it will take its proper place, and receive the same justice as other
alternative systems, so that any advantages it possesses, may be utilised for the benefit
of the Service.

Mr. Donald Cueeie : I will only say a few words, not from any technical knowledge
I possess as to the firing of guns, but as to the management of ships. It appear*
to me that the question in the next war will be one of steam-ship management.
The quality of coal you have in your men-of-war will help you to gain a battle. If
you start with a thousand tons of one class of coal in your ship, and another vessel
has the same quantity of inferior quality of coal, the one ship will beat the other if
the captain knows how to handle her. You have not, as far as I can judge, sufficient
graving-dock accommodation at your naval stations round the world for the risks
of maritime warfare. How would a steam-ship aftsr a collision, or after damage in
action, keep afloat and get repaired if off the Cape of Good Hope ? Again, with
reference to the Mercantile Marine (it mar not be proper to go into that question),
the Government are now elaborating a scheme for the employment of private ship*
ping during war, but it will be found that there are many available and suit-
able vessels for use in event of hostilities, some of light draught for river- work,
others fit for ramming, others for torpedo-carrying in shallow water, others which
can steam 12,000 miles, carrying coal the whole way, at from 12 to 14 knots' speed.
The Government are preparing these plans, and they will develop their proposals at
the proper time, but it is no question that there are hundreds of ships which at a
given moment in the Mercantile Marine will be drawn into the Service very readily.
With regard to manning our Bhips, it would be well to press Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to carry out a system of training sailors, not only educating them well and
subsidizing vessels to carry them, or helping the Mercantile Marine so as to get the
use of them at the proper time, but by pushing on the Naval Reserve and encou-
raging it. You might have at a given momenta man-of-war of great efficiency. One
of our Bhips went to sea the other day with eleven-twelfths of the crew belonging;
to the Naval Reserve, and the Captain was one of your own instructed Officers. No
men can handle steamers in war so well as those who are every day at sea, but
Naval Officers are compelled to stay at homo perhaps for half -a-dosen yean, and then

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 489

are ordered to go to sea in an emergency. I have always urged the advantage of
interchangeableness between the services. It was only to-day I had an application
from a Captain of a man-of-war to ask me to give him any sort of employment as an
Officer. . It is deplorable that Naval Officers should be driven to seek what they
cannot obtain, and that is, employment in the Mercantile Marine, all because there
is a want of harmony between the two. There is an absence of early training and
association, which could be well carried out, if the Government would consider what
the wants of the Mercantile Marine are, and reconoile them with the requirements
of the Naval Service. Then there is the question of telegraphs. Before the Suez
Canal shares were bought, I told the Government that in the next war, which would
be in all probability in the East, there would be the great difficulty that the Suez
Canal could be shut up in a very few hours by any Officer of enterprise and skill at
the very moment the English fleet might be seeking to pass through, with stores or
preparations for some naval or military operation. I pointed out that there were
three lines of telegraph to India and China, and that it was proposed to establish
a line of telegraph to the South African colonies by way of these established lines
round to Zanzibar, and thence by NataL I showed the Government that at that
moment there was only one line of these three open, and that through Russian ter-
ritory— the Indo-European line. I suggested that the wisest way would be to have
an alternative line by the western side of Africa, and that it should connect our
naval stations on the South Atlantic. No time should be lost, for in time of peace
it is well to be prepared for war. We would be able to telegraph to the Gold Coast,
with St. Helena, Ascension, the Cape, and Natal, and, indeed, I would add the
Mauritius. The result would be that at any moment your men-of-war at the Gold
Coast, or at the Cape station, or at St. Helena, or the Flying Squadron, could be
called together suddenly ; or by a connection with Brazil, the Pacific, and the
West Indies, our squadrons there could be brought into play.

If anything should occur in the East at the present moment involving maritime
action on our part, it is quite clear we have no arrangements for carrying troops
round the Cape of Good Hope, no graving docks to put men-of-war into, no means
of telegraphic communication. In the case of the Ashantee war, a cable was sent
out, which did not arrive in time. But the Officer in charge took twenty miles of
cable in his trunk when sailing with the troops, and had this laid down. No more
was laid, but what had been laid was of service ; for when the King of Ashantee sent
his message to Sir Garnet Wolseley, our General was able to send it forward to the
coast from the Adamsi Hills, part of the way by that wire, the other part by runners
on foot. The whole telegraph if it had been laid would have been of service.
Many such illustrations might be given to show how we have failed in our arrange-
ments in moments of emergency, and that the great thing is to be prepared for any-
thing.

Lieutenant Gbbntbll, R.N. : It may be of interest to state that an effort is
being made to revert to the use of oast iron for armour-plates. In the early days of
armour-plating, oast iron, as we all know, was tried, but was found so defective that
its use was abandoned for that of wrought iron.

The plates to which I refer, are cast in chill, and are consequently intensely hard
on the surface, whilst the iron is so selected and combined that the plates have on
extraordinary degree of general tenacity and strength, qualities which have hitherto
been absent from the use of cast iron for these purposes.

When opposed to a gun superior to our 25-ton gun, hardly any impression was
made on the plates at ail, a result which seems remarkable.

I do not say that the problem is as yet altogether solved, but should the trials
lead to success, the use of oast-iron for armour presents many advantages. It is
much cheaper than wrought iron. The varying curves of the ship's side can be at
once given. Its extreme hardness and local strength would be most efficacious in
resisting the action of torpedoes, if armour is applied, as Captain Scott suggests, to
the bottoms of ships, whilst it permits for turrets the use of the dome-shaped or
cupola form, which, as every Artillerist knows, possesses so many merits from a de-
fensive point of view.

It would also be possible to dispense with those sharp angles at the armour-shelf
to which Captain Scott referred, which you see in the overhang of the " Tcgothoff "

2 k 2

490 " THE MARITIME DEFENCE OF ENGLAND,

(diagram). In many other instances it seems to offer great advantage*, and may
possibly open up an entirely new field for the use of armour.

Admiral Selwyn : There.are one or two observations I should like to make from the
point of view of the men who fight the ships. Captain Scott considers that unsinka-
bility is to be first desideratum ; second, ramming powers ; third, gun and torpedo
r>wers ; fourth, armour-protection ; fifth, speed, with coal capacity or steam power.
want to suggest to him (with all due deference to his superior knowledge of the
subject) that a vessel's speed is the one thing which every naval Officer wants. If
his ship is fast, he will care very little what else she is, because he feels distinctly
that that gives him the power to carry whatever offensive or defensive capacities he
may have, most quickly to the'scene of action. That fatal word " too late " renders
nugatory the very best armour and the most perfect powers of every description ;
and we must remember that " too late " to-day, has even more importance than it
had in former wars. Therefore, I say speed is the first condition. That a ram can
be carried with nothing else on board, and be made to produce magnificent effects,
no one one who recollects the arguments used by Admiral Sartorius, or the illustra-
tions his arguments have since received, can doubt for a single instant : we have had
too many fatal experiences of its power to doubt that it is so. Then it is clear that
if you only have speed and the ram, you have a powerful offensive weapon. There-
fore, I put speed first. I give the second value to unsinkability, because to carry
about offensive weapons, or to retain the power of defending your country, you
must at least be able to keep the ship above water. Next I put offensive power, and
this may be varied. The ship may carry guns or torpedoes, so as to make her a for*
midable antagonist, for her ramming power may not be sufficient. The defensive
power I put, as I think all English seamen will join me in putting it, at the very
lowest of all our considerations. If you keep a ship above water and leave her some
offensive power, seamen will not ask to be Kept entirely from the effects of shot or
shell. We do not expect it, for we know we cannot get it. I think the first require-
ment, speed, is to be obtained primarily by studying the results of such experiments
as those carried on by Mr. Proude, and by carrying them at once into practice. As
fast as Mr., Froude turns out an accepted fact, let us try it. Bo not let us wait
until he has carried out, some years hence, the most elaborate of his experiments,
and then find that we have buut at a very large cost, vessels to which his finished
experiments point as being wretched blunders. Then the duration of speed. This
must be a question of fuel, and, as I heard from Mr. Barnaby on the last occasion
I saw him here, that he thought I had abandoned the question of condensed fuel, I
beg to say that is so far from being the case that I am still exerting myself in every
direction to obtain due consideration for what I still consider the most important
question of the whole, for the Navy ; that is the power of carrying a large supply of
fuel to sea. I am perfectly convinced by all those experiments which I made that
there is no difficulty whatever in obtaining three times the amount of power from one
pound of condensed fuel that now can be got from the best coal, and that there is a
probability that a careful consideration of the chemical effects derived from burning
steam in the presence of carbon will show a possibility of raising that to six times.
That has been done in a large boiler, and I think it can be done again. Therefore,
fuel can be made more lasting by being condensed first, and scientifically used after-
wards, and speed can be made lasting also. But it would be ridiculous to attempt
to give us improved fuel, if at the same time, thorough and careful attention is not
given to the form of boiler in which we use it. That is one of the greatest defects
in our modern steam-ships. The boiler is simply an absurdity from beginning to
end. We attempt to burn fuel in a chamber whose walls are surrounded with hot
water, and as we can never keep up the proper temperature of combustion round that
fuel, we always get smoke. The cellular construction, I quite agree, carried out to
the utmost limit, and accompanied with wise stowage, will give us all we can hope to
have in unsinkability. I think the resistance to under-water shot, which is part of
the question of unsinkability, may be obtained by carrying more armour under water
and less above. I think it may also be wisely considered whether that armour ought
always to be carried outside the ship, whether it is not a wrong idea, and particularly
if you get chilled cast iron to resist chilled shot, whether that could not be usefully
employed in the structure of the ship, whether the armour ought not to be part ana

INCLUDING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE." 491

parcel of the structure of the ship, whether you cannot carry that armour inside, so
as to require less area than it does now outside. It could also be used in another
way. Ail seamen know the value of bringing up ballast in giving great stability,
great steadiness, and easiness at sea, and if ballast, instead of being put in to remove
what Mr. Scott Russell calls wretched blunders, in one lump at the bottom of the
ship— a practice of which Captain Scott has very ably shown the great disadvantage —
if we disposed it properly we ought to get more value out of it than that of being
simply ballast. As regards enlarging the chamber of the gun, I think the question
is hanging back very much more than it need. I cannot see any particular reason
why we should wait for an 81-ton gun in order to discover the effects of enlarged
chambers, or why we cannot do that quite as well with any other sized gun, and why
we cannot experiment with powder, which I regard as one of the important ques-
tions, still more than we do. We have got to a state in which there are different
kinds of powder for every particular gun ; from the Martini-Henry up to the 81 -ton
gun, we have powder of a different nature for each kind of gun. I advocate very
strongly indeed a much larger expenditure in wisely conducted experiments. I do
not think that these can be fairly and properly committed to any one class of men,
or to any one committee. I think all the engineering talent available should be en-
listed, in order to solve the various questions, each by those persons most fitted by
nature or scientific attainments to consider them. With reference to naval architects and
the questions they are asked to solve, I think that would be best done by asking them very
frequently to go to sea in their own ships, and if that were done, I think we should no
longer hear that there were certain ships built in the Navy which were not intended
to succeed. For instance, of the " Waterwitch," the " Vixen," and some others, it
is said that they were not intended to succeed. This is an admission which I should
have thought would be regarded by any persons who called themselves scientific aa
fatal entirely to the claim of any scientific knowledge whatever. In common with
the other speakers, I have the highest appreciation of the lecture as^one of the new
developments of Captain Scott's labours. I am quite sure, had he been listened to
when long ago he brought forward that remarkable improvement in rifling shot, to
which he slightly adverted to-day, that is to say, ribbed, not studded shot, in which
the centricity of the axis of the shot was secured by the driving power of the rifling,
we should have had muoh less to lament in the effect of the powder-gases which are
supposed to erode the bore ; much less to lament'in the weakness of our shell ; and
very much more efficient guns in the point which is the one most to be sought for,
namely, the velocity with which the shot is propelled, and the force with which it
strikes, since the latter results largely as a consequence of the velocity, instead of
which the mass which has just been advocated as the only thing to be increased,
gives us, besides other inconveniences, a striking force comparatively but little
enhanced.

The Chaibkajt : I think there is one point we must all agree upon, that is, in
conveying our thanks to the lecturer for the very efficient way in which he has treated
the subject throughout. We have enjoyed two lessons from Captain Scott, and if it
had not been for the lateness of the season, we should like to have had a third. There
is material in the lecture certainly for another discussion, and also for a great deal of
reflection when we go to our homes. The more we consider it, the more we shall
be convinced of its value.

Captain Scott : Captain Dawson is mistaken in supposing that I advocate the
service 25 -ton gun ; but it is more powerful, and therefore superior to the 18-ton
gun, which is the smallest that will penetrate armour.

There will always be a question as to the relative advantages of a greater or less
number of guns, but having a sufficient number of plate-piercing guns, the great
thing then is to get accuracy. I believe, as Captain Colomb, Commodore Good-
enough, and other like careful observers have shown, that in ordinary firing, our sea-
men will only hit an enemy once out of ten times at a 1,000 yards : but I think,
instead of that being the case, we ought only to miss once in ten times at a 1,000
yards. I believe that far greater accuracy than has yet been gained, is possible, and
ought to be attained. Wimbledon has taught us what can be done with the small
gun (the rifle), and I am quite sure if we were to take the matter in hand nation-
ally, great results would be attained. I wish to point out with respect to the 38-ton

492 "THE MARITIME DEFENCE OP ENGLAND/' &C.

•

gun at Shoeburyness, which General Collinson has referred to, that its mean rate of
firing, including stoppages, was actually four and a half minutes per round, and taking
the average that Captain Colomb has given (see Vol. XV, page 412, etseq.), and sup-
posing the 88-ton gun had been mounted on board the " Thunderer," this gun would
only have given one hit per hour as the result of the rate of firing at Shoeburyness ;
so that the four guns, viz., two of 35 tons and two of 38 tons, whioh comprise her
sole armament, would only have hit once in a quarter of an hour. I do not think
that is a very satisfactory state of things. As to manoeuvring and turning the ship
quickly, I have mentioned the turbine, whioh affords an efficient means for reversing,
and also for pumping the ship clear of water. The engine for weighing the anchor
could be very easily applied ; but I think most of us who have put forward plans,
however successful they may have proved, are perfectly contented to let some one
else work out the details for doing it. With respect to Major Moncrieff's system,
as it has not been adopted into the Naval Service, I did not think it necessary to
advert to it, in comparing the relative protection afforded to guns mounted upon the
different plans now used on board ship. Speaking generally, four guns on board a
ship is not a sufficient armament, for with the "Thunderer's " armament of four 86-
and 38-ton guns you might only get one hit in every quarter of an hour. The 81-ton
gun cannot be so accurate at sea as the 35-ton gun, and hence, judging according to
our present knowledge, a ship firing four 81-ton guns will only hit another every half •
hour. The graving-docks and telegraph lines that Mr. Donald Currie adverted to, no
doubt ought to be provided for and proceeded with at once, for it is most important
that we should have these ready before war breaks out. Supposing you took one of
the vessels shown here, the " Alexandra," with an enormously heavy mass of armoured
superstructure, into action, would she not require a graving-dock after the action P
It is better to speak out plainly if a real need exists, because it will be met, and then
we can be prepared for eventualities ; but I fear that without docks to repair her
battered sides, the " Alexandra " and other heavily weighted ships would follow to
where the " Vanguard " now lies, viz., the bottom of the ocean. With respect to
gun-boatB, I will only say, as was vainly said prior to the breaking out of the
Crimean war, that by utilizing such vessels as we may have at the moment, and
mounting light guns in them, we might at once attain to a considerable amount of
efficiency ; but in the war referred to, we lost our opportunity, and built gun-boats
which were too late to be of use. With respect to casting armour-plates and chilling
them on the surface, I fear we shall not be able to use cast iron armour for this simple
reason, that weight is a very important consideration, and you cannot get the same
strength in cast iron that you can in steel. What we want is the best, and the
strongest, and the toughest materia], and I do not think that cast iron will give us
this material. The only other point I need refer to, and really I am very sorry to
refer to it, is the efficiency of our war crews as compared with that of other nations.
If we take the fighting crew of such a vessel as the " Vanguard," with a comple-
ment of 461 men, we shall find that only about 200 are really drilled sailors, 100
are undrilled, and the remainder are either boys or non-combatants. Now, a 1- ranch
ironclad with 461 men will only have 23 non-combatants and no boys, so that she
would have 438 men thoroughly well drilled. We should not allow that disparity
to continue, but take steps to raise our war crews to a more thorough degree of
efficiency.

I think I have answered all the points that have been put forward, except as to
whether experimental firing with various guns lias been carried out. The simple
fact is that no such trials have been made, and the studded shot of the present tixno
cannot safely stand the velocity which can be given by a battering charge. If the
powder chamber were to be increased, the studs and wads used would break up
the projectiles, and were these tried against armour-plates, I believe the defects of
our present service system of ordnance would be apparent.

LECTURE.

Friday, June 23rd, 1876.

Admibal Sib Hbnby J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., Chairman of the

Council) in the Chair.

THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN
AUXILIARY TO THE ROYAL NAVY.

By T. Brasset, Esq., M.P.

Mr. Brassey : I have been honoured with an invitation from the Council of this
Institution to address the members on more than one occasion before to-day. Having
previously written a long paper, with reference to the personnel of the merchant
service, and its actual condition so far as it would be appreciated by an analysis of the
Parliamentary literature on the subject, I feel that it is not necessary for me now to
do more than give a short statement of the strength of the merchant service in
regard to the ships. Of course the review of the situation in regard to the merchant
steamers is exceedingly incomplete, unless those vessels are considered from a naval
architect's point of view, and also from a naval Officer's point of view. Now I am
not in a position to state to this meeting, as my friend Mr. Barnaby could, if he
were not bound by official reticence, whet the value of these vessels would be with
regard to the power of carrying guns, and still less am I able to treat the subject
from a naval Officer's point of view, and to indicate to the meeting the kind of
armament which would be most suitable for vessels of the kind which we have to
take into our review.

When I was asked by the Council to prepare a short paper on this subject it was
suggested, and I was very thankful for the suggestion, that the preparation should
be a joint labour to be undertaken by Captain Wilson and your humble servant. The
difficulty was to know how the twin brothers were to work, and I suggested to
Captain Wilson that ho should undertake, if he were disposed to do so, a considera-
tion of the best mode of providing the armament for these vessels, while I would
undertake to examine the Parliamentary documents, and to ascertain the number
of the vessels, and some of their qualities with reference to their speed. From
various circumstances with which I am not acquainted, Captain Wilson has not yet
set forth upon his part of the task, and I can only hope that ho will bo kind enough
to follow up this short statement which I am now about to read with reference to
the number of steamers that we possess, by considering, as only a naval Officer can,
how it would be most expedient that they should be armed for the purposes of war.
With these few words of explanation I proceed to read to you the paper which I
have prepared.

It is proposed in the present paper to give a brief review of the re-
sources we possess in our merchant navy for home defence, and for the
protection of oar commerce. Some may think that we are so secure,
that preparation for the emergency of war is superfluous. We ought
not, however, to be over-contident, for, as Lord Palmerston wisely said,
4* to imagine that we are safe from invasion now, without precautions,
" because hitherto we have prevented it by precautions, is the greatest
" of all possible absurdities.'1

494 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

The steam tonnage of the British Empire, according to the latest
returns, is 1,825,000 tons ; that of the United States, for over-sea
foreign trade, 193,000 tons. France has 516 steamers, of 188,000 tons,
and Norway has 199 steamers, of 39,000 tons. Our larger vessels are
at least as well adapted for conversion into cruizers for the protection
of commerce as the trading steamers of other nations are adapted for
conversion into privateers. Our merchant navy list includes the
following : —

Tons register.

Number of Steam-ships.

165

167

Total 419

It may be presumed that all these ships could carry at least two
armour-piercing guns, and in addition, a considerable armament of the
64- pounder gun, which, at the present time, seems to be the favourite
weapon in the Navy for vessels not intended to engage ironclads.

I may perhaps here venture to interpose an observation upon the
much-debated question of armament. Many naval men are of opinion
that armour-piercing guns should be mounted in every vessel in the
service. They think that there is safety in numbers ; and that, how-
ever hopeless it may seem for a small unarmoured vessel to engage a
heavy ironclad, circumstances may arise in which a flotilla of small
vessels, armed with powerful guns, might inflict fatal injury even on
an ironclad. It is to be remembered that the large vessel carries very
few guns, and that our most powerful naval artillery has become so
ponderous, and the range of view so limited, since the introduction of
armour, that perfect accuracy of aim cannot be relied upon, especially
should the Are be directed against a small gunboat moving rapidly on
an irregular course. Hence a large vessel in narrow waters might
suffer most seriously from a combined attack by a flotilla of gunboats
of the " Coquette " class, or a squadron of cruizers of the " Opal "
type. It would seem desirable, therefore, to introduce a mixed arma-
ment, at least in some of the vessels, which are now armed exclusively
with the 64-pounder gun.

To return to the merchant navy, it would be a statesmanlike measure
on the part of the Admiralty to enter into communication with the
owners of ocean steamers, and to endeavour to agree upon terms for
the hire of such vessels, in the event of war. As it has been thought
expedient to engage a certain number of the merchant seamen to serve
in the Navy, by giving them an annual retainer during peace ; so it
it might be worth while to subsidize the owners of steamers, adapted
to carry an armament, in consideration of their undertaking to hold
their ships at the disposal of the Government in the event of war.
No less than 640 steamers were hired by the Government of the

AUXILIARY TO THE BOYAL NAVY. 495

United States during the civil war, and without these vessels it would
have been absolutely impossible to have blockaded the coast of the
Southern Confederacy.

What occurs to me as important in carrying out this suggestion is this, that it
being admitted that by far the greater number of merchant steamers being, when
built solely for mercantile purposes, very imperfectly adapted to any service of war,
it would probably be an expedient course for the Government to endeavour to enter
into communication with shipowners at a time when they were contemplating build-
ing new vessels, so that there might be introduced in the original design those
necessary modifications which would enable the ships to carry guns. No doubt
shipowners would say, " These things do not advance our interests in the least ; we>
" look simply to carrying passengers and cargo, and we are not prepared to alter our
" designs." To that, of course, the ready answer is, it is a mere question of expense,
and if the Government be prepared to pay the expense for these modifications, and
if the vessel be not injured by them for commercial purposes, I take it there would
be no objection on the part of many merchants to do it, especially if the Govern-
ment were prepared to pay a sufficient sum by way of retainer, enabling them to-
make use of these vessels for a stipulated amount in case of war. Of course such a-
suggestion means expense, but it may be better that the public money should be
spent in that way ; for I take it for a given sum of money you would have a very-
much larger number of vessels at your disposal, than if you built vessels expressly
and solely for the purpose of war; and whereas an unarmoured vessel may be
utilised as a merchant vessel in time of peace, it is quite certain that no ironclad can
be utilised for that purpose. The question therefore is, whether it is not desirable
to spend as large a sum available for ship-building as possible upon vessels which
are exclusively of the fighting class, and to endeavour to supplement the fighting
class by subsidiary vessels to be partly engaged in time of peace in the merchant
service. Of course these things present themselves to everybody in the House of
Commons from a financial point or view ; perhaps they do not strike naval Officers-
in the same way j but what we have to consider is that the sum available for ship-
building is not an unlimited quantity. There is only so much money available.
You may have to increase the estimates ; we have increased the estimates ; we are
increasing the estimates ; and I dare say we shall increase them still more ; but
even assuming that we are to proceed in the direction of further expenditure, still
after all the Bum of money is limited, and no one knows it and feels it more keenly
than those who, like Mr. Barnaby, have to rack their brains year after year in order
to produce the greatest amount of force for the money placed at their disposal.
Therefore it is worthy of consideration, whether you cannot provide your unarmoured
fleet in part by some alliance and partnership with the merchant service.

All naval Officers are agreed in attaching more or less importance to
the quality of speed in unarmoured vessels. The " Inconstant " was
built specially with the view to attain an unprecedented speed. Now
in point of speed, and in coal-carrying capacity, the fine steamers,
employed in the North Atlantic trade, present very remarkable ele-
ments of power. In his exhaustive work, Mr. Lindsay has published
details, giving the average passages of the principal lines of ocean
steamers between Liverpool and New York. The speed and "regularity
maintained are truly marvellous. I give a few figures, extracted from
Mr. Lindsay's tables, which will serve to show what an immense
reserve of power we possess in our merchant navy for the emergency
of war.

The distance from Queenstown to Sandy Hook is 2,777 miles, and
it was performed in the years 1873 and 1874, outwards and home-
wards, by the steamers of the White Star, Cunard, and Inman lines,
at the average speed shown in the following table : —

496

THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

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AUXILIARY TO THE BOYAL KAVY.

497

As an example of the marvellous perfection to which, ocean steaming
has been brought by the enterprise of British shipowners, unaided by
subsidies from the Government, the recent performances may be cited
of the " City of Berlin " :—

Log of the Inman steamer " Oity ofBerUn."

Queenstown to Sandy Hook.
Days. Hours. Minutes.
7 18 2

Sandy Hook to Queenstown.
Days. Hours. Minutes.
7 15 28

Date.

Distance run.

Date.

Distance run.

1875.
Sept 18 ....
19 19 ... .
„ 20 ... .
„ 21 ....
u 22 ... .
»> 23 ... .
„ ^4 ....
„ 25 ....

303 miles.

867 „
876 „

868 „

380 „
324 „

381 „
380 „

1875.

» 4

» 5

„ 6

» 7

,. 8

„ 9

» io

388 miles.
362 „
866 „
861 „
381 „
3471 „
362 „
258 „•

1 Fresh gale and heavy beam sea.

The performances of the White Star line have been equally remark-
able for the extraordinary speed attained. In 1873 the Adriatic, sailing
west, made the voyage from Queenstown to Sandy Hook at the average
speed of 18'55 statute miles per hour ; and in March, 1872, the same
ship made the passage, sailing east, at the rate of 18*9 miles per hour.
The regularity of this vessel's passage is not less remarkable than the
speed, the average time for twenty-nine voyages from New York to
Queenstown being 8 days 10 hours 57 minutes.

The shortest passage was in October, 1874, occupying only 7 days
23 hours 12 minutes. This passage was surpassed, by a few minutes
only, by the " Germanic," which made the run from Queenstown to
Sandy Hook, in August, 1873, in 7 days 23 hours 7 minutes. The
greatest run in a single day, recorded by Mr. Lindsay, was made by the
44 Adriatic," on the 10th April, 1873, on which day she steamed 396
miles, the course being S. 61° W., with the wind N., force 6.

These particulars will have sufficiently shown what the large steamers
of our Merchant Service can do. We are equally strong in the means
of coast defence. The flotilla of steamers in our home-trade includes
5,530 vessels under 50 tons, 4,173 over 50 and under 100 tons, and
1,670 steamers over 100 and under 200 tons. If those 11,373 steamers
were all equipped with Harvey's towing torpedo, and if, in addition,
all those of sufficient strength were armed with one or two guns, no
hostile fleet could approach our shores with impunity.

The torpedo has given a ready means of converting the smallest
steamer into a formidable vessel of war. Torpedoes should be kept in
store in all our great commercial ports. The captains of tugs and
other suitable vessels should be formed into a Marine Torpedo Corps.

498 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

They should be thoroughly drilled in the use of the weapon by expe-
rienced officers, and their services should be secured by a retainer or
pension.

A report was made to the Admiralty some years ago as to the adapta-
bility of the tug and ferry-boats of the port of Liverpool for conver-
sion into gunboats. A large number were found to be capable of
carrying the heaviest gun at that time mounted on board ship. The
81 -ton gun has since been constructed. A weapon so formidable can
only be carried in a vessel of special construction and of large tonnage.
The torpedo, however, has to a considerable extent neutralized the
increased power of the gun, and has furnished us with the means of
arming with a powerful weapon, every swift and handy steamer for
coast defence. By the use of the torpedo and submarine mine, the
narrow, shoal, and tortuous channels of approach to London, Liverpool,
Hull, Glasgow, Cork, Bristol, and Cardiff — in short, all the busiest
sea-ports — may be closed to the most formidable ironclads.

Though the subject is more interesting to a naval Officer than to a
naval architect, I cannot omit from the catalogue of ships required for
the Navy, a certain number of sailing vessels, to be attached to the
receiving ships at Devonport, Portsmouth, and Sheerness, for the pur-
pose of taking the seamen to cruize in the Channel in summer, and to
Lisbon and Gibraltar in winter. Such vessels become more and more
necessary for training purposes at a time when it seems probable that
the fighting navy will be largely composed of mastless ironclads.

Having elsewhere shown the great superiority of our armoured fleet,
I may here, in conclusion, advert to the relative condition of the Navy
in unarmoured vessels. The Americans have only 39 unarmonred
cruizers, and very few of these have a speed of 10 knots, a consider-
able number being unable to steam more than 7 knots an hour.

Probably gallant gentlemen in this room have bad in their hands Admiral
Porter's Annual Reports upon the condition of the United States Navy, and those
who have read those publications must be aware of his great disappointment at the
want of speed which characterises the unarmoured vessels which are placed at hia
disposal by a legislature which is even more narrow-minded than the British.

The Russians have but few unarmoured cruizers, and their entire
fleet in the Baltic and Black Seas only carries 271 guns. The Germans
have only 11 corvettes and 4 despatch boats, carrying altogether 145
guns. The Turks are practically without a cruizing squadron.

I say that with deference to those who know more about these things than I do ;
but to the best of mv belief the Turks do not possess any unarmoured cruizers of a-
kind which we should view with satisfaction if they belonged to our own service.
Gallant gentlemen must appreciate the very different view we take of ships when
they fight under the British flag and when they fight under a foreign flag. We too
certainly more critical with our own ships than with foreign ships. That perhaps is
quite right.

When, therefore, we compare our own position with that of other
Powers, and when we And that the ships included in the return of vessels
building in 1875, will carry no less than 304 guns, of a calibre on the
whole incomparably heavier than that of the artillery mounted in the
unarmoured ships of other Powers, it must be clear that our situation,

AUXILIABY TO THE ROYAL NAVY. 499

both, in the present and in prospective, can give no just grounds for
anxiety to the most susceptible and timid mind. The superiority of
our resources will not, however, give us any proportionate advantage
without complete and careful organization.

I most sincerely hope that the attention which thiB Institution is pleased to direct
to these subjects may have the effect of promoting arrangements of the kind which
I venture to indicate between the Admiralty and the merchant service. m I .believe
that in our merchant steam navy we now possess what might, with a certain amount
of trouble and expense, be converted into a valuable auxiliary ; but if we were to
take this question in hand in a masterly, effective, and liberal spirit, I believe
that what we possess now is as nothing to what we might have hereafter. I trust
the subject will be taken up perhaps by Captain Scott, or some other gallant gentle-
man, and worked out in a lecture to be delivered in this Institution at no very
distant date. The personnel of the merchant service I have already ventured to
discuss in a lecture delivered here in February, and the organization of that per*
*onnel as a reserve has also been treated, no doubt very imperfectly, by me, and
much more satisfactorily by others in former lectures delivered in this Institution,
and I believe that our labours have borne fruit. Anyhow, the Naval Reserve has
been immensely strengthened in the last few years. I wish we could go further in
that direction. I wish that every able-bodied seaman in the merchant service could
be induced to register his name on the Reserve lists of the Navy. If that were
done, if we had our seafaring population as much at the command of the country in
an emergency as the seafaring population of France is, of course we should be, in
even a greater sense than we are now, the dominant maritime power of the world.
In order to accomplish that, you must have either compulsion or expenditure. We
cannot have compulsion, and I think we have now sufficient expenditure. I think
we give enough to the Naval Reserve individually. Therefore, the great question is
to consider whether there are prejudices still lying more or less dormant in the
minds of the seafaring people which tend to keep them out of the Navy. I was
talking upon this subject only a few days ago with Captain Furnell, the Superin-
tendent of Green's Sailors' Home, now very large shipping offices, and he told me
that there still is an amount of stupid prejudice winch keeps a great number of
sailors from joining the Naval Reserve. He says that their wives object to it.
The wives, I am happy to say, have great influence in that, as they ought to have in
every class of society, and they think that this Naval Reserve means fighting, and
interruption to domestic happiness, and their influence is strongly exerted in a
sense adverse to the Naval Keserve. Well, I hope that may be overcome. The
fighting will only be for their hearths and homes ; and if their husbands did not go
forth on the supreme emergency it would be very awkward for the wives, and I
hope that may be appreciated. I have nothing more to say, and I thank you very
much for your patient hearing.

The Chairman : The subject is a most interesting one to us, and I hope there are
gentlemen present who will kindly favour us with their opinions not only on the
constructive part but also on the part relating to the personnel of the mercantile
marine.

Commander W. Dawson, R.N. : It is a very important question whether in a
national emergency this country cannot have the benefit of the services of some
4,000 or 5,000 splendid steam-ships, and whether no means can be devised for con-
verting these steam-ships into valuable auxiliary engines of war for the defence of
the country. You, Mr. Chairman, may remember better than I do, how about a
quarter of a century ago a Committee of Naval Officers was appointed to consider
the armament of merchant steam-ships. In those days we had not the mechanical
means of mounting guns which Captain Scott has now provided us with, and it was
decided that it would require a good deal of strengthening to the decks and beams
of these ships in order to make them fit to mount and work even the 82-pounders of
that day ; but I take it there would be no difficulty in the present state of mechanical
science in mounting, say 6^-pounders, in most of the sea-going steam-ships of the
Merchant Navy. It is true that it is a question of expense, but we are speaking of
an occasion of a maritime straggle for national existence, and then expense must be

500 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

thrown to the winds. It would not then be a question of 10,000,000?. or 11,000,0002.
for the Naval Estimates, but of saving the country. It is, therefore, a question
that ought to be taken into serious consideration now, in the piping time of peace,
in order that it may not only be done economically, but efficiently, and rapidly, when
the time of trial comes. It would be well if the Government could experiment a
little on merchant vessels of different classes, in order to give naval architects and
naval artillerists an opportunity of discovering what is the best and cheapest way
of strengthening these ships, and what armaments they could most conveniently
carry. For my own part, I see no difficulty in the way of strengthening any sea-
going merchant ships by internal girders and cradle work, so that she shall carry
any sized gun. But no very extreme weight of ordnance is required. What is
required is this, that merchant vessels may be made capable of carrying an ordinary
gun ; that their bows may be fortified for ramming, and that provision may be made
for the use of various kinds of offensive torpedoes, so that when called upon, thev
may be able to fight vessels of somewhat the same class. So far I quite agree with
those who are of opinion that auxiliary unarmoured vessels converted from the
merchant navy need not carry guns capable of piercing thickly armoured ships.
But there is a class of unarmoured vessels beyond these, auxiliary merchant ships—
unarmoured men-of-war for attacking forts and ' for other purposes, and the arma-
ment of those vessels is a disputed point. I am one in favour of the mixed arma-
ment which Mr. Brassev has put forward, but he has not quite brought forward
my argument, which is this : — An English ship-of-war cannot always be the strongest
in fight ; she cannot always be the fastest on the seas, arid she may be driven into
such a corner that she cannot run away, and must either strike her flag or fight
a far superior force. Her guns ought to be capable of perforating that superior
force, whatever thickness the sides of the enemy's ships may be. If her guns are
not capable of perforating the enemy, Bhe is perfectly helpless, and I do not think it
is fair to send men in command of unarmoured vessels, armed with weak hitting
guns, out to China or the Pacific, where they may be compelled to encounter iron-
clads. Let the guns be so powerful that the English ships-of-war, of whatever size,
can pierce the hostilo side, and then English Captains need not be frightened
because they cannot run away from a Japanese, a Peruvian, or a Turkish ironclad.
This is why I am strongly in favour of mixed armaments for the smaller class of
ships-of-war. With reference to the auxiliary force of cruizing ships, there is no
reason why the country should not be able to avail itself of the services of the
steam-ships of the Mercantile Marine in case of war if they be provided with guns,
torpedoes, and fortified bows ; and as to expense, that must be thrown to the winds
in a national emergency. As to the question of personnel, there were two points
raised on the last occasion in the course of the discussion which rather taxed my
credulity. One was, that the number of able seamen in our merchant navy who are
not foreigners was so small that it would be about an average of one English able
seaman per registered ship in the British Mercantile Marine. (" A.B.'s — first-class
men P") Yes, I mean A.B.'s. My credulity cannot take that in ; but I was relieved
a little by another very eminent authority, who told us he had gone into the figures
some little time ago, and had found that 12,000 fighting men wore quite sufficient
for the purpose of manning all the merchant steamers that wo had under the
British nag for fighting purposes. Well, if we take 4,000 in round numbers as the
number of available merchant steamers that might be converted for fighting pur-
poses, that would be three able seamen to a ship. Well, it would depend on how
many fighting men were in the enemy's ship, whether those three able seamen
would suffice to fight the enemy, unless they acted as Captain Bobadil, and asked
the enemy to stand forward, three men at a time. But I do protest against the
assumption that 12,000 fighting men would go any reasonable way in manning the
fighting ships which we could draw from the Mercantile Marine, to say nothing of
the ships which we should capture from the enemy. I protest quite as strongly
against that assumption as against the idea that there is only one able-bodied sea-
man to each registered English ship.

The Chaibmax : The subject at present is not quite so much the personnel at the
maUriel of the mercantile navy.
Commander W. Dawson, B.N. : I understood yon to invite discussion on the

AUXILIARY TO THE ROYAL NAVY. 501

personnel* I just wished to allude to those two points in our former discussion, and
to say how cordially I agree with what Mr. Brassoy put forward in a pamphlet
which he published last year, on unarmoured vessels, and to thank him for the
labour he has so frequently bestowed in representing the Nary, as he has so nobly
done both in the House of Commons and elsewhere.

Bear- Admiral de Horsey : I think we are very much indebted to Mr. Brassey now,
as we always are when he gives us his valuable information on naval matters, and I
feel particularly the importance of the subject he has mentioned to day, the arming
of the Merchant Navy ; but I should like to suggest its being done in a different
way. Preparing passenger and other merchant ships for carrying guns now in time
of peace would lead to very large expenditure, and I think the shipowners would
not be satisfied even if they were well paid, for they would say it interfered with
their speed and the accommodation for passengers and cargo. I cannot see why the
Government should not bring in a bill to empower them in the event of war to take
such vessels as they required, at a valuation, as they now take land for public works
and for public convenience, as in the case of railways. How much greater would
the cause be when it was for the safety of the nation in time of war ! I think that
no reasonable shipowner could complain if a fair sum was given him for his ship
when she was wanted. With regard to strengthening an ocean steamer to carry
guns (I speak with diffidence in the presence of Mr. Barnaby and other naval
architects), but I can conceive no difficulty whatever. Their hulls are as well able to
carry 100 tons in the shape of a gun as in the shape of cargo. The part that re-
quires strengthening is the. deck, and our naval architects are quite able to put any
amount of strengthening. I feel confident that they would make no difficulty about
that in time of danger. The Chairman said that we were not to talk about the
personnel, but perhaps I may be allowed to say one word. I think to improve the
personnel of the Naval Reserve it would be desirable in the first place to improve
the Merchant Navy. The men require improving before they are fit for us to take
into the Naval Reserve.

Captain Bedford Pim, R.N., M.P. : I see a very eminent naval architect pre-
sent, Mr. Scott Russell, and I should like to ask him to give us the benefit of his
opinion upon this point. Mr. Brassey tells us that we have in our Merchant Navy
419 ships of a large size, and that " it may be presumed that all these ships could
" carry at least two armour-piercing guns, and in addition a considerable armament
" of the 64-pounder gun, whioh at the present time seems to be the favourite
" weapon in the Navy for vessels not intended to engage ironclads." The question
I wish to ask Mr. Scott Russell is simply this : all those ships have at least eight
times their beam for length ; many of thorn have ton times their beam for length.
Will Mr. Scott Russell tell us whether any one of those ships can carry the
armament proposed by Mr. Brassey upon her upper deck without capsizing, and
especially after she has got well out of her coals, after, say, five days' run ? For
my part I believe that the mere firing the gun, would start ever}- rivet in its neigh-
bourhood. It seems to me that the long, narrow, unhandy steamers we have at
the present time are utterly incapable of being used in time of war with heavy guns
on the upper deck.

Captain Scott : What do you call a heavy gun ?

Captain Pim : A 25-ton gun — the gun named by Mr. Brassey.

Admiral Selwyn : I join most heartily with those speakers who have said that
Mr. Brassey's paper is one of the most thoughtful and valuable that we have had
in this Institution on the subject. In almost all the conclusions which he draws, I
should thoroughly agree. I am particularly able to confirm all that he has said with
regard to the value of the great ocean lines running across the Atlantic, since I have
been very often across lately, and have seen vessels doing even better work than
those of which he has given you the returns. He has got only eight above 3,000
tons. I think that will be subject to the new measurement, which will make a little
change in favour of a larger tonnage. Mr. Scott Russell has been for many years
practising all sorts of plans to make a difference between the measurement
tonnage and the actual carrying capacity, with great success to his firm, but when
we are considering such questions as this, that should be eliminated. Their fuel-
power is extraordinarily great, and so is their speed, and these are two points on

502 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

which we ought to be able to imitate them more nearly in the Nary. They will be
of the utmost value in case of war, when we shall be called upon probably to pro-
Tide for the rapid carrying of troops to our colonial possessions. With regard to
their carrying guns, I entirely agree with Admiral de Horsey and others that there
would be no real difficulty if you give them the right carriages. The question of
weights could be easily disposed of. The weight on deck is nothing in a ship of that
«ize. Captain Pirn has forgotten that length gives stability as well as beam. As to
the question of subsidy in peace, I think it would be rather a wasteful expenditure,
because our most durable steam-lines do not always remain in the same hands, and
in some cases the change is very frequent, and we cannot give an owner a subsidy
when the ship would pass out of his hands. I would rather give the full value for
the ship, as was done in the case of the " Himalaya " in the time of the Crimean war,
with good effect. With regard to the torpedo, I quite agree with Mr. Brassey that
it is a most admirable weapon, and that even where no guns can be carried, it would
be moBt formidable in the hands of a fast cruizer. Those who dared to follow her,
would very often find a torpedo in their path. The question on which I venture
elightly to differ from Mr. Brassey is this : the Navy of England has, as its chief
purpose, the protection of the commerce. Commerce must be carried on, if we
would have the sinews of war equally during war and peace ; and we cannot afford
to take away the very best ships from that commerce at the moment when we are
most pressed for our food and for other things which are essential to the well-being of
the nation ; and we must recollect that every vessel taken under those circumstances
from the Mercantile Marine takes a certain portion from the sinews of war. If we
are driven into a corner and overweighted, then it is quite clear that, as with the
Volunteers so with the Mercantile Marine, every nerve must be strained to defend
the Empire. For that purpose organization and registration ought to take place
now. Every inquiry ought to be made during peace, that we may be prepared to
take them when the necessity arises. We ought to think that it is wiser to spend
treble on the Navy for really efficient vessels during peace than to take from those
which would provide the sinews of war when the necessity arises. As regards the
personnel, I will only say one word, and that is, I think the money may be ex-
pended much more wisely than it is now, and with much better effect, if we only
give when the men come back to us, instead of giving constantly.

Mr. Babnaby : I came here to listen to what might be said by Mr. Brassey, and
by the gentlemen assembled here, and not for the purpose of saying anything my-
self. I feel as Mr. Scott Russell does, that I would like to hear all the Naval
Officers speak, and I think I may ask to be excused from saying more than one or
two words. It is right perhaps that I should say this much, that the difficulty
which is felt with regard to the use of merchant ships for fighting purposes is not
with reference to the strength of their structure, nor their stability, but with refe-
rence to their division into compartments. It will be remembered by everybody
here, that as iron came to be used very largely in the Merchant Navy, it was believed
that the time was come for giving up that mode of strengthening the Navy in time
of war, and the Report of the Committee in 1852 was to the effect that those
vessels being unfit for war purposes, the subsidies which had been granted ought to
be put an end to. Fresh light and the introduction of better material and better
modes of construction, and other weapons than guns, have brought us round to the
conviction that iron ships built for mercantile purposes may be armed and used cer-
tainly for their own defence in time of war, and possibly also as auxiliary to the
Royal Navy : but I would point out again that the one difficulty that has to be over-
come is, that the merchant ships which are being built, and some of the grandest
among them as to speed, coal-carrying power, and sea-going qualities, are deficient
in what we consider ought to be a necessary provision for security against foundering
in the event of any one of their compartments being damaged. What the arrange-
ment with the owners should be is a question which is undergoing the consideration
of the Admiralty, and you will excuse my saying anything further upon it.

Mr. Scott Russell, F.R.S. : Sir, if no more sailors will do us poor shipbuilders
the honour of confiding to us their views on this subject, I will give you mine. I
will use Mr. Brassey's words : " The superiority of our resources will not give us any
" proportionate advantage without complete and careful organization." And what

AUXILIARY TO THE ROYAL NAV1T. 503

does organization mean ? It means what Lord Palmeraton said, arranging for war
long beforehand, during peace. Now, if you ask me whether suddenly and abruptly,
and all at once, on a demand from the Admiralty, we would undertake to select for
them ressels which would be good, sound, safe vessels, capable of being armed even
with the most ordinary guns, and engaging with anything like fair security in war,
I say we could not take that responsibility ; we won't take that responsibility.
Therefore, I hope Mr. Brassey's paper will be received with the greatest possible
weight attached to its last sentence, and that you will believe that the great mass of
those ships which he has quoted, are not at all to be relied on for war purposes.
Now, I wish I could say that we English are in a condition to defy everybody ; that
we are stronger than all the rest of the world put together. Gfontlemen, I should
be a traitor to you if I said so, because I should lead you to trust to a broken reed.
Those vessels which Mr. Brassey has so eulogised, are vessels which with a very slight
blow from a rock, or a rocket, or any of those ingenious weapons which we see exhi-
bited in this place, would certainly go to the bottom. Therefore, I entreat you to place
no faith in them. I do entreat you, on the other hand, to place faith in vessels which Mr.
Barnaby and the Admiralty may be building, unarmoured, but with great precautions,
trying to make them as safe as possible, and with power to carry certain guns. But
as we are all friends and countrymen here, will you allow me to tell you of a terrible
blunder you have made ? I think about forty years ago I was asked to take the
responsibility of building four Royal Mail steam-ships to carry mails for you at the
greatest possible rate then known. I built you your ships ; they were the fastest of
the whole of that fleet ; they were quite satisfactory ; but what did you do at that
time ? You did this : you made me responsible to you that those ships should be
capable of carrying guns, and before you would give the ships their subsidy for
carrying the mails, you made them satisfy your Admiralty that they were seaworthy
and able to protect their mails against invaders. Why have you dropped thatP
Can anybody tell me that you still do that ? I asked the highest possible authority
the other day what he could tell me about that, and he said he had never heard
there was any such thing. You are now paying all the money you do for the mail
service to magnificent fleets of ships without ever once asking whether those original
arrangements have been adhered to, and whether the vessels are fit to be trusted in
time of war. Now, I ask you Members of Parliament, what representatives are you
of the public interest if you have allowed that sort of thing to go on ? And now
you come and read your papers ! Why, if you had looked into the accounts of which
you boast so much, if you had looked into the votes a little bit, you would have
found that all that money that was paid to those companies on those conditions, has
not been earned. Now, I think you will agree with me that there are funds at the
disposal of the nation for this honest national purpose, and following up what Mr.
Barnaby has said. I will do what I have always promised I would when you sailors
put me a difficult question, — I will give you a straightforward, open answer. You
tell me that you want merchant ships to be ready for your purposes in time of war.
You have only to let that generally be known ; you have only to tell all the ship-
owners that you will give a preference to ships which have those qualities whicfi
you require ; you have only to say that all your mail contracts shall include that
condition which I have referred to ; you have only to organize and arrange before-
hand, and you will find one day that you can use all your Merchant Navy for war
purposes, for it is not difficult to make them so. You have only to have a wise pro-
portion of beam and depth ; you have only to get a wise position for that beautiful
element in our modern ships, which so many of you forget, the ballast ! We have
got ballast now without paying for it ; we have got the most magnificent arrange-
ment of ballast in our engines and boilers. If you put them in a foolish place, you
make an unseaworthy ship ; but if you put them in the right place, I become
responsible to you that you can carry a large deck armament of those delightful
8-inch guns which we have been talking of. But if you do not do all this before-
hand ; if the Admiralty do not see that they are of the right proportions ; and if
the Post Office do not see that these things are carried out before they pay the
quarterly dividends for carrying the mails, then they will never get them. Another
thing you can perfectly well do to benefit the public, and the sea-faring population :
you can make it a sin by Act of Parliament to send a large merchant steam-ship to
TOL. XX. 2 L

504 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

sea which was cot practically unsinkable. Ton say that is nonsense ; I Bay it is not
nonsense, because my " Great Eastern " steam-ship, bj the skill of a clever captain,
who found out a rock in quite an out-of -the way place, had a hole torn in the hull
83 feet long and 9 feet 10 inches wide in the centre, and with this hole in her
bottom she went to the end of her journey. They tried to cobble it, and could not ;
and with this hole she came back from her journey. She carried all her passengers
and cargo safe and dry to one end of the journey, and brought an entirely new set
of passengers and cargo safe and dry to the other end. That she did, too, without
being surveyed by the Admiralty, and without being chartered as a mail-ship. Now,
I ask you, am I wrong in saying that if you will put the problem to us ship-
builders, we know how to accomplish it ? I think I know, and I think Mr. Barnaby
does, how to make a respectable sea-going steam-ship, unsinkable by all the ordinary
means ; and I think he knows how to put on board such a ship a Tory large arma-
ment of guns, which may not be capable of encountering and sinking a fully armoured
ship, but which will be capable of sinking a great many cruisers and privateers, and
doing harm to a great many troublesome customers. Will you allow me to say one
word as to how I should set about it in our private ships. I should like to have my
unsinkable ships ; I should like to have the ballast in the right place, which would
be pretty low under the water ; I should like to have my guns in the right place, and
of a big diameter. I do not want to have them very heavy, because I do not want
to be far away from the enemy ; I want to come close to him. Give me big shell,
big shot, and big bore ; then with my fleet of twenty merchant ships I would sur-
round this grand fellow with his 81-ton guns. I would pepper him, and if he sent
one of his 81-ton shots through me here and there, I should not mind ; if half-a-
dozen of us sank it would not matter ; if we sank him we should win the victory.
Therefore, I entreat you not to arm those sinkable, incapable ships which Mr.
Brassey has spoken of, with any hope of doing good, but return to your old ways as
quickly as possible, and say that any person who desires the Government money, must,
in some way or other, put his ships into a condition to be fit to serve for purposes
of defence in time of war against all vessels of his own class, whether they are called
privateers or anything else.

Mr. Brassey : I am sorry that I am obliged to leave this roon, but I trust it
will not cause the discussion to terminate if any gentleman is anxious to address
you. I am sure I appreciate very much, as I always do, the kind reception 1 meet
with in this theatre. With regard to the speech which we have just heard with
so much interest and satisfaction, I am quite sure it was a very instructive and
stimulating discourse for those Members of Parliament who are present. I see
before me three of the least benighted and incapable of your neighbours at
St. Stephens, and I am sure we shall go back to our labours refreshed and
encouraged by Mr. Scott Russell's speech. Feeling as I do from what he said, that
the idea of utilising the merchant steamers is feasible if properly carried out, I
certainly, along with others, will watch carefully the next arrangements that are
made with regard to the contracts for carrying mails, and will not allow the oppor-
tunity to pass by neglected of introducing afresh into those agreements the beneficial
arrangements which were formerly made, because I am one among others who take
an interest in these subjects without having the professional knowledge which distin-
guishes Mr. Scdtt Russell. Therefore, one would not be disposed to press a view
upon the House of Commons such as he has propounded, without being satisfied in
the first instance by professional advice that it was proper to be entertained by Par-
liament. But now, after having heard so many able gentlemen assure us, that with
comparatively inexpensive modifications introduced at the right time and in the right
way, you may make a large number of your merchant steamers valuable for war, I
say that when we come to deal with mail contracts again, we must make use of
that which is an excellent opportunity of doing what I was proposing, that is,
making your arrangements ah initio, when the vessel is about to be built. It may
be that the same principle may be extended even to vessels which are not to be used
for the conveyance of Her Majesty's mails. I am very sorry that I have to leave
the room, but I trust it will not cause the discussion to terminate, if gentlemen are
pleased to continue it.

On the motion of the Chatbican, a vote of thanks was passed to Mr. Brassey,
before leaving the room, for his valuable and suggestive paper

AUXILIARY TO THE ROYAL NAVY. 505-

Mr. BuTLHB-JoHWflTOKi!, M.P. : I too, in common with Mr. Scott Russell, was
extremely anxious to hear all the naval men speak on this occasion, and I was
equally anxious to hear the naval architects, because it is essentially a question for
naval architects as well as for naval men. But there is also another aspect of the
question which is no less important. In old times there were two descriptions of
ships which we sent out in case of war. There were the ships which had to fight
the enemy's vessels,-— and do what you like with the " Cunard " and " White Star,"
and other lines, you will never make them equal in fighting strength to a vessel built
expressly for that purpose, any more than you can make a carrier pigeon equal in
strength to a hawk ; but there was another class of vessels sent out, what we used to
call specifically " cruiiers," to prey upon the enemy's commerce, and to destroy his
resources, and so put an end to the war. These fast-sailing clipper steamers are the
very things which could, at a very small expense, be admirably adapted for that pur-
pose. But if, as Mr. Scott Russell said, we made a mistake forty years ago relative
to the contracts for mail steamers, what a gigantic, what a disastrous mistake we
made twenty yean ago, when we signed the Declaration of Paris ; because even if
you send out the cruisers, and cover the ocean with your fast-sailing ships, carrying
guns, there will be no commerce to prey upon. Do you suppose any enemy will be
foolish enough to come out of his forts and fight your vessels when he can remain in,
as the Russians did, and defy you ? Nelson's great victories, Howe's great
victories, how were they achieved ? By putting an absolute embargo upon the
enemy's commerce. The enemy came out to protect his commerce, and then you
sank his fleet. But now, under the Declaration of Paris, the enemy's commerce will
sail under a neutral flag, and there will be nothing for your cruisers to prey upon.
You may spare yourselves taking any trouble about these armed vessels, for there
will be nothing for them to do. You have plenty of ships of war to defy the
enemy, but they will never come out to you ; and as long as the Declaration of Paris
is unrepealed, there will be no enemy's commerce to prey upon ; and all these ques-
tions of turning our merchant steamers into ships of war are useless. There will be
nothing for them to fight. In my capacity as Member of Parliament, I thought it
my duty to put this aspect of the question before you. I have received great profit
from the discussion to-day, and shall be only too happy to support Mr. Brassey the
next time a mail contract comes before Parliament.

Captain Scott : Mr. Scott Russell has given us a view of the future, but what we
want is a correct knowledge of the present requirements. Of course you may find
fault with the strength of merchant ships, but the point is to utilise them for what
they are fit, and doubtless this very foundation force can be largely utilised. As
Mr. Brassey has just left this theatre, I can freely refer to the great good he has
done, in stirring up the authorities to inquire whether our merchant steamers can
or cannot carry guns. This question, and also the question as to the best use which
can be made of the merchant navy during war, ought long ago to have been set*
tied. At the commencement of the Crimean war, just before the sailing of Admiral
Napier for the Baltic, when I had just returned from a special mission with the
masters and pilots intended for his fleet, I put before the First Lord the suggestion
of Mr. J. Bodie and the other masters, viz., the effect it would have, if all the
powerful Bteam-tugs were to be immediately taken up, armed, and sent off at once to
Cronstadt to threaten St. Petersburgh. Look at the moral force we should have
exerted by their early presence. The First Lord, however, sent for me the follow-
ing day, and said he had been considering the matter, and would build some vessels,
as was accordingly done, but they were built too late to take part in the war.

Mr. G-BBAVE8, M.M. : Mr. Chairman, with your permission I should like to make a
few remarks on this subject. In the year 1841, when the Royal Mail Company
first started, I had the honour of being one of its servants, and very well recollect
that every one of the Royal Mail Company's vessels was bound by the terms of
their charter of incorporation and contract, to be built of sufficient strength to be
able to carry an armament in the event of war. Of late years that idea has been
abandoned, and if you were now to go to any of these mail companies and make a
proposition to them to build henceforward only such vessels as would be approved
of by toe Government for the purpose of warfare, I do not suppose that they would
listen to you for a moment. Since that time we have become a remarkably practical

2 L 2

506 THE MERCANTILE MARINE CONSIDERED AS AN

people. Merchants and shipowning companies have now another gospel than that
which prevails among the Navy and Army, who are brought up to regard warfare
as their natural field of industry. Outside of the Navy and Army, there is a new
gospel — " to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest." Now, if such a
proposition was made to the directors of these companies, they will say : " What
" are we going to do with the eighty ships, more or less, we have on our books ?
*' What would our shareholders say to us ? We were incorporated under a Royal
" charter for a specific purpose, and laid ourselves out to carry the mails at a contract
" rate of speed ; moreover, all our vessels are built so that they may be ventilated in
" the largest possible degree, and every one of these ventilation holes is a great source
" of weakness when you would set about the difficult task of strengthening these
" vessels, so as to enable them to carry an armament." These companies could
not put aside their old fleets, because that would simply mean insolvency. Besides
that, there is another reason. All these vessels that are now employed by the
Post Office in carrying the mails under subsidy, Buffer a very great deal from competi-
tion with other companies, which are not incorporated in the same way, and which
are not subsidized by the Post Office, and yet which do carry mails for nothing ;
and in the course of some ten years we may almost assume that there will be no
longer in existence any such thing as subsidies for mail steamers. Already a very
large number of the existing companies are in great fear as to what they shall do
in consequence of having over-built themselves. Witness, for instance, the Pacific
Company, which has more ships than it can profitably employ; moreover these
large mail steamers, if they burn more than a certain proportion of their coals are
brutes. If any man has stood in Panama, or at the New Zealand terminus of that
line, and seen those magnificent mail steamers come in at the end of their voyage,
he must have been horrified to see what bladders they were, lying on the top of the
water, and it is a fact that in those vessels the greatest care had to be taken to see
that they did not get a permanent list. In the last days of their voyage you would
see these ships— then " flying light " — swaying from side to side. With regard to the
.steamers eight times their beam, unless they could be always maintained at one
particular measure of immersion, they would not be safe to carry guns on their deck.
Neither, if war broke out, would we find artisans sufficient to refit them for pur-
poses of war ; for we have not at the present moment men enough in our dock-
yards. Every man who reads his half-a-dozen papers a day — as he ought to do —
and keeps his eyes open, knows we are on the eve of a very terrible war, and I do
not believe we could take twenty or thirty of these vessels, and suddenly and swiftly
prepare them and send them out. They would have to go out, remember, to fight
all comers, and they are utterly useless when the coal is out of them. They must
find coal wherever they go. They will not be able to say, as now : " Good bye ;
" this day ten days I shall be in New York." Those competing mail steamers burn
coal without any economy at all. Engines of the most economical class are put
into them, but they are all competing with each other, and if one makes a shortar
passage than another by an hour, there is a paragraph in every Liverpool and every
London paper the next day about it. They are living the life of men who compete
with one another, knowing that the chances are that some one or other of these
companies must cave in, because, for the most part, they have over-built themselves,
and their carrying powers are larger, particularly at this present moment, than this
country has any demand for. If you were to take the whole of the mail steamers
employed by the Post Office, I doubt if you would find amongst them twenty vessels
that could be made fit in a reasonable time, supposing war broke out, to carry a
64-pounder on their upper deck, and I have very much doubt whether the firing off
of those guns, say, half-a-dozen times, would not reveal such defects in their construc-
tion as would make you very much surprised to think you could ever have had the
■audacity to place such a gun on board. Even if we had any number of these vessels,
we have nobody to man them. One speaker has said he very much doubts the
statistics with regard to the number of British seamen. I am perfectly certain
that, do whatever you will with those statistics — you may be the greatest master of
hanky-panky in statistics that ever existed in this world — but you cannot find four
men to every ship that are fit to be called seamen. You may stretch a point, and
assume that you nave two able-bodied men to each ship, but the rest must be made

AUXILIARY TO THE ROYAL NAVY. 507

up of ordinary seamen, landsmen, and boys ; and can you expect that joining the
Naval Reserve for a month's drill in each year will make them of any value iu time
of war ? Men turn round and say in their vernacular " Cui bono f What benefit
" do I get by it P Nothing at all. Not only that, but there is another reason why
" I should not join the Naval Reserve. The Government has laid open the mercan-
" tile marine, which used to be the British Merchant Servicet as a trading school
" for the seamen of all the nations in the world, and I find the foreigner in every
" grade and position. I have lost my bread, my industry, and my ambition ; I am
" without hope ; I do not care anything about it, and I intend to go out to the
" colonies, and remain there permanently, and become a citizen, and not fojlow the
" sea any longer." We do not now find that class of men going into the merchant
service during these last ten years that used to flock to it when I was a boy. You
may find an advertisement in the " Daily Telegraph " from a firm for apprentices, who
are to be allowed to wear midshipmen's uniform, which means that no two persons
on board ship will be found to be dressed alike. A very large number of these
youths who are thus invited and trapped are the sons of opulent tradesmen, and
after a few years they find out that the life is a hard life, that it demands great self'
denial, and a considerable degree of brains, and greater application than they thought,
and they forsake it, so that we hare not now in our merchant service any of those
boys, of whom we once had such a number, growing up to men whose delight it was
to fight. I take it as an absolute necessity if any man goes into the Navy, he must
love fighting for fighting's sake, and I take it that a merchant seaman joins a fleet
ship in the hope that she will be so fleet that if she meets an enemy she will be
able to run away, and never fight at all. In fine, there is an utter absence at this
moment, as there has been for years, of anything like sympathy between the men
who serve on board the merchant ships which now sail under the British flag and
those men by whom her Majesty's vessels of war are manned, and for the simple
reason that in every point, their lives are as different as it is possible that lives
can be.

Captain Cabmichaxl, 6th Royal Irish Lancers : The speaker who has just sat
down said that this question of shipping is affected very much by the gospel
of England that we must buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest.
Now, we bring forward these questions at this Institution, not so much as soldiers-
and sailors, but as Englishmen, and it is because we believe that in the end the
commercial classes will have to buy in the dearest and sell in the cheapest market
if they neglect the Navy, that we open these discussions. With regard to
the armament of these oruizers, perhaps I may be permitted to draw a simile
from the Army. If we send out a cloud of cavalry, composed of three
squadrons, and there is only one opposed to us, we prevent the enemy doing us a
great deal of injury ; but if the enemy bring up their heavy artillery and infantry,
we have to retreat. So, if we have a numerous body of light cruizers, we shall
defend ourselves from a great deal of damage that we should otherwise suffer ; but
when the heavy ships come up, no doubt we shall have to give way, and if we have
no heavy vessel to meet those of the enemy, we shall suffer. But plainly we are
better off with a great number of light cruizers than without them.

The Chairman : If nobody else wishes to address us on this subject, I think I
may gather up your opinions in this, viz., to thank the lecturer, Mr. Brassey, not
only for this lecture, but also for the previous one, and for the amount of atten-
tion he* has uniformly given to these subjects, greatly to the benefit of the_ nation
as well as of the Navy. I am sure you will all join with me in thanking him, and
hoping that he will continue his attention to them as efficiently as he has done.

LECTURE.

Friday, June 9tb, 1876.
General HORT, C.B., in the Chair.

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY BY THE
REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

By Majoe Lonsdale A. Hale, R.E., Instructor in Military History,

&c, <fec., R.E. Establishment, Chatham.

Majoe Hale : General Hort and Gentlemen, — If any excuse is required
for an Engineer Officer undertaking to deal with this subject, con-
cerning as it does more particularly Officers of the non-ordnance
and mounted services, I hope it will be found in the fact of my long
and intimate educational connection with those services, a connection
which I look back to with the greatest pleas are, and which I am glad
to say is not altogether terminated. Among the conclusions to which
that connection has led me, there are two or three on which I would
base my observations this afternoon.

The first of these is, that there seems to be an impression on the
part of regimental Officers that the study of Military History is not
incumbent on them as a body ; that it is incumbent only upon those
of them who intend to lay themselves out for special employment,
such as employment on the Staff. I hope to be able to show in the
course of my observations this afternoon that that idea is altogether
unfounded.

The next is that among those Officers who do make a study of
Military History, there is a very large amount of labour misapplied.
It is misapplied with regard to the character of the reading, especially
as respects the period of Military History which is the subject of study.
As an instance of this, I may mention the case of two Officers whom
I met a short time since — two Officers of different ages, of different
ranks, belonging to different branches of the service, and, I am per-
fectly sure, of different intellectual tendences. Both told me that they
wished to study [Military History. I asked : " For what purpose —
" whether as an intellectual study, a literary study, or with any other
" object ? " They said the purpose they had in view was to make
themselves better soldiers in the field. I then asked them what they
proposed to study, and they had both struck upon the same book,
Napier's " History of the Peninsular War." As they told me that
their object was to become practical soldiers, I, not unnaturally, said :

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY, ETC. 509

* Then of course you have read all about the campaign of 1870 and

* 1871 ? *• No, they had not read much in connection with that war;
fhat is to say, those two Officers, in order to become practical soldiers,
were about to study the tactics of a period when men fought, so to
speak, across a pocket-handkerchief, whereas now they fight across the
main-sail of a man-of-war ; of a period when, if a man fired at a
church-steeple, he, according to an old saying, was lucky if his shot
fell within the parish, whereas individual men can now-a-days be
struck by small arms at about 1,000 paces, and artillery boast thai
troops are not safe from them at upwards. of 4,000 yards. These
Officers were merely typical of a number of others, who begin their
studies altogether at the wrong end. They should begin with the
events of the most recent campaign, inasmuch as the tactics therein
pursued are more like, though not exactly like, the tactics of any
future campaign in which they may be engaged.

1 also find that the regimental Officers who do study the most
modern Military History do not study the right documents. A class of
writers has sprung into existence to whom we ore doubtless very much
indebted — essay writers. I am not talking of prize essayists, but of
essay writers generally, and I find they are a very popular class of
writers, and very much read by regimental Officers. I do not wish to
say one word against these essay writers, but 1 do feel it to be my duty
as an instructor in tactics, especially to protest against the wufae
importance which is attached to the writings of these gentlemen.
They are, as a rule, men who have seen no service whatever in modern
war. They are most industrious people ; they collect a very great
number of facts, and on those facts they build up their own theories.
Now, of all facts which it is difficult to obtain, the most difficult are
those which occur on a battlefield ; and when we have obtained those
facts we know there are numerous stand-points from which they may
be viewed. 1 would, therefore, ask the regimental Officers not to put
implicit faith in, or to ascribe too much authority to, these writers, but
first of all to study the original documents connected with the last
campaign, and having provided themselves with the means of ascer-
taining the accuracy of the facts that these essayists deal with, to use
their own common sense, and to test the theories of the essay writers*
We are very fortunate in having at hand authentic documents con*
nected with the campaign of 1870-71. First of all, we have them in
the Official Account of the Franco-German War, 1870-71, which has
been translated by Captain Clarke, It. A., of the Quartermaster*
General's department. And with regard to that translation 1 wish to
bear my humble testimony to the marvellous fidelity with which the
original has been rendered into English. Then we have them in a
book called " The German Artillery in the Battles near Mete," by
Captain Hoffbauer, which has also been translated for us by
Captain Hollist, of the Artillery. These two documents are drawn
up by responsible persons and are founded on accounts furnished by
responsible persons. The compiler of the official account has not had
to depend for his information on the disposition of individuals to give
it, but he has had before him reports of commanders of all companies

510 THE STUDY OF MILITARY HI6TORY BY THE

and all batteries engaged. They have been collated by the Staff at
Berlin, and thus we have one of the most truthful accounts which it
is possible to obtain of the events of a campaign. It bears the most
searching analysis ; and if ever it can be shown to be other than accu-
rate, yon may rest assured that the well in which tactical truth lies is
unfathomable. But if you want to read this, you must be prepared for
hard study. It really is hard reading. You won't find any sensa-
tionalisms in it ; you will not find any " tall writing," as it is called ;
everything is described in the simplest and plainest manner. For
instance, when in the Prussian account you find a regiment falls short
of cartridges, you are told simply and plainly that the ammunition ran
short ; you are not told that the men raged angrily and furiously for
their cartridges. When Von Steinmetz appears on the field of
Columbey and finds fault with the generals who brought on that
fight against his orders, you do not hear anything of " the grand old
" boy's favourite oaths." There is nothing of that kind to be found
there. The only " tall talk " I have been able to detect throughout
the book, are the words "hero's death." There is no more high-flown
language than that. When a man is killed, he is sometimes said to
have died the death of a hero.

It is to this account that I would direct the attention of the regi-
mental Officers of the Army. In such a wide field it is somewhat
difficult to select instances to illustrate the value of its study, but I have
taken as the first illustration, the conduct of the German cavalry on the
26th of August, 1870. With regard to anything that I have to submit
to you, many cavalry Officers may say : " Oh, we knew all that before ;
" we were told that our non-commissioned officers ought to be well
instructed, and we quite believe it ; we were told how much depends
on looking after the shoeing of the horses, and keeping the horses in
good condition ; these are mere truisms." But I do not think that
Cavalry Officers, unless they have studied this book, will find any-
where the practical application of these instructions so clearly laid
down.

Sketch 1. — On the 23rd of August the Army of the Meuse and the
Third Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony and
the Crown Prince of Prussia respectively, set out from the line Jean-
delize-Oondrecourt. They were ordered to march in the direction of
Chalons, where, during the 23rd, the French army were supposed to be.
During the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of August there was no change what-
ever made in the direction of the line of march. The total strength
of the two armies was. up wards of 200,000 men, and their orders were
that on the 26th the advanced guards should arrive at a much shorter
line, St. Menehold on the north and Yitry on the south, and there be
able to act against the French at Chalons. UnJfeo tne evenlMML^6
25th no alteration whatever was made in thpimginsA direction _ _
line of march, and on the evening of the,, 125th we find the German
corps in the position shown on the sketch (ftate XV) . On the right were
the 12th, or the Saxons ; in front of them was their own cavalry division :
in front of these were the 5th Cavalry Division. The Guards and the
4th, who were the remaining corps of the Second Army, were on the

1 * teau ~"

REGIMENTAL OFF1CER8 OF THE ARMY. 511

left of the Saxons, covered by the Guard Corps Cavalry Division.
Farther south were the troops of the Third Army, viz., 2nd Bavarians,
the 5th and the 11th Corps, and on the extreme left the 6th Army
Corps ; the Wurtembergers and the 1st Bavarians were in rear of the
5th Army Corps. The 2nd Cavalry Division, the 4th Cavalry Division,
and, the Wurtemberg Cavalry Brigade covered the front. But during
all this time information was gradually being collected at the King's
head-quarters, which were first at Comraercy and then at Bar-le-Duc,
to the effect that the French were not at Chalons any longer;
that they had moved of? north-west, in the direction of Rheims.
And not only that they had so moved off, but intelligence received
also asserted that they were on their way, not towards Paris, but in
an easterly direction, so as to effect a junction with Marshal
Bazaine, who was at Metz. But Von Moltke was an old soldier, and
he would not allow himself to alter the direction of the line of march
without being perfectly sure of his grounds for doing so, and it was
not till 11 a.m. on the 25th that any order whatever for the slightest
change in the line of march was issued. When that change really
took place, great inconvenience and great suffering were incurred
by the German troops. That change of direction is sometimes thought
an easy business, but if you look at Hugo Helvig's account of the
march of the Bavarians you find they suffered very much by that
change. The alteration made was very slight. Believing that the
French might be at Rheims, but doubtful as to whether they had gone
off to meet Bazaine, Von Moltke simply ordered that the line of march
should take a north-westerly direction ; that the 12th Army Corps,
instead of going towards St. Menehold, should incline slightly towards
Vienne ; that the Guards and the 4th Corps should move up in a similar
direction, and that the corps down in the south should accelerate
their pace ; but at the same time he issued this order, which was a very
important one, viz., that the cavalry should be thrown well forward to
reconnoitre the front and right flank and reach more especially Vouziers
and Buzancy.

Von Moltke knew that if the French had really started from
Rheims in the direction of Metz, in all probability a large proportion
of them would be found upon this main road running from Vouziers
and Buzancy either to Don or to Stenay. It was, therefore, of vital
importance to him to know what was going on at Buzancy and
Vouziers. After he had issued this order, fresh intelligence came in,
and the Prussian Head-Quarter Staff were gradually brought to be
nearly certain that the French were actually on their march to relieve
Marshal Bazaine ; but still nothing definite for the future movements
was absolutely determined on.

On the evening of the 25th of August, Von Moltke obtained the sanc-
tion of the King to make provisional arrangements for a march
towards the norm-east, by which, in the event of it proving cor-
rect that the French were actually on the march towards Marshal
Bazaine, he would be able to concentrate, on the 28th, at Damvillers,
on the eastern bank of the Meuse, seven Corps d'Armees, a force of
about 150,000 men, to act on the flank of the French.

512 THE STUDY OP MILITARY HI8TOEY BY THE

But in order to do that, it was necessary to have recourse to a most
dangerous expedient. We know perfectly well what the relative posi-
tions of the French in Metz and the Germans round Metz were a*
this period, and that if Marshal Bazaine had then made a determined
effort to break out, there can be little doubt but that he would have
succeeded. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, of which, the German
leaders must have been perfectly cognizant, two Prussian corps were
ordered up from Metz, in order to effect this concentration at Dam
Tillers. That was owing to the uncertainty as to the exact position
of the French forces. It was felt that if they had really started from
Bheims at the time alleged, and had marched well, the only chance
of stopping them short of Metz would have been at this point ; most
important it was therefore for Yon Molfcke to know exactly what
was taking place on this main road.

The Crown Prince of Saxony had his head-quarters at Fleury, on the
right flank, and he would recoivo the cavalry reports sooner than
would the King ; the initiative was therefore left to the Prince, and
he was informed that the movement of the troops to the north or
north-east might be deferred until 12 o'clock on the 26th, and if
by that time no news had been received from the cavalry, then this
change of direction was at once to take place ; but it was hoped that
in the meantime information would have been received from the
cavalry which had been thrown out.

Von Moltke was ready to wait till 12 o'clock on the 26th before
initiating this movement ; the Crown Prince of Saxony at once orders
the flanking movement to commence at 5 o'clock on the morning of
the 26th ; at the same time he sends out his cavalry in accordance
with the orders he has received.

The cavalry of the 12th Corps are ordered to bend round, and go into
bivouacs at Bantheville. The 5th Cavalry Division were ordered to
bend round and try to get through Grandpre1, towards Buzancy, whilst
the 6th Cavalry Dvisioin were ordered to go direct to Tahure, and
look out towards Bheims and the north.

1 will give you a detailed account of what the cavalry did under
those circumstances, obtaining all my information from the official
account.

First with regard to the cavalry of the Saxon Corps. They bent
round from Clermont, in a north-east direction. When they were
ordered to change direction towards the north-east, they left a flanking
patrol five miles from Grandpre*. Whilst there, there came out from
Grandpre' a French squadron, which drove this small patrol back on
a Prussian squadron, and the Prussian squadron were enabled to
follow up the French squadron, who apparently retired through
Grandpre, and to send information into the Royal headquarters as to
what they saw. The information which they sent in to Von Moltke
at Clermont was this : " At Grandpre, and Chevieres " (which is a
email village close to Grandpre), "hostile troops. The enemy i$
"retiring at this moment to the northward of QramdprS. Infantry,
" cavalry, and carriages are seen, but it cannot be distinguished if they
" are artillery." Among the many points connected with that, you see

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 513

the caution with which the cavalry-leader frames his report. He does
not say at once that there are artillery, but he fairly owns he cannot
see what the vehicles are. Imperfect information is better than a
misstatement. Here was this astounding report, that the French are
absolutely retiring to the north. That information was sent into
Clermont, and reached the Royal head-quarters at 7 o'clock in the
evening. The man who took it, had some 20 miles to go (measured in
a straight line), and in a strange country ; that was very fair riding.
At the same tune, another Saxon squadron reconnoitred also to the
north from Bantheville, and came up to Buzancy (be good enough to
remember, only one squadron), and there, to their astonishment, they
saw a couple of French battalions, not going to the east, but right
away to the west, and information of that was also sent to the Royal
head-quarters, and appears to have been received in plenty of time in
the evening. Another squadron reconnoitred towards Dun, where it
was supposed the French might be in the act of crossing, and they
found that the French were not there, and had never been there. That
was all the information which was available from the 12th Cavalry
Division.

The 5th Cavalry Division started out and attempted to fulfil its
mission, but as they approached the Aire they found themselves fired
upon, and all the information which they transmitted to head-quarters
was to the effect that troops of all arms were around Grandpre\ and
that they themselves had been fired at. That was all the information
which was available at Royal head-quarters before 11 o'clock on the
night of the 26th.

The consequences were, that at 11 o'clock on the night of the
26th, the Chief of the Staff of the Army of the Meuse, who was at
Royal head-quarters, received orders that the march towards Dam-
villers was to be continued the following day, and that the two
Army Corps from Metz were still to come up there. It may, I think,
be assumed that the continuance of this movement is owing to the
non-arrival of certain information from Youziers and Buzancy. That
information, and most important it was, was on the road.

While the 5th Cavalry Division were changing their line of march
to the north-east, they had thrown out one solitary squadron towards
Youziers. From that, non-commissioned officer patrols had gone out,
and one of them under a Serjeant Brohmann sends in word that
it has arrived within two miles of this important point (YQUziers,)
and that the enemy is posted in considerable force eastward of the
town. That information was obtained during the afternoon, but
owing to some fault committed by somebody — whether a sore back of
a horse, or an Officer not being able to read a map, or a horse having
gonel ame, or thrown off a shoe, is not recorded — that message, which
was so important, and which had to be carried only twenty-five miles,
took twenty-four hours in transmission, and arrived only too late. But
you may say that was only a non-commissioned Officer's report, and
even if it had reached head-quarters much stress would not have been
laid upon it ; but there was straying about the country a confirmatory
report from an Officer of the 6th Cavalry Division. The orders of the

514 THE STUDY OP MILITABY HISTORY BY THE

6th Cavalry Division were to go to Tahnre and search the country
towards Bheims and the north. They did so. They threw out patrols,
and Lieut. Yon Werthen, an Officer of the 16th Hussars, at half-past
five in the afternoon, obtained a perfect view of the French positions
at Youziers, and on the basis of the personal observations of this
Officer the 6th Cavalry Division sent the following report to Cler-
mont : — " The heights east of Youziers, between Chestres and Falaise,
" are covered with camps of all arms. On the road to Longwe, stand
" one or two cavalry regiments with a battery and a rifle battalion
" in front. At Chestres, columns are now emerging from the wood
" previous to encamping. On this side of Youziers is a squadron
"of Lancers. The town itself does not appear to be occupied by
" infantry. The inhabitants say that there are about 140,000 men
" assembled at this point. McMahon is at Attigny, and is expected here
" in two days." This report was supplemented by the statement that
the detachments which had proceeded towards Chalons and Rheims
had not as yet come into collision with the enemy, but that all the
French troops were said to have been sent northward from the former
neighbourhood.

Here we find the cavalry have obtained two vitally important pieces
of information (and how true they were, can be seen from the positions
of the French Army on the 25th, shown on the plan), but owing to
some accident, this valuable information from the Officer, which had to
be carried only twenty-five miles, was ten hours and a quarter in trans-
mission, and arrived too late to cause any alteration in the following
day's march. On the evening of the 26th, Yon Moltke was left
without any authentic information as to where the French were on
that day, and this dangerous movement from Metz had, as has been
observed, to continue. The information obtained was, however,
thoroughly reliable; and throughout the subsequent days of the
campaign, seldom do we find incorrect reports sent in by the German
cavalry.

But now by way of contrast let me point out to you what took
place on this same day among the French, and really it reads almost
like a play. On the 25th the 7th Army Corps, under General Douay,
were at Youziers ; they had thrown out an infantry brigade and a
battery partly to Buzancy, and partly to Grandpre\ The rest of the
French Army were executing on the 26th a wheel to the right on
Youziers as a pivot. On referring to the map, we find the 1st Cavalry
Division thrown out well to the front, where there are no Prussians at
all ; the 2nd Cavalry Division is carefully stowed away in rear of the
centre, where there cannot possibly be a Prussian. During the
26th, information kept coming in to General Douay at Youziers
as to what was taking place in his front. We do not know who sup-
plied the information, whether it was a Staff Officer or a cavalry
patrol, but whoever it was, the information sent was utterly erroneous,
and this erroneous information was received with credulity by those
to whom it was sent. In the first place you may remember there
was a Saxon cavalry squadron out opposite Buzancy. They saw
two battalions marching away. These two battalions came in towards

REGIMENTAL OFFICE R8 OF THE ARMT. 515

Vouziers, and reported a "vigorous action" at Buzancy. The
position of the Prussian infantry on the plan shows the absurdity
of that report. Then from Grandpre" more information came in to
the effect that the Prussians were advancing in force. Now all that
was at Grandpr6, were detachments of cavalry and the 5th Cavalry
Division; and to complete the discomfiture of the French, in came
from the south of Vouziers itself a report of the presence of a strong
force of Lancers at Monthois. This was Serjeant Brohmann's squad-
ron: nothing much larger had advanced near Vouziers. Here we
have a small force of Prussian cavalry magnified into the whole
Prussian Army. Of course, General Douay, who was in command,
at once thought he was being attacked by the Prussian Army. He
ordered his advanced brigade to withdraw to Vouziers, and' he drew
up his whole Army Corps in fighting order, as the Officer of the 6th
Cavalry Division told Von Moltke, and he began to entrench him-
self. His whole corps remained the whole night in the pouring
rain, expecting an attack from a large force. In the meantime General
Douay, believing in the intelligence he had received, sends back word
to Marshal MacMahon who is in rear, and MacMahon, on the night of
the 26th, orders the whole French Army up to Vouziers to receive the
Prussian Army, and the consequence was, that the French Army on
the 27th, instead of continuing their advance, were drawn up in order
of battle, expecting the advance of an enemy who was not within
twenty or thirty miles of them.

I know nothing that to my mind conveys more forcibly the import-
ance of having a well instructed cavalry than these instances. I do
not understand how any Commanding Officer of cavalry can read this
official account without taking most energetic steps to train his
Officers and men in outpost duty, or how any cavalry regiment can be
efficient, if the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men are not
thoroughly practised in the duties which devolve on them when cover-
ing other troops. On the other hand, this account should make us
very careful of attributing blame to commanders of armies ; here
were commanders of armies 200,000 strong absolutely in the dark as
to each other's movements, and depending, not on trusty Staff Officers,
but on the reports perhaps of a non-commissioned officer of cavalry.
Therefore, when Commanders make mistakes, we shoald give them
credit for the difficulties under which they arrive at their conclusions.
These accounts further make us realize the unpleasant fact, that the
safety of whole armies is in the hands of individual persons ; com-
manders-in-chief and cavalry non-commissioned officers : the former
are like poets, born, not made ; it is our own fault if we fail to ensure
the latter being trustworthy and reliable.

But if this account contains lessons of importance for the cavalry,
it assuredly does also for the infantry. Verdy du Vernois, whose
name may be familiar to most of you in his " Studies on Troop Lead-
" ing," of which the translation is being continued by Lieut. Hildyard,
says : " Very soon we shall have a large number of young Officers in the
" army again with no experience of war. It is as well to acquaint them
" with the dark side of this, for the youthful imagination very seldom

516 THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY BY THE

" approaches it of its own accord. -The young Officer should be taught
" war as it i*, so that such occasions may not take him entirely by sur-
" prise, but find him prepared to take his measures judiciously. In
" war, circumstances occur amongst the bravest and best disciplined
" troops which, without the experience of war, would hardly be judged
" possible." I suppose that not even the most ardent admirer of the
Drill Book will maintain for a moment that we learn what war
actually is from that volume ; and yet one would imagine from the devo-
tion of some Officers to it, and the ardour with which its most minute-
provisions are sometimes discussed, that it really taught us everything.
So little do I personally believe in this, that had I the honour of com-
manding an Infantry Battalion I should spend my winter in endeavour-
ing to prevent my Officers and non-commissioned officers and men
drawing false conclusions from the Drill Book, and I should do that
by bringing instances before them of what actually happened under
fire on the battle-field. I know some very clever people tell us that what
happened in the last war among the German troops will not happen in
future wars among our* own troops : they tell you that the Germans were
led very badly and recklessly, that the troops got out of hand, and all
that sort of thing. I dare say they did ; there is no doubt the tactical
leading of the Germans in some cases was very faulty, and no doubt
in some cases they did act very recklessly ; but I think every British
Officer may assume that the discipline of English troops will not be
more severe in the battle-field than the discipline of the German
troops ; I think he may assume that the British troops will get out of
hand quite as much as did the Germans ; and he may assume as a fact,
which seems to be almost denied by some people, that foreign powder
and bullets will have just the same effect on English flesh and blood as
in the last war it had on the Germans. Then they may also assume
that whole battalions will sometimes be left absolutely deprived of their
Officers ; and they may assume that in such cases the companies will
go about from one side to another, ranging themselves under the com-
mand of the leader who is nearest at hand.

Then if I were this Commanding Officer I should point out that
whatever may be laid down in " the Field-Exercise," positions are very
seldom won by troops bounding along 50 paces at a time, and even-
tually forming line two deep, or even single rank, at the position ; I
should point out that the battle sways backwards and forwards, that
the bounds are as often to the rear as to the front, and that a great
mixture of troops ensues. The official accounts tell us, also, among
other things, that when troops come under fire they take one of two
courses. If they are going towards a certain point and are taken in
flank by fire from another direction, they will either edge away under
the cover of ground to get out of the fire, or else they will turn
towards the fire that takes them in flank and endeavour to go forward
and meet it.

I should illustrate this by this instance, which is one of the most
striking in the book. Sketch No. 2 shows the advance of the 35th
Regiment at Vionville. The three battalions of the regiment were
given well defined points on which to advance to attack. There id

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

517

no doubt that the field being new to the Officer who gave the order, he
did not quite see the relative importance of these three points. He
directed one battalion of four companies on to Yionville ; the centre
battalion was directed on the clamp of trees, and the third battalion
was directed on Flavigny. As a matter of fact, these three battalions
starting from one line, the centre one had the most difficult task, because
the clump of trees lies in a re-entering angle, and the men advancing on
it would suffer from the fire from both flanks. Of the first battalion
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were sent against Yionville. The third company

4.3.2.1

.8.7.6.5.

12.11.10.9.

Attack ty35&Begf VlomrOU.

may possibly have been a little in advance of the others, at all events,
they found themselves struck by fire from the clump of trees, and
they not only bent away to the clump of trees, but right across the
battle field to ground 1,000 yards away, and are found fighting at
Flavigny : the Fusileer battalion on the right acted similarly ; three
companies go where they are ordered ; bat the 11th company finds
the fire rather hot from the clump of trees, and absolutely crosses the
path of the third company, and is found an hour afterwards fighting
at the village of Yionville. Of the 2nd battalion in the middle, the
5th and 8th companies were the rear companies, and the 6th and 7th
leading. T£e fire was very hot from the clump of trees, and there-
fore the 6th and 7th, intent upon taking the clamp of trees in flank,
bent away from the direct line of attack, but instead of coming round

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 519

his five battalions, starting from the point marked C, to follow him
through the wood up to the village of Staring Wendel. The brigadier
started with the leading battalion through a rather dense wood, and
struck upon the open at the point D. He then looked round for the
remainder of his troops, and found nobody with him, so after fighting
a little time, he went back. In the meantime his next battalion had
tried to follow him, but they had also failed. They debouched from
the wood at the point E, to find that their brigadier whom they were
following had gone. The next battalion, comprising four companies
split up, two companies following the last battalion, and the- other two,
arrived at the point F. With regard to the two remaining battalions,
a curious incident occurred. General Francois, who, after fighting
gallantly and nobly, fell leading a battalion, turned round and saw
at the point 0, on some rising ground, two battalions. He im-
mediately sent off an officer to bring them up. They were the
last two of Von Weynar's brigade, whose original orders were to
follow the brigadier through the wood; one comes into the copse,
and the other is found shortly afterwards fighting at the house
H, two miles away from the right flank of the brigade. I in-
stance that as showing the difficulty of brigade-leading in a difficult
country.

Perhaps the most prominent example of the difficulty of unity in
com- mand is shown in Sketch No. 6 (Plate XVH). The 11th Army
Corps came into the battle of Worth on the left flank, and as they
came up they had at once to take part in the engagement. As each
brigade arrived on the field, instead of being led en masse by the
brigadier to a certain point, it had to be broken up and sent to the
most threatened points. Therefore the brigades were split up, and the
brigade commands ceased. There being three points against which
the army corps could be directed, we find troops belonging to different
brigades and divisions mixed up at these points.

In the Niederwald, parts of the 80th and 87th Regiments, 41st
brigade, 21st division, and of the 88th Regiment, 42nd brigade, 21st
division. At the Albrecht'skairserhof are engaged some of the 87th
Regiment, 80th Regiment, 41st brigade, 21st division ; 95th Regiment,
43rd brigade, 22nd division ; and 83rd Regiment, 44th brigade, 22nd
division.

At Morsbrunn we find the 94th Regiment, 44th brigade, 22nd divi-
sion; the 32nd Regiment, 43rd brigade, 22nd division; and the
80th Regiment.

The accounts in this book go into detail with regard to the com
panics in the most precise and apparently correct manner, and I do
think if an infantry Officer will put aside everything else, and study
this book closely and carefully, he will be prepared for almost any-
thing which may happen on the battle-field, and not be liable to be
taken by surprise.

I now approach the subject of artillery. After the campaign of
1866, artillery were at rather a low ebb, but since the campaign of
1870 and the Okehampton experiments, there is nothing now that
artillery cannot do. With regard to those experiments, let me say as

vol. xx. 2 m

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 519

his five battalions, starting from the point marked C, to follow him
through the wood up to the village of Staring Wendel. The brigadier
started with the leading battalion through a rather dense wood, and
struck upon the open at the point D. He then looked round for the
remainder of his troops, and found nobody with him, so after fighting
a little time, he went back. In the meantime his next battalion had
tried to follow him, but they had also failed. They debouched from
the wood at the point E, to find that their brigadier whom they were
following had gone. The next battalion, comprising four companies
split up, two companies following the last battalion, and the -other two,
arrived at the point F. With regard to the two remaining battalions,
a curious incident occurred. General Francois, who, after fighting
gallantly and nobly, fell leading a battalion, turned round and saw
at the point 0, on some rising ground, two battalions. He im-
mediately sent off an officer to bring them up. They were the
last two of Von Weynar's brigade, whose original orders were to
follow the brigadier through the wood; one comes into the copse,
and the other is found shortly afterwards fighting at the house
H, two miles away from the right flank of the brigade. I in-
stance that as showing the difficulty of brigade-leading in a difficult
country.

Perhaps the most prominent example of the difficulty of unity in
com- mand is shown in Sketch No. 6 (Plate XVII). The 11th Army
Corps came into the battle of Worth on the left flank, and as they
came up they had at once to take part in the engagement. As each
brigade arrived on the field, instead of being led en masse by the
brigadier to a certain point, it had to be broken up and sent to the
most threatened points. Therefore the brigades were split up, and the
brigade commands ceased. There being three points against which
the army corps could be directed, we find troops belonging to different
brigades and divisions mixed up at these points.

At Morsbrunn we find the 94th Regiment, 44th brigade, 22nd divi-
sion; the 32nd Regiment, 43rd brigade, 22nd division; and the
80th Regiment.

The accounts in this book go into detail with regard to the com
panies in the most precise and apparently correct manner, and I do
think if an infantry Officer will put aside everything else, and study
this book closely and carefully, he will be prepared for almost any-
thing which may happen on the battle-field, and not be liable to be
taken by surprise.

vol. xx. 2 m

520 THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY, BY THE

an instructor in tactics I rather regret that they were not more
exhaustive in one point of view. The artillery at Okehampton
smashed cavalry to pieces and slaughtered Major East's infantry, bnt
they did not have any very extensive experiments on artillery itself.
For instance, it would be desirable to learn whether Hoffbauer's
remark holds good that artillery under fire can execute a flank march ;
also whether guns, the position of which is indicated only by the flash
of the discharge, can be struck by artillery ; and we learn nothing
about the loss the guns would have suffered from the opposing artillery
when Major Bast's infantry were advancing to the attack. Experi-
ments such as these would have required much time, but would have
been of great value.

With regard to the statements which Hoffbauer and other artillery-
men make respecting the doings of their own arm, it may be
remarked that these statements must be accepted with caution, as
must also the examples which they brine: forward. When I find an
instance quoted frL Hoff ban or bearing in one direction, I haTO
generally not very much trouble to recall to my memory other instances
from Hoff bauer bearing in the other direction. He deals with the
battle of Columbey as if it were a great artillery success. But why
was it ? Because the French did not want to attack the artillery, if
we may believe the statement of a French Officer, who has written
" Three Months with the Army at Metz," Marshal Basaine distinctly
gave orders to the French not to assume the offensive. Therefore no
attempt was made to drive the Prussian artillery away.

The most remarkable differences in the behaviour of artillery under
fire occur not far from each other on the same battle-field. The
1st Horse Artillery battery of the 4th Army Corps remained all day
in, or close to, the position it took up at 9 a.m., west of Vionville ;
bnt the 2nd Horse Artillery battery of the 3rd Army Corps, which
came into action at the same time, retired within an hour before
infantry skirmishers, when the skirmishers had succeeded in approach-
ing to within from 1,200 to 1,400 paces of the guns. I do hold most
strongly to the power of artillery; but the instance most to the
point in the earlier battles of the war of 1870-71, of which we have
authentic details, tells against the guns. At the battle of Noisseville,
which was fought over the same ground as that of Columbey, there
were sixty German guns drawn up on a tongue of land running down
from Poix and Sevigny towards Metz. The French infantry came down,
and before these French infantry, the sixty guns had to retire to the
German infantry line. I will give an instance showing the necessity
of exercising the caution of which I have spoken, in receiving the
details of any fight from a member of a special arm. General Von
Bulow commanded the artillery of the 3rd Army Corps, and he has
evidently communicated to the Prussian War Office and to Hoffbauer
his view of the artillery battle; but Captain Hoffbauer apparently
did not quite know what to do when he received this information. He
found a certain amount of respect must be paid to the report, but I do
not believe he thought for one moment it was accurate. Therefore he
adopts the compromise of putting Von Bulow's report in a foot-note

Jourrvah RJJ.S Jnatzlutiorc
VOL 20.

pi.xyffl

J.Jobbins

Journal RU.S Irustituiian,
VOL.20.

piax

BATTLE OP VIONVILLE

5. p.m. 16* Aug 1870.

J Jobbms

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 521

" General Von Bulow states that from the time of the captnre of the farm
" of Flavigny " (which took place at 12 o'clock), " np to that of post-
" ing the outposts in the evening " (which took place at 8 or 9 o'clock),
" there was not a single infantry soldier within reach of the artillery
" of the centre, or, in other words, from the position of the right
" wing of the corps of artillery on the hill as far as the 4th heavy bat-
" tery, near the high road ; the farm of Flavigny alone being occupied
" by two companies. The artillery was consequently obliged to defend
" itself against the attacks of the enemy's skirmishers, which was
" done with perfect success." Directly I read that, having also read
the official account, I felt there must be some mistake. I turned at once
to the Staff account and to the Staff maps, and the sketches Nos. 7 and
8 (Plates XV 111 and XIX) are the statements which they furnish. It is
a very natural mistake for General Yon Bulow to make. A gunner does
not look around to see if infantry are coming up to help him, he relies on
his guns, and he peppers away on the infantry in front, not caring two
straws whether the infantry come up to protect him. The General saw
the French retreating, and naturally thought it was caused by his
own guns ; but the infantry had been really near him in support, and
when the infantry came to write their account, they corrected the not
unnatural description which General Yon Bulow has furnished. That
is the clue to what some people think an exaggeration, but which I
think merely the one-sided view of what takes Jplace, which artillery
Officers give of the actions in which they have been engaged. I do
not think infantry have very much to fear in the future. The ground
they will have to fight over will be very much like what they have
fought over hitherto ; and if we take into account the ground, and
the fire which will be poured upon the batteries by the assailant's
artillery, I think that infantry will find just the same scope for action
in the future as they have enjoyed up to the present time.

Lastly, with regard to the corps to which I have the honour to
belong, there are lessons for them to learn from this war. I hope I
shall not bo thought an ill bird if I venture to speak of one little
failing of the Royal Engineers. I do not know if they really do
possess any failing, but if they do, it is attaching undue importance to
one word in their motto, the word " ubique" They seem to think that
the Corps of Engineers can be ubiquitous under all circumstances ; and
this feeling is rather nourished by the practice of " Peace manoeuvres."
I do not think any General has ever commanded a corps at " Peace
" manoeuvres " who will not say that the engineers were ready to go any-
where and do anything required of them ; but then there are many
Officers of engineers who imagine, because they can be everywhere in
peace time, they can be so in time of war also, and in this they are
encouraged by the cavalry and infantry. I know there are a great
many engineer Officers who imagine that the duty of the destruction
of an enemy's communications in front, of his railway bridges, railway
lines, telegraph lines, Ac, properly belongs to the engineers ; and
cavalry Officers, who think this work is not in accordance with their
brilliancy and dash, say, " Do it by all means." I am glad to find the
authorities taking a different view, and we have now started a cavalry

2 M 2

522 THE STUDY OP MILITARY HISTORY, BY THE

pioneer class at Chatham. I would ask any engineer Officer to
take this map (sketch No. 1), and see the enormous extent of country
covered by the cavalry divisions, and then try to devise any possible
organization of engineers by which he will be able at the right point
always to have engineers ready to act upon the communications of the
enemy in front. It is absolutely impossible. A cavalry regiment can
only be deemed able and efficient to perform its duty in covering the
advance of its own army, if it is prepared to undertake a certain amount
of pioneer duty as well as those of reconnaisance. On the battle-field,
it is just the same ; and we have a difference of opinion in our own corps
upon the subject. Some Officers tell you : " We will do all the
" intrenching ; " and an Officer of an infantry battalion, when I urged
him to learn a little field-fortification, said to me : " Why should I ?
" It is your fellows' work, not ours." But I will ask you to take any
field of battle you like, and tell me how you can be sure that when an
army comes up and gains possession of some position, you can arrange
that the engineers shall always be at the right point when they are
required. What is more, you will find sometimes, as happened at
Vionville and Worth, that, owing to the necessities of the moment, the
engineers have been taken away from their proper duties, and are
fighting side by side with the rest of the infantry. My opinion, — and I
think it is the opinion of many others, — is that the duties of engineers
and infantry on the battle-field must, to a limited extent, be absolutely
interchangeable.

I have now dwelt upon the desirability of the study of this book by
all branches of the service. I should very much regret if anything I
have said should lead you to read this book in order to see what grand
fellows your own branch of the service in particular are. That is not
the way to study it. It should be studied page by page, paragraph by
paragraph, sentence by sentence, line by line, and then you will arrive
at the conclusion that an army does not consist of four isolated mem-
bers, but of four members bound up in the closest and most intimate
union ; and I venture to think that an Officer who, with an exaggerated
feeling of esprit de corps, sits down to the perusal to find out something
which shall delight him with his own corps, will rise, I won't say
humiliated, but humbled. He will find that although on the field of
Vionville, the artillery of the 10th Army Corps went forward without
any escort and effected most useful results without much harm to
themselves, he has merely got to turn over a few pages to find that
when, two or three days afterwards, on the field of Gravelotte, the
artillery of the 9th Army Corps repeated that manoeuvre, they en-
countered, what I cannot but consider, a crushing defeat. The cavalry
Officer who boasts that he can ride down everything because those six
squadrons performed prodigies of valour on the field of Vionville,
merely has to turn back a few pages, and he will find that a division
of cavalry who attacked infantry, unshaken by artillery fire, were
compelled to ride back with severe loss. And the infantry Officer who
"inks because his arm succeeded at Spicheren, almost unaided by
'Uery, they can always do so, has merely to go a little further, and
ill find the Germans themselves admitting that infantry trying to

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 523

attack infantry without any aid from artillery must assuredly meet
with repulse.

The lesson we here learn is, that if one member of a body be not
properly cared for, it becomes weak and inefficient ; if it be taken too
much care of, and is over-nourished and expanded beyond its right
size, it becomes a deformity.

The value of this study will not, I venture to think, be confined to
war-time only ; it will be just as valuable for peace. The army is a
society subject to exactly the same rules as every othfer aggregation of
human beings, and therefore we find that it is not when war threatens
us that the bonds which bind us together are in danger of being
loosened ; it is in the sunshine of peace, when we have not very much
to employ our time, that, in the words of the old proverb, " the devil
" finds work for idle hands to do." It is then that we cease to be to
the failings of the other branches of the service " ever kind, to their
" faults a little blind." It is then that the specks on the characters of
the other branches of the service grow into dark ugly spots.

Gentlemen, from time to time there crop up for decision, questions
affecting us each and all, questions of vital importance to the service,
questions connected with organization, with the distribution of duties,
with supersession, with promotion, with appointments to the Staff or
other offices. When they arise, the first thing we do is to ask (and not
unnaturally), " How will this affect me ? " Then, " How will this
€i affect my branch of the service ? " And too often, according to our
selfish instincts, or deluded by our esprit de corps alone, do we form an
opinion on the question. But to a man who has studied the accounts
of the campaign with which I have been dealing, to him, when such
questions come up for consideration, there will arise, almost spon-
taneously, the recollection of dangers which the four arms have shared
in common ; of perils which by each other's aid have been averted ; of
glories which by the unselfish assistance of the other branches his
own arm has won ; and, softened by these recollections, and bearing
them in mind, he will try to come to a decision, animated solely and
entirely by that grand principle without which an army becomes
merely a collection of armed hordes; that principle which, if it is
required, as for aught I know it may be, at Chatham and at Woolwich,
is equally wanted elsewhere, — the good of the service first, the good of
my own corps, the good of my own branch of the service, it may be
the good of the regiment, afterwards.

The Chairman : I am sure you will all join with me in giving our
best thanks to Major Hale for his very interesting lecture.

LECTURE.

Friday, May 26, 1876.

The Eight Honourable Sib HENRY BARTLE E. FRERE, Bart.,
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c, &c., &c, in the Chair.

MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
POWER AND OF POLITICAL USEFULNESS.

By Major-General Sir Frederic J. Goldsmid, C.B., K.C.S.L

The subject selected for the Lecture on the present occasion may seem
neither inviting nor utilitarian, nor can I lay claim to the possession
of those special powers of attraction which make the Lecturer, as it
were, independent of his theme. But I will, at least, endeavour to
substantiate my proposition by illustration and argument. Succeeding
in this, it will be comparatively easy to deal with the later question
of practical application. Failing in it, I must hope that your time
and attention will not have been entirely thrown away, and it is not '
improbable that from any after discussion provoked, something of
advantage may be extracted.

It has been common to depreciate tho public usefulness of military
men in an unprofessional sphere. Whether this be the tendency or not
at the present moment, when diffused knowledge is doing so much to
raise, level, or revolutionize, is another matter. There can be little
doubt as to what have been the true causes for such an opinion. In the
first place, the preliminary education has hardly been that of the learned
professions. Few men who have distinguished themselves at college
have become soldiers. Few men indeed who have read up to a high
mark in classics are content to forfeit the natural fruits of their read-
ing for the problematical honours of a military career. Secondly, the
ordinary routine of garrison duty and the direct requirements of drill
and discipline are not favourable to broad intellectual development.
Questions that immediately arise to the thoughtful Officer out of his
professional experience are so far important in that they affect the
comfort and well-being of his fellow-creatures, the honour of his
country, and the advancement of science. But they are under serious
limitations : human nature is regarded in a state of artificial control ,

MILITARY TRAINING, ETC. 525

glory is ever associated with trumpets and weapons of war ; science is
purely that of attack or defence. Thirdly and lastly, the social aspect
of military life is not snch as to leave the outer world impressed with
the belief that the school is a good one for cosmopolitan usefulness.
The popular notion of a mess-table may not be always the true one,
bit it is not absurdly incorrect ; and it is difficult to tone down an
exaggerated picture, once credited and received, to a guise of truth to
wKch the spectator's mind is unaccustomed. Now, though I am will-
ing to admit that the intellect may not have been fairly exercised for
the vorld in a mere professional routine of soldiering, I maintain that the
intellgent and observant Officer who in vigorous manhood may be
calledfrom such restricted field of action to public life, has rather bene-
fited turn lost ground by his military associations. He has known
and f ei the value of discipline and organization. He will have to
apply thru in a less practical and severe form to mankind at large, than
has beenhis wont with soldiers : but' he will never regret the absolute
experience of his course of study ; and at the close of his career he will
probably rrive at the conclusion that he could not have started on a
better baa. than that of military training. I am not speaking here of
that nominl experience which is required for qualification for promo-
tion in speed cases, but of the hard, real training of a soldier, without
any claims \ exception, or, it may be, without any wish for exemption
from the oroiary every-day lot of his fellows.

Let us begt with a boy's education at the period when the abstract
profession is *e guiding-star to his future. If the pupil is to be a
soldier, he mn be prepared for Woolwich or the line, and according
to the particiu* fancy of parent or guardian he is sent to a public
school, a priva. school, or a crammeiv— perhaps from one to the other.
Should the boy 3 studiously disposed and self -helping, nothing to my
niind, under prent circumstances, could be better for him than the
English public &100I ; nothing certainly could be better at any time,
were due attenti* only given to what is called the " Modern Depart-
" ment," an introiction of recent date, and consequently imperfect and
of partial use. Lmch an arena as this, companionship is formed with
members of thoselasses which, independently of recruiting society in
its broader sense, mmonly supply the nobles and princes of an intel-
lectual world ; anthe training and discipline which serve to develop
the genius of the to-ecclesiastic, lawyer, statesman, orator, and poet,
would be equally alisposal for the profit of the future military com-
mander. This is 9 healthy atmosphere in which the latter may
safely reside up tche period of examination, whether for further
academic and purel^rofessional instruction, or for active professional
life. Should a boy,i the other hand, be idle, or indifferent, or want-
ing in intelligence, Lesume that the private school and the crammer
may present greater Ivan t ages for his tuition than the other. But
the process by which e backward or mischievous youngster becomes,
as he sometimes doesecome, a distinguished man, is a little foreign
to our present purpose His personal history is perhaps of itself evi-
dence that he has anCeptional genius, which makes him more or
. less independent of ruand system, though I should be inclined to

526 MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF

suggest military discipline as the best corrective for his early short-
comings.

Woolwich and Sandhurst have of late years undergone many and
notable changes. We may readily believe that these have been effected
as much by the spirit of the age as by professional requirements : thst
they have been worked out, in fact, much in the same spirit as tie
reforms in all public schools. It is, therefore, reasonable to concude
that the several systems of the several educational establishment in
England has been to some extent assimilated as well as the norde
improved ; and that there is at least a stronger sympathetic b<nd of
union between the Eton and Woolwich, or Harrow and Sandhirst of
the day than was ever known before. Let us take a passing glance
at what has been the standard of military education in one material
branch.

An excellent authority on Woolwich, in a work of fiction o closely
akin to fact that its evidence is fully equal to that of an oflkal report,
thus speaks of the mathematical studies of a cadet thirty ears ago :
" My course in mathematics consisted of plane and sphfical trigo-
" nometry, conic sections, statics and dynamics, property of roofs
" and arches, hydrostatics, projectiles, and the deferential *nd integral
" calculus. In this course I had obtained a very good ecimal, and
" therefore might be said to have a fair knowledge of th subjects. I
" was, therefore, anxious to compare my mathematitl knowledge
" with that of a Master of Arts of Cambridge, a4 discover, if
" possible, how much longer it would take me to work ? to the extent
" requisite to become M.A. To my surprise I found fat the gentle-
" man from Cambridge knew only as much mathemat* as I did when
" I was in the second class, and, in fact, if I had be1 at Cambridge
" instead of at Woolwich, I should have been distjgaished all my
" life as M.A., and should, of course, have been lo<ed on as an au-
" thority on such matters as mathematics by peoplefho had no other
u means of testing one's qualifications than by £ literary annex
" after one's name." But this ambitious tuitio'may have been
overdone, and liable to degenerate into cramming,* the detriment of
practical soldiering. For further on he 'says: -The defect that I
" experienced after leaving Woolwich was that Jonnd considerable
" difficulty in writing a clear account of any eve in a concise and
" grammatical manner, so that had I been c^d on to write a
" despatch, and describe officially some action or ttle, my production
" would have been discreditable. I could solve * abstruse question
" in dynamics, but I could not write three atences in English
" correctly. Again, as regards tho method of^ducting discipline
" with soldiers, what their pay was, how the/ere paid, how men
" were treated for various offences, Ac., I « as ignorant as a
" civilian, and there was then no preparatory*ining for an officer
" after joining the Artillery by means of whi£© could learn these
" matters." But he adds : " Defects such ate above-named have
" since been almost entirely removed, whil&'arious other matters
" have been improved at the Academy ; " ano"hough apprehension
is expressed that "the cadet's comfort is to^uch cared for," it is

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 527

most satisfactory to find recorded the opinion of an experienced
Artillery Officer that at this particular hour, it may be fairly asserted
on behalf of the Military Academy at Woolwich, it is " perfect of its
" kind, and the training given there will compare favourably with that
" of any military college on the Continent."1

As regards public schools and what they are, I might quote from
many modern tales of real life, not the less true from the use of ficti-
tious names, all charming in their way, and useful in illustrating the
popular education of the period. Of these the best known and not
the least bright and attractive is " Tom Brown ; " but allowance must
of course now be made for the salutary reforms which have rendered
its darker pictures obsolete. As for the high-minded masters of these
institutions, notwithstanding the great individual examples of an age
fast passing away, their work and influence have in no wise deterio-
rated. Still is their teaching of that wholesome kind quite as fitted
to the soldier as to the scribe; still is the aim of teaching to go
forward; there is just the one reservation to the aspirant's young
ambition, and that is, he must not restrict the desire of progress to
the narrow limits of personal advancement ; the mind must not be
narrowed by repeatedly numbering individual steps, or too seriously
brooding over cases of individual good and bad luck in promotion, to
the exclusion of higher objects. I say nothing on the utility of
Chaucer and Greek iambics to a military student. On these, as on
other details of army-examination, it seems to me there is room for
reconsideration and improvement, without injury to the mental refine-
ment or general accomplishment evidently kept in sight.

To school and college studies the passed candidate will find added
drill and discipline, both of which, notwithstanding the instinctive
dislike of many novices to either, have to certain minds a positive
fascination. Those whose tastes lead them into this particular groove
are deserving of every respect : they are the mainstay of an essential
daily routine ; it is to them we must look for keeping the profes-
sional progress of the British Army up to the mark of the continent of
Europe. Great attention to the minutiaa of dress and carriage is per-
plexing to some civilians, and is not even always apprehended by the
wearer of volunteer uniform : the value of regimental distinctions in
respect of tying a scarf, has to my recollection puzzled a superior
civilian mind ; but I confess to an opinion that where a profession,
such as that of arms, has once been adopted, it should be adopted
in toto. Moreover, where regulation is the backbone of discipline, as
in the Army, regulation must be supported and followed, unless sus-
pended or repealed; and so long as common things, commonly
expressed, are associated with duty, an Officer's business with buttons
and pipeclay is never too trivial to be done carelessly or otherwise than
well.

And now let us ask what is the natural result of a constant regard
to externals and the physical attributes of man, to the aspect of
humanity in its mechanism — if the world will have it so, to the reduc-

1 " The Gentleman Cadet ; a Tale of the Put" By Lieut.-Col. A. W. Drayton,
B-A. London: Griffith and Farran. 1876.

528 MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF

tion of a thinking f ellow-creature to a passive machine ? Is the gene-
ral tendency of such practice to lower or to elevate ? Of its effect
upon the ploughman or the ordinary recruit, there can scarcely be two
opinions. He rises in the scale of humanity if he only feels that he is
somebody beyond the limits of his village ; that his name is called
over with that of hundreds of his fellows, and of sufficient importance
to be missed if not responded to ; that, as Charles Kingsley says, " he
has a character of his own, and a responsibility and a calling of his
own." Not that he might not, and should not feel much of this in
his original sphere, but that in nine cases out of ten he does not. His
wages, his food and sleep, and his holiday-making, are his pleasures —
the rest is work. And here we have the very material once considered
the prize prey of the ensnaring sergeant. Experience has demonstrated
that the best type of the infantry soldier is to be found among the
agricultural and working classes. This estimate has more, perhaps,
to do with the actual physique than, the mental powers ; but fortunately
for the recruiting officer, in these days of highly paid labour, there is
a wider field of selection open, where mind is more on a par with
matter. It is needless to detail the various trades and callings repre-
sented in the Engineers and Artillery; nor is the line wanting in
diversity of elements. As regards the Cavalry, about two years ago it
was stated on excellent authority, and in this very room, that many
gentlemen who failed at Woolwich and Sandhurst examinations,
besides clerks, who could not, with the agricultural labourers, take to
pickaxe and shovel work, became recruited into this branch of the
service. Men of such stamp winning their commissions, come espe-
cially within the pale of our present argument. To them apprentice-
ship in the ranks is in no way a disqualification for loftier aims — in
fine, for the development of statesmanship or administrative capacity.
Proof positive might be given of a directly opposite result, so that I am
putting forward no new theory.

And why should Drill and Discipline lower the mind of the
educated Officer, even if he give his earnest attention to the thorough
mastery of the one, and apply his energies to assert and maintain the
other? To learn that a man should take 75, 108, or 150 paces in a
minute, and that the length of each pace should be 30, 33, or 36 inches ;
that he should always commence his movements with the left foot; and
that his two feet when in repose should form an angle of 60 degrees,
is not more derogatory to the intellect of the pupil than would be a
study of the alphabet or rudimentary arithmetic. The daily inculca-
tion and repetition of these military aphorisms, with a vigilant regard
to their practical observance, may to some minds appear an irksome
duty ; bnt in truth the onerous part of the work is borne by the adju-
tant ; and, off the parade-ground, captains and subalterns of companies
are hardly more harassed by misapplication or misapprehension of
professional rudiments on the part of those under them than the
classical scholar is by men who speak in recklessness of grammar or
disregard to quantities. Were it otherwise, how, in innumerable cases,
would time be spent ? What are the occupations to which we volun-
tarily abandon ourselves ? Are they one whit more instructive, or

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 529

worthy of attention, in an intellectual point of view, than the " balance
"step" or the "turn of the head in dressing ? " Surely there are
conventionalities in the world of fashion and etiquette, a study and
practice of which is imperative upon the highest order of intellect, and
knowledge of which is acquired without complaint or consciousness of
detriment. Again, some of the most accomplished diplomatists at
home and abroad have been renowned for a punctilious regard
to ceremonial forms which in themselves are trivial and absurd. In
some courts, especially in the East, there is a meaning in ridiculous
TTtinutioB, the comprehension of which is of vital consequence to the
envoy and the cause he advocates. Among Persians, a chair pushed
an inch or two forward or backward, so as to transgress the border of
a particular carpet marked for its limit, may cause serious offence ; a
cup of tea, or a tobacco pipe missing from the conventional number
offered to a guest, may awake hostile feelings ; there may be hidden
mischief in a misapplied word of welcome or farewell, in a clumsy
gesture, in a new-fashioned article of wearing apparel. Trifles could
hardly go farther in the way of puerility ; but it is a part of common
sense diplomacy to acknowledge with gravity thingB which are to all
seeming the most opposed to common sense. It is hoped that these
studies do not unfit the mind for more genial and manly occupation ;
for if they do, ministers of long experience in Asiatic courts must be
incapacitated for transfer or promotion. But as nothing of the kind
is admitted, it may be reasonably argued that continuous attention to
intelligible and rational details, such as the bearing and behaviour,
the dress and cleanliness of the soldier, has no really injurious or
cramping effect upon the intellect. Beyond this stage of military
routine, drill merges into science, and needs no more defence or ex-
planation than does the presence of grammar in literary composition.

On the other hand, are there not instances in which the constant
practice of elementary drill and the continuous maintenance of military
discipline supply results which should be instructive even to candi-
dates for diplomatic or administrative honours P The conversion of a
throng of awkward bumpkins into a smart regiment of combatants is
an experience which has its uses for the statesman as for the soldier ;
and the habit of enforcing, as of acknowledging authority, is one, the
acquisition of which is essentially the duty of every employe of Her
Majesty's Government. Nowhere, perhaps, can it be so well acquired
as in the orderly room and in barracks, aud on parade.

But let us go a step further, and look at the captain busied in the
interior economy of his company ; when the happiness and well-being
of many fellow-creatures are more or less affected by his daily ruling
and actions. If he possess tact, and judgment, firmness and kindliness,
and has a sufficient experience, he should prove a good Officer. If he
be wanting in these, or any of these — for the four are not always com-
bined— it may be presumed that he will sometimes err. In such case,
the best thing that could happen for himself and his men would be
the reversal of his decision where it had failed in fitness, and censure
in however mild a form. But we will suppose, as we are amply
justified in doing, an individual example where practice has led to a

530 MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF

certain perfection : where the captain is as just and wise in bis own
decrees as he is true to the regulations of superior authority. What
training could be better than this for a public yet non- military career ?
It would teach the diplomatist that breaches are repairable rather by
tact than by temper; the statesman that the only true popularity is that
born from the belief in justice and good faith, and the diplomatist
and statesman both, that the appreciation of men by personal ac-
quaintance, is far more accurate than that derived from report and
hearsay channels seldom untainted by bias and interest. It knows
nothing of party spirit or of favoritism — it has but one aim, to uphold
the discipline of Right. Punishment is administered where necessary,
and promotion is only given or recommended where it has been earned
by merit. I am not one of those who take legal exception to the
abstract justice of Courts-martial, and am, on the other hand, inclined
to pin much faith to their findings and sentences. But I will go yet
further, and express the opinion that if appointments in high places
were distributed on the principles which guide the hard-working
regimental Officer with his men, there would be less causes of com-
plaint on the score of unfair supersession than at present. Those who
agree with me, and I am sure there are some such, will also agree
that a lesson of this importance is not confined in its application to
the ranks of the Army. It has a universal bearing, and assuredly are
its influences wholesomely exercised in the sphere of national adminis-
tration and politics.

But of all the advantages in military training to the public man
attaining power and usefulness, none is of higher moral significance
than experience of those physical trials and hardships which are
incidental to a military career. The prolonged campaign with its
chequered journal of success and reverse, the station in a noxious
climate with its rolls of pestilence and mortality, the long sea-voyage
with its episode of storm and shipwreck, all these situations tend to
bring out the nobler qualities of men, to test the stuff of their morale,
to develop and cement the brotherhood of nature's brothers ; and
those who have come well through the ordeal, may be congratulated
on having served an honourable apprenticeship. This sense of proved
manhood and consciousness of having incurred habitual danger,
awaken, as it were, the generous impulses of the heart, and lend
assistance towards estimating the claims of fellow-men. If possessed
by the statesman in power, his perceptions become quickened in the
detection of true worth, his sympathies are at once enlisted in the cause
of those who have done solid service to their country; he feels a
personal pride and pleasure in rewarding the deserving and rejecting
the pretensions of men who rely only upon party or family interest.
I know not whether I have made myself intelligible in this particular
argument, which may, after all, be more a question of sentiment than
of logic, but I thoroughly believe in its soundness. It advocates a
form of truth which is rather intuitive than prescribed. It speaks
for something akin to the boy's admiration of the sailor after his first
experience of a boisterous sea, and who can say that such admiration
is not warranted and confirmed by the long experience of the man P

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. fi3l

It had been ray intention, on arriving at this stage in the present
paper, to have cited the careers of illustrious individuals in support of
my case ; but as a lecture provocative of discussion must necessarily
be brief, and as the citation contemplated, to have been effectual, should
have been full and inclusive of many historical periods at home and
abroad, I have abandoned the notion. It is one, however, suggestive
of scrutiny, and I would commend it accordingly to abler heads and
hands than my own for development. Suffice it now to state, before
calling your attention to India, in which country I propose to find the
materials for further consideration of our subject, that my original
purpose has not been put aside from the consciousness of any lack of
individual examples, either in this country or elsewhere out of Asia.
For instance, the name of Wellington will naturally offer itself as that of
a soldier-statesman of eminence in our own time, whose administrative
power and political usefulness owe much to military training. The
great qualities which will cause his memory to be honoured, elsewhere
than in the annals of military Commanders, were unquestionably
matured by the professional life he had led, and the habits he had
acquired in that life rather than by any adventitious advantages of
birth or family connection. " Such men," wrote a thoughtful teacher,
on the eve of the funeral in St. PauPs, " take a century to grow, and
" we cannot have another such in this generation. If you could find
11 a man equal in genius, you could not have the tried of eighty years
" until eighty years are gone. This old dull country, which the
" filigree nations laugh at, with her inconsistencies and her prejudices,
" how sound at heart she is in the way she does her hero-worsnip, and
" what unique heroes her's are ! Duty, the watchword of Nelson and
" Wellington, the last sublime battle-cry of the one and long life-law
" of the other, and no splash or dash nor French theatricals about

either of them Goodness, duty, sacrifice, these are the

qualities that England honours. She gapes and wonders every now
" and then like an awkward peasant, at some other things, railway
•* kings, electro-biology, and other trumperies, but nothing stirs her
" grand old heart down to its central depths universally and long
except the right. She puts on her shawl very badly, and she is
awkward enough in a concert-room, scarcely knowing a Swedish
nightingale from a jackdaw, but blessings large and long upon
" her ! she knows how to teach her sons to sink like men amongst
" sharks and billows, without parade, without display, as if duty were
" the most natural thing in the world ; and she never mistakes long*
" an actor for a hero or a hero for an actor. Men like Arnold and
" Wordsworth she recognises at last, men like Wellington, more
" visibly right, at once, and with unalterable fidelity."1 I have quoted
the words of one of a different cloth to that of the military biographer ;
but the writer was of a kindred spirit to all true heroes, whatever
their field or calling.

If I now turn to the Indian Army as representing par excellence
the field of the English soldier-statesman, it is from the conviction

1 The late Frederick W. Bobertson. See " Life and Letters by the Eer. Stop-
"ford Brook, M.A-" Smith, Elder & Co. 1868. Page 406.

4<
ftC

532 MILITABT TRAINING, A MEANS OF

that within the sphere of that Army, have been found, from the very
first, special opportunities — I may say the actually desired oppor-
tunities— for aspirants to administrative and diplomatic distinction.
And here it is that we seek accordingly the more abundant instances
of successful administration and successful diplomacy carried out by
professional soldiers. From the time of Clive and Close, or the
trusted Cornwallis (sent back at sixty-five years of age as the fittest
ruler for an Indian crisis), the later days of Malcolm, Ochterlony and
Munro, the still later experiences of Buraes and Pottinger, and up to
the comparatively recent administration of Sir Mark Cubbon, Sir
Henry Lawrence, and others living, in fine for a century and a quarter,
there has been no lack of names from which, to select illustrations
for our purpose ; nor is the present generation wanting, nor does it
show the least sign of failure in the supply. Let us take a passing
glance at quite modern annals.

In the Afghan campaign, however much military men may have
been involved in responsibilities which brought both blame and honour
to the bearers, it cannot be said that its chapter of disasters was in-
augurated by military advisers or soldier administrators. That one
of the presumed younger counsellors of the State had " graduated,"
as we are told, " in the learning of the camp, and that his after studies
" had done much to perfect his acquaintance with the tactics and
" strategy of modern warfare,"1 is unimportant evidence, because in
the first place I am not limiting the notion of military training to a
" little learning," and secondly a question has been raised with regard
to the precise counsel here tendered.

The administration of the Province of Scinde under Sir Charles
Napier was, without doubt, the outcome of an enlightened military
view, of which the wisdom was proved by after events. Those who
succeeded him in government were not ashamed to admit the suc-
cessful results of his practical statesmanship, and the noble spirit in
which he worked. Few readers of the " Administration of Scinde,"
chronicled by a distinguished historian, will cavil at the writer's
reference to the surprise felt by one of England's greatest Ministers
at the extraordinary talent for his work of the military Governor.
" It cannot be supposed," he fairly argues, " that Sir Robert Peel's
" astonishment sprang from the vulgar, contracted English notion of
" military men's intellects ; he must have known that a consummate
" captain cannot have a narrow genius, and that service in every part
" of the globe must have furnished such a person with opportunities
" for observing different forms of Government."1

After the annexation of the Panjab and British Birmah, it was
on military Officers that devolved much of the work of organization
and settlement ; and the records and present condition of both pro-
vinces bear testimony to the thoroughness and ability with which this
important duty was performed. In types, such as illustrated by
Herbert Edwardes, Nicholson, and others whom it might be invidious

i Kare's " History of the War in Afghanistan." Book II. Chapter 4.
2 "General Sir C. Napier's Administration of Sind." By Iaeut.-Genml Sir
William Napier, E.C.B. London : Chapman & Hall. 1861.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 533

to specify, but some of whom are still breathing and in harness, is to
be found the stuff not only of warriors but of diplomatists. To my
humble apprehension of the powers of this class, the only element it may
want of completeness is the polish of European practice, the habit of
the salon and the Continental tongue. Where this is- combined with
the ruder and more essential experience of camps and Oriental Courts,
we have at once the ready-made statesman or ambassador, if not for
every service, then for special service only. But we should remember
that these specialities are of vital moment. It is with the greatest
respect for recognised authority and the diplomatic service, and in a
spirit, I hope and believe, of ingrained conservative loyalty, that
I venture the suggestion, to test somewhat more freely than hereto-
fore the skill of soldiers in unravelling political knots. They will be
able to use the sword, if all other methods fail ; but it is a vulgar
error to infer that a knowledge of its uses would lead them to resort
causelessly to the Alexandrian remedy.

The Indian Mutiny, with all its horrors, was not to this country a
mere episode of storm and darkness. Its flashes of light were as
penetrating as vivid, and served to disclose the faces of good and true
men in crannies where they would have been unobserved at ordinary
noontide. Here the crisis demanded, as it were, a military head for
immediate action ; but the causes of the crisis, and its whole course
of treatment, were subjects for statesmen and administrators. Yet
in this notable instance, while civilians grandly came forward to help
their military brethren in the hot work of physical suppression, it
cannot be argued that soldiers were wanting in the council chamber.
That was, indeed, a time for India to distinguish efficient workers
from " hard bargains." The cant phrase of " right men in right places ,f
then derived peculiar significance. In many instances, unsuspected
heroes arose out of circumstances ; for there never was a fitter oppor-
tunity to bring forward and recognise solicitants to deserve well of
their country. But an Empire like British Asia should not be de-
pendent on circumstance to find her true supporters. Her Govern-
ment should always know those whom it would be of advantage to
consult on the occurrence of a crisis, whose sword is the sharpest and
truest, as well as whose judgment is the most profitable to direct. A
crisis did arrive in 1857 ; and truly fortunate — let us say Providential
— it was that the authorities at the helm of affairs, and less widely
responsible executives, had in themselves sufficiently the elements of
greatness to be qualified for the all-important task which then devolved
upon them.

A military man, in India, does not come to civil employ, as may be
supposed, without some technical knowledge of his new duties. The
details of " Revenue" work present to his mind a certain novelty, and
need close and careful study. Much common sense and sound reason-
ing power are indispensable to their mastery ; and in instances where
centralization has overstepped the mark of local requirements, it may
be that regimental discipline will be found useful in practising that
which is not always approved. But in judicial matters it is otherwise.
The intelligent Officer, conversant with military law and practised

534 MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF

in courts-martial ranging from regimental to general, has practically
nothing to acquire but form in the civil dispensation of justice. His
appreciation of evidence is fully up to the mark; so also are his
knowledge and estimate of native character. He will not have dealt
solely with svpdhis, but his personal experience of bazars and canton-
ment will have brought him in contact with a sufficient number of
types to fit him for the bench or kachhari. In olden times, when
svpdhi battalions were not what they are now, when a smart adjutant
might have been a little king (I am recording, not upholding, this
contingency), there were few better schools for young and legitimate
ambition than the staff of a native regiment. The kind of experience
there acquired was precisely that needed to secure efficiency in after
public life. The ground- work was admirable. Among the lessons to
be learned were self-reliance, discrimination, industry, patience, and
energy. The man who could fail to profit from these would not be
the man for responsible posts at all, no matter his cloth or profession.

If, then, in modern Indian history, the military element of Govern-
ment has been tried out of its own legitimate sphere, and found equal
to the ordeal without any actual training for other than strictly pro-
fessional work, may we not naturally infer that the school in -which
the soldier-statesmen or soldier-administrators of British India have
been reared, possesses elements of usefulness beyond the range of a
parade ground or field of battle ? On the other hand, if we analyse
the brilliant successes achieved by civilians, do we not, without in the
least detracting from the intrinsic merit of individuals, acknowledge
that they often indirectly result from the possession of those very
qualities which make good soldiers, rather than from any professional
instruction or preparation — nay, more, that these qualities have
ripened and developed by association with camps ? The ready wel-
come, in contradistinction to the disguised avoidance of responsibility)
denotes a condition of mind which seems to me of all others that
which is most fitted to deal with an emergency, because it implies
a consciousness of power, in itself a guarantee of success. And one
who has been used to active military life; to work in trenches, or
watching on outposts ; to eat, drink, and sleep within distance of
likely shot or shell ; to encourage the living and attend the dying,
under circumstances of peril and despondency; should have Had a
better training in this respect than that of polite or classical learning
and literature. I may go further, and assert that even one who has
had to carry out a mere routine of garrison discipline, in the absence
of superior authority, is a more qualified and promising candidate for
responsibilities of the severest kind, than are many skilled diplo-
matists whose experiences have been acquired in the closet.

And now to wind up the argument, as it were, which I have had
the honour of submitting, and with which I may have had the mis-
fortune to weary you, and to come to a practical conclusion. If it be
allowed that the profession of a soldier not only does not disqualify
him for general usefulness in public life, but rather fits him for certain
offices outside the limits of his professional range, then let us see
what are the channels of employment more manifestly open to him.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 535

The common-sense answer will be : " Give him a position befitting his
" particular experience, proved qualifications and idiosyncrasies."
There is, however, another consideration of no mean importance to
be taken into account — one of more general tendency. " What are
" the questions of the day in which the opinion of thinking military
" men would be of most value, and what the appointments out of
" their own professional sphere which they are the best calculated to
" fill ? " It shall be my endeavour to supply a brief but comprehen-
sive answer to this very pertinent enquiry, afterwards leaving the
whole matter to your disposal in discussion.

The question of the nighest political interest to England at the
present hour is that of Turkey and her struggles. Three years ago it
was that of Russia and her encroachments eastward. Next year the
excitement may be caused from another quarter: but I think the
attraction will still be towards the East. In fact the "Eastern
" question," of which so much has been heard and on which so much
has been written, may be only now in its infancy : for it has many
phases and belongs to a vast region both in Europe and Asia. To
meet the difficulties now presented in a wise and fair spirit, no legi-
timate aid should be despised, and no available means neglected, what-
ever objection be offered on the score of existing prejudice and
wanting precedent. Ministers at home should have the most experi-
enced and best informed counsellors at their beck and call : ambas-
sadors and envoys abroad, especially in the countries more immediately
concerned in, or affected by the threatened crisis, should be the most
thoroughly competent men for their posts. Knowledge of national
character and of mankind at large, appreciation of passing events, tact,
loyalty, zeal, discretion — above all the sense and power of responsi-
bility, should provide the personnel of the diplomatic staff, from the
Ambassador and Envoy Extraordinary to the Vice-Consul and Con.
sular Agent. We must never be at fault on the threshold of our work
— that is, in the preliminary knowledge which should form the basis
of our diplomacy.

But let us pause to ascertain how the matter really stands. While
fencing for an open route to India, and holding cautiously back from.
the counsels of continental Empires which foreshadow stupendous
changes, yet exercising a certain moral and passive interference not
without dignity or political drift — do we really know as much as we
ought to know, and could know on the state of Muslim feeling from
Constantinople to Delhi ? In India we should have abundant data to
guide us : but it is a long, long line from the Bosphorus to the Indus,
and the whole of the vast intervening tract is peopled by the votaries
of Islam. These Muhammadans are not to be classed as of one family
— as all Boumelian Turks, or all Anatolians, or all Persian Shiahs,
or Uzbegs, Afghans or hybrid Indians. Yet they are liable to be so
considered on the authority of travellers in European Turkey, Asia
Minor, Central Asia or India, as the case may be, each viewing the
general Muslim in the local specimen he has seen. An electric link
of brotherhood is said by some to connect the whole of the followers of
the Prophet ; so that a blow to the wide-spread religion effected in

VOL. xx. 2 N

586 MILITABT TRAINING, A MEAN 8 OF

Morocco is felt and resented by the Tungan in Mangolia. Though
I do not subscribe to so sweeping a theory, I think it very important
that we should know the true state of things : and I am sure that
independently of published [volumes, there are many travellers who
could give valuable testimony on the subject — some for Anatolia,
some for Persia, some for the dismembered Khanates of Central Asia,
some for Turkistan, and very many for India — testimony, which
massed in a single blue-book, would have its lessons and its uses for
diplomatists. Two-thirds of the witnesses would, I venture to affirm,
be military men; several of whom I could name as having been
actively employed in exploration between the^.Caspian and Kashghar,
since I myself returned from Persia towards the close of 1872. And
if this question, to be rightly apprehended, requires the testimony of
soldier travellers, it is not unfair to suppose that for its solution the
counsel of soldier travellers would have especial value. And not only
these, but of soldier politicals also — men who know the Muslim as a
priest, as a soldier, as a peasant, as a friend — in other words in his
fanaticism, in his fighting, in his simplicity, in his social life. It
strikes me forcibly that this minute knowledge is the true basis on
which we should mould our diplomacy — a knowledge which, while it
enables us to approach Muhammadanism without undue prejudice,
ready to admit its merits as its defects, in no way prevents its treat-
ment in a Christian spirit. In fact, thus qualified, we bring to the
sick man the skill and intelligence of a practised physician, instead of
the experimental remedies of an ordinary practitioner.

We are told, and on Bound authority, that the Sultan of Turkey is
prayed for in the Indian mosques as a recognised head of religion :
we are told that he is, as it were, the acknowledged Khalif or Pontiff
of the Muslim world ; and we are taught to infer that his right to
religious supremacy renders our support of this greatly embarrassed
potentate an essential feature of our Oriental diplomacy.1 Now, if the
Indian Sunni, because he offers up prayers for a name which he can-
not explain, at a distance of thousands of miles from the habiiat of
the Sultan, is to be held up as a sign of the vast power, moral or
spiritual, centred in the Golden Horn, how shall be interpreted the
indifference of the Arab in Turkish Arabia to the same supremacy
which is ever present before his eyes in the form of a material
sovereign rule P In illustration of my meaning, I recall a circumstanco
which occurred to me, when in those parts. While watching some
Arab workmen digging a trench for the telegraph-cable at a point
where the mingled waters of the Tigris and Euphrates flow into the
sea, an elderly, respectable-looking native came up and accosted me.
We got into general conversation, and among other things he asked
what I knew of the Sultan ? Was it true that such a person really

1 Very shortly after the reading of this paper> a telegram reached London,
announcing the actual Sultan's deposition. The report of his suicide followed.
Could we learn to what extent the communication of this intelligence has affected
the Muslims of India, we should have a good and useful illustration of their apprecia-
tion of a tragedy which might naturally be supposed to interest them deeply. — F. J. O.
[How much more so since the second Sultan has been deposed, and a tnird raised to
the Throne.— En.]

ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 637

existed ? Or had the British, as he had heard, carried him away
from Stambul? Questions of this description, if genuine, as they
really appeared to he, are hardly indicative of the sentiment of a
sensitive Semitic people, douhtful of the welfare or bewailing the
possible captivity of a spiritual chief. But the matter is one on
which there should be no room for doubt. It is too grave to be left
to individual opinions, or the judgment of single, and it may be
biassed counsellors. The division between the Persian Shiah and
the Turkish, Arab and Indian Sunni is too well known to need more
than passing mention.

I have spoken of one phase only of the Turkish difficulty ; because
it seemed to be the one more applicable to the subject of this paper,
as suggestive of a field for the employment of intelligent and locally
experienced Officers. For my own part I have sufficient faith in the
cloth to believe them capable of dealing with the whole question of
the Herzegovina and States south of the Danube : but shall not attempt
to argue out so startling a proposition. If, however, military men be
deemed in any way, intellectually or professionally, worthy of con-
sultation in respect to the Eastern policy of Government, or to be
employed as agents or executives in negotiations, explanations or com-
plications arising from the present disturbed state of the Turkish
Empire, there is another field in which they will readily find no less
legitimate or congenial work. I need hardly say that allusion is
intended to Central Asia, where British explorers have already made
their mark, and where British prestige should on no account be
suffered to decline. The subject is one worthy of far more time than
can now be spared for it: but a very few words may define two
means for the utilization of competent Officers which I do not think
should be neglected. One is the continued collection of topographical
and political data : the other the arrangement of all reliant data into
a form available for ready reference. The first implies systematic
travel and exploration: the second, the organization of a Central
Asian bureau in London, a scheme on the merits of which I have
before written, and in the policy of which I honestly believe. Again,
would it not be a wise move to attach an intelligent Indian Officer to
the embassies at St. Petersburg and Constantinople, and, perhaps,
even two to the legation of Tehran — not for purposes of obtaining
secret information, according to the habit of less civilised days, and
after the fashion of the Oriental news- writer, but openly and in the
broad light of day — for the purpose of communicating with the Indian
Viceroy and Government when necessary, and advising, when re-
quired to do so, with Her Majesty's Ambassador, on points of vital
importance to British interests in the East, however immaterial in
the "West ? Such a dignified recognition of the employes of our Indian
Empire would show the value attached by the home Government to
the British Indian Army ; would be highly appropriate at the present
juncture; and could not produce other than beneficial results.

A few words in conclusion. I anticipate one possible answer to my
case as it now stands, in the very natural remark that a soldier
should keep to his profession : ne sutor ultra crepidam : and that it is

2 h 2

538 MILITARY TRAINING, A MEANS OF

unwise to unsettle his mind and cool bis military ardour by diverting
his attention to foreign aims and objects. This is really my own
view. The Army cannot afford to maintain and educate men for tbe
Civil Service. Such a measure would be destructive of all efficiency.
I also know and am ready to admit the force of the fact, that many-
good Governors of Colonies, or Presidencies, have been and may still
be selected from the ranks of military men, whence also come Special
Delegates and Commissioners.

But let me solicit your attention to the matter in the following
light. Active service is comparatively rare. If amid a host of able
and good men wearing Her Majesty's uniform, it be thought that
some of the number could be more useful to their country than in the
particular form of occupation to which they are tied by a garrison
life, half-pay, perhaps even retirement — at any rate, by some not
extraordinary or incomprehensible contingency, would it not be well
to test them in posts where any particular merit they may have
already displayed, foreshadows just the kind of efficiency required?
It surely is no reflection upon the civil or diplomatic services to
assume that certain appointments, at certain times, usually held by
civilians or diplomatists, might be better filled by soldiers trained by
nature and circumstance to the particular duties required than in the
ordinary routine of departmental promotion. An Officer of the British
Army in diplomatic costume, would present no more startling novelty
at St. Petersburg or Constantinople, than at the less noted Tehran, at
Warsaw or at Cairo ; or than he would do, were he to appear in the
simple uniform of his military rank at any of these cities. But as the
question is one of principle, the specification of posts or places is un-
necessary. If in the event of any nomination such as here con-
templated, the nominee were pleasantly conscious that military
training, so far from being a drawback to his usefulness, had been
found a means of increasing it, the point which I have deferentially,
if earnestly, pressed, would have been established.

That I have confined myself in these remarks to one branch of the
State Service must fee excused by the nature of the subject discussed.
But I may, on the other hand, en revanche, take the opportunity of
recording a conviction that there are civilians whom a very little
practice would make not only good soldiers, but good commanders ;
and that judging from the events of comparatively recent years, we
need not go far to find an illustration of the truth of the theory.

The Chaibhan : I would ask any gentleman who has heard this able and eloquent
lecture to favour us with any remarks or criticisms which may occur to him.

Lt. -General Sir R. Wilbbahak : I may perhaps be allowed to make one remark
with regard to the latter part of the Lecturer's statement. I was employed for three
years, attached to our embassy in Persia, and the part I rather think the lecturer
has laid a little too much stress upon is, the value of information on special sub-
jects, and especially on the feelings of the natives, that might arise from. Officer*
residing or travelling through those countries. I was there during a very anxious
time, just before the Afghan War broke out, and when Eastern affairs, though for
less imminent than they are now, certainly created a much more anxious reeling
throughout Europe. Lord Palmerston was then our Secretary for the Foreign
Department, and Sir John McNeile was our Minister in Persia, and there was a great
deal of anxiety felt at the progress of Russia in the East. But what I should

ADMINISTRATIVE POWEB AND POLITICAL USEFULNESS. 539

like to ask both the lecturer and* our distinguished Chairman is, whether the fact
of the Mutiny having broken out so unexpectedly in India does not show us how
almost impossible it is for Europeans living in the most intimate way with the
natives to ascertain what their real political feelings are. I do not think you can
exaggerate the value topographically of our being thoroughly acquainted with these
-countries, but from my own experience in the East, and from reading very carefully
the history of the outbreak of the Sepoy Mutiny, it does not appear to me that it
is possible for Europeans to have the slightest idea of what is going on in the
oriental mind.

The Chatemak: As I have been appealed to on this point, perhaps you will
allow me to say a few words on that and on the subject of the lecture generally.
First, with regard to what has been said of the difficulty of any European ascer-
taining the real feelings of Asiatics, I may say that at all times, and under all cir-
cumstances, it seems to me extremely difficult for a man of one country, unless he
has been living in the most intimate relations with those of another country, to
interpret their real feelings as a native would. But I am quite sure that the diffi-
culty is less in the case of military men than with those of most other professions,
and if I were asked, I should say that military men, as a rule, have better opportu-
nities, if they care to use them, in India than most other classes for knowing what
the real feelings of the natives are. It is not always that their knowledge is as easily
available to the Government of the country or to the public as that of other classes.
There are some who, like the missionaries and merchants, have no particular reason
for concealing what they know or keeping it back, who may have peculiar facilities
for publishing what they know ; but as regards ascertaining tne feeling of the
natives of the country, I should say that there is no class which has better opportu-
nities than military men in the sort of employment for which Sir Frederic Goldsmid
has argued that they are so peculiarly fitted, I mean particularly the Political
Department of the Indian Government. On the two occasions to which allusion has
been specially made, during the Afghan campaign and the Indian Mutiny there was
always the most accurate information obtainable and obtained, and very often com-
municated to the Government, by military men, both those who were with their
regiments and those detached from them on political duties. As a matter of expe-
rience, I can say that during the whole of both periods, when I was in India, I never
failed to hear from military men what afterwards proved to be true. Unluckily, it
was not always possible for this information to be laid before the Government of the
country in such a convincing shape as to influence the action of the Government,
but that was no defect of the observer and no fault of his. Perhaps one charac-
teristic of the military observer which prevents his being recognised as an accurate
index of native opinion is that his habits of official reticence are somewhat stricter
than those of other classes. A crucial case is that of the Indian Mutiny, and I know
as a matter of experience that in all three armies there were Officers who pointed
out the defects which led to the Mutiny ; pointed out the exact feelings of the natives,
neglect of which gave bitterness to many of the actions connected with the Mutiny,
and that if these men had been better known and more listened to earlier in the
day, much of what happened might have been foreseen and prevented.

On the general subject of the value of military training as an education for diplo-
matic employment, as a civilian who for upwards of forty years has been on
terms of the greatest intimacy with military men in civil employment, I can
only add my testimony, such as it is, to that of the many civilian swho have recorded
their opinions of the inestimable value to the Empire of India of the services of
military men in civil, and especially in political or diplomatic, employ. The cases to
which the lecturer has referred were some of them under my own observation, more
particularly in Scinde. Both the conqueror of Scinde, so well known to you all as
a military man of the highest genius, and some of those who followed him — I will
only now speak of those who are no longer among us, men like General Jacob and
Sir James Outram, and others who might be named — I can testify that as civilians
they were in no way inferior to any men that I know who were trained exclusively
in civil life. There were parts of Sir Charles Napier's administration, notably I
may say his police, which were perfect models of administrative capacity in their
conception and in the way they were carried out. And I may mention that Sir

540 MILITARY TRAINING, ETC.

Charles Napier once told me that the whole of his scheme of police for Sonde,
which has been more or less since adopted throughout India, was turned over
and perfected in his own mind as he sat on the rocks of Cephalonia, looting at the
opposite coast of Albania. He then said to himself, " If I were told, as Major Napier,
" at this moment to take charge of that mountainous country, full of troublesome
" spirits, how should I get to work about it ?" And he said at that time, when he
had one sergeant and half a dozen Greek constables as his whole police force, he elabo-
rated in his own mind, and got ready to put down within four days, all the great
features of the most perfect police system that I know. That seems to me a tolerably
good instance of the way in which a soldier may at the time of his most active ser*
rice, or the service which seems to be least productive of the means of self -improve-
ment for civil education, fit himself for great civil administration. There is a point
which to my mind has always seemed one of the most important with regard to the
employment by the State of those of the military profession who could be brought
to turn their attention to civil affairs, and that is the extremely high standard of
duty which the military profession everywhere inculcates. I do not mean to say
that there is not as high a standard as you could possibly have in all branches of
State administration in England, but it is a great thing that you should have some
of your men selected men, the best men of a profession which habitually does not
look to mercantile results or rewards, which does not look for immediate payment
in pounds, shillings, and pence ; and the soldier, who always looks to duty as the
first thing incumbent upon him, who always considers that his duty must be done
whether any one is looking on and praising him, or whether he is perfectly alone, and
who feels above everything his reward is to have done his duty, — he has learned the
great secret of the best administrative ability that is to be obtained in a country
like ours.

I think I may interpret your feelings in returning the thanks of the meeting to
Sir Frederic Gfoldsmid for his very interesting lecture.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, NOTES.

AND

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

This portion of the Number is reserved for Articles, either Original
or Compiled, on Professional Subjects connected with Foreign Naval
and Military matters ; also for Notices of Professional Books, either
Foreign or English.

It is requested that communications, or books for review, may be
addressed to

MAJOB LONSDALE A. HALE,
Royal Engineers,

Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall Yard, London, S.W.

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

By Colonel Sir Lumlet Graham, Bart.

Whilst all European powers, great and small, have been more or less
busily engaged in remodelling their military organization and in pre-
paring their armies to meet the requirements of modern warfare, no
one of them has been more active, in this respect than Austria, and,
-eminently conservative though she be by nature, no other nation
has, we believe, effected such radical and sweeping changes in the
constitution of its forces and in its tactical system.

This is hardly to be wondered at, for, with the exception of France,
no other nation has, since 1815, been exposed to such grave military
disasters. The last and most serious of these misfortunes effectually
roused the statesmen and soldiers of the empire to a sense of its
military deficiencies, leading them to imitate, and, in some respects, go
beyond the adversary who had given them such a severe shock. There
was, indeed, much room for reform, and it may truly be said that
Austrian military institutions have been reformed in all their
branches.

In the present paper we shall devote ourselves more especially to
tactical questions, and particularly as relating to infantry, making
merely a passing allusion to the changes of a more general character,
which have been effected in the Austrian military system, and which
have been carefully analysed in the pages of that excellent periodical,
the "Revue Militaire de TEtranger" (January — June, 1874). It
would hardly be possible to find a better guide in the prosecution of
our inquiries than the one we have selected, the well-known soldier-
author, Lieutenant- Colonel von Kuhne, whose able and exhaustive
analysis of some of the principal operations of the war of 1866 must
be familiar to many of our readers (" Kritische und unkritische "Wan-
"derungen," &c.).

Colonel von Kuhne visited Austria last summer, and attended some
field exercises, also the inspections of several infantry regiments and of
a field artillery regiment, near Vienna, proceeding afterwards to the
camps of instruction at Brack and Salzburg and, lastly, assisting at some
divisional manoeuvres which took place in the " Puster-Thal," in the
Tirol, under command of Lieutenant- General Count Thun-Hohenstein,
military Commandant of Tirol and Vorarlberg. The Prussian Officer,
who was everywhere received with the greatest cordiality, had thus a
good opportunity of studying the new tactics of the army against
which he had fought so successfully a few years before, of noticing the

544 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

peculiarities of mountain warfare, unknown, except in theory, to
soldiers of his nation, and of making himself acquainted with the
practical working (as far as can be seen in peace-time) of the system
last adopted for the defence of the rugged frontier-lands which have
so often been the scene of conflict. He communicated the observations
made during his tour to the " Militair-Wochenblatt," in an article1
which we have before us, and of which we propose to give a short
abstract, with a translation of some passages of peculiar interest.

The principal object of Colonel von Kuhne's journey appears to
have been to study the military arrangements in Tirol, the principal
part of his pamphlet being devoted to them, and his observations upon
what he saw of the Austrian Army elsewhere being given very briefly,
notwithstanding which they constitute, in our opinion, not the least
important part of the little work under notice, and that which will
probably be of the greatest interest to the English reader.

Our author, according to the laudable practice of his countrymen,
goes to the root of the matter, and, before proceeding to describe the
arrangements made for the defence of the mountainous region which
is the subject of his essay, prepares the way, by a dissertation, firstly,
on the general characteristics of mountain districts as affecting war-
fare strategically and tactically; secondly, on the influence exerted
by local circumstances in such regions on the employment of the
different arms and the execution of military operations. His views
upon these matters appear to us sound and well-stated ; but, as there
is nothing new or original in them, and as, to use his own words, his
object in giving them is only to " recall briefly to his readers' memories
" things long since known," we think it advisable to pass over these
prefatory chapters, so as to have more space for matter of greater
interest.

The next chapter treats of the proper strength and composition of
military bodies acting in a mountain region, of the importance of a
local militia therein, and, lastly, of the organization of the forces
in Tirol. The following remarks appear to us specially worthy of
notice : — "All European powers have adopted the army corps organiza-
" tion, which is admirably suited to ordinary warfare, but bodies of
" 25,000 or 30,000 men cannot be handled to advantage in mountainous
" regions ; even divisions of from 12,000 to 15,000 men are too large ;
" and it will be found preferable, from every point of view, to break up
" such formations into smaller bodies of from 3,000 to 6,000 men, chiefly
" composed of infantry, but with a mountain battery and a small detach-
" ment of cavalry, and to give such bodies great independence of action,
" supplying each with a due proportion of transport and supplies of
" every description, also with signalling and pioneer detachments, ai^d
" all necessary tools. To make each little column thoroughly self-
" sufficing, as it should be, it should further be provided with pack-i
" animals, as well as with wheel-transport."

The inhabitants of a mountainous district (particularly when the

1 " Der Krieg im Hochgebirge, die Organisation der dsterreichisohen Wehrkr&fte
" in Tirol una Yorarlberg und die Diyisiona-Uebungen in Tirol im September,
" 1875."

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875. 545

mountains attain a high elevation) are a great value for its defence,
and in almost all instances of mountain warfare, they have taken an
active part in the operations (witness the campaigns of 1703, 1796,
1799, and 1809, in the very regions of which we are now treating).
Local knowledge and the hardiness acquired in mountain life render
them peculiarly fitted for performing the duties of light troops on
ground which is most trying to men whose abode is in the plains.
But, in order to make the most of such good material in war, previous
organization in peace-time is requisite. The mountaineers must be
enrolled in corps of local militia, properly officered and trained. Their
presence would give the defensive force a great advantage over an
invader in mountain warfare.

Inhabitants of Tirol and Yorarlberg, capable of bearing arms, have
been for centuries organized for the defence of the country, and even
now occupy a peculiar position in the general military scheme of the
Austro- Hungarian empire.

It will probably be of interest to our readers, if we enter somewhat
into details upon this subject, and, before doing so, some general
remarks upon the law regulating military service, throughout the
empire are indispensable. The personal liability to military service of
every citizen is the fundamental feature of this law. Those subject
to it are enrolled in the standing army, in the war- navy, or in the
" LandS^enr." Men joining the army or navy are retained three years
in active service, passing afterwards, for seven years, into the reserve,
and, in the case of soldiers, for a farther term of two years into the
" La^wenr," but those directly enrolled in the latter force, remain in
it for twelve years. The Landsturm is composed of volunteers who
do not belong to any of the other military forces. The reserve, for
recruiting purposes (Ersatz- Reserve) which is calculated after ten
years (reckoning from 1868), to attain the strength of one year's
contingent for the army (fixed at 95,000 up to 1878), is intended to
supply, immediately on the outbreak of war, a number of recruits
equal to the strength of the annual levy. These men will at first be
distributed amongst the dep6ts, whence they will be told off to corps
as required. Men of the " Ersatz-Reserve " remain liable to service
in the army or navy up to the completion of their thirtieth year, after
which they join the " Landwehr " for two years. The latter force is
intended to support the standing army, and for internal defence in
time of war, whilst in peace-time it may be used, in cases of emergency,
for the maintenance of order and security. The " Landsturm" is
embodied as an extreme measure, and acts as a support to the standing
army, and to the " Landwehr " within the realm.

The only regiment of the standing army which is recruited in Tirol
and Yorarlberg is the " Kaiser- Jager Regiment." The Colonel is
ex-officio Commandant of the recruiting district in which the corps is
raised. The regiment consists of seven four-company field battalions,
seven reserve companies, and one depot battalion, of which last only
the cadres of seven companies are kept up in time of peace. The
districts of Tirol and Yorarlberg having thus to furnish a relatively
small contingent to the standing army are expected to contribute, in

546 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

greater proportion than the rest of the empire, to purposes of local
defence, and are therefore subject to a special law for the purpose.

The first law for the organization of the Tirolese forces was, we are
told, enacted as far back as 1511, in the time of the Emperor Maximi-
lian, since which period it has been altered more that twenty times, in
order that it might be brought into harmony with existing circum-
stances. Many of these enactments, however, never came into force.
Originally, the Tirolese militia, or first levy, as it was called, was
supposed to consist of 20,000 men, divided according to age into four
classes, and only liable to be called out for a service of 100 days, but
no organization was prepared in peace time, and the companies were
only formed when war actually broke out, the communes usually raising
the required contingent of volunteers by appeals to patriotism and to
the pocket. A certain number of companies were thus made up, com-
posed of men hurriedly scraped together, and mostly serving for the
sake of the bounty, hence not the best of material. Still, the Tirolese
.sharpshooters rendered good service on several occasions. Up to 1864,
the Tirolese militia continued to be raised on the voluntary principle,
and the result was far from satisfactory, either in the wars of 1848 or
•of 1859. Long discussions upon the question ensued, resulting in an
ordinance issued in 1864, which established the principle of the
general liability to service, for home defence, of all inhabitants of
Tirol and Vorarlberg.

The militia was by this law divided into three classes : —

1. The organized rifle companies, 6,200 men ; length of service, four
years.

Officers elected by the men. The latter were frequently assembled
in small parties for drill, and the companies were called out, once a
jrear, for three weeks' training.

2. The volunteer sharpshooters. No fixed establishment. Length
of service, also four years, or till the conclusion of peace.

They were expected to take part in target-practice, whenever
possible.

Officers elected by the men.

3. The " Landsturm," composed of all able-bodied men, between 20
and 50 years of age, and not belonging either to the army or to classes
1 or 2 of the militia.

This state of things was an improvement on what had gone before,
both on account of prolonged service, of improved organization, and of
the recognition of the principle of universal liability ; but the election
of Officers by men was maintained, a very serious defect, and moreover
the arms provided were not of the best. The new organization was
barely completed when the war of 1866 broke out. In the course of
the campaign, 35 companies of riflemen (Landesschiitzen), about 4,000
men, and four companies of volunteer sharpshooters, about 2,000 men,
were actively employed, being attached by Major-General Baron Kuhn,
commanding in Tirol, to the demi-brigades into which he had divided
his regular forces. Towards the close of the war, the Imperial Govern-
tent appealed to the people " to defend their native, land to the last
extremity." Whereupon, 10 companies of Landsturm, about 1,500

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875. 547

men, were quickly raised in North Tirol, and over 2,200 men, within
48 hours, in South Tirol. According "to the Austrian official account
of the war of 1866, the whole local force enrolled in Tirol and Vorarl-
berg consisted of —

1. 8 battalions of riflemen 4,012 men.

2. 19 companies of volunteer sharpshooters . . 2,696 „

3. 187 „ of Landsturm 36,412 „

Besides 2 „ of Tirolese from Vienna .... 320 „

Total 43,440

The great measure of military reform which was applied to the
whole Austrian Empire by the law of December 5, 1868, could not
but affect the arrangements for local defence in Tirol and Vorarlberg.
Accordingly an Act was passed on December 19th, 1870, supple-
mented by one of May 14, 1874, for regulating the organization of
militia and Landsturm, and the provisions for target practice.

The local forces are now composed as follows : —

1. The Landesschiitzen (Militia Rifles), who form a portion of the
general Landwehr of the Empire, and are organized in peace time into
ten battalions and two squadrons; four companies to the battalion.
In war-time, they form ten field battalions, ten reserve battalions, ten
depot companies, and two squadrons. The establishment of a field or
reserve battalion is 23 Officers and 967 men (of whom 18 Officers
and 913 men are combatants), besides 40 men trained as gunners;
that of a depot company is 4 Officers and 236 men. In peace-time,
a cadre is kept up for each rifle battalion, consisting of 1 Field Officer
(Commandant), 1 Officer for administration, 4 Officers for instruc-
tion, 30 non-commissioned officers and privates.

The establishment of a squadron on the war footing is 1 Captain,
4 subalterns, 180 men.

A cadre is kept up in peace-time for the two squadrons of 1 Officer
and 30 men.

This constitutes the dep6t in time of war.

The horsemen are recruited from the population of the whole
district, being selected as specially apt for the particular service for
which they are intended, namely, that of scouts and orderlies.

The rifle battalions are recruited : —

1. From the Army reserve and Recruiting reserve of Tirol and
Vorarlberg.

2. By direct enrolment of able-bodied men of the military age who
are not required for the Kaiser- Jager Regiment.

3. From volunteers who have already served their time and are
still fit for service.

The length of service is —

Two years for men who have already served their time in the stand-
ing army or in the recruiting reserve.

Twelve years for men enrolled directly in the local militia.

Two years, or for the duration of a war, for volunteers.

The Tirolese militia is in the strictest sense of the word a local

548 [THE AU8TRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

force, and can only be employed in foreign parts with the consent of
the District Assembly. It is under control of the District Defence
Commission (Landesvertheidigungs-Oberhorde), composed partly of
Government officers, partly of members of the District Assembly, the
military Commandant of the district being also commanding officer of
the militia.

The corps of officers is at present composed as follows : —

1. Of those already serving in the local militia, when the new regu-
lations came into force.

2. Of officers fit for service on the pension establishment.

3. Of aspirants, natives of Tirol and Vorarlberg.

4. Of such qualified non-commissioned officers of the local militia
as are able to pass the reserve officer's examination.

5. Of officers transferred from the standing army to the Mounted
Rifles.

The supply of officers will be kept up : —

1. By the transfer of officers on full pay from the standing army.

2. By enrolling in the militia, or by temporarily attaching thereto
reserve officers.

There is an officer's school at Innsbruck for training militia
aspirants.

Non-commissioned officers and privates of the second category (see
above) have, if in the infantry, to turn out for training during eight
weeks, those in the Mounted Rifles, and those told off as gunners,
during three months, in the course of their first year's service.

The field training of the militia rifle battalion takes place in autumn,
and consists in alternate years of battalion-exercises for three weeks
(battalions taking part in turn in the army corps manoeuvres), and of
company drills for a fortnight, together with target practice at the
communal ranges. All militia men may be called out for battalion-
exercise, but only men of the second category during their first six
years of service for the company drills.

Militia men (except those coming out of the army reserve) must put
in an appearance at least twice a-year, for a day each time, at com-
munal target practice.

Unless a Government range be available, each commune has to pro-
vide one at least 600 paces in length, and to keep it up, together with
all necessary appliances, the State, however, supplying arms, ammu-
nition, and equipment similar to those issued to the " Kaiser- Jager
" Regiment." Target practice is superintended by instructors chosen
from amongst the militia non-commissioned officers, and the " marks-
" men " ( Scharf schutzen). The latter title is given to riflemen who par-
ticularly distinguish themselves in shooting, and confers certain privi-
leges, the most important being extra pay when on service, and
dispensation from attending target practice unless as instructor.

When embodied, militia men are on the same footing as the line as
regards pay, pensions, Ac.

Militia men cannot emigrate without permission.

Every inhabitant of Tirol, unless in the standing army or militia, is
liable for service in the Landstnrm from his nineteenth to his forty-

THE AUSTRIAN ABMT IN 1875. 549

sixth year. The first levy consists of the younger classes np to forty
years of age, its members being bound to serve both in their own and
the neighbouring districts; the older men, on the other hand, who
compose the second levy, can only be called upon to serve m their own
districts. Landsturm men cannot be embodied for more than fourteen
days at a time. Men liable for service in the Landsturm are already
in peace-time enrolled in sections by the communal authorities. These
will afterwards be organized into companies and battalions.

A company must not be less than 150 men, nor exceed 300. Batta-
lions must be between 500 and 1,000 strong.

(In other parts of the empire the Landsturm is still to be recruited
by voluntary enlistment alone, and no provisions for its formation are
made in peace-time.)

The officers will be elected when war is imminent. Section-leaders
by the men of their sections, the choice being limited to those who
have been officers or sergeants in the " Kaiser- Jager Regiment."
Section-leaders will choose the captains; these again the major,
quartermaster, surgeon, and chaplain. The choice of major is subject
to the veto of the Defence Commission.

Both officers and men wear their ordinary clothing, with a light
green arm-band, having on it the battalion number. Arms, ammuni-
tion, and equipment, are provided by the State.

The regulations for target-practice form an important part of the
scheme of defence for Tirol and Vorarlberg, being calculated to pre-
pare and work up the elements of a defensive force without actual
military organization. This applies more particularly to the Land-
sturm. The formation of rifle clubs, under sanction of the authorities,
is encouraged. A club must consist of at least twenty members, each
of whom must take part in at least three practices of individual firing
annually with his own club, besides a practice of rapid independent
firing. Ranges, <fec., are kept up at the expense of the club, which,
however, receives an allowance from the State, also money prizes for
encouragement of good shooting. Practice is carried on according to
army regulations. The members of each club choose from amongst
themselves two officers to preside at the ranges, also a committee of
management. The whole system of target- practice is under the
Defence Commission, the rifle clubs of Tirol and Voralberg being
respectively under general superintendence of an officer called the
" I^ndes-ober-Schutzenmeister," which title we will leave it to tho
reader to translate. There is an annual " grand national rifle meet-
" ing " (Landes-Fest und Freischiessen) at Innsbruck, Botzen, Trient,
and Bregenz in turn, supported partly by State funds, partly by local
contributions.

The system of defence thus briefly described is evidently a great
improvement upon any system before in force in Tirol. It has not,
however, as yet been long enough in operation to be carried out in all
its details, and as its successful working depends much upon voluntary
effort, the active sympathy of all officials, and indeed of the whole
population, must be enlisted in its favour. Much depends upon the
military commandant, who is also, ex officio, a member of the

D50 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

Defence Commission and commanding officer of the militia. It is of
great importance, particularly daring the present period of transition,
that this post should be filled by an officer of tact, energy, and vigour*
moreover, one acquainted with the people, and popular. The Austrian
Government appears to have made a good selection in Lieut.-General
Count Thun-Hohenstein, the present commandant.

It is to be hoped that he will be supplied with sufficient funds to
carry out the system in all its integrity. It would be false economy
not to do so, but to such false economy there seems to be unfortunately
some tendency in Austria.

The war strength of the militia rifles (Landesschutzen) is estimated
at about 20,000, about the same in point of numbers as the first levy
of the old Tirolese force, but their efficiency should be far superior to
that of the latter, which until quite of late years received no military
training whatever, was badly equipped, and only bound to serve 100
days.

Colonel v. Khiine says, that he was unable to ascertain the exact
number of enrolled militia men, or how far battalions and companies
had been exercised, but that he was convinced from what he heard
and saw, that in case of war, ten field and ten reserve battalions,
fairly trained and thoroughly well equipped, would be turned out
available for service at the shortest notice, whereas in the war of 1866
Baron Kuhn could only dispose at first of 4,500 men between militia
and volunteers, their total strength actually in the field never quite
attaining 7,000.

Besides which, the Landsturm is now in course of organization.

The divisions which took part in the manoeuvres of 1875 was com-
posed as follows : —

1. Standing army—

The Kaiser- Jager Regiment (Tirolese Rifles) . . 8 battalions.
7th Regiment of Infantry . . . . 3 „

oorQ ,, ,, • • • • • • o ,,

9th Garrison Artillery battalion . . 3 mountain batteries.

1 Section for Signalling.

1 Section for Hospital Corps.

2. Militia —

The Rifle battalion of Bruneck . . . . 1 battalion.

A detachment of Mounted Rifles . . . . . . 50 horsemen.

The militia battalion only took part in one day's manoeuvres.

As already mentioned, the Kaiser- Jager Regiment furnished eight
battalions to the manoeuvring force. Two of these were, however,
provisional battalions formed out of the reserve companies; one of
the seven field battalions of which the regiment is composed being in
garrison at Hamburg,

The Austrian infantry peace establishment is very small, too small
for efficiency, that of the Kaiser-Jager being 80 rank and file per
company, that of the line regiments, only 70. The 53rd Regiment
was particularly weak, having suffered much from dysentery, and its

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875. 551

companies did not turn out more than from 40 to 50 men. (It
should be remembered that Austrian battalions have only four com-
panies).

A mountain battery has both in peace and war four rifled three-
pounders. Its* peace establishment amounts to 4 officers, 40 men, 9
pack-animals, and 4 riding horses ; in war there are 48 pack-animals
and two country waggons, or 63 pack-animals, where there are no
carriageable roads.

They carry 120 rounds per gun. Each animal has to transport
about 280 pounds (English) weight. The ammunition consists of
common shell, shrapnel, and canister. The effective range with shell
does not exceed 1,000 paces.

Great attention has been made to signalling in the Austrian service.
At the manoeuvres in question, large white triangles and white disks
were used instead of the various coloured flags formerly employed.

The troops never once bivouacked, but were always quartered on
the inhabitants. Provisions were obtained by contract. The meats
were cooked in portable camp kitchens. The manoeuvres lasted four
days, a day of rest intervening between the second and third. The
scene of operations was the district known by the general name of
" Pusterthal " (Puster valley), a district really composed of two
valleys divided by a small and nearly flat plateau elevated about
4,000 feet above the sea, and forming the water parting between the
basins of the Drau (or Drave), and the Etsch (or Adige), the former'
of which flows to the Euxine, the latter to the Adriatic.

Both the valleys and the intervening plateau are well cultivated,
and the former contain several villages and the town of Bruneck.
The Pusterthal is of considerable strategical importance, affording the
most convenient means of communication between Tirol and Carinthia,
both by road and rail. The mountains which enclose it are of varied
formation and are much intersected by ravines, valleys, and water-
courses. The Pusterthal and its vicinity afford some good tactical
positions and appear well suited to the practice of mountain warfare.

In Colonel v. Kiihne's pamphlet, will be found a good map and a
minute description of the district, also a careful account, followed by
a critique of each day's operations.

Our space will not admit even of an abridgement of these instruc-
tive chapters, and we must content ourselves with some quotations
from the author's final remarks upon the operations generally.

The division was formed daily into an eastern and a western force
which acted against one another. The operations of each day were
entirely independent of those which preceded and followed them, no
general strategical idea being worked out, as at Prussian manoeuvres.

Hardly any instruction was given in outpost duty, no pickets being
posted by night.

The object of the manoeuvres was mere tactical instruction, to
which, when you consider the nature of the country, it was judicious
and perhaps inevitable to confine them, as to work out a strategical
idea a much larger field of operations must have been traversed, and
turning movements in such a region being necessarily widely extended

vol. xx. 2 0

552 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

and slow, more time would have been required than was available.
The want of practice in outpost duty and in forming bivonacks,
appears to have been a serious omission from the programme, and to
have been due, in great measure, to considerations of economy, which
in such a matter can only be misplaced.

The general and special ideas for each day's manoeuvres were given
out daily on parade, orders consequent thereupon being issued verbally
on the ground. It is well that Commanding Officers should be accus-
tomed to do this, but the habit of reducing an order to writing should
also be cultivated, as to do so clearly and at the same time briefly, is
by no means easy.

The map issued for the manoeuvres was on a very small scale;
1 : 144,000, and was based on old surveys requiring much correction.
The Austrian military authorities prefer this small scale, because they
think it would be inconvenient to Officers to carry about larger maps
on service. The Prussian Army, however, daring the late war was pro-
vided with maps of France on the scale of 1 : 80,000, and the troops
investing Paris received maps of the environs on the scale of
1 : 20,000. (The one-inch scale chiefly in use in the British Army is,
of course, as 1 : 63,360).

The following remarks upon the different arms, of which we give a
summary, are founded, not only upon what the author saw in Tirol,
but upon the observations which he had the opportunity of making
elsewhere.

Austrian regiments differ very much from one another, both in the
bearing of the men and in their tactical efficiency. This is intelligible
when we take into account the great variety of nationalities to be
found in the Imperial Army, and, consequently, the great number of
dialects spoken therein.

Colonel v. Kiihne thinks that the regiments recruited in the
German provinces are the best drilled, and remarks that this is not to
be wondered at, seeing that the great majority of Officers throughout
the Army are of German nationality ; and though there are probably
more good linguists in the Austrian Army than in any other, Officers
being required by regulation to know enough of the language or
languages of their men (for sometimes three or fonr different tongues
are spoken in the same corps) to be able to communicate with them
on matters of duty, yet, it is evident that under such circumstances,
instruction is likely to be incomplete, and all the more so on account
of the short term of service.

The Infantry.

The Kaiser- Jager regiment distinguished itself particularly amongst
those in the Pusterthal. It has the advantage, as already stated, of
being recruited in Tirol and Vorarlberg, where the material is ex-
cellent. Fine upright men, strong and active, capital marchers, and
inured to mountain work.

Whilst tactical reform in the Prussian Army has been progressing
pon the principle of " Festina lente," the conservative spirit of the

THE AUSTRIAN ABUT IK 1875. 553

higher military authorities having acted as a drag upon any rapid
advance, in Austria the tendency has rather been to go into extremes.

In the former country, the last new regulations are only a reprint
with emendations (considerable 'tis true) of those of 1847, which
again are founded upon those of 1812, whilst Austrian Officers of the
higher ranks have in their time had to make themselves acquainted
with five or six " Field-exercise "-books differing considerably from one
another. The one at present in force appears quite up to the times,
perhaps even going too far in some matters. For instance, having
wisely concluded that the gigantic losses of 1866 were due quite- as
much to a mistaken system of tactics, founded upon the action of
masses and upon the shock, as to the superior armament of their
enemy, Austrian tacticians ran into the extreme, not only of for-
bidding mass-formations in action, but alsp any sort of bayonet-charge,
unless under very exceptional circumstances. They appear to think
that positions may be carried by fire alone, the skirmishers shooting
their way up to the enemy and pouring into him a heavy and rapid
fire at close quarters.

In consequence of this, the attacks of Austrian Infantry seem to be
tamely executed.

" It is all very well to show no masses until you come to the actual
" onslaught, to the final rush, but at that moment the assailant cannot
" do without them and must put up with the losses which are in-
" evitable when they are employed."

When on the defensive, the same false principle naturally made
itself apparent.

Troops in position retired without waiting for any positive attack
as soon as the assailant was supposed to have fired sufficiently long and
heavily. The author quotes the following passage from the latest
edition of the " Field Exercise," to show how little reliance is now
placed upon the bayonet, the use of which was, as we know, so
strongly advocated in the period between 1859 and 1866.

" The bayonet attack must only be employed, as an extreme measure,
" to drive an enemy from his position when the latter has been com-
" pletely surprised, or when he has been so thoroughly shaken by fire
" that he cannot be expected to offer further resistance, or when to
" remain any longer in the effective zone of fire, would seem to promise
" a heavier loss to the assailant than would a vigorous advance. It
" will, therefore, not be judicious, leaving the idea of surprise out of
" the question, to order a charge until your fire has obtained its greatest

degree of intensity.1 Still less excusable would it be to ground

your dispositions for attack upon a bayonet-charge. This should,
" on the contrary, only be the natural consequence of the effect pro-
" duced by the gi eatast possible development of fire."

It is with the last two sentences that the Prussian critic and we
also are chiefly inclined to quarrel, for, however requisite it may be to
prepare the way for an attack upon good troops well posted and armed

1 The principle advocated in this sentence, at least, appears to be both sound and
to haye been recognized as a maxim by all European armies, including that of North
Germany.

2 0 2

554 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

with breech-loaders, by the utmost development of artillery and rifle-
fire, yet snch troops will not be dislodged by fire alone, and resort
must finally be had to the bayonet, upon the use of which, therefore,
as an ultima ratio, all our dispositions for attack should be grounded.
We are disposed the more to insist upon this, because we think that
many of our own tacticians are inclined to favour the false maxim ft
as to attack noticed as prevalent in Austria.

The Austrians wisely lay great stress upon the careful use of cover
to shelter troops from fire, but, says von Kuhne, " this must not be
" carried to the pitch of avoiding open ground, where the tactical
** situation positively requires it to be traversed. One can't always
" choose one's own ground, witness Spicheren and St. Privat ; and we
41 must, therefore, accustom our infantry to cross ground unfavour-
" able to the attack in the most suitable formation and in the most
" practical manner. We remarked, however, on frequent occasions,
" that Commanding Officers appeared to make dispositions for tho
" attack out of keeping with the general situation, solely for the pur-
" pose of avoiding open ground. We cannot, moreover, see any
" advantage in the practice of making skirmishers run over this sort
" of ground in a stooping attitude. It is very doubtful whether they
" gain thereby the advantage of better cover, and there is no doubt
" that their advance is retarded and their morale impaired by the
*' practice. Another thing struck us pretty often. They appeared to
" extend their front too much with the idea of making the most of
" their fire. The line of skirmishers, long and unwieldy, was not
" properly backed up by reserves in close order ; commanders seeming
in general to let their troops get out of hand too soon. When each
side aims at outflanking and turning the other, the tendency to
undue extension is only too easily developed, and it seems, therefore,
u advisable to combat this tendency by assuming a deeper formation.
" The importance of keeping a reserve in hand for the final crisis
" must also not be lost sight of in presence of the fire-arms now in
" use. Lines of skirmishers were often to be seen firing into one
" another for a long time at too close quarters, supports also approach -
" ing too close to the line of fire in open ground."1

There are two very remarkable peculiarities in the new Austrian
tactics : —

1. The importance given to the " Zug " as a sub-unit. The captain
handles his company like a little battalion, giving only the cautions,
while the Zug leaders give the executive words of command. The
Zng is not confined to its original position in the company any more
than is the latter to its original position in the battalion.

2. The so-called " Vorwarts-sammeln " (forward gathering).
Bodies of troops, either in close or open order, are taught to avoid

loss, in crossing dangerous ground to gain a forward position, by prac-
tising themselves to do so, the men being trained to rush or creep
across either individually or by files. After the party is re-assembled
under cover, the forward movement is re-commenced anew in the

1 These unrealities are common enough at "sham fights" in all countries, not ex-
cepting Prussia.

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY 12* 1875. 553

same manner, the point of assembly being each time indicated by the
commander. Colonel v. Kiihne thinks that the Austrian Officers and
soldiers do not yet enter into the spirit of the thing, and remarks that
the movement was generally performed by the successive advance of
Schwarme (groups) or of Zuge (divisions)1 very much after the
fashion practised for some time back in Prussia and now adopted in
most armies ; moreover that this mode of advance was often employed
when not required by circumstances, thus causing needless delay, and
that it was often omitted when it would have been clearly of advantage.
The supports moved too often up to the skirmishing line to fire volleys,
and the said firing was frequently kept up too long. Colonel v. Kiihne
counted on one occasion eighteen such volleys fired one after the other.
A very unnatural performance. The practice, too, of making men take
ground to a flank, when in the skirmishing line, or immediately behind
it, for the purpose of avoiding intermixture of units was frequently
noticed and is strongly to be reprehended, as such a practice must
necessarily be given up on actual service on account of the heavy
losses which it would entail without any commensurate gain.

The Prussian observer, although making the above depreciatory
remarks, was upon the whole favourably impressed by what he saw of
Austrian infantry. They are well-drilled and their " fire-discipline/ ' is
very good. They have made remarkable progress in all respects within
the last few years, and the steady, quiet manner in which they
manoeuvre, is remarkable.

" Not a sound was to be heard except the words of command and
" the shrill notes of the whistle, and we often noticed how a shout from
" the commander and a wave of his sword sufficied to lead a ' zug '
" smartly from one position to another. They have worked hard and
" well, and already much has been done."

The men seem to be well trained in the minor operations of war.
Patroles were well conducted, and gave good information, though
German-speaking men were not always to be found. This is very
inconvenient, but an inevitable evil in the Austrian army. One very
good practice was noticed. Each captain and " zag "-leader in the
skirmishing line kept two or three men about him to carry orders and
messages. (This institution, and also that of the whistle, used only to
call attention, might be introduced with advantage into our service as
a means of facilitating the direction of long lines of skirmishers, or of
half -companies, distributed as in our new formation for attack).

The Austrian " Koncentrirte Ausstellung," answering to the

1 The company is sub-divided into Zuge and Schwarme. There are four Zuge in
a company.

The number of Schwarme in a Zug depends on the strength of the latter. The
Schwarme must not consist of less than four, or of more than seven files.

The Austrian peace establishment is so low that it renders the Schwarme and Zug.
identical.

We saw the " Vorw&rts-Sammeln " practised in our own army many years ago,
long before the practice was adopted in Austria. But it was not sanctioned by au-
thority, and was only, as far as we know, practised by one corps, the 2nd battalion
19th regiment, whose commanding officer, Colonel R. Warden, was, as a tactician,
far in advance of his age.

556 THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

" Rendezvous Stellung " of the Prussians, or to our own " line of
4i quarter-columns," is worthy of notice. It consists of battalions
formed in line of company-columns. Distance between the company-
di visions (ziige), 6 paces ; interval between companies, 3 paces ; interval
between battalions, 12 paces. A regiment of three battalions advances
to the attack in the following order : —

No. 1 battalion, with its four companies in line, or in line of company-
columns, the leading division of each company skirmishing. The move-
ment is continued without a cheok up to within some 400 or 500 paces
of the supposed enemy, the skirmishing line being meanwhile rein-
forced by the second division of each company. The supports follow
close behind the skirmishers, generally remaining in column.

Nos. 2 and 3 battalions follow the movement, either in the " concen-
*' trated " order above described, or in " line of columns," i.e., line of
company-columns at deploying intervals plus 3 paces. During the
advance of the leading battalion and the subsequent standing-fire which
it maintains at a distance of from 400 or 500 yards from the enemy,
the other two battalions gain ground upon it and move up to the front,
as a rule simultaneously, one prolonging the line, the other acting on
the flank of the enemy. It is rare to see one of the battalions kept
back in reserve.

The farther advance to within about 100 yards of the enemy is
executed by the " forward-gathering " process already described, the
skirmishers being seldom reinforced by the third divisions of companies.
As a general rule, these, together with the fourth divisions, move close
up to the skirmishers, deploy, and fire a great many volleys.

" A little before the assault the fire is increased to the utmost : rapid
" independent firing from the skirmishers, volleys from the supports.
" The assault itself is executed by only a portion of the line, covered
" by the fire of the remainder, bugles sounding the advance, skir-
" mishers and supports rushing on with loud hurrahs. At this moment
" no reserves are kept in hand, not even bodies of any strength in
" second line. Eire is kept up on the retreating enemy in a very effec-
" tive manner."

The Prussian observer, when comparing Austrian infantry with that
of his native land, was struck by the comparative looseness of the
former, in drill and appearance, to a certain extent also in discipline,
at least as regards externals. " Smartness" and "pipeclay " (zopfwesen)
seem to have been discarded in Austria together with the old white
tunic. But, on the other hand, the free movements, the long, easy
stride, the quick step, did not fail to impress the looker on favourably.1
Even the lively swing of the left arm in marching, at first annoying to
an eye accustomed to Prussian parade-stiffness, was admired after a
time, because in keeping with the rest. Many things in every army
strike a foreign observer unpleasantly, because he is unaccustomed to
them, but he must not conclude that a practice is bad merely because
unfamiliar to him. What is suited to the genius of one army and

1 Beally, however, the Germans seem to get over more ground in a'given time than
the Austrian*. In an article in the 179th number of the " Rerue Militaire do

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN 1875.

557

nation may be totally unsuitable to others. Thus in substance says

t. Kiihne, and further adds : —

" Notwithstanding some things which at first sight struck us unplea-
santly, we were always and everywhere impressed with the convic-
tion that we had before us an ancient and well-disciplined army,
inspired by glorious traditions."

The Cavalry.

Colonel v. Kiihne only had the opportunity of seeing two cavalry
regiments manoeuvre, one against the other, at Brack. He was very
favourably impressed by what he saw, and speaks in high terms of the
way in which the regiments were handled under trying circumstances
and in difficult ground. They also marched past very well at the trot
in columns of divisions.

As with the infantry, trumpet-calls and words of command were
reduced to a minimum. The horses were small, compact, and in excel-
lent condition.

Artillery.

The Prussian Colonel had the good fortune to see the inspection of a
field artillery regiment by the Emperor.

It was drawn up in line at close intervals, i.e., with 20 paces between
divisions, 10 paces between batteries, and 6 paces between guns.
Divisions, of which there are 4 in the regiment, consist of 3 batteries,
the latter of 4 guns. There were consequently 48 guns on parade, 4-
pounders all drawn by 4 horses, 8-pounders by six. The gunners
were all seated, three on the limber, two on the gun-carriage. The
batteries were well turned out ; horses in good condition and well
groomed, though rather small.

The movements were well executed, quickly and with great steadi-
ness. The mountain batteries which took part in the manoeuvres in
Pusterthal are described as having shown on the whole great efficiency,
but their effective range and the power of their projectiles (in other

" l'Etranger" on " Le Nouveau Reglement d'Exercises de l'lnfanterie Autrichienne"
we find the following details : —

Pm habituel de route.
Quick step (£).

France . .
Oermany
Austria..
Italy....

Number
of paces

per
minute.

110
112
115
120

Length
of pace.

m.
0 65
0-80
0-76
0*75

Pas eymnastique (F).

DerTrab (Pr).

Laufschritt (Au).

Double (S).

France.. .
Germany.
Austria . .
Italy....

Number
of paces

per
minute.

170
165
155
170

Length
of pace.

m.
0*80
0'88
0-90
0-90

N.B. — Length of pace is given in decimals of the metre.

Reducing the English inch to the decimal of a metre we arrive at the following :—

England

116

0-76

England I 165

0-8S

518 THE STUDY OP MILITARY HISTORY BY THE

to it, the 6th is found at Flavigny and the 7th at Vionville ; and the
only two companies who went straight to the front were so utterly
crushed by the overpowering fire that they were driven back, and
rallied on the reverse slope of the hill. If such a thing occurred
among the Germans, I cannot see why it would not be likely to occur
again amongst ourselves.

Next observe what happened at the battle of Beamont to the 26th
Regiment, of three battalions. The regiment had to pass through a not
very extensive wood, but when it got to the other side, the three batta-
lions were found split up into two bodies. Sketch No. 3 (Plate XVI,
fig. 1) shows the details of one of these bodies. As you may remember,
the companies in the German army are composed of three divisions, one
of which is the shooting division. The 8th company has lost its shooting
division altogether, and the 5th company is doing its work. The 7th j
has managed to stick together ; but the 1st and 2nd shooting divi- i

sions have strayed from the main bodies of the 1st and 2nd companies
which are in another part of the battle-field. The 3rd, 4th, 9th, and
12th each hold together, but the 11th does not do so, and its shooting
division appears here alone.

Let us take another instance, sketch No. 4 (Plate XVT, fig. 2), the
storming the Rotherburg on the field of Spicheren. The leading of that
battle undoubtedly is open to the gravest and most severe criticism ; bat
the mistakes which occurred, were not due only to the local leaders, but
to misunderstandings in the strategical leading which preceded the
fight. The advanced portions of two armies are directed upon the
same bridge, and the consequence is, that in the course of the action,
we find parts of three divisions or of four brigades joining promis-
cuously in the fight". What was the result ? The Rotherburg, which
is shown on the sketch, is the point aimed at. It is a very marked
feature on the field, and projects beyond the line which was occupied
by the French, and unless it was taken, it would take in flank any
Prussian troops coming: in a southerly direction. It proved a very
tough job for the Prussians to get hold of that point; but at 6
o'clock, the fighting having lasted from 12 o'clock, we find a curious
collection of companies at this important decisive point. What
became of two brigadiers I do not know, but with regard to two others,
their brigades were spread along a thin line at the beginning' of the
day, so that their command was entirely lost. We find 32 companies
of two different armies mixed up in utter confusion, with no unity of
command whatever, viz., 5 companies of the 74th Regiment, and 4§
companies of the 39th Regiment, belonging to the 27th brigade, 14th
division, 7th Army Corps, 1st army ; 11 companies of the 40th Regi-
ment belonging to the 32nd brigade, 16th division, 8th Army Corps,
1st army; 8 companies of the 12th Regiment, 10th brigade, and 4
companies of the 48th Regiment, 9th brigade, 5th division, 3rd Army
Corps, 2nd army.

Sketch No. 5 (Plate Xvi, fig. 3) shows a curious instance of a brigadier
losing his brigade. The dotted lines show the distribution of the 28th
Brigade, General Von Woyna. When the General arrived on the battle-
field he resolved to endeavour to turn the French left flank, and he told

• kitrvijal JR U S In&titutwn.

VOL 20.

PI. "XV

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THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OP THE GERMAN ARMY IN

PEACE AND WAR.

By Surgeon-Major T. W. Fox, R.E.

The Emperor of Germany, as a proof of his satisfaction with the
services rendered by this department during the late war, approved
of a new organization of the Medical Corps, under date, 6th February
1873. For information on this subject we are indebted to that valu-
able publication "Revue Militaire de l'Etranger," Nos. 289, 290,
which bases its articles on a voluminous work, " Das Preussische
" Militfflr-Medicinal-Wesen in Systematischer Daret^^g," by Dr.
Prager, Oberstabarzt, and also to " Militair Wochenblatt,,, 13th April,
1873, 4th September, 1875.

By these regulations, no medical man can serve as a military sur-
geon who has not served six months in the ranks (mit der Waff e), the
young surgeon may then servo for six months more, as a medical
volunteer, to complete his one year of obligatory service, provided
he can produce certificates from his commanding officer of good con-
duct, attention to duty, character and intelligence. The medical
men among the one-year volunteers l are permitted to postpone their
year of service until they are twenty-three years of age. They have
then the choice of serving one year in the ranks, and for another six
months in the ranks as soldiers, and for another six months as military
surgeons, Under the conditions already stated.

It is requisite, in the first place, in order to appreciate the machin-
ery of mobilisation, to know the data of the problem ; on the one
hand, the existing resources (the active and auxiliary cadres) ; on
the other, the numbers necessary to raise these to a war-footing.

It is only when these premises are laid down, that the means taken
to meet with the resources available, the needs of mobilisation, can be
Qtdvantageously studied.

I. — The Cadbb of the Medical Depabtment in teme of Peace.

(a.) Superior Medical Officers.

Of the eighteen army corps of which the German army is com-
posed since the war of 1870 — 1871, there are fourteen which are
included in the Prussian budget, whereas the 12th and 13th corps
(Saxony and Wurtemberg), the two Bavarian corps, and the Bruns-
wick Contingent adhere to their own arrangements.

1 Germans possessing a certain amount of education, permitted on certain con-
'ions to serve for one year instead of three years with the colours.

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY, ETC. 561

The Prussian cadre of the medical department on the peace
establishment, according to the warrant published on 25th January,
1872, by the medical department of the Ministry for War is composed
as follows : —

1 surgeon-major-general of the army (director-general) ;

16 surgeons-general, of whom 14 are surgeons general of army
corps : one is attached to the medical department of the War Office ;
one is deputy- director of army medical schools ;

244 principal surgeons for 114 regiments of infantry, 72 regiments
of cavalry, 28 regiments of artillery, 19 fortresses of the first class ;
1 for the invalids', 1 for the cadets' school at Berlin, and 2 for the
medical department of the War Office.

351 surgeons-major, 228 for infantry battalions, 14 for rifle batta-
lions, 5 for the school of non-commissioned officers.

41 for field-artillery, 14 for pioneers, one for the railway battalion,1
1 for the 35th battalion of Landwehr.

21 for fortresses of the 2nd class.

20 for the army medical schools, and 6 for the provincial schools of
cadets.

(b.) Subaltern Surgeons.

This catagory of surgeons, which comprises assistant and sub-
assistant surgeons, and the one-year medical volunteers, has a strength
varying with the number of volunteers, the number amounting
usually to nearly 700.

(c.) Hospital Orderlies (who are to be practically instructed in the Field

Hospitals).

Their number is one per company of infantry or rifles, per battalion
of train, per squadron of cavalry, battery of artillery, company of
pioneers.

The total strength is therefore not less than 2,500 men on the peace
establishment.

(d.) Hospital Assistants (Dressers).

Since 1863, the State requires each army corps to instruct in their
field hospitals 26 military hospital assistants taken from soldiers of
infantry who have completed one year's service, making a total of 377
men for the 14£ army corps which appear in the Prussian budget.

(e.) Apothecaries.

The peace establishment includes one principal apothecary attached
to the director-general of the medical department, one senior apothe-
cary attached to each surgeon- general of army corps, and about 150
junior apothecaries attached to the hospitals in the proportion of one
for a hospital for 2 to 5 battalions, two for one for 6 to 10 battalions,
three for one for more than 10 battalions.

Thus, to conclude, the strength of the Medical Corps on a peace
footing amounts to —

1 The conversion of this battalion into a regiment necessitates an augmentation of
Che cadre of the Medical Corps.

562 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT Or THE

1 director-general (me'decin-major-general).
16 surgeons-general.

244 principal surgeons.
351 surgeons -major.

700 junior surgeons (medecins subalternes), including sub-assist-
ant-surgeons and the one-year surgeon- voluntoers.
165 apothecaries.
2,500 hospital orderlies.
546 hospital assistants.

II. — Strength of the Medical Cobps on a War Footing.

(a). Superior Surgeons.

On the subject of the effective strength of superior (or senior)
surgeons required for mobilization, or in war time, a few general data
only can be given. It is evident that the normal peace establishment
is insufficient for the needs of war. This normal strength is so much
more insufficient, since in time of peace the framework, basis, or
" cadre " of every kind of formation required in war time is not kept
up, such as chief or principal medical officer at head-quarters of the
army, principal medical officers of army corps, surgeons-general of
military routes (etapes), surgeons consultant-general, surgeons of
divisions, directors of field hospitals of army corps, surgeons of camp
hospitals, of home hospitals (dc l'interieur), surgeons of sanitary
detachments, &c.

It is requisite, therefore, to have recourse for field services to the
surgeons of the Beurlaubtenstand,1 even to the military surgeons on
retired pay, or to those still available for service (a la disposition), and
also to civil surgeons not liable for military service.

Counting the figures necessary for a single army corps, without
reckoning superior appointments, the requirements are as follows :

2 surgeons- general, 1 for service in the field (mobilise"), 1 for home
service (territorial).

2 divisional surgeons.

The director of The hospitals of the army corps.

Principal surgeons of 12 field hospitals.

6 surgeons-major of sanitary detachments.

Surgeons-major of the personal reserve.

Principal surgeons of established war hospitals.

Surgeons-major of military etappe (routes), and of commissions of
transfer.

Senior surgeons of the troops, mobilized in the same number as
those assigned to corps by the peace-establishment, except the prin-
cipal surgeon of a divisional regiment of artillery, and the surgeon-
major of a battalion of pioneers, both of whom become available for
other duties by the breaking up of their corps, in consequence of
mobilization.

1 The Beurlaubtenstand is composed mainly of men who hare served with tho
colours, and are in the reserve or Landwehr, from the fourth to the twelfth year of
service inclusive.

GERMAN ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR. 563

Surgeons-major of battalions, and for replacing casualties (rein-
placement).

Chief surgeons of fortress.

Surgeons of schools of cadets and of other military establishments.

Principal and practising surgeons, i.e., the chief surgeon and those
in charge of the patients in the hospitals at home.

Surgeons-major of garrison troops and of corps of " Landwehr."

(b.) Subaltern Surgeons.

The numbers of assistant-surgeons required on a war-footing are —

1 assistant-surgeon attached to the surgeon-in-chief of the army ; to
each surgeon-general of army corps, or of " etappe ; " to each battalion
of infantry and rifles ; company of pioneers ; bridge train ; company of
construction of railways ; section of field-telegraph ; to the staff of each
division of ammunition-columns and auxiliary-supply columns ; each
battalion of foot-artillery, including the Landwehr ; depot battalion of
infantry ; depdt company of rifles and of pioneers ; dep&t division of
artillery ; of the railway battalion of military train ; and each command-
ant of the line.

2 junior surgeons to each regiment of cavalry of the line, of Land-
wehr, or of garrison, to columns of ammunition of each army corps,
to each group of 100 patients in the hospitals at home.

3 junior surgeons to the staff of each battalion of train mobilized,
to each field hospital.

4 junior surgeons to the staff of each of the 2 of the field-artillery
regiments of each army corps.

5 junior surgeons to each sanitary detachment.

9 junior surgeons to the hospital reserve of each corps.

(c.) Hospital Orderlies.

Up to the year 1869, the number of hospital orderlies required by
an army corps on a war-footing amounted at first to 316, subsequently
to 350. In 1869, the number was raised to 441 or 511 for army corps,
according to their effective strength ; about 6,148 for the Northern
Confederation. At the present time, this number would be insufficient,
and the strength must be calculated so as to allow —

1 hospital orderly for each company, squadron, battery, or ammuni-
tion column of the army in the field, and the troops of reserve, relief,
or of garrisons ; for each surgeon-general of corps ; director of hospi-
tals ; consulting surgeon ; divisional surgeons ; also for each construc-
tion company, or each railway field division.

2 hospital orderlies for each surgeon-in-chief, and for the division
of the depdt of the railway battalion.

3 hospital orderlies for the division detachment of relief of the
train battalion.

4 hospital orderlies for the surgeon-in-chief of the army, and for
each reserve depot of hospitals.

8 hospital orderlies for each sanitary detachment.

9 hospital orderlies for each field hospital.

27 hospital orderlies for a hospital reserve of each army corps.

564 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE

Lastly, in the hospitals at home, 3 hospital orderlies for each group
of 100 patients.

(d.) Hospital Assistants.

For the troops immediately mobilized, the following are required by
each army corps : —

204 hospital assistants (dressers), 24 for the 3 sanitary detach-
ments, 144 for 12 hospitals, 36 for the hospital reserve. For the
home hospitals must be reckoned in addition 6 dressers for each 100
patients.

(e.) Apothecaries.

The numbers required for each army corps are thus laid down —

2 senior apothecaries (one for field, one for home service).

19 field apothecaries attached to the three sanitary detachments, to
12 field hospitals, to the hospital reserves' depdt, in the proportion of
1 for each establishment, but 2 in the hospital reserve.

Moreover, each home hospital receives 1 apothecary for each group
of 400 patients.

To give an idea of the numbers required for the mobilization of the
medical corps of the Northern Confederation (12£ corps) in 1870 — 71).

1. Part of the Army immediately Mobilized.

4 surgeons- general (surgeons-general of the active army).

24 surgeons-general (7 surgeons-general and 17 principal surgeons
of the active army.

32 divisional surgeons (principal surgeons of the active army).

13 directors of hospitals (12 principal surgeons from the active list
and 1 recalled from the reserve).

152 chief surgeons of field hospitals (105 principal surgeons and
45 surgeons-major on the active list, 2 surgeons-major of Beurlattb-
tenstand).

568 surgeons-major (94 surgeons-major, 58 assistant-surgeons from
the active list, 163 surgeons-major, and 222 assistant-surgeons from
the reserve Beurlaubtenstand).

2 surgeons-major and 12 assistant-surgeons from surgeons not liable
for military service, 17 vacancies).

1,587 subaltern surgeons (311 assistant and sub-assistant, and 202
one-year volunteers from the active list), 619 assistant-surgeons and
and sub-assistants from the Beurlaubtenstand, of which 12 had served
in the ranks (mit der Waffe) ; 31 reservists of the ersatz reserve ; 20
assistant surgeons and sub-assistants not liable for service.

58 pupils of the medical corps, 330 medical students who have
passed their seventh half-year of study, of whom 8 are not liable for
service, 16 vacancies.

11 consulting-surgeons (1 surgeon-general on the active list, 5
surgeons-general of Beurlaubtenstand, 5 surgeons not liable for
service).

72 practising surgeons, of whom 52 are not liable for service ; 20
foreigners.

GEBMAN AKMT IN PEACE AND WAR, 565

152 assistant-surgeons, 52 not liable for service ; 18 students of
7 or 8 half-years' standing ; 57 foreigners.

2. Pa/rt of the Army subsequently Mobilized.

12 surgeons-general (3 general, 7 principal surgeons on the active
list, 1 general, 1 principal surgeon recalled).

30 principal surgeons (17 principal surgeons, 6 surgeons-major on
the active list, 1 surgeon-major of Beurlaubtenstand, 1 surgeon-general,
5 principal surgeons recalled).

391 surgeons-major (14 surgeons-major and 9 assistant-surgeons on
the active list, 44 surgeons-major, and 145 assistant-surgeons of Beur-
laubtenstand, 17 surgeons-major, and 8 assistant-surgeons recalled to
the active list, 16 assistant-surgeons not liable for service, 138
vacancies).

610 subaltern surgeons (16 assistant-surgeons and sub-assistants, and
36 one-year volunteers of the active service, 106 assistant-surgeons of
the Beurlaubtenstand, of whom two had served in the ranks and 41
came from the Ersatz Reserve,1 4 assistant-surgeons recalled to the
active list, 4 not liable for service, 2 medical corps students, 409 sur-
geons liable to service, 18 surgeons of the Ersatz Reserve, 7 surgeons
not liable for service, 1 vacancy).

8 consulting surgeons (not liable for service).

Reckoning up the totals, it is evident that, without counting the
personnel of the voluntary assistance, the mobilization of the 12^ army
corps of the Northern Confederation required not less than 3,851 sur-
geons, in the following category :—

1,156 surgeons on the active list ;
1,363 „ of Beurlaubtenstand;

241 „ not liable for service ;

842 „ who have not yet obtained a diploma ;
77 „ foreigners ;

172 appointments vacant.

In this enormous list of 3,851 military and auxiliary surgeons are
not included the 1,769 surgeons engaged under contract to do duty in
the military hospitals at home.

As to the non-medical personnel, always excepting the agents of
societies in aid of the sick and wounded, the following are the
figures : —

1,376 employes ;

577 apothecaries ;
5,286 hospital orderlies ;
10,576 „ assistants (dressers) ;

13,017 train soldiers, including carriers of wounded (kran-
kentrager or brancardiers) ;
30 surgical instrument makers ;
170 surgery boys ;
743 cooks.

Total 31,775 persons.

1 The Enati Reserve.

566 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE

3. The Mobilization.

It remains now to ascertain in what manner the military authorities,
with the means at their command succeed in placing on a war-footing
at the proper time, all the combinations in which each of the consti-
tuent elements of these large numbers takes its place. Dr. Prager, in
his book on the Prussian army, Medical Department, thus writes : —

" On account of the great want of surgeons and the absolute neces-
" sity of providing at once for the needs of the part of the army to be
" immediately mobilized, there is no other resource at the first moment
" than to take some or all of the military surgeons from the troops
" still non-mobilized (immobile), especially from garrison troops, depdt-
u battalions, and corps of Landwehr. To provide for the medical
" duties with these troops, arrangements are made in the different gar-
" risons with the civil surgeons who from age are no longer liable for
" military service. These surgeons receive a remuneration in propor-
" tion to the services required of them.

" The contract is made with those interested, and the remuneration
" fixed by the Intendance Department of the province (Provincial
" Intendantur), in accordance with the conditions of the surgeon -in-
" chief of the territorial army.

" The allotment of the persons to their different employments at the
" time of mobilization was formerly the duty of the Medical-Director-
" General ; but experience soon proved that such a duty was beyond
" his power to carry out. It was then laid down that in each army
" corps the surgeon-general should allot all the available persons. The
" surgeon-general, as soon as the mobilization is ordered, draws up his
" plan of distribution of duties with the least possible delay, and sub-
" mits it to the medical department of the Minister of War.

" There the distribution is examined and approved, or, if need be,
" modified.

" In the plan of distribution, any numbers which may be in excess,
" may be transferred, so as to allow the Director- General to meet any
" deficiencies which may exist in other army corps.

" As the Guards have no surgeons of Beurlaubtenstand, this army
" corps must, in the same manner, draw upon the resources of other
** corps.

" To place the surgeon-general in a position to complete the distri-
" bution returns without delay, commandants of brigades are ordered
" to furnish each year to the general commanding the army corps, a
" nominal roll of civil surgeons belonging to the Reserve, the Land-
*l wehr, and the Ersatz Reserve1 troops of the first and second class.

" These lists, furnished to the surgeon-general, enable him to regu-
" late and complete his own lists.

" Moreover at the time of mobilization, the civil authorities send to
"the surgeons-general 'states' of all the medical men residing within
" their districts.

1 The Ersatz Reserve includes the one-year volunteers and the men who, though
in the annual contingent, are not required to serve with the colours.

GERMAN ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR. 567

" As regards apothecaries, hospital assistants, and orderlies of the
" Benrlaubtenstand, the surgeons-general receive annually from the
" Landwehr battalions nominal lists by which they can at all times
" control the movements of men of these classes in the different dis-
" tricts of the Landwehr battalions. By the aid of these documents,
" the surgeons-general establish each year numerical * states ' of all
" the surgeons, hospital orderlies, Ac, of the line or the Beurlaubten-
" stand, and forward these ' states ' in the month of March to the
" medical-director-general.

" With the object of simplifying mobilization, it has been ordered to
" carry out in advance annually in the various army corps the scheme
" of distribution of the surgeons of the active service, of the Reserve,
" the Landwehr, and Ersatz Reserve. To facilitate this arrangement,
" it is requisite every year that the compensation transfers, which are
" decided upon by the surgeon-in-chief of the army, should be carried
" out on paper by names, or at all events by numbers, and should be
" made known to the Generals commanding the respective army corps.

u Furnished with this information, the surgeon-general can easily
" complete a nominal distribution return of the officers of the medical
" department."

As to the Guards, the surgeon-in-chief establishes, by means of a
numerical strength in excess of other corps, a nominal distribution
scheme, and brings it to the notice not only of the surgeon-general of
the Guards, but also, as far as it may concern them, of surgeons-general
of army corps which are to supply surgeons needed to the Guards.

Finally, to save loss of time, from the moment of mobilization, or
during the course of a campaign, the surgeon-in-chief is authorised,
during the time the army remains mobilized, to dispose of all military
surgeons without distinction of army corps up to the rank of principal
surgeon, inclusive, without restriction, and according to the exigencies
of the service, with the single condition of reporting such transfers to
the War Department.

In the carrying out of the distribution, every latitude is left to
surgeons-general, who are required to know the capabilities of all
military surgeons, and to make themselves acquainted with those
of the surgeons of the Benrlaubtenstand. The following regulations
must, however, be followed : —

The most able physicians and the most clever operators are to be
reserved for the field hospitals.

For duty with sanitary detachments, preference should be given to
those surgeons who, in addition to professional ability, possess great
vigour and activity of mind and body. The hospitals are to receive as
junior surgeons, and as surgeons in charge of patients, a certain pro-
portion of surgeons of Benrlaubtenstand. The sub-assistants and the
one-year volunteers will, as a general rule, not be attached to these
hospitals.

After the field hospitals and the sanitary detachments have been pro-
vided for, the remainder of the medical officers are to be distributed,
according to their seniority and ability, among the different appoint-
ments of surgeon-major and assistant-surgeons of corps. Almost all

VOL. ix. 2 p

568 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OP THE

the principal surgeons of regiments are placed at the head of field
hospitals.

The surgeons-general of army corps are always provided with printed
forms of summons and of letters of service.

Such are the principal arrangements which regulate the mobilization
of the medical corps.

The entire resources of the active army and of the Beurlaubtenstand
are quite inadequate to meet the requirements of the army in the field,
as we have seen above. For that army, recourse must in addition be
had to the pupils of the medical corps and to two non-military ele-
ments— qualified surgeons not liable for military service, and medical
students advanced in their studies. As regards these latter, the con-
ditions of their employment laid down in 1870 are as follows : —

1. All medical students who have reached, at least, the seventh half-
year of study, and are liable for military service, will during the pre-
sent period of mobilization be excused from serving in the ranks, on
condition of completing their military service by serving in the medical
corps from the time of receiving their first summons from the medical-
director- general .

2. These surgeons will be made known to the medical- director-general
by the recruiting authorities. The military documents and students1
certificates which concern them will be attached to this notification.

3. When the surgeons have been already summoned to serve in the
ranks, the documents referred to above will be forwarded by their
corps.

4. Control of Sturgeons of the Beurlaubtenstand.

In time of peace the surgeons of the Beurlaubtenstand include : —

1. Surgeons who have fulfilled their military obligations in the
medical corps and have been discharged as surgeons of Beurlaubten-
stand.

2. Surgeons who have fulfilled their military obligations by serving
in the ranks, and have been subsequently admitted on their own re-
quest to enter the Beurlaubtenstand of the medical corps.

3. Those who, belonging to «the Ersatz Reserve have not served in
time of peace, but have been called upon for active service, and after
three months' medical service have passedlnto the Reserve or the Land-
wehr of the medical corps.

4. Those who, having completed the time of service, have been re-
turned to be disposed of by the recruiting authorities, and have after
six months' service succeeded in passing into the medical corps.

5. Those who, after serving six months in the ranks, and on condi-
tion of having to complete the rest of their active service, have been
classed in the reserve of the medical corps, and invested, in case of
mobilization and subject to the condition of having completed the sixth
half-year of their studies, with the rank of sub-assistant-surgeon.

6. Those who in former wars have served as sub-assistants, and
having obtained their diplomas, have been admitted into the Beurlaub-
tenstand of the medical corps.

The complete detailed and constant control of these different classes,

GERMAN ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR. 569

and precise information as to the surgeons of the Beurlaubtenstand, also
as to those not liable for service in the Ersatz Reserve, are under the
surgeons-general. This knowledge alone makes it possible for them to
make an exact estimate of the personnel placed at their disposal in case
of mobilization, to utilise this strength according to the seniority and
ability of each, and to establish the plan of a regulated distribution
•each year, as well as the plan of distribution, which at the decisive
moment they must forward, without further orders, to the medical-
director-general. But in order that the surgeons- general be kept con-
stantly informed, it is necessary that the Officers commanding dis-
tricts of Landwehr pay constant attention to the personnel or list of
surgeons, that they keep the surgeons-general constantly and imme-
diately informed of all changes that occur — of surgeons newly esta-
blished, change of residence, death, transfer into the active service,
emigration, liberation from the service, <fcc.

On the other hand, Surgeons-general, Commandants of Corps and
of Landwehr-districts, must each time that a surgeon quits the army
corps, the various corps, or the district, report to the district com-
mandant of Landwehr where the surgeon is about to establish himself.

It is not the less necessary that the rolls should be kept with the
greatest care, as well in the offices of the surgeons-general as in those
of the Landwehr authorities, and that surgeons-general should receive
all reports addressed to the authorities of the command in everything
which concerns the Officers and troops of the Beurlaubtenstand, also
the nominal rolls of surgeons on the rolls of the commands of the
Landwehr-districts, who do not form part of the medical corps rolls,
which are opened each year and closed in the month of December. It
is also necessary that the surgeon-general examine carefully the nominal
rolls of surgeons of the Reserve, of the Landwehr, and of the Ersatz
Reserve. These lists are forwarded every year to the commanding
Officers of the army corps by the Officer/ commanding infantry bri-
gades. There the different rolls are carefully compared with those in
their own office, and in the event of discrepancies, inquiries are made
or the necessary measures taken.

The control of the apothecaries of the Beurlaubtenstand is held by
the commandants of Landwehr-districts, before whom the apothe-
caries must present themselves every time that the regulations in force
require it, with the same punctuality as the surgeons.

On the other hand, the surgeons-general receive* (1) every month
from the Landwehr commands, a return showing the casualties which
have occurred in their personnel ; (2) every year from brigade com-
mands a nominal list of the apothecaries borne upon the rolls of the
Reserve and of the Landwehr.

Lastly, the surgeons-general cause a list to be prepared by the
apothecary-in-chief of their numbers, and forward annually to the
medical-direotor-general a numerical return and a nominal roll.

As regards the hospital orderlies, they receive from their regiments
at the time they leave the active service, the " military pass " and a
•certificate of good conduct, and are, like other soldiers, sent back by
their corps to the authorities of the Landwehr. They arc entered in

2p2

570 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE

the rolls of the Landwehr authorities on the one hand, and of the
surgeons-general on the other. The two rolls are made out by reci-
procal communication of monthly reports of casualties, and of annual
nominal rolls. The hospital orderlies appear in the distribution laid
down each year by the director-general and at the time of mobilization.
In the latter case the hospital orderlies are sent by the district com-
mand to the train battalion, and there, according to the distribution
return, are allotted to sanitary detachments, field hospitals, &c.

Such is the outline of the means of mobilization of the medical
department in Prussia. The surgeon-general of an army corps is the
prime mover of the machine. It is necessary, however, to remember
that the mobilization of surgeons, apothecaries, and hospital orderlies
is only a part, and that the most easy, of the difficult task of all the
medical field arrangements of army corps.

The most difficult part is the mobilization of the sick-bearers, the
train-men and teamsters, the means of transport, and of all the mate-
rials required for a battalion or for a train dep6t.

We must add that the " Intendance," or control department has also
to take part in this arrangement, placing at the disposal of the medical
department in the field the men required for these purposes.1

From No. 299, " Revue Militaire," we have also abstracted the
following interesting resume of the organization of the medical service
in the principal Continental Armies.

I. The medical service in all the Armies of Europe is self-governed,
that is to say, it forms a service distinct from all others, and directly
subordinate to the chief military authority.

In the German Army, this autonomy of the medical service has so
long been regarded as a matter of course, that it is impossible in the
voluminous collection of warrants, War Office orders, and regulations
which govern the medical department, to find a single sentence clearly
affirming this fact.

The " Intendance," which, from a French point of view, can alone
be intermediate between the military authorities and the medical ser-
vice, has no other connection with that service than with other corps*
and services non-adininistrative.

In the Italian Army, where the intendance, such as we understand
it, has no existence, and where the commissariat corps, which in part
corresponds to it, is a corps acting side by side with the medical corps
but not above it, the medical service regains its own independence
(right of self-government) under the command of the military
authorities. It is the same in Switzerland. If, on active service, a
part of the Italian medical service, the field hospitals, are placed under
the orders of what is termed in Italy the " Intendance of the Army/'
it is because this intendance, far from being analogous to that which
is so called in the French Army, is merely a part of the military com-
mand.

1 See "Militair Wochenblatt," 13th April, 1872, and "Bertie Militaire d
l'Etnnger," 16th April, 1872, and 11th and 18th March, 1876.

GEBMAN AEMY IN PEACE AND WAB. 571

From many points of view, and especially in all its relations with
the medical service, the intendance of the Italian Army is no other
than the Prussian department of inspectoro-general of military com-
munications (" inspection generale des etapes"). It would then be
a strange misconception of terms, to conclude from this arrange-
ment, that the medical department in Italy was subordinate to the
intendance.

In Austria, as in Italy, the medical department is not subordinate
to the " intendance." If on service, the second line of the medical
establishments and their medical director are placed under the orders
of the " Intendant of the Army." It is to be observed that the latter
is, as in Italy, a general officer, and that his authority is not simply
administrative, since, in addition to his administrative staff, he has a
military staff. This subordination to military authority represented
by a general Officer invested with the full powers of an intendant of
the Army, is direct.1

Those of our readers who remember our remarks on the medical
services of the Russian and Spanish Armies, know that this depart-
ment is in those countries absolutely independent of every administra-
tive service and is placed under direct military command.

II. In all European Armies the control of the medical department
is in the hands of the military surgeons.

Let us proceed to examine, in detail, how this control is exercised.

1. In the peace and war establishments.

2. In army corps.

3. At the central administration.

1. Establishments.

The Prussian Army. The control of the peace-hospitals is left
absolutely and without restriction in the hands of the surgeons-in-
chief : the peace hospitals are declared officially by the Cabinet Order
of 24th October, 1872, to be placed under the control of the chief
surgeons. The surgeon-in-chief holds the command of the hospital,
he is chief of all tbe personnel, military, medical, and administrative,
employed for the service of the hospital. The administration (which
is conducted by a Committee, of paymaster and steward) is sub-
ordinate to his direction and control. As to the intendance, which
once took part in the administrative control, its duties are limited to
the verification of accounts and the ordering of credits. It still in-
tervenes to direct, in concert with the surgeon-in-chief , the distribu-
tion of the different branches of the administrative services among
the various persons employed at each establishment.

The arrangements applicable to peace-hospitals are equally so to
field-hospitals.

This principle is not neglected except as regards sanitary detach-
ments (ambulances of the first line), where an Officer being placed at
the head of the company Of carriers of the wounded attached to the

1 The head of the Medical Department near the Intendance of the army is re-
sponsible to the Intendant in all matters concerning the medical service under bis
immediate orders.

572 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE

ambulance, it is naturally to this Officer, and not to the chief surgeon,
that military commanders refer, under the general direction of the
surgeon of the division or army corps.

Italian Army. " The control of each hospital belongs to the
" surgeon of the highest rank among those attached to the hospital.
" The board of administration of each hospital will be composed of ~
" the surgeon director, president ; the two next senior surgeons, mem-
" bers; an officer of the pay department reporter; and secretary.' r
(Decree of 23 November, 1872, Article TV.)

Austrian Army. In addition to the control of the medical service,
properly so-called, the senior medical officer takes at the same time
the title and duties of director (Leiter) of administration and
management. He is president of a board of management, composed
also of the commanding officer of the " troupe de SanteY' and of an.
accountant.

Russian Army. The greater portion of the hospital establishments
of the Russian Army are the regimental hospitals placed under the
authority of the chiefs of their respective corps. General hospitals
and militia hospitals are placed, in all that concerns their military
aspect, under the orders of the Commandant of Militia (des troupes.
s£dentaires), for medical and administrative purposes under the direc-
tion of the chief surgeon, president of the board of administration.

Spanish Army. The control exercised by the surgeon-in -chief is
absolute, as in Prussia.

2. General Commands, Army Corps, Divisions.

All the Military Powers have established near the chief of the great
strategic unit — army corps, general command, or division — a director
of the medical department, whose duty it is to centralize within the
limits of this unit, everything which concerns the medical corps and
service.

The duties of surgeon-general of a Prussian army corps include —
the personnel of surgeons, apothecaries, hospital orderlies and dressers,
all medical, surgical, and pharmaceutical stores, hygiene, sanitary
police, medical statistics, the recruiting and mobilization of the
medical corps. A recent article in the " Revue," has given elsewhere,
circumstantial details of the duties of a medical director of an army
corps. We may add that an Order in Council of the 6th February,
1873, lays down, for the Prussian Army, the creation of the appoint-
ment of surgeons of division, intended to form a new grade between
the local authorities represented by the chief surgeons of hospitals
and the authorities of the province represented by the surgeon-general
of army corps.

In Italy, the decree of the 17th November, 1872, defines the duties-
of principal surgeons of divisions — the organization of the Italian
Army in time of peace corresponds, as is well known, with terri-
torial divisions and not with army corps districts. This decree lays-
down orders that :

" The appointment of director of military hospitals, instituted by
" the decree of the 13th November, 1870, in each territorial division.

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GEBMAN AMY IN PEACE AND WAR. 573

" shall be given to a medical director, nominated for that employment
•• by decree.

"The medical director of the military hospitals of a division,
" already responsible for the professional control of the medical ser-
" vice in the hospitals, shall have, in addition to these dnties, the
" control of administration and of discipline. He will be, in point of
" fact, entrusted with the authority of chief of a corps, in all that
ki concerns the personnel as well as the supplies and the management.
/'"" * " Each divisional direction of hospitals will be administered, carried
" into effect, by a permanent Committee, of which the medical director
" will be president ; the two next senior military surgeons, members ;
" the pay officer, director of the accounts ; reporter ; and secretary."
The hospitals and ambulances are subordinate to the divisional
rjii*:- command (territorial or mobilized) as a detachment depends on the
^ ^ ' unit which furnishes it.

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Russia, and in Spain, the

V ~J -' surgeons-in-chief of military commands, of territorial circles, of con-

>£■*-- scription, &c., fulfil under the sole authority of the general command-

^:* ing, functions analogous in all points to those of surgeons-general of

Prussian army corps.

3. Central Administration.

Prussian Army. T he dualism, which, before the reforms of 1868
completed in 1872 and 1873, was the characteristic of the German
medical service, and which placed, on the one hand, the professional
portion {personnel and materiel, medical, surgical, pharmaceutical, and
auxiliary) at the office of the medical director-general, and on the
other hand, the purely administrative portion, at the department of
military administration, this dualism was suppressed by the creation,
at the War Office, of a military medical division (Army medical
department) at the head of which was placed the surgeon-in-chief of
the Army.

By the terms of the Order in Council of 28th September, 1868, the
duties of the Army medical department include :

1. Hygiene, sanitary police, and medical statistics.

2. Final decision of medical questions of recruiting and of discharge
from the service.

3. The supply of the Army with medical stores, surgical instru-
ments, and materials.

4. The management of hospitals in peace and war.

5. The personnel' and the schools for military surgeons, apothecaries,
hospital orderlies, and assistants.

In Bavaria, the organization of the military medical department at
the War Office is the same.

The Spanish Army has an almost exact copy of the same organiza-
tion.

In the Austro-Hungarian Army, the dualism, which we remarked
above was once the characteristic of the German service, still exists,
only the two leading divisions, on which depend all the branches of
the medical service, are both under the control of a military surgeon,

1 1 f.

,j.i •

574 THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GERMAN ABUT, ETC.

One of these divisions is the medical board, of which the president is
the director-general of the medical department, and which is entrusted
with the hygiene and sanitary police of the Army, also with the
medical machinery of recruiting and of invaliding. The second of
these divisions, which constitutes the 14th division or department of
the War Ministry, the military medical division, is responsible for the
hospital service.

In the Russian Army, the medical service is conducted by a special
central administration, it bears the number nine, and comes imme-
diately after the administration of engineers. Presided over by a
medical inspector-general of the Army, it comprises, independently of
a scientific committee and office of administration, the four following
sections :

1. Hygiene, sanitary police, and legal medicine.

2. The personnel of surgeons, veterinary surgeons, apothecaries* and
hospital dressers.

3. Stores, medical, surgical, and pharmaceutical.

4. Accounts and records of expenditure of stores.

All that concerns the personnel^ the establishments, furniture, and
working stock, is controlled by the hospital committee, consisting,
under the presidency of the chief of the general staff, of three mem-
bers, who are : the chief of the central direction of the medical service,
the deputy chief of the central direction of engineers, and the inten-
dant- general.

The Italian Medical Board is formed on the model of that of the
Austrian Army. Independently of its professional duties (hygiene,
military, and legal medicine), it is invested with the control of the
officers and men of the medical corps, and centralizes the divisional
medical service.

In conclusion, in all the great Continental Armies, all the com-
ponent parts which form the medical service of the Army are arranged
in one corps, distinct non-administrative service, independent of other
corps, arms, or services of the army, and placed immediately under
military authority.

In all armies and in the different details steps which form the
general organization of armies, from the hospital up to the medical
division or section of the central administration, the control of the
medical service is in the hands of the military surgeons.

THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF HOLLAND.

By C. E. Howard Vincent, P.R.G.S., Lieut.- Colonel Central London
Rifle Rangers; of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, late 23rd
Fusiliers.

The Dutch are a quiet, industrious people, occupying themselves but
little with the disagreements of their neighbours, and seldom assert-
ing themselves upon international questions. But they occupy
wherewithal a territory, which, at the same time that it is for our
interest they should continue to hold, possesses such a seaboard and
such maritime resources, as cannot fail to excite the envy of any
power desirous of developing its naval strength. Small kingdoms
lying at the gates of mighty sovereigns, need be watchful lest their lack
of foresight should jeopardise their very existence. From time imme-
morial, the inhabitants of the Netherlands have, upon necessity,
proved themselves patriotic and courageous. These, however, are
days when mere patriotism and courage avail but little unallied with
preparation and organization. The former moral qualities the Dutch
still incontestably possess. How .they stand as regards the latter
necessities for defence, I here propose to show.

The forces of Holland are composed of: —

(a.) The standing Army.

(6.) The militia.
c.) The schutters (protectors).
d.) The landsturm.

The standing Army is recruited by the voluntary enlistment of men
from the early age of 16 to the mature state of 40. The first engage-
ment is for six years, after which men can bind themselves afresh for
one, two, or six years. It is strange to find a foreign country furnish-
ing its Army in a manner so similar to ourselves. Nor is it possible to
deny that the Dutch are no less dissatisfied than ourselves with this
voluntary system. For them the question at stake is of a more
serious character. We have three score miles or so of treacherous
ocean betwixt ourselves and an invader ; they, naught but an
artificially-marked frontier line. True, the dykes, which in peace
keep at bay the intruding waters, may be cut through and the
impatient flood suffered to come in, but the result, though incon-
venient to the enemy, overwhelms the country with ruin, destroys
towns and villages, overthrows castles and cabins, nullifies the in-
dustry, the labour of years, and presents a terrible picture of human
suffering.

576 THE MILITARY RESOURCES OP HOLLAND.

The attractions of a civil career, the emoluments attainable by
skilled labour in less irksome paths, render th» recruiting slow and
difficult. Re-engagements are rare, even amid the non-commissioned
officers, who can thereby obtain a bounty of 600 guldens. Never-
theless, it is stated, and no doubt correctly, that the Army numbers in
peace some 30,000 men, and in war 61,000. This large increase
is obtained by the accession to the standing Army of the militia,
which forms its reserve.

The militia is likewise recruited, as far as possible, voluntarily, but
its numerical deficiencies are repaired by conscription. The period of
service extends over five years, whereof the first year is continuous,
and the remaining four are subject to an annual inspection and one
training of five or six weeks. As of late the standing Army Has been
considerably below its strength, it is in contemplation to extend the
first training from one to two years. At present some 11,000 militia-
men are assembled each year, but it is proposed to increase this
number to 13,000, and to allot 1,000 thereof to the naval militia.

The Dutch infantry consists of 9 regiments, each of 4 battalions
with 2 dep6t companies, armed with the Beaumont breechloader.

Each company numbers 3 Officers and 188 men.

The cavalry consists of 4 regiments of 6 squadrons, whereof one is
in reserve and another forms the depdt. The field squadron is com-
posed of 5 Officers, 202 men, and 126 horses.

The artillery consists of 1 regiment of 14 field batteries, and
1 regiment of 4 horse batteries.

In addition to these forces, there is an Engineer corps, with
70 Officers and 40 artificers ; and 5 companies of sappers and miners.

The whole of the above form the field Army, which is divided into
four Divisions. Their military value is not perhaps particularly
strong, but they possess one cardinal quality in the allotment of all
the commands, and in the exact composition of the several divisions.

We may now turn to the Schutters or protectors of Holland. They
are intended for the defence of the soil and the preservation of
internal order. Every Dutchman not serving in either the standing
Army, the Navy, or the militia, is supposed to belong to the schutters
from the twenty-fifth to the thirty-fifth year of bis age. But as the
schutters can only be two per cent, of the entire population, the can-
didates are selected by lot. The ten years' liability is divided into
two equal periods, of which for the latter the schutter belongs to the
reserve. The active schuttery, consisting of the twenty-five to thirty-
year old men, is divided into 220 companies, of from 110 to 150 men.
Twenty-five of these companies are instructed in big gun practice.
The reserve schuttery numbers 89 battalions, with a total strength of
some 40,000 men, armed with the Snider.

The last unit of the Dutch defensive force — the Landsturm — includes
all males from nineteen to fifty years old, but, as is usual, its organiza-
tion is deferred to the moment of necessity.

As to the Officers, after a two years' course — about to be extended
to three at the Military Academy — those Officers destined for the
cavalry and infantry are appointed to regiments. Those wishing to

THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF HOLLAND. 577

enter the engineers or artillery, having successfully passed the ordinary
examination, remain for an additional twelvemonth at the school. Last
year also a Staff College was established at Breda ; but, as the entire
staff corps numbers but 20 Officers, it is not expected that very many
will avail themselves of the College on such a very meagre chance of
employment.

Such are the military resources of Holland. We confess that they
are not on so satisfactory a basis as might be desired. Although the
most is made of an inferior system, it may well be doubted whether,
even in such a limited area, the Army could be mobilised within the
forty-eight hours that sanguine Dutchmen anticipate. Sufficient
allowance is not, we venture to think, made for the variety of elements
which compose the military forces. Insufficient account is taken of
the deficiency of Officers and good non-commissioned officers in the
militia and in the schuttery, not to say in the regular Army. It is
idle to conceal it, the Dutch are not a soldier people and the
Army is not popular. It partakes singularly little of a national
character. In those branches recruited in part by conscription,
substitutes are obtainable for a very small sum, and they consist
almost wholly of inferior individuals, taken from the poorest classes.
Universal service is an absolute necessity for Holland, and the sooner
it is adopted, the more secure will the country be.

Not a few will recognise, even in this glimpse of the forces of
the House of Orange, a system, as regards many particulars, which
some of our insular reformers would feign import. Such is especially
the case with respect to the Dutch East Indian Army. It is entirely
distinct from the Home Army, and is formed of Europeans, mer-
cenaries, and natives. The total force numbers 1,476 Officers, of
whom 67 are non-Dutch Europeans, and 29,194 men, with 1,379
horses. The infantry are armed with the Beaumont rifle, and the
artillery provided with breechloading rifled guns.

I will not go so far as to say that this system is radically bad ; but
the heterogeneous nationalities and the inferior Officers of the Dutch
Indian Army must detract considerably from its value.

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS.

By a decree dated 12th June, 1875, a new system of Infantry drill was
substituted in the French army for the regulations then in force, and
which date from the 16th March, 1869.

To a Commission of Officers presided over by General Blot, of the
Staff of the Minister of War, was entrusted the duty of bringing the
Regulations of 1869 into conformity with the requirements of warfare
evidenced by the campaign of 1870-71. The Commission disclaim any
revolutionary inclination in dealing with the question, but whilst acting
as far as possible in a conservative spirit, they seem to have accepted
in their entirety the conditions of the combat in which the rifled gun
and the breech-loading small arm are the weapons employed.

The report of the Commission is placed in the drill-book as an in-
troduction to its contents, an excellent and praiseworthy measure, as
such prominence is thereby given to the spirit which animates the
new system, that it will be difficult for any French soldier to follow
out henceforth that system only in the letter. It is purposed to give
in this article an outline of the new system and of the grounds on
which it is based.

As a matter of course increased importance is assigned to the com-
pany, but the reasoning by which this alteration is supported and
justified, is so peculiar that it must be given in extenso.

" It is evident that in the combat in extended order, the battalion
" in first line, which as has just been admitted must be broken up, can
" no longer be commanded directly and by word of mouth of its com-
" mander, as should be the case with all bodies of troops in immediate
" contact with the enemy.

" In the company, this mode of command will still be possible for
" the captain ; we are therefore led to regard the company as the real
u fighting unit {unite de combat).

" But the company is too weak to carry on an action by itself ; its
" strength is not sufficient to allow it to act independently ; the bat-
" talion, on the other hand, unites all the conditions indispensable to
" carry through an enterprise to a successful conclusion ; moreover, it
" is to the battalion, not to the company, that under any circumstances
" orders will be given from superior authority. It is then the duty of
" the commanding officer of the battalion to exercise a general control
" over his four fighting units, and to cause them to work together to a

ommon end. The battalion is always the centre of action ; it is a

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS. 579

" body, of which the companies, the fighting units, are the arms. It
" follows that it remains the tactical unit."

It is to be hoped that in their efforts to learn from their late antagonists
in organization and tactics, the French have not grasped at the shadow
instead of the substance. If the French want to find the unit com-
manded on the field of battle by word of mouth, they must search far
below the company ; but, assuredly, no reason of this kind influenced
the Germans when they assigned a certain amount of independence
and a great share of responsibility to the leader of 250 men.

The Commission is more successful in dealing with the means by
which order is to be maintained under the antagonistic influences of
undivided action and of formations in which " touch" is no longer
preserved: — "The inconveniences arising from the new system of
" tactics will be avoided if the fighting in extended order be carefully
" regulated, and if troops are practised during peace under circum-
" stances resembling as closely as possible those met with in war, so
" that by the use of a simple formation always and everywhere
" practicable, this order soon becomes familiar to them ; " and re-
cognizing the vital importance of decentralization in drill as well as
in administration, the report continues : — " For the same object the
" cohesion in each fraction must be maintained by every available
" means ; commanders of all ranks must, in assuming the initiative,
" learn to judge accurately the amount of responsibility which rests on
" them ; and finally the intellectual and moral power of each officer
" and soldier will be increased by a more complete and thorough
" training."

The second part of the introduction deals with the "Proposed
' ' Normal Formation for a Battalion in first line. ' ' The battalion works
in four lines, the front three being made up of two companies work-
ing side by side under their own captains. The three lines are
respectively " shooters," one-fourth of each company, " re-inforce-
" ments," one-fourth of each company, "supports," one-half of each
company, the " shooters," and the reinforcements are under the com-
mand of one officer of the company ; the third line, the " supports,"
aiding the lines in front, and connecting them with the fourth line
which is the reserve of the battalion, are commanded by another officer
of the company; the captain is free to select his own position; the
" supports " must be kept intact as long as possible, and as soon as men
are sent from it to the lines in front, the task of support devolves at
once on one of the companies in rear, which either united or separate
from the battalion reserve. Each line has a certain amount of lati-
tude of action. The directive authority of the commander of the
battalion is maintained.

It is considered that at the moment of contact with the adversary,
the number of men in the front three lines should be one man per
metre ; their strength is therefore regulated so that after a reason-
able deduction, arising from losses and other causes, this result will
be attained. It is assumed that a company on war footing commenc-
ing a campaign with 250 men, will, from causes operating outside the
battle-field, soon be reduced to a strength of 200, then deducting

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS.

By a decree dated 12th June, 1875, a new system of Infantry drill was
substituted in the French army for the regulations then in force, and
which date from the 16th March, 1869.

As a matter of course increased importance is assigned to the com-
pany, but the reasoning by which this alteration is supported and
justified, is so peculiar that it must be given in extenso.

" It is evident that in the combat in extended order, the battalion
" in first line, which as has just been admitted must be broken up, can
44 no longer be commanded directly and by word of mouth of its com-
" mander, as should be the case with all bodies of troops in immediate
" contact with the enemy.

" In the company, this mode of command will still be possible for
" the captain ; we are therefore led to regard the company as the real
" fighting unit (unite de combat).

" But the company is too weak to carry on an action by itself; its
" strength is not sufficient to allow it to act independently ; the bat-
" talion, on the other hand, unites all the conditions indispensable to
" carry through an enterprise to a successful conclusion ; moreover, it
44 is to the battalion, not to the company, that under any circumstances
44 orders will be given from superior authority. It is then the duty o(
44 the commanding officer of the battalion to exercise a general control
44 over his four fighting units, and to cause them to work together to a
44 common end. The battalion is always the centre of action ; it is a

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS. 579

" body, of which the companies, the fighting units, are the arms. It
" follows that it remains the tactical unit."

The Commission is more successful in dealing with the means by
which order is to be maintained under the antagonistic influences of
undivided action and of formations in which "touch" is no longer
preserved : — " The inconveniences arising from the new system of
" tactics will be avoided if the fighting in extended order be carefully
" regulated, and if troops are practised during peace under circum-
" stances resembling as closely as possible those met with in war, so
" that by the use of a simple formation always and everywhere
" practicable, this order soon becomes familiar to them ; " and re-
cognizing the vital importance of decentralization in drill as well as
in administration, the report continues : — " For the same object the
" cohesion in each fraction must be maintained by every available
" means ; commanders of all ranks must, in assuming the initiative,
" learn to judge accurately the amount of responsibility which rests on
" them ; and finally the intellectual and moral power of each officer
" and soldier will be increased by a more complete and thorough
" training."

The second part of the introduction deals with the " Proposed
' * Normal Formation for a Battalion in first line. ' ' The battalion works
in four lines, the front three being made up of two companies work-
ing side by side under their own captains. The three lines are
respectively " shooters," one-fourth of each company, " re-inforce-
" ments," one-fourth of each company, "supports," one-half of each
company, the " shooters," and the reinforcements are under the com-
mand of one officer of the company ; the third line, the " supports,"
aiding the lines in front, and connecting them with the fourth line
which is the reserve of the battalion, are commanded by another officer
of the company; the captain is free to select his own position ; the
" supports " must be kept intact as long as possible, and as soon as men
are sent from it to the lines in front, the task of support devolves at
once on one of the companies in rear, which either united or separate
from the battalion reserve. Each line has a certain amount of lati-
tude of action. The directive authority of the commander of the
battalion is maintained.

580 THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS.

further 16 men for staff (not rank and file), and 30 men (about i)
for losses, there will remain out of the three lines in which each of
the advanced companies was originally formed, 154 men. The two
companies side by side will therefore at the decisive moment cover,
in round numbers, 300 metres, or 327 yards. This front of 300 metres
for the battalion, and 150 for a company, is accepted as the normal
front.

With regard to the distances apart of the four lines, the Commission
still regards 2,000 metres = 2,180 yards, as the limit of effective range
of shrapnel (obits a holies), and therefore as the distance of the reserve
from the enemy's guns when the shooting-line comes into action against
them at 1,000 metres. This difference of 1,000 metres between the
head and the rear of the battalion is a maximum. The reinforce-
ments are placed 150 metres in rear of the shooters. The supports
are 350 metres further back and consequently midway between the
shooters and the reserve. These distances are of course subject to
modification, but psrve under exceptional circumstances, the depth of a
battalion is not to be less than 500 metres, as it is considered that if
the lines be brought closer together it will be difficult to prevent
those in rear taking part in the fight prematurely. Great stress is
laid on the reserve remaining intact in the hand of the Battalion-
Commander to the last moment.

In laying down the principle on which the attack is to be conducted,
the Commission supposes that the artillery of the enemy is 600 metres
in rear of his shooting line.

At 2,000 metres from the position, the battalion, already in line of
company columns, breaks into the attack formation.

Before, however, following in detail the movements of these com-
panies, a sketch of their interior organization is necessary. A company
■of French infantry is divided into four sections, numbered from right to
left. The first two, form No. 1 peloton, the last two No. 2 peloton.
On the peace footing, each section is divided into two squads (escouades),
these are numbered respectively 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, through the
company. On service, the number of squads is increased by the addition
of squads which take the even numbers. In those companies, however,
which have twelve corporals the four sections are each divided into
three squads, and on mobilisation, four others, numbered 4, 8, 12, and
1G, are formed. Each of these squads is placed in charge of a corporal,
and each squad will consist of 12 or 13 men. The company is, there-
fore, so organized that it may be broken up, even into sixteen pieces,
and yet the men of each piece will find themselves under control. The
Commission very truly observed in an earlier part of the report that
much of the confusion of modern fighting was due to the absence of
an organization reaching down sufficiently low. The theory somewhat
inconsistently put forward by the Commission that a company can be
efficiently commanded personally by one Officer is contradicted by the
plain logic of facts, and the Commission practically refutes the idea by
providing commanders for the sixteen fragments into which the com-
pany can, on an emergency, be divided. It is only in fact by the com-
plete development of the squad system, which with weak companies

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRT TACTICS. 581

•

necessarily falls into abeyance, that the fighting of the future will be
other than that of a mob.

The battalion in advancing to the attack is preceded, 80 metres in
advance, by eclaireurs, whose duty it is to search and learn the ground
for the benefit of the troops which follow. Even if cavalry be lending
its aid, the eclaireurs are thrown out to the front.

Each of the leading companies sends forward a section to form its
shooting-line, the section opening out gradually into line of squads
at deploying distance ; each squad remains grouped in close-order
until ordered to deploy, and it is preceded by two eclaireurs. The de-
ployment of the squads takes place at 800 metres from the enemy,
the eclaireurs at the same time opening fire slowly. On arriving 200
metres nearer the enemy, the fire is opened along the whole shooting
line, being reinforced, if necessary, from the second line. The shooting
line advances in the orthodox manner in fractions by bounds, a process
continued until 300 metres have been traversed, and they are at that
distance from the adversary. Reinforcements are called up as required.
After a few moments of rapid fire at this range, any portion of the
" support " not already called up, and a company of the reserve which
has replaced the " supports," advance in close formation to give a final
impulse to the fighting-line at the decisive moment. The fourth com-
pany hovers about in rear, gradually moving forward, but carefully
abstaining from, taking a more active part in the operations. It is
thus ready to avert a counter attack or to execute an attack in flank.

How to carry the assailant successfully over the ground lying
directly under the rifles of the defenders, is a problem which has been
determined to the satisfaction of theorists only. The Commission
having to direct practice, not to enunciate theories, honestly admits
that for this period of the fight it is impossible to lay down any rules.
They object to a general advance firing, as throwing away ammunition
and destroying that dash which is, under the circumstances, of special
value.

" At this moment there can no longer be any rules, no mode of
" procedure can be laid down : one portion of the line favoured by the
" position of some obstacle, rushes rapidly towards it and assists the
" advance of the remainder by a well-aimed and well-sustained fire ;
" units are no longer acting, but fractions of no particular size whose
" strength and number depend on circumstances only."

The only resource, the Commission says, is to resume the advance in
echelon by bounds, the short halts being utilized for the delivery of
rapid fire. On arriving within 50 metres of the enemy, shock tactics,
if such are ever now called into play, or the dread of them, must effect
the rest.

The fourth company now acts vigorously in support, always remain-
ing under the hand of a commander, and either occupies the position,
or else covers the retreat. As soon as this company enters into the
engagement, the troops in rear are informed of the fact, and some of
them are sent to replace it.

Having enunciated the principles which should govern the offensive,
the Commission proceeds to deal with the defensive ; and it may fairly

582 THE NEW FBENCH INFANTRY TACTICS.

be presumed that the lessons derived from the bitter teachings of
experience of the last war will have been turned to profit.

"In principle the hypothesis of a passive defence is absolutely
" rejected. The active defence, the only one dealt with here, should
" only seek in the choice of ground and in the attitude of expectation
" an increase to its own power, and the means of bringing the fight
" on to ground it knows, where it has arranged its troops beforehand,
" so as to strike the enemy with certainty and under the most favour-
" able conditions."

The formation adopted for the defence is similar to that used in the
attack ; the distances between the lines are however less, and are not
diminished during the action, each line remaining in its original posi-
tion until required to take a part in the fight. The occupation of
the front line may be continuous or at intervals, or in tiers ; the
minimum strength of rifles in the shooting-line is one per metre.
The reinforcements and supports kept under shelter are called up as
wanted. It is only when the efforts of the three advanced lines no
longer suffice to hold back the assailant, that the two companies form-
ing the reserve are called on to act. A portion of them is left in rear
as a rallying point and support, while the remainder endeavour to
create a diversion by a counter-attack in flank. The French are
severely reproached by military writers for their neglect of an active
defence during the last war ; these writers are for ever urging' the
importance of counter-strokes.

Theorists, however, are very careful not to prescribe the details of
this most difficult and hazardous operation. In fact, Boguslawski
himself says: "The counter-attack, leaving your own position, has,
" however, now become a ticklish matter, and should, at most, be made
" only to a short distance. This is a serious undertaking, because it
" leads yon at once into the enemy's fire without cover, and thus
" brings you into the most awkward position of modern warfare. Yon
" should think twice before you leave your shelter (from whence you
" are pouring a destructive fire) for this purpose." — " Tactical Deduc-
" tions," page 174.

Notwithstanding, then, the advice so freely and gratuitously showered
on the French in this matter, it will hardly surprise those who have
studied the subject to find it dealt with in the "New Field Exercise,"
in the following brief sentences : —

" If the defence is not successful in keeping the enemy out of the
" position, the part of the reserve which has been retained in rear
" receives the front lines, rallies them, and endeavours to lead them
" back to the fight. At this moment the artillery fire of the assault has
" ceased, the assaulting troops are disorganized and out of breath, a
" counter-attack, executed energetically, with fresh troops, even though
" numerically weak, possesses chances of success. The commander of
" a battalion ought always to spare his troops in view of the eventu-
" ality ; if he has to abandon the position, he will, aided by the second
" line, try, by a vigorous counter-attack, to drive the enemy out before
" he has time to make sure his footing."

" As to the counter-strokes to be made during the preparatory portion

THE NEW FRENCH INFANTRY TACTICS. 583

" of the attack, they must depend on particular circumstances, on the
14 form of the ground, and on the faults committed by the adversary.
u No favourable opportunity will be allowed to escape. The fractions
" of troops thus employed will generally be taken from the companies
" in reserve ; their action will be always seconded by an increase of
44 fire on the part of its defence."

Such, then, are the principles on which French troops will fight in
future, whether on the offensive or the defensive.

In the third and last portion of the Report, the Commission deals
with the important question of the method of instruction to be carried
out in peace-time, laying down, incidentally, the common-sense maxim
— first settle the tactics, then regulate the drill. The recommendations
of the Commission seem thoroughly sound ; whether tbey are altogether
applicable to the French character, time alone can show.

There can be little doubt, however, that no system of instruction
whatever can produce satisfactory results, unless, following the advice
of the Commissioners, it is based on the development of the power of
the individual, the combination of individual efforts to one common end,
the maintenance of strict discipline, the zealous devotion of all avail-
able time to drill which is really useful, the engaging the interest of
the young soldier in the instruction, the assimilation of peace- drill
to the actual occurrences of actual war, simplification and uniformity
in words of ccmmand.

VOL. XX. 2 Q

NOTES ON FIELD GUNS.
Br Lieut. W. H. Jambs, F.G.S., R.E.

The German Guns are made of cast steel hooped round the breech
with rings of the same material. The breech-closing apparatus is that
known as the " Rundkeil Verschluss," i.e., a cylindro-prismatic wedge
tightened in the gun by means of an interrupted screw acting per-
pendicularly to the axis of the bore. The gas-check is composed of a
ring of soft steel ; it acts on the Broadwell principle, butting against
a steel plate in the surface of the wedge. Each gun carries three steel
plates and three rings. The carriages are made of sheet-steel. The
hand- spike is permanently attached to the left side of the trail. The
elevating screw is similar to that formerly employed, except that the
upper portion screws into the lower. The axle is of steel. There are
no axle-tree boxes ; but seats are provided for two gunners on the axle
of the 9 cm. gun. The wheels are Madras wheels with bronze naves.
The method of packing the ammunition in the limbers differs consider-
ably from any yet introduced. The projectiles are contained in two
cupboards in the rear of the* limber-box, which is of iron ; each cupboard
contains three hollow racks, each holding six projectiles for the 8 cm.
and five for the 9 cm. guns. The cartridges and necessary stores are
carried in the top of the limber-box which opens in the usual way.
The wheels of the limber are the same as those of the gun. The
ammunition- waggons are those of the construction of 1864 (except the
limbers which are the same as for the guns) and have merely been
altered to take the new projectiles, but new waggons of iron are under
experiment.

The common shell fired by the German field-guns is that known as
the double-skin shell. It consists of two projectiles embedded one
within the other ; the exterior surface of the inner one being shaped into
a number of pyramids which when the outer portion of the projectile is
cast over them, rest in corresponding cavities in the latter. The
result of this arrangement is a more regular fragmentation on
explosion, and a larger number of fragments than is obtained with an
ordinary shell, and there is no doubt that it is, qua its man-killing
powers, a far more efficient projectile. The shrapnel shell contains a
larger number of bullets than the English one, but the bullets are
lighter. The bursting charge of the Garman shrapnel is contained in
a central tube. It is ignited by means of a time-fuse in which the
composition is arranged in a ring. This fuse differs in no important
particular from that in use since 1870 for field-guns in the Prussian
service ; but it is understood that a new pattern is under experiment.
The percussion fuse used for double-skin shells is similar to that
hitherto employed, with the addition of a safety-pin, which permits
the shells to be carried ready fused in the limbers.

NOTES OK FIELD GUNB. 585

The French Guns are made of bronze, that portion of the bore towards
the breech which is usually the first to show signs of corrosion, being
lined with steel. They are breech-loaders, the breech- closing ap-
paratus being similar to that in use in the French Navy for heavy
guns, i.e., a solid interrupted screw. The surface of the thread of the
screw being divided into six equal parts, the alternate ones are re-
moved, so that one-sixth of a turn disengages the threads, and allows
the breech-screw to be withdrawn. There is no gas-check, its place
being supplied by the base of the cartridge which contains the powder
charge. The cartridge-case has a brass base, the body being formed
of sheet-iron lined inside and out with paper. On explosion, the base
expands and effectually prevents the escape of any gas.

The gun-carriages are of iron and call for no particular remark.
The limbers are also of iron, and an iron ammunition- waggon is under-
going trial.

The French have adopted to a slight extent the double-skin shell ;
but their principle projectial is the common shell. The bursting
charge of their shrapnel is placed in front of the shell, and is ignited
by a percussion fuse, time-fuses not being employed for any nature of
projectile. These guns are only provisional and, as soon as steel
guns have been manufactured in sufficient numbers for the regular
army, will be turned over to the territorial army.

The Austrian Field Chins are of cast bronze, composed of 92 parts of
copper and 8 of tin. They are cast chase downwards, are turned and
bored, and the bore is then hardened and compressed by forcing coned
steel mandrils through it.

The breech-loading apparatus is similar to that employed in the
German guns ; but the gas-check is made of copper and consists of a
copper ring in the posterior end of the chamber, and a copper plate
in the wedge.

The gun-carriages are of steel ; the limbers are of wrought iron and
are open behind in a manner analogous to the German limbers.

The common shell is similar to the double-skin shell employed in
Germany, except that the interior portion is divided into a series of
rings placed one on the top of the other, each ring presenting the
appearance externally of a ring of pyramids. This construction is found
to give even better results than the original type from which it was
taken.

The shrapnel-shell resembles that employed in the English service
in the position of its bursting charge, which is, however, larger. It is
fired by means of a time-fuse.

The Austrian Artillery carry a small proportion of incendiary shells
which are similar to the old-fashioned carcases.

The gun above-mentioned is intended for the field batteries, that
for the horse artillery is still under experiment, but will have a calibre
of 295 ins.

The German and French projectiles take the rifling by means of a
lead coating, that for the former being hardened. The Austrian shells
are provided with copper rings on the Vavasour principle.

2q2

NOTES ON FIELD GUNS.

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FORTIFICATIONS ON THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN FRONTIER,

The following notice in connection with this subject is taken from
the " Revne Militaire de PEtranger," of the 25th March last.

Fortifications of Posen. The " Rnsski Mir," of the 2nd March, con-
tains the following article : —

" Posen correspondence, which we give helow, will convince our
" readers that our neighbour, Prussia, notwithstanding the entente

cordials between the Governments, is directing all her efforts to arm

as quickly as possible the frontier contiguous to Russia, and is

making Posen one of the strongest fortresses in Europe.

" The rapidity and the energy with which the works are being
" carried out, renders the fact doubly remarkable ; no pause is allowed

even in face of the enormous expense involved, and of tbe ruin which
" threatens the province through the appropriation of a vast amount
" of agricultural labour for the construction of the new works.

" We cannot pass by, in silence, an important fact which belongs to
" a past not long gone. During the last Franco-Prussian war, when
" Russia gave such aid to Germany, as the Emperor of Germany has
" himself openly declared, Prussia allowed no opportunity to escape of
" increasing and strengthening the fortifications of Konigsberg, Thorn,
" Hffitzen, and Memel, by employing French prisoners at the work.
" To the foregoing we will add the remarks made by one of our rail-
" way constructors recently returned from Paris. He tells us that the
" German railways leading from Berlin towards the Russian frontier
" are on a footing out of all proportion to commercial requirements.
" The quantity of auxiliary lines and sidings is very striking. These
" have no meaning unless intended for the rapid and easy transport of
" large bodies of troops.

" Are we taking corresponding measures ? we may ask. We hope
" those who defend in Russia the civilizing influence of Germany,
*' will forgive our suggestions."

The Posen correspondence alluded to is as follows : —

*' Prussia is day by day working to strengthen her Russian frontier.
" In a little time Posen will be one of the strongest fortresses in Prussia ;
" not even excepting the recently acquired Metz. A considerable number
41 of advanced forts are to be constructed round the enceinte in the
" spring, commencing with three on the south-west and west of the
" town ; on tho left bank of the Wartha there will be two large and
" three small forts, and on the right bank four large forts. To
" facilitate the transport of materials for the construction of the
" advanced works, a road is to be made near the villages of Gourtchine
" and Yonnikow, in connection with the great Breslau Road. It is easy
" to imagine the vast amount of labour subtracted from agricultural

590 NOTICE OF BOOK.

" work. The inconveniences thus arising have been foreseen by the
" military authorities, who have declared that they will only employ
" those labourers who have not made any previous engagements with
" farmers, proprietors, &c. This measure will, however, not be very
" efficacious, as the labourers, attracted by the high pay, will find plenty
" of excuses for breaking their engagements. Anyhow the coustrnc-
" tion of the forts threatens agriculture with danger, from which,
" profit will be derived only by those fortunate proprietors on whose
" property the works are to be erected. It is true that by law the
" State takes possession of their property, but on the other hand the

" loss is compensated by the very high prices paid

" Whilst these works are in progress, building is completely at a
" standstill inside the town "

The " National Zeitung," of the 8th March, endeavoured to reply to
this article, but practically admitted that the transformation of old
fortresses, on the Russian frontier, into fortresses of the modern type
is in progress, a measure of self-defence, for taking which Prussia can
hardly be blamed.

In connection with this subject we learn from the " Revue " of the
2nd of September that by a decree of the Minister of War, date 22nd
July last, Glogau and Thorn, t£tes-de-pont on the Oder and Vistula re-
spectively, Neissi on the S.E. frontier, and Spandau, the arsenal near
Berlin, hitherto considered fortresses of the second class are henceforth
rated as first-class fortresses, as also is Kustrin at the confluence of
the Oder and the Warthe, hitherto a third-class fortress. — (0.)

NOTICE OF BOOK.

" Jahresberichte uber die Veranderungen und Fortschritte im Militair-

wesen." l

Such is the somewhat lengthy title of one of the most valuable mili-
tary publications of the day. Indeed we cannot call to mind anything
at all approaching it, either as to the mass of its information, the width
of its scope, or the general excellence of its matter. The editor, Colonel
von Lobell, must be a man of immense energy and talent to have
devised and carried out so complete a plan. Colonel von Lobell
deserves the gratitude of every scientific military man, and we sin-
cerely hope that his efforts may meet with the practical appreciation
they deserve. He proposes to make his publication an annual one,
giving, as the title designates, reports of the changes and progress in
the various branches of military art in the preceding twelvemonth.
The number before us treats of last year, and is but the second that
has been published.

There are many contributors — one Englishman, one Italian, one

1 Mittler und Sohn, 69, Kochi tnaie, Berlin.

NOTICE OF BOOK. 591

Dane, one Dutchman, one Austrian, but the remainder, some twenty
in number, belong to the German army, and principally to the staff
corps. The foreign Officers give each a report on the organization of
the army of their country. The Englishman, Lieutenant-Colonel
Howard Vincent, — a frequent writer in our own pages, and lecturer
in the theatre of the Institution — has an article on the Heerwesen
Grossbritanniens. We confess that it appears to us unnecessarily
brief, but the author excuses himself for treating his subject so cur-
sorily by the fact that he had to write the article amid his travels
and investigations last autumn in the Ottoman dominions.

The volume under our notice is divided into three sections, the first
containing reports on the organization of individual armies; the
second, reports on the various branches of military science ; the third,
materials for the military history of the year 1875. We shall not,
we are sure, be overtaxing the patience of our readers if we look
roughly into the details of each of these divisions.

The first contains, as we have said, reports on the organization of
individual armies. It occupies nearly 300 quarto pages of matter, and
really treats of every army in Europe. We presume that the bulk
another year will not be so considerable, for it would almost seem,
after reading these twenty reports, there is nothing left to learn, as
far as theory extends, in the various military systems obtaining in
Europe. To Germany, as of right, is assigned the place of honour.
The names of authors are not, with the above exceptions, and wisely
it may be, appended to the articles they contribute, so we cannot
award more praise to the one pen than to the other. After the
German report comes the Belgian, then the Danish, French, Grecian,
British, Italian, Montenegrin, Dutch, Austrian, Portuguese, Rou-
manian, Russian, Swedish, Servian, Spanish, Turkish, American, and
Japanese. Our limited space will not permit us to examine each
report minutely. It is not, however, too much to say that they all,
without exception, attain a very high figure of merit. In some cases,
it is obvious the author has been obliged to rely, in a very great
measure, on such statistics and information as penetrate through
the diplomatic channel to the outer world ; and the minuteness and
accuracy which distinguish a report made upon the spot, are want-
ing. This remark applies peculiarly to the report on the Servian
forces, exalted as high as any candidate for popularity in Belgrade
and the Skouptschina could wish. In the Roumanian report, the
Hohenzollern sympathy is decidedly apparent, and we are sorry
in the Turkish to perceive a tendency to confound military matters
with civil delinquencies. The French report appears to us to be
impartially drawn up. It occupies nearly 50 pages of the volume
(beside which Colonel Vincent's 11 pages look a little meagre), and
though we regret its not coming from the pen of a Frenchman, for we
assume it does not, as the name of no French Officer appears in the list
of contributors, we must concede that the author has treated hi* sub-
ject most conscientiously. Colonel von Lobell having included even
Japan in his search for military information, vividly brings home to
our minds the activity with which the Intelligence Department of the

592 NOTICE ON BOOK.

Berlin Staff Corps is administered, and not only the excellence but the
extent of its sources of information.

The second division into -which Colonel von Lobell has arranged his
matter consists of reports on the various branches of military science.
Nor is he here more behind- hand than with the reports on foreign
armies. There is absolutely no department which Colonel Ton Lobell
has not allotted to one of the Officers who write for him, and with
such judgment have the tasks been given out, that the result is admi-
rable. The first section is upon infantry tactics; and Germany,
France, Austria, Russia, and Holland are noticed. Then follows a
report on cavalry tactics, and the changes effected in the cavalry
manoeuvring of Germany, Russia, France, Austria, and England
during the past year are recorded. Under the last subsection we
find the recent orders for the movements of cavalry ; and it even
goes so far as to reproduce the memorandum of his Royal Highness
the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief .

After the cavalry reports, we have reports on field and garrison
artillery, on artillery train, on siege guns, on coast batteries, on gun-
powder and the leading explosives, on small arms, on fortification.
These are next succeeded by reports on the development of military
statistics, on military supplies, on the Geneva Convention and its
branch societies, on military telegraphy, on the Kriegsspeil, on military
surveying, on map drawing, and on military literature. We are sorry
to be obliged here to content ourselves with a bare enumeration of
headings. It must necessarily rob our notice of much interest, but
we have adopted this course as being the one best calculated to set
before the members of the Institution the extremely valuable nature
of Colonel von Lobell's compilation.

Nor is the tbird and last division inferior to the other two. It con-
tains materials towards the military history of tbe year 1875. Com-
mencing with a report on the Carlist war, going on with another on
the hostilities in which the Dutch troops have been engaged, continu-
ing with a necrology of the more prominent Officers who died last
year, it concludes with a from day to day calendar of the leading mili-
tary events in Europe, and a complete index of the contents of tbe
whole volume. Indeed, as one reads on, one's admiration of the work
cannot fail to increase. It is so complete, so impartial, that if anxious
to find some fault, we must absolutely turn to the binding. This is in
the loose German style. To cut the leaves is a serious labour ; and it
is not conducive to a temperament for study when the pages insist on
coming out in the reader's hand. Before the work can be read with
any comfort, it must be bound, and this is truly the only suggestion
we find it possible to make concerning it. Every Officer should read
the Berichte from end to end, and if ignorant of German, he should
learn the language in order to be able to do bo. Moreover, when the
present volume is superseded by a successor, it will be a valuable addi-
tion to the impedimenta of a regimental mess. Once more we say that
Colonel von Lobell deserves our gratitude; and, on behalf of the
Institution, we tender him hearty thanks.

JtopI Wrtitd Jlmito ^nsfttntloir.

Vol. XX. 1876, No. LXXXVIII.

LECTURE.

Friday, 7th April, 1876.
Rear-Admiral T. A. B. SPRATT, C.B., F.R.S., in the Chair.

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

Part I.

By the Rev. Edmond Warrb, M.A., Eton College.

I cannot help feeling that at the very outset of this lecture an apology
is due on my part for venturing to address an audience in the theatre
of this Institution upon the very difficult, though interesting, subject
of ancient naval tactics. For, in order that such a theme may be
properly handled, three things are requisite: 1st, classical know-
ledge; 2ndly, a practical acquaintance with seamanship and naval
construction ; 3rdly, leisure ; and of these three the two latter have
fallen to my lot in but very scanty proportions. Hence the sketch
that I am about to offer you will present many imperfections and
omissions both to scholars and to nautical men ; but the time that has
been spent upon it will not have been wholly unfruitful, if by it,
perchance, some member of the illustrious naval profession, who may
happen to have both learning and leisure at his command, shall be
induced to study this question, and throw light upon its many ob-
scurities.

The subject before us is that of "Ancient Naval Tactics;" but, having
regard to its vastness and complexity, it will be as well at once to
introduce some limitations, so that we may not attempt an impossible
task in sixty minutes. By ancient, therefore, we will understand Greek
and Roman — dismissing altogether those interesting questions con-
cerning the Assyrian, Phoenician, Egyptian, and Carthaginian navies, ,
which might well form the subject of a separate discourse. Of the
Greeks and Romans we shall find ourselves compelled to give most
attention to the former, not only as presenting us with the best infor-
mation, but as being in virtue of their seafaring habits, their con-
structive skill, and their tactical intelligence, facile priyicipes in the
naval art.

With these limitations* the consideration of ancient naval tactics will,
in the first place, involve an inquiry into the character of the principal
tactical units of which an ancient fleet was composed, their gradual
development, their construction, and propulsion. Secondly, we shall
find ourselves called to notice the weapons of offence with which these
tactical units were armed, and especially the ram which has, owing to

vol. xx. 2 B

594 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

recent developments, a peculiar claim upon our attention. Thirdly,
we shall come to tactics proper; minor tactics, as exhibited in the
handling of a single vessel, and grand tactics, as illustrated by such
instances as we have of the disposition and manoeuvring of fleets.
Lastly, we may draw a comparison between the fleets of ancient and
modern times, their tonnage, their power of propulsion, and the number
of men employed.

Of these divisions of the subject, the first will more than occupy
our time to-day; but I trust, through the kindness of the Council,
that I may have an opportunity of dealing with the remainder at no
very distant date.

The subject of ancient galleys is one which, as is well known, has a
literature of its own. We can but briefly glance at this. A mere
enumeration of the names of the authors who have expended their
toil and their acumen upon it would cost us too long. The first, who,
after the revival of letters undertook a treatise " de re Navali," was
the Ambassador at Venice of the French king Francis the First, the
Chevalier de Baif. No doubt, the sight of the grand galleys that
thronged the blue waters of the Queen of the Adriatic suggested
this work to him; but it also started him with prejudices as
regards form and construction which made him labour to prove that
impossible which the clear testimony of the ancients undoubtedly
affirms. Once introduced to literate Europe, the subject, owing to its
interesting character and obvious perplexities, became a favourite with
the learned, and we find many great names attached to treatises upon
it. Our own Sir Henry Savile, Provost of Eton, the great Scaliger,
Scheffer of Upsala, Meibom of Amsterdam, and Isaac Vossins,
are among those who, in the seventeenth century, entered the lists of
the literary tournament " de re Navali." Of all these it may be said
with truth that while each in his turn criticised the faults of his pre-
decessors he fell into errors no less great himself; not, indeed, in most
cases from want of learning, or of industry, or of literary insight, but
chiefly because the data dealt with were insufficient, and the whole
approached from the theoretical and not from the practical side.

During the last century, and indeed up to the last twenty
years, Scheffer's treatise " de re Militari Navali " remained the best
text book on the subject. Montfaucon in his " L'Antiquite Expliquee "
gives some illustrations from the column of Trajan and the church
of San Lorenzo, two of which have been enlarged for this lecture.
With this exception there is nothing concerning our subject in the
last century that calls for notice, except the ingenious and practical
attempt of a countryman of our own, General Melvill, who caused,
in the year 1773, a model of a quinquereme to be erected against a
high wall behind his house in Pulteney Street, in which we are
told that he " performed the motions of rowing with some Officers
of both the land and sea service, and all agreed, as well as one
of His Majesty's chief ship-builders, who had come to inspect
it, that such and no other must have been the construction of the
ancient galleys." Though we cannot quite endorse this opinion, since
tho side of the quinquereme in question appears to have been at a very

ANCIENT NATAL TACTICS. 595

improbable angle (45°) to the water, yet we may say that tbe gallant
General's attempt was certainly the most successful of those that
have hitherto been made. In the present century Mr. John Howell,
about the year 1826, constructed a trireme for the Edinburgh Society
of Antiquaries. Of late years the subject has been handled with
ability by Mr. Smith of Jordan Hill, whose solution, however, is found
to conflict with the evidence of antiquity ; and with plausibility by
M. Jal, the author of the " Gloesaire Nautique," and of two volumes on
" Archeologie Navale." M. Jal's knowledge of mediaeval shipping
renders both these works extremely valuable, but his imperfect know-
ledge of Greek and Latin makes his conjectures as to ancient galleys
misleading. It is very unfortunate that the trireme constructed at
Paris by the order of the late Emperor Napoleon, under the superin-
tendence of the very eminent naval architect M. Dupuy de Ldme,
should have been built in accordance with the ideas of one whose
interpretations of the ancient authors are at fault.

The honour of having solved many, if not most of the difficulties
which have perplexed so many eminent men, must be given to the
illustrious German scholar Boeckh, and his pupil Dr. Graser, who in
an exhaustive treatise " de re Navali " has elucidated satisfactorily
the most knotty points of this ancient problem. The discovery at
Athens in the year 1834 of a number of inscriptions which proved
to be inventories of galleys and their gear, belonging to the dockyard
at the Peirous, dating from a period not long subsequent to the close
of the Peloponnesian War, was an event of the utmost importance in
the history of our subject. These authentic documents of the Athenian
Admiralty, when elucidated by the vast erudition and great critical
ability of the author of the " Public Economy of Athens," and by the
practical sagacity and genuine enthusiasm of his learned pupil Graser,
have shed a flood of light upon the whole question of the construction
of ancient ships of war.

Would it be out of place here to express a hope that as we have
now the data upon which such a work could be undertaken with a
prospect of success, funds and enthusiasm may be forthcoming now
as they were a hundred years ago, and another attempt be made to
reproduce the Attic trireme as it was in the days of Phormion or of
Chabrias ?

But we must hasten on to describe such a trireme, premising that
we shall find but little help in the representations that remain to us on
the coins, pottery, bas-reliefs, or pictures of antiquity. In the case
of coins the scale is so small that but little can be gathered as to detail,
though this field is not altogether barren with regard to the com-
parison of types of vessels of different epochs and localities. In the
other representations the treatment is for the most part so conven-
tional, and so devoid of perspective that but a few things can be
learnt. The artist has generally been, as in the case of the representa-
tions on the column of Trajan, anxious solely to pourtray the figures
of men and animals to advantage, the accessories, whether ships or
houses, being treated in an arbitrary manner, and dwarfed out of
all proportion. Still these representations are interesting as pre-

2e2

5D6 ANCIENT NATAL TACTICS.

serving certain records of detail, and we shall find them useful for
reference from time to time.

It is important to observe that the ancient ship of war was an
improvement on the pirate vessel, just as the piratical craft itself
was an improvement on the original merchant galley, and made
with a view to superior speed and handiness. The trader, built to
carry goods, was broad of beam and slow of speed, and gradually,
as heavier weights were to be transported, ceased to depend upon
oars, and trusted to sails for locomotion. The predatory instincts
of mankind were not slow to equip themselves with craft fitted so
as to be speedy enough to overtake the sluggish merchant-man,
and at the same time roomy enough to stow away their ill-gotten
gains. Not that in early times suoh gains were looked upon as ill-
gotten. The Robin Hoods of the sea, whom we should deem cut-
throat villains, were merry gentlemen in their own estimation, and
in that of their neighbours, bold buccaneers, who were not ashamed
of their profession. But the fact that they were enemies of civilisa-
tion was also patent, and the necessity of putting them down became
more manifest as the advantages of commerce and free maritime
intercourse were more generally appreciated. The mythological eleva-
tion to the judicial bench in the infernal regions of Minos, King of Crete,
had perhaps, if we may venture a conjecture on such, a subject, its
origin in the stern justice with which that monarch repressed piracy,
and the sense of the benefit that resulted to mankind from his
efforts. He is mentioned by Thucydides as the first possessor of a
fleet in Greek waters, and the historian tells us that he used it in
establishing his Thalassocracy, or maritime dominion, by putting
down the pirates.. To this end, and thus early was the Greek ship of
war elaborated. It is easy to see that the point in which it would be
made to excel its pirate foes would be swiftness, and that this swift-
ness would be attained by construction with a view to carrying
nothing but the crew and the necessary provisions and armament.
Hence the ship of war was known as the " long ship" far excellence.
Centuries, however, were necessary to perfect its construction. The
ships of the Homeric period, long after Minos, were still undecked,
except at the bow and stern, where they had fighting decks.
We hear nothing in Homer of the ram, or of the distinction between
rowers and seamen and marines, which is so marked at a later period.

In the simpler early vessel any increase in the number of oars
necessitated an increase in the length of the ship, till at last a
limit was reached, when a loss of handiness in turning out-
weighed the possible advantage of increased speed. Hence the in-
vention of hanks of oars ; an invention by which the necessary
distance of the " interscalmium,,, or .space between the rowers1 benches
could be subdivided and utilised in such a manner that the oars
might be doubled or trebled in number within the same horizontal
space, and yet not clash together when worked in time. In order to
comprehend ^better the principle upon which this improvement was
effected, it must be understood from the first that, so far as we know,
the ancients never, at any rate until late Roman times, employed more

ANCIENT NATAL TACTICS. 597

than one man to an oar. The construction of the Venetian galleys, —
whether " alia scaloccio," in which long handled oars were worked by a
number of men placed on successive steps rising inboard towards
the centre of the vessel, or " alia zenzile," in which the space of
the interscalminm was subdivided by oars with handles of different
lengths, so that the rower of the longest oar sat nearer amidship
than his neighbour — was unknown to the ancients. Nor would
it have suited their requirements in the long ships which had but
a narrow space along the centre of the vessel, which they could
not afford to lose. Accordingly, we find first among ancient ships,
single-banked galleys of 20, 30, 50, and up to 100 oars each,
in which the usual interscalminm. of two cubits gives us a con-
jectural ground for estimating their length. These are all embraced
under the term of " moneres," or " monocrota," as striking the water
with one beat. The first improvement upon this was the construction
of the bireme which if we are to believe Pliny, is due to the Ery-
thraeans, Ionian Colonists of Asia Minor. If anything is to be inferred
from this, it is that the first step in the improvement of the con-
struction of galleys came from the eastern and not the western side
of the ^Igean, and in all probability was of Phoenician origin. " Ce
rCest que le premier pas qui cov&e" is a familiar and true proverb,
and the invention does not deserve the slight notice which has been
taken of it in ancient authors. When once the principle upon which
increased power could be obtained by increasing the number of oars
without lengthening the ship was discovered, it was easy to develop it,
and it is worthy of notice that though the biremes gave place to triremes
in the seventh century before Christ they ultimately survived them, and
in the seventh century after Christ were in use when such a thing
as a trireme was hardly to be seen. In like manner they in turn
disappeared while their predecessors, the monocrota, survived. But to
this growth and decay and its analogy in modern time, we may have
to refer later on.

By whom the trireme was invented we know not. Probably by the
Phoenicians, for there is a statement in the Stromata of Clement of
Alexandria that the Sidonians were the inventors. Ail we are told by
Thucydides is that the Corinthians were the first who built triremes
in Greece, and further, that an eminent naval constructor of Corinth,
Aminocles by name, did not confine his skill to the limits of his own
country, but built four of these new ships-of-war for the Samians, of
which event he fixes the date at about 300 years before the end of the
Peloponnesian war, or about 700 B.C.

At this point we may proceed, taking Graser as our authority, to
describe as briefly as possible, the principles of construction and pro-
pulsion iu the case of the trireme and quinquereme, so that we may
. have some definite idea of the character of the vessels employed when
we proceed to consider the naval tactics of the Greeks and Romans.

And first we must call attention to the fact that two classes of
vessels appear to have been employed, distinguished by the name of
"Aphract," unfenced, or u Cataphract," fenced, according as the
rowers of the upper tier were protected or exposed. Both classes were

598 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

decked and floored, but the " Aphract " class carried their decks and
flooring lower than the "Cataphract," so that in them the rowers of
the upper bier were visible above the side of the vessel ; this is dis-
tinctly seen in the bireme and trireme, given by Montfaucon from the
Column of Trajan.

We have also an instance of the transitional form between the two
classes, in the fragment of a bas-relief of an Attic trireme of which a
cast is to be seen in the British Museum, and of which a sketch after
Michaelis is given here.

You will remember that the disposition of the banks of oars was the
problem to be solved, and that the object of arranging the oars in
banks was to economise horizontal space, thus obtaining an increase in
the number of oars without having to lengthen the vessel. Now, the
rowers of the upper tier were called, from the elevated bench on which
they sat, ThratvUcB ; those of the middle tier Zygitce, from the zyga
or benches, which, in the Aphract class of vessels, traversed the
whole breadth of the ship and bore the deck ; those of the lower tier
Thalamitce, from the thalamus or chamber in which (below the zyga
in the Aphract class) they plied their oar. These names remained
the same for the upper, middle, and lower tiers, ' even when the
invention of Cataphract ships with high decks and more banks of
oars than three, had altered the conditions of construction. The
Aphract ships had their flooring one foot below the water line and
the deck five feet above it.

After the battle of Actium, which was won by the use of the
light Liburnian biremes, which were Aphract, the Romans seem to
have built most of their vessels after what was then considered the
new, but was in reality the old fashion. Previous to that date, from
the time of the invention by the Thasians of this system, all the larger
vessels of war used by both Greeks and Romans were Cataphract.

In the Cataphract trireme, the space allowed for each oarsman
was, according to Graser, eight square feet per man, and this propor-
tion was observed in the larger vessels up to the octireme. In vessels
with ten or more banks of oars the proportion allowed seems to have
been reduced to seven square feet per man. We know from a passage
in Cicero that the space was so completely filled and so densely
crowded, that there was not room for an additional man.

The rowers in all classes of banked vessels sat in the same vertical
plane, the seats ascending in a line obliquely inclined towards the stern
of the vessel. Thus in the trireme, the Thranite was nearest to the
stern of the set of three to which he belonged. Next behind and some-
what below him sat his Zygite, and behind and below the Zygite, the
Thalamite. The vertical distance between the seats belonging to the
same set was 2 feet, the horizontal distance 1 foot. The seat itself
was from 9 to 12 inches broad. The lowest rank used the shortest
oars, and the difference of the length of the oar in-board was provided
for by the outward curvature of the ship's side. The oar ports were
vertically I foot 3 inches below the handle of the oar when the blade
was just touching the water The lowest or Thalamite oar ports were
3 feet above the water. The Zygite oar ports were 4£, the Thranite

ANCIENT NATAL TACTICS. 599

5| feet above the water. The vertical distance between the oar ports
was but 15 inches, the distance obliquely measured on the ship's side
21 inches. Each oar port was protected by the ascoma or leather bag
which fitted close over the oar, closing the aperture without impeding
the action of the oar.

The seats of the rowers were supported on benches, three feet long,
or thereabouts, which ran from the ship's side to beams which rose
from the floor, and reached up to the under surface of the deck.
These beams were inclined at an angle of 64° towards the stern, and
were at a distance of four feet apart. They were technically called
the Diaphragma. This Diaphragma, viewed from inside the vessel,
presented the appearance of a succession of staircases, the steps of
which were the benches between it and the ship's side. The space
between the Diaphragmata on either side constituted that part of the
vessel in which stood the masts, and in which stowage was possible. It
was in the Attic trireme seven feet wide. This arrangement is clearly
shown by the model of a section of a Greek trireme which we have
here, for which we are indebted to the intelligent and patient labour
and constructive skill of a present Etonian, Mr. Chambers.

The length of the oars used in the trireme has been calculated
as follows. We know from the Attic tables the length of the oars
used by the seamen or supernumerary oarsmen when there was need.
These were the longest in the trireme, and they varied from 13 feet
6 inches to 14 feet 3 inches in length.

The Thranite oars must have been nearly of the same length, but
could not have exceeded 14 feet under any circumstances.

The Zygite oars were 10£ feet. The Thalamite 7\ feet.

The rowers where the space of eight square feet was allowed per
man had a vertical space of 1 foot 3 inches allowed for the rise and
depression of the handle in rowing, and a space horizontally of 2 feet
6 inches for its forward and backward motion. It is, however, pro-
bable that there was hardly any motion forward of the body, the work
being done by falling backwards from the perpendicular.

In all cases the oars used by the regular rowers preserved
nearly the same proportion of one-third inboard to two- thirds out-
board.

The oars of the upper ranks projected at the point where they
reached the water 2 feet 6 inches beyond those of the next lowest
tier.

In the case of the gigantic oars of the Tesseraconteres of Ptolemy,
a vessel of the size of the " Agincourt," we are expressly informed
that the handles were weighted with lead, so as to bring the oar
inboard and outboard nearly to an equilibrium.

For the purposes of comparison I have appended a table showing
the length of oars used in the different classes of ancient vessels, in
the British Navy, and in the University and Eton eights.

Let us now proceed to consider the construction of the vessel itself.
In the Cataphract class, the floor was 1 foot above the water-line.
Below this was the hold which contained a certain amount of ballast.
Through the floor into the hold, the buckets for baling, or as we

600 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

should say the pumps, were worked, and that very constantly in ancient
vessels, as the use of the word both by the poets and orators in meta-
phors expressing labour and sorrow, amply attests.

The keel (t/h>V«?) of the early ancient ship appears to have had consi-
derable " camber." Under this was a strong false keel (xeXvapa), which
was very necessary in vessels that had frequently to be drawn up on
the shore. Above the keel was the kelson (tpvrxjov, columba), into
which the ends of the ribs" were fastened. Above the kelson lay the
(tevTepa 7ft6m*) upper false keel in which the mast was stepped. The
stem (tneipa) rose from the keel at an angle of 69° to the water.
Within was an apron (<pd)ucii) giving solidity to the bows which had to
stand the weight of the beak and its concussion. The stem was carried
upwards and curved generally backwards above the forecastle, termi-
nating in an ornament which was called the acrostolion {ampuirroXiow).
The stern post rose at the same angle as the stem, and was carried high
over the poop curving inwards, and finishing in the aplustre, an orna-
ment which may be likened to the feathers on the head of an angry
cockatoo ; and behind this curved backwards the cheniscus or goose
head, symbolising the floating powers of the vessel.

Bound the hull of the vessel horizontally at about the level of the
ieet of each bank of rowers, stretched waling pieces (vo^c?y), and
in the case of the Attic triremes, these were again strengthened by
long cables {yvo^u}ftAta)> which were bound round the ship from stem
to stern, and which tightened by shrinking when wet, gave additional
security to the vessel, which from her length and narrowness was apt
to strain much in bad weather.

From the side of the vessel below the level of the thranitic bench
projected the gangway (vapohoH, fori),, for a space of 1 foot 6 inches,
giving a passage of 3 feet in all. This was supported by (/3/axa)-
brackets fitted below and springing from the ribs of the vessel. The
gangway was fenced in by an upright bulwark extending the whole
length of the space occupied in the ship by the rowers. Here, in the-
" Parodus," the (*c/Miwp) seamen had their station in action as light-
armed troops ; who also, when needed upon special occasions, rowed as
supernumerary oarsmen with the long oars already mentioned.

The ribs of the vessel from the point where the bracket fitted to
them, curved upwards and inwards to a height which was 10 inches
above the heads of the thranitic oarsmen. Upon them at this
height were placed the cross beams (ovpwrijpe*), which supported the
(icardarpta/ia) constratum or deck, which was thus a clear 3 feet above-
the gangway, allowing the marines (im'fiarai) in action, free play for
their javelins over the heads of the seamen in the Parodus.

Beyond the space occupied by the rowers, there was the Parexei-
resia, a space of 11 feet in the bows and 14 feet at the stern,
which included the ("icpta) fighting deck already noticed iK the
Homeric vessels. On either side of the main deck rose the cancelh^eja
open lattice work, and seen as such in the Aphract ships, but nK
the Cataphracts usually covered with hides, or with the (cilicium)
goats hair curtains of that manufacture, at which St. Paul and A qui la
and Priscilla used to labour working with their hands This served

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 601

both as a protection against the waves and to a certain extent against
the darts of the enemy.

At the bow and stern, torwers, especially in the Roman vessels, were
often erected which gave a vantage height from which to shower down
missiles on an enemy's deck.

In very early times we find the elevated forecastle, of which the
very name is significant, and which, in some cases, strikingly reminds
ns of the structure erected at the bows of the "Devastation," serving
to protect the fore deck from the waves, and the crew and marines
from a raking fire as they approached the enemy,

On either side of the forecastle was figured the eye of the vessel, the
centre of which was formed by an aperture which served as a hawse-
hole.

At the stern was a raised quarter-deck, on which was a kind of
cabin or deck-house forming a shelter for the chief Officer and
the helmsman. This quarter-deck was the sacred part of the ship.
Here was the image of the patron god, not to be confused with the
parasemon, or badge of the vessel figured near the bows. Behind
the deckhouse rose the flag staff on which was hoisted the pennant
(taenia) and probably in the case of the admiral's ship, the red flag
that was the signal for going into action, and such other signals as
were from time to time required.

On either side the bows catheads (ewwrtBei) projected, which in the
case of the earlier Athenian triremes seem to. have been merely
sufficient to hold the anchor. The Corinthians, however, who<, as we
have seen, were enterprising and clever shipwrights, by strengthening
greatly these catheads, were able to receive a blow from the enemy's
ram in such a way as to inflict the damage they were intended to
receive, an invention which cost the Athenians dear, both in the
Corinthian Gulf and in the great harbour at Syracuse.

Between the catheads, and in front of the stem, projected two beams
one above the other at some distance apart, headed generally with
metal fashioned as a ram's head, or the head of some other animal,
which were called respectively vpocfifioXiov and vpoepfioXi*. The purpose
of these beams seems to have been to give a racking blow to any vessel
pierced by the beak, which projected much further below, and thus to
cause her to heel over and shake off, making it easier for the imping-
ing vessel to disentangle herself by backing water.
* Underneath was the rostrum or beak, answering to that which we
now call the ram, which was a long spur, and in the later periods
usually divided into three teeth. Of this we shall speak more fully
hereafter.

The trireme was steered by two paddles or rudders, one on eiihar
side of the stern of the vessel, to the tillers of which, under the deck,
was attached a rope, which, passing through a block on either side and
over two. wheels on the quarter-deck, enabled the helmsman to turn
the two rudders which way he pleased by a single effort.

In the mid space of 2 feet, which we have already mentioned, as
lying between the Diaphragmata, stood the main, or great mast, which
was square rigged, and before and behind it the two acati, fore mast

602 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

and mizen mast, which carried lateen sails. The ancients, however,
did not use sails in action, trusting then entirely to their oars, so that
I will not enter further into the question of the rigging.

We may now (for I fear that we are already surfeited with detail)
briefly sum up the measurements of the trireme as calculated by
Graser, so as to complete the picture of the vessel such as we may
fairly imagine it to have been.

. The total length (exclusive of the beak, for which we must add
nearly 10 feet), was 149 feet, of which 25 feet belong to the par-
exeiresiiB (11 to the bows and 14 to the stern) and 124 feet to the
space occupied by the rowers.

The greatest breadth (which has been calculated in an ingenious
manner from the thickness of the hawsers employed for anchoring the
vessel, (a detail preserved to us in the Attic Tables) at the water line
was 14 feet ; above, at the broadest part of the beam 18 feet, and with
the gangways added 21 feet. The space between the Diaphragmata
was 7 feet.

The height of the deck in Cataphract ships above water was 11 feet.
The draught, 8£ feet. Total height, 19* feet. Thus leaving 10£ feet
for the hold. The height of the aphract trireme from water to the
top of the gunwale is calculated at 8 feet. The capacity of the Cata-
phract trireme, calculated according to the modern formula of measure-
ment gives 232£ tons.

As all the Attic triremes appear to have been built on one and the
same model, their gear was interchangeable. It is obvious that such
an arrangement in a fleet of from 300 to 400 vessels would offer great
facilities in refitting.

The regular crew of an Attic trireme consisted probably of 225 persons
in all. Of these 174 were employed in rowing, disposed as follows: —
. 54 Thalamites, 58 Zygites, 62 Thranites, the upper oars being the most
numerous, as the contraction of the vessel near the bow and towards
the stern afforded less space for the lower tiers. Besides the rowers,
there was a force of 10 marines, heavy-armed soldiers, and 20 seamen.
The number of marines seems to have varied greatly, and depended
much on the style of fighting preferred. Where, as in the case of the
Athenians, speed and dexterity in the use of the ram were the chief
tactical features, fewer marines were employed. Xerxes' great fleet
carried 30 marines to each trireme. We hear of forty picked men on
board each Chian vessel at Lade. The Corinthians and Corcyreana
had their decks crowded at the battle of Sybota ; and the unfortunate
Athenians, in the great harbour of Syracuse, where there was no space
for their usual methods of manoeuvring, found themselves obliged to
imitate their enemy's tactics in this respect, with disastrous results.

Of the officers the chief was the Trierarch or Captain, and next to
him the master (nffiepvTjTri*), who was responsible for the steering
and sailing of the vessel. Each tier of rowers on either side had its
captain (^toi^o^x0*)* There was also the (xpwpct/*) boatswain, the
keleustes, who gave the time to the rowers, a steward, a purser, and
their subordinates, and last, not least, the ship's piper (rpirjpau\rft).

We have thus completed our sketch of the trireme, and from it we

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 603

may also form, without any difficulty, an idea of the larger vessels,
quadriremes, quinqueremes, <fcc. The principles of construction in
these were exactly the same, the additional tiers being added by
carrying on the Diaphragmata upwards, and at the same regular
intervals inserting the thwarts on which the rowers' seats rested. The
increase in the size of the whole vessel was not as large as one might
at first expect. In order to avoid entering into further detail I have
prepared a table from Graser, which exhibits clearly the difference.
The increase in the size of Greek vessels began after the Pelopon-
nesian war, and seems to have culminated in the time of Demetrius
Poliorcetes, who manoeuvred with vessels of sixteen banks of oars, and
we hear of nearly every number of banks of oars up to that figure.
The huge tesseraconteres of Ptolemy Philopater, with its forty banks
of oars, was in reality a costly toy, and of no practical use. A minute
and curious description is given by Graser of this great ship, but I fear
that we must not delay upon it here.

The Romans who copied a quinquereme which fell into their hands
in the first Punic War, appear to have used vessels chiefly of that
description. They did, however, build much larger vessels up to the
time of Actium, when the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra's great
ships, by the light Liburnians, altered the whole fashion and prepared
the way for the disappearance of the great banked galleys, and the
almost complete loss of the knowledge of the principle on which they
were constructed.

An interesting question arises at this point, and one not easily
solved, as to the pace at which these galleys could be moved. We
may make a comparison between the man-power of the galley and the
horse-power of the modern ship of war. The difference in the bulk to
be moved is very great and the inferences derived may be misleading.
Taking, however, one horse-power to be equivalent to between 7 and
8 man-power, we may say that the trireme was propelled by a force
equal in amount to about 24 horse-power, the quadrireme by about
32 horse-power, the quinquereme about 42, and so on, increasing a
little more than 10 horse-power for each tier of oars added. It is,
however, obvious, that the man-power cannot be counted upon as
applied to the oar with that uniformity which is attained by the use of
steam in the case of horse-power.

There is a passage in Xenophon (Anab. vi, 42) in which it is stated
that from Byzantium to Heraclea, in Bithynia, a distance of about
150 nautical miles, could be rowed in a day by a trireme, and was
a very long day's work. Now, allowing eighteen hours' daylight for
the work, a speed would have to be maintained of over eight knots.
This, considering the shape of the vessel and the man -power employed,
may perhaps seem excessive, but if such a speed could be maintained
on an average for a whole day's voyage, it is* obvious that in action
or when any special effort was required, a greater pace, say perhaps
] 0 knots, could be attained.

Such speed we may believe was attained, if at any time, in those
famous encounters, in which the vessel itoelf was the missile hurled
at the enemy, when, in the prime of her Thalassocracy, the rapidity

604 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

and agility of the trireme of Athens was the terror alike of her Greek
and her Phoenician foes. Long and careful training had perfected
the system of rowing and steering. The vessel itself was shaped for
speed by the cunning master builders of a people whose eye for form
has never been surpassed. To the attainment of the highest possible
speed everything was sacrificed, till at last the thin sharp bows were
incapable of standing a concussion with the heavy mass presented to
them by Corinthian and Syracusan constructors, and suffered them-
selves the damage they were intended to inflict upon others.

Time will not allow me here to follow out in detail the second part
of my subject, the development of the ram in its successive types,
from the sharp Assyrian spur, the old Phoenician fish -like snout, the
early Gieek boar's head, which we can trace down to the third cen-
tury on coins, to the three teethed rostrum of the early Macedonian
and later Roman epoch.

I should have liked, had time sufficed, to have touched upon some* of
the instances of single encounters, such as those of Artemisia, and
of the Samothracian vessel at Salamis, and of Phormion's Captain
off Naupactus, and further, to have pointed out the causes why the
(wpoofioXjf) direct attack stem-on, that, which in the eyes of the
Athenian was the unskilful and unseamanlike manoeuvre, prevailed
over the skilful attack on the enemy's quarter or side (c^oXiJ), success
in which was the glory of the Attic sailor; to have shown how, as
Thucydides aptly calls it, "land fighting at sea" became the rule;
how grappling irons, and boarding bridges, and ponderous missiles,
ultimately superseded ramming tactics to such an extent that Brutus,
off Marseilles, exposed the sides of his great vessel on purpose to the
enemy, trusting to the thickness of his timbers, and making sure of
destroying his smaller antagonists with the ponderous weight swinging
from his yardarm.

Time, however, forbids me to enter upon these points ; and in
conclusion, if I have not already tried your patience too long with
what I fear has been a somewhat dry mass of details, I would ask you
to leap back with me in thought over long centuries of the past that
we may imagine ourselves standing in the Peireeus, with the glories of
Athens behind us, the great spear head of the goddess who guards the
Propylaea flashing the reflected ray far across the Saronic Gulf, where
in front of us lies bright Salamis, and beyondT ^Egina, once called
the eye- sore of the port in which we stand.

It is a busy bustling scene, one that would rival our own Portsmouth
and Plymouth in a time of war. There are the long sheds in which
the triremes have been housed during the winter, but they are mostly
empty (for is it not April ?), and the rollers on the long stone ways
have run down many of the dry keels and launched them already. It is
April, 415 years before Christ, and the Athenians are preparing their
fleet for their grand and fatal expedition to Sicily. They dream of
conquest, of the conquest of the golden west. The triangular land is
the stepping-stone to greater things beyond. Nearer home there are
enemies, but ambition is stronger than fear, and we fit out our fleet and
send our picked men for distant enterprises, while the enemy is not

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 605

very far from our own doors. And so the dockyard is all life. Look
at the huge coils of hawsers, at the rows of anchors, at the stacks of
oars, all carefully marked, all arranged with precision. There in the
harbour are already lying some hundred sail, some few ready to start
for Corcyra, but most still fitting out with all haste. What shrill
pipings, what a clatter of tongues, what a smell of pitch. Yonder goes
Lamachus the busiest of the three Admirals, and the most practical.
He sees to details with the eye of a master who means business, and
knows that real work is grim work. Fine young Alcibiades will
be down in the afternoon on a four-in-hand from town. He gives
himself airs, but is clever and brilliant, and handsome, and with the
exception of some old sea dogs, hard bitten ones who mislike the smell
of jockey-club and musk, and growl about effeminacy and affected
manners, his subordinates like him well enough. And here comes kind
well meaning Nicias, a good man, and well esteemed, but hardly the stuff
for such a command, though his good fortune has been tried up to the
present time and has never been found wanting. Truly it were better
to die young than to be so fortunate. And the chiefs being there the
work is not slack. The hammering goes on with redoubled vigour. The
petty officers have their hands full and look serious, the comptrollers
of accounts are in dismay, the trierarchs are sure they will be ruined.
But there is a strong will behind them all, and a nation's behest is not
easily disobeyed, and fancied impossibilities both as regards time and
space are reduced by hard work to possible proportions. And so the
fleet is fitted out, and if we will return after a few days, we shall -see
in company with all Athens, a spectacle which none will forget to his
dying day, which now may draw tears of mingled pride and sorrow,
pride patriotic, and sorrow for those who are going away, but the
recollection of which hereafter will command, alas ! far more bitter
tears of shame and grief ; shame for country humbled, and grief for
those who will never return. There in the glorious bright blue bay,
float, fully equipped, as we have described, one hundred triremes,
6<> as men of war, 40 as transports. They are to start solemnly with
a nation's prayers and a nation's blessing. The pennants are waving
in the breeze, the acrostolia are crowned with flowers; the piper
sounds the rowers to their seats, and then silence is demanded by the
long blast of the bugle from the Admiral's flag-ship, caught up and
re-echoed by the ships of each of the three divisions. Then are the
prayers offered and the libations poured to unwilling deities by brave
hands, and hearts ignorant of the future, and the signal being forth-
with given, more than 17,000 oars dash into the water together, and
the whole fleet starts in one splendid trial of speed towards iEgina.
We strain our eyes after them until the white sails are set, and the
hope and strength of Athens fares onwards out of sight, to a dis-
tant enterprise, the issue of which with all its pride and all its folly,
with its glory and its misery, will adorn history, and point a moral for
maritime powers in all time to come.

606

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

APPENDIX.

Table showing Comparative Length of Oars.

Athenian Navy.

Quinquereme

Quadrireme

Trireme, Thranite . ,

„ Zygite. . . .

„ Thalaxnite

Inboard.

ft. in.

6 6

5 6

4 6

3 6

2 6

Outboard.

ft. in.
13 0

11
9
7
5

0
0
0
0

Total.

ft. in.
19 6
16 6
13 6
10 6
7 6

Blade.

ft. in.

British Navy.

Inboard.

Outboard.

Total.

Blade.

ft. in.
5 3
3 6
2 6

ft. in.
12 9
11 7

9 6

ft. in.
18 0
15 0
12 0

ft. in.
0 5f

o 54

0 5*

Oxford University Eight.

Inboard.

Outboard.

Total.

Blade.

1876

ft. in.
3 8

ft. in.
9 1

ft. in.
12 9

ft. in.
0 6

Eton Eight.

1875

Inboard.

ft. in.
3 6

Outboard.

ft. in.
9 0

Total.

ft. in.
12 6

Blade.

ft. in.
0 5}

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

607

Table of Measurements, 8fc, from Graser.

Class of Vessel.

Length, exclusive of rostrum
Breadth at waterline

„ greatest

„ with TTcipoSoi ....

,, between tiaQpaynara

Draught of water

Height of deck, Cataphract

„ „ Aphract. . . .

Tons measurement

Number of rowers , . .

Estimated horse-power ....

Crew, total complement.

Trireme.

149 feet.

8*„

11 „

8
232*
174

24
225

»
»

Quadrireme.

158* feet.
16
22
25

9
10
13
10

365

240
32

300

Quinquereme.

168 feet.
18
26
29
11

11*
15

534

310

375

it
ff

Tesseracon-
teres.

420 feet.
57
76
79
49
20
44

tf
if

11,320

4,054

540

7,500

Triaconter, 54 feet long,
Penteconter, 90 feet long,

}

two masted.

The Chairman : I am sure that we all feel deeply impressed with the fact, that
we hare just heard a most interesting lecture, and not only a very interesting, but a
very learned and eloquent one, especially in the moving words with which it was
concluded. But what I also myself feel, and strongly feel, in consequence, is a
deep regret that a more fit and competent person is not in the chair on this occa-
sion. For I was requested to fulfil this honour purely through having a larger
acquaintance with the localities referred to in the lecture — the scenes of the great
naval battles and contests mentioned — than most of the members likely to be
present.

That advantage has undoubtedly tended greatly to enhance the interest of
the lecture with me, and I am sure that there are some present who are likewise
familiar with some of these localities, and have felt a similar enhanced interest.

The lecturer referred to, and recommended to your notice, Mr. Smith's book, on
" The Voyage of 8t. Paul." Mr. Smith was an intimate friend of mine, and spent
a winter in Malta whilst I was there ; and as an able geologist, he had intended,
during his stay, to work out the geology of Malta. But, as I happened to be a
mere smatterer in this branch of science, I had been induced just previously to do
the same. Mr. Smith thus finding that the labour of his hope and love had
been somewhat forestalled, as he himself told me, was induced to take up the
voyage of St. Paul, from its special interest in connection with Malta. We were,
therefore, frequently in communication with regard to it, and to the construction of
the ships, mode of rowing them, &c., of the ancients of that date. Mr. Smith
has in that work given a chapter of great interest upon the form and position of the
oars and rowers in the quinquiremes, triremes, Ac., as he had conceived them to be.
But I must confess that, although there was much that was new in it bearing upon
the subject, yet it did not fully satisfy me that we vet understood the exact con-
struction of the ancient Greek and Roman ships of war, so as to know how the
rowers of the several tiers were placed. Now, however, I fully understand it, after
the beautiful illustrations, and the clever model made by the Eton boy, that has been
so often in the hands of the learned lecturer during the delivery of his most instructive
and most interesting discourse. I must not, however, try your patience further with
more remarks of my own, but at once fulfil the duty that now devolves upon me, of
asking you to accord your hearty thanks to the learned lecturer for his very instruc-
tive and interesting lecture, and also to the Eton boy for the clever model his
talent has produced, and that has tended so much to assist the lecturer in his de-
scription, and ourselves in understanding the difficult points of the subject.

LECTURE.

Friday, Jane 2nd, 1876.
Rear-Admiral T. A. B. SPRATT, C.B.> F.R.S., in the Chadr-

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

Part II.

By the Rev. Edmond Warrb, M.A., Eton College.

In resuming the subject of Ancient Naval Tactics this afternoon, I
propose to follow the lines laid down in my first lecture, and to treat
in the first place of the weapons of offence used in ancient vessels, and
of the means employed to meet them. The consideration of the pro-
gressive improvements and alterations made for offensive and defen-
sive purposes in the construction of vessels, and their armament will
naturally tring us to our main and proper topic — the naval tactics of
the ancients* These will fall under two heads : minor tactics, which
concern the handling of a single vessel, and grand tactics, which con*
cern the handling of fleets. For illustration, we shall have to refer to
incidents of Greek and Roman warfare recorded by ancient authors,
and it is possible, though I am not very sanguine upon this point>
that the consideration of those ancient conflicts may be suggestive to
those whose attention is given to the important subject of modern
naval tactics, which have at least the use of the ram in common with
those of the ancient world. Lastly, if time allows, we may glance at
the growth and decline of the ancient marine, and the causes that pro-
duced these effects, and attempt to draw some comparison between the
size and tonnage of ancient and modern fleets, and the number of men
employed in them respectively.

Of the weapons* of offence with which ancient ships were armed, the
ram, or, to speak more correctly, the beak, was for a long period the
most formidable, and that from very early times. If we are to believe
Pliny, the invention was due to one Piseus, a Tuscan pirate chief, who,
according to a quotation given from Manetho, was master of Italy for
a considerable time. There does not, however, seem to be much in
support of this statement ; all the other evidence wo have points to
Egypt or Phoenicia, the east, and not the west, as the cradle of this

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 609

invention. There is, as I have already said, no direct mention of the
beak in Homer, who, however tells ns how

" round the vessel's prow (orfipy)
The dark waves loudly roared as on she rushed
Skimming the seas and cut her watery way," l

a passage which seems to me to indicate that an advance in bnild from
the earlier type had already been arrived at in Homer's time. The
later poets, indeed, speak of the war-vessels of Greeks as armed
in Trojan times with brazen prows, and in a fragment of -<Eschylus,
Nestor's ship is called a ten-beaked or ten-spurred ship (fere'^oXoe).
I am not, therefore, disposed to regard the silence of Homer as
proving that the beak was unknown to the Greeks in Trojan times.

. We have in Diodorus a statement regarding a conflict which has
been claimed as the most ancient sea-fight whereof this world holds
record, to the effect that " Semiramis, when she reached the Indus,
" found the King's fleet prepared for battle, put her soldiers on board
" her own flotilla, attacked him, and after a desperate struggle, in
44 which nigh a thousand ve*^1..* were sunk, won the victory." This
statement finds support in several other passages, and amongst them
in one from Suidas, in which he says that " Semiramis had con-
" structed in Bactria 3,000 vessels of war with brazen beaks
" (xa\*«/4#oX<w), the crews for which were furnished from Syria, Phce-
" nicia, JESgypt, Cyprus, and Cilicia." Such legendary splendour
surrounds Semiramis that one is quite sorry to And her either sub-
limated into a solar myth, or reduced by a prosaic inscription to the
position of consort to Pul, King of Assyria, and her date brought
down from the time of Abraham, assigned to her by Eusebius and
Augustine, to the much later figure of 740 B.C. There is in the
British Museum a very spirited representation of an Assyrian war-
galley, moving at full speed, such a galley as we may imagine the
warrior Queen to have employed. The beak in this case has the
character of a pointed spur attached to the bows of the vessel at the
water-line.

If ancient authors fail to tell us any more than this concerning the
invention of the ram, we must turn for information to those early
representations of vessels which the venerable and ever fresh antiquity
of Egypt has preserved for us.

In his earliest efforts to construct a ship from sawn planks, man
found himself assisted by the natural tendencies of the material em-
ployed. The natural curvature of planks fastened together in the
middle, on a curved pair of ribs, which would represent what w*
should call the midship section of the vessel, determined in the first
instance to a great extent the shape of the bow and stern. These in
the earliest vessels were nearly alike, a feature which though it
obtained in trading vessels to a late period, is wrongly attributed to
all ancient vessels by Mr. Smith, of Jordan Hill. We see this early
type clearly shown in the representations which so often occur on
Egyptian sarcophagi of the craft in which the souls of the dead nvc

1 II., i, 482. Lord Derby's Trans.
VOL. XX. 2 S

610 ANCIENT NAVAL TAOT108.

being carried on their last voyage by attendant deities.1 These are
worthy of our attention, not only as being extremely ancient, but as
giving us a point of departure in the history of the construction of
the beaked prow. Both ends of the boat are alike sharp, and upon
both the superstructure is carried in a curve backwards and upwards
so as to afford protection from the waves, presenting us with the
rudimentary outline of that which was afterwards to develop into
prow and poop respectively. The top of the structure above the
prow is often flattened and covered in, and upon it is seated a guiding
deity, the prototype of the *• look-out " man at the bows in later time.
The keel, as is evident, has great camber fore and aft, bad for speed,
good for turning quickly, useful in the case of a boat steering' down
the current of father Nile, but not so advantageous when some distant
village had to be reached across his wide inundations. The loi
d'epargne, the law of least effort, which as part of the many-sided
necessity that rules so largely in human affairs, is the mother of mani-
fold invention, would soon, where human labour at the oar was too
lavishly expended, teach men, as they built their vessels, to decrease
the upward curve towards the bow, and to bring it down nearer and
nearer to the water, by fastening the planks together, end to end
vertically. Thus by degrees the forward part of the vessel was
immersed in its whole length, while the high stern preserved the
advantage of rapid turning-power. Similarly when the vessel was
used for purposes of attack, and the experience of charging an enemy's
ship had been ensued, the adaptation of the bow for this purpose by
prolonging it with projecting timbers would naturally suggest itself.
The subsequent addition of a metal boss or pointed share, so as to in-
flict either a racking or piercing blow, was an obvious improvement to
those whose business it was to plough the main. But the earliest
type of artificial beak consisted simply in the prolongation of the keel-
timber beyond the point at which the stem of the vessel was carried
upwards.

That all these successive improvements in construction were due in
the first place to the Egyptians is in a high degree probable. That they
possessed a fleet and navigated the Mediterranean and Bed Seas at a
very early period is tolerably certain, even if the statement made by
the priests to Herodotus (Book II, 1 02) concerning Sethi or Sethosis,
that he navigated the Erythrean Sea or Indian Ocean in a fleet of ships
of war, be fabulous. The legends of Danaus and ^Bgyptus connect
Egyptian maritime enterprise with Greece, and in a remarkable
passage Euripides (Troades 127) calls the ropes of the Greek vessels
the " twisted teaching of Egypt."

Did the Phoenicians — (the chief rivals of the Greeks in the carrying
trade of the Mediterranean, and certainly their teachers in many
things connected with ship building from very early times)— did the
Phoenicians in the first instance owe their knowledge of ship-building
to Egypt, or was it of native growth ? The earliest representations of
Phoenician vessels that we have are of a much later date than thosi
on Egyptian monuments, and are many stages in advance of them in

> See Pkte XX

ANCIENT NATAL TACTICS. 611

form. They are in most respects similar to the early Greek types,
which probably were borrowed from them. In these, both on coins
and vases, we have the projecting beam for a beak, and a nearly
straight bow and forecastle rising above it. The coin of Phaselis, a
town of Lycia, of which we have here a drawing, and the figures of
ships taken from Etruscan vases belong in all probability to a period
between 500 and 600 B.C. They are the earliest that I have been
fortunate enough to find.

The construction of beak here shown had in itself manifest dis-
advantages, which would soon make themselves felt, especially in a
sea-way, when the force of the waves, as they tumbled home into the
angle formed by the projecting spur, would soon be felt to impede
the vessel's way, and to weary the rowers. And secondly, the weight
of the projecting spur, especially if any metal was added to it, would
be such as to involve a great strain on the fore part of the vessel, and
further, being unsupported, it would in the shock of a concussion be
liable to break off and endanger the safety of the ship.1 We can
fortunately trace the improvement that these considerations were
sufficient to introduce. We have here a drawing from a coin of
Samoa, of which the date is given as about 490 B.C., in which the
type has altered so far that the angle before noticed has been filled
up by carrying on the waling-pieces that strengthen the hull of the
vessel, and filling in on a gradually rising and receding curve, while
from the point at which the upper waling-piece projects beyond the
stem, the stem itself is carried up and forward in a bold line, so as to
meet and divide the crests of the waves that might rise to that height.
The whole structure marks an advance in the seafaring habits of the
Greeks. The vessel thus constructed at the bows had a general
resemblance to a pig's face, or, to speak more artistically, a boar's
head ; and it is interesting to find an historical incident connected
with this matter. Herodotus tells us (Book III, 59) that the Samians
who had risen .against the tyrant Polycrates, when deserted by the
Lacedemonians, who had come to their aid, after making a raid on the
island of Siphnos (and extracting one hundred talents of gold from
the pockets of the inhabitants), settled in Gydonia, in Crete. There
they flourished till they were beaten by the ^ginetans in a sea fight,
who, after the victory, cut off the bows of their ships, which were
shaped like a boar's head, and placed them in the temple of Athene,
in iEgina. The date of this battle is about 516 B.C. The coin is of
somewhat later date, but it bears witness to an improvement in ship-
building which is thus confirmed incidentally by Herodotus ; for the
circumstance would hardly have been mentioned if the shape had not
been regarded as a novelty. That the Samians themselves claimed it as
their own invention and were proud of it, may be inferred from the fact,
that it became with them a national symbol, which survived on their
coins even as late as the first century B.C. That it was recognized as
such by the other Greeks, and especially by the jealous Athenians,
may be gathered from the account given by Plutarch in his Life of

1 Compare the instance grren by Poljbiui, Book XVI, in the battle between
Philip and the Bhodians.

2 s 2

612 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

Pericles, wherein lie tells us that the Samians taken prisoners in
the war which ensued upon the Samian revolt in 440 B.C., were
branded by the Athenians with a " Samsena," as it was called, and
explains, that the " Samsena " was a kind of ship invented by Poly-
crates, and was boar-faced in the curvature of prow (vow-pupa* to
aipupa). If Polycrates was the inventor, it is interesting to notice
that he was closely connected by friendship with Amasis, the Egyptian
king ; but, at the same time we may observe a development -towards
the same type upon coins of Phaselis, of a date quite as early as that
which we have just noticed. I would also observe that an intermediate
stage, showing the improvement begun, but not yet fully carried out,
is discernible in the representations of some of the pirate vessels on
the Etruscan vases.

I may mention at this point that, so far as we can gather from
coins, the Persian and Greek types of beak seem here to part company.
The coins of Pharnabazus of between 400-380 B.C. show, with very
little modification, the type we have noticed in the earlier coin of
Phaselis. Have we not here a clue to the maritime superiority of
the Greeks over the Persians ; progress in adaptation of means to
ends on the one hand, prejudiced adherence to that which has led the
way to success in past time on the other ? A nation which cannot
invent for itself, or, at any rate, assimilate the inventions of others,
can never command the seas.

The Samian invention was not in any way a perfect one, but it
was a real step in construction. That it was somewhat clumsy may
be inferred from the remark that Plutarch makes that the " Sameena "
was " low in the fore part and wide and hollow in the sides, making it
" light and expeditious for sailing." The Athenians when their
necessities had forced them to become a naval people, produced a
vessel calculated for greater speed and ramming power. Fortunately,
we have a representation of part of an Athenian trireme which enables
us in some measure to judge of the progress made. The details of
construction are clearer than in the representation given on coins.
Here is a vessel built for speed, with lines as fine as those of a racing
yacht.1 The lowest waling-piece is carried out to a sharp point, which
rises at some little height above the water, so that in smooth water
it would always be clear. The entry iB extremely sharp and fine, and
gives at the first glance the idea of great speed. Such a vessel was
well adapted for the Athenian tactics, which were based on rapidity
and dexterity of movement. But the weak points are evident. A
bow so constructed was capable of piercing the side of any vessel of
the period to which it belonged ; but as I have noticed in my previous
lecture, the Corinthian shipwrights accurately gauged the force of
impact with which a vessel of this build was capable of delivering a
blow, and proceeded to strengthen the bows of their ships in such a
way as to be able, not only to withstand the full force of such a blow,
but to cripple the vessel that delirered it. This they effected by
shortening the projecting prow and making the bows of their vessels
much thicker and stronger, and at the same time by greatly strengthen-

1 See Plate XX. Athenian galley with rowers.

PERSIAN.

GRECIAN

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 613

ing the catheads (cVwrcfcv) that projected on either side of the bow.
These catheads were constructed of heavy balks of timber, supported
both from within and from without by wooden stays of about nine
feet long, stretching from under them to the sides of the ship. These
when the attack of the enemy's vessel was received "stem-on," which
was, as we shall see hereafter, the form of attack which they took
care to invite, broke up the forecastle and upper parts of the hull
of the Athenian vessels so as to make them unseaworthy.* The event,
as we know, answered the calculations of the Corinthians, and from
that moment the Athenian ceases to be the representative type of
Greek war- vessel.

Yet the type itself is not wholly lost, and I think I may venture to
say, though the subject is obscure, and I have not had all the oppor-
tunities that I could wish of following it out, that the subsequent
Greek types oscillate between those of Athens and of Corinth, lor it
was only in close waters where there was not room for manoeuvring
at large, that the Corinthian build was certain of its advantage. In
the open sea, speed was still indispensable for victory. Hence the
question for the shipbuilder in the construction of the prow of his
vessel was how to combine speed and strength. The invention of
larger vessels with many banks of oars gave greater speed and greater
force of impact. To meet this, heavier timbers were used in con-
struction, and the waling-pieces became thicker and the bows of the
vessel were not unfrequently armour-cased with bronze. The beak, no
longer projecting so far as in the Attic trireme, was armed with three
teeth so as to inflict a crushing blow without incurring the danger of
being entangled in the enemy's vessel, a danger which often
proved very real in action, as the following instances show : —
In the course of the battle of SaJamis, an ^Eginetan vessel rammed
a Samothracian vessel. The Samothracian marines were expert in
the use of the javelin, and while their own vessel was sinking, and
before the ^Eginetan could clear himself of their wreck, they cleared
his decks and boarded and took possession of his ship. Much later in
a battle between the Ulyrians, 229 B.C., with Acarnanians as their
allies against the Achseans off Paxo (Polyb II, 10) the Ulyrians used
this stratagem against the great quadriremes and quisqueremes of
their antagonists. They yoked their light vessels together by fours
and exposed them sideways to the onward rush of the enemy, who
thus became hampered with the wrecks of the innermost vessels,
while the IUyrians from the outer vessels at once boarded and swept
the decks, and in this way became masters of four quadriremes, and
of one quinquereme with all its crew.

It would greatly exceed the limits of a single lecture if I were to
delay much longer on the construction of the Greek prow. I will
merely ask you, therefore, to notice the four instances that I have
selected from coins, for casts of which I am indebted to the kindness
of the authorities of the numismatic department at the British Museum.
The first is a coin of Kius in Bithynia, which shows the influence of the
Athenian type very clearly. The bows, however, are not so long or sharp
as in the Attic trireme, and there is a sheer downwards in the main

614 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTIC8.

waling-piece, which terminates in a trident beak. The timber of
the second waling-piece is prolonged into a second spur (irpoe/i&dXiop),
and above again we see one if not two upper spurs. The epotis is very
large and projecting, and shows the influence of the lesson of Syracuse
taught a century earlier. The second and third coins are of about
brty years later, and belong to the time of the successors of Alexan-
ler. The first, one of Demetrius Poiiorcetes, represents, I think, the
>row of one of his large vessels, for the construction of which
ic was justly renowned. The trident beak is here prefixed to a
)iece of timber, which has a straight run, and projects but little.
The spurs above also are short. But the Corinthian type is manifest.
There is an air of massive strength about the whole, which is want-
ing in the previous instance. The epotis, the forecastle, and the
double timbers of the deck, all combine to give the idea of solidity
and weight. The next instance, from a coin of Antigonus, is more
ornate. I would remark only on the prominence of the beak and
upper spurs, and the difference of the angle at which the stem is
carried upwards as compared with the previous instance. The fourth
and last Greek coin is of Leucas, now Sta. Maura, an ancient colony
ot Corinth. It is of a date when Greek independence was drawing
nigh to its extinction, and the Romans were already masters of the
sea. Compare this type with that of the Athenian of two centuries
before, and the difference of build is at once apparent.

Let us now pass from Greek to Roman prows, of which I have
selected for comparison seven instances from coins in the British
Museum. Of these, three belong to a period previous to the first
Punic war; and I mention this, as it has been often too readily
assumed that the Romans had never engaged at all in maritime war-
fare before that time. The treaty however with Carthage, which was
made in the time of the kings, proves that even as early as the fifth
and sixth centuries they were familiar with the sea. The appoint-
ment of Duumviri Navales, officers charged with the duty of equipping
and repairing the fleet, an office which existed before the year 311 B.C.
(as we find the right of election of these officers then transferred to
the people) — is in itself sufficient evidence of the existence of a fleet.
The coin, of which we have here a drawing, dates from the year 350
B.C. ; and so far as can be distinguished from the rough outlines which
it presents, is of a somewhat different type from the Greek, much
more rude and bluff, the stem carried forward at a sharper angle to
the water, and terminated in a curved acrostolion of much shorter and
stouter build than those observed in the Greek types. If the
Romans did borrow from the Greek cities of Italy in the matter of
naval construction, we may be sure that they departed from their
models freely to suit their own ideas of practical utility. In the two
next instances, which belong to the half century preceding the first
Punic War, we have two varieties of construction belonging to the
same period. In the one, the beak is depressed, and the timbers that
support it are of less thickness in themselves, but compacted together
by means of cross-pieces. It seems to represent an attempt at a con-
traction which should save weight without sacrificing strength. The

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTI08. 615

other is more decidedly Greek in type,, showing a single piece of
timber carried out straight into the trident beak, and similarly a
straight single piece snpporting the upper spur {vpoepf&oktov.) It is
probable that these vessels were triremes. They may have belonged
to that fleet which was forbidden by the treaty contracted with Taren-
tum about the year 303 B.C. to sail beyond the Lacinian Promontory,
or to the fleet of ten Cataphract ships which, under L. Cornelius in
282 B.C., violated that treaty, and being attacked by the Tarentines,
suffered a loss of four vessels sunk and one captured. The long
struggle, however, of the Samnite wars had engrossed the attention
of the Romans almost completely in military matters ; and the very
terms of the treaty, the infraction of which met with such signal
chastisement, show that their efforts by sea were of secondary con-
sideration to them. The war with Pyrrhus succeeded, and at the
opening of the first Punic war in 264 B.C. Rome was practically with-
out a fleet. Her armies marched by land to Rhegiam, and thence, in
the absence of the Carthaginian fleet, crossed the narrow strait by such
transports as they could collect from their Greek Bubject cities. It was
not till the Carthaginian fleet, ravaging the coast of Italy, brought home
to them the real conditions of the contest upon which they had entered,
that the Romans turned their attention in real earnest to the sea.
Hitherto the conquest of Italy had occupied their thoughts, and Italy
was to won by land. But the first Punic war was the commencement
of a struggle for a wider empire, the empire of the ancient world. No
empire is ever won, no, nor ever maintained, without the mastery of
the highways that are the means of communication ; and the first step
to the empire of the ancient world meant the command of the Medi-
terranean. I am therefore tempted here to dwell upon the construc-
tion of the Roman fleet in the first Punic war as an event unparalleled
in history, and surely one of the gravest significance, if by a sudden
effort a purely military nation could take to the sea, and with the aid
of a new mechanical contrivance, in a few years utterly crush and
practically extinguish, not only the fleets of the first maritime
power in the world, but the very spirit which made those fleets
formidable. Hannibal may ravage Italy, but he has reached Italy by
land and not by sea. He may march to the very walls of Rome, but
no Carthaginian fleet dares to support him at the mouth of the Tiber.
We hear of one or two skirmishes, but of no great naval action.
It is not too much to say that from the close of the first Panic war
to the days of Ricimer, no foreign nation dared to contend against
the maritime power of Rome. Actium indeed decides the fate of tho
world, but Actium is Rome arrayed against herself.

The transference of maritime dominion is- closely connected
with the subject immediately under our consideration, the use
of the ram. We have already seen how, by the- improvement in the
construction of the bows of their vessels, the Corinthians and Syra-
cusans were able to paralyse the superior nautical skill of the
Athenian. Brute force, thickness of timber and armour-plating,
patient attention to detail, and a steady perception of the end in
view, prevailed over elan and seamanship and quickness of manoeuvring

616 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS,

power. The same lesson is now taught again upon a larger scale, and
with far more momentous results to the world, The Romans had no
iieet, — perhaps a few triremes, but nothing that could keep the sea
against the Carthaginian quinqueremes, ships of five banks of oars,
which were the line-of -battle ships of the day. By chance, in the year
260, one of the Carthaginian vessels of this rate was driven ashore
and captured by the Romans. With the practical sagacity and
unswerving energy of purpose which distinguished them, they
determined to construct a fleet upon this model. The timber was
felled, the shipwrights set to work, and, within two months of the
time when the trees were standing in the woods, a fleet of a hundred
vessels, each 168 feet long and of 534 tons measurement, had been
constructed. Not only this, but the future crews meanwhile were
placed on framework set up upon the land, and there and then prac-
tised in the motions of rowing to the voice of the keleustes* When all
was nearly reacly, the Admiral, Cn. Cornelius, set sail in advance with
seventeen ships, leaving orders for the fleet to follow. He sailed, and
within a few days was taken, ships and all, by the Carthaginians.
Meantime the rest of the fleet was under way. The ships were badly
built, and terribly slow, as might have been expected. Defeat was a
certainty ; but some ingenious spirit suggested to Duillius, who now
assumed command, the construction of a novel engine of warlare,
destined to render useless the rams of the enemy. This contrivance
was called the "raven" {cormia). As described by Polybius, it was of
the following character : at the prow of each vessel was fixed a mast
24 feet high, 9 inches in diameter. This had a pulley on the top*
Attached to this mast was a long ladder-shaped construction, with
planks nailed across it, 4 feet wide and 36 feet long, with an oblong
slit in the cross- planking in the first 12 feet of the ladder. This long
ladder or gangway had a balustrade about the height of a man's knee
running the whole length of each side. At the end was fastened an
iron ciaw, which Polybius compares to the knocker of a door, only
sharpened into a point. This had a ring on the top of it, so that the
whole was, he says, not unlike the long trays used by bakers in their
ovens. To this ring was attached the rope by which, as a ship came
up for the purpose of ramming, aided by the pulley on the top of the
mast, they let the ladder, which thus formed a boarding bridge, fall
on to the deck of the enemy's ship, sometimes over the prow and
sometimes slewing it round when the attack was on one side. The
weight of the boarding bridge falling drove the sharp iron spike into
the planks of the enemy's deck, and so bound the two vessels together ;
then the marines, if the vessel was prow to prow, rushed two abreast
over the bridge ; if alongside, boarded from all parts together.,
Once the trained soldiers of Rome had gained the deck of a Cartha-
ginian vessel, and there was but little chance for her. The " mere
" rabble " (as Niebuhr calls them) of an African crew could do nothing
to withstand such a foe, for the crew of the Roman quinquereme
seems to have consisted of 120 soldiers, in addition to 300 rowers and
seamen, a far larger proportion of marines than that employed in the
Greek vessels.

Ths "Bitis" (Cobtttb)

618 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

The result of the first naval engagement proved clearly the sound
good sense of Duillius in adopting the new invention proposed to him.
Unless he could reduce the conflict to something like land-fighting,
there was no chance whatever for him, considering the quality of his
ships and his crews as compared with those of the enemy. The
" corvus " provided him with the means of using his real strength.
The two fleets met at Myl», the modern Melazzo, not far from the
Straits of Messina. The Carthaginians advanced with a fleet of 130
vessels, full of confidence in themselves and contempt for the crews
which had learnt to row on dry land, but somewhat puzzled at the
masts and long crane- like machines swinging at the bows of the
Roman quinqueremes. However, the advanced squadron of 30 ships
at once charged, and were almost immediately grappled, and boarded,
and taken, including the Admiral's flag-ship. After a short time the
remainder of the fleet, finding themselves unable to cope with this
novel engine, which robbed them of all the natural fruits of their
seamanship and skill, turned and fled, with a loss of about 50 ships,
3,000 killed, and 7,000 prisoners. This victory was the presage of
doom to Carthage and the prelude of maritime dominion to Borne.
The ram henceforth, though still formidable, had no longer the
first place as a weapon of attack. It may be for this reason that in the
coin of 216 B.C., of which we have here a drawing, we see it much less
projecting, and apparently less strongly supported. Duillins still enjoys
well-merited renown, and in the present year has had his name
revived in an Italian ironclad. In his lifetime he was even more
fortunate. He alone of all Romans was allowed the unprecedented
honour of having a piper to play before him whenever he went out to
dinner, and torches to light him as he returned.

In the later Roman coins the representation of vessels of war
seems to me to evince on the part of the artists a want of interest in
naval matters. The types are either grotesque, as in the coin of 91
B.C., or as in the two last instances (one of B.C. 38 and the other of
the Emperor Hadrian a century and a half later), indistinct, and fail
to convey any instruction as to the build. In fact, if anything, we
seem to have reverted back to a type resembling the old Persian type,
which I have placed side by side for comparison. We may notice also,
that in these later Roman coins we have the sail represented, which is
not, so far as I have observed, ever found in the case of a Greek man-
of-war. In the eyes of a Greek, the -sail was a symbol rather of flight
than of fighting.

We have seen how the invention of the " corvus " paralysed the use
of the ram. It is interesting to notice how the Athenians, in their
distress in the great harbour of Syracuse, where their ramming tactics
were rendered useless by the want of space, and by the Corinthian
build of bow, at once perceived that boarding tactics were the only
alternative left to them by which the victory might possibly be gained.
To this end they devised an " iron hand " or grappling iron attached
to a chain which was to be thrown on board the enemy's vessels and
so make them fast. Against this danger the Syracusans provided, by
covering their decks with greased hides, so that the grappling iron

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 619

slipped off without gaining a hold, llie weight of the corvus as it
fell prevented any such device availing against its utility.

Of the other weapons of offence used in naval warfare the most
important was the " dolphin," a heavy mass of metal, used for the
purpose of sinking an enemy's ship. It was hoisted by means of the
yard-arm, which was swung round over the enemy when he came to
close quarters. Then the weight was suddenly let fall upon his deck,
which it was sufficient to penetrate, even if it did not break right
through the bottom of the ship and sink her. We hear also of great
beams that swinging from the masts were used as rams against the
side, or slung so as to sweep the decks of the foe.

The graphic account given by Caesar of the fight of his fleet with
the Veneti, on the coast of G-aul, introduces us to the Falces, great spars
with curved steel heads like a reaper's sickle, with which the cordage
of the barbarians was cut, and their vessels which were too unwieldy
for rowing thus rendered helpless. In later days we have also the
counterpart of modern artillery, the Siphons, from which the terrible
Greek fire was launched, rocket fashion, against the enemy. Some of
these seem to have been of a very large calibre, others, again, small
enough to be carried by a single man.

The sketch will not be complete unless we mention the Turres,
towers, the " alta propugnacula " of Horace, erected at the bow and
stern, and sometimes, if we are to credit the representations on the
Column of Trajan, amidships. These were much in vogue among the
Romans, to whose tactics they were subservient, giving a vantage height
from which the heavy pilum or javelin could be thrown down upon the
enemy's deck. Agrippa is credited by Servius with an invention by
which these towers could be run up suddenly on coming into action,
and were so adapted for the purpose of taking the enemy by surprise.

We may at this point quit the consideration of the armament of the
ancient man-of-war and pass to the subject of tactics, properly so
called. And first, with regard to the handling of a single vessel, much
in old time, as now, depended on readiness and fertility of resource in
the officers, and especially in the trierarch, or captain. The skill of
the helmsman, the inspiriting voice of the keleustes, the alertness of the
stoicharchs, or captains of the banks of oars, were scarcely less import-
ant ; but above all, upon the training and condition of the oarsmen,
upon the efficiency of the motive power of the vessel, depended the
chances of victory in single combat. It was in the perpetual training
and hardening, under circumstances in which real danger supplied the
motive for energetic action, that the free crews of AthenB and her allies
attained to that excellence which secured to her the sovereignty of
the -<Egean for so many years. It was the want of training and the
refusal to endure hardships that caused the Ionians to be disastrously
defeated by the Persians at the battle of Lade, and delayed their
chances of freedom for fourteen years. The story of Dionysius the
Phocaean is interesting and instructive. There, off the shore of the
island of Lade, now a hill in the flat marshy plain of the Maeander, in
the year 494 B.C., four years before Marathon, was drawn up the com-
bined fleet of the Ionians then in revolt against the great king. They

620 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTJC8.

covered Miletus, their base of operations, and lay facing the north. The
Milesians, with 80 ships, held the right wing, the place of honour, and
next to them the Ohians with 100 ships, each with 40 picked marines on
board. Next were the Lesbians, with 70, then 43 from the various
isles, and last the Samians with 60 on the left. Among the 43 were
3 from Phocsea with Dionysius in command, an energetic and able
man. In the council his voice was heard telling some home truths, that
without practice they could not be perfect, and that with a fleet of 353
sail as against 600 of the enemy, they wanted all the perfection to which
they could attain. His advice prevailed. He was placed in command of
of the combined fleet. Each day he led them out in column, in order to
practice the rowers in manoeuvring for some hours, and for the rest of
the day he kept the vessels at anchor, and would not allow the crews
to land. This last measure, we may here notice, was a most salutary pre-
caution when the enemy were anywhere near at hand, as the crews, when
the vessels were drawn up, were wont to stray away and so to render a
sudden embarcation a scene of the utmost confusion. The neglect of
this precaution was the cause of the utter destruction by Lysander of
the Athenian fleet at uEgospotami, of the final blow that laid the
hopes of Athens in the dust. The Ionians, however, were made of
softer material than their Athenian kinsmen. For seven days they
endured the discipline of Dionysius, but then complaints of fatigue and
sickness became rife, and the insubordination reached such a pitch
that the Admiral was deposed from his command, and the crews had
iheir own way and remained on shore. But a few days afterwards
the Persian fleet of 600 sail appeared. The natural result followed.
Divided counsels had fostered treachery. They hurried out in column
line ahead, and had just time to form up abreast, when the Samians,
all but ten, hoisted their sails and left the line. The rest, with the
exception of the Chians, who fought bravely, and a few others, among
whom was the brave Dionysius, followed their example. Had they
persevered in their training, the events of a few years afterwards
showed that, although outnumbered, they might have been quite a
match for the seamen of the East.

Xenophon, in his short treatise on the Athenian Republic, tells
us that the seafaring habits of the Athenians were such that
every one knew how to handle an oar, and that the crew of a
trireme could be got together with ease at once. In his Hellenics
(Book VI), he gives a graphic account of the stern training to which
the crews were subjected by Iphicrates, the Athenian Admiral, with
a view to getting them into condition, and so increasing the speed
of his ships. He left, he tells us, all his mainsails at home, and
setting the smaller sails (atcaieta) very seldom, used the oar for the
entire voyage. Whenever the fleet was nearing the place selected for
disembarcation for breakfast or dinner, his custom was to put out
further to sea. At a given signal the whole fleet came about and the
vessels raced to shore. The crews of those that arrived first had
choice of ground and water, and were able to get their meals in com-
fort, while the laggards fared but ill. By such devices and by con-
stantly practising the formation of different orders of sailing while on

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 621

his way, he brought his crews to a high state of efficiency without
losing time (which was important) in his voyage to Corcyra. His
diligence and forethought, which are warmly praised by Xenophon,
were rewarded by success.

The skill of the captain of each vessel in the manoeuvres of an
ancient fleet must have been taxed in no ordinary degree. The
number of vessels generally sailing in company rendered the danger
of collision considerable. Attention to signals from the admiral's
flagship was constantly required. The captain was responsible for
everything that occurred in connection with his vessel, and the story
of the unfortunate Scylax, who was lashed to a porthole, with his
head outside and his body inside his vessel, shows that punishment
was sometimes summary as well as severe. ,

The exploit of Artemisia, the famous Halicarnassian Queen, at
Salamis, is a type of the ready daring in handling a vessel which the
Greeks so greatly admired. Hotly pursued out of the rout of
Salamis by an Attic ship, with friends in front of her and enemies
behind, she had the unscrupulous cleverness to run down a Calyndian
vessel belonging to the King's fleet, which sank with all hands. The
Athenian thinking, when he saw the exploit, that he was pursuing one
of his own side, gave up the chase. Xerxes, who witnessed the same,
gave her credit for sinking an enemy's ship, and exclaimed that " the
44 men in his fleet had become women and the women men."

More legitimate was the clever manoeuvre of Phormion's captain
off Naupactus. The last of the eleven ships that had escaped in
the flight from vastly superior forces, he was hotly pressed by a
Leucadian vessel. Seeing, as he approached the roadstead, a mer-
chantman lying at anchor some way out, he made straight for her,
and turning sharply behind and round her, rammed the Leucadian
just as she came up, and sank her, and by this daring exploit, not only
saved the remnants of the Attic squadron, but struck the Lacedae-
monians with such fear that they stopped rowing, and were ignomini-
ously defeated by a force only half their number.

A captain's readiness required to be well seconded by his officers,
and especially by the KvQeprfirj*, or helmsman, who, next to the
captain, was the most important person in the ship. The *vf$€pvrJTri9
was responsible for the navigation of the vessel. He was the navigat-
ing lieutenant as well as steersman. It was requisite that he should
be weather wise as well as waterwise, if one may coin such a word.
The advice of the tcvfiepvyrai seems to have been constantly asked
by the admirals in command. We have instances when it was taken
and proved of the greatest use, as in the case of Ariston, at Syracuse,
who bade the admirals have food brought down to the shore for the
crews at noon, so that they might get their dinners and then embark
suddenly and attack the Athenians, who had returned to their naval
camp thinking that work was over for the day. On the other hand,
it would have been well for the brave Callicratidas, if he had listened
to the advice of Hermon, the Megarian, his rv/Se/j^iJn;?, who realised the
value of the odds at Arginusae, instead of making the gallant rejoinder
44 that Sparta would be no great loser if be died, but that it was base to

622 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

" run away." It was not his personal safety or reputation, but the
proper use of the fleet under his command that was the true issue
upon which his judgment should have been exercised. The neglect of
the advice of experienced Kv$€pvt)7tu was, on another occasion, even
more severely punished, when the Romans, in all the confidence of the
victory of Mylee, had begun to fancy that Italia ruled the waves, and
Marcus JEmilius and Servius Fulvius in the vear 255 B.C., took the sea

• with a magnificent fleet of 364 vessels, defeated the Carthaginians,
and rescued the remains of the ill-fated Army of Regulus. Then,
returning triumphant in the autumn, in defiance of the repeated
expostulations of the KvftepvrjTui they persisted in sailing, though
Orion was already showing his great shoulder above the wave, along
the southern coast of Sicily. The storm fell upon them, and of the
whole fleet, but 80 hulls survived the greatest naval disaster, that the
world has ever seen, when 106,500 men and 151,656 tons measurement
of shipping were at one and the same time sacrificed to blind pre-
sumption and proud ignorance.

Of the tactics of a single vessel in action, when the ram was the
chief weapon of offence, it is necessary to notice, first, the epfioXy or
impact on the enemy's side or quarter, to effect which skilfully and
quickly, was regarded as the acme of success ; next, the vpoefiokr), or
direct attack, stem on, which was thought unseamanlike by the Athe-
nians, but adopted, without hesitation, by the Corinthians. It was also of
great importance that a crew should be able to back water (avatpovftv)
with strength and in time. The diagrams, which face page 535 of the

• volume of the Journal of this Institution for the year 1874, of some
experiments carried on at Cronstadt, by the Russians, with steam
launches, might be taken, mutatis mutandis, as fairly representing
the kind of war-dance that two ancient triremes would execute
around each other in a prolonged effort to ram and not be rammed.
We do not often hear of vessels of the same rate sweeping away each
others banks of oars, for this reason, I suppose, that the projecting
parodus, as shown in the model, afforded a protection to them, owing
to the angle at which they were worked.

We have seen with what rapidity an ancient fleet was constructed,
in the case of the Romans, in the first Punic war. The Greeks, how*
ever, appear to have taken longer to build their vessels, the construc-
tion as well as the repair of which was costly. Upon this point we
have ample details, as regards Athens, but time forbids us to enter
upon it here.

At the end of my last lecture, 1 ventured to describe the fitting-out
aud departure of the fleet of triremes that carried the Athenian ex-
pedition to Syracuse. No mention was then made of the various
smaller craft that accompanied the movements of an ancient fleet.
But, besides the line-of-battle ships, as we may call them, there were
many lighter vessels used as despatch boats, as tenders to the flag-ship,
as pilot and look-out vessels. Such vessels did not keep out of action
when the fleet engaged, but were used to hamper the enemy's oars by
running under his counter, sometimes even to ram him when already
engaged, or to divert his attention in various ways. And when the

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 623

size of the men-of-war had been so greatly increased that failures in
their motive power were more frequent, and more disastrous when
they occurred, the use of the smaller vessels was more and more
fully recognized, till, at the battle of Actium, the light Liburnians
bore away the palm, and the " tall bulwarks of ships " became a thing
of the past to the ancient world.

Foremost in dignity, and generally in size and speed, was the
Admiral's flag-ship, known by its pennant or badge (irapanrifiov). It
carried the vavapx** or Admiral. His second in command was called
ivioioXev*. From the admiral's flag-ship the signals were given and
probably repeated by all the ships of the fleet. These seem to have been
generally made by flags, the red sagum or cloak with the Romans being
hoisted as a signal for action. W hat the principle of their signal-
code was we cannot now discover, but it must have been sufficiently
elaborate, to judge by the indications that we have remaining.

It is interesting to notice that the raising of a shield appears, upon
two or three occasions, to have been employed as a signal, suggestive
of the question whether the flashing of reflected rays may not have
been employed thus early as a means of communication. The
Alcmaeonidae were accused of having, in this way, signalled to the
Persians after Marathon. It was thus that Lysander turned the course
of his fleet for iEgospotami. It was by lifting up a golden shield
that Demetrius Pofiorcetes gave the order to join battle. We have
also an elaborate code of fire-signals, given by Polybius, for use on
land, by the employment of which any word could be spelt out.

An ancient fleet as a rule did not go far from land, and generally
the crews went on shore for meals, and for the night. The vessels
were moored stern to the shore, or drawn up, according as the coast
permitted, Herodotus, speaking of the Persian fleet which conveyed
Datis and Artaphernes to Marathon, naively remarks that they did not
follow the usual straight course along the shore round by the Helles*
pont, but came across the iEgean.

In many instances, very frequently in the Peloponnesian war, the fleets
were accompanied by land forces marching along the shore, and
often when the vessels were driven ashore, the soldiers came
down to the water's edge to rescue a friend or complete an enemy's
disaster. Who that has read it, can ever forget the graphic picture
drawn by Thucydides of the actions at Pylos, when, oy a wonderful
inversion of the natural order of things, Lacedaemonians were fighting
from the sea, which was not their element, against Athenians on
Laconian land, and, when a . few days later, after the defeat of the
Lacedaemonian fleet in the bay, the land forces of the Lacedaemonians
engaged in a naval action from the land, while the Athenians
were land-fighting, as he calls it, from their ships ? Not less
stirring is the account of the gallant rescue of part of Phormion's
fleet by the devoted Messenians of Naupactus, whose love for their
deliverers the Athenians, was increased and quickened by their fierce
hatred of their former masters.

In preparing for action, the chief object was to lighten the
vessel as much as possible. Hence the great sails and masts

624 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

were put on shore, and everything that could be spared aa not
wanted for immediate nse. This practice necessitated the forma-
tion of naval camps as immediate bases of operation. A surprise
and seizure of such depots was frequently the object of a victo-
rious, or even of part of a defeated fleet. Thus, during the battle
of Sybota, the tCorcyr»an left wing defeats the Corinthian right,
pursues it, and burns the camp of the latter, while, all the while,
their own centre and right were being disastrously defeated. Similarly,
after the battle of <£Dgospotami, Cenon, escaping with nine ships, lands
at the headland of Lampsacus, and carries off all the mainsails of the
victorious Lysander. The practice of fighting near the land was not
unattended with danger. Proximity to the shore not unfrequently
damaged the Peloponnesian fleets, the crews of which were more
happy on terra firma than on the less stable element, and were thus
apt to begin backing when they should have been advancing. The
Athenians, as we have seen, preferred mere open water; and the
description of Phormion's manoeuvres, by which he wished to draw
the Lacedaemonian Admiral outside the Straits of Rhium, at the month
of the Corinthian Gulf, is well known to the readers of Thucydides or
Grote.

The orders ef battle adopted by the ancient fleets were, in the
earlier times, extremely simple. The fleet sailed generally in a column
or columns of divisions line ahead (*Vi icipa*). When the enemy was
sighted, these moved into column line abreast, generally in single line
(r<ifi9 or wa/>aTnf«). Fleets composed of an extraordinary number el
vessels were drawn up in several lines abreast; that of Xerxes at
Salamis, for instance, in six. The crescent formation was not unusual
in the case of a superior force, or one that had its wings protected by
the coast. The centre thus refused, the wings could close in and
envelope the enemy. It was in this formation that the Persians sailed
to their first defeat at Artemisium. And in the same, the Lace-
demonian Cnemus, tried, off the Achaean Panormus, to draw into
action the wary Phormion. The circle was also occasionally adopted,
as by the Greeks at Artemisium on the occasion above mentioned,
when, though cooped up in a small space, and face to face at close
quarters with the foe, on the second signal they fell bravely to work,
and before nightfall had taken thirty of the enemy's ships. The
circular formation, however, proved disastrous to the Corinthian
fleet, when, fearing the swift Athenian tactics, they adopted it at the
mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, thinking that by showing a front of
sharp prows on every side, with their five best galleys in the centre
ready to help in any quarter that might be pressed, they would be
impregnable. They had not yet altered their build, or the result
might perhaps have been different. As it happened, that excellent
seaman Phormion, the Cochrane of AthenF, when he saw their for-
mation, at once concluded that they could not remain firm like
infantry on land, which was what they seemed to think possible, but
that after a little, their ships would come into collision one with
another, especially if the breeze, as was usual in the morning, should
spring up and blow from the Gulf. He, therefore, gave orders not to

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 625

attack, but kept his fleet in single line ahead, moving round and
round, ever closer and closer, till he saw them in confusion. The
breeze sprang up with a roughish swell from the eastward, and the
circle was already in trouble, the oars interlaced, the crews shouting,
and all order lost. The moment had arrived, the signal was given,
and the Athenians attacked. The Corinthian Admiral's ship was
sunk at the first onset, the others showed no fight. A few escaped to
Patrffl and Dymce, the rest were crippled or taken in pursuit.

We have in Xenophon a minute account of another formation
adopted by the Athenians at the battle of Arginusaa, which he calls
iirl 0d\a77o«, which we may describe as two columns of divisions in
four lines abreast, each consisting of fifteen ships, with an interval
between the first lines of the two divisions filled by ten ships in
single line abreast. It was in this formation that the Athenians met
the brave Callicratidas, who attacked in single column line abreast.

Ml Mill Mill M II II MM II IMMI Mill MM

MIMMMMMM Mill 1 1 til i it M

IMMMIIMIMI IMMIIMMMM

MIMIMMIIMI MMMMMIMM

Athenian Order of Battle at Arginus*.

One other formation remains to be mentioned, as adopted by the
Romans in the battle of Ecnomus, near Heraclea, in Sicily, which may
be called the wedge (Cuneus) . It is described by Polybius in his first book.
The Soman Admirals Marcus Atilius Begulus and Lucius Manlius sailed
parallel to each other in two Hexeres six-banked galleys. Their fleet fol-
lowed in four divisions, arranged in the following order : — The first and
second divisions in rear of the two flag-ships in single column line
ahead, but so disposed that each ship was in echelon outwards from the
front, thus forming two sides of a triangle, the base of which was
filled up by the third division in column line abreast towing the
transports, and in rear of this, the fourth division in a similar formation
for their protection. They thus hoped to present an unbroken front to
the Carthaginians, their superiors in speed and in power of manoeuvring.
The Carthaginian Hamilcar, to oppose them, having divided his fleet
likewise into four divisions, drew up three of these in line abreast
at right angles to the course of the Roman fleet. The fourth he
disposed enpotence on his left towards the land. His object was not
only to enclose the wedge, but if possible to draw the two first
divisions of the Roman fleet away from the other two, which were
hampered with the transports. To effect this, the Carthaginian centre,
as soon as the enemy approached, turned in pretended flight and was
hotly pursued by the Romans. As soon as Hamilcar judged that the two
sides of the wedge were drawn sufficiently far away from its base, at
a given signal, the Carthaginians turned fiercely on their pursuers.

vol. xx. 2 T

626

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

2nd Position, Caethaointan Centbe.
1.7+ shifts

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f

RlgfTDIVJSI0N#&7SHlPS^f

•7

XI64- SHIPS]
2" POSITION
ROMAN WIDCE

CENTRE DIVISIONS , v
SHIPS) (87 SHBPS)

ION OP CARTHA

C".' POSITION
3« DIVISION

CKNIANS

i i I f

e*» p6smoN

4-Tm DIVISION

IV POSITION^

3'.* DIVISION(ee SHIPS}

1 1 1 , ,\l '

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ae TRANSPORTS

BATTLE Of ECNOMUS

BETWEEN ROMANS & C^RTHACINANS B.C. 256,

14.*." OIVISION(02 SHIPS)

OF ROMANS

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 627

They found, however, that the wedge formation was still unbroken in
pursuit, so far as the two sides were concerned, and that it was, as the
Roman Admirals had judged, admirably suited for defence, each
vessel facing outward with her next neighbour, ready to assist her if
rammed or in any other trouble. Still, if Hamilcar's orders had been
obeyed by the commanders of his first and fourth divisions, and these
had turned upon the open rear of the Roman wedge now separated
from its base, the victory was assured. These, however, seeing the
third and fourth divisions with the transports, and thinking to have
an easy victory, engaged with them respectively. Thus three naval
actions were going on at one time, in which not less than 680 ships-of-
war were taking part. In the end, the Romans were victorious, the
terrible " corvus " showing itself still, as before, soperior to the ram.
The Carthaginian defeat has its lessons for commanders of divisions
or detached squadrons, and its moral is, " Obey orders." The wedge
formation in echelon has something in common with the peloton forma-
tion of modern days.

Such were the various orders of battle, so far as I have been able to
discover them, but these by themselves do not exhaust the subject of
the tactics of a fleet. For the purpose of attack with the ram two
manoeuvres were commonly employed, named respectively diecplus and
periplus. In the diecplus, which accurately rendered, means " the
" sailing out through,'* the vessels of the attacking fleet passed through
the intervals of an enemy's line, doing what damage was possible by
sweeping off oars, and by a fire of missiles en passant, and then turning
with all speed sought to ram the enemy before he could come com-
pletely about. In the periplus, a portion of the attacking fleet sheered
out of line, and sought to wheel in succession on to the flank of the
foe. But for this manoeuvre open water was necessary. In a land-
locked bay or harbour, such as that of . Syracuse, it could not be
employed. Against the diecplus, the practice of sailing in double or
triple, or even quadruple lines, was employed, but there was great
danger in such formation unless the crews were most perfectly trained,
first, because the increase of depth naturally contracted the front, and
so laid the fleet open to flank-attacks; and secondly and chiefly,
because, as happened to the Persians at Salami*, the second line was
apt to encroach upon the first, and the third upon the second, and the
difficulty was increased tenfold if the leading line retired in disorder
on the second while it was advancing. In fact, for the success of any
such combination, the most perfect discipline and silence on the part
of the crew was absolutely necessary. The history of the changes in
ancient naval tactics is sufficiently well defined. It would not be
difficult to trace their development and decline from Dionysius the
Phocoean to Vipsanius Agrippa, from Lade to Actium. But time fails
us, and I would fain ere I conclude speak briefly of the causes which
contributed to the decline of the ancient marine.

To ourselves, who are familiar with the all-potent steam, slave of
the wheel or the screw, it might at first sight seem immaterial
whether the crews, which were the motive power of the ancient man-
of-war, were bond or free, so long as they had the requisite strength

2 t 2

628 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

and training. But as with the Venetians in later days, so with the
ancients, the employment of slave labour at the oar tended both
directly and indirectly to impair the efficiency of the naval service.
There were, however, many causes that led to the practice of employ-
ing forced labour. First, the absolute discomfort of the crew in a
Cataphract ship must have been extreme. In a hot climate, with but
very little ventilation, it must have been exceedingly trying to take
part in a laborious mechanical toil with perhaps some hundred or two
of human beings stark naked, and packed so closely that there was
not room, as Cicero says, for even one man more. The heat, the
smells, the toil, must have been terrible ; to any one undergoing it
against his will so terrible as to suggest that even death itself were
better than such drudgery. A dull dead feeling of despair must have
crept over many a crew in such a case, and though the lash might
keep them going under ordinary circumstances, such spirits could not
be relied upon in times of emergency.

In proportion as the size of the vessel was enlarged, so the number
of the crew was increased, and we have seen that it is probable that
in the larger vessels, the ordinary space allowed per man for the rowers
was reduced from 8 to 7 square feet. The conditions of the service
were therefore rendered worse and not better by the advance in naval
architecture.

Besides the question of discomfort, the actual danger -was very
great. The crews were liable at any moment to be drowned or burnt,
or in the case of defeat, butchered by the victors, perhaps, as at Sybota,
deliberately in cold blood. Conceive the moment of conflict and its
horrors, when the sharp- pointed beak came crashing through the
timbers, smashing them right and left along with the helpless mass of
human beings, while the water followed swift upon the blow,
perhaps just giving time to the Thranites to swarm up upon the deck,
while the helpless Thalamites were drowned at once.

It is not to be wondered at that such a service should become un-
popular, and that in the deficiency of free labour, which became all
the more costly as the conditions under which it was to be employed
became less inviting, recourse should have been had to slaves. Hence,
perhaps the glory of the trireme has been greater than that of the
larger vessels that superseded it, for the great feats which it per-
formed were wrought by the hands of free men fighting for their
country or its allies, or else voluntarily giving their services for pay.
At the time of the Peloponnesian war the pay of an ordinary oars-
man, I may mention here, was three obols a day, increased towards
the end or the war to four obols, or a little more than sixpence of
our money. The pay of the Thranites was higher, their services
being valued at a drachm, or about ninepence per diem. Raising the
pay of seamen was a favourite expedient during hostilities, with a
view to crippling the resources of the enemy, by inducing his crews to
desert, a practice not without its parallel in modern times. For no
purpose was Persian gold more greedily sought after, except perhaps
for bribing the chiefs themselves.

The Komans manned their fleets by levies from the lowest orders,

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 926

and by forced service of their allies. Still, the greater proportion of
the labour employed by them was that of slaves, contributed by free
men as substitutes, and it is this fact which perhaps explains the
equanimity with which they endured the huge waste of human life
which their fleets involved. Hence among the Romans the service on
board ship was most unpopular, and we are not surprised to find in
the pages of Tacitus the discontent of the Classiarii recorded, who
wished to be transferred to a more honourable calling " in spem hono-
ratioris militia." They felt they were despised by their brethren of the
legions, and wished to quit a service which herded them with slaves
and offered them danger without hope of distinction. Such were some
of the influences which led to the decay of the ancient navies, and at
the same time to the obscurity in which the details concerning them
are involved. As a rule, the historians (who take endless pains in
minutely narrating military operations, for I must except Polybius
and Cffisar) pass over naval affairs with but slight notice, or at the
best give slight sketches of such matters in general terms.

It remains for us to institute a short comparison between ancient
and modern fleets as regards their tonnage and manning. In this I
rely upon the calculations of Graser, for I have not yet had time to
work them out for myself. He compares the Attic fleet of the year
330 B c. with the Russian fleet in the Crimea in the year 1854. The
tonnage of this he gives at 72,000 tons ; tbe Attic fleet, consisting of
411 vessels, he computes at 98,085 tons. During the next five years
the Attic fleet had been increased to 103,577 tons measurement. The
present tonnage of the British navy is, I believe, about 300,000 tons,
of the French about 200,000 tons in round numbers. The fleet of
Xerxes, which we are assured on good authority consisted of 1,207
triremes, must have had, upon Grafter's basis, 280,627 tons measure-
ment. The great fleet of the Romans at Ecnomus, consisting of 364
quinqueremes, represent* shipping to the extent of 193,376 tons.
These numbers may not be exactly accurate, but they assist us to
realise the vast scale upon which these ancient navies were constructed,
and forbid us to underrate them.

The multitude of men employed exceeds by far that of modern
times. The crews of Xerxes' fleet all told, are estimated at upwards
of 340,000 men. The Attic navy of the time of Demosthenes required
upwards of 90,000 men for its service. The Roman fleets in the first
Punic war carried in some instances nearly 120,000 men.

The thought of the employment of these vast forces can hardly fail
to bring home to us the awful conditions of ancient naval service.
What a terrible sight must have been tUat storm to which I have
already alluded, when the coast of Sicily for miles was strewed with the
bodies of the dead and with the fragments of the perished fleet ! What
a spectacle, again, must have been that great Battle of Ecnomus, when
from the Sicilian coast might have been seen those two great fleets,
the mighty Roman wedge and the long bent line of the Carthaginians,
approaching each other for a struggle to the death. No wreaths of
smoke obscured the prospect : the fight with all its pitiless carnage was
open to view, and far, we may believe it, over that quiet summer-sea

630 ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS.

re-echoed the thundering crash of the ram, the heavy rattling fall of
the corvus, the shouts of fury, and the shrieks of pain.

Come with me now, in thought, for a few minutes more. Let us
stand, in spirit, upon the beach of the great harbour of Syracuse, and
see the fate of that great fleet, the departure of which, amidst all the
enthusiasm of popular exultation, we witnessed but a short time ago.
The scene is now far different. There is no gladness, but sadness
everywhere. The reinforcements have come, but tjfcie fleet reinforced
has been beaten. Athens no longer can claim supremacy on the
sea. Her tactics are useless in this close land-locked bay. Worse
still, the very mouth of the bay is closed by the enemy; there is
no escape. Only a narrow strip of shore, where the naval camp
is standing, can be called our own ; the rest is in the hands of the
enemy.

" Truly we came to beleaguer yon city, whose circle of walls is still
unbroken, but are now ourselves beleagured — besieged rather than
besiegers. The months have been months of misadventure and mis-
take, and of labour in vain. All has deteriorated, men and material
alike — our ships are heavy, their timbers are sodden — our hearts are
heavy, and our strength is failing. One more desperate attempt must
be made. We must change our tactics. Grappling-irons must be
used, archers and slingers must crowd our decks. Our old seamanship
is gone ; our pride, it is now of no avail. Here come the chiefs —
not Lamachus. No ; he i^ at rest up yonder, on the hill. He sleeps
in a soldier's, not a sailor's grave. No ! nor Alcibiades. Where is
he ? Who knows f Perhaps at Sparta, plotting against his country ;
perhaps in Asia, intriguing with the Persian. Why did they not
try him before we started? His youth and cleverness might have
been of good service ere now to us. But he is gone ; he is a traitor ;
why talk more about him ? Nicias is here, the only one of the
original three, and the good omen clean taken out of his name. How
pale and wasted he looks, scarce dragging his limbs along for pain.
Verily, if the Athenians had taken his advice, and recalled him, they
would have done well. And with him is Demosthenes, a famous
captain, the best of our time. Why send him out too late ? Why
send him out at all, unless with full powers to do what his experience
dictates ? As it is, he is crippled by Nicias, well meaning man,
with his superstitions, and false hopes, and dangerous intercourse
with Syracusan traitors, who make him their dupe." Such are the
muimurings that we overhear, but now the necessity for action
silences complaints. The ships are manned, the chiefs address their
captains, the captains their crews. They speak with all encourage-
ment ; they tell them of home and country to be seen once more, if
they win the day; they tell them of the honour of Athens to be
maintained. Let us stand aside and see the battle. The fleets are
nearing each other. Part of the Athenians are detached to break the
barriers that close the harbour mouth. With that the action com-
mences— a fight unparalleled, where, in a narrow space, less than a
mile broad, 200 vessels are crowded together in mortal conflict. At
\rst, the Athenians almost succeed in loosing the barrier, but the

ANCIENT NAVAL TACTICS. 631

Syracusan detachment there is reinforced, and the fight becomes
general over the whole harbour. The straggle is long and intense,
crews and helmsmen and troops alike vying with each other in doing
their best. The land forces of either side, drawn up on the shore,
are in agonies, at one time shouting for joy, at another time groan-
ing with despair, as they witness the victory or defeat of their friends :
swaying their bodies to and fro in frantic excitement, following,
by gesticulations, the movements of the combatants. At last the
fatal moment comes. The Athenians can hold out no longer; they
turn and fly towards their camp, pursued brilliantly by the Syracu-
sans, with shouts of triumph. The two great hulks, with the dolphins
suspended over the entrance to their naval stockade, protect some of
their ships — the rest are run on shore. All is now over. Demos-
thenes would fain, with picked crews, make one more attempt to
break out, but the men are cowed, their spirit is broken, and they refuse
to go on board. Nothing remains but a retreat by land, and so, on
the third day, leaving the dead unburied and the wounded uncared
for, burning some ships, and leaving the rest to fall into the enemy's
hands, the remnants of the Athenian force, numbering still 40,000
men, start on their hopeless march, to end in death or slavery.

Sad is the story of broken pride and humbled ambition, but its
lessons are wholesome and instructive, and the conduct of Athens,
in her humiliation, still unyielding, still courageous, sheds a lustre
on the dark days of her calamity. Truly, in virtue of this noble spirit,
she had a brighter life in store for her in after time, brighter than
that which the selfishness of commercial Carthage either deserved or
obtained.

LECTUEE.

Friday, May 19, 1876.

Gbnbbal Sir WILLIAM CODRINGTON, G.C.R., Vice-President*

in the Chair.

THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIE-
TIES FOR AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS
IN WAR.

By John Furley, Esq.

Mobs than once I have been requested to address a public audience
on the subject chosen for to-day ; but I have hitherto declined to do
so, feeling that it might be considered presumptuous in me to offer
suggestions on a matter which is more particularly within the pro-
vince of members of the military and medical professions, or more
properly still, perhaps, of persons possessing a combination of qualities
which belong to both. But I have waited in vain for somebody more
fitted than myself to undertake this duty, and I now ask for every
indulgence, whilst I endeavour in the brief time allowed me to draw
attention to the Convention of Geneva, as well as to what the National
Societies for Aid to Sick and Wounded Soldiers in War have already
accomplished, and what will be expected of them in the event of
another war.

Although anxious to avoid obtruding my own individuality as little
as possible, I shall not be misunderstood when I say, that nothing
but my own personal experience on the subject I am about to discuss,
gives me any right to appear here to day. This experience dates
from the Schleswig-Holstoin war in 1864, when I first learnt to
appreciate the value of volunteer assistance in military hospitals;
and it was greatly extended during the Franco-German war. Sub-
sequently, I was attached to the Army of Marshal MacMahon during
the war of the Commune; and more recently I have served with
Spanish ambulances both in the Army of the Government of Madrid,
and in that of Don Carlos.

And here let me anticipate any expression of opinion that Red

Cross Societies ought to hold aloof from civil war and rebellion. It

is undoubtedly right that the national societies of countries not im-

nediately affected by a civil war should abstain from any active in-

THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, ETC. 633

terference in it : bat it is quite otherwise with those principally con-
cerned, as the French Societe de Sccours anx blesses militaires during
the Commune, and the Spanish Society in the Carlist war ; especially
when, as in the former, the insurgents were practically acknowledged
as belligerents by M. Thiers, and in the latter when the Alphonsists
and Carlists mutually treated each other as on an equal footing. No
person who was a daily witness of the awful horrors of the Paris
Commune, or who has served as an ambulance volunteer on battle-
fields in the north of Spain will be inclined to assert that wounded
Communists and Carlists had no right to any sympathy. Humanity
protests against such a conclusion. To their honour be it recorded
that some of the most prominent members of the French Societe* de
Secours remained at their posts in Paris throughout the whole period
of the Commune, and relieved the sufferings of hundreds of Com-
munists, whilst their, colleagues were at Versailles, engaged in the
same manner amongst the soldiers of the Government and the
wounded prisoners who fell into their hands. And so with regard to
Spain, the Red Cross Society of Madrid and the members of the
Garidad (a Carlist society, of which the Dona Margarita was the
President) made no difference between friends and foes.

It is quite unnecessary to recapitulate the history of the Convention of
Geneva. An attempt to do so would almost involve a history of war
itself. It had long been ackowledged that no Army ever possessed
medical and sanitary means equal to the exigencies of a great campaign;
and this feeling culminated in the splendid voluntary efforts which were
made to relieve the sick and wounded soldiers during the Crimean war,
and in the war between the Northern and Southern States of America.
Notwithstanding the universal conviction as to the insufficiency of all
official means for carrying off wounded men from the field, applying
temporary relief and subsequent attendance in the hospitals, no-
attempt was made to obtain the opinion of the civilised nations of the
world as to the best manner in which to meet this great want, until
the year 1863, when the first Conference was held at Geneva. From
this meeting emanated the Convention which was adopted on the
22nd August in the following year.

But even were it necessary to remind my audience of the various
circumstances which gradually led to the Congress at Geneva, when
that Convention was framed which less than a year afterwards was
accepted by nearly all the States of Europe, I should have good reason
for hesitating to do so.

In 1866, from the place I have now the honour to occupy, Deputy
Inspector- General Longmore, C.B., Professor of Military Surgery at
the Army Medical School, at Netley, described, in language and with
an authority to which I cannot pretend, the development of that idea
which found expression at the International Conferences held at
Geneva in 1863 and 1864. * At Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and elsewhere,
during the last ten years, I have assisted at the official meetings at
which the Convention has been discussed, modified, and extended ; and
I am glad to have this occasion to bear testimony in presence of my
1 See Journal of the Institution, vol. x, p. 182, ei stq*

634 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

own countrymen to the important influence which Mr. Longmore has
exercised upon the deliberations of those who have borne forward and
marched under the Red Cross Flag* I can personally testify to the
fact that there is not in Europe an army hospital establishment* or a
society for the relief of sick and wounded soldiers in which the valuable
assistance rendered by Professor Longmore is not acknowledged ; and
there is not one in which his professional brethren and all those
who, like myself, have had the honour to be associated with him, do
not admit he is one of the very few representatives of different nation-
alities who thoroughly understand the Convention of Geneva in all its
bearings, both civil and military, and under whose cautious guidance
the humanitarian theories which were advocated at Geneva, have
become accomplished facts. I am quite aware that this mention of
his name would not be in harmony with the characteristic modesty
which so distinguishes the gentleman of whom I am speaking ; but
as one of the rank and file of the Red Cross army, I could not forego
this opportunity of paying a humble tribute to one of the worthiest,
most conscientious, and most honourable of our chiefs.

Has the Convention of Geneva succeeded in accomplishing that
which its promoters expected of it ? It may be unhesitatingly affirmed
that it has done so. In some respects, perhaps, it has partially failed
in its objects, whilst in others, those who without authority, have
adopted it, have gone far beyond the limits which this international
agreement was intended to define : but on the whole the opinion of
the civilized world has prevailed, hundreds of lives have been saved,
and comfort and consolation have been brought to wounded and dying
men by the intervention, not only of accredited volunteers, but of
irregular helpers, who have boldly taken possession of an agreement
that was never designed to give them the benefits of neutrality in
war, however benevolent their intentions might be.

The good effects of the first Conference held at Geneva were im-
mediately made evident in the Sohleswig-Holstein campaign. In
February, 1864, nearly six months before the King of Prussia signed
the Convention, a society was formed at Berlin, and an appeal was
made to the nation on behalf of the sick and wounded soldiers. This
undoubtedly contributed to the success of the second Congress held
in the same year..

The Convention was tried cautiously, and on a comparatively
small scale during the short campaign in Bohemia in 1866, but this
could not be considered a decisive trial, as Austria had not then signed
the Treaty. The Prussian Red Cross Society, however, gave good
proof of its labours during the two years that had elapsed since its
formation. On the day the battle of Langensalza was fought, in
response to a telegram stating that there were 1,500 wounded men
lying on the field in want of the simplest necessaries, three special
trains laden with surgical aid and hospital material, left Berlin at
midnight. The work then performed by the Prussian Society was
sanctioned by the Government, and its agents in the field were under
military control.

But although such societies had been established in several countries,

FOR AID TO BICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 635

with the approval of their respective Governments, it was not until
the year 1870 that the Red Cross assumed a position that had never
been contemplated even by its most sanguine adherents.

At the very commencement of the war, France and Germany were
covered with a network of aid committees. This contagious benevo-
lence spread to other countries, which, though remaining at peace,
determined to do their share towards the relief of the sufferers in
a war that was evident would soon count its victims by -thousands.
Everybody talked of and worked for the Red Cross. Funds were
liberally subscribed ; immense dep6ts of gifts in kind were formed, and
rich and poor contributed their pence, their pounds, and the work of
their own hands to this novel undertaking, which appealed so irresis-
tibly to the genuine sympathies of all. In a word, one great inter-
national impulse seized upon the Convention of Geneva, and gave to'
its articles the meaning which best satisfied humanity.

It was not only in France and Germany that volunteer societies,
for the relief of the victims of the war, entered on the campaign
simultaneously with the combatant troops which were marching
towards the Rhine. Volunteers from almost every State in Europe
which possessed a Red Cross Society, at once enrolled themselves
under the new flag, and appealed to their compatriots for material
assistance. Belgian, Dutch, and Swiss doctors, nurses, and ambulance
helpers immediately appeared on the field, and others soon followed.

When the rival Armies of France and Germany first came into
collision, in the month of July, 1870, England had no such Society ;
but in the first week of August we had one, with a fund which was
rapidly assuming large proportions, and a numerous band of volun-
teers, in presence of whom the only difficulty was one of selection.

The circumstances connected with the establishment of the British
National Society for Aid to Sick and Wounded in War, are so well
known that it is unnecessary I should trace its origin or describe all
that it accomplished in 1870-1. But I may be allowed to recall
certain facts, a f orgetf ulness of which has encouraged the belief that
the British Society was formed only for the Franco-German war, and
that it will remain in abeyance until another international war shall
again call it into a state of activity.

At the first public meeting of the Society, held at Willis's Rooms,
on the 4th of August, 1870, it was resolved, " That persons be ad-
mitted as Members of the Society on payment of £5 donation, or 5*.
annual subscription. n At the same meeting the two following resolu-
tions were also adopted : — " That a Central Committee of 21 Members
be appointed to assist in carrying out the objects of the Society.
That the said Committee be annually elected, by rules similar to
those of the National Rifle Association. That Sub- Committees of the
Society be established in various parts of the country, and that these
Sub- Committees regulate their own subscriptions, manage their own
affairs, defray their own expenses, and transmit to the Central Com-
mittee such contributions as they are able to collect, and such material
as may be suggested from time to time by the Central Committee."

Now, these resolutions were framed with the intention of making

636 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

the Society a permanent institution in this country, on the broadest
possible basis.

It is not perhaps surprising that, when the war was concluded
which had brought the Society into existence, and which had taxed to
the utmost the strength and energy of the London Committee and ail
who had been actively employed as its agents, these resolutions were
forgotten, and those who had laboured under the able direction of
Lieutenant- Colonel Loyd-Lindsay, #.C, M.P. — whose name will ever
be honourably associated with the grand effort which England then
made in the cause of humanity — were only too glad to furl their banner
and return to those avocations from which they had been drawn.

No one will, I think, venture to predict that wars have for ever
ceased, or even, looking towards the eastern horizon, that we have
entered upon a long period of peace. Whether in any future war we
may be engaged as principals or spectators, the moment it breaks out,
attention will naturally tarn towards the British National Aid Society,
and much will be expected of it. Undoubtedly the call will meet with a
generous response ; but the same lenient criticism that was accorded to
the work in 1870 must not be expected. At the outbreak of the Franco-
German war, as I have already remarked, there was no British National
Aid Society, but the sympathy of the nation made the formation of one
a comparatively easy task. Volunteers, money, and gifts in kind were
speedily dispatched to the seat of war. The result was grand, but
such an experiment can never be repeated.

I make this assertion advisedly, and after the most careful con-
sideration. What an English society might do in supplementing the
work of our military medical establishment, in time of war, and what
it will be allowed to do, in the same capacity, for foreign Armies, are
two different matters. But they are questions that must be settled, if
the Society is to be a permanent and an useful institution.

The Crimean war afforded an example of what English men and
women will do for their own soldiers ; and British energy and philan-
thropy will, I trust, always be equal to even greater trials than that
was. But the Crimean war brought home to us all two facts of which
the promoters of the Convention of Geneva did not fail to make use :
namely, that no Army can possess in itself a hospital establishment
and sanitary means equal to the emergencies of a sanguinary cam-
paign, and that no satisfactory supplement to it can be extemporized
at a moment's notice. All that individual devotion and public gene-
rosity could accomplish for our sick and wounded soldiers was
witnessed in 1855-6. And if the necessity should unfortunately
again arise, this would be repeated. But " para bellum " is a good
motto, even when applied to military hospitals and Red Cross societies.

What I have just said refers more especially to the relations which

have existed, and which may again be created, between volunteer

hospital helpers and our own Army. This is the easiest part of the

question to which a solution is required. But the Convention of

teneva affords the benefit of reciprocal neutrality to all non-com-

>atants who may be, serving in the hospitals of belligerent Armies.

>uch persons are now distinguished by an armlet, with a red cross on

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAS. 637

a white ground, which is generally believed to be given to them under
the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to which they
are officially attached, but which, in 1870, were manufactured and
distributed in the most indiscriminate manner. I need say no more
as to the way in which this Article of the Convention was treated in
1870, only now remarking that, whether it be for our own Army or
for that of a foreign State, it is quite impossible properly to comply
with this or any other of the provisions of the Convention of Geneva
at the outbreak of wars carried on as rapidly as they now are, unless
all the preliminary arrangements have been settled in time of peace.

1 have already spoken of the general ignorance that prevails as to
the Articles of the Geneva Treaty. Fortunately, this was of little
consequence during the Franco-German war, and the fullest latitude
was allowed to those who were attending to the sick and wounded
on the field, and in the numerous hospitals which were scattered
over France. An agent of the British Society determined to accom-
plish his mission could go almost where he pleased, without meeting
with any obstacle sufficiently serious to stop him. German sentries
or French franc-tireurs might cause delays, or a siege might compel
him to alter his course ; but in other respects his liberty of action was
almost complete.

But this freedom must not be entirely attributed to the benevolent
consideration which Generals and Commanding Officers are willing to
bestow on all persons engaged in hospital work. As was said by the
late Dr. Lceffler, Surgeon-General in the Prussian Army, " la tactique
" prime la philanthropic ; " and as long as there are wars, so long
will humanity suffer from countless concomitant evils. Unless
Generals are in a position which permits them to be generous, they
must not be expected to bestow much thought on any but combatant
followers. Hence it is necessary that every branch of an Army should
be an integral part of the whole ; and even a volunteer ambulance should
be under strictly military discipline, and attached to a division or
brigade.

But the Franco- German war, from which the best experience of
the working of the Convention of Geneva and the Red Cross Societies
can be drawn, was altogether an exceptional campaign, and this not
bo much on account of its magnitude as by reason of the one-sided
character of its principal results. Even the most sanguine anticipa-
tions of the conquerors were surpassed by the first engagements, and
situations were created which had never been foreseen by the advocates
of the Geneva Treaty.' The framers of this international agreement
had not imagined, that in the event of a war almost all the States of
Europe would send delegates to the relief of the victims. There is
not a single paragraph in the Convention, or in the Articles which were
subsequently added to it, which refers in any way to the presence with
belligerent armies of a body of volunteer helpers from neutral States
with stores intended for use in field-ambulances and stationary
hospitals. The peculiar character of the Franco-German war made
the introduction of this novel element comparatively easy ; and, look-
ing at the results, it would be hypercritical now to examine too severely

638 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL 80CIETIE8

the free and easy manner in which the objects of the subscribers to
the various Bed Cross Societies were accomplished. One of the
belligerents was so completely overmatched by the other, that the
latter could afford to allow considerable liberty of action to those who
had come with vast stores to aid in relieving the thousands of victims
who were scattered over the country from the Rhine to the Loire and
the Seine.' No donbt the German head-quarter staff would have pre-
f erred the materiel without the persownel ; but as these could not be
separated, they accepted the arrangement which was imposed upon
them, and regarded with considerable indulgence the " eccentricities1
" of this new feature of modern warfare."

As far as possible complete impartiality was observed by the con-
querors in the treatment of the sick and wounded of both armies ;
but it must be borne in mind that, owing to the course of the war,
almost the whole of the neutral assistance was absorbed by the
Germans. A separate and exact partition between the belligerents
was impracticable after th© first few weeks of the campaign, and no
share intended exclusively for the French hospitals, with the remark,
able exception of the 20,000/. carried into Paris by Lieutenant- Colonel
Loyd-Lindsay9 could reach them, as they were completely blockaded
on all sides except towards the south.

The greater part of the share of assistance intended by volunteer
societies for France found its objects in the hundreds of wounded
prisoners who were left amongst the Germans. Both sides enjoyed
the benefit of extraneous aid, and it is impossible to calculate the
n amber of lives saved by this means. But those who were shut up in
towns which were besieged could not derive any of the assistance from
without. This isolation in some places was of short duration ; in
Belfort and Strasbourg it was for a longer period, whilst in Metz it
lasted rather more than two months, and in Paris for five months.

Nothing better exemplifies the status of volunteer ambulances from
neutral States during the Franco-German war than that of the
Dutch Society, which was under the direction of M. Van de Velde.

This gentleman, accompanied by four or five surgeons, a secretary,
and one or two other persons, arrived at Versailles about the 12th
September, 1870. At this time the Red Cross Committee of that town,
of which M. Horace Delaroche was president, had established a hospital
of 105 beds in one of the numerous wings of the palace. The whole
establishment was immediately offered to M. Van de Velde, as it was
evident that Versailles was abont to become the head-quarters of a
German army-corps, and it would be useful to have a hospital there
under the protection of citizens of a neutral State. There were then
six wounded men and nineteen cases of typhus, all Frenchmen, in the
hospital. A few hours later there was fighting in the neighbourhood
of Versailles, and M. Van de Velde and some of his staff went out iii
the direction of the firing. On their return in the afternoon they

1 Inspecteur-G6neral Dr. Chenu, at the Conference held at Geneva in 1863, said,
in reference to the employment of volunteer hospital assistants, " L'Amtirique seule
1 peut m permcttre de telles excentricittis." Since that time no person has worked
nore zealously than he has done with volunteers under the Bed Cross flag.

FOR AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 639

found that Versailles had capitulated, and the chief of the Prussian
medical staff of the 3rd Army Corps, Dr. Kirchner, had taken possession
of the chateau, including the Dutch amhulance, and was then estab-
lishing a large German hospital. The twenty-five sick and wounded
Frenchmen actually in the chateau were removed to other houses in
the town, and the acting personnel were requested to obey the new
chief. M. Van de Velde contended that this was a violation of the
Convention of Geneva ; but he was answered by a reference to the
explicit instructions laid down for the sanitary service of the Prussian
Army ; according to which, voluntary aid to the sick and wounded
cannot be independent of the Army, but it must be incorporated with
the organisation established by the Government, and directed by its
Officers in order to avoid any interference with official action.

I repeat that no Article in the Convention of Geneva refers even
remotely to the supplies of neutral volunteer societies. However,
this was not the belief in 1870, and I can best illustrate some of the
difficulties which arose by the following example which occurs to me.

Paris was closely invested. Nothing was allowed to be sent in for
the use of the hospitals, and it may be said that nothing was absolutely
wanting in them. A convoy of goods intended for the depdt of the
English Society at Versailles, and under the command of Mr. Thomas
was stopped at Vernon, and only such articles as were evidently
for hospital use were allowed to be taken on. Food, and there were
many cases of biscuits, was absolutely prohibited. This was in-
dignantly pronounced to be a contravention of the Convention of
Geneva. But even supposing it had been so, I think it would not
have been surprising if persons who, perhaps, had never even read
that document, had regarded such a cargo with suspicion, and had
argued that if their enemy prevented anything from entering Paris,
they had a perfect right to do their best to blockade the head-quarters
of that enemy. *

Let me offer another illustration which will still further exemplify
my meaning. We all remember what heroic efforts were made,
especially by the women of England, for the relief of the sick and
wounded soldiers in the Crimea. Red Cross Societies had not then
been established ; but supposing they had been in existence, is it likely
that the English and French besiegers would have allowed hospital
supplies to have passed through their lines into Sebastopol, or would
their enemy have permitted similar stores to have been sent over
Russian territory to the hospitals of the allied armies ? I think not,
and yet this was the sort of benevolence which in 1870 it was imagined
would be tolerated under the Bed Cross Flag.

Notice of bombardment is, or should be, always given to the in-
habitants of a town before any shots are fired into it, in order to
allow time for the departure of non-combatants, and aged and sick
persons. But when once a siege has been commenced, in the interests
of humanity it is not desirable that this should be prolonged by any
sentimental considerations.

Thus far 1 have endeavoured briefly to call to mind the origin of
the Convention of Geneva, and the manner in which the Bed Cross

640 THE CONVENTION OP GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

Flag first gained a position on the battle-field. I have also described
how this treaty, which was only intended to cover sick and wounded
soldiers and the personnel and materiel of military ambulances and
hospitals in time of war, was invoked in 1870 for the protection o£
independent volunteer helpers and stores from neutral States.

I propose now to devote a short time to these two important
questions.

lstly. Can the Convention of Geneva be maintained in its present
form, or is it desirable that it should be modified or extended ?

2ndly. How can the British National Aid Society be so employed
in time of peace as to be in a fit state to supplement the hospital
service of tne British Army if called upon to do so in time of war ?

Now, however much this celebrated Treaty of Geneva may be open
to criticism, I do not think that any assembly in the civilised world
would vote for its abrogation. The treaty itself is clear and distinct ;
and almost all the mistakes which have been committed under its
asswmed sanction have arisen from ignorance of its Articles, and the
pardonable zeal of persons who have adopted the spirit of that inter-
national agreement rather than the letter.

Few persons have read this document ; and the vague notions which
exist sb to the general meaning of the treaty were still further con-
fused by the irregularities which were permitted to "benevolent
neutrals " during the Franco-German war.

Whatever may have been suggested before or since the adoption of
the Convention of Geneva, the first words of the first Article in it
expressly define the limits to which this agreement was intended to be
confined. They are as follows : — " Military ambulances and hospitals

* shall be acknowledged to be neutral, and, as such, shall be protected

* and respected by belligerents, Ac." As was said by Professor
Longmore in 1867, and repeated by him in this theatre in 1872,1

4 The treaty only comprehended the military ambulances and hos-
i pitals of the belligerents, the staff employed in attending the sick
' and wounded contained in them, and the materials necessary for
' their proper treatment. Its articles did not provide for any

* volunteer or independent staff of hospital assistants ; and such
4 persons could only participate in the provisions of the Treaty by
' being regularly admitted into the hospital service, and forming for
4 the time being part of the military establishments of the armies
( engaged, and thus becoming subject to the ordinary rules and

* articles of war. These latter would then come within the provisions
4 of the treaty, because then they would be comprised in the personnel

* of the military hospitals, as laid down in the second article of the

* treaty." At the Congress of 1864, it was unanimously determined
by the official delegates then present, to exclude from the text of the
convention that part of the circular note which had been sent by
Switzerland to the Governments of all civilized countries, which sug-
gested the neutralization of voluntary hospital assistants recruited by
aid committees, and to confine the neutralization to the official sanitary
personnel of the hospitals of the belligerents.

1 See Journal, vol. xvi, p. 206, «t seq.

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IK WAR. 641

Enough has been said to prove the manner in which the agreement
was infringed during the Franco-German war. If no personal assist-
ance had been given to the hospitals of the belligerents by the societies
of neutral States, there would have been little necessity for any re-
consideration of the Treaty of Geneva. This document is sufficiently
•explicit for all the purposes for which it was intended, namely, the
neutralization of military hospitals and ambulances in time of war.
But a precedent was set, which, though attended with excellent results
from a humanitarian point of view, only escaped introducing a most
serious international complication by the force of circumstances, which
were exceptionally favourable to the philanthropic experiment which
was then made. Such an occasion might be repeated; but I, for
one, cannot believe it will arise.

A flood-gate has been opened which can never again be closed ; and
I feel no hesitation in asserting, that the Convention of Geneva cannot
be maintained in its present form, unless the position, in time of war,
of the volunteer personnel of national societies — other than those of
the contending nations — with regard to the hospitals and ambulances
of the belligerents be clearly and unequivocally defined.

The second question is : How can the British National Aid Society
be so employed in time of peace as to be prepared to supplement the
hospital service of the British Army if called upon to do so in time of
war?

This proposition is purposely limited to the connection which ought
to exist between the Society and the Army, because this should be the
paramount object.

I will briefly describe what the Continental Societies have done,
and are doing. Their work includes much that does not strictly
belong to the province of Bed Cross Societies ; but a general descrip-
tion of their labours will perhaps lead by inference to a more useful
and practical solution for ourselves, than any dogmatic expression of
my own could possibly do.

The International Exhibition, held in Paris in 18G7, gave an oppor-
tunity to France to exhibit the practical side of the humanitarian
ideas developed by the Convention of Geneva. On the initiative
of Count Serurier, who was one of the earliest promoters of that
Treaty, and who is still one of the most zealous and indefatigable
representatives of the Bed Cross, a large exhibition of hospital and
sanitary material was organized ; and, in connection with this, a Con-
ference was held, which was virtually the starting point of the
activity which has been displayed by the National Aid Societies of
Europe.

The Societe de Secours aux Blesses des Armees de Terre et de Mer
has made remarkable progress since the war of 1870-1.

Notwithstanding the enormous amount of work which devolved
on the members of the Paris Central Committee in that terrible year,
they have not once discontinued their labours. What was done by
the Society during the Franco- German war can be gathered from the
voluminous statistical report of Dr. Chenu, Inspector- General of
Ambulances. Immediately after the war, there was the repatriation

vol. xx. 2 u

642 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

of the French wounded, who had been prisoners in Germany ; and
this was accomplished under the personal direction of Baron Mundy
and M. Albert Ellissen. Nor even then did the Central Committee
consider that its duties towards the victims of the war were at an
end.

Artificial limbs and costly surgical appliances were provided for
those who had been mutilated, and pensions were granted to invalids,
as well as to widows, orphans, and the aged parents of those who had
died in the service of their country. The graves of the dead were also
carefully marked, and in some places monuments were erected.

In 1873, an exhibition of hospital and sanitary material was held in
Paris, and six dipl6mes d'honnenr, eleven gold, thirty-one silver, and
sixty bronze medals were awarded by the Society for the best inven-
tions which could be utilised in hospital work. It was then that the
kitchen- waggon was first introduced ; and the time will assuredly come
when no ambulance column will be considered complete without such
a carriage. I may add, that this model, constructed by M. Kelluer,
of Paris, is one of the admirable inventions chiefly due to the in-
genuity and indomitable energy of Baron Mundy.

But certainly one of the most important steps of the French Society
was taken in April, 1874, when a conference of delegates from all the
departments in France was held in Paris. Resolutions were then
adopted which, whilst recognising the superior control of the Paris
Central Committee, allowed each of the Provincial Committees certain
freedom of action, and the disposal of its local funds, with the excep-
tion of a fixed proportion which is to be sent annually to the Treasurer
of the Central Fund.

At this meeting it was also suggested by M. Albert Ellissen that
eighteen centres of action should be established corresponding to the
head-quarters of each of the Army-Corps, and that eighteen depots of
hospital material should ba formed.

The material of a divisional ambulance is , to be composed as
follows : —

One omnibus.

One large fourgon.

One small fourgon.

One kitchen-waggon.

Five ambulance carriages.

One carriage for medical and surgical stores.

One box of surgical instruments.

Fittings, &c, for the large fourgon.

Fittings, &c, for the small fourgon.

19 furnished hampers for the fourgons.

50 stretchers.

The total cost of each divisional ambulance to be 30,000 francs
(£1,200).

It was also proposed that a delegate of the Society should be
attached to the General commanding each military territorial division.

Many other propositions were made, including one for the formation
of a special institution where medical students and nurses should

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 643

receive practical instruction on all subjects connected with field-
hospital work.

I have thus briefly indicated some of the principal points to which
the French Society has devoted its attention since 1871.

I have already alluded to what Germany in general, and Prussia in
particular, have done towards the development of volunteer hospital
relief in time of war. The interval which elapsed between the Danish
war in 1864 and the outbreak of the war in 1870 had been well em-
ployed by the Berlin and other German committees ; and the experience
gained in the seven weeks' war of 1866 was not without value. The
Franco-German war was declared on the 17th of July; on the 19th
the Central Committee of Berlin made an appeal to the nation ; on the
20th it announced that gifts to the Society, whether sent direct to
the principal depots or addressed to the different army corps, would be
conveyed free on all the State railroads. At the same time the King
of Prussia appointed Prince Pleas as Royal Commissioner and Military
Inspector of Volunteer Assistance. He was to be the medium between
the Aid Societies and the Army in the field ; and it is well to call atten-
tion to the fact that he alone had the right to distribute the Red Cross
brassards, and to give authority to wear them. Under Prince Pless a
delegate was attached to the head-quarters of each Army operating in
an independent manner ; and one was also appointed to every corps of
such Army. Besides these were sub-delegates at the different Etapes,
and others whom it is unnecessary to specify.

All the principal offices in this volunteer department were held by
men of position, who, like Prince Pless, were members of the Order
of St. John, or of that of Malta, the former (Johanniter Bitter) being
Protestant, and the latter (Malteser Ritter) Roman Catholic.

During the war of 1870-1 there were in Germany 25 principal,
1,956 sectional committees, with more than 250,000 members, all work-
ing more or less under the direction of the Berlin Central Committee.

The Central Comite* der Deutschen Vereine zurPflege im Felde verwun-
deter and erkrankter Krieger differs from the French Central Committee
in many respects ; but there is one very important point of dissimi-
larity. The French Society not only devotes itself to sick and wounded
soldiers and sailors in war, but, as I have already said, it grants pen-
sions to invalids, and to the widows and children of those who have
died in war or from its effects. The German Red Cross Societies do
not directly undertake this branch of relief, but they leave it to sister
societies, which work in connection with them. Of these the principal
is the Kaiser Wilhelm Stif tung, an institution which supplements the
pensions given by the State to disabled Officers and soldiers, and their
widows and children.

However, it seems that the German Societies now intend to admit
within the sphere of their labours in time of peace, such calamities as
may be caused by fire, inundation, or epidemics.

Amongst the German Societies auxiliary to that of the Red Cross
may be mentioned the Ladies' Societies (Deutscher Frauen HiiJfs und
Pflege Vereine) of Berlin, Munich, Dresden, Stuttgardt, Darmstadt,
and Carlsruhe. In consideration of the services rendered by these, in

2 u 2

644 THE CONVENTION OP GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

the training of nurses and hospital assistants, who may be employed
in time of war, subventions are granted by the •Central Committee. It
wonld be difficult, even if it were necessary, to enumerate all the different
institutions which are thus working, directly or indirectly, for the
objects of the Red Cross. Incidentally I may name the Deaconesses'
Institution at Bielefeld, the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Victoria-Stiftung at
Insterburg, the Mutterhaus at Kiel, the Sanitary Institution at
Loschwitz, near Dresden, of which Madame Simon is the directress,
the asylum for female nurses at Frankfort-on-the-Main, and the
AuguBta Hospital at Berlin.

The title of this last most excellent institution reminds me that no
account, however incomplete, of what the Germans are doing to alle-
viate the sufferings caused by war would be just, did it omit to
acknowledge that the Empress Augusta is not only the President of
the German Central Society de jure, but also de facto. In every way,
by word and example, she has encouraged and urged forward the work
both in peace and in war ; and whether at Berlin or in the provinces,
she seems to regard any fatigue as light which enables her to assist it
by a gracious act. Nor is Her Majesty less generous with her purse.
During the Conference held in the Red Cross Pavilion at the Universal
Exhibition of Vienna, in 1873, she awarded twenty gold medals for
the best models of hospitals and surgical appliances for the relief of
wounded soldiers,a prize of £300 for the best essay on the Convention of
Geneva, and a prize of similar value, and two prizes of £75 for the best
manuals of military surgery. Of the medals not one came to England,
which was scarcely represented in this department of the Exhibition :
but it is satisfactory to know that Surgeon-Major Porter, Assistant
Professor of Military Surgery at the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley,
gained one of the prizes for his treatise on military surgery.

The work of the German Red Cross and kindred societies is far too
extensive to allow of its being described in detail in one short paper ;
but I may mention one important fact that deserves to be noticed.
Quite recently in every province of Germany a corps of kranken trager
(bearers) has been enrolled and attached to the army-corps of that
province. Each man is furnished with a uniform, and he is paid a
small annual sum, in consideration of which he must undergo the
necessary training, and he must hold himself ready to march with his
division in the event of war. It may be briefly summarised as follows :
Germany possesses six Central Committees at Berlin, Munich, Dresden,
Stuttgardt, Darmstpdt, and Carlsruhe, with a superior Committee at
Berlin. Under these are some hundreds of less important Committees.
In peace, hospitals for invalid soldiers are maintained, nurses and ambu-
lance-helpers are trained, exhibitions of hospital and sanitary material
are held, and, as I have shown, prizes are bestowed for the best models,
and also for the best essays on given subjects connected with hos-
pital work. A military inspector and commissioner for the volunteer
societies assists at Conferences held at the Ministry of War ; and in
fact the most complete solidarity is maintained between the various
Societies, the Committees, and the War Department. On the outbreak
of war, as was witnessed in IB70, a message (lashed along the telegraph-

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED 80LDIEB8 IN WAR. 645

wires from Berlin is sufficient to militarize the whole system in the
coarse of a few hoars, and the German Bed Cross army is found to be
almost as completely organized as the combatant portion of the Army
of the Fatherland.

As has been already stated, it was not until after the campaign in
Bohemia in 1866, that Austria signed the Convention of Geneva. A
Red Cross, or Patriotic Society, was then formed, which, as far as I
can gather, has since been chiefly employed in supporting invalids,
the victims of that war. The annual Reports of the society indicate
that all its stores have reference to treatment in fixed hospitals ; they
are in fact hospital equipment stores, with the exception of three car-
riages, each for one wounded man, which are probably intended for
bringing patients to fixed hospitals, and not for use in the field.

Daring the Franco- German war, Austria was officially represented
on the German side by Professor Billroth, and on that of France by
Professor Mundy. Each was accompanied by one or two surgeons and
hospital assistants. This is an interesting fact, because it was the first
time that the government of a neutral state sent surgeons to aid the
medical establishments of the belligerent armies, in accordance with
the desire expressed at the Berlin Conference in 1868.

But the Austrian Red Cross Society had no organisation for war,
and was only able to contribute a few stores.

It mast not be thought because the Austrian Patriotic Society-
is less actively employed than those which have just been mentioned,
that the relief of sick and wounded soldiers in war receives less
consideration in Austria than in France or Germany. This is by no
means the case. The Teutonic order of which the Archduke William
is Grand Master, has, with the sanction and approval of the Minister
of War, now taken the lead in this direction in the most liberal and
intelligent manner.

This order already possesses forty sanitary columns ready to supple-
ment the forty infantry divisions of the regular army. The material
which comprises ambulance carriages and foargons with their con-
tents, is distributed over seventeen garrison towns, in several of which
the order has constructed special waggon-sheds at its own expense.
It has spent £30,000 in forming sanitary trains for the first line, and
a reserve fund of £15,000 will be required to place them on a war
footing. By request of the Ministry of War, the baggage-waggons
have been arranged, in case of need, to carry severely wounded men.
In this and in many other ways it is needless to particularise, the
expenses incurred by the order have been increased and have far ex-
ceeded the original estimates. The possibility of mountain warfare
has not been forgotten, and experiments are still going on with the
object of arriving at the best forms for bearer-chairs and bearer-
baskets.

Regulations for the guidance of the order in its relations with the
army are now in course of arrangement at the Ministry of War.

It is the intention of the order to establish a divisible fixed hospi-
tal for 600 wounded men ; but the number is to be limited to 200
until the funds are sufficient to allow the plan to be fully carried out.

646 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

I may also a4d that this distinguished order, on the roll of which
are most of the noblest names in Austria, maintains three hospitals
for the civil population, At the beginning of last year, there were
in these 36 patients; during the ensuing twelve months, 332 were
admitted, of whom 303 went out cured, 24 died, and 41 remained at
the end of the year.

Another noble order, that of the Austrian Knights of Malta, has
also entered the same field of benevolent activity ; and it has under-
taken to provide twelve sanitary trains for use on railroads. The
value of such trains can scarcely be appreciated in this country ; bat
it is otherwise on the continent, where in all recent wars, railroads
have played a very important part, both in military operations and for
hospital purposes. The best model that has yet been used was that
employed by the Germans during the Franco-German war; but this
has been surpassed by the train which was built in Paris from the
designs and under the superintendence of Baron Mundy for the
French Societe de Secours. This was first exhibited in the Sanitats
Pavilion of the Vienna Exhibition in 1873. It contains wards for the
patients, separate rooms for the medical officers and nurses, a kitchen,
store rooms and everything necessary for the purpose for which it is
intended. In a word, it is best described as un Iwpital roulant. It is
on this plan I believe that the sanitary trains are being constructed
for the Malfceser Bitter, who will bear the expense and responsibility
of this important supplement to the hospital establishment of the
Austrian army in the field.

I have more than once casually mentioned the name of Mundy,
but I must be allowed to say something more of this well-known
and eminent Professor. In 1859, he was acting as Aide-de-camp to
General Giulai at the head-quarters of the Austrian Army in Italy.
He then left the combatant ranks in order to devote himself entirely to
that profession of which he is now so distinguished a member ; and in
the war of 1866, we find the gallant cavalry officer transformed into
Surgeon«Major of the Army in Bohemia. At the Conferences held at
Geneva, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, he appeared as the enthusiastic
advocate of reforms in the treatment of the wounded. During the
siege of Paris, he identified himself with the French Societe de
Secours aux Blesses, and he established and personally directed a
large hospital at the Palace of the Corps Legislate, where he
was ably assisted by Dr. Von Mosetig. During the Commune, he
designed and constructed a Pavilion hospital, of novel form, for use
in summer. This is still standing in the park of St. Cloud, it
having been accepted by Marshal MacMahon on behalf of the Army.
In 1870-1, ambulance carriages of the Mundy pattern were to be seen
wherever there was a column of the Societe de Seoours ; and, more
recently, I have met in Navarre with some of these carriages and
mountain stretchers, also the invention of Professor Mundy.

All that the two knightly orders I have mentioned are doing in
Austria for the sake of the soldier may be traced to the inspiration of
the same gentleman ; but, as I have shown, in this respect he knows
no nationality. Were I asked to name one man who, more than

FOR AID TO 8ICK AND WOUNDED 80LDIERS IN WAR. 647

any other, is the incarnation of the Bed Cross idea, I should unhesi-
tatingly say Professor Baron Mandy. In forwarding the cause he
has at heart, he has spared neither his parse nor his person: and
to his courageous perseverance, disinterested advocacy, practical
ability, and restless energy must be attributed a very large share of
the success that has attended all recent efforts for the alleviation of
the sick and wounded in war.

Perhaps I ought to have abstained from any special allusion to the
work performed by three or four of the National Aid Societies of
Europe, unless it were possible to refer to others equally deserving of
notice. Bat the reason for the selection I have made is obvious. It
would take far too much time to describe in detail the system pursued
by all similar societies, and I have therefore chosen those which have
made themselves the most prominent, or which offer the best examples
of the preparation that can be made in peace for time of war.

I might call attention to the activity of the Russian Society, and
describe what it did in France and Germany in 1870-1 ; and later
for its own troops in Khiva. More recently it has sent a well-equipped
ambulance column to the Herzegovina. Like some other societies
already mentioned, it has not limited its work to the alleviation of
sufferings caused by war ; it organized considerable relief for the
victims of the famine in Samara, and also for the inhabitants of
Morchansk, which town was destroyed by fire in May, 1875.

When the war broke out in 1870, it is doubtful if any Society,
except those of Germany, was so well prepared as the Dutch. This
was, in a great measure, owing to the interest which had been excited
by the admirable Exhibition of Hospital and Sanitary Material, and
the Conference, held at the Hague in 1869.

The war in Atchin has offered other opportunities to extend the
experience of this admirable Society, and to utilize some of the excel-
lent materiel which it possesses.

Belgium, as in everything which exhibits civilization in its best and
noblest form, also claims a high place for her Red Cross Society.
And it will not be out of place, I think, if I call attention to the Inter-
national Exhibition of all objects connected with the saving of life,
and the Congress of Hygiene, which are shortly to be held at Brussels.
The initiative in this case is entirely attributable to Lieutenant-
General Renard, one of the first and most eloquent advocates of the
Red Cross. He has travelled over Europe, endeavouring to obtain
official recognition and the support of all the Governments in Europe
for his useful and philanthropic scheme ; and I earnestly trust that a
great success may attend efforts which appeal so irresistibly to all
members of Red Cross Societies, whatever may be their nationality.

Spain lias been afflicted during the last few years by a miserable
civil war, which fortunately has now ceased. The Red Cross Society,
under the guidance of the Central Committee of Madrid, has per-
formed good work ; and La Caridad, a Carlist society with the same
object, but under a different flag, has also laboured well in the same
field. Whilst deprecating anything like jealous rivalry in such a
cause, it is satisfactory to know that these two societies carried out

648 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

their one object, and acted with regard to each other in a manner
worthy of the old chivalry of Spain.

It is a very common thing for the National Bed Cross Societies to
be included nnder one title— the International Society— and miscon-
ception on this point has led to many serious mistakes. Each Society
is a national one, though the spirit which atiimatea them all may be
called international; and this reminds me that the solidarity which
now exists amongst all the societies of Europe is chiefly due to two
gentlemen, who were the most zealous pioneers of the Convention of
Geneva. M. Oustave Moynier and Dr. Appia, during thirteen years,
have laboured incessantly on behalf of that Treaty, which was first
proposed in the Soci6te Genevoise d'Utilite* Publique. They assisted
in framing it; and one or both of them has been present at every
conference and exhibition of hospital material which has been held
under the Bed Cross. They have been the most active members
of the International Committee which has its head-quarters at Geneva,
and of which, since the death of General Dufour, M. Moynier has
been the president. When the war broke out in 1870, they formed an
agency at Bale. This not only offered a means of communication
between the societies of the belligerent states, but it also became a
channel through which gifts from neutral States of a value of more
than three millions of francs were distributed amongst the sick and
wounded.

Whatever may be the fate of the original Agreement, the names of
Moynier and Appia will always be associated with it ; and we need be
under no apprehension, but that the philanthropic work commenced at
Geneva will continue to flourish under some name and flag so long as
the world shall suffer from the curse of war.

I have thus described, in a general and by no means exhaustive
manner, the work in which some of the Bed Cross Societies of Europe
are occupied in time of peace. Some portion of this work, excellent
as it undoubtedly is, is of a nature which ought not to be comprised
in the sphere of these institutions. For instance, it should be no part
of their work to give pensions to invalid soldiers, or to the widows and
orphans of men who have died in the service of their country.
Such work is the legitimate province of the Government acting for
the country at large. If done by a non-official establishment, such an
establishment might be made collateral to that of a Bed Cross Society ;
and I apprehend there is no reason why, in this country, a separate
Society, like that which administers the Patriotic Fund, should not be
formed to supplement pensions awarded by Government, and to watch
over the interests of aged and crippled soldiers and sailors and their
widows and children. I venture parenthetically to recommend an
extension of this field of usefulness as one that would materially help
to add to the popularity of military service in this country.

In time of peace, it is not only within the sphere, but it is the posi-
tive duty of a Bed Cross Society, to use every opportunity to educate
a staff for the work which it professes to be able to perform. This
mn be done through the instrumentality of institutions entirely sup-
ported by Bed Cross Societies, or by means of independent establish*

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 649

ments partially subsidised by them. The best examples of this kind
of instruction are to be fonnd in Germany.

A few years ago we were told that the legitimate susceptibilities of
the Army medical profession would be excited if an attempt were
made to introduce a civilian element into the Army hospitals in time of
war. Experience has proved the fallacy of this assertion, and there is
not a single Army in Europe in which the services of well-trained
volunteer hospital assistants would not be received with satisfaction,
during a campaign. Members of Bed Gross Societies have a well-defined
mission to fulfil, and those who understand and act up to this would
be the very last to usurp functions which do not belong to them, or in
any way endanger the feeling of cordiality with which the military
medical profession and the Army hospital corps will be ready to regard
them. Whether in peace or war, no man or woman is fitted for hospital
work without some previous and special training, and I need scarcely
add that strict discipline is absolutely indispensable.

I have endeavoured to direct attention to the increasing activity
of the Societies on the continent, all of which are more or less
patronised and encouraged by their respective Governments. It would
be easy for us to follow their example : but it is this very facility, and
the fact that in England all philanthropic movements are due to private
initiative, which makes us so indifferent with regard to the future.
What the British National Aid Society did in 1870-1 without previous
preparation is regarded as satisfactory proof of what it would do if
called upon again, for our own or any other Army, but such a prece-
dent cannot safely be relied on.

I venture to say that there is not one of those who responded to the
call of Colonel Loyd-Lindsay in 1870, who would not be ready to do so
again, if required, bringing with him the experience gained in that
memorable year. Bat this is not enough. The muster-roll of the Bed
Gross already shows many blanks. Some have passed away, and others
are hastening on ; new blood is wanted. As we recruit our combatant
army, so must we recruit our non-combatant forces. And not only this,
it is absolutely indispensable that whilst some direct attention to the
perfection of weapons of destruction, others should be occupied in
doing all they can to prepare for and mitigate the wounds which such
arms are destined to inflict.

As was said by Dr. Landa, the Spanish delegate at the first Confe-
rence held at Geneva, in 1863 : — " We are apt to accuse war of not
allowing the arts of peace to flourish, but peace also, when it is of long
duration, makes the art of war to fall into forgetfulness ; and it is
strange that this same forgetfulness is much greater for all that con-
cerns the arts intended to preserve the Army than for those destined
to destroy the enemy. At the decisive moment we ask for a miracle,
and as this is not forthcoming, we exclaim against deception, instead
of crying out against improvidence."

Nothing I have said is intended to depreciate in the smallest degree
the value of the Army Medical Establishment, and I should not be
standing here now, if I thought that one word of mine could seem to
disparage the eminent services of this distinguished branch of the
military profession.

650 THE CONTENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

What better authority can I adduce than that of a gentleman whom I
have already quoted ? In 1866 Professor Long-more, when advocating
the formation of a National Committee in England, said: — " Committees
" no doubt will be formed, and subscriptions poured in, as has hap-
pened hitherto, as soon as there is need of them ; bat, as hereto-
fore, there will be absence of system and independence of action,
" and there will not be the advantage, at any rate at first, of Govern-
" ment support; while, in other countries, on war breaking out the
" necessary preparations will have been long made and fully considered,
" everything will be systematized on preconcerted plans, so as to har-
" monize with the arrangements of the Government and the action of
" the combatant and Army medical authorities."

In 1871 Colonel Loyd-Lindsay concluded an interesting account of
what the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded
in War had done during the Franco-German War with these words :l —
" Can we wisely or justly decline to do what other nations have done,
*' namely, to appoint National Committees, recognised by Government,
" whose functions it would be to organize the distribution of the
" national donations on a sound and proper footing, and thus be pre-
" pared to supplement what all admit must greatly need expansion,
" viz., the medical department of the Army in time of war ? "

And in the interval which elapsed between the lecture of Mr. Long-
more in 1866 and that from which 1 have just quoted, Lieutenant-
Colonel Henry Brackenbury made an appeal to the British public in the
columns of a daily newspaper. He said : — " In Heaven's name, let us
" be up and doing! We have signed the Convention of Geneva. We are
" bound in honour to be working in time of peace, not for ourselves alone,
"but for all the other nations whose wounded may, by even the remotest
" possibility, ever fall into our hands. We invite discussion and action
41 on a subject affecting both our soldiers' lives and our national honour."
And you, Ladies, who are to be found in every place where there is
sickness to relieve, wounds to bind up, or grief to assuage, permit me
to conclude in the words used by the Empress Augusta, when taking
leave of the General Assembly of the Patriotic Association of Ladies,
which is closely allied to the Bed Cross Societies of Germany.

Her Majesty said : — " Let us continue to act and to work together in
44 the great task which rests upon us. Let us show during peace the
" same perseverance as in time of war. Let us have the conscientious
44 conviction that we are devoting our strength to the service of our
4t country, and we shall find in this sentiment our best reward."

The Chairman : No subject can be more interesting to the Army and to the
nation generally than the subject which has been brought before us by Mr. Furley ;
and it is well known how successful in diminishing the terrible sufferings of war
the exertions of this Society have been. I hope that if any gentlemen hare remarks
or suggestions to make, they will offer them freely to this assembly.

Professor Longmorb, C.B. : I find myself unexpectedly called upon to make
some remarks on the excellent paper which has just been read by Mr. Furley.
Unfortunately I did not hear the first part of it, but I know its general tenor. I
am quite certain we must all feel very greatly indebted to him if only for
calling attention to the necessity of considering our own position in respect to the

1 See Journal, toI. xt, p. 381, ei teq.

FOR AID TO 8ICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 651

available means for supplementing the official aid to wounded in time of war. He
has shown us what is being done in other countries and has thus indirectly called
attention to what is not being done in our own country. There can be no doubt
that should war unhappily arise, and there be a necessity for carrying into practical
operation, the scheme which has been lately devised for the mobilization of our
forces, there oan be no doubt that the Army Medical Department will require
extraneous help, and that the War Department may well expect to derive some
assistance from the " National Aid Society for help to Wounded Soldiers in time of
War." By the mobilization scheme, the organization of each corps d'armee requires
no less than 267 surgeons with nearly 3,000 men of the Army Hospital Corps.
There are eight such corps d'armee contemplated for the defence of the country,
and besides these forces there is surgical assistance for the garrisons, for general
hospitals, and other establishments to be provided for, as the mobilization scheme
contemplates additions to the fighting strength of the regular and Militia forces of
the country from the Volunteer combatant forces, so I think the Army Medical
Department will have to look for additions to its surgical and nursing staff from civil
volunteers. There will certainly be a difficulty in finding surgeons and hospital
attendants in sufficient numbers in the usual official way. As far as I am aware,
although I have the honour of belonging to the National Aid Society, no scheme
has as yet been considered for meeting the wants that will then arise, and I fear the
National Aid Society will be looked upon as having somewhat neglected its duty, if
it do not in time of peace make some preparation for the demands which are sure to
be made upon it in time of war. I believe there are some difficulties from the con-
stitution of the Society in respect to outlay of money ; but if Mr. Furley, who has
so fully considered the subject, and who is personally so well acquainted with all
that has been done in continental countries, and especially with the arrangements be-
tween the National Aid Societies in those countries and their respective war depart-
ments, would frame a scheme in detail for carrying out a system of training and pre-
paration, in harmony with the peculiar institutions of our country, and would submit
the scheme to the Committee of the National Aid Society, I feel confident his scheme
would be fully considered, and that, if practicable, the Committee of the Society would
do all they possibly could to carry it into effect. I feel as a member of the Army
Medical Department that the department itself is indebted to Mr. Fnrley for
calling attention to the important questions which are connected with the subject of
volunteer assistance to the official surgical staff of the Army on occasion of war.

Lieut. -Col. Hbnky Bbackrnbury, R.A. : I have listened with very great interest
to the exceedingly sensible and practical remarks that Mr. Furley has made to us to-
day. There are two point* of view from which this Red Cross work has to be
looked at. There is the point of view of the soldier and the point of view of the
philanthropist. I being a combatant soldier by profession, was present as a philan-
thropist for five months during the Franco-German war, and I am bound to say that
in my opinion it is not possible that again in any war the same latitude can be
allowed to members of national philanthropic societies as was allowed during that
war. I think that the occasions on which that latitude was abused, were few and far
between, but I am sorry to say I do know of occasions on which it was abused, and
if I were in command of troops, or chief of a staff to a General in command, I would
absolutely forbid anything like that latitude which was allowed in the Franco-
German war. The want of any recognised understanding as to the position of the
agents of Red Cross Societies other than those of the belligerents themselves, led to
strange misconceptions. People wearing a Red Cross upon their arm considered
themselves almost insulted if they were not allowed to go anywhere and everywhere,
and to pass without restraint from one line to another, and their pretensions were
often admitted. Application was made by the English National Society for per-
mission to send an agent with medical comforts into Mets during the siege, though
we all know that suffering is one of the chief means by which a blockading force is
endeavouring to break down the besieged troops. Naturally the permission was
refused. In. another war these irregularities will not be tolerated ; and, therefore,
if these philanthropic efforts are to be continued (and I believe it. is impossible to
overrate the amount of good done by them) it is absolutely necessary that some
definite and distinct understanding should be come to by our Government as to

652 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

what position the Bed Cross Society of our own country as well as those of foreign
countries are to be placed in in the event of war. I believe at this moment we are
absolutely without any arrangement between the Government of this country and
the representatives of the National Aid Society, which has still a very large sum of
money in hand : and further the Society itself is without any arrangement as to
what is to be done by it in case of war and our own troops being engaged. Nor do
I see how it is possible for the National Society to ask the Government to recognise
them as long as they have no organization of their own : and we have not got any
organization whatever with which to take the field. I believe I have the honour
to be on the Council of the National Aid Society ; and I own, to my great regret,
that we have not stirred one single step since the war of 1870, in the direction of
organizing ; and until we have done that ourselves, how are we to go to Government
and say : " We want you to make arrangements as to our position and sphere of
work P " The first thing should be for our Society to go to work and to devise a
practicable scheme of action. We have on our Committee such men as Dr. Long-
more and Dr. Manley ; we have combatant officers who have seen war ; we have
civil surgeons of the greatest possible eminence ; and we have the practical experience
of Mr. Furley. Surely amongst ub all, we ought to be able to arrange a scheme
with which we can go to the Secretary of State for War and say, " Will you go
" hand in hand with us and help us to carry this out ? " If we do that, then I
believe we should find at all events that some of the obstacles sure to be put in our
way, might be done away with. More than two years before the Franco-German
war, my attention was directed to this subject, and I wrote those words which
Mr. Furley has quoted to-day, and which are as applicable now as then, u In
" Heaven's name let us be up and doing."

Dr. Manley, 9.6 . : Having been engaged in connection with this Society, I
must say the thing that struck me most was the want of detail, the want of
organization, and the want of discipline which existed under the Bed Cross. That
may be excused by the fact that at that time it was a new organization altogether ;
but still there did not seem to me to be a sufficient connection between the light-
field ambulance in the field and the depot. For example, after one of the battles, I
remember a German surgeon coming into the house where we were and stating that
there were 2,000 wounded lying in the villages around, and they had not so much
as a piece of bread or a bandage for them. Now seeing what an organization the
Germans have, that will tell you what war is, and how the departments must be
supplemented, because we find that notwithstanding the most perfect organization,
on a pinch of that kind it is impossible that they can do everything. It is therefore
most essential that it should be supplemented by a well organized volunteer aid,
because as far as my experience goes, it was immediately after an engagement and
before the regular field hospitals came up, that the volunteers were of most use.
When the field hospitals came up, the Germans immediately took the wounded out
of our hands ; and we were of no further use except for transporting them. There-
fore it is necessary that societies, such as the English Society, should have on its
roll an equipment of field ambulance stores, medical and surgical, and provisions for
the support of the wounded, and that they should have volunteer aids enrolled and
properly trained, because volunteers without organization, though they are zealous
and active, have great waste of power and a great waste of material. I should like
to ask one or two questions which more particularly sffeot this country. We have
seen how easily ships can be sunk, and no doubt in the first naval engagement there
must be several ironclads sunk. Is there any means of saving the wounded from
being drowned and of taking them rapidly to England, even before the action u
over ? have they any plan of a hospital-ship for conveying the wounded ? Is there
any volunteer staff? because that is a point where a volunteer aid society can come
in Tetj well indeed. In the Ashantee war the " Victor Emmanuel " was kept m a
hospital ship, but there is nothing of that kind ready for a naval engagement now.
I think in that direction there is the promise of a very good work for a Volunteer
Aid Society. I mention these facts because I am not aware that anything has been
done at all in the society latterly. There is a great field for volunteer aid if properly
organized, but there n ust be discipline and there must be organization and proper
ittention to detail.

FOR iTD TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 653

General Sir Richabd Wilbbaham, K.C.B. : I wish to make one or two remarks
on what has just been said. I think there is great danger of our trespassing upon
another department which does not belong to a volunteer society, when it is pro-
posed that the National Aid Society should provide ships to carry home the
wounded. It appears to me that if there is one duty more evidently that of the
State than another it is that of sending home the wounded. The National Aid
Society ought in my opinion to begin with much smaller things than that. There
are two questions I should wish to ask the lecturer. We have heard a great deal
about what foreign societies of this kind are doing, but we have heard nothing
about what our own National Aid Society is doing. I should like to know whether it
has ambulances in store or any material with which to take the field, in case its
services should be required, and in the second place, as Colonel Brackenbury says,
we ought to be up and doing. I want to know whether the National Aid Society
has taken any steps to secure the services of experienced surgeons or even of trained
orderlies, or whether they would be found as unprepared as they were at the out-
break of the Franco-German War ? The best ambulance we had in that war — in
which I believe that a number of the members of this Society worked— was, if am not
mistaken, one furnished by own Government from Woolwich. I do not know
whether there was any ambulance furnished by the National Aid Society. I think
we are treading upon Terr dangerous ground if we are supposing that a private
society can, or ought to do the work of Government. Of course our position is
very much more difficult than that of a similar society in any foreign country. The
natural duty of such a society would be to assist and supplement the military
organization of their own country. One of the speakers has expressed his opinion
that the work of this society would have to encounter the jealousy of the War
Office. I do not think that there would be any fear of this, if their services were
required in our own country. But I think that there would be great fear of its
incurring the jealousy of the military authorities of any foreign country to which
it was giving its services, unless the utmost prudence were exercised.

Admiral Sir Hbnbt Codbikgton, K.C.B. : I must say I think there is hardly so
much field for the exertions of the society in the Navy as there would be in the
Army. In the first place, I do not think that our number of wounded would
be so great, nor would they be so dispersed as in warfare on shore. It is suggested
that aid should be given in the case of ramming, and that the wounded should be
disposed of ; I am sorry to say in that view it is not only the wounded that would
be disposed of, the ship herself and all on board of her would be disposed of also.
Next, with respect to the surgical care of those men who happen to be unluckily
wounded, the medical staff, I think, would be sufficient and it would be supplemented
very largely by the civilians on board the ship. They are the assistants of the
medical profession in the cockpit, and wherever else the wounded may be. I do not
think there is such urgent necessity for increased surgical assistance in the Navy,
but if there were, I do think it would be the duty certainly of the Government to
provide it, and I do not think really and truly there is any means for that assistance
being given in each particular case by any civilian society. Next, as to transporting
the wounded home. Certainly that is a thing we in the Navy ought to do ; but
there is a very great difference between picking up wounded men from a field and
hoisting men out from one ship in the middle of trie Atlantic and transporting them
into another, even supposing there were neutral ships to receive the wounded. Again,
if a ship has been in action, I think she will very shortly go into harbour if she
swims, and more particularly as warfare now will always be carried on by means of
steam propulsion, for no war-ship could be kept out of her harbour after action
more than a few days, certainly not weeks, and it might be very dangerous to move
a recently wounded man from a ship immediately into another ship. On th» whole,
therefore, I do not see any field for a society of this excellent nature to be brought
to bear upon the Navy as it is now constituted, and as it will be in any future war-
fare in which it may be engaged.

Sir Edmund Leo h mere, Bart.: I must express my acknowledgments to the
Counoil of this Institution for their kindness in giving mean opportunity of hearing
Mr. Farley's very valuable paper, and I may be permitted as a civilian to express my
hearty concurrence in what nas fallen from the previous speakers. It has always been a

654 THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

great cause of surprise, and some disappointment to me, that more active steps hare not
been taken by the Red Cross Society, following in the steps of other branches of the
same organization abroad, to carry on in times of peace some corresponding service*
to those required in war. I cannot conceive any great difficult? which would arise
in taking such steps, and I can only suppose that the state of quiescence in which the
Society has remained in England has arisen from the belief that everything was
right and proper, and that in time of war the skeleton would be filled up, and the
Society might resume the field with the same activity it before manifested. But I
cannot help thinking, after what we have heard, that* this is a mistake. I think also
there has been great disappointment in the provinces on this question. I can only
say that in our own county of Worcester very active steps were taken to raise a very
large sum of money and a considerable amount of maUriel during the Franco-
Prussian war, and it was looked upon that our Worcestershire branch of the Red
Cross Society would bo a permanent institution. The subscriptions were kept up,
and all our books are ready, and the storekeeper is ready at any moment to set to
work in the Town Hall of Worcester, and to take active steps to carry on the
work of the Society. I believe, if the effort were made, a great amount of good
might be done, not only in reviving the spirit, which ought not to subside in times
of peace — the spirit of philanthropy, which was so conspicuous at that period, and
which prored so valuable in time of war— but I believe also the National Society
might gain valuable experience by subsidizing some institutions for nursing the sick
poor and for training nurses for the sick — those societies that take upon themselves
the conveyance of the sick to hospitals. I am happy to say the English Branch of
the Order of St. John of Jerusalem has taken upon itself the provision of means for
the conveyance of persons to hospitals who have been wounded in such accidents,
and I really believe that by giving encouragement to this or similar hospital organiza-
tions, a great deal might be done to keep up an organized staff of philanthropists,
who might by proper discipline (and discipline is everything) become very valuable
in any future war. I therefore hope that what has been said to-day may call the

attention of the Council of the English Bed Cross Society to the real advantage

I might almost say the duty— of utilizing to some extent the great resources which
the country has placed in their hands ; and by calling to their aid the admirable body
of men who have been active members of that society, thev might readily frame a
good and practical scheme for some useful and national work.

8ir Edward Pebbott, Bart. : With regard to the observations that have fallen on
the subject of abuses under the Bed Cross cognizance, it has appeared to me very
often that there is not sufficient executive power given to medical officers in general.
We know that at the moment the medical officer goes to a military parade his mouth
is closed.

The Chairman : I think that is perhaps a little beyond the question before us
to-day. I hope you will not go into the general question of medical authorities with
regard to the War Office or the Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Edwasd Pbbbott : Not in that point of view, but it is with a desire of see-
ing whether these abuses which have been referred to would not have been controlled
if the medical officer in charge of parties under the Bed Cross cognizance was ena-
bled himself to be accountable for every man that would be present and claim to be
under that badge.

Deputy-Commissary J. S. Young : I am sure every one must be indebted to
Mr. Purley for calling attention to the humanitarian movement which had its origin
in 1870 and 1871, and which, I think, has lain too long asleep. The only fear I have
from what has come out of the discussion to-day, especially from those who hold a

position in the Army at present — Colonel Brackenbury and Surgeon- Major Manlev

is that the object of the lecturer, which is the benefit of the sick and wounded* in
time of war, will be frustrated if the responsibility of the Government itself is not
fully brought forward. It seems to me that if we are to leave so much to the
National Society for Aid to Sick and Wounded, Governments will be very much
tempted to leave aside the proper provision that they ought to make for aid to then-
own sick and wounded in time of war. A distinguished Officer, who was a governor
of one of our largest medical establishments, has spoken, and it is within his recol-
lection, I dare say, that a Royal Commission sat in consequence of the disastrous

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 655

state of affairs in connection with the sick and wounded of the arm y in the East in
1855 and 1856. The outcome of that Royal Commission was that the executive of
the Army was so strengthened that in all our recent expeditions, at any rate, there
was no necessity for aid to the sick and wounded from outside the Army itself. I
am very much afraid, if too much prominence is given to voluntary effort that a re-
action might take place. A redaction has already taken place, I am afraid, as regards
the executive branch of the Army charged with the welfare of the sick and wounded
in war. At the same time I cannot agree with Colonel Brackenbury that it is neces-
sary to regulate these things, as regards the National Aid Society, so closely as to
bring it into official relation with the executive of the Army. The old proverb that
" Necessity knows no law " holds equally good with reference to any great war ; that
where there is a necessity then there will be a gladness to accept the efforts of volun-
tary societies, and so long as the action of the National Aid Society is confined to
that, I think there will be more than an ample sphere for their efforts, as there was
in 1870 and 1871. Surgeon Manley referred to efforts in connection with ships
at sea. I cannot fancy that being the sphere of a National Society at all, for the
simple reason that you cannot guarantee for a National Society that there will be the
funds necessary. It takes an immense amount of money to have a ship and keep it
at sea for any indefinite period. It is the peculiarity of the circumstances connected
with aid to the sick and wounded that everything is unforeseen ; for instance, we
know that the supply of an army is a question to the commissariat of how many
effectives they have to supply. This is a matter which can be dealt with to a degree of
accuracy, but when you come to sick and wounded, they never know how many they
have to supply and it is in the time of these unforeseen emergencies that the aid to
sick and wounded will come in most efficiently. Having had some experience, and
having served in the service of the National Society, I feel that we have not heard
the other, the official, side of the question. His Royal Highness, at a recent meet-
ing in this theatre, stated that people by their absence sometimes seemed to take for
granted that everything was all right. I hope that those present here will attend at
the lecture to be given on the 29th instant by Surgeon Sandford Moore, a distin-
guished Officer of the Medical Department, and who also served during the Franco-
German war, and then they will be able to hear the official side of the question. I
am perfectly sure that with the special attention that has been given to the subject by
the lecturer, and that which will be given to it by Surgeon Moore, some good ought
to result.

Mr. Shse : During the German war my brother-in-law, Baron von Laner, was
engaged in building a harbour for the German Government. Finding his civil
career temporarily suspended, he set about organizing voluntarily, in conjunction
with those under him, a service corresponding somewhat to that which came to the
aid of the military, and accordingly there was inaugurated a new branch which, con-
sidering the position of Germany as a naval power, certainly might put us to shame.
It went by the name of the " See-wehr," or Naval Militia, and did good service in
protecting the harbour and also in coming to relieve the sick and wounded. I
mention this in corroboration of the remark made by Surgeon-Major Manley, and
my belief is that if Germany, taking so humble a rank as a naval power, thought it
worth while, under a stress of circumstances unparalleled, to do something in the
direction mentioned, then surely it might be for our own advantage and ultimate
good were we to follow the example thus given us.

Dr. Danfobd Thomas : I was six months, during the Franco-German war,
engaged by tho Society, and the thought that has struck me, after what I have
already heard to-day, is that our Volunteers in this country are without any medical
organization whatever for time of war. They have their surgeons and their assistant-
surgeons, but there is no organization at all for taking charge of the sick or wounded,
nor are there any ambulances for that purpose. This large body of men if brought
into action would be entirely destitute of medical provision and service in time of
war, therefore if a Red Cross Society did nothing else but support our own soldiers
in time of war, that would be in itself one great reason why a thoroughly organized
system should be adopted. The only difficulty in this plan would be if our assist-
ance as an International Society was required for other countries. If we confined
our Red Cross services to our own country, there would be little or no difficulty in

656 THE CONVENTION OP GENEVA, AND NATIONAL SOCIETIES

organizing ambulances to attach themselves to the various regiments of the volun-
teer service, where they might be properly trained and really rendered efficient far
any emergency.

The Chairman : There is one point I should wish to refer to, which is a military
one. I certainly must endorse the feeling about there being a limit and a distinct
limit to the presence of the Sed Cross, and the facilities of getting about and using
the Bed Cross in a way that General Officers, perhaps, must object to. It is a very
difficult duty to be obliged to say that what is nominally for the assistance of the
sick and wounded is something that is positively noxious to your own Army, perhaps,
by information or facility being given to the enemy, and must be prevented. There-
fore, I cannot but feel that that is a very strong point that has been mentioned by
Colonel Brackenbury, and one on which it would behove the Society itself to get
the most stringent rules laid down in order that they may be protected in their real
legitimate duty, so as to draw a line and prevent any illegitimate entries into
fortresses or communication being made which would put a stop to the real well-
doing and well-being of the Society itself. It is a very important point for as to
consider, and they must feel that there are occasions in which it is possible that the
Bed Cross may be abused. Of course, every enemy will take advantage of getting
information and using even the most legitimate means in an illegitimate manner—
the old story of " all fair in war," you go very near the wind in many things of that
sort — therefore I think the Society should lay down its own rules strictly so as to
support the real authority of a General Officer, so that he may be able to give them
the utmost protection with safety to his own Army. I will leave it to Mr. FurAey
to enter into the other questions with regard to the Society itself.

Mr. Furley : I do not think that there is much more I can say on the subject.
Dr. Manley's proposition as to a scheme of relief in naval warfare has already been
brought forward at more than one conference, and the French Society, as you*
perhaps, have noticed, calls itself SociGbe de seoours aux blesses des Armees de Terre
et de Mer. I think that societies rather shirk this question because they see the
difficulty Sir Henry Codrington has alluded to. In 1868 I was asked at Berlin if
I could do anything in England towards this object, because it was thought of all
countries in the world England was the one which ought to initiate this branch of
relief ; but I very much doubt if there is any one in England who sees a way to
any practical scheme of relief for the wounded at sea. In fact, I believe the
majority of naval men are quite satisfied with present arrangements. At the same
time, I hope the question may be ventilated at the next Congress. Sir Edmund
Lechmere nas alluded to what might be done in time of peace. I feel very strongly
upon that subject. I think our starting point should be the connection between
the Society and the British Army. The work that the National Society ought to
undertake should be of such a nature as to be useful to hospitals and nursing
establishments in time of peace. If then we are required to aid our own Army
Medical Establishment, or to render any assistance to foreign Armies in supplement*
ing their medical establishments, we shall be ready, if called upon, to do so. I do
not think there would be the slightest difficulty if there was a proper organization
connected with our civil hospitals in time of peace, such as you find in Germany
and elsewhere. Professor Longmore has suggested that I should draw up a scheme.
I confess I prefer that it should be done and drawn up by a man like himself. I
will gladly give any assistance I can, but I think there are men much better fitted
than I am to take the lead in such a matter. I should not shirk from any labour
it might entail, because I think it ought to be done.

General Welbbaham : I asked two definite questions ; whether Mr. Furley con-
siders they come within the scope of his lecture may be another question. First,
has the National Aid Society a store of ambulances and material ready to take the
field ? and, in the second place, in the event of their being called upon to take the
field, have they made any sort of arrangement by which they could secure medical
aid and the assistance of trained hospital nurses ?

Mr. Fublky : Having been very much out of the country of late years, I am not
aware that we possess auy material at all. I believe we have two or three ambulance
carriages presented by the French Society to us after the war, but Dr. Manley
mows more about that than I do.

FOB AID TO SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS IN WAR. 657

Mr. Longmokb : I am sorry to say the Society has no depot of stored, and,
secondly, that as far as I am aware it has not made any preparation for meeting the
demands which may be made upon it in time of war. I would also, as I hare been
called upon to s£eak again, merely call attention to one fact which has scarcely
been alluded to, but which has an important bearing on some of the observations
which have been made. Golonei Brackenbury mentioned that a great number
of irregularities took place under the Bed Cross during the Franco-German war.
One irregularity is sure to lead to other irregularities, and I must say that in the very
first place the tact of our National Aid Society interfering at all in that war was in
itself an irregularity. There is no treaty or legal enactment by which our National
Aid Society could under any circumstances rightly assume to itself an international
character, or by which any English person under any circumstances could "claim a
right by virtue of beinc a member of a Bed Cross Society to be on or near a field
of military operations in which foreign nations only were concerned. The Geneva
Convention simply legalizes and recognizes in each country a National Aid Society,
and that National Aid Society has no standing whatever until it has received- the
sanction and has come more or less under the authority of the Minister of War
of that country. The Convention of Geneva most strictly excludes all reference
to independent volunteers. There is no mention of a volunteer, separate from
the military ambulances and hospitals of the belligerents, in the treaty from begin-
ning to end ; and, having taken part in framing the terms of the Convention, I
know for a fact that so general was the feeling for excluding such persons, seeing
the utter impossibility, without grave irregularities ensuing, of giving anybody
who might choose to take it the right as a volunteer to be on the field among
combatant Armies ; that had volunteers, independent of nationality and military
control, been introduced into the articles, the Convention would never have been
acceded to. Indeed, with regard to the French representatives who were at the
framing of that Convention, they mentioned that they had distinct orders if the
word " volunteer " were introduced into the treaty that they were immediately to
leave Geneva, and to take no further part in the proceedings. Those who will study
the Convention of Geneva carefully will see from beginning to end there is not a
single allusion to Bed Cross volunteers in it. The National Aid Society, when
properly placed under the authority of the Minister for War and duly recognised,
becomes for the time as much a part of the medical department of the Army as
the combatant volunteers are of the fighting ranks, and the properly accredited
members of the society then become entitled to certain privileges, which privileges are
laid down in the Convention of Geneva. The real problem which remains to he
solved in this country, and which in my opinion ought to be solved without delay,
is how on the one hand to preserve the general volunteer character of the National
Aid Society, and on the other to consider how it can best be subordinated to the
established military authorities, so that there may be no clashing with good order
and necessary discipline in time of war ; but, on the contrary, efficient co-operation
towards the common end in view. It is the same problem that has had to be
worked out with regard to volunteer combatants.

The Chaibjcait : I am very glad Mr.. Longmore has mentioned this, for I myself
to a certain extent was ignorant of the various details. I understand Mr. Long-
more to say that those under the Convention of Geneva must be backed by the
Government in order to be recognized by the belligerent forces.

Mr. LovoacDBi r Quite so.

The Chaikx A* : I am very glad these few expressions have shown exactly t\ e
status of the Bed Cross Society when war takes place. We have had a very interest-
ing lecture from Mr. Furley, and the subject is most interesting both to the civil
and more especially to the- military population of England, who have to suffer
during war in this terrible way on the field. The main point I cannot help
thinking, is the relief of the wounded on the field; that non-combatants should
be attached to each company to carry the wounded from the place where thev fall
to a place of temporary safety, and then to convey them to hospitals. That is the
main point which every General Officer would wish to see carried out in the Army,
and these are subjects that are debated and discussed with very great attention by
military men. I am very glad that the subjeet has been brought forward here, and
beg to offer Mr. Furley our best thanks for his very interesting lecture.

YOL. XX. 2 X

(BbmixiQ SJlwtmg-

Monday, May 29th, 1876.
Lutjt.-Colonxl R. J. LOYD-LINDSAY, #.«.. M.P., in the Chair.

NAMES of m£MT»era who joined the Institution between the 2nd and

29th May, 1876.

LIFE.

Carington, C. B., Lord, Capt. Royal Hone Guards.
Willis, G. H. S., C.B., Major-General, Unatt.
Aitchison, H. C, Commander R.N.
Wauchope, A. G., Lieut. 42nd Highlanders.
Aires, W. L., Lieut. B.A.

ANNUAL.

Goold- Adams, F. M., Lieut. B.A. Harrison, Wm, Capt. 19th West York B. T.
Smyth, H. F., Capt. B. A. Holt, G. Trefusis, Capt., late Indian Nary.

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

By Surgeon Sandford Moore, M.B., F.S.S., Instructor, Army Hospital

Corps.

My subject this evening is " Assistance to the Wounded in Time of
" War." The question of how to make adequate provision for meeting
the requirements of the wounded of our own Army, in the event of a
European campaign, and to which my remarks will chiefly refer, opens
up a field regarded at once as so large and so complicated that I feel
I owe an apology for presuming to deal with it, in any way whatever.

Since the year 1870-71, when it was my privilege to serve with
Mr. Manley's division of the so-called Woolwich ambulance in the
Loire campaign, and to be an eye-witness of the prompt relief afforded
to the wounded by the excellent system of field hospitals in use in the
Prussian Array, I have been deeply impressed with the importance of
the subject, so that, on recently being asked by the Council of the Royal
United Service Institution to read a paper embodying my views on
the subject of help to the wounded, although the time for preparation
placed at my disposal was short, I determined to try and do so.

It is very generally admitted that, in all Armies, the most defective
portion of the field arrangements, and that which has shown least
signs of progressive improvement, is that which concerns the medical
service. Nor, in one way, is this altogether a matter of surprise. In
the words of Mr. Longiuore, " The community at large are deeply
" interested, when attempts are made to improve the destructive im-
'* plements of war, and to ascertain the most effective T
'* employing them, for it is felt that power as well as pre

involved in their possession, but if, is a comparatively sh<

since attention was first ermine practica

A8SI8TANOE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIMS OF WAR- 659

" means of meeting the pressing necessities of those disabled by the
" effects of wax, and even during the interval of time which has since
" elapsed, interest in the question has been limited, with compara-
" tively few exceptions, to the persons officially concerned with the
41 special duties belonging to it." These remarks were originally
made with special reference to transport of the wounded, but they
apply, with equal force, to all field medical arrangements generally.

It is probably unreasonable to expect people to busy themselves with
a subject which affords such dry aud uninteresting materials, and
which does not press home to them until war breaks out, when, too
late, the picture, with all its attendant horrors, is held up for their
inspection. The solution of the problem at any time is attended with
difficulty ; then it is impossible, or well nigh impossible. The question
is principally one of men, " How form an adequate reserve of trained

surgeons, carriers, and nurses, ready to serve when wanted, and

ready to find employment for themselves when their services are no
" longer required by Government ? "

The personnel required for attendance upon the wounded in war-
time forms a body, whose numbers are largely in excess of those
required for the peace establishment. Approximately, more than
eight times the peace establishment would not over-estimate the
strength of the reserves required to enable the work to be done
efficiently ; and it will be shown, further on, that it is desirable that
all who are intended for this service should receive a course of special
instruction such as will fit them for the important duties required of
them in campaigning.

The requisite amount of reserve matSriel does not present nearly
the same difficulty as the personnel does. In well-organized European
Armies the sick and wounded are sent to the rear as fast as possible.
In all such evacuations common country carts and waggons, and rail-
way waggons, take the place of specially constructed sick- transport
conveyances, the use of the latter being restricted exclusively to the
battle field and its immediate vicinity.1 A slight increase in specially
constructed ambulance-conveyances would, however, doubtless be
necessary over and above the peace establishment.

To form the reserves and construct whatever proportion of ambu-
lance-conveyances may be necessary requires a certain expenditure —
and any Government which undertakes the task of bringing an incom-
plete medical department up to a war footing must be prepared to incur
expense — an outlay, too, for which a return seems so far distant that,

1 As an instance of evacuation by country carta, I may mention a Prussian evacua-
tion of wounded from Moree to Chartres, at which, by Mr. Man ley's orders, I
assisted in December, 1870. I brought with me three ambulance-waggons of the
National Aid Society ; the Prussians had forty and odd common country carts. On
the 20th, at noon, we commenced to load our waggons, and took up 260 wounded ;
with these we marched to Cloyes, at which place we arrived at 2 A.M. on the 21st.
The wounded were there placed in the Mairie for a few hours' rest. At 2 p.m. we
started for Chartres, which place we did not reach until 6 a.m. on the morning of
the 22nd— a distance of not much under sixty-five English miles in less than forty -
light hours, including halts.

2x2

660 ASSISTANCE TO THB WOUNDED IN TIME OP WAR.

to many in peace time, it would no doubt appear to be quite uncalled
for, if not unjustifiable ; and, although no serious person probably could
be found in any country to dispute, for a moment, that the nation is
not under an absolute obligation to provide for the wants and proper
care of its wounded soldiers, still the fact remains that, from some
such cause or causes as are above enumerated, the army medical service
in many countries — in nearly all — remains in an imperfect condition,
being, from its in expansibility, quite unable to respond to the calls
made upon it in war-time.

The history of international philanthropy has clearly demonstrated
that, not only has the defective nature of the official medical arrange-
ments generally been recognised, but that strenuous private efforts have
persistently been made to provide a remedy. In 1863, we had National
Committees formed for the express purpose of becoming the agents of
the public at large for supplementing the regular hospital service in
war-time. In 1864 was signed the Geneva Convention, having for its
object the neutralization of the wounded of belligerent Armies, and
the materiel and personnel necessary for their care and treatment — a
further step in ameliorating the wounded soldiers' condition and
materially lessening his misfortunes — and since that date, whenever
hostilities have occurred to iuterrupt the peace of Europe, — in Schles-
wig-Holst ein, in the Austro- and Franco- Prussian campaigns, — the
National Committees have irrefutably proved, by their career of
usefulness, not only how invaluable their services were on these
occasions, but also, in proportion to the amount of work done, the
existence of gaps in the official medical arrangements of the contend-
ing forces.

In the Franco-Prussian war, in the early part of the war, had the
arrangements been satisfactory, Sir H. Havelock would not have had it
in his power to write from Pont-a-Mousson, on the 21st of August, —
" It makes me sick at heart to see the scenes of suffering that cannot
" be relieved, first, from want of appliances, next, because surgeons are
" too few for the work. All the French wounded have fallen into the
" hands of the Germans. There are actually numbers of wounded,
" struck on the 16th and 18th, who have only had their wounds dressed
" on the field when hit, and never Bince." Under the Geneva Con-
vention every facility was given for a portion of the French medical
service being left behind to look after the French wounded who fell
into the hands of the enemy on this and other occasions. Two cir-
cumstances may have assisted in causing this omission — one, the now
notorious state of ignorance of the Officers and men of the French
Army concerning the purport, or existence even of the Articles of
the Geneva Convention, and the other, a short-handed medical service.
Both may have had a share in its production, but I am inclined to
think the latter.

Even the Prussians, with their wonderfully arranged organization,
succumbed here and there to the press of difficulties. Medical aid was
wanting in the first battles, although, at the beginning of the war, they
had enrolled 2,700 surgeons, and provided hospital effects for 40,000
beds.

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 661

At Saarbruck the natives, for two whole days, drew the wounded
from the field in country carts, and brought them to their homes.

After Weissembourg, some of the wounded lay for two whole days
where they fell, and in Remilly, writes M. Pirogoff, a street was
pointed out in which 1,000 wounded were laid down, having been
travelling thither for two days and two nights from Gravelotte. " From
" the scene of action at Metz," the same writer remarks, " 3,000
44 wounded were sent to Gorze, where Professor Langenbeck with four
" assistants was, and such was the pressure that they could only receive
" the most necessary dressing, prior to being passed on to places of
" greater acooinmodation.''

The medical service of the Armies of Europe when in the field is
conducted upon one or other of two general principles. One principle,
the more modern, is the principle of separating the wounded from the
moving force, then isolating and distributing them. For this, a
system of field hospitals is requisite. The other principle is the
principle of conveying the wounded in company with the moving
force. For this, a large ambulance transport is requisite. The former
is the one on which the Prussian medical service is conducted, the
latter is the one on which the British medical service has hitherto
been conducted, and which, to a certain extent, in so far as one can
judge from the autumn manoeuvres and in the absence of any late ex-
perience of British troops in a European campaign, is interwoven with
our military system in the present day. For example, we read in
accounts of the Peninsular campaigns that it was the duty of the
principal medical officer to see that, however short a time a battalion
or corps rested in a place, a regimental hospital was established;
indeed, as it carried with it medicines, bedding, stores, and all
the materials of a hospital, a regiment might be said to have its
hospital established even on the march. It was frequently esta-
blished in the face of an enemy, and nearly within reach of his gans.
By this system as few men as possible were separated from the moving
force, and these, the most severely wounded only, who were sent back,
on any available transport, commissariat carts, bullock carts, Ac., to
the nearest town where a general hospital was established. An
attempt was not made, at any time during the Peninsular war, to
establish field hospitals, by which means the principle of separation
can be effected. In the Crimean war there was no opportunity of
introducing a system of field hospitals, for then the Army was sta-
tionary, or nearly so, and close to its base. In India, the transport,
&c, is so different to that required at home, that the methods in
use there cannot be applied to European campaigns, while for each
of our little wars special arrangements require to be made.

An American surgeon of great experience remarks, "By a rapid
" dispersion of the wounded the fighting force is less diminished than
" by any other plan. Fewer combatants are withdrawn from their
" proper duties to attend to their sick and wounded comrades. The
" number of sick and wounded engaging in fresh active service will
" be greater by this arrangement than by any other, provided that
" there be such an enforcement of discipline in the base hospitals as

662 A88I8TANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

u will ensure the prompt return of convalescents, and large accumu-
" lations of hospital supplies with the Army become superfluous.
" Lastly, the most important consideration is the most obvious, the
" distribution of sick and wounded prevents the generation of those

pestilences that are the greatest scourge of armies. The sick and

wounded avoid infecting each other, and those who are well escape
u contagion."

The converse may be expected where accumulations of the sick and
mounded are formed and carried with the marching columns. The
presence of such accumulations will depress healthy comrades, and
may even influence the progress of the campaign, for advantages
attained by a rapid onward movement of the force cannot be expected
to accrue while it remains encumbered with long convoys of sick and
wounded. The enormous number of ambulance-waggons, vehicles
specially constructed for sick-transport, and of little use for other
purposes, required when this principle is adopted, is another very
serious objection. For example, in the British Service, 27 ambulance
waggons are required per brigade, but only six per division of two
brigades in the Prussian Service, or an economy in these vehicles of
about 90 per cent. The six Prussian waggons are supplemented by
four movable field hospitals (800 beds), with a reserve of two field
hospitals (400 beds), which afford temporary ward-shelter to the whole
of the wounded who are not able to make their way further to the
rear, and until such time as they can be removed, while the 27 British
waggons are supplemented by two field hospitals, with a reserve of
one and three-quarter field hospitals, in which only the very severely
wounded are afforded ward-shelter until their removal to some garrison
hospital in towns in the rear, while the remainder of the wounded are
carried on with the moving force.

And at this point I would ask permission to describe briefly the
Prussian arrangements for the care and removal of the wounded,
and for this I shall borrow largely from Dr. FitzQerald's excellent
report on the subject. I am no advocate for Prussianising our
medical department unless it can be clearly demonstrated that we
should be decidedly benefited by the change. Personally I believe the
Prussian system could be modified so as to be made applicable to the
British Service. Certain I am that on the whole it worked remark-
ably well in 1870-71. Its sanitary detachments are spoken of by both
Prussian Officers and men in the very highest terms of praise, and
are of such recognised proved utility that their number is to be con-
siderably increased for the future.

A Prussian battalion takes the field with a medicine cart, and a few
stretchers, and a proportion of surgeons and auxiliary bearers — two
of the former and four men per company of the latter. The battalion
carries with it no regimental hospital equipment, nor any equipment
for opening a detachment hospital.

In minor actions, first assistance to the wounded is given by the
battalion surgeons and auxiliary bearers. Both advance with their
battalions under fire, and tender what aid they can to those who fall.
The medicine cart and stretchers* are advanced as far as possible, and

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 663

" bandaging places," as shown in the diagram, are formed just beyond
rifle range under the orders of the Officer commanding. The auxiliary

AMNELPLAT2

IANDACING
PLACE

FIELD
HOSPITAL

bearers then carry back the severely wounded, who are unable to walk,
on their stretchers to the bandaging places. Care, however, is taken
that the bearers do not congregate there, but return forthwith to the
front aa soon as their stretchers are unloaded. The senior regimental
surgeon conducts these " bandaging places." Injuries are there ex-
amined, dressings applied, and the necessary surgical operations per-
formed ; and, moreover, measures are taken for the removal of the
wounded, when dressed, to shelter, where they are to receive such
further attention aa they may require until removed to the etappen or
field hospitals. For these slight engagements, the ambulance waggons
are not brought up, nor are the field hospitals unless by the special
requisition of the General commanding the divison.

If the engagement becomes general, other arrangements than those
above enumerated are made. In such a case the sanitary detachments
and field hospitals, which follow the advancing Army as closely as
possible, are then thrown forward, the sanitary detachment to replace
or supplement the auxiliary bearers in carrying the wounded off the
field, and the field hospitals to provide the temporary ward accommo'-

664 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

'dation for the wounded, which it is absolutely necessary for them to
have until their farther removal to base hospitals in the rear.

The composition of a sanitary detachment is shown in the table
below.1 It is made up of a certain fixed proportion of ambulance-car-
riages and store- waggons and ambulance equipment, as well as surgeons,
bearers, nurses, and Train soldiers, the duty of the latter being to act
as grooms, drivers, &c. There are three sanitary • detachments to
each Army-Corps. One is permanently attached to each of the two
infantry divisions, and the third is held in reserve at the disposal of
the General commanding.

To provide ward-accemmodation for the wounded forms no part of
the functions of the sanitary detachment. Its duties simply embrace
the formation of bandaging places, and the collection and removal of
wounded from the field of battle ; and on the forward movement of
the Army after a battle, it, or at least one section of it, quickly foUews
its division. The ambulance waggons are at no time used for the
conveyance of sick or wounded on the line of march, or in camps, nor
are they ever employed in evacuations of sick or wounded.

The Divisional Commander issues the order for the movement of
the sanitary detachment into action, and fixes upon the points where
the bandaging places shall be established, appropriate buildings being
utilised if such exist, if not an operating tent is pitched in the most
sheltered situation. These are to be denoted by the Red Cross Flag,
and after dark by a red lantern.

Here the ambulance surgeons and a proportion of the regimental
surgeons are assembled, the store waggons unpacked, ehloroform
and dressings got in readiness, and the arrival of the first party of
wounded from the fighting line awaited, these soon begin to arrive,
those able to walk first, those severely wounded carried by the bearers
on stretchers. In the mean ;<time, while this is being accomplished,
the ambulance waggons and bearers, led by their Officers, are to
be pushed forward by the best road available to the sammelplats
(shown in the diagram), the furthest point to which it is considered

1 'Sanitary Detachment.
MatSriel. Personnel.

2 sanitary waggons. 1 first lieutenant.

2 baggage waggons. 1 second lieutenant.

6 ambulance waggons. 1 paymaster.

42 stretchers. 1 sergeant-major.

-3 wheeled atretcher-supporU. 12 under officers.

12 corporals and second-period men.
124 sick-bearers.
1 first staff surgeon.
1 second staff surgeon.
6 assistant surgeons.

1 field apothecary.

2 upper hospital attendants.
6 hospital attendants.

8 hospital orderlies.
8 train corporals (mounted) .
8 train under officers (mounted).
23 tain soldiers.

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 665

expedient to bring ambulance waggons. There the waggons are to be
drawn up and reversed, and the bearers hurried forward by their
Officers to search for -and collect the wounded. The surgeons at the
bandaging place are formed into three divisions by the Directing
Surgeon.

The first division regularly examine all who arrive. Those with
slight wounds are dressed and sent further on. The mortally wounded
are placed aside in a sheltered spot, as further removal would augment
their sufferings.

The second division apply difficult bandages, plaster of Paris, dex-
trine, Ac., for fracture cases.

The third division undertake the performance of all capital opera-
tions which must be performed without delay. A " diagnosis tablet "
is then attached to each man's clothes, recording the description of the
injury and other particulars, which are of great utility in preventing
repeated examinations by successive surgeons, into whose hands he may
pass, and facilitates the distribution of the wounded in directions and
to distances suitable to their injuries.

The Directing Surgeon then settles the further distribution of the
wounded. The slightly wounded are sent to the etappen hospitals, the
remainder to the field hospitals ; the most severely to the nearest, and
those able to walk on foot ; those unable to walk, by the ambulance
waggons. This course having been followed, the sanitary detachment
is ready to march after its division. If a retrograde movement has to
be made, the Directing Surgeon arranges who of the medical officers
and subordinates, as well as what stores, shall be left behind with the
wounded.

To afford the requisite temporary ward-shelter, there are twelve field
hospitals to each Army Corps, four attached to each of the divisions, and
four held in reserve. Each possesses its fixed establishment of surgeons
and subordinates, stores, transport, and equipment, and being extremely
movable, can rapidly follow the advancing Division or Army Corps.
These field hospitals are opened in towns, villages, and detached build-
ings in the vicinity of the operating force. As few as possible are brought
into activity at a time, the rest are kept packed and ready for a sudden
move. When a general engagement is expected, farm-houses, &c., are
selected, as near the bandaging places as possible, and are made com*
fortable, as the wounded may have to be detained there a few days or
longer, every effort being made to transfer them to the reserve hospitals
as fast as their condition admits. When a field hospital cannot be
evacuated, it ceases for a time to belong to its own Army Corps, and is
associated with the etappen system. As soon as it is evacuated it is
free to move to rejoin the corps to which it belongs. The etappen
hospitals, to which allusion has been made, are situated along the line
of communications, about 100 miles apart on lines of railway, or 20
miles apart on the etappen roads, and form resting-places for invalids
returning home. The reserve hospitals are formed for patients
evacuated from the field- or etappen-hoBpitals, and exist during the
whole time of the war.

Under this system, during the removal of the wounded man from

666 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

the place where he falls to his own town hospital in Germany, his
safety is intrusted to two distinct classes of subordinates, and I desire
particularly to draw attention to this division, as I am convinced that
therein lies the key to any thorough plan for assisting the wounded in
war time.

The two classes are —

1. Bearers.

2. Hospital-orderlies, or nurses.

The duties of bearers may be summarized thus : they search for the
wounded during and after an engagement, and administer water or
other refreshment, to them. They examine the whole of the fallen,
and separate the Hying from the dead. The living are then removed
either to the sammelplatz, or if there are no ambulance-waggons
available there, to the nearest bandaging-place. They assist in load-
ing the waggons and wheeled stretchers at the sammelplatz, and
immediately return to the front to search for other wounded. Four
bearers form a stretcher-party, two to carry the stretcher, and two to
act as a reserve, and carry accoutrements, paeks, <fcc., not only those
belonging to the wounded man, but any stray ones lying about the
field. Cases of emergency, such as hemorrhage, &c, are to be treated
by the bearers, but only in the unavoidable absence of the surgeon ;
and, lastly, the bearer company is required to find a guard for its
stores and waggons on the line of march, and at the head-quarters of
the sanitary detachment.

For the performance of such duties as these it will be obvious- that
skill, powers of endurance, intelligence, and courage require to be com-
bined in no small degree in one and the same individual, but above all,
that bearers must be disciplined, not necessarily highly trained, troops.
The duty is at times dangerous and fatiguing in the extreme. Again
and again has the bearer to cross and recross the zone between the
fighting line and the sammelplatz or bandaging-place — the zone in fact
of rifle fire — it may be each time in doing so exposed to great risk. I think,
therefore, it will be readily admitted that no other than a corps with a
distinct military organization need attempt to discharge such duties,
and in such a situation. It requires Officers and non-commissioned officers,
who themselves understand the details of the work the bearers will be
called on to perform, and who appreciate the necessities they will have
to meet, to command, and soldiers, masters of the details, to execute
the commands. A body of trained civilians may be perfect in every
respect but the one, but without strict rules of discipline must speedily
become a disorganised mob on the battle-field. I do not, however, wish
to be understood to say that under no circumstances could trained
civilians be made to supplement the military establishment. Instances
must of course again occur when after the fighting has terminated, the
military establishment finds itself unable to cope with the large numbers
of wounded still remaining on the field ; then, of course, there would
be nothing to prevent the employment of trained civilians to any extent
that might be thought necessary. But these instances are exceptional,
and besides there must always be a difficulty in assembling a body of
civilians, whose presence for all other purposes would be positively

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 667

hurtful in the front, and in timing them to arrive <m the battle-field
exactly when their services were most needed.

That the work the bearer has to perform is sufficiently irksome and
fatiguing, and demands considerable powers of endurance, will be mani-
fest from a simple calculation, which I extract from an excellent trans-
lation of Surgeon- Major Al cock's. For each severely wounded man
four stretcher-bearers are required in the Prussian service, and as the
sammelplatz, or point where the ambulance- waggons are drawn up,
cannot be established nearer the fighting line than half a mile, it
follows that to bring in ten men the four bearers must walk ten miles,
and to bring in 1,000 men will therefore require 400 bearers at the
lowest calculation, and this, too, assuming the most favourable condi-
tions, viz., that the line traversed between these two points is the
direct line, and that the bearers are not obliged to turn aside through
unevenness of the ground, <fec. The same writer, referring to the
earlier battles of the war, makes the remark : — " In the Prussian ser-
" vice, as only 400 bearers were allowed to each Army Corps, it is easy
" to understand why the wounded lay whole days and nights upon the
u field of battle." This the Prussians intend to rectify, as has already
been mentioned, by increasing the number of sanitary detachments.

Bearers are selected in the following manner in the Prussian service :
two men per infantry or Jager company of two years' service are trained
annually during the winter months as bearers, and out of these the
sanitary detachments are formed in the event of war. The auxiliary
bearers, to the number of four men per company are trained in the
same manner and at the same time. On the termination of the period
of training the bearers return to their duty in the ranks of the army.

I would next request to be allowed to glance at the training given to
the Prussian bearer. It is partly theoretical and partly practical. The
theoretical includes a slight knowledge of such subjects as anatomy,
gun-shot wounds and their immediate attention, of appliances used in
dressing, the mode of distinguishing real from apparent death, &c.
The practical includes exercises in loading and unloading sick-transport
conveyances, stretchers, waggons, <fcc, in marching with them, and
handling them generally.

The period of training does not occupy above a month. In the fol-
lowing spring or summer, bearers trained during the winter are assem-
bled with the Train for ten days' exercise. A sanitary detachment is
formed, and marched out into the country, and various situations selected
to represent the scene of a general engagement. A party of men iB
detailed to represent the wounded requiring carriage ; these are sent
on in front, and distributed in a lying-down position. To the coat of
each a small label is attached, and on this label written the description
of wound the man was supposed to have received. The sanitary de-
tachment is then halted and waggons reversed, stretchers and ban-
dages, <&c, got out, the bandaging-tent pitched, and the bearers
advanced with their stretchers to the wounded, to dress them, and
bring them in to the waggons. At the bandaging-tent the injury is
examined by the surgeon, and if nothing further is required, the
wounded are placed in the ambulance-waggons, ready for further

668 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

removal to the rear. These exercises are conducted by the garrison
medical instructor. It is the opinion of an excellent judge of these
matters " that the practical application of such exercises on a battle-
" field would contribute towards saving many lives that would other-
u wise be lost, but especially would be the means of preventing aggra-
" vation of fractures and other injuries, that would invariably suffer
" under like circumstances to such an extent as to render all attempts
" at conservative surgical practice unavailing, if no system of the kind
" were followed, nor corresponding aid available."1

Returning to the personnel, to whom the safety of the lives of
German wounded is intrusted in war-time, the second class comprises
the hospital orderlies, or nursing staff. These men are employed solely
in the hospitals, as ward attendants on the wounded ; they form an
essential part of the staff of all reserve hospitals, of the etappen hos-
pitals along the line of communications, of all field hospitals, and to a
less extent of the sanitary detachments, being, in the latter case,
intended for duty at the various bandaging places. Bringing in the
wounded from the battle-field on stretchers, <fcc, forms no part of
their functions, nor are they ever employed on such duty; their
special province is nursing : at the door of the bandaging tent their
duties begin, and, generally speaking, those of the bearers end ; while
from this outset, until the wounded soldier's discharge from hospital —
be it field, etappen, or reserve hospital, or death — the military nurse
is called on to perform certain special duties, requiring no small
amount of special knowledge, dexterity and skill, and the trustworthy
execution of which is of such absolute necessity and vital importance
to those most concerned. For example, at the bandaging places they
assist the surgeons in dressing the slightly wounded, in applying
such difficult bandages as plaster of Paris, dextrine, <fcc, in cases of
fracture, in capital operations, and in attaching and making out
" diagnosis labels " — in short, all subordinate duties are assigned to
them by the surgeon. They have, besides, to assist in moving the
wounded into the ambulance waggons for further distribution to the
rear, in loading railway hospital trains, in packing and unpacking
hospital equipment, and in pitching and striking the bandaging tents.
Similarly in base hospitals, all the subordinate duties are assigned to
them, so that they thus become very valuable aids to the Medical
Department.

It must be manifest that, for the efficient discharge of these duties,
very high class men are required — steady, intelligent, and trustworthy,
and well versed in the special duties they will be called on to perform
— if not, the wounded must proportionately in some ways suffer. As
to whether hospital orderlies should be soldiers or civilians ; to my
mind, if forthcoming, no nurses should be employed on service other
than military nurses ; but, at the same time, the same necessity for a
distinctly military body does not exist in this case as in the case of
bearers; bearers are employed exclusively in the midst of active
operations, whilst only a portion — a small portion — of the nursing

1 Prof. Longmore.

ABSI8TANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 669

staff is there employed, the remainder being distributed along the
line of commnnications, where thers is comparatively little danger to
be encountered or risk to be run, and therefore not so much necessity
for strict discipline. To be able to place dependence, however, upon
that portion which is employed in the field hospitals and at the band-
aging places demands a military organization ; while civilians, with
some distinctive dress, and with habits of obedience to the orders of
superiors, and who had received the necessary training beforehand,
might be employed in such situations as intermediate and base hos-
pitals, and in railway hospital trains.

The course of training for the Prussian hospital orderly or military
nurse embraces all these subjects, theoretical and practical, required
by nurses in civil hospitals, to which, however, is superadded such
knowledge of military medical subjects, with particular reference to
field hospital equipment and sick-transport conveyances, as will fit
them for the exigencies of campaigning.

No fixed period is laid down for the course of training of a Prussian
hospital orderly, but as the range of subjects is wider, and the ward
training requires time, it considerably exceeds the period required for
training a bearer. To train a nurse in civil hospitals occupies from
six months to one year and a half. I observe that the latter is the
probationary period laid down in Miss Nightingale's recently pro-
posed scheme for establishing a training school for district nurses in
London. Probably from six months to a year would be the general
average time required. But under no circumstances should the course
occupy less than four months, which is the least time it is possible for
even intelligent men to become thoroughly acquainted with their
duties — a conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from the
experience already gained by some hundreds of men who have passed
through my hands at the Army Hospital Corps Training School. The
necessity for keeping up a large reserve of orderlies in peace time
will therefore be at once obvious — a necessity which, owing to the
longer probationary period* is even, more pressing than keeping up a
strong reserve of bearers.

A word as to my professional brethren in the Prussian medical
service.

. The Prussian surgeon is taught to consider himself before all things
a soldier, and his avocation as one to be practised under fire ; and as a
proof that such is the case, it is mentioned that no less a number than 80
Prussian surgeons fell in battle in the Franco- Prussian war of 1870-71.
On first entering the Service, he is drilled on foot and in the riding
school for a period of about six months, and this drilling goes on
hand-in-hand with his military medical studies. At the termination
of this probationary period, he thus not alone becomes disciplined
himself, but has learnt the art of dealing with the disciplined — no small
advantage in itself, a knowledge of the ways and wants of soldiers
being absolutely necessary for him — and at the same time acquires
that knowledge of his speciality by which alone subsequent success
can be attained in the practice of military sanitation.

1 am aware that there are those who would have us believe that civil

670 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

surgery and hygiene are one and the same thing as military surgery
and hygiene, and that those who practise the former may, without
farther training, devote themselves to the latter. I for one, with all
deference, however, hold a different opinion. Civil and military prac-
tice are the same so far only as their principles are concerned. The
principles of both are the same, but the mode of application is modified.
The civil surgeon, who has not studied military sanitation in all its
branches, will find this to his cost, if he arrive for the first time at
the seat of war, and is placed without an experienced adviser in
a position of responsibility. He, without special training, can have
no conception of the countless extemporaneous expedients that are to
be employed for the relief of the wounded when the usual resources
fail. His first experiments will possibly be a series of mistakes,
which may or may not be irretrievable, while, if a thoughtful observer,
the remainder of his time will be spent in improving or adding to the
store of special knowledge, with a full complement of which he should
have set out in the first instance. For example, take the one case of
plaster of Paris splints, so much used in transporting wounded, and
so little in civil life ; although this might appear a simple apparatus
to apply, I would strongly recommend those who are not adepts in its
application, and who have not treated cases of fracture with it before,
to make their first experiments on gun-shot fractures.

But although the Prussian surgeon is formed in this stern mould,
which fits him to exercise powers of command over hospital sub-
ordinates (and in which he differs so materially from the surgeons of
our own Service), and which powers have, since the war, been con-
siderably added to, his position is not a satisfactory one on the field
of battle. He is shorn of responsibility often when the interests of
the wounded can ill afford him to lose it.

" Every one will probably be willing to admit that the duty of
" clearing a field of battle is of vast importance, and that it may be
" accomplished with rapidity and methodically, the general direction
" should be under one head, responsible only to the General .oom-
" manding for its efficient performance. It seems to be equally clear
" that the responsibility of this strictly professional duty should be
" borne by the principal medical officer of each division, adequate means
" being placed at his disposal for its proper execution. These means
" comprising sanitary detachments and field hospitals or other ambu-
" lance train, which should be commanded by its own officers, but at
" the same time with such regulations as will enable the responsible
" officer to* direct the employment of the men and conveyances
" wherever and in whatever way they are most likely to serve the
" interests of the wounded."

But in the Prussian Service this course does not obtain — the
General, one would think burdened with quite enough work in direct-
ing the movements of hia division, without requiring to work out
details which might with propriety be entrusted to responsible sub-
ordinates— in this case the principal medical officer — takes the general
direction out of the principal medical officer's hands, selects the sites
for bandaging places and for field hospitals, and controls the move-

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IK TIME OF WAR. 671

mente of the sanitary detachments, with what result can easily be
surmised. Sometimes the sanitary detachments or field hospitals
are moved to a part of the battle-field where their services are least
required, thus throwing double work on the bearers ; and sometimes
the General, occupied with more pressing work, forgets all about the
sanitary detachment, and leaves it standing idle, when it might be
actively employed elsewhere. The remedy for this is easily supplied.
Give the general direction of this professional duty to one officer, who
has nothing else to think of, and hold him responsible for its execu-
tion ; and I have no hesitation in saying that, if the right man be in
the right place, the duty would be more efficiently done than under
any other plan. This certainly is one point where the Germans have
systematised to too great an extent

On the other hand, in the American war of the rebellion, where
another course was pursued, and where the commanders recognised
and practised the principle of holding the chiefs of the medical depart-
ment directly responsible for the execution of all field medical duties,
investing them beforehand with the requisite authority, it is very
remarkable how small was the mortality, much smaller than that
recorded in any previous wars ; and that the details were efficiently
executed was made manifest by the unanimity which prevailed in the
many favourable criticisms which appeared after the war, and since
that time. As it bears on the subject in hand, I make no apology for
quoting a short extract, showing the success of the system pursued,
from Circular No. 6, of November, 1865, of the American official
circulars. " Never before in the history of the world was so vast a
" system of hospitals brought into existence in so short a time. Never
" before were such establishments in time of war so little crowded or
" so liberally supplied. They differed, too, from the hospitals of other
" nations, in being under the command of medical officers. Instead
" of placing at the head of establishments intended for the treatment
" of disease and wounds, Officers of the line, who, whatever their other
" accomplishments, could not be expected to understand the require-
" ments of medical science, and who, with the best intentions in the
world, might seriously embarrass the action of the surgeon, as was
sadly the case in the Crimean war, and as has since been the case
" in the English hospitals, our Government, with a wiser discretion,
" made 4 he surgeon the commandant of the hospital, and thus, while
" holding him responsible for the results of its management, put into
" his power to do much to make those results favourable. The medical
" staff can point with pride to the consequence of this liberal course.
" Never before in the history of the world has the mortality in military
" hospitals been so small, and never have such establishments so com-
" pletely escaped from diseases generated within their walls."

I fear I have dwelt on this well-devised and elaborate system of the
Prussians — on its advantages and drawbacks — at a length which must
have severely tested the patience of my hearers, but not at greater length
than its importance demanded, for I believe it is a system which is not
generally known, and that it forms the nearest approach to solving
the difficulty of how to make adequate provision for assisting the

G72 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OP WAR.

wounded in time of war in Europe. When we begin to compare the
Prussian system with our own, we find that, in the British service, no
distinction seems to be drawn between bearers and hospital orderlies —
all hospital attendants are alike styled Army Hospital Corps men ; and,
in reality, our Army Hospital Corps men are trained to act in either
capacity — either as bearers or nurses. Some therefore on service would
act as bearers and some as orderlies or nurses. But, from what has been
already stated, this is clearly a wrong principle to* go on. A brief
course of training in rudimentary subjects suffices to turn out a
bearer. * To employ a man, therefore, in the capacity of bearer who
has received the complex education required by an orderly is a mere
waste of power — a course which may not inaptly be compared to
cutting blocks with razors. The orderly's education fits him for a
higher sphere, for the performance of a higher class of duties ; and
besides, being a much more costly individual to the State, from bis
prolonged probationary course than a bearer, he is more difficult to
obtain, or replace, and in war time the extravagance becomes all the
more apparent, in any Army like ours, which is recruited solely by
voluntary enlistment-

Under the mobilization scheme which was published in the Army
List for August, 1875, it appears that our active Army, which i&
intended for service in the event of invasion, or in a European cam-
paign, is to comprise eight Army Corps. At the same time a fixed
medical department was laid down for each Army Corps, the com-
position of which is shown below.* Amongst other items, it will
be seen that 2,195 Army Hospital Corps men is the number required
for an Army Corps on a war footing, 1,000 being stated as being for
sanitary detachments, and therefore, I presume, to act as bearers, and
the remainder to aet as hospital orderlies. I believe I am correct in
saying that the total existing strength of the Army Hospital Corps does
not exceed 1,500 men ; not sufficient, therefore, for supplying even one
Army Corps. This. Being the case, it may not be devoid of interest to
inquire by what means the present strength of the corps can be supple-
mented, so as to bring the total up to 16,000 men, the total number
required at 2,000p men per Army Corps* A variety of suggestions
have been advanced, from time to time, with a view to solving thin
particular difficulty. I propose now briefly to review the more promi-
nent ones. It has been proposed to supplement the corps —

1. By increasing its existing strength to that required.

2. By employing bandsmen.

3. By employing untrained combatants from the ranks.

As to the first plan, viz., increasing- the existing strength tor that
required, it certainly would meet the difficulty in one sense, but only
by creating a more formidable one. In what manner could the excess
(about 13,000 or 14,000 men) over and above the peace establish-

1 War Strength of Medical Department with an Army. Corps.

{Medical officers .... 267 f Ambulance waggons . 268

Other officers 80 Matiriel. < Gh S. waggon* 150

Army Hospital Corps 2,195 [ Draught horses 418

Drivers 568

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 673

ment of military hespitals be employed in peace-time. There would
be no field for their employment in hospitals, or in acting as bearers.
The institution therefore would not be* an economical one; besides,
those who have entertained the plan have for the moment forgotten
the mode in which the Army Hospital Corps is recruited. Its ranks
are filled by volunteers from the ranks of the regular army. Govern-
ment would not unnaturally be very unwilling to surrender so. large a
proportion of fighting men as 14,000 or 16,000 for non-combatant
duty. In brief, I do not believe that any government would entertain
the proposal for a moment.

Proposal No. !2, employing bandsmen, has very recently been
revived in the columns of an influential medical journal, for whose
views I have the highest respect, but with whom I must beg to differ on
this point. If bandsmen are taken to supplement the Army Hospital
Corps, " it must be remembered they have received no training either
" to act in the capacity of bearer or nurse, and, even if trained, have
" no organization which would insure the duty being performed."
Besides, it is highly improbable that regimental officers would quietly
submit to their bandsmen being taken away for periodical training,
which would be necessary if this proposal were adopted, or for service
with sanitary detachments, or for nurses in field hospitals — enliven-
ing airs which would make the men step out and keep their spirits up,
will be considered, and very justly, much more the province of the
bandsman on active service by the vast majority of officers. A sort
of tradition, I am aware, exists in the army at large, that bandsmen
are the men who may have to perform the duty of bearers in action,
and they certainly appear to have been so employed in the Peninsular
war, but I have been unable to find any regulation which directs their
being so employed on service. But even if it be decided that they are
to be so employed with a view to supplementing the Army Hospital
Corps, it will be found that there is only a sufficient number of them
partly to accomplish this end. If the twenty-one infantry regiments
in an Army Corps supplied a quota of say 30 bandsmen each, this would
give a total of 630 men per Army Corps, while a sum total of 2,000
and odd is required per Army Corps. This plan therefore is a
notoriously inefficient proceeding.

As to the third proposal, should untrained combatants quit the ranks
to perform the duty ? This certainly has been, for the most part,
the way in the British service in which it has hitherto been done, but
it is open to several objections. The inevitable consequence must be
an aggravation of the injuries of the wounded, and a prolongation of
their sufferings ; besides, a still graver objection arises from the preju-
dicial effect of such a plan upon discipline. But on this point I can-
not do better than quote the words of Lord Strathnairn, when Commis-
sioner at the French head-quarters in the Crimea : " Transport of the
" wounded from the field of battle to a good ambulance, besides satis-
" fying the rights of humanity and sustaining that spirit of confidence
" in the soldier, which, like discipline, should never leave him, has
" another admirable effect: it obviates the incalculable disadvantage
" of troops engaged in action leaving their ranks for the purpose of

VOL. XX. 2 T

674 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

" carrying off the wounded. Certainly good soldiers have no other
" motive in leaving their ranks for this purpose than sympathy for a
" suffering comrade. But, on the other hand, all know that in a field
" of battle there are at times men of a different description, who either
" seek rest, or refreshment, or are as desirous of placing themselves as
" their comrades in a place of safety, and four or five such men are
" seen assisting a man for whom one attendant would be sufficient.
" Nothing is so likely to insure a reverse in action as the want of con-
" fidence and the gaps caused by men leaving their ranks to carry
" away the wounded, which is most practised when it is most preju-
" dicial, at the time and places when and where the enemy has caused
" the most casualties, and, consequently, when every available man
" should be present and ready to fill up broken lines, and assist by his
" concurrence and example in resisting or attacking the enemy."

Each of these plans for supplementing the Army Hospital Corps
proving impracticable or objectionable, there is but one approximate
solution of the difficulty possible, viz., to draw on the auxiliary forces
(the Volunteers) for the strictly military portion of the personnel
required, and on the National Aid Society for the civil portion.
This idea in its entirety has not originated with me, it has been
advanced by Colonel Loyd- Lindsay, Professor Longmore, Major
Burgess, and several veteran philanthropists; but so far as I know
has never gone beyond the shape of a suggestion.

The regular forces contribute their quota to the Medical Depart-
ment in the Army Hospital Corps,, and as the Auxiliary forces now
form a component part of the military system there surely can be
no valid reason why they should not contribute theirs. Volunteers,
from their general average intelligence being greater than that of
Militiamen, would be a more suitable material to form bearers out of.
I, therefore, name them. There are 1,747 companies of infantry
Volunteers ; if two men per company, strong, active, intelligent young
men, of not less than two or three year's service as Volunteers, volun-
teered for this duty and underwent the necessary training for one
month, at the end of that time the country would have 3,494 Volunteer
bearers thoroughly qualified, and in every respect ready to take the
field to act in that capacity. At the end of two months, if two more
men per company were trained, twice this number of bearers (6,988),
and at the end of three months, with six men trained per company,
we should have 10,482 bearers — a supply more than sufficient to
furnish bearers for our eight Army Corps; even if these were all
mobilized at one and the same time. The only outlay required to
obtain these 10,000, or even a larger number of bearers, would be
that necessary to defray the expenses of a medical instructor (with a
few Army Hospital Corps subordinates to assist), one of whom should
be sent to the head-quarters of each Army Corps, with all conveyances
and the apparatus necessary for him to commence the moment his
classes were formed. Volunteer and other buildings would possibly
be lent the Government for the exercises, &c. ; while the men were
being trained the exercises might then count as drills. On the
quota of men for the station being trained, the instructor would be

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAB. 675

directed to pack up his kit and move off to some other station, there
to begin his classes and so on, moving from place to place nntil the
entire nnmber of Volunteer bearers for the Army Corps was trained.
A proportion of Volunteer Officers and non-commissioned Officers
should be trained at the same time, so that they would be ready to
take command of the Volunteer sanitary detachments when these were
formed on mobilization. To complete and perfect the training, all
should be assembled for ten days' exercises in spring or summer, or
oftener if found necessary.

A code of regulations for Volunteer bearers, defining their duties,
and organization, and relation to the Army at large, would be all that
would be required to make the movement a success.

This, of course, is assuming that the proposal were congenial to
the temper and spirit of the Volunteer body. I, myself, believe it
would. The Volunteer cannot hope to serve the cause of patriotism
by evading any of the liabilities of his position, nor do I believe that
he would be found unwilling to undergo any of the requirements
physical or moral, which, in a state of invasion or general European
war, might in this way, or in fact in any other way, be imposed on
him.

Moreover, the employment of Volunteer bearers might not necessarily
be confined to the seat of war. In peace-time such a body could give
conclusive proofs of its utility at railway or factory accidents. A-
telegraph sent from the scene of a collision, for example, to the nearest
" volunteer bearer " station, would bring a bearer party, with stretchers
and dressings complete, by the next train, who would systematically set
to work to dress the wounds and clear away the wounded in a pre-
eminently satisfactory manner, such as unskilled labour could never
hope to approach, or to attain to.

With regard to the 568 drivers required per Army Corps on mobili-
zation to drive ambulance waggons, Ac., these might in some similar
manner be obtained from either Yeomanry or mounted Volunteer
regiments.

Such is the plan by which I assume we could supplement the
medical department of eight Army Corps, with the military increment
required to act as bearers.

As for the increment, which may either be military or civilian, viz.,
surgeons and orderlies, or nurses, when we come to enquire how it
can be provided, a problem of much greater difficulty is presented.
A great part, however, of this difficulty may be removed by a pre-
concerted arrangement with the National Aid Society. One func-
tion of this society might be to enroll, and where necessary, to teach, a
staff of nurses and surgeons, who would enter into an engagement to
serve either at home or abroad in the event of an European campaign,
and who could be depended upon to fulfil their engagements ; and as
a test of the vitality of the engagement, they might from time to time
be called on to serve with Army Corps on mobilization, or during
epidemics, etc. But at the same time it should be distinctly given to
be understood by these agents of the society that on their arrival at the
seat of war, it was the intention of the society to hand them over to

2y2

676 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

the General for employment tinder the Chief of the Medical Depart-
ment with the force in such situations at the base, or along the line
of communication, as their services might be required at. I do not
attempt to discuss details of how this could be done, for I am not
aware of the resources at the command of the society ; but of this I am
convinced, that no more signal service could be rendered the nation
than this very one to which I have been alluding. Material aid in
time of war, it appears to me, is quite a secondary- consideration for
the society, it is not so much stores as men that are wanted : money
can be made to purchase stores, but it takes time as well, to make
orderlies and surgeons ; and if the Franco-Prussian war be taken as
an indication of the suddenness and rapidity with which wars in future
will be commenced and conducted, there will not be time when once
war has broken out, to organize the Medical Department for the force
taking the field on its proper footing.

A reserve of some 1,000 surgeons and 8,000 orderlies or nurses is
required for our eight Army Corps on mobilization, and I candidly
confess I am unable to suggest any other mode by which these numbers
could be obtained economically.

Although I so strongly advocate the formation of a reserve of order-
lies and surgeons by the National Society, I would, moreover, suggest
the inexpediency of small flying ambulances being sent, with roving com-
missions, to the seat of war by it. These may or may not be useful, and
in the majority of instances, if the itinerary be closely examined, it will
be found that the " marching " days are ten times as numerous as the
" working " days. In short, I question their utility. They are likely to
hinder the movements of troops, and to embarrass baggage masters and
etappen commanders. I am aware that Mr. Manley's division of the
Woolwich ambulance has frequently been pointed to as illustrative of
the success of such small ambulances, but it must be borne in mind, in
connection with this, that Mr. Mauley, in addition to his other qualifi-
cations, was an Officer of great war experience, and his subordinates
disciplined soldiers, so that his ambulance was essentially a military
ambulance, which contributed far more to its success than either its
independence or compactness.

The disorder in the administration of the volunteer ambulances of
the French, which were purely civil institutions, u experience of great
value, if it prevents a repetition of this- kind of mistake on the part of
National Societies. For instance, the chief of the 5th French ambu-
lance writes : — " I might endeavour to show the improvements of
" various kinds of which the volunteer ambulance corps are susoep-
" tible. I shall, however, not go into details, as I believe that civil
" ambulances, so far as battle-fields are concerned, have played their
" role, and that role is finished." Again, the chief of the 6th am-
bulance writes : — " The sanitary service of the Army should have an
" organization wholly military, and in no way civil, upon the battle-
" field." The thirteen volunteer ambulances of the French National
Society, having been found wholly incompetent, were disbanded in

itober, 1870.

[ have time to mention only one other matter which might engage the

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OP WAB. 677

attention of the National Society, that is, the adaptation of railway
waggons for the conveyance of wounded. Railways are of great value
for removing wounded. The advantages offered by their use may be thus
summarized : — they enable the active part of the force to be rapidly dis-
encumbered of its wounded, and convey the ineffective soldiers to fixed
hospitals, remote from the seat of war. A permanent halt can then
be made in these situations, until recovery takes place. This expedites
recovery, and sends men quicker back to the ranks for duty. Besides,
railways assist in the dispersion of the wounded, and so diminish the
risk of epidemics. And, lastly, they tend greatly to do away with the
necessity for intermediate hospitals on the line of communications —
institutions which are costly to maintain, and too often hiding-places
for idleness, as was the case in the Peninsular war.

On British railroads there are three sorts of carriages which can be
utilized for the purpose of transporting severely wounded, requiring
the recumbent position : —

1. Goods waggons.

2. Second-class passenger carriages.

3. Specially constructed invalid carriages.

There is only one example of the class of invalid carriages in exist-
ence in England, as far as I am aware. It is employed, on the arrival
of the Indian troop ships, in conveying invalids requiring the re-
cumbent position, from Portsmouth to Netley. It is not probable that
ever any large number of these will be constructed, but, even if they
were, it does not follow that they could be got near enough the front
to be made available ; and, besides, such a reserve would be unneces-
sary, for goods waggons and second-class carriages can be easily
adapted to take their place.

Sleeping-saloon carriages may be mentioned in the same category,
and could or need not be counted on in time of invasion, for precisely
similar reasons.

The compartments of second-class carriages can be prepared for the
reception of two stretchers with severely wounded by placing two cross
supports upon the opposite seats : the stretchers are then introduced
into the compartments by the attendants, and laid on these.

The cross supports are made of wood, about 5 feet long, 6 inches
broad, and 1| inch thick : a centre block and two side blocks are nailed
on one side, leaving two gaps into which the side pole of each stretcher
fits ; the stretchers are thus kept from shifting during transit, and a
space left between the two on which an attendant can sit.

But it is to goods waggons we must mainly depend for the convey-
ance of wounded requiring the recumbent position. Experience has
demonstrated, that of the various conveyances, making up trains for
the movement of large bodies of troops, 50 per cent, are goods waggons.
These are the waggons, therefore, which will principally require to be
adapted for the purposes of sick- transport ; but as their springs are very
stiff, means must be devised for lessening the roughness of the trans-
portation. The simpler and more economical the method by which
this is accomplished, the more suitable it will prove itself to be. Vari-
ous methods have been practised from time to time. Sometimes the

678

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR.

floor of the goods waggons has been covered with a thick layer of
loose straw or leaves, as was the case in the earlier part of the Ameri-
can war of the Rebellion, and the stretchers holding the wounded,
then laid on this : bnt so imperfect was it found to be, that it was soon
abandoned. On other occasions upright stanchions, provided with
india-rubber rings, were inserted between the floor and the roof at the
proper distance to receive the ends of the stretcher poles, and in this
way two tiers of stretchers suspended in the waggon. Another com-
fortable plan, which, however, has been only submitted to experimental
trial, consists in the employment of spring stretchers, which are made
to contain within themselves the requisite amount of elasticity to
obviate the inconveniences resulting from concussion or vibration.

These and other methods have been objected to on the ground of
their cost or else complexity. " It must not be forgotten that a plan
applicable to those waggons, which are most likely to be available
near the battle field, viz., the goods waggons of the supply trains, is
much preferable to even better yet more complicated arrangements."
The two simplest and best methods1 of transforming goods waggons
to hospital use are those of Mr. Grand and Dr. Zavodovsky — the for-
mer a Prussian, and the latter a Russian gentleman. Some short
account of each may not prove uninteresting, and particularly of the
latter, which seems not to be very generally known in this country.

In Mr. Qrund'splan (vide, Figs. 1 and 2), three stretchers are supported
on two transverse wooden bars resting on semi-elliptical springs. The
springs are fastened at one end to the flooring to keep the bars stationary,
while at the other end are rollers to permit the yielding of the springs.
The latter are surmounted by clips to receive the cross bars. Two

Fiff. 1.— End section of part of a goods waggon, fitted on Grand's plan (after
Loeffler).

1 For an account of which I am indebted to a work on " Transport on Bail-
Roads," by Assistant-Surgeon Otis, United States Army.

ASSISTANCE TO THE WODNDED IS TIMS OP WAK.

679

cress beams and four springs constitute the outfit requisite for the
reception of three stretchers, and cost £1 16a. This system is simple,
inexpensive, and comfortable, and of ready adaptation. Any sort of
stretcher can he nsed. Four hospital railway trains, employed by tha
Bavarians in 1870-71, were fitted np on this principle. The train*
made thirty-nine trips, transporting 10,800 patients.

JLJI I I 3T3C!

Fig. 2. — Longitudinal section of the name (after Lodfler).

In Dr. Zavodoetky't plan (vide, Fig. 3), two cables an inch thick are
suspended across the top of the waggon, and secured to iron hooks that

n ZaTodoTikv'f plan (after

680 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OP WAB.

fasten to iron rings 2£ inches below the roof of the waggon. If hooks
and rings are not available, the ropes may be passed through holes bored
in the side of the waggon. To each rope is attached a pole of oak,
ash, or elm, at least 8 feet long, and 2£ inches thick. To the poles
are attached four cords with knots arranged that they may support the
stretchers on a level, To prevent the swaying of the stretchers, the
lower ones are fastened .to hooks in the floor. Expense of outfit for
fonr stretchers, £1 16s. The system is simple and inexpensive.

As Professor Esmarch remarks, " It would be a worthy undertaking
" for National Aid Societies to collect models of these and other plans,
" from which, on the outbreak of war, the requisite materials might
" be manufactured."

In conclusion, I have only to say that I hope the day may not be
far distant when we can point to our ample hospital reserves — adequate
in every way to meet the requirements of the wounded in an Euro-
pean campaign, and to tender my apologies for the many imperfec-
tions of what no doubt must have been to many a tedious lecture, and
to thank you for the kind attention you have been pleased to grant me
during its delivery.

Surgeon -Major Manlbt, V.C. : I can add very little, or absolutely nothing to
what Mr. Moore has said ; the lecture has been bo exhaustive, and at the same
time so much to the point. As far as my own experience goes, only one plan seems
to offer, and that is the plan by which the wounded are distributed as soon as
possible from the front ; setting aside the military question altogether, on the score
of humanity, it is the only one that can possibly be entertained. Tou save life in a
great number of instances which otherwise would be sacrificed by leaving the
wounded on the field, or by keeping them close to the front, you get them into better
beds, they have better food, and you get them better treatment because you hare
more force and appliances available. I myself, after capital operations in the New
Zealand War, such as amputation of the thigh, moved men four hours after the
operation twenty-six miles in a country drag-cart with very good effect, much better
than if they had remained in the tents in the front. As regards the attendance,
our great failing is, I think, that the highly-trained Hospital Corps man is put to
the dutv of bearer, by which means his energy is exhausted, as it cannot be sup-
posed that he can attend on the wounded men as well, because you must remember
that these men require night and day attention ; therefore a man very soon gets
knocked up. I was looking over the mobilization scheme the other day, and I
consider the number of Army Hospital Corps men quite inadequate. In fact, the
field hospitals would be hors de combat altogether after three or four days' fighting,
simply because the skilled orderlies are not supplemented bv what I may call
hospital labourers to do the rough work, or, in fact, bearers. I therefore think the
Army Hospital Corps must be very much increased, and the only way in which it
can be done is that suggested by Mr. Moore.

General Cayanagh : It is in my power, from personal experience, to corroborate
Dr. Manley's assertions as respects the practicability of at once removing the
wounded to a distance. It has fallen to my lot to be twice removed, severely
wounded from the field ; and on the first occasion, when I had lost my leg, the
medical man carried me with the regiment, because he was satisfied that under hj*
own charge I should get proper attention, and I believe, owing to his adopting this
course, my life was saved. I think we marched ten or twelve miles a-day for the
three successive days after my leg was amputated.

Mr. Ftoley : I am afraid you do wrong in calling upon me, although I feel

flattered that you should do so. I listened with very great attention to the

dmirable lecture that has just been given, but it would be an impertinence to

tempt to add anything to what has been so ably said. I cannot pretend to enter

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOONDED IN TIME OF WAR, 681

into such technical and professional questions. At the same time I must say the
part I, as a volunteer, appreciate the most, and most perfectly understand, is, that
suggestion made by Mr. Moore with regard to the manner in which the Army
Hospital Corps should be recruited. That, I think, is an admirable suggestion, and
certainly the most practical I have yet heard.

Mr. J. G. Irvine : I do not know whether I may be in order in giving a little
experience with regard to the possibility of Volunteers being able to carry out such
a duty, but I think, as having been myself a Volunteer Captain, and as having also
started a very perfect organisation of another character as firemen, I may say that
I think the element that the author of this paper is falling back upon for his bearers
is one that may relied upon. We have tested them as firemen, and find them quite
equal to sailors.

Deputy-Commissary J. S. YoiTNO : I feel some difficulty in rising, because just as a
system is made up of details, so in this case— as the Chairman has said — the subject
of the lecture is very wide, and it is therefore somewhat difficult to embrace all the
subjects of criticism in a few words ; but there are some points which seem to my
mind worthy of one or two remarks. The lecturer has directed his attention
chiefly to the mode of recruiting the Army Hospital Corps, and to the wants of the
Army at large, as laid down in the mobilisation scheme. There is one thing to be
said with reference to that, that the mobilisation scheme itself has not yet made its
appearance except upon paper, and it may be presumed that the authorities have
some scheme in their minds for developing the resources of the Medical Depart-
ment equally with the resources of the combatant portions of the Army. At pre-
sent there is but one Army Corps, which is stated to be completely filled up by the
Line, and certainly the Army Hospital Corps, as laid down in that table, is not at
present sufficient for the purpose. It must be remembered, however, that the
strength of the Army Hospital Corps, specified in the table — namely 2,195, is a
maximum strength for an Army Corps, at least I believe so ; and that it is not
exclusively for the conditions of home service but the maximum strength that may
be applied to an Army Corps in any great European war ; I take it, for most of
the wars England has engaged upon, that such a strength would be altogether out of
place. In connection with the suggestion for increasing the Medical Department by
the aid of Volunteers, I would just point Jout this one fact, that it looks very much
like continuing the regimental hospital system. It is making a unit within the
regiment itself, a system which the Secretary of State for War only last session, in
introducing the Army Estimates, laid down that he had departed from entirely,
and he stated that he would not listen to any plan which involved the introduction
of the regimental hospital system. I am afraid, therefore, that this suggestion is
quite at variance with the principle laid down broadly by our War Department. At
the same time it seems to me branching out from this suggestion ; it is quite pos-
sible, in connection with local volunteer bodies, to organise a sort of Reserve Army
Hospital Corps, whioh shall not form part of the combatant volunteer force in
itself, and by localising its efforts to spread it through6ut the country in such a
way that its members can make use of all the local means which are peculiarly
known to themselves as being in the locality in which they serve. I think in that
respect certainly an addition might be made to the resources of the Medical Depart-
ment. There was one other point, and that is, the suggestion that the National Aid
Society should furnish, or rather that we should like the National Aid Society to
furnish, surgeons to aid the regular service. It seems to me that that is placing the
National Aid Society in a position it may not feel itself able to come up to, because
it assumes that the society is placed upon some recognised and definable official basis,
whereas at present it has only existed as the outcome of national sympathy with
the sufferings of the sick and wounded during the Franco-German war. If any
efforts were made in that direction it might tend to lessen the responsibility of the
Government itself to give that complete and perfect system which it ought to
establish within the Army itself. In that way I think it might be dangerous to
rely upon the National Aid Society, though at the same time I feel that just as
there was a field during the Franco-German war for aid to the sick and wounded,
so there will be again in any great war that may subsequently arise.
Sir Wiixiax Codeinoton : The point I wish to remark upon is the value of

682 ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OP WAR,

the lecture with regard to establishing a certain number of men either in rear of
<*aeh company, or in rear of each battalion, specially adapted for the purpose of
taking the wounded off the field ; this I should imagine was the general tendency
of the lecture. Any person who brings that to the notice of the Government, in
or\er to establish that which every military man must feel to be a necessity, would
give a great advantage to the army in which it were adopted. The tendency to help
a comrade is laudable ; but when it perhaps employs four men to take ono man to
the rear, you may imagine what a diminution it may cause to the fighting force in
front. The only way of really preventing that, is to have men told off, as in the
German services both of Austria and Prussia, men whose special duty it is. In
that case, when any other person leaves the ranks, it becomes a breach of duty,
because we know that there are other people able to take that man off the field,
and do it better than the man with arms in his hands. I think that is the main
point we should wish to see established in the Army, and I hope the tendency of
this lecture will be to put it in that light. In that respect I, as a combatant Officer,
should feel it is of the greatest possible advantage. The details of the medical
part, namely, moving the wounded quickly off from the front to the more immediate
voir, and then eventually to their own homes are, no one can doubt, of extreme
value.

The Chairman : It remains to me to tender our thanks to Mr. Moore for the
very interesting lecture that he has given us, on a subject of the very deepest
importance, and one which must enlist the sympathies of all Englishmen and
Englishwomen. We know that war is a great and tremendous evil, but neverthe-
less we all admit that it is a necessary one ; and, if we are bound to admit that it is
a necessary evil, surely it is the part of all humane people to be quite certain that
they have done all in their power to render aid to the soldiers who are bound under
their sense of duty and under their engagements to go into war ; and it is nothing
else than our duty to see that everything is done within our power for affording
them that assistance which they may unfortunately require. Having listened
attentively to the interesting lecture, I am bound to say, speaking in the presence of
Sir William Oodrington, that I am very glad Mr. Moore has drawn our attention
to the fact that we are behind some other nations in providing for the clearance of
the wounded from the field in time of battle. Sir William Codrington's remarks
are not new to me, for shortly after the termination of the French and German
war, I gave a lecture in this theatre, and Sir William Codrington at that time drew
attention to the necessity of having a staff of men trained to carry the wounded
from the field. I remember his drawing attention to the fact, that it was a very
great risk to allow our soldiers, men who ought to be using their rifles, and engaged
in military operations, to leave those duties in order to carry the wounded from the
field. After so long a period as has elapsed since the French and German war, I
do think it is to be regretted that our lecturer found it necessary to go the Prus-
sians to teach us what should be done. We should have been much better pleased
if Mr. Moore had been able to tell us what we had done ourselves, and what we
might learn from preparations already completed for the transport of the sick and
wounded in war. Unless these things are practised in time of peace it needs no

Sroof to show that when we are put face to face with an enemy there will be great
ifficulty in carrying them out. It is like drill, we cannot expect soldiers to be
acquainted with it unless they have practised it in time of peace ; neither can we
expect those who should carry the wounded off the field to the field hospitals in the
first instance, and then to the more permanent hospitals in rear, unless they have
b. r taught the manner in which it should be done, as described in the lecture.
With the Prussians the system may be said to be simplified by great consideration
and management, and it has become comparatively a simple thing. But first, the
organisation must be there ; and I should like to ask whether we now have a
thoroughly well thought-out scheme by which when we go to war, this most
important duty will be efficiently performed. Our sympathies are all with it,— the
sympathies of the Queen, the sympathies of the Royal Family, and the sympathies of
all the people are in favour of a good service for the sick and wounded ; but, after
all, what has been done P I am afraid that very inadequate provision has been
made to meet this want. Mr. Moore has suggested, that we, as a National Sick and

ASSISTANCE TO THE WOUNDED IN TIME OF WAR. 683

and Wounded Aid Society, should lend our assistance, or at all events offer our
assistance, and if possible giv| our aid as volunteers to supplement this want, which
is admitted to exist. I believe that we should be able, ana if asked, we should be
willing to do something. But you must remember, that we are unrecognised. We
have never received any encouragement from the Government, and we have never,
in any way, been recognised by the military authorities ; and I am convinced at
this moment that if we were to make such an offer as that which has been sug-
gested, we should be told that it was perfectly unnecessary, and that the whole
thing was properly arranged. I will not say anything more upon this subject. It
would not perhaps be becoming that we should discuss that question in this room.
I will merely add that the discussion has been most interesting ; and on your part,
I beg to tender to Mr. Moore our very sincere thanks for his lecture.

(BbtmrtQ lading.

NAMES OF MEMBERS who joined the Institution between the 80th Mav and

19th June, 1876.

LIFE.
Spratt, A. Gk, Lieut. 1st West India Regiment.

ANNUAL.

Lloyd, Or. MM Lieut. R.A.

Graham, F. W., Captain 103rd Regt.

Harrison, Henry, Lieut, late 8th Hussars
Boys, Charles Vincent, Lieut, late 7th.
Surrey Rifle Volunteers.

Monday, June 19th, 1876.
Admiral Sir HENRY J. CODRINGTON, K.C.B., in the Chair.

ON THE BEST METHOD OP PROPELLING STEAM SHIPS,
SO AS TO GIVE THE GREATEST FACILITY FOR MAN-
OEUVRING IN ACTION, AND FOR AVOIDING COLLISIONS
AT SEA.

By R. Griffiths, Esq., C.E.

Since I proposed reading a paper on the above subject, I have been
making several experiments with models, and it may not be out of
place here to explain those results which are connected with the
present subject.

Since the introduction of steam for propelling ships, there have been
proposed numerous plans and suggestions for obtaining the greatest
speed with the steam power employed, the principle movement being
in the direction of lengthening the ships relative to their width ; this
plan has been carried so far, that screw ships are now constructed whose
length is from eight to twelve times their beam ; while armour-plated
ships have been carried to the other extreme, and have been con-
structed with a length only equal to their width. With regard to the
lines of a ship, there appears to be as great a diversity of opinions as
with regard to its proportions ; and there are advocates for full bows
and sterns, fine bows and sterns, wave lines, and lately, I find, for
stream lines ; but it appears extraordinary that, after all the elaborate
experiments that we constantly hear of being made, with such extra-
ordinary results, there does not appear to be any improvement in the
speed of ships-of-war, relative to the power exerted to propel them,
over that which was obtained twenty or thirty years back. Nor has
there been any improvement, as far as speed is concerned, in the
screw-propeller ; the only improvement has been made by the engineer,
who has constructed engines which, with the same consumption of
fuel, give out considerably more power than was formerly obtained.

Journal K 0 6 bvshixjJuuon,
A^OL 20.

Pl.XXflL

ON THE BE6T METHOD OF PROPELLING STEAM SHIPS, ETC. 685

The great question that now requires to be solved is, how to make
war-ships capable of meeting all the exigencies of the present age? It
will be admitted that, whatever may be the destructive weapons used
in naval warfare, speed and facility of manoeuvring will be essential
elements in the ship's favour. Of the two, I consider speed and
safety to the ship of the greatest importance, and, to obtain it, ships
must be made from four to six times their beam in length. The
movement at present appears to be in favour of shortening ships of
war: this offers several advantages, such as reducing the armour
relative to the displacement, and enabling the ship to manoeuvre
better ; but I find that when the length is reduced to three and a-half
to four times the beam, the resistance, relative to the displacement,
begins to increase. The diagrams, Nos. 4 and 5, represent models of
the same displacement, the weight of each, with the propelling appa-
ratus, being 44 lbs. No. 5 is eight times its beam in length, viz.,
5 feet long, 7£ inches beam, and is fitted with twin screws in the
ordinary manner. No. 4 is two and three-quarter times its beam in
length, viz., 3 feet 2\ inches long, 1 foot 2 inches beam, and is fitted
with screws in tunnels. When the models were towed through the
water at the same speed as when propelled by screws, the resistance of
the short model was* to that of the long as five to three ; but when
they were propelled by the same power and screws, both made the
same speed, viz., 88 feet in a minute. This was caused by the screws
in the tunnels of the short model drawing their supply of water from
underneath the model at sufficient distance forward to prevent them
retarding the model by drawing it from the stern; but when the
screws were moved back 3£ inches out of the tunnels into the open
water, and the tunnels plugged up, the speed was reduced to 62 feet
in a minute, and the resistance to the power was increased. For, when
the screws were in the tunnels, the revolutions were 645 in the minute,
and 565 when the screws were moved into the open water, though the
strength of the springs and the pitch of the screws were exactly the
same in each case ; and in all my experiments I find that, when the
screw cannot, or does not, obtain a sufficient supply of water, it re-
quires more power to obtain the same number of revolutions, and less
speed is given to the model relative to their number.

The armoured ships of the present time are generally fitted with
twin screws, with separate engines to each screw, both engines being
together, and subject to be disabled together, in case of the ship being
rammed, or a torpedo striking it. My opinion is, that ships of war
should have their engine-power and screw-propellers separated into
four distinct compartments, so that, should the ship be injured by
ramming or by a torpedo, only one-fourth of her engine-power
might be disabled ; this method would also give increased facility for
manoeuvring. When twin-screws were first introduced, it was ex-
pected that, by reversing one screw, a ship mifrht be turned round on
its centre, and would also answer her helm quicker than if fitted with a
single screw; but practice has shown tha^ twin-screws possess no
advantage over a single screw for steering or turning a ship. Now
all the anticipated advantages of twin screw9 can be more than fully

686 ON THE BEST METHOD OF PEOPELLING STEAM SHIPS, ETC.

realized by having two screws within tunnels at each end of the ship ;
for, by going ahead with the port engine and astern with the starboard
engine at one end, and ahead with the starboard and astern with the
port engine at the other, the vessel would turn on her centre in a very
short time, and would answer her helm when going either ahead or
astern much quicker than is now the case. Moreover, when the
screws are employed in tunnels, they can be so arranged that they may
draw their supply of water from inside the ship in the event of a large
breach being made by a ram or a torpedo, and thus the whole power
of the engines could be made available to pump out the water while the
vessel would also be propelled.

With regard to the speed obtained by the models, when the difference
of resistance is taken into account, it will be found that nearly 16 per
cent, more speed is obtained by working the screws in tunnels ; and
there can be no doubt but that this amount is lost in all vessels which
have their screws worked in open water.

In order to avoid collisions at sea, which have of late caused so
frightful a loss of life and property, it becomes imperative on steam
ship owners to adopt every practical plan that would have the effect of
reducing the risk of their occurrence. The most necessary requirement
is to have the ship constructed so that she will answer her helm quickly
under all circumstances, and I feel convinced that commanders of
steam ships are often unjustly blamed by the public when they have
met with a collision, for when a steam ship gets so near to another as
to render a collisipn probable, the first thing that is done is to stop and
reverse the engines. The helm has then no control on the ship, while
the momentum carries the ship forward for a considerable distance. In
many cases she would be more likely to escape the collision if the
engines had not been reversed, for then the helm might have been
sufficient to turn the ship so as to escape it ; but should this have been
done, and a collision take place, what would a jury and the public
say ? All passenger steam ships ought to have their engine-power
divided between the bow and stern, which would give considerably
greater safety, as well as speed and other advantages. With such an
arrangement, a commander would have perfect control over his shipr
for by stopping the bow-engine and reversing it, and allowing the
stern-engine to remain working, the ship would be brought to a stand-
still quickly, while her helm would continue to act until she was
entirely stopped. I have no doubt that at some future time the Legis-
lature will compel passenger ships to divide their engine power, and
not allow so many lives to depend on one engine and on one propeller,

I will now briefly describe the models and give some of the results
obtained by my experiments.

Diagram No. 1 represents a model similar to the Russian circular
ironclad " Novgorod," which when tried gave a speed of 52 feet in a
minute with 640 revolutions of the screws.

Diagram No. 2 represents the same model, but it is fitted with elon-
gated ends, and the screws are placed in tunnels. When tried it went
68 feet in a minute with 645 revolutions.

Diagram No. 3 represents the same model, but without the elongated

ON THE BEST METHOD OF PROPELLING STEAM SHIPS, ETC. 687

ends, the screws being still in tunnels. This went 66 feet with 645
revolutions.

Diagram No. 4 represents the model 2f times her beam in length,
which is fitted with screws in tunnels. When tried it went 88 feet with
640 revolutions.

Diagram No. 5 represents the model of an ordinary ship 8 times her
beam in length, fitted with twin screws in the ordinary manner, which
went 88 feet with 620 revolutions.

In these experiments, the power employed and the displacement of
the models were the same in every case. The experiment in towing
models Nos. 4 and 5 to show their relative resistances, before referred
to, was accomplished as follows : the models were attached to each end
of a rod 6 feet long, and a line was attached to the rod between them.
The point of attachment of this line was then shifted till the rod would
remain at right angles to it when the models were towed at the speed
they would make by their screws, viz., 88 feet a minute, and then the
distances from the ends of the rod to the point where the line was
attached showed the relative resistances of the models. These distances
were found to be 2 feet 3 inches from the short model and 3 feet
9 inches from the long, so that the resistance of the short model was
to that of the long as 5 is to 3. In another experiment the short model
was propelled by her screws moved back out of the tunnels into the
open water, and the tunnels left open, and the speed was then found
to be only 71 feet in a minute with 600 revolutions ; and when the
tunnels were plugged or stopped, the screws being left in the same
position, the speed was reduced to 46 feet in a minute with 558
revolutions.

In conclusion, I would remark there is one feature in connection with
having the screw-propellers worked in casings or tunnels to which I
drew attention here some time back, and to which I would again
refer, viz., as to the facility it offers for drawing the water out of the
ship, should she be rammed or be struck by a torpedo. An armour*
plated ship, with 800 to 1,000 nominal horse-power, would require four
screws of 12 to 15 feet diameter, and, when worked at full speed, would
discharge a column of water through each of them at the same speed
as the ship would make. It follows, therefore, if the engines gave out
the power that would propel the ship at 10 knots, each screw would
discharge the water inside her at the rate of about 3,000 tons of water
per minute, provided suitable arrangements were made ; and since the
probability is that a ship in action is more likely to be disabled by a
ram than by a shot, or by a torpedo, I think this point should be well
considered by those who have the designing of our ships-of-war. I agree
with Captain Scott, in the very able paper he read here last Friday,
in which he gives the first place to the ram, and the next to the unsink-
ability of ships-of-war, and I consider that we shall very soon find that
the guns will become of secondary consideration to the qualities of
high speed and unsinkability in ships. From some recent experiments
which I have made (which, for several reasons, I cannot at present dis-
close, though I may state this much), I foresee that greater speed,
invulnerability, and unsinkability may be effected by very simple modi-

688 ON THE BEST METHOD OF PROPELLING STEAM SHIPS, ETC.

fications in the construction of our ironclads, and which result* are quite
within the power of the authorities to effect without that enormous
outlay which the armour-clad ships of the ordinary types would require
for effecting these objects.

The Chairman : I hope some gentlemen present will favour us with their remarks
on the lecturer's paper. I would myself begin by asking a little more information
on one or two points. I do not quite understand whether those tunnels are to be
opened below, bo as to allow the water to flow into them from below. (Mr.
Griffiths : Exactly so.) But supposing we leave them open below, so as to allow a
free volume of water to rise up underneath and flow into them, how is the proposed
connection made with the cavity of the ship, in order to extract the water which has
leaked into it P How is that communication to be made so that that water which
rises from below into the tunnel will not by preference go also into the cavity of the
ship, as well as supply the screws ? How is the engineer to shut off the external
water rising up from the bottom, and to take the water from the cavity of the ship ?
Then we must remember that by putting four engines into a ship; two at each end,
we come across other difficulties. First of all, there is the difficulty of the chance of
collisions, which mostly affect the fore-body of the ship. There will also be a very
large gap taken out of the strength of the ship in the fore-body, in addition to what
is naturally taken out of the run of the 6hip. We must provide some means of
strength for that fore-body, or something to make up for that. Then there is the
difficulty of having four engines to deal with, instead of merely at most two : there
is the supply of fuel and all the requirements of the engines, the additional space
required, which would take out of the space for cargo or for anything else, and of
course the additional hands required in the engineer's department, to attend to four
engines instead of two. I presume in the trial of the towing, the screws were not
fixed ; in each case there were two screws, and in each case those two screws were
allowed to be free.

Mr. Buboh, : Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — I should like to offer a remark or
two. Mr. Griffiths has been good enough to give us a great deal of information on
the screw, but there are one or two details he has entirely left out. He has not told
us what time his vessel will back in, and whether there is any difference when he
applies tthe tunnel in combination with the screw ; that is to say, supposing he is
going at a certain speed, and stops the engine and reverses, I should like if he would
give us what time it takes before the vessel stops, then what time it takes before she
goes astern, and also whether there is any visible difference when the tunnel is left
out?

Captain Sir George Biddleoombb, R.N., C.B. : I should like to make one
remark with regard to enclosing the screw with a tunnel. We have already in the
Navy fitted one vessel of that sort. Mr. Turner, assistant master shipwright
at iLeyham Yard, in 1858, fitted one (as stated in a lecture given by me here), and
from various experiments he had previously made, he concluded that it would be
very successful. The Government gave him the opportunity, but I am sorry to
say the speed obtained by the screw being enclosed did not come up to what
she originally worked at when it was open. I merely mention this as a fact.
In regard to introducing a screw into the fore-body of a ship, especially of a man-
of-war constructed as a ram, I do not know how that would act when you are going
to ram a ship. For instance, in coming into collision with her, the chances are your
screw would be in a very awkward position, and possibly get much injured by the
collision, and you may not then be able to work the screw again. There is another
point the lecturer mentioned in reference to collisions, that it was objectionable to
stop and reverse the engines. My experience does not lead me to concur in that
opinion ; but I think if we saw a collision about to take place, common sense would
dictate that we should stop the engines at once, because with the speed the ship had
upon her, the helm would still be acting. I do not agree with the view that the ship
* not acted upon by the rudder after the screw ceases operation.

Admiral Selwtn : I have one or two remarks to make on this subject, because I
ive taken a considerable degree of interest in Mr. Griffiths' experiments, as show-

ON THE BEST METHOD OF PROPELLING 8TEAK SHIPS* ETC. 689

ing the anxiety of a stead/ worker to prove by models all that could be so
arrived at, and he has done a great deal in this direction. I also take a great in-
terest in developing the screw off the face of the earth. I want to see its place taken
by the turbine, and Mr. Griffiths has made a step towards making it a turbine by
casing it. I doubt very much indeed that a division of the power, and therefore of
the engineers and stokers, would be an advisable thing, either on board a man-of-war
in action, or in a merchant ship, with a view to economy. Tou cannot work a number
of stokers at two sets of furnaces in different parts of the ship with equal effect to
that obtainable with the same number at a single set of furnaces. You must have
different engineers, therefore you must engage inevitably in more expense. You must
have two engineers in each watch, and a certain number of stokers to each set of
fires. Each man cannot do his best work if he has not his full number of furnaces
to attend to, and if he is obliged to go to another part of the ship. I should say
you must have your staff nearly doubled. It is a question of economy. Whether it
may be more advisable in the view of propulsion to put them there, is another thing ;
but at least in our mercantile marine, economy carries the day in every shape and
form. Mr. Griffiths' experiments show very strongly the enormous value of a con-
stant reference to a still larger series of experiments, of which very few people avail
themselves to their full extent. I speak of Colonel Beaufoy's. Colonel Beaufoy has
shown in a very large and long eerie* of experiments, nearly all the facts that we now
are trying to bring out. These would be more generally referred to if only they had
been put in a condensed form ; but it takes a man half a lifetime to get out the value
of Colonel Beaufoy' 8 experiments. He has shown one remarkable thing, and that is
this : that whether vou divide the water by a very narrow fine bow, cleaving the fluid
like an axe, or whether you put that narrow fine bow flat on the water, and drive it
over the water, the resistance is for all practical purposes the same : having fine lines,
there is no more resistance in the one case than in the other. I say this because
Mr. Elder distinctly showed by an experiment precisely similar to that of Mr.
Griffiths, that is to say, a species of steelyard arrangement at the stern of the ship,
and towing large models from it, that whether he took the finest vessel of deep
draught and ten beams to the length, or whether he took a vessel of similar tonnage,
but made of the shape of the segment of a sphere, there was not the slightest differ-
ence between their resistance. But there was this remarkable difference in another
way : that whereas the sharp deep-keeled vessel plunged undeil water constantly and
made bad weather of it, the segment of the sphere always rode over the water with

rirfect ease. I must demur to Mr. Griffiths' ideas about the turning by twin screws. t
went down with all Mr. Dudgeon's early twin screws, and was witness to their '
turning with the utmost facility in smooth water. I am not so sure that they would
always turn well in a heavy sea, and I have heard that they do not do so. But it is
a great thing to be able to turn in a ship's own length, even in smooth water. When
we attack in harbours or in smooth water, we shall very often find it of very great
value, and as we shall not generally fight fleet-actions in gales of wind, it may be
extremely useful in that case at sea also. Twin-screw ships do turn on their own
centres so quickly that the remark of Sir Edward Belcher, who was with me on that
occasion, was that he could not train the gun on board the ship so quiokly as lie
could turn the vessel ; that it brought the gun up to its mark better in every respect
for the gunners than if he had tried to twist the gun about with screws and levers.
Still, all these experiments have their value ; and although I quite agree that for a
man-of-war a screw at the bow is a very questionable advantage, I should much rather
have something inside the ship altogether, if I could do it. When we come to sub-
stitute the use of the ram for guns and shot, I quite agree with the lecturer that the
ram is a shot of the number of thousand tons force which is due to the mass pro-
pelled and its velocity, and therefore it is an irresistible shot. Admiral Sartonus's
views on that subject are too well known in this Institution for me to advert to them.
He was one of the first advocates of it, and he has been proved to be perfectly right
in all that he advanced. But if we are to have a ram it is impossible to have the
screw in the bow. It would simply be throwing away half the whole engine-power
to do so. We could not hope to have the bearings in their proper place after the
shock of ramming, and we all know what a distorted bearing of a screw-shaft is.'
Therefore I do not think we shall make any great progress in that direction. In the
TOL XX. 2 Z

690 ON THE BE8T METHOD OF PROPELLING STEAK SHIPS, ETC.

experiment Mr. Griffiths has also tried an enlargement (first proposed in this theatre
by Mr. Reed) of the Russian circular ships, giving her the how and stern which
Mr. Reed advocated, that is to say, a species of compromise between the sharpness of
the deep-keeled sbip, keeping the wedge shape to cleave the water, and the extreme
diameter of the Popoffka and her sisters, I see one of those compromises which
seldom gives full value in any directloL, and Mr. Griffiths has thoroughly well proved
that it does not give value in the sense of superior speed to any very great extent.
On the other hand, taking the ciroular ship for what she is worth as an unmasted
steam-driven vessel of enormous capacity and tonnage, capable of carrying coals for
any voyage at any speed, with any gun and any weight of armour, I do think that
there is a great advance to be made, and I hope to see strong attention given to the
subject, as I also hope to see new experiments made on the " Wateiwitch," to give
us some idea of the value of the turbine-propeller.

Mr. Griffiths in reply said : The first question is whether the screw takes the
water from below. It certainly does, as shown in all these drawings ; it comes from
below right into the screw and passes out at the stern, and at the bow enters in front
and passes out underneath the ship. With regard to the strength of the bow, I eon-
tend that the strength of that bow is as great with these screws as you can make it on
the ordinary plan. Now, if I make a beam through the ship like a backbone, and
make the tunnels and put the screws as far back as you like in the ship, the tunnels
being built in the ship, how can anything give way ? or that backbone can be made
as far back as you like into the ship ; so far as that goes, it is equally as strong as
if there was no screw at all in the bow. The great advantage of taking the water
from below is, as has been explained several times, — Mr. Froude experimented
upon that, — that if you put the stern screw outside, it sucks away from the ship that
water which would go to fill the space the ship has left, and, consequently, there
is just double the resistance to the ship when the screw is pulling the watet
back. That he has proved and explained in two or three papers, and I find that to
be the case in my experiment. It is not only what it takes from the ship, but thin
water that is forced back stops the current which runs after the ship to fill the
space, so that it has a double effect in stopping the ship.

With regard to sucking the water out of the ship, one way which I have tried,
and which I believe to be the simplest plan, is to have outside this tunnel {pointing),
about half way around it, a space left all along connected with a pipe inside the
ship. The forcing of the water through that tunnel will suck the water out of the ship.
There was an experiment to this effect shown the other evening at the Royal Institution
by Mr. Froude. The first who brought that out was Bernouelli, who showed that if
water was flowing through a horizontal pipe at 9 feet per second, and a vertical pipe
was connected with the horizontal one, water would be drawn up the vertical pipe
a height of 2 feet in opposition to gravity. Mr. Napier, of Glasgow, has proved
that by putting a pipe through the bottom of a ship, the suction of the water
down, would show the speed of the ship. This takes place here exactly, when the
screw is working, the water is forced back at half as fast again as the speed the ship
is making, or faster according to the power exerted ; first it takes the speed of the
ship and afterwards the speed the screw forces the water back. If you are sucking
the water from the inside at that speed, you may depend the water will go pretty
quickly out of her.1

Admiral Selwtn : Is the access of the water cut off at the time you use the
inductive, or the eductive, effort of the screw to pump the water out of the ship ?

Mr. Griffiths : No, certainly , not. The screw uses the water from the sea,
but the force of the water that it suoks through the tunnel also sucks the water

1 I find from some recent experiments which I have made, that this plan cannot
be relied upon, for the least leakage of air into the conducting-tube will destroy the
effect of it, and an arrangement to shut off the sea-water from the screw and open
the communication from inside of the ship to the screw would be preferable,
or a rotary or other pump could be easily worked from the screw-shaft when
required and the discharged water could be used for manoeuvring the ship if
required.

ON THE BE8T METHOD OF PROPELLING STEAM SHIPS, ETC. 691

out of the ship. Nothing is wanted bat a valve to stop the pipe that is connected
with the water within the ship.

A V18ITOB : When the vessel is proceeding forwards, does the water go back,
because if the water goes back then it is all slip, the ship would not move. Water
never does run back when the ship is going forward.

Mr. Griffiths : Of course when the screw is working the ship moves on ; if the
ship is kept standing still, the water will be forced back. Loose the ship and nearly
double the water goes through the screw directly.

The Visitob : Not driven baok.

Mr. Griffiths : The ship goes forward. You must take the speed the ship goes,
as well as the quantity of water the screw draws. I think in one of the papers
I read, I explained that the pressure is double when the ship is under way.

With regard to the boilers, all the boilers would be placed in the centre of the
ship whether working the forward or aft engine, and, consequently, that removes the
difficulty with regard to the stokers. These need not be two sets of stokers if you
divide the power, any more than if the whole boilers were working on one engine.
Then as to how soon she will go astern : I found that by reversing the forward
engine she would stop in one-third the time that she would if I reversed the after
engine, because she drives that water forward against her, which is not the case with
the engine at the stern ; as to the speed, it is no matter at all which way I go, for-
ward or backward, it makes no difference in speed or anything else. With tunnels
around the screw there is a loss of speed, but how nobody ever ascertained the
cause of it, is strange. I was with Ericsen trying that experiment forty years
ago, and he found directly there was loss of speed. When a screw is working in open
water it gets a great quantity of water all round the periphery to supply it, whereas
if you put it in an ordinary casing you stop the supply and your screw is short of
water, but if you continue your casing and put a bell-mouth equal to the quantity
of water the screw requires, you make up for that loss, — it is the funnel-mouth that
makes the difference. In these casings I have a funnel- mouth whu-h gives me
about 50 per cent, more water than the area of the tunnel gives me. I enlarge the
mouth of the tunnels according to the power used on the screw, and the effect of
the screw in propelling the ship is in proportion to the water it gets supplied with.

The Chairman : However we'may criticise some details of this plan, I think we
must all feel obliged to Mr. Griffiths for the information he has given us on this
point. There is a great deal that I admire in it and a great deal in which I go
cordially with him, though in one or two points I might criticise him. I think we
must all thank him very much for his lecture.

2z2

SPECIAL LECTURE.

Friday, December 15th, 1876.
Genbhax SIR RICHARD DACRES* G.C.B., R.A., in the Chair.

"A SKETCH OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS OF

1828-29 IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA."

By Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Wilbraham, K.C.B., Ac., Ac., Ac.

I have found it a more difficult task than I had anticipated to bring
so large a subject as the Russo-Turkish war of 1828 and 1829 within
the compass of a single lecture.

My lecture professes, indeed, to be merely a sketch, but I fear that
in some parts it will be little more than a bare outline.

It has been my endeavour, at all events, to bring before you in a
clear and connected form the most important operations of a war,
which is of peculiar interest at the present moment. I need scarcely
say that I have treated the subject exclusively from a military point of
view.

The chief interest and value of a study of the war of 1828-29 lies
in this : — that it is the most recent of the many wars that Turkey has
waged single-handed against her powerful neighbour. It therefore
gives us the most reliable data that we can command for forming an
estimate of the comparative military strength of the two powers.

We must, of course, bear in mind, in making such comparisons,
that Russia was carrying on an offensive war at a great distance from
her resources, while Turkey was acting on the defensive within her
own borders.

War between Russia and Turkey was already imminent at the close
of the year 1827, and indeed it had been evident long before that time
that it was inevitable.

The Russian Army collected during the early part of 1828 on her
southern frontier consisted of three corps, the 3rd, the 6th, and the
7th, and was placed under the command of Field-Marshal Count
Wittgenstein, a name well known in the Russian wars against
Napoleon. Later in the year it was augmented by another corps, the
2nd, and a division of the Imperial Guard. Moltke estimates the
effective strength of the whole force employed against Turkey in the

lourrvab R.U.6.IrvstuMjjbLon/.
VOL. 20.

Ifc

PL XXIV

JMAP OF THfca-

RUSSO-TimKISlT7

1828. "l82£

Noie.Jfotte* (rftheRussutrveiiv 18Z8.
Retreat of the llussixuts uv 18Z8..~...

P-.i — -i»Jl-~ p -•— JttfrO _

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A 8 KETCH OF THE RUSSO -TURKISH CAMPAIGNS," ETC. 693

first year's campaign at about a hundred thousand men and three
hundred grins. This number includes four thousand Cossacks.

On the 28th of April, war was formally declared by Russia, and on
the 7th of May, two corps, the 6th and 7th, crossed the Pruth and
occupied the Principalities.

This declaration of war, so closely followed by the invasion of her
territory, did not of course take Turkey by surprise,, but it found her
but ill-prepared for defence. The destruction of her fleet at Navarino in
the preceding autumn had given to- Russia the undisputed command
of the Black Sea, without which,, as we shall clearly see,, the passage
of the Balkan would have been impossible. Her regular Army — or
Nizam — was so recent a creation that it had not yet acquired the con-
sistency of disciplined troops. It was also composed mainly of mere
lads, it having been thought that it would be easier at that early age
to break them in to a system so novel, and so violently opposed to all
their national and religious prejudices; and in 'the third place, the
necessity of opposing a large force to the Russian troops collected on
her Asiatic frontier prevented her from drawing reinforcements from
the northern provinces of Asia Minor, which had always furnished the
hardiest and most faithful portion of her Army.

Before entering upon a sketch of the military operations, it may be
well to make a few general observations on the theatre of war in
European Turkey. They shall be very short, for with an audience
composed mostly of military menr I feel as if they were scarcely
needed.

The defences of the northern frontier of Turkey are strong and
clearly defined. They consist of two almost parallel lines — about sixty
miles apart — the course of the Lower Danube and the range of the
Balkan.

In modem warfare a river is no longer the formidable barrier that it
used to be. But the Danube presents more than ordinary obstacles to
the passage of an army advancing from the north. Throughout its
whole coarse from Widdin to the sea — and we do not need to extend
our observations beyond Widdin — the right bank dominates the left.
It rises, for the most part, abruptly from the water's edge, to a height
in many places of two or three hundred feet, while on the opposite
bank, the country is low and marshy, intersected with watercourses
and flooded during the rainy season. The- river varies in breadth from
half a mile to a mile. In some parts it is sixty or seventy feet deep,
but generally much less ; the ordinary current runs between two and
three miles an hour.

The line of the Danube is strengthened by numerous fortresses.
The chief of these — all of which played an important part in the war
— are Widdin, Rustchuk, Silistria, and Brailow. With the exception
of the last-named they all stand on the right bank. Widdin and
Rustchuk have tetes-de-pont on the left bank at Kalafat and Ghurgovo,
which gave them free access into Wallachia and obliged the Russians
to detach a considerable force to keep their marauding parties in check.

Below Rustchuk there are only two points at which the left bank of

** river can at all seasons be approached. The first is Oltenitza and

694 "a sketch of the russo-turkish campaigns

the second is opposite -to Silistria. The passage at Oitenitza is
defended by an entrenched position at Turtukai on the right bank,
which, though of no great strength, sufficed to deter the Russians
from attempting to cross, and caused them, as we shall see, the most
serious inconvenience.

For several reasons Oitenitza would be the most favourable spot for
an invading army to pass the Danube. It is -the most direct, or at
least the most practicable, line from the Russian frontier to both
Sbumla and Varna. It avoids the harassing march through the
barren and waterless Dobrudscha, and it stands at a considerable dis-
tance from any of the great fortresses, which might threaten the line
of communication, being twenty- four miles from Silistria, and more
than forty from Rustchuk. The breadth of the river at this point
is just short of a thousand paces.

Of Brailow we shall have to speak presently.

The country lying between the Danube and the Balkan is an un-
dulating plain more or less well cultivated, and practicable for troops
till you reach the wooded spurs projecting from the great mountain
range. In the rainy season, however, the Bulgarian roads are well-
nigh impassable, while in summer the heat is intense, and the water
scanty and bad. Near the southern edge of the great plain stands the
fortress, or rather the entrenched camp, of Shumla, which Turkey has
always considered -her main bulwark against Russian invasion. We
shall, however, -find that the possession of Shumla, which she retained
during the whole war, was no security against the passage of the
Balkan, or even the advance upon Adrianople. Shumla is connected
with Varna by the fortified post of Pravadi.

The Balkan consists of a chain — or rather mass — of thickly wooded
mountains from four to five thousand feet in height and from fifteen
to twenty miles in breadth. It is only with the eastern part of this
chain that* we shall have to do. The passes are of no very great height,
but the country is so rugged, and the roads — or rather tracks — so bad
that they would have been very difficult for troops to cross even un-
opposed. There are six passes considered more or less practicable,
but as, owing to the incapacity and inertness of the Grand Vizier, no
attempt was made to defend them, it would only be a waste of time to
describe them, more especially as they have since that time, I under-
stand, been strongly fortified.

I will now endeavour to give as clear and concise account as I can
of the movements of the contending armies, beginning with the Rus-
sians, who were ready to take the field long before the Turks had
begun to bestir themselves.

We have seen that the 6th and 7th corps had crossed the Pruth on
•the 7th of May. The former, under General Roth, was to occupy Mol-
• da via and Wallachia, which it did without opposition. The troops
that had been stationed in these provinces had been withdrawn to
garrison the Danube fortresses, and all the resources of the Principa-
lities in grain, and cattle, and forage, had been abandoned to the
?nemy. The 7th corps, commanded by the Grand Duke Michael, and
which was provided with a battering train, was directed against

OP 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND ASIA." 695

Brailow, and commenced siege operations on the 21st May. The
besieging force amounted to about 18,000 men. We shall find that
this was the only siege throughout the war which was undertaken
with anything like adequate means. Though it must have been fore-
seen from the number of fortresses, and from the well known tenacity
of Turkish troops behind stone walls, that several sieges would have
to be carried on at the same time, only one battering train had been
provided ; and to this unaccountable neglect we shall find that most
of the hardships, and dangers, and losses of the campaign are to be
attributed.

Brailow is the strongest of all the fortresses on the Lower Danube.
As a rule, the Turkish fortresses are of a very defective construction ;
they are seldom protected by efficient outworks, and the suburbs are
allowed to extend up to the very walls, thus affording shelter to a
besieging army.

Brailow was rather more scientifically' constructed than most. It
was amply provided with stores of all kinds, and defended by a
numerous and determined garrison. The walls were armed with 278
guns and mortars.

Moltke gives a curious picture of the manner in which the guns
of Brailow — like those of all Turkish fortresses, I suppose — were
mounted and served. Guns and mortars of all calibres were placed
side by Bide indiscriminately, and served from a common heap of shot
and shells of every size and shape — for he tells us that very few shells
were round. When the balls were too small, the Turkish gunners
wrapped them in a sheepskin to make them fit. The powder was
stored partly in private houses and partly in wooden sheds. There-
were no cartridges, and all the pieces had to be loaded with a scoop.
Yet in spite of all this, the guns were well served, and did great
execution at short ranges, which a Turk prefers.

After a stubborn defence of twenty-seven days of open trenches,
during which several ineffectual attempts were made to carry the
place by storm, Brailow capitulated on the 3 8th June. The garrison
was allowed to march out with bag and baggage, and to proceed to
Silistria, where they formed the nucleus of the garrison which defied
all the attempts of the Russians throughout the whole of the campaign
of 1H28 and great part of that of 1829.

Meanwhile, the 3rd corps, after a month's delay, had effected the
passage of the Danube on the 8th June. It was a daring and hazard-
ous undertaking, and owed its success partly to an unexpected piece
of good fortune, and partly to the misconduct of the Turkish troops
opposed to them. The spot selected for the passage was Satanovo,
nearly opposite to the Turkish fortress of Isaktchi. The left bank of
the river is here so low and marshy that the point at which the bridge
was to be thrown across could only be reached by laying down a
causeway of fascines and planks several miles long, while the landing
place opposite was even more difficult, being boggy and overgrown
with brushwood.

The Turks had entrenched themselves on the heights facing Sata-
novo, their left protected by the fortress of Isaktchi. A battery of

696 "a sketch of the busso-turkish campaigns

fifteen heavy guns commanded both the proposed site of the bridge,
and the causeway. Two divisions of infantry were told off to force
the passage. The Emperor Nicholas was present to witness the attack.
But fortunately for the Russians, before the bridge had even begun to
be constructed, the Turkish position was carried by a coup de main.
A battalion of chasseurs had been brought up as a reinforcement by
the flotilla. A tribe of Zaporogue Cossacks who had migrated
from Russia into Turkey in the reign of the Empress Catherine, and
had done good service to the Porte in former wars against Russia,
now suddenly returned to their former allegiance ; they had settled
on the banks of the Danube, where they plied the trade of fishermen;
they now did excellent service to Russia, for under cover of the
flotilla, they carried over the Chasseurs in their light fishing boats,
un perceived by the enemy, and landed them a little below the
Turkish entrenchments. With great boldness, this small body
stormed the nearest redoubt, and the Turks — numbering more than
10,000, mostly cavalry — were seized with a panic, and fled preci-
pitately, part to Isaktchi and part to Bazardjik.

The 3rd corps now crossed into the Dobrudscha, and Isaktchi sur-
rendered at the first summons. The main body, which the Emperor
accompanied, commenced its march to the south on the 11th June. It
did not exceed 16,000 of all arms, for it had detached four columns of
from two to three thousand strong, with a few field pieces, to summon
the smaller forts of Isaktchi, Matchin, Hirsova, and Kustendje, which
threatened both its flanks. This was done in the hope that these
places would offer no resistance — a hope, which the result fully justi-
fied, for by the time the Russians appeared before them Brailow
had fallen, and one after another they surrendered without firing a
shot.

We have seen that the 3rd corps did not cross the frontier till a
month after the 6th and 7th corps. Yet in spite of this delay, and of
the slowness of its subsequent march (it took fourteen days to reach
the line of Trajan's Wall, a distance of only seventy-five miles) it was
still too soon, if its further operations were to be conducted in com-
bination with the other corps. Silistria, far from being taken, as
had been calculated upon, was not yet even invested. The 6th corps,
to which the siege operations had been assigned, had failed to cross
the Danube at Oltenitza. The 7th corps was still detained at Brailow,
for though the place had capitulated on the 18th of June, ten days had
been agreed upon for its evacuation. The 3rd corps was therefore
unsupported, and with Shumla and Silistria on its flank and rear,
an advance upon Varna would have been most hazardous.

Moltke is of opinion that if the 3rd corps had moved boldly upon
Silistria, before the garrison had been reinforced by the brave de*
fenders of Brailow, the place might have been taken by a coup de
main, for the works were both faulty in construction, and much out of
repair. Had they succeeded in their attempt, they might then have
taken the works of Turtukai in reverse, and opened the passage of the
Danube to the 6th corps.
As it was, the 3rd corps remained inactive at Karasu for eight days,

OF 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND ASIA." 697

and then continued its march leisurely towards Varna by way of
Bazardjik. It was on this march that the Russians first came into
collision with the Turks in the open field. The Seraskier had sent for-
ward a reconnoitring force of nearly 8,000 men — mostly cavalry. And
the Russian advanced guard somewhat rashly attacked them without
waiting for their supports. The Turkish horsemen charged with their
usual impetuosity ; the Russian cavalry were repeatedly driven back,
and it was only the steadiness of their infantry that saved them from
defeat. Tt was not till the artillery came up that the Turks were
finally repulsed.

On the 11th July the 7th corps from Braflow joined the main Army
at Bazardjik. Towards the end of the month it was further rein-
forced by the troops which had been observing Silistria, and which
were relieved by 10,000 men of the 6th corps from Wallachia.
This force had been obliged to make a long detour in order to cross
the Danube at Hirsova, having, as we have seen, been unable to force
a passage at Oltenitza.

The insufficiency of the forces detailed for the war was becoming
every day more apparent. The main Army collected at Bazardjik did
not exceed 25,000 men, of whom only 2,500 were cavalry ; the invest-
ment of Silistria was incomplete. The two divisions of the 6th corps
left in Wallachia barely sufficed to keep in check the garrisons of
Widdin and Rustchuk, while the force detached against Varna, which
consisted of only 5,000 men, was utterly inadequate to invest a fortress
with a garrison of double its numbers.

More especially was the want of light cavalry felt throughout the
war. Most of the cavalry that the Russians had brought — with the
exception of a few regiments of Cossacks — was heavy cavalry. Even
that which was called light was not really so, for Moltke states that
the Russian Hussar was more heavily equipped than the Prussian
Cuirassier. With their large heavy horses they were quite unequal to
cope with the active and well mounted irregular Turkish horse even
at the beginning of the campaign ; much more so, as we shall see, when
scarcity of forage, and overwork had begun to tell upon them.

The small number of Cossacks employed in this war is said to have
been caused by the fear of lack of forage, but it was in fact the want
of light cavalry that made them unable to collect forage. The
Turkish cavalry always move in large bodies, which made it hazardous
to send out patrols or weak advanced guards. The saying that where
you see one turban you may be sure there are a thousand more, is a
very true saying.

It was here decided to change the line of operations; and the
column quitting the direct road to Varna advanced in the direction of
Shumla.

It will now be necessary to look back, and see what measures the
Turks had adopted to meet the enemy's advance. It is evident that
the Porte had contemplated the possibility — if not the probability — of
a Russian army landing near Constantinople. Their undisputed com-
mand of the Black Sea, where they had a fleet of 16 line-of-battle ships,
6 frigates, and 7 corvettes, made such an undertaking quite feasible.

698 "A SKETCH OF THE RU88O-TURKI8H CAMPAIGNS

Besides this, the Sultan's reforms were very unpopular with the greater
part of the Mahomedan population, and an outbreak in the capital was
at any time to be dreaded. The bulk of the Army was therefore de-
tained in and around Constantinople, until the advance of the Russians
made it absolutely necessary to send forward an army to check their
progress.

We have already seen that the Principalities were entirely denuded of
troops, while the numerous fortresses on the Danube and in the
Dobrudscha were but inadequately garrisoned. It must, however, be
borne in mind that the inhabitants of a Turkish fortress instead of
being a source of weakness are really a source of strength, every Turk
being in possession of arms and well practised in the use of them.

When the Russians crossed the Pruth the passes of the Balkan
were still unoccupied. It was not until the 31st May, when Brailow
had already been besieged for fourteen days, that the Seraskier— or
Commander-in-Chief — left Constantinople for Schumla. On the 3rd
of July the Capudan Pacha or High Admiral — whose occupation afloat
was gone — marched with a large force to Varna. Lastly the Grand
Vizier only quitted the capital at the beginning of August, for Adria-
nople. But for the unaccountable deficiencies and consequent delays
of the Russians both the Turkish lines of defence might have been
broken before any effectual measures had been taken to hold them.

But by the time the Russian Army had directed its march upon
Shumla, this neglect had been in a great measure remedied. The
Seraskier had succeeded in assembling at that point a force of about
32,000 infantry — including 10,000 Arnaouts or Albanians, undiscip-
lined but fierce and dauntless soldiers — and 13,000 cavalry. What-
ever may have been his military capacity — or incapacity — the
Seraskier was a man of great energy, and he set to work at once to
improve and to extend the fortifications of the place.

For more than a century Shumla, as I have already remarked, has
been looked upon by the Turks as the main bulwark of the Empire,
and in all their wars with Russia it has been occupied as an en-
trenched camp. In 1774, and again in 1810, it successfully resisted
the attacks of the Russians, and we shall see that throughout the
wbole of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829 it again defied all their
attempts to make themselves masters of it. Whether its defence on
this occasion was not too dearly purchased by the neglect of still
more important points is another question.

The position of Shumla is a very striking one as you approach it
from the north or from the east. It stands on a plateau some eight or
nine hundred feet above the great plain of Bulgaria forming a spur
from the Balkan, but separated from the main range by the valley of
the Kamstchik, The town itself is not fortified. It is, however,
effectually protected on three sides by a chain of wooded hills which
form as it were an amphitheatre round it, while the fourth is de-
fended by a continuous line of works carried along the outer ridge of
the plateau and abutting at either end on precipitous heights. This
line consists of earthworks with a deep but narrow ditch, and its
length is about 8,000 p:ices. To the north of the town lies the en-

OP 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND ASIA." 699

trenched camp occupied by the barracks of the infantry. The
cavalry were picketed in a sheltered and well watered valley a little
in rear of the camp. 500 yards in advance of the fortified front a
chain of redoubts was extended across the plain. Several roads con-
verging upon Shumla afforded means of obtaining supplies from
districts not occupied by the enemy.

An assault upon a place so strong, and held by so large a garrison,
was of course not to be thought of, nor indeed would the posses-
sion of Shumla have been an unmixed advantage to an invading
army. It would, it is true, have made its flank more secure, but it
would not have opened the passes of the Balkan, from which it is too
far distant. On the other hand the large force which was shut up in
the entrenched camp would have been set free to occupy those passes
and bar the further progress of the Army.

A complete investment of the place was equally out of the question,
not only on account of the extent of country that would have to be
guarded, but because of the danger to the investing force from the
frequent and vigorous sorties of a garrison so strong in cavalry. Had
Varna by this time been hardly pressed, as it might well have been,
the Russian Army might have taken up a strong position at some
distance from the place in the hope of drawing the Seraskier oot of
his entrenchments for the relief of that fortress, but the siege of Varna
was still unaccountably delayed for want both of guns and of men.

Under these circumstances it was decided to make at least a partial
investment of the place, and the Russians proceeded to throw up a
chain of redoubts in front of the Turkish lines. They had, however,
the great disadvantage of being within range of the enemy's heavy
guns, to whose fire their own field-pieces were unable effectually to
reply. At the same time they had the mortification of seeing long
strings of camels laden with provisions and ammunition entering the
camp daily from the hills behind the town. This led to an attempt
to close the approaches from that side, but it was found too hazardous
on account of the vigorous sorties made by the garrison, and it was
soon abandoned.

Things continued thus for many weeks, the sorties of the Turks
becoming every day more daring. Colonel Chesney relates that the
most daring of these sorties were led by Hemin Pasha, whom he states
to have been the Mameluke who alone escaped from the massacre of
his comrades at Cairo in 181], by leaping his horse over the ramparts
of the citadel. His ambition was to capture the Emperor, who was
present with the Army at that time, and to exact as his ransom the
restitution of the Crimea to Turkey.

On the 27th August, the Seraskier made a might attack — a phe-
nomenon, Moltke remarks, in Turkish military history— on two of the
principal Russian forts. One of them was successfully stormed, and
the guns carried off in triumph. On the. 10th September he made a
still more vigorous attack before daylight with a force of 8,000 men,
but fortunately the Rupsians had been warned by their Bulgarian spies,
and were prepared to meet it.

At length the Russian General perceived the uselessness of perse ver-

700 "A SKETCH OF THE BUSSO-TURKI8H CAMPAIGNS

ing in the investment. The army had lain for more than six weeks
before Shumla, exposed to the fearful heat of a Bulgarian summer;
Insufficient food, and bad water, had filled the field-hospitals to over-
flowing, and there was no place of security to which their sick oould
be removed. Scarcity of forage and over- work were carrying' off their
horses at the rate of more than a hundred a-day, and their reduced
and enfeebled cavalry was no longer able to protect their convoys
from the flying columns of Spahis which hung about their communica-
tions.

Moltke points out that during these months — August and Sep-
tember— the position of the Russians was everywhere critical. The
blockade of Silistria was altogether ineffectual ; the siege of Varna had
only just begun — and not under promising auspices, whale Wallachia
was seriously threatened by the enterprising garrisons of Widdin and
Rustchuk. Had the Turkish commanders shown half as much capacity
as they did energy, the result of the campaign could not but have
proved disastrous to the Russians.

The siege of Varna had been formally opened by the Emperor on
3rd of August. The Russian fleet, under Admiral Greig, had arrived
a few day 8 before bringing reinforcements, and had anchored a mile
and a half from the town prepared to take part in the siege. The
besieging army, under Prince Menschikoff, did not at this time exceed
9,000 men, but early in September it was reinforced by the 2nd corps
and a division of the Guards, which raised its numbers to 18,000 or
20,000, and enabled Menschikoff to complete the blockade. But still
there was no battering train, though Brailow had fallen on the 18th of
June. " The fate of this battering train," says Moltke, " is involved
" in mystery. After the fall of Brailow it was absent everywhere.*'
They were obliged to make shift at last with ship guns.

On the other hand, the Capudan Pasha, whose departure from Con-
stantinople we have already mentioned, had arrived at Varna on the
17th July with 5,000 men, mostly artillery, and had entered the place
under the very eyes of the Russians. The garrison now numbered
15,000 men, of whom nearly half were Albanians. The walls were
armed with 162 guns.

1 most refer my hearers for all details of this memorable siege to
the two chapters that Moltke has devoted to this subject. It would
be impossible to abridge them without their losing all their interest.
It was of vital importance to the Russians to make themselves masters
of the place without delay, for their situation was becoming critical ;
their daily losses were heavy ; disease was rife in their camp — it was
said even the plague. The position of the main Army before Shumla
was precarious ; and a large army, under the command of the Grand
Vizier himself, was advancing to the relief of the place. The siege
operations were therefore pressed with all the vigour possible.
Nothing could exceed the energy and perseverance of the assailants,
unless it were the determined courage of the defenders. The latter,
long after the siege had commenced, maintained their positions out-
side the walls, and surrounded themselves with a labyrinth of lodg-
ments which sometimes interfered with the Russian approaches. The

OF 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND ASIA." 701

siege was carried on more by means of mines and galleries titan by
batteries, and though several practicable breaches were made by the
explosion of the mines, and even a lodgment effected on one of the
bastions, the ardour of the defence never slackened. Colonel Chesney
relates that the Capudan Pacha worked with his own hands to close
the breach, and adds, that " he encouraged his men with a stick I " The
fierce obstinacy with which the Amaonts defended the ditch to the last,
neither giving nor receiving quarter, is almost incredible. Moltke's
remark is indeed true, — that defence only begins with a Turk where it
ends with any other troops.

Meanwhile the Grand Visiter's seal had cooled, and halting his army
on the Kamstchik, he sent Omar Pacha with 15,000 men to attempt
the relief of Varna. Omar advanced within a few miles of the
fortress, and then, in Turkish fashion, he entrenched himself strongly
at the village of Kortepe.

Prince Eugene of Wurtemburg was sent to dislodge him, and was
making arrangements to do so when he received peremptory orders
from the Emperor to attack the position in front. The Emperor had
been led to believe that the Turkish force was much weaker than it
was, nor was he acquainted with the rugged and wooded nature of the
ground which made their position almost unassailable. So thick was
the wood that the Russian guns could not be brought into action, and
the battle was a succession of hand-to-hand encounters. The result
was undecided, but the gallantry of the Russian troops had a great
effect' upon the Turks; and though Prince Eugene had to fall back,
and the road to Varna was open to him, Omar Pasha did not avail
himself of the opportunity. He remained inactive in his entrench-
ments, though the explosion of mine after mine must have warned him
that the fall of Varna was imminent. And when, after a few days, he
saw the Russian flag floating over the ruins of the fortress, he made a
precipitate retreat beyond the Kamstchik. For fourteen days this
relieving force had been within five miles of Varna without rendering
any assistance to the hard-pressed garrison.

The fall of Varna was, after all, the work of treachery. It seems
strange that the Commander who had conducted so heroic a defence
should turn traitor at the last. There is, however, no doubt that the
intelligence of some intrigue that was being carried on against him at
Constantinople led Yussuf Pacha to betray his trust. Accompanied
by a large body of followers he Bought the Russian camp, and threw
himself on the mercy of the Czar. The gallant Capudan Pasha
refused to surrender, and retired into the citadel with several hundred
men. The siege had lasted eighty-nine days, twenty-seven of which
with practicable breaches. Two-thirds of the garrison had fallen, and
Varna was a heap of ruins.

There may perhaps be some few here present besides myself who
remember the deep interest with which the progress of the siege of
Varna was watched in England. A war between Turkey and Russia
was not, however, supposed at that time to be fraught with such
serious consequences to the balance of power in Europe as it has
been of late years, nor were our sympathies with the defenders height-

702 CCA SKETCH OP THE RU8SO-TUKKI8H CAMPAIGNS

ened as in the case of Kars and Silistria in 1854 by the gallant part
that our countrymen took in the defence.

I have only time to notice briefly the siege of Silistria. It com-
menced on the 21st of July, at the same time thai the main Army
arrived before Shumla, and the investment of Varna began.

Silistria has played an important part in every war between Turfiaey
and Russia. It commands one of the most practicable passages of the
Danube, and threatens the flank of an army advancing upon either
Shumla or Varna. It was taken by the Russians in 1810, and razed
to the ground; but it was soon rebuilt. In 1828 — and indeed so
late as 1854 — the fortifications of Silistria were very imperfect. It
had no regular outworks — only a few lodgments, as Moltke calls
them, in front of the gates, which would otherwise open on the plain.
It is surrounded by a low rampart and a dry ditch, which one of the
English defenders of the place contemptuously described to me as
being what a good hunter would take in his stride.

The place is commanded from the adjacent heights, and is also
within range of the opposite bank of the Danube, which at this point
is only a thousand paces in breadth.

The garrison had been reinforced by a part of those of Brailow and
the small forts of the Dobrudscha, and the town contained about 6,000
inhabitants capable of bearing arms. A Russian flotilla of thirty-six
vessels reached Silistria on the 10th August, but it was of little use. It
did not even capture or destroy a very inferior Turkish flotilla which
was aiding in the defence, nor was any attempt made to throw a
biidge across the river, which would have facilitated the arrival of
supplies and secured a safe line of retreat. In the middle of October
the besieging force was raised to 30,000 by the arrival of the 3rd
corps.

Finding that the place could not — or rather, would not — be taken,
it was decided to convert the siege into a blockade, but the weather
had now broken up. Incessant rain flooded the trenches, followed by
snow and piercing cold. Sickness increased to an alarming extent,
and on the 10th November, after an ineffectual attempt to terrify the
garrison into surrender by a bombardment of forty-eight hours, the
siege was raised. The retreat, though unopposed, was disastrous;
the roads were so deep that it required 200 men to t!rag a single gun ;
after undergoing severe hardships the besieging A my at length
succeeded in re crossing the Danube at Hirsova.

The season was now too far advanced for further operations, and it
was decided to place the army in winter quarters. The 6th and 7th
corps were cantoned in and around Varna and Pravadi ; the rest of
the army in Wallachia and Moldavia, excepting the Guards who were
moved back into Bessarabia. The line occupied by the Russians ex-
tended from Varna to Crajova, a distance of 250 miles, and it was cut
in two by the Danube. Only in presence of such an enemy as the
Turks could such winter-quarters have been taken up with impunity.
But the Turkish Irregulars, who were the most likely to harass them,
had disbanded themselves on the approach of winter and returned to

Journal R. JI.SJrLsUtuium.
VOL.20.

1. JSS7

Jabs

MAP OF THE

IttJSSO TURKISH ASIATIC

CAMPAIGNS.

1828. 1828. '

— ■ ^^^Van

Note. Route cftheJbieeiane l8Z8r |

n? Turks mzs & WZ»

£ OF 1828-29 IS EUROPE AND ASIA." 703

their homes in Asia. " They had," they said, " left their winter-stock-
" ings behind."

In summing np the results of the campaign, we find that after tbe

fall of Brailow, and the small forts of the Dobrudscha, the only real

success had been the capture of Varna — how hardly won we have

already seen. Shumla and Silistria had defied all the efforts made to

I take them, and in the numerous engagements that had taken place in

I the open field, the results had been quite as often favourable to the

' Turks as to the Russians.

_ _j__ As Moltke remarks, " When we consider the enormous sacrifices that

S£Jhc " the war cost the Russians in 1828, it is difficult to say whether they

f "or the Turks won or lost it. It remained for a second campaign to

4&u " decide the value of the first."

We must now cast a glance at what had been going on during this
time on the Asiatic frontier of Turkey ; but it will not be necessary to
enter into much detail, as the military operations in that quarter had
only been important in so far as they had obliged the Turks to divide
their forces.

Until the year 1801 the Caucasus had formed the southern boundary
of Russia, and the Turkish frontier had been a very defensible one.
Her actual frontier was far less well defined

The war between Russia and Persia, which had begun in 1826, had
just been brought to a successful close by a winter campaign, and
General Paskevitch's army was now disposable for operations against
Turkey. It consisted of about 30,000 men with 130 guns.

To this force the Turks were at first able to oppose only a small and
disorganised army.

The campaign opened with the siege and capture of Anapa by a naval
force, assisted by a detachment from the Army of the Caucasus. But
before Anapa had fallen, the Russian army had begun its advance from
In. Tiflis. It moved in three columns, the right towards the Black Sea,

the left towards Armenia, and the main body towards Kars. On the
14th June, about 15,000 men crossed tbe Araxes near Goomri, an im-
portant Russian frontier-post, now strongly fortified, and continued its
march unopposed to Kars, where it took up a position south of that
"" fort, between it and the Army of the Seraskier.

It is unnecessary to describe a place so well known as Kars has since
become. It had always been one of the bulwarks of Asiatic Turkey,
and had successfully resisted Nadir Shah in 1735 and a former invasion
of the Russians in 1807.

On the present occasion it did not uphold its former (or its future)
fame. The weak walls of the suburbs were soon breached, and the
suburbs themselves occupied after a short but sharp resistance. The
fall of the town followed within a few days, and on the 23rd of June
the Pasha surrendered the citadel. The relieving army was actually
within sight when the place fell. 150 guns and large stores of ammu-
nition fell into the hands of the Russians.

The plague now broke out in the Russian camp ; this delayed fur-

704 "A SKETCH OF THE RU 8 SO -TURKISH CAMPAIGNS

ther operations and gave the Seraskier time to collect some 35,000
men, with whom he took np a position in front of Ardegan. This
movement prevented Paskevitch from advancing upon Erzeronm, as he
would have left this army in his rear, so he made a demonstration
against Ardegan, which caused the Pasha to beat a hasty retreat across
the Saganlugh mountains. He then doubled back and appeared unex-
pectedly before the strong fort of Akhalkalaki, which was taken by-
storm after a short bombardment. The garrison resolutely refused to
surrender, and two-thirds of their number perished in the assault.

I may here mention that the inhabitants of this bleak mountainous
part of Asia Minor are among the hardiest and bravest of the subjects
of the Porte, and, I may add, the most fanatical.

Paskevitch next moved against Akhaltsik, a still stronger place. Short
as is the distance, it took him ten days to reach it, so difficult was it to
carry troops and guns through that densely wooded and mountainous
country. He arrived just in time to take up a strong position com-
manding the west front of the fortress, and to throw up some entrench-
ments, before the Seraskier appeared with a large force to relieve the
place. The Pasha imprudently divided his force, and after an obstinate
resistance the Russians succeeded in carrying his whole position. The
Seraskier, after losing 10 guns and 1,700 men, threw himself into the
fortress with several thousand men. The rest of his army dispersed.

The defence of Akhaltsik was as heroic as that of Brailow. After a
lodgment had been made in one of the bastions, the Russians advanced
to the assault. For thirteen hours the garrison maintained a desperate
resistance ; the Russians fought with equal obstinacy. At length they
carried a howitzer by hand across the ditch and placed it on the flat
roof of a church. A shell set fire to the town, which continued to burn
throughout the night, lighting up the §erce conflict. At daybreak the
fort surrendered, being no longer tenable.

After the faD of Akhaltsik nothing of any consequence was under-
taken by the main army, but the left wing had made itself master of
the important town and fortress of Bayazid. This secured to the
Russians the possession of the whole country as far as the Saganlugh
range, which furnished them with a good base for the operations of the
next year's campaign.

We must now return to the more important theatre of war in
Europe, and relate the events of the decisive campaign of 1829.

The command of the Russian Army had been transferred to General
Diebitsch, who had served in the preceding campaign as Chief of the
General Staff. He joined the army in Moldavia at the end of
February, and applied himself diligently to the re-organisation of ail
departments of the service. The cavalry was remounted, and the front
ranks of the Hussar regiments armed with lances as a better protect
tion against the swords of the Spahis ; the Cossacks were increased to
22 polks, or regiments, of about 250 each ; the Commissariat was pro-
vided with 2,000 Asiatic camels, a mode of transport well suited to the
plains of Bulgaria.

The constitution of the four corps d'armee remain unaltered, but

OF 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND A8IA." 705

several changes were made in the commands. Count Pahlen com-
manded the 2nd corps, General Erassowski the 3rd, General Both the
6th, and General Rudiger the 7th. Altogether the army amounted to
48,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 4,000 artillery with 300 guns.
This force was not larger than that with which the previous campaign
had opened, but it was stronger in artillery and light cavalry.

But before the army began its advance operations had already com-
menced by sea. The possession of a secure harbour south of the
Balkan was of the utmost importance before attempting the passage
of that range. It would save the difficult and laborious task of trans-
porting military stores across the mountain passes, and would facili-
tate the provisioning of the Army.

Bourgas wonld,have been the most suitable spot but for its proximity
to Aidos, where the Turks had assembled a large force. Sizeboli was
therefore selected, and so early as the middle of February it was occu-
pied by a Russian squadron without serious resistance. It had the
advantages of a strong position and a safe harbour, but was at a greater
distance from the Russian line of operation than Bourgas.

The Seraskier was ordered to advance at once from Aidos and re-
take the place, but he delayed obeying the order for several weeks, and
when at last he arrived before Sizeboli he found the Russians too
firmly established to be dislodged.

Nor was a subsequent attempt by sea more successful. The Turkish
Admiral on his way to Sizeboli fell in with a solitary Russian frigate,
which he took ; and then he thought it best to return to Constantinople
with his prize.

No further attempt was made to retake the place, which remained
in possession of the Russians throughout the war.

The advance of the Army did not commence till May. The weather
and the floods were assigned as the cause of this delay, but in truth
the preparations were not completed earlier.

Part of the 2nd and 3rd corps now crossed the Danube at Hirsova
and joined the 6th and 7th corps, which had wintered around Varna.
The other divisions of the 2nd and 3rd corps were detained in Wallachia,
awaiting the construction of a bridge at Kalarasch a little below
Silistria.

Diebitsch was forced to open the campaign with a siege, which
ought not to have been left for the second year of the war. The
capture of Silistria was an absolute necessity before the Army could
advance. Its garrison was large, and it commanded every possible line
of operation. Diebitsch arrived before it on the 17th May, and found
it exactly in the condition in which it was left in the preceding autumn.
The besieging army amounted to 15,000 men (shortly increased to
21,000) and 88 guns. The garrison, with the armed inhabitants, num-
bered some 20,000. Diebitsch proceeded with great caution. He would
not even assault when there was a practicable breach. He had learnt to
respect the Turk behind a stone wall, and preferred the surer though
slower process of mining.

After a brave defence of forty-four days the place surrendered, and
the garrison became prisoners of war.

VOL. xx. 3 A

706 "A SKETCH OF THE RU8SO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS

Diebitsch had, before the conclusion of the siege, handed over the
command to General Krassowski, and had joined the main Army at
Shumla. Important events had already taken place in that quarter,
and this time the Turks had taken the initiative. The new Grand
Vizier, after re-organizing t the motley force he had found at Shumla,
had quitted his entrenchments on the 16th of May and advanced in
the direction of Pravadi with some 20,000 men, hoping to overwhelm
the force under General Both. The 6th and 7th corps were very
weak from the losses of the preceding campaign, and the sickliness of
their winter quarters around Varna. They did not muster more than
14,000 effectives of all arms.

On the 17th the Vizier reached the village of Eski Arnautlar, where
a force of Russians — 3,000 strong — had taken up a well chosen position
covered by live small redoubts. These the Vizier instantly attacked
with his left wing, while with his right wing he assaulted the entrenched
works of Pravadi. Both these attacks were repulsed after fifteen hours
of hard fighting, and Russian reinforcements coming up during the
night, the Vizier fell back upon Shumla. Such vigorous action was
a great contrast to the supineness of the late Grand Vizier. Rescind
Pacha had set his troops an example of personal bravery, and both he
and his second in command had been wounded.

On the 28th May the Vizier again quitted Shumla at the head of
40,000 men, leaving only four regiments to guard the entrenched
camp. He directed his march upon Kustendje.

It was the intelligence of this move which had decided Diebitsch to
leave Silistria. It was his intention to march with as many men as
could be spared from the besieging force upon Pravadi, to form a
junction with the 6th and 7th corps, and then to throw himself across
the road from Pravadi to Shumla, so as to intercept the Pasha's retreat
and force him to fight in the open field. Should he succeed in doing
so, he felt confident that discipline would prevail over numbers. This
bold decision decided the fate of the campaign and of the war. The
force with which it was undertaken numbered 21,000 infantry, 7,000
cavalry, and 140 guns.

Time will not allow me to relate the movements of the two armies
which preceded the decisive battle. The Vizier seems to have re-
mained in total ignorance of Diebitsch's plans, and was retracing his
steps leisurely towards Shumla- expecting to have to deal only with
General Roth's weak force. But on the forenoon of the 11th June,
28,000 Russians barred his further passage. The battle so much
desired by Diebitsch took place at Kulewtcha. The Turks resolutely
attempted to cut their way through, and for some hours their efforts
were successful. The Russians lost great numbers of men and several
guns ; but when at length they had succeeded in driving the Turks
back to their original position, which was a very strong one, a sudden
panic seemed to come over them. They broke their ranks and dis-
appeared singly in the thick woods. Scarcely a prisoner was taken,
but the whole of the artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the
Russians. The Vizier with 600 horsemen succeeded in reaching
Shumla in safety by a circuitous route. Within a fortnight the bulk

OF 1828-29 IN EOROPE AND ASIA," 707

of the Army also found its way thither by twos and threes. " A
'* Turkish Army," as Moltke observes, " is not easily destroyed, it is- only
"dispersed."

The former campaign was lost by the inactivity of one Grand Vizier.
The present was lost by the too enterprising spirit of another.

Diebitsch at length found himself in a position to attempt the
passage of the Balkan. Shumla, indeed, was still in the hands of the
enemy, but without an army, Shumla was of little importance. A
corps of observation would suffice to keep its beaten and disheartened
garrison in check. The fall of Silistria was hourly expected. With the
Dobrudscha, 'and the sea for a basis an advance would no longer be
hazardous. The season was favourable, for the great heats had not
yet set in. The health of the Army made it desirable that it should
quit its present unhealthy positions.

All these were arguments in favour of an immediate advance, but
the Russian Army was too weak for such an undertaking. Diebitsch
had but 25,000 men in all, and if he detached 10,000 to mask
the entrenched camp of Shumla, there would remain but 15,000
available for active operations. It seems unaccountable that the
experience of the last year's campaign- should not have taught Russia
the insufficiency of her preparations. Four precious weeks. were lost
while awaiting the fall of Silistria and the arrival of the besieging
force.

On the 15th June, Diebitsch removed the head-quarters to the
neighbourhood of Shumla. It gives an awful picture of the horrors
of this war to read that while crossing the battle-field of Kulewtcha
the escort of the Commander-in-Chief was regularly attacked by an
enormous pack of dogs, which were devouring the corpses of the
slain.

At length the force under General Krassowski arrived. It was left
to watch Shumla. General Roth with the 6th corps was ordered to
advance along the coast roads leading from Varna to Bourgas, while
General Rudiger with the 7th corps was to cross the mountains by
the road from Pravadi to Aidos. General Pahlen with the 2nd corps
was to act as a reserve to both these columns. The head-quarters
accompanied the reserve.

Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, alarmed for the safety of Shumla,
chose this very moment, when the Russian Army was in full march
for the Balkan, to order a force of nine regiments of regular infantry,
and several thousand Albanians, which had been allotted for the
defence of the passes, to join him in the entrenched camp.

Consequently the two Russian columns, which had advanced to the
Kamstchik, effected the passage of that river at Kiuprikoi without
any serious opposition. The head-quarters with the reserve followed
closely, and on the tenth day after leaving Shumla, the whole Russian
Army was assembled around Ronmelikoi to the south of the Balkan-
range, and in free communication with the fleet.

In this short time it had accomplished a march of above a hundred
miles through an unknown and difficult mountainous country. The
passage of the Balkan had, after all, been effected by one single route.

3 a 2

708 "A SKETCH OF THE RU8SO-TURKI8H CAMPAIGNS

Aidos still lay before them on their line of march. It is a town of
some 25,000 inhabitants lying at the foot of the Balkan, and, though
unfortified, was very capable of defence. The Vizier, alarmed when
too late by the Russian advance, had hastily sent a force of from ten
to twelve thousand men across the mountains to occupy this important
post ; but they made but a weak defence, and the 7th corps quickly
drove them out of the town and took possession of it. The filthy
state of the Turkish camp at Aidos is said to have sown the seeds of
the diseases which from this time forth raged among the Russian
troops.

Diebitsch's Army was by this time reduced to less than 25,000 men
of all arms ; but it had a secure basis at Bourgas, and an ample supply
of provisions. Intelligence had been received from Adrianople that
there were only a few thousand men collected for the defence of the
city, and that no serious resistance need be anticipated. Diebitsch,
therefore, decided to advance, knowing the effect that the possession
of Adrianople would produce at the capital, and sent on the 2nd corps
as an advanced guard.

The rest of the army did not at once follow, for a report had
reached the head-quarters that the Pacha of Rustchuk had effected a
junction with the Vizier, and that the Russian line of communication
was seriously threatened. This report induced Diebitsch to concentrate
his forces, and to move along the foot of the Balkan to Slivno, about
70 miles west of Bourgas. Rumour had exaggerated the danger. He
found only a small force at that place, which he quickly dispersed, and
he then resumed his advance upon Adrianople, from which he was no
farther than he had been at Aidos.

The Turkish Army was now thoroughly demoralized. Fortified
positions were abandoned on the approach even of cavalry unsup-
ported, and it was clear that any measure however bold might be
ventured upon with impunity against such a foe.

Indeed the only enemy the Russians had to encounter on the march
was the intolerable heat, aggravated by scarcity of water, for the
Turks had destroyed the fountains along the road. Fever was in-
creasing in the camp at a fearful rate, and it was with difficulty that
the enfeebled troops could accomplish a daily march of ten miles.

At Buyuk-Derbend there is a formidable defile, but happily for the
Russians it was undefended.

At length, on the 19th August, four weeks after crossing the Balkan,
20,000 men, enfeebled as we have seen by disease, encamped before the
gates of Adrianople. Out of a force of 70,000 men, with which the
campaign had opened in May, this was all that could be brought
together for a further advance of more than a hundred and thirty
miles upon the capital. It would scarcely be too much to say, looking
at it from a military point of view, that the Russians were no nearer
Constantinople at the end of the second campaign than they were at
the beginning of the first.

Adrianople is an open town, and though its position is strong, it
would have required a large force to hold it. The garrison, composed
mainly of fugitives from Aidos and Slivno, had no heart for fighting,

OF 1828-29 IN EUROPE AND ASIA/9 709

and without waiting' to be summoned they offered to capitulate.
Diebitsch gladly accepted the offer with the conditions that they were
to give up their arms, their standards, and their guns. These hard
terms were accepted without hesitation, and the Russians marched
into Adrianople, to use Moltke's words, " as into a friendly town,
" where nothing but the garrison is changed."

Stilt Marshal Diebitech's position was a critical one in spite of his
success ; and it caused so much anxiety at St. Petersburg, that a fresh
levy of 90,000 men was ordered, lest the negotiations set on foot at
Constantinople should fail. Rest, so far from restoring the health of
the troops, seemed to aggravate the disease that had so long hung
about them. Colonel Chesney, who was present at a grand review
held at Adrianople some months later, states that there were less than
13,000 men of all arms on the ground.

But General Diebitsch put a bold face on the matter, and in order
to stresgthen the hands of the Ambassador at Constantinople, he
advanced in three columns towards the capital. Report, fortunately
for him, had magnified his force to 60,000 men, and as there was not
even a show of opposition made to his advance, the weakness of his
actual numbers escaped detection.

His boldness was rewarded, for the Porte, alarmed by the approach
of the enemy, and still more perhaps by the fear of an outbreak in
the capital, signed, on the 28th of August, the Treaty of Adrianople.

My time will not allow me to relate the events of the Campaign of
1829 on the Asiatic frontier. That campaign had no influence on the
result of the war, nor was there anything remarkable in the operations
on either side. The Turks displayed indeed somewhat more vigour
and enterprise than they had done in Europe ; not only did they take
the initiative, but they did what is very foreign to their habits : — they
undertook a winter campaign in the hope of recovering the ground
they had lost in summer. On the 18th February, they made a bold
but unsuccessful attempt to re-take Akhaltsikh by escalade, and when
this failed, they commenced a regular siege. But a Russian force soon
came to its relief and they were defeated with heavy loss.

The defection of the Pasha of Mush at this time deprived the
Turks of some 12,000 Kurdish cavalry — a very serious loss. In every
quarter success attended the operations of the Russians. In June,
Paskevitch forced his way across the Saganlugh range, and after
defeating the Army with which the Seraskier attempted to cover
Erzeroum, he pursued him to the gates of that city and forced him to
surrender.

He then advanced upon Trebizonde, but finding the country almost
inaccessible for artillery, and meeting with a more serious opposition
than he had expected from the warlike Mahomedan tribes of that
mountainous district, he abandoned the project and fell back upon
Erzeroum.

Some desultory fighting took place after this at Baiburt and at
Bayazid, but intelligence of tbe signing of the Treaty of Adrianople
put an end to hostilities before any decisive blow was struck. The

710 UX SKETCH OP THE RUSSO-TTJRKI8H CAMPAIGNS,* ETC.

•most serious result of the war in Asia was the loss of Akhaltsikb,
which -this Treaty handed over to Russia.

It will be unnecessary for me to make more than a "very few general
•observations on the- conduct of "this war. Those who wish for a critical
resume of the operations of both armies will find it in the concluding'
chapter of Moltke's History. Such a war as that between Russia and
Turkey cannot be judged by the ordinary rules of European warfare.
The best recognised principles of strategy were systematically ignored
both by Turks and Russians ; by the former from sheer incapacity -or
inertness, by the latter from a more or less well-founded contempt of
her enemy.

If we are to judge of 'this war simply by its results, it is certainly
one of the most successful wars on record. It had the effect of greatly
strengthening the influence of Russia in the east of Europe, and of
heightening her -prestige in the west. But it is another question
whether it has in anything like an equal degree increased her reputa-
tion or given fresh proof of her strength, as a great military power.

The energy and determination of her officers, and the courage and
constancy of her soldiers, under difficulties and trials of no ordinary
kind are indeed beyond all praise ; but a careful study of this war not
only reveals an unaccountable want of foresight in her military admi-
nistration, but leads one to doubt whether the power of Russia, at least
for offensive warfare, has not been greatly overrated.

The most interesting question for us, especially at the present
moment, is whether the campaigns of '28 and '29 will throw light upon
any future war that may be carried on between the same combatants,
and on the same ground. One thing is clear : which is, that, should suck
a war unhappily arise, it will take place under greatly altered condi-
tions. I am looking at the question solely from a military point of
view.

On the one hand, a Turkish army of the present day would be very
different from what it was now nearly fifty years ago. The Nizam
would doubtless be more efficient soldiers than they were then ; but, if
I am not greatly mistaken, the irregular troops, both horse and foot,
which did such good service at Varna and Shumla, would be found to
have lost much of that daring courage which made them prefer death
to surrender. The Bashi-Bazouk of 1876 is but a sorry representative
of the Spahi or Arnaout of '28 or '29. Nor is it to be expected that after
so severe a lesson, the frontier fortresses — still less the passes of the
Balkan — will again be neglected.

On the other hand, the Russians are not likely a second time so
greatly to miscalculate the forces required for a successful invasion of
Turkey. They cannot expect again to have the undisputed command
• of the Black Sea, which alone enabled Marshal Diebitsch to add the
proud title of " Za Balkanski" — or crosser of the Balkan — to his name ;
and in crossing the Pruth they will feel that they are embarking upon
an undertaking which will task to the utmost the strength of the
.Russian Empire to bring to a successful issue.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHINESE NAVAL ARSENAL AT
FOO-CHOW: TRANSLATED AND ABRIDGED FROM M.
GIQUEL'S PAMPHLET.1

By Commander Cyprian Bridge, R.N,

Ddrino my service in China, I have had the good fortune of making
the acquaintance of Lieutenant Giquel, of the French navy, whose
name is pre-eminently distinguished amongst those of the group of
able French Naval Officers who have lately exercised an important
influence on the course of affairs in more than one ancient State in the
far East. With his permission, I make use of an account published
by him of the arsenal at Foo-Chow, and of the work done there. The
importance of this establishment, and the results achieved in a very
few years, are too striking to render necessary any apology for bring-
ing them to the knowledge of the members of the Royal United
Service Institution,

Object of the Arsenal.

The arsenel of Foo-Chow is not, as this designation might seem to
imply, an establishment intended for the manufacture of arms and
munitions of var. It is a collection of building- slips and workshops
designed for the construction of ships, and having annexed a factory
built for the rofling of iron in bars and sheets. The object in view in
establishing it las been to furnish the Chinese with ships of war and
transports, to instruct them in the methods of building and managing
these vessels, ani to take advantage of the metallic wealth, notably
that of iron, possessed by the province of Fohtsien.

Reasons for Selecting the Port of Foo-Chow.

The harbour oat be easily defended, as the entrance of the Alin
River is studded with islets and elevations well adapted to the reception
of forts, and, some ten miles higher up, the hills along which it runs
contract its course efficiently for the laying down of a few torpedoes
to render its passage absolutely impossible. The anchorage, quite
accessible to vessels with a draught of water of 22 to 23 feet, was
found to suffice fot ships of the dimensions which it was decided
to construct, and they could be moored alongside the frontage of
the arsenal at the quays, which was necessary to facilitate the work of
construction. Beforehand it was known that the province would

1 " L'Arsenal de F»u-tch6ou, sea l&ultat*." Par Prosper Giquel, Lieutenant de
Yairaeau, Direct eur. Shanghai : 1874.

712 ACCOUNT OF THE CHINESE NAVAL ARSENAL AT FOO-CHOW.

furnish iron, piles for the foundations of the workshops, that the coal
of Formosa was not far off, and that manual labour was cheap.

Negotiations relative to the Establishment of the Arsenal.

M. Giquel had made the acquaintance of a distinguished Mandarin,
his Excellency the Viceroy Tso-Tsong-Tang, when at the head of a
Franco-Chinese corps, he had been engaged, in company with the
troops under his Excellency's command, against the rebels in the
province of Che-Kiang. On the conclusion of the campaign, at the
end of 1864, the Viceroy had requested him to furnish a plan, for the
construction of a naval arsenal. The one submitted was not definitely
approved of till the end of 1866, when the contracts between M. Giquel
and the Chinese Government were signed.

Programme of Foundation.

The programme drawn up was as follows : —

1. Establishment of workshops and slips suitable for the construc-
tion of ships and their engines.

2. Establishment of schools for the education of leading men in the
constructor's department, of captains, and of engineers for the ships.

3. Engagement of a sufficient number of Europeans to conduct the
works and to instruct the Chinese.

4. Laying down of a patent slip, on Labat's system, similar to that
at work at Bordeaux, for the repair of vessels.

5. Establishment of an iron-foundry for rolling bars ani sheets out
of the pigs of rough iron furnished by the province, and the old iron
that can be procured in China.

Beginning of the Works.

At the beginning of 1867, some preliminary worts, such as the
quarters for the personnel and the storehouses, were taken in hand ;
but it was only in the month of October in the same year, on the
return of M. Giquel from a voyage to France to collect the necessary
materiel and the staff, that the works of the arsenal, properly called,
made a real start. The residents of Foo-Chow still remember the
surprise and doubt experienced by them when they saw the bare
paddy-fields upon which the works had to be erected. None of the
plant purchased in France had arrived ; the fouiders of the under-
taking were at a port without resources in the shaje of machinery and
European implements. However, it was necessary to set to work ; a
small square hut, the only one on the ground, served as a smithy ; in
it were built two forges, and from them were burned out the first
nails. With native carpenters, pile-drivers were constructed for driving
the piles, and the laying down of a slip was proceeded with, on which,
three months afterwards, the director — with appropriate solemnities —
laid the keel of a transport. During this time, tlie embanking was
vigorously pushed on by means of 1,200 men ; for it was necessary to
raise the ground five feet to elevate it above the highest rising o£ the
river ; and as the very natural impatience of the Chinese had to be

ACCOUNT OF THE CHINE8E NAVAL ABSENAL AT FOO-CHOW. 713

allayed when they wished to Bee results withont delay, the constraction
of a series of wooden workshops was begun, in which were placed a
part of the machines and tools as they arrived from France. These
workshops still exist, and the arsenal presents the somewhat common
spectacle in new establishments abroad, of buildings run up in haste
standing beside permanent structures built with a perfect luxury of
materials and workmanship.

Workshops and Building Works.

The following is a list of the shops, factories, Ac. : —

The Iron-works (usine metallurgique), in which are the buildings
for the large forges and rolling-mills, include a space of 5,011 square
yards. The large forges are provided with six steam-hammers, one
single-action hammer, with a power of 138 cwt., made at the arsenal,
one double-action Farcot hammer; the remaining four are single-
action and smaller. There are sixteen fires for heavy jobs and six re-
heating furnaces. This factory has up to the present (February, 1874)
turned out the forgings for nine marine engines of 150 horse-power,
including the shafts and cranks. There have also been forged the
large pieces, such as bower anchors of 27 cwt. and boats' davits, re-
quired as ships' fittings.

The Boiling mill {atelier des laminoirs) has six furnaces and four
apparatus — one for sheet-iron, one for stout iron and angle-iron, one
for small sizes, aud the fourth for copper. They are worked by an
engine of 100 horse-power. They can, working day and night, turn
out 3,000 tons of plate iron a year.

The Metal mill, or coppersmith's shop (chaudronnerie), has one
engine of 15 horse-power. Besides the current work of the arsenal,
setting-up boilers sent out from Europe, fitting ships, <fcc.f this shop
has completed fourteen boilers, of four and five furnaces, intended
for engines of 150 horse-power, with the necessary tubes.

The Fitting shop (ajustage) employs an engine of 30 horse-power.
It can turn out machinery to the extent of 500 horse-power a year. It
has actually turned out seven marine engines of 150 horse-power, and
two others are in a forward state.

The Setting-up shop (montage) occupies a space of 950 square yards.

The Foundry (fonderie) has three smelting furnaces, capable of cast-
ing pieces of fifteen tons. It has turned out an average of twelve to
fifteen tons of castings a week, such as cylinders, condensers, &c., for
engines of 150 horse-power.

The Chronometer shop (chronometrie) is divided into three sections, one
for the manufacture of chronometers, one for that of optical instru-
ments, and a third for that of compasses.

The Smithy (petites forges) has forty-four forges and three steam-
hammers.

• The Locksmith's shop (serrurerie) occupies a space of about 600 square
yards.

There are also a Steam saw-mill a Pattern shop, and a Joiner's shop.

There are three Building slips, with sheds on both sides, and a large
mould loft, in which the lines of ships can be traced the full size.

714 ACCOUNT OF THE CHINESE NAVAL ARSENAL AT FOO-CHOW.

Masting sheers, able to lift weights of forty tons, and a patent slip, on
Labat's system, complete the plant necessary for naval construction ;
the latter can hanl np ships of over 300 feet length of keel, and 2,500
tons displacement. The ships on it are hauled up " broadside on."

In addition to the above, there are Stores, Schools, and Quarters for
the staff of the establishment, both European and Chinese.

The total extent of the ground occupied by the arsenal is 117 acres.

There are three French schools — the School of naval architecture, the
Drawing school, and the Schools for apprentices. There are also three
English schools — the Naval school, in which mathematics and the
theory of navigation, &c, are taught ; the Seamanship school, on board
the training-ship, Kien-wei, and the Engineering school.

In the latter schools, M. Giquel has had the assistance of some of
our countrymen, Captain R. E. Tracey having been placed in charge
of the training-ship, a post in which he has been succeeded by Captain
P. P. Luxmoore, C.B.

The European staff consists of, at present, 52 persons. The native
employes of this truly great establishment amount to 2,600 men.

During the astonishingly short time of seven years, M. Giquel has
not only constructed an arsenal from its foundations, but he has
actually built, and, in a great part, engined fifteen ships of war ; one
a corvette of 250 horse-power (450 I.H.P.). See accompanying list.

In a letter to me, dated August 29th, M. Giquel says : — " Instead
" of fifteen vessels, there are now eighteen launched ; the three latter
" are similar to the one called Foo-Po [No. 4 in the list], and we have
" begun building composite vessels ; two are at present under con-
" struction."

That M. Giquel has been able to do all this, in spite of the formidable
difficulties in his way, is a remarkable proof of the energy and sagacity
which he has brought to the direction of the important work he had
undertaken. The very ground on which the arsenal is built had to be
made. The soil of the site was alluvial, formed by a thick layer of
solidified mud, covered with a coating of nearly liquid clay ; a site
about as unfavourable for a naval yard as could well be imagined. The
freshets of the river obliged him to raise the level of the ground five
feet above that of the original paddy field, on the unstable soil of
which the works had to be established. He has succeeded wonder-
fully, and has not only placed the Chinese in possession of a valuable
arsenal and a respectable squadron, but he has also taught many of
them how to equip and manage the vessels which his ability ha
enabled them to construct.

ACCOUNT OF THE CHINESE NAVAL ARSENAL AT POO-CHOW. 715

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OCCASIONAL PAPERS, NOTES,

AKD

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

It is requested that communications, or books for review, may be
addressed to

MAJOR LONSDALE A. HALE,
Royal Engineers,

Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall Yard, London, S.W.

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876.

By Colonel £. Nbwdigate, Commanding Rifle Depdt.*

A new edition of the regulation drill of the Prussian Infantry has
been issued to the German Army. The great experience of this
nation upon the field of battle, the immense amount of thought and
study she has devoted to the art of war, and the high state of efficiency
into which her troops are brought after a very short period of service,
cannot fail to give importance to this work. In it we have embodied
all the latest changes and orders upon the subject of drill which have
been issued up to the 3rd of March, 1876.

The work still bears on its title-page the original date of the 25th
of February, 1847, and from that time until 1870 no new edition was
published. Numerous addenda had, however, been added from time
to time, more especially in 1867, after the Austrian war and the
introduction of the breech-loading rifle. The edition of 1870, dated
the 3rd of August, was not issued to the army until a year later,
when ample time had been taken to consider how far the changes it
contained were in accordance with the experience of the battle-field.
King William was at the head of his army at Mayence when he signed
its introduction, and as the troops were already in the field, the delay
in its issue can be easily explained. It was no time then to make
alterations in drill. The effect would have been to unsettle those
troops which had not practised the new formation, and the con-
sequences might have been disastrous. As it was, however, the heavy
losses in the earlier battles made it peremptory that some modifications
in the old system of attack should be introduced even during the war.
This old system was the attack by whole* battalions formed either
in line, three ranks deep, or in the attacking column, i.e., a double
column on the centre with skirmishers on the flanks. The losses
which the Brigade of Guards and others suffered in these close forma-
tions caused the King to issue an order that company columns were
to be employed. This formation had long been introduced into the
drill book ; but it was not until 1870 that it was established as the
fighting formation for infantry.

In the following year (4th July, 1872), a cabinet order was issued
from Berlin, calling upon General Officers to practise some further
changes which were considered necessary on account of " the dis-
u proportionately heavy losses which had been shown by experience
" in the last war to result from the employment of closed battalions
" under fire in level and open ground ; and, on the other hand, of the
" success which had attended a widely extended use of company
" columns and strong lines of skirmishers." In this order twelve
points were comprised, all relative to the dispersed system of fighting

720 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876.

upon which reports were to be furnished at the end of the drill
season.

In the next spring, an order, dated 19th March, 1873, directed that
the proposed additions should almost entirely be embodied in the
drill regulations. There is, however, one point which should be
noticed. It was proposed that " the supports " should be allowed " to
" follow the skirmishing line not only in line and in column, but also
" in extended order, with the groups (sections) either opened out or
u closed ; " but the opening out of the supports was not sanctioned
in the order of 1873, neither has it been inserted in the present edition.

In the latter we have a few further alterations, but they come in
here and there as additions. There has been no attempt to remodel
the work ; it still remains the drill book of 1847, with the modifications
rendered necessary by the introduction of modern fire-arms. Mnch
that has been considered unimportant has been struck out, and the
whole comprises nine pages less than the last edition.

It is especially worthy of remark that the rapidity, strict dressing,
discipline, and the perfect steadiness in the ranks for which the
Prussian Army is proverbial, are now considered more necessary than
ever. At the same time the training of the individual soldier requires
even greater care, for each man must also thoroughly understand the
art of skirmishing; he must be more self-dependent; and he must
learn to think for himself not only in extended but also in close order.
The company now forms the important sub-unit for battle, and the
men composing it must be able to drill equally well " whether the
" front or rear rank be in front, or however much the subdivisions or
" sections of the company may be inverted." For all of this, individual
intelligence is required, and the men are obliged to make use of their
heads, instead of being mere machines, moved by word of command.

The present edition of the regulations is divided, as formerly, into
five parts, and subdivided into chapters as follows : —

Pabt L
Instruction of the Individual Infantry Soldier.

Chapter 1. Instruction without rifle.

2. Instruction with the rifle.

3. Manipulation with the rifle for non-commissioned officers :
carrying the colour, and the sword exercise for

Officers.

Pabt II.
Upon the Squad and Company.
Chapter 4. The squad.

5. Formation, telling off, and dressing of a company.

6. Manipulation of the rifle and firing of a company.

7. Movements of a company.

8. The company column and dispersed order of fighting.

9. Formations for particular objects.

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 721

* Part III.

The Battalion.

Chapter 10. Formation in three ranks; dressing; manipulation of

the rifle ; firing, and movements of a battalion in line.
„ 11. Formation of column from line.
„ 12. Movements in column.
,, 13. Formation of line from column.
,, 14. Formation in two ranks (fighting formation.)
„ 15. Squares.
„ 16. The assembly.

Part IV.

Upon the fight of a battalion, with special reference to dispersed fighting,

and the employment of company columns.

Chapter 17. Instruction of the individual soldier, and of the troops

in dispersed order. Conduct of the Officers and non-
commissioned officers.
,, 18. The fight of a battalion; the use of skirmishers, and
company columns in general.

Part V.

The Brigade.

Chapter 19. Rendezvous and development.

„ 20. Movements of a deployed brigade.

„ 21. Parades.

„ 22. Colours and their honours.

,, 23. Signals, marches, and instructions for drums and fifes.

In the following remarks we shall not attempt to enter into minute
details as to the actual formations, positions of Officers, <fcc., Ac., for
in these matters there are no changes; but we shall endeavour to
show what is the present system of tactics in force in the Prussian Army.

Paets I and II,

The first seven chapters remain almost as they were in the edition of
1847. In 1870 the instructions for countermarching were added to
the company drill, and taken out of that of the battalion. This
movement has now been struck out of the book altogether, because
" it must be a matter of indifference to the troops, both at drill and in
'* the field, which rank is in the front, and whether the right or left
" flank is at the head. The men must therefore be practised

individually and collectively in divisions (Abtheilungen) in carrying

out -whatever movement may be ordered with the subdivisions
" (Ziige) in inverted order and out of their usual succession1'
(Section 34.)

The formation in three ranks is still retained; but for parade

vol. xx. 3 B

722 PRUSSIAN DUILL, 1876.

purposes and route marching only. It has been the Prussian formation
for years, and consequently all the reserves who have been througk
her ranks are familiar with it. Probably this may be a reason for
retaining it. For parade purposes it has the advantage that the front
of a company is one- third less than if it were in two ranks, but on
the other hand Jager Battalions are only formed in two ranks, and the
additional width of front improves the appearance of their companies
in marching past. For all fighting purposes the formation in three
ranks is an obsolete formation. Formerly there was a meaning in the
third rank : it was composed of the best shots and most adroit men.
These formed the third subdivision, " Zug" of a company, called the
skirmishing subdivision. In a battalion formed for battle these four
Ziige were placed under the command of a Captain selected for the
purpose. In an " attacking column" (a term which has entirely
disappeared from the drill book of 1876) the Ziige were placed two on
each flank ; and when in line, two in rear of each flank. This system
was altered in the book of 1870, when the skirmishing Ziige were
always formed in rear of their own companies, and they ceased to be
placed under a Captain appointed for the purpose.

Now, however, all the subdivisions of a company have to act as
skirmishers ; the best shots are distributed equally among the com-
panies (Section 15), and although as a rule the skirmishing Zug is
first extended, it is a matter of no importance which of the three is so
employed.

The transformation of a company of three ranks in line into a
column of three subdivisions in two ranks is decidedly an intricate
movement, and it is quite at variance with the principles of Prussian
drill that the memory should be "clogged with a multiplicity of
" formations ;" but, at the same time, it is equally contrary to them to
break down what already exists for the purpose of re-building entirely
anew. The three rank formation is well known, and it is remarkable
to see the rapidity with which a company, either advancing or
retiring, suddenly breaks off and forms itself into a company column,
and then remains perfectly steady. This in itself is a most useful
practice for the men, because it accustoms them to find their places — a
most important point in the " dispersed order of fighting," which we
come to in Chapter 8. '

The expression " dispersed order " must not be understood to refer
only to the extended line of skirmishers which forms the front or
firing line, but also to the breaking up into smaller bodies of all troops
when in contact with the enemy. It is the subdivision of a battalion
into four company columns, acting subject to the orders of the battalion
commander as independent units, and the partition again of the
companies into Ziige and half-Ziige and sections. It is the change
which has been made from fighting with whole battalions, either in
line or column, under command of one voice, to fighting in smaller
fractions, each under its own chief, and each possessing, in proportion
to its strength, a certain amount of independence of action. It is
essentially the fighting system of the Prussian Army, and as the drill
qook is stall retained in its old form, it is not surprising that we should

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 723

have to search in many parts of it for the additions which have been
made relative to this subject. But the prominence given to com-
pany drill, and the important part which the company plays, are
manifest from the large proportion of the drill book which is devoted
to this subject, and the intimate connection which exists between
skirmishing, dispersed order, and company columns, is the reason why
we always find these three subjects treated together.

In preparing for action the companies are at once formed into
company columns at quarter distance, viz., seven paces from front rank
to front rank. If the subdivisions are 16 files in strength or more,
they are divided into half subdivisions, but if less than 16, they are
not to be divided. The formation takes place " out of step," i.e., the
men move off at once and form up as quickly as they can, quite
independently, but remain steady as soon as they are formed. All
movements of the column also are made " out of step." For instance,
the company may be ordered to form line on the leading subdivision
(either to the right or left on one subdivision to the right, and the other
to the left), when the men move off at once and form as rapidly as
possible. In order, however, to preserve the rifles from injury, they
are never carried at the u {rail " except when skirmishing, but at the
"slope," and always ordered at the halt.

The present regulations have made some important exceptions to
the rule of marching "out of step :" "Under the most effective rifle
" fire of the enemy, company columns are always to march in step.
" In the bayonet attack by these columns, the rules for the bayonet
" attack of a battalion are to hold good." Thus, when supports and
reserves are being brought up to the line of skirmishers for the
decisive charge upon a position, every portion, however small, must be
brought up in close order and with the same regularity and precision
that was formerly required of a battalion.

Again we find another exception ; "It must be rigidly enforced
" that retiring movements immediately after an attack are always
" carried out in step (not at the double), and that on these occasions
" taut hold of the men is never lost."

These passages are most significant, and may be almost said to
contain the essence of Prussian drill, the aim of which is to maintain
strict discipline at the most critical moments, and to restore order as
rapidly as possible after confusion. For this reason the greatest
attention is paid to the steadiness of the men in the ranks. The perfect
time, dressing, and carriage of the men in marching at attention,
or " in step," is well known. When marching at the " shoulder " the
arms are kept rigidly steady. At the " slope " the right arm is swung
both by officers and men, and especially so when marching past a
reviewing General. There is no half measure in this matter of
swinging the arms any more than there is in any other part of their
drill. They are swung with a will, and this movement is an assistance
to the men both as regards time and dressing in marching.

Movements to be made "out of step" are preceded by the caution
" Ohne Trttt." The men open out and march as is most comfortable
to themselves, but with their rifles at the slope. The moment, however,

3 b 2

724 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876.

the order is given " in step/' everything is done, even at sham fights
and field days, with the regularity of the barrack square. The
supports, for instance, if under fire, are moved, halted, or fronted, and
arms ordered by word of command with the utm >st precision. The
object seems to be to transfer to the dispersed order of fighting as
much as possible of that command over the men which close order
affords.

But it must not be supposed that this produces either slowness of
action or inflexibility of movement. ' The reverse is the case. Nothing
can be more flexible or handy than the company column. It can
send out skirmishers just in the strength required ; it can re-inforce
.them when needed ; it can form one general and intermixed firing line
and reform in company column with the greatest rapidity. Bayonet
attacks are made by the company, or by the small detachments of it
which are scattered as supports in rear of the skirmishers. In fact,
every duty which formerly belonged to whole battalions is now the
role of the companies..

But it is the last paragraph of the quotation which deserves special
notice : retiring movements must not be made at the double, the men,
on the contrary, must march in step, and must be kept tightly in hand.
The expression u retiring movements " is worthy of notice ; it does not
necessarily follow that the attack has failed — a contingency that should
never enter the heads of the men making it. But from whatever
cause a retreat may be necessary, it is of the ntmost importance that
the greatest regularity should be observed. If once the men were
allowed to double when exposed to fire it would be almost impossible
to stop them, and the more the firing line had been previously re-
inforced by supports and reserves, the more hopeless would be the
confusion, and the greater the risk of disaster. This short paragraph
speaks with an eloquence which cannot be overrated ; for it touches
the weak point in the dispersed order of fighting.

So long as the fighting line is successful and re-inforcements are at
hand to be thrown into it whenever required, all goes well ; but when
these have been used up and ammunition, perhaps, is also running short,
then danger arises. At the commencement there are plenty of
reserves. Every battalion has its two companies and every brigade
(6 battalions) has either two or three battalions, forming a second
line of battalions called the "third Treffen;" but in an obstinate
fight these are soon dissolved, and only a very small portion of each
battalion is perhaps left. To keep back the third Treffen as a reserve
in the event of defeat would be contrary to the principle that yon
should make your attack as strong as possible ; and the feeling that
there was a force in rear to fall back upon might lead the first line into
giving up too soon ; whereas, if a sufficient re-inforcement had been
sent into it victory would very probably have been the result. At all
events, it would have been the best chance of securing it. We should
here mention that the old rule that " the skirmishers are to fall back
'* upon the battalion when they can no longer offer resistance to the
" enemy'* has been struck out of the regulations; it belongs to an
obsolete system. But to return : the attack, in spite of everything,

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 725

may fail, and then the difficulty of drawing back in an orderly manner
would be very great. This difficulty is increased by the intermixing
of men belonging to different subdivisions, companies, and battalions.
It cannot be prevented altogether, but the regulations lay down that
it should be avoided as far as possible ; and that in re-inforcing the
skirmishers, groups (sections) should be pushed up into the intervals
between the firing groups, and not files between files. This is another
advantage in skirmishing by sections, with intervals kept between
them. It also applies equally to the half-subdivisions which first
extend in front of a battalion. There is no reason why considerable
intervals should not be left between these to be filled up later on by
the other half -subdivisions which form the first re-inforcements.
Everything must be fostered that tends to keep the men in hand, yet
it is only by the constant practice of an orderly retirement — drawing
back portions of the line by degrees, leaving only a few skirmishers to
cover the movement, whilst the remainder move steadily to the rear
and re-unite as quickly as possible in their different sections and sub-
divisions— that the danger of this weak point can be lessened.

The regulations for extending, for the movements, re-inforcement,
and firing of a line of skirmishers, remain almost unchanged. A
certain number of simple rules are given without entering into detail,
as for instance : —

A half-subdivision only is to be extended in the first instance (this
used to be a section only).

The files make a half -turn and move by the shortest way to take
up the ground they are to occupy, or until halted.

It is a matter of no importance whether they remain one in front
of the other or side by side.

An interval of a few paces is to be left between the sections in
order to give the non-commissioned officers greater control over the
firing of their groups.

In quite open ground the files must not open out more than six
paces.

When moving, skirmishers carry their rifles at the trail, or for the
sake of change, under the right or left arm like a sportsman.

Strict injunctions are given for the superintendence of the Officers
at the firing.

Should it be necessary to fire during movements, the actual men
must be named for this purpose.

" In rapid firing, in order to maintain strict fire-discipline, and to
*r avoid the useless expenditure of ammunition — so disadvantageous
" in its consequences — it is well always to order the number of
" cartridges that are to be expended."

When closed re-inforcements are sent into the firing line they
usually fire volleys, and volley firing must not be allowed to degenerate
into rapid firing or independent firing.

It has been proved by target practice in the Prussian Army that
the percentage of hits made by a squad firing volleys by word of
command, is greater than that made by independent firing, even in
extended order, and the better the volley the greater is the percentage of

726 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876.

hits. The reason given for this is that the word of command tends to
calm the men, which is all-important in firing. A writer in the
Militair Woclumblatt considers the habit of volley firing so essential
in the present day, that he recommends its being practised, even for a
few minutes only> on every occasion when the men parade with arms ;
that it should be repeated two or three times every day, and that the word
of command should be given by different Officers or non-commissioned
officers, with the view of accustoming the men to take orders from
others than those to whom they are accustomed. In the last war, it
is true that volley firing was seldom used, and when it was it
always degenerated into independent firing; but this, he argues, is
only a proof of the want of fire discipline and of the necessity of paying
much greater attention to it in future.

With regard to the instructions as to the conduct of the skirmishers
when attacked by cavalry, the regulations first describe how they
may make use of the nearest cover, or form clusters round their
leaders, or unite with the nearest supports. A new rule has now been
added that " in many cases it will be advisable to leave the
" skirmishers in their position, especially if it affords any cover " —
and the next chapter, which describes how a company column is to
form square, commences with the remark that " against a cavalry
" attack it is not always necessary to form a company square, but
" should circumstances render it necessary, Ac." And again, in
Section 102, "upon the movement of the skirmishing line," there
is another new passage to the same effect : " When attacked -by cavalry
" the skirmishers must especially depend upon the efficacy of their
u fire, and it is therefore recommended in many oases that they should
" remain in their positions, particularly when the ground affords some
" cover." "this principle that men must not as a matter of course run
into close masses and form targets for the rifles and guns of the
enemy on the appearance of a body of horsemen, was laid down in
the order of March, 1873, and now for the first time is incorporated in
the drill book. It is experience gained in war and speaks for itself.
On the other hand, close formations will sometimes be necessary to
resist a heavy charge, and instructions are given for firing upon
cavalry in four ranks. This mode of firing is also sometimes used
when the supporting Ziige are brought up to the skirmishers in order
to pour in the greatest weight of fire immediately before a final assault.

Great stress is laid upon the value of volley firing at this moment,
which consists " not so much in the number of volleys, but in the
calmness and coolness with which they are delivered." The closed
detachments which are placed at intervals along* the line in rear of
the skirmishers mast be practised in loading while moving. The
bayonet attack may be carried out either in line or column, and after
it has succeeded these closed detachments are to fire volleys.

This part of the book winds up with repeating the injunction that
" Companies must be able to execute the simple formations and move-
" men to which are necessary for fighting under all circumstances, by
" day as well as by night, either rank in front, in inverted order, Ac.
" They must be able to deploy on the leading subdivision with the

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 727

" greatest rapidity and certainty, not only in close order but also in
" extended order, and towards either side — to the right or left, or
u simultaneously to both sides." And again "they must be able just
" as quickly to re- assume a formation suitable for some other phase of
" the combat. The training of a company must in short be such
" that the captain has it always in hand, and so fully attentive to his
" orders, as to be capable even of executing what has not been specially
"practised beforehand.1*.

Pabt III.
The Battalion.

Although so large a proportion of the drill book is devoted to
instructions relating to company columns, the battalion is considered,
as it has ever been, the principal unit for combat. This unit has to
be subdivided into smaller sub-units, each acting with a certain
amount of independence, but still remaining under the single guid-
ance of the battalion commander. In 1866, when company columns
were first used in action, the great disadvantage of their getting but
of the hand of the battalion commander was experienced. Since
then, the new regulations which have been issued all aim at prevent-
ing this evil in future. It is probable that the authorities had
also this point in view, when they added the following paragraph to
Section 91. " When the company columns of a battalion are formed

in one Treffen (line of columns) at the deploying intervals of a battalion

only, the battalion commander id to give the word of command for
u carrying ont evolutions common to all — such as manual exercises, Ac.
" — in the same way as with a closed battalion. When the company
" columns are not formed in one Treffen, or have a wider extension of
" front than the above, the captain takes up the word of command from
" the battalion commander."

The movements of a battalion formed in three ranks have not been
changed, but their number has been considerably reduced. Of those
that remain, some are not to be made the object of an inspection ; they
are not applicable for fighting purposes, and must not be regarded as a
test of the efficiency of the battalion.

In Chapter 10 we have the formation in three ranks ; dressing ;
advancing in line ; retiring in line ; diagonal march ; passing obstacles
and changing front. The latter is comprised in four lines : " The
" divisions are marched off and reformed in the new dressing line,
" unless it be desirable to form close column, or column on the centre."
Until 1870 a line changing front on the centre (the colour) was one of
the line movements. In 1867 a note was added that u this can be
" practised on the drill ground as a peace-exercise, because it helps to
" promote the adroitness of the Zng-leaders and men. It must never
" be made the object of an inspection." In 1870 it was struck out of
the book altogether.

Chapter 11 gives the different modes of forming column from line.
Forming column in front of a named division has been struck out, and

728 PRUSSIAN DBILL, 1876.

the formation of a column left in front is not to be a test of efficiency
at inspections.

Chapter 12 contains the movements in column. These consist of
marching in files, in sections, in half subdivisions, and in subdivisions;
changing direction in open column ; reducing and increasing tbe front
of divisions in open column ; marching in close column ; wheeling, and
the diagonal march ; opening and closing a column ; forming column
on the centre from open or close column of divisions (Zuge), and re-
forming open or close column from a column on the centre. Neither
of the two last movements, nor the marching in file, is to be made
use of at inspections.

Chapter 13, on the formation of line from column, consists of
deployments to the right or left and to both flanks simultaneously ;
and deployment from column on the centre. The deployment to the
right is forbidden at inspections.

This ends the movements of a battalion in three ranks, and they are,
as before observed, only such as are required for a march past or for
route marching.

Chapter 14, on " the formation of two ranks (fighting formation) "
commences with a new section (77). It is a fundamental rule that
when a battalion in three ranks has to take up a fighting formation
this is to be done by forming company columns.

The change from a fighting formation into a three rank formation
is made on the order from the battalion commander " Three ranks
— form ! " by the skirmishing subdivisions forming up in the shortest
way as a third rank.

In forming these company columns from line, the companies on
the right of the colour form columns of subdivisions (or half -sub-
divisions) to the left, those on the left of the colour form columns to
the right. The colour and escort remain with No. 3 company, and
move as a section in rear of the 3rd subdivision. Bandsmen join
their companies.

So long as the two centre companies remain together, the senior
captain of the two commands them, unless there is a Becond Staff
Officer with the battalion.

The double column in rear of the two centre companies (column
on the centre) is the established rendezvous formation of a battalion
" because it facilitates the battalion commander's super vision of his
" troops, and from it any fighting formation can easily be taken up."

When the company columns of a battalion are opened out from
one another, the battalion commander names a company upon which
this formation is to be made, and the others move up by the shortest
way.

The movements of a battalion in two ranks are made the same
as when in three, and the skirmishing subdivisions remain as
in the former edition, in rear of their respective companies.
Under the heads of " The attack with the column " (Section 84)
and " The bayonet attack with a deployed battalion " (Section 88), we
find hardly any alteration since 1867. This certainly appears rather
inconsistent with the positive orders against employing whole battalions

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 729

under the effective fire of the enemy ; bnt the object of retaining them
is no doubt for the guidance of the companies and subdivisions sent
forward for the final charge, and which are directed to carry it out
in the manner laid down for a battalion. The instructions run as
follows : " Upon the order, For attack, rifles on the right ! the battalion
" bring the rifles to the right side and break into a quickened pace,
" which is indicated by the beating of the drums without the fifes

" playing At a short distance from the enemy (about

" 12 paces) the order is given Charge rifles ! — Double ! upon which
" the front subdivisions of the battalion bring the rifles to the charge,
and the men rush upon the enemy with a loud hurrah ! . . . ."

In the dispersed order of fighting such a thing as a battalion
attack can hardly be expected to occur. But the bayonet attack
carried oat simultaneously by all the closed troops behind a long firing
line, with all the drums beating the storm step, the dispersed bodies
converging as they advance upon some special point — a previously
arranged flank attack developing itself at the same time, and then the
final rush and hurrahs of the whole, is, to use the mildest term, most
imposing.

In the formation of the skirmishing line, great liberty of action is
left to the battalion commander, who can employ whatever companies
or subdivisions may be most suitable, but the rule given in Section 87
is first to send out half of the " skirmishing subdivisions " of the flank
companies. These extend in front of the battalion, but are not allowed
to open out more than six paces. The other halves follow to re-inforoe
the skirmishers when necessary. The remaining subdivisions of these
companies follow in column as supports ; and the two centre companies
form the reserve. This is considered the normal formation when
several battalions are working together, and the distances which,
however, " may be increased according to the objects of the exercise,"
are given in Section 111 as follows : From skirmishers to re-inforce-
ment 100 paces, to supports 150 paces, and to reserve or main body
150 paces, making a total of about 400 paces. This is dispersed
order, but we cannot help observing that in this part of the book
much of the obsolete system appears to be retained. Thus the two
reserve companies, which are now specially termed the Haupttreffen are
called the Battalion; and the skirmishers are to be guided in the
direction of their march by the movements of the battalion. There
are also instructions for clearing the front at the double, and forming
up in rear of the flanks, which are quite inconsistent with the new
order of things. But after a few pages we come to another Section
(91) upon company columns, which begins with a new paragraph as
follows: "The fundamental fighting formation of infantry is the
" battalion formed in company columns. It is therefore a rule that
" when a battalion prepares for fighting it must take this formation."

No fixed rules can be laid down for all occasions, either as to the
number of companies to be sent forward or the intervals between the
companies. The battalion commander must adapt his dispositions to
the circumstances of the case and the end he has in view. As a rule,
greater depth than width should be given to the formation ; companies

730 PRU88IAN DRILL, 1876.

must never be opened out so far apart as to be unable to support
one another. The gradual development of the force must be con-
sidered ; and one company at least must always be kept in reserve.
" The battalion colour remains with the company in reserve, and in
" case this should exceptionally be dissolved, the first Zug of this com-
" pany must, under all circumstances, remain with it."

Chapter 15 is upon " squares.'* This subject has already been
referred to. That it is not considered necessary always to form
square is evident from the new sontence with which it commences.
" Should a battalion in two ranks have to defend itself against a
" cavalry attack by forming square, it will, &c."

Chapter 16, upon " the assembly," concludes this Part. The only
alteration here is that the men always assemble in two ranks instead
of in three.

Paet IV,

" The mode of fighting of a Battalion, with especial reference to dispersed

" order and the use of Company colu/mns."

In former editions the heading of this Part had special reference
to the vocation of the third rank. Now it has reference to the dispersed
order of fighting.

Chapter 17 contains "The instruction of the individual men and of
" the troops in dispersed order, and the conduct of the Officers and
" non-commissioned officers." Although there is not much that is
new, the practical remarks are excellent :

Skirmishers must possess power of judgment, skill, boldness,
activity, and self-confidence. In the use of their rifles they must be
thoroughly expert. It is the special task of all Officers to cultivate
these qualities among the men.

Skirmishers must move with freedom and without constraint ; such
matters as careful dressing, position, manner of carrying the rifle,
number of paces between files, and such like, should never be
mentioned.

They must be taught how to avail themselves of cover, and how a
very slight wave in the ground will screen them from the enemy's fire.
In order to teach this, squads should be opposed to one another.

No greater number of men should be extended than is rendered
necessary either by the formation of the ground or by the strength of
the enemy.

No firing to be allowed on single men at a greater distance than 250
meters, nor on larger objects, such as columns, artillery, &c., than
500 meters.

Long lines of skirmishers must have a few men sent out on the
flank or a detachment echelloned towards the rear in order to cover
the flank, unless it is protected by other troops or natural obstacles.
Great attention is called to this point ; and the files sent out on the
flank are not only useful in preventing surprise, searching small
covers, Ac., but also in keeping up the connection between different
bodies of troops.

(«
ft

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 731

As a general rule movements must be made at a brisk pace, but
without doubling. The regulations say that "it is only on rare
" occasions that an exception to the rule is permitted," but it is under
the head of these exceptions that one of the most important changes
in the mode of advancing under a heavy fire is introduced, viz., the
advance by rushes. After referring to the different occasions when it is
proper to double, such as crossing a flat open space swept by the
enemy's fire or driving the enemy from a position by a front attack
when it is impossible to surround him on the flanks, and a rapid
onslaught has to be made by the skirmishers, re-inforced to the
utmost. The book goes on to describe " the advance by rushes " in
the following manner :

" Under certain circumstances, and with due regard to the ground,
it may sometimes be advantageous to execute the attack by making the
skirmishers run rapidly over a tract of ground (60 to 80 paces) and
" throw themselves down in order to fire ; then, after a short pause, to
" continue the advance in the same manner. The attacking movement
" may, however, be prolonged by such an advance, and, as it expends a
" great deal of strength, it must not be commenced, at the soonest, at
" a greater distance from the enemy than 500 paces."

This was ordered to be practised and reported on in the cabinet
order of 12th July, 1872. It was included in the order dated 24th of
March, 1873, and now for the first time is embodied in the drill book.
The only points of difference in the three orders is the space to be
crossed ; the first says 50 to 80 paces, the second 50 to 60 metres, and
the final order fixes it at 60 to 80 paces, and also forbids the advance
in this manner at a greater distance than 500 paces from the enemy.
These are matters of detail which no doubt had been deeply considered
before definite conclusions were arrived at, and they are of great impor-
tance. It is the opinion held by many that the only way of advancing
over that most dangerous zone — from 600 to 200 yards from the enemy
— is by rushes, or at all events that this is the best means of reducing
the losses ; and for these reasons it should not be an occasional mode
of advancing, but one that is constantly practised, and to which the
men become thoroughly habituated. This is the only way of over-
coming the objection that if once you allow the men to lie down you
will not get them easily to make another advance ; and it is likely that
this objection carried weight when the decision was made that the space
crossed in each successive rush should be as great as possible without
distressing the men too much.

At 200 yards or less the supports are brought into the firing line.
Soon after this the order is given to attack, and the drums beat the storm
step. Finally "the whole — skirmishers and closed groups — run straight
" to the front so as arrive in a loose line upon the enemy, or else con-
" verge as they advance upon one or more points in the enemy's
" position previously indicated by the leader. In the latter case they
" run through the enemy's fire in loose order, and unite in more or
" less closed divisions (but always under the immediate command of
" their leader) in the enemy's line in order to roll him up or to oppose
" his supports."

732 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876*

As soon as skirmishers are no longer required, or are only needed
in small numbers, they must be recalled. In the event of their being
driven back they must at once rejoin tbeir companies or battalions.

With regard to the conduct of the Officers and non-commissioned
officers, they must thoroughly understand skirmishing on account
of " the often decisive share that skirmishers in the present day
" have in every fight." They must acquire aptness in dealing at
once with circumstances as they present themselves.

They must strive never to let their divisions get out of hand, and
they must lead their fire. They must indicate the distances and aim.
They must take care that the men are sparing of their ammunition on
the one hand, and on the other they must point out the moments and
objects which justify an increased expenditure of cartridges.

All leaders of skirmishers must consider how they can get the
shooting line, or a portion of it, nearer to the enemy* How they can
surround him or make a flank attack ; how they can take advantage
of any mistake on his part, and so on.

It is only when there is danger in delay that re-info rcements must
be sent by the shortest way into the firing line. At other times it
must be considered how and where this can be done, with a promise of
the best results, without intermixing the divisions, or interfering with
their mutual connection by bringing them through one another.

Chapter 18 is on " The fight of a battalion, and the use of skirmishers
" and company columns in general."

The introduction draws attention to the " offensive character " of a
concentration of the fire for short moments upon single points ; the
independently decisive results which sometimes are produced by this,
and the assistance which, under any circumstances, it renders to the
attack which follows. Also to the importance of supporting the loose
first line, when obliged to act on the defensive, especially as experience
proves that the greatest losses always occur whilst retreating. It
further says that in most cases there is very little use in occupying
advanced points merely for a passing defence. It is far preferable as
a rule to bring the forces which are to be employed in a defensive
position into action in one and the same line, although by degrees.

" Infantry well instructed in firing can repulse by their fire every
" attack in front . . . The conviction must be roused and fostered in
" the men that they are unassailable in front and that it is only when
" they turn their backs that they have anything to apprehend."

Great importance is given to the protection of the flanks, and the
further back the different supports of the first line are kept, the
better will this object be attained.

As to the position and employment of skirmishers, no rules can be
laid down applicable to all occasions. " The effect would only be to
" paralyse the mind of the leader," there is, however, one fundamental
principle insisted on " that the skirmishers are always supported by
' the companies to which they belong." This is one of the advantages of
the strong companies of the Prussian Army. They are fit for
independent action, and the only rules laid down are that when
detached for any special purpose their skirmishers must go with them,

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 733

and skirmishers are not to be employed without being supported by
their own companies.

The employment of battalion columns under fire, however, is
forbidden. The normal formation must be in company columns.
The instructions contained here, and the illustrations given in the
following section, are only applicable to the simplest phases of fighting,
and only intended to show how troops are to be instructed in fighting.

Thus : in attacking, the object must be first to strive to get the
firing line as efficaciously near to the enemy as possible in order to
subdue his fire.

In the advance by rushes the supports also advance in this way, but
the companies which form the reserve or third Treffen advance in
the usual manner — not by rushes.

When a position has to be taken, or some special point gained, a
sufficiently strong force must always be employed, as a failure is
injurious to the morale of the troops, and only leads to useless losses.

The leaders of the skirmishing line — and this is now the place for
the captains — must always be on the look-out for the best means of
making themselves masters of the next section of ground, and act
upon their own responsibility as soon as they are actually engaged.

Should the enemy appear to be shaken in any part of his position,
the nearest supports must be brought up, and a concentrated attack
made upon this point. As the troops draw together, the Officers
must get them in hand again as quickly as possible to resist a counter
attack. The divisions farther back must take the opportunity of
graining ground, whilst the enemy's attention is taken up with the
attack, in order to oppose, either by volley firing or a bayonet attack,
the reserves which he may be sending up in force.

Advice is given as to the selection of a defensive position. Shelter
trenches may here be used with advantage, but they must be limited
to affording cover for men lying down, and must on no account
impede the advance later on. In the German Army several shovels
for this purpose are carried by the men.

The increased efficacy of the fire gives great strength to the front
of infantry, and points to the attack on the flank as the weakest point.
The deep formation recommended affords protection in the defence,
and the closed divisions kept back are available for being moved round
in a circuit against the enemy's flank "who will easily be induced to
'* slacken his resistance on the firing becoming audible on his flank or
" quite in his rear."

All closed divisions now act almost entirely as reserves. Their
office is to foster the skirmishers' fight, and they must often adhere
closely to their movements. (We cannot quite understand why, in an
early chapter, the skirmishers were directed to guide their advance by
the battalion in rear?). It is- most essential that the leaders of these
closed bodies of men, of all ranks, should pay great attention to the
mutual connection of the skirmishing line with its own Bup ports and
reserves, in order to guard against the intermixing of the different
parts of the troops ; and when obliged to support one body of troops
with another this must be done if possible by sending them up on the
side and not by intermingling them.

734 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876-

The next section is again " on Company Columns."

The intensity of fire renders dispersed order necessary, but the
partition of a battalion into smaller divisions than is actually necessary
is strongly deprecated. Superior Officers must constantly guard against
letting their troops get out of hand ; and all subordinates,, the compcmy
leaders in particular, must rejoin their battalions quickly after having
accomplished their task. On the other hand the dexterous and
independent leadership of the company Officers must be brought into
play as much as possible.

Although it is again repeated that fixed forms for all the different
modes of development in company columns cannot be laid down, some
formations are given applicable in large combinations of several
battalions at the same time.

The normal formation has already been given in our remarks opon
chapter 14, but it is here that the terms " Vortreffen " and "Haupttreffen"
are first introduced. The former is composed of the two com-
panies (usually the flank companies) which are first sent forward to
form the line of skirmishers and their supports. The " Haupttrefen "
consists of the two centre companies which remain behind at first,
held together as a half battalion and acting as the reserve.

It is a formation which can easily be taken up, either from the line
of march, or from any formation in which the battalion may be ; and
on account of its depth is suitable either for attack or defence. The
two companies in front can develop a strong firing line, and in this
formation a crisis may be brought about by a bayonet attack, either
by the two front companies alone with the supports coming up to the
skirmishing line; or by the companies in reserve coming up and
joining those in front ; or these two latter companies may be directed
against the flank and endeavour to surround the enemy.

Another advantage of company columns mentioned here is the
facility with which they can take advantage of the ground for cover,
as compared with a whole battalion; the smallest inequality of ground
affords them cover, and even without this they offer but a small object

of aim.

They can rapidly take up any formation that is required, and
another point which is always insisted on is the facility with which a
Commanding Officer can get his troops again in hand and re-establish
the internal steadiness which may have begun to waver.

When a battalion is fighting alone, the company column system is
suitable for carrying out the established principle in fighting : never
employ more forces than are necessary. Some illustrations are then
given of a battalion acting alone.

The fight begins with one company, of which half a subdivision
only, or at most one subdivision, is extended. As soon as it has been
ascertained where the enemy can best be attacked, or on what point
he is going to make his attack, another company can be sent up to
that side to prolong the line of the first company. We must here
draw attention to the fact that the line is not to be prolonged by a
subdivision of the first company, because this would deprive the
skirmishers of a portion of their own supports, but another company

PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876. 735

complete is Bent tip, thus carrying ont the rule that skirmishers must
always be supported by their own companies.

Later on it may be necessary to prolong the line still more, either
on the same or on the opposite side, when a third company, with its
skirmishers and supports, is sent forward.

Should the enemy now be shaken by the fire, or should any favour-
able point have been gained for a more severe attack, the fourth com-
pany can still be brought up in order to bring about a crisis. In the
defence, however, when there are no other reserves present, this last
company must be kept back as long as possible, for the purpose of
making a counter attack, should the jenemy attempt to bring about a
decision.

Again, if a battalion is marching alone in the vicinity of the enemy,
one company should be sent forward to act as an advanced guard, and
this company should be preceded by skirmishers. Or if a battalion
is moving prepared for action, when there are no other troops between
it and the enemy, it must be preceded by scouts sufficiently far in
front to prevent its coming unexpectedly under an effective fire.
Should the skirmishers succeed in turning back the foe and gaining a
position, the battalion must at once establish itself there. For this
purpose the closed detachments must be at hand. It is in order to
insure having these closed detachments in readiness, that so much stress
is laid upon keeping the different sections of troops as intact as
possible ; also that all men who are not actually required in the firing
line are at once to be recalled ; and again that no more men should be
extended than are absolutely needed on each separate occasion.

When a retreat becomes necessary, it is important that a portion of
the battalion should be sent back to some point or ordered to take up
a position, previously indicated, in readiness for the reception of the
remainder ; but on no account must any of them be sent back for the
reception of defeated troops before a retreat has even been decided on.

The troops falling back should, if possible, retire on the flank of
those formed up to receive them, and the position to be taken up by
the latter should be selected with this view. When the enemy's
cavalry are in the neighbourhood during a retreat, the skirmishers
must not be left too far behind the other troops.

This part concludes by saying that, in the barrack square, the
instruction of soldiers should be in all the formations for fighting, with
the various phases they take in different kinds of ground, irrespective of
the level nature of the parade ground. The correct employment of
these various phases in accordance with the formation of the ground
must be taught in the country. On the parade ground, skill in
executing formations and evolutions ; mutual understanding between
the troops that are side by side and in rear of each other ; cohesion
and strict discipline can alone be taught and learnt. But this does
not depend on a multiplicity of intricate manoeuvres. A few simple
forms, such as those previously given, are amply sufficient for fighting
purposes.

" It is, however, unconditionally necessary that every battalion
" should be able to execute these with regularity and certainty under

736 PRUSSIAN DRILL, 1876.

" the most unfavourable circumstances — in bad ground, in the dark,
" in inverted order, rear rank in front, &c."

And finally, neither the fatigues of long field days nor the privations
of war must on any account cause the influence of the Commander
over his troops, or their attention to his orders, to be lessened.

Pabt V.
The Brigade*

Chapter 19. "Rendezvous and Development." A brigade is com-
posed of six battalions, usually of two regiments of three battalions
each. But the rules for a brigade hold good, however small a number
of battalions may be collected together. If there are more than two
they must be formed in two " Treffen." We have no word which
corresponds with this term, but it is used to express the bodies of
troops which form the different lines.

The usual formation is to place the battalions of the junior regiment
in the 1st Treffen, and those of the senior in the 2nd Treffen. Each
Treffen is then commanded by the Colonel of its regiment.

When field evolutions are about to take* place the battalions are
formed in " column on the centre.' ' Previous to a march they are
formed in " close columns of subdivisions."

For evolutions a brigade is formed in three Treffen. That is, one
battalion is placed in front as an advanced guard, or else one is moved
back as a reserve. The distance between the different Treffen is

30 paces.

The development of a brigade consists in opening out to deploying
intervals with 20 paces between the battalions, and gaining the full
Treffen distance on the march. The latter must depend upon the
circumstances of the fight, and must therefore be decided by the
Brigade Commander. When no distance is specified, 400 paces must
be considered as full Treffen distance. To economise space, however,
on the drill ground, this may be reduced to 150 paces.

Chapter 20. "Movements of a developed Brigade" The batta-
lions are all in company columns. Those of the first Treffen advance
in the formation already described with a Vortreffen and Haupttrefen.
A battalion of direction must be named.

Great liberty of action is, however; left with the Brigade Com-
mander, both as to the employment of the different battalions, and
also in the position of the regiments. Instead of having the battalions
of one regiment in the first Treffen, and those of the other in the
second, he may place the regiments side by side, each having two
battalions in the first Treffen and one in the second.

This arrangement has many advantages ; it fives each regiment a
deep formation, and prevents to a great extent the intermixing of the
two regiments in action.

The attack of a brigade is only carrying out on a larger scale what
has been already remarked upon, with the addition of instructions
about the employment of the 2nd Treffen.

One battalion must be kept in reserve under the immediate orders
of the Brigade Commander.

PRU88TAN DRILL, 1876. 737

When advancing with one battalion as an advanced guard, this
battalion commences the fight, bnt it mnst not extend its front too
mnch. The prolongation of the front mnst be carried ont by sending
np battalions on the side of the one engaged, precisely npon the same
principle as was illustrated by the fight of a battalion in company
columns.

In changing the front of a brigade the battalions as a rule forn
columns. There are very few words said about this ; the battalion on
the turning point wheels into the new direction, the others move into
the new alignment thus indicated, one after another, by the shortest
way, and take up the dressing.

As a rule, changes of front are to be made " out of step, but in
" perfect order."

The change of front will, in most cases, be only slight, and wheeling
a quarter-circle at full interval is forbidden. Should it be necessary to
show a fighting front towards a flank, the nearest battalions must be
employed, which will at once form a line of skirmishers with supports
(a Vortreffen).

A slight change of front can also be made bv advancing one wing
and wheeling the battalion, which would then be in a short echellon
formation.

The general observations which conclude this chapter again repeat
the remark that the formations given are only examples of the most
simple nature, and when employed it may be found that they require
frequent modifications. "The attention -of Brigade Commanders
" must never be diverted from the essential by retaining appointed
" forms." An example is then given of the employment of regiments
by wings (i.e., side by side), which is full of useful instruction.

The whole book, indeed, is full of valuable advice, which, being
compiled from practical experience, must be beneficial to all students
of the art of fighting ; and yet throughout it is the spirit rather than
the letter of the instructions that is insisted on.

As, however, our object has been merely to lay before our readers
the present system of fighting in the Prussian Army, we shall now
bring our article to a close. We must not, however, omit the conclud-
ing paragraph of this chapter, which has been added in the present
edition. It is to the effect " That those in command over the different
41 divisions of troops having to change about, it becomes essential for
" the due comprehension of their orders that the manner and wording
44 of these should be similar under all circumstances. It is therefore
" laid down that no words of command or signals excepting those in
44 the regulations are to be used by Commanders of troops. For the
14 same reason, all laying down of rules or fancies (Schematisirung) is
44 strictly forbidden, as tending to limit the free-play allowed by the
" regulations. No superior Officer may therefore issue written orders
44 or explanations of the regulations.

" Above all, in order to insure that precise unity of action in the

troops, which is so absolutely necessary for any special objects of the

drill-ground or the field, a verbal order from the Commanding
" Officer, suitable to the case in question, must in all cases suffice."

vol. xx. 3 c

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.
By Lieutenant H. E. Rawson, R.E.

At a time when the qnestion of the purchase of the whole system
of railways throughout Germany by the State is being eagerly
discussed by the Federal States, and Prussia has set the example in
the matter by voting on the 2nd of May last, by a substantial majority
in the Chamber of Deputies, the law ceding its railways to the Empire,
there is a peculiar interest attaching to the organization which would
be adopted by it for their management, and which is very clearly
indicated by that which already exists in the Prussian Railway
Regiment.

It is for want of such a complete system, that the Italian Govern-
ment, upon concluding the purchase of the South Austrian and Alta
Italia railways on Jane 27th ultimo, has been obliged to stipulate that
a private company should carry on the administration for the next
two years, though as early as June, 1875, it had ordered that all
Officers of the Army should go through a course of instruction in the
technicalities of railway management. Quite three years must elapse
before the vote of May 2nd can be carried through the Reichstag, and
the Prussian railways finally handed over to the Empire, when the
expanded organization of the regiment will be quite sufficient to
meet the demands made upon it. Such a powerful branch of a
military system commanding the respect of the whole world, needs
no argument from the writer, to show the value of the subject touched
upon in these pages, nor to assure its place among the three recognized
arms of warfare, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, for to deny its right
to be among them, is to shut one's eyes to the times.

The Prussians were the first nation to recognize, in a practical
manner, the fact that the day had gone by in which it was possible
for a general in command to conduct, simultaneously, the organization
of the services required in maintaining the communications, as well as
the military operations of the army. Wellington did it, Napoleon did
it ; but neither Wellington nor Napoleon had to deal with the question
in the aspect it has assumed to-day, complicated as it is by the
increased number of men to be provided for, the greater rapidity
required in all movements, the more extensive scale on which military
operations can be carried out by railways, and the larger area of
country over which they are conducted. In the Peninsular war,
convalescents, assisted by detachments from the main army, and
organized by the General in command, were able, under the charge of
the officer commanding the Corps of Guides, to ensure the lines of
communication ; but this was for an army seldom exceeding 40,000 men.
The army sont into the field by Germany amounted to between 400,OUO

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 739

and 500,000 men, and to effect the concentration of this enormous
force, required the transport of no less than 42,000 men daily to the
frontier. It was completed in thirteen days after mobilization. In
Jacqmin's words1*. "on the 24th or 25th of July the railways were
" closed to passengers and goods. Eleven days afterwards the concen-
" tration of the whole of the Germany army upon the western frontier
" was terminated ; two days later, the army was victorious at Forbach
u and Freesch wilier. . . . Francs appeared ready the day war was
" declared. Ordinary traffic on the railways was suspended on the 1 6th ;
" trains followed trains in rapid succession* and ten days later, 186,000
" men and 32,000 horses were disposed along the frontier." It is not to
our purpose, to follow him in the picture he draws of the two armies
at that time, except so far as is contained in the following sentence.
" While France was in every respect in disorder and confusion, while
" in Metz the Intendance Department was searching for its provisions,
" the Corps for their kits, the Artillery for its ammunition, regularity
" and order pervaded the whole of the operations of the German army."
Prussia had recognized the important part railways had played in
the American Civil War, had studied the successful application of
organized bodies of workmen, civilians it is true, but bowing for the
time to the severest military discipline, to the construction of railway
works requiring rapid execution, to the destruction, and to the
restoration of lines ; had made trial of such a method for itself in the
campaign of 1866, and had found that properly systematized, a new and
most powerful arm might be developed. As the result of its experience,
the army entered upon the campaign of 1870 with four Railway corps,
subsequently increased to seven, for the three main lines of com-
munication. They were but bodies of civilians and military inter-
mingled ; hastily associated, and provided with material for such
operations as they were intended to carry out. They amounted in all
to 800 men at the commencement, to 1,400 men at a later period of
the war. But there was a method in their organization, there was
order and precision in the way they were employed, and above all
they formed a link in a chain which Prussia had long forged, had
tested in 1866, and had pronounced sound and strong in the principles
upon which it had been constructed. A system of Route Service
(Etappen-wesen) which organized a special body to preserve the lines
of communication, had been approved before the contest with Austria
commenced, had been improved by the experience obtained, and was
now put into practice against an enemy, who had not got as far as
its own condition in 1866, and who was destined to give a proof in
acknowledgment of its past blindness, by creating a Railway corps
during the war. It succeeded in collecting a vast store of material in
Metz and Strasbourg, only in time to fall with these places into the
hands of the Germans. The results of the war of 1870-71 left
Prussia in no wise content with what it had done ; and it has pressed
onwards with such vigour, in its attention to the organization of a
military body capable of taking over the complete management of

> '• Les Chemiiw de Fer pendant la Guerre, 1870-71." By M. Jacqmin, Paris, 1872.

3 C 2

740 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

each lines of railway as may be employed, that whereas in 1870 it had
not a man who had not to be specially mobilized for the Railway
corps, it now possesses on a peace footing a railway regiment, and on
mobilization an effective list of 326 officers and men in proportion.
Such a result justly merits our attention.

A brief glance at the Railway corps employed in the American
Civil War of 1861-65, will best show how far Prussia adapted
the example to its own military system. The railway divisions of
workmen formed in 1862 in consequence of the enormous extent of
country traversed by railways, and the peculiar influence which they
exerted upon the military operations, were placed under General
MacCallum as general manager, with the title of Military Manager
and Superintendent of the United States Railways. Be was given com-
plete control over the whole system of railways, and power to requisition
what amount of rolling stock he might require. His first step was to
form corps for constructing railway works, and for maintaining the
traffic, and he concentrated the power over the whole in his own
person. The engineers and workmen of all kinds who were associated
together were civilians, and were employed temporarily as their
services were required ; but they were subject to severe military
discipline ; and it was this power, exercised alike by the military
authorities and by the civil administration, which undoubtedly led to
such excellent results being obtained. The important services which
they rendered, gave rise to the institution of a similar body in Prussia.
On 9th of May, 1866, the Prussian Minister of War published the
basis of the organization for railway divisions to be formed in the case
of mobilization. It stated the objects for which such a body was
instituted, appointed the managing body, and specified the Staff,
system of its formation, plant and functions. Three divisions were
mobilized upon the declaration of war with Austria in the same year,
and their employment forms an interesting chapter in a pamphlet
translated from the German, " De l'emploi de Chemins de fer en
temps de Guerre.' ' 1869.

Previous to this campaign, Prussia had formed a distinct body for
carrying out a regular system of route service, and the experience
obtained produced the " Organization of Route Service," approved by
the King on the 2nd of May, 1867, but not made public. Thoroughly
tested in the campaign of 1870-71, this organization was found
to be based on sound principles, but imperfect in some of its details :
the principal of which, and that from which the others sprang, being
the strain thrown upon the Route Inspector-General's Department in
order to meet all that was required of it. Large additions were made
to its numbers during the war ; and the great exertions developed by it
coupled with the ability of those employed, prevented any mishap.
But it was admitted on all hands that no single department conid,
except under the most favourable conditions, carry out for the future
the duties with which this department was charged, viz., assuring the
connection between the army and its base of operations, forwarding all
men, horses, supplies, stores and materials along the lines of communica-
tion, and regulating the employment of the railways. The task of

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 741

maintaining the railway traffic was entrusted to this department, upon
the supposition that one line of railway could be placed at the disposal
of each army composed of several corps d'armeV, but the inconvenience
which soon arose from the unequal distribution of rolling stock, and
accommodation afforded by the various lines, clearly showed the necessity
of placing the whole system of railways under some central authority.
The Executive Staff at the Royal Head-Quarters were therefore, during
the remainder of the war, charged with the general direction of the
railway transport, and control over the Railway corps. But this measure,
though it relieved the Route Inspector-General's Department and did
good work by so doing, gave more convincing proofs than before, that
no organization for the service of communications would be complete,
which did not provide during peace a distinct and trained depart-
ment, to undertake the entire management and control of the railways.
To this end at the close of the war, the Minister of War in concert
with the Chief of the Staff organized the " Railway Battalion," in
which the necessary training might be acquired, and by which without
altering any of the principles of the existing military organization of
Prussia, a large personnel might within a limited time be obtained,
subject in war to the Chief of the Army Staff.1

The obligatory service exacted from all Prussians, made the realiza-
tion of any railway scheme an easy matter, as far as mere numbers
were concerned. A stroke of the pen could at any time provide a
fixed annual contingent ; and the peculiar military system allowed of
these men being passed rapidly through the ranks into the reserve,
ready to be called together at any moment. The objects therefore to
be furthered by the creation of a Railway Battalion were little
hampered by other considerations in organizing its peace footing.
It should doubtless be the nucleus of all necessary railway formations
for war ; the technical training in peace should be such as to enable its
staff to construct any works requisite ; to repair without loss of time
any that had been destroyed, and to undertake the entire traffic along
railway lines of communication ; it should in peace procure, prepare,
and preserve all plant and materials required in railway work, and be
capable of supplying with tools the detachments which would be
organized in war.

It was determined that the railway sections of 1870-71, should form
the basis upon which the battalion should be raised. The non-com-
missioned officers and men whose time of service under the colours
was not completed were enrolled, and such plant as had been collected

1 The necessity of having a military body, educated during ptaee to the technicali-
ties of railways, was recognized from the ©rents of the late war by our own Govern-
ment as well as by the Prussians, for on February 2nd, 1871, the Inspector-General of
Fortification* called for a detail of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men,
with tools and plant for a detachment of Royal Engineers, to be attached to a
division of 10,000 infantry, for the purpose of repairing and maintaining the railway
communications. It is a matter for regret that the report of the Committee to
whom it was referred has not been made pnblic ; but the correctness of the views
they embodied in it, has been established by the success of the Prussian organiza-
tion which was subsequently published.

742 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

for their use during the war and such as had been taken from the
French and retained by the Peace of Versailles, was appropriated to
the battalion, and stored in its depot in Berlin. A royal order of
May 19th, 1871, decreed its constitution. The Major in command and
the Adjutant were appointed in June, and the rest of the officers
during the following months. On October 1st, a force amounting to
330 rank and file took up its quarters in barracks assigned to the
battalion in Berlin. The officers were drawn from the Engineers ;
60 non-commissioned officers and men were enrolled from the
demobilized railway sections ; 234 from the Pioneers, infantry, and
re-engaged men of other arms still serving; and a contingent of
36 recruits and three-year volunteers. All were of a trade useful in
railway work, smiths, carpenters, miners, quarrymen, and the like.

The Inspector-General of the Engineer Corps was given the superin-
tendence of the discipline and economy, the Chief of the Staff the
technical training of the Railway Battalion — a disposition which has
given every satisfaction. A knowledge of all European railways,
and acquaintance with the resources in rolling stock of all the lines
in the Empire, whether State or private, is at once -the duty of all
officers of such a branch as a railway battalion, as well as of the Staff
of the army. To control and direct the technical work of a body in
constant intercourse with the various lines of the Empire, was wisely
entrusted to the General Staff, and could not fail to be to the advan-
tage of both. The relation which naturally sprang up between the
officers of the Battalion and the Staff, has given rise to the sentiment
sometimes expressed by their fellow officers of the Pioneers, " tne
" officers of the Railway Battalion obtain everything they want through
" the Staff." It was found that it was only by constant intercourse with
the officers of the Staff, and with the railway and telegraph employes
of the various railways, that the officers of the battalion could be
trained, and keep themselves informed of the progress of State and
private lines in course of construction, of the amount of rolling stock in
use, of the telegraph lines last established, and of the value of
instruments and tools lately invented. The officers of the battalion
were thus enabled to express their ideas to the Staff, benefitting them
by the experience they gained daily, and having an opportunity them-
selves to. study the special work of the Staff. A relation between the
two of such a nature was held to be necessary to prevent friction
between any of the departments — employers and employed — charged
with such various work in war as the rapid transport of troops ;
with maintaining supplies of all kinds; with perfecting projects tor
establishing a second line of way along the most crowdealines, and with
constructing new ones. In peace the railway department of the Staff
were also charged with training officers to the knowledge of railway
service, directing the transport of troops out for manoeuvres, and of
the various " classes M when called out for drill and returning home ;
preparing every detail for transport in war; collecting statistics
about foreign railways ; examining, from a military point of view the
proposed construction of any lines ; and finally studying all subjects
for the advancement of the military railway service. In these

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

743

Staff.

» _

matters the officers of the battalion were frequently consulted, and
the result has been that this branch of the army is popular.

The peace-footing organization of the first battalion has been
followed in the recent augmentation into a regiment.

It was composed of a staff, 4 companies, and a depot : —

T. Field-Officer (Colonel or Major) Battalion
Commander.
1 Second- Lieutenant, Adjutant.
1 Surgeon and 1 Assistant- Surgeon.
1 Paymaster and 1 Aspirant-Paymaster.1

1 Sergeant- Major, Quartermaster.

2 Non-commissioned Officers, a draughtsman and
clerk.

1 Drum-Major.
^1 Armourer.

"4 Officers (1 Captain, 1 First-Lieutenant, 2 Second-
Lieutenants.)

18 Sergeants and Non-commissioned Officers
(1 Sergeant-Major, 4 Sergeants, 12 Under-
officers').

2 Buglers.

3 Tradesmen.
1 Hospital- Assistant.
100 Lance- Corporals and men.

Captain and 1 Sergeant, in charge of a large
and valuable store of war material.

Each Company. -

Dbp6t.

Upon mobilization each company is augmented into two Construction
Companies and one Traffic Company, making an establishment, on a
war footing, of four traffic companies and eight construction companies.
Also a Reserve Division, consisting of a Staff, two companies and a
section of tradesmen. Each of the construction companies has a train
of five waggons for the transport of tools and material.

It is evident from what has just been said, that on the declaration
of war the system on which the men have been trained is abandoned.
The peace companies of the battalion give place to mobilized
companies of a different organization each complete in itself, inde-
pendent and acting upon its own responsibility ; the wholedirected by one
head, but under officers whom most of the men do not know, and non-
commissioned officers ignorant of the temper, individuality, or abilities
of those with whom they have to deal.

Why is such a course adopted ? The answer lies partly in the
military system of Prussia. The whole army is under the same dis-
advantage. The service for all is three years under the colours, four
in the Reserve, and five in the Land we hr, and the military system has
been developed by the national character. Further reasons which
determined the constitution of a railway battalion during peace, and
not independent companies attached to corps d'arme'e, may be

1 Awaiting oommiaaion.

* Superior rank to our Corporal.

744 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

traced to the facility afforded by such a system to recruitings, and
more especially to a fact already alluded to. The lesson of the last
war showed the original idea to be untenable, that it was possible to
place one line of railway at the disposal of each army, to be worked
by the railway companies belonging to the several corps d'armee com-
posing it. Centralization of the authority over the whole was proved
to be indispensable. Isolated sections experience showed, could not
be detached from their army corps to perform extraordinary work
requiring a more powerful personnel, without danger. Moreover a
battalion could be supplied with a valuable stock of plant and material,
which it would not be advantageous to entrust to independent com-
panies. In short the following were the grounds for constituting a
railway battalion: it enabled a large and valuable stock of plant to
be collected in the depot in Berlin ; officers and men could be rapidly
passed through its ranks into the Beurlaubtenstand1, where they
would be available at any moment and yet without cost to the State;
it ensured similarity of procedure, and uniformity in material; and
lastly, it was in itself a school of instruction for the future.

The men were given the same equipment as the Pioneers of the
Guard, and an uniform only differing by having the distinguishing
letter E (Eisenbahn) in yellow, instead of the number of the regiment.
They were armed like the Pioneers, at first with the '68 pattern of
the needle gun, subsequently altered in 1875 to an improved form of
chassepdt suited to metal cartridges, and they now have a special form
of the Mauser rifle similar to that known as the Pioneer rifle.

In addition to the military training which the battalion received
to enable it to become part of and manoeuvre with the Guard corps,
in the same way as the Pioneer Battalion with its corps, a regular
scheme for its technical training was laid down. It provided for the
theoretical instruction and practical education necessary in laving
down, repairing, or destroying all works belonging to t system of iron
way, including a scientific teaching in all branches of the art of con-
struction, and a knowledge of law so far as it affects railway matters.

The rolling stock appropriated to the battalion consisted of two
locomotives, two carriages, two guards' vans with baggage compart-
ments, and two trucks. With these it was practised in rapid em-
barkation and disembarkation of men and material ; as well as engine-
driving, stoking, taking to pieces and cleaning the machinery
employed. In case of service away from a railway, each company on
peace footing had the following waggons which, except the office
waggons, are similar to those of the bridge equipment, and of the
same pattern as those of the rest of the armv. They were built by a
firm, Dittman, in Berlin, who contracted for it in July, 1872, and may
be found in detail in the official " Zeichnungen der Fahrzeuge der
" Briickentroins, Berlin, 1874." They are four general service waggons
with four horses for tools ; two with four horses for the transport
of prepared girders and timber ready to be fitted together ; two for
baggage, with two horses; two office waggons for repairing and

1 The BeurlaubUnttand oomprises all who have already serred and have
to the Beeerre and Landwehr.

THIS GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 745

working the telegraph. The Battalion Commander had, in addition,
a baggage waggon. These forty- one waggons formed the transport
train with which the battalion practised loading and unloading in its
Spring route-marches.

In addition, each company in its annual manoeuvres or upon taking
the field, had the power of requisitioning private boards for a train of
twenty-one carriages for the transport of the men and material
complete, retaining it till the close of operations.

The tools for the complete equipment of the eight construction
companies were in temporay stores in Berlin until the end of 1875,
when a large building with eight magazines, one for each company,
was erected in connection with the new barracks for the regiment at
SchoBnefeld. An officer (a captain of the Battalion) and a sergeant
were placed in charge and lived at the depot, superintending the issue
and storage of all tools, Ac. ; horses alone were wanting to complete the
field establishment. The requisite horse-cloths, harness, whips,
hatchets, bill-hooks, lanterns, oat-measures, forage and strappings
complete, were kept in the company stores. Upon mobilization the
ten waggons are distributed between the two construction companies,
into which each company on peace footing is formed. These five will
only carry half the materials of the company ; but as in practice the
restoration of a line destroyed by the enemy is begun from both ends,
the other half is left in the special train which has brought it.

The estimate for rolling stock, waggons, and tools for the Railway
Battalion in 1872, was £15,285, and was largely exceeded. The
total expense of organizing the Military Railway Service, including
the purchase of land for a station and practice ground and the cost of
building a barrack, amounted to £140,880. l The tools and rolling
stock purchased in 1872, and added to those of the demobilized railway
sections* completed the battalion establishment of plant and material.

Immediately after the Railway Battalion was definitely constituted,
all officers who had served during the war and who were on the
railway staff in civil life, were enrolled as part of the reserve
of the Battalion, whatever arm of the service they might have belonged
to when with the colours. The effective officers of the Battalion were
at first recruited from the Infantry and Engineers alike, and it was
hoped that in future the majority could be drawn from the former.
Experience soon showed that a greater technical knowledge was required
than Infantry Officers could as a rule acquire in the time allotted, unless
they were previously acquainted with the subjects of study ; and it was
found necessary to call annually for volunteers from among the Engi-
neers, previous to their entering the practical school for Artillery and
Engineer Officers.

From this school they generally entered the Battalion as second-
Lieutenants, and remained with it at least three years, in order to
learn successively the different branches of construction, working,
destruction and rapid repair. Under the Benior officers of the
Battalion they studied " Technical Railway Management," as given

1 Tneee figure* aw taken from the report of a Swim officer to his Government.

746 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

by Heusinger von Waldegg, in " Technische Dienst Instruction fur das
" Konigliche Preussiche Eisenbahn Bataillon;" '* Telegraph and
" Signals," by Baron von Weber ; " Machinery Inst^lction,,, by Paulm ;
" Report upon tbe Employment of Railways during the American War."
Mathematics and drawing also formed part of the course. The above
works supplemented by verbal instruction in rapid repair and
destruction of railway works, mining, and destruction of tunnels, formed
the theoretical course. The application of it to practice began in April,
and lasted till October of each year, either upon the practice ground of
the Battalion at Schoeneberg, or when attached with men to railways
belonging to the State. No one was permitted to make a speciality of
any branch, by which arrangement all were trained so as to act in any
capacity. Though officered in this way by Engineers, the Battalion
was always independent of the Engineer Corps, and received officers
of other arms if over two years' service and duly qualified; they
served for the first year on probation.

The Battalion was kept up to a strength of about 500 men, and received
annually about 160 recruits, furnished in certain proportions by each
district. The non-commissioned officers were principally from three-
year volunteers employed previously on railways. The annual con-
tingent was drawn from railway employes, or such trades as are em-
ployed in railway work, carpenters, smiths, quarrymen, and the like.
Only Locomotive Superintendents and Engineers of the permanent way
were admitted as one-year volunteers, and after their year of service
were passed into the reserve of the Battalion, if they did not wish to
obtain their commissions. A number varying yearly, but always con-
siderable, availed themselves of this privilege, by which their military
service was turned to profit in their civil profession. The plan was
economical to Government. It was a good plan because it proved
successful, and any inconvenience was easily remedied by increasing
or diminishing the contingent. In order to train a large number of
men, it was commonly the practice to allow even three-year volunteers
to return to their profession after two years with the colours, rejoining
whenever required.

The organization and armament of the Railway Battalion being
similar to that of the Pioneers, the recruits were put through the same
training. It received the annual contingent in the beginning of
November, the three-year volunteers on the first of October, and one-
year volunteers in the middle of the same month. A certain number
of recruits were selected at the outset and joined the three-year
volunteers, with a view to being trained as under-officers ; by which
plan that much vexed question of the supply of under-officers in
the German army was considerably relieved for the Battalion.
Military exercises and the theory of war formed the recruits* first
course of instruction. They passed successively through the regular
drill of an individual soldier, through that of a company, and that
of a battalion ; two months to each of the two former, and one t« >
the latter, without leave of any kind. For one hour each day of
this period they received a lecture on military subjects. During tho
training of the recruits, the remainder of the Battalion was employed

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 747

in the workshops as mechanics, carpenters, smiths, &c, repairing
tools, improving or altering the rolling stock. In each company,
under-officers who had been previously trained by the officers,
gave technical instruction in the machines and telegraph instruments ;
musketry practice completed the winter course. Practical work
began in April upon the practice ground at Schceneberg ; picketting
out and completing a formation level, curves, changes of slope;
destruction and repair of lines by various methods ; permanent
and temporary stations ; construction and leading into stations of
telegraph lines ; establishment, charge, and boring of mine shafts ;
and details of bridges and tunnels. Particular attention was paid to
the hasty construction and repair of bridges, both by means of material
collected on the spot and by such as was carried by the Battalion in its
column of transport ready made up and easily put together. During
the summer each company sent four or five non-commissioned officers
to be attached to private railways boards, to learn the duties of station-
master, train-conductor, engine-driver, telegrapher and engineer of a
telegraph line ; and every year in turn three-fourths of the men of the
Battalion under their own officers, were detached to construct lines
strategically important, or advantageous to the public. Continual
applications were made for the services of the men to repair accidents
to the lines, and damages from storms and floods, all of which were
readily acceded to by the officer in command, and promptly carried
out. When employed on this work for private railways, the boards
paid the men extra working pay amounting to about Is. 6d. a- day; the
officers reserved their independence, and accepted no emolument.
The ordinary pay of the officers and men was the same as for the
rest of the army. By the summer of 1875 a sufficient number of
men had been trained for the duties of the subordinate staff,
superintendents, stokers, Ac, and the practice of detaching non-
commissioned officers to learn these duties was given up. During
summer there was a weekly parade for drills, and the Battalion was
required to be present at reviews and garrison parades. It furnished
its own guard. It would be impossible in even a sketch of the
practical instruction given, to omit entire mention of what disposition
was made of time.

An ordinary day was much as follows : —

5 a.m., Reveille* ; 6 a.m., Breakfast (coffee) ; 6.30 a.m., a general
parade in two ranks, and roll called by the orderly non-commissioned
officer of the day. Orders for the day's work and suoh as the
Captain in command issued were read out, and the 'officers then
inspected and detailed the working parties. The same men always
worked together, and only the non-commissioned officers in charge
were occasionally changed; each party performed the same work
constantly, and was therefore perfected in only one branch, but the
rapidity was increased. The tools were in charge of the men who used
them, and were not returned into store daily ; the non-commissioned
officer of each party checked them after work, and all repairs were done
by a workman at the general dep6t, close to the barracks. At work,
the men wore working frocks and trousers of white serge.

748 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

Work continued from 7 to noon, with a quarter of an hour's rest at
10 o'clock ; from 12 to 1 they broke off for their mid-day meal of
bread and sausage, or bacon, brought from barracks, and which they
eat where they had been working. Work was resumed at 1, and at
4 p.m. they returned to barracks ; at 5 o'clock they had their
principal meal, after which till tattoo the men were at liberty. Four
days in the week they worked eight full hours; Wednesday and
Saturday only six hours. On Sundays there was generally an
inspection parade at noon, dinner at 1, and the men were then free to
go where they liked within certain bounds.

Rapid destruction of the permanent way was practised on the
manoeuvring ground of the battalion at SchcBneberg, both by taking
to pieces and removing rails and sleepers, and by blowing up the joints
of the rails with cartridges of dynamite. This latter, method has
been almost entirely handed over to the Cavalry, who use one pound
cartridges.

The practical work done by the Battalion for instruction, was small
in comparison with that done since the time of its formation in 1871
in the interests of private railway boards, in repairing the damage from
inundations and accidents. Between the time of its constitution and the
end of 1872 it had no practice ground of its own, and was employed
altogether in this way, by which at the outset it established its public
utility, raised a feeling of confidence between itself and the civil
engineers with whom it was employed, and paved the way to that good
understanding which now exists with the various railway boards. In
the first year of its existence, 1872, the battalion constructed 100
miles of permanent way, two termini with their points and crossings,
one roadside station, enlarged four termini, restored two dykes
destroyed by inundations, and a railway bridge at Rykgraben near
Greifswald.

In 1873, 4 officers, 9 non-commissioned officers, and 76 men
changed the iron-way of the line from Altkirch to Dammerkirch, from
double-headed to Yignole rails, with the points and crossings in the
termini, in three months. In Silesia, one company, in the same
time, constructed 15 miles of permanent way, five iron bridges, and
ten points, on the line from Kamenz to Frankenstein. Another detach-
ment in Thuringia, 16 miles of way, a temporary bridge of 16 feet
span, and the necessary signals for tne whole portion.

A detachment of 120 men enlarged the terminus of the Eastern
Railway at Berlin, adding sidings and sheds. A detachment was
further employed towards the end of the year in removing granite
rock by blasting with dynamite, for the Gcerlitz-Reichenberg Railway.
Very valuable observations were made during the course of this work.

In 1874 the Battalion made the tunnel under the Circular rail war
round Berlin, where it passes over the Battalion's practice ground.
It was complicated by the necessity of not interfering with the over.
head traffic. It is now used by the Berlin- Dresden Railway, as well as
by the Battalion for its line to Zossen.

On the Berlin-Dresden line a detachment of carpenters and miners
of the Battalion were employed in changing two level-crossings, so as

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 749

to carry the lines over the roads. The roads were sunk 9 feet
10 inches, and the lines raised on a wooden bridge 650 yards long.
Civil labour was called in to assist them in this, and the work
continued night and day without interruption to the traffic, and without
any accident.

in 1875 a laggage train off the line, on the Berlin- Dresden Railway
was replaced, and the way repaired by 2 officers and 90 men. The
traffic was resumed after twenty-one hours' work.

On December 9th, 4 non-commissioned officers and 14 men were
despatched at the earnest request of the Berlin-Magdebourg Railway,
to relieve their own staff, tired by their exertions to meet the traffic
after a short suspension from snow.

But the principal work of the Battalion this year was the construc-
tion of the line from Berlin to the artillery practice ground at Zossen.
It was undertaken to afford the Battalion a ready means of instruc-
tion in the technical working of a railway, the whole administration
being left in its own hands. Its total length is 30 miles, and it has
three stations. It was commenced in the first week of April by
nearly the whole of the Battalion, which had left Berlin in three
detachments on March 31st, and had been cantonned near Zossen,
Blankenfeld, and Mariendorf . These returned on May 19th, and were
replaced by the 3rd company, consisting of 3 officers, 10 non-com-
missioned officers, and 90 men, who completed it in the first week in
July. It was opened in the middle of the month, and the direction of
it given to the Battalion commander, with a staff of 1 Captain1 as Traffic
Manager, 1 Lieutenant as Secretary, and 1 Lieutenant as Locomotive
Superintendent. The whole management of the line was entrusted to
the Battalion. An augmentation of its numbers had been contemplated
before, and being necessary for this purpose, was approved by the
Emperor in August. By the middle of September a second battalion,
organized on the same footing as the first, was being rapidly pushed
on with, as well as the barracks, buildings, and stores for it. at
Schoanefeld; and till these should be completed, quarters were pre-
pared at Tempelhof and Schoeneberg.

The Budget of 1876 for Military Service, provided for a Railway
Regiment of two battalions, and declared its creation necessary, both
to provide the requisite staff for the numerous lines, which would have
to be worked in war, and to give instruction in railway work to a
large number of the Beurlaubtenstand. This latter point is readily
understood when we remember that Prussia was at this time com-
templating handing over all its railways to the Empire. The Budget
provided for the following addition to the peace footing; 3 Field
Officers, of whom 1 was to command the regiment, 1 the new battalion,
and 1 to be Supernumerary, effective, but without special command; 2
Captains of the first class, 1 Captain of the second, 4 first and 14 second-
Lieutenants ; total 24 Officers. 2 Surgeons, 1 Paymaster, 1 Armourer,
4 Sergeant-Majors, 4 Vice- Sergeant-Majors, 16 Sergeants, 53 Under*
Officers, 48 Lance- Corporals, 353 men, 12 tradesmen, 2 Aspirant-Pay-
masters, and 4 Hospital- Assistants ; total 500.

1 By royal order of 8th February, 1876, a staff officer.

750 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

This augmentation allowed of a second battalion being formed, with
the same effective as the first, except for the addition of another
second-Lieutenant to each company, and of one to the staff, of the
second battalion.

It was completed by March 1st, 1876.

The peace footing organization of the Railway Regiment is there-
fore, a staff, eight companies, and a depot, and consists of : —

4 Field-Officers, of whom 1 commands the Regiment, 2 the
Battalions, and 1 is without special command.

8 Captains, 8 First-Lieutenants, 27 Second- Lieutenants.

2 Surgeons and 2 Assistant- Surgeons.

3 Paymasters and 3 Aspirant- Paymasters.

2 Armourers, 1 Drum-Major, 9 Drummers and Fifera, 8 Hospital-
Assistants, 24 Tradesmen.

9 Sergeant- Majors, 8 Vice-Sergeant-Majors.
32 Sergeants, 103 Under-Officers.

98 Lance-Corporals, and 700 men.

On a war footing, each company is augmented into two construction
and one traffic company, and the instructions of July 20th, 1872, on the
Service of communications, then regulate the railway organization. A
General or Field Officer is placed in charge of the railway-service in
the field, with the title of Chief of the Field Railways, under the
orders of the Inspector-General, who has general superintendence of the
entire route-service. He arranges for the transport of stores, reserves,
<&c., and for the concentration of the several Army Corps, he organize?
the railway service at the seat of War, and makes new sidings and
works if required.

Attached to him for duty are : —

The Officer commanding the Prussian Railway Regiment.
Two officers of the general Staff, two superior railway officials and
four clerks.

Within certain limits fixed by the regulations, the Chief can dispose
of the rolling stock on all home lines, and those on occupied territory,
exercising this power through —

1. Military railway directors, for railways within the theatre of

operations. This limit is fixed, in every case, by the Emperort
and is considered to extend 80 miles from the front.

2. The railway division of the General Staff at home, to regulate

all military transport over lines not within the theatre of
operations, and which are worked by their own officials.

3. Railway Line Commandants, in charge of certain home-lines

and systems, and the military transport over them.

4. Railway Station Commandants, who are under the orders of a

Military Railway Director (1), or of a Railway Line

Commandant (3), according to the position of their station.

The Prussian Railway Regiment (sixteen construction and eight

traffic companies), is at the disposal of the Chief of the Field Railways.

for employment in repairing existing lines or in constructing new ones,

\nd also in working them. For this purpose each traffic company is

41 Sergeants and
Under-Officers.

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 751

organized to work a section of line of 28 to 37 miles, with an effective
of:—

6 Officers (1 Captain Commanding, 1 First-Lieutenant, 4 Second-
Lieutenants as Station Superintendents).

1 Company- Sergeant-Major.
4 Station Masters.

1 Booking clerk.
12 Engine-drivers, 7 train-conductors, 7

baggage-masters (guards).
3 Permanent- way overseers.
|^ 6 Telegraphers.

3 Guards.

ft/x T ~ , J 1 Telegraph foreman.

20 Lakcb-Coepobai.s. < 2 q,^ rf platelayers.

2 Stationary-engine-drivers and 12 stokers.

4 Makers-up of trains, 18 pointsmen.
14 Platelayers, 7 workshop artificers.

139 Men. •{ 4 Carriage greasers, 2 engine cleaners.

55 Watchmen and gatemen.
35 Breaksmen.

There are sixteen construction companies, each with an effective of : —

9 Officers, 1 Captain (Chief Engineer), 2 First- Lieutenants,
4 Second-Lieutenants (engineers of the permanent way),
1 locomotive engineer, 1 telegraph engineer.

I Surgeon, 1 Paymaster.

25 Non-commissioned Officers.
176 men, including 2 buglers.

II men of the train and 11 horses.

Each is accompanied by its column of transport-waggons.

1 Under Officer in command.

9 Men of the train, 18 horses, and 5 waggons.

The construction and traffic companies are distributed as required,
among the Railway Directors and the Railway line Commandants.
They can be increased from their depots if necessary ; for which
purpose a reserve division for each battalion on peace footing is
formed. Its effective is: —

^taff / l 0fficer' l Surgeon.

° I 1 Paymaster, 1 Armourer.

{6 Officers.
25 Non-commissioned Officers, 2 Buglers,
1 Hospital assistant.
176 men and 2 horses.

A Section of Tradesmen, f 1 Officer.

Tailors, Shoemakers, < 6 Non-commissioned Officers.
Saddlers, Ac. [ 100 men.

All orders referring to the Railway Regiment and its work, are given
through the Officer commanding it.

752 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

For every 280 miles of way used, a Military Railway Director is
appointed. He is a Field Officer (Colonel), and his principal duty is
to organize the train-service over lines on occupied territory, and over
such home-lines within the theatre of war, as are prevented, through
the war from carrying on the service unassisted by the military
authorities. He regulates both the transport arrangements, and the
technical working and management of the lines under his charge.

He is assisted by a staff of : —

1 Field-Officer in charge of the Transport Department.
4 Officers to superintend the Traffic Department.

The Field-Officer carries out his orders for the transport-service,
through 1 Captain as Adjutant, 1 Staff-Surgeon, 1 Field- Paymaster,
and 1 Officer of the Intendance.

The traffic department contains a manager's office, an engineer's
office, an accountant's chest and office, and a telegraph inspector's
office ; the establishment for these is detailed in the " Re*vue Militaire
" de l'Etranger," of November 26th, 1872, to which the writer would
refer all interested in the subject, as one of the most valuable transla-
tions from the German that has appeared in that valuable journal.

To work the line, to repair, restore, or enlarge where necessary, a
military traffic inspection and from two to four companies of the
Railway Regiment are appointed to every 70 to 140 miles. A traffic
inspection consists of 1 Captain, 5 officers, 14 non-commissioned
officers, and 8 train soldiers.

The regulations laid down for the Prussian Railway Regiment
govern the working of the lines.

It would be but a mere quotation from the Regulations of July
1872 on the German Route Service, to proceed with the functions and
powers of the remainder of the departments under the Chief of the
Field Railways, all of which may be read in the number of the " R^vue "
referred to above.

But the following extracts are compiled as the number may be out
of print, or not easily obtainable.

Field officers are trained as railway line commandants during
peace, and upon mobilization are appointed to districts. With the
railway officials they arrange for the concentration of the army,
borrowing rolling stock, drawing up time tables, and providing
refreshments at stations determined upon. The conveyance of sick
and wounded as they arrive at the hospitals of the district, is also
regulated by them.

Railway station commandants enforce strict adherence to the time-
tables, and arrange the police and military duties about the stations.
They are informed as to what trains will run through, stop, or be
unloaded at their stations ; by which they will be enabled to provide for
the wants of troops, horses and cattle. Certain arrangements are
necessary at all stations, such as latrines, fixed platforms, and move-
able ramps ; a ward for sick unable to continue their journey, buckets
for watering cattle, and cups or other vessels for men. The proper
supply of refreshments is also regulated by them. All finance and
accounts of the mobilized military-railway bodies alluded to are settled

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 753

by the field paymaster on the staff of the railway-district, with the
exception of those of the field-railway companies. They keep their
accounts separately and have separate pay-chests. The finance of
those not mobilized is managed by paymasters belonging to their
staff.

To provide the large number necessary to carry out the regulations,
so far as they affect railways, very early steps were taken. An. order of
the Minister of War declared that after the 1st October, 1872, all
employes of railways, whether belonging to the State or private boards,
and who formed part either of the Reserve or Landwehr, should be
enrolled in the Reserve and Landwehr of the Railway Battalion,
whatever branch of the service they served in when under the colours.
But it specified that this order only referred to those who had a special
knowledge of the construction and working of lines, and not to porters
and the like. All men of the Reserve and Landwehr are enrolled upon
" Stammliste," under that branch of the service in which they served ;
and by the order in question, it was decided that the men affected
should be borne on these lists as belonging to the railway branch ;
but should be able to have their names transferred to their former
place in the lists, if they left the service of the boards and desired it.
Officers as well as men were included in this order. Also since the
constitution of the Battalion, the men upon quitting it have been
enrolled on separate lists among the troops of the Landwehr; the
officers according to seniority, upon two lists, those of the Reserve and
of the Landwehr. The Railway Regiment now keeps a similar list
corrected monthly from reports sent to them by the commanders of
Landwehr in the various districts ; and every year on May 15th, when
the annual state is forwarded to the King, the regiment appends to
the effective list of officers, that of the officers of the Reserve' and
Landwehr who have passed through it. The lists kept in each
district of Landwehr contain the service, age, residence, and civil
employment of every man and officer, and from this is determined
their liability to, or exemption from, service upon mobilization. Twice
a-year the district commanders of Landwehr furnish the regiment
with a list of men employed on the staff of any railway who have not
passed through the regiment. The employes of a line who thus
become part of the Reserve and Landwehr of the regiment, include the
staff for administration and issue of tickets, for working the rolling-
stock, in charge of the way and stations, and workmen of various
trades; the higher grades are, inspectors of traffic, of works of
construction and of telegraphs, architects, foremen of works, railway
engineers, locomotive engineers, foremen of machinery and workshops,
overseers and comptrollers of the way, traffic superintendents, and
assistant-superintendents of stations. The above, and very much
more, forms the subject of the Landwehr Ordnung, and the Control
Ordnung deals with the question of liability to and freedom from
service amongst the employes. One extract will be given here, " All
" immunity from service ends, when the last class of Landwehr is
44 called out." The lists are of the greatest importance to the railway
boards, who are by their means in no danger of being deprived upon

vol. xx. 3d

754 THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

mobilization, of all the officials working the lines, and they exemplify
the unit j of interests existing between the army and the State.
Exemptions of officers and men are readily and easily made, without
having, as wonld otherwise be the case, to pass from the district
commanders of each Landwehr battalion, through those of the corps
d'armee, for the decision of the Chief of the Staff, as commander of
the Railway Regiment. As a further means of increasing the number
of railway employes in the Beurlaubtenstand, inducements were
always offered to officers, after their term of service, to accept positions
on railway boards, and to men, appointments on the staff of the State
lines. Only lately, the difficulty of getting nnder-officers to remain
under the colours for a greater number of years, has obliged the
German War Office to hold out to them the certainty of appointment
in State railways after a definite number of years.

In the Army List of 1873, the First and Second- Lieutenants classed
in the Reserve and Landwehr of the Battalion amounted to 43 and
118 respectively. In 1874 these figures had risen to 56 and 121. And
in that of November 12th, 1875, we find in the Reserve, 1 First and 72
Second- Lieutenants ; in the Landwehr, 8 Captains, 37 First, and 179
Second-Lieutenants, or a total of 297 officers.

The Army List of that date also gives the effective officers of the
Battalion, (those of the second battalion had not been appointed,)
as 1 Colonel commanding, 5 Captains, 5 First-Lieutenants, and 4
Second- Lieutenants.

Officers attached for S erv ice: 2 Majors of the Engineer Corps.
4 Captains, 2 First, and 5 Second-Lieutenants attached from Line
regiments.

Administration of the plant in store: 1 Captain.

Total, 1 Colonel, 2 Majors, 10 Captains, 7 First and 9 Second-
Lieutenants.

In case of mobilization, therefore, Prussia has 1 Colonel, 2 Majors,
18 Captains, 45 First and 260 Second- Lieutenants, total, 326 officers,
for the various requirements of railway transport. Each battalion
on a war footing is, as we have seen, augmented into eight construc-
tion companies, and four traffic companies, with a reserve division
of two companies and one section of tradesmen. These require 112
officers, so that there is a greater number than necessary for two such
battalions. As for men, the system pursued of receiving a large
number of one-year volunteers who brought with them a previous
knowledge of railway matters, and who therefore could be passed
rapidly into the Reserve ; of extending the privilege so far to the
others, as to allow them to leave the colours after two years;
and of incorporating in the reserve of the regiment all employes
of the railways, has more than met the requirments of the case. By
the law of June 13th, 1873, upon the allegiance of public depart-
ments in case of war, the boards of railways are obliged to be pre-
pared to convert trucks into carriages for horses and men, to provide
for the transport of troops and supplies, and to furnish rolling-stock
of every kind, as well as the necessary staff for repairing and

THR GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 755

working the lines.1 There is little or no difficulty, therefore, in raising
the 6,000 men required for the service-establishment of the railway
companies from railway officials, engineers and artificers liable to
render military service, as well as from suitable men in the Reserve ;
and this without depriving the boards of the staff required to work
the home portions of their lines ; their services are called for by the
Chief of the Field Railways as necessity arises, and the exigiences of
the home railway service permit. If any are still available after the
concentration of the army is effected, and the formation of the
railway corps completed, the regulations upon the Route Service lay
down that with the consent of the Chief of the General Staff, they
may be incorporated with other depot troops by the Minister of War,
or they may be used to furnish guards and construct field-works for
the protection of the lines, or to fill up the depdt of the Railway
Regiment. In addition to the departments mentioned above,
officials of the Government lines, not liable to military service, may be
called upon for railway service in the field, by the authority of the
Imperial Chancellor. Civilians may also be engaged for the same
service by authority of the Chief of the Field Railways. The two
classes last mentioned are attached to the railway companies as
military officials.

A military organization carefully prepared during peace can alone
develop the qualities required of such men, in the course of a war which
may be protracted, and is sure to be subject to diversities of fortune ; and
General MacCallum, in his report to the United States Congress after
the campaign of 1861-65, was most emphatic in his assertion that
the experience and practice in the first two years as director of
Railways, alone enabled him to undertake with any chance of success
the enormous task imposed upon him. Convinced that to wait till war
is declared to complete the smallest link in the chain, is to expose the
whole to failure, the railway department of the Prussian Staff have
taken active measures to prepare the principal stations along important
strategic lines, so as to permit of troops being readily disembarked
and sheltered and provided for; to establish permanent stores of
provisions in the principal termini, and to train " line commandants "
to their duties during peace. They have also built "interrupting
forts " (Sperr Forts) at intervals along important lines, to prevent the
turning of a single fortress along a railway being sufficient to put the
whole of the rest of the line in the enemy's power ; Metz affords an
example of this in the late war.

The most important work undertaken to provide instruction to the
Regiment is undoubtedly the construction, maintenance, and working of
the military line from Berlin through the wood of Kummersdorf
to Zossen, the administration of which is entirely left in its hands.
A translation of the statute organizing it in 1875, is given in
exteneo, both because of its value as based upon the joint reports of
the Minister of War and the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and

1 The tariff for transport and the use of stock is settled by the central committee,
composed of delegates from the Federal States, but no indemnity is paid for the
conversion of the trucks

3 D 2

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

Public Works, and because of its instructiveness as the first publica-
tion of the kind relating to a military railway body.

" The following statute organizing the Government line from Berlin
" to the practice ground, based upon your joint reports, bearing' date
" 31st July of this year, has been approved by me, and is forwarded
" to you to be carried out.

(Signed) " WILLIAM.

(Countersigned) "VON KAMEKE.

" To the Minister of War and the Minister of Commerce, Industry,
"and Public Works.''

1st Article. Administrative Authorities.

The military line from Berlin to the practice ground is under the
superintendence of the Royal Military Railway Department; it is
controlled, on the one hand, by the War Office and the Chief of the
Army Staff, and on the other, by the department charged with the
supervision of Railways.

2nd Article. Managers.

The body of Managers comprises a Captain1 and two Lieutenants of
the Railway Battalion, in the capacity of General Manager, Secretary,
and Locomotive Superintendent.

3rd Article. Executive Staff .

The " Military Railway Traffic Department " will cany on the
traffic, the maintenance of works, and the administration of the line,
under the General Manager1. The Senior Captain of the Railway
Battalion will be appointed Manager of the Traffic Department, with
the following Staff as permanent members : —

1st. A Lieutenant in charge of the head office ;

2nd. A Lieutenant, Locomotive Superintendent ;

3rd. The officer in charge of the Battalion's depot, who will

superintend the traffic at the depot of the military line, and

the plant in the workshops ;
4th. A Paymaster at the head of the pay office ;
5th. Subordinate Staff — Clerks, draughtsmen, store-keepers,

foremen of works.

Temporarily attached to the Traffic Department are a certain number
of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Battalion to
work the line, and be instructed in the management of the traffic.

4th Article. Duties of the General Manager.

The General Manager will see that the administration and working
of the line conform to the laws relating to them, and to the special
directions issued by the authorities named in Article 1. He has full
power to issue and enforce such orders, instructions, and bye-laws as
relate to his department as he may think fit. He is charged with
the correspondence of the managing body, and refers all questions
which require the decision of the higher authorities ; he represents
the managing body (except in the case treated in Article 6) ; he gives

1 By royal order of February 8th, 1876, a staff officer ; and for battalhm
•egiment throughout.

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 757

judgment in the litigation of the line, and sanctions all contracts,
except those specially reserved to other authorities. In carrying on
the traffic of the line, he is never to lose sight of the main object for
which it was intended, namely, to afford the means of instruction in
the technical management of a railway to officers, non-commissioned
officers, and men of the Railway Battalion. Everything is to be
subordinate to the furthering of this end.

5th Article. Nomination of the Staff to carry on the traffic.

The Manager, the Officer in charge of the head office, and the
Locomotive Superintendent of the Traffic Department, will take up
their duties as part of the Executive Staff, upon nomination by the
Chief of the Army Staff, as recommended by the Commander of the
Battalion. This latter will appoint the subordinate staff of this
department, the company to work the line (complete in itself, or
combined with men from others), and the employes to superintend and
be instructed in engine-driving, relieving them from time to time.

6th Article. Duties of the Manager of the Traffic Department.

The Traffic Manager will direct the work of the department,
according to the orders and instructions issued by the General
Manager, whose place he will nil in emergencies. He sees that all
matters connected with the traffic and administration of the line are
promptly carried out, directs the correspondence of the department,
and has the use of a stamp, " Traffic Department of the Military Line
" from Berlin to the Practice Ground." He is especially responsible for
the maintenance) regularity, punctuality, and economy of the traffic, as
well as for the discipline which should exist throughout the whole.
All offences not committed when doing the duty of the railway, or in
connection with it, are to be treated as regimental offences, and dealt
with according to Article 1 of the Army Regulations of October 31st,
1872, by him or by one of his immediate superiors in the
administration. The Traffic Manager has the disciplinary powers of
an officer' commanding a detached company. When he is unavoidably
absent, from illness or on leave, the Commander of the Battalion will
appoint another officer to do his duty.

7th Article. Superintendence of the traffic.

The duties of the Company Officers detached according to Article 5,
irrespective of those of the Company, will be regulated by Article 8
for the superintendence of the traffic.

8th Article. The details of the service and employment of the
Traffic Department, as well as the special duties to be performed by
the Manager, and by the non-commissioned officers and men of the
Military Railway, will be given subsequently in Regulations for the
Service,

9th Article. Administration of the Depot.

The Officer in charge of the unused rolling stock and plant, and of
the workshops, will also purchase, store, and issue all plant, tools, and
other material in his charge, and will keep the ledgers and account
books. Special instructions are issued for his guidance in " Instructions

1 By royal order of February 8th, of a detached staff officer.

758 THE GERMAN BAILWAT REGIMENT.

" for the Administration of the unused Plant of the Military Railway
" from Berlin to the Practice Ground."

10th Article. Administration of the Paymaster's Department.

The administration of the Pay-Chest will be superintended by a
committee composed of the Captain who is nominated Traffic
Manager, the Lieutenant of the head office, and the Paymaster of
this department, who will form " the Committee for the Administration
" of the Pay- Chest of the Military Railway from Berlin to the Practice
" Ground." They have the use of the stamp of the Traffic Department,
and will be governed by the regulations in force for a regimental pay-
chest as modified and supplemented for the Battalion.

Berlin, 31st Aug., 1875.
The above Cabinet Order, as well as the accompanying Statute, are
issued for the information of the Army.

(Signed.) VON KAHEKE.

The line was opened to the public in November, 1875, and was
worked by each company of the Battalion for a month at a time. The
officer who at first did the duty of Locomotive Superintendent, the
Sergeant and Under-officers employed as engine-drivers, had been
trained for a year previously on the Eastern Railway, and held cer-
tificates. For a week the regiment of Grenadiers, Francois Joseph,
was conveyed daily to the practice ground at Zossen, returning
in the evening. At another time, practice was given in loading
and unloading such material as would constantly be used in war.
An excellent example of the efficiency attained, and of the rapidity
with which work can now be performed, is afforded by one of the
latest services rendered. On the 17th February the Board of the
Berlin- Dresden line applied to the Colonel in command for a detach-
ment, to re-establish the communication interrupted by the flooding of
the River Dahme, an affluent of the Spree, which had destroyed a
large portion of embankment. Colonel Schulz lost no time in re-
quiring explanations or, making enquiries of any sort whatever.
Three hours after its receipt, the Chief of the Army Staff bad been
consulted, the company to furnish the detachment had received its
orders, the material required for the work had been brought to the
station and loaded ; in fact every preparation had been made in one-
eighth of the time in which civil engineers and men, under the most
favourable circumstances, could have been collected together. On
Friday the 18th, the same morning that they arrived, they began the
works in the bed of the Dahme, and at about the same hour on
Monday morning the heaviest traffic was able to pass over the gap
on a permanent bridge, 40 ft. long, of wooden longitudinals, supported
on four rows of piles. The work was directed by Major GoIe.

A glance at the Budget for 1876 shows that the advancement of the
new regiment is being pushed forward vigorously, and that there is
no appearance of allowing it to remain inactive. The sum of £3,000
is asked for as a special item this year to purchase an iron bridge,
a practical trial of which has been strongly recommended by the
Great General Staff. It was designed by Mr. Stern, engineer of

THE GERMAN RAILWAY REGIMENT. 759

Carlsruhe, for the purpose of rapidly and efficiently replacing railway
bridges which have been destroyed, and its construction has given
satisfaction to the Prussian Minister of Commerce. It provides
£2,000 for the railway to the practice ground at Zossen ; £300 for
special tours of reconnaissance to be made by the regiment ; £1,100 for
the annual special manoeuvres ; £10 for small-arm ammunition for
musketry practice, and £1,050 for contingencies. A new item occurs
amongst the sums devoted to the Great General Staff, £850 to training
field officers of the Staff to the duties of " Line Commandants," duties
which we have seen play an important part in the route service
organization scheme. It is proposed to name three this year, but from
the tone adopted it is certain that this number will be added to very
shortly. " The increase is necessitated by the complication of military
44 transport, and the desirability of practising the work of * Line Com-
" ' mandants ' during peace. Only three are named, as the best scheme
for their duties is not yet decided upon." A sum of £2,610 is asked for
for the office expenses of the military railway authorities, printing of
time-tables, stationery, copies of regulations and the like. This item
shows an increase of £1,050 upon last year.

In any subsequent war Germany will possess in the Prussian Rail-
way Regiment an organization which will have an influence hitherto
unparalleled, upon all military operations. Its creation has given rise
to a new arm. Exercised in peace to manoeuvre independently under
the exclusive direction of its officers, it will act in concert with the
army, assisting in invading, occupying, defending or evacuating
strategic points, represented by the principal stations. It will be
engaged in the most exposed part of the iron road comprised within
the field of operations, and will be called upon to show not only the
punctuality and precision of railway traffic, but discipline, military
spirit, and power, as well as science, in manoeuvring. As part of the
valuable system of route service possessed by the Germans, it enables
them to spread rapidly into the enemy's territory, to seize and turn to
their own use in a moment all local resources, paralysing the
patriotism of the population ; with cavalry to flank and reconnoitre
in advance, it is the most rapid instrument in bringing up reinforce-
ments of infantry to an important station seized by cavalry, or a
central depot of stores insufficiently defended. When acting on the
defensive, the enormously extended frontier of Germany renders this
arm equally indispensable, in order to meet the enemy in overpowering
numbers at any point. Nothing perhaps strikes a reader of the
"History of the War by the German Staff" with greater force than
the following quotation from page 82 of the first volume : — " The
" report made in the winter of 1868-69, served without any modifica-
" tion, as the basis of the principal dispositions taken upon the
" declaration of the war in 1870. In anticipation of the adoption
" of the plan proposed, all preparatory steps had been completed,
" down to the smallest detail ; and upon His Majesty's approval of it,
" after his arrival in Berlin, there remained only to write in the day
" for commencing the mobilization, in the tables of the movements
" and transports, which had been prepared for each fraction of the

760 THE GERM/VN RAILWAY REGIMENT.

" army by the railway department of the Staff, and the movement was
" commenced.* *

Railways enabled MacMahon to withdraw his army after defeat at
Worth to Chalons, where he was joined by corps also brought by rati
from Belfort and Paris, but the want of organization in the adminis-
tration caused great suffering- to the men, who could not leave their
carriages for an incredibly long period. Railways permitted
Canrobert to quit Chalons at the last moment with a large portion
of his corps, and take part in the decisive battles round Metz ; bat
on the other hand, the absence of a trained staff to restore the
portion of line between Frouard and Metz, destroyed by the Prussian
cavalry on August 13th, obliged him to leave a large part of his
artillery behind, a result which weighed heavily against the French in
the issue of the battle of the 18th. It was due to the re-establishment
of the lines by the Prussian and Bavarian Railway Corps, and in
particular the line from Amiens to Rouen, that the investment of Paris
on the north could be assured over a very wide circle by a much
smaller force than that opposed to them. The loop-line, 63 miles long,
from Remilly to Pont-a-Mousson, constructed by the First and Fourth
Prussian Railway Sections, to avoid Metz, is a matter of history. It
is no exaggeration to say, that the lamentable conclusion of
Bourbaki's expedition eastwards, was due to the inefficient adminis-
tration of the railways he was employing. Between Bourges and
Chalons-sur-Sadne, his army could not be moved backwards or
forwards owing to the block on the line. They remained eight days
in the carriages, in intense cold, and without sufficient food. Could
anyone expect them to have retained their morale when they arrived
at their journey's end ?

With such facts before us, it cannot but be a matter of regrct
that England makes no effort to provide a military body trained to a
practical and technical knowledge of railway management. Will it
require an experience more costly than even that of the Crimea,
to show that the time for the further development of this branch has
arrived ? In case of invasion, no doubt patriotic ardour will hasten to
provide the means to the same end ; railway officials throughout the
kingdom will afford their utmost assistance. But zeal and patriotism,
without a pre-arranged and organized system, in a matter requiring
the greatest precision and method, will not suffice. There would not
be much difficulty in creating a military body similar in character to
that which has formed the subject of this article, and which might
become the nucleus of further expansion in case of war either at home
or abroad . We shall do well, therefore, to remember that the
" extraordinary requirements arising out of recent great changes and
" improvements in the means and appliances of warfare, render the
" necessity more imperative than formerly, that dependence should not
" be placed upon exceptional talent, nor upon lavish expenditure, to
" provide at the moment of action all that may have been omitted dozing
" peace in our administrative organization."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Historical Records of the First Regiment of Militia or Third West York
Light Infantry.— By Captain G. A. Raikes, Third West York
Light Infantry Militia; Lieutenant- Instructor of Musketry, Hon.
Artillery Company. Price 21s.

Captain Raises deserves the gratitude of all connected with the Third
West York for the enormous amount of labour and time which he
must have expended in compiling the records of the regiment. The
interest of the volume is of course mainly local. Cap tarn Raikes
must, however, have at hand an abundance of information connected
with the old constitutional force, considered as one branch of national
defence. It is to be hoped, therefore, that in view of the exhaustion
of the present edition of the records by local requirements, the author
will in good time turn his energies and abilities to the preparation of
the work from which he has here advisedly withheld his hand, namely,
a general history of the militia of the United Kingdom.

Captain Raikes will forgive us reminding him that he has somewhat
inverted the importance of the titles of the corps of which he has
shown himself so able an historian. His avowed object in compiling
the records is to aid in maintaining esprit de corps. The esprit de corps
of a militia regiment is intimately connected with locality ; the place
of honour in the title page should therefore be given to the " West
" York Light Infantry," not to to the " First Regiment of Militia."
This task of plain and simple duty conscientiously performed, reflects
credit on the West Riding ; it is as belonging to the West Riding of
Yorkshire that we would see the esprit de corps of the regiment
fostered, and not merely as the fortunate (?) corps whose precedence is
the result of an after-dinner ballot. — (0.)

" Leitfaden fur den Unterricht in der Dienst-Kenntniss auf den Konig-
licheii Kriegsschulen." — By Captains Schnackenburg and Bartels.
Berlin. A. Bath, 1876, Pp. 93.

It is not the lack of professional books that the German Officer can
ever plead as an excuse for ignorance of any part of his duties. Their
name is simply legion. The present " Guide to Instruction in
" Military Regulations at the War Schools," is one of many others
which treat of the same subject ; in this case, however, the book has
the official sanction of the Inspector General of Military Education, and
therefore its facts may be accepted as perfectly correct, which indeed
on investigation they prove themselves to be.

" Dienst-Kenntniss," or as it is here translated, " Military Regula-
tions," includes at the War Schools not only a knowledge of the
organization and formation of the army, but also of the arrangements
for recruiting, mobilization, and preparation for war, the command

762 NOTICES OF BOOKS.

and administration of the army, interior economy, garrison duty, duty
on the line of march, in quarters and in camp, and military law.

Such a vast range of subjects cannot obviously be exhausted in a
pamphlet of some 90 pages. It is a mere bald sketch of the subject*,
intended to be enlarged upon and amplified by the instructor in hi*
lectures. Consequently the guide is of too cursory a nature to be of
much use as a book of reference to any but a German Officer. Still
the sketch of the organization of the army, corrected up to the most
recent date, will be found sufficiently full for those at all acquainted
with the German Army who wish for information but have not
the inclination to consult the more detailed works of Frohlich r.
Witzleben or v. Helldorf .

Sur la Dispersion Natuurelle des Projectiles et la Loi des Erreurs. — Par
Aloys van Mbyden, Capt. Artillerie. Lusanne, 1876,

A knowledge of the laws of the deflection of projectiles is necessary to
the practical artillerist, in order to enable him to form a just estimate
of the probable performance of his gun under certain circumstances.
An acquaintance with the calculus of probabilities, as laid down bj
recent mathematical writers, and with the method of least sqnare>
of Legende, is essential to a proper comprehension of the subject.
The object of the pamphlet before us is, taking the established formula
for granted, to show its application in order to determine under certain
circumstances the performance of any particular gun: — i.e., the
chance of hitting an object in a certain number of rounds. The
subject is gone into very fully and in a few clearly written pages ; the
question is brought thoroughly within the grasp of anyone possessing
the necessary mathematical qualifications to follow the reasonings o."
the author. We strongly commend this pamphlet to the attention of
scientific gunne/s, as well as to those engaged in astronomical or
geodetical operations, as being a clear exposition of a difficult subject.

Campaign of 1870-1. The Operations of the Corps of General v. Werd<*r,
Compiled from the Official Documents by Ludwio Lohleih, late
Captain 1st Baden Body Guard Grenadier Regiment. Translated
bv Lieutenant F. T. Maxwell, Royal Engineers. Gale, Chatham.
P.p. 171. Price 5s. 6d. Weight 1 lb. ; size 8|" x 5f" x £".

Lieutenant Maxwell has done good service by placing before the
public a translation of Lohlein's account of this portion of the campai^ni
of 1870-1. The operations of the XlVth Corps are very interesting
General Werder fought long and well against a force far superior in
point of numbers, though inferior in most other respects. It would
be difficult to say whether the regiments or the Staff had the harder
work to perform. The task which devolved on General Werder was
thoroughly well executed, under circumstances which were in the
highest degree trying.

A close and careful study of the book, which is well provided with
plans and maps, will well repay the military student.

INDEX

THE LECTURES AND PAPERS

COSTUMED IK

VOLS. XI.— XX.

$02*1 Into £dri« |nstMon:f

THE NAMES OF THEIR AUTHORS.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY W. MITCHELL AND 00.,

39, CHABINO CROSS.

1878.

Prim it.

INDEX OF SMJICTS:

Subject of Lectube ob Paper.

Abyssinia

"Achilles/* H.M.S., Inglefield't New
Ilvdraulic Steering Apparatus, as
being fitted to, with plate

— — Means of Screw-Ship Steerage, and
a Description of the Hydrostatic
Steering Gear fitted on board, with
the Results of Biperimenta at Sea ;
also a Plan of Apparatus fitted on
board the Turkish Ironclad "Fethi-
Bulend," with plate

Africa, The Best Mode of Defence of the
Protected Territories on the Gold
Coast of, and the Organization of a
Force Sufficient for that Purpose, with
map

" Agincourt," H.M. Ship, on and off the
Pearl Bock, with plate*

Airman's Instruction-Rifle and Prac-
tice-Tester for Ordnance, with plate

Ambulances, A Visit to Some of the, and
Buttle Fields of the North of France

American Nary , its Organization, Ships,
Armament, and Recent Experiences,

with plate*

AifurNiTiON-Supply Car, Skeleton Am-
munition Car, Packing Ammunition,
Ac, with plate*

Ancient Naval Tactics, with plate*

Aneroid Barometer, An Occasional Note
on the Use of, in Surreying

Name of Author

Parkvns, Mans-
field

Inglefield, E. A.,
Captain R.N.

„ E. A.,

Rear- Admiral

Lauderdale, Adra.
the Earl of,
G.C.B.

Boyle, R. ff., Com-
mander R.N.

Aikman, F. R.,

Lt.-CoL, w.c.

Mouot, F. J., Sur*
gcon-Moj., M.I).

Hamilton, J. Ran-
dolph

Martin, T., Lieut .-
Col. (late 4th
Regiment)

Warre, the Rot.
Edmond, M.A.

Fawcett, R. H.,
Capt.33rdRegt.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.

xii 51 900

xni 53 22

xit 57 52

xvii 74 676

xvr67 183

xv 65A 847

xv 64 469

xii 49 243

xiii 55 337

xx SS 503
in 66 148

A 2

Year.

1868

1869

1870

1873

1S72
1871
1871
1868

I860

1876
1872

IKDKX OV SUBJECTS.

SUOTCT O* LlCTtTBl OB PAPER.

Namb ot Author.

VoL, No., and

**•

of Journal.

Tear.

Axixaxs, Minute Sea 8urface, Delineation
of some (Coloured Drawings), Part I.

Toynbee, Mrs*

ToL Ko. P.
xix 8o 214

1875

xtx Si 39 V

1875

ft »» >» ■"••

TTT

>» n

JsvA-^L wl %Mn sT

xrx 82 531

1875

n n »» *■"•

99 99

n 99

xix 83657

1875

n »> »■■■*•

Apparatus for automaticaflj Becording
the Boiling of a ship in a Sea-way,
see Rolling.

Apfsvpicbs.*

Abmada, Spanish, A Warning Yoice from. .

Collinson, T. B.
Maj.-Oen. RE.

xix 81 285

1875

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut.23rdBoyal
Welah Fusiliers

xrx 83 549

1875

Abmies, Foreign, the Practical Instruction
of Staff Officers in

Burnaby, F. 'Gh,
Capt. Boy. Horse
Guards

xti 68 633

1872

of different Nations, the Com-
parative Cost of, and the loss to a
Country by Conscription

Ardagh,J.C.,Capt.
B.E.

xx 86 218

1875

Akmoue-Clads, Firing at, reduced to a
System, with plate

Orde-Browne, C,
Capt. late B.A.

xti 69 684

1872

Armour (Deflecting) Plated Ships for
Coast Defence, with plate

Hyde, J. M.

xni 53 128

1869

Armoured Turret Ships, The Conversion
of our Screw Line of Battle Ships
into, with plates

Henwood, Cliarles
F.

xiii 54 181

1869

ArmoxtB' Plated Ship, Description of a
Model of, designed by him, with illus-
trations

Wilson, Edmund,
Capt. B.N.

xii 51 502

1868

Arms of Precision, New, The Amount of
Advantage they give to the Defence
over the Attack

Schaw, H., Capt.
B.E.

xiv 59 377

1870

rrf "Prrrinirm TTntr fnr the FtnTtlov

Smith, MiahaelW.,
Maj.-Gen., C.B.

in 49 147

1868

ment of Cavalry is Affected by Recent
Improvements in

1 To each Volume of the Journal, ther
ul General Meetings, Additions to the
bers.— Kd.

containing the Proceed
and erery second j

INDEX OF 0TJBJKCT8.

Subject of Lxotubb ob Papbb.

Arhb, Small, Breech-Loading, the Pro-
great of, with plates

— Small, Breech-Loading, Cartridges
for, and the Best Form of Projectile,
with plate

— ^— Small, Military Breech-Loading,
with plate

Abxt Administration, Beforms in. •

a Propositiom for one General Mili-

Nakb op Authob.

tary School for

— British, The Cultivation of Scienti-
fic Knowledge by Regimental Officers
of

— Chinese, The Economy of, with
iUmetratume

— Construction of Boots and Shoes
Suitable for the, Police, and others
subject to Severe Walking, with plate

— German, The Medical Department
of, in Peace and War

— Night Telegraph— The Spakowsky
Marine

of England, an Organization for

— On the Best Practical Method
for Ensuring Efficiency in, and for
Obtaining an Effective and Reliable
Reserve, having Regard to the Existing
Feeling in the Country on the Subject

On the Organization of the Com-

munications of, including Railways

Organization : our Infantry Forces

and Infantry Reserves

— Suggestions for the Land Trans-
port Service

Army, the, The Best Mode for Recruiting
for, and the Influences bearing upon
that Service

Latham, John ..

0'Hea,J.B.,Capt.
late 25th Regt.

Majendie, V. D.,
Capt. R.A.

De Fonblanque,B.
B., Dep. C.-G.

Collinson, Col. T.
Bernard, R.E.

Ross, MaiorW.H.,
late R. A.

Lamprey ,J., M.B.,
Surgeon 67th
Regiment

Howlett, Samuel
B.

Fox, T. W., Sur-
geon-Gen. R.E.

Doty, H.H., Capt.

Bevan • Edwards,
G., Major R.E.

WardefSirEdward
C, K.C., Major-
General, R.A.

Home,Lieut.-Col.,
C.B., R.E.

Leahy, Arthur,
Major R.E.

Beazley, G. G.,
Capt. 83rd Regt.

Noake,R.C.,Capt.
AdjutantScottish
BorderenMilitia

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
83 631

^ XII 48 105

XI 44 190
xin 53 88
xiii 54 241
xtt 69 774

xi 46 403

xii 48 44
87 560

xi 47 658

in 50 295

xix 80 128

82 381

XII 50 310

XIII 56 564

XI 43 27

Year.

1875
1868

1867
1869
1869
1872

1867

1868
1876

1867
1868
1875

1875
1868.
1869
1867

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lectitrr or Papbr.

Attmy, the, The Dress and Equipment of,
with plate

The Education df , frith Reference

Nraz ov Atjtbob:

to Young Officers

— The Italian, with plan

The Russian . .

Prussian, A Brief Sketch of the

Bystem of Officering
— The Austrian.

The Studj of Military History by

the Regimental Officers of, with map
and plates

Artillery and Troops, Moveable Steel
Mantlet for the Protection of, with
plate

Field, on the Connected System,

with plate

"Walker, Arthur,
C»pt.

Middleton, IP. D.,
Lt.-Col.

Waveney, Col.
Lord,

Vincent, 0. E. H.,
Lieut.28rd Royal
Welsh Fusiliers

VoL, No., and

Page
of Journal.

VoL Jfo. P.
XI 45 375

i»

Fire in Peace Manoeuvres, with

diagrams

Modern, as exhibited at Paris in

2867, with plates

— of the Advanced Guard of an Army
in the Field, the Constitution and
Duties of— (The R. A. Institution
Prize Essay of 1874)

Practical, with platen

Practice, Expanding Sponge for,

with plate

The Modes of Determining the

Accuracy of, with diagrams

the Tactical Power' of Modern

Field

Asn'ANTBH Campaign — TI.M.S. " Victor '
Emanuel" as an Hospital Ship during
'the late, with plate

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Maj. R.E.

Eddy, Charles B.t
M.A.

Ross, W. H., Maj.
R.A.

Carmichael, L. M. ,
Capt. 5th Royal
Irish Lancers I

Owen,C. H., Lieut. -
Col. R.A.

Pratt, S.C., Lieut.
R.A.

Strange, T. B.,
Capt, R.A.

Gilmore, A. H.,
Lieut. R.N.

Pole,ProfessorW.

Brackenbury, C.
B.,Lt.-CoL R.A.

Ryder, A.T.,Tice-
Admiral

65 686

86 359
xti 57 285

xvi 69 796

xvn 73 827

87 506

im 55 326

xn 48 72

xnn 78 449

xn 48 €0

xviii 79 489

xv 63 119

xm 53 30

*i 43 1

86 310

xnn 78 383

Tear.

1867
1871
1876

1872

1873
1876

1869

1868
1874

1863
1874

1871
1868
1867
1876
1874

BTDKX. OV SCBJECTB.

Subject of Lxctvse OB Paisb.

Nasi of Authob.

Ashanti Campaign, Tha Tolls Expedition,
fcrilA map

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Expedition of 1873

Asia in Europe, and a Sketch of the
Busso-Turkish Campaigns of 1828-29,
with maps

Central, The Strategy of Russia, in,

from a Persian Point of View, with
map

Asian (Central) Question, with map

Atlantic, The Winds of the North, with
plates

The Meteorology, Sea Temperature,

Glover,SirJohnH.,
G.C.M.G., Capt.
B.N.

Wood, Evelyn,
Col., tH«ff •» C.B.,
90th Regiment

Wilbraham, Sir
Richard, Lieut. -
General, E.CJB.

Smith, R. Mur-
doch, Capt. R.E.

Vol. No. P.
XTin 78 817

xrin 78 381

xx 88 192

xvn 71 212

and Currents of the 10° square of the,
which lies between the Equator and
l(f N., and from 20° to 30* W., with
plates •

Attack in Skirmishing Line, Proposed
Method of, with diagrams

Proposed Formation of a Bat-

talion for the, with plate
Austrian Army

in 1875

Trench, F. Chene- xtii 71 184
vix, Capt. 20th
Hussars

Toynbee,H., Capt.

— Confidential Report, and New
Method of Promotion

Autumn Manoeuvres of Continental Armies,
Military Maxima Suggested or Exem-
plified by the last, with plans

. Manofuvree abroad and at home . .

ManccuTres of England

Parker, F. G. S.
Capt. 54th Regt.

Bigge,T.S., Major

5th Fusiliers

Vincent C. E. H.
Lt. 23 R.W.F.

Graham, Sir Lunt-
ley, Bart., CoL

Vincent, C. E. E.,
Lieut.23rdBoyal
Welsh Fusiliers

Shute, C.Cameron,
CoL, C.B.

Codrington, Sir
William J., Ge-
neral G.C.B.

Brackenbury, C.
B., Capt. K.A.

xt 64 567

xtii 72 881

1874

1876

1873

1871

1873

xvn 74 741

xviii 56 152

xvn 73 527

xx 87 548

in 66 151

xiv 58 206

xvi 68 497

xvi 67 222

1873
1874
1873
1876
1872

1870

1872

IXDKX OF SUBJECTS.

SrBJBcr of Lecture ob Papeb.

NAME 07 AUTHOB.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Autumn Manoeuvres of 1872

Manoeuvres of the Prussian Guard

Brackenbury,C.B
Capt. B.A.

•»■

Vol. No. P.

xtii 71 73

Corps in September, 1872, with plate*

Azimuth Tables, Croudace's New Book of
Stellar, and a Newly-Invented Il-
luminated Stellar Azimuth Compass,
Croudace's Ordnance Night* Sight
Vane or Collimator

Babbette System, Further Particulars re-
garding Moncrieff's Protected, with
plates

Babometkb, Aneroid, An Occasional Note
- on the TJse of, in Surveying

BaBbacks, Suggested Improvements in
Sanitary Arrangements of Hospitals,
Camps, and Shipping, Ac.

Battle of Kdniggratz, with maps

Hildyard, H.,
Lieut.72ndHigh-
landers

Croudaee, W. S.

1873

xyi 69 781 187

xviii 77 265

of Worth

Bed cr Mattrass, Life-Saying

Bedstead, The Chobham, with illustration

Bessemeb Saloon, A Proposed Method of
Mounting Heavy Ordnance at Sea on
the Principle of

Binnacle Lights, Nunn's Improved, with
plate

Biscuit and other Farinaceous Articles of
Diet in H.M. Navy, The Preservation
of, from Weevil, Maggots, and other
Insects, with illustrations

Boat Lowering and Self-Detaching Appa-
ratus, HilTs, with plate

^oatb, Lowering, at Sea, with plate

— Quarter, Plan of Sustaining and
Lowering Ships', with plates

Moncrieff, A.,
Capt. Edinburgh
Artillery Militia

Fawcett, B. H.,
Capt. 33rd Begt.

Synge, Millington,
Major-Gen. K.E.

Walker, Beau-
champ, Col., C.B.

Collen, £. H. H.,
Lt. xv. A.

Smith, Henry • .

Billon, Conrad A.,
Capt.

Strange, Alex.,Lt.-
Col.

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. B.N.

Seccombe, E.

xi 44 241

xvi 66 143

1874

1867

1872

xnii 78 299 • 1874

xn 51 4-10

xvii 73 426

xm 54 216
xvi 66 56

xvn 75 836

xn 49 272
xix 83 681

Hill, E. J.

Lacon,W. Stirling

Simpson, C. H.,
CaptRN.

xvi 69 762

xvn 71 97
xi 47 619

186S

1873

1869
1872

1873

1868

1875

1872

1873
1867

INDEX OV SUBJECTS.

StTBJECT OV LeOTUBE OB PaPEB.

Nun GW Authob.

Vol., No., and

Pago

of Journal*

Boats, On Improvement* in Apparatus for
Lowering and Baising, Engaging and
Disengaging Ship*', with plate

Borrow and Colomb's Signal Lights, with
illustrations

Boot, Military, Parfcer»Bhode*s

Boots and Shoes Suitable for the Army,
Police, and others subject to Severe
Walking, Construction of

Bow and Stern Screw Steamships, with
diagram

Boys— On Training them for Soldiers

Bbuch-Loadbbs, with Reference to
Calibre, Supply, and Cost of Ammuni-
tion, with plate

Bbmch-Loadino and Muzzle-Loading for
Guns, with illustration*

Cannon, Stuart's, with plate

Gun, Heavy, A Proposal for one of

Novel Construction, with plates

■— Small Arms, Cartridges for, and
the best form of Projectile, with plate

Small Arms, Military, with plates

Small Arms, The Progress of, with

plate

BsnorBB's Steam Steering Screw, with
illustration

Bbidoi (Military) Construction, with
plates

Bboadsidb and End-on System, Combined,
with plates

System, The Turret versus the.

with plates

Folkard, A.,

M.I.CJS*

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. R.N.

Parker-Bhodes, C.
B.

Howlett, Samuel
B.

Griffiths, E.t C.E.

Macgregor, John,
M.A.

Selwyn,J.H.,Capt.
E.N.

Morgan,J. P., Ma-
jor B. A.

Stuart, Graham,
Capt. 4th W. Y.
Artil .Volunteers

Merg*n,J.P.,Capt.
B.A.

O'Hea, J.B., Capt.
late 25th Bcgt.

Majendie, V. IX,
Capt. B.A.

Latham, John,

Bremner, Geo.,
Capt.

Leahy, Arthur,
Lieut.-CoL RE.

Symonds, T. E.,
Capt. B.N.

Coles, Cowper P.,
Oapt

Vol. No. P.

xvm 77 278

in 50 373

xyi 69 764

xii 48 44

XYH 74 784

xix 82 899

xi 43 16

xvin 78 408

xiy 57 19

xit 60 479

1874

1868

1872

1868

1873

1875

1867

1874

1870

in 48 105 1868

xi 44 190
83 681

xvii 70

84689

uowper r.,
Rtf , C.B.

xi 46 485

xi 46 484

1867
1875
1873
1875
1867
1867

INDEX OF SUBJECTS. \

Subject op Lbctobb or Papbb.

Broadside, Working Heary Guns *m the,
with some Observations on the All-
Round Fire, combined with the Broad-
side System of Armament, with plate

" Bbutsee," H.M.S., On the Casing of the
Propeller of, with plate

Bullets, Explosive, and their Application
to Military purposes, with plait

Burma ii, Upper, its Defences and War-
like Resources, with map

Cablbs, the Atlantic Telegraph of 1857-
58, also those of 1665-66

Caithness's, the Earl of, Gravitating
Compass, and Nunn's Improved Bin-
nacle Lights, with illustration

Campaign of 1870-71, &c— (Notice of
Work)

_ 9

Mantcuffel's, in the East of France,

with map

Campaigns of 1828-29 in Europe and Asia,
a Sketch of the Russo-Turkish, with
maps

Campaign (The Lost), of Hanorer, with
maps

the late Russian, against Khira,

with map

— The UmbeyU, with plate . .

(The Winter) of Le Mans, with

maps

'ampbixl's Range-Indicator, with plate . .

Sax* op Ajpthob.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Year.

Wilson, Edmund,
Oapt. R.N.

Vol. No. F.

im 53 110

•

lfl®

Griffiths, R., C.E.

xx 86171

1876

Fosbery,G. V. ,Maj .

V.C», H.M.
Bet gal Staff
Corps

xn 4$ 16

1S6S

Browne, Edmond,
Capt. 21st Royal1
N.B.Fus.

xix 83 588

1875

Moriarty, H. A.,
Staff-Commander,
C.B., R.N.

xi 44 127

1867

Colomb, P. II.,
Comr. R.N.

xu 49 272

186b

Lohlein, Ludwig,
late Captain 1st
Baden Body
Guard Grenadier
Regt.

xx 88 762

1876

Gun, H. A., Capt.
R.E.

xtii 72 268

1873

Wilbraham, Sir
Richard, Lieut. -
General, JLC.B.

xx 88 693

1876

Brackenbury, H.,
Cbpt.RJL

xit 5S 255

1870

Trench, F. Cheno-
vix, 20th Hut*. *

inn 77 212

1874

Fosbery, G. V.,
Major, IP. C»,
H.M.Bengal Staff
Corps

xi 47 548

1867

Brackenbury ,CB . ,
Capt. R.A.

XT 64 B&b

nsn

Campbell, J. R.,
Capt. HantsMili-
tia Artillery

xvx<G7 »9

1875

INDCX O* 8UBJBC8S*

Svbjidt of LBorosa ob Papbb.

Nams of Atjthdb

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Year.

CamfbsllVi Bange-IadtactoT.
ditto ditto

Buultuh

Camphtg and Moving of Troop* m Tro-
pical Regions,— Sanitary Precautions
to be observed, &o.

Canada, Dominion of, Report of a Recon-
naissance of the North- West Provinces
and Indian Territories of , and Narrative
of a Journey Across the Continent
through Canadian Territory to British
Columbia and Vancouver's Island, with
map

Caniton, Stuart's Breech-Loading, with
plate

" Captain," On the Causes of the In-
sufficient Stability of H. M.'s late
Turret Ship, and of other Ironclads,
with plates

Cartridges for Breach-Loading Small
Arms, and the Best Form of Projectile,
with plate

Caucasus, The Eastern, and Daghestan,
with map

Cavalry — How far its Employment is
Affected by Recent Improvements in
Arms of Precision

Campbell, J. 3ft.,
Capt. Hants Mili-
tia Artillery

Maclean, W. C,
M.D., C.B., Sur-
geon-General

Robertson -
P., Colonel

Vol. No. P.
XVI -68 644

xvm 76 114

xrax 74 648

1872

1874

1873

Organization and Employment of,

with Discussion on ditto

Regiments about to take part in

the Exercises of the Combined Cavalry
Division Detailed from Regiments,
translated by Major-General Walker,
C.B., Instructions for — (Notice of
Book)

the Employment of, in War

with plates

Cehtbal Asian Question — The Euphrates
"Valley Route to India, in connection
-with, with map

Stuart, 'Graham,
Capt. 4th W. Y.
Axtil. Volunteers

FwhboTrroe, E.
Gardiner, Rear-
Admiral, C.B.

O'HeajJ.B., Capt.,
late Z5th Rcgt.

Ounynghame, Sir
A., Gen., K.C.B.

Smith,MichaelW.,
Me j.- Gen. C.B.

Baker, Valentine,
Col., late 10th
Hussars

VonSchmidt,Maj.-
Gen., translated
by Ma j.- Gen. B.
Walker, C.B.

Hoziar, H. M.,
Capt.

Russell, Frank S.,
14th In.

xiv 57 I*

xv 62 1

Andrew, W. P.

xn 48 105

xtii 75 749

xn 49 147

xtii 73 375

xx 86 422

1870

1871

1868

xn 67 168

xx 86 179

xtii 73 472

1873

1868

1873

1876

1872
1876
1873

INDBX OF SUBJECTS.

SUBJBOT OF LBOTUBE OB PlPBB.

Namb of Authob.

VoL, No., and!
Page |Y<
of Journal.

Central Asian Question, The, with map . ,

Asia, the Military Geography of,

with maps

— — — Asia, the Strategy cf Russia in,
from a Persian Point of View, with
map

" Challenge*," H.M.S., The Voyage of,
with map and diagrams

" Challbngbb," H.M.8., The Voyage of,
continued, with diagrams

The, Extracts from a Paper read

at the British Association for the
Adrancement of Science, at Bradford,
on the Scientific Voyage of, with
map

Chinese Army, the Economy of, with
illustrations

Naral Arsenal at Foo-chow, an

Trench, F. Ghene-
Tix, Capt. 20th
Hubs.

Baker, Valentine,
CoL, late 10th
Hussars

Smith, B. Mur-
doch, Capt. B.E.

Carpenter, Wil-
liam, M J).

»»

Davis, J. E., Capt.
B.N.

Vol. No. P.

xvn 71 184

xvm 79 463

xni 71 212

xvii 75 813
xix 84 741
xyh 75 828

Account of, translated and abridged
from M. Giquel's Pamphlet

Chittagong Column of the Lushaie Ex-
peditionary Force, 1871-72, an Account
of the Proceedings of, with map

Torpedo, Description of a Model

of
Ciboitlab Ironclads, with plates

Ships of War, see Ships of War.

Coal, Economy of, as riewed by the Com-
mander of a Steam Vessel

Coals, Methods of ascertaining the Bo-
latire Value of, for Nayal Purposes,
with illustrations

Coast Defences, and the Application of
Iron to Fortifications, with plate

■ Fog Signals, see Fog Signals.

Lamprey, J.,M.B.,
F.B.G.S., Sur-
geon 67th Regi-
ment

Bridge, Cyprian A.
G., Comr. B.N.

East,C.J.,BreTet-
Major41stBegt.

Beal, Ber.8., B.N.

Beed, E. J., C.B.,
M.P.

Shortland, P. F.,
Capt. B.N.

Eckersley,E.,Chief
Engineer, B.N.

Jerrois, Col., C.B.,
B.E.

xi 46 403

88 711

XTH 71 113

XT 65 728
xx 85 85

1873

1874

1873

1873
1875
1873

1867

1876

1873

xnn 76 2
xix 84723

xn 52 648

1871
1876

1874
1375

1868

INDEX OV SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lbottob ob Papkb.

Coast Defence, Deflecting Armour-Plated
Ships for, with plate

Collimator, The TJte of, for Laying Guns
for Night Firing, with plate

Collision, Ac., in Cases of, The Naval
Hammock, its Buoyancy and Use in
Saying life at Sea

Collisions at Sea, Helm Indicator for the
Frerention of, with illustrations

Read and NioholTs Patent Day and

Night Helm Signals for Preventing,
with plate

On the best Method of Propelling

Steam Ships, so as to give the Greatest
Facility for Manoeuvring in Action,
and for Avoiding Collisions, with plate

Colomb, Captain, Signal Lights of, and of
Captain Bolton, with plate

Commission, Permanent, the Necessity for,
on State Scientific Questions

Company, The, as a Military Body; its
Establishment, and the Best Number
of Companies in the Battalion

Compass, Description of a Registering,
with illustration

Compasses, The Demagnetization of Iron
Ships and of Iron Beams, Ac., of
Wooden Vessels, to prevent the De-
viation of, Experimentally shown by
means of a Model, with plate

Conical Screw and Breech-Loading Can-
non, Steenstrup's, with illustration

Conscription, Universal, the only Answer
to the Recruiting Question. — (The
Institution's Military Prise Essay,
1875)

Control Service, The, with Practical
Suggestions for its Improvement, Ac.

Contention, The Geneva, of 1864, in
Relation to aid afforded by Volunteer
Societies to Sick and Wounded
Soldiers during the late Franco*
War, Ac

Name of Author.

Hyde, J. M.

Davidson, D.,
Lieut.-Col.

Ryder, A.P.,Rear-
Admiral

Read,George,R.N.

Griffiths, R., C.E.

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. R.N.

Strange, Alex.,Lt.-
Col.

Graham, SirLum-
ley, Bart., Col.

Arthur,Capt.,R.N.

Hopkins, Evan,
C.E.

Jensen, Peter

Hime, H. W. L.,
Capt. R.A.

De Fonblanque, E.
B.,Dep. C.-G.

Longmore,T.,C.B.,
M.I>.,Dep.Insp.-
Gen. Hospitals

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
xiii 53 128

xin 55 386

xy 62 111

xii 48 141

xti 69 749

88 684

' xii 50 873

xt 64 537

xix 83 067

xiv 61 667

xi 44 260

xiy 57 124

xix 80 92

xvi 66 106

xvt 67 206

Year.

1869

1871

1868

1872

1876

1868

1871

1875

1870

1867

1870

1875

1872
1872

o* mi

flUBJKZ OF Tiaii'imB OB

ov Ai

VoL, No., and
of Journal.

CooxnrffApparatDs,8elf- Acting, Sfiaann's
Norwegian, with, illustrations

for Troop*, with iHnstraUoi

SAmbmb, John.* ••

Coit, Comparative, of the Armies o£
different Nations, and the loss to a
Country by Conscription

CboudiCI's New Book of Stellar Azimuth
Tables, and on a Newly-Invented Illu-
minated Stellar Azimuth Compass,
Croudace's Ordnance Night - sight
Vane or Collimator

Comr.BJr.

ArdagM C.CapL
BJS.

Croudaoey W. Si

VoL Ho. P.

aa'4fe27A

1£0»

Cubbhntb, Ocean

Ocean, and their Influences, with

Laughton, J. K.,
B.N. .

Eindlay, A. Ck

xr 65 663

1871

xm 5S 1S3-, 1870

maps

D*0HBSTAH and the Eastern Caueaaus,
with map

Dbcz-Raftb for Saving Life at Sea* and' a
System of Improved Life-Buoys* with
illustration

•

Dhvbxch, Harbour

— Maritime', of England, including;
Offensive and Defensive Warfare : —
Fart I. The Organisation of our
Maritime Forces. Fart II. Our Ships
of War and their Armament, Ac., with
plates

of England, Observation on the .

of Paris, The New Works for,

with map

Defences, Coast, and the Application: of
Iron to Fortifications} with platm

Drvencbs, National, of Great Britain,
Especially with Reference to the
Future Requirement of Floating Forts,
with plate

Cunynghame, Sir

A., vfOH», JimCuJj*

Hamilton, Mark,
M.D., Surgeon
R.N.

Monetteff, Alexan-
der, Major

Scott, R. A. E.,
Capt. R.N.

xtoi 75 740

xvii 74 725

187*

\SIZ

8t 357

xx 87 447

Soady,F. J., Lieut. -
Col. R.A.

Tyler, E.S., Major
R.E.

Jerrois, GoL, C.B-,
( BtJSL

Mackie, Samuel J.,
1. Inst. CJ5.

xit 61 570

xix 80 74

xn 53 546

xn 49 222

1ST*
1876

IXDBX. OF SCBJBCX3

StrBJBCT qf Lbcxiibb. qb Pasib.

DaTEves/The Amount of Advantage which,
the new Arms of Precision giro to the,
over the Attack

■ The Position and Lines of the 5th
Corps before Versailles during, the
Winter of 1870-71, with map

Detbvbiyb Submarine Warfare, with
plate

Deflbcting Armour-Plated Ships for
Coast Defence, with plate

Demaoxetizattoit of Iron Ships and of
Iron Beams, &c., of Wooden Vessel*,
to Prevent the Deviation of the Com-
passes, experimentally shown by
means of a Model, with plate

Disembarkations (Lecture to Officers of
Volunteers)

DiSTBiBrriOTf, The, of our War Forces,
with map

Diving Apparatus, Propositions in con-
nection with, with plate

Dons Bay, the Proposed Enclosure of;
Review of Designs, and Historical
Essay on the Harbour, with plates

Dress and Equipment of the Army, with
plate

Drill Book, Infantry, The Latest Changes
made by the Prussians in their

Prussian, 1876

Dveb, Captain, a Few Notes on His Paper

Eastern Question, The Military Aspects
of the, and the Turkish Forces

Eroxomr of Coal, as viewed by the
Commander of a Steam Vessel

Economy of Fuc1, comprising Mineral
Oils

Nakjc oef Auxhoa.

Schaw, H., Cant.

r.e:

Vol. No. P.

■ xi* 59 377

Walker, Beau
champ,Maj.-Gen.,
Mil.Attach6,Berlin

Stotherd, R. H.,
Major R.E.

Hyde, J. M.

Hopkins, Evan,
C.E., IT .G.S.

Knollys, W. W.,
Maj.93rdHighlrs.

Colomb, J. C. R.,
Captain Royal

Marine Artillery

Bucknill, J. T.,
Lieut. R.E.

RedmanfJ.BaIdry.

Walker, Arthur,
Capt.

Jones, E.M., Major
20th Regiment

IXewdigate, E.,C6L

Nicolson, SirFred.
W.E.,Bart.,C.B.,
Vice- Admiral

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut. -Col.

8hortlandf P. F.,
Capt. R.N.

Rankine,Professor
W. J. Macquorn

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

XT 65 806

XT 65 705

xm 53 12S

xi 44 260

Year.

St1}**

xm 53 37

xt 654 860
xix S3 ffi9

xi 45 375

xvi 68 527

xx 88 719
xvi 11 77 290

xx 86 346

xtiii 76 2

xi 44 218

187ft

1871

1869

1867

1873
1869

1871
1875

1867

1872

1876
1874

1876
1874
1867

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lbctubb ob. Pafbb.

Namb ob Authob.

Vol., No., and

Page
of Journal.

Economy of Fuel in Ships of War, see
Fuel.

Education and Professional Instruction
of Officers

Education of Staff Officers. .

Education of the Army, with Bef erence to
Young Officers

Education, (Preliminary), of Naval
Officers

Education, the Higher, of ditto

Electbio - (Magneto) Light, with illus-
tration*

Elevating. Gun Platform, with illustration

End-on and Broadside, Combined System,
with plates

Engineering, Field, Illustrated by some
of the Operations of the German
Engineers during the War of 1870-71,
with maps

Engines, Simple and Compound, the
Comparative Merits of, with plates

England, Observation on the Defence of . .

The Government Breech-Loading

Rifles of, and of France and Prussia,
with plate

Tulloch, Alexan-
der B., Captain
69th Regiment

Jones, Alfred S.,
Major, 9.C

Middleton, F. D.,
Lt.-Col.

VoL Ho. P.

xvn 75 759

xiv 59 271

xv 65 686

Goodenough,J.G., xv 64 338
Capt. R.N.

the Boyal Navy of

The Maritime Defence of, inclu-
ding Offensive and Defensive War-
fare:— Part I. The Organization of
our Maritime Forces. Part II. Our
Ships of War, their Armament, Ac.,
with plates

English and Foreign Maps, and their Use
for Military Purposes

Ryder, A.P.,Rear-
Admiral

Abney,W. deW.,
Capt.R.E.

Stone,C. P., Lieut.
77th Regiment

Symonds, T. E.,
Capt. R.N.

Schaw, H., Lt.-
Col. R.E.

Rennie, G. B.,
M.I.C.E.

Soady, F.J., Lieut. -
Colonel R.A.

Drake, Mervin,
Capt. R.E.

Anonymous

Scott, R. A. E.,
Capt. R.N.

xv 65 734
xx 86 332

xiii 53 84

xi 46 485

XTOI 76 18

1873

1870
1871
1871
1871
1876
1869
1867
1874

xix 80 199

xiy 61 570

1875

1870

xt 64 438 1871

Wilson, C. W.,
Capt. R.E.

86 419

87 447

xvi 67 245

1876
1876

187S

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lbcttjek ob Papee.

Entrenching Tools, New Arrangement
for, with a Method of Converting the
Regulation Bell Tent into a Shelter
Tent, with illustrations

Essay (The Institution's Military Prize,
1875). — Universal Conscription, the
onlj Answer to the Recruiting
Question

— (The Naval Prize, 1876) .—The Best
Types of War Vessels for the British
Navy, with plates

■ (The R.A. Institution Prize of
1874). — The Constitution and Duties
of the Artillery of the Advanced
Guard of an Army in the Field

Euphrates Valley Boute to India, in
connection with the Central Asian
Question, with map

Europe, The Armed Strength of . •

Exercises, Gymnastic, The Military and
Naval Force derivable from the Intro-
duction of Military Drill, as part of a
National System of Education, into all
Elementary Schools

Expedition, Ashanti, of 1873

Name of Author.

The Bed River, with maps . •

James, Wm., late
4£ndHighlanders

Hime, H. W. L.,
Capt. B.A.

Noel, G. N. TJ.,
Comr. B.N.

Pratt, S.C., Lieut.
B.A.

Andrew, W. P. . .

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut.2SrdRoyal
Welsh Fusiliers

Chadwick, Edwin,
OB.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
XTI 67 183

Wood,Evelyn,Ool.
.C, C.B., 90th

xix 80 92

86 253

xviii 79 489

XVII 73 472

S3 549

xiv 59 287

Year.

1872

1875

1876

1874

Extracts from the four last Chapters of
Admiral Jurien de la Graviere's Work

Explosive Agents applicable to Naval and
Military Purposes as Substitutes for
Gunpowder

Bullets and their, Application to

Military Purposes, with plate

ExPioarvEfl, Fog Signalling by, with plates

Begt.

Huyshe, G. L.,
Capt. Rifle Brig.

Byder, A.P., Bear-
Admiral

Abel, F.A.,F.R.S.

Fosbery, G. V.,
Major, V«C*»
H. M. Bengal
Staff Corps

Mnitland, E.,
B.A.

xviii 78 331

xv 62 70

xvn 72 250
xvi 68 457

xii 48 16

1873

1875

1870

XXX 8a 481

1874
1871

1873

16'/ 2

1868

1876

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op LscTrBB or Papeb.

Explosive Force of Gunpowder, The
Determination of, with plates

Experiments at Shoeburyness during the
yvx 1868-69, Summary of

• • • •

EYE-Training, Target for

Field Artillery on the Connected System,
with plate

Engineering, see Engineering.
Railways, see Railways.

Filter, Description of a New

Fibivg, Accurate, of Naval Ordnance by
means of the Vessel's Motion, with
plates

— at Armour • Glads reduced to a
System, with plate and illustration

Fleet-Etoltttions and Naval Tactics
Fleet- Manceu veins, with plates . .

Name of Authob.

Morgan, J. P.,
Capt. 1LA.

Mackie, Samuel .J.

Foore, F.H., Capt.
E.M.A.

Ross,W.H., Major
B.A.

Fleets, Fog-Signals in

• • • •

— The Attack and Defence of, Part I.,
with plates

Ditto ditto

with illustrations

Floating Forts, see Defence*.

Fog-Signals, Coast

Part II.,

Lord,W.B.(h.p.),
E.A.

Bessemer, H.

Orde-Browne, C,
Capt. late R.A.

Bridge, Cyprian
A.Gh,Comr.jR.N.

Pellew, Pownoll
W., Comr. R.N.

Brent, H. W.,
Comr. B.N.

Colomb, P. H.,
Capt. B.N.

Vol, No., and

Pag*

of Journal.

VoL No. P.
XT 64 812

55 *»
72 909

1871

1869

1875

ni 48 93

>»

in 51 568
xvn 75 888

xvi 69 684

xvn 72 227

xi 47 527

xv 63 136

xr 64 405

xti 66 1

1868

187S

• • • •

— .-- — for Vessels under Weigh, with
tihtstrations

— Some Account of the Obser-
vation* recently made by the Cor-
poration of the Trinity House on,ioi*A
plates

Beaclev, Alex. . .

Bichartls, J. C,
StaffCommander
B.N.

ColliiMOTi ,Sfcr Rich.
K.C.B., Vice-
Admiral.

xti 69 645
xix 82 491

xix 82 465

1872
1873
1867
1871
1871
1872

1S72
1ST*

INDKX OK fUBJJtCTfl.

SUBJECT OF LbCTUBB OB PaPEB.

Foo-SimrAiLT5G by Explores, see Ex-
plosives.

Foboxs, our Military, The Constitution of,
and the Conditions of Military Serrice

— — War, The Distribution of our, with

Nucs or Author .

FoBHicnr Armies, The Practical Instruction
of Staff Officers in, with map

— and English Maps, and their Use
for Military Purposes

Fobms for Registering the angles of rolling,
kc.y see Registering.

Fobttfioatiokb on the Russian-German
frontier

Fbancb and Prussia in 1870, The Military
Systems of

Robertson, A.
Cunningham, Col.

Colomb, J. C. R.,
Captain Royal
Marine Artillery

Burnaby, P. a.,
Capt. Roy .Horse
Guard*

Wilson, C. W.,
Oapt.R.B.

Vol, No., and)

Page Year,
of Journal.

ManteuffeTs Campaign in the

East of, with map

— the Nortt of, a Visit to some of
the Battle Fields and Ambulances of

— Prussia, and England, The
Gorerniticnt .Breech-Loading Rifles of,
with plate

Anonymous

Braekenbury, C.
B., Capt. R.A.

Gun, H. A., Capt.
R.E.

Mouat, F. J., Sur-
geon-Maj., M.D.

VoL No. P.

XIII 56 477
XIII 53 37

xti 68 683

xyi 67 245

87 509

XT 63 232

xm 72 268

XT 64 459

Drake, Merrin, | xt 64 438
Capt. H.E.

State Nary of

French and Montigny Mitrailleurs : —
Machine Guns ; the Gatling Battery,
the Agar and Claxton Guns, with
plates

Army, The Constitution, Com-

position and Recruiting of
— Infantry Tactics, New

Anonymous
Gatling, R. J.

— International Exhibition of 1867,
The Naral Department of

— Rifle, New, with plate

Fuel. Economy of, is Ships of War, with
illustrations

Balfour, G., Maj.-
Gen. C.B., R.A

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Maj. R.E.

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. R.N.

Liresay, R. A. E.,
Capt. R.E.

Prideaux,T.Symes,
C.E.

1869
1869

1872

86 419
xrr 60 504

xi 47 569

xx 87 578

xii 48 54

xx 86 400

xti 68 315
B 2

1876
1871
1873
1871
1871

1870
1870

1867
1876
1868
1876
1872

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lbctfbb ob Pafeb.

Name of Authob.

Vol., No., and

Page

of JournaL

Year.

Fuel, The Economy of, comprising
Mineral Oils

Game of Naval Tactics, see Naval Tactics.

Gatling Gun ; its place in Tactics, with
illustrations

Geneva Convention of 1864, in Relation
to Aid afforded by Volunteer Societies
to Sick and Wounded Soldiers during
the late Franco-Prussian War, &c.

The Convention of, and National

Societies for Aid to Sick and Wounded
Soldiers in War

Geography, Military, of Central Asia,
with maps .

Germany, Improvements in Tactics in, see
Tactics.

German Railway Regiment

Army in Peace and War, the Me-

Rankine,Profes8or
W. J. Macquorn

Vol. No. P.
XI 44 218

1867

dical Department of the

Gilmobb's Safety Lamps for Mines and
Ships, with illustrations •

Gold Coast of Africa, the best Mode of
Defence of the Protected Territories
on the, end the Organization of a
Force sufficient for that Purpose, with
map

Great Guns (Naval), and Gunnery, with
illustrations

Guns, the Revolving System of

Firing, with plates

Griffiths, Bow and Stern*Screw Steam-
Ship, see Bow and Stern- Scretc, Sfc.

Gun-Carriage, Innes's Self-Acting, with
Elevating Mantlet, with illustrations

— Muzzle-Pivoting ; Lever, Fulcrum,
and Incline Plane Principle, with aims'
tr at ions

Rogers, £., Capt.

Longmore,T..C.B.,
M.D.

Furley, John

Baker, Valentine,
Col. late 10th
Hussars

Rawson, H.E., Lt.
R.E.

Fox, T. W., Sur-
geon-Gen., R.E.

Gilmore, A. H.,
Comr. R.N.

Lauderdale, Adm.
the Earl of,
G.C.B.

Russell, John Scott

8harpe, Benjamin,
Comr. R.N.

Innee,A]ex.,Major
Aberdeen Artil-
lery Volunteers

Heathorne, T. B.
Capt. (h.p.) R.A.

xix 82 419

xti 67 206

1875

1S72

xx 88 632

1876

xtiii 79 453

xx 88 738

87 560

xnr 59 394

xvii 74 676

1S74

xix 82 446

XIII 56 460

xix 82 524 187i

1S76

1ST*>

157S

1S75

1S6.»

xu 49 169

1S6«

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lbctubb or Pafbb.

Guhcottoh, applied to Demolitions, with
plates

Gun, Description of Mont Storm's Breech-
loading 9-pounder Field or Pinnace,
with illustrations

Field, for India, with plates

first 35-ton, Powder Pressures in

the, with plates

Light, Short, throwing a Heavy,

Sharp - Edged, Disooidially - Formed
Projectile, with plate

— Heavy Breech-Loading, of Novel
Construction, a Proposal for, with
plates

Platform, Elevating, illustrated

The Mackay, and Projectiles, with

plate

— The Macomber, with plate . .

Gunpowdeb, Explosive Agents applicable
to Naval and Military Purposes as
Substitutes for

Schultze's Granulated- wood

The Determination of the Ex-
plosive Force of, with plates

Grxa, Breech-Loading and Muzzle-Loading
for, with illustrations

Namb op Author.

Field, Notes on

Heavy, Rifling for, with illustrations

— Heavy, the Working of, and Pro-
jectiles, with plates

— Heavy, Working, on the Broadside,
with some observations on the Ail-
Round Fire, combined with the Broad-
side System of Armament, with plate

Fisher, A. a'Qpurt,
Col., C.B.,R.E.

Phelps, Charles . .

Maxwell, H. H.,
Col. R.A.

Dawson, Wm.f
Comr. R.N.

Hutchinson,W.N.,
Lt.-Gen.

Morgan ,J.P.,Capt.
R.A.

Stone, C.P., Lieut.
77th Regt.

Mackay, James ..

Macomber, D. O.,
C.E.

Abel, F. A., F.R.S.

Dougall, James D.

Morgan, J. P.,
Capt. R.A.

Morgan, J.P..Maj.
R.A.

James, W. H., Lt.
RE.

Morgan, J. P.,
Capt. R.A.

Cunningham, H.D.
P., Major 3rd
Hants Artillery
Volunteers

Wilson, Edmund,
Capt. R.N.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
XIT 60 419

X1T 59 374

xit 58 179

XTII 70 1

xi 43 40

xit 60 479

im 53 84

xii 50 359

xix 81 268,
xvi 68 457

in 48 127
xt 64 312

xtiii 78 408

xx 87 584

xtii 74 648

xit 57 108

xiii 53 110

Year.

1870
1870

1870
1873
1867

1870

1869

1868

1875
1872

1868
1871

1874

1876

1873

1870

1869

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lecttjbb or Pafxb.

Guiffl, Naval, tcith plate

Heavy, On Mounting and Working

at Sea, with plates

— Machine — the Gatling Battery, the
Agar and Claxton Guns, the French
and Montigny Mitrailleurs, with illus-
tration

The Working of Heavy Broadside. .

Gymnastic Exercises and Military Drill,
The Military and Naval Force derivable
from the Introduction of, as part of a
National System of Education into all
Elementary Schools

Hammock, Naval, its Buoyancy and Use
in Saving Life at Sea in Cases of
Collision, &c.

Hjlnottsb, The Last Campaign of, with
maps

Humous Defence

NAICX 07 AUTHOS.

Dawson, Wm.,
Comr. B.N.

Gatling, B. J.

Drew, Andrew A.
W.

Chadwick, Edwin,
C.B.

Habboub of Sevastopol; Ship Raising,
especially with reference to his Ex-
perience in Raising the Russian Ships
sunk in the, with plates

Habboubs, Military or Strategic, and
Ref lge

— Military, The Strategical
Importance of the, in the British
Channel, as connected with Defensive
and Offensive Operations, with maps
and plate

Hilm Indicator, for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea, with illustrations

Byder, A.P.,Rear-
Admiral

Brackenbury, H.,
Capt. B.A.

Moncrieff , Alexan-
der, Major

Gowen, John E.,
Colonel United
States Army

Coode, Sir John,

Jxt., V.E.

Collinson, T. B.,
Maj.-Gen. B.E.

Vol., No., and

Piage

of JouraaL

VoL No. P.
XTi 68*43

xn 86 401

xiv 6o 504

XI 43 €7
59 28*

Goode, Samuel . .
Bead,GeoTge,R.2f.

xv 62 111

xiv 58
xjx: Si

xiii 55

357

348

XIX 81 334

inn 77 227

xix 83
xn 48

533
141

Tear.

1872

1870

1867

1870

1S71

1ST"
1873
lrfi»

1S75

1S74

187."»
18*

IXMKX OF SUBJSCXfc

SUBJIOT OF LkYOBB OB PAP**.

NicholTs Patent
Day and Night, for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, with plate

Hz&AT to Khiva, Journeys from, with wop

Hell* 8 Boat Lowering and Self-Detaching
Apparatus, with plate

Hindustan and Central Asia, the Steppes
of ; The Communications, Commercial
and Military, between, with map

History, Military, The Study of, by the
Regimental Officers of the Army, with
mape

Historical Records of the 1st Regiment
of Militia, or 3rd West York Light In-
fantry— (Notice of Book)

Histoby, Naval, The Scientific Study of . .

Holland, The Military Resources of

Homiss'b Storm and Signal Lights, illus-
trated

Honduras, Extracts from a Report on
Orange Walk, New River, as a
Military Position for the Protection
of British Interests in, with Notes and
Experiences on Outpost Duty in the
Bosh

Hospital Ship, H. M. S. "Victor Ema-
nuel" as an, during the late Ashantee
Campaign, with plate

Ships, Ventilation of, with plates .

— Barracks, Camps and Shipping, Ac.,
Suggested Improvements m Sanitary
Arrangements of

H0B8I8 for Military Purposes, Tho
Breeding of

Nam* of Author.

Read,George,R-N.

Goldsmid, Sir Fre-
derick J., Major-
General, C.B.,
jl.CS.I.

Hill, E. J.

Adair, R. A.Shaf to,
Col.

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Maj. R.E.

Raikes, G. A.,Capt.
3rd W. Y. L. I.

Laugh ton, J. K.,
R.JN.

Vincent, C. E. H.
Lieut.-Col. Cen-
tral LondonRifle
Rangers

Holmes, Natha-
niel

Bale, Lieut. 1st
W. I. Regt.

Ryder, A.P., Vice-
Admiral

Macdonald, J. D.,
M.D., Staff-Sur-
geon R.N.

Synge, Millington,
Maj.-Gen. K.E.

Hosier, H. M.,
Capt.

Vol., No,, and

Page

of JournaL

Vol. No. P.
xti 69 749

xix 80

xvi 69 762

XI 45 3C2

xx 87 608

xx 88 761

xtiii 79 508

xx 87 575

xti 66 24

xvii 75 806

xtiii 78 383

xviii 76 136

xviii 78 288

xvi 69 735

Year.

1872

1875

1372

1867

1876

1874

1876

1872

1873

1874

1872

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lbotttbb oe Papbb.

Hotspttb-Glatton ExperimentB, Lessons
from the, with plates

Discussion

Htoienb, Military

India, Certain Boads between Turkestan
and, independent of the Oxus or of
any Oxus Boundary, with map

On Military Transport and Supply

Name op Author.

Vol., ~No., an

of Journal.

Barnaby, Natha-
niel, Chief Naval

»>

i»

De Chaumont, F.,
M.D., Army Me-
dical School,Net-
ley

— The Euphrates Valley Boute to,
in connection with the Central Asian
Question, with map

The Field Gun for, with plates . .

The North- West Frontier of, with

map

The Military Advantages of a Daily

Mail Boute to, through Turkey and
the Persian Gulf, with map

Indian Forces, The Sikh and European
Soldiers of our

Inpanthy Forces and Infantry Beserves,
Our, and Army Organization

Oar, Is a Radical Change in

the Tactical formation of, Beally
Necessary?

Tactics

Tactics, The New French . .

nglbfibld's New Hydraulic Steering
Apparatus, as being fitted to H.M.S.
"Achillea," with plate

Goldsmid, Sir Fre-
deric J., Colonel,
C.B., £. C.S.I.

Collen, E. H. H.,
Lieut. B.A.

Andrew, W. P.

Maxwell, H. H.,
Col. B.A.

Campbell, George,
Bengal Civil Ser-
vice

Clarke, Hyde

Eyre, Vincent,
Maj. -Gen., C.B.,
B.A.

Leahy, Arthur,
Maj. B.E.

Thesiecr, Hon.
Frederic, Col.,
C.B.

Williams, W. J.,
Col. B.A.

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Maj. B.E.

Ingle'
Ca

Vol. Na P.
xvn 72 2941 1872

1872
1870

„ 315

XI T

59 336

xvin 79 469 1874

xvi 68 477

xvn 73 472

v 179

xiii 54 217

1872

1875

1870

1869

in 49 181 1868

xi 43 66 J 1867

XII 503IO
xyii 73 411

xvi 69 768
xx 87 578
Till 53 22

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

SUBJECT OF IjEOTUBB OB PAPBB.

Innbb's Self-Acting Gun-Carnage, with
Elevating Mantelet, with illustrations

Instruction, Scientific, in the Navy

Instrumbhtb, Improved, for Military
Sketching, illustrated

Insufficient Stability of H.M.'s late
Turret Ship " Captain " and of other
Ironclads, on the Causes of, with plates

Intelligence Duties of the Staff, Abroad
and at Home

Invading Force Landing on the East
Coast, The Protection of London
against an, with map

In tab ion, Our Naval and Military Es-
tablishments regarded with reference
to the Dangers of

NAMB 07 AUTHOB.

■ The Strategy of, as exemplified
in the American and Austro-Prussian
Wars, and in the War of Metz, with
Remarks on Centres of Defence and
the Training of National Forces

Iboncladb, Circular, with plates . • • .

Present and Future, with plate

Ibonclad Ships of War, New Form of,
with illustration

Ibon Ships and Iron Beams, Ac., of
Wooden Vessels, the Demagnetization
of, to prevent the Deviation of the
Compasses, experimentally shown by
means of a Model, with plates

Ships, The Present State of our

Knowledge regarding the Magnetism
of, with plates

The Application of, to Fortifications,

with plates
Italia* Army, The, with illustration

Innes^AIex., Major
Aberdeen Artil-
lery Volunteers

Laughton, J. K.,
B.N.

Hutchinson, A.H.,
Maj. B.A.

Fishbourne, E.
Gardiner, Bear-
Admiral, C.B.

Brackenbury,C.B.,
Maj. B.A.

Tulloch, Alexan-
der B.,Capt.69th
Begt.

Harcourt, Vernon,
Esq., Q.C., M.P.

Adair, B. A.
Shafto, Col.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
XIX 82 524

xix 81 217

xtii 70 65

xt 62 1

xix 81 242
xi v 59 358

iti 68 575

xyi 67 153

Year.

Beed, E. J., C.B.,
M.P.

Hen wood, Charles
F.

Wheatlev, John,
Capt. K.N.

Hopkins, Evan

Evans, F. J., Staff
Capt B.N.

Jervois, CoL, C.B.,
B.E.

Waveney, Col.
Lord

xx 85 85

xiv 58 148

xt 64 476

xi 44 260

xti 66 78

xii 52 548

86 359

1875

1875
1873
1871

1875
1870

1872

1876
1870
1871
1867

1872

1868

1876

IMDSX OF BCBJMTS.

Subject of Lsctubs oe Pap:

NaXJ OF AtTTHOl

VoL, No., and
of Journal.

Jahresbebichtb uber die Veriladerragen
und Fortschritte im Militairwesen—
(Notice of Book)

£afis Wan, British Troops and Savage
Warfare, with special refereooa to,
with map

Shit A, Journeys from Herat to, with map

Anonymous

VoL Mo. P.

87 590

1875

The late Russian Campaign against,

with map

Knapsack, White's Porte*, with illustration
K&niggbatz, The Battle of, with maps . .

Labour, Military

Lamps, Safety, Gilmore's, for Mines and
Ships, with illustration

LAVD-Transport Service of the Army,
Suggestions for

La uk oh of H.M.S. "Northumberland,"
with plates

Law, Military

Lxittadbn fur den Unterricht in der
Dienatkenn tineas auf den Kdmgtichen
Kriegsschulen— (Notice of Book)

Li Mans, The Winter Campaign of, with
maps

~rFE-BTOY8, Improved, and a System of
Deck-Bafts for Saving Life at Sea,
illustrated

Gawler, Col., late
73rd Begt.

Goldsmid, Sir Fre-
derick J., Majox-
General, C.B.,
K.C.S.L

Trench, F. Chene-
vix, Capt. 20th
Hubs.

White, Wm.

Walker, Beau-
champ, CoL,C.-B.,
Military Attache,
Berlin

Webber, C. E.,
Capt. B.£.

Gilmore, A. H.,
Comr. B.N.

Beazley, G. G.,
Capt. 83rd Begt.

Hay,SirJno.C.D.,
Bart.,C.B.,M.P.

Blake, G. Frederic,
Capt. B.M.

Schnackenburg,
Capt.

Brackenbiiry,C.B.,
Capt. B.A.

Hamilton, Mark,
M.D., Surgeon
B.N.

xvii 75 922

xix 80

187S

1875

XYiii 77 212

xn 69 747

xii 51 440

1874

182
186S

xiy 57 73
xit 59 394
xiii 56 564

1830
1870
I860

xni 56 435

ISO

xi 47 506

1867

xx 88 761

1876

XT 64 583

xtu 74 725

1871
1893

IHOKK 09 SUBJECTS*

Subject as Lsctvbx ob Paf:

Njlmx or Afthob.

Vol., No., and
of Journal.

Tear.

Litc-Savhw Apparatus, Rogers's, wift

Bed or Mattrass

Light Infantry, Movements, &c, of

Vessels, &c., apparatus for . .

Lighting of H.M. Ships, with plate

Lights, Improved Binnacle, The Earl of
Caithness's Gravitating Compass, and
Nunn's, with plate

Rogers, J. B.

Smith, Henry . .

Bell, T. Lynden,
Major 1st Batt.
6thRegt.

Bead, George, E.N.

Colomb, P. H.,
Capt. B.N.

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. R.N.

■ Signal, of Captains Colomb and

Bolton, with plate

— Storm and Signal, Holmes's,
illustrated

LlSSA, Lessons from, with plate

London, The Protection of, against an
Invading Force Landing on the East
Coast, with map

Lowebing and Raising, Engaging and
Disengaging Ships' Boats, on Improve-
ments in Apparatus for, with plate

and Sustaining Ship'* Quarter-

Boats, Plan of, with plate*
— Boats at Sea, with plate

Lumxky'b Patent Rudder, with plates

Lushaie Expeditionary Force, 1871-72, An
Account of the Proceedings of the
Chittagang Column of, with map

Machine Guns: — the Gatling Battery,
the Agar and Claxton Guns, the French
and Montign? Mitrailleurs, illustrated

Mackat Gun and Projectiles, with plate ..

Maooxbbb Gun, with plate

Holmes,Nathani*l,

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. R.N.

TuIloch,Alexander
B., Captain 69th
Regt.

Folkard, A.

Simpson, C. H.,
Capt. R.N.

Laoon,W. Stirling

Lumley, Henry . .

East, C. J., Brevet-
Maj. 41st Regt.

Vol. No. P.
xiv 57 28

xni 54 216
xit 61 581

xn 48 144
xvi 68 437

xii 49 272

xii 50 373

xvi 66 24

xi 43 104

XIV 59 358

xviii 77 278

xi 47 519

xni 71 97

xiv 57 70

xni 71 113

1870

1869
1870

1808
1872

1868

1872

1867

1870

1874

1867

1873
1870
1873

Gatling, R. J.

xiv 60 504

1870

Macomber, D. O.

xii 50 359
xix 81 268

1868

1875

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lbcttjbb oe Papeb.

Name of Author.

Vol., No.,
Page

of Journal.

Magnetism of Iron Ships, the Present
State of our Knowledge regarding the,
with plate

Magneto - Elbctbio light, with illus-
trations

Manceuvbes, Autumn, Abroad and at
Home, 1869-70

Autumn, of England

Evans, F. J., Staff
Capt. K.N.

Abney, W. de W.,
Capt. E.E.

Codrington, Sir
William J., Gen.

Brackenbury,CB.,
Capt. B.A.

of 1872

i»

Peace, Artillery Fire in, illustrated

Peace, the Theory and Practice of,

with their Relation to Seal Warfare,
with maps

• The Autumn, of the Prussian

Guard Corps in September, 1872, with
maps

Mance'b Heliograph, or Sun Telegraph . .

Manning the Nary

Mantlet, Moveable Steel, for the Pro-
tection of Artillery and Troops, with
plate

Elevating, with Innes's Self -Acting

Chin-Carriage, illustrated

Maktbxttfel'b Campaign in the East of
France, with map

Maps, English and Foreign, and their Use
for Military Purposes

Notes on (Lecture to Officers of

Carmichael, L. M.,
Capt. 5th Eoyal
Irish Lancers

Chesney, C. C,
Lt.-Col. B.E.

Hildyard, H., Lt.
72nd Highlan-
ders

Goode, Samuel . .

Beddie, James

Eddy, Charles B.

Innes,Alex.,Major
Aberdeen Artil-
lery Volunteers

Gun, H. A., Capt.
E.E.

Wilson, C. W.,
Capt. B.E.

»»

Volunteers)

Mabchbs

• • • •

Maeinb and Army Night Telegraph, The
Spakowsky

* abikbb, The Royal, are they a Necessary
Auxiliary to the Royal Navy ?

Colley,G.P.,Maj.
2nd Queen's, Ac.

Doty, H. H., Capt.

SohombergjMajor-
General, C.B.,
B.M.A.

Vol. No. P.
xtt 66 78 1872

86 332 1876

xvi 68 497

xyi 67 222

1872

xvii 71 73 1873

xtiii 78 449

xyi 68 550

xvi 69 781

xix 83 533

xi 45 279

xin 55 326

1874

1872

XIX 82 524

xvii 72 268

xvi 67 245

'?£">

xvii 70 47

xi 47 658

xv 64 486

1872

1875
1867
1969

1875

1873

1873
1873

1867

1871

INDEX OF 8UBJECTS.

Subject 07 Lbctubb ob Papkh.

Mabitcmr Defence
Defence.

of England, see

Right*

NaMB 07 AUTHOB.

No., Vol., and

Page

of Journal.

Mabtini-Hekbt Rifle, Proposed Alter-
ations in, illustrated

Rifle, uith plates

Medical Department of the German Army
in Peace and War

Memory, a New Method of Improving the,
and Facilitating the Acquirement of
Knowledge

Mercantile Marine, The, considered as
an Auxiliary to the Royal Navy

Merchant Service, Is Our, any Longer a
Feeder to the Royal Navy ?

Meta-Cbntre, Ship's, Practical Method of
Finding, at great Angles of Incli-
nation, illustrated

Meteorology, The Sea Temperature and
Currents of the 10° square of the
Atlantic which lies between the Equa-
tor and 10° N., and from 2tT to
80° W., with plates

Militia and Volunteer* — the recent War,
with reference to (Lecture to Officers
of Volunteers)

Military Law, see Law.

Military and Naval Establishments, Our,
regarded with reference to the Dangers
of Invasion

and Naval Force, The, derivable

from the Introduction of Military Drill
and Gymnastic Exercises, as part of a
National System of Education into all
Elementary Schools

— Forces, the Constitution of Our,
and the Conditions of Military Service

Ross of Bladens-
berg, John,Cold-
stream Guards

Thayer,L.O.,M.D.

Majendie, V. D.,
Capt. R JL

Fox, T. W., Sur-
geon-Gen. RE.

Pick, Dr. E. • .

Brassey, Thos.,
M.P.

Wilson, J.C.,Capt.
R.N.

Blom, T.A., Chief
Constructor,Nor-
wegian Navy

Toynbee,H.,Capt.

Home, R.} Capt.
R.E.

Harcourt, Vernon,
Esq., Q.C., M.P.

Chadwick, Edwin,
C.B.

Robertson, A.
Cunningham,Col.

VoL No. P.

87 423

xix 83 654

nil 55 360

XX 87 560

xi 43 78

xx 87 493

xx 85 61

xvii 73 423

xtii 72 331

Year.

srV

xvi 68 575

xiv 59 287

xin 56 477

1876

1875
1869
1876
1867

1876
1876
1873

1873

1872

1870

1869

HTDBX OF SUBJBCTS.

Subject op Lktdii OS Papsb.

Militaey Forces, Organization of, see
Organization.

Telegraph j and Signalling, see Tele-

graphy.
— Hygiene

Labour

• • • •

— Maxims Suggested or Exemplified
by the last Autumn Manoeuvres of
Continental Armies, with plans

Model Apparatus

Organization, General Principles

Resources of Holland

— General School, a Proposition
for one, for the Army

— Science, The Study of, in time
of Peace

— Training, a Means of Adminis-
trative Power and of Political Use-
fulness

ITtlf £ OP AUTHOB

YoL, No.,
of

Vol. Ko. P.

Transport

Mines and Ships, Gilmore's Safety Lamps
for, illustrated

Mitrailleubs, a Memorandum on

and their Place in the Wars of

the Future! with plates

-, the Employment o£ during the

Recent, War and their Employment
in Future Wars, with plate

De Chaumont, F.,
M.D.

Webber,C.E.,Capt.
E.E.

Shute, C.Cameron,
Col., C.B.

Clarke, E. Pod-
more, Oapt.

Colomb, J. C. R.,
Capt. Royal Mar.
Artillery

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut.-Col. Cen-
tral LondonRifle
Rangers

Collinson, T. Ber-
nard, Col. R.E.

Chesney, C.C., LL-
Col. R.E.

Goldsmid,Sir Fre-
derick. J., Major-
General, O.B.,
K.C.o.1.

Wingfleld,F.,Dep.
Assistant Com-
missary-General

Gihnore, A. H.,
Comr. R.N.

Shute, C.Cameron,
Col., OB.

Fletcher, H. C,
Lt.-ColonelScot«
Fusilier Guards

xit 59 3361 1870

xiv 57 73
xir 58 206

xix 84 758

64 888

87 575

1870
1879

1873
1871

1876

xin 54 241 IS®
xt 63 254j 1871
xx 87 5341 1S76

xiii 54 263

xit 59 394
xti 66 63
XIII 56 539

18®

1370
1872
1869

XTI 66 28

1872

rJTDBX OF SUBJECTS.

SUBJBCT OF LbCTVSI OB PAFKB.

Mowoeibpp System of Mounting Ordnance,
Further Observations on, with plate

System of Mounting Ordnance,

Nam of Authotl

Observations on the, with plates

Mokobtbff*b Protected Barbette System,
Further Particulars Begarding, with
plate

Mohobibff System, The Progress that has
been made in the Application of, to
Garrison, Siege, and Naval Ordnance,
and to Coast Works, with plate*

Mokt Stobjc's Breech-Loading 9-pounder
Field or Pinnace Gun, Description of,
with illustrations

Mounted Riflemen (Lecture to Officers of
Volunteers)

Musketby Practice, Annual, Proposed
Alterations in, so as to bring it into
accordance with the Infantry Tactics
of the Bay, with illustrations

Muzzlk-Pivotino Gun-Carriages ; Lever,
Fulcrum, and Incline-Piano Principle,
with plate

Muzzle-Loading and Breech-Loading for
Guns, with illustrations

MOBcneff, Alexan*
der, Maj.

English, T., Lieut
RE.

Jaonornff, A., Gap*
tain, Edinburgh
Artillery Militia

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Year.

Natiottax Forces, The Strategy of Inva-
sion, as exemplified in the American
and Austro-Prussian Wars and in the
War of Metz, with Remarks on Centres
of Defence and the Training of

Nautical Surveying, Practical, with plates

Natal and Military Establishments (Our),
regarded with reference to the Dangers
of Invasion

— and Military Faroe, The, derivable
from the Introduction of Military
Brill and Gymnastic Exercises, as part
of a Hational System of Education
into all Elementary Schools

Phelps, Charles . .

Wood, Evelyn, Lt.-
Col., fB.C, 90th
L.L

Vol. No. r.

^^i 74 59*

xvu 74 668

XI 44 241

xrv 59 396

17
xiv 59 8,

1878
1873
If
1867

^}p«

Brooke, Chas. E., xix 8o 22
Cap*. 15th Eegt.

Heathorae, T. B.,

Capt. (h.p.) B.A.

Morgan, J.P.,Mai.
E.A.

Adair,R.A.Shafto,
Col.

HuU, T. A., Staff
Comr. E.N.

Harcourt, Vernon,
Esq., Q.C., M.P.

Chad wick,
C.B.

xu 49 169

xviii 78 408

1875

1873
1876

1868

1874

xyi 67 153

in 69 701
xn 68 675

xiv 59 287

1872

1870

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lectttbb oe Papke.

Natal Steam Transport Fleet, see Steam
Transport.

Department of the French Inter-

national Exhibition of 1867

— Great Guns and Gunnery , illus-
trated

— Guns, with plates

by History, The Scientific Study of
Con

-^Officers, Our, and the Public Ser-

Naxe op Author.

ices : Proposed Employment of Her
Majesty's Ships and Naval Officers in
connection with the Mail and Troop
Services combined

, the Higher Education of,

see Education.

— Officers, The Preliminary Educa-
tion of

— Ordnance, On the Accurate Firing
of, bv means of the Vessel's Motion,
with plates

Organization, General Principles of

Power, The True Economies of

England's
— Reserves

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. B.N.

Russell, John Scott

Dawson, Wm.,
Comr. B.N.

Laughton, J. K.,
R.N.

Clanchy, H. T.,
Lieut. R.N.

Vol., No., and

Page
of Journal.

Vol. No. P.

XII 4& 54

xix 2 446

xvi 68 343

xyhi 79 508

XY 65 824

1868

1875

1873

1874

1871

Goodenough, Jas.
G., Capt. R.N.

Bessemer, H.

Colomb, J. C. R.,
Capt. Royal Ma-
rine Artillery

Selwyn,J.H.,Oapt.
R.N.

Brassey, Thos.,
M.P.

the

Reserve, Royal, Three Years with

- Matters, Notes on . .

- Tactics, Ancient, with plates

— Tactics, see also Fleet Evolutions.

— Tactics, A New System of, with
plate

— Tactics, (Same of, with plates

XT 64 338

xvii 75 888

xv 64 269

1871
1879

1871

xv 63 157 1871

xvii 73 501

Brent, H. W., xvni 78 858
Comr. R.N.

Anonymous

Warre, the Rev.
Edmond, M.A.

Bower, Graham,
Lieut. R.N. ,

Castle, W. M. F.,
Lieut, R.N.

86 413 1876

1873

1874

88 593

1876

82 502

xvn 75 786

1875

1873

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lbotttbb oh Papeb.

Natal Tactics, with plate

Name of Aitthob.

Navy, H.M., The Preservation of Biscuit
and other Farinaceous Articles of Diet
in, from Weevil, Maggots, and other
Insects, with illustrations

Manning the

— Royal, Reserves of Officers and
Seamen, see Reserves.

— Scientific Instruction in the

— The American, its Organization,
Ships, Armament, and Recent Ex-
periences, with plates

The Royal, Are the Royal Marines

Inglefleld, E. A.,
Capt. R.N.

Seccombe, E.

Reddie, James . .

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
xii 51 483

XIX 83 681

xi 45 279

a Necessary Auxiliary to P

The Royal, Is our Merchant Service

any Longer a Feeder to P

The Royal, The Mercantile Marine

considered as an Auxiliary to

Night Telegraph, The Spakowsly, Marine
and Army

Nicholl and Read's Patent Day and
Night Helm-Signals for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, with plats

Nolan's Range Finder and Ranges,
illustrated

Nobthuxbbbland," The Launch of
H.M.S., with plates

Notes on Naval Matters, see Naval
Matters.

Laughton, J. £.,
R.N.

Hamilton, J. Ran-
dolph

Schomberg, Major-
Gen. C.B., R.M. A.

Wilson, J.C.,Capt.
R.N.

Brassey, Thos.,
M.P.

Doty, H.H., Capt.

ReadlGeorge,R.N.

Nolan, Jno. Philip,
Capt. R.A.

Hay,8irJohnC.D.,
Bart., C.B.,M.P.

xix 81 217

xii 49 243 1868

Year.

186S
1875

1867

1875

XT 64 486

xx 85 61

xx 87 493

xi 47 658

xri 69 749

xiv 57 1
xiii 56 435

1871
187G
187C
1867
1872

1870

1869

Ocean Currents

Currents and their Influences, with

map

Officbbs, Regimental, the Appointment
and Promotion of

Laughton, J. E.,
R.N.

Findlay, A. G-.

Robertson, A. Cun-
ningham, Col.

xv 65 663

XIV 58 133

xii 49 192

1871

1870

18G8

INDEX OF 8UBJECTS.

Vol., No, and]

Page Tear.
of Journal.

Subject op Lectubb ob Papeb.

Name op Author

Precision, Arms o£ How far the Employ-
ment of Cavalry is Affected by Recent
Improvements in

— — — — — — The Amount of

Advantage which they give to the
Defence over the Attack

Pbiihtivb Warfare, see Warfare.

Promotion, The Austrian Confidential
Report, and New Method of

Projectiles, Chilled White Iron, and the
Conversion and Rifling of Cast-Iron
Ordnance, with plates

Smith,MichaelW.,
Maj.-Gen., C.B.

Schaw, H., Capt.
R.E.

Vol. No. P.
xii 49 147

xiv 59 377

186S

1870

— et la Loi des Erreurs, Sur la
Dispersion Naturelle des — (Notice of
Book)

— — Working Heavy Guns and, with
plates

Pbojectile, The Best Form of Cartridges
for Breech-Loading Small Arms, with
plate

Propeller, a Cylindrical, Working on a
Vertical Shaft in the Midship Section
of a Ship, illustrated

— Screw, Further Experiments with
his Bow and Stern, with plate

of H.M.S. "Bruiser," On the

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut.23rd Royal
Welsh Fusiliers

Palliser, William,
Major late 18th
Hussars

Van Meyden,
Aloys., Capt.
d'Artillerie,Lau-
sanne

Cunningham,H.D.
P., Major 3rd
Hants Artillery
Volunteers

0'Hea,J.B.,Capt.
late 25th Regt.

Skinner, Major-
General, C.B.

Griffiths, R., C.E.

xvi 66 151

IS**

XI 44 149

88 762

1867

137*

xiv 57 108

1870

Casing of the, with plate

Propelling Steam Ships, best Method of

Propeller, The Hydraulic," as a Motive
Power for Ships, illustrated

The Turbine, with plate

*»

Propellers, Proposed New Combination
of, for Ships of War

Propulsion, a New Mode of Marine, with
plate

Screw, a New Adaptation of, with

plate

Elliot, G., Vice-
Admiral

Murray ,And.,C.B.

Quick, Geo., Engi-
neer R.N.

Simpson, C. H.,
Capt R.N.

Paynter,J.Aylmer,
Rear-Admiral

xn 48 105

xiv 58 174

xvni 77 157
xx 86 171

xx 88 684

xi 47 589

xv 65 643
86 157

186S

1ST*'

xi 47 646

1874
187*

1S76
1867

1871
137*

1967

xvra 79 527J 187*

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lbotubjb ob Papbb.

Nab« or Authob.

Vol., No., and

Page
of Journal.

Year.

Prussian Drill, 1876

Army, System of Officering,

A Brief Sketch of

Drill-Book, Changes in, eee Drill.

Pbubua, The Government Breech-Loading
Rifles of, and of France and England,
with plate

The Military Systems of, and of

France in 1870

Newdigate, £.,Col.

Vincent, C. E. H.f
Lieut. 23rd Royal
Welsh Fusiliers

Drake, Mervin,
Gapt. R.E.

Brackenbury,G.B.,
Capt. R.A.

Vol. No. P.
88 719

xyi 69 796

1876
1872

XT 64 438

63 232

187/

1871

Railways, On the Organisation of the
Communications of an Army including,
illustrated

Field, and their General Appli-

cation in War, with plates
Railway Regiment, The German' • • •

Rakgi-Iwdioatob, Campbell's, with plate
Ranges and Nolan's Range Finder

Read and Nicholl's Patent Day and Night
Helm-Signals, for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, with plate

Recoil Utilised, with plate • . ..

Records, Historical, of the First Regiment
of Militia, or 3rd W. Y. L. Infantry—
(Notice of Book)

RsoBUimro, Constitution and Composition
of the French Army

for the Army, The Best Mode

of, and the Influences bearing upon
that Service

Question, The, from a Military

and a Medical point of View

Home, Lieut.-CoL
R.E., C.B.

Luard, C.E., Capt.
R.E.

Rawson, H. E.,Lt
R.E.

Campbell, J. R.,
Capt. HantsMili-
tia Artillery

Nolan,JbhnPhilip,
Capt. R.A.

Read,George,R.N.

Hutchinson, W.N.
lit. -Gen.

Raikes, G. A*,Gapt.
3rd W. Y. L. I.
Militia

Balfour, G., Maj.-
Gen., C.B., R.A*

Noake,R.C.,Oapt.
Adjutant Scot-
tish Borderers
Militia

Adams, A. Leith,
M.D.,8urg.-Maj.

82 881

xvii 74 693
xx 88 738
xyi 67 309

xnr 57 1
xyi 69 749

xni S3 75
xx 88 761

xi 47 669
xi 43 27

1875

1873
1876
1872

1870
1872

1869
1876

1867
1867

xvm 76 55

187

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject ov Lectttbb ob Papeb.

Nam ov Adthob.

7^~

Hime, H. W. L.,
Capt. R.A.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Tear.

Bbqbuitiko Question, Universal Conscrip-
tion, the Only Answer to. — (The Insti-
tution's Military Price Essay, 1875)

Vol. No. P.
xix 8o 92

1875

Discussion on

if »>

146

t»

— System, The Establishment of
County Military Training Schools;
a Suggestion for Improving the

Bed River Expedition, with maps . .

Reforms in Army Administration . .

Regimental Officers, The Appointment
and Promotion of

Thomas, W. Cave,
late Captainl9th
Middlesex Rifle
Volunteers

Huyshe, G. L.,
Capt. Rifle Bri-
gade

De Fonblanque, E.
B.,Dep.C.-G.

Robertson, A.
Cunningham, Col.
8thRegt.

Xin 54 148

1889

xv 62 70

xin 53 88
xn 40/ 192

— — of the British Army, the Cultrra*
tion of Scientific Knowledge by, see
Army.

Registering the Andes of Rolling and
Heeling, for the Information of the
Construction Department of the
Admiralty, Forms for, illustrated

Reserve Forces, Our, with map . .

— On the Best Practicable Method
for Ensuring Efficiency in the Army,
and for Obtaining an Effective and
Reliable, having regard to the Existing
Feeling in the Country on the Subject

Our First

Ryder, A.P.,Bear-
Admiral

Malet, Lieut.-Col.
Gren. Guards

Warde,SirEdward
C, K.C.B., Maj.-
Gen. RA.

Fox, L. Loftus
B., Capt. Royal
Longford

Reserves, Infantry, Army Organisation,
our Infantry Forces and

Naval, see Naval Reserves.

— of Officers and Seamen for the Gardner, G. H.,
Royal Navy, The Formation of, and Capt. R»N.
the Evils and Inadequacy of Impress*
ment to provide the same

Retmat of the Ten Thousand ; a Military
Study for all time, with map

Leahy, Arthur,
Maj. R.E.

XT 62 58

1871

1869
1868

1871

xin 54 160

xix 80 128

Vaoghan, J. L., |xTin 76 90
C.B., Bun.-GeEL

xni 53 i;

xn 5a 310

xr 65 601

1869

1875

1869

1868

1871

1874

IK1>EX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lectori oe Papbb.

Name op Attthob.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Year.

Ripxed Ordnance, Heavy, The Construction
of, with plate

Riples and Rifling, with plate* . «

Breech-Loading, The Government

of France, Prussia, and England, with
plate

Rifling, and Conversion of Cast-Iron
Ordnance, and on Chilled White Iron
Projectiles, with plates

for Heavy Guns, with illustration* . .

Riflemen, Mounted, see Mounted Riflemen.

Rogers's Life-Saving Apparatus, with
plate

Rolling of a Ship in a Sea-way and the
Contemporaneous Wave Slopes, Appa-
ratus for Automatically Recording,
with plates

Royal Navy ; Is our Merchant Service
any Longer a Feeder to the ?

Naval Reserve, Three Tears with . .

Rudder, Jury, Explanation of a, invented
by him, with plate

The Fish-Tail, for all Classes of

Vessels, with plate

Rule of the Road at Sea, or the
Steering and Sailing Rules, with plate

Russian Army

- Army, Recent Reforms in .

Campaign, the late, against Khiva,

with map

Palliser, Major
William, late
18th Hussars

0,Hea,J.B.,Capt.
late 25th Regt.

Drake, Mervin,
Capt. R.E.

Palliser, Maj. Wil-
liam

Morgan, J. P.,
Capt. R.A.

Rogers, J. B. . .

Froude, William,
M.A., F.R.S.

Wilson, J.C,Capt.
R.N.

Brent,H.W.,Comr.
R.N.

Commerell, Sir J.
E.,v**X», xL.CB.,
Capt. R.N.

Croft, J.M*Grigor,
M.D.

Lacon, W.Stirling

Vincent, C. E. H.,
Lieut.2SrdRoyal
Welsh Fusiliers

Clarke, F. C. H.,
Capt. &A.

Trench, F. Chene-
vix, Capt. 20th
How.

Vol. No. P.
xii 50 378

1868

xvn 72 356 1873

IV 64 438

xi 44 149

xvn 74 648

xiv 57 28

xvn 75 858 1873

1871

1867

1873

1870

xx 85 61

xvin 78 358

xrx 84 956

XIV 57 40
XVI 67 262
xvi 67 286

86 373

xvni 77 212

1876

1874

1875

1870

1872

1876

1874

INDEX OF SUBJECTS,

Subject of Lecttjbe ob Papbb.

Nahb of Authob.

VoL, No., and

Page

of Journal.

Russian Bamming Diagrams, Presented to
the Royal United Service Institution,
A Statement to Accompany, with plate

Ships sunk in the Harbour of

Sevastopol, Ship Raising, especially
with Reference to his Experience in
Raising, with plates

Russia, The Strategy of, in Central Asia,
from a Persian Point of View, with
map

Rusbo-Tubkish Campaigns of 1828-29 in
Europe and Asia, A Sketch of, with
maps

Sanitaby Arrangements of Hospitals,
Barracks, Camps, and Shipping, &c.,
Suggested Improvements in

— » Precautions for Troops, see

Troops,

Savage Warfare, Experience in, with mop

see Warfare% and Kafir,

Scientific Questions, State, see State.

School for the Army, see General Military
School,

Schools, the Establishment of County
Military Training ; a Suggestion for
Improving the Recruiting S# Anm

Leitpadbw fur den Unterricht n.

der Dienstkenntniss auf den Koniff-
lichen Eriegsschulen — (Notice of Book)

Scbbw-Ship Steerage, means of, vid a
Description of the Hydrostatic k'*«"»r-
ing Gear fitted on board H.iu. fl
"Achilles/' with the Results of Ex-
periments at Sea; also a Plan of
Apparatus fitted on board the Turkish
Ironclad " Fethi-Bulend," with plates

— Line of Battle Ships, the Conver-
sion of our, into Armoured Turret
Ships with plates

Ryder, A.P., Vice-
Admiral

Gowen, John E.,
Colonel United
States Army

Smith, R. Mur-
doch, Capt. RJ5.

Wilbraham, Sir
Richard, Lieut -
Gen., K.C.B.

Synge, Millington,
Maj.-Gen. R.E.

Vol. No. P.
xvin 79 535

xm 55 348

xyii 71 212

88 692

xvra 78 299

Baker, Sir Samuel
White, Kt.

xyii 75 904

Thomas, W. Cave,
late Captain 19th
Middlesex Rifle
Volunteers

Schnackenburg and
Bartels

Inglefield, E. A.,
Rear-Admiral

xiii 54 142

761

xir 57 52

Henwood,Chas.F.

XIII

131

1874

1869

187*

1876

1874

1873

1869

1876

1870

1869

INDEX OK SUBJECTS.

SUBJBCT 07 LbCTUBB OB PAPBB.

Scbbw Propulsion, a New Adaptation of,
with plates

Sbaxbv of the Country, How Beet to
Improve and keep them up

of the Fleet; their Training, and

how the Employment of marines
Afloat in Peace lime affects them

Sbctiok Skirmishing, and Bide and Tie
Patrolling

Shbltbb Tent, a Method of Converting
the Regulation Bell Tent into a, with
a New Arrangement for entrenching
Tools, with illustrations

plate

Tent, Suggestions for a, with

Trenches or Temporary Cover for

Troops in Position, with plates

Ships of War, (Modern) as Illustrated
by the Models in the Institution, with
plates

of War, Circular, with Immersed

Motive Power, with plates

of War, a new form of Ironclad,

with illustration

Economy of Fuel in, see Fuel.

Armour-plated, Description of a

Model of, as designed by him, with
illustration

SHIF-Raising, especially with Reference to
his Experience in Raising the Russian
Ships sunk in the Harbour of Sevasto-
pol, with plates

Ships, Ventilation of, especially of Low
Freeboard and Hospital Ships, with
plates

Lighting of H.M's., see Lighting .

Shoebubxjibss, Summary of the Experi-
ments at, during the year 1868-69

Naxb of Attxhob.

VoL, No., and

Page

of Journal.

Paynter, J. Ayl-
xner, Rear-Ad-
miral

Bbassbt, Thos.,
MP.

Wilson, J. C,
Capt. R.N.

Jones, Lieut.-Col.,
tf.C

James, Wm., late
42nd High-
landers

Tulloch,Alexander
B., Captain 69th
B«gt.

Graham, Gerald,
Col., v«'*> C.B.,
RE.

Barnaby , Nathaniel

Elder, John

Wheatley, John,
Capt. R.N.

Wilson, Edmund,
Capt. R.N.

Gowen, John E.,
Colonel United
States Army

Macdonald, J. D.,
M.D., R.N.

Mackie,8amuelJ.,
Assoc. Inst. C.E. |

Vol. No. P.
xvni 79 527

85 110

xix 83 604

xvi 66 127

xyi 67 183

xvii 70 63

XIV 60 448

xn 66 68

xii 52 529

xt 64 476

xn 51 502

xin 55 348

inn 76 136

xin 55 301

1874

1876
1875

1872
1872

1873

1870

1872

1868

1871

1868

1869

1874

1868

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Sttbjbot of Lbcttjeb OB Papbb.

Shot Plug, Expanding ; Expanding Sponge
for Artillery Practice and Anti-Tor-
pedo Vessel, with plates

SchUltzb's Granulated- wood Gunpowder. .

Sick and Wounded in War, aid to the

aid to, Ac. Ac.

Societies for

and Wounded Soldiers during the

late Franco-Prussian War, Ac., the
Geneva Convention of 1864, in Re-
lation to Aid afforded by Volunteer
Societies to

Siege of Paris, Personal Experiences and
Reminiscences of the, with plate, <$fc.

Sights of Ordnance, Note on Aligning the,
when laying for an Object, with illus-
tration

Sigfjxmng, Military, and Telegraphy,
with plates

Signals, Fog, in Fleets, with illustrations

■ Some Account of the Obser-

vations recently made by the Corpora-
tion of the Trinity House on, with
plates

Signal Lights of Captains Colomb and
Bolton, with plates

Si eh and European Soldiers of our Indian
Forces

Sketching, Military Improved Instru-
ments for, with illustrations

Skibmishikg Line, Proposed Method of
Attack in

Small Arms, the progress of Breech-
Loading, with plates

Arms, Military Breech-Loading,
with plates

Name of Authos.

Gilmore, A. H.,
Lieut. R.N.

DougaH, James D.

Loyd-Lindsay, R.
J., Lieut.-Col.,
fp.C, M.P.

Fnrley, John

Longmore, T.,
C.B., M J):

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Wyatt, Surgeon-
Major, Cold-
stream Guards

Grenfell, H. H.,
Lieut. R.N.

Stotherd, R» H.
Capt. R.E.

Brent, H. W.,
Comr. R.N.

Collinson, Sir
Richard, K.C.B.,
Vice- Admiral

Colomb, P. H.,
Comr. B.N.

Eyre, Vincent,
Mai. -Gen. C.B.,
R.A.

Hutchinson, A.
H., Maj. KA.

Parker, F. 0. S.,
Capt. 54th Regt.

Latham, John . .

Majendie, V. D.,
Capt. R.A.

Vol. No. p.
xin 53 30

in 48 127
xv 64 381

88 632

xvi 67 206

xni 71 167

xvn 74 746

xiv 59 312

xv 63 136

xrx 82 465

1869

1868
1871

1876
1872

XII 50 373
XI 43 86

xvn 70 66
xvn 74 741

1873

18tt

1870
1871
1875

1868
1867

1873
1873

xix 83 631 1875

xi 44 100 I 1867

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject op Lbctubb ob Papeb.

Soldiers' Unemployed Time, Utilisation of

SdBBVSBv's Norwegian Self- Acting Cook-
ing Apparatus, with illustration

Spakowsky Marine and Army Night-
Telegraph

Spaicish Armada, A Warning Voice from

Ships, Beyolted in 1873. British

Interference with

Stability, Insufficient, On the Causes of
of H.M.'s late Turret Ship "Captain"
and of other Ironclads, with plates

Stavf, The Intelligence Duties of the,
Abroad and at Home

— The Connection between the Ordi-
nary Work of, in Peace-time and War-
like Efficiency (Lecture to Officers of
Volunteers)

Officers in Foreign Armies, The

Practical Instruction of, with map

Officers, the Education of . .

State Scientific Questions, Permanent
Commission on, see Commission.

Steam Steering Screw, Bremner's, with
illustration

Steax-Tbaxsfobt Fleet (Naval), Neces-
sity for an increase in

Stbenbtbdp'b Conical Screw and Breech-
Loading Cannon, with plats

Stbbbibo Apparatus, Inglefield's New
Hydraulic, as being fitted to H.BLS.
« Achilles," with plate

Stbbx and Bow-Screw S
plates

ipa, with

and Bow, Screw Propeller, Further

Experiments with his, with plate

Nay b op Atttrob.

VoL, No., and

Page

of Journal.

Tear

Sloane, Captain,
Sherwood Fo-
resters Militia

VoL No. P.
XII 48 1

1868

SOrensen, John . .

in 49 292

1868

Doty, H.H., Capt.

zi 47 658

1876

Collinson, T. B.,
Maj.-Gen. B.E.

xix 81 286

1875

Dyer, Hugh Mf-
Neil, Capt. B.N.

XYin 77 283

1874

Fishbourne, E.
'Gardiner, Bear-
Admiral, C.B.

XT 62 1

1871

Brackenbury, C.B.,
Maj. B.A.

xrx 81 242

1875

Maurice, J. F.,
Lieut. B.A.

S^}p.80

1873

Burnaby, F. G\,
Capt. Boy. Horse
Guards

xrt 68 633

1872

Jones, Alfred S.,
Maj. 0.C«

XTT 59 271

1870

Bremner, Geo.,
Capt.

xm 70 69

1873

Hoseason, J. C,
Capt. B. N.

xit 61 530

1870

Jensen, Peter . .

xir 57 124

1870

Inglefleld, E. A.,
Capt. B.N.

•

xirr 53 22

1869

Griffiths, B., C.E.

mi 74 734

1873

if >»

xmi 77 157

1874

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lecture ob Paphb.

Stobk and Signal Lights, Holmes's with
illustration

Stobjcs in the British Islands, and Tele-
graphic Weather Intelligence, with
plate

Stbatigy of Russia in Central Asia, from
a Persian Point of View, see Russia.

— — - of Invasion, as exemplified in
the American and Austro-Prussian
Wars and in the War of Metz, with
Bemarks on Centres of Defence and
the Training of National Forces

Stuabt's Breech-Loading Cannon, with
plate

Study, Scientific, of Naval History

SUBMABDfi Warfare, Defensive, with pla tes.

Supply in India, see Transport.
SuBYEYnro, Practical Nautical, with plates

An Occasional Note on the Use

of the Aneroid Barometer in
Swibb Military System

Tactics, Naval, a New System of, with
plate, tifc.

of the Three Arms, as Modified

to Meet the Requirements of the
Present Day, with plate

Name op Authob.

Holmes, Nathaniel

Scott, Robert H.

Adair,R.A.Shafto,
Col.

Stuart, Graham,
Capt. 4th W. Y.
ArtiL Volunteers

Laughton, J. K.,
B.N.

Stotherd, R. H.
Maj. RJS.

Hull, T. A., Staff
Comr. R.N.

Pawcett, R. H.
Capt. 33rd Regt.

Martini and Hotze

Changes of, consequent on the

Improvement of Weapons, Ac.
— Naval, with plates

Naval, Meet Evolutions

« •

Bower, Graham,
Lieut. R.N.

Bracltenbury, H.,
Capt. R.A.

Middle ton, F.,Lt.-
Col.

Inglefield, £. A.,
Capt. R. N.

Bridge, Cyprian
A- G., Comr.
R.N.

VoL, No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
xvi 66 24

xni 54 287

zyi 67 153

xiv 57 19

xviii 79 606

XT 65 705

xn 69 701

xn 66 143

xv 64 606

xix 82 602

xvu 74 618

xn 51 483

xvu 227

1872

1869

1878

1870

1874

1871

1872

1871

1875
1873

1873
1868
1873

INDEX OF SUBJECTS*

Subject of Lbotubs or Papbb.

NAME 07 AUTHOB,

Tactics, Military, and Fonnation in (Ger-
many, A Review of the Improve-
ments in, during the last year (1873),
being a precis of an Article from the
" MiUtate Wochenblatt "

Infantry of the Day, Proposed

Alterations in the Annual Musketry
Practice, so as to bring it into accord-
ance with the, with illustration*

Naval, The Game of, with plates

The New French Infantry

Ouray, H.A., CoL,
C.B.

— The Gatling Gun ; its Place in,
faith illustrations

Infantry

• •

Ancient Naval, see Ancient Naval

Tactics.
Tactical Examples

— Formation of our Infantry ; Is a
Radical Change in, Really Necessary ?

Power of Modern Field Artillery . .

Tabobt for Eye-Training, with illustration

Telegraph Gables, The Atlantic, of 1857-
68, also those of 1865-66

Tzuoraphy and Signalling, Military, with
plates

Tbht, Suggestions for a Shelter, see Shelter
Tent.

Bell, A Method of Converting the

Regulation into a Shelter Tent, with
a New Arrangement for Entrenching
Tools, with illustration

Brooke, Chas. K.,
Capt. 16th Regt.

Castle, W. M. F.,
Lieut. R. N.

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Maj. R.E.

Rogers, E., Capt.

Williams, W. J.,
CoL R.A.

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P.
XVIII 78 441

XIX 80 22

xvn 75 786
87 678
82 419

XY169768

Year.

1874

1875

1873
1876
1876
1872

Ten Thousand, The Retreat of the; a
Military Study for all time, with map

Helvig, Hugo . .

Thesiger, Hon.
Frederic, Col.,
C.B.

Brackenbury, CJJ.
Lieut.-Col. R.A.

Poore, F.H. Capt.
R.M.A.

Moriarty, H. A.,
Staff - Comr.,
R.N., C.B.

Stotherd, R. H.,
Capt* R .E.

James, Win., late
42nd Highlanders

Yaughan, J. L.,
C J., Maj.-Gen.

86 389

xrn 73 411

86 310

xvn 73 309

xi 44 127

xrr 59 312

xvi 67 183

xvm 76 99

1876
1873

1876
1873
1867

1870

1872

1874

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Subject of Lboturb or Fates.

Nakb op Author.

Vol.) No., and

Page

of Journal.

Time, Unemployed, Utilization of the
Soldiers' ; A Proposed Scheme Inde-
pendent of Government Supply ; also
a Plan for Regimental Charities

Thrabymene, Note on the Battle of,
with plate

Torpedo Warfare, Offensive, with plates . .

Chinese, Description of a Model

Boats, "Fortune" and "Triana,"

United States Nary, Description of,
with plate

Tobpbdobs, Plan for Protecting Ships
(at anchor) Blockading a Port from
Attacks by Outrigger, Whitehead, or
Harvey, with plate

Training, Military, a Means of Adminis-
trative Power, and of Political Use-
fulness

Schools, Military, The Establish-

ment of County ; a Suggestion for Im-
proving the Recruiting System

Boys for Soldiers

Trinity House, Some Account of the
Observations recently made by the
Corporation of the, on Fog Signals,
with plate*

Transport Fleet, Naval, The Necessity
for an Increase in our, for Military
Purposes, with map

Military, and Supply in India

Dfilitary

Troops in Tropical Regions, Ac., Sanitary
Precautions to be observed in the Mov-
ing and Camping of

'urbinb Propeller, with plate

Sloane, {W^in,
Sherwood Fores-
ters Militia

Napier, the late Sir
Chas. J., GXLB.,
IA.-Gten.

Dawson, Win,,
Comr. B.N.

Beal, Bev. S.,
B.N.

Bucknill, J. T.,
Lieut. B. E.

Lindsay, Charles,
Lieut. B.N.

Goldsmid, Sir
Frederic J.,
Major - General,
CB>, xL.U.S.I.

Thomas, W. Cave,
late Captain 19th
Middlesex

Magregor, John

CoUinaon, Sir
Richard, K.C.B.,
Vice-Admiral

Hoseason, J. C,
Capt. B.N.

Collen, E. H. H.,
Lieut. B.A.

Wingfield, F.,
Dep. Asst C.-G.

Maclean, W. C,
M.D., C.B., Sur-
geon-General

Murray, [Andrew,
C.B.

Vol. No. P.
XII 48 1

1868

xvin 78 439

xr 62 86

xt 75 728

xni 73 289

82 528

87 524

1874

1871

1873

1875

1876

xxii 54 148

xix 82 3 9
xix 82 465

xit 61 530

xtt 68 477

xin 54 263

xvni 76 114

XT 65 643

1869

1875
1875

1870

1872

1869

1874

1871

nrosx or sobjkjtb.

Subject of Lbctttei ob Papxx.

Nams ov Author.

Tubkbstan and India, Certain "Roods
between, independent of the Oxus or
of any Oxus Boundary, with map

Tubkish Forces, The, and the Military
Aspects of the Eastern Question

Tubeit, The, verms the Broadside System,
with plate*

Ships, Armoured, The Conversion

of our Screw lane of Battle Ships
into, with plats*

Ukbiyla Campaign, The, with plats

Uksubybtzd World, The, in 1874, with
map

YuroouvxR'B Island and British Columbia,
Report of a Beoonnsissance of the
North-West Provinces and Indian
Territories of the Dominion of Canada,
and Narrative of a Journey across the
Continent through Canadian Territory
to

VuNTiXATioir of Ships, especially of Low
Freeboard and Hospital Ships, with
plates

Vibsaiixbs, The position and Lines of
Defence of the 5th Corps before,
during the Winter of 1870-71

" Viotob Emanuel," H. M. S., as an
Hospital Ship during the late
Ashantee Campaign, with plats

Volta Expedition, The, during the
Ashanti Campaign, with map

Voluxtibb8, The recent War, with
reference to (Special Lecture to Offi-
cers of Volunteers)

Goldsmid, Sir
Frederic J., Col.,
C*B., JL. C.S.I.

Vincent, 0. E. H.,
Lieut.-Col. Cen-
tral London Rifle
Bangers

Coles, Cowper, P.,
Capt. RN., OB.

Henwood, Chas.F.

Fosbery, G. V.,
Maj., u«&>H.M.
Bengal Staff
Corps

Hull, T. A., Staff -
Comr.

Robertson-Ros8,P.,
CoL

VoL, No., and

Page

of Journal.

Vol. No. P
XYIII 79 469

86 346

XI 46 434

xm 54 181

XI 47 548

xix 80 48

xrn 74 548

Macdonald, J. D.,
M.D., Staff-Sur-
geon B.N.

Walker, Beau-
champ, Major-
Gen., Military
Attachl, Berlin

Ryder, A, P.f
Vice- Admiral

Glover, Sir John
H., G.C.M.G.,
Capt. RN.

Home, R., Capt.
R.E., &c.

Year.

xvm 76 136

XT 65 806

xnn 78 383

xvui 78 317

V1}**

1874

1876

1867

1869

1867

1875

1873

1871

1874

1873

INDEX OF SUBJSCT8.

Subject of Lectubb or Papbb.

Wab VesBels for the British Navy, The
Best Types of.— (The Naval Prize
Essay, 18*76), with plates

Wab-Fobcbb, Distribution of, see Forces.

Wabfabb, Defensive Submarine, with
plate

Savage, Experience in, with map.

Name of Authob.

Noel, Gerald N.,
Comr. R.N.

— and British Troops, with

Special Reference to the Kaffir Wars,
with map

— Primitive, Section I., with plates.

— — — Section II. ; on the Resem-
blanoe of the Weapons of Early
Races, their Variations, Continuity, and
Development of Form, with plates

■ Section III. ; Metal Period, with
map and plate

Wabhtkg Voice from the Spanish Armada,
see also Spanish Armada.

Voice, Another, from 1805, with map

Wbatheb Intelligence and Storms in the
British Islands, Telegraphic, with plate

White's Porte-Knapsack, with illustration

Wrjn>8 of the North Atlantic, with plate*

Wobld, Unsurveyed, The, 1874, -with map

W3BTH, The Battle of, with maps
Wotoded in War, Aid to the Sick and

Stotherd, B. H.,
Maj. R.E.

Baker, Sir Samuel
White, Kt. ^

Gawler, Col., late
73rd Begt.

Fox, A. H. Lane,
Col. late Gre-
nadier Guards

Vol., No., and

Page

of Journal

Vol. No. P.
86 253

Collinson, T. B.
Maj.-Gen. B.E.

xv 65 705
xni 75 904
xtii 75 922

xi 47 612

xii 51 399

1876

xin 56 509
81 285

Scott, Robert H.

White, Wm., ..
Toynbee,H.,Capt.

xx 85 1

xm 54 287

xn 69 747
xv 64 567

1871
1873
1873
1867

1868

Hull, T. A., Staff- xix 80 48
Comr. B.N.

. Societies for aid to

in time of War, Assistance to she,

with illustrations

~Vbecxs, The Destruction of, under Water,

Collen, E. H. H.,
Lieut. B.A.

Loyd-Lindsay R.
J., Lieut.-Col.,
1B.C, M.P.

Furley, John

Moore, Sandford,
Surgeon, M.B.

Jekyll, Herbert,
Lieut. B.E.

xvii 73 426 1873

1869

1875

1876
1869

1872
1871

1875

XV 64 381

88 632
88 658

xm 55 395

1871

1876
1876

1869

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Abbl, F. A., F.R.S.

Abhbt, W. de W.,
Capt. R.E. (School
of Military Engi-
neering, Chatham)

Adaib, R. A. Shaf to,
Col.F.R.S.,A.D.C.
to the Queen

Subject or Lecture ob Paper.

Explosive Agents applicable to Naval
and Military Purposes as Substitutes
for Gunpowder

On Magneto-Electric Light

Vol. and

No. of

Journal.

Year.

xvi. 68

1872

xx. 86 1876

»!

Adams, A. Leith,
M.D., Surg.-Major
London Recruiting
District

Aikmax, F. R., Lt.-
Col., 9.G.

Andrew, W. P.,
F.R.G.S.

Abdagh, J. C, Capt.

A.E., F.R».\Jr.o.

Arthur, Capt., R.N.

The Communications, Commercial and
Military, between the Steppes of
Central Asia and Hindustan

The Strategy of Invasion, as exemplified
in the American and Austro-Prussian
Wars and in the War of Metz, with
Remarks on Centres of Defence and
the Training of National Forces

The Recruiting Question, from a Military
and a Medical point of View

Aiknian's Instruction-Rifle and Prac-
tice Tester for Ordnance

The Euphrates Valley Route to India,
in connection with the Central Asian
Question

The Comparative Cost of the Armies of
different Nations, and the Loss to a
Country by Conscription

Description of a Registering Compass • .

xi. 45

xti. 67

xtiii. 76 1874

1867

1872

xv 117

xtii 324

128

xit 267

1871

1873

1876

1870

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Baillib, J., Lt.-Col.
H.M. Bengal Staff
Corps

Bakeb, Valentine,
Col., late 10th
Hussars

Bakeb, Sir Samuel
White,Paeha,M.A.
F.R.S., F.R.G.S.

Bale, Lieut. 1st W.
I. Eegt.

Balfoub, G., Maj.-
Gen. R.A., C.B.

Barnaby, Nathaniel,
Assist . -Constructor
of the Navy

Babvaby, Nathaniel,
Chief Naval Con-
structor Admiralty

Babtbls, see Schnac-

KBKBUBG.

Beal, Rev. S., R.N.

Beazley, G. O., Capt.
83rd Regt.

Beazley, Alex.

Bell, T. Lynden,
Major 1st Batt. 6th
Begt.

BlSSEMEB, H.

• •

Bet ak-Edwabdb, G.,
Major U.K.

Subject of Lectubb ob Pafbb.

Photography applied to Military Science

Organization and Employment of Ca-
valry, with Discussion on ditto

The Military Geography of Central Asia
Experience in Savage Warfare

Extracts from a Report on Orange Walk,
New River, as a Military Position for
the Protection of British Interests in
Honduras, with Notes and Experiences
on Out-Post Duty in the Bush

The Constitution, Composition, and Re-
cruiting of the French Army

Modern Ships of War as Illustrated by
the Models in the Institution

Lessons from the Hotspur-Glatton Ex-
periments

Description of a Model of a Chinese
Torpedo

Suggestions for the Land Transport-
Service of the Army

Coast Fog-Signals

Movements, &c., of Light Infantry

On the Accurate Firing of Naval Ord-
nance by means of the Vessel's
Motion

An Organization for the Army of Eng-
land

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

xm. 56

xyii. 73

xvra. 79
xvii. 75

xvii. 75

xi. 47
xvx. 66

xm. 72

xv. 65

XIII.

1869

XVI.

1872

XIV.

1870

xvn.

1873

XII. 50

1869

1873

1874
1873

1873

1867

1872

1871

1868

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Namb ov Author.

Bigoe, T. S., Major
5th Fusiliers

Blake, G-. Frederic,
Captain B.M.

Bloh, T. A., Chief
Constructor, Nor-
wegian Nary

Bo wee, Graham,
Lieut. R.N.

Boyle, B. H., Com-
mander B.N.

Bbackbnbuby, H.,
Capt. B.A. (Pro-
fessor of Military
History, Royal Mi-
litary Academy,
Woolwich

SUBJECT OF LbCTUBB OB PAPBB.

Proposed Formation of a Battalion for

the Attack

Military Law

• •

Practical Method of Finding a Ship's
Metaoentre at great Angles of Incli-
nation

A New System of Naval Tactics

H.M. Ship Aginoonrt on and off the
Pearl Bock

The Last Campaign of Hanover. .

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Year.

»»

Bracken bury, C. B.,
Capt. B.A.

>»

i»

»»

*»

»>

Bbackbkbuby, C. B.,
Major R.A.

Bbackbkbuby, C. B.,
Lt .-Colonel R.A.,
A.A.G., O.O.G.I.

Brassby, Tho*., M.P.

>»

Bbemnxb, Geo., Capt.

Bbext, H. W., Com.
B.N.

The Tactics of the Three Arms, as Modi-
fled to Meet the Requirements of the
Present Day

The Military Systems of France and
Prussia in 1870

The Winter Campaign of Le Mans

The Autumn Manoeuvres of England . .

Autumn Manoeuvres of 1872

The Intelligence Duties of the Staff
Abroad and at Home

The Tactical Power of Modern Field
Artillery

Naral Reserves

How Best to Improve and Keep np the
Seamen of the Country

The Mercantile Marine considered as an
Auxiliary to the Boyal Navy

Bremner's Steam Steering Screw

Fog Signals in Fleets

xvra. 76

xi. 47

xyii. 73

xix. 82
xyi. 67
xiy. 58

xyii. 74

xy. 63

xy. 64

xix. 81

xvn. 73
xx. 85

xx. 87

xvn. 70
xy. 63

1874
1867
1873

1875
1872
1870

1873

1871

xvi. 67 1872
xyii. 71 1873

1875

1876

1873
1876

1876

1873
1871

INDEX OK AUTHORS.

Name op Author.

Brent, H. W., Com.
R.N.

Bridge, Cyprian A.
a., Corar. R.N.

Subject op Lecture ob Papeb.

»»

Brooke, Chas. K.,
Capt. 15th Regt.

Brownb, C. Orde-,
see Obdb-Brownb

Brownb, Edmond,
Capt. 21st Royal
N. B. Pus.

Bucxnill, J. T.,
Lieut. R.E.

»»

Burnaby, F.G., Capt.

Three Yean with the Royal Naval
Reserve

Fleet Evolutions and Naval Tactics

An Account of the Chinese Naval
Arsenal at Foo-chow, Translated and
Abridged from M. Giquel's Pamphlet

Proposed Alterations in the Annual
Musketry Practice, bo as to bring it
into accordance with the Infantry
Tactics of the Day

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Upper Burmah, its Defences and War-
like Resources

Propositions in connection with Diving
Apparatus

Description of the Torpedo Boats " For-
tune " and " Triana," United States
Navy

The Practical Instruction of Staff Officers

xttii. 78

xvn. 72

Roy. Horse Guards in Foreign Armies

Campbell, George,
Bengal Civil Service

Campbell, J. R.,
Capt. Hants Militia
Artillery

1874

1873

1876

1875

xv. 65a
xvii. 73

xvi. 68

1875

1871

1873

1872

The North-West Frontier of India

Campbell's Range-Indicator

Carmichael, L. M.,
Capt. 5th Royal I.
Lancers

Carpenter, William,
M.D.,LL.D.,F.R.S.

Castle, W. M. F.,
Lieut. R.N.

Erratum ditto ditto .. .. xvr. 68
Artillery Fire in Peace Manoeuvres . . xviii. 78

xm. 51
xvi. 67

The Voyage of H.M.S. Challonger

Ditto

ditto

continued

The Game of Naval Tactics

xvii. 75
XIX. 84

XVII.

1869

1872

1872
1874

1873

1875
1873

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Chadwtck, Edwin,
C.B.

Chaumont, see db

CflAUMOST

Chesnkt, C. C, Lt.-
Col. R.E.

Clancht, H.
Lieut. R.N.

T.,

Clabxb, Hyde

Clabke, E. Podmore,
Capt.

Clabxb, F. C. H.,
Captain B. A.,

D.1Q.M.G.

Codbikgton, SirWil
liamJ.,Gen.,G.C.B.

Coles, Capt. Cowper
P., C.B., R.N.

CoiXBX, . E. H. II.,

Lieut. R.A.

»»

Collby, G. P., Major
2nd Queen's, Pro-
fessor of Military
Administration ana
Law, Staff College,
Sandhurst

Collihsok, T. Ber-
nard, Col. B.E.

Colliksok, T. B.,
Maj.-Gen. R.E.

Subject op Lectubb ob Papbb.

The military and naval Force derivable
from the Introduction of Military
Drill and Gymnastic Exercises, as part
of a National System of Education
into all Elementary Schools

The Study of Military Science in time
of Peace

The Theory and Practice of Peace-
ManoBurres, with their Relation to
Real Warfare

Our Naval Officers and the Public Ser-
vices : Proposed Employment of Her
Majesty's Ships and Naval Officers in
connection with the Mail and Troop
Services combined

The Military Advantages of a Daily
Mail Route to India through Turkey
and the Persian G-ulf

Military Model Apparatus . . . .

Recent Reforms in the Russian Army . .

Autumn Manoeuvres Abroad and at
Home, 1869-70

The Turret verms the Broadside System

On Military Transport and Supply in
India

The Battle of Worth
Marches

A Proposition for one General Military
School for the Army

The Strategical Importance of the Mili-
tary Harbours in the British Channel
as connected with Defensive and Offen-
sive Operations

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

XIT. 69

xv. C3

XYi. 68

XT. 65

XII.

1868

XIX.

1875

XX.

1876

XVI.

1872

XI.

18C7

XVI.

1872

XVII.

1873

XVII.

1873

Xin. 54

XTm. 77

Year.

1870

1871

1872

1871

1869
1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name OF Attthob.

COLLIKBOH, T. B.,

Maj.-Gen. B.E.

Subject ov Lectubb ob Papbb.

*»

„ Sir Biohard,
Vice-Admiral, K.
C. B., (Elder Bro-
ther of the Trinity
House)

Colomb, P. H., Com-
mander E.N.

j»

Colomb, P. H., Capt.
B.N.

>»

Colomb, J. C. B.,
Capt. Royal Marine
Artillery

A Warning Voice from the Spaniih
Armada

Another Warning Voice from 1805

Some Account of the Observations
recently made by the Corporation of
the Trinity House on Fog Signals

Lessons from Lissa

The Naval Department of the French
International Exhibition of 1867

The Earl of Caithness's Gravitating
Compass, and Nunn's Improved Bin-
nacle Lights

Signal Lights of Captains Colomb and
Bolton

The Attack and Defence of Fleets, Pt. I.

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

ziz. 81

xx. 85

xix. 82

Ditto

ditto

Part II.

COMMBBBLL,Sir J. E.t
w*w«i IL.G.B.,

Capt. R.N.

Coode, Sir John, Kt,
C.E.

Cbopt, J. M'Grigor,
M.D., M.B.C.P.

Ceottdaci, W. S.,
Mercantile Marine

The Lighting of H.M. Ships

The Distribution of our War Forces

General Principles of Naval Organiza-
tion

Ditto

Military Organization

XI.

1867

XII.

1868

XII.

1868

XII.

1868

XV.

1871

XVI.

1872

XVL

1872

XIII.

1869

1875

1876
1875

Explanation of a Jury-Rudder invented
by him

On Military or Strategic and Befuge
Harbours

The Fish-Tail Rudder for all Classes of
Vessels

Groudace's New Book of Stellar Azimuth
Tables ; a Newly - Invented Illu-
minated Stellar Azimuth Compass;
and Croudace's Ordnance Night Sight-
Vane or Collimator

XT. 64

XT. 64
xix. 84

xix. 81
xiv. 57
xtiii. 77

1871

1871
1875

1875
1870
1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Nun OY Authob.

Subject o» Lbctube ob Pafbb.

Vol. & No.
of Journal

CUNNINGHAM, H. D.
P., Major 3rd Hants
Artillery Volunteers

Cunynghamb, Sir A.,
General, K.C.B.

Davidson, D., Lieut.-
Colonel

Davis, J. E., Capt.
B.N.

Dawson, Wm., Comr.

bjt.

Working Heavy Guns and Projectiles

The Eastern Caucasus and Daghestan . .

xiv. 57

xvu. 75

1870

1873

The Use of the Collimator for Laying
v Guns for Night Piling

Extracts from a Paper read at the
British Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, at Bradford, on the
Scientific Voyage of the " Challenger "

Offensive Torpedo Warfare

• ■ • •

!»

Naval Guns

• • • •

On Mounting and Working Heavy Guns

at Sea

Powder Pressures in the first 35-ton Gun

dk Chaumont, P.,
M.D., Army Medi-
cal School, Netley

DB FoNBLANQUB, E.

B., Deputy Com-
missary -General

Military Hygiene

Beforms in Army Administration

The Control Service, with Practical Sug-
gestions for its Improvement, Ac.

Dillon, Conrad A.,
Capt.

Dots, H. H., Capt.. •

Dougall, James D.

Dbakb, Mervin,Capt.
B.E.

Dbbw, Andrew A.W.,

SB- A,

Dtsb, Hugh M'NeU,
Capt. B.N.

The Chobhazn Bedstead

The Spakowsky
Night-Telegraph

and Army

Shultze's Granulated-wood Gunpowder

The Government Breech-Loading Bifles
of France, Prussia, and England

The Working of Heavy Broadside Guns

British Interference with Bevolted
Spanish Ships in 1873

xm. 55

xtii. 75

1SC9

1S73

XT. 62

1871

XVI.

1872

XVI.

1872

XVII.

1873

xrv.

1870

XIII.

1869

XVI.

1872

XVI.

1872

XI.

1867

in.

1868

XV.

1871

xi. 43

xvin. 77

1867

1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name op Authob.

East, C. J., Brevet-
Major 4l8t Begt.

Eckebblby, E., Chief
Engineer R.N.

Eddy, Charles B.,
M.A.

EDWABDS^ee Bevan-
Edwabds

Eldeb, John

Elliot, G., Vice-
Admiral

English, T., Lieut.
R.E.

Evans, F. J., Staff
Capt. B.N., F.B.S.

Eybe, Vincent, Maj.-
General, C.B., B.A.

Fawcbtt, B. H.,
Capt. 33rd Begt.

Findlay, A. G.,
F.B.G.S.

JFwhbottbne, E. Gar-
diner, Rear- Admi-
ral, C.B.

Fibhbb, Colonel A.
a'Court, C.B., B.E.

Fletcheb, H. C,
Lt.-Colonel Scots
FuBilier Guards

Folkabd,A., M.I.C.E

Subject op Lbctxtbe ob Fapbb.

An Account of the Proceedings of the
Chittagong Column of the Lushaie
Expeditionary Force 1871-72

Methods of Ascertaining the Relative
Value of Coals for Naval Purposes

Moveable Steel Mantlet for the Pro-
tection of Artillery and Troops

Circular Ships of War, with Immersed
Motive Power

The Hydraulic Propeller as a Motive
Power for Ships

Observations on the Moncrieff System of
Mounting Ordnance

The Present State of our Knowledge
regarding the Magnetism of Iron
Ships

The Sikh and European Soldiers of our
Indian Forces

An Occasional Note on the Use of the
Aneroid Barometer in Surveying

Ocean Currents and their Influences . .

On the Causes of the Insufflcent Stability
of H.M.'s late Turret Ship "Captain"
and of other Ironclads

Gun-Cotton applied to Demolitions

The Employment of Mitrailleurs during
the B-ecent War and their Employ-
ment in Future Wars

Improvements in Apparatus for Lower-
ing and Raising, Engaging and Dis-
engaging Ships' Boats

Vol. & No.
of Journal

xvn. 71

in. 84

xiii. 55

xii. 52

xx. 47

1867

xni. 74

187S

xyi. 66

1872

XI. 48

xyi. 66
xir. 68
XT. 62

XIV.

XVI.

60
66

xvxti. 77

1873

1875
1869

1868

1867

1872
1870
1871

1870
1872

1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

FOXBLAVQUB, B60 DB
FONBLANQUB

Fosbbbt, G.V., Maj.,
f3.€-, H.M. Bengal
Staff Corps

Fox, A. H. Lane,
Colonel late Grena-
dier Guards

Fox, L. Loftus B.,
Capt. Boyal Long-
ford Sides

Fox, T.W., Surgeon-
General R.E.

Fboudb, William,
M.A., F.B.S.

Fubxey, John

Gardnbb, G. H.,
Capt. K.N.

Gatlino, B. J.

Gawlbb, Col., late
73rd Begt.

GlLXOBB, A. H.,
Lieut. B.N.

Subject of Lbctubjs ob Papbb.

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Year.

The TJmbeyla Campaign . .

€•

Explosive Bullets and their Application
to Military Purposes

Mitrailleurs and their Place in the Wars
of the Future

Primitive Warfare, Section I

Section IT. ; on the
Besemhlance of the Weapons of Early
Baces, their Variations, Continuity,
and Development of Form

Period

Section III. ; Metal

Our First Reserve

The Medical Department of the German
Army in Peace and War

Apparatus for Automatically Recording
the Boiling of a Ship in a Sea-way and
the Contemporaneous Wave Slopes

The Convention of Geneva and National
Societies for Aid to Sick and Wounded
Soldiers in War

The Formation of Reserves of Officers
and Seamen for the Boyal Navy, and
the Evils and Inadequacy of Impress-
ment to provide the same

Machine Guns: — the Gatling Battery,
the Agar and Claxton Guns, the
French and Montigny Mitrailleurs

British Troops and Savage Warfare, with
Special Reference to the Kaffir Wars

Expanding Shot Plug ; Expanding
Sponge for Artillery Practice and
Anti-Torpedo Vessel

xi. 47

xii. 48

xiii. 56

xi.. 47

in. 61

xiii. 66

xiii. 68

xx. . 87

xni. 75

xt. 65

xit. 60

xvn. 75

xm. 68

1867

1868
1869
1867

1868

1869
1869

1876
1878

1876

1871

1870

1873
1869

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Nam op Author.

SUBJBOT 09 LflCTTOB OB PAPER.

VoL&No.
of Journal.

GlLMOBE, A. H.,

Commander R.N.

Glover, Sir John H.,
G.C.M.G., Capt.
R.N.

G0LD8MID, Sir Fre-
deric J., Colonel,
C.B., 1L.C.S.I.

Goldsmid, Sir Fre-
derick J., Major-
Gen., C.B.,K.C.S J.

»i

Goods, Samuel

Goodbnough, James
G., Capt. R.N.

Gowbx, John E.,
Col United States
Army

Graham, Gerald,
&.C,C.B.,Col.R.E.

Graham, Sir Lumley,
Bart., Col.

*»

GSBKTBLL, H. H.,

Lieut. B.N.
GRtFFITHS, B., C.E.

>»

»»

Gun, H. A., Captain
xt.lfi.

Gilmore's Safety Lamps for Mines and
Ships

The Volte ExpedtiandurugtheAahanti

Campaign

Certain Boads between Turkestan and
India, independent of the Oxus or of
any Oxus Boundary

Journeys from Herat to Khiva

Military Training, a Means of Adminis-
trative Power and of Political Use-
fulness

Mance's Heliograph, or Sun Telegraph. .

The Preliminary Education of Naval
Officers

Ship Raising, especially with Reference
to his Experience in Raising the Rus-
sian Ships sunk in the Harbour of
Sevastopol

Shelter Trenches or Temporary Cover
for Troops in Position

The Company as a Military Body ; its
Establishment, and the Best Number
of Companies in the Battalion

The Austrian Army in 1675

Note on Aligning the Sights of Ord-
nance when Laying for an Object

Bow and Stern Screw Steamships

Further Experiments with his Bow and
Stern Screw Propeller

On the Casing of the Propeller of H.M.S.
"Bruiser'^

On the Best Method of Propelling Steam
Ships, so as to give the Greatest
Facility for Manoeuvring in Action,
and for Avoiding Collisions at Sea

Manteuffel's Campaign in the East of
France

xiy. 59
A via, 78

xvin. 79

xix. 80

xix. 83
xv. 64

mi. 55

XIY.

1870

XIX.

1875

XX.

1876

xvn.

1873

xvn.

1873

XYIII.

1874

xx. 86

xvn. 72

1870
1874

1874

1875

1876

1875
1871

1869

1876

1873

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

Hale, Lonsdale A.,
Major R.E. (In-
Btructor in Military
History, Naval En-
gineer Establish-
ment, Chatham)

Subject of Lectubb or Paper.

The 8tudy of Military History by the
Begixnentt* Officers of the Army

Hamilton, J. Ran-
dolph (late C. S.
Nary)

Hamilton, Mark,
B.A., M.D., Sur-
geon B.N.

Haboottbt, Vernon,
Esq., Q.C., M.F.

Hat, Sir John 0. D.,
Bart., C.B., M.P.,
F.R.S.

Heathorne, T. B.,
Capt. (h.p.), BJL

Hblyio, Hugo

Hsxwood, Charles F.,
Naval Architect

Hildyard, H., Lieut.
72nd Highlanders

Hill, E. J. . •

Hike, H. W. L.f
Capt. B.A., F.S.S.
(B. A. Institution
Gold Medallist)

Holmes, Nathaniel,
Electrical Engineer

Home, B., Captain,
B.E.

„ Lieut.-CoL,

C. B., B. E.,

D.A.Q.M.G.

The New French Infantry Tactics

The American Navy; its Organization,
Ships, Armament, and Recent Ex-
periences

Improved Life-Buoys, and a System of
Deck-Rafts for Saving life at Sea

Our Naval and Military Establishments
regarded with reference to the Dan-
gers of Invasion

The Launch of H.M.8. "Northumber-
land "

Muzzle-Pivoting Gun-Carriages ; Lever,
Fulcrum, and Incline Plane Principle

Tactical Examples

The Conversion of our Screw Line of
Battle Ships into Armoured Turret
Ships

Ironclads, Present and Future

The Autumn Manoeuvres of the Prussian
Guard Corps in September, 1872

Hill's Boat Lowering and Self -Detach-
ing Apparatus

Universal Conscription the Only Answer
to the Recruiting Question. — (The
Institution's Military Prize Essay,
1875)

Holmes's Storm and Signal Lights

The recent War, with reference to the
Militia and Volunteers (Lecture to
Officers of Volunteers)

On the Organization of the Communica-
tions of an Army, including Railways

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

xx. 87
xii. 49

xvti. 74

xyi. 68
xiu. 66

Year.

in. 49

xvi. 66

Special No.

xix. 82

1876

XX.

1876

xm.

1869

XIY.

1870

XVI.

1872

XVI.

1872

XIX.

1875

1876
1868

1873

1872
1869

1868

1872
1873

1875

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Subject of Lbotubb ob Pafkb.

Vol.* No.
of Journal.

Yeto.

Hopkins, Evan, C.E.,
F.G.S.

The Demagnetization of Iron Ships and
of Iron Beams, &c., of Wooden vessels,
to Prevent the Deviation of the Com-
passes, Experimentally Shown by
means of a Model

XI. 44

1867

Hosbason, J. C, Capt.
B.N.

The Necessity for an Increase in our
Naval Steam Transport Fleet for
Military Purposes

XIY. 61

1870

Hotzb, Bee Mabtdti.

Howlbtt, Samuel B.
(late War Office)

Construction of Boots and Shoes Suit-
able for the Army, Police, and others
subject to Severe Walking

xn. 48

1863

Hozieb, H. M., Capt

The Employment of Cavalry in War . .

xn. 67

1872

» »f

The Breeding of Horses for Military
Purposes

xyi. 69

1872

Hull, T. A., Staff
Commander B.N.

Practical Nautical Surveying • .

xn. 69

1872

Hull, T. A., Staff
Commander B.N.
(Superintendent of
Charts, Admiralty)

The Unsurveyed World in 1874

xix. 80

1875

Hutchinson, W. N.,
Lieut.-Gfoneral

A Light Short Gun, throwing a Heavy,
Sharp - Edged, Discoidially - Formed
Projectile

xi. 43

1867

>* »

xin. 53

1869

Hutchinson, A. H.,
Major B. A.,
F.B.G.S., Ac.

Improved Instruments for Military
Sketching

xyii. 70

1873

Huyshe, Gh L., Capt.
Bine Brigade

The Bed Biver Expedition • .

xr. 62

1871

Hyde, J. M.. .

•

Deflecting Armour - Plated Ships for
Coast Defence

xin. 53

1869

Inolkfield, E. A.,
Capt. B.N., F.B.S.

Naval Tactics . . . .

xn. 51

1868

•

n »

Inglefield's New Hydraulic Steering
Apparatus, as being fitted to H.M.8.
« Achilles " '

xin. 53

1869

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Subject or Lecture ob Paper.

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Year.

1870

IVGLEFIBXD, E. A.,

Bear-Adml.,F.B.S.

Innes, Alex., Major
Aberdeen Artillery
Volunteers

Jambs, Win.; late
42nd Highlanders

Jakes, W. H., Lieut.
B.E., F.G.S.

Jektll, Herbert,
Lieut. B.E.

Jensen, Peter

Jbrtois, W. Drum-
mond, C.B., Col.
E.E., Deputy Di-
rector of Works for
Fortifications

Jones, Alfred S.,
I9.C«> Major, Adj.
Staff College, Sand-
hurst

Jones, Lieut.-Col.,
HJ.ff., Adjutant
Staff College, Sand-
hurst

Jones, E. M., Major
20th Regiment

Knollts, W. W.,
Major 93rd Highl.,
Garrison Instruc-
tor, Home District

Means of Screw-Ship Steerage, and a
Description of the Hydrostatic Steer-
ing Gear fitted on board H.M.S.
" Achilles," with the Results of Ex-
periments at Sea; also a Plan of
Apparatus fitted on board the Turkish
Ironclad " Fethi-Bulend "

Innes's Self- Acting Gun-Carriage, with
Elevating Mantelet

xir. 67

xix. 82

A Method of Converting the Regulation
Bell Tent into a Shelter Tent, with a
New Arrangement for Entrenching
Tools

Notes on Field Guns

The Destruction of Wrecks under Water

Steenstrup's Conical Screw and Breech-
Loading Cannon

Coast Defences, and the Application of
Iron to Fortifications

The Education of Staff Officers . .

Ride and Tie Patrolling, and Section-
Skirmishing

The Latest Changes made by the Prus-
sians in their Infantry Drill Book

xyi. 67

xx. 87

xiii. 55

xir. 67

xn. 52

xir. 59

xvi. 66

xvi. 68

Disembarkations (Lecture to Officers of
Volunteers)

1875

1872

1876

1869

1870

1868

1870

1872

Special No.

1873

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

Subject op Leotubb ob Pafbb.

Lacon, W. Stirling. .

VoLANo
of JournaL

>»

Lampeet, J., M.B.,
F.R.G.S., Surgeon
67th Begiment

Latham, John, F.S.A.

Laudbbdalb, Adml.
theEarlof,G.C.B.

Lauohton, J. K.,
M.A.,R.N., Mathe-
matical and Naval
Instructor, Royal
Naval College,
Greenwich

The Rule of the Road at Sea, or the
Steering and Sailing Rules

Lowering Boats at Sea

The Economy of the Chinese Army

The Progress of Breech-Loading Small

The Best Mode of Defence of the Pro-
tected Territories on the Gold Coast
of Africa, and the Organization of a
Forco Sufficient for that Purpose

xvi. 67

xtil 71
zi. 46

1872

1873
1867

1875

xyii. 74 1873

Ocean Currents

• • • •

xr. 65

Lbahy, Arthur, Major
R.E.

Leahy, Arthur,
Lieut-Col. R.E.

>»

»*

Lindsay, Charles,
Lieut R.N.

Li v ebay, R. A. E.,
Capt. R.E.

Loyd Lindsay, R.
J., fP.C, Lieut.-
Colonel, M.P.

Hie Scientific Study of Naval History . .

Scientific Instruction in the Navy

Army Organization : our Infantry Forces
and Infantry Reserves

The Organization of our Military Forces

Military Bridge Construction

Plan for Protecting Ships (at anchor)
Blockading a Port from Attacks by
Outrigger, Whitehead, or Harvey
Torpedoes

The New French Rifle

Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War . .

1871

xvra. 79
xix. 81

m. 50

XY. 63

XIX. 84

«
xrx. 82

xx. 86
xv. 64

1874
1875

1868

1871

1875
1875

1876
1871

IN1>EX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

LoHXEDr, Ludwig,
late Captain 1st
Baden Body Guard
Grenadier Regt.

Longmoee, T., C.B.,
M.D., Dep. I. G.
Hospitals

Lord, W. B. (h.p.),
BjL

Luard, C. E., Capt.
E.E.

Lumley, Henry,
Assoc. I.N.A.

Macbokald, J. D.,
M.D.,F.R.S.,R.N.,
Staff -Surgeon (Pro-
fessor of Naval
Hygiene, Army
Medical School,
Netley)

Mackay, James

Mack is, Samuel J.,
Assoc. Inst. C.E.

Subject of Lecture or Paper.

Campaign of 1870-71, Ac. — (Notice of
book)

The Genera Convention of 1864, in
Relation to Aid afforded by Volunteer
Societies to Sick and Wounded
Soldiers during the late Franco-
Prussian War, &c.

Description of a New Filter

Field Railways and their General Appli-
cation in War

Lumley's Patent Rudder

Ventilation of Ships, especially of Low
Freeboard and Hospital Ships

Maclean, W. C,
M.D., C.B., Sur-
geon-General (Pro-
fessor of Military
Medicine, Army
Medical School,
Netley)

Magombib, D. O.,
C.E.

Maorkgor, John,
M.A.

The Mackay Gun and Projectiles

The National Defences of Great Britain,
Especially with Reference to the
Future Requirement of Floating Forts

Summary of the Experiments at Shoe-
buryness during the year 1868-69

Sanitary Precautions to be Observed in
the Moving and Camping of Troops
in Tropical Regions, Ac.

The Macomber Gun

• » • •

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Year.

On Training Boys for Soldiers . .

xvi. 67

xti. 51

xvn. 74

xit. 67

xvm. 76

xii. 60
xn. 49

xih. 65

xtiii. 76

xix. 81

xix. 82

1876

1872

1868

1873

1870

1874

1868
1868

1869
1874

1875
1875

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name op Author.

Mainland, E., Major
R.A. (Assist. Sup.
Royal G-un Fac-
tories, Woolwich)

Majbxdib, V. D.,
Capt. R.A., Assist-
ant Superintendent
Royal Laboratory,
Woolwich

SUBJECT OF LbOTUBB OB PAPBB.

»1

Malkt, H., Lt.-CoL
Gren. Guards

Mabtiit, T., Lt.-Col.
(late 4th K. O. R.
Regiment)

Mabttni and Hotzb

Maurice, J. F., Lt.
R.A., Professor of
Tactics, R.M. Coll.,
Sandhurst

Maxwbll, H. H.,
Colonel R.A.

MlDDLETOH, F. D.,

Lt.-Col., Superin-
tending Officer of
Garrison Institu-
tions

Fog Signalling by Explosives . •

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

1875

Military Breech-Loading Small Arms .

The Martini-Henry Rifle
Our Reserve Forces

Ammunition Supply Car, Skeleton Am-
munition Car, Packing Ammunition,
&c.

The Swiss Military System

The Connection between the Ordinary
Work of Soldiers in Peace-Time and
Warlike Efficiency (Lecture to
Officers of Volunteers)

XI. 44

xin. 55
xiii. 54

xin. 55

1867

The Field Gun for India.

The Education of the Army with Re-
ference to Young Officers

xv. 64

1869
1869

1869

1871

Special No. 1873

xrv. 58

1870

Moncrieff, Alexan-
der, Captain Edin-
burgh Artillery
Militia

Moncbiefp, Alexan-
der, Major, F.R.S.

Changes of Tactics consequent on the
Improvement of Weapons, &c. (Lec-
ture to Officers of Volunteers)

Further Particulars Regarding Mon-
crieff's Protected Barbette System

The Progress that has been made in the
Application of the Moncricff System
to Garrison, Siege, and Naval Ord-
nance, and to Coast Works

Further Observations on the Moncrieff
System of Mounting Ordnance

On Harbour Defence

xv. 65 1871

Special No. 1873

XI, 41 1867

xrr. 59

1870

XTTi. 74 I 1873

xix. 81

1875

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Najie of Authob.

Subject of Lecture ob Fapeb.

Moore, Arthur, Lieut
R.N.

Moore, Sandford,
Surgeon, M.B.,
F.S.S. (Instructor,
Army Hospital
Corps)

Morgan, J. P., Capt.
R.A.

Morgan, J. P., Major
R. A.. (Assist.Super.
Rojal Gunpowder
Factory, Waltham
Abbey)

Proposed Plan of Canvas Pontoons to be
made out of Ships' Stores

Assistance to the Wounded in Time of
War

A Proposal for a very Heavy Breech-
Loading Gun of Novel Construction

The Determination of the Explosive
Force of Gunpowder

Rifling for Heavy Guns

Recent Improvements in the Manufac-
ture of Pebble Powder

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Year.

MORIARTT, H. A.,

C.B., Staff -Com-
mander R.N.

Mouat, F. J., Sur-
geon-Major, M.D.,
r .K.Co.

Murray, Andrew,
C.B.

Napier, the late Sir
Chas. J., G.C.B.,
Lt.-Gen.

Newdigate, E., CoL

Nicomoit, Sir Fredk.
vf. £., Bart., C*B.,
"Vice- Admiral

Breech-Loading and Muzzle-Loading for
Guns

Some Special Features in Large and
Small Grain Powders

The Atlantic Telegraph Cables of 1857-
68, also those of 1865-66

A Visit to Some of the Battle Fields and
Ambulances of the North of France

The Turbine Propeller

xiy. 60

XT. 64

xvti. 74
xyhi. 77

1875
1876

1870
1871

1873
1874

xviii. 78

XI. 44

XT. 64

XT. 65

Note on the Battle of Thrasymene

Prussian Drill, 1876

A Few Notes on Captain Dyer's Paper.—
(See Dtbb)

1874

1876

1867

1871

xTin. 78

88
xv ui. 77

1874

1876
1874

INDEX OP AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

Subject op Lectube ob Papeb.

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

■ Tear.

Noake, R. C, Capt.
and Adj. Scottish
Borderers Militia

The Best Mode of Recruiting for the
Army, and the Influences bearing
upon that Service

XI. 43

1867

Noel, Gerard H. U.,
Comr. R.N.

The Best Types of War Vessels for the
British Navy. — (The Naval Prize
Essay, 1876)

xx. 86

1876

Nolan, John Philip,
Capt. R.A.

Ranges and Nolan's Range Finder

xrr. 57

1870

O'Hba, J. B., Capt.
late 25th Regt.

Cartridges for Breech-Loading Small
Arms, and the Best Form of Projectile

xii. 48

1868

» »>

xvii. 72

1873

Obdb-Bbowhb, C,
Capt. late R.A.

Firing at Armour Clads reduced to a
System

xn. 69

1872

Otttey, H. A., Col.
C.B.

A Review of the Improvements in
Military Tactics and Formation in
Germany during the last year (1873),
being a precis of an Article from the
"Militaire Wochenblatt"

xyiii. 78

1874

Owsir, 0. H., Lieut.-
CoLRJL

Modern Artillery, as exhibited at Paris
in 1867

Xll. 48

1868

Pallibbb, William,
Maj. (unattached),
late 18th Hussars

The Conversion and Rifling of Cast-Iron
Ordnance and ou Chilled White Iron
Projectiles

XI. 44

1867

>» »

The Construction of Heavy Rifled Ord-
nance

xn. 50

1868

Pabkbb-Rhodes, C.
E.

Pai ker-Rhodes's Military Boot

xyi. 69

1872

Pabkeb, F. G. S.,
Capt. 54th Regt.

Proposed Method of Attack in Skirmish-
ing Line

xvii. 74

1873

Pabkyks, Mansfield

Abyssinia .. . . . .

xn. 51

1868

Patnteb, J. Aylmer,
Rear- Admiral

A New Adaptation of Screw Propulsion

xyiii. 79

1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authoe.

Pbllew, Pownoll W.,
Commander R.N.

Phelps, Charles

Pick, Dr. B.

Pole, Professor W.,
F.R.S., M.I.C.E.

Poobe, F. H., Capt.
R.M.A.

Pbatt, S. G, Lieut.
R.A.

Pbidbaux, T. Symes,
C.E.

pBJTCHABD,H.Baden,
Chemical Depart-
ment, Roy. Arsenal,
Woolwich

Quick, Geo., Engineer
R.N.

Raises, G. A., Capt.
3rd W. Y. L. I.
Militia

Rankixb, Professor
W. J. Macquorn,
CE.,LLD.,F.R.S.
&c.

Rawbojt, II. E., Lieut
R.E.

Read, George, R.N.

Subject of Lectube ob Pafeb.

Fleet Manoeuvring

Description of Mont Storm's Breech-
Loading 9-pounder Field or Pinnace
Gun

A New Method of Improving the
Memory and Facilitating the Acquire-
ment of Knowledge

The Modes of Determining the Accuracy
of Artillery

Target for Eve-Training

The Constitution and Duties of the
Artillery of the Advanced Guard of
an Army in the Field — (The R. A.
Institution Prize Essay of 1874)

Economy of Fuel in Ships of War

The Application of Photography to
Military Purposes

Proposed New Combination of Pro-
pellers for Ships of War

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

XI. 47
xiy. 5

XI. 48

XI. 43
xvii. 72
xvin. 79

xn. 68

xm. 65

xx. 86

»•

Historical Records of the First Regiment
of Militia or 3rd W. Y. L. Infantry—
(Notice of Book)

The Economy of Fuel, Comprising
Mineral Oils

The German Railway Regiment. .

Helm-Indicator for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea ' ,

Apparatus for Light Vessels, Tidal
Harbours, &c.

XX. 88

XI. 44

xx. 88

xn. 48

xn. 48
E '1

Year.

1870
1867

1867

1867
1873
1874

1872

1869

1876

1867

1876

18f>8

1S(U

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

NAMB 07 AUTHOE.

Rbad, George, E.N.

Bbddix, J., Account-
ant-General's De-
partment, Admi-
ralty

Ebdman, J. Baldrj,
M.I.C.E., F.R.G.S.

Bbbd, E. J., C.B.,
M.P.

Rbttmb, G. B.,
M.I.C.E.

Biohabds, J. C, Staff
Commander R.N.

BOBBBTSON, A.

Cunningham, Col.
Commanding 2nd
Batt. 8th or King's
Begt.

Sttbjbot op Leotube ob Papbb.

Bead and Nicholl's Patent Bay and
Night Helm -Signals for Preventing
Collisions at Sea

Manning the Navy

BOBBBTSON-BOSB, P.,

Colonel

Rogbbs, J. B.

Bogbbs, E., Captain,
F.R.G.S.

Ross, Major W. H.,
BJL

Bobs op Bladbnb-
bbbg-, John, Cold-
stream Guards

The Proposed Enclosure of Dover Bay ;
Review of Designs, and Historical
Essay on the Harbour

Circular Ironclads • • • .

The Comparative Merits of Simple and
Compound Engines

Fog Signals for Vessels under Weigh . .

The Appointment and Promotion of
Regimental Officers

VoL & No.

of Journal.

xn. 69

The Constitution of our Military Forces
and the Conditions of Military Service

Report of a Reconnaissance of the North-
West Provinces and Indian Territories
of the Dominion of Canada, and
Narrative of a Journey Across the
Continent through Canadian Territory
to British Columbia and Vancouver's
Island

Rogers's Lif e»Saving Apparatus

The Gatling Gun ; its Place in Tactics. .

Field Artillery on the Connected System

The Cultivation of Scientific Knowledge
by Regimental Officers of the British

Army

Maritime Bights

XI. 45

xix. 83

xx. 83

xix. 80

xix. 82

xn. 49

Tear.

nil. 66
xyii. 74

xit. 67
xix. 82

xn. 48

xn. 69

1872

1867

1873

1876
1875
1875
1868

1869

1873

1870
1875

18**

1ST::

xx. 87 J 1S76
I

INDEX OF AUTHOB8.

Name of Author.

Bussbli<, John Scott,
F.B.8.

Bussbxl, Frank S.,
Major 14th Hus.

Btdbb, A. P., Bear-
Admiral

Subject of Lbctubs ob Paper.

Naval Great Guns and Gunnery

Cavalry

»»

Bydkb, A. P., Vice-
Admiral

Schaw, H., Gapt.
R.E., Professor of
Fortification and
Artillery, Staff
College, Sandhurst

Schaw, H., Lieut.-
CoL B.£.} Ac. Ac.

SCH5ACKBNBTTBG,

Captain

SCHOXBBBG, G. B.,

Major - General,
C.B., B.M.A.

800TT, Robert H.,
Director of the Me-
teorological Office

Forms for Jtegiajbering the Angles of
Boiling and Heeling for the Infor-
mation of the Construction Depart-
ment of the Admiralty

The Naval Hammock, its Buoyancy and
Use in Saving Life at Sea in Cases of
Collision, Ac.

The Higher Education of Naval Officers

Extracts from the four last Chapters of
Admiral Jurien de la Gravieres Work

H. M. S. " Victor Emanuel " as an
Hospital Ship during the late Ashantee
Campaign

A Statement to Accompany the Russian
Bamming Diagrams Presented by him
to the Institution

Vol k No.

of Journal

in. 82

xv. 62

XT. 62

Year.

1875

1876

1871

xv. 65

xvii. 72

xviii. 78
xviii. 79

1871

1871
1873

1874
1874

The Amount of Advantage which the
New Arms of Precision give to the
Defence over the Attack

Field Engineering, Illustrated by some of
the Operations of the German Engi-
neers during the War of 1870-71

Leitfaden fur den Unterricht in der
Dienstkenntniss auf den KOniglichen
Xriegsschulen — (Notice of book)

Are the Royal Marines a Necessary
Auxiliary to the Royal Navy ?

Storms in the British Islands, and Tele-
graphic Weather Intelligence

xiv. 59

1870

xviii. 76

1874

xx. 88 1876

xv. 64

XIII. 54 1869

1871

K 3

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Attthob.

Subject of Lecttjbe ob Papeb.

Vol. & No. j Yea*
of Journal.

Scott, R. A. E., Capt.
R.N.

Seccombe, E. (Ad-
miralty)

Skxwyn, Captain J.
H., R.^i.

»»

Shakpe, Benjamin,
Commander (ret.)
R.N.

Shobtland, P. F.,
LL.D., Capt. R.N.

Shuts, C. Cameron,
Colonel, C.B.

»»

Simpson, C. H., Capt.
R.N.

»»

>»

Skinner, Major-
General, C.B.

Sloane, Captain,
Sherwood Foresters
Militia

Smith, Michael W.,
Major-Genl. C.B.

Smith, Henry

The Maritime Defence of England, in-
cluding Offensive and Defensive War-
fare : — Part I. The Organization of
our Maritime Forces. # Part II. Our
Ships of War, tlieir Armament, &c.

The Preservation of Biscuit and other
Farinaceous Articles of Diet in H.M.
Navy from Weevil, Maggots, and
o . her Insects

Breech - Loaders, with Reference to
Calibre, Supply, and Cost of Ammu-
nition

Further Information on the Employment
of Mineral Oils as Fuel for Steam
Ships

The True Economies of England's Naval
Power %

The Revolving System of Firing Great
Guns

Economy of Coal as Viewed by the
Commander of a Steam Vessel

Military Maxims Suggested or Exempli-
fied bv the last Autumn Manoeuvres of
Continental Armies

A Memorandum on Mitrailleurs. .

Plan of Sustaining and Lowering Ship's
Quarter Boats

A New Mode of Marine Propulsion

A Cylindrical Propeller Working on a
Vertical Shaft in the Midship Section
of a Ship

Utilization of the Soldiers' Unemployed
Time : A Proposed Scheme Inde-
pendent of Government Supply j also
a Plan for Regimental Charities

Cavalry: How far its Employment is
A-ffected by Recent Improvements in
inn b of Precision

Lite-Saving Bed or Mattrass

xx. 87

1876

xix. 83

1875

XI. 43

xii. 48

XT. 63

xni. 56

xviii. 76

xvi. 66
xi. 47

xi. 47
xiv. 58

xii. 48

xn. 49

xni. 54

1867

1868

1871
1869

1S74

xiv. 58 1870

1872
1867

1867

1870

1868

1S6S

1869

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name op Authoe.

Smith, R. Murdoch,
Captain R. E.,
F.R.G.S., Ac.

Soady, F. J., Lieut.-
Colonel R.A.

SAbbnsrn, John

Stoke, C. P., Lieut.
77th Regiment

Stowbt, F. S., Capt.
R.A., Assist. Super-
intendent Royal
Qun Factories,
Woolwich

Stothebd, R. H.,
Capt. R.E., In-
structor in Tele-
graphy, School of
Military Engineer-
ing, Chatham

Stothebd, R. H.,
Major RE., In-
structor in Tele-
Saphy, School of
ihtary Engineer-
ing, Chatham

8t bangs, T. B., Capt.
R.A.

Stbangb, Alex., Lt.-
Colonel, F.R.S.

*»

»»

Sttabt, Graham,
Capt. 4th W. Y.
Artil. Volunteers

Svmokds, T. £.,
Captain R.N.

Syxgb, Millington,
Major-Gen. R.E.

Subject of Leotubb ob Paper.

The Strategy of Russia in Central Asia,
from a Persian Point of View

Observation on the Defence of England

Sdrensen's Norwegian Self -Acting Cook-
ing Apparatus

Elevating Gun Platform . .

• •

The Progress of our Heavy Ordnance,
and the Principles and Progress of its
Construction

Military Telegraphy and Signalling

On Defensive Submarine Warfare

Practical Artillery

The Necessity for a Permanent Com-
mission on State Scientific Questions

A Proposed Method of Mounting Heavy
Ordnance at Sea on the Principle of
the Bessemer Saloon

Stuart's Breech-Loading Cannon

The Combined End-on and Broadside
System

Suggested Improvements in Sanitary
Arrangements of Hospitals, Barracks,
Camps, and Shipping, Ac.

Vol. & No
of Journal.

xvii. 71

xit. 61

XII.

1868

XIII.

1869

XIV.

1870

xiv. 59

xv. 65

xv. 63

xv. 64

xvh. 75

xiv. 57

xi. 46
xviii. 78

Year.

1873

1870

1871

1871
1871
1873

1870

1867
1874

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Namb o? Authob,

Subject OF LBcnrsx OB Papbb.

VoL k No

of Journal.

&BAYBB, JL 0., M.D.

Tkbsi&kb, Hon. Fre-
deric, Col., O.B.|
A. D. C. to the
Queen

Thomas, W. Cave,
late Captain 19th
Middlesex Rifle
Volunteers

Totnbbb, H., Capt.,
F.R.A.S.

Totnbbb, H., Capt.,
F.R.A.S. (Marine
Superintendent,
Meteorological
Office, Board of
Trade)

Totnbbb, Mrs.

Proposed Alterations in the Martinl-
Henry Rifle

Is a Radical Change in the Tactical For-
mation of our Infantry Really Neces-
sary?

The Establishment of County Military
Training Schools ; a Suggestion for
Improving the Recruiting System

The Winds of the North Atlantic

The Meteorology, Sea Temperature, and
Currents of the 10° square of the
Atlantic which lies between the Equa-
tor and 10* N., and from 2CT to
80° W.

Delineation of some Minute Sea Surface
AnimftU (Coloured Drawings), Fart I.

Tbench, F. Chenevix,
Capt. 20th Hussars,
F.R.G.S.

Tulloch, Alexander
B., Captain 09th
Regiment

„ n.
» in.

,, IT.

The Central Asian Question

xix. 83
xvn. 78

xiii. 54

xt. 64

xyii. 72

1875
1878

1869

1871

1878

xix. 80 ! 1875

Trass, E. S., Major
R.R.

The late Russian Campaign against Khiva

The Protection of London against an
Invading Force Landing on the East
Coast

Suggestions for a Shelter Tent

The Education and Professional Instruc-
tion of Officers

The New Works for the Defence of
Paris

xix. 81

xix. 82

xix. 88

xvn. 71

xtiii. 77
xiv. 59

xvn. 70
xvn. 75

xix. 80

1875
1875
1875
1873

1874
1870

1873
1873

1S75

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Author.

Van Metdkn, Aloys.,
Capt. d'Artillerie,
Lausanne

Vattqhan", J. L.,
C.B., Maj .-General

Vincent, 0. E. H.,
Lieut. 23rd Royal
Welsh Fusiliers

Subject of Lectusb ok Paper.

»>

Sut la Dispersion Naturelle des Pro-
jectiles et la Loi de Erreurs — (Notice
of Book)

The Retreat of the Ten Thousand; a
Military Study for all Time

The Austrian Confidential Report, and
New Method of Promotion

Vol. & No.
of Journal,

Year.

The Russian Army

Vincent, C. E.
Lieut.-Col. Central
London Rifle Ran-
gers

Voh Schmidt, Maj.-
General

Waxkbb, Arthur,
Captain (temp,
h.p.), 79th High-
landers

Walker, Beau-
champ, C.B., Col.,
Military Attache1,
Berlin

Walker, Beauchamp
Major-Gen., Mili-
tary Attache1, Berlin

A Brief Sketch of the SyBtem of Officer-
ing the Prussian Army

The Austrian Army • .

The Armed Strength of Europe

The Turkish Forces and the Military
Aspects of the Eastern Question

The Military Resources of Holland

Instructions for the Cavalry Regiments
about to take part in the Exercises
of the Combined Cavalry Division
detailed from Regiments. Translated
by* Major-General Walker— (Notice
of Book)

xx. 87
xx. 86

The Dress and Equipment of the Army

The Battle of Koniggratz

The Position and Lines of Defence of
the 5th Corps before Versailles during
the Winter of 1870-71

XI. 45

xil. 51

xt. 65

1876

XYIII.

1874

XTI.

1872

XYI.

1872

XTI.

1872

XTII.

1873

XIX.

1875

XX.

1876

1876
1876

1867

1868

1871

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Walk eb, Beauchamp,
Major-Gen., Mili*
taryAttach6, Berlin

Wabde, Sir Edward
C., K.C.B., Major-
General R.A.

Wabbe, the Rev. Ed-
mond, M.A. (Eton
College)

Wabben, Frederick,
Commander R.N.

Waveney, Col. Lord,
F.R.S., A.D.C. to
the Queen

Webbbb, C. E., Capt.
R.E.

Wheatlet, John,
Captain R.N.

White, Wm., F.S.A.

WlLBBAHAH, Sir

Richard, Lieut. -
General, K.C.B.

Williams, W. J.,
Colonel R.A.

Wilsoit, Edmund,
Captain R.N.

Subject of Lecture ob Papeb.

j»

>»

WiLBOW,C.W.,Capt.
R. E., Director
Topographical and
Statistical Depart-
ment, War Office

Wilson, J. C, Capt.
R.N.

Outpost Duty

On the Best Practicable Method for En-
suring Efficiency in the Army and for
Obtaining an Effective and Reliable
Reserve, having Regard to the Existing
Feeling in the Country on the Subject

Ancient Naval Tactics

Cooking for Troops

The Italian Army.

Military Labour

A New Form of Ironclad Ship of War

White's Porte-Knapsack

A Sketch of the Russo-Turkish Cam-
paigns of 1823-29 in Europe and
Asia

Infantry Tactics

Description of a Model of an Armour-
Plated Ship designed by him . .

Working Heavy Guns on the Broadside,
with some Observations on the All-
Round Fire, combined with the
Broadside System of Armament

English and Foreign Maps and their
Use for Military Purposes

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

Notes on Mops (Lecture to Officers
of Volunteers)

Seamen of the Fleet; their Training,
and how the Employment of Marines
Afloat in Peace Time affects them

xr. 65

xix. 80

xx. 88

xn. 49

xx. 86

xit. 67

xv. 64

XYI.

69
88

xn. 69

xii. 51

xin. 58

xn. 67

Special No.

xix. 83

Year.

1871

187;

1876

1868
1876

1870

1871

1872
1876

1872
1868
1869

1872

1873

1875

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

Name of Authob.

Wilson, J. C, Capt.
R.N.

Winofield, F., Dep.
Assistant Commis-
sary General

Wood, Evelyn, Col.,
V.C, C.B., 90th
Regiment

Wyatt, Surgeon-
Major, Coldstream
Guards, F.R.C.S.,
&c.

Subject of Lectube ob Papeb.

Is our Merchant Service any Longer a
Feeder to the Royal Nayy ?

Military Transport

The Auhanti Expedition of 1873

Mounted Riflemen (Lecture to Officers
of Volunteers)

Personal Experiences and Reminiscences
of the Siege of Paris

Vol. & No.
of Journal.

xx. 85
xiii. 54

xtiii. 78

Special No.
xvn. 71

Year.

1876
1869

1874

1873
1873

' r

W-4

LONDON :
HABBIBON AND 801TB, PBENTEBS IN OBDINABY TO HEB 1CAJBSTT,

BT. MABTIN'B LAJTB

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